System Architecture Description DL7

DELHI METRO RAIL CORPORATION LTD.
DELHI MRTS PROJECT PHASE III - LINE 7

TRAIN CONTROL & SIGNALLING SYSTEM
CONTRACT CS03
ARCHITECTURE
SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
DESCRIPTION
Responsible Division: Responsible Unit: Document Type: Distribution Status: Document State:
RCS ENG Plan External Released
Prepared:
Piyawadee Suwanwichit 2013-10-31
Design Engineer, RCS Engineering
Verified:
Manpreet Mann 2013-10-31
Systems Engineer Team Leader, RCS Engineering
Approved:
Vivek Mahalingam 2013-10-31
Lead Project Engineer, RCS Engineering
Name / Title, Group Signature Date
Identity Number:
This document and its contents are the property of Bombardier Inc. or its
subsidiaries. This document contains confidential proprietary information.
The reproduction, distribution, utilization or the communication of this 100222654
document or any part thereof, without express authorization is strictly Effective Date: Revision: Language:
prohibited. Offenders will be held liable for the payment of damages.
©2011, Bombardier Inc. or its subsidiaries. All rights reserved. 2013-10-31

1.0 EN
Filename:System Architecture Description.docx Page 1 of 38 Template ID-Number: 011496_R0

100222654
Revision : 1.0
Revision Log
Revision Date Description of Changes

(yyyy-mm-dd)
00 2013-10-21 First issue

1.0 2013-10-31 First Release after reviewed by Manpreet M.
File name: System Architecture Description.docx Confidential and proprietary Template ID-Number: 000108
Page 2 of 38 Template Instruction ID-Number: 000345
100222654
Revision : 1.0
Table of Contents
Section Subject Page
1 introduction 4
1.1 Purpose 4
1.2 Scope 4
2 Abbreviations & Definitions 5
2.1 Abbreviations 5
2.2 Definitions 8
3 REFERENCES 10
3.1 Project Documents 10
4 SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE 11
4.1 The System Architecture Design 11
4.2 System Interfaces 11
4.2.1 CITYFLO 650 Internal interfaces 14
4.2.2 CITYFLO 650 External interfaces 16
4.3 Supervision Architecture 18
4.3.1 Central Operation 19
4.3.2 Local Operation 19
4.3.3 Off-line Operation 20
4.4 Wayside System Architecture 21
4.4.1 Region ATP (RATP) Subsystem 22
4.4.2 Region ATP (RATP) Architecture 22
4.4.3 Region ATO (RATO) Subsystem 24
4.4.4 Region ATO (RATO) Architecture 24
4.4.5 Computer Based Interlocking (EBI Lock) Overview 26
4.4.6 Train Routing and Degraded Operation 26
4.5 Data Communication System Architecture 27
4.6 Radio System Architecture 28
4.6.1 Train to Wayside Communications (TWC) System 28
4.6.1.1 CBTC CITYFLO 650 Radio (2.4GHz) 28
4.6.1.2 CCTV Radio System 29
4.6.2 Network Radio System (NRS) Overview 29
4.7 Onboard System Architecture 32
4.7.1 VATC System Description 32
4.7.2 VATC System Architecture 32
4.7.3 VATC Interfaces 33
4.7.4 CBTC Radio Communication 34
4.7.5 CCTV Radio 34
4.7.6 Positioning Subsystem 34
4.7.6.1 Norming points reader 34
4.7.6.2 Tachometer 35
4.7.6.3 Doppler Radar 36
4.7.6.4 DMI 36
4.8 Platform Screen Doors 37
100222654
Revision : 1.0
1 Introduction
1.1 Purpose
The purpose of this document is to provide an overview description of the CBTC
system (CITYFLO 650) to be installed in Delhi Metro Line 7, identifying its system
architecture and high level interfaces for both on-board and wayside equipment.
1.2 Scope
The scope of the provided system for Signalling can be split into two main sections:
A) Functional;
B) Non-Functional.
A) Functional
All functional items will be described within the SDS at a function level and shall
translate to sub system requirements, which will be shown in the SSRS of the relevant
sub-systems. These SSRS’s will be then translated to sub-system level descriptions
in the SSDS.
i) CBTC Stations/OCC/BCC/Depots – Areas covered here will be RATP, RATO, CBI,
ATS, Object Controllers, Interface to UPS, Mimic Panels.
ii) Trackside – Areas covered here shall be Norming Points, Switch Machines, Axle
Counters, Lineside signals, WNRA LoS, WNRA LcX, CCTV Radio and ESP.
iii) CBTC Vehicle – Areas covered here shall be VATP, VATO, CCTV Radio, CBTC
Radio, and Antennas.
iv) External Interfaces – Areas Included here shall be Telecom, Depot Equipment,
Rolling stock, Platform Screen Doors, Trackworks and Tunnel ventilation
B) Non-functional
All non-functional items will be described in the SRS and will translate into further
requirements for the relevant sub-systems and will be described in the SSRS of the
sub-system.
Performance requirement;
i) Environmental EMC, vibration requirement
ii) Ergonomic design and implementation and
iii) Training, DLP, maintenance
100222654
Revision : 1.0
2 Abbreviations & Definitions
2.1 Abbreviations
Abbreviation Definition
ANSI American National Standards Institute
AOA Area of Authorization
ARS Automatic Route Setting
ATC Automatic Train Control
ATO Automatic Train Operation
ATP Automatic Train Protection
ATR Automatic Train Regulation
ATS Automatic Train Supervision
BCC Backup Operations Control Centre
BT Bombardier Transportation
CANbus Controller Area Network Bus
CATS Central Automatic Train Supervision
CBI Computer Based Interlocking
CBTC Communications-Based Train Control
CCTV Closed Circuit Television
CENELEC European Committee for Electro-technical Standardization
CER Central Equipment Room
CFMS CITYFLO Monitoring System
CM Coded Manual
COTS Central Operator Training Simulator
CPU Central Processing Unit
CRC Cyclical Redundancy Check
DCC Depot Control Centre
DCS Data Communication System
DMI Driver Machine Interface
100222654
Revision : 1.0
DTS Data Transmission System
ECS Element Construction Set
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility
ESP Emergency Stop Plunger
ET Electric Trains
FO Fiber Optic
GPS Global Positioning System
GUI Graphic User Interface
HMU Health Monitoring Unit
HVAC Heating Ventilation Air Conditioning
I/O Input/Output
IP Internet Protocol
KVM Keyboard, Video, Mouse
LAN Local Area Network
LATS Local Automatic Train Supervision
LC Local Control
LCD Liquid Crystal Display
LCO Local Control Operator
LCX Leaky Feeder
LDP Large Display Panel
LOS Line of Sight
MA Movement Authority
Mbps Megabit per second
MDR Mobile Data Radio
MHz, GHz Megahertz, Gigahertz
MIO Modular digital Input Output
MMI Man-Machine Interface
MVB Multiple-function Vehicle Bus
100222654
Revision : 1.0
NMS Network Management/Monitoring System
NPR Norming Point Reader
NR Network Radio
NRS Network Radio System
NTP Network Time Protocol
OCC Operation Control Centre
OCS Object Controller System
OPC Operation Planning Centre
OS Operating System
PAS Public Address System
PC Personal Computer
PIDS Passenger Information Display System
PLC Programmable Logic Controller
PS Particular Specification
PSC Platform Station Control
PSD Platform Screen Door
PTU Portable Test Unit
PWM Pulse Width Modulation
RAP Radio Access Points
RATO Region Automatic Train Operation
RATP Region Automatic Train Protection
RCP Radio Communications Processor
RF Radio Frequency
RFI Radio Frequency Interference
RM Restricted Manual
SCR Station Control Room
SER Signalling Equipment Room
SIL Safety Integrity Level
100222654
Revision : 1.0
SSDS Sub-System Design Specification
SSRS Sub-System Requirements Specification
TC Traffic Controller
TCP/IP Transport Control Protocol/Internet Protocol
TIMS Train Integrated Management System
TWC Train to Wayside Communications
UDP User Datagram Protocol
UPS Un-interruptible Power Supply
UTO Unattended Train Operation
VATC Vehicle Automatic Train Control
VATO Vehicle ATO, a subset of VATC
VATP Vehicle ATP, a subset of VATC
VCU Vital Communication Unit
VDX Vital Digital I/O Unit
VLAN Virtual Local Area Network
VME A Standard high-performance backplane bus for micro-computers.
VNRS Vehicle Network Radio System
VO Virtual Occupancy
VRRP Virtual Router Redundant Protocol
WNRA Wayside Networked Radio Assembly
Table 2-1: Table of Abbreviations
2.2 Definitions
Terms Definition
Civil Speed Limit The permanent maximum speed limit for all trains upon a section of
line. This speed limit shall not be exceeded at any time.
Command The facility to perform or modify a function of the System.
Degraded Mode A mode in which the system is not fully perform as design, due to
either complete or partial failure of one or more components
Delay Delay is caused when a train is unable to move or its speed is

