Aznar vs.

Garcia
GR no. L-16749 January 1963

Facts:

EDWARD Christensen, a citizen of United states but his domicile is Philippines, died testate. The estate
was distributed by Executioner Aznar according to the will, which provides that: Php 3,600 be given to
HELEN Christensen, natural child of the deceased, as her legacy, and the rest of his estate to his daughter
LUCY Christensen, as pronounced by CFI Davao. However, Helen opposed to the partition of the latter’s
as she was allegedly deprived from her rights as natural child. One of its grounds is that the law that
should govern the estate of the deceased Christensen should not be the internal law of California alone,
but the entire law thereof because several foreign elements are involved, that the forum is the
Philippines and even if the case were decided in California, Section 946 of the California Civil Code, which
requires that the domicile of the decedent should apply, should be applicable in which Edward’s domicile
is Philippines. Meanwhile, the rule here in the Philippines is that successional rights shall be regulated by
the national law of the peron regardless of the property may be found. However, the court ruled that
since he was a citizen of the united states at the time of his death, the successional rights and intrinsic
validity of the provisions in his will are to be governed by the law of California. Hence, this appeal

Issue: Whether or not the lower court erred in failing to recognize that under international law,
particularly under the renvoi doctrine, the intrinsic validity of the testamentary disposition of the
distribution of the estate of the deceased edward e. Christensen should be governed by the laws of the
philippines.

Ruling: Yes, Philippine laws shall be applied in this case

Applying the renvoi doctrine, the national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on
conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the reference or return of
the question to the law of the testator's domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil
Code, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his
domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile can not and should not refer the
case back to California; such action would leave the issue incapable of determination because the case
will then be like a football, tossed back and forth between the two states, between the country of which
the decedent was a citizen and the country of his domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own law
as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the question has to be decided,
especially as the application of the internal law of California provides no legitime for children while the
Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes natural children legally
acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.

We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of California, is the
Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the
appellant, should be governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code
of California, not by the internal law of California..
 Bellis vs. Bellis
20 SCRA 358, June 06, 1967

FACTS: Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States."

He had five legitimate children with his first wife Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced and three legitimate
children with his second wife. He also had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina
Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.

Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines where: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen;
(b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma
Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c)after the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the remainder shall
go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis,
Alexander Bellis, and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal
shares.

Amos G. Bellis died and his will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila.

The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests which it
released from time to time accordingly as the lower court approved and allowed the various
motions or petitions filed by the latter three requesting partial advances on account of their
respective legacies.

The People's Bank and Trust Company preparatory to closing its administration, filed its "Executor's
Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition".

Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions to the project of
partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and,
therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.

Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition. After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other
pertinent pleadings, the lower court, issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving the
executor's final account, report and administration and project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the
Civil Code, it applied the national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not
provide for legitimes.

Motions for reconsideration has been denied. Appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of
which law must apply—Texas law or Philippine law.

ISSUE: Whether renvoi shall be applied in this case.

HELD: No. Renvoi shall not be applied in this case.

The doctrine of renvoi is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country and is
domiciled in another. It does not apply to a case where the decedent was a citizen of Texas and was
domiciled therein at the time of his death. So that, even assuming that Texas has a conflicts rule
providing that the domiciliary law should govern successional rights, the same would not result in a
reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but it would still refer to Texas law.

Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule, adopting the rule of lex rei sitae, which calls for the application
of the law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, where the properties
involved are found in the Philippines.

The decedent's national law governs the order of succession, the amount of successional rights, the
intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will and capacity to succeed.

Where the decedent was a citizen of Texas and under Texas laws there are no forced heirs, the system of
legitimes in Philippine law cannot be applied to the succession to the decedent's testate because the
intrinsic validity of the provisions of the decedent's will and the amount of successional rights are to be
determined under Texas law.

Note: The parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine of renvoi.
 G.R. Nos. L-27860 and L-27896 March 29, 1974

PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, Administrator of the Testate Estate

of Charles Newton Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1672 of the Court of First Instance of
Iloilo), petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE VENICIO ESCOLIN, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Iloilo, Branch II, and AVELINA A. MAGNO, respondents.

