World Development, Vol. 9, No. 6, pp. 569-582, 1981. 0305-750X/81/060569-14$02.

00/0
Printed in Great Britain. o 1981 Pergamon Press Ltd.

The Military in Politics: Who Benefits and How

NICOLE BALL*
Swedish Institute of International Affairs

Summary. - The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the complexity of evaluating the pol-
itical role of Third-World militaries and to underline the necessity of including many different
kinds of information into analyses of that role.
Four broad societal groups are identified which might be expected to benefit the most by
some degree of military involvement in the economic and political life of a country: domestic
civilian groups, the military as an institution, individuals within the military, and foreign groups.
Some of the major reasons why each of these groups may favour a political and economic role
for the milirary are outlined and examples are provided throughout of how these elements have
operated in practice. The way in which the interests of the four broad groups may coincide is
also discussed.

1. INTRODUCTION ought to be controlled by civilian governments.

This is the way in which civil-military relations
Since the 1950s and early 196Os, when de- are structured in industrialized societies’ and it
colonization expanded the number of indepen- is this pattern of relations which French and, in
dent Third-World countries, there has been particular, British military officers sought to
considerable theorizing on the part of social impart to the colonial armies they trained. As a
scientists, particularly Americans, about the result, the academic literature has been heavily
role played by the armed forces in the develop- concerned with the failure of civilians in the
ment process. For the most part, this theorizing Third World to maintain control over the armed
has reflected the main ideological divisions of forces. The desirability of civilian control is not
the period. Liberals and conservatives have disputed here. A distinction must be made be-
judged Third-World armed forces in terms of tween military control of the government and
their success or failure in assisting the develop- civilian control. The reason for this is simple.
ment of externally oriented market economies. When it is the dominant force in the political
Those on the left have argued that organized process, the military is required to make fewer
force has been crucial to the integration of compromises in the determination of policy
Third-World areas into the capitalist economic than if it were required to influence the de-
system. Viewed from this perspective, Third- liberations of a civilian government. Since miii-
World militaries become a major cause of tary organizations have a monopoly over the
underdevelopment. As is often the case in the use of force. military control of government
social sciences, theoretical frameworks have can - and indeed generally does - mean less of
been established first and the search for facts a role for most other groups within society.
has come second. in some instances, the general It should be recognized, however, that even
propositions set forward - which are meant to within industrialized societies, militaries can
apply to all countries - are built on evidence have a great deal of influence over govern-
which consists of no more than a few anecdotal mental policies. Even if the military does not
observations. In other cases, the empirical evi- have a direct voice in general economic policy
dence is stronger, but important gaps remain. formulation, for example, as long as it has rela-
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate tive autonomy in deciding what resources will
the complexity of evaluating the political role
of Third-World militaries and to underline the * The author wishes to thank Milton Leitenberg of
necessity of including many different kinds of the Swedish Institute of lnternational Affairs for his
information into analyses of that role. many useful comments, and the Swedish Agency
Most of the literature dealing with Third- for Research Cooperation with Developing Countries
World militaries assumes that armed forces (SAREC) for financial supporr.

569
570 WORLDDEVELOPMENT

be consumed by the military each year, the pos- tary as an institution, individuals within the
sibilities open to other sectors of the economy military, and foreign groups. Outlined later are
are reduced. In the Third World, the influence some of the major reasons why each of these
exerted by militaries over their governments has groups may favour a political and economic
undeniably grown over the last 30 years. Yet, it role of the military and how their interests may
can be argued that the political role of the mili- coincide. It must, however, be stressed that this
tary in many of these areas is very much in line discussion is meant only to be illustrative, not
with precolonial experience. The European col- definitive.
onial powers were hardly the first to use force
to build and maintain empires or to exploit the
resources of a foreign area; many pre-colonial 2. DOMESTIC CIVILIAN GROUPS
groupings in what is now called the Third World
were created and maintained by force. It can When we speak of military involvement in
be argued, of course, that the 19th and 20th politics, we do not refer solely to direct control
century European empires extended over a of the government by the military. Even ‘civil-
much wider area than most precolonial groups. ian’ governments can experience a good deal of
Nonetheless, it may be that what is essentially military intervention in the decision-making
a British ideal - civilian control of the mili- process whiie ‘military’ governments require
tary - is the aberration, while military involve- some degree of civilian (primarily bureaucratic
ment in politics is, in a historical sense, the and technical) co-operation and assistance. In
norm. designating governments as either ‘military’ or
If one wishes to understand the role played ‘civilian’, the illusion is perpetuated that mili-
by organized force in the development process, tary institutions are apoliticai.3 Even a brief
it may be more useful to examine the roots of survey of the political situation in the Third
military involvement than to focus on the World today leads to the conclusion that mili-
phenomenon of involvement per se or to debate taries are heavily involved in the political and
why civilians fail to control the military. Such economic life of many countries that they do
an evaluation can best be made by identifying not formally govern. Where militaries do govern,
those groups - foreign and domestic - which they still need some assistance from civilians. It
stand to gain in some way from the involve- is therefore closer to reality to speak of mili-
ment of the military in the political and econ- tary-dominated or civilian-dominated govern-
omic processes of a country and by clarifying ments.
what each group expects to obtain from the There are a variety of reasons for the devel-
military’s participation. opment of close civil-military relations. In
In essence, this is the approach employed by many instances, a country’s political, bureau-
those who argue that armed force has been cratic and military elites share some combina-
essential to the establishment and development tion of class, ethnic. regional, religious and
of capitalism. However, those who make this racial affiliations. While this does not guarantee
argument concentrate on the interests (particu- the establishment or maintenance of close civil-
larly the economic interests) of domestic civil- military relations, it does facilitate these pro-
ian elites and of foreign capitalist governments cesses. The more or less simultaneous develop-
and corporations. The military’s corporate and ment of the armed forces and the ruling party
personal interests which may be served by its in the course of an independence or liberation
participation in the economy and politics of a struggle also encourages co-operation between
country, as well as the political and economic the military and the civilian sectors of the
interests of socialist foreign governments, are government. Burma and Indonesia are good ex-
barely discussed. A second group of researchers amples of countries in which the military and
have evaluated the corporate and personal in- the political wings of nationalist movements
terests of the military, but here the economic developed together and where the military has
interests of domestic civilian elites and the adopted as part of its ‘mission’ the administra-
benefits to be derived by industrialized-country tion of the country. Sometimes, although less
governments and foreign capital are ignored or so now than even 25 years ago, the entire state
minimized.2 A synthesis is required. Such a apparatus, including the military, is virtually
synthesis should focus on the four broad groups the private property of a very small group of
within society which might be expected to wealthy people. In these cases. the military is
benefit the most by some degree of military entirely dependent on the ruling group and
involvement in the economic and political life is frequently quite well treated in terms of
of a country: domestic civilian groups, the mili- salaries, perquisites and equipment. The re-
 THE MILITARY IN POLITICS 571

cently deposed dictatorship of the Somoza fam- have contributed to the economic problems
ily in Nicaragua fits into this category. that Indonesia has suffered in the last 15 years.
In yet other cases, civiliandominated govern- It is increasingly the case that militaries which
ments insist on following policies which are un- have been or envisage being in power for a long
popular with the majority of their population period of time, such as those in Peru or Brazil,
and must rely on the military to maintain law give officers who will be involved with econ-
and order. In return for ensuring regime secur- omic policy-making or the administration of
ity, the armed forces may obtain greater politi- state corporations some degree of training in
cal influence over decisions and policies pertain- economic affairs. The failure of military offi-
ing to non-military affairs. This is what has cers to understand the mechanics of economic
happened in the Philippines with the institution policy formulation and implementation or
of the martial law regime.Alternatively, civilian- their complete lack of knowledge of economic
dominated governments might follow policies affairs in general has sometimes prompted this
which are unpopular with all or part of the kind of training. This has been the case, for
armed forces. They may then seek to buy the example, in the Philippines, where the military
loyalty of all or some portion of the military does not directly control the government appar-
with an increased allocation of resources and atus but has been given an increasingly large
some form of participation in the decision- role under Marco? martial law regime.6
making process. Militaries are not always the Military leaders frequently become involved
first to suggest their involvement in politics and in the economic system in order to improve
civilians are not always opposed to military their personal financial situation. In these cases,
participation. close working relations with local and foreign
When the military seeks to influence the businessmen and control over the distribution
political process, allies can be sought either of economic aid are sought. In partnership with
among politicians or among bureaucrats and local business interests, the military provides a
technocrats. In cases where the armed forces protective business environment while the bus-
take over governments, the collaboration of the inessmen provide capital and entrepreneurial
civil service is vital since no military-dominated skills. The opportunities for the military to en-
government, not even one as entrenched as that gage in economic corruption are greatest when
in Thailand, Indonesia or Brazil, can administer the military controls the political process, but
a country solely with military manpower. Be- civilian leaders who need to ensure the loyalty
cause they share certain characteristics, such as of the armed forces may also provide oppor-
a hierarchical structure and a belief in techno- tunities for senior officers to increase their per-
cratic solutions, it is often suggested that the sonal wealth.
military and the civilian bureaucracy are par- The impetus for allowing the military some
ticularly well suited to be allies.4 Where the political role does not come uniquely from the
military seeks influence rather than direct con- military. Civilians frequently seek the support
trol, allies will be sought among politicians, and co-operation of the armed forces, or por-
those in opposition as well as those in power, in tions of them. Politicians may ask the military
addition to bureaucrats and technocrats. to intervene directly in government in order
Where the military seeks involvement in the to prevent political opponents from gaining
economic system, even before acquiring control power, or they may tacitly acquiesce to such
over a government, alliances with bureaucrats intervention. A series of coups occurred in
and technocrats and with local or foreign busi- Sierra Leone in 1967, for example, because
ness interests are generally sought. Military .4lbert Margai sought to retain control of the
leaders often recognize that they are not ade- government despite his party’s loss at the polls.
quately trained to develop and implement econ- According to Bebler:
omic strategy, although some militaries attempt The first and second coups initially were a continu-
to retain more control over economic policies ation by other means of civilian party politics in
than others. It has been suggested that in the which the purported nonpolitical and supraregional
case of Indonesia the military has retained too nature of the armed forces was used as a cover and
much power over economic decision-making as expendable political currency to achieve particu-
and that the economy has suffered as a result.5 laristic goals.7
It must be added, however. that the siphoning- Politicians may also seek political allies among
off of government revenues to supplement the different groups with the military in order to
defence budget or line the pockets of individual strengthen their position among competing civ-
officers as well as the whole pattern of econ- ilian groups or as a hedge against direct military
omic development followed by the military intervention. Welch traces much of the political
572 WORLDDEVELOPMENT

involvement of African militaries during the cases of civilians seeking military support in
1960s to civilian encouragements order to exclude other political and economic
Civil servants are less likely than politicians elites from positions of power even when the
to court military officers actively in order to groups involved all share similar class back-
promote their own views, but bureaucrats can grounds and operate within essentially the same
make their support, or lack of it, for a particu- economic framework.9
lar regime quite clear by the way in which they A major preoccupation of many Third-World
implement government policies. Local business elites is the concentration of power and wealth
interests are likely to favour military involve- in their own hands. Indeed, this is one reason
ment in the political system if this involvement why they favour the development of capitalism
in some way improves the economic climate for in their countries: capitalism allows a relatively
them. Conversely, they will withdraw their sup- small group of individuals to control the politi-
port from military-dominated governments if cal and economic systems of a country. In-
governmental policies prove detrimental to creased participation of the mass of the people
business. In short, civilians encourage or support in the decision-making process would prevent
the participation of the military in politics elite domination and is thus to be opposed,
when such involvement is perceived as in some although ruling groups may very well differ on
way necessary or desirable for the maintenance the degree of exclusion that is viable. At the
or improvement of the civilians’ political and/or same time, a country’s economic and political
economic position. elite is itself divided into many competing
It is often argued in the iiterature concerning groups, each of which seeks to acquire for
the political role of Third-World militaries that itself a major share of the benefits of the sy-
the armed forces tend to act as the defender of stem and to reduce as much as possible the
middle-class interests and, thus, of capitalism. economic and political power exercised by its
Attempts have been made to link this tendency rivals.
to the class background of military officers. Civil-military relations are profoundly affec-
Such attempts have not been very successful, ted by these various divisions. Like any large
partly because class background is but one fac- grouping of people, the military reflects the
tor influencing the behaviour of members of divisions within society as a whole. When civil-
the armed forces. Not all military involvement ians seek the co-operation of the military, they
in politics is determined by class considerations. most often do not seek the co-operation of
In some cases, class interest provides a good ex- the entire armed services. To begin with, they
planation of civil-military relations. In others it deal almost exclusively with the officer corps,
does not. It is true, particularly with regard to generally with its highest level. Then, they build
Latin America, that civilians often seek military alliances with individual services or with fac-
support to exclude the mass of the population tions within the military as a whole or within
from the political and economic decision- the services. Civil-military relations often in-
making process. One reason for this exclusion is volve interactions between several different
that elites fear that increased participation by civilian grOUpS, on the one hand, and several
the poor would lead to alterations in existing different military groups, on the other. Coali-
political and economic structures which would tion formation is of the greatest importance.
be inimical to elite interests. Thailand offers perhaps the best example of
It is important to understand, however, that this process, but it is by no means a unique
Third-World elites do not only guard against the case.‘O Any assessment of what civilians expect
dissolution of a political and economic system to gain by military involvement in politics must
which has enabled them to amass considerable specify precisely which civilian group(s) choose
personal wealth and power; they also seek to to ally themselves with which group(s) within
maintain their preeminent position within that the military and just what each group expects
system. The ‘middle class’ is not a homogeneous to obtain from the collaboration.
entity with all members sharing precisely the
same beliefs and benefiting to exactly the same
extent from the operation of the capitalist 3. THE MILITARY AS AN INSTITUTION
system. Occupational differences, ethnic divis-
ions, generational gaps, regional divisions, race As an institution, the military has a variety
differences, hierarchical disputes, all divide the of reasons for seeking a political role. These can
middle class and lead some portions of it to be grouped under four main headings: mainten-
pursue policies which are disadvantageous to ance of or increase in its share of national re-
other members of that class. There are many sources, maintenance of the integrity of the
 THEMILITARYINPOLITICS 573

armed forces, fear of national disintegration, (b) Maintenance of the integrity of the
expansion of the concept of ‘national security’. armed forces