reduced due to failure of the Train Control and Signalling System. The
delay is measured by the time lost by the first affected train due to a
100222654
Revision : 1.0
failure of the Train Control and Signalling System.
Dwell Time The period of time taken from the instant that a train’s wheels stop at
a station until the point in time when the wheels start in motion again.
Emergency Brake An irrevocable braking to halt.
Failure A failure is an event, which causes loss of function or performance

within any part of the Train Control and Signalling System and
requires a maintenance intervention to restore full functionality and
performance.
Fail-Safe A characteristic of a system, which ensures that known, or expected

malfunction, will cause the system to revert to a more restrictive
condition.
Fault An abnormal condition that may cause a reduction in, or loss of, the
capability of a functional unit to perform a required function.
Headway Minimum time interval between successive trains at any point on the
line such that the speed of a following train is not reduced by the
presence of any other service train ahead.
Leaky Feeder A cable that radiates radio waves of a desired frequency along its
length. Often used for track to train communications.
Limit Of Movement Authority The point beyond which the train may not safely proceed.
(LOMA)
Line Speed The maximum operational speed on the line.
Main line Lines/tracks other than those within the Depot.
Maintenance Track Maintenance tracks are those tracks within the depot on which first,
second and third line maintenance will be carried out.
Man Machine Interface The visual interface between the Controller and the control system.
The MMI consists of the computer screens, displayed objects, icons,
and equipment as well as the facilities by which the Controller
executes control.
Maximum Safe Speed The maximum safe speed shall be the lowest of: the Civil Speed
(MSS)
Limit, the safe speed required to ensure that the LOMA is not
passed, any Temporary Speed Restrictions in force, maximum
permissible train speed, maximum speed set by the current
operating mode and train parameters.
Mimic A graphical representation of the railway and its global operating

status.
Operating hours Operating hours shall be 05:00 to 24:00, 7 Days per week.
Recoverability The measure of ability of a system to recover from a system failure.
Reliability The measure of ability to rely upon equipment and systems to perform
100222654
Revision : 1.0
their intended function. The measure of reliability is MTBMA.
RM That mode of the ATP system that is the default mode within the
depots or in certain cases in the main line. It allows for a maximum
(Restricted Manual) mode
speed of 25 km/hr with no cab signal energy being received.
Route A part of the line originating at a signal through which the points have
been set and secured to enable the safe passage of a train.
Sub-system A part of the Signalling and Train Control Permanent Works as

defined in this Contract.
Target Speed The speed the train must achieve at the required target distance.
Train Operator The person on the train responsible for its operation.
Workstation The collection of processors, screens and input devices necessary to

provide one Controller with the necessary System displays and
Commands.
Table 2-2: Table of Definitions
3 REFERENCES
3.1 Project Documents

Document Number Document Title
xxx Particular Specification (PS)
xxx General Specification (GS)
xxx System Requirements Specification
xxx System Design Specification
Table 3-1: List of References ~ Contractual Documents
100222654
Revision : 1.0
4 SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
4.1 The System Architecture Design

