REFLECTIONS FROM RUMANIA AND BEYOND: MARSHAL ŚMIGŁY-RYDZ IN EXILE

Author(s): STANLEY S. SEIDNER

Source: The Polish Review, Vol. 22, No. 2 (1977), pp. 29-51
Published by: University of Illinois Press on behalf of the Polish Institute of Arts & Sciences of
America
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STANLEY S. SEIDNER

REFLECTIONS FROM RUMANIA AND BEYOND:

MARSHAL SMIGLY-RYDZ IN EXILE

1. Exile and Beyond

During the early morning hours of September 18, 1939, Marshal

Edward Smigly-Rydz, theCommander-in-Chief of Poland's armed forces,
crossed the Czeremosz bridge onto Rumanian territory and began a two
year period of exile. For seventeen days, theMarshal contained the greater
part of the Wehrmacht in anticipation of a promised major French offen
sive which never materialized. Suffering from declining health and facing
the prospect of incessant criticism, Rydz began the final journey which
eventually returned him to his native land.
With the Soviet invasion of its eastern provinces the day before, Poland
was now decisively defeated. The Marshal could expect less help from
England and France against the U.S.S.R. than he had anticipated against
Germany. Under no condition did the Western powers desire the addi
tional burden of war with the Soviet Union. The abandonment by theWest
and the increasingly awesome responsibilities of command contributed
towards a deterioration in health, which theMarshal kept from his sub
ordinates. Although he conveyed an outward picture of calm and serenity,
few knew of Rydz's mounting physical suffering from a defective heart.1
The chief of Poland's intelligence service, then Colonel Jozef Smolehski,
was one of those who appeared unaware of this when he related:

The last time I saw Smigly on September 17was when I told him of theRussian
invasion. Smigly took thenews quietly.All the timeSmigly appeared calm, because

The author would like to express his special gratitude for the assistance rendered by the late
Professor Alexander Korczynski.

typescript of Interview between Gen. Kordian Zamorski and Stanley S. Seidner,

December, 1973, in author's possession, (hereafter cited as Zamorski Interview)', a life-long
friend of theMarshal, Zamorski served with Smigly-Rydz in the P.O.W. and legion. He later
became Chief of the State Police.

29

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 30 The Polish Review
I think he knew itwas impossible to win over such overwhelming odds. He thought
his job now is to go to France and carry on in French territory.2

The ramifications of the Soviet invasion became a key issue during an

afternoon conference at Kotomyja on September 17 between Rydz, Prime
Minister Felicjan Slawoj-Skladkowski, and Foreign Minister Jozef Beck.
The three agreed that the Government and High Command should force
theirway southward.3 A second afternoon conference at Kuty, attended by
President Ignacy Moscicki, Rydz, Skladkowski and Beck, resulted in the
collective decision to cross the Rumanian frontier.4 Upon fulfilling his
obligations by providing the disposition of various Polish units, theMar
shal planned to stay and fight,much to the distress of Skladkowski, among
others. It was with apparent difficulty that the cumulative effect of their
arguments presented to Rydz caused a change ofmind. Beck had already
indicated that King Carol offered the Polish President and the Govern
ment the droit de passage through Rumanian territory, and even the re
jected General Wladyslaw Sikorski offered his services toward the rein
statement of a Polish army on French soil.5 The political considerations

2Typescript of Interview between Gen. Jozef Smolenski and Stanley S. Seidner, Decem
ber, 1973, in author's possession; the Deputy Chief of Staff, then Col. Jozef Jaklicz, noted
that Rydz was "as usually" calm and composed, but he sensed "an internal conflict?", Jozef
Jaklicz, "17 wresriia 1939 R. w Sztabie Naczelnego Wodza" ("September 17, 1939 in the
Commander-in-ChiePs Staff) Zeszyty Historyczne (Historical Issues), no. 12 (145), 1967, p.
149; Jaklicz served as Deputy Chief of Staff of Poland's Armed Forces.
3
Felicjan Slawoj-Skladkowski, Nie ostatnie stowo oskarzonego (Not the Last Word of the
Accused), (London: B. Swiderski, 1964), pp. 303-305; Jozef Wiatr, "Decyzja Naczelnego
Wodza przejscia granicy rumuhskiej, dnia 17 wrzesnia 1939 roku" ("The Decision of the
Commander-in-Chief to Cross the Rumanian Frontier on September 17,1939"), Bellona, no.
1-2, 1961, pp. 46-51.
4General Waclaw Stachiewicz's response to Historical Commission Questionnaire (here
after cited as Stachiewicz Questionnaire), October, 1960, pp. 1 (5), 2 (6), General Sikorski
Historical Institute (London), (hereafter cited as G.S.H.I. MSS), Military Archives, (here
after cited as M.A.); also the section on the crossing of the frontier by the Commander-in
Chief, in Stachiewicz's Relacje o Kampanii Wrzesniowej (Reports about the September
Campaign), (hereafter cited as "Stachiewicz MSS), 1960, G.S.H.I. MSS/M.A.; Gen. Wiatr,
who witnessed many of the events in the position of Quartermaster-General,
challenged the
descriptions of Beck and Pobog-Malinowski; see Wiatr, op. cit., pp. 50-52; Wladyslaw
Pobog-Malinowski, "Na rozdrozu rumunskim" ("At the Rumanian Crossroads"), Kultura,
no. 7, 1948, pp. 129-130;_, Recent Political
Najnowsza historiapolityczna Polski(The
History of Poland) 3 vols. (London: Gryf, 1960), vol. Ill, pp. 61-62; Jozef Beck, Final
Report
(New York: Robert Speller and Sons, 1957), pp. 226-229; Stachiewicz was Chief of Staff of
Poland's Armed Forces.
5Col. Jaklicz's
letter to Col. (Dr.) I. Modelski, Feb. 29, 1940, G.S.H.I. MSS/M.A.,
Naczelny Wodz Marszatek Smigty (Commander-in-Chief Marshal Smigly), (hereafter cited
as N. W.M.S.); also Jaklicz, op. cit., pp. 150-152; Wiktor Drymmer, "Pierwsze i ostatnie dni
niepodlegtosci Polski-Rok 1918 i 1939" ("First and Last Days of Poland's Independence?
1918 and 1939"), Zeszyty Historyczne, no. 16 (176), 1969, pp. 159-163.

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Marshal Smigly-Rydz in
Exile____31

involving the possibility of Rydz's capture or death, and the necessities

governing the reestablishment of Poland's army in France, probably out
weighed his desire for an heroic last stand.6 A short time later, on Ruman
ian territory,Rydz claimed:

I had three alternatives at hand ... these were: 1. to fight, 2. to commit suicide,
? ?
3. to be taken prisoner. To fight I didn't have more than half a company that
is to say to lead StaffOfficers with pistols against tanks . . . commit suicide?
namely to confirm defeat. To fly toWarsaw?... Not for anything would I want to
be taken prisoner. I expected that the army would cross to France.7

Nevertheless, a number of Rydz's critics expected theMarshal to return

to besieged Warsaw. They claimed that when defense no longer proved
feasible, Rydz could then "possibly take an airplane and escape." Conse
quently critics like the Socialist leader Adam Ciolkosz declared that Rydz
had "left a bad memory."8 For the moment, the combined Soviet and
German advances obscured such bitter sentiments while the leaders of the
Second Republic pondered their final decisions before exile. The capture
by Soviet forces of Sniatyn, only forty kilometers from the Polish High
Command headquarters at Kosow, led to theMarshal's final decision to
evacuate.9 After requesting through Skladkowski that the President and
government members immediately cross the border, theMarshal left for
the frontier bridge on theCzeremosz River. Upon leaving Polish territory,
the Marshal issued an order which failed to reach a large number of
Poland's engaged units. "The Bolshevik invasion occurred," Rydz stated,

