SOCIAL JUSTICE CLAUSE

CALALANG VS. WILLIAMS

Facts:

 Maximo Calalang brought a petition for a writ of prohibition against the following respondents:
Chairman of the National Traffic Commission (A.D. Williams), Director of Public Works (Vicente
Fragante), Acting Secretary of Public Works and Communications (Sergio Bayan), Mayor of the
City of Manila (Eulogio Rodriguez), and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila (Juan Dominguez).
 It is alleged in the petition that the respondents have caused and enforced the  prohibition of
animal-drawn vehicles from passing along Rosario St. extending from Plaza Calderon de la
Barca to Dasmarinas Street (from 7:30am-12:30pm and from 1:30-5:30p.m.); and Rizal Avenue
extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street (from 7-11a.m.) for a
period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge, to the detriment not only
of their owners but of the riding public as well.
 The petitioner avers that the rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic
on national roads, pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 548, infringe upon the constitutional
precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security
of all the people

Issues Ratio:

 WON CA No 548 is unconstitutional for being an undue delegation of legislative power – NO

o The provisions of CA No 548 do not confer legislative power upon the Director of Public
Works and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications.
o The authority therein conferred upon them and under which they promulgated the rules
and regulations now complained of is not to determine what public policy demands
but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly.
o The delegated power is not the determination of what the law shall be, but  merely the
ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the application of said law is to
be predicated.
o To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads and to determine when
and how long a national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the
road or the traffic thereon and the requirements of public convenience and interest, is
an administrative function which cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly.
It must depend on the discretion of some other government official to whom is confided
the duty of determining whether the proper occasion exists for executing the law . But it
cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of the law. 

 
  WON CA No 548 constitutes as an unlawful interference with legitimate business or trade and
abridge the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion – NO  
o Commonwealth Act No. 548 was passed by the National Assembly in the exercise of the
paramount police power of the state.
o In enacting said law, therefore, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations
of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by a desire to relieve congestion of
traffic, a menace to public safety. Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the
enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the general welfare may
interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations.
o Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to
secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state. 

 WON CA No 548 infringes upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social
justice – NO
o The promotion of social justice is to be achieved not through a mistaken sympathy
towards any given group. Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor
atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and
economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular
conception may at least be approximated.
o Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the
Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent
elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social
equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally,
through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the
exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored
principle of salus populi est suprema lex. 
o Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of
interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that
should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social
and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state
of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the
greatest good to the greatest number."

