Russian Tactical System in WW2

In response to an email question, I wrote the following description of Russian

tactics in WW II. I thought some here might find it useful, or worth comment.

There were two principle components of the army, rifle forces and mech forces.
Rifle forces were numerically dominant and provided the structure of lines and
provided mass for attacks. They were also expected to lead breakthrough
fighting. Mech forces were numerically an order of magnitude smaller, but much
better equipped. They did most of the attacking after the first break in, and a fair
portion of the defensive fighting as reaction reserves.

The overall system was echelons in depth, a macro version of traditional line and
column tactics from clear back to the Napoleonic period. Compared to others,
they used much greater depth. This was a reaction to empirical unreliability of
single layers and subelements. Flat deployments of all major subelements on line
were almost never used. Defensive deployments were generally 2 up 1 back to
cover frontage, while attack deployments were frequently in full column, a major
unit getting the frontage of only a single sub-unit. This was true for both rifle and
mech components, though mech were a bit more likely to use 2 up 1 back on the
attack, looking for a weak point rather than overloading a chosen one.

All echelons and formation types were expected to provide their own scouting and
their own inherent fire support - though it was frequently fairly modest - and had
ways of accomplishing their typical missions without any outside assistance.
There was much less favoring of a single echelon level as the coordinator of all
actions. And important decisions were shoved much higher up the chain of
command than was typical in other country's systems.

There were all sorts of specialist unit types, which were generally folded into the
formations they were supposed to work with as attachments or 4th or 5th pieces
of their command span, each an echelon level smaller than the unit they
supported. But to a much greater extent than other armies, they also pooled
these an echelon level or two higher, and then assigned them to larger
formations than usual, to bump up their combined arms ratio in this or that
category.

This was effectively a method of centralizing the force composition decision at a

higher level, typically army. Thus, AA would exist as divisions of 4 regiments each
about enough to protect a single division sector, by pushing their battery
subcomponents down to regiments. But an AA division was used, in order to put
the decision "where does the AA go?" in the hands of the army commander or his
chief of staff. He might delegate regiments to each of his divisions but he might
instead concentrate it on a single sector or use most of it to cover artillery
positions or supply routes etc.

The same was done with AT formations, 120mm mortar formations, rocket
formations, larger caliber artillery formations, motorcycle recon formations, etc.

The actual mix of weapons present in an area therefore depended on 1 TOE less
losses and 2 higher level decisions about where to put all this extra stuff. The
TOE at the division level or below was a base level or bare minumum. They'd
have more of whatever the mission called for, added on top by army or front
command.

The mech guys fought more nearly at TOE - their TOE just included lots of these
extras, typically at mech corps level, occasionally at tank army level. Even then
the tank army stuff was usually assigned to a given mech corps for the duration
of a single operation.

The operational units were rifle armies, tank armies, and tank or mech corps.
Rifle armies accomplished things with their organic rifle divisions, and frequently
had a single tank corps assigned when they had an offensive role, and/or a few
brigades or regiments of tanks or SUs. Tank corps were minimum operational
units of armor for fighting in the mech fashion. Independent brigades and
regiments were instead used to support rifle formations. Tank armies generally
had 3 mech corps, 2 tank and 1 mech being the most common form at midwar.

The mech had a bit more infantry weight and generally had the role of holding
the ground taken until rifle formations closed up. The offensive part of the mech
way of fighting was quite tank heavy. The tank corps was effectively their armor
division, and its permanent brigade structure was there version of KGs or combat
commands. Meaning, all cross attachments and such occurred at the brigade
level, and everything other than the main 4 brigade themselves was given to
some one of them for its mission. One was frequentty kept out of battle as the
corps commander's reserve, and anything not really assigned would be put with
it. The tank corps structure of 3 tank and 1 motor rifle brigade was meant to
strike with tank heavy forces and hold the ground taken with mech infantry.

The mech infantry was purely truck borne, and intended to keep up with the
tanks in an operational sense, but fought dismounted as ordinary infantry. The
organic "antitank" regiments of the mech formations were their main field
artillery as well - 76mm guns, motorized. They also used 120mm mortars, again
motorized. Nothing heavier was expected to keep up with the mech or to stay
supplied - though MRLs were also used in major operations, frequently for just 1-
2 shoots then leaving to resupply. So when motor infantry went to hold
something, it occupied ground already taken by the tank forces, dug in infantry,
set up 76mm guns for direct and indirect fire, registered 120mm mortars and
their own organic 82mms - the last typically direct lay - and held until foot rifle
formations relieve them.

The striking portion was the tank brigade, with a single battalion of infantry to the
equivalent of a western tank battalion's worth of tanks. Thus quite tank heavy.
The infantry typically rode on the decks of the tanks. If some followed in trucks
e.g. for weapons etc, it was a secondary measure. Indirect artillery coordination
was minimal and limited to the 76mm and 120mm mortar stuff mentioned above.
Basically tanks with riders were expected to be able to take ground on their own.
They were massed and it usually worked, though a failure in the face of a PAK
front or superior AFVs could get expensive. Lacking arty etc.

The infantry method of attack was to assume column formation on the

subelements and then go at the enemy in echelon waves. This does not mean run
him off his feet in one go. On the contrary, it means probe on a narrow front with
a full strength unit, typically matching or outnumbering the defenders opposite in
a single wave. They approach as closely as they can. When halted by fire they get
what cover they can and fire back, as well as calling for all forms of fire support.
The next wave then tries on the same portion of the front, after a bit of that fire
prep. Repeat until the enemy gives way or there is only one subelement left in
the attacking formation. The last one does not repeat the attack, but digs in and
holds whatever is safely Russian after the previous.

This amounted to reinforcing failure, compared to German ideas, and they

regarded it as the height of mindless stupidity, wanton disregard of human life,
folly, stubborness, etc. In fact is was basic attrition tactics adapted to modern
combined arms conditions and to "command push" planning. Attacks were
planned from the rear at a high echelon level, and expected to produce definite
results that the rest of the plan depended on. It was not acceptable in such plans
for various units to report that the situation did not look good in their sector, try
somewhere else. Nor could a successful one call everyone to follow him and
expect to be obeyed - or even heard. The higher level commander was
responsible for giving his subformations do-able tasks and for providing them the
mix of weapons they would need to succeed, in a combined arms and terrain-
tactics sense. The subcommander was responsible for "laying his ship alongside
the enemy" - i.e. fighting like the dickens on the terms his superior gave him.