6See Edward Smigty-Rydz, "Relacja" ("Account"), Na Strazy (On Guard), no. 32, 1947,
pp. 7-8; "Press Information no. 14(55), on Marshal Smigly-Rydz's"Account," April3,1947,
G.S.H.I. MSS/M.A./N.W.M.S.
7Melchior "Ostatnia rozmowa z Beckiem iRydzem-Smigfym"
Wankowicz, ("Final Con
versation with Beck and Rydz-Smigty"), Wiez, no. 7-8,1959, p. 242; see also Jan Kowalewski,
"Cykl Rumunski" (Rumanian Cycle"), Zeszyty Historyczne no. 6, 1964, pp. 131-132; the
Polish consulate in Bucharest reportedly aborted a subsequent plan of theMarshal to flee
Rumania with the aid of falsified papers and join Warsaw's defenders; Kowalewski preceded
Zygmunt Wenda as Chief of Staff of the Camp of National Unity.
8Typescript of Interview between Adam Ciolkosz and Stanley S. Seidner, December 1973,
in author's possession, (hereafter cited as Ciolkosz Interview); Ciolkosz was a prominent
personality in the Polish Socialist Party.
I
9Turning to Jaklicz, Rydz remarked to the effect that, "The inevitable hour has arrived.
wish it could have been postponed for as long as possible. I cannot forestall itany longer. The
future is unknown. I must fulfill my obligation to the end." Jaklicz, op. cit., p. 152;
"Stachiewicz MSS," pp. 476/63-477/64; see also Rydz's short September 18 dispatch in
-
Instytut Historyczny (Military Historical Institute), Wojnaobronna Polski 1939
Wojskowy
War of Defense in 1939: Selected Sources) Minis
Wybor zrodel (Poland's (Warszawa:
terstwo Obrony Narodowej, 1968), p. 888; Drymmer, op. cit., p. 161.

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32 The Polish Review
... at the time when our armies were executing a maneuver which was to concen
trate them in the southeastern section purpose of the maneuver
of Poland. The was
to keep open communication with France and England via Rumania, in order to
obtain equipment and war materials.... Iwanted... to transfer you to France and
there to organize thePolish army.My thoughtwas that thePolish soldierwould
continue to partake in the war and upon the victorious conclusion of the war the
Polish army would represent Poland and her vital interests. You must remember
that this isour major aim_Those who fallvictim toweakness of the spiritor the
instigations of foreign agents... are pawns in the hands of the foe. We must grit our
teeth and bear it. The situation changes and the war goes on. You shall continue to
battle for Poland and . . . return . . . her victory.10
bringing

The events following thewithdrawal portended further disappointment

and tragedy for theMarshal, who expected Rumania to extend itspledge
of passage through its territory to the eventual destination of France.
Already, Rumania experienced increased pressure from Berlin through
September. In view of the fate which befell Poland, Bucharest officials
pondered and partition upon antagonizing the
the prospects of occupation
Reich. Facing in addition the belligerence of Hungary, Bulgaria and the
U.S.S.R., arising from territorial questions, Rumania decided against
fulfilling itsminimum obligation as Poland's ally.11 As Commander-in
Chief of Poland's armed forces, Rydz posed the exception to any professed
offers of transit, in view of the Hague Convention of 1907, which pro
hibited the droit de passage for military personnel. The prohibition
weighed heavily upon the Marshal, who was under the impression that
Beck's indications extended also tomilitary personnel. These assurances
apparently had influenced Rydz to reverse his decision of remaining
behind in Poland. The interpretation of the Rumanian promise resulted in
at least one "sharp exchange of opinion" between Rydz and Beck at their
temporary site of accommodation, the bishop's palace at Cernauti.12
Preferring a modification of its promise to open hostilities, Rumania's
hospitality took the form of confining Rydz to Craiova in southern Ru

">Smigty-Rydz's general order to Poland's armies, 18.IX.1939, G.S.H.I. MSS/M.A./

M.W.M.S.
"Some background materials
found in Andreas Hillgruber, Hitler, Konig Carol und
Marshall Antonescu S. Steiner, 1954); see also Alexandre Cretzianu, "Rumania
(Weisbaden:
a Wrzesieh 1939," ("Rumania and September 1939"), Kultura no. 77, 1954, pp. 106-115.

12Gregoire Gafencu's aide-memoire to Roger Raczynski, Sept. 26, 1939, pp. 1-4, Jozef
Pilsudski Institute inLondon (hereafter cited as /. P.I.L. MSS), Felicjan Slawoj-Sktadkowski
Collection (hereafter cited as Skladkowski Collection)', Clement Dunn's memorandum to the
U.S. State Department (hereafter cited as S.D.\ Sept. 22, 1939, S.D. MSS, National Ar
chives (hereafter cited as N.A.), 871.00/708; Beck, op. cit., pp. 230-231; Jozef Wiatr, "Nowa
relacja w sprawie prejscia przez Naczelnego Wodza Granicy Rumuhskiej w 1939 r."("A New
Report Concerning the Crossing of the Rumanian Frontier by the Commander-in-Chief in
1939"), Bellona no. 1-2, 1962, pp. 57-58.

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Marshal Smigly-Rydz in Exile_33

mania, Moscicki to Bicaz and other members of the regime to other distant
localities such as Slanic and Baile Herculane.13 During this period, Po
land's embassies in Paris and London pressed theWestern powers to use
their influence to gain a reversal of Rumania'sposition. An important
obstacle to such pleas developed when Poland's pre-war opposition cen
ters openly blamed Rydz and other leaders for their nation's defeat.14
While Rydz fought in Poland, opposition leaders met in Lwow on
September 11 and discussed among other things, the institution of a
political triumvirate, made up of Generals Sikorski, Sosnkowski and
Haller. Although Sikorski declined the proposition, he would conduct
negotiations with French military and political representatives with the
apparent aim of replacing Poland's ruling leaders.15 Following talks with
French Ambassador Leon Noel, Generals Felix Joseph Musse and Louis
Faury, Sikorski readily seemed to accept the probability of Rydz's con
finement. Already inMay of 1939, Sikorski maintained separate contact
with Noel and other officials.16 Even as he repeatedly professed loyalty and
the desire to serve theMarshal, Sikorski's ambitions visibly surfaced as a
partial result of approaches from discontented Polish political and mili
tary personalities.17
Sikorski appeared to gain willing converts towards his future acquisi
tion of power. Poland's military attache to Bucharest, for example, re
affirmed his verbal allegiance to theMarshal, but subsequently placed

"Gunther to S.D., Sept. 19, 1939, S.D. MSS, N.A. 860C.001 Moscicki, Ignacy, 123;
William to S.D., Sept. 19,1939, S.D. MSS,
Bullitt N.A. 760C.71/145; also Major Cornwall
Jones to Nichols, Sept. 4, 1939, British Foreign Office (hereafter cited as F.O. MSS), F.O.
371, Political Southern General 7100-122-37; Le Moment: Journal de Bucharest, Sept. 20,
1939; Wiktor T. Drymmer, "Z Kut do Bicaz" ("From Kuty to Bicaz"), Na Strazy (On Guard)
no. 28/30, 1946, pp. 6-8.

l4Raczynski's note to Lord Halifax, Sept. 20, 1939, G.S.I. MSS/Diplomatic Archives
(hereafter cited as D.A.)/ Zmiana Prezydenta: Zmiana Rzqda Polskiego (Change of Presi
dent: Change of Polish Government), t.49/WB/tj; Wactaw Jedrzejewicz, ed., Diplomat in
Paris 1936-1939: Memoirs of Juliusz Lukasiewicz (New York: Columbia University Press,
1970), p. 341 (hereafter cited as Lukasiewicz Papers); Lukasiewicz represented Warsaw in
Paris.
15See Karol
PopieFs account in the weekly Polska Walczqca (Fighting Poland), Sept. 11,
1943; Komisja Historyczna Sztabu Glownego w Londynie (General Staff Historical Com
mission in London), Polskie Sify Zbrojne w Drugiej Wojnie Swiatowej (Poland's Armed
Forces in the Second World War) (Londyn: Gryf, 1959), v. 2, pt. 1, p. 14, (hereafter cited as

P.S.Z.); a leader with Wojciech Korfanty of the Party of Labor, Popiel later served in several

capacities within the Sikorski cabinet.

