International Review of Sociology

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Legalism and creativity: tax non-compliance in the

eyes of the economic elite

Jorge Andrés Atria Curi

To cite this article: Jorge Andrés Atria Curi (2019): Legalism and creativity: tax non-
compliance in the eyes of the economic elite, International Review of Sociology, DOI:
10.1080/03906701.2019.1532653

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INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF SOCIOLOGY—REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE SOCIOLOGIE
https://doi.org/10.1080/03906701.2019.1532653

Legalism and creativity: tax non-compliance in the eyes of the

economic elite
a,b
Jorge Andrés Atria Curi
a
Center for Economics and Social Policy and Faculty of Humanities, Universidad Mayor, Santiago, Chile;
b
Centre for Social Conflict and Cohesion Studies (COES), Santiago, Chile

ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY

This paper analyzes elite tax compliance from a sociological Received 25 June 2017
perspective in order to examine how different tax behaviors are Accepted 23 August 2018
justified or how they embody different taxpayers’ subjectivities.
KEYWORDS
Drawing from the case of Chile and using a qualitative approach Tax compliance; elites;
based on 32 interviews conducted with members of the economic repertoires of evaluation; tax
elite, it is argued that forms of non-compliance -such as evasion avoidance; inequality
and avoidance- are grounded in different ‘repertoires of
evaluation’ while denoting a plurality of distinctions and criteria of
evaluation which relate to the legal culture in which the tax
system operates. Findings show that legalism -a literal conception
of the rules- does not always favor tax compliance and that it may
even go against the purpose of tax collection when a creative use
of the law prevails. Furthermore, legalism and creativity allow for
the main justifications for challenging tax payment as well as the
perceptions and beliefs that underlie the everyday relationship
between taxpayers and the state to be understood.

1. Introduction
How do people justify not paying taxes? ¿What are the perceptions and beliefs which sus-
tain their arguments? Tax compliance represents a challenge in every society and govern-
ments strive to introduce new strategies of control and enforcement. However, the broad
range of taxpayers’ behavioral responses rarely attracts attention. Even though some works
consider taxpayers’ actions or acknowledge a high variety of behaviors, we know little
about how they are justified or how they embody different taxpayers’ subjectivities.
This paper offers a sociological understanding of elite tax non-compliance, understood
as a behavior which generally indicates ‘disenchantment with or lack of commitment to
taxation’ (Davos, 2014, p. 2). To do this, a two-pronged approach is used: first, to explore
its definitions and manifestations by examining the different modalities to fulfill the tax
liability and how they are socially perceived; and second, to systematize justifications
related to diverse forms of non-compliance. This task requires paying attention to the
relation between reflection and action as well as the ways agreements or disagreements
are framed in disputing processes (Bolstanski & Thévenot, 1999, 2006). Furthermore,

CONTACT Jorge Andrés Atria Curi jorge.atria@umayor.cl José Toribio Medina 29 (second floor), Región Metro-
politana, Santiago 8340589, Chile
© 2019 University of Rome ’La Sapienza’
2 J. A. ATRIA CURI

justifications may imply the use of technical definitions, subjective beliefs, prevailing con-
ventions, aesthetic sentiments, or ethical or political requirements (Boltanski & Thévenot,
2006, p. 33).
Based on this approach, this paper argues that forms of non-compliance are grounded
by individuals of the economic elite in different repertoires of evaluation, while denoting a
plurality of distinctions and criteria of evaluation which has to be documented both
empirically and inductively (Lamont & Thévenot, 2000, p. 5). Though this paper applies
this perspective to the Chilean case, it also seeks to contribute to the debates on tax fair-
ness, global inequality, and the perceptions and beliefs that underlie the everyday relation-
ship between high-income taxpayers and the state (Atria, Groll, & Valdés, 2018;
Harrington, 2016; Zucman, 2015).
More specifically, this paper provides inputs for three areas that require additional
research: first, new insights arise regarding tax morale1 in the business sector, on which
there is limited knowledge (Torgler & Schaltegger, 2005); second, tax non-compliance is
analyzed with focus on how taxpayers use or manipulate the law (McBarnet, 1988,
p. 114). This makes it easier to observe ordinary dishonest behavior in specific contexts
(Andrighetto et al., 2016). Third, drawing from elite tax behavior, it questions how it
impacts their participation in the national community, in terms of willingness to join
the institutionalized structure for cooperation and mutual dependency conforming the
state. This approach might offer deeper knowledge on the wealthy and the institutions
enabling their production and maintenance (Amsden & DiCaprio, 2012; Khan, 2011, p. 5).
Chile represents a particularly appealing case because of its singular economic
development. While it has experienced remarkable economic growth and poverty
reduction rates over the past decades, in terms of equality it is the lowest ranked country
in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, 2015).
Although Chile is considered a legalist country2 with high levels of tax compliance, due
to an encouraging tax environment (Bergman, 2009), an appropriate compliance culture
and adequate information technology to enforce tax laws (Arellano & Corbo, 2013), recent
cases of evasion involving important members of the private and public sector have
challenged this image.3
Following a qualitative approach based on an analysis of 32 interviews conducted with
economic elite members, I identified several definitions and action criteria when paying
taxes. Although adherence to the law assumes a common frame to challenge evasion
and maintain that ‘in Chile, taxes get paid’, each action criterion informs how dissimilar
willingness to pay taxes coexist. Additionally, two major repertoires of evaluation are
introduced, which represent the elite’s justifications when facing different forms of tax
non-compliance. The findings prove that the distinction between evasion and avoidance
is key to analyzing the ways tax compliance is contested, leading to evasion penalization
and social legitimacy of avoidance as distinctive features of a particular legal culture. Here,
the issue shifts towards ‘creative compliance’ (McBarnet, 2001), to suggest that legalism
does not always contribute to the tax payment and that it may even go against the purpose
of tax collection.
This paper is organized as follows: the review of literature with focus on tax compliance,
the development of a sociological perspective, and the case of Chile is presented. Second,
the research method and performed empirical work is introduced. Third, findings are
exposed in terms of repertoires of evaluation of the economic elite, which comprise
 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF SOCIOLOGY 3

definitions, action criteria, and justifications. Lastly, a conclusion and discussion section
regarding the results and issues to explore in future research is provided.