PROTECT
ALDRINE B. ILUSTRICIMO, Petitioner, -versus- NYK-FIL SHIP MANAGEMENT, INC./INTERNATIONAL
CRUISE SERVICES, LTD. AND/OR JOSEPHINE J. FRANCISCO, Respondents. G.R. No. 237487, THIRD
DIVISION, June 27, 2018, VELASCO JR., J. For disability to be compensable under Section 20(A) of the
2010 POEA-SEC, two elements must concur: (1) the injury or illness must be work-related; and (2) the
work-related injury or illness must have existed during the term of the seafarer's employment contract.
The same provision defines a workrelated illness is "any sickness as a result of an occupational disease
listed under Section 32-A of [the] Contract with the conditions set therein satisfied." Meanwhile,
illnesses not mentioned under Section 32 of the POEA-SEC are disputably presumed as work-related.
Notwithstanding the presumption of workrelatedness of an illness under Section 20(A)(4), the seafarer
must still prove by substantial evidence that his work conditions caused or, at least, increased the risk of
contracting the disease. No less than respondents' doctor diagnosed the petitioner with bladder cancer
and opined that his occupation exposed him to elements that increased his risk of contracting the
illness. As found by the VA, petitioner was employed by the respondents for 21 years. It is, therefore,
not implausible to conclude that petitioner's work may have caused, contributed, or at least aggravated
his illness. Given the company doctors' conclusion and the afore-stated facts, the burden on the part of
petitioner to prove the causality of his illness and occupation had been eliminated. 79 FACTS: Petitioner
was engaged by respondent International Cruise Services Ltd., through respondent NYKFil Ship
Management, Inc. (NYK), as a Quarter Master onboard its vessels. His last employment with the
respondents was on board the vessel MV Crystal Serenity. While MV Crystal Serenity was on its way to
Florida, USA, petitioner started experiencing gross hematuria, or blood in his urine. He reported the
matter to his superiors and was given antibiotics for suspected urinary tract infection. Due to his medical
condition, petitioner was brought to a hospital in Key West, Florida, where he was subjected to a CT
Scan. The results revealed the presence of three polypoid masses in his bladder. Petitioner was
medically repatriated and immediately referred to the company-accredited hospital for treatment. Dr.
Nicomedes Cruz, the company-designated doctor, diagnosed him with "bladder cancer." Dr. Cruz issued
petitioner with a final assessment of Grade 7 disability-moderate residuals or disorder of the intra-
abdominal organ. Petitioner underwent another operation using his own funds. This prompted him to
secure the opinion of another physician, Dr. Richard Combe, who diagnosed him with bladder mass and
declared him unfit to work due to his need to undergo instillation chemotherapy and cystoscopy every
three months. Thereafter, petitioner, thru counsel, sent respondents a letter claiming total and
permanent disability benefits. Notwithstanding petitioner's communication, respondents failed to
respond, prompting him to file a complaint for total and permanent disability before the NCMB. The VA
issued a Decision in favor of the petitioner and, accordingly, ordered respondents to pay him total and
permanent disability benefits in the amount of USD95,949.00. The CA adjudged respondents liable only
for partial permanent disability benefits under the parties' Collective Bargaining Agreement amounting
to USD40,106.98. Petitioner claims that the CA's reliance on the Grade 7 disability rating given by the
companydesignated doctor is based on the flawed finding that he failed to secure the opinion of a
second doctor. He likewise faults the respondents for the non-referral of the case to a third doctor as
required under Section 20(A)(3) of the POEA-SEC since the latter ignored his request to undergo another
medical examination to prove the extent of the disability being claimed. Respondents, for their part,
insist that petitioner's illness is not compensable since it is not listed as an occupational disease under
Section 32 of the POEA-SEC. Assuming that petitioner's condition is disputably presumed to be work-
related, the burden lies upon him to prove that his work contributed/aggravated his illness, a burden
which, according to the respondents, he failed to discharge. And even if petitioner's illness is
compensable, respondents maintain that the disability rating of Grade 7 given by its doctor should
prevail in view of his failure to prove that he sought a second medical opinion and to seek for the
opinion of a third doctor, as provided for in the POEASEC. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling
that petitioner is not entitled to total and permanent disability benefits. RULING: 80 For disability to be
compensable under Section 20(A) of the 2010 POEA-SEC, two elements must concur: (1) the injury or
illness must be work-related; and (2) the work-related injury or illness must have existed during the term
of the seafarer's employment contract. The same provision defines a work-related illness is "any
sickness as a result of an occupational disease listed under Section 32-A of [the] Contract with the
conditions set therein satisfied." Meanwhile, illnesses not mentioned under Section 32 of the POEA-SEC
are disputably presumed as work-related. Notwithstanding the presumption of work-relatedness of an
illness under Section 20(A)(4), the seafarer must still prove by substantial evidence that his work
conditions caused or, at least, increased the risk of contracting the disease. Settled is the rule that for
illness to be compensable, it is not necessary that the nature of the employment be the sole and only
reason for the illness suffered by the seafarer. It is sufficient that there is a reasonable linkage between
the disease suffered by the employee and his work to lead a rational mind to conclude that his work
may have contributed to the establishment or, at the very least, aggravation of any pre-existing