16Leon Noel's telegram no. 711 to Quai d'Orsay, May 4, 1939, Ministere des Affaires

Etrangeres, Pieces Ecartees, Dossier 1-10 Mai, 1939.

-
17Wiestaw Krzysztofowicz, "Edward Rydz Marszalek'Smigfy': Epilog" ("Edward Rydz
- Marshal
'Srnigly: Epilogue"), Wiez no. 1, 1972, pp. 103-106; Jaklicz, op. cit., p. 150.

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 34 The Polish Review

himself, as did others, at Sikorski's disposition. The Polish Ambassador to

London, Count Edward Raczyhski, believed that his brother Roger, who
served as Ambassador to Bucharest, "played a considerable part in the
change of regime." Roger Raczyhski visited Moscicki at Bicaz and sug
gested that the President resign his office after appointing a replacement
for Rydz as Commander-in-Chief. Here Noel reportedly expressed the
a "both 18
desirability of change of regime and of personalities." Faury
similarly had intended to tell Rydz on September 19 that Sikorski should
organize Poland's army in France. If Paris had once desired Beck's re
moval as Foreign Minister, to the point of attempted blackmail, now
various French political circles welcomed a complete change of the Polish
government.19 Such sentiments crystallized in opposition to one of Rydz's
old comrades-in-arms, General Boleslaw Wieniawa-Dlugoszowski, who
was designated by Moscicki as the presidential successor. Dlugoszowski's
designation raised a storm of controversy from Poland's exiled opposition
elements who desired to terminate what they considered the Pilsudski
succession. Interference with Poland's constitutional prerogatives con
firmed the convictions of more than one Polish diplomat that France had
acted in cooperation with opposition elements under Sikorski's leader
ship.20

Coinciding with the succession crisis, a furtherobstacle to the transfer of

Poland's military and political authorities occurred with the assassination
of Prime Minister Armand Calinescu on September 22 by the pro-German
extremist Iron Guard organization. Rumanian press editorials cited Bri
tain's failure to effect any deviation regarding Calinescu's neutrality poli
cy, "thus blocking the British scheme to transport Rydz-Smigly and the
Polish soldiers. . . ."21 Following Moscicki's resignation on the night of

18Tadeusz to Stachiewicz,
Zakrzewski Sept. 19, 1939, G.S.I. MSS/M.A./N.W.M.S.;
Witold Bieganski, Wojsko Polskie we Francj: 1939-1940 (The Polish Army in France:
1939-1940), (Warsaw: Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej, 1967), pp. 21-22; Alfred Poninski,
"Wrzesieri 1939 r. w Rumunii" ("September 1939 in Rumania"), Zeszyty Historyczne no. 6,
1964, pp. 152-153, 178; Edward Raczynski, In Allied London (London: Birchall and Sons,
1962), p. 40.
19Krzysztofowicz, op. cit., p. 106; Stawoj-Skladkowski, op. cit., p. 321; Bieganski, op. cit.,
pp. 21-23 (on Sikorski's conversations); Polska Walczqca (Fighting Poland) no. 37, 1943
(Boguslawski's article.).
20Lukasiewicz Papers, op. cit., pp. 342-357,364-370; Raczynski, op. cit., pp. 40-44; Roger
Raczynski, "Zapiski Ambasadora Rogera Raczynskiego dotycz^ce przejscia naczelnych
wladz polskich do Rumunii i rezygnacji b. Prezydenta R. P. Prof. Ignacego Moscickiego"
("Ambassador Roger Raczynski's Notes Relating to the Passage of the Polish High Com
mand to Rumania and the Resignation of Professor Ignacy Moscicki, President R.P.")
Kultura, no. 9-10, 1948, p. 122; Poninski, op. cit., pp. 191-195.
2>James Kirk to
S.D., Sept. 22,1939, S.D. MSS, N.A. 871.00/702; Pobog-Malinowski, op.
cit., Ill, pp. 67-68; Le Moment: Journal de Bucarest, Sept. 22,1939; Curentul, Sept. 22-25,
1939.

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Marshal Smigly-Rydz in
Exile_35

September 29-30 in favor ofWladyslaw Raczkiewicz, the former governor

of Pomorze, no difficulty was now "apprehended for the free exit of
everyone of the former government." This, however, failed to apply "in the
case ofMarshal Smigly-Rydz who would remain interned."22 In a conver
sation with the Marshal,Faury reportedly indicated that the possible
transfer of Polish
troops from Rumania depended upon Rydz's confine
ment. Any attempt by theMarshal to escape would supposedly jeopardize
these movements.23

Although Rydz retained the position of Commander-in-Chief, Sikorski

was officially placed on September 28 at the head of Poland's army in
France. The decision ran counter to theMarshal's previous designation in
agreement with Paris of General Jerzy Ferek-Bleszyhski to lead future
Polish formations on French soil. The reported "bitterness and outrage" in
the exiled units over Rydz's withdrawal to Rumania, as well as Sikorski's
prominent status in France's opinion contributed towards the decision.24
Two days before Sikorski's appointment, theMarshal managed to trans
mit final orders to General Juliusz Rommel, who commanded Warsaw's
beleaguered garrison, to defend Poland's capital as long as ammunition
and provisions permitted, and to establish a clandestine network of army
cells. Rydz's order giving Major Edmund Galinat "command and direc
tion" of the future underground organization was "tragically illustrative,"
to Rommel, "of the prevailing relations in our High Command."25 Per
haps the effects of the emerging malevolent sentiments in concert with the
uncertainty of his own position impelled theMarshal towrite to Rommel
that:

Owing to theBolshevik army I remained isolatedwith the stafffromour army. I

was to withdraw to Rumanian territory. As a result of the Bolshevik
compelled

22
Anthony Drexel Biddle, Jr., to S.D., Sept. 30,1939, S.D. MSS, N.A. 860C.001 Moscicki,
Ignacy/34-1/27; Bullitt to S.D., Sept. 30, 1939, S.D. MSS, N.A. 860C.00/77; Biddle had
as Washington's ambassador to Poland's Second
replaced John Cudahy who retired earlier
Republic. Bullittrepresented the United States in Paris.
23Cited in Jan Rudnicki, Slowa i czyny (Words and Actions) (Toronto: Autor iCzytelnicy,

1965), p. 336.
24P.S.Z., op. cit., II, pt. 1, p. 15; Lukasiewicz Papers, op. cit., pp. 357-361; Edward
Raczynski, op. cit., p. 44; Gustaw Lowczowski, "Przyczynki do genezy formowania Wojska
Polskiego we Francji w 1939 r." ("Contributions to the Genesis of the Polish Army Forma
tion in France in 1939"), Bellona no. 2, 1958, p. 125.
Obrona Warszawy w 1939 r.: Wybor dokumentow
25Wojskowy Instytut Historyczny,
wojskowych of Warsaw
(The Defense in 1939: Selected Military Documents) (Warszawa:
Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej, 1968), p. 473; Juliusz Rommel, Za Honor iOjczyzne (For
Honor and theMotherland) (Warszawa: Iskry, 1958), pp. 358-359; Michael Karasiewicz

Tokarzewski, "Jak powstawala Armia Krajowa" ("On the Origins of the Home Army"),
Zeszyty History czne no. 6, 1964, pp. 18-20.

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 36 The Polish Review

invasion I ordered detachments which were able to do so to retire to Rumania and

order given to you General to defend Warsaw as long as the ammuni
Hungary. My
tion and provisions lasted is as before valid. Thank you, General, President

Starzynski, soldiers and people for the heroic stand.26

The defense of theMarshal's flightand his order directing Polish units to

cross the Rumanian and Hungarian frontiers was developed during early
October by such supporters as Col. Zygmunt Wenda, the former contro
versial Chief of Staff of the "Oboz Zjednoczenia Narodowego"(Camp of
National Unity) or OZN, who shared a similar exile. According toWenda,
some 45,000 Polish "citizens" arrived in Rumania by this time, while an
additional 50,000 made theirway to Hungary.27 During the firstweek of
October, Polish authorities in Paris received unconfirmed reports that
various foreign representatives in Bucharest urged the Rumanian authori
ties to arrange for the release of interned Polish troops, "in the event of an
attack which now seemed imminent by Russia on Bessarabia-"28 Con
trary to the expectations of the reformed Polish Government-in-exile, the
Rumanian Minister for Public Order issued a communique on October 11,
which in effect restricted and concentrated Polish soldiers to specified
"camps" and "localities." Three days later, Rumanian authorities trans
ferred Rydz from Craiova to Dragoslavele.29
While Rydz coped with the daily monotony of confinement at Drago
slavele, Sikorski and other members of Poland's French-based govern
ment-in-exile worked towards the total removal of his vestiges of military
command. By September 30, Sikorski had already managed to secure both
the command of Poland's army in France and the positions of Prime

26Smigly-Rydz's dispatch to Rommel, copy transmitted from Bucharest toGen. Burhardt

Bukacki (Paris), Sept. 27, 1939 (21: 45), G.S.I. MSS/M.A./N.W.M.S.
27
Wenda's letter to Jozef W. Bronowicz, Oct. 12,1939, printed inAmeryka-Echo, Nov. 12,
1939; compare with statistics given in Bieganski, op. cit., pp. 116, 118.
28Sir Orme Sargent to Foreign Office, (hereafter cited as F.O.), Oct. 7,1939, Public Record
Office Archives (hereafter cited as P.R.O.), P.R.O. MSS, F.O. 371/Political Central Poland
(hereafter cited as P.C.P./Cl6612-2687-55; Sir Reginald Hoare to F.O.,Oct. 8,1939, P.R.O.
MSS, F.O. 371 /P.C.P./C16112-2687-65; Hoare served as England's Ambassador to Bucha
rest.
29Le Moment: Journal de Bucarest,
Oct. 11, 1939; Witold Bieganski, "Wtadze rumunskie
wobec internowania polskiego w Rumunii Wrzesien
i uchodzstwa 1939-Luty 1941" ("Ru
manian Authorities in the Face of Polish Internees and Refugees in Rumania: September
1939-February 1941"), Najnowsze dzieje Polski: 1939-1945 (Recent Polish History: 1939
1945) (Warsaw: Panstwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1964), VIII, pp. 45-82; Stanislaw
Zabiello, "Na emigracji, 1939-1940" ("On the Emigration, 1939-1940"), Sprawy Miedzy
narodowe (International Affairs) no. 9, 1956, pp. 41-51; attendant rumors attributed the
Marshal's transfer to the hostility on the part of interned Polish officers.

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Marshal Smigly-Rydz in Exile 37

Minister and Minister ofWar.30 Under increasing attack for his perform
ance during the September campaign, theMarshal succumbed to a combi
nation of criticisms, pressure from Raczkiewicz, and the immediate hope
lessness of escaping internment. On October 27, Rydz submitted his resig
nation as Commander-in-Chief of Poland's armed forces. Officially ac
cepting theMarshal's resignation on November 7, Raczkiewicz appointed
Sikorski as the new Commander-in-Chief on the same day. Some members
of the government-in-exile, including Sikorski, were said to have wished
that Raczkiewicz's written acceptance of Rydz's resignation was "couched
in a severer form."31Without any mention of theMarshal's former service,
Raczkiewicz accepted Rydz's resignation "on the strength of article 13,
paragraph 2, heading D of the law of the constitution_"32 The condition
of resignation only increased the burden of theMarshal's physical sur
roundings. This was reflected in the first of several letterswritten by Rydz
to the wife of former President Moscicki:

for your letter which for me was a pleasant

Thank you very much reception
surprise and that itarrived here in thisquiet and desolate place where I am living.
This stillness is very relative since the mountain stream is constantly murmuring
and is washing the saw in the woodmill. Besides that, there are many clouds which
from day to day are descending lower, covering both the sky and mountains,

greying even more. When I arrived here, the trees still had leaves of full autumn
colors. Here I am also lacking news. It was worse than itwas in Craiova. And if
therewere (news), itwould be unhappy. Everyone of us is looking forsomething to
for example, work becomes only an escape. I suspect that
do, teaching languages,
therewill be worse timesbutwe have to gritour teeth. I boughtmyself paint and a
am beginning to paint. I paint six hours a day, although rain or even
palette and
snow attempt to obstruct me. Unfortunately the days keep getting shorter and the

nights are becoming unbelievably long. In the evenings, along our path there are
wild geese and they are easier to hear than to see. Day after day is the same without
?
are only different because the church bells ring not as in the
any change, Sundays
Russian Orthodox churches but in ours. Thank God that the health of the Presi
dent In these conditions,
is better. all ailments become even worse. Iwish you from
the bottom of my heart the best of health. My health already does not matter.
Please do not be surprised that my letter fails to speak of so few specifics. But how
am I to write if I am not sure whether the letter will be sent out and ifalong the way
it will not be read before it gets to you. Please send news.33

3?Bullitt to S.D., Oct. 20, 1939, SD. MSS, N.A. 860C.001/16; Biddle to S.D., Nov. 10,
1939, S.D. MSS, N.A. 860C.001/17; Lukasiewicz Papers, op. cit., pp. 359, 364, 369; Pobog
Malinowski, op. cit., Ill, pp. 83-84; Monitor Polski no. 218/219, Oct. 2, 1939 (Paris).
3ISir Howard Kennard to F.O., Nov. 14, 1939, P.R.O. MSS, F.O. J7//P.C.P./C18578

1110-55; Kennard had represented St. James inWarsaw.

32Ibid, Polski no. 245/251, Nov. 9, 1939 (Paris).
(enclosure); Monitor
toMarie Moscicki, Nov. 7, 1939, N.P.I.L. MSS ICollection 12:Marszalek
33?migly-Rydz
Edward Smigty-Rydz (hereafter cited as Smigly-Rydz Collection.)

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38 The Polish Review

The Marshal's instances, continued to reflect the in

letters, in many
creased censorship imposed upon the exiled Polish community. "My
letters are not reaching anyone," he wrote, "and those sent tome are being
held back somewhere." 34Rydz's letter to Skladkowski on December 9
emphasized this censorship but also demonstrated his resolve to answer
the ever increasing criticism. "My letters," Rydz continued to complain,

. . . like those written to me are confiscated. I already had a few of these cases. It is
must be done to come through
verydifficultto livebut I toldmyself thateverything
and find strength. This same maxim applies to you, General. I have the impression
that we will still be needed?in the worst case in order to protect the past from
attacks and accusations. We must be ready for the worst attacks.35

Already in Paris, the Sikorski-dominated government had rejected the

services of Rydz's most ardent supporters and co-workers. The Marshal,
himself, embarked on a written defense of his role during the Polish cam
paign.36 He to know that "certain Polish political and military
claimed
opposition groups" negotiated with French agents during the "firstdays of
warfare," to the detriment of the government. Those Poles who so con
spired, "in the face of God and the fatherland," would be revealed by
history "in their own time."37 During this period, which extended through
1940, Rumania found itself subjected to the territorial claims of its im
mediate neighbors. Rumania appeared to be on the verge of dismember
ment as the U.S.S.R. demanded Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina,

Bulgaria coveted Southern Dobruja, and Hungary reached for themuch

contested Transylvania. Therefore, King Carol decided to renounce the
useless Franco-British guarantee in July, 1940, and placed Rumania under
German protection. However, in view of the second Vienna Award which
contributed to Carol's overthrow in September, themove ultimately failed
to preserve Rumania's territorial integrity. The following month, the
Wehrmacht entered Rumania.38 The occupation created a new situation,
which placed Rydz directly into German hands. The Marshal attempted
on at least two occasions to escape from his place of internment. The first

34Smigly-Rydz toMarie Moscicki, Dec. 15, 1939, J.P.I.L. MSS/Smigly-Rydz Collection.

35?migly-Rydz to Slawoj-Skladkowski, Dec. 9, 1939, J.P.I.L. MSS/Skladkowski Collec
tion.
36For of these rejections, see Sikorski to Kasprzycki, Nov. 30, 1939, Sikorski to
examples
Slawoj-Sktadkowski, Nov. 30, 1939, G.S.I. MSS/M.A./N.W.M.S.; the Marshal collabo
rated on his defense with the historian, Waclaw Lipihski.
37Summary of Smigty-Rydz's declaration of Dec. 24, 1939, J.P.I.L. MSS/Smigly-Rydz
Collection.

38Grigore Gafencu, Prelude to the Russian Campaign (London: F. Muller, 1945), pp. 274
276, 288-297; also Hillgruber, op. cit., pp. 69-71.

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Marshal Smigly-Rydz in
Exile_39
attempt ended in failure due to insufficient preparation and either "indis
cretion or denunciation." Following the arrival of Julian Piasecki at
Dragoslavele, the former vice-president for communication* made known
his intention of preparing Rydz's escape. The Marshal, as well as Wenda,
"welcomed the initiativewith great pleasure and gratefulness, which is very
characteristic of all people wishing to escape captivity."39 Finally, on the
evening of December 15-16, 1940, Rydz crawled through a hole which had
been cut earlier in the barbed wire fence surrounding his interned residence
and fled toward the Hungarian frontier. The Marshal's aide-de-camp,
Major Jerzy Krzeczkowski, Wenda, and a few others remained behind in
order to detract attention from the escape. Piasecki preceded Rydz to
Hungary to contact sympathetic Polish emigre elements and to arrange
adequate accommodations.40

Rumanian authorities discovered theMarshal's disappearance at "the

earliest, around the 18-19 of December, when Wenda was already crossing
the frontier. . . ." The Rumanian dictator, General Ion Antonescu, who
was under apparent German pressure, ordered a nation-wide manhunt.

Alerts regarding the possible direction of Rydz's flightwere transmitted to

Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Hungary.41 The day following his escape, the
Marshal occupied his first living quarters in Budapest. As a diversionary
measure, he addressed a letter to the Rumanian prefect of Kimpolungu to
be mailed from Istanbul. This undoubtedly influenced the series of Ger
man reports which placed theMarshal in Istanbul and other distant locali
ties.42The effect of Rydz's letterwas reflected inWeizsacker's emphasis
upon Turkey's neutrality regarding the sheltering of Rydz as a "Militar
person." The German Ambassador to Ankara, Franz von Papen, declared

at the highpoint of these rumors that, "Nach vertraulicher Mitteilung

tiirkischer politischer Polizei hat Rydz-Smigty am 20 Januar Turkei via

* In Poland the Ministry of Communications handles transportation.

39Col.
Mieczyslaw Szumahski's letter to the editor, Na Antenie (Wiadomosci) (On theAir
(News)), Jan. 31, 1965, p. 8; Kowalewski, loc. cit.
40
Krzysztofowicz, op. cit., p. 110; Bazyli Rogowski, "Wspomnieniao MarszalkuSmiglym"
("Remembrances about Marshal Smigly"), Zeszyty Historyczne no. 2 (LXXX), 1962, pp. 34
38, 43, 71; Krzysztofowicz's date appears more accurate than Bazyli Rogowski's citation of
Dec. 10. Rogowski makes many errors in dates (e.g., Rydz's birth in 1885), and the availa
bility of an automobile further supports Krzysztofowicz's indication.
41Wilhelm Fabricius to Auswartiges Amt (Foreign Ministry) (hereafter cited as A.A.),
A.A. MSS, N.A. 2356/20.12MSS1/1721; Michal Sokolnicki, Dziennikankarski: 1939-1943

(Ankara Diary: 1939-1943) (London: Gryf, 1965), p. 169; Rogowski, op. cit., p. 46.
42Ernst von Weizsacker to Franz von Papen, Feb. (?) 7, 1941, A.A. MSS, N.A. Tel. i.z.

(399437-8)-MSS 1/1721; Emil von Rintelen to A.A., Jan. 10, \94\yA A. MSS, N.A. Tel. i.z.

(399430)-MSS 1/1721; Rogowski, op. cit., pp. 45, 48.

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40 The Polish Review

Irak nach Palastina verlassen. . . ,"43 A few German observers, however,

sensed theMarshal's correct geographical location with such speculations
as ". . .Rydz-Smigly mit Juden springen in Budapest eingetruffen sei."44
The possibility of immediate exposure caused Rydz to assume the identity
of "Stefan Kwiatkowski, Gymnasium Professor from Lwow." German
authorities would find it difficult to verify the Soviet-occupied origins of
theMarshal's adopted pseudonym.45
After fifteenmonths of confinement, Rydz finally faced the decision of
whether to attempt a passage to theWest or to return to Poland. The
number of days left to theMarshal for any contemplated service remained
questionable, however, considering the strain on his energies and health.
Upon arriving in Budapest, Rydz found himself surrounded by a small
group of Polish emigres whose services had also been rejected by Sikorski.
Members of this group, which included the historian Lipihski and Slawa
Wenda, the wife of the former OZN Chief of Staff, immediately began to
prepare forRydz's comfort and security. The news of theMarshal's escape
from Rumania and thewatchfulness of local officials prompted Piasecki to
arrange the Marshal's temporary transfer, on December 21, to a sani
torium in Budapest which was directed by a sympathetic Hungarian doc
tor. Hungarian army officers reportedly,

. . . knew Smigly's silhouette verywell from various illustrationsand military

journals and he, although dressed in civilian clothes, hadn't changed very much.
His hair cut short at the temples and in the back made his baldness stand out more.
His black brows and his eyes, dark as two coals, were so characteristic that even his
short close-cut mustache didn't change his looks so much that people couldn't
recognize him.46

Rydz insisted on spending as little time as possible at the sanitorium, and

moved once again within theweek to a prearranged apartment. During the
following months, theMarshal devoted himself largely to painting, writing
poetry, and conversing with the few supporters and sympathizers who
were aware of his presence inBudapest. Rydz's painting reflectedmore and
more his increasing depression. One watercolor self-portrait shows what
appears to be an old man, physically bent and broken in spirit.47Piasecki

43Weizsacker to Papen, Jan. 15, 1941, A.A. MSS, N.A., Pol. V 198/211-MSS 1/1721;
Papen to A.A., Jan. 28, 1941, A.A. MSS, N.A. Pol. V506-MSS 1/1721; also Papen toA.A.,
Jan. 13, 1941, A.A. MSS, N.A. Pol. V 132-MSS 1/1721.
44Braunstumm to A.A., Jan. 6, 1941, A.A. MSS, N.A. Pol. V 160-MSS 1/1721.
45
Rogowski, op. cit., p. 39.
46
Ibid., pp. 41-42, 46-47; Rydz registered for precautions under another name, Stanislaw
Rogowski with residence at Ernesa-Gygor megye; Krzysztofowicz, op. cit., p. 111.
47Smigly-Rydz's sketches and paintings completed inHungary, Jozef Pilsudski Institute of
America (hereafter cited as J.P.I.), J.P.I. MSS/S.R.A./Zgon Marszatka Smiglego (Marshal

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Marshal Smigly-Rydz in
Exile_41
assumed during this period the unofficial position of Chief-of-Staff to the
Marshal. The former vice-president of communications and OZN leader
"held very many various secret talks with Smigly." By nature a conspira
tor, Piasecki defended OZN and stressed the need for clandestine activi
ties. Conversely, theMarshal considered Piasecki's emphasis exaggerated.
"As far as OZN," related the former Vxct-voivode of Tarnopol, Bazyli
Rogowski, "in my talks with Smigly I later became convinced that he
himself thought that the entire business wasn't the best thing." Rydz's
belief that Poland would have to undertake new forms of government
"since fascism would undoubtedly fall," implied the recognition of the
extremism associated with OZN.48 However, there appeared little or no
indication that the various elements which composed the present-day
government-in-exile would readily overlook this recent controversial epi
sode. Conversely, in Rydz's eyes, Sikorski and the "united" opposition
parties represented Poland's worst traditions. As for receiving their "good
will," theMarshal wrote in a last letter toMadam Moscicki,

... ?
I never expected it but what does criminal stupidity have to do with under
standingyour own country?By the time itwill be possible todemonstrate lies, those
liesmay bring on so much evil which will never be able to be rectified.This isjust
stupidityand ill-will.A phantom representingtheworst fromour past has risen
from the grave and is the representativeof Poland in the eyes of theworld. This is
enough, I do not wish to be the source of bitternessof which you already have
enough.49

Nevertheless, theMarshal remained open to suggestions regarding pos

sibilities for his further service. Following Colonel Wenda's death inMay,
1941, Rydz appeared to rely increasingly upon the advice of Piasecki and
Lipihski. It is difficult tomeasure, however, the degree of their influence
upon theMarshal's acceptance of the "Oboz Polski Walczacej (O.P.W.),"
or "Camp of Fighting Poland," as the successor organization to both OZN
and the original P.O.W. Although oriented primarily towards the consoli
dation of Pilsudczyk or pro-Pilsudski elements in Poland, the O.P.W.
aimed at collaborating with other Polish underground organizations.50

Smigly's Death)(hereafter cited as Z.M.S.); also Edward ?migly-Rydz, "Wiersze"(Verses"),

Kultura no. 8 (25), 1949, pp. 71-79, Rogowski, op. cit., p. 69.
48Rogowski, op. eit., p. 58; Ryszard Zielihski, "Na marginesie 'ostatniego miesiaca Smig
lego'" ("Side Note on 'Smigly's Last Month'"), Zycie Literackie (Literary Life), Jan. 14,1973,
p. 32.
49Smigty-Rydz to Marie Moscicki, March 28, 1941, J.P.I.L. Collec
MSS/Smigly-Rydz
tion.

50Andrzej Garlicki, "Legenda Smiglego" ("Smigly's Legend"), Zycie Literackie, Jan. 14,
1973, pp. 30-31; Szumahski, loc. cit.; Rogowski, op. cit., pp. 77 (Wenda's death), pp. 80-82,
86-88.

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42 The Polish Review

Following Rydz's already cited transmission to Warsaw regarding the

formation of an underground network, General Tokarzewski formed the
"Shizba Zwyci^stwu Polski" (Service for theVictory of Poland) during the
last days of September, 1939. By November, this organization had evolved
into the "Zwi^zek Walki Zbrojnej (Z.W.Z.)," or "League for Armed
Struggle," under the control of the Polish government-in-exile. However,
direction from exile proved unsatisfactory and Colonel Stefan "Grot"
Rowecki received command of the Z.W.Z. Although Soviet authorities
arrested Tokarzewski, who served as Commander-designate of theZ.W.Z.
in eastern Poland, Rowecki was able to unite various groups into a force by
mid-1940, of approximately 100,000 men.51 One of theO.P. W.'s tasks, the
attempt to form a basic liaison with this and similar London-oriented
organizations, would prove extremely difficult to accomplish. No one in
Hungary or Poland possessed the stature of the Marshal as the "most
senior Pilsudczyk" to lead the newly-conceived O.P.W. Rydz himself had
already expressed the desire to return to Poland. The Marshal's depression
from confinement and inactivitymomentarily gave way to plans, reminis
cent of his more youthful conspiratorial days.52
Preparing for his return to Poland, Rydz assigned tasks to the small
group of potential O.P.W. functionaries. As one of the group, Piasecki
"energetically" developed theO.P.W. idea with theMarshal during a short
stay by Balaton at the time Germany attacked the Soviet Union. The
organization adopted a system of small units of five people each, based on
a graduated system and limited inter-group contacts.53 Four months later
inOctober, Rydz planned to returnwith thisO.P.W. concept to Poland.
As he became "more and more occupied," few saw Rydz "smiling or
interested in anything other than his planned trip to Poland and thework
awaiting him there." The date of theMarshal's planned escape changed at
least twice, "due to the total isolation" which Rydz and his small circle of
friends experienced. The Marshal already rejected an offer from an influ
ential source who was sure that either Count Paul Teleki, the Hungarian

51 on Poland's
Background underground formation in P.S.Z., op. cit., Ill, pp. 101-102,
130-145, 165, 172-183; W.W.N.P., op. cit., pp. 206, 214-215, 219, 246-249; the brochure
written by Janina Karasiowna, Pierwsze polrocze Armii Podziemnej (S.P.Z., Z. W.Z.) (The
First Half-Year of the Underground Army (S.P.Z., Z.W.Z.)) (London: Instytut Jozefa
Pilsudskiego, 1948), pp. 19-31, reprinted from Niepodleglosc;
Tadeusz Bor-Komorowski,
Secret Army (London: 1950), pp. 26-30, 41-44; Studium Polski Podziemnej
Gollancz,
(Polish Underground Studies), Armia Krajowa w dokumentach: 1939-1945 (Home Army in
Documents: 1939-1945), 2 vols. (London: Gryf, 1973), I, pp. 11-19, 31-37, II, pp. 452-453
(hereafter cited as Underground Documents.)
52Szumariski, loc. cit.; Rogowski, op. cit., p. 80.
53Rogowski, op. cit., pp. 78-80, 95; part of Rydz's following cited in Krzysztofowicz, op.
cit., p. 111.

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Marshal Smigly-Rydz in
Exile_43

Premier, or the Regent, Admiral Nicholas Horthy, would gladly provide

sanctuary from theGermans.54 Finally, on October 25, Rydz "was to leave
the country which, after all, had given him a fewmoments of peace and
relief."55

By a combination of train and taxi, theMarshal reached theHungarian

Slovak frontier. Accompanied by Rogowski and a guide, Rydz then
crossed the Tatra Mountains on foot and continued later by automobile,
as Hungarian and Slovak guards patrolled both sides of the frontier. Upon
reaching Turdosina, the group continued along the route through the
Slovak villages of Cimova and Vilanova on October 26, until they reached
Polish soil.56 One of the retinue had procured a dung-cart where the
Marshal

. .. covered himself with a blanket and sat crouched in his seat... We moved step by
step and the higher up we went the more the wind blew... Hour after hour went by
in monotonous travel. The huddled silhouette of Smigly persistently reminded me
of Napoleon during his retreat from Moscow. He probably also traveled in a cart,
huddled from the cold through the snow-covered fields.... Finally daylight came,
the snowstorm subsided, and before us appeared the railroad tracks and not far
away the Szaflary train station. It was 7 A.M. on October 27, 1941.57

2. The Last Days

Two days later, theMarshal returned toWarsaw, following a period of

exile of more than two years. In order to avoid detection, Rydz travelled
from Cracow to Poland's capital by car. The condition ofWarsaw made a
"very dreary impression." Bombed and burned-out houses lined themain
roads and overcrowded trolleys were divided by signs indicating, "Nur fur
Deutsche!" The Gestapo, or German Secret Police, freely indulged in
excesses of brutality, contributing towards an atmosphere of terror.58
Under these conditions, Rydz found temporary residence in neglected
quarters on Marszalkowska Street. Moving tomore suitable lodgings on

54Szumariski, loc. cit.; Rogowski, op. cit., pp. 63, 92.

55Rogowski, op. cit., p. 97.
56 of crossing and passing at Chocianowicz,
Description ibid., pp. 98-110; Krzysztofowicz,
op. cit., pp. 12-13; Piasecki left the retinue at Halatan; Underground Documents, op. cit., II,
p. 511.
57Rogowski, op. cit., p. Ill; Alfons Filar states that Piasecki, Gall, Rogowski and Jan
Zietarski came to him on Oct. 24, cited in Krzysztofowicz, op. cit., pp. 113-114.
58Szumahski, loc. cit.; treatment of occupation period in Tadeusz Cyprian and Jerzy
Sawicki, Nazi Rule in Poland: 1939-1945 (Warsaw: Polonia, 1961): Republic of Poland,
German Occupation of Poland: Polish White Book (New York, Greystone, n.d.).

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44 The Polish Review
November 3, theMarshal endeavored to establish contact with Colonel
Edward Radwan-Pfeiffer of the Z.W.Z. Of all the underground officials,
Pfeiffer proved to be the most sympathetic toward theMarshal.59 More
than one participant during this period contended that Rydz intended to
conform with the existing Polish authorities both inLondon and Warsaw.
Technically, the existence of theO.P.W. as an independent organization
conflicted with the prerogatives of the Z.W.Z. and the London-based
Polish government. Although Rydz intended to meet with Rowecki,
Piasecki, who joined theMarshal inWarsaw, had a "different opinion." As
a result, Rydz and the former OZN leader "had many disagreements."
Irrespective of Piasecki's wishes, theMarshal desired his own agreement
with Sikorski. A Polish agent who had contacts with anti-Hitler German
officers was entrusted with the task of reaching General Wladyslaw
Anders. Supposedly, it was the arrest of this agent that aborted this
attempt. In view of the London government's rejection of service offers
from pre-war regime personnel, there was no guarantee, however, that
Sikorski would accept Rydz.60 Such negative prognostications were visible
during February of 1941, when Polish government officials contemplated
possible reactions to reports of theMarshal's return. Sosnkowski, who at
the time conducted liaison between the Sikorski regime and the Z.W.Z.,
communicated the sentiment that Rydz's presence might threaten the
government-sponsored resistance efforts against the Germans.61 Eight
months later, little or no evidence existed to support the contention of a
positive reception.
Throughout this remaining period of his life, theMarshal conveyed a
picture of "perfect self-control and his quiet manner gave those around
him confidence." Those who met with him agreed that Rydz's "honesty,
high-mindedness and straightforwardness elicited great respect and ap
proval."62 On the few ocasions that theMarshal showed depression, itwas

59Tymon Terlecki, "Ostatnie chwile Smigtego-Rydza" ("Smigty-Rydz's Last Moments"),

Wiadomosci (News), July 14, 1968, p. 3; Zamorski Interview.

60Edwin Radwin-Pfeiffer, "Relacja z robytu Marszalka w Kraju w 1941

Smiglego-Rydza
r." ("An Account of Marshal Smigty-Rydz's Stay in Poland in 1941"), Nov. 25, 1951, J.P.I.
MSS/S.R.A./Z.M.S.; Klaudiusz Hrabyk, "Pisze b. Szef propagandy O.P.W." ("O.P.W.
Chief of Propaganda Writes"), Zycie Literackie (Literary Life), Jan. 14, 1973, pp. 32-33;
refers to Jerzy Steinhauf, "Ostatni Miesi^c ("Smigly's Last Month"), Zycie
Smiglego"
Literackie, Dec. 31, 1972; Terlecki, loc. cit.; a reported meeting between Rydz and Rowecki
was scheduled at the time of theMarshal's death, Nowy Swiat (New World), March 29,1946.
61
Underground Documents, op. cit., II, pp. 512-513 and photographic inserts; Sosnkowski
held this position of liaison until August 18, 1941.
62Terlecki, loc. cit.; Pfeiffer, op. cit., pp. 5-6, noted Rydz's reserved responses; Szumahski,
loc. cit; also Jadwiga Maxymowicz-Raczyriska, "Wspomnienia (Reminiscences), 1966-67,"
pp. 6-7, J.P.I. MSS/S.R.A./Z.M.S.

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Marshal Smigly-Rydz in
Exile_45

mainly due to the public's opinion of him. "I have enough of life," Rydz
once declared,

... I have of the sun, I feel as if I were in a barrel full of nails, but even so, I
enough
couldn't have acted differently. They say that I should have shot myself and been
taken prisoner.What would that have accomplished? I think I have proven inmy
entire lifetimethat I do not fear death. Iwas travelingforhelp, I believed inmy
authority abroad, I believed in theAllies, theirhonor and help. They betrayed
me!63

If expressions of such depression appeared rarely, symptoms of Rydz's

deteriorating health occurred more frequently. Medical prescriptions
which were issued to theMarshal indicated treatments for a failing heart.64
Several doctors, including Julian Piasecki's brother, attempted to reverse
the process which inevitably claimed Rydz's life.The constant vigilance for
German agents which impelled one last change in the Marshal's living
quarters, this time to the house belonging to thewidow ofGeneral Wlodzi
mierz Maxymowicz-Raczyhski, probably added to the strain of Rydz's
weakening health. On November 28, Rydz began to suffer increased pain
from his heart condition. Despite a combination of caffeine and morphine
capsules, themarked breakdown inhealth continued through December 1.
On this date, Dr. Jan Roguski, one of three physicians tending theMar
shal, declared that Rydz's health took a serious turn for theworse. None
theless, the Marshal received a number of visitors. When one of these
arrivals inquired as to how theMarshal felt,Rydz responded with, "Right
in the cemetery."65
Marshal Edward Smigly-Rydz died in the early morning hours of
December 2, 1941, from an attack of angina pectoris.66 The following day,

63Terlecki, loc. cit.; also, Klaudiusz Hrabyk on Rydz's rejection by the general populace in
Warsaw, cited inWactaw Zagorski, Wolnosc w niewoli (Constrained Freedom), (London:
Gryf, 1971), pp. 338-340; also Henryk Gruber, Wspomnienia iUwagi: 1892-1942 (Reminis
cences and Observations: 1892-1942) (London: Gryf, 1966), pp. 443-444, 460.
64For example, Dr. Jan Roguski's medical prescription to Smigly-Rydz on Nov. 28, 1941,
J.P.I. MSS/S.R.A./Z.M.S.
65Raczyhska, op. cit., pp. 13-16; Jan Sejfer, "Taki zgotowal sobie los" ("So followed his
fate"), Zycie Literackie, Jan. 14, 1973, p. 33.
66Handwritten death certificate of Marshal Smigly-Rydz signed by Dr. Roguski, Dr.
Edward Loth, Julian Piasecki and others, Dec. 2, 1941, J.P.I. MSS/S.R.A./Z.M.S. The
certificate stated that "The second Marshal of Poland Edward Smigly-Rydz died of'Angina

Pectoris'secretly on December 2, 1941, in the year of our Lord at about 4 A.M. on native soil
in the unequivocal Capital of the Republic?heroic Warsaw, under the pseudonym Adam
Zawisza. . . ."; Rogowski inaccurately dates theMarshal's death at December 7, Rogowski,
op. cit., p. 122; death-certificate copy in Underground Documents, op. cit., II, p. 523 and
photograph; Roguski's name ismisspelled.

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 46 The Polish Review

a third physician, Dr. Edward Loth, embalmed the body as others pre
pared for the burial. A large group of theMarshal's subordinates arrived
before the time designated for the funeral procession and despite the
danger, placed two large wreaths, decorated with Virtuti Militari, or
Military ribbons, on the coffin. Neither the Gestapo nor other
Valor
German agents interfered as an automobile caravan transported Rydz's
body for burial to Pow^zki Cemetery inWarsaw. There, on December 6,
the Marshal was buried under a soldier's cross, bearing the pseudonym
"Adam Zawisza."67

Piasecki demanded that theMarshal's death be kept a secret. A few days

after the funeral, the formerOZN leader ordered a meeting of theO.P.W.
membership to discuss "one of the more serious problems" which the
Marshal faced before his death, namely the establishment of contact with
the Z.W.Z. Piasecki claimed to have received instructions from Rydz
during their last conversations, to devote all of his energies, in the event of
the Marshal's death, toward the unity of the Pilsudczyk organizations.
Rydz considered above all, alleged Piasecki, that no one outside of this
circle should receive word concerning the event of his death.68 Following
the execution of this so-called "testament," Piasecki continued talks begun
by the Marshal with such Z.W.Z. representatives as Zygmunt Hempel,
who also retained some former pxo-Sanacja sympathies. As the self-pro
claimed interpreter of Rydz's "testament," Piasecki undertook the fulfill
ment of organizational matters which had been outlined earlier by the
Marshal in Hungary, and initiated inWarsaw. Here again, it becomes
difficult to differentiate between Piasecki's initiative and the Marshal's
will.69 Although Rydz reportedly intended to subordinate himself to Lon
don, he desired the consolidation of the Pilsudczyk elements in Poland.
Conversely, Piasecki, who desired the O.P.W. to be independent of
Z.W.Z. control and the London-based government, appeared loyal to the
Marshal's requests.

Nevertheless, as a result of Rydz's initiative, the O.P.W. established

close contact at the beginning of 1942 with the recently-formed "Konwent
Organizacji Niepodleglosciowych (K.O.N.)," or "Convent of Indepen

67Terlecki, loc. cit.; Raczynska, op. cit., pp. 6-7; Waclaw Zagorski, "Marszalek Smigfy
Rydz w Warszawie" ("Marshal Smigty-Rydz inWarsaw"), Robotnik Polski (The Polish
Worker), Sept. 6, 1959, pp. 3, 7-8.
68Szumahski, loc. cit.; Pfeiffer, op. cit., pp. 6-7; Wtadyslaw Drzymulski, "Observations to
Col. E. Radwan-Pfeiffer's Relation of Marshal Smigly-Rydz's Stay in the Country, 1941,"
July, 1952, J.P.I. MSS/S.R.A./Z.M.S.
69Pfeiffer, op. cit., p. 5; Szumariski, loc. cit.; on the fate of Piasecki and other collaborators
of the Marshal, see Rogowski, op. cit., pp. 122-124.

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Marshal Smigly-Rydz in Exile_47

dence Organizations," which included the resurrected P.O.W. and

"Zwiazek Strzelecki." This collaboration produced, by the end of January,
1942, the publication of a modest weekly, Przqglad Polityczny O.P.W.
[O.P.W. Political along with the K.O.N.
Review], publication, Mysli
Naczelne [Main Thoughts]. By the beginning of May, the O.P.W. and
K.O.N. increased their circulation and managed a national distribution
through such associated groups as the "Zwiazek Przysposobienia Kole
jowego" (Railroad Training League). Additional expansion resulted in the
publication of Nurt [Current], which printed articles by Ferdynand
Goetel, the Polish writer who gave OZN its name. Most of these publica
tions continued "up to the first hours of theWarsaw uprising."70 Rydz's
final contribution regarding theO.P.W., then, figuratively reached beyond
the grave. Curiosity concerning the Marshal's fate occasionally arose,
while numerous Polish organizations of varying political denominations
fought for their respective conceptions of a restored homeland. Known to
only a few as the Marshal's last resting place, the grave under Adam
Zawisza's name in Powazki Cemetery remained physically unscathed by
the devastation of the remaining four years of warfare. For themost part,
the uncertainty and confusion regarding the origins of Poland's defeat, as
well as the precarious nature of its future, contributed towards Rydz's
relegation to a period of ignominity and obscurity in thememory of his
countrymen.

3. Epilogue: Myth and Reality

The day after Rydz's death, Stalin suggested to Sikorski at theirmeeting

in the Soviet town of Kuibyshev "minor" alterations of Poland's frontier
with theU.S.S.R. Despite Sikorski's refusal to discuss thematter, Stalin's
suggestion portended further tragic consequences to befall Poland in the
near future.Within four days of thismeeting, theUnited States entered the
Second World War. The Marshal's death remained a virtual secret
through the ensuing years of war. When Stalin met with General
Wladyslaw Anders on March 18, 1942, to discuss problems concerning
Poland's reformed armies, the Soviet dictator inquired from curiosity,
"And where is Smigly?" Anders replied:

10P.S.Z., cit., Ill, pp. 166-167; Pfeiffer, op. cit., pp. 7-8; Szumariski,
op. loc. cit.; Jan

Rzepecki, Wspomnienia iprzyczynki historyezne (Reminiscences and Historical Contribu

tions) (Warsaw: Czytelnik, 1965), pp. 212-213; Underground Documents, op. cit., II, pp.453,
512.

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 48 The Polish Review

According to information received from the homeland, he is inWarsaw, ap

parently gravely ill, sufferingfrom angina pectoris.
Stalin: He is presumably hiding.
Gen. Anders: Naturally.
Stalin: Certainly Rydz-Smigly proved in 1920 not to be a bad commander. He
commanded well in the Ukraine.
Gen. Anders: Yes, but in this war as Commander-in-Chief he completely gave up
his command after a few days.71

This uncertainty surrounding Rydz's fatemanifested itself in the diver

gent interpretations which continued beyond the end of the war. One
version claimed that Rydz's clandestine return to Poland in 1943 resulted
in his death the following year in theWarsaw insurrection. According to
others, theMarshal returned toWarsaw in 1946 where he was executed.
Still another story placed Rydz at the head of Jewish armies in theMiddle
East.72 During July, 1941, while he was still in Budapest, a Turkish peri
odical reported theMarshal's offer to serve in the Soviet Armies, which
had supposedly been conducted through themediation ofMoscow's mili
tary attache inAnkara, but was rejected.73Within a year and a half of the
Marshal's death, a London periodical declared, in effect, that Rydz led
Poland's forces. Assuming
underground the pseudonym of "Grzyb"
(Mushroom), Rydz, according to the article which was duplicated in
Polish language publications abroad, organized sabotage attacks against
the occupying German forces.74
It was not until February of 1946 that the firstpublic revelations con
cerning Rydz's last days appeared in the Polish weekly Defilada [Parade].
Reproduced in other publications as well, the article emphasized Rydz's
tragic return and attempted contact with Rowecki.75 The following years
witnessed a two-sided phenomenon as the post-war Polish regime per
mitted chrysanthemums crossed in the shape ofMarshal's batons, assorted
flowers, wreaths and flaming torches to adorn Rydz's grave. However,
virtually all publications originating from Poland manifested anti-rehab
ilitation characteristics by condemning theMarshal as the promoter and

71General Sikorski Historical Institute, Documents on Polish Soviet Relations: 1939-1945,

2 vols. (London: Heinemann, 1961), I, pp. 307-308; also see Underground Documents, op.
cit., II, p. 513.
72Robert R. Jars, La campagne de Pologne
(Paris: Payot, 1949), p. 173, f. 1;Rudnicki, op.
cit., p. 325; Ferdynand Goetel, Czasy wojny (War Times) (London: Veritas, 1955), p. 100;
Nowy Swiat, July 17, 1950.
73Nowy Swiat, July 4, 1941.
74Citations, for example, in The Daily Herald, June 22, 1943; Nowy Swiat, June 24, 1943;
similarly, "Rydz" translates as a type of "mushroom."
75Defilada (Procession), Feb. 24, 1946; Dziennik Polskii Dziennik Zolnierza
(Polish Daily
and Soldiers' Daily), March 8, 1946; Nowy Swiat, March 29, 1946.

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Marshal Smigly-Rydz in
Exile_49
continuator of pseudo-fascistic designs which had been instituted earlier
by Pilsudski. Many formerly prominent personalities who supported or
opposed the Sanacja and who now resided in theWest, blamed Poland's
pre-war leadership for the catastrophe which overtook their homeland.
More than one Western European historian popularly associated Rydz
and other Polish leaders with theworst elements of dictatorship and cited
them for gangsterism, essentially contributing to the breakdown of the
European system. The few voices, such as Slawoj-Skladkowski's, which
rose inRydz's defense, were denounced as theMarshal's collaborators in
sowing the seeds of Poland's destruction.76
Many critics who considered Rydz ill-suited to serve as Commander-in
Chief failed to provide convincing alternatives in either personalities or
decisions. Against the reality of Poland's virtually embryonic state of
national development, theMarshal's appearance in internal politics during
the years 1935-1939 appeared inevitable and became, in essence, a race
against time and impossible odds. No other European nation during this
period faced the myriad of pressures which beset Poland. Solutions to
Poland's military, economic, political and social problems were largely
interdependent upon each other. For a period of little less than a decade,
the charismatic personality and authoritarian tutelage of Marshal Jozef
Pilsudski, rather than those government forms provided by the 1921 con
stitution, held Poland together. The era of pacification and economic
restoration following the Locarno Agreