Great Power Dynamics and the

Waning of ASEAN Centrality in

Regional Security

Herman Joseph S. Kraft *

The regional security architecture in Southeast Asia, arguably even within the broader
East Asian region, has largely revolved in the last 25 years around the viability of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as the driving force behind Southeast
Asian (and East Asian) regionalism. Multilateral institutional arrangements established
since 1994 had the ASEAN states as their core component, and the “ASEAN way” of
conducting foreign affairs as their normative guide. These arrangements were seen as
being a critical aspect of maintaining peaceful relations in the region in the face of long
standing disputes and historical suspicions. This state of affairs, underpinned by
ASEAN’s ability to provide the basis for managing regional relations, has now begun to
unravel with the intensifying strategic competition between China and the United
States. Is the ASEAN-driven multilateral security architecture sustainable in the face of
intensifying great power competition?

Key words: Association of Southeast Asian Nations, East Asia, great power competition, regional
security architecture, regional security cooperation

过去25年里, 东南亚的区域安全架构, 甚至是东亚地区的区域安全架构, 都在很大程度上围绕

着东南亚国家联盟（简称东盟, ASEAN）的生存能力（Viability）进行展开, 同时作为东南
亚以及东亚区域主义背后的驱动力。1994年建立的多边制度安排（Multilateral institutional
arrangements）将东盟国家作为核心组成部分, 并将实施外交事务的“东盟方式”（“ASEAN
way”）作为规范性指导。这些安排被视为在区域内维持和平关系的重要方面, 以共同面对长
期以来的争端和历史上的猜疑。东盟为管理区域关系提供了基础, 加强了外交事务的状态, 其
外交事务已开始与中国和美国之间愈演愈烈的战略竞争逐步分离。面对大国竞争的不断加
剧, 东盟驱使的多边安全架构还能保持可持续吗？

关键词：区域安全合作, 东盟, 区域安全架构, 东亚, 大国角力

T he economic crisis that hit the United States in September of 2008 opened
up widespread discussions on the prospect of American hegemonic decline

*Herman Joseph S. Kraft is an Associate Professor at the Department of Political Sci-

ence, University of the Philippines Diliman.

DOI: 10.1111/aspp.12350
Asian Politics & Policy—Volume 9, Number 4—Pages 597–612
V
C 2017 Policy Studies Organization. Published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
598 Asian Politics & Policy—Volume 9, Issue 4—2017

(see, e.g., Acharya, 2014; Clark & Hoque, 2012; Ipek, 2013; Zakaria, 2008). This
is not the first time that there has been speculation and rebuttal on the relative
decline of the United States as the dominant superpower, or indeed, as the
global hegemon (see, e.g., Milner & Snyder, 1988; Russett, 1985; Strange, 1987).
And yet there are a number of factors that seem to point out that this time, “it’s
for real” (Rachman, 2011).
That the United States remains dominant is not being questioned. However,
the age of American unipolarity that we witnessed in the aftermath of the col-
lapse of the Soviet Union (Krauthammer, 1990/1991) is coming to an end.
Developments in the Asia-Pacific region have raised the prospect of a return to
balance of power politics. The rise of China and the rebalancing strategy of the
Obama government in the United States revitalized realist projections about a
regional order that will be dominated by the rivalry and competition between
these two superpowers. This competition’s increasing significance impacts the
way the governments of both countries frame their relationship and, subse-
quently, their relations with other countries around the region. This situation
presents a vast difference compared with the situation a few years back when
regional security revolved around the cooperative security framework built on
“the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) centrality,” and a
regional security architecture that was largely based on overlapping multilat-
eral arrangements buttressed by a liberal order supported by American military
and political predominance. The question is whether such a security architec-
ture can continue to manage the security of East Asia in the face of uncertainty
about the future of U.S. hegemony? More specifically, is the current security
architecture of East Asia that is built around an ASEAN-driven multilateralism
sustainable in the face of the intensifying competition between China and the
United States?
Recent trends portend an emerging dilemma for the region. The intensifying
rivalry between China and the United States more clearly emphasizes tradi-
tional international relations and security, highlighting competition in interstate
relations. The revitalization of alliance politics, increasing emphasis on mari-
time territorial issues, and remilitarization in the political dynamics of the
Korean peninsula only contribute to this framing of regional relations. On the
other hand, the multilateral mechanisms that have had ASEAN at the center
emphasize cooperation, at least normatively if not always materially. In this
multilateralist context, nontraditional security concerns had become the princi-
pal area of discussion and debate.
The dilemma lies in the way that the great power dynamic between China
and the United States, without the moderating influence of multilateral plat-
forms, may increasingly push regional security relations into a competitive con-
text reminiscent of balance of power politics. Unfortunately, the same dynamic
is undermining the influence and impact of existing multilateral institutions
and arrangements (exemplified by ASEAN and ASEAN-driven mechanisms)
designed precisely to mitigate the effect of great power politics and competi-
tion. Unless the regional order moves away from this trend, the prospect of
cooperative security with its less conflict-oriented framing of security would be
difficult to sustain.
 The Waning of ASEAN Centrality 599

The East Asian Security Architecture: Building on the

Foundation of ASEAN Centrality
Since 1994, a regional security “architecture” designed around a framework of
multilateral security cooperation has been in place in East Asia (or even the wider
Asia-Pacific as some policy makers have argued). That year saw the inception of
the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) which became the precursor to more than a
decade of extensive discussions on regional security arrangements, the develop-
ment of “soft” institutions concerned primarily with informal normative struc-
tures, and an increasing emphasis on nontraditional security concerns. At the
center of these developments was the ASEAN which pushed a security perspec-
tive that was seen as being comprehensive and inclusive in its scope. Working
with a security model built around a comprehensive and cooperative framework
(Dewitt, 1994; Vetschera, 2007), ASEAN and ASEAN-driven regional institutions
tended to de-emphasize balance of power politics and its “us vs them” formula-
tion in favor of an inclusive approach to security. The ARF in fact showed that
there could be such a thing as being too inclusive, as the forum had to adjust with
some difficulty after membership expanded to 27 countries by 2007.
The key to ASEAN’s approach to regional security is in trying to “manage”
balance of power politics in Southeast Asia—which is tantamount to managing
great power dynamics in the region. The very establishment of ASEAN itself
was partly influenced by a desire to keep the ASEAN subregion and, by exten-
sion, Southeast Asia free from the potentially dangerous effects of superpower
rivalry and politics at the height of the Cold War. The inclusion of the principle
of noninterference as a key ASEAN principle was not only in keeping with
principles and norms accepted in the United Nations (UN) but was also
intended at keeping the region secure “by preventing its getting entangled in
great power rivalries as . . . with preventing the latter from being involved in
the internal affairs of countries in the region” (Kraft, 2012, p. 63).
By 1994, however, ASEAN had made its mark beyond the region as an associa-
tion of developing states that had unusual success (for such an association) in
managing intra-ASEAN relations and ensuring that differences would not lead
to conflict among its member-states. Among its dialogue partners, this was more
than enough to establish confidence in the Association’s capacity to replicate its
“success” in a wider territorial scope and, consequently, for ASEAN to be asked
to become the agenda setter for an Asia-Pacific-wide forum on regional security.
The establishment of the ARF formalized the role of ASEAN as agenda-setter for
regional security dialogue. By the time ASEAN had adopted its Charter in 2008,
this position had expanded into a central role in regional security. ASEAN cen-
trality was etched in the ASEAN Charter as well as in the ASEAN Political Secu-
rity Community Blueprint as a key goal of the ASEAN Community. As late as
the ASEAN Summit of 2016, the importance of ASEAN centrality in the region’s
security architecture continued to be emphasized (Rolls, 2016, p. 2).
The link between ASEAN-driven multilateralism and the regional security
architecture has been discussed in numerous fora, publications, and conference
papers. Generally speaking, the idea of a regional security architecture refers to
the multiple elements that constitute interlocking facets that balance the effects
of
600 Asian Politics & Policy—Volume 9, Issue 4—2017

potential challenges to security and stability against the authority of

the institutions, mechanisms and processes available to develop
instincts to accommodate national preferences to the collective inter-
ests of regional states, to resolve instances of conflicting aspirations,
and to deter any inclinations to use national power to intimidate or
coerce others into line in a manner that falls outside accepted norms
of diplomatic interaction between states. (Huisken, 2009, p. 9)