2. Literature review
2.1. Research on tax compliance
Consent is one of the most intriguing tax topics from a sociological perspective, since it
relates to the process of state formation and the representation of citizens (Tilly, 2009).
By definition, consent is part of taxation. From a fiscal sociology perspective, taxation is
described as ‘the obligation to contribute money or goods to the state in exchange for
nothing in particular’ (Martin, Mehrotra, & Prasad, 2009, p. 3). Thus, although taxes
may contain an implicit promise of public expenditure, they do not represent a direct
exchange of service or payment, but rather a compulsory imposition by the state, which
is socially recognized. This definition creates the possibility for tax non-compliance,
which would be impossible if it were a direct payment. This train of thought has histori-
cally allowed taxes to be a source of permanent conflict: as shown by Ardant (1975, p. 194),
tax discontent was a leading factor behind the European uprisings of the XIV through
XVIII centuries.
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) developed a pioneering model to understand tax com-
pliance in economics. Even with the subsequent addition of new factors, that have
increased its explanatory power and realism, a focus resting on financial incentives under-
lying evasion and the assertion of individuals paying taxes exclusively for fear of being
detected and sanctioned, remains active (Alm & Torgler, 2011).
Apart from economics, Levi (1988) developed an influential approach to evaluate indi-
viduals’ cooperative dispositions from a quasi-voluntary compliance model. While the
voluntary aspect is provided by the taxpayers’ willingness to pay, whoever fails to comply
faces the threat of coercion. Under this model, tax payment cannot be purely perceived as
a matter of principles or as behavior entirely based on self-interest, and rarely can it exclu-
sively be accounted for by positive selective incentives (Levi, 1988, p. 52).
The literature generally agrees that consent is crucial for tax compliance. For example,
higher penalty rates and the use of threat and coercion do not necessarily reduce tax eva-
sion, but they could decrease tax morale (Frey & Holler, 1998). Likewise, compliance levels
are usually higher than expected, given existing enforcement standards, suggesting social
norms influence taxpayers’ behavior (Cummings, Martinez-Vazquez, McKee, & Torgler,
2009). Ide and Steinmo (2009) illustrate this influence in research on the loss of social
trust and public discontent with Japanese tax policy, though the positive impact of trust
on tax compliance has also been demonstrated in countries where trust is strongly per-
ceived, in general and towards authorities (Kogler et al., 2013). Other authors emphasize
political flexibility when negotiating with constituents, so they perceive fair treatment
(Einhorn, 2009), or the degree of personal identification with the country, and the recog-
nition of taxes as a contribution to the nation, which is clearly noted during times of war
(Feldman & Slemrod, 2009).
Another line of research allows studying consent through the impact of ethics on com-
pliance, underlining a ‘full house’ of individual behaviors (Alm & Torgler, 2011) that
should be addressed by the tax authority through various monitoring strategies according
4 J. A. ATRIA CURI

to different taxpayer profiles (Lisi, 2015). Wenzel (2004) studies the nexus between social
and personal norms demonstrating how both could influence tax compliance. The rel-
evance of the former norms, however, depends on the degree of social identification
with a reference group. While the literature shows the importance of consent and the
moral dimension on tax compliance, it is ambiguous when assessing the degree to
which it may complement enforcement. One exception is found in Luttmer and Singhal
(2014, p. 151), who declare while tax morale is crucial, enforcement is the main driver
of compliance.
While some authors stress the relational dimension in taxation to comprehend compli-
ance where a ‘fiscal contract’ figure appears, the literature differs on the form and resources
exchanged. Feld and Frey (2007, p. 115) refer to a psychological tax contract, explaining
compliance as the interaction between deterrence measures and responsive regulation.
Simultaneously, it encompasses ties and loyalties among the parties involved. Other
works accentuate the social character of exchange, which could include private or collec-
tive goods (Martin et al., 2009, p. 18) expanding the definition of the fiscal offer beyond the
goods and services available in the market place, to include respect for and protection of
democratic principles and processes (Braithwaite, 2002b, p. 269). From another approach,
Abelin (2012, p. 8) considers that tax payment is bonded to the recognition of a sovereign
entity. It is in the face of this entity, where the renunciation of a part of one’s property to
improve one’s personal moral condition and to restore a sense of community, occurs. Tax
compliance, therefore, puts ‘fiscal sovereignty’ into play, reflecting the state’s capacity to
project an image of credible and transcendent authority, offering moral recognition for
citizens’ generosity towards the collective, such that citizens seek membership through
payment (Abelin, 2012, p. 14).
Finally, studies specifically focused on perceptions of tax compliance and tax morale,
which consider regional and national differences, have found diverse factors influencing
evasion: the size of a shadow economy; tax burden; tax knowledge; individual honesty;
corruption; perception of fairness in the tax system as well as citizens’ just behavior;
trust in public officials; preference for democracy; satisfaction with one’s life and identifi-
cation with one’s country (Gangl, Kirchler, Lorenz, & Torgler, 2015; Liebig & Mau, 2005;
McGee & López Palau, 2008; Torgler, 2003, 2005). On the other hand, studies focused on
the institutional level document the impact of the following factors: administrative
deficiency; complexity and inadequate knowledge of the tax system; the type of enforce-
ment strategy used by authorities; quality of political institutions; diverse institutional
and legal regulations as well as accounting issues (Fjeldstad & Heggstad, 2012; Frey &
Torgler, 2007; Murphy, 2008; Saad, 2014).

2.2. A sociological approach to analyze tax compliance among the elite

Tax collection differs from tax revenues theoretically expected in accordance with ‘the
letter and the spirit’ of the law. The distance between them is referred to as ‘tax gap,’
and it includes every reason for taxpayer’s non-compliance: involuntary under-reporting,
errors in tax declaration, evasion, voluntary and illegal under-reporting, avoidance, and
tax flight (Jorratt, 2013, p. 49; Kirchler, Maciejovsky, & Schneider, 2003).
An economic evaluation, however, does not require an in-depth analysis of the motiv-
ations or justifications that support tax behavior. Thus, it dominates an interpretation of
 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF SOCIOLOGY 5