Military officers are antagonistic to any at-

(a) Maintenance of or increase in military’s
tempt to remove from them the responsibility
share of national resources
for internal military matters such as promo-
tions, appointments or punishments. When con-
The desire to command a significant share of flicts arise between military and political
national resources is not one which is limited to leaders, the latter often seek to strengthen their
military establishments. It is fairly common to position by manipulating promotions and ap-
all bureaucratic organizations. The armed forces pointments, forcing particularly strong oppon-
are, however, particularly well .placed to press ents within the military into early retirement or
their demands, since they have a monopoly sending them on missions abroad.12 Both the
over the means of violence. manipulation itself and the attempt to alter the
Case studies of coups d’itat frequently note ideological make-up of the officer corps are
that one outcome of the military takeover is a resented and may encourage officers to take
rise in military expenditure: salaries (particu- some sort of political action against the poli-
larly those of the officers) are raised: new ticians. In Ghana, both Nkrumah and Busia
equipment is ordered; new facilities and per- (who was overthrown by a coup in 1972) inter-
quisites are provided for officers and their fered with the appointment and retirement
familities. Militaries do not always have to system of the regular army and the police. In
resort to direct intervention to increase their both cases, however, the officers who led the
share of national resources. Civilian-dominated coups had a variety of other complaints against
governments that are heavily dependent on the government. Dissatisfaction with the form
military support or that are faced with serious of the politico-economic system promoted by
opposition from their own military often find it Nkrumah and Busia was reportediy included in
prudent to supply the armed forces with the these. It is, however, instructive to note that
resources it claims to find necessary. while officers in 1966 disliked Nkrumah’s at-
It seems likely that dissatisfaction with the tempts to promote Ghanaian ‘socialism’, in
share of national resources devoted to military 1972, it was policies which benefited only a
purposes is more.a contributing factor to than minority of wealthy Ghanaians that were one
the sole cause of military involvement in the cause of dissatisfaction with Busia.13
political process. Militaries which feel that they Attempts to undermine military hierarchy
are not receiving a sufficient share of budgetary are also strongly opposed. Attacks on military
expenditure are likely to be in conflict with the hierarchy generally occur when a political
government on a whole range of issues relating leader whose government faces considerable
to the military’s role in society. In general, opposition from the highest ranking officers
complaints from the armed forces about restric- cultivates the support of middle- or lower-
tions on military expenditure should be con- ranking officers and occasionally even ordinary
sidered symptomatic of a more fundamental soldiers. In Brazil, Goulart was fearful of being
conflict between the military as an institution overthrown by the military because of his left-
and other portions of the state apparatus. In wing political views and his connections with
Ghana, for example, during the 3 years follow- militant trade unions. To counter the power of
ing the coup against Nkrumah’s government, the top-ranking officers, Goulart became the
1966-l 969, military expenditure rose by an patron of the enlisted ranks, particularly the
average of 22%/year.” This was a reflection of non-commissioned officers. Although the mili-
the fact that, prior to the coup, Nkrumah had tary had many grievances against Goulart, the
placed the regular army on an austerity budget. immediate cause of the coup which overthrew
The reason for reducing the regular army bud- him in April 1964 was his support of a sailors’
get was, however, not only related to the need mutiny which arose out of the naval com-
to reduce state expenditure in general. It was mand’s attempt to prevent the formation of a
also linked to Nkrumah’s desire to reduce the sailors’ union.14
power and status of the regular army - which An action which can be construed as a threat
he suspected of plotting against him - in favour to the central position of the armed forces as
of the President’s Own Guard Regiment which the guarantor of internal and external security
Nkrumah had created to protect his position may also provoke military intervention. Politi-
of power. cal leaders who seek to enhance their own
574 WORLDDEVELOPMENT

power and/or to promote some form of social (c) Fear of national disintegration
change and cannot find alhes within the armed
forces to support these activities may attempt Military officers frequently say that they are
to do one of two things. First, a politician who required to intervene in politics - especially to
is particularly interested in strengthening his take over the government - because civilians
personal power base may create a special mili- have proven inefficient, corrupt and generally
tary unit responsible only to himself. Often this incapable of governing and the country is, as a
unit will be better equipped than the regular result, plagued by widespread social, economic
forces which increases the resentment felt by and political disorders. It is perhaps self-evident
the regular military toward the special unit and that military intervention is considerably easier
toward the politician. Second, a politician who to effect in the absence of a strong, popularly
is particularly interested in effecting some kind elected civilian-dominated government. In very
of social reorganization and who is not sup- many Third-World countries, there are no real
ported in this by the military may respond by opportunities for most of the people to partici-
setting up militias. These groups may be linked pate in government or to choose those who do
to a political party that the leader has created participate. It should come as no surprise, there-
as a vehicle for promoting social change. Often fore, that governments fail to respond to the
these militias are not particularly well equipped needs of large segments of their population or
or trained but the military nonetheless per- that those who are effectively disenfranchized
ceives them as a threat since they embody a should take to the streets to express their dis-
particular ideology which the military does not content. Nor should it be surprising that under
support and symbolize an attempt by politic- these conditions politicians and bureaucrats are
ians to disregard military interests. Some of the primarily concerned to advance their own inter-
instances in which the creation of personal ests and that those who do not share in the
guards or militias are said to have influenced benefits of a manifestly unequal system are un-
the decision of military officers to carry out willing to defend those who do.
coups include Boumedienne’s coup against Ben The mass of the population may initially wel-
Bella in Algeria, the 1968 coup against Keita in come a military-dominated government which
Mali, the 1974 coup against Diori in Niger and, promises to end corruption and to make the
of course, the coup against Nkrumah in Ghana. government more responsive to the needs of the
Furthermore, Latin American militaries are said poor. The record shows, however, that military
to be particularly fearful of the replacement of governments are unlikely to follow through on
the regular armed forces with a militia if left- these pledges and that they frequently become
wing politicians are allowed to come t.o as corrupt and inefficient as their civilian pre-
power. ls decessors. Furthermore, extensive factionalism
Finally, militaries which have in the past re- among civilians is often reproduced within the
moved politicians from power are likely to military, and military-dominated governments
intervene in the political process whenever formed as a result of civilian factionalism often
those politicians attempt to become active in fall prey to military factionalism and counter-
government once again. This is said to have coup follows countercoup.” In general, then,
been a factor in the coups during 1963 in one can say that coups d’dtat are no solution
Ecuador and Guatemala, for example.16 Such to the problem of unrepresentative government;
intervention has not occurred to date against indeed, military-dominated governments can be
Belaunde Terry who was recently elected head seen as further entrenching those inequitable
of Peru’s first civilian government since 1968 conditions that were at the root of the popular
and who had been deposed by the military. discontent which the military used to justify its
Intervention can occur even when the politician intervention in the first place.
in question has subsequently modified his polit- More to the point, the military’s decision to
ical opinions to bring them more into line with replace ineffective civilian-dominated govern-
those of the dominant military group and has ments is based at least in part on the belief that
made a concerted effort to demonstrate his lack that breakdown in the social order associated
of antagonism to the military as was the case with unrepresentative government favours the
with Bosch in the Dominican Republic. It ap- development of political parties or movements
pears that the military generally assumes that which champion the rights of the poor and
politicians whom it once deposed will seek call for grezter participation of disadvantaged
revenge by reorganizing the military leadership, groups in the political and economic processes.
eliminating those who had opposed them and From the point of view of the military as an
promoting or appointing supporters to import- institution, political and economic liberaliza-
ant positions within the military hierarchy. tion may be resisted for a number of reasons.
 THE MILITARY IN POLITICS 575