Taylor (2009, p. 11) noted that ASEAN and “ASEAN centrality” have been
among the “key drivers” in the trend toward the building of a regional security
architecture around cooperative mechanisms (see also Zhai, 2009).
The exact meaning of ASEAN centrality has proven to be elusive as even
ASEAN has not really sought to define it precisely. Nonetheless, Mely
Caballero-Anthony (2014) has noted that this could be seen from the perspec-
tive of social network analysis as “the node in the cluster of networks . . . [that
plays] a central role in the region’s institutional architecture that includes major
powers” (p. 565). More importantly, she identified two particular roles that per-
tain to its function in the regional architecture, namely membership and
agenda-setting (Caballero-Anthony, 2014, p. 571). Taking on these roles effec-
tively meant shifting the political strategy of ASEAN in its approach toward
the security of Southeast Asia and that of the Asia-Pacific region.
Where it used to emphasize the need to insulate the Southeast Asian region
from balance of power politics and great power rivalries, the increasing shift to
“ASEAN centrality” in a wider East Asian and Asia-Pacific regionalism
imposed an imperative to accept the involvement of and engagement with the
major powers in the region. This seemed to represent a break from the 1971 aspi-
ration to establish a Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality in the region
(Haacke, 2006), and symbolized the Association’s changing perspective of its
role in regional security. On the other hand, Ba (2007) and Leifer (1994) noted
that such a role for ASEAN in a wider Asia-Pacific context not only made sense
but was also necessary in the post-Cold War context. The latter was very
explicit in emphasizing that the fact of the establishment of the ARF showed
how important it was for the ASEAN states to change their narrow Southeast
Asia focus and “expand their strategic horizons in the interest of addressing the
problem of common security” (Leifer, 1994, p. 7).
ASEAN took the opportunity to use in the ARF the formula that had worked
so well for managing intra-ASEAN relations. At the heart of this formula were
norms that ASEAN had emphasized and that became the basis for a nascent
form of extra-ASEAN regionalism. Of particular importance is the adherence to
informal consultations and consensus-seeking, the peaceful resolution of dis-
putes, and respect for sovereignty and noninterference. There was an initial
willingness to work within the parameters of what became known as the
“ASEAN Way” as ASEAN’s dialogue partners understood and generally inter-
nalized how it worked (Katsumata, 2006; Morada, 2002). It was this acceptance
of the ASEAN Way as the normative foundation of regional interstate relations
that Job (2010) pointed to as the real accomplishment of ASEAN in the context
of the nascent process of extra-ASEAN regionalism.
Hand in hand with the paramountcy of ASEAN centrality (and arguably
directly an effect of it) was the increasing importance of the need to address
 The Waning of ASEAN Centrality 601

nontraditional security. According to the website of the Centre for Nontradi-

tional Security (NTS) Studies of the S. Rajaratnam School for International and
Strategic Studies (RSIS), nontraditional security contrasts from those regional
concerns involving the protection of territory and the people that reside within
that territory from external aggression and internal subversion, as well as the
defense of sovereignty. Instead, nontraditional security regards those concerns
that constitute a threat to the survival and well-being of people and communi-
ties that arise from nonmilitary sources. ASEAN tended to put a premium on
NTS issues and thereby de-emphasized those issues that concern great power
dynamics, and thus effectively rejected great power dynamics itself as the
defining security framework for the region. A second aspect of NTS that fits
into the ASEAN-driven regional security architecture is the emphasis on the
transnational scope of and remedies to these issues, as well as the comprehen-
sive response they required, pointing to the need for cooperative mechanisms
rather than the self-help nature of traditional security.
It is ironic that the ARF was originally conceived to address the problems
that could come out of the changed power dynamics of the immediate post-
Cold War era, yet so much of the discussions within its ambit were predomi-
nantly about nontraditional security concerns. Even the first instance of opera-
tional cooperation under the ARF was an exercise on NTS. In 2007, the
Philippines and the United States collaborated on a Humanitarian Assistance
and Disaster Relief exercise, the first ever operational exercise conducted under
the aegis of the ARF. Eventually other ASEAN-driven mechanisms, that is, the
ASEAN Plus Three (APT) process and the East Asia Summit (EAS), were estab-
lished around these same norms and pursued an agenda that gave a premium
to nontraditional security. Even the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus
(ADMM Plus) process has given equal value to a non traditional security
agenda.1
There is, however, reason to believe that ASEAN leadership of a broader East
Asia or Asia-Pacific regional process is unsustainable. Job (2010) has argued
that ASEAN possesses neither the material capacity nor the ideational force to
push action on emerging and future issues in the various fields that extra-
ASEAN regionalism is seeking to address. In another article, he and Erin Wil-
liams point out that weaknesses in institutionalization (especially in mediation
and preventive diplomatic mechanisms), and the continued insistence on the
“comfortable to all” pacing of the process reinforced tendencies towards
“multilateral institutional stasis and issue avoidance” (Job & Williams, 2011, p.
9). Tan (2013, p. 29) similarly points to institutional weaknesses within ASEAN
itself and the inability of the Association’s members to provide “good action-
able policy ideas” even as threats to East Asian regionalism or even the wider
Asia-Pacific region were becoming more prevalent.
These arguments about the institutional limitations of ASEAN ironically
complement another aspect of the ASEAN-centric security architecture that has
provided the framework for security cooperation in East Asia and the broader
Asia-Pacific region. By and large, this regional security architecture, fragmented
as it is, has operated under the context of some form of benign tolerance by the
great powers, especially in the absence of bloc politics, a regional concert of
powers, or an imposed or accepted hegemonic structure. Mutual suspicions
602 Asian Politics & Policy—Volume 9, Issue 4—2017

