PORTIA'S REASONING IN THE TRIAL SCENE OF SHAKESPEARE'S "THE MERCHANT OF

VENICE"
Author(s): Leon Howard
Source: Neuphilologische Mitteilungen , 1972, Vol. 73, No. 1/3 (1972), pp. 103-109
Published by: Modern Language Society

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/43345338

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 103

PORTIA'S REASONING IN THE TRIAL SCENE OF

SHAKESPEARE'S THE MERCHANT OF VENICE

The trial scene in The Merchant of Venice has provoked as great a dis
as anything in Shakespeare outside of Hamlet. Portia's speech on
was the first selection from the English dramatist to be translat
Japanese, and the universal nobility of its sentiments prepared t
for the introduction of his plays into a completely foreign cultu
whole scene has been given mythological overtones by the discover
possible relationships to the medieval "Processus Belial" in wh
Virgin Mary pleads for mercy against the Devil's demand for stric
toward Mankind. German scholars have been fascinated by the relat
of the case against Antonio to the traditions of Roman law, and nu
efforts have been made in various countries to use the scene to b
refute charges of anti-Semitism against Shakespeare. Since the m
the nineteenth century a large body of literature, in which this scene
an important part, has developed in connection with the controver
Shakespeare's knowledge of and expertise in English law.1
Yet critics and scholars appear to have made no attempt to e
Portia's reasoning to discover the logical pattern or patterns whi
lie back of it. The difference between the generosity of Portia's p
mercy and the ruthlessness of her application of the letter of the
Shylock has often been noted, and Professor George W. Keeton i
right in saying that the former speech is "so familiar that its deeper s
cance is in some danger of being overlooked" (op. cit., pp. 142-43
does not necessarily follow that its deeper significance may be explaine
layman's prejudice against the rigidity and formality of Common L
his preference, "following St. Thomas" of Aquinas, for Divine and
laws, "both based on perfect reason, and both . . . closely linked w
Law of Nature" (p. 143). In fact, the logical pattern of Portia's re

1 The most recent and comprehensive example of this literature is George W.

Shakespeare's Légal and Political Background (London: Sir Isaac Pitman and Son
which is the work of a distinguished legal historian who is not only an authority
bethan law but a master of relevant Shakespearean scholarship. I am indebted to
most of the specific information alluded to above with the exception of the Japan
lation, which was referred to as a matter of common knowledge at a literary co
in Tokyo in 1951 but for which I cannot cite a published source.

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 104 LEON HOWARD

seems to vary. Her first speech w

but to reason itself in a logical fo
closely related to an audience's ac
rather than of its Catholic herita
but in two quite different ways.
The logical form was the system o
anti- Aristotelian, which required
ments" for the primary but full e
any matter. These "Arguments" (
them) were supposed to have a pow
might be described in more mode
These consisted of the absolute or
of (1) Cause and (2) Effect; the les
ship of (3) Subject (something to w
(4) Adjunct or the thing attached
the soul); "disagreeable" relationsh
they were (5) Relative or "somewh
of their disparity or contrariness;
of (7) Quantity (equal or, in term
Quality (like and unlike). These
forth by the Ramists generally a
book which may have been used l
reasoning in Hamlet's soliloquies.1
of the First, might also be used f
discover the full truth of a matter
the most important of these was
value if human but was convincin
Although Portia's first speech co
these relationships completely, it
beginning in two significant ways
by Shylock's query into what the

1 I have discussed the parallels between

forth in Fenner's The Arte of Logic and R
Soliloquies , a pamphlet privately printed
Lone Pine Press. Lone Pine, California. I
Argument (5) where Roland Macllmaine'
than Fenner's "Divers."

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 Portia's Reasoning in the Trial Scene 105

of mercy. "On what compulsion must I [be merciful]?" he asks. This

category of causation that Fenner had avoided, and her response, whi
fits into the pattern of other Ramists, apparently echoes the languag
Thomas Wilson, who in The Rule of Reason (1551) had made efficient C
the first of all and had said: "Some of these causes, worke by force
violence of nature, some by an outward power, being streigned thereunto.
Portia immediately classifies the operational Cause of mercy as somet
which is not "strained" by external compulsion but which operates b
natural force from within, dropping like "the gentle rain from heav
The other deviation from Fenner - and from the Ramists generally -
Portia's failure to be explicit about the formal "Subject" of mercy. T
Subject was logically something to which something else was attache
and Shakespeare clearly thought of mercy as being attached to some f
of power. But he was not precise about the nature of this power and ident
fied it only by implication throughout Portia's speech. It may be th
precision was simply inappropriate to the circumstances (as was the
analysis of causation), or it may be, as we shall see later, that Shakesp
was avoiding theological speculations. Portia's religious sentiments, in
event, were not allowed to go beyond accepted Protestant doctrine a
the explicit Testimony of the Word of God.
In other respects, however, the first fourteen lines (184-97) of Port
speech on mercy correspond closely with Fenner's system of "Argumen
Mercy has the double Effect of blessing both the giver and the taker. It is
Adjunct of power but is more becoming to a monarch than his crow
It is Relative or "somewhat differing" from individual to individual, b
"mightiest in the mightiest," but it is Disparate from the temporal po
symbolized by the scepter. In Quantity it is superior to and therefore grea
than dread and fear; and in Quality it is like something divine, and un
earthly power which becomes like God's only when mercy seasons jus
Throughout the speech there seems to be an implication that mercy is
only "an attribute to God himself" but that God may be the only tr
Subject of that virtue - that is, the one original source from which it flow
It is this implication which makes Shakespeare's omission of any for
reference to this "Argument" so teasing. He could have had in mind s
1 This quotation, however, is from the 1584 edition, fol. 43r. It may be interesting to
that Wilson is the only authority cited by the OED for the use of the word "straine
the technical sense that it also appears to have in Portia's opening line.

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106 LEON HOWARD

Thomistic notions of the identity

have held neo-Platonic notions of
in man. Or he could have been im
to imitate God by being merciful. A
would involve theological ramific
uncharacteristic of Shakespeare. A
of the word "quality" at the begin
to the comparisons with which this
When Portia turned from prim
Argument of Testimony , howeve
familiar theological grounds. Her n
none of us / Should see salvation," c
who, as the more sophisticated m
under the First Covenant of salv
But they could have had a moving
Elizabethans were) of their commitm
tion by Grace alone. It was Protestan
ed by the Word of God. Portia's n
And that same prayer doth teach
the most direct possible use that
every member of the audience kn
to pray: "Forgive us our debts, as we
was not only appropriate to the s
Word of God which was most aut
The thoroughness of her logic an
suggest that Shakespeare's Portia,
with "this strict court of Venice" th
She made no serious effort to "m
but she did forestall any future a
to Christian charity. One other po
principles of English common l
When Shy lock falls into her trap
I crave the law," she closes his las

1 These are the words of the Geneva Bib

read English version in Shakespeare's tim
in all sixteenth century English Bibles wit
The word "trespasses" was used in the ex
followed the conclusion of the prayer.

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 Portia's Reasoning in the Trial Scene 107

plea that she mitigate the justice of her own decision. "I beseech you,"
he says, offering to pay the amount of the bond "ten times o'er:"

Wrest once the law to your authority.

To do a great right, do a little wrong,
And curb this cruel devil of his will.

"It must not be," she replies:

'Twill be recorded for a precedent,
And many an error, by the same example,
Will rush into the state. It cannot be.

When Shylock enthusiastically approves of this decision, Portia can go

through the formality of giving him another chance to change his mind but
she is ready to turn, for the first time, to the law itself.
Portia's concern for the effects caused by a bad precedent is too direct
and simple to be attributed to any particular logical pattern, but when she
turns to "the law" she abandons the Ramistic exploratory reasoning of her
first speech and becomes a strict constructionist of the statutes. Thejudgment
against Antonio, of course, is foreordained, because the facts of the bond
are stipulated and Shakespeare's Venetian law, like that of Elizabethan
England, fully supported the specified penalty (lines 47-49). Portia's
"Tarry a little" for the observation that "The bond doth give thee here
no jot of blood" is interpreted by Professor Keeton (pp. 144-45) as a
preparation "to move from the realm of Common Law into Equity," but
this would be an illogical action to an Elizabethan audience who were well
aware (as Professor Keeton elsewhere points out) that suits in Equity were
tried in Chancery Courts rather than in Courts of Common Law. In any
event, the text does not support this interpretation, for Portia cites another
act of statute law, of which Shylock is ignorant, penalizing the shedding of
Christian blood. And when Shylock asks in surprise "Is that the law?"
she replies "Thyself shalt see the act."1
1 I am not at all sure, however, that considerations of Equity are entirely missing from
the trial scene. My original assumption, in fact, was that Portia's speech on mercy was a
calculated attempt to preclude, from the beginning, any appeal to Equity that Shylock
might be expected to make. The background for this assumption was no more than an
awareness of the parallelism between the extraordinary popularity of Ramean logic in
legal circles and the equally extraordinary increase in importance of the Chancery Court
during this period. The new logic seems appropriate to the exploration of problems in
Equity but not in Common Law, but I have no evidence whatever concerning the actual
reasoning used in specific cases in the rival courts.

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 108 LEON HOWARD

In the final, climactic part of the

role of the strict constructionist w
she is more learned in the law th
still another overlooked statute a
the life of a Venetian citizen and cit
detail to make clear that she is ju
the law when she condemns Shyl
of the Duke.

Portia thus appears in three intellectual roles and exemplifies three

kinds of reasoning in the trial scene. In her first speech, she is the humane,
Christian rationalist, exploring all the logical implications of a subject
and relating it to the essence of Protestant doctrine. In her second, when
she responds to Bassanio's plea, she is a legal philosopher, reasoning ex-
clusively from cause to consequence and concerned only with the effects
of a bad precedent. Finally, when she is acting as a judge, she is a strict
constructionist of the statutes, drawing inferences from the letter of the law,
judging rigidly when the law covers the case and permitting an appeal for
clemency only when the written act provides for it. At the very end, when
the Duke is displaying "the difference of our spirits" by his charitable
sentence of Shylock, she is careful to protect the rights of Antonio and
give him his own chance to show that the quality of mercy, indeed, is not
"strained."

From this brief survey of Portia's reasoning it would appear that too
much emphasis upon the purely legal aspects of the trial scene limits the
critic's view of Shakespeare's purpose and accomplishment. Such legal
significance as may exist in the penalty of the "pound of flesh" and in the
quibble of "no jot of blood" should be attributed to the Italian sources of
the play rather than to Shakespeare's invention, and when Portia is directly
concerned with the law she limits herself to the strict and literal inter-

pretation of statutes invented by Shakespeare to serve the purpose of th

plot. It is true that these imaginary statutes are based upon principles
and couched in terms that make them seem plausible to an English audience
generally familiar with the law and its processes, but they do not involve
any great legal sophistication.
On the contrary, Portia's reasoning is most impressive and memorable
when she is exhibiting Shakespeare's logical rather than legal sophisti-
cation. Such sophistication is not always easy to demonstrate in Eliza-

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 Portia's Reasoning in the Trial Scene 109

bethan literature because the Ramis ts differed from other logicians, befor
and after them, by insisting that "Invention" or the discovery of Argumen
was the First Part of Logic which necessarily preceded "Disposition" or
Second Part which dealt with the presentation of Arguments in a pers
sive way. As Abraham Fraunce pointed out in The Lawiers Logike (one of th
most elaborate Ramean treatises of the time) Invention was more app
priate to "solitary meditations and deliberations with a man's self" th
to public discourse which had to be directed toward an audience. Port
speech on mercy is therefore a rare example of discourse in which the patt
of invention is revealed without giving the impression of artificiality
affectation. It represents only a part of her reasoning in the trial scen
but it is the most succinct exhibition in Elizabethan literature of the whole
of Ramist "Invention" made evident within a memorable "Distribution"
of Arguments that seems universal and unaffected yet had a calculated
appeal to the essentials of sixteenth-century Protestantism.

The University of New Mexico

Albuquerque, New Mexico
Leon Howard

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