Once it becomes necessary to deal seriously In the 1950s and 196Os, American academic
with the needs of the entire population, a re- theorists postulated that the professionalization
alignment of budgetary priorities becomes nec- of the military would reduce its interest in poli-
essary. There will be strong pressure in favour tics.*O This was supposed to occur because pro-
of reducing military expenditure in order to fessionalization implied specialization, and as
pay for investment in education, health and the officers’ military skills became more special-
other public services, welfare schemes and so ized it was suggested that they would have less
on. Reallocation of national resources may also time for or interest in political affairs. Accord-
involve cutting back on investments in or sub- ing to Huntington, ‘Officership, in short, is an
sidies to industries run by the military. exclusive role, incompatible with any other sig-
The military may have been used by civilian nificant social or political roles.‘*’ It was not
governments to suppress previous attempts at noticed at the time that Huntington was speak-
organization on the part of the poor. Just as ing primarily of militaries whose central task
it is feared that politicians who have been the was to guarantee external security and that he
victims of coups d’itat will in some way punish subsequently postulated that armies concerned
the military should they be allowed to return to with internal security would evolve different
power, the military fears that popular govern- patterns of civil-military relations. Thus, an
ments will seek revenge for previous military important rationalization for US military assist-
repression. It was suggested earlier that one ance was that, by professionalizing the military,
reason that militaries oppose left-wing or popu- the US would depoliticize ‘traditional’ armies
list political groups is that their ideologies fre- which had been heavily involved in politics. In
quently call for the establishment of ‘peoples’ fact, the opposite has occurred.
militias’ and for purges of the military. Needler As militaries have become concerned with
quotes a newspaper interview, given by the devising military doctrines and techniques for
Bolivian commander-in-chief of the armed confronting domestic insurgency, they have
forces following the 1964 coup, in which the also become interested in the social and politi-
military leader stated that Paz Estenssoro, who cal causes of insurgency. Either through their
had been deposed by the coup, was not a com- exposure to domestic political, economic and
munist. ‘But’, the officer was reported to add, social problems in their staff courses or through
‘some of the leaders of his party are, as they ideological preferences, some military officers
showed during their time in office [since] they have come to the conclusion that they are as
armed militias, wanted to put an end to the capable of devising solutions to these problems
army, and sponsored communist movements.‘18 as are civilians. The more unrepresentative
Several observers have suggested that Latin civilian-dominated governments are and the less
American militaries were particularly impressed able they are to prevent social unrest, the more
by Castro’s victory in Cuba which led to the likely the military is to decide that it must take
purge of Batista’s army, including the summary over the government in order, in the vast major-
execution of most of the army’s senior of- ity of cases, to forestall a radical reordering of
ficers. lg societal power and wealth. Militaries which
come to power in this way appear to be the
most likely to attempt to institutionalize their
(d) Expansion of the concept of rule, for example, those in Brazil, Chile and
‘national security’ Indonesia. Today, most Third-World militaries
are primarily concerned with internal security,
One direct and extremely important result and it therefore seems likely that in the future
of the military’s fear of political and economic military officers throughout the world will be
liberalization has been the expansion of the more, not less, interested in politics and active
concept of ‘national security’ to include inter- in government.
nal security. A good deal - but by no means
all - of the impetus behind this change was
provided by US officer training programmes. 4. INDIVIDUALS WITHIN THE MILITARY
These programmes were a form of US military
assistance which promoted the professionaliza- Broadly speaking, individuals within the
tion of Third-World officer corps as well as a military seek a political role for the armed
concentration on counter-insurgency and civic forces for the same reasons as civilians attempt
action. They probably had the greatest effect to hang on to power: to enhance their personal
in Latin America, where the impact of Castro’s Power and wealth. In many Third-World coun-
victory in Cuba was mostly strongly felt. tries, the military is one of the few avenues of
576 WORLD DEVELOPMENT