have led the region’s most powerful states to accept and (to a fairly significant
extent) defer to what Morada (2002) has referred to as the “middle power” lead-
ership role played by ASEAN. This compromise has allowed ASEAN to broker
a form of institutionalized security cooperation built around a sustained dia-
logue among these great powers.
Evelyn Goh (2012), however, posits that ASEAN’s role as the driving force
behind East Asian (APT) and Asia-Pacific (ARF, EAS, and the ADMMPlus)
security regionalism is more a by product of a “minimalist bargain among the
great powers” based on the “minimalist normative position” derived from the
“ASEAN Way” and the consultative form of leadership exercised by ASEAN
through “ASEAN centrality.” The latter in fact provides a source of legitimacy
for great power resistance to negotiating the foundations for a sustainable order
based on mutually understood institutionalized “rules of the game” (Goh, 2012,
p. 106). ASEAN leadership is effectively a “brokerage” role exercised at the suf-
ferance of this minimalist great power bargain and is largely a temporary
arrangement. William Tow’s (2012) assessment follows the same line and
argues that the great powers did not really intend for the ASEAN-driven secu-
rity multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific region to “manage their core national
security interests” and would abandon the former when the latter is directly at
stake (pp. 160–161).
The arguments presented about weakly institutionalized norms (even in the
face of successful norm socialization) as opposed to great power sufferance of
ASEAN leadership in fact constitute complementary rather than mutually
exclusive positions in the debate about the sustainability of ASEAN centrality
in East Asian, let alone an Asia-Pacific-wide, regionalism. What is clear is the
conclusion that they reach about the unsustainability of ASEAN centrality in
the face of pressures emerging from great power dynamics. In a regional con-
text increasingly characterized and even dominated by the intensifying rivalry
between China and the United States, this becomes a key consideration. In the
face of escalating great power dynamics and the increasing need to further
institutionalize cooperation in order to address nontraditional security con-
cerns, these weaknesses make it unlikely that the regional security architecture
based on an ASEAN-centric framework can long be upheld.

Changing Power Dynamics: U.S. Vulnerability and

the Rise of China
A key aspect of the intensification of the rivalry between the United States
and China is the growing sense that the former is a hegemon in decline. This
impression was principally brought about by a combination of factors emanat-
ing from the United States’ slow economic recovery since 2008, its large fiscal
deficits, as well as the belief that the United States has lost influence because of
its overstretched commitments in response to the attacks of September 11, 2001.
There are even references to how the United States has lost its moral standing,
weakening the impact of its “soft power,” with the way it has handled ques-
tions about the detainee facilities in Guantanamo, the use of torture against the
detainees in these facilities as a way of gathering intelligence, and the conduct
of the invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Kagan, 2012). President Barack Obama pointed
 The Waning of ASEAN Centrality 603

out in his State of the Union Address on January 12, 2016 the continuing
strength of the United States and that those who talk about U.S. decline “do not
know what they are talking about” (Obama, 2016). A key factor, however, dom-
inating this perception of hegemonic decline is the emergence of China as a
challenger to U.S. dominance, especially in the Asia-Pacific (see e.g., Lake, 2006;
Layne, 2008; Luce, 2012; Rachman, 2011; Schweller & Pu, 2011).
The appearance of China as a regional power with hegemonic characteristics
has raised questions about the future of regional order in a region that has been
and is projected to remain the hub of global economic production and trade.2
Beyond the economic implications, however, China’s emergence has opened
up a significant discussion on the issue of how this development affects
regional security in East Asia and the broader Asia-Pacific.
Realist arguments have always emphasized the danger of systemic change
(Doran & Parsons, 1980; Gilpin, 1981; Levy, 1985). In the context of the Asia-
Pacific region, the inevitability of a hegemonic war involving the United States
and China was raised by White (2012) who proposed that this can be mitigated
if the United States accepted the need to share power with China. This argu-
ment reflects how the phenomenal rise of China since the end of the Cold War
as first an economic power and increasingly a political-military one as well, has
within the span of a little over two and a half decades completely turned the
era of American unipolarity around. White’s (2012) argument is that the best
prospect for continuing prosperity in a peaceful strategic environment for Asia
would be the emergence of a concert of powers between the United States and
China, an Asia-Pacific codominium. There is little, however, to indicate that
such a development could come to pass.
China’s position as a regional power has always been a core consideration for
security analysts and strategists around the region. China’s participation in the
ARF was considered a major factor in its establishment. Even for nonstate net-
works involved in regional security affairs such as the Council for Security
Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, China’s involvement was considered to be a
prerequisite to its continued relevance. With its “peaceful rise,” this has become
more of an imperative for these institutions and networks. Once in, however,
China has proven to be a willing participant in security multilateralism in the
region, particularly those involving an exclusively East Asian grouping. It coor-
dinated very closely with ASEAN on the APT process. It was particularly active
in promoting security coordination especially on nontraditional security issues.
China hosted a number of meetings that discussed issues and policies concern-
ing climate change and disaster relief under the APT process. From 1998 to
2008, China engaged in a diplomatic offensive intended to present a more
benign picture of China to its Southeast Asian neighbors. This “charm
offensive” was particularly effective when contrasted with perceptions (rightly
or wrongly) of an increasingly unilateralist United States at the time of the inva-
sion of Iraq in 2003. According to Goh (2005, pp. 10–12), there was a perceptible
shift in Southeast Asian attitudes toward China.
In 2009, however, a number of events signaled a change in China’s approach
to its neighbors on matters regarding questions of sovereignty. Where China
had been willing to set aside these issues before (even as it made its protests
known through diplomatic channels), the Chinese government now chose to be
604 Asian Politics & Policy—Volume 9, Issue 4—2017