The System architecture design describes the logical and physical architecture
projected to Delhi Metro Line7.
The document describes the Systems and Sub-systems involved on the Delhi Metro
Line7 project, in order to answer the requirements on the Particular Specifications. A
highlight description of the systems is also provided on the document.
System safety is primarily performed through three vital systems:
Region ATP (RATP) is responsible for communicating with all trains in its area. For
each train the RATP receives positional information, performs calculations based on
the state of the railway (derived from the CBI), and then transmits a Limit of
Movement Authority back to the train. (SIL4)
Computer Based Interlocking (CBI) performs route based interlocking function and
transmission of “State of the Railway” information to RATP. (SIL4)
Vehicle ATP (VATP) receives movement authorities from RATP, calculates safe
brake profile for the train and supervises train location and speed to ensure it stays
within safe values. (SIL4)
Vital Systems ensure safety by end to end safety checks and guards (more details will
be provided in the SSRS and SSDS of the Vital Sub-Systems). The following non-
vital systems connect to the vital sub-systems to facilitate the overall operation of the
system:
ATS system ensures centralized supervision of the whole system and allows dispatch
of orders to relevant equipment. It also provides advanced route and regulation
control to automatic train operation during commercial service. (SIL2)
Region ATO (RATO) handles status and alarm monitoring of CBTC system, and
transmits operational information received from ATS system (time, schedule,
regulation information, etc.).(SIL2)
Vehicle ATO (VATO) allows automatic control of train speed according to regulation
targets, door management at stations and man machine interface with driver. (SIL2).
Please refer to Appendix A for the System Architecture Drawing for diagrams of how
the various subsystems connect to each other.
4.2 System Interfaces

The system interfaces can be divided into the following groups:
 Internal interfaces
 External interfaces
The internal interfaces include the interface of each sub-system within CITYFLO 650.
100222654
Revision : 1.0
The external interfaces include third party systems and man-machine interfaces with
drivers, operators and maintenance staff.
Physical characteristics of those interfaces as well as main information exchanged
through them are described.
The following diagram shows a representation of the CITYFLO 650 system as applied
to Delhi Metro Line 7 with each interface uniquely identified. This diagram should be
referred to in conjunction with the tables below.
100222654
Revision : 1.0
OCC
Master Mimic Overview CCTV Central Control
Radio PIS 4 Operators
clock System Controller
1 2 3 5 6
H
CATS
Printer / Schedule
Gateway
D PLC EBI Screen
Plotter Compiler
Servers
D D D
D D
DTS
CORE CABINET
CER
Fibre
ODF
(by DMRC)
FIBRE OPTIC CABLING (BY DMRC)
v
FIBRE OPTIC CABLING (BY BT) In-Line
Splice
Enclosure
STATION SER ODF
(by DMRC)
Fibre Fibre
F
Local ATS
DTS
Operator 7 EBI Screen E CABINET
Servers
Ethernet
E E
E
Power
Over PC
Service
Ethernet
personnel Switch F PLC I/O I RATP RATO 15
CFMS tool
Interlocking
G EBI Lock
10 RS232
F
CCTV PTU tool
Radio Ethernet CBTC DOOR 8
Radio A PLC PSD
PC WNRA C
(by Others)
LOS Antenna LOS or LCX Antenna 18
PTU tool
OCS
Service 9
Maintenance B
Terminal
CCTV CBTC personnel
5.8GHz 2.4GHz ESP,
B EKT
Radio Radio
VATC Fibre Optic

LOS LOS/LCX
Antennas Antennas
RS-485 Norming point
2.4 GHz Wayside Objects
Y reader
Coax Coax
RS-232
CCTV Tachometers
MDR
Radio (on wheels) Norming points
Pulses
Q R S
VATP VATP COMM VATP

VATO
(Vital I/O) (CPUs) (Ethernet) (Serial)
MVB
X T Axle counter Point
Signals
(Mainline) Machine
V W U RS-485
U
Doppler
Safety MIO VCU-C
relays (Non-Vital I/O)
Train position Driver Train route
11 12 13 14
TRAIN WAYSIDE
Non-Vital Event
Vital Circuits DMI TIMS Rec.
Circuits
One Train Cab 16 Driver
Figure 1: CITYFLO 650 main interfaces
100222654
Revision : 1.0
4.2.1 CITYFLO 650 Internal interfaces
Interface Symbol Protocol Description
Ethernet
over FO.
According
Internal CBI Vital communications between EBI Lock and
A to
Interfaces OCS.
EN50159-1
for closed
networks
Discrete Connection with wayside equipment is

OCS –
Signals performed by means of OCS configured
Wayside B
over according to each device type (signal, axle
Equipment
Copper counter, point machine, etc.).
Locally, each EBI Lock interlocking will includes

web-based Maintenance terminal software
Internal.
accessible from dedicated workstations. The
MT is also
CBI- maintenance terminals installed in SER will
C accessible
Maintenance also have the possibility, via the dedicated
via web
Terminal network, of carrying out maintenance
service
operations on interlocking located at other
points of the line.
ATS – Mimic
overview
 ATS-Mimic overview system: display a live
system
representation of the signalling system and
ATS- Ethernet the running trains
Schedule over Cat  ATS-Schedule Compiler: Timetable
Compiler D 5e copper Development
ATS- cable
 ATS-Gateway PLC: connection to external
Gateway (DCS)
systems via Firewall
PLC
 ATS-Peripherals: Client Workstations,
ATS – Printers etc
Peripherals
ATS – RATP  ATS – RATP : ATO Information (Train ID,

ATS – CBI Driving Strategies, Train Status)
Ethernet  ATS – CBI : Route Commands and Wayside
CBI – RATP E over FO Statuses
RATP – (DCS)
 CBI – RATP: State of the Railway (e.g.
RATP
Route, Point, Signal, Axle Counter)
RATP –  RATP – RATP: Handoff Information
100222654
Revision : 1.0

RATO  RATP – RATO : Primarily information
RATO – ATS required for Automatic Train Operation and
receive status and Alarm information.
CBI – CBI
 RATO – ATS : Send/reception of info
to/from ATS: command, supervision and
alarms; such as train alarms, or as
Skip/Hold station, driving profiles to be
transmitted to the trains, etc.
 CBI-CBI: Cross Boundary Route Controls
and Statuses
This interface is used to transfer all data

required between wayside CBTC system and
Ethernet onboard CBTC system. This includes both vital
over FO, and non vital data encapsulated in different
RATP –
compliant packets and protected by safety features.
Radio F
with EN
System On each region, the Wayside Networked Radio
50159-2
standard. Assemblies (WNRA) are connected via FO
cable to RATP system, allowing bidirectional
communications with running trains.
Power over This interface connects between the WNRA

CCTV Radio Ethernet and the CCTV Radio.
G
-WNRA
The CCTV Controller interfaces to the DTS,

DTS - CCTV which in turn interfaces (via the CCTV Radio
H Ethernet
Controller and Onboard network) to the Train IP Cameras
(provided by others).
This interface allows CFMS tool to receive and

Ethernet store information provided by RATP system
RATP –
I over FO about status and operation of CBTC system.
CFMS
(DCS) The stored information can be reproduced and
analysed at a later stage with the same tool.
Not Used J--P
This interface is used to transfer all data

VATC required between wayside CBTC system and
(COMM onboard CBTC system. This includes both vital
Q Ethernet and non vital data encapsulated in different
Board) –
packets and protected by safety features.
Radio (MDR)
RS-485 By means of this interface, the onboard CBTC

VATP – R over system receives information stored in Norming
Norming
copper Points placed along the line. This information is
100222654
Revision : 1.0

Point Reader cable then used to calculate absolute train location on
the line.
This interface allows detection of wheel rotation

by onboard CBTC system. This information is
used to calculate train speed, acceleration,
TTL pulses
travelling direction as well as travelled distance.
VATP – over
S Advance processing of this data also provides
Tachometers copper
information on potential slip / slide events in
cable
case of axle blocking, braking capabilities,
automatic wheel diameter calibration and vital
zero speed detection.
This interface is used to detect train speed and

RS-485 acceleration by independent means from
VATP –
over tachometers mounted on train axles. Such
Doppler T
copper information is primarily used to detect wheel
Radar
cable slip and slide and still allow accurate calculation
of train location.
VCU-C – U MVB This interface is intended for transmission of

DMI relevant operational information between the
onboard CBTC system and the DMI.
Vital digital
VATP – outputs
Interface with the train e.g. Emergency Brake,
Safety V under a
Door Enable, Propulsion Enable.
Relays fail-safe
design.
By means of this interface, onboard CBTC

VCU-C –
W MVB equipment communicates with all non-vital I/O
MIO
designed in train interface and the DMI.
VATC
This interface allows the VATC to use a MVB
(COMM
X Ethernet bus for communicating with the DMI and the
Board) –
MIO.
VCU-C
RS-232 This interface is used to interact with onboard

over CBTC system in real time and also log data for
VATP – PTU Y
copper later analysis. It is intended primarily for testing,
cable maintenance and diagnostic purposes.
1.1.1
4.2.2 CITYFLO 650 External interfaces

1.2
100222654
Revision : 1.0
This interface allows time

synchronisation of ATS
system with an external
To be determined during
ATS – Master Clock 1 master clock. ATS acts then
interface meetings
as master time system to
synchronise time for the
whole system.
This interface allows reporting

of the alarm and status of the
Train borne Signalling & Train
To be determined during Control Equipment to OCC
ATS – Radio 2 interface meetings through a Radio
Communication Port. PTI
information shall also be
passed from Train radio to
OCC via this interface.
The PIDS interface with the

To be determined during ATS to display and play the
ATS – PIDS 3 interface meetings train running information on
the platform and other
locations in the station.
This is to allow CCTV images

CCTV – Mimic panel 4 Video I/O to be displayed on the mimic
overview system
This interface will be based

upon a graphical user
interface allowing interaction
with the operator for
command and supervision
purposes. This interface
ATS – Operators 5, 6, 7 Graphical User Interface
makes extensive use of
mouse functions to accelerate
operator actions. In addition,
keyboard shortcuts are also
available to operate the
system.
Vital “Door Enable” control,

Door PLC – PSD 8 Copper Wires and “Door Closed & Locked”
status.
User interfaces between

Maintenance Equipment Through graphical diagnostic tools and
9, 10, 18 maintenance personnel will
– Operators interfaces
be performed by means of
graphical menus and options.
100222654
Revision : 1.0
Main equipment includes:

 Maintenance
Terminal
 PTU
 CFMS
Free voltage contacts Interface with the train wiring

VATC – Train 11, 12
connected to train wires and train controls.
Train run number
- Station identification,
distance from the station,
target speed, actual speed
and permitted speed.
- Station characteristic (which

VATC – TIMS 13 Ethernet side to open door)
- Trainborne ATC status for

train operator (i.e. zero
velocity relay status, wheel
slip/slide detected,
localization, major alarms,
start-up condition)
Status information as required

VATC – Event Recorder 14 Ethernet by Even Recorder (provided
by Train Supplier)
Door Open and Close

Serial interface (to be
RATO - PSD 15 commands / statuses. PSD
defined)
Health status / alarms.
Speed, Distance To Go,

Statuses, Alarms, Selection
Buttons – to allow driver to
DMI – Driver 16 Graphical User Interface drive in Manual Modes. To
be determined during Human-
Machine-Interface design in
conjunction with Operators.
4.3 Supervision Architecture

The Automatic Train Supervision for the Delhi Metro is divided into three categories:
 Category 1: Central Operation
 Category 2: Local Operation and external communication
 Category 3: Off-line Operation
100222654
Revision : 1.0
Operation Control Center Backup Operation Control Center Training Centre
Controller Workstations, CCTV, Controller Workstations, CCTV, Trainer Trainee Trainee Training
Mimic, Playback, etc. EBI Screen Mimic, Playback, etc. EBI Screen OPC workstation workstation workstation Servers
OPC
Servers Servers
Redundant Transmission Network Redundant Transmission Network Standalone Network
Redundant Transmission Network
Maintenance MMI, Train controller, CCTV, EBI Screen RATP CBI Maintenance MMI, Train controller, CCTV, EBI Screen RATP CBI Depot Controller, etc EBI Screen CBI
Interlocking VDU, crew controllers, etc. Servers Interlocking VDU, crew controllers, etc. Servers Servers
Station Control Station Control Depot Control
Figure 2: Simplified ATS architecture

The detail system architecture can be found in the System Block Diagram for Delhi
Metro Line 7.
4.3.1 Central Operation

The Operation Control Centre (OCC) for Line 7 is located in DMRC building. The OCC
consists of the OCC theatre, the Central Equipment Room (CER) and the Operation
Planning Centre (OPC).
The mainline traffic operation takes place in the OCC theatre. The facilities for train
control are provided e.g. traffic controller workstation, chief controller workstation,
CCTV monitors, mimic panels, printers, plotter, etc. All facilities are connected through
the dual redundant transmission network to the EBI Screen hot/standby servers in the
CER.
The CER contains the EBI Screen servers, Maintenance MMI and CATC system
development workstation, the transmission network equipment and Ethernet switch to
connect to other external systems such as SCADA, PAS/PIDS, master clock and
radio network.
The timetable management and planning is taken care by the operators in the OPC.
The operation planning workstations are connected to the same dual redundant
network with the EBI Screen servers.
There is a replica OCC backup at a different building; this is to ensure that the traffic
operation will not be disturbed when the OCC is failed. The Backup Operation Control
Centre (BCC) has its own dual redundant network which connects to the local control
workstations and interlockings.
4.3.2 Local Operation

The station control or local control is located at each station. Typically, there are
Station Control Room (SCR) and Signalling Equipment Room (SER) at every station.
Some stations may have Signal Maintenance Room (SMR) and Crew Controller
Room.
100222654
Revision : 1.0
The SCRs at non-interlocking station contain CCTV workstations and train control
workstations while the SCRs at interlocking station have CCTV workstations, train
control workstations and extra workstations as interlocking VDU workstations.
The SERs at non-interlocking station contain the Ethernet switches for the
transmission network while the SERs at interlocking station contain the Ethernet
switches, maintenance terminals and EBI Screen local redundant servers.
The crew controller workstations are provided in the crew controller’s rooms at
terminal station. The maintenance MMIs are provided in the SMRs of stations with
points and crossing.
The Depot Control Operation is considered as a local operation, it controls only within
the depot area. Depot has the same control rooms as the interlocking station and
there are SMR, SER, crew controller’s room and Depot Control Centre (DCC) which is
similar to the SCR in the interlocking station.
4.3.3 Off-line Operation

The training centre in the OCC is an off-line operation. The operation in the training
centre is standalone and has no effect at all to the on-line operation. The workstations
provided in the training centre serve as training simulator, trainer workstation and
trainee workstation.
The training simulator simulates the operational conditions designed by revenue
service personnel for the trainees to learn. It is equipped with Play Back function for at
least 24 hours and replays scenes or incidents according to the data recorded by
system in order to assist the operating personnel for analysis.
100222654
Revision : 1.0
4.4 Wayside System Architecture

The system is based on the Communications Based Train Control (CBTC) CITYFLO 650
system. The Wayside CBTC system is based on the following main components:
 Region ATP (RATP);

 Region ATO (RATO);
 Computer Based Interlocking (CBI);
 Object Controller System (OCS);
 ATS (Automatic Train Supervision)
 Data Transmission System (DTS);
 Train to Wayside Communication (TWC);
 Platform Screen Doors (PSD)
A key early decision when determining the architecture for a CITYFLO 650 application is to
determine the number of “regions” which the line or lines will be divided into. The size of a
region is determined by several factors, including the number of wayside objects, the length of
that system and the number of trains in operation. For Delhi Metro Line 7 we have planned for
10 regions; 5 for the mainline and 5 for the depots. The following figure shows the Wayside
Architecture for Delhi Metro Line 7.
Automatic Train Supervision

(Central ATS)
Control center
ATS Workstations Videowall
External
systems
DTS
cabinet
Central ATS servers Gateway

(hot-stdby)
Wayside DTS
DTS cabinet
Region equipment
Local ATS CBI RATP RATO

(hot-stdby) (hot-stdby) (hot-stdby) (hot-stdby)
Object controllers Door PLC

Trackside
Radio Point
Signals Axle Counter ESP PSD
machines
Figure 3: Wayside System Architecture
100222654
Revision : 1.0
4.4.1 Region ATP (RATP) Subsystem

The RATP subsystem controls the vital portions of the overall ATC system. The overall RATP
subsystem is divided into distinct regions of control in the same manner as the RATO
subsystem is divided into regions of control. The primary functions of each RATP are to
vitally control the following elements contained in its region:
 Train movement;
 Secondary train detection;
 Track switch operation;
 Train and wayside door enabling;
 Handoff of trains from one region to another;
 Signal operations
The regions control trains located in their region of control. The RATPs hand-off trains going
from one region to another. Each region can have multiple entrances from outside lines or
yard areas.
4.4.2 Region ATP (RATP) Architecture

The RATP is setup in a Hot-Standby configuration. Each RATP system A and B, as shown,
see
100222654
Revision : 1.0
Figure 4. The active cradle can be selected manually, either locally via a key-switch on the
RATP cabinet, or remotely via the ATS computer console. In the event of a failure of the
active RATP, the standby will automatically become
active without input from an operator. Only the active
system generates outgoing data packets to the trains and
other subsystems and controls the trackside equipment.
Within each ATP, both channels enable the Synchronized
Vital Driver (SVD) board output, which in turn drives an
enable signal to each channel processor. This ensures that
a partially failed ATP does not transmit data to the Radio Communications Processor (RCP).
The channel 1 RATP processor interfaces to Radio Communication Processor and the
channel 2 ATP processor interfaces to the Wayside Communications Processor. Both
channel ATP processors control digital outputs and receive digital inputs.
All wayside device interfaces are brought back to redundant RATP units to allow the
redundant unit to take control of the system when a switchover takes place from the active to
the standby. Therefore, train control, train tracking, and interlocking functions are
implemented by the currently active RATP.
100222654
Revision : 1.0
Figure 4: RATP Rack
The two channels are configured to detect single point hardware failures. Each channel has
an ATP processor that performs all vital safety functions. There is one health relay associated
with a RATP system which is controlled by independent hardware. Each ATP processor within
a RATP system monitors its associated health relay and enters a shutdown state if the health
relay is not energized. If one channel of a RATP system shuts down, the health relay for that
system will no longer indicate "healthy". The second channel of the RATP system will detect
the "unhealthy" state and also shutdown. In this way, either channel in a RATP system can
shutdown thus disabling all outgoing system commands to the TWC radio, DTC Ethernet, and
discrete (relay) outputs.
The cross-channel Ethernet network is a point-to-point bidirectional link that is used for
channel synchronization, data transfer between channels and cross-checking of data that the
other channel has. Each channel compares its cross-check data set with the other channel’s
data set. The comparison is used to detect single-point failures. If a failure is detected in
either channel, the RATP will enter a fail-safe shutdown state as previously described.
4.4.3 Region ATO (RATO) Subsystem