A plan needed both to work, but the demarkation in responsibility as crystal clear,
and on the whole meticulously enforced. Meaning the lower commander who
shrunk from action would be shot, while a superior who gave hamfisted orders
that were not achievable with what he provided would be relieved. The lower
commander was not responsible for success but for the attempt, for fighting.
Presenting a large casualty role excused failure, and bucked the responsible party
up to the mucketee-muck who ordered the show. Success was always welcome.
Failure in the mission without debiliating losses to explain why the attempt had
failed or to demonstrate that it had been undoable, was inexcusable.

There was a fetish of concentration on attack sectors. It did not mean

overstacking but depth, the waves explained above. The sin being avoided as
evenly spreading the force all along the line, thereby making all the defenders
effective and nowhere getting maximum use of technical means and combined
arms. Even spreading was used only for defense and even then only for a
minumum variety of weapons and the basic depth. Meaning a rifle division in 2 up
1 back formation with its organic 45mm, 76mm, 120mm, MGs, etc. Everything
more specialized was supposed to be in the right place instead of everywhere -
which in practice still meant spread, but over ~1/3 of the line where it would do
the most good, instead of the whole line. So if a rifle army has 6 RDs and an
antitank brigade attached, all of the ATB will be covering the sector of the 2 most
threatened RDs. Instead of 12 ATGs per RD, 4 go without and 2 get 36 each,
enough to put an extra battery of 76mm with each rifle battalion.

As for infantry tactics more specifically, they used a variety of types in both mech
and infantry ways of fighting. In the mech way, the infantry were split between
recon, tank rider, motor rifle, and pioneer. Recon meant motorcycles and a few
trucks for modest supporting weapons, very lightly armed, working alone or with
light tanks or armored cars. They did operational recon and screened long flanks.
They were fully 20% of the infantry manpower of the mech formations, not an
afterthought. Their basic mission is to put eyes everywhere to guide the tanks
intelligently, because the tanks need to stay quite concentrated.

The next 20% were the riders, typically "tommy gunners", who rode on the tank
decks. They did battlefield recon for the tanks and dug enemy infantry out of
their holes, after the tanks drove them deep. The idea was to give the defender a
dilemma about whether to open fire, and at what range. If the enemy fired while
the force were still at long range, the riders dismounted and went to cover, and
the tanks just stood off and plastered the place with HE. If they held their fire and
so remained unspotted, the tanks would come reasonably close and then the
riders would dismount and get into cover near the objective. A few would then
investigate under overwatch from the tanks and the rest of the men. This system
was hard on the infantrymen doing it, but quite effective and very useful for the
tanks. The riders got to be tough as nails, those that stood it and lived, and they
were individually the best in the force.
Half the mech infantry force were the standard motor rifle. They rode in trucks
and had the full heavy weapons load of ordinary infantry - meaning heavier
machineguns, 82mm mortars, ATRs. Their main mission was to hold ground. They
would be called on to back up any of the other types in a pinch, or occasionally to
deliver an infantry-force-type style echelon-wave attack. But usually they were
spared that, being too valuable to throw away. They would also be pressed into
supporting tank forces to bump the infantry to armor ratio back up - after losses
or to accomodate terrain - and they got the missions only infantry could do -
night recons, river crossings, woods interiors, block clearing, etc - that a mech
force still needed done.

The last 10% were pioneers. In the rifle forces they had a larger role, but in the
mech their main mission was to keep the routes serviceable. That meant
bridging, mineclearing, road repair. Sometimes they would be included in assault
groups, along with tommy gunners, as explained in the rifle version of things
next.

Most of the fighting was done by the tankers and the tommy gunners, while most
of the manpower was motor rifle that just held things and did the dozen dirty
infantry jobs. The recon guys were near action a lot but did not press and were
not hard hit, and the pioneers had it easy compared to the others.

In the rifle formations there was also an infantry division of labor. This time there
was foot recon and "shock" groups of tommy gunners, line infantry, weapons,
and pioneers.

Foot recon was a much more aggressive branch of service than the motorcycle
guys, and included night infiltration as the standard mission. They spent days at a
time in enemy rear areas. The mission was generally intel, sometimes raiding or
getting PWs, rarely pitched battle. In major attacks, though, they also got
"pathfinder" jobs - meaning they went first to KO enemy outposts and listening
posts by stealth, marked paths as clear of mines or enemy observation. This was
not "recon by death" but "sneaking into the movies goes to war". These were the
elite of the rifle force.

Shock groups and pioneers were assault specialists, "SWAT". They used tommy
guns, grenades, explosives, and flamethrowers, in roughly that order. They
wanted to get within 50 meters from the enemy to kill him. How they got there
was roughly a third sneaking, a third cover fire, and a third balls of brass. The
focus was on special equipment and using it, and the groups were kept small.
Numbers were not the point. Indeed, the idea was to risk a few (suicidally brave)
men rather than a whole company in the open. They worm their way up to the
enemy, using the distraction afforded by the rest of the war. In major assaults
they followed the pathfinders in platoon sized groups. Individual enemy positions
were targeted by a squad or two, not by massing. The skill level here was
generally high - the men were picked and frequently volunteers - but so were loss
rates, which kept them less uniformly good than foot recon.

Pioneers had other missions - mine clearing, wire clearing, minelaying, improving
positions - and weren't always used for the assault roles above. Drafts would be
made from the larger pioneer formations for the assault details. Plenty of other
pioneers are doing more mundane things in relative safety.