more confrontational, leading to high levels of tension with other claimant

countries. Current tensions have been traced to May 2009, as the deadline for
registering continental shelf claims with the UN in accordance with the UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) approached. Jia (2013), a Chinese
scholar, noted that even as these submissions clarified each country’s claims,
they “also broke the previously ambiguous peace over conflicting claims”
(p. 17). China increased the number of its patrol vessels in the disputed areas
and confronted the presence and activities of boats and ships from other claim-
ant states in the area. More importantly, China began to “more actively [chal-
lenge] the right of U.S. reconnaissance aircrafts and ships to collect information
near its coastal areas” (Jia, 2013, p. 17).
Other factors have been identified as having influenced developments in the
disputed areas and as being consequential over the long term. These include
estimates of the volume of gas and oil available in the seabed and the surround-
ing waters of the area in dispute, the emergence of different media where popu-
lar opinion could be shaped, harnessed, and even mobilized in the absence of
“strong and imaginative leadership in the region” (Jia, 2013, p. 18). Considering
the claims of regional leadership associated with “ASEAN centrality”, the last
point made by Jia (2013) is at the very least an implicit indictment of ASEAN in
its supposed role as the “driving force” and agenda setter of East Asian region-
alism. A fourth point, is however, directly related to perceptions about U.S.
hegemonic decline, its diminished stature in global and regional politics, and
its capacity to respond to challenges to its position of dominance. In other
words, Chinese calculations seemed to include considerations that the United
States is overcommitted and would have little inclination to be involved in the
territorial disputes in the South China Sea.
In 2010, the Obama administration declared a “U.S. pivot to Asia,” a multi-
faceted strategy geared toward bolstering U.S. presence and influence in the
Asia-Pacific region. Principally, it referred to an increase in the naval and mili-
tary deployment of U.S. forces in the region. In particular, this meant shifting
60% of the United States’ naval assets to the Pacific theater, thereby reversing a
policy that had given priority or equal attention to Europe since the Second
World War. In November 2011, U.S. President Barack Obama announced the
rotational stationing in the Australian city of Darwin of 2,000 Marines. While
the strategy was supposed to go beyond the military, it took some time before
the Obama administration began to define its nonmilitary aspects. These
included an emphasis on the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a club of high-
performing economies in the region intended to push an economic agenda
beyond the pace set by the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).
What is striking about the pivot, since 2011 renamed the rebalancing strategy
to Asia, is the perception that it is in response to China’s challenge to U.S. preem-
inence in the Asia-Pacific region. The United States has been at pains to deny
that this strategy specifically responds to the emergence of China as a dominant
power in the Asia-Pacific. Nonetheless, in January 2012, the Department of
Defense announced as one of the priorities of the U.S. defense posture the
“necessity [to] rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region” as “[o]ver the long
term, China’s emergence as a regional power will have the potential to affect the
U.S. economy and our security in a variety of ways” (Department of Defense,
 The Waning of ASEAN Centrality 605