The RATO is a Hot-Standby configuration. The ATO functions are responsible for the “non-
vital” operations of the train control system, The ATO functions include:
 Alarm generation and event logging
 Interface with the Central ATS and RATP
 Control of station platform doors
 Train operation according to commanded speed profile (acceleration and deceleration),
including performance levels (coasting, energy saving etc.)
 Station Door Control Requests
 Routing the trains through the system
Each Region has an independent ATO designated as Region ATO. In the same way as the
Region ATP, the Region ATO units are also operationally redundant with an Active and
Standby units. The Region ATO performs all non-vital functions related to directing train
movement and station operation. In support of these functions, the Region ATO is responsible
for the generation of various non-vital train movement controls and commands for the
respective elements located on the wayside. System status and control data associated with
each Region ATO are processed and sent to the ATS, where the current status of the system
is displayed to the Line Controller.
Each Region ATO consists of an independent active and standby system which operates in
conjunction with the Region ATP active and standby system. Both the active and standby
Region ATO collect data from their own region, but only the active system will issue
commands and requests.
A terminal is located within each region cabinet and is available to maintenance personnel as
a diagnostic tool. This terminal is provided for local region requests, diagnostics and
monitoring activities. It can also be used to monitor the region during an event where the main
or contingency ATS systems are unavailable. Switchover in the event of failure is performed
automatically without loss of operation.
The Region ATO interfaces with the Region ATP computer via the Data Transmission
System. It also sends and receives vehicle messages from the Vehicle ATO through the
Region ATP.
4.4.4 Region ATO (RATO) Architecture

The standby system is a hot standby, ready to take control upon a detected failure of the
active RATO.
100222654
Revision : 1.0
Each RATO is comprised of a VME cradle with following boards:
 CPU Board;
 Power supply board.
 Multiple RATOs may be installed into a common enclosure or cradle.
 The CPU board is a 6U, VME board that utilizes an IBM Power PC. The board has the
following 2 built-in ports on the front panel:
 EIA-232 serial port: Used for engineering diagnostics.
 10/100 BaseT Ethernet port: Main communication port used by the RATO to
communicate to the other subsystems (RATP/ATS, etc)
 The RATO uses an add-on second 10/100BaseT Ethernet port that is used for
communication between the primary and the redundant backup RATO in the same
region.
 The CPU board has 128Mbytes of Synchronous DRAM (SDRAM) and 16MB of Flash
memory.
 An add-on Compact Flash Drive of 1 GB or more will be installed on each RATO to store
the RATO software.
Figure 5: Region ATO System Architecture
100222654
Revision : 1.0
4.4.5 Computer Based Interlocking (EBI Lock) Overview

Bombardier’s CBI system comprises the Central Interlocking System (EBI Lock) and a
distributed Object Controller Subsystem (OCS). For CITYFLO 650 the CBI performs two
major functions:
 Route Based Interlocking
 Transmission of “State of the Railway” information to RATP

The “State of the Railway” information transmitted to the RATP includes route status, point
status, track status, etc. The RATP uses this information to determine “Conflict Point” status.
The EBI Lock communicates with the OCS via a separate fibre optic network (physically
separate to the DTS. The OCS comprises sub-racks contained within cabinets. The OCS
Hardware is based on the VME standard and is Bombardier proprietary. For Delhi Metro the
Indoor Cabinet will be used, as the OCS will be located within the SER. Each OCS interfaces
with wayside objects such as axle counter, point machines, signals and other devices.
4.4.6 Train Routing and Degraded Operation

The Traffic Controller is able to route trains via the ATS System. The ATS interacts with the
RATO and EBILock to . The RATO is responsible for moving each train from station to station
based route triggered by the ATS. The EBILock uses the same information to control wayside
objects. The RATP ensure that the train travels safely. The Automatic Train Regulation
(ATR) system within the ATS is responsible for timetable management. The ATR is able to
route the trains by either considering Headway or the Timetable.
100222654
Revision : 1.0
4.5 Data Communication System Architecture

The DCS provides a redundant, fault-tolerant communications path between central control,
the station platforms, the station equipment rooms and at trackside. This includes wayside
ATC equipment, central control equipment, TWC equipment and non-ATC equipment
interfacing with the Bombardier-provided ATC equipment.
This network is only used for ATC-related communications. In order to maintain system safety
and reliability requirements, the DCS network is not used for other purposes.
The DCS consists of multiple redundant gigabit Ethernet networks. These networks contain
distributed switches interconnected by a combination of divergent single mode fibre optic
cabling and data category grade copper cabling. Each ATC equipment location will have two
gigabit Ethernet switches of the store-and-forward type to which the ATC equipment will be
connected. These switches are of a modular industrial design, supporting hot swappable
components. The network is isolated into areas based on track and equipment layout and is
further isolated by line and yard. Redundant firewalls and anti-virus service (according to
specific project requirements) may be provided and configured.
Figure 6: Example of the switch used in

DCS
For the subsystem level in this project the DCS comprises: DTS+NRS+CCTV Radio as shown
in figure below.
Figure 7: Data Communication System
100222654
Revision : 1.0
4.6 Radio System Architecture
4.6.1 Train to Wayside Communications (TWC) System
4.6.1.1 CBTC CITYFLO 650 Radio (2.4GHz)

The CITYFLO 650 Radio provides a radio based private information transfer channel for the
signalling information at very high speed. This network provides a private, secure and
redundant communications path between the ATC equipment and the onboard ATC
equipment.
The CITYFLO 650 Radio system can be viewed as a “black box” where a data message of a
specific format is passed in both directions, with expected throughput and error rates. In the
CITYFLO 650 Radio system, the signal is passed either as baseband data (Ethernet) or at
radio frequency (2.4 GHz spread spectrum RF).
The CITYFLO 650 Radio system consists of a network core equipment cabinet, wayside
distributed equipment (WNRA, heliax cables, leaky cable and RF signal combiners). The
trainborne TWC equipment include Mobile Data Radio (MDR) and RF antennas as shown in
Figure 8.
RCP is located at the head and tail of data transmission channel in the TWC sub-system. As
the part of section ATC and train carried ATC equipment, RCP transforms the information
from ATO and ATP computer into train control data pack (ATC data pack), which is sent to
TWC main instrument or mobile data radio (MDR).
Figure 8: Train to Wayside Communication Diagram
100222654
Revision : 1.0
TWC Wayside Configuration - LOS

Maximum Unobstructed Free Space Separation
Free Space Distance Free Space Distance
RADIO ZONE 1 RADIO ZONE 2

F1
F2
LOS Antenna LOS Antenna
1A-2 2B-2
LOS Antenna
1A-1 LOS Antenna
2B-1
FSJ4 Feeder Coaxial FSJ4 Feeder Coaxial