condition he might have had. No less than respondents' doctor diagnosed the petitioner with bladder
cancer and opined that his occupation exposed him to elements that increased his risk of contracting
the illness. As found by the VA, petitioner was employed by the respondents for 21 years. It is,
therefore, not implausible to conclude that petitioner's work may have caused, contributed, or at least
aggravated his illness. Given the company doctors' conclusion and the afore-stated facts, the burden on
the part of petitioner to prove the causality of his illness and occupation had been eliminated. Anent the
matter of compliance with the third-doctor referral procedure in the POEA-SEC, Section 20(A)(3) of the
contract provides that if a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment of the
company-designated doctor, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the employer and the
seafarer, and the third doctor's decision shall be final and binding on both parties: SECTION 20.
COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS The liabilities of
the employer when the seafarer suffers work-related injury or illness during the term of his contract are
as follows: 3. x x x If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor
may be agreed jointly between the Employer and the seafarer. The third doctor's decision shall be final
and binding on both parties. (Emphasis supplied) This referral to a third doctor has been held by the
Court to be a mandatory procedure as a consequence of the provision in the POEA-SEC that the
company-designated doctor's assessment should prevail in case of non-observance of the third doctor
referral provision in the contract. Stated otherwise, the company can insist on its disability rating even
against the contrary opinion by another doctor, unless the seafarer expresses his disagreement by
asking for a referral to a third 81 doctor who shall make his or her determination and whose decision
shall be final and binding on the parties. According to the respondents, petitioner's second medical
opinion only came to their knowledge during one of the scheduled mandatory conferences before the
VA. They argue that petitioner's failure to communicate his separate medical certification prior to the
filing of the complaint not only constitutes a breach of his contractual obligations under the POEA-SEC,
but also renders the complaint premature and is a ground for the dismissal of his claim for disability
benefits. Respondents do not deny receiving petitioner's October 16, 2015 letter despite their insistence
that he failed to activate the third doctor provision. In fact, respondents repeatedly insisted that the
letter was not meant to dispute the company-designated doctor's assessment, but rather to inform
them that petitioner needed continued medical assistance. On the assumption that petitioner indeed
"belatedly" informed respondents of the opinion of his second doctor and his intent to refer his case to
a third doctor, the fact remains that they have been notified of such intent. The POEA-SEC does not
require a specific period within which the parties may seek the opinion of a third doctor, and they may
do so even during the mandatory conference before the labor tribunals. Accordingly, upon being
notified of petitioner's intent to dispute the company doctors' findings, whether prior or during the
mandatory conference, the burden to refer the case to a third doctor has shifted to the respondents.
This, they failed to do so, and petitioner cannot be faulted for the nonreferral. Consequently, the
company-designated doctors' assessment is not binding. In any event, the rule that the company-
designated physician's findings shall prevail in case of nonreferral of the case to a third doctor is not a
hard and fast rule. It has been previously held that labor tribunals and the courts are not bound by the
medical findings of the company-designated physician and that the inherent merits of its medical
findings will be weighed and duly considered. In keeping with the avowed policy of the State to give
maximum aid and full protection to labor, the Court has applied the Labor Code concept of disability to
Filipino seafarers. Thus, We have held that the notion of disability is intimately related to the worker's
capacity to earn, and what is compensated is not his injury or illness but his inability to work resulting in
the impairment of his earning capacity. Hence, disability should be understood less on its medical
significance but more on the loss of earning capacity. In determining whether a disability is total or
partial, what is crucial is whether the employee who suffered from disability could still perform his work
notwithstanding the disability he met. A permanent partial disability, on the other hand, presupposes a
seafarer's fitness to resume sea duties before the end of the 120/240-day medical treatment period
despite the injuries sustained and works on the premise that such partial injuries did not disable a
seafarer to earn wages in the same kind of work or similar nature for which he was trained. Petitioner
cannot be expected to resume sea duties if the risk of contracting his illness is associated with his
previous occupation as Quarter Master. Indeed, records do not show that he was reemployed by
respondent NYK or by any other manning agency from the time of his repatriation until the filing of the
instant petition. Moreover, the recurrence of mass in petitioner's bladder, the requirement by both the
company doctor and his personal doctor that he undergo repeat cystoscopy to monitor polyp growth,
his subsequent operation to remove the growing polyps in his bladder even 82 after the lapse of the
240-day period for treatment and despite the final disability grading given, all sufficiently show that his
disability is total and permanent. Petitioner's disability being permanent and total, he is entitled to 100%
compensation in the amount of US$95,949.00 as stipulated in par. 20.9 of the parties' CBA and as
adjudged by the VA.