Then there were the weapons. The rifle formations did not generally have tanks -
sometimes modest levels of support from an independent armor brigade, or SU-
76 formation later in the war - so the heavy firepower and overwatch role was
performed by a different subgroup. It was the heavy weapons formations and
artillery attachments. This included the MGs, the mortars, and the ATRs at the
bottom of the echelon tree, and then added small antitank guns, infantry guns,
76mm guns in direct lay, and observors for those and for 120mm mortars
indirect. All were regiment or below weapons in practice and under rifle formation
command. Their role was overwatch fires, to react to fire hitting their own unit by
taking out whoever was messing it up. They also formed the backbone of the
defense when in position, both with heavy HE and MG coverage against infantry,
and the AT net vs. armor. Range and relative immobility are their leading
characteristics.

The Russians got a lot better at that part of infantry fighting as the war
progressed. In 1941 they were pretty awful at it. As late as October 1942, they
were still doing things like having all the 76mm guns and 120mm mortars fire
with the main artillery in big prep fires long before the actual attack, and leaving
most of the MGs in fixed defensive positions. The result was infantry attacks that
consisted almost entirely on riflemen trying to advance onto intact German
positions (since the prep never knew exactly where they all were etc), which
typically failed with huge losses. By 1943 they were using all their supporting
arms much more effectively, and divided artillery use between division and above
stuff (which fired to a plan or prep) and the reactive regimental team and below
stuff (which fired on targets as they appeared). Direct fire by field caliber artillery
was a key Russian method here, much more heavily used than in other armies.

Then there is the main body of the infantry, the line. This was around 2/3rds of
the manpower, after all the roles above are taken out. Everything else made
conditions for them to fight in that they could succeed within, or didn't. On
defense they formed the close range part of the defense, within the ranged
protection of the heavy weapons and artillery and AT networks. Typically in 2 up
1 back deployments, repeated at several echelons levels. The idea was to create
a kind of honeycomb of modest sized positions, platoon to company scale, leaving
the ground between them open, but overlapping their fields of fire at rifle ranges.

On defense there was an enourmous emphasis on digging in as deep as possible,

fortifying buildings, creating obstacles. A rifle soldier spent far more time and
effort with his shovel than with his rifle. The operational effect sought was
unkillable sprawling pockets of annoying ranged fire. They wanted to make the
Germans come up and exchange off each position at grenade range, expecting to
give as good as they got if the Germans obliged.

On the attack, it was instead the waves tactics already mentioned. When a
position succumbed, all the following waves would continue through it and lap
around the edges of positions on either flank. The holdouts standing up to the
repeated attacks would draw more and more of the available supporting artillery
and heavy weapons fire, and a new wave would hit them. Eventually they'd
crumble under the arty, or accumulating losses, or their ammo would give out, or
a shock group would get close and lucky, etc - that was the idea. Of course it was
also expensive if none of those things happened, or soon.

The waves themselves do not try to just run onto the enemy position. They are
driven to ground by fire - it is expected. They are then just to fire back (with
LMGs and rifles) from where they pinned, improving their positioning, cover,
closing the range again, as opportunity offers. If they can't budge they can't
budge - the weapons and arty hit the guys hitting them, and another wave tries.
When cover fire pins enough of the defenders, somebody will get close enough for
tommy guns and grenades, and that will finish it. Everybody takes their share of
the pain. It is thought that there is no getting around it, that flinching from
enemy fire as too strong to attack will just leave another hard fight for tomorrow.
They don't expect to get lopsided clean kills by going around or any other razzle
dazzle, they just wade in and take their licks, to give their own back.

The operational effect wanted is "relentless". To get relentless from expensive

tactics, you need a lot of depth in the deployments, hence the pure column form
of attack e.g. a regiment attacks with up to 8 company waves on a width of only
1-2 companies - saving the last to hold its own frontage along with the weapons -
rather than say 6 companies wide with shallow reserves. It is meant to *outlast*
the enemy on the chosen frontage, to have the last reserve locally. When one of
the early waves succeeds, the remainder continue without loss and the
momentum of the attack stays strong. Effectively the front wave is shielding the
others and helping carrying them deeper into the enemy position before they are
harmed.

I hope this is interesting.

How does arty above field level work in this system ? As godlike, but
unresponsive prep fires, only loosely linked to the antlike action at Battn level ?"

Basically yes, and episodically. The reasons are organizational and logistical.

First, it is pooled at the army level. Some is initially under Stavka control - the
whole Russian army's central reserve - and it passes to Front command, but
those are organizational "way stations" on the way to an army level assignment.
Entire "breakthrough artillery corps" will be assigned to a single rifle army. With
more besides - scores of independent regiments each of 20 or 24 guns. Half of all
the tubes in the force are in these higher level pools, and they are the heavier
half.

The armies that get them, get them because they have some key overall mission
given to them by their Front or the overall high command. Example - 11 Guards
Army is to spearhead the northern prong of Operation Kutuzov, aka the Orel
counteroffensive.

OK, then it gets a whole breakthrough artillery corps - 8th - plus another artillery
division - 14th - plus 12 yes that is right 12 more independent gun artillery
regiments (122mm guns) plus 5 independent howitzer regiments plus 2 mortar
regiments plus 2 rocket brigades and 5 rocket regiments - plus 3 AA divisions and
4 extra AA regiments (37mm) and 2 extra AA battalions (85mm). Overall, the
army has 2650 guns and mortars 76mm and up and 140 MRLs. For 12 rifle
divisions - over 200 guns per division, against more like 50 on the divisional TOE.

Then how are they used? Well, the army picks an attack sector and stuff half its
infantry in that sector, with more behind in second echelon. And the guns pile up
behind that part of the front. Acres of them, layered by their ranges and
missions. Some long ranged 122mm guns with counterbattery missions need to
reach deep so they are pushed up close to the front. The divisional and
regimental 76s and 120s are also close. The rockets come up close when it is
time, but don't stay long. The bulk of the 122s and 152s are farther back, able to
hit the first couple lines of German positions but otherwise sheltered by their
range, spread to ease logisticial burdens and avoid being a perfect counterbattery
or air target, etc.

Massive amounts of ammunition are stockpiled by all these guns. Remember the
logistics system is mostly rail, with horses and wagons hauling stuff from rail line
to firing position - so the build up takes weeks to months. And the stuff isn't
going to move again, not rapidly.

