North American Philosophical Publications

The Myth of Protagoras and Plato's Theory of Measurement

Author(s): Oded Balaban
Source: History of Philosophy Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 4 (Oct., 1987), pp. 371-384
Published by: University of Illinois Press on behalf of North American Philosophical
Publications
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27743826
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 History of Philosophy Quarterly
Volume 4, Number 4, October 1987

THE MYTH OF PROTAGORAS AND

PLATO'S THEORY OF MEASUREMENT
Oded Balaban

TWO principal issues

between Plato's have to attitudes.
and Protagoras's be considered in elucidating
The first concerns the the difference
question of whether virtue is teachable. The second has to do with the
unity of virtues. Both issues are connected with Plato's well-known asser
tion that virtue (?peTf|) is knowledge (?mo-TfifiT)). Plato and Protagoras
adopt different attitudes. Plato considers that virtue is teachable because
it is knowledge; that is to say, there is a knowable content that is virtue.1
The logical upshot of Protagoras's thinking is that virtue is different from
knowledge (Prot. 361b 4). However this does not imply for him that virtue
is unteachable. Thus, according to Plato, education is possible only if
there exists a knowable content and a unity of virtues achieved by means
of knowledge; whereas for Protagoras, political education can be pursued
even though virtue is not knowledge and there is no unity among virtues.

Socrates begins his discussion with Protagoras by raising two objections

to the sophist's claim of being able to teach political virtue. Firstly, if
virtue were teachable, then the task of teaching it would have to be
reserved for experts. But this is intolerable for Athenians, who allow
everyone to express his opinion in political matters (cf. Prot. 319 b-d).
Hence Athenians regard virtue as being unteachable. Secondly, Socrates
argues that if virtue were teachable, then outstanding statesmen like
Pericles would teach it to their sons. But they evidently do not do so, and
we can therefore conclude, again, that virtue is not teachable (Prot. 319e
320b). Protagoras meets these objections in two stages: he responds to
the first with the myth of the birth of culture, and to the second by
reasoned argument.2 According to Protagoras, the fact that Athenians
allow everyone to express his opinion in politics actually demonstrates
the opposite of what Socrates contends. It shows that virtue is teachable.
Political virtue cannot in fact be taught to any creature other than man.
It can be taught only to those who have the capacity to be taught, and it
is this capacity which defines human beings as being educable.3 What
this means is that human nature determines the limits of all possible
kinds of education. Thus Protagoras grasps Socrates' question in a very
different way from that intended by the philosopher. What Socrates meant
to ask was if it is possible for someone to be a teacher of virtue. Protagoras
however understands the question to be about whether it is possible for

371

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372 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY

someone to be a pupil of virtue. And in order to offer a complete exposition

of the nature of the pupil of virtue (i.e., of the nature of man), Protagoras
tells his own version of the myth of the birth of culture, in which three
distinct and even antagonistic types of human skill and activity are per
sonified by three figures: Epimetheus, Prometheus, and Zeus (Prot. 320d
323c).

I. The Myth of Protagoras

Protagoras tells of how Prometheus and Epimetheus were charged by

Zeus with the task of distributing among all mortal species the powers
they needed in order to survive. Epimetheus then besought Prometheus
to allow him to make the distribution, saying to his brother, "When I
have dealt you shall examine" (Prot. 320d).4 And having received permis
sion, he proceeded with his work, giving wings or speed to small creatures
so they could escape from the large ones (Prot. 320e) making those who
fed on plants more fertile and numerous than predators (Prot. 321b), and
so on. Thus he continued distributing powers to the creatures of the world,
dealing with each species separately and in its turn, until at last, when
man's turn came, Epimetheus had imprudently exhausted his entire stock
of powers and had nothing left for the human race (Prot. 321c). So there
was man, who alone among mortal creatures was left entirely defenseless.
Epimetheus was at a loss. But then Prometheus returned and, being
considerably more astute than his brother and greatly concerned about
man's future, decided to steal on man's behalf wisdom in the arts from
Athena, and fire from Hephaestus (Prot. 321e). These powers were given
to the human species as a substitute for the natural Epimethean powers
so as to ensure man's survival.
Nevertheless men remained relatively weak, inasmuch as the powers
they possessed were insufficient to allow them to live in society. Being
without political skill, they could not even defend themselves in their
struggle with wild beasts. And although they tried to join together to
build cities, they failed in their efforts, and ended up hurting one another
and eventually dispersing once again (Prot. 322b). It was at this stage
that Zeus appeared and, concerned with the well-being of the whole
species, and not merely with that of the individuals of the race,5 he
commanded Hermes to equip mankind with two additional powers: a
sense of justice and of shame (8?kt]v kol? af?o>). These would establish
harmony among men. Hermes then asked if these capacities should be
distributed variously, like technical wisdom, of which different indi
viduals possess different parts, or to all men alike; in other words, should
there be specialists in shame and justice, or should all men share equally
in them. Zeus replied that everyone should have an equal share in these
virtues (Prot. 322d).