social and economic advancement open to the have an easy means of justifying their requests.
sons of the poor, and even of the not-so-poor. In other instances this is not so. Whatever the
This is not to suggest that ideology or political case, many governments, civilian-dominated and
preference plays no role when military officers military-dominated, find it expedient to keep at
undertake coups. It is clear, for example, that least their officer corps well paid and provided
the 1968 coup in Peru was very largely directed with all sorts of additional benefits.
against the economic and political dominance More lucrative opportunities are also often
of the country’s oligarchy22 even if Peruvian provided by the involvement of the military in
military leaders were divided on the form that the political system. The best opportunities
Peru’s economic system should ultimately take. are, of course, in those countries where bribery,
The coup against Sukarno in Indonesia was rake-offs and other forms of corruption flourish
simultaneously a coup in favour of capitalist as a matter of course. Here, pay-offs may not
development. Nonetheless, when one reviews be limited to senior or middle-ranking officers
case studies of military-dominated governments, since even low-level bureaucrats find ways to
it is clear that the enhancement of personal take advantage of the system. In general, how-
power and wealth is a very high priority for a ever, it is the senior officers who benefit the
large number of Third-World coup leaders. most. In Sudan, for example, military officers
In most militaries, of course, ambitions to were able to acquire restricted public land for
increase one’s personal power are not limited to their own use, had public works undertaken
an individual officer, and cliques develop as solely for their own benefit or that of their
senior officers jockey for position. Sometimes relatives, and demanded money in return
these groups will be divided on such issues as for the provision of import licenses. In Ghana,
the degree of political involvement that the where the economy had suffered as a result of
military should seek or the kinds of policies Nkrumah’s often wasteful expenditures, the
that the military should promote, as in the case salaries of military officers rose substantially
of Peru between 1968 and 1980. At the same following the first coup and foreign exchange
time, divisions similar to those which afflict was squandered on the purchase of luxury
civilian elites will influence clique formation goods - such as Mercedes Benz automobiles -
within the military: ethnic divisions, genera- by military officers.23
tional gaps, rCgional divisions, race differences, Personal advancement is easiest in cases
hierarchical disputes, class affiliations and occu- where the military has taken over the govern-
pational differences (i.e. army vs navy, or engin- ment, but even in civilian-dominated govern-
eer corps vs infantry). Coalition formation be- ments military officers may be appointed to
tween different military cliques ‘and among posts which provide them with ample oppor-
military cliques and similar groups of politic- tunities for enriching themselves. From top-
ians. bureaucrats and businessmen is crucial if level bureaucratic positions, military officers
one or several military leaders are to play an will be able to direct government expenditure
important role. These intra-military divisions into investments that will benefit private com-
may themselves produce increased involvement panies with which they have become involved.
of the armed forces in politics as particular They will also be able to divert economic devel-
groups, or coalitions of them, seek to protect opment assistance to their own uses and to
their interests or pre-empt actions by other demand payments for favouring the interests of
groups. a particular company, domestic or foreign. Simi-
There are many ways in which individual lar benefits can be obtained from high-level
members of the military, especially officers, can appointments to nationalized industries. Some
increase their personal wealth. It is often the military governments, such as those in Indo-
case that increases in military expenditure do nesia and Thailand, have virtually institutional-
not only lead to the procurement of more mod- ized these kinds of arrangements. With regard
em or larger stocks of weapons or to the ex- to Thailand, Bienen and Morel1 have concluded:
pansion or improvement of military training.
Rather, military budgets often rise because
military officers want salary increases, better Widespread participation in and tolerance of cor-
housing and other perquisites such as medical ruption play a crucial role in maintaining military
care or educational facilities for their children. cohesion, cutting across factional or personal cleav-
ages to produce common requirements for mutual
In some instances, military salaries and per-
protection. Factional competitors on governmentai
quisites have clearly lagged behind those in the issues may sit on the same corporate boards or par-
upper echelons of the civil bureacracy, or ticipate jointly in the spoils from a participate con-
even behind those enjoyed by a more favoured tract. If no one at the top is ‘clean’, no one can
branch of the armed forces. The officers thus betray his fellows.a4
 THE MILITARY IN POLITICS 577

The extent of the Thai military’s economic military had the economic field very much to
role has been commented upon by a number of itself:
observers:
The military has a virtual monopoly of the econ-
T. H. Silcock lists 154 government enterprises omic activities of the nation. The Defense Services
which are capitalized at $490 million. Of these, Institute, the Burma Economic Development Cor-
forty-nine, capitalized at $393 million, or 80 per- poration, and the government’s 1964 nationaliza-
cent of the total, are administered by the prime tion program successively placed most economic
minister’s office and the ministries of defense, enterprises under government control. The military
interior, and communications, all of which are leaders thus control the productive, financial, and
headed by army generals. Writing of fourteen major foreign exchange resources of the country as well
enterprises which are owned and managed by the as lucrative executive posts for top officers.29
Ministry of Defence, Silcock comments, ‘. they
produce little which is of any military significance, The possibilities are many and varied.
and. bring little return to the government. Their Involvement in these sorts of economic ac-
chief function appears to be to provide livelihood tivities will strengthen the commitment of mih-
and patronage.*’ tary leaders to a capitalist economic system,
since that system is easily manipulated for per-
The military’s relations with domestic busi-
sonal gain. Such involvement may also lead the
ness can be co-operative or they can be antag-
armed forces to oppose significant political and
onistic. In some cases, domestic capital may be
economic liberalization. The greater participa-
discriminated against in favour of international
tion of the poor in the political and economic
capital. In the late 195Os, for example, the
process can only mean that those already in
economic organ of the Burmese military, the
power will, at the least, see their dominance
Defense Services Institute, concluded many
eroded. At the worst, they can expect to be
joint ventures with US, Israeli, Japanese and
cut out of, the system entirely or be faced with
Singaporian companies. By the end of the
a new’system in which the opportunities for
1950s the Institute had 25 major firms and
economic advancement are severely reduced.
was one of Burma’s most powerful economic
Officers can expect to lose their top-level pos-
organizations.26 The lndonesian military has
itions in the political and bureaucratic sphere as
also given priority to projects involving foreign well as in nationalized industries. Changes in
capital, even where they directly compete with
government priorities which are likely to follow
already established Indonesian firms.*’ In other
political and economic liberalization may well
cases, government policy may generally support reduce the opportunities open to firms in which
domestic business, but will discriminate against
officers have invested, although that would vary
firms owned by particular ethnic or racial from case to case.
groups. If these groups are deprived of their
holdings, their businesses may be taken over by
military personnel as happened in Uganda fol- 5. FOREIGN GROUPS
lowing Amin’s assumption of power. Ugandans
of Asian descent - generally the small business Industrialized-country governments may wel-
class - were expelled from the country and come or promote the political involvement of
their establishments were often turned over to the military in the Third World as a means of
Ugandan military officers or their relatives. advancing their own politico-strategic and econ-
As noted earlier, military officers or mem- omic interests. Their bilateral aid agencies are
bers of their families may enter into partner- frequently used to further these interests. Inter-
ships with domestic businessmen, This process national aid agencies have sometimes also been
is facilitated by coups d’etat because it is the manipulated in order to weaken Third-World
military elite which becomes the guarantor of governments which have failed to conform sat-
the protective business environment. Thailand isfactorily to the politico-strategic roles assigned
and Indonesia offer two good examples of this to them by industrialized-country governments.
relationship. In some cases, military officers The main interests of the international aid agen-
have declared existing partnerships between cies are, however, economic, as are those of
domestic businessmen and political elites null multinational corporations and private lending
and void following a coup and then concluded agencies.
similar agreements with the same businessmen The major powers are interested in obtaining
themselves.2s Alternatively, military leaders access to Third-World countries in order to ful-
may attempt to eliminate both domestic and fil a number of politico-strategic goals. Among
foreign capital. Whereas at the end of the 1950s these are to provide themselves with military
it had concluded many joint ventures with facilities in strategic areas, to provide assured
foreign capital, by the mid-1960s the Burmese sources of raw materials which are considered
 578 WORLD DEVELOPMENT