But at zero hour, they can throw the kitchen sink at the German lines. They fire
hurricane barrages for 3 hours on the morning of the attack, while the attacking
infantry are still in their own holes. Not coordinated with ground movements, just
a big fire plan based on whatever intel they've managed to collect before the
whole show starts. Kaboom, front line positions sent into orbit and their
defenders pinned deep in their dugouts. "Our forward defenses looked like a
freshly plowed field" is a typical German side comment.

During the attack itself, the long ranged guns are still in range, and they are
firing at phase lines. Divisional 76s may fire a rolling barrage ahead of the
infantry advance. 122s are firing counterbattery, or hitting known enemy reserve
positions to keep the men there deep while the front line positions are hit. Some
of the bigger guns are drizzling in a few shells an hour on the transport routes,
the rail lines and roads and bridge areas. Just interdiction, to discourage large
movements.

Up at the pointy end, the barrage has lifted as rifle forces go in. They are racing
Germans to the front of the German trenches - Germans climbing out of their
dugouts, digging out of fallen crap, trying to maneuver through caved-in
communication trenches - while Russians race across no man's land. If a few
Germans at their MGs can delay the Russians, the rest of the Germans will get
time to deploy.

Ok, but there are still new targets appearing. MG nests, holdouts, a manned
trench system an hour after the barrage. What does artillery do about these?

The full breakthrough artillery corps and all those regiments of 122s? Precious
little. Instead it falls to the 120mm mortars and the 76mm guns, the stuff pushed
down to regimental command, to deal with them. Sometimes by direct fire. SUs
do the same thing, direct fire.

The heavy stuff is still used on the second day, with new phase lines based on
where they got on the first day. A few batteries have inched forward - to the edge
of the moonscape made by the first day's barrage. But if the attack is going well,
in 2-3 days they will be out of range of the original positions of the guns, and
their ammo stockpiles. And the supporting fire will drop off to nothing - from the
big higher echelon stuff, that is.

When the German defenses harden again, guns will gradually collect opposite
them, as logistics and time allow. A position that has held out for a month in an
otherwise moving front line, will find a whole park opposite. Battering away day
after day, as ammo can be brought up to fed the guns. Each time, firing at the
map coordinate because it is known it is German owned rather than friendly.
Whether there is anyone there that instant, whether they aren't deep in cover,
whether it would be tactically useful - who cares? There are Germans in that
town, shell that town.

On defense, similar methods. Now the artillery park is set up behind the expected
axis of enemy attack. It is layered somewhat deeper, because they understand
the front line may move against them.

Where is the enemy main effort today? Everybody within 10 miles fires at it. They
aren't waiting for a call on the radio saying "Fire mission! enemy in the open!".
Instead, general Konev arranges for staff colonel Demerov to coordinate fires
against the enemy grouping on the Belkov direction, and the colonel calls or visits
a dozen batteries and gives them their orders, signed and in triplicate. These say,
"at 10 AM, fire at sector Belkov A" or what have you.

The defenders in that sector just know that their attackers get inundated with
shells from time to time. If they want to organize reactive fires, they instead use
the organic mortars and direct fire guns (76mm etc) that are part of their own
unit and answer to their own colonel. If they tried to order an independent
122mm gun regiment to fire in their support, they'd get "Who authorized this?
Where is your signed order? Do you think you are Stalin or something?"

The local tactical commander does not have the authority to control all this higher
echelon stuff. It is directed to support him by the higher commander who gave
him his mission. That commander tells him about it, so he understands what will
be done to help him etc. They may coordinate it all the night before in a council
of war in some tent or hovel. But he does not command it, it simply happens in
his sector.

The reason all units have their own organic fire support however modest, is
because it is the only thing they "own" for certain. Everything else might be
directed by some muckety-muck to some more urgent task. The company and
battalion can count on their own mortars, the regiment on its own assigned
76mms and 120mm, with others perhaps added to them as attachments because
the mission is important etc. That is all.

And deep into a running battle, those may be the only things supplied or in the
tactical area, anyway. The big stuff moves slowly. It isn't a scalpel.

The mech guys have their own motorized 76mm guns and 120mm mortars, and
sometimes MRLs, which are always motorized but frequently just one-shot and
withdraw for resupply, style weapons. Occasionally there will be a single
motorized regiment of something bigger, 122s or 152s, attached to some given
tank corps for the duration of an operation - but rarely, and only when motorized.
They benefit from all the big stuff on defense in an important sector or during a
breakthrough - without "owning" it. But once they exploit or the line moves, that
stuff is gone. They use direct fire from tanks and SUs, or the reactive lighter
stuff.

I should perhaps expand on the virtues of this artillery system. Its efficiency
drawbacks and limited flexibility are presumably obvious, to people who know
western systems. But it solves 3 tough problems that the Russians needed
addressed.

First, it gives the higher commander a way to shape the developing battle. He
decides where the artillery weight falls. It isn't pulled away by frantic units trying
to save themselves - which there are in abundance, regularly. Central direction
means artillery is used en masse where it is most needed - operationally
speaking. The shells are not wasted on some secondary front because some FO is
aggressive.

Second, it eases the logistic, unit shifting, and planning burden involved in
keeping all these heavy tubes positioned and supplied. The ammo is saved unless
an express order for its use comes down from on high. Staffers can plan out units
of fire and combat days, a month in advance if they have to, and the calculations
will be accurate. They can translate units of fire into tons of throughput and solve
railcar loading problems, site dumps, allocate horse teams etc.
Westerners letting any battalion that wants to, fire off 5000 rounds a day, are
leaning on fleets of 2 1/2 ton trucks that can move anything anywhere in an
instant, on demand - the Russians have nothing remotely like that.

Third, the Russians have lots of tube production capacity but not so abundant
ammo production capacity, and very weak logistics links once you leave the rail
line compared to either. This system lets them multiply tubes everywhere, and
then feed the ones that are close to the action, without moving them. And just
leave the ones away from the action in position, but not fed. This might seem
wasteful in tubes or the combat power per gun, but those are not scarce. Ability
to move stuff is scarce, and ammo. So "preposition" the tubes, and some dumps,
and then feed the ones that need it because the action is near them this week.

When the whole front moves 300 miles, the Russians have to pick up the whole
apparatus and set it up again. That means railcar loadings, trips over repaired
lines as fast as they can be fixed, rail unloadings, wagons out to the battery
position. For the guns and for every shell. The rate determining step is not how
fast you can cock the cannon, but how fast the horseteams and stevedores can
do all this work. So when you've got lots of time from a relatively static front, you
can blast as powerfully as you please. But when it moves, not so much. Ergo, you
better get your firing in during that window, so the surge firepower has to be
huge, because firing time is not going to be (with everyone in position, ready,
supplied etc).

You don't get huge surge firepower to work by waiting around for neat targets.
When the chance is there logistically, you grab it, and dump everything you can
on every enemy area within range.

To give some further information on this, based on Soviet officer memoirs I have
read, this collection of intel was a core task for divisional and below staffs during
the attack preparation. Higher levels of command would compare the amount of
targets reported by divisions. If you were (well) below the average in reporting
targets in your divisional sector, it could happen that the Front commander pays
you a visit, and gives you the option to either report more targets, or attack on
D-Day without artillery support (so happened to one Colonel commanding a rifle
division - the meeting with Konev was apparently quite frosty). The way
reconnaissance at this level was done was standard. Send a group of 3/4 men out
to capture a POW. Feign an attack by a battalion at night, while the divisional
intel staff is sitting in overwatch with a map and a pen, drawing in firing posts as
they open up. The Germans did of course know this, and designated 'Schweige'
(silent) MG posts which would under no circumstances open fire before the big
day. The Soviets in turn knew this, and tried to make their feint attacks
believable big ones to get the Schweige MGs to open up.

During the barrage, artillery would also leave small corridors uncovered, through
which assault companies/battalions would move, while the Germans are still in
their dugouts. That way they would be in the trench, welcoming the Germans
coming out of their dugouts when the barrage ended (vividly described by a
survivor of the initial assault at Iassy).

It could also happen that the initial barrage was curtailed/cancelled, because the
Germans had given up their first trench position to avoid it.

Finally, Soviet air support operated together with the artillery, and presumably
integrated into the fireplan (again vividly described by the Iassy survivor).

All the best

Andreas

Regarding Cavalry Corps, their main use was to give some added mobility to
breakthrough forces in the often not particularly well-developed geography of the
east.

Unknown Pages of a Heroic Raid

In general they were not expected to get into heavy combat by frontally
assaulting anyone. Konev's (increasingly upset) missives to Baranov and his
Cavalry Corps during the L'vov-Sandomierz Operation make that very clear. They
were supposed to move fast, block roads against movement, disrupt
reinforcements, and exploit 'unpassable' terrain by moving through it. In the
process they could get hammered very badly, as the text above indicates, and as
happened to 5th GCC in the latter stages of Bagration, and Pliev's Cavalry
Mechanised Group at Debrecen.

A Cavalry Corps was a relatively small formation, smaller than a German rifle
division, and because of this it could survive with low supply requirements for a
while (but not forever - even horses need fodder if you are always on the move).

I would think that they were mostly used on the flanks of breakthroughs because
of their comparatively lower combat power, where through their actions they
could serve to broaden the breakthrough into directions where no heavy
opposition was present, and to prevent the Germans from massing forces on the
flank. The real fighting against German counter-attacks and reinforcements would
be up to the mechanised breakthrough formations.

All the best

Andreas

Andreas has sketched the cavalry story reasonably well, but I'd modify a few
details and add some historical and regional variation.

First understand that cavalry corps did have armor in the TOE, and frequently in
practice. Light tanks, BTs originally and then T-60s and T-70s, but also modest
numbers of T-34s by 1942-3, more of them in the late war. They were treated as
independent operational units much like tank corps, but held at Front level much
longer and (in the most common use anyway) released aka assigned to some
army only during an exploitation phase. They did not have the hitting power of a
tank corps but had a comparable number of riflemen and about the tanks of a
tank brigade.

In the early war the mech arm failed completely for technical and command
reasons. They were huge formations of 1000 tanks and 1000 trucks and they
could not be maintained in the field. In the circumstances, the Russians moved to
using infantry armies for offensive missions, and for mobile defensive stuff they
went smaller scale and lower tech. Tanks went to brigades, the prewar mech
corps was abolished. But they still did not really know how to use the cavalry.

It came into its own during the battle of Moscow. Along with small formations of
ski troops - a brigade or so was typical - the cavalry kept its tactical mobility in
the harsh winter conditions. They could move in 2 foot snow. They could traverse
the endless forests of the central Russian zone, which are extended by marshland
that freezes in the winter. While not easy to supply - horses eat a lot and die in
droves when underfed or overworked - a cavalry unit would achieve plenty while
its mounts held and then become a dismounted unit.

So they infiltrated. They and the ski guys turned flanks through woods once the
Germans were holding strongpoints in places with houses to stay indoors to avoid
frostbite. There were already partisans in the German rear, and there were also
leftovers from the 1941 disasters who had taken to the woods rather than died.
As these mobile formations pushed deeper into the German operational rear, they
received aid from these scattered forces. They got supplies by raiding the
Germans, "making war support war", as Napoleon put it.

A cavalry corps "raid" could last a month or two and might lose half the force. But
it would achieve something - cut off German forces, cut rail lines, flanks turned
locally whenever the Germans tried to form a line rather than an all around
hedgehog defense, raided HQs supply and artillery positions, etc.

Their successes in the winter of 41 convinced the Russians to keep them. In

spring and summer, still in the north and speaking of defensive periods, they
found other uses for them - screening long quiet sectors of bad terrain, patrolling
areas far from roads or rail supply, etc. If there were serious Germans opposite,
it was a rifle formation job, but there weren't everywhere and always. The theater
was just too big.

In the south they had cross country mobility in the absence of roads, but not
compared to tanks. They were used on secondary axes and during the
exploitation phase of major offensives. What does that mean? Well, after the
breakthrough, the tank arms is tear-assing into the German operational rear, and
the Germans are railing in the kitchen sink to try to stop them. Meanwhile, the
Russian rifle formations are laboriously mopping up the holdouts and trying to
walk clear across Russia, hauling their supplies and ammunition in 2 wheeled
carts.

The cavalry follow the tanks and provide them the sort of support infantry does
otherwise, because the infantry is not up with them. The Mech guys have their
own organic motor rifle for the tactical side of that, but to keep combined arms
those have to stay right up with the tanks, most of the time. So somebody has to
take the secondary axis, screen the river line just reached etc. Send cavalry.

E.g. in Uranus, when the tanks turn southeast to encircle Stalingrad, the 8th
cavalry corps heads west to the Chir river instead. In Kutuzov, when 4th Tank
army turns east to try to trap the Germans still in the Orel salient, a rifle corps
from 11th Guards Army is pushing south through woodland to cut the east west
rail line - and it gets its mobile support from the 2nd Guards cavalry corps.

Later, as the fighting moved to the huge marshlands of west-central Russia, the
cavalry was called on to flank positions on either side of the Pripyat by making
"hooks" through it. In the late war when it was a matter of crossing the
Carpathians to enter the Balkans etc, cavalry would be sent at passes that
wouldn't support full tank armies. And try to use them to turn the others.

Tactically, things varied somewhat with the season and region, because whether
they actually had their tanks along depended on whether snow was 6 inches or 2
feet, whether it was marsh or open steppe, etc. When they had their tanks, the
idea was to envelope with mounted cavalry and a few lights, and then hit the
encircled enemies with T-34s and dismounts fighting as infantry.

It was generally an exploitation phase, so the enemy didn't have continuous full
battle positions. They were trying to stop tanks at bottlenecks - river crossings,
roads or rail, passable open gaps in woodland or marsh, etc. So enveloping
tactically was usually possible, if you positioned things right beforehand. It they
were too tough to crack, you'd just block the roads and cut the bridges etc behind
them so they couldn't get away, and wait for the rifle masses to come up and eat
them.

When they didn't have their tanks, they were in terrain where the enemy
wouldn't have any either, and usually where visibility was quite limited, force to
space low, etc. The idea then is to screen the enemy to blind him, send out
scouts to get an intel advantage - a better picture of where everyone actually is,
enemy and friendly - and then exploit it to gang up on some subunit of the
enemy or cut it off etc.

If that last part isn't clear, understand, a very thin screen of cavalry could hold
against enemy infantry forces in tough terrain, because there was a big honking
reserve behind the thin screen, out of action - which thanks to its horses could
reach any part of the screen in an hour, and would if they heard firing. Thin
layers of scouts then find all enemy and send runners to HQ to piece it all
together. When the commander sees it all laid out on a map, he notices enemy
unit A is out on a limb, sends cavalry regiment D to block its retreat, and then
takes the whole reserve to go kill enemy unit A. Repeat as necessary.

Well not entirely right, Andreas. First on regiments, the Russian artillery
regiments routinely had 16 or 20 pieces, and the SUs followed that as a matter of
course. Same reason 31 StuGs was called a "brigade" - because things we'd think
of as "platoons" were designated "batteries" in the artillery, and a battery is a
company sized unit (for towed artillery manning reasons). So it was already
normal for units of about 20 weapons to be designated a "regiment" in the
Russian force structure. Not a command issue, just standard. You see the same in
AA.

Heavy tank regiments had 21 tanks. There were also independent tank regiments
equipped with lend lease vehicles, typically 40 or so, that were used to support
the infantry for the most part. Valentines and such. There were also independent
regiments equipped with Russian equipment, typically mixed T-70s and T-34s. In
1942 there were a lot of light tanks (T-60s e.g.) that were spread around
supporting infantry, too. Sometimes these were with mixed formations that had a
few KVs and T-34s, but frequently those were missing, and an RD might just
have a regiment of T-60s and split them up as mobile MG nests and scouts etc.

Then there were larger armor formations that were subordinated to infantry
armies. It was common for them to each have a tank brigade, and ones given an
offensive role often had a single tank corps assigned to them as their
breakthrough leaders and exploitation force. Sometimes a few regiments of SUs
at army level, too - particularly late in the war, when there were scads of them.
These would be assigned to a particular sector to beef up its antitank ability or to
enable one rifle division to attack more effectively. The same happened with the
independent tank brigades - those would generally pair with one RD, rather than
being split over several.

These different layers of modest independent supporting armor forces let the
higher ups pick the armor to infantry ratio. There were maybe 5 formulaic levels
of this. A full tank army had 3 mech corps and attached SUs, sometimes a heavy
tank regiment as well, and was expected to fight purely in the mech style, and
was given important independent operational missions.
A single tank corps, on the other hand, was expect to act as a sword for the army
it was assigned to, but fighting in the mech style. Usually it was kept together,
though often one brigade would be held back in reserve, and the other two might
find themselves reinforcing adjacent sectors with the prior infantry formations still
present. On defense in particular.

A single tank brigade was not expected to fight on its own, but instead teamed
with some larger formation and gave it armor support. Sometimes it would be
split to defend. Or after a rifle regiment leads an attack, it hits the breech as a
body and tries to widen it for the next one.

Single regiments aren't expect to fight alone either, and instead are supporting
some combat team, subordinate to a particular division or mech corps
commander. And they might well be penny packeted, as low as one platoon of
SUs supporting an infantry battalion.

Last there is the level of "none", which you see for static defense or fighting in
terrain unsuited to tanks. Also sometimes early one, say through mid 1942. But
later, attacks in terrain where tanks could move at all would have one of the
above levels of armor support. In cases of "none", towed guns used direct were
the ranged overwatch arm, rather than tanks.