Cable (10m max) Cable (10m max)
WNRA WNRA
1A 2A
Fiber Optic Trunk 1A

Fiber Optic Trunk 1B
Ethernet Ethernet
Two Fiber Optic Pigtail Assemblies per WNRA
Switch - A Switch - B (supplied by BT)
Fiber Optic Splice Enclosures
Region Region
ATP - A ATP - B
Revision A
Figure 9: Train to Wayside Communication Configuration
4.6.1.2 CCTV Radio System

A separate and dedicated 5.8GHz Ethernet radio will be provided for transmission of train
based CCTV images at the OCC.
On the wayside the CCTV Radios will be collocated with the CF650 Radio System WNRAs.
In this way the same Ethernet Switch can be used, saving on additional equipment and
improving maintainability.
At the OCC a separate CCTV controller will be provided, with a user workstation. In this way
the User will be able to select the train and camera identification for display on the Overhead
Display system.
4.6.2 Network Radio System (NRS) Overview

The NRS subsystem provides continuous communication between all trains and the wayside
radios.
The system performs a broadcast from the wayside radios without the need for an IP
connection between the base and mobile radio, therefore, the wireless link is not an IP based
communications channel. A frequency channel change request is sent to the radio by the
VATO based on vehicle civil location. This is utilized to begin the hand-off process. If the
mobile radio is in the process of being polled (receiving data) or transmitting back to the base,
the radio will maintain the current frequency until the poll is complete before changing to the
new frequency. There is sufficient signal overlap in each RF area to allow for transmission or
reception of data at the fringe of any RF coverage zone.
The actual poll time to receive the message is in the millisecond range; therefore, it is virtually
impossible to lose data during a hand-off. This approach has resulted in excellent hand-off
characteristics and limits the extent to which the data communication system is susceptible to
100222654
Revision : 1.0
either a cascading failure or network intrusion. Utilizing this technique has proven itself on
previous CITYFLO 650 projects as a reliable communications handoff technique.
The MDR will scan for the radio’s frequency which has been detected along the track and give
the information to the VATO to select the best available candidate frequency.
The initiating message from the region (poll message) is broadcast to all active WNRAs.
Since each WNRA is operating on a non-overlapping frequency, the message is transmitted
simultaneously (ignoring network latency delays) on all of the system’s frequencies. As long
as the VATO has selected the correct radio frequency, the radio will communicate to the
wayside when addressed.
Connected to each RATP is the Data Communication System core. The data network
includes the radio Wayside Network Radio Assemblies (WNRA), which act as radio access
points (RAP) for the train to wayside communications.
The wayside radio antenna system consists of the Line-of-Sight (LOS) antennas. Train control
data is exchanged between the wayside and train borne systems through this link. The RATP
is responsible for formatting all data to be transmitted to the trains. It receives information
from the central control through the RATO, and the RATO itself, and transmits that data along
with data of its own to the trains. The RATP also receives all data from the trains within its
region, distributing the portion that is intended for the RATO. The Radio equipment onboard
includes LOS antennas, and MDR (mobile data radio on board the trains).
Figure 10: Radio Architecture, Normal Transmission
100222654
Revision : 1.0
The Data Communication System cabinet receives the formatted data message from the
RATP that is intended for the trains that are currently in that region. This data message is
passed to all the WNRAs within that region, which in turn broadcast the message over an RF
link, through the antenna system connected to the WNRAs, to the passing trains.
Radio system is designed to be fully redundant without any single point of failure. Each
location in the line is covered by two radios. In case of a single failure in a radio device, the
system can still operate transparently without any degradation in performance.
100222654
Revision : 1.0
4.7 Onboard System Architecture
4.7.1 VATC System Description

The VATC equipment contains two main subsystems:
 Vehicle Automatic Train Protection (VATP) subsystem (SIL4)
 Vehicle Automatic Train Operation (VATO) subsystem (SIL2)

In addition, there are supporting subsystems included in the onboard equipment, also described here in this
document:
 Radio communication subsystem
 Speed measurement
 Positioning subsystem
 Driver-Machine Interface (DMI)
LOS Antenna
LOS Antenna LOS Antenna
LcX Antenna LcX Antenna
A-end
CCTV
VATC Trainline
RADIO
MMI MDR1 VATP VATO VCU MIO TCMS Train Control
MDR2
ATC-MVB
Tachometer 1 Norming Tachometer3

Doppler
Point Reader Radar
Figure 11: VATC Overview
4.7.2 VATC System Architecture

The vehicle ATC system is a dual-channel cross-checked redundant architecture using fail-safe principles.
To ensure system safety, two CPUs independently read the same inputs and determine the proper state of
the outputs. All inputs and outputs are then cross-checked by each CPU board to ensure that no
undetected single-point failure can occur. All safety related outputs are either fail-safe in design or are
implemented with dual output architecture so that a single failure in the output hardware can not cause an
unsafe condition. Each train will have two VATC systems. One system will be designated as “Controlling”
and the other will be the Backup. Should there be a failure (data mismatch, hard failure, etc.) the Standby
VATC system will take over the control of the train in a seamless fashion.
100222654
Revision : 1.0
The Vehicle ATC equipment consists of a single card cage assembly called the vehicle ATC cradle, a data
radio that provides communication between vehicle and wayside, an RF tag reader called the Norming
Point Reader that reads tags placed along the track, speed sensor devices and various relays used to
interface to the vehicle trainlines. There are two sets of vehicle ATC equipment on each train for operation
redundancy.
The vehicle ATC cradle contains 3 CPU components: 2 ATP components and 1 ATO component. The
ATP components are programmed with the vital software used to ensure safe operation of the train. The
ATO component is programmed with the software used to perform all of the non-safety related, operational
functions.
More details about the VATC are included in the SSRS and the SSDS of the VATP and the VATO
subsystems.
Figure 12: VATC Architecture
4.7.3 VATC Interfaces

The vehicle ATC must interact with other systems on board the train as shown in Figure 13. These systems
include:
 Propulsion and Brake Systems (via trainlines)
 Manual Controllers (via trainlines)
 Miscellaneous Car Equipment (via Trainlines)
 Vehicle Doors (via trainlines and train bus network)
 Passenger Information System (via train bus network)
 Train Management System (via train bus network)