2012, p. 2). Clearly, even as U.S. officials maintain that the pivot is not directed
against an emergent China, China is clearly a key part of the agenda (Suryodi-
ningrat, 2013, p. 21). What is perhaps more important as far as this paper is con-
cerned is that the Chinese also saw it in those terms. An argument has been
made in Chinese policy and academic circles about how the U.S. feels compelled
to increase its participation in regional affairs because of its weakened global
stature—and thus has become more strident in its involvement in territorial dis-
putes in the region (Jia, 2013, p. 18; Suryodiningrat, 2013, pp. 24–25).
Suryodiningrat (2013, p. 21), the editor of the Jakarta Post and long an
observer of geopolitics in the region, has pointed out that China is concerned
about how U.S. actions and rhetoric in support of its allies in the region have
contributed to the heightened level of tension in the region. It has been China’s
belief that these embolden some of those allies into taking what might be per-
ceived as reckless and provocative steps. A particularly significant episode was
when then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton referred in a speech in November
2011 to the South China Sea by its then newly minted Filipino nomenclature
“West Philippine Sea” (see also Jia, 2013, p. 19). In this context, the Obama
administration’s policies associated with the rebalancing strategy have intensi-
fied the nascent rivalry between China and the United States, and sharpened
potential and actual divisions between China and some of its neighbors who
happen to be treaty allies and political partners of the United States.
Certainly, there have been attempts to shift the relationship between China
and the United States from its more competitive aspect to more cooperative
arrangements through summit meetings (in 2013 and 2015) and other bilateral
discussions (e.g., the bilateral program between Presidents Barack Obama and Xi
Jinping at the 2014 APEC summit in Beijing). A variety of issues were discussed
and, if not resolved, positions were laid out for mutual understanding. These
include cybersecurity, climate change, and territorial disputes in East Asia. A his-
toric agreement was signed between the two powers to control carbon emissions,
with China promising to ensure that there will be no increase in emissions by
2030 (Landler, 2014). It is, however, in the area of existing territorial disputes that
the competitive aspect of the relationship has been played out in potentially dan-
gerous terms. In this regard, ASEAN’s immediate concern on this front is the ter-
ritorial dispute over the land features and waters around the Spratly islands.

The South China Sea as an Arena of Great Power

Contention and ASEAN Division
China’s claim of sovereignty over almost the entire expanse of the South
China Sea has been a source of tensions since 2010 when this claim was more
strongly asserted through increased and more constant Coast Guard presence
around the contested rocks, reefs, shoals, and islands constituting the Spratly
archipelago. It was, however, a two-month stand off that started on April 10,
2012 between units of the Chinese Coast Guard and the Philippine Navy and
Coast Guard that highlighted the danger to regional peace and security of rival
territorial claims over the waters and land features in the area of the South
China Sea.3 For decades this area had been identified as one of the potential
“hotspots” that could trigger conflict in the region. These territorial disputes
606 Asian Politics & Policy—Volume 9, Issue 4—2017

have at times led to episodes and events that raised tensions among claimants,
although these have largely been managed and prevented from reaching crisis
proportions. By and large the issues were never allowed to get in the way of
good (or even friendly) bilateral relations among the claimants, and the mainte-
nance of stable peaceful regional conditions. The Scarborough Shoal standoff
served as a reminder that these conditions should not be taken for granted and
that countries in the region need to continue working toward sustaining peace-
ful relations.
The standoff also showed the complexity of the situation, involving not just
the relationship between the Philippines and China, but also relations with
(and among) other claimants, within ASEAN, and the dynamics between China
and the United States. All of these are usually framed in the context of the
emergence of China as not only an economic power in the region (which has
been a welcome development), but also as a political and military power (which
is at the core of concerns about China as a regional hegemon). The latter in par-
ticular has been raised in terms of language that describes China’s “bullying
tactics,” “increased assertiveness,” and China’s demands (as presented by a
number of officials and academics) that regional states should be “sensitive” to
its interests. Reports about these incidents and developments emerging from
these incidents tend to emphasize China’s growing confidence as the underly-
ing, if not direct, cause. China’s stronger assertion of its claim to sovereignty
has been a key factor in the escalating tension in the area. Since the standoff in
2012, for example, Filipino fishermen have been largely prevented from fishing
in what had been their traditional fishing areas around Scarborough Shoal. Fol-
lowing these developments, the Philippine government took the unprecedented
step of asking the Permanent Court of Arbitration to clarify maritime entitle-
ments in the area in accordance with UNCLOS.
As the case went through the usual procedures, China refused to participate
even as at strategic points during the process it made public its position regard-
ing the case. At the same time, the Chinese more aggressively sought to secure
their presence (and presumably their claim) in the disputed area. In 2015, China
engaged in extensive island construction, building airstrips that give it the
potential to expand its military and naval presence in the area. In January 2016,
China sent the Haiyang Shiyou 981, a drilling platform, into disputed waters
off the Vietnamese coastline (Ives, 2016).
While not challenging China’s claim to sovereignty, the United States has
criticized China’s activities in the area (especially the island construction that
took place) and insisted that this dispute could best be resolved by resorting to
mechanisms embedded in international law rather than unilateral action. The
U.S. challenge was largely in the form of what the Americans have referred to
as freedom of navigation patrols or freedom of navigation operations (FONOP).
In October 2015, the American destroyer USS Kidd sailed within the 12 nautical
mile zone off Subi Reef which is one of China’s artificial islands. American sur-
veillance planes have also frequented the area.4 A dangerous aspect of these
developments has been the radio challenge raised by Chinese outposts in the
disputed area against American planes and those of the Philippines that have
been overflying the area. The United States claims that these challenges effec-
tively signal the establishment of a Chinese Air Defense Identification Zone
 The Waning of ASEAN Centrality 607