Sample levels of armor support in different operational roles - 11 Guards Army in

Kutuzov hada major breakthrough role, and had been bulked up to the size of 2
standard armies. 2 tank corps worked alongside it and exploited through its
breech - 1st and 5th - but remained operationally independent and subordinated
to Western Front. 11th Guards itself had 4 tank brigades, a heavy tank regiment
(KVs), a separate tank regiment (LL), and an SU regiment. The army total was
280 AFVs for 12 RDs. The neighboring 50th Army, initially defensive and
screening a long sector, but eventually pressed into a subsidiary diversionary
attack, had 1 tank brigade and 1 SU regiment, 87 AFVs total, for 7 RDs.

The Front level had 2 tank corps each with its own SU regiment, 3 extra tank
brigades, and 5 extra tank regiments. It could and did dole out the independent
brigades and regiments to beef up RDs in this sector or that. About half the
armor was in the 2 TCs.

So overall, that front had 2 tank corps, 8 tank brigades, 7 tank regiments (for
KVs and LL), and 5 SU regiments. It used half of the independent armor - a
quarter of the total - to support the initial breakthrough effort and kept the other
half initially in reserve to meet events. And unleashed the major TCs - with half
the armor, used en masse but fighting mech style not rifle style - on day 2 of the
offensive (basically).

What is characteristic of this thoroughly mixed system is that it puts flexibility in

the hands of the Front and Army commanders for operational planning, while the
lower divisional guys can't rely on a single set amount of support coming from a
TOE. They get what the muckety-mucks give them.

JK - penal unit fantasies are pretty much just that, fantasies by German side
historians. There were indeed penal units in the Russian army, but a penal detail
typically consisted in digging ditches or removing mines - dirty and hazardous
duty far away from where it could do immediate operational harm to the rest of
the army, if the f-ups f'ed up again.

There were also cases of penal units pressed into combat. But these were more in
the nature of a second chance than a punishment. Combat was honorable. As in
most armies, honor followed responsibility on the one hand and danger on the
other. If a unit performed well in difficult and bloody combat, the men would be
forgiven past errors.

One needs to understand the basic attitude a typical Russian soldier had toward
the risks represented by the war, what he thought of his chances, and what he
ascribed things to. The typical soldier did not expect to get killed. And the typical
soldier didn't get killed. The typical soldier *did* expect to get wounded, even to
get wounded repeatedly. He expected to bleed but to survive. And most did.

In a typical month long major operation, up to a third of the participating

personnel might become casualties. The other two thirds - three quarters if things
went well - would be unscathed. But face continued hazardous duty, of course. Of
the third or quarter who became causalties, 3 out of 4 would be in the "medical"
category - a stint in hospital - not permanent military losses. The last was largely
a euphemism for dead, but included the cripples invalided home after loss of a
limb, PWs, missing who deserted or went partisan etc. Each of them a slice of
that quarter. Overall maybe a 6th of the causalties were actually killed.

A stint in hospital had various things to be said for it. It wasn't so dangerous as
the front. It was cleaner. Creature comforts and society were better. Various
opportunities for change of role in the war might present themselves as well. And
one was honored, one had served and sacrificed, done one's part for the time
being.

Few could expect to survive continued exposure to the risks of front line combat
for the duration of the war. But wounds made that risk somewhat self-limiting,
because months would be spent off the line recovering. A man worried about
whether the wound he got would be mortal, or would maim him for life, or hoped
it would be the kind that kept him out of action for a while but did not serious
imperil him. But he expected to get one. When he "got his", he was off for the
month.

There were of course jobs much less exposed than the front line infantry, and a
man might go the whole war in them safely. He'd probably see a few people
around him die and a number get wounded, but was unlikely to be harmed
himself. And if he was, it would probably be a relatively minor wound from which
he'd recover fully. These included rear area service and logistic roles, HQ roles,
most of the artillery, engineering when it wasn't of the assault pioneer variety
etc. The Russian army was short on such "tail" compared to the German, in
particular, but it was a quarter to a third.

Some of the combat roles were less dangerous than others, as well. Tankers were
much less likely to be frequently wounded than infantry. Heavy weapons crews
and the average pioneer likewise. AA, arty. The most dangerous positions were in
the infantry.

But infantry also had quiet sectors, screening operations, static defense. A man
who had served well enough might earn promotion to NCO and might see a spell
spent training others. Major operations required build up periods logistically
speaking. Deep layered reserves have portions in the safer rear areas, and they
rotate the roles, so spells in the line are interrupted by periods of relative safety.
Then there is the hospital.

So men did not view military service as a death sentence - nothing like it. They
thought the war could not be avoided and had to be won, that it was hard, that it
demanded sacrifice, that they would be expected to try and to risk and to bleed.
Some might angle for safety immediately, most sought to give enough for honor
and then to survive.

Russian propaganda rapidly saw that patriotic appeal would do more than party
nonsense or cynicism. They appealed to the defenselessness of Russian civilians
and the harshness of the Germans, played up to be sure, but with plenty of
reality to start from. And the men were simply and directly called on to interpose
themselves between German soldiers and defenseless Russian civilans and to
save their lives by fighting and bleeding for them. It was perfectly effective
motivation.

They had a bigger morale problem originally, with the widespread contempt the
rank and file had for Soviet leadership and for military command. The
commanders seemed not to know what the heck they were doing, and its seemed
folly to follow their orders. That improved after the battle of Moscow - that was
vital to Russia simply because there had been widespread despair beforehand,
and now they knew the Germans could be beaten. By the time of the end of the
successful Stalingrad campaign, those problems were basically gone.

As for tank riders in particular, it was a prestigious role, thought of as hazardous

certainly but also admired for prowess and bravery, as such roles usually are. You
can see this in propaganda, which requires a grain of truth to work. Recon roles
and rider roles were played up in Russian propaganda precisely because the
rankers looked up to men who did such things, for their sheer balls. Undoubtedly
most of that propaganda is schlock. But the underlying admiration had to be
there for it to make sense even as schlock.

I think in practice it was much more common that the first armor was committed
while the defense was still holding, but strained, than after a breakthrough had
already been achieved by the rifle forces. There are exceptions that went "by the
book" but they are the rarer cases, and usually depend on favorable
circumstances (wooded terrain and surprise, extensive arty prep that was
unusually well directed, very thin defenders, etc).