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 PROTAGORAS AND PLATO 373

II. The Interpretation of the Myth

1. The Epimethean Principle

Assuming, then, that the deities of the myth represent human

capacities, we can proceed to interpret the specific kinds of human skill
or differentiated human activity that each of them personifies.
It can be asserted that, strictly speaking, Epimetheus does not work?at
least not in the sense of going about something efficiently and according
to plan. He neither knows nor is he interested in knowing how many
powers he has in stock, or if there are enough of them to go around; and
he has no idea of how many species are waiting in line to be served: he
makes no inventory of his stock and keeps no files on his clients. Thus,
the principle by which Epimetheus first equips predators with sharp teeth
and talons, and then compensates their prey by giving them swiftness to
escape, is not the result of any master plan but emerges as a consequence
of his having run out of his supply of teeth and talons. Therefore when
his labors are judged by the standards of an efficient worker like Prom
etheus, he must necessarily be found wanting. We can think of him as
the god of consumption or of present-oriented activity (in contrast to
Prometheus as the god of production, or future-oriented activity). Epime
thean activity is not instrumental; it is not a means for the achievement
of an end different from itself, but rather an activity oriented toward a
particular object of interest.
The standard by which the activity of Epimetheus must be judged is
that of the logic of immediate pleasure. Epimetheus symbolizes the
pleasure principle. Thus Epimetheus personifies instinctive drives, or
those activities that are motivated by impulse and appetite. Epimetheus
never gives up a present pleasure for the sake of a future one, since doing
so would mean foregoing a pleasurable activity. Also, the duration of an
activity is completely irrelevant. But in the event that Epimetheus does
pay attention to duration because what he is doing is pleasant, he prefers
that the action continue indefinitely. Satisfaction of a need, either phys
ical or spiritual, is a good example of Epimethean activity. However, as
we shall see, the Epimethean attitude is not hedonistic in the sense of
reducing good to pleasure. The pleasure he derives from an activity cannot
be quantified and therefore cannot be compared with the pleasure
inherent in another activity; pleasures are qualitatively different from
one another and are irreducible to a quantitative common denominator.
Hence Plato's theory of measurement is completely irrelevant to his way
of thinking and incomprehensible to him. So for example, to employ
pleasure-units in order to compare and choose among pleasures is to apply
a non-Epimethean criterion to activity.

2. The Promethean Principle

Prometheus, the brother of Epimetheus, personifies a different kind of
human activity. As his name suggests ("Forethought"), Prometheus rep

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374 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY

resents purposeful activity in which there is a clear differentiation

between means and ends. He can be defined as the god of production (as
opposed to Epimetheus as the god of consumption). Promethean activity
is instrumental; it is a means to an end different from itself.
The emphasis in Promethean activity is neither on the activity itself
nor on the object used in it. Physical or spiritual labor are instances of
Promethean activity. Benefit, utility and efficiency are the values that
best characterize it; the main thing in this sort of activity is the result
and not the act. The act in itself being a means, it has no intrinsic value.
If the end can be achieved by other means that are more efficient, then
present means are given up for the new means. Since Promethean activity
is focused on its consequences, and since its end is not present in the
activity itself but transcends it, the duration of the activity has only a
negative meaning because what is required is that the duration of the
activity be minimized. The Promethean ambition is to annul the time
invested in production. This kind of activity is in itself not pleasurable
but entails a sacrifice for the sake of the end. Indeed the capacity for
self-sacrifice is the pre-eminent Promethean faculty; without it there
could be neither technology nor production. Strictly speaking, Prometheus
is never interested in what he does but in the future, in the result. He
symbolizes a morality of ends and results. An activity is good in the
degree that it contributes to the achievement and creation of the end.
The standard by which his activity must be measured is success or
failure in achieving the end. Prometheus sacrifices the present in behalf
of the future. Every quality becomes in his eyes something measurable
and quantitatively comparable to every other thing; quality is reduced
by him to quantitative units. This is the attitude of the producer or
tradesman, for whom products and merchandise have value only insofar
as they can be translated into numerical units?i.e., money. Merchandise
has a different value for the seller and the buyer; for the seller it has a
Promethean value, and for the buyer an Epimethean value (unless of
course he buys for the purpose of selling). For the seller, quality is a
means for achieving quantitative value. For the buyer, the translation
into quantitative units is a means for establishing the quality of the
object, or its capacity to satisfy a particular need. As we shall see, Plato's
theory of measurement is compatible with the quantitative logic of Prom
etheus.
We may ask why Prometheus should have given to mankind the par
ticular gifts of skill in the crafts and of fire. This was not a casual choice.
Technical activity is measured by the criterion of specialization. Techne
is a kind of poesis; and poesis, as defined by Aristotle, is an activity
undertaken for the sake of the end (Eth. Nie. 1140 b) and is therefore
without intrinsic value. For this reason Aristotle called it "ignoble" (Pol.
1328 b).6 Prometheus is ignoble to the point of being prepared even to
steal for the sake of the end (Prot. 32le). From his point of view, all
means are morally valid. The need for specialization in technical activity

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 PROTAGORAS AND PLATO 375

has to do with the means. An expert knows which means are necessary
to achieve a particular end. The crafts and arts are the means of existence
but never its ends. Techne is a teleological activity of which the end
always becomes a means for another end, and so on ad infinitum. The
activity of Prometheus is therefore teleological but without a telos, for
which there can be no more fitting punishment than that meted out to
him by Zeus, who sets a vulture to devour his bowels, the devoured part
being constantly renewed so that his torment should be without end.

3. The Zeus Principle

According to the Myth, mankind furnished merely with technical skill

and Epimethean impulses cannot survive. In other words, the human
condition cannot be explained as originating solely in man's instincts
and technology. These alone cannot account for human beings coexisting
in a state of harmony and mutual cooperation. Epimethean impulses are
incapable of creating society, since they allow for no consideration of the
needs of one's neighbor; desires recognize no limits. The same may be
said of Promethean reasoning. From a Promethean point of view, one's
neighbor is always a means to be exploited for the sake of an end. Hobbes'
view that force and mutual fear are the grounds of political existence is
based on the Promethean principle.
According to the myth, however, politics is not?indeed cannot be?an
issue for Promethean specialists; a society grounded solely on fear, coer
cion and mutual exploitation is inconceivable. What man requires, there
fore, are faculties other than those deriving from Epimetheus and Prom
etheus. These are provided by Zeus through Hermes, and consist of shame
and justice. Zeus's choice of these particular powers was not accidental:
shame is anti-Epimethean and functions to restrain Epimethean urges;
and justice is anti-Promethean, acting as a brake on the Promethean
avidity for the end. Shame and justice represent the concern of Zeus for
the human race as a whole, rather than for each member of the species
individually. To Hermes' question about whether these faculties should
be distributed in the same manner as are skills in the arts, Zeus answers
that they must be allotted in such a way that they may be shared equally
by all men: in other words, there can be no specialists in political matters.
Hence politics is not to be regarded as an art or technical skill, but as
an end in itself. The value that best characterizes the sort of activity
associated with Zeus is that of the good. This is an intrinsic and not a
transcendent value. In the myth, Zeus is the symbol of morality and,
being the supreme god and king of the world, he is concerned with the
activity no less than with its end.
So interpreted, the myth of Protagoras does not present the structure
of the human soul as consisting in a harmonic totality in which there is
a well-defined hierarchy of values, but describes men as a being in conflict
with both themselves and their neighbors. According to the myth, rather

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376 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY

than there being only one kind of reasoning, such as the instrumental
reasoning of Prometheus, there are at least three kinds of reasoning
based on three kinds of values: that of pleasure, that of utility or advan
tage, and that of morality. The theoretical advantage of this model is
that, although an activity undertaken on the basis of one type of reasoning
can be in harmony with the values associated with the other two types
of reasoning, it can also be in contradiction with them, so that the different
principles may be clearly distinguished. Thus an act may give pleasure
but be detrimental to the end and immoral; or it may be useful in regard
to the end but immoral and painful; or, finally, it may be moral but
detrimental to the end and painful. What this means is that there is no
harmony between good, pleasure and advantage. None of these values
can be reduced to the others. Hence if men are considered to be means,
they cannot at the same time and from the same point of view be consi
dered as ends. If an act is pleasant, it cannot at the same time and from
the same point of view be regarded as advantageous. For one tries to
reduce the duration of an activity intended to gain an advantage; whereas
in the case of pleasurable actions one tries to prolong their duration, or
time is irrelevant to them.7 According to Protagoras, the lives of men
require their constantly having to compromise among their diverse values
and inclinations. So, it is quite possible for a moral act also to be beneficial
and pleasant. But for the purpose of understanding the conflict proposed
in the myth, we need only consider that there is a possibility of a good
action being in conflict with the principles of benefit and pleasure.
Hence the myth of Protagoras has a twofold purpose: to answer Socrates'
question of whether virtue is teachable; and to provide the basis for
Protagoras's argument against the idea of unity and harmony among the
virtues. The Protagorean myth is therefore crucial for the purpose of
understanding the entire dialogue.

III. Virtue as Knowledge and the Knowledge of Virtue

According to Socrates virtue is teachable if and only if it is knowledge;

and virtue is knowledge if and only if there is a unity among its various
parts?i.e., if the different virtues are all reducible to knowledge (cf.,
Prot. 329c-334c, 349b-350c). Thus, knowledge being the criterion of virtue,
it is in all of its varying degrees?ranging from total ignorance to perfect
knowledge?the only motive and the only reason of human activity.8 On
the other hand, Protagoras considers that virtue is teachable without
necessarily being knowledge. The virtues have an autonomous existence,
and it is therefore impossible to speak of degrees of knowledge, since to
assume degrees would mean to assume the existence of an absolute truth
that is a criterion of knowledge. Rather, the opposite is the case. According
to Protagoras there are a variety of values and a variety of truths: Epimet
hean, Promethean, and Zeusian values and truths. The truth of
Epimetheus is determined by pleasure; that of Prometheus by results;
and that of Zeus by moral good. Virtues are not one in concept and many

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 PROTAGORAS AND PLATO 377

in number, but are qualitatively different from one another. So, for exam
ple, Protagoras argues that it is possible for unjust persons to be courage
ous; in other words that there can be a conflict between Epimethean
motives such as courage and Zeusian motives such as justice (see Prot.
349d). Therefore, according to Protagoras, knowledge must be this con
sciousness of the differences among virtues and motives. But for Plato,
knowledge has a very different meaning, as we shall presently see.
Once it is made clear that knowledge is always knowledge of its object?
the discussion between Protagoras and Socrates can be understood as
being about what this object of knowledge consists of. For Socrates what
is known in knowledge is the content, or the external reality to which
knowledge refers. This reality determines knowledge. That is, knowledge
can be true or false. It is true if it reflects reality like a mirror; and it is
false if it does not. What cannot be taken as a reflection of reality is not
to be considered true knowledge. The interference of subjective motives,
drives, and interests is considered by Socrates as false knowledge. It is
false knowledge because subjective motives, drives, and interests are not
determined by the reflected content but are rather determinants of con
tent. In other words, content becomes in such cases subjective. From the
Socratic point of view this line of reasoning is validly applicable to every
particular virtue?to courage, pleasure, utility, good, holiness, and so on.
All of these are varieties of knowledge; that is to say, they reflect the
content of virtue but virtue as such cannot be regarded as a skill or
capacity of the virtuous man.9 For Plato, knowledge is knowing about
the object, provided that the knower as knower is not himself the object
of knowledge. The content of knowledge refers in its entirety to the
external world. Thus no content can be attributed to the subject.10
By contrast, for Protagoras knowledge is always knowledge about the
knower-subject. In other words, Protagoras regards the knower-subject
to be the only reality that can be taken into account. The knower-subject
is for him the entire and only reality to be considered: the only knowable
thing is human knowledge. The subject's knowledge can thus be regarded
as the genuine and the unique content of knowledge. It is this possibility
that Plato rejects. The famous statement of Protagoras that man is the
measure of things (Cf. Theaetetus 151-152) shows that Protagoras was
concerned only with subjective knowledge, or with reality only as it
appears to the human mind. About things in themselves we can say
nothing, just as we can say nothing about the Gods.11
If we reconstruct Protagoras's thinking from what is explicitly con
tained in the dialogue, it would appear that for him the issue is not
principally one of the content of knowledge; rather it is the subject that
is at the crux of the question of whether virtue can be taught. It is
probable, moreover, that the position of the historical Protagoras was
diametrically opposed to that of Plato; Plato was object-oriented whereas
Protagoras was subject-oriented. For Protagoras, the content of knowledge
is determined by the character of the knower-subject. For Plato, the con

