South Africa country profile

Electoral system
National and Provincial Elections
South Africa's national and provincial elections take place every five years.

Voters vote for a political party, not individuals. The political party then gets a share of seats in
Parliament in direct proportion to the number of votes it got in the election. Each party then decides on
members to fill the seats it has won. This is called a proportional representation (PR) voting system.

National government makes and carries out laws and policies for the whole country. It is made up of:

 Parliament led by the Speaker

 National Government led by the President and Ministers

Provincial government makes and carries out laws and policies that affect the province only. It is made
up of:

 Legislature (the laws of the country) led by the Speaker

 Provincial Government led by the Premier and Members of the Executive Council (MECs)

Democratic national and provincial elections have taken place every five years starting in 1994.

Municipal Elections
Municipal elections take place every five years.

A mixed or hybrid system, making use of both the ward system and the proportional

representation (PR) system, is used for municipal elections.

There are 3 types of Municipal Councils in South Africa:

 Category A: Metropolitan Councils;

 Category B: Local Councils (LC); and

 Category C: District Councils (DC) (have executive and legislative powers in areas that include
local municipalities)

For metropolitan municipalities, there are 2 types of elections in each ward:

 Metropolitan council ward, and

 Metropolitan proportional representation.

In all local municipalities other than metropolitan municipalities, there are 3 types of elections in each
ward:

 Local council ward;

  Local council proportional representation; and

 District council proportional representation.

The first democratic municipal elections took place in 1995/6, and the first municipal elections run by
the IEC took place in 2000.

Afrobarometer
Corruption - 15 september 2021
Key findings

Almost two-thirds (64%) of South Africans say that corruption increased in the pastyear, including half
(49%) who believe it increased“a lot.”

State institutionsare widely seen as corrupt. Half or more of citizens say “most” or“all”officials are
involved in corruption in the police (56%), the president’s office (53%),local government councils (51%),
and Parliament (50%). Non-governmentalorganizations, traditional leaders, and religious leaders are less
commonly seen ascorrupt.

Three-fourths (76%) of South Africans say the government is performing “fairly badly”or “very badly” in
the fight against corruption,

Among citizens who interacted with key public services during the past year,substantial proportions say
they had to pay a bribe to avoid a problem with thepolice (24%) or to obtain a government document
(21%), police assistance (15%),public school services (10%), or medical care (8%).

Three out of four South Africans (76%) say people risk retaliation or other negativeconsequences if they
report incidents of corruption, a 13-percentage-point increasecompared to 2018.

Seven in 10 citizens (71%) believe that officials who break the law“often” or “always”go unpunished,
while half (49%) say ordinary people who commit crimes enjoy suchimpunity 1

Economy - 22 September 2021

Key findings

▪ More than two-thirds (68%) of South Africans describe the economic condition of the country as “fairly
bad” or “very bad,” a 21-percentage-point increase over the past decade.

o A majority (58%) say the economy is in worse shape than it was a year ago. And fewer than half (46%)
expect things to get better over the coming 12 months.

▪ Four out of five South Africans say the government is performing poorly on income inequality (81%)
and price stability (79%).

1
https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-10-07-anc-fails-to-stop-the-corruption-train-32-major-scandals-
four-in-2021-alone/
▪ More than four in 10 respondents (44%) assess their personal living conditions as bad, a 5-percentage-
point improvement compared to 2018, while about the same proportion (43%) describe them as good.

▪ Almost half (46%) of South Africans say that they or someone in their family went without a cash
income “several times,” “many times,” or “always” during the previous year. About one-third of citizens
report having repeatedly gone without enough clean water (34%), enough cooking fuel (33%), or enough
food (32%).

▪ Two-thirds (66%) of citizens say people are at least “sometimes” treated unfairly by the government
based on their economic status2.

Trust in institutions – 24 august 2021

Key findings

▪ Trust in nearly all institutions is low – and declining. Only media broadcasters, both independent (63%)
and government (61%), and the Department of Health (56%) enjoy the trust of a majority of citizens.

▪ Only a minority of South Africans say they trust the president (38%) and Parliament (27%) “somewhat”
or “a lot.” For the first time in Afrobarometer surveys, only a minority (43%) express trust in courts of
law.

▪ Only about one in three citizens (36%) trust the Electoral Commission of South Africa, with trust levels
particularly low among younger respondents. Slightly more (42%) trust the Public Protector.

▪ Trust in both the ruling African National Congress (ANC) (27%) and opposition parties (24%) continues
to decline. Trust in the ANC is especially low among younger and more educated respondents.

▪ Two-thirds (67%) of South Africans would be willing to give up elections if a nonelected government
could provide security, housing, and jobs. Nearly half (46%) say they would be “very willing” to do so,
with higher levels of support among younger and more educated respondents 3.

* South Africans’ low levels of trust in public institutions signal a weakening of democratic norms. Over
two decades of democracy, poverty, unemployment, inequality, and crime have remained prominent
problems as the promise of South Africa’s democracy has yet to introduce substantial material
improvements for the majority of people. In this context, a growing majority (67%) of South Africans
would be willing to forego elections if a non-elected government could provide security, jobs, and
housing. This has been the majority view in all survey rounds since 2006, but in 2021, amid the health
and economic crises presented by COVID-19, the proportion who say they would be “very willing” to
give up regular elections for an unelected but efficient government has shot up to nearly half (46%).

Government’s COVID-19 response – 28 july 2021

Key findings
2
https://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Dispatches/ad478-
economic_insecurity_persists_for_south_africans-afrobarometer_dispatch-18sept21.pdf
3
https://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Dispatches/ad474-
south_africans_trust_in_institutions_reaches_new_low-afrobarometer-20aug21.pdf
▪ More than three in four South Africans (77%) say they are “somewhat” or “very” well informed about
the COVID-19 pandemic and efforts to combat it.

▪ One in five South Africans (19%) report that someone in their household became ill with COVID-19,
while more than a third (34%) of households have temporarily or permanently lost a major income
source since the onset of the pandemic.

▪ Nearly two-thirds (64%) of South Africans found it difficult to comply with lockdown and curfew
restrictions. Despite this, four in five citizens (80%) believe that these measures were necessary to curb
the spread of the virus.

▪ Most South Africans (72%) also support the school closures, though just as many (73%) believe the
schools should have reopened sooner.

▪ Three in 10 citizens (30%) say their household received pandemic-related government assistance.
Twice as many (60%) say assistance was distributed unfairly.

▪ Almost two-thirds (64%) of South Africans approve of the government’s performance in managing the
response to the COVID-19 pandemic, and almost eight in 10 (78%) say the government has done a good
job of keeping the public informed.

o But only about one-third (36%) say they trust official COVID-19 statistics provided by the government.

o And almost nine in 10 (85%) believe that “some” or “a lot” of the resources available for responding to
the COVID-19 pandemic were lost to government corruption.

▪ Fewer than three in 10 South Africans (28%) say they trust the government “somewhat” or “a lot” to
ensure that COVID-19 vaccines are safe.

▪ And fewer than half (43%) say they are “somewhat” or “very” likely to try to get vaccinated.

▪ Close to half (47%) of citizens believe that prayer is more effective than a vaccine in preventing COVID-
19 infection4.

1) Democratic Alliance and Mmusi Maimane

South Africa's largest opposition party has been wrestling ever since to shake off that image in a country
where the public still tends to vote along racial lines - the black majority endorsing the former liberation
movement of the ANC and its various allies and off-shoots, and the white minority backing the DA, a
party which emerged from the liberal white benches of the old apartheid parliament.

Brought in partly to challenge that racialised perception, Mr Maimane exudes the confidence of
someone who has been comfortable in a leadership role from an early age.

4
https://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Dispatches/ad467-
south_africans_support_governments_covid-19_response_but_are_skeptical_of_vaccines-afrobarometer-
27july21_1.pdf
When Maimane was elected president, DA was running against a governing party that after 25 years in
power appears to many to have lost its way, presiding over a decade of economic stagnation and the
soaring corruption known here as "state capture".

Officials from the ANC, and the small but more radical Economic Freedom Fighters, openly dismiss the
country's official opposition as lackeys of „white monopoly capital” 5.

His election as president of DA was seen as a milestone of sorts. For the first time in its democratic
history South Africa had an official opposition led by a black person. In that context, it was hard not to
see the Democratic Alliance's (DA) election of Mmusi Maimane as its new leader as a significant step in
the country's journey towards political maturity 6.

After an impressive performance in the 2016 local government elections where the DA was able to,
thanks to a coalition with several small parties, snatch Johannesburg, Tshwane and Nelson Mandela Bay
(it later lost it), Maimane faced a headache after the May 2019 general elections when the party failed
for the first time to increase its electoral support. The party got 20.8 percent of the total vote against
the 22.2 percent it garnered in 2014 under Zille.

Some analysts have attributed the decline in electoral support to some white voters moving to radical
parties like the Freedom Front Plus, which did exceptionally well after years of moving to political
oblivion.

When the party’s support declined, there were talks of an internal rebellion to kick Maimane out, but a
truce was reached allowing him to stay until 2021. Nonetheless, the truce seems to be falling apart as
some leaders are allegedly digging up damaging information about Maimane and leaking it to the media
in order to force him out of office 7.

With Maimane’s election, the DA overturned everything — experience, their classical or neoliberal ideas
and intellectual ability — just to be able to compete with the ANC at the centre-left spectrum of politics.
It was done purely to attract more black voters in order to win elections without giving serious thought
to the challenges and the future of the country.

Despite this criticism, Maimane initially resonated with many South Africans, because he was young,
fresh and black to boot — in sharp contrast to Zuma, who was regarded as incompetent, corrupt,
arrogant and bored.

A lively orator, thanks to his years behind the pulpit, Maimane soon got the better of Zuma in
Parliament, labelling him a “broken” president, to the delight of many. Focusing on Zuma’s faults and
shortcomings served him well for a very long time because he was able to hide his own inability and
shortcomings. This could not last forever, however.

The euphoria of the 2016 municipal elections, when the ANC lost three large metros to the
DA/Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) coalition, soon made way for DA infighting and racial debates,
5
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-48066052
6
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32682037
7
https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/five-crises-for-mmusi-maimane-as-he-battles-internal-da-opponents-
33863814
making enormous demands on Maimane’s leadership ability. He was accused of having limited
knowledge about the Constitution after he made ambiguous comments to explain his stance on the
death penalty.

The water crisis in Cape Town, Zille’s contentious tweets defending the consequences of colonialism and
the falling-out with Cape Town mayor Patricia de Lille all assisted to catapult the DA into mayhem.
Maimane’s announcement in October 2016 that the DA would diversify its leadership, so that all party
structures from branch to national level should set targets for the recruitment and development of
exceptional black candidates for public office, added oil to the flames 8.

The lack of credible black leaders in the DA saw Maimane being pulled from his comfort zone behind the
pulpit into the political arena. He is essentially a reluctant political participant who has never really had a
well-seasoned political strategy and vision. Maimane operates, like most clergymen, from a theological
reference frame that has little or no space for other social influences.

2) Mmusi Maimane
Worked in business consultancy before entering politics, becoming DA spokesman in 2011

Elected the DA's first black leader in May 2015 at the age of 34.

Maimane grew up in the old black township on the outskirts of Johannesburg during the last decade of
racial apartheid. In 2005, Mr Maimane married a white woman he had met years before at church.

He describes the fight for a non-racial South Africa as his "historic mission".

When elected president of DA, officials from the ANC and Economic Freedom Fighters said about
Maimane that he was a "garden boy" working for the interests of South Africa's white minority.

At the moment of appointment into office as president of DA, his critics from the party said the party's
strength is built on its reputation for competent governance and that Mr Maimane, with no such
experience and with a reputation for vacillation on key policy issues, has had little measurable impact on
the DA's support base9.

Critics, not least in the ANC, said that Mr Maimane's speedy ascent to the top post is another "parachute
job" - that the 34-year-old is too young and inexperienced to deserve the position, and that his swift
elevation smacks of racial tokenism 10.

Maimane resigned as DA leader, saying that despite his best efforts, the DA was “not the vehicle best
suited to take forward the vision of building ‘One SA for All’.” 11

Resignation from DA - Mmusi Maimane cites difficulties making the DA, a traditionally white party,
appeal to black voters for resignation.

8
https://mg.co.za/article/2019-02-08-00-the-rise-and-fall-of-mmusi-maimane/
9
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-48066052
10
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32682037
11
https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2019-10-24-maimane-resigns-from-the-da-and-parliament/
“Over the past few months it has become more and more clear to me that there exists those in the DA
who do not see eye-to-eye with me, who do not share the vision for the party and the direction it was
taking,” he said.

Political analyst Prince Mashele said the resignations signal a backward step for the party. “The DA is
going back to its original self, which is a party of white people, focusing on the interests of white, and
nothing else,” Mashele told AP news agency 12.

Now, analysts say that Mmusi Maimane is looking to make a comeback to Parliament in 2024, but
through independent candidates and his One South Africa Movement 13.

Scandals:
1) Lease scandal involving his rented Cape Town home. On September 2019, DA MP Mike Waters
wanted to see proof that Maimane was paying rent for the house from his own pocket.

2) Donated luxury Toyota. Media said that Maimane was driving a white Toyota Fortuner “donated” by
former Steinhoff CEO Markus Jooste. Rapport alleged that he continued driving the car, despite being
warned by party colleagues about potential damage to the reputation of the DA.

Note: Mmusi Maimane resigned on 23 Oct 2019, and the scandals regarding him took place on the
beginning of October 2019. At that time, political analyst, Thabani Khumalo, said Maimane can only be
saved by resigning from his position as party leader. He said the major undoing for Maimane was that he
presented himself as an anti-corruption crusader so much so, that people would find it hard to forgive
him for alleged corrupt deeds14.

3) OSA
One SA Movement was founded by former DA leader, Mmusi Maimane who insists the entity is not a
political party but a civic movement15.

One South Africa presents themselves as being activists and they campaign on behalf of all citizens and
hold government and civic society accountable for their actions.