around the disputed area and are a threat to long-term U.S. concerns about free-
dom of navigation (Glaser, 2012). China on the other hand has rebuffed these
criticisms arguing that this is an issue that concerns only those involved in the
dispute and the United States has no cause to be involved.
Two consequences of these developments have had an important impact on
the question of ASEAN centrality in regional affairs. First, the adoption of an
American policy directly challenging China’s claim to the disputed waters
increases the likelihood of unforeseen events with unintended consequences
taking place. Even as it is clear that both China and the United States are not
intent on allowing any such development to get out of hand, these develop-
ments magnify the unpredictable nature of great power competition in the
region. Clearly, tensions in the South China Sea are feeding off the intensifying
rivalry between the United States and China.
While the leaders of the two largest economies in the world and the two most
militarily powerful states in the Asia-Pacific have met and discussed these and
other issues that concern both their countries, it simply amplifies the importance
of the fact that the United States and China are increasingly becoming rivals for
leadership in the Asia-Pacific region. China has made it clear that it feels that it
has to take action on issues that involve its sovereign claims to disputed territory
in view of the behavior of its neighbors that have claims to the same territory.
These actions in turn have led to increased tensions in its relations with the United
States even as Chinese officials claim that China does not want a direct confronta-
tion with the United States. that could lead to conflict between them. Hugh
White’s (2012) argument about the need for the United States to share power with
China may be the most obvious way by which the U.S.-dominated regional order
transitions toward a new arrangement without having to go through the devastat-
ing consequences of a systemic or hegemonic conflict. It does not seem, however,
that the United States is prepared to go that route, even as China is unwilling to
concede ground it has gained as an emerging power. The two powers will have
to negotiate what the new regional order will look like, but there is a lack of clarity
on the terms that would guide how such a negotiation would proceed.
This leads to the second issue: the diminishing significance of ASEAN in the
emerging geopolitical condition. This is exemplified by the inability of ASEAN
to come out with a joint statement at the end of the ASEAN Ministers Meeting
in Phnom Penh in 2012 that included an expression of ASEAN’s concern over
the Scarborough Shoal standoff and its consequences. Cambodia (the Chair of
the ASEAN Coordinating Council for 2012) was unwilling to include such lan-
guage in the statement that was being drafted, arguing that the South China
Sea in general and Scarborough Shoal in particular were issues that involved
only some members of ASEAN and not the entire association and therefore had
no place in an ASEAN joint statement. This was the first time that the ASEAN
Ministers Meeting was unable to come out with a consensus on a joint state-
ment at the end of a meeting. It had strong reverberations because of the dam-
age it caused to the already fragile impression of ASEAN unity. Cambodia’s
actions were seen as a sop to China, with other countries in ASEAN also being
seen as similarly beholden to China. On the other hand, other members of
ASEAN (with the Philippines foremost among these) were strategically closer
to the United States. These internal divisions within ASEAN in terms of
608 Asian Politics & Policy—Volume 9, Issue 4—2017

strategic preferences are key to the dilemma faced by ASEAN in sustaining

“ASEAN centrality” (Laksmana, 2016). In this context, the competition between
China and United States has ASEAN caught in the middle, and with dimin-
ished capacity to influence the course of that competition.
In 2016, the election of President Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines and
Donald Trump in the United States only intensified the prospect of great power
dynamics further marginalizing ASEAN and the sustainability of the multilat-
eral security architecture that it was responsible for. President Duterte’s emer-
gence in the regional political arena was characterized by a complete turn-
around in the relationship of the Philippines with the United States. Whereas
the previous administration under the leadership of President Benigno Aquino
III had been criticized for being too close to the United States at the expense of
its relationship with China, President Duterte surprised everyone (even the
members of his own cabinet) with his declaration of the “separation” of the
Philippines from the United States and his proposed formation of a strange axis
involving China, Russia, and the Philippines “against the world” during a state
visit to China in October 2016 (Lee-Brago, 2016). A weakening of the ties
between the Philippines and the United States largely compromises the strate-
gic position of the latter, especially in the context of the rebalancing strategy
wherein the Philippines is supposed to play a key role.
This compromised situation is made even more dangerous with the emergence
of a Trump administration that could very well intensify the United States’ com-
petition with China by undertaking punitive measures in response to the “unfair
trade” practices that Donald Trump accused China of. During his campaign,
Trump had promised to slap heavy tariffs on Chinese products, a policy that
could provoke a trade war that would be costly to the global economy in general
(McCarthy, 2015; “The Piecemaker,” 2016, p. 17). The irony is that Trump has
never indicated that his administration would be strategically engaged in the
Asia-Pacific, even threatening not to come to the aid of South Korea and Japan
unless they increased their defense spending or helped defray the cost of Ameri-
can military support. Even on the matter of the increasingly problematic threat
posed by North Korea’s nuclear weapons development, the Trump administra-
tion is effectively allowing China to take the lead. The deployment of a “mighty
armada” to the waters around the Korean peninsula cannot erase the fact that
President Donald Trump expects China to do most of the heavy leaning on Kim
Jong Un in order to facilitate a “complete and irreversible” denuclearization of
the Korean peninsula (Holloway, 2017; Reuters, 2017).
What is also clear is that in all these developments, ASEAN has been little
more than a bystander.