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378 history of philosophy quarterly

tent of knowledge is determined by the known object. According to the

myth, the knower-subject cannot be reduced to knowledge of the object
and, as we have seen, a different kind of logic is presupposed by each of
the types of values and motivations of the subject. In the view of Pro
tagoras, the subject has an ontic existence that determines the content
of his knowledge. Moreover the subject is not conceived of merely in terms
of his capacity as knower, but as a complex being that acts in response
to a variety of motives that may even conflict.
From the foregoing, another important difference between Protagoras
and Plato emerges. Since Plato is concerned only with the content of
knowledge, he regards teaching to be synonymous with instruction; that
is, with communicating information about the content of teaching, or the
object. But Protagoras, being concerned only with the knower-subject,
regards teaching to be synonymous with education in the sense of upbring
ing or paideia.12 The early Plato, for his part, is unconcerned with upbr
inging, since he does not regard the subject as being different from what
he knows or does not know. The subject is to be defined only by the degree
of his knowledge in respect of content.13 Protagoras, on the other hand,
argues that virtue is knowable because it exists on its own account and
can be an object of knowledge, and therefore taught in the sense of paideia.
In the place of the ontology of Socrates which excludes the knower-subject,
Protagoras proposes a theory of knowledge in his version of the myth
which is a theory about the subject. Although Protagoras does not regard
virtue to be knowledge, he nonetheless believes it to be knowable.

IV. The Theory of Measurement

Proceeding from the assumption that virtue is defined by means of its

content?of the object?Plato turns once more in the Protagoras to the
issue of the unity of the virtues (Prot. 351a). His aim is not only to show
that there is no difference among the virtues, but to reduce virtue itself
to knowledge, so that strictly speaking, the very existence of virtue is
denied by him. Protagoras, for his part, takes issue with this sort of
reduction. Thus when asked by Socrates about the relationship between
soundness of mind, courage, justice and holiness, Protagoras distinguishes
between Zeusian and Epimethean virtues by pointing out that there are
unjust and irreligious men who are nevertheless courageous (Prot. 349d).
Later, Protagoras sharpens his differentiation among the varieties of
virtue by distinguishing between (a) courage in the Zeusian sense, which
derives from a sound natural condition and proper nurture of the soul;
(b) daring in Epimethean sense, which originates in rage or madness;
and (c) daring in Promethean sense, which results from skill (j?xvT)). 14
When Plato then attempts to reduce pleasure (an Epimethean virtue) to
good (a Zeusian virtue), Protagoras objects by saying that this would
mean that good and pleasure coincide: "... some pleasant things are not
good, and again . . . some painful things are not bad, while some are, and
a third class is neutral, neither good nor bad" (Prot. 35Id).

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 PROTAGORAS AND PLATO 379

By acknowledging that "wisdom and knowledge is the mightiest of

human things" (Prot. 352c-d), Protagoras is merely stating his preference
for the Zeusian principle and not, as Socrates would claim, attempting
to reduce all virtues to knowledge. Unfortunately, from this point forward
it is no longer possible to reconstruct Protagoras's position from the
dialogue, since he and Socrates now turn to a joint consideration of the
popular point of view (352d), without taking a clear position of their own
in the matter. Nevertheless, the Protagoras furnishes sufficient material
to allow us to understand the historical Protagoras's opposition to the
conclusions set out by Plato in the rest of the dialogue.
Thus, having raised the question of what is meant by the expression
"to be overcome by pleasure" (Prot. 353c), Socrates introduces a number
of instances of Epimethean activities involving the gratification of needs,
such as drinking, eating and sex, which were considered in ancient Greece
to be kinds o? praxis, or activities whose telos is in the activity itself
rather than its results.15 Whenever such activities are judged to be "bad,"
it is not the activities but their pernicious consequences that are being
considered. That is to say, these activities are being condemned not
because they are pleasant to do, but because they make us ill when we
indulge in them to excess. Now were Plato to have given Protagoras a
fair opportunity to reply in the dialogue, the sophist would surely have
argued that there was a difference between an action and its results, in
the way that there is a difference between Epimethean and Promethean
varieties of activity. He would then have defined eating, drinking, and
sex as typical Epimethean activities in which the doer must eventually
suffer the consequences of his deeds. Therefore, the fact that such
activities may have unpleasant results does not mean that Socrates is
right in claiming that such activities are undertaken for the sake of their
consequences.
By the same token, unpleasant activities that yield good things in the
Promethean sense, such as gymnastics, medicine and military service
(Prot. 354a), are regarded as being good not because of the pain incurred
in their doing, but because of their effects. Such activities are typically
Promethean and require that the doer sacrifice present for future advan
tage. Thus the fact that the consequences of an action are pleasant does
not mean, as Plato would have us believe, that the action itself must be
pleasant as well.
In general, it would seem that Plato asserts that if the consequences
of an act are desirable, so is the act itself; that if you desire the ends you
also desire the means. But from the point of view of Protagoras, this is
incorrect. The fact that pleasure results from an activity does not imply
that the activity per se is wanted, but only that one is prepared to repress
the Epimethean principle. On the other hand, the fact that Epimethean
activities are desired in themselves does not imply that their results are
desired, but only that one is ready to suffer the consequences of repressing

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380 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY

the Promethean principle.

Therefore, to speak of "bad pleasures" or "good pains" is merely to
confuse two modes of discourse, one applied to an activity that is a means
toward an end different from itself, and the other to an activity that is
an end in itself. Once Plato merges these two kinds of discourse, he has
set the stage for a theory of measurement that is the basis of a criterion
for judging actions and their consequences, namely: Pleasure is bad when
it prevents greater pleasures. This is a technique for maximizing pleasure
and minimizing pain. But to Protagoras's way of thinking, pleasure and
pain are judged by a criterion that is different from the criterion of good
ness and badness. In the case of pleasure and pain, the criterion is satis
faction of needs; whereas in that of goodness and badness, the criterion
is the utility or benefit of the results of an action. Hence "good" and "bad"
are terms applied to means alone, which are good if they are helpful in
achieving the end, and bad if they prevent its attainment. It is impossible,
therefore, to establish a common basis for these criteria.
Nevertheless, once Plato reduces pleasure to good he is able to refute
the popular notion of "being overcome by pleasures," since whoever knows
what the good consists in will act according to that knowledge. But if the
concept of being overcome by pleasures is to have any meaning once good
and pleasure are equated, then whenever someone does a bad thing
because he is overcome by pleasure, he must also have been overcome
by good (cf. Prot. 355b-d). But it would be a mistake to attribute a hedonist
point of view to Plato, since self-control is for him wisdom itself (cf. Prot.
358c). In point of fact, his attitude is closer to stoicism than to hedonism.

Plato's merging of Epimethean and Promethean values reaches a

climax in the Protagoras when he sets out to abolish the qualitative
distinction between present and future (Prot. 356a-d). In Protagorean
terms, Plato is trying to abolish the difference between, on one hand,
Epimethean orientation to the present, associated with pleasures and the
satisfaction of urges (praxis), and on the other hand, Promethean orien
tation to the future, which has to do with the concern for utility and
benefit characteristic of the productive process (poesis). Such a reduction
is made possible when pleasures that are qualitatively different in their
origins become quantified once a hypothetical unit for measuring pleasure
is arrived at. According to Plato, it is possible to speak about a "quantity"
of pleasure and a "quantity" of pain; and if the difference between the
present and future is annulled, a theory of decision-making can be
developed.
Accordingly, all pains and pleasures must be conceived of as occurring
either in the present or at the same distance in time. The case is similar
to that of the differences in the size of objects placed at different distances
from the eye. Just as optical illusions of this sort can be overcome by a
theory of measurement that annuls spatial distance (Prot. 356c-d), so
may pains and pleasures be translated into quantitative units that would