individuals as passive agents reacting to exogenous variables, who are only willing to pay
taxes because of audits and sanctions (Kirchler et al., 2003, p. 536). Sociology can contrib-
ute to the study of tax compliance beyond an economic approach by integrating
institutional factors, perceptions and social practices, emphasizing the research of issues
such as moral judgments, perceptions of community behavior, informal social sanctions
(Welch et al., 2005), national tax cultures (Nerré, 2008), or legal environments (Edelman,
1990).
The present paper contributes to three areas: first, though little is known about tax
morale behavior in general (Torgler, 2003), by enquiring on the economic elite’s per-
ceptions regarding tax compliance, a tax morale characterization of the business sector
emerges – a group on which there is particularly limited knowledge (Torgler & Schal-
tegger, 2005). Second, forms of non-compliance are analyzed from a perspective that
does not prioritize how the law is crafted or supervised, but rather ‘how those in
the receiving end use and manipulate it’, which is often ignored (McBarnet, 1988,
p. 114). This may reveal tax law to be insufficient, complex and debatable (Braithwaite,
2002a) and law avoidance can be problematized. Third, it allows the exploration of how
elite tax behavior reflects their participation in the national community, in terms of
willingness to join the institutionalized structure for cooperation and mutual depen-
dency of the state. The framework to stress each of these issues is presented in the
remaining part of this subsection.
To assess perceptions on tax compliance, I use what Lamont and Thévenot named
‘Repertoires of Evaluation’. These are ‘elementary grammars that can be available across
situations and that pre-exist individuals, although they are transformed and made sali-
ent by individuals’ (Lamont & Thévenot, 2000, pp. 5–6). These repertoires constitute
schemes irregularly displayed across national cultures, where a plurality of criteria
assumptions, in constant competition, underlies the evaluation. When using this tool,
it is possible to determine which types of evaluation prevail, how they differ from
each other, and how they relate to the specific context where they are performed.
Additionally, one can observe the influence of culture on individual actions, whose val-
idity moves beyond the fiscal scope, extending to each individual’s ‘action strategies’
(Swidler, 1986).
Researching repertoires of evaluation in tax compliance should shed light on specific
criteria, logics of action and prevailing justifications, in contesting compliance among Chi-
lean economic elite. This might offer a deeper understanding of the diversity of this
group’s valuations of compliance, which factors impact the national features that shape
a specific tax culture, and what role institutions can play in modifying such behaviors.
Following Lamont and Thévenot (2000, p. 9), different socially available meaning sys-
tems favor the relevance and symbolic weight of certain distinctions. While Lamont and
Thévenot’s research offers a comparative analysis between countries, this paper focuses on
distinctions among Chile’s economic elite in order to explore the definitions, beliefs, and
justifications used when explaining multiple forms of non-compliance.
To assess diverse forms of compliance, McBarnet (2001) differentiates between four
categories: ‘committed compliance’, which refers to those voluntarily paying; ‘capitulative
compliance’, which defines those involuntarily obeying taxation even when dissenting
from it; ‘non-compliance’, where default and rejection of tax liability take place; and
finally ‘creative compliance’:
6 J. A. ATRIA CURI

If they have the resources, they may set their lawyers to work on the legal form of their activi-
ties to package or repackage them in ways they can claim fall beyond the ambit of disadvan-
tageous or within the ambit of advantageous, law (McBarnet, 2001, p. 6).

For McBarnet, the essence of creative compliance lies within the possibility of defining it as
‘perfectly legal’, simultaneously eluding the expected law effect. Hence, the problem is
understood as ‘legal avoidance.’
Creative compliance requires a particular attitude towards the law and it does not natu-
rally arise from it. It conceives the law as unofficial or illegitimate policy, or subjugates the
legitimacy of law to personal interest. It is therefore open to adaptation, as if it were an
indeterminate matter. Active legal work, in this sense, becomes indispensable, which
‘involves careful scrutiny of the law in order to seek out material for and actively construct
alternative and innovative arguments and legal forms’ (McBarnet, 2001, p. 8). Creative tax
compliance reintroduces a distinction within legal/illegal code from the legal side, which
both facilitates a subtler enquiry regarding the ways taxpayers perceive and practice tax
liabilities, and allows for the coexistence of different levels of tax commitment and willing-
ness to pay. Under this approach, avoidance joins this research.
This perspective has not been widely acknowledged in the literature. For instance, Berg-
man (2009, p. 206), while comparing cheating and compliance political cultures in Argen-
tina and Chile, argues that Chile possesses an encouraging tax environment, drawing from
socialization and rational imitation assumptions as well as shared beliefs, values and atti-
tudes towards decision making. Unlike Argentina, he places Chile ‘among the more tax
compliant nations of the world’ based on the ‘ability to engender law-abiding behavior
through an effective administration of its sanctioning power’ (Bergman, 2009, p. 204).
For Bergman, non-compliance in Argentina and Chile is related to evasion, since both
countries rely heavily on VAT and tax avoidance is a minor problem in VAT based sys-
tems (2009, p. 52). This analysis suggests a positive evaluation of the Chilean case, while
reducing the observation scope on evasion and neglecting legal mechanisms that facilitate
tax saving or aggressive tax planning. The latter, however, is key to understanding the
relationship between taxation and inequality in Chile (Atria, 2014, 2015b; Fairfield & Jor-
ratt, 2016; López, Figueroa, & Gutiérrez, 2016).
Moreover, avoidance research allows an evaluation of tax administration ability to
ensure the expected tax collection in accordance with the law and facilitates the study
of disputes and controversies surrounding its creation. Fairfield (2010, pp. 44–45), also
comparing Chile and Argentina, shows major companies in both countries are concerned
with tax law. Since they contribute a significant portion of national tax revenue, they are
closely monitored even in contexts where government institutions have difficulty control-
ling evasion. The business sector then tries to influence reform processes in order to antici-
pate future changes, a strategy that can prove to be more effective than responding once
laws have already been implemented.
Finally, to assess willingness to be part of the national community, I assume that several
forms of non-compliance derive from both economic and moral concerns. The latter
includes taxpayers’ evaluations of aspects such as personal affectedness, experience, and
knowledge (Kirchler et al., 2003, p. 550). Therefore, a systematization of repertoires of
evaluation in elite tax compliance contributes to deeper knowledge on the wealthy and
on how tax regulations in specific legal cultures are understood.
 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF SOCIOLOGY 7

Following Khan’s argument (2011, p. 13), greater comprehension of the elite is necess-
ary to understand how they acquire, maintain and protect their positions, particularly in
an era of growing inequalities (Seron, 2016) or within a context of high and persistent
income concentration, as occurs in Chile. The study of elites is also important to focus
on contemporary dynamics of social change, making the specificities of elite formation vis-
ible and recognizing fundamental processes of present capitalism (Savage & Williams,
2008).
Discussing the moral dimension of tax compliance among the elite, a sociological
approach might benefit from a perspective that inspects institutions through observing
cultural frameworks impacting their performance, ‘embodying particular ways of thinking
and often built on reservoirs of authority with cultural roots’ (Hall & Lamont, 2013, p. 51)
in addition to rational terms, focused on sanctions and incentives. This broader perspec-
tive helps identify which characteristics influence how the elite understand and practice
tax compliance and reveals the role institutions play in the persistence of inequality.

2.3. Tax policy and tax compliance in Chile

Chile exhibits high levels of economic inequality and is ranked 115 out of 135 countries, as
measured by the Gini coefficient (0.50) (Repetto, 2016). Redistribution levels are insuffi-
cient to alter this pattern due to, among other aspects, the weak effect of Chile’s tax and
benefits system (OECD, 2015). The tax system is slightly regressive: the two main taxes
are VAT, which in Chile is regressive, and a progressive income tax (Engel, Galetovic,
& Raddatz, 1999). Regressivity is verified in effective tax rates: the poorest 40% and
the richest 10% of the Chilean population pay around 15% of their income in taxes
(Castelletti, 2013).
Tax exemptions and benefits, known as tax expenditure, increase regressivity, ineffi-
ciency and facilitate evasion and avoidance (Arellano & Corbo, 2013). In 2011, they rep-
resented 4.79% of the GDP where 75% accounts for mechanisms and special regimes in
income tax (Jorratt, 2013). Due to high inequality, only the richest 19% of the population
are subject to paying income tax; given a lack of resources, the remaining 81% are exempt
(Agostini, 2013). Consequently, all tax expenditure that reduces the income tax, directly
benefits the top 19% (Agostini, Martínez, & Flores, 2012).
Chile, as the first country where ideas and policies associated with a free market econ-
omy were introduced (Harvey, 2011), serves as a ‘canonical’ case to observe the negative
impact of neoliberalism, especially on inequality (Galbraith, 2002). Neoliberal principles
are plainly visible in tax reforms of 1974 and 1984, where efficiency and indirect tax col-
lection were increased (Marcel, 1986) and direct taxation was simplified, lowering the
highest income group’s contribution (Palma & Marcel, 1990). The 1984 reform strength-
ened savings and investment while focusing taxation on personal income and not on com-
panies. It established that company owners pay taxes according to profit withdrawals,
instead of accrued profits (Cheyre, 1986) and thus capital income receives preferential
treatment, when compared to labor income (Jorratt, 2009). Some efforts to change the
tax system have been made, through progressive modifications and reforms. Nevertheless,
it has met significant challenges, due to business groups’ opposition (Fairfield, 2015;
Napoli & Navia, 2012), legislative malapportionment (Ardanaz & Scartascini, 2013) and
the priority given to progressive social expenditure while overlooking revenue (Agostini,
8 J. A. ATRIA CURI

2008). A new tax reform, approved in 2014, maintained VAT rate, increased corporate tax
and reduced the top marginal income tax rate. The redistributive consequences of this
reform remain unknown.
Chile is positively evaluated on matters of evasion where legalism and a culture of com-
pliance are underlined (Arellano & Corbo, 2013). Public opinion surveys show evasion is
perceived as an issue of medium significance, less relevant than in other Latin American
countries and primarily performed by peddlers (Servicio de Impuestos Internos [SII]-
IPSOS 2008). For 2011, VAT evasion was estimated at close to 14% although it was
only 8% in 2007 (Jorratt, 2013). These levels are low when compared to other Latin Amer-
ican countries. On the other hand, income tax evasion reached 34% by 2009 (Jorratt,
2013). As previously mentioned, this tax is solely paid by the wealthiest 19%. Moreover,
an OECD report on base erosion and profit shifting (OECD, 2013, p. 17) indicates that
Bermuda appears as the third largest investor in Chile in 2010 and a study by Global
Financial Integrity (2015) shows Chile ranking 27th among emerging economies with
the highest flows of illicit resources. Crossing the data suggests significant amounts of
money exist that could substantially increase tax non-compliance in Chile, not only
through evasion but also avoidance. Avoidance may also be exemplified by means of
the inheritance tax, which collects 0.1% of total tax revenue (Micco, 2013) and is often
dodged through legal tax planning (Saffie, 2012).

3. Method
In this research, a qualitative methodological approach was adopted, utilizing semi-struc-
tured interviews. Here, I gather significant information regarding Chilean taxation from
different sources. I consider institutional features, political discourses, and experts’ diag-
nosis, but mostly elite perceptions, that is, evaluative and non-evaluative understandings
that combine cognitions, norms, and values (Reis & Moore, 2005, p. 3).
As part of a wider research project focused on the Chilean elite and taxation4, fifty inter-
views with members of the economic, political, and scientific elite, as well as tax advisors,
were performed from February to May of 2013 in Santiago de Chile, from which 32 were
members of the economic elite. For the economic elite, sampling was based on two selec-
tion criteria: belonging to the top 5% (average household income per capita, according to
National Socio-Economic Characterization Survey (2011), and holding a prestigious pos-
ition within a company, foundation or business group, or working as independent consult-
ants. Since elites represent a difficult group to gain access to and a previous ‘knowledge of
insiders’ is often required (Atkinson & Flint, 2001), an initial set of 9 respondents was
identified, using a chain-referral method to request that they suggest other relevant indi-
viduals with similar criteria (Tansey, 2007). This method was developed to reach 32 inter-
views. Studies using qualitative methods to investigate tax perceptions or similar issues
have employed similar or smaller sample sizes.5 Given the initial selection of diverse rel-
evant respondents, interviewees from 8 different activities or productive sectors of the
economy were included: Transportation, Mining, Electricity and Gas, Financial and Insur-
ance Activities, Consulting Services, Food Service Activities, Private Foundations, and
Business Associations. The sample was unbalanced along gender lines (87% men and
13% women), which relates to the very low proportion of women occupying management
or board member positions in Chile (Tokman, 2011). The interviews lasted between 35
 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF SOCIOLOGY 9

and 100 min each, were recorded and transcribed, and later codified and analyzed using
the software Dedoose. The analysis of codes was based on different stages of codification,
considering descriptive, interpretative and causal aspects (King & Horrocks, 2010). The
interview guidelines were organized into six modules (General Perception, Tax Structure,
Compliance, Reform, Institutions and Inequality). Each interview was assigned an identifi-
cation number, noted within brackets, when quotes are used to support findings. In this
article, only findings concerning the economic elite and the Compliance module are
presented.
In several cases, interviewees proved to have poor knowledge on tax issues. The analysis
of the material, therefore, makes conceptual distinctions only when participants explicitly
refer to a concrete action (e.g. avoidance, evasion, tax planning, etc.). In consequence,
repertoires of evaluation are revealed, restoring the arguments of the participants with
regard to legal and illegal phenomena, which potentially contest tax compliance.

4. Economic elite and tax compliance

Repertoires of evaluation in the economic elite’s tax compliance comprise definitions,
action criteria and justifications. Regarding definitions, two assumptions illustrate differ-
ences between lines of action that the actors pursue. One proposes that the rich are not the
most affected by taxation and the other indicates tax payment is the result of a decision.
Interviewees frequently agree with a widely known narrative: those with more resources
‘fix it’ or ‘find the way’ to not pay taxes or pay less than they should:
The middle class is the greater payer. The poorest people have some deduction possibilities,
and the richest people create investment companies, they make things, they build ways to pay
less taxes. (EE3)

Successful employees in this country, hard-working people and the comfortable middle-class
make much more effort to pay taxes and they compromise their life’s standards even more to
prioritize usefulness than rich people in this country. (EE28)

This remark concurs with the previous section, regarding the existence of easier terms for
high-income groups to avoid and evade taxes. This narrative, however, is not mentioned as
a structural critique but to confirm an unjust inequality (Therborn, 2013) in the distri-
bution of the tax burden.
The second assumption holds that tax compliance among the very wealthy is the result
of a decision. Since taxable income at this level is derived from complex operations, or that
income is received from multiple sources, paying taxes does not involve a single calcu-
lation unequivocally estimated by tax administration and the taxpayer. Hence, payment
in this segment is not a ‘chemically pure’ (EE8) process:
There are a lot of people who don’t properly understand or they set the problem in black and
white, on what it is to pay or not pay taxes. Because one thing is to make an efficient tax pay-
ment, as anything you would do in life (…) if I charge 20% here (…) and I pay 20 and I just
forget about it, well, that’s one way to do it, but if I started looking at it and I withdraw this,
and I pay 20% exactly of what I need to pay, it is legal and I am not evading. (EE14)

Tax liability, in this sense, has a freedom factor granting actors a certain capacity to choose
how to comply. This implies that a rich taxpayer and his or her advisors decide how much
10 J. A. ATRIA CURI

to pay. This decision is one more among a set of calculations and operations comprising
business financial administration. Some will plan sophisticated operations with the advice
of experts to decrease their tax burden, while others will show less interest in the matter.
Decision-making also extends to high-income managers, although with a lower degree of
freedom, since their tax is automatically withheld from wages. Nonetheless, they can create
an investment company to trade shares on the stock market, to pay for personal consump-
tion of goods or services, or to transfer wealth in life, among other alternatives.
Avoidance and evasion definitions are entwined around this diversity: subjects describe
their behavior and establish differences in tax payment evaluation with their peers, con-
sidering if they request experts’ help for payment planning and which way they exert
their freedom, according to their possibilities.
There is, however, a common denominator: a deeply rooted perception among inter-
viewees recognizing evasion as a felony whereas tax liability commands respect. Evasion
lacks social legitimacy and, therefore, it is strongly condemned. The whole idea is summar-
ized under the postulate: ‘In Chile taxes do get paid’ (EE3), as opposed to ‘I’m the only
stupid one paying taxes’ which describes the Argentinean case (Grimson & Roig, 2011,
p. 99). The Chilean hypothesis verifies the academic discourse, which celebrates the rule
of the law and the existence of a ‘compliance culture’ (Arellano & Corbo, 2013, p. 24).
Strict adherence to the law generates a new diversification on perceptions; it does not
aim to answer if evasion is performed or not, but to explain how tax compliance is exe-
cuted and what criteria are at stake. Considering the interviewees’ restrictions to speak
on the issue and its nuances and contradictions, three sets of action criteria are identified
(Figure 1):
Although adherence to the law assumes a common frame to criticize evasion, priorities
of each action criteria inform how completely dissimilar tax scenarios coexist. These
action criteria are somewhat akin to the three-level typology of honesty proposed by
Andrighetto et al. (2016) -honest type, dishonest type, and fudging type-, though here,
instead of primarily referring to types of honest behavior, they represent types of

Figure 1. Action criteria according to types of behaviour.

 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF SOCIOLOGY 11

evaluation prevailing in the tax payment decision. Hence, action criteria include honesty
alongside the other factors influencing tax compliance, mentioned in the literature review.
Even when interviewees are generally located in the superior alternative, this is not the
only set of existing criteria. The use of multiple criteria by one interviewee, depending on
the tax analyzed, is observed. For instance, consensus exists that VAT offers fewer plan-
ning opportunities and is strongly enforced, which leaves little room for diverse behaviors.
Contrarily, inheritance tax illustrates an orientation towards elusive behaviors even among
those located in the inferior alternative -non-avoidance criteria-, because of disapproval of
its function and easy avoidance, which is broadly considered legitimate. Consequently, the
scheme classifies main criteria for tax compliance in general, not for specific taxes.
Those calling for avoidance criteria make an effort to exhaustively differentiate between
avoidance and evasion, since mixing categories risks labeling oneself as a potential offen-
der. The reasoning visualizes tax planning as seizing the best possible conditions within
the law. When questioned about such advantage taking, how it is performed, by whom,
its boundaries and consequences, initial differentiation fades, and the taxpayer finds
him or herself in a vague and thus indisputable position.
In this criteria set, legalism appears stronger than among those adopting less elusive
behaviors. Legalism exhibits many taxpayers’ pragmatic reasoning. They do not question
the performed action and consider law obedience a greater virtue. They do not acknowl-
edge multiple possible interpretations but hold the legislator responsible for the law’s out-
come and opt for a literal reading of the law, identifying opportunities and limits when
paying taxes, where every effort to reduce the burden within legal boundaries is deemed
legitimate:
Nobody can brand you of misuse if you are within the law, I mean, you can walk, law reaches
up to here [pointing out the table’s edge]. You can walk up to here, and that’s what a busi-
nessman does, he walks up to here, because here are the greatest benefits. Some of us are not
such perfectionists and we walk up to here [further in from the table’s edge], and others walk
up to here and make no use of it. (EE20)

While interviewees identify several taxpayers’ behaviors – which could entail recognition
of diverse subjectivities – acknowledgement is covered up by classifications on how puristic
each taxpayer is, regarding legal interpretations, as a mechanism to justify behavior per-
ceived as relatively common, moderating guilt and the impression of an atypical act.
Boundaries criteria lead to tax planning, but without prioritizing convenience or per-
sonal benefit. Business operations are meant to be efficient and rational and the realm
of tax payment also faces such demands. Even when this requires payment planning
and the hiring of advisors, it is fully accomplished via compliance with the law and dis-
missing actions open to avoidance interpretation:
If I start paying taxes beyond what is due, what am I doing? I am compromising in the long
term the very existence of the business. Because I’m losing utilities, I’m generating fewer
resources to invest and to build upon in the future. And since my competitor is paying
way less than I, a better future is growing. (EE8)

Boundaries criteria, then, prompt an extensive use of law instruments, establishing they
are required to perform tax payment, which should not be detrimental to the company nor
the state.
12 J. A. ATRIA CURI

Non-avoidance criteria, finally, reduce centrality and set restrictions on motivations for
reducing the tax burden. To use one interviewee’s analogy: ‘squeezing the lemon’ (EE16)
to obtain maximum performance is neither desirable nor necessary.
This group’s arguments, more than others, present a strong image of the creative action
of avoidance, by recognizing there are multiple interpretations of the law, while question-
ing legalism as an obedient attitude born out of inertia:
Horizontal inequality exists, and it is because there are so many alternatives to … investing a
lot of time, you can pay less. I am aware of it, the thing is I don’t have that time, nor am I
interested in getting into it. But I do know there are mechanisms (…) I know I could do
less. I just don’t do it! It’s my fault I don’t! (Laughs). (EE16)

Although the interviewees’ justifications combine miscellaneous explanations, not all of

them are supported by the same logic. Disaggregation in different repertoires allows for a
clear examination of not only the foundations of the relationship between subject and pay-
ment but also different logics to understand, among others, what changes could potentially
reduce non-compliance. Table 1 identifies two types of repertoires and four predominant
logics:
First, a distinction exists between interpretative and non-interpretative arguments.
Among the interpretative ones, the dominant narratives on evasion and avoidance con-
sider them to be natural reactions to a certain state of affairs or a certain habitual

Table 1. Tax compliance: economic elite’s repertoires of evaluation.

Non-interpretative
1. Civic – Formative and cultural aspects, as well as
ontological references to universal issues or
characteristics of human beings in
general and, in consequence,
inevitable.
– It is a matter of ethics.
– It is Chilean deviltry.
– ‘Shameless people’ and ‘scoundrels’ are
everywhere.
– It is an educational problem.
– It is the individualism of our age.
– It is the creativity of the human being.
Interpretative
3. Countervailing Comprehensive and specific evaluations
of public performance suggesting
deficiencies or injustices. Responses
appear as actions for personal benefit,
countervailing the damage caused or
provoking the impression a higher
justice has been obtained.
– Tax rates are extremely high.
– There is poor management of public
apparatus resources.
– Legislation unfairly treats or harms
certain groups.
– Very little is perceived from the state.
Taxes do not become tangible.
– A concrete tax is rejected, modestly
evaluated because it is mistaken,
inappropriate or unfair.

2. Regulatory Reactions to regulations and incentives in
the system; any changes in this matter
most likely would change tax
compliance.
– It is what is allowed by the legislation.
– The system encourages this behavior.
– It is the need for adjustment and
market competitiveness.
– It is an incentive given great disparity in
tax rates among people and
companies.
4. Affirmative Positive manifestations accounting for
the purpose which the tax system was
created for. They are not anomalies
rather expected and desirable
consequences for economy
– The country needs further saving and
investment. Current instruments
and mechanisms have helped it
during the last decades.
– It is unfair some cannot plan their
taxation (extension of avoidance
capacity).
 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF SOCIOLOGY 13

human behavior. In these cases, a lack of guilt prevails – it is not clear what is responsible
for avoidance and evasion – suggesting that it may be possible to alter behavior by chan-
ging the context, for example, through civic education, a ‘major cultural development’ or a
modification of the system’s incentives. In this repertoire, two predominant logics exist: a
civic-ontological one and a regulatory one. In both cases, interviewees based their opinions
on ‘facts’ where non-compliance plays out as an obvious reaction. Discourses suggest
given scenarios, unavoidable contexts lived by the subjects.
Civic-ontological arguments suggest formative or cultural weaknesses, which allude to
ethical or educational differences between individuals, or individualism. The latter empha-
sizes personal benefit to the detriment of the common good, which is invoked by taxation.
Wit and creativity are expressions of skills resulting from the search for areas or issues that
permit interpretations that adjust rules to the private reality, which transpires in a peculiar
fashion in Chile, as this behavior occurs within institutions and not along the system’s
margins. The task is to act according to the legal standards while simultaneously seeking
personal gains, even when it might completely contradict institutional aims. This logic also
includes a justification for non-compliance since in every society a percentage of individ-
uals transgress the law and consequently minimizes non-compliance in light of a positive
evaluation of the country. These transgressions become ‘tiny spots’, as there are few cases
and their impact is weak:
It’s just in Chilean DNA, to look for a tiny trick, not just to avoid taxes but to violate the
system. Then, I think this threatens our development; first, we need to develop our minds
for development to work (…) One of our country’s shortcomings is our search for deviltry,
we are quite witty when it comes to deviltry. (EE11)

I don’t know if finally through taxes you can regulate such things, there, I think, it’s more
related to personal ethics. If a guy is capable of it, more or less taxes, more or less control,
he will always look for a formula where he can do it. (EE10)

Regulatory logic stresses institutional fragilities, where individuals may have little eva-
luative margin and therefore, tax planning is the rational option to endure ferocious com-
petition, to take risks and innovate with sufficient guarantees, or to respond to disparity in
taxes between people and corporations since ‘I’d be stupid if I didn’t do it’ (EE19). Simply,
the system is to blame or at least, standing incentives provoke such behaviors. Legalism is
also framed within this logic and is used to justify taxpayer submissiveness to laws
approved by parliament. Obedience to the law is ignorant of the subject’s creative work
in planning a tax payment or, minimally frees him or her from any responsibility, since
the law which permits diverse interpretations was discussed and decided upon by
legislators:
That one can optimize this entire distributive game is the result of a legislative discussion
which ultimately are the rules of the game. Then, what one actually thinks is that lawmakers
pursued that balance. Finally, when you optimize taxation on your stuff, you’re doing some-
thing that is actually fair from a society’s perspective, because society … laws allow it. (EE21)

In interpretative repertoires, evaluation is central beyond a verification of facts. It is less

related to a natural state of affairs or a logical reaction towards an institutional configur-
ation, but rather centers on a subjective analysis not necessarily based upon empirical
observation. Here, tax non-compliance is not a negative consequence of certain incentives
14 J. A. ATRIA CURI

or ethical matters but a result of a particular interpretation of state functioning, the need to
contribute to the common good, or the belief that the law transcends individual will. Inter-
pretative repertoires suggest that evasion and avoidance behavior will not necessarily
change, even if the system’s incentives or taxpayers’ education do, since they might persist
as narratives protected by ‘common sense’, which implies that solid proof would not be
needed to uphold two predominant logics of action: a compensatory one and an affirma-
tive one.
In compensatory logic, testimony and subjectivity are more clearly perceived than in
previous justifications. Responsibilities are addressed, such as: the malfunctioning of a
public apparatus while wasting resources, legislation that inadequately considers the inter-
ests of some interviewees, or tax rates that are inconsistent with Chile’s reality. Hence, in
order to correct this imbalance, personal actions are modified to compensate for the sys-
tem’s failures.
Furthermore, this reasoning will not necessarily change in different contexts as
although the effective tax rates for the top ten percent are not high (Castelletti, 2013),
they might be considered disproportional even were they to be lowered, since this reflec-
tion is not derived from a comparison to other countries, but from a personal assessment
of what an appropriate tax burden should be. Similarly, when considering positive inter-
national evaluations of the Chilean state (Repetto, 2016; World Economic Forum [WEF],
2014), it could be argued that this logic, which justifies seeking personal advantage to com-
pensate for state malfunctioning, could be maintained across diverse scenarios. Finally,
evasion and avoidance as responses to legal injustices or inadequate taxation imply a
logic where the individual believes the possibility exists to make personal amends with
the system, through the handling of tax payment or other legal obligations. Accordingly,
a willingness to proceed beyond the boundaries of the state, with greater consequences
than tax non-compliance, is hinted:
Every system has gaps and because of these gaps evasion happens, evidently. If these gaps
should disappear or not, it depends on what you want to do, because once again, everything
you do, since the cost of tax payment is so deeply felt, advisors will look for the way to evade
it, we will look for the way to evade, or defer, or … (EE31)

But, what if you have on the one hand a feeling of taxes being out of proportion. Two, you’re
not getting the tax benefit. Three, you know some taxes are poorly invested. Then, you say,
you know what, perhaps it’s not within the spirit of the law but I don’t see how this money is
being properly used and therefore, I don’t have a moral objection when I don’t deliver it, if I
cannot deliver it within the legal frame. (EE25)

Affirmative logic is the only one that positively justifies non-compliance since it indi-
cates the system is working according to its original aims. Rather than being an anomaly,
tax planning is productive for the country, as untaxed money ultimately results in growth
and wealth. A positive analysis of the elite’s defense of such non-compliance mechanisms
also represents an interpretative exercise: in the end, the loss of public resources due to this
reason is documented, as well as the consequence of a reduced capacity for social expen-
diture. Similarly, if the primary justification for non-compliance is growth and investment,
with the premise that private hands that keep money would contribute more to the
country than the state could, avoidance could defend itself even if the present system
 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF SOCIOLOGY 15

were to change, because of its contribution to create new entrepreneurships and to the
greater common good:
These investment companies created by professionals start, where guys create an investment
company, but deep down they’re just doing it to avoid tax payment … Personally, I don’t dis-
agree with it, actually I think it’s ok. Entrepreneurs are also there; assume I have a shares port-
folio and I create an investment company to manage my stocks and that is completely
reasonable. Actually, it is a company. I find it completely normal. I don’t see the sinfulness
of it, I find it perfectly valid and legitimate (…) It’s a different structure because deep down
they are investments. It isn’t your job, it isn’t money you keep in your pocket, it isn’t money
to spend. It’s important, because the bottom line is, it’s super important to keep a saving rate
in the country, which still isn’t enough. (EE15)

5. Discussion and conclusion

This paper examines manifestations of Chile’s economic elite’s tax behavior, while explor-
ing diverse ways to contest compliance and its justifications, restoring repertoires of evalu-
ation supporting non-compliance. A sociological comprehension of tax compliance is
proposed, which combines works drawn from diverse disciplines and produces insights
to overcome several deficits in the literature. A qualitative approach involved the analysis
of discourses and social practices to examine how tax non-compliance is perceived and
understood.
Repertoires of evaluation on economic elite tax compliance comprise definitions, action
criteria and justifications. First, regarding the definitions, two assumptions illustrate differ-
ences between the lines of action pursued by the actors: the rich are not the most affected
by taxation and tax payment is the result of a decision. Secondly, three main action criteria
are revealed, showing strict adherence to the law, but with highly diverse perceptions:
orientation towards avoidance behavior, orientation towards non-avoidance behavior
and boundary criteria.
Third, repertoires of evaluation show a distinction between interpretative and non-inter-
pretative arguments. The interpretative ones are dominated by narratives that treat evasion
and avoidance as natural reactions to a certain state of affairs or to a certain habitual human
behavior. In this repertoire, two predominant logics exist: civic-ontological and regulatory. In
contrast, for the interpretative arguments, evaluation is more important than fact verification.
It is less related to a natural state of affairs or to a logical reaction towards an institutional
configuration, than to a subjective analysis not necessarily based upon empirical observation.
Here, two predominant logics of action, compensatory and affirmative, are identified. In
order to avoid elite homogenizing interpretations and to illustrate multiple coexisting narra-
tives, this characterization proves to be fundamental. It could also prove valuable when
designing policies promoting compliance. These reforms should consider institutional
modifications to enforce compliance, but also the improvement of consent and civic commit-
ment, greater transparency of public expenditure, and marketing of the numerous fiscal
goods and services, particularly those that support the private sector. Results also support
previous suggestions in the literature that tax administration should consider strategies
and tools for different types of taxpayers’ behaviors (Alm & Torgler, 2011; Lisi, 2015).
In general, repertoires of evaluation show that the economic elite tax compliance is
based upon a widespread sanctified obedience of the law. They value the act of tax pay-
ment and assume it is a behavior followed and respected by all individuals. Avoidance
16 J. A. ATRIA CURI

is strictly differentiated from evasion. The latter is a felony; a legal infringement, a cheat,
and perceived as a seldom-performed illegitimate practice met with severe disapproval.
Tax evasion is thus considered an unattractive form of non-compliance, associated with
unlawful behaviors.
Avoidance, in comparison, embodies a clear and viable alternative. It represents unrest-
ricted respect for the law and as such, it is far from a cheat. Rather than being reproached it
might even be praised as a clever and efficient practice, which makes use of what the law
provides. In this sense, it enjoys complete social legitimacy. Several interviewees recognize
avoidance behaviors, which could be categorized as aggressive, moderate or subtle. How-
ever, avoidance criteria coexist with non-avoidance and boundary-based behaviors where
dissimilar preferences prevail.
Although evasion and avoidance occur throughout the population, due to a preferential
treatment of capital income (Jorratt, 2009), the elite enjoy greater possibilities of reducing
their tax burden. Thus, those that are shareholders in a company or receive substantial
income from numerous sources could readily plan tax income, through the assembly of
complex operations. Another difference might be found in social sanctions: while VAT
evasion has been internalized as a major felony and is more strictly regulated, sophisti-
cation in income tax planning easily blends evasion and avoidance where tax saving
actions are concealed under reinvestment initiatives and entrepreneurship, which is
harder to regulate and enjoys social legitimacy.
The interviews reveal that a high degree of willingness to pay taxes is not always
present, and legalism does not necessarily inspire better behavior. If compliance is a
game, where the winner pays a lower tax burden without crossing the legal boundaries,
then consent of tax payment, and therefore, validation of a fiscal bond that embodies a
web of generalized reciprocity (Martin et al., 2009) is as poorly viewed as those who
directly infringe the law by evasion. This also raises alerts on the potential disinterest
of high-income groups towards structures of national solidarity (Piketty, 2014; Rosan-
vallon, 2012). Therefore, although enforcement is crucial for improving compliance, it
is insufficient if elite willingness to pay what they ought to goes unaddressed. In other
words, increasing the level of taxpayers’ tax morale also matters (Molero & Pujol,
2012).
The results relate to various strands in the literature. First, it supports research on tax
compliance focusing on variations in norms and culture when they are operative in a
specific context, highlighting a willingness ‘to fudge’ or ‘to cheat a little’, as partial com-
pliance (Andrighetto et al., 2016). This includes the ability to categorize behavior as
other than dishonest or immoral, by rationalizing and classifying actions into more accep-
table terms (Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008). Future research could compare the Chilean
case to other middle-income countries, to examine different levels of honesty or cross-
country patterns regarding tax compliance.
Second, results connect to existing literature dealing with types, determinants and
processes of rule-following, especially regarding legal environments and responses to
the law, constructing meanings of compliance, and thus mediating the impact of law
on society (Edelman, 1990, 1992; Kalev & Dobbin, 2006). This is particularly salient
when it comes to laws that contain controversial or vague language, like the Chilean
tax law (Dumay, 2011), as it leaves more room for organizational mediation, from
which distinct forms and boundaries of compliance arise (Edelman, 1992, p. 1532).
 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF SOCIOLOGY 17

Future research could study the diverse ways companies re-construct the boundaries of
tax compliance, emphasizing the role played by organizational practices and routines, as
well as by actors such as tax advisors, in reproducing or hindering different forms of
non-compliance.
Finally, preferential treatment for capital gains, legalism, and creative compliance can
be further examined as symbolic distinctions classifying various social groups, connecting
to the sociological tradition of studying boundaries to analyze inequality reproduction
(Lamont & Molnár, 2002). For instance, boundaries between the entrepreneur and the
worker; between who is subject to paying income tax and who is not; or between who
hires a tax advisor and who decides against it, are all issues involving not just legal or econ-
omic questions related to compliance, but also moral and symbolic ones. Gaining insights
from tax compliance as a symptom or a cause of symbolic boundaries would allow for the
expansion of this research field, following the perspectives of fiscal and cultural sociology.

Notes
1. Tax morale is defined here as ‘the intrinsic motivation to pay taxes’ (Torgler, 2008, p. 1250).
2. In this case, legalism is associated with a formalistic notion of law, which indicates that ‘the
language of a rule’s formulation -its literal mandate- be followed’ and denotes predictability,
logical coherence and autonomy, among others (McBarnet & Whelan, 1991, p. 849).
3. One of these cases, known as ‘Pentagate’, in which the owners and executives of the financial
holding company Penta Group took part, was based on the use of fake invoices, tax evasion,
and illegal financing of electoral campaigns, which in turn evidenced strong links between
members of the private and the political sector (Bonnefoy, 2015).
4. The interviews carried out for this project were part of a doctoral dissertation in sociology at
the Freie Universität Berlin (Atria, 2015a).
5. Regarding tax perceptions, see Prabhakar (2012); for tax perceptions of social leaders, see
Grimson and Roig (2011). Regarding perceptions on inequality, see Sachweh (2012).

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Funding
This work was supported by Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo Científico y Tecnológico [grant number:
3160705]; Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo Científico y Tecnológico [grant number: 1160921]; Comi-
sión Nacional de Investigación Científica y Tecnológica (Conicyt-Fondap) [grant number:
15130009].

Notes on contributor
Jorge Andrés Atria is Assistant Professor at the Centre for Economics and Social Policy at Univer-
sidad Mayor and Adjunct Researcher at the Centre for Social Conflict and Cohesion Studies
(COES). His research interests are economic and fiscal sociology with focus on taxation, inequality,
and elites. In 2018 he co-edited the book “Rethinking Taxation in Latin America: Reform and chal-
lenges in times of uncertainty” (Palgrave Macmillan).
18 J. A. ATRIA CURI

ORCID
Jorge Andrés Atria Curi http://orcid.org/0000-0001-7145-3048

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