Mmusi Maimane is not presenting himself as a president of this organization, but as Chief Activist: One
South Africa Movement.

The One South Africa movement is an umbrella platform for independent candidates. South Africa
doesn’t need more political parties, argues Maimane.

12
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/10/23/south-africas-mmusi-maimane-quits-as-democratic-alliance-
leader
13
https://ewn.co.za/2021/01/26/maimane-explains-why-his-one-sa-movement-is-backing-independent-candidates
14
https://www.iol.co.za/news/nothing-can-save-das-mmusi-maimane-after-latest-scandals-say-analysts-33878374
15
https://www.sabcnews.com/sabcnews/political-party-one-sa-movement/
Maimane introduced OSA last year as an alternative to wrestle power away from political parties and
give real power back to the people.

At the latest electoral campaign, OSA did not have its own candidates. This year, OSA supported a
cohort of independent candidates, chosen by their communities to stand for election as ward councillors
in this year’s Local Government Elections.

OSA’s focus was on supporting, training, equipping and campaigning for OSA endorsed independents in
wards and municipalities throughout the country. These were independent candidates of their
community, supported by the people, focused on delivering for the people.

In their election plan, OSA stated that they are convinced that their new model is a solution to the
political party dominance that has taken power away from the people. It will depolarize and depoliticize
local government, allowing for government to be controlled by citizen-led organizations and competent
individuals – citizens who are honest, equipped and passionate about delivering basic services in a
financially prudent and responsible manner.

One South Africa Movement is about:

Electoral Reform: To advocate for direct democracy in South Africa which involves the election of public
representatives by voters in the three spheres of government, namely local, provincial and national
government

Education: To advocate for a quality and inclusive education for learners from the earliest stages of
schooling to high-level degrees that prepares them for a future economy. 

The Economy: The creation and harnessing of the entrepreneurial spirit of South Africa and to make it a
start-up nation.

Health: To advocate for universal access to quality healthcare for all citizens. 

Justice: To uphold the needs and rights of citizens to have dignity as enshrined in the constitution.

Agile/Clean Government: To advocate for quality standards for the ethical and moral leadership of all
state organs and to ensure their stability. 

Racial Harmony: To adopt a theory of justice that actively addresses inequality borne out of our racial
past and to build a society that eliminates discrimination on the basis of race, gender and class.

One South Africa Movement values:

Advocacy - To advocate on behalf of citizens, especially the poor and marginalized. To support petitions
and/or recommendations from South Africans with respect to particular policies or causes.
Accountability - To hold politicians and elected local and national officials accountable for their actions.
To remove them from office should they fail in their duties.

Aspiration - To hope or strive for something worthwhile. To celebrate other citizen’s or community’s
success. To work hard.

Activism - To promote, direct, or intervene in social, political, economic, or environmental reform with
the desire to make changes in South African society toward the greater good.

Non-violence - To follow peaceful means to bring about social change.

Justice - To uphold the needs and rights of citizens to have dignity as enshrined in the constitution. This
is a mission to address historical injustices and ensure a future upon which all citizens enjoy justice,
equality and shared prosperity.

Racial Harmony - To adopt a theory of justice that actively addresses inequality borne out of our racial
past and to build a society that eliminates discrimination on the basis of race, gender and class.

4) President: Cyril Ramaphosa (ANC)

Cyril Ramaphosa was elected president by parliament in February 2018 after his predecessor, Jacob
Zuma, resigned over corruption allegations.

A successful but sometimes controversial businessman, Mr Ramaphosa was picked as leader of the
governing African National Congress (ANC) a few months earlier.

He inherited a struggling economy, a divided party, and the problem of entrenched corruption.

Unlike many senior party figures of his generation, Mr Ramaphosa was not driven into exile for opposing
apartheid.

He fought the injustices of white minority rule from within South Africa, most prominently by defending
the rights of black miners as leader of the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM).

He was heavily involved in the talks to end apartheid, and played an important role in the drafting of
South Africa's post-apartheid constitution.

After missing out on becoming then President Nelson Mandela's deputy, Mr Ramaphosa withdrew from
active political life, switching focus to business.

He returned as deputy president in 2014, before finally taking the top job from the scandal-plagued Mr
Zuma. He passed his first test when the ANC won the May 2019 parliamentary elections, although its
58% share of the vote was its lowest margin of victory since the end of apartheid 16.

South Africans see corruption as worsening during President Ramaphosa’s tenure

Perceptions of pervasive corruption in South Africa have dominated public discourse for thebetter part
of the past decade. In its many forms, corruption undermines the effectiveness ofthe state, worsens the

16
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-20767093
quality of public services, and ultimately erodes public trust(Fukuyama, 2014). In South Africa, former
President Jacob Zuma and some of his allies standaccused of state capture – the use of the state for
personal interests that has crippled variouscompromised institutions (February, 2019). During thelatter
part of Zuma’stenure, publicopinion was largely negative on indicators of service delivery (Nkomo,
2017), trust(Chingwete, 2016), and the responsiveness of democratic institutions (Dryding, 2020).