militarily and economically vital, and generally omies and multinational corporations can flour-
to enhance their position of power throughout ish. Nonetheless, conflicts can arise since cor-
the world. Another important goal is to prevent porations are concerned to increase their own
their rivals from obtaining access to these same well-being, while governments must also be con-
things. Both capitalist and Soviet-bloc govern- cerned about the national economy as a whole.
ments have preferred to deal with ‘stable’ gov- Economic policies which suit the foreign activi-
ernments and this has often meant military- ties of corporations may be in conflict with
dominated ones. Furthermore, a good deal of economic policies which a government believes
the foreign aid which has been sent to Third- will promote domestic economic well-being. In
World governments since the end of World War addition, governments have non-economic goals
II has consisted of aid to the military. Approxi- that may cause them to promote economic
mately 50% of USSR post-war aid has been policies which run counter to the interests of
designated as military aid and 50% as economic their corporations. In general, the policy of
aid. For the US the ratio is about 3:2 in favour capitalist governments toward their corpora-
of aid designated as economic. Both market- tions is one of support, but conflict can arise
economy and Soviet-bloc countries have used over particular matters.
military assistance for international political Bilateral and multilateral aid agencies can be
power reasons. Even where the industrialized quite effective in shaping global economic con-
countries may not have sought to actually re- ditions to the benefit of capitalist countries and
place civilian-dominated governments with mili- corporations. Bilateral agencies are, of course,
tary-dominated ones, military aid has strength- subject to much c!oser control than multilateral
ened the position of the armed forces at the ones, although a country like the United States
expense of civilians. is able to exert considerable influence over
Industrialized countries benefit economically organizations such as the World Bank and the
from increased military participation when the IMF. Bilateral aid can be channelled in such a
military causes government economic policy to way as to strengthen the position of the armed
be changed in a way that is favourabie to the forces uis-&is civilian elements within govern-
industrialized country in question (or group ments while maintaining the fiction that the aid
of them), or when the military prevents a is serving civilian-oriented economic purposes.30
change that would negatively affect industrial- Both bilateral and multilateral agencies can
ized-country interests. Industrialized countries refuse to lend money to governments or can
favour, for example, export policies which make the terms so unattractive that the govern-
allow them to continue importing commodities ment will be forced to reject the funds or to
and manufactures of importance to their econ- change particular policies which are offensive to
omies at prices advantageous to them, laws the aid agency and, by extension, to foreign
which encourage foreign investment, import governments and corporations. Governments
policies which do not restrict industrialized- which continue to pursue their more indepen-
country exports, economic ‘interdependence’ dent economic course may be severely weak-
instead of ‘self-reliant development’. In short ened by the withdrawal of external assistance
the governments of developed capitalist and and may fall prey to direct military interven-
socialist countries seek to mould their econ- tion. On the other hand. one result of accepting
omic relations with Third-World countries so the conditions attached to loans from inter-
that the Third-World produces items needed by national agencies is sometimes that governmen
the industrialized world and purchases products are forced to reduce the financial support of-
produced by developed economies. all on terms fered to the poorer section of their population.
favourable to the industrialized countries. This frequently leads to popular discontent. If
An important foreign policy consideration serious social disorder results, the military may
for all industrialized-country governments is to be provided with an excuse to intervene in
improve the global trade and investment cli- order to ensure that popular movements do not
mate for their corporations and state external- become too strong.
trade organizations. The Soviet-bloc state trad- From the point of view of the military as an
ing organizations are a direct expression of institution, alliances with foreign capital may
Soviet-bloc foreign policy. The relationship be useful when some percentage of military ex-
between capitalist countries and their corpora- penditure is derived from businesses which the
tions is somewhat more complex. In very broad military controls or has a financial interest in.
terms, capitalist governments land corporations Militaries that derive some of their finance from
share the same goal: to shape the international such arrangements are likely to be more con-
economy in such a way that domestic econ- cerned with promoting economic growth for its
 THEMILITARYIN POLITICS 579

own sake and to be less interested in developing sources within their own economies to be
economic programmes designed to provide for shaped by the requirements of a larger and
their population’s basic needs. Investment must stronger economy. Where Soviet-bloc countries
be channelled to enterprises with large cash require payment in hard currency, countries are
flows which can be siphoned off for military in precisely the same situation as if they had
use. Basic-needs investment does not meet this purchased weapons from a capitalist country.
criterion. Indonesia offers a prime example of Furthermore, countries which purchase arms
this kind of relationship. Another consideration from Soviet-bloc countries often do not at-
may be that foreign firms can more easily pro- tempt to disengage from the world capitalist
vide access to a particular sort of technology economy. Soviet-bloc arms can then be used to
for a military-related industry, such as elec- suppress popular discontent arising out of de-
tronics or special metals.31 pendent development.
From the point of view of the individual A greater governmental role for the military
military officer, alliances with foreign capital is likely to expand arms imports for Third-
are desirable if they allow individuals to enrich World countries. This is beneficial to the econ-
themselves by receiving pay-offs in return for omies of all arms-exporting countries as well as
favouring the interests of particular companies, to private and state-run arms industries. To the
by involving military-allied domestic businesses extent that foreign sales of weapons subsidize
in deals concluded with foreign corporations, the arms industries of industrialized countries
and so on. An open-door policy to foreign (capitalist and socialist), increased arms sales
capital may also facilitate the acquisition of assist these countries in maintaining the huge
substantial support from multilateral and bilat- arsenals that they train on each other. The ten-
eral agencies. Well-placed military officers will sions produced by arms build-ups in industrial-
be able to divert some of these funds to their ized countries often spill over into the Third-
own uses. World, and the temptations to seek military
The degree to which foreign capital is fa- solutions to Third-World disputes is increased.
voured at the expense of domestic business in- This strengthens the domestic position of Third-
terests will depend on each country’s domestic World militaries.
situation. Where domestic capital is weak, or There are definite advantages for both mar-
foreign capital is able or willing to offer better ket-economy and Soviet-bloc countries in the
opportunities of various sorts, foreign capital increased political participation of Third-World
is likely to be favoured. Where domestic capital militaries. As far as economic considerations
is stronger, close working partnerships exist alone are concerned, market-economy countries
between military and domestic business elites, clearly benefit the most from politically active
or military officers are particularly national- armed forces. More militaries are favourable to
istic, alliances with domestic capital will be a capitalist form of development and are likely
sought as well. to adopt the kinds of policies proposed by aid
The claim is often made that arms exports agencies that will fit themselves into the Soviet-
from industrialized capitalist countries serve to bloc system. Bangladesh’s military government
tie the Third World into the world capitalist has, for example, made it a central element of
economy. This process is said to operate in a its development policy to rely, very heavily in
number of ways. The weapons themselves are fact, on the assistance and advice of bilateral
used to suppress domestic opposition to devel- and multilateral aid agencies. In Indonesia,
opment policies which benefit foreign and dom- Suharto’s ‘New Order’ involved the denational-
estic elites and foreign corporations but leave ization of many foreign firms, the reduction of
the mass of Third-World populations living in government control over the economy, and the
conditions of poverty. In order to pay for the encouragement of foreign investment.32 In
weapons and weapons-related services, coun- Chile, Pinochet’s coup has brought exactly the
tries are forced to export more and more same changes. The involvement of the United
and/or to obtain loans from international aid States government in the overthrow of the
agencies of multinational banks. This further popularly elected Allende government in Chile
draws them into the capitalist world economy. is now well-known. Although the most widely
Similar transactions between Soviet-bloc accepted rendition of the Indonesian coup calls
countries and the Third-World create similar it a protective move in the face of an attempted
links of dependence, both with Soviet-bloc Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) take-over
countries and with market-economy ones. condoned by Sukarno. it is more likely that the
Where arms are imported from Soviet-bloc situation was manipulated by the military, pos-
countries as part of barter agreements, Third- sibly with the assistance of the United States. It
World countries allow the allocation of re- has also recently been suggested that the United
580 WORLDDEVELOPMENT

States was in some way involved in the initial to military or military-related purposes. The
coup which overthrew Sheikh Mujibur Rahman working assumption here is that once control is
in Bangladesh in 1975 although the evidence on gained over the government, military leaders
which this assertion rests is considerably less channel a greater amount of resources directly
solid than, for example, that for the Chilean into the military sector and to military-related
case.33 activities, such as investment in particular types
While there may be more opportunities for of industries, than would occur under most civ-
Western countries to benefit from the political ilian-dominated governments. Equally import-
and economic participation of the armed forces ant in this respect. military-dominated govern-
in the Third World, Soviet-bloc countries defi- ments prevent reductions in the resources allo-
nitely take advantage of those opportunities cated to the military sector and to related
that present themselves. They also seek to ma- activities.
nipulate economic relations with the Third As was stressed at the outset, the discussion
World to their own advantage, promoting the of the benefits that various groups may derive
involvement of the military as it suits their from the involvement of the military in politics
purposes. Indeed, these countries, particularly has been illustrative and suggestive. Each of
the Soviet Union, seek to make much the same the elements mentioned in this discussion has
use economically of Third-World countries as played a part in a number of cases in which the
do capitalist ones. The Soviet government drives military has sought to expand its role in the
just as hard a bargain as many multinational political process, but all are not necessarily
corporations and capitalist governments when it present whenever the military becomes politi-
has the chance to do so. For example, agree- cally active. The precise pattern, moreover,
ments covering the export of fruit, natural gas varies from country to country as well as over
and wool from Afghanistan to the USSR during time. The political involvement of the military
the Daoud period were reportedly very much to in Peru, for example, may not benefit the same
the economic advantage of the USSR. In the individuals or groups as the political involve-
mid-1970s, Indian debt repayments to the ment of the military in Brazil, or Ghana or
USSR were said to be running at five times the Burma, just as the political involvement of the
inflow of Soviet aid.% The difference between military in Peru in 1958 may not have benefited
the Soviet-bloc countries and the Western ones the same individuals or groups that it benefited
is that, to date, the latter have had more oppor- in 1978.
tunities to exert influence over the economies In general, the political inv-olvement of the
and political systems of Third-World countries. military in Third-World countries should be
examined within the framework of elite-group
politics. In broad terms, the interests of military
6. CONCLUSION elites are the same as those of civilian elites: to
enhance their power and their financial posi-
There are two central reasons why this ar- tion, and in some cases to pursue political or
ticle has focused on the political role of the ideological goals. The activities of individuals as
military in the Third World. The first is that well as those of groups are important. Elite
military-dominated governments are least likely groups may be defined in terms of class, occu-
to respond to the needs of the poor majority in pation, religion, or ethnic, regional or genera-
developing countries. Military dominance of the tional affiliation. Most likely is some combina-
political system greatly complicates the task of tion of these. The priority given by elites to the
those who seek to alter the balance of power advancement of their personal or group in-
and wealth within Third-World societies. This is terests leads them in most cases to support poli-
the case precisely because of the frequent re- tical and economic structures which assign a
course to arms and the suspension of civil law minimal role to the mass of the population. To
practised by military-dominated governments. repeat, governments dominated by the military
The political requirements of law and of parlia- are least likely to respond to the needs of the
mentary compromise, which might be expected poor majority in the Third World.
to moderate government activities, can be and Military involvement in Third-World political
are ignored. The military has and is willing to systems can also benefit and be promoted
use arms far more frequently than civilian- by industrialized-country elites. Industrialized
dominated governments in order to repress civ- country governments seek to advance their pol-
ilian demands and unrest. The second reason itico-strategic and economic interests, while the
for the focus on the military is that as its politi- interests of bilateral and multilateral aid agen-
cal role grows, so does its responsibility for cies, commercial lending institutions, and multi-
determining a country’s allocation of resources national corporations are largely economic. Aid
 THE MILITARY IN POLITICS 581

agencies and commercial lending institutions ence to foreign interests automatic. There is a
can and have been used to serve the politico- strong element of choice involved in co-opera-
strategic interests of capitalist governments. The tion between foreign elites and domestic, Third-
interests of these foreign elites and of domestic, World ones. It is important to understand to
Third-World ones may coincide or they may what extent the domestic elites choose this co-
diverge. Different domestic elites will have dif- operation and what they obtain from it.
ferent attitudes toward foreign groups, both in The purpose of this paper has been to point
general and in particular. For their part, foreign out the variety of groups, domestic and foreign,
elites may differ in their estimation of which which may be expected to benefit from the
domestic elites are most likely to promote for- involvement of the military in the political pro-
eign interests, and all foreign elites do not share cess in the Third World and to give some indica-
the same interests at all times. In general, tion of the multiplicity of reasons each group
foreign elites are superior in strength, econ- might have for supporting the political activities
omically, politically and militarily, to domes- of Third-World militaries. Improved understand-
tic, Third-World elites. Nevertheless, domestic ing of the political role played by the military
groups retain considerable autonomy and it in the Third World requires in-depth case studies
would be a mistake to consider their subservi- which are as synoptic as possible.