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 PROTAGORAS AND PLATO 381

annul temporal differences in order to enable us to compare relative

degrees of pain and pleasure, and thereby to choose the right kind of
action.
In other words, we must possess a science of the more and the less.
Thus in weighing pleasures against pleasures, we would select the
greater, whether in the present or in the future. And in weighing pains
against pains, we would choose the lesser, whether in the present or in
the future. Finally, in weighing pleasures against pains, we ignore the
temporal element, and make our choice in the following way: If what is
postponed is pleasure and what is immediate is pain, and the pleasure
is greater than the pain, then we submit to present pain in order to enjoy
future pleasure?in other words, we sacrifice the present for the future;
and if what is postponed is pain and what is immediate is pleasure, and
the pain is greater than the pleasure, then our choice is to enjoy present
pleasure and to suffer future pain?that is, we sacrifice the future for
the present, and so on.
Up to this point, Plato's intention seems to be to reduce the diversity
of virtues to a unity by transforming them all into Promethean virtues.
Indeed, Socrates' admission by the end of the dialogue of his preference
in the myth for Prometheus rather than Epimetheus would seem to sup
port my view that the discussion about the unity of the virtues represents
Plato's answer to Protagoras's theory. But Plato goes even further. The
establishment of the unity of virtues is only a preliminary to the reduction
of virtue to knowledge. Knowledge of the true measure of things is the
only virtue, and all else that is conventionally thought to be virtue is
mere ignorance. There can only be knowledge or ignorance, being or
nothingness, truth or error (cf. Prot. 357d).
The question that has to be asked here is why Plato should assume
that there is only knowledge and not virtue. In other words, why should
he regard virtue to be knowledge? I think I have already suggested the
answer in proposing that, in Plato's view, the subject and his capacity of
being virtuous cannot be different from the object of his knowledge. This
extreme rationalist and cognitivist position leads Plato to assume that
passions and interests are subordinated to the rational part of soul. Fear
and courage, for example, are not in his view states of mind. They have
no ontic existence, and are not defined as attitudes and powers in their
own right?as Protagoras would believe?but are defined entirely by
their objects. They are merely knowledge of fearful and unfearful things
(Cf. Prot. 359-360).
What still remains to be analyzed is the relationship between Plato's
reduction of virtue to knowledge and his preference for the Promethean
principle (cf. Prot. 361 d). What, then, is the connection between the
philosopher's claim that virtue is knowledge and his preference for Prom
ethean teleological activity?
In the Socratic Plato, the subject is merely the product of what he

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382 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY

knows and what he is ignorant of. This circumstance characterizes tech

nical expertise and productive knowledge. Persons specializing in par
ticular fields of endeavor are differentiated from one another by their
particular variety of knowledge. Indeed the basis of specialization is
knowledge of those things that pertain to a specific field, and such knowl
edge is about means; in other words, it is technical knowledge. And the
theory of measurement, too, is knowledge not about ends but about means.
Therefore if, as the Greeks believed, virtue is not techne, then it cannot
possibly be taught, and there would be no reason for anyone to try to
teach it. But by the end of the dialogue, Plato asserts that political virtue
is teachable; however this takes place only after the theory of measure
ment is applied so as to turn political virtue into Promethean virtue?that
is, into statecraft.
According to the myth of Protagoras, political virtue is Zeusian. For
Plato, however, politics is Promethean in nature. Thus the subject, for
whom such productive activity is a means to an end, is submerged in the
deed; he postpones his own vital needs, and sacrifices himself in behalf
of an end that is different from the activity in which he is engaged. The
subject is similarly suppressed in Plato's conception of virtue as knowl
edge. Knowledge means knowledge of the object but never of the subject,
for the reason that to Plato's way of thinking there is no such thing as
a subject which is different from what is known and unknown by him.
Hence the suppression of the subject is the common denominator of Plato's
theory of the unity of the virtues as knowledge and of his preference for
teleological activity.
* * *

The basic problem of Plato's philosophy is his attempt to red

variety of activity to expertise. However expertise has meanin
the extent that given ends are assumed. But if all activities ar
to expertise, how are we to determine the ends that guide the
Plato's absolute commitment to expertise obliges him to con
end into a means; so that, strictly speaking, there are no ultim
In the Protagoras it would appear that Plato defends the id
ultimate end is to save one's life (Prot. 356e). One may ne
ask?in the Socratic spirit?to what purpose do we need to save
Plato's philosophy, however, admits of no ultimate ends?on
that are the means to other ends; the issue of ultimate ends is m
within the context of Platonic reasoning.
On the other hand, the problem with Protagoras's theory?
the form that I have reconstructed it?is that it requires th
ontological status to known reality. Since what is known d
forms of knowledge and reasoning that pertain solely to the s
possibility of knowing reality itself is excluded. These are the
for Protagorean relativism as we find it set out in the Theaet

