International Phenomenological Society

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

Aristotle and the Physical Object

Author(s): Irving Block
Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Sep., 1960), pp. 93-101
Published by: International Phenomenological Society
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2104791
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 ARISTOTLE AND THE PHYSICAL OBJECT

The point of Aristotle's polemic against Plato was that we could have
knowledge of the physical world. The objects revealed to us through our
senses were not passing shadows like the ones on the wall of Plato's cave
but were substantial things having fixed essences which could be known
by the intellect on the basis of what the senses reported. The program of
Aristotle's metaphysics and epistemology was to show how this was
possible. Accordingly, there is much discussion in the Metaphysics con-
cerning substances and their essences and in the De Anima concerning the
senses and their special objects, the sense-qualities. But one question that
has persistently plagued modern philosophy was never explicitly discussed
by Aristotle, namely how and in what manner we perceive or come to be
aware of the concrete, physical objects to which sense-qualities belong.
Aristotle, it seems, never considered this an important philosophical
question; he nowhere discusses it directly. No Greek, for that matter, ever
addressed himself to this question. Protagoras' relativism was an objective
relativism. It was the physical world that constantly changes, and we
could have no objective knowledge of it. Plato agreed with Protagoras as
far as the physical world was concerned. His argument against Protagoras
was that while there can be no knowledge of the physical world, there was
another world, the world of essences, concerning which there is knowledge.
Both believed, though, that we perceive the physical world with our
senses. If challenged as to just how we perceive the concrete, furniture of
this world, Plato might have shrugged his shoulders and have said that this
was not an important question because it makes no difference as far as our
knowledge is concerned whether it is a substantial object that we see or
only a shadow, for the field of genuine knowledge lies elsewhere in the
world of essences. For Aristotle, though, it was an important question,
because if we do not perceive the physical object we can have no knowledge
of it. But Aristotle's main concern was to show, in opposition to Plato, that
we can have genuine knowledge of the concrete object. The fact, then, that
Aristotle did not discuss the question is an indication that he did not
recognize the problem clearly, and not that it was not crucial for him. For
Plato it may not have been important but for Aristotle it was.
Although this question is, as we say, not directly discussed by Aristotle,
there is something to be gathered concerning his thoughts on this subject

93

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 94 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RIESEARCH

from remarks that he makes in discussing other aspects of sense perception.

This paper will attempt to gather clues throughout Aristotle's discussion
and to arrive at some view which can be said to be implied by his remarks.
We will first examine the De Anima to see what can be gathered from
this work concerning our problem. We shall discover that not much
advance can be made here. Only when we read the Parva Naturalia and the
De Insomniis in particular can we begin to understand what might have
been Aristotle's thoughts on this question. But let us first turn to the
De Anima.
The De Anima. The cardinal principle of Aristotle's theory of sense
perception which we find in the De Anima is that sensation is defined as
the reception by an individual sense of a sensible form without the matter.
As wax receives the shape of the seal but not the metal itself, so the
perceiving senses receive the sensible shape, color, and other sensible
qualities of the perceived object but not the object itself. This direct
perception of a quality by a particular sense, i.e., color by sight, sound by
hearing and so on, is termed "direct" (iocO'ocU&o)perception. This is
contrasted with what Aristotle calls "indirect" (Knot-o&c ouVsf3pK64)
perception, which is really not perception at all but an association of ideas
connected with direct perception or perception iocO'ocur5o.For instance,
upon seeing a white object there is called to mind the sweet taste which I
have once had of that object. Aristotle calls this indirectly perceiving
sweet by sight (425a 22-23). Another example is this: upon seeing a
particular color, we recognize the universal color of which it is an instance.
In this case, "sight sees universal colors indirectly" (Met. 1087a 20).
In both of these cases it can readily be seen that indirect perception is
not real perception, but as we said, an association of ideas initiated by
direct perceptions. Direct perception or perception KioO'OC&Tois the
receiving of a sensible form by an active sense. The directly perceived
qualities are not brought to our attention by an association that must be
learned as we must learn to associate the sweet taste with the white object
or this universal with that color. Directly-sensed qualified are "brought to
our attention" by simply opening our eyes or sniffing with our nose.
Now that we have two distinct kinds of "perceptions," we can ask
ourselves the question, Can one of these be the manner in which we
perceive physical objects? It is difficult to see how physical objects could
be perceived via direct perception, for indeed the very definition of this as
the reception of the sensible form without the matter would seem to
exclude the physical object because it is the matter which is the dis-
tinguishing characteristic of physical objects. Matterless forms are certain-
ly not physical objects, but this is all that is perceived in direct perception
by an individual sense. How and in what manner, then, do we come to
perceive physical objects, for Aristotle always says that when we look with