G.R. Nos. L-27936 & L-27937 March 29, 1974

TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE LINNIE JANE HODGES (Sp. Proc. No. 1307). TESTATE
ESTATE OF THE LATE CHARLES NEWTON HODGES (Sp. Proc. No. 1672). PHILIPPINE
COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, administrator-appellant,
vs.
LORENZO CARLES, JOSE PABLICO, ALFREDO CATEDRAL, SALVADOR GUZMAN,
BELCESAR CAUSING, FLORENIA BARRIDO, PURIFICACION CORONADO, GRACIANO
LUCERO, ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR, MELQUIADES BATISANAN, PEPITO IYULORES,
ESPERIDION PARTISALA, WINIFREDO ESPADA, ROSARIO ALINGASA, ADELFA
PREMAYLON, SANTIAGO PACAONSIS, and AVELINA A. MAGNO, the last as
Administratrix in Sp. Proc. No. 1307, appellees, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY,
INC., movant-appellee.

FACTS:

Linnie Jane Hodges and Christian Hodges were both Americans, originally residing in
Texas. In her will Linnie said that she would bequeath all her property to her husband Charles,
and give him the authority to manage it and dispose of the estate, except the property in
Lubbock, Texas. The will also had a provision that in case of death of Charles, the estate should
be distributed among her siblings, collectively known as the Higdons. Charles was able to sell
and dispose some of the properties in his capacity as administrator of the estate.

Charles subsequently died. His lawyer filed a motion for the determination, liquidation,
and distribution of the estate to the heirs of both spouses. The lawyer advised that a reference to
the will of Charles be made, which was kept in an iron vault, and that the employee Avelina
Magno be appointed as administratix of the estate, because she was the trusted employee of the
spouse.

Thereafter the brother of Charles Hodges, Joe Hodges appeared and asked that a
liquidation of the assets of Charles be made. Since during the life of Charles he was
unable to liquidate the estate of his wife, there was a question on whether the
distribution to the siblings should follow the Texas Law or the Philippine Law.

PCIB:
 Article 16 of the Civil Code provides that "the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless
of the country wherein said property may be found", shall prevail.

However, the Conflict of Law of Texas, which is the "national law" of the testatrix, Linnie
Jane Hodges, provide that the domiciliary law should govern the testamentary dispositions and
successional rights over personal properties, and the law of the situs of the property with regards
real properties. Thus applying the "Renvoi Doctrine".

MAGNO (administratix):

Magno denies that Mrs. Hodges died a resident of the Philippines, since allegedly she
never changed nor intended to change her original residence of birth in Texas, United States of
America, and contends that, anyway, regardless of the question of her residence, she being
indisputably a citizen of Texas, under said Article 16 of the Civil Code, the distribution of her
estate is subject to the laws of said State which, according to her, do not provide for any legitime,
hence, the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges are entitled to the remainder of the whole of her
share of the conjugal partnership properties consisting of one-half thereof.

ISSUE:

Whether there is a need to ascertain the laws of Texas.

RULING:

It cannot be determined what law of Texas applies, since neither parties presented
evidence to prove the law of Texas.

It should be borne in mind that as above-indicated, the question of what are the laws of
Texas governing the matters herein issue is, in the first instance, one of fact, not of law.
Elementary is the rule that foreign laws may not be taken judicial notice of and have to be
proven like any other fact in dispute between the parties in any proceeding, with the rare
exception in instances when the said laws are already within the actual knowledge of the court,
such as when they are well and generally known or they have been actually ruled upon in other
cases before it and none of the parties concerned do not claim otherwise.
 G.R. No. L-35694         December 23, 1933

ALLISON G. GIBBS, petitioner-appelle,
vs.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, oppositor-appellant.
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF THE CITY OF MANILA, respondent-appellant.

FACTS:

The case involves parcels of land in Manila belonging to the conjugal partnership of
Allison and Eva Gibbs, citizens and domiciliary of California. Eva died intestate while residing in
California. Subsequently, Allison was appointed administrator by California Court and granted
Allison to be the sole and absolute owner of all the properties. Gibbs presented this decree to the
register of deeds (RD) of Manila and demanded a TCT be issued to him. The RD declined to
accept as binding the California order and refused to register the TCT on the ground that the
corresponding inheritance tax had not been paid. Allison filed a petition for an order requiring
the RD "to issue the corresponding titles" without requiring payment of inheritance tax.