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 PROTAGORAS AND PLATO 383

Thus Protagoras, in favoring the knower-subject, ends up in adopting

a position of complete relativism, whereas Plato raises the object of knowl
edge to the status of absolute truth. For Plato, the subject is a product
of what he knows and does not know, so that he may be taught only in
the sense of being instructed or informed. For Protagoras, however, the
subject is an ultimate datum that cannot be produced and that itself also
determines what is known and what is unknown; therefore the subject's
essential nature cannot be altered, although he may be improved by
education.16

University of Haifa
Received November 4, 1986

NOTES

1. A question arises here concerning the difficulty of proposing a virtue which, as Zas
lavsky observes, "is so difficult to achieve . . . that it would be available only to the few."
See R. Zaslavsky, "The Platonic Godfather: A Note on the Protagoras Myth," Journal of
Value Inquiry, vol. 16 (1982), p. 79. But I shall not deal with this issue here, since it has
no direct bearing on the subject of this paper.
2. On this point I am indebted to Patrick Coby, "The Education of a Sophist: Aspects of
Plato's Protagoras," Interpretation, vol. 10 (1982), p. 144.
3. What Protagoras describes as being the share of all men in political virtues, I term
"human capacities." See Prot. 323a.
4. If not specified otherwise, all quotations from the dialogue are taken from the trans
lation of W.R.M. Lamb, Plato's Protagoras, (London: William Heinemann, 1924).
5. "Zeus feared that our entire race would be exterminated [my italics]. . . ."{Prot. 322c).
6. For a more detailed explanation of the distinction between praxis and poesis, see my
"Aristotle's Theory of Praxis," Hermes, vol. 114 (1986), pp. 163-172.
7. There is a contradiction between, say, studying for an examination or diploma and
studying in the Epimethean sense, out of an interest in the subject. Indeed anyone wishing
to pass an examination has to be careful not to be too interested in the subject, lest his
enthusiasm deflect him from studying for the test. In situations of this kind, a decision
must be made between one's interest in the subject for its own sake and one's need to
study it in order to pass an examination.
8.1 have purposely avoided dealing with the logical and linguistic aspects of the Platonic
thesis, such as the problem of whether the relationship among the virtues is that of unity,
similarity or biconditionality, since none of these interpretations contradicts the thesis
that virtue is knowledge. See however Gregory Vlastos, "The Unity of the Virtues in the
Protagoras" in Platonic Studies, (Princeton, 1973), pp. 221-265, and T. Penner, "The Unity
of Virtue," Philosophical Review, vol. 82 (1973), pp. 35-68.
9. Thus, the question of whether virtues are of a piece, as though constituting a gold
brick, or are constituent elements that are distinct but make up a single unit like the
features that form a face, is irrelevant. Once virtue has been reduced to knowledge, the

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 384 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY

issue of the relationships between the virtues is abandoned, since it served only as a
springboard to arrive at the reduction. As a matter of fact, at times Plato defends the
gold analogy of the unity of virtues, and at others the analogy with the parts of the face.
10. Cf. a similar attitude in Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus l?gico-philosophicus, 5.531.
11. Cf. Diogenes Laertius, Vitae et Placita Philosophorum, IX, 51.
12. About education as upbringing in ancient Greece, see Werner Jaeger, Paideia: Die
Formung des griechischen Menschen, (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1933), Introduction.
13. It should be remarked that on this point there is a difference between the Socratic
Plato and the Plato of The Republic, in which the philosopher's attitude is closer to that
of Protagoras (cf. Rep. 401d and 411e).
14. In C.C.W. Taylor's translation of Prot. 351a-b, the difference between the Promethean
and Epimethean aspects of daring is not made clear. Taylor translates the passage as:
"For daring results both from skill and from animal boldness and madness, like capabil
ity ... ." Rather, the passage should read: "For daring results from art or from animal
boldness or madness" (?apcros [x?v 7ap kol? airo j?xvr\s "y?^veTott av?pwTrois Kai ?ir? Oufio?
ye Kai ?Tr? pav?as, focnrep if] ?waixi?. . .).
15. Cf. Aristotle, Et. Nich., 1140b.
16.1 am grateful to the anonymous reviewer of this article for his fruitful comments.

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