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 ARISTOTLE AND THE PHYSICAL OBJECT 95

our eyes we see colored objects and not just color patches. But if sight is the
reception of the color alone, why do we not see only color patches? How
come we to see colored objects?
Since this evidently can not come through direct perception, the most
likely prospect is what we have called "indirect" perception. In Book II,
chapter 6, it is said that indirect perception occurs when the white object
happens to be the son of Diares.1 This is sometimes interpreted to mean
that upon directly seeing the white color, I see indirectly the physical
object to which the color belongs. Our problem would then be solved, and
we could say that Aristotle thinks that awareness of the physical object
enters our perceptual consciousness by means of indirect perception.
Unfortunately, this neat solution can not stand and it becomes obvious
on closer inspection that, according to Aristotle, indirect perception can
not be the source of our perception of physical objects. There are a
number of reasons for this and we shall discuss them in order.
As we mentioned above, there is one passage in Book II, chapter 6 of the
De Anima which some interpret as saying that the physical object is
perceived indirectly, and it is upon this passage alone that this view is
based. Let us examine this passage to see if this is really what it implies.
The passage reads as follows in Hicks' translation: "What is meant by the
indirect object of sense may be illustrated if we suppose that the white
thing (noA XeuKOv)before you is Diares' son. You perceive Diares' son,
but indirectly, for that which you perceive is accessory to the whiteness"
(418a 20-24).2 The focal point of this passage is the meaning of the
TO-XYUKOv.If it is taken to mean "white patch" or "white color," then
it is possible to understand by "Diares' son," the physical object. This
passage could then be said to be telling us that upon directly seeing the
white color we indirectly see the object to which the color belongs.
This is a plausible interpretation, but there are a number of difficulties
standing in its way. First and foremost, if the -o XsuKov is taken as
meaning white color, the sentence becomes meaningless on Aristotle's own
metaphysics. For the sentence would read, "What is meant by the indirect
object of sense may be illustrated if we suppose that the white color (or
patch) before you is Diares' son." Now Aristotle is insistent that a quality
1 It might be thought that this means that indirectly perceiving the son of Diares
simply means that we perceive an object which also happens to be the son of Diares
regardlessof whetherwe realizethis or not. Such an interpretationdenies that "indirect
perception"is a perceptualterm designatinga specific kind of cognition. This conflicts
with the two other cases mentioned above where "indirect perception"is a perceptual
term and with Aristotle's contrast between this and direct perception. If "direct
perception"is a perceptualterm, then "indirect perception"must also be a perceptual
term in order to be contrasted with it, as it is 418a 9.
2 R. D. Hicks (ed.), De Anima (text and translation with commentary),Cambridge,
1907.

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96 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH

can be nothing more nor less than a quality. It can not change. It can only
go away or return (Met., 101b 20-26). Only substances can be things, i.e.,
have qualities and change. Therefore, in any proposition that states that
one thing is something else, as is stated in our passage, the subject of that
proposition must signify some substance. Thus "white" in the phrase,
". if we suppose that the white before you is Diares's son" must mean
"white thing," a physical object and not a mere quality.
The reason for confusion here is that the term to XeuKOvfrom a
grammatical point of view could mean either the quality white or a white
thing and is in fact used by Aristotle to mean both. Even more, the number
of times that Aristotle uses this term to mean the color white, predominates
over the times it is used to mean a white thing. However, if one examines
all the places where Aristotle means "white thing," we find that they all
have a factor in common.3 Namely, the so ?euKOv is used as the subject of
a proposition to which some quality or property is attributed. Therefore,
the term must be referring in all these places to a substance, a white
object, and not to an abstracted quality.
Another reason why it is difficult to take our passage as saying that the
physical object is perceived indirectly is that there is no other example of
indirect perception in Aristotle which could be interpreted in this manner.
Always it is used to signify some mental association initiated by a direct
perception - the Aristotelian counterpart of Hume's association of ideas.
Thus when I directly see the sugar, its sweet taste is called to mind, and
when I see a color, the universal is associated with it. These two examples
plus the son-of-Diares passage are the only concrete examples of indirect
perception that Aristotle gives us. Therefore, it would seem more probable
that Aristotle means here some kind of awareness similar to the two other
examples, and it is hard to believe that he would give a unique meaning to
"indirect perception" which is never mentioned again. Certainly our
perception of physical objects, or whatever way we become aware of
them, is no association of ideas for Aristotle. It would seem more plausible
to interpret this passage in line with the other examples of indirect
perception. That is, upon seeing the white object we identify this object as
being the son of Diares. We have learned from past experience that this
object is the son of Diares and upon seeing this object we associate it
with the property of being the son of Diares. This example of indirect
perception is similar to the other two in the sense that all are associations
of ideas connected with some direct perception.
It would seem, then, that this passage in De Anima, 418a 20-24, can not
serve as a basis for saying that Aristotle thought the physical object

3 Passages where so keux6vis used to mean "white thing" are: Met., 1017a 15;
De Anima, 428b 21 and 430b 30; Post. Anal., 83a 1-7; and Prior Anal., 43a 35.

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 ARISTOTLEAND THE PHYSICALOBJECT 97

enters our perceptual experience through indirect perception. This is

further confirmed by another consideration that shows conclusively that
this can not be Aristotle's view.
In various places throughout Aristotle's works on sense perception, it is
claimed that perception by the individual senses of their specific sensibles
is always true but that perception of the common sensibles and the
sensibles perceived through indirect perception are prone to error (De
Anima 428b 18-25). Now if we examine what Aristotle means when he
says that the eye's perception of color is always true, we will find that he
means when the eye sees a colored object under normal conditions, the
object truly has that color and no other. He does not mean something like
contemporary epistemologists mean when they say that sense datum
propositions are incorrigible. There is objective reference involved in
Aristotle's affirmation of the truth of our perceptions. Objects really have
the qualities that our individual senses perceive them as having. But if
this is so, then we must always perceive the physical object truly for the
physical object is a term in the proposition affirming the truth of our
perceptions. If we were often mistaken in perceiving physical objects per
se, then Aristotle could not say that the eye's perception of colored
objects is always true. However, Aristotle says that the objects of indirect
perception are often false (De Anima 428b 20), therefore physical objects
can not be objects of indirect perception.
This leaves us with a dilemma. If the physical object is not perceived
through indirect perception, how then is it perceived or how do we become
aware or it? The only other alternative is direct perception by an indi-
vidual sense, but this is defined as the reception of the sensible form
without the matter, and this definition excludes objective reference. Thus,
the physical object can be perceived neither through direct perception by
an individual sense nor through indirect perception. On the other hand,
objectivity can not be said to be contributed by any of the higher
judgmental faculties belonging to reason, as objectivity is definitely an
element closely integrated into the direct perception of qualities. For
whenever we perceive a quality truly, we perceive it as belonging to some
object. How then does the physical object get into the perceptual act?
On the basis of what we find in the De Anima, no answer is forthcoming,
for in this work there is no perceptive faculty which carries out this
function. The physical object has slipped into the perceptual field, so to
speak, without paying an admission fee. Before we oust this illegal entrant,
though, let us examine that little-studied work of Aristotle, the De
Insomniis, for it is here that we get real indications of Aristotle's thoughts
on this subject.
The De Insomniis. In this work, Aristotle discusses two abnormal
kinds of perceptual experience, illusions and dreams. They are abnormal in