What usually happened is the rifle forces conducted the initial assault, took the
forward enemy positions, and then wallowed there in increasing disorder,
brawling with arriving reserves. They sometimes got the second position or
through the prepared ones altogether, but they seldom broke clean through.
Their forward edge could be held by relatively thin forces, because confusion and
loss spread throughout the defended zone.

This came from holdouts and pocketed strongpoints and "wait a minute" MGs,
from flanking fire etc. But most of all it came from defending artillery fire hitting
the breeching site, which tended to pin the bulk of the attacking infantry, even if
it could not stop them completely. The more active bits pressed beyond the
shelled zone but were contained by local infantry reserves and fire brigades of
more mobile units and if necessary alarm units drummed up from pioneers
Luftwaffe services, etc. Sometimes a major defensive reinforcement would arrive
and simply backstop the dissolving front line infantry one, with a new line.

So the first tank forces were usually committed with the fight still in progress.
Typically is was the tank corps of the attacking army, rather than a full tank army
(though there are a few exceptions to that, too). They'd pick a spot and hit the
line, and usually get through easily enough. This was a matter of a full tank
brigade on a narrow front, with the whole rest of the corps behind it in column.

Once they were through the immediate front line, tanks leading, they exploited
straight to the rear to just get clear of the front line defensive zone. The logic was
parallel pursuit - race the defenders to their own rear. If they remained in place
at the front line, great. Rifle forces would follow in the wake of the whole corps,
and widen the penetration by rolling up the flanks of the defenders opposite each
shoulder of the breech. The tank guys did not have to worry about that part, it
wasn't their job.

Their main job was to get through the inevitable arriving reserves, typically
motorized divisions with tanks etc.

Doctrinally, their organic motorcycle recon were supposed to spread from the
column as soon as it was clear, scattering in all directions and letting themselves
get thinner and thinner on the ground. They were to report back enemy positions
and just as important, open routes. The tanks instead stayed concentrated and
went where they planned.

In practice the motorcycle recon were not usually that aggressive, and usually
drew screening missions along the flanks behind the column, instead. They'd ride
out a few clicks as flank guards but didn't race to contact in all directions, really.

The tanks did stay concentrated and they did just go where the plan pointed
them. There was little "opportunity pull". The operational plan called for some
distance of encirclement, and they drove for it.

If they wanted to try multiple distances (a "small solution" and a "big solution" in
German staff terms), they'd send a different operational force for each - e.g. the
Tank Army gets the big objective while 1-2 tank corps get the small one. Or
sometimes the full tank army gets the small one and a mere cavalry corps takes
its chances on the Germans not being ready for a deeper hook.

The goal was never geographic really, it was to destroy some portion of the
German army by cutting it off from the rest. Geography and the arrangement of
forces - especially the latter - dictated what seemed feasible on that score. It was
a matter of tying together the threads created by two or more breakthroughs, to
kill the stuff between them.

They perforce ran into the reserves the Germans sent to stop such things. They
had SOPs they used for this, pretty formulaic rather than adaptive. The lead tank
brigade stays well concentrated and hits whatever it hits, hard, line of march
attack. No pushfooting or looking around for open flanks. The idea is to blow
through thin screens and only be stopped by a real position.

If or when the lead brigade gets a bloody nose trying this, the following forces
can try another route, typically a short hook. Sometimes this is tactical, just
turning the position that stopped the leading brigade and then driving right into
the same guys that stopped them, from a flank. Sometimes they will go around
rather than into the blocking force.

Typically the motor rifle brigade guys are being trailed along behind, setting up
screens, and aren't up with the point. But they may come up to "fix" a block from
the front, to allow the lead brigade to change direction. The tank corps
commander typically keeps one tank brigade as his reserve. He will throw it in
wherever it looks good - right at a block to break it down, around the same flank
as the second, whatever.

The idea was that the Germans could put up a strong position at one or two
bottlenecks or a screen everywhere, but could not be strong everywhere. So hit
first and turn second, and one or the other is expected to work. Not meant to find
out which before hand, just find out by attacking.

With tank armies the same ideas were used, but the two tank corps were typically
given parallel routes, and the army as a whole followed the more successful one.
The mech arm definitely had the "reinforce success" idea down pat, by late 1942
at least. A full tank army could have a whole mech corps as its reserve, and so
could meet even a whole arriving panzer division and smash or turn it on a time
scale of days.

They generally had success or failure largely based on German readiness and
reserves, and secondarily on how sensible the depth of "bites" was at the
planning level. If they went for bites that proved too large, the Germans would
hold the jaws apart and both sides would find themselves in pretty much straight
ahead fighting. If they got them small enough their close and eat something, but
if too small that might be one infantry division or corps and not change the
campaign all that much. The first mistake - too large - was much more common.

It could still work out. The mech guys brawled the arriving German reserves and
in the meantime the rifle forces were mopping up the German infantry and
expanding the initial break ins. The mech fighting had the net effect of keeping
the German reserves from doing much to help the latter. Which then typically
withdrew as best it could, with losses. The panzer forces held the way open long
enough for them to get out, most of the time - but often leaving lots of
equipment behind etc. And in the cases where they caught the Germans with
weak reserves, the Russian mech just plain won the mobile fight, closed the trap
exactly as planned, and an army or more died.

It was a quite effective system and robust to operator error, so to speak. But it
wasn't a masterpiece, and losses could be high. The breakthrough forces fight the
German deep reserves well in the rear of the original line, without much in the
way of extra artillery etc. And with rifle formations coming up only slowly.

If the tanks got overextended and the Germans sent enough, they could set them
back. Even more common, the Germans sent not quite enough, the Russians
bludgeoned them and bludgeoned them some more, and the Germans then gave
way or backed up - but the Russians lost a lot in the process.

They did not give up their operational objectives while sizable forces were intact.
Instead they committed them in sequence. Fronts launched armies at week and
100 mile intervals. The Germans had to be ready everywhere and run back and
forth, then brawl unit after unit breaking through their infantry lines at an
operational, not a tactical scale. (Meaning the PDs fight 20, 50 miles behind the
old front, which moves in consequence).