NOTES

1. The terms ‘industrialized societies’ and ‘industrial-
ized countries’ refer to both capitalist (marketecon-
omy) and socialist (planned-economy) countries.
2. A long study of the corporate interests of the
military is found in Eric A. Nordlinper, Soldiers in
Politics: hlilitary Coups and Governments (Englewood
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1977). Nordhnger even re-
duces the opposition expressed by militaries to pro-
gressive socioeconomic change to a matter of corpor-
ate interest.
3. See, for example, Sam C. Sarkesian ‘African mili-
tary regimes: institutionalized instability or coer-
cive development?‘, pp. 15-46; and Jose Z. Garcia,
‘Military factions and military intervention in Latin
America’, pp. 47-75, both in Sheldon W. Simon (ed.),
The Military and Security in the Third World: Domes-
tic and International Impacts (Boulder, CO: Westview
Press; and Folkestone, UK: Dawson, 1978).
4. Indeed, some analysts have characterized the mili-
tary as a special form of bureaucracy. See, for ex-
ample, Edward Feit, The Armed Bureaucrats (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1973; and Robin Luckham, ‘Mili-
tarism and international dependence: a framework for
analysis’, p. 154, in Jose J. Villamil (ed)., 7’rans-
national Capiralism and National Development: New
Perspectives on Dependence (Hassocks, UK: Harvester
Press, 1979).
5. Ho Kwon Ping, ‘The men on white horses now
ride a tiger’, Far Eastern Economic Review (11 April
1980), p. 42.
6. Ibid., p. 46.
8. Claude E. Welch, Jr., ‘Personaiism and corpora-
tism in African armies’, in Catherine M. Kelleher (ed.,),
Political-Military Systems: Comparative Perspectives
(Beverley Hills: Sage, 1974), p. 128. Welch points our
that by the 1970s African militaries needed very little
encouragement from anyone to intervene.
9. An interesting exposition of this point as it relates
to Ghana is found in Eboe Hutchful, ‘A tale of two
regimes: imperialism, the military and class in Ghana’,
Review of African Political Economy, No. 14 (Jan-
uary-April 1979), pp. 36-55.
10. See, J. Stephen Hoadley, Thailand: kings, coups
and cliques’, in his The Military in the Politics of
Southeast Asia: A Comparative Perspective (Cam-
bridge, MA: Schenkman, 1975), pp. V-24.
11. Bebler, op. cit., p. 42.
12. Such manipulation is not practiced only by civil-
ians but also by military leaders in power who are
faced with opposition from within the armed forces.
Also, coups are often followed by a reorganization of
the military hierarchy, or part of it, in order to ehrnin-
ate opponents of the new military leaders and move
supporters of the coup-makers into positions of re-
sponsibility.
13. Ibid., pp. 33, 56-58. On thesamepoint,seeNord
linger, op. cit., p. 74. An excellent discussion of civil-
military relations in Ghana can be found in Bjom
Hettne. ‘Soldiers and politics: the case of Ghana’,
Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 17, No. 2 (19801,
PP. 173-193.
14. Nordlinger, op. cit., p. 73.

7. Anton Bebler (ed.), Military Rule in Africa: 15. Ibid., pp. 74-77.
Dahomey, Ghana, Sierra Leone and Mali (New York:
Praeger, 1973) p. 69. 16. On Ecuador, see, Martin Needler, Anatomy of a

.
582 WORLD DEVELOPstENT

Coup d%tat: Ecuador 1963 (Washington, D.C.: Insti- 25. Hoadley, op. cir., p. 20. The Silcock quotation
tute for the Comparative Study of Political Systems, comes from T. H. SiIcock (ed.), Thailand: Social
1964), p. 41. On Guatemala, see, Nordlinger, op. cit., and Economic Studies in Developmenr (Canberra:
p. 82. Australian National University Press, 1967), p. 309.

17. It is sometimes the case that the militvy appears 26. Hoadley, op. cit., p. 46.
united, agreeing more or less unanimously that the
civilian-dominated government must be replaced, and 27. Crouch, op. cir., p. 532.
that the depth of military factionalism only becomes
apparent once the military intervenes and is required 28. Crouch, ibid., describes how this process occurred
to formulate policy. for Indonesia.

18. Martin Needler, ‘The Latin American military: 29. Hoadley, op. cit., p. 58.
predatory reactionaries or modernizing patriots?‘,
Journal of Inter-American Studies (April 1969). 30. Similar use can be made of economic aid from
p. 241. socialist countries, of course.

19. Edwin Lieuwen, Generals vs. Presidents: iVeo- 31. Increasing personal or institutional financial re-
militarism in Latin America (New York: Praeger, sources are not the only reasons militaries have for
1974), p. 101; NordIinger, op. cit., p. 81. favouring a development strategy derigned to promote
industrialization. A concern for operating efficiency
may lead the armed forces to become invoived in the
20. It is unclear to what extent the US military itself
production of a variety of items. The South Korean
subscribed to this theory or even the recipient mili-
textile industry deve!oped in large part out of the
tary officers in the deveioping count:& who were
military’s efforts to ensure itself of a reliable source of
being provided with the instruction.
clothing while the Argentinian military was instru-
mental in the creation of Argentina’s iron 2nd steel
21. Samuel Huntington, ‘Civilian control of the mili- industries.
tary: a theoretical statement’, in H. Eulau. S. Elders-
veld and Morris Janowitz (eds.), Political Behavior: 32. On Bangladesh’s economic policy under GeneraI
A Reader in Theory and Research (New York: Free Ziaur Rahman, see Gdrard VirateIle, ‘Ddmocratisation
Press, 1956), p. 381, quoted in Alfred Stepan, ‘The au Bangladesh. 11: l’id&ologie du “Ddveloppement”‘,
new professionalism of internal warfare and military Le Monde (17 February 1979). On Indonesia’s ‘New
role expansion’, in Alfred Stepan (rd.), Authorifartin Order’, see Hoadley, op. cif., p. 110.
Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1973), p. 48. 33. Lawrence Lifschultz and Kai Bird, ‘Bangladesh:
anatomy of a coup’, Economic and Political Weekly,
22. In 1968,1% of the Peruvian population accounted Vol. 14, No. 49 (8 December 1979), pp. 1999-2014.
for 31% of the country’s income while 75% of the
population accounted for only 3%. Similarly, 2% of 34. On India, see, David Lascelles, ‘Little aid on
the country’s agricultural estates covered 76% of the tough terms’, Financial 7Ymes (25 June 1975). On
arable land while 89% of them covered only lm of Afghanistan, see, David Chaffetz, ‘.i\fghanistan in tur-
the arable land. Abraham F. Lowenthal, ‘Peru’s moil’, Infernafional .4$yairs, Vol. 56 (January 1980),
‘revolutionay government of the Armed Forces’: back- pp. 18-19, for a brief account of how the USSR set
ground and context’, in Kelleher ied.), op. cir.. p. 152. the terms of trade for non-military exchanges to its
advantage. Luckham, op. cir., p. 159, also suggests
23. Nordlinger, op. cit., pp. 127-128. that the terms Imposed by socialist countries in order
to obtain payment for weapons can be as difficult for
24. Henry Bienen and David MorelI, ‘Transition from Third-World countries to meet as those imposed by
military rule: Thailand’s experience’, in Kelleher (ed.), capitalist countries. See also, David Lane, ‘Soviets
op. cit., p. 15. The best short piece on Indonesia is lose base in EquitoriaI Guinea’, Los Angefes Times
Harold Crouch. ‘Generals and business in Indonesia’. t2S January 1980), for an account of the terms ob-
Pacific Affairs, No. 4 (Winter 1975-1976), pp. 519- tained by the IJSSR for military facilities and fishing
540. Crouch begins with the Sukarno period and dis- rights in Africa; and Alain Case, ‘Moscow aid woos
cusses the personal and institutional reasons lndo- the Third World’, Financial Times (4 March 1980),
nesian military leaders have had for participating in for a discussion of Soviet economic aid to the Third
the many kinds of corruption he outlines. Wor!d.