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98 PHILOSOPHY RESEARCH
ANDPHENOMENOLOGICAL

the sense that images are presented to us just as they are in veridical
perception, however they are false in that they are qualities of no physical
object. The manner in which we are fooled by illusions or hallucinations in
waking-perception is the same as that by which we are misled in dreams
(461b 1). In both cases we believe that our perceptual experience is a
real perception which is caused by an external object. "For, speaking
generally, the controlling power (&sX) affirms (orocv) the report given
by each sense, unless some more authoritative power contradicts it." For
instance, if a finger is placed against the eye we see double. It is the natural
inclination of the controlling power to affirm this double seeing and to say
that there really are two objects. However, the knowledge that our finger is
against our eye counterbalances the natural tendency of the controlling
power to affirm the perception or to attribute the property perceived to a
physical object. Actually there is nothing in the perceptual experience per
se of an illusion or a dream to distinguish it from a veridical perception.
This is why we are easily deceived unless that power which affirms or
objectifies the perceptions is "wide-awake" and functioning properly. If
one is ill or in a delirium, then his controlling power does not function
properly and the ill person thinks he is really seeing all kinds of creatures
presented to him by his overactive imagination. Again when we are
asleep, our discriminating faculty (TO zrrLKpLVov) is dulled and believes
that the dream is a real experience (461b 5-10). Just as when we are awake
and real perception is taking place, then the controlling and discrimi-
nating sense (no K6p~ov i'Ko -''7OcKp'vov) declares (zeye) by means
of the sense impression that Coriscus is over there (461b 25-26). So like-
wise, when we dream we make the same objectification but here we are
mistaken. On some occasions, though, we may be aware that we are
dreaming at the time we are having the dream experience, and in this case
.... one says within himself that there is the appearance of Coriscus, but
it is really not Coriscus... but if one is not aware that he is sleeping there
is nothing to contradict the image" (462a 5-8), and - we might add -
therefore our discriminating and controlling sense follows its natural
tendency to affirm the sensory image presented to it (461b 4).
Let us review the following passages: In 461b 4, it is said that the
controlling power (&pxJ)affirms the sensory image; two lines later in
461b 6, Aristotle says that the discriminating power (no rcnKpZvov) is
sometimes hindered and does not function properly; in 460b 17, the
master faculty (so K6pLov) which judges the sensory images is not
identical with that faculty which perceives them; and finally, the con-
trolling and discriminatingsense (sorK6plOV Koa -O eitLKpLvov) of 461b 25
which judges on the basis of the image that Coriscus is over there. It is
obvious that all these different terms are meant to designate one faculty,
the common or primary sense. It is this faculty that objectifies our

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 ARISTOTLE AND THE PHYSICAL OBJECT 99

perceptionsand its act of affirming(0saev) the sensory images is the act

wherebywe attribute objective referenceto sensations- it is the act
whereby we perceive physical objects. This is the solution to our
problem.Under ordinarycircumstances,it is a natural tendency of the
commonsenseto objectifysensoryimagesand perceivethemas belongingto
a physicalobject. Underabnormalconditions,as when we are ill, or when
our fingeris pressedagainst our eye or when we are sleeping,this natural
tendency is checkedby our knowledgethat there is somethingabnormal
involvedin our perceptualexperience.If, of course,we are unawareof this
abnormality,then the commonsensegoes right on objectifyingand we are
misledinto thinkingwe areperceivingphysicalobjects.However,and this
is an importantpoint, as long as normalconditionsare present,the com-
mon sense is never mistakenin objectifyingthe reportsof the senses. As
we will remember,it was necessaryfor Aristotle'sperceptionof physi-
cal objects to be always true in order not to contradict his thesis
that the perceptionof the colored object by sight is always true. This
conditionis fulfilledin the commonsense's "affirmation"of the sensed
qualities.
Further, this affirmationis built into our perceptionof the specific
sensiblesby the individualsenses,and this is the solutionto the puzzleof
how Aristotlecouldsay that we alwayssee coloredobjectsand nevermere
color patches,while sight is definedas the receptionof the sensibleform,
i.e., the colorpatch without the matter. True,all that sight perse directly
sees is the color patch, but we always see colored objects wheneverwe
open our eyes becausethe commonsenseimmediatelyobjectifiesthe color
patch. The field of perceptualexperiencecontains many elements like
colors, sounds, tastes, physical objects and their spatial relations. Sight
contributesonly one of these elements,colors,whilethe "affirming"act of
the common sense contributes the physical object. When we perceive,
however,we perceivethe entirefield - the colors,sounds,and the physical
objects all together. The individual senses are only a few of the many
functions that contribute to this field while the specific sensibles are
simplyperceptualabstractionsfromthis field.
There is good reason to believe that the view we have reconstructed
from various remarksof Aristotle, concerningthe perceptionof physical
objects, is Aristotle'strue view. It has three large advantages.First, it
need not fall back on director indirectperception,neitherof whichcan be
said to carryout the perceptionof physicalobjects.Second,the awareness
of the physical object is kept on the level of perceptionwhere it clearly
belongsin Aristotle.Finally, this view fits the need for the perceptionof
physical objects to be true under normal conditions as is requiredby
Aristotle'sstatement about the truth of the specific sensibles.For these
reasons, as well as on the basis of the positive evidence from the De