Doctrine of incorporation clause

Bayan Muna vs. Romulo - GR No. 159618 Case Digest

Facts:

Petitioner Bayan Muna is a duly registered party-list group established to represent the marginalized
sectors of society. Respondent Blas F. Ople, now deceased, was the Secretary of Foreign Affairs during
the period material to this case. Respondent Alberto Romulo was impleaded in his capacity as then
Executive Secretary.

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court

Having a key determinative bearing on this case is the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal
Court (ICC) with “the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of
international concern x x x and shall be complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions.” The serious
crimes adverted to cover those considered grave under international law, such as genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression.
On December 28, 2000, the RP, through Charge d’Affaires Enrique A. Manalo, signed the Rome Statute
which, by its terms, is “subject to ratification, acceptance or approval” by the signatory states. As of the
filing of the instant petition, only 92 out of the 139 signatory countries appear to have completed the
ratification, approval and concurrence process. The Philippines is not among the 92.
RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement

On May 9, 2003, then Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone sent US Embassy Note No. 0470 to the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) proposing the terms of the non-surrender bilateral agreement
(Agreement, hereinafter) between the USA and the RP.
Via Exchange of Notes No. BFO-028-037 dated May 13, 2003 (E/N BFO-028-03, hereinafter), the RP,
represented by then DFA Secretary Ople, agreed with and accepted the US proposals embodied under the
US Embassy Note adverted to and put in effect the Agreement with the US government. In esse, the
Agreement aims to protect what it refers to and defines as “persons” of the RP and US from frivolous and
harassment suits that might be brought against them in international tribunals.8 It is reflective of the
increasing pace of the strategic security and defense partnership between the two countries. As of May 2,
2003, similar bilateral agreements have been effected by and between the US and 33 other countries.

The Agreement pertinently provides as follows:

1. For purposes of this Agreement, “persons” are current or former Government officials, employees
(including contractors), or military personnel or nationals of one Party.

2. Persons of one Party present in the territory of the other shall not, absent the express consent of the first
Party,

(a) be surrendered or transferred by any means to any international tribunal for any purpose, unless such
tribunal has been established by the UN Security Council, or

(b) be surrendered or transferred by any means to any other entity or third country, or expelled to a third
country, for the purpose of surrender to or transfer to any international tribunal, unless such tribunal has
been established by the UN Security Council.

3. When the [US] extradites, surrenders, or otherwise transfers a person of the Philippines to a third
country, the [US] will not agree to the surrender or transfer of that person by the third country to any
international tribunal, unless such tribunal has been established by the UN Security Council, absent the
express consent of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines [GRP].

4. When the [GRP] extradites, surrenders, or otherwise transfers a person of the [USA] to a third country,
the [GRP] will not agree to the surrender or transfer of that person by the third country to any international
tribunal, unless such tribunal has been established by the UN Security Council, absent the express consent
of the Government of the [US].
5. This Agreement shall remain in force until one year after the date on which one party notifies the other of
its intent to terminate the Agreement. The provisions of this Agreement shall continue to apply with respect
to any act occurring, or any allegation arising, before the effective date of termination.

In response to a query of then Solicitor General Alfredo L. Benipayo on the status of the non-surrender
agreement, Ambassador Ricciardone replied in his letter of October 28, 2003 that the exchange of
diplomatic notes constituted a legally binding agreement under international law; and that, under US law,
the said agreement did not require the advice and consent of the US Senate.
In this proceeding, petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondents in concluding and ratifying
the Agreement and prays that it be struck down as unconstitutional, or at least declared as without force
and effect.

Issue: Whether or not the RP-US NON SURRENDER AGREEMENT is void ab initio for contracting
obligations that are either immoral or otherwise at variance with universally recognized principles of
international law.

Ruling: The petition is bereft of merit.

Validity of the RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement

Petitioner’s initial challenge against the Agreement relates to form, its threshold posture being that E/N
BFO-028-03 cannot be a valid medium for concluding the Agreement.

Petitioners’ contention––perhaps taken unaware of certain well-recognized international doctrines,

practices, and jargons––is untenable. One of these is the doctrine of incorporation, as expressed in Section
2, Article II of the Constitution, wherein the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law and international jurisprudence as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of
peace, cooperation, and amity with all nations. An exchange of notes falls “into the category of inter-
governmental agreements,” which is an internationally accepted form of international agreement. The
United Nations Treaty Collections (Treaty Reference Guide) defines the term as follows:

An “exchange of notes” is a record of a routine agreement, that has many similarities with the private law
contract. The agreement consists of the exchange of two documents, each of the parties being in the
possession of the one signed by the representative of the other. Under the usual procedure, the accepting
State repeats the text of the offering State to record its assent. The signatories of the letters may be
government Ministers, diplomats or departmental heads. The technique of exchange of notes is frequently
resorted to, either because of its speedy procedure, or, sometimes, to avoid the process of legislative
approval.

In another perspective, the terms “exchange of notes” and “executive agreements” have been used
interchangeably, exchange of notes being considered a form of executive agreement that becomes binding
through executive action. On the other hand, executive agreements concluded by the President
“sometimes take the form of exchange of notes and at other times that of more formal documents
denominated ‘agreements’ or ‘protocols.’” As former US High Commissioner to the Philippines Francis B.
Sayre observed in his work, The Constitutionality of Trade Agreement Acts:

The point where ordinary correspondence between this and other governments ends and agreements –
whether denominated executive agreements or exchange of notes or otherwise – begin, may sometimes be
difficult of ready ascertainment. x x x
It is fairly clear from the foregoing disquisition that E/N BFO-028-03––be it viewed as the Non-Surrender
Agreement itself, or as an integral instrument of acceptance thereof or as consent to be bound––is a
recognized mode of concluding a legally binding international written contract among nations.

Agreement Not Immoral/Not at Variance

with Principles of International Law

Petitioner urges that the Agreement be struck down as void ab initio for imposing immoral obligations
and/or being at variance with allegedly universally recognized principles of international law. The immoral
aspect proceeds from the fact that the Agreement, as petitioner would put it, “leaves criminals immune from
responsibility for unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity; x x x it precludes
our country from delivering an American criminal to the [ICC] x x x.”63

The above argument is a kind of recycling of petitioner’s earlier position, which, as already discussed,
contends that the RP, by entering into the Agreement, virtually abdicated its sovereignty and in the process
undermined its treaty obligations under the Rome Statute, contrary to international law principles.

The Court is not persuaded. Suffice it to state in this regard that the non-surrender agreement, as aptly
described by the Solicitor General, “is an assertion by the Philippines of its desire to try and punish crimes
under its national law. x x x The agreement is a recognition of the primacy and competence of the country’s
judiciary to try offenses under its national criminal laws and dispense justice fairly and judiciously.”

Petitioner, we believe, labors under the erroneous impression that the Agreement would allow Filipinos and
Americans committing high crimes of international concern to escape criminal trial and punishment. This is
manifestly incorrect. Persons who may have committed acts penalized under the Rome Statute can be
prosecuted and punished in the Philippines or in the US; or with the consent of the RP or the US, before
the ICC, assuming, for the nonce, that all the formalities necessary to bind both countries to the Rome
Statute have been met. For perspective, what the Agreement contextually prohibits is the surrender by
either party of individuals to international tribunals, like the ICC, without the consent of the other party,
which may desire to prosecute the crime under its existing laws. With the view we take of things, there is
nothing immoral or violative of international law concepts in the act of the Philippines of assuming criminal
jurisdiction pursuant to the non-surrender agreement over an offense considered criminal by both Philippine
laws and the Rome Statute.