In 2018, President Cyril Ramaphosa’s promises to restore government integrity, strengthendemocratic

institutions, and fast-track development gave South Africans a renewed sense ofhope (Hendricks, 2019).
To tackle corruption, his administration improved independentoversight and presented an extensive
new National Anti-Corruption Strategy that calls on allstakeholders to take responsibility for ethical
leadership (Republic of South Africa, 2020).

Three years into Ramaphosa’s tenure, what impact has his government had on corruption?

Transparency International’s (2020) most recent Corruption Perceptions Index scored SouthAfrica at 44
out of 100 points, just a 1-point improvement from 2017. In 2020, the governmentwas accused of
misappropriating COVID-19 relief funds (Auditor-General of South Africa,2020). Evidence of irregularities
in the awarding of tenders related to COVID-19 responseefforts (McCain, 2021) has engulfed the
Department of Health in a scandal that led to theresignation of Minister of Health Zweli Mkhize hours
before a cabinet reshuffle (Tandwa, 2021).And corruption again made the news with the recent murder
of a whistle-blower in theGauteng Health Department (Klein, 2021).

New Afrobarometer survey findings from 2021 mirror the headlines: Not only do South Africansbelieve
that corruption is getting worse, but they also see large portions of elected officialsand civil servants as
involved in corrupt activities. Society says the government is handling theanti-corruption fight badly,
while channels to report corruption are increasingly seen asunsafe 17.

Role and power of the president

Appointment - At its first sitting after its election, and whenever necessary to fill a vacancy, the National
Assembly must elect a woman or a man from among its members to be the President.

The President is the Head of State and head of the national executive; must uphold, defend and respect
the Constitution as the supreme law of the Republic; and promotes the unity of the nation and that
which will advance the Republic.

The President is responsible for assenting to and signing Bills; referring a Bill back to the National
Assembly for reconsideration of the Bill's constitutionality; referring a Bill to the Constitutional Court for
a decision on the Bill's constitutionality; summoning the National Assembly, the National Council of
Provinces or Parliament to an extraordinary sitting to conduct special business; making any
appointments that the Constitution or legislation requires the President to make, other than as head of
the national executive; appointing commissions of inquiry; calling a national referendum in terms of an
Act of Parliament; receiving and recognising foreign diplomatic and consular representatives; appointing

17
https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-10-07-anc-fails-to-stop-the-corruption-train-32-major-scandals-
four-in-2021-alone/
ambassadors, plenipotentiaries, and diplomatic and consular representatives; pardoning or reprieving
offenders and remitting any fines, penalties or forfeitures; and conferring honours.

The President exercises the executive authority, together with the other members of the Cabinet.

No person may hold office as President for more than two terms, but when a person is elected to fill a
vacancy in the office of President, the period between that election and the next election of a President
is not regarded as a term.

5) Juilus Malema - President and Commander-in-Chief of the Economic Freedom

Fighters (EFF)
The "son of the soil", as he has been styled by his Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), has spent turning
the party he founded into a disciplined force that has set the agenda in some policy areas.

Expelled from the governing African National Congress (ANC) in 2012, Mr Malema, or "Juju" as he is
sometimes called, has positioned the EFF as the true inheritor of the ANC's radical agenda and has
exposed the governing party's left flank.

The relentless focus by the EFF's commander-in-chief on the inequality in South Africa, and the failure of
the ANC to redistribute land from the white minority to the black majority, has cost support for his
former party, which led the fight against apartheid.

The EFF took just more than 6% of the vote in 2014 in its first run in a general election, but its influence
seems to outweigh that figure.

Ever since the start of his public life he has not shied away from controversy, offending a wide range of
people from women's rights groups, to white farmers, to his own political bosses 18.

6) John Henry Steenhuisen – the new leader of Democratic Alliance

John Steenhuisen is a South African Politician who serves as the Leader of the Democratic Alliance Party.
The main opposition party in South Africa. Steenhuisen is fluent in both English and Afrikaans

John Henry Steenhuisen has been serving as the Leader of the Opposition in the National Assembly since
October 2019 and the interim Federal Leader of the Democratic Alliance since November 2019.

He previously served as the Chief Whip of the Official Opposition under the leadership of Mmusi
Maimane from May 2014 to October 2019. He has been serving as a Member of the National Assembly
since July 2011.

Prior to his appointment to the National Assembly, he was involved with the politics of KwaZulu-Natal,
serving as the Provincial Leader of the DA and the party’s caucus leader in the KwaZulu-Natal
Legislature.

18
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-14718226
When the then DA leader Mmusi Maimane resigned in October 2019 leading John Steenhuisen to loose
the chief whip position. He declared his candidacy to succeed Mmusi Maimane as the parliamentary
leader, he was elected unopposed on 27 October 2019.

John Steenhuisen formally announced on 28 October 2019 that he would run for Federal Leader of the
party. He was elected to the position on an interim capacity on 17 November 2019 after he defeated
Gauteng MPL Makashule Gana.

On 15 February 2020, he declared his intention to seek a full-term as Federal Leader of the Democratic
Alliance at the Hellenic Community Centre in Mouille Point, Cape Town. Several public representatives
attended the launch of his campaign, including Western Cape Premier Alan Winde, the head of the
party’s governance unit James Selfe, Shadow Minister of Justice and Correctional Services Glynnis
Breytenbach, and DA chief whip in the National Assembly Natasha Mazzone 19.

In May 2020 John Steenhuisen criticized President Cyril Ramaphosa and his government for extending
the national lockdown to level 4. He described lockdown level 4 as unjustified and lacks common sense.

The Democratic Alliance (DA) demanded the minutes of all discussions held by the National Coronavirus
Command Council (NCCC), including the decision to continue the ban on tobacco products. John
Steenhuisen said the lockdown will be stopped fed up by citizens.

Democratic Alliance (DA), South Africa’s largest opposition party, has elected in November 2020 John
Steenhuisen as its new leader.

Steenhuisen’s triumph will see him lead the DA in the 2024 presidential elections against the African
National Congress (ANC), which has governed the country since the end of apartheid in 1994.

In his acceptance speech, Steenhuisen said “people power” would be the order of the day under his
leadership, promising to “fight to give power and opportunities to every law-abiding, honest and hard-
working citizen, regardless of their background”.

Steenhuizen’s election reaffirmed that the DA will pursue minority politics instead of challenging the
ANC nationally, said analyst Ralph Mathekga, of the University of the Western Cape. Mathekga said the
DA is expected to lose many Black voters as it appears to be more interested in keeping its traditional
white support instead of attracting new Black voters 20.

After the local elections, John Steenhuisen has dismissed suggestions that his weak leadership is at root
of the party’s downward trajectory, with projections pointing to it losing control of the Tshwane and
Nelson Mandela Bay metros in the local government elections. Steenhuisen apportioned some of the
blame on the exit of Mmusi Maimane as DA leader after the party’s poor showing in the 2019 general
vote. Steenhuisen has also fallen short in terms of bringing back traditional white voters, which the
dominant faction in the DA had believed him capable of doing 21.

19
https://savannanews.com/john-steenhuisen-biography-profile-age-net-worth-qualifications-contacts-wife-
speech/
20
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/11/1/south-africas-main-opposition-party-appoints-new-leader
21
https://mg.co.za/politics/2021-11-02-steenhuisen-hints-at-maimanes-exit-hurting-the-da-at-the-polls/
7) ANC
African National Congress (ANC), South African political party and Black nationalist organization.
Founded in 1912 as the South African Native National Congress, it had as its main goal the maintenance
of voting rights for Coloureds (persons of mixed race) and Black Africans in Cape Province. It was
renamed the African National Congress in 1923. From the 1940s it spearheaded the fight to eliminate
apartheid, the official South African policy of racial separation and discrimination. The ANC was banned
from 1960 to 1990 by the white South African government; during these three decades it operated
underground and outside South African territory. The ban was lifted in 1990, and Nelson Mandela, the
president of the ANC, was elected in 1994 to head South Africa’s first multiethnic government. Since
then, ANC governed South Africa.

In the 2014 elections the ANC’s status as the governing party was secured for another five years when
the party won about 62 percent of the national vote. At the provincial level it remained the dominant
party in all provinces except the Western Cape. The success of the party came even though its
membership base had seen erosion from dissatisfaction with the performance of the ANC-led
government and by other parties gaining in popularity. One such party, the Economic Freedom Fighters,
was founded in 2013 by Julius Malema, the fiery former ANC Youth League leader who had been
expelled from the ANC in 2012.

The ANC saw its worst performance yet in the 2016 municipal elections. It lost control of key urban
areas and, for the first time since the ANC took power in 1994, won less than 60 percent of the total
vote. The party’s loss of support was widely attributed to the electorate’s dissatisfaction with how the
ANC-led governments at the municipal and national levels were handling the economy and delivery of
services, as well as frustration with the persistent corruption and scandals associated with Zuma and the
ANC.

Another closely fought battle for the party’s presidency played out at the ANC’s national conference in
December 2017, with the polarization of Zuma’s supporters and critics at the fore. The two front-runner
candidates were Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, a physician, veteran politician, and former chairperson of the
African Union Commission who also happened to be the president’s former wife, and Cyril Ramaphosa,
a successful businessman and party stalwart who served as deputy president of both the ANC and the
country. Dlamini-Zuma had the backing of Zuma and his supporters as well as party members drawn to
her promise to tackle the racial inequality that still existed in the country. Ramaphosa, meanwhile, had
the support of those believing that he would be the more business-friendly leader of the two as well as
those who had been most vocal in criticizing the scandals that surrounded Zuma and thus supported
Ramaphosa’s promise to fight corruption. Ramaphosa was narrowly elected party president.

Ramaphosa’s victory further weakened Zuma’s standing in the party, as did a December 2017 court
ruling that held that the National Assembly had failed to fulfill its obligation to hold Zuma accountable
for his actions as they pertained to the Nkandla scandal—which involved extensive upgrades made to
Zuma’s home in Nkandla, ostensibly for security reasons, that were paid for by the state and the legal
fallout from his initial disregard of a recommendation that he repay the government for a portion of the
upgrades that were deemed unrelated to matters of security. Both events increased the likelihood that
the ANC would pressure Zuma to step down as president prior to the 2019 elections in order to stem the
damage to the party from the allegations of scandal and corruption that had swirled around him for so
long. In early 2018 ANC officials engaged in several meetings and negotiation sessions regarding Zuma’s
remaining time as president. The situation peaked on February 13, 2018, when the ANC announced that
it had decided to recall Zuma from the presidency. The recall, however, did not legally compel Zuma to
step down, so the party had to wait for him to offer his resignation. Zuma acquiesced, albeit somewhat
defiantly, and offered his resignation the next day. He was succeeded as president of the country by
Ramaphosa.

The 2019 elections were held on May 8. On the national stage, it was the party’s worst showing to date,
a sign of the continuing dissatisfaction with the ANC-led government. Although the ANC still took a
majority of the vote—about 58 percent—and secured a five-year term as president for Ramaphosa, it
was the party’s smallest margin of victory since taking power in 1994. At the provincial level, the party
was able to keep control of eight out of nine provinces it previously held, with the Western Cape once
again going to the DA22.

Conclusions about South Africa’s local elections 2021

The 2021 elections saw both turnout and the ANC vote drop to record lows. Small parties meanwhile
collectively doubled their vote.

Before elections analyst said:

New contestants may entice new voters to the polls. The prospects of independents winning are much
higher this time than previously, when they hardly registered a dent. Their relative failure has been due
to lack of support, both organisationally and financially. Now they seem to have both, including training
on electioneering, provided by the One SA Movement of Mmusi Maimane, former leader of the official
opposition, the Democratic Alliance. Maimane’s organisation accounts for over 300 of independents.

Independents obviously hope to capitalise on the widespread distrust of political parties. The governing
African National Congress (ANC) has been most affected by the lack of trust in parties. This is a hangover
from the Jacob Zuma years23.

Key trends

The first is the very low turnout. Just 46% of registered voters – which is about 30% of all eligible voters
– turned out to vote, the lowest in post-apartheid South Africa. If this pattern continues, it could lead to
a crisis of legitimacy for national governments.

The second is the rise of local interest parties. These groups not only took votes from the DA in the
Western Cape, but also from the ANC in the Free State and Mpumalanga, denying them majorities in
some municipalities. Many of these small parties are led by disgruntled former ANC activists and
politicians. It remains to be seen whether they remain outside of the embrace of South Africa’s Grand
Old Party or can be brought back into the fold through patronage and other inducements.

The third, related to the second, is the comeback of certain parties and the emergence of new ones. The
FF+ had its best local election yet, winning about 2% of the vote and doing well enough to be the biggest
22
https://www.britannica.com/topic/African-National-Congress/Internal-dissent
23
https://theconversation.com/south-africas-local-elections-new-entrants-likely-to-be-the-big-winners-170804
opposition in some areas or parts of governing coalitions in others. The Inkatha Freedom Party, which
derives its support mainly from Zulus, also showed that talk of its demise was premature. It won a
swathe of councils across northern KwaZulu-Natal and is well placed to form the core of a coalition
government in the province after the next national and provincial elections in 2024 24.

The official results show:

 The ANC got 46% of the vote

 The main opposition Democratic Alliance (DA) 22%

 The left-wing Economic Freedom Fighters 10%

 The Zulu Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) 6%

 The majority Afrikaner party Freedom Front Plus 2%

 And the newly minted ActionSA also 2%

a) ANC
For the first time, support for the African National Congress (ANC) dropped below 50%. Overall, the
ruling party gained 45.6%, down from 53.9% in 2016. Although this election has no bearing on the
national picture, this could be a harbinger of what is to come in the next national election, scheduled for
2024. The psychological blow of a sub-50% ANC cannot be overstated.

The ANC was decimated in most of the country’s urban areas, dropping below 40% in the major cities in
Gauteng, South Africa’s economic heartland. In Johannesburg, Tshwane (Pretoria), and Ekurhuleni (East
Rand), it is still the biggest single party but lost substantial support. It won barely a third of votes in
Johannesburg, a city in which it won nearly 60% two local elections ago.

The ANC also lost its majority in eThekwini (Durban) on the country’s east coast, sinking to 42% of the
vote, a 20-point drop compared to 2011, two elections ago. In Cape Town, it didn’t even manage 20% of
the vote, having once governed that city.

However, outside urban areas, the ANC is still by far the party of choice. In five of the nine provinces, it
was the single biggest party in each municipality. In some parts of the country, it is racking up numbers
that one typically sees in elections that are rigged. In municipalities in Limpopo and the eastern parts of
the Eastern Cape, the ANC consistently won more than 80%. Paradoxically, these are also the parts of
South Africa that lag on most developmental indicators.

b) DA
The main opposition Democratic Alliance (DA) also saw its support decline, from 26.9% to 21.6%. This
was its worst local election since 2006. It lost support on its right flank to the Afrikaner nationalist

24
https://africanarguments.org/2021/11/what-did-we-learn-from-south-africa-local-elections/
Freedom Front Plus (FF+) and in the Gauteng metros to ActionSA, a new outfit founded by Herman
Mashaba, a former DA mayor of Johannesburg.

Because both the ANC and DA lost support, there are now an unprecedented number of hung councils,
with nearly 70 having no overall majority. In only three of South Africa’s eight biggest urban areas (the
“metros”) did a single party win enough support to govern alone – the DA in Cape Town, and the ANC in
Mangaung (Bloemfontein) and Buffalo City (East London).

In Tshwane, both main parties lost votes, but the DA fell behind the ANC. The opposition party also lost
ground in Nelson Mandela Bay, the biggest city in the Eastern Cape. In 2016, the DA narrowly missed out
on an outright majority here, but this time was in a dead heat with the ANC on 40%.

In the Western Cape, the only province which it governs, the DA lost its majorities in many of the rural
councils in the eastern reaches. This swing mostly benefited local interest and community parties rather
than the ANC.

There were some bright spots for the DA, however. It increased its majority in Midvaal, the only
municipality it governs outright in Gauteng. And, for the first time, it won a municipality in KwaZulu-
Natal. That means it now controls uMngeni whose new mayor will be the 30-year-old Chris Pappas, a
white man who speaks Zulu fluently, still an anomaly in post-apartheid South Africa.

The DA held onto its Cape Town stronghold with a reduced majority, but still with over 60%.

c) EFF
The Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) grew its vote to 10.3%, up from 8.2%, though fell well short of its
claims that it would win two-thirds of the vote. Its support increased markedly in certain areas,
particularly KwaZulu-Natal and parts of the Eastern Cape, but fell in others.

In places like Polokwane, the biggest city in Limpopo and the hometown of leader Julius Malema, the
EFF’s vote share dropped from nearly 30% to 23%. It saw similar declines in other places it had done well
previously, such as the mining centre of Rustenburg in North-West province. In Johannesburg and
Tshwane, the EFF also lost support, remaining at just about 10%.

d) Maimane conclusion
About 450,000 people have voted for contenders from outside of the ANC, DA and EFF and community
forums across the country so far, said the leader of One South Africa Movement at a press briefing on
Wednesday.

“This means, independents, as a voting bloc, are now larger than political parties Cope, VF+, ACDP,
UDM, ATM, PA, Good and the NFP — and only trail the ANC, DA, EFF and IFP in real numbers — at
approximately 4% of the national vote,” said Maimane.

OSA supported 12 movements and 250 candidates across the country.

Although Maimane has said that OSA is a movement that backs independent candidates, elections
analyst Wayne Sussman said that OSA “is slightly different because they’ve gotten behind regional
parties that don’t have affiliation with political parties. These are not independents, independents are
people who represent themselves and possibly the community”.

At the briefing, Maimane didn’t make a distinction between independent ward candidates and OSA-back
independent ward candidates. Commenting on this, Sussman said: “Maimane can be proud of
Cederberg Eerste’s results in Cederberg and Knysna Independent Movement’s results but he can’t claim
to speak for all the independent candidates. He’s obviously trying to get a following because he wants to
run in 2024”.

According to Maimane, the roadmap to the 2024 national and provincial elections had been established.

“We are fast-tracking our efforts to ensure direct elections are in place before the next national
elections as required by the Constitutional Court, said Maimane 25.

25
https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-11-03-mmusi-maimane-touts-success-of-independent-
candidates-as-black-eye-for-big-party-politics/