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100 RESEARCH
PHILOSOPHYAND PHENOMENOLOGICAL

Insomniis, the view we have proposed seems to be the only likely one to
attributeto Aristotle.
Contemporary Counterparts.It might help to get a better hold on this
"affirming" act, this Oqnvvof the commonsense, if we compareit with
similarconceptsput forwardby two contemporaryphilosophers,George
Santayana and H. H. Price. Both Santayana and Price have fairly
precise opinions on the question of how we come to perceive physical
objects and their views are not too far removedfrom what is impliedby
Aristotle'sremarkson this matter. Aristotle,as we have seen, holds that
the physical object is neither directly seen nor indirectly perceived in
the sense that it is somethingwe learnto recognizethroughexperienceor
some associationof ideas. The perceptionof the physical object requires
some unique kind of mental act. So Santayana's "animal faith" and
Price's "perceptualacceptance"are neither direct perceptionsnor as-
sociations of ideas, but they both signify some unique kind of mental
awareness,and this peculiarkind of awarenessappearscloseto the kind of
mental act by which Aristotle intimates that we attribute objective
referenceto oursensations.
It must be emphasizedhere that we do not mean to identify Aristotle's
view of how we perceivephysicalobjectswith Santayana's"animalfaith"
or with Price's "perceptualacceptance,"nor do we mean to identify
Santayana's "animal faith" with Price's "perceptual acceptance."
Aristotle'sview lacks the organicneed or impulse that goes along with
Santayana's "animal faith," and Price's "perceptual acceptance" is
certainly prone to error as Aristotle's perceptionof physical objects is
not.4 Nevertheless,all three have one importantfactor in common.For
all of them, the perceptionor realizationof physicalobjectsis not the same
act that perceivesqualitiesbelongingto those objects. The act whereby
we perceivethe "raw data" or "sensorycore"of perceptionis a different
and completelyseparateact from that wherebywe perceivethe physical
object. Santayana calls these raw data "essences," Price calls them
"sense-data"and Aristotlecalls them "specificsensibles."This awareness
of the mereessence,sensedatumor specificsensiblecan be separatedfrom
the act whereby we perceive physical objects, and indeed all three of
these authors have a special name for this act. Santayana calls it "in-
tuition,"5 Price says "that data of this specialsort are called sense-data,
and the acquaintancewith them is conveniently called sensing,"6 and
Aristotle,as we know,calls this act "directperception."All three acts are

4 Cf. H. H. Price, Perception,London: Methuenand Co., 1950, p. 139.

5 Cf. GeorgeSantayana, Skepticismand Animal Faith, London: Constableand Co.,
1924, p. 226.
6 Op. Cit., p. 3.

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 ARISTOTLE AND THE PHYSICAL OBJECT 101

alikein that throughthem alonewe wouldnever perceivephysicalobjects.

Physicalobjectivity is somethingextra that is added to these acts by the
perceivingsubject though the way it is added is not by means of any
consciousinferenceor associationof ideas. It is an element that is spon-
taneouslyinterjectedinto all normalperception.This spontaneousinter-
jectionis called"animalfaith" by Santayana,"perceptualacceptance"by
Price, and "affirmation"(qna~v) by Aristotle. It is in this that all three
authorsarealike.
IRVING BLOCK.
YESHIVA COLLEGE, NEW YORK.

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