The above assumptions are based on preliminary discussions with the various contractors. These
assumptions may change during the detailed design discussions with the contractors.
100222654
Revision : 1.0
Trainlines
Relay Logic
Interface
Speed Propulsion
Sensors System Manual
Controllers
Norming Point Dual Channel ATP
Tag Reader
Brake System
Other VATC
Doors
PTU
Single Channel ATO
VNRS
Misc. Car
VCU-C
Equipment
VATC Card Cage Assembly
Passenger
Information Train Network
Systems
BT MVB Network
Figure 13: VATC Interfaces
4.7.4 CBTC Radio Communication

The CBTC Radio Communication subsystem is hot-standby dual redundant. There are two Mobile Data
Radios (MDR’s) per VATC. Each MDR has one LOS and one LCX antenna. So in total, per EMU, there
are four LOS and four LCX antennas. The radio subsystem performs the communication functions
between the vehicle and the wayside equipment using the 2.4 GHz spread spectrum radio.
4.7.5 CCTV Radio

Two CCTV radios and associated antennas are proposed for each train (one per DM). These radios will be
connected to an Ethernet network supplied by the train supplier.
4.7.6 Positioning Subsystem

The onboard system includes a positioning system that normally consists of the following components for
each VATC.
4.7.6.1 Norming points reader

There is one norming point reader for each of the VATC systems mounted under the end car in the centre
of the rail. A total of two norming point readers per train will be needed for redundancy purposes. The
norming point reader is used to read the norming points (tags) which are located between the running rails
throughout the system. When a valid tag is read, the train location is updated and the position error is reset
100222654
Revision : 1.0
to zero. The norming point reader is powered with 24VDC from the VATC system. Power and signal are via
separate cables.
Figure 14: Norming point reader
The reader transmits a 2.4 GHz radio carrier frequency to and receives modulated reflections from each
norming point tag over which the antenna passes. The reflections from each tag provide the reader
assembly with an exact location that corresponds with a point on the vehicle's physical map. The tag data
from each norming point is verified for accuracy by the reader assembly and is then passed to each vehicle
ATP channel through an RS-485 serial link. To provide better reading statistics active tags are used (tags
have an internal battery). The ATP processors use this data to determine the vehicle's precise location in
the system.
Figure 15: Position Error Accrual Mitigation
4.7.6.2 Tachometer
There are two (2) tachometers (Pulse Generators) installed on the axles of the train for each
VATC system. The Tachometers are used to determine speed and distance to accurately locate
the train.
100222654
Revision : 1.0
4.7.6.3 Doppler Radar

There is one (1) Doppler Radar on the train for the VATC system. The Doppler Radar is used to
validate the speed signals from the Tachometers and compensate for wheel slip/slide effects to
maintain the vehicles position.
4.7.6.4 DMI
Two DMIs are provided, one per end. It is anticipated that these will be housed within a cabinet
provided by the train supplier. The DMIs will only be used during degraded modes (RM, Cut-Out,
ROS).
The DMIs will interface with the VATP and VATO via a dedicated MVB (Multi Vehicle Bus)
running the length of the train. The VATP and VATO will access the MVB via the VCU-C (Vehicle
Control Unit- Computer) that acts as a protocol converter – taking data over Ethernet and
converting it to MVB.
100222654
Revision : 1.0
4.8 Platform Screen Doors

The interface between the CITYFLO 650 system and the Platform Screen Door (PSD) control panel (PSC)
can be summarised as follows:
 Vital Door Enable sent using volt free contacts from OCS Vital Output Relay (VOR) board.
 Vital Door Closed & Locked signal received by OCS Contact Condition Monitoring (CCME) board.
 Serial data link (Ethernet) between RATO and PSC for open/close commands and status
information.
The RATP sends vital Door Enable command and receives Door Closed and Locked status via DTS
connection to CBI. The RATO sends non-vital Door Open/Door Close command to PSD. PSD Door Closed
and Locked status will be monitored by the CBI.
Figure 16: PSD Block Diagram
100222654
Revision : 1.0
APPENDIX A Drawings.
System Architecture Drawing
System_Architecture
_Drawing _DEL7.pdf

System Architecture Description DL7

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

System Architecture Description DL7

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

DELHI METRO RAIL CORPORATION LTD.

DELHI MRTS PROJECT PHASE III - LINE 7

RCS ENG Plan External Released

©2011, Bombardier Inc. or its subsidiaries. All rights reserved. 2013-10-31

Filename:System Architecture Description.docx Page 1 of 38 Template ID-Number: 011496_R0

Revision Date Description of Changes

00 2013-10-21 First issue

ii) Ergonomic design and implementation and

iii) Training, DLP, maintenance

2 Abbreviations & Definitions

AOA Area of Authorization

ARS Automatic Route Setting

ATC Automatic Train Control

ATO Automatic Train Operation

ATP Automatic Train Protection

ATR Automatic Train Regulation

ATS Automatic Train Supervision

BCC Backup Operations Control Centre

CANbus Controller Area Network Bus

CATS Central Automatic Train Supervision

CBI Computer Based Interlocking

CBTC Communications-Based Train Control

CCTV Closed Circuit Television

CENELEC European Committee for Electro-technical Standardization

CER Central Equipment Room

CFMS CITYFLO Monitoring System

COTS Central Operator Training Simulator

CPU Central Processing Unit

CRC Cyclical Redundancy Check

DCC Depot Control Centre

DCS Data Communication System

DMI Driver Machine Interface

DTS Data Transmission System

ECS Element Construction Set

EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility

ESP Emergency Stop Plunger

GPS Global Positioning System

GUI Graphic User Interface

HMU Health Monitoring Unit

HVAC Heating Ventilation Air Conditioning

KVM Keyboard, Video, Mouse

LAN Local Area Network

LATS Local Automatic Train Supervision

LCD Liquid Crystal Display

LCO Local Control Operator

LCX Leaky Feeder

LDP Large Display Panel

LOS Line of Sight

Mbps Megabit per second

MDR Mobile Data Radio

MHz, GHz Megahertz, Gigahertz

MIO Modular digital Input Output

MMI Man-Machine Interface

MVB Multiple-function Vehicle Bus

NMS Network Management/Monitoring System

NPR Norming Point Reader

NRS Network Radio System

NTP Network Time Protocol

OCC Operation Control Centre

OCS Object Controller System

OPC Operation Planning Centre

PAS Public Address System

PIDS Passenger Information Display System

PLC Programmable Logic Controller