Allison Gibbs:

Article 9 of the Civil Code, as follows:

The laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition, and legal
capacity of persons, are binding upon Spaniards even though they reside in a
foreign country.

It is argued that the conjugal right of the California wife in community real estate in the
Philippine Islands is a personal right and must, therefore, be settled by the law governing her
personal status, that is, the law of California; that properties of the wife are automatically
transferred to husband without need of administration.

Lower Court:

Article 10 of the Civil Code, as follows:

Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of

succession as well as to the amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic
validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the
person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the
property or the country in which it may be situated.
 The lower court held that California law applies; that Allison is the absolute owner of all
the community property not by virtue of succession or death, but because the wife never had
more than an inchoate interest in the properties. Hence, the Court ordered new TCTs to be
issued to Allison, appealed by the Government.

ISSUE:

What law should be applied in this case?

RULING:

Philippine law. The nature and extent of the title which vested in Mrs. Gibbs at the time
of the acquisition of the community lands here in question must be determined in accordance
with the lex rei sitae.

Under lex rei sitae, the respective rights of husband and wife in such property, in the
absence of an antenuptial contract, are determined by the law of the place where the property is
situated, irrespective of the domicile of the parties or to the place where the marriage was
celebrated.

The second paragraph of article 10 applies when a legal or testamentary succession has
taken place in the Philippines and in accordance with the law of the Philippine Islands (and the
foreign law is consulted only in regard to the order of succession or the extent of the
successional rights). In other words, the second paragraph of article 10 can be invoked only
when the deceased was vested with a descendible interest in property within the jurisdiction of
the Philippine Islands.

Here, it is admitted that the Philippine lands in question were acquired as community
property of the conjugal partnership of the appellee and his wife. Under the law of the Philippine
Islands, she was vested of a title equal to that of her husband. It results that Eva Gibbs was, by
the law of the Philippine Islands, vested of a descendible interest, equal to that of her husband,
in the Philippine lands from the date of their acquisition to the date of her death.
 MICIANO V. BRIMO
G.R. No. L-22595, 1 November 1927

FACTS: Juan Miciano, the judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo,
one of the brothers of the deceased, opposed it. The court, however, approved it.

Based on the last part of the second clause of the decedent’s will, it says:

“I likewise desire to state that although, by law, I am a Turkish citizen, this citizenship having been
conferred upon me by conquest and not by free choice, nor by nationality and, on the other hand,
having resided for a considerable length of time in. the Philippine Islands where I succeeded in acquiring
all of the property that I now possess, it is my wish that the distribution of my property and everything in
connection with this, my will, be made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the
Philippine Islands, requesting all of my relatives to respect this wish, otherwise, I annul and cancel
beforehand whatever disposition found in this will favorable to the person or persons who fail to comply
with this request."

The appellant's opposed that the provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will are not in accordance with the laws
of his Turkish nationality.

ISSUE: Whether renvoi shall be applied in this case.

HELD: No. Renvoi shall not be applied in this case.

The fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testamentary dispositions are not in
accordance with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what
the Turkish laws are on the matter, and in the absence of evidence on such laws, they are
presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. (Lim and Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36
Phil., 472.)

It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish laws are. He, himself,
acknowledges it when he desires to be given an opportunity to present evidence on this point;
so much so that he assigns as an error of the court in not having deferred the approval of the
scheme of partition until the receipt of certain testimony requested regarding the Turkish laws
on the matter.

The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove such laws does not constitute an
error. It is discretionary with the trial court, and, taking into consideration that the oppositor
was granted ample opportunity to introduce competent evidence, the court find no abuse of
discretion on the part of the court in this particular.

There is, therefore, no evidence in the record that the national law of the testator Joseph G.
Brimo was violated in the testamentary dispositions in question which, not being contrary to
our laws in force, must be complied with and executed.
G.R. No. 124371 November 23, 2000

PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F. LLORENTE, respondents.

PARDO, J.:

FACTS:

Lorenzo Llorente and petitioner Paula Llorente were married in 1937 in the Philippines. Lorenzo
was an enlisted serviceman of the US Navy. Soon after, he left for the US where he was admitted
to United States citizenship and a Certificate of Naturalization was issued in his favor by the
United States District Court, Southern District of New York. Upon his visitation of his wife, he
discovered that she was living with his brother, Ceferino, and a child was born.

The child was registered as illegitimate but the name of the father was left blank. Lorenzo filed a
divorce in California, which later on became final. Lorenzo returned to the Philippines and
married Alicia. They lived together for 25 years bringing 3 children, Raul, Luz and Beverly.

Lorenzo made his last will and testament stating that all his properties will be given to his second
marriage. He filed a petition of probate that made or appointed Alicia the special administratrix
of his estate. Before the proceeding could be terminated, Lorenzo died.

Paula filed a letter of administration over Lorenzo’s estate. The trial court granted the letter and
denied the motion for reconsideration filed by Alicia, finding that the divorce decree granted to
the late Lorenzo is void and inapplicable in the Philippines, therefore the marriage he contracted
with Alicia is likewise void. The trial court further stated that American law follows the
‘domiciliary theory’ hence, Philippine law applies when determining the validity of Lorenzo’s
will. It held that the will was intrinsically invalid since it contained dispositions in favor of Alice,
who in the trial court’s opinion was a mere paramour.

Alicia appealed to the Court of Appeals, which declared her entitled to one half (1/2) of whatever
property she and Lorenzo acquired during their cohabitation, applying Article 144 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines.

Paula filed a motion for reconsideration with the Court of Appeals, but was denied for lack of
merit.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court and the Court of Appeals were correct in applying
Philippine law in this case.

RULING:

NO. The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long before and at
the time of: (1) his divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and (4)
death, is duly established, admitted and undisputed. While Philippine laws do not recognize
divorce, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, subject to the limitation that they are valid under
their national law. In the given case, the divorce obtained by Lorenzo, being an American at the
time he obtained the divorce, has legal effects in the Philippines. As such, the first marriage
between Lorenzo and Paula is validly dissolved, making the second marriage between Lorenzo
and Alicia valid and subsisting.

Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best proved
by foreign law which must be pleaded and proved. Foreign laws do not prove themselves in our
jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact,
they must be alleged and proved.

While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded, the Court of Appeals did not admit the
foreign law. The Court of Appeals and the trial court called to the fore the renvoi doctrine,
where the case was "referred back" to the law of the decedent’s domicile, in this case, Philippine
law.

Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines clearly provides that testate and testamentary
succession, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights
and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of
the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property
and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.

While the trial court stated that the law of New York was not sufficiently proven, in the same
breath it made the categorical, albeit equally unproven statement that American law follows the
‘domiciliary theory’ hence, Philippine law applies when determining the validity of Lorenzo’s
will. First, there is no such thing as one American law. The "national law" indicated in Article
16 of the Civil Code cannot possibly apply to general American law. There is no such law
governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United States. Each State of the union
has its own law applicable to its citizens and in force only within the State. It can therefore
refer to no other than the law of the State of which the decedent was a resident. Second, there is
no showing that the application of the renvoi doctrine is called for or required by New York
State law.

WHEREFORE, the Supreme Court REVERSES the decision of the Regional Trial Court and
RECOGNIZES as VALID the decree of divorce granted in favor of the deceased Lorenzo N.
Llorente by the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of San Diego.
Further, the Court REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic
validity of Lorenzo N. Llorente’s will and determination of the parties’ successional rights
allowing proof of foreign law.

GROUP 7

ALCANTARA,BLESSING HOPE

TOBIAS, RODOLFO

TUMANAN, GELIKA ANNE

ZULUETA, ANGELIKA MARIZ

GROUP 7
ALCANTARA,BLESSING HOPE
TOBIAS, RODOLFO
TUMANAN, GELIKA ANNE
ZULUETA, ANGELIKA MARIZ