The Effect on ASEAN Centrality and Multilateral Security

Cooperation in the Region
This article started out with the premise that the great power dynamic
between China and the United States, without the moderating influence of mul-
tilateral platforms, will increasingly push the region into a competitive context
reminiscent of balance of power politics. Unfortunately, the same dynamic is
undermining the influence and impact of multilateral institutions, particularly
 The Waning of ASEAN Centrality 609

ASEAN. What is evident here is that the relationship between China and the
United States is increasingly becoming the dominant dynamic in the region.
How the two powers manage their relationship will frame the new regional
order. As noted before, the U.S. pivot into Asia is seen by China as an attempt
to contain its growing power. The Chinese leadership, while not prepared to
challenge the U.S. militarily, is likewise not prepared to concede its political
gains of the past decade in terms of the influence it has built in the region.
Regardless of how this dynamic proceeds, it has made the ASEAN-driven pro-
cesses that had powered security cooperation in the East Asia and the Asia-
Pacific since 1994 largely irrelevant. This does not mean that there is no longer
any place for these processes in a regional order that is being shaped by the rela-
tionship between China and the United States. It does mean, however, that
ASEAN, the ASEAN Way and ASEAN-driven processes in the region will no
longer be the driving force behind East Asian regionalism or the broader context
of Asia-Pacific regionalism. Regional security will once again be based on the
nature of the China-U.S. dynamic, whether it tends toward cooperation or com-
petition. If it is the former, there will be no need for ASEAN and its processes to
broker relations between China and the United States. If it will tend toward a
more competitive relationship, then ASEAN has neither the material nor the ide-
ational resources to manage the relationship. ASEAN had its chance to put
together a regional order based on an inclusive and cooperative regionalism. Its
refusal to take a more active role in directing the region and the inability of its
members to act more in concert has made it miss that opportunity. At present, it
has been overtaken by a relationship in which it cannot hope to play a role in
managing or directing, and whose main players have no intention of letting it do
so. Even with the establishment of the ASEAN Community in 2015, ASEAN’s
role in the region will increasingly be diminished by the China-U.S. dynamic.

Acknowledgment
This is an updated version of a paper presented at the 1st Asian Politics and Policy Conference enti-
tled “Is the Philippines Ready for a Post-American World?” held at the Asian Center, University of
the Philippines Diliman, on July 24, 2015. I am grateful for the questions generated in that conference
and the very helpful comments of two anonymous reviewers. Nonetheless, errors in the article are
solely my responsibility.

Notes
1
These are all part of the series of concentric circles of multilateral arrangements radiating from
ASEAN. The APT process was established in response to the Asian financial crisis of 1997. It puts the
10 ASEAN countries with China, Japan, and South Korea in a comprehensive partnership even as its
most emphasized element is economic in nature. The EAS was intended to be the platform for discus-
sing strategic concerns and visions that the APT process might encounter. Despite the opposition of
China (and with Japan taking the opposite position) it was decided that such a mandate would have
to involve more than just the countries in the APT process. Eventually, the EAS grew to include Aus-
tralia, India, New Zealand, Russia, and the United States. The ADMM was an ASEAN instrumentality
under the ASEAN Political and Security Pillar of the ASEAN Community. It is a consultative forum of
the Defense Ministers of the ASEAN countries. When it was conceived, the ADMM was supposed to
have a counterpart forum that would allow the ASEAN Defense Ministers to engage with their coun-
terparts among the dialogue partners of ASEAN. This became known as the ADMMPlus process.
2
There have been so many references to the Asian or Pacific century in books and conferences that
it has become a cliche to mention it. A good starting point, however, would be the ADB Report on
“Realizing the Asian century” (Asian Development Bank, 2011).
610 Asian Politics & Policy—Volume 9, Issue 4—2017

3
The Philippines has officially renamed parts of the South China Sea that are adjacent to areas it
claims to have sovereignty over as the West Philippine Sea. For purposes of this article, however, the
more traditional reference will continue to be utilized (see Ubac, 2012).
4
Interestingly, while these FONOPs in the South China Sea directed against China have been well
publicized, the United States has also conducted FONOPs against 12 other countries in 2015. These
included operations against Indonesia and the Philippines (“Pentagon Says U.S. Challenged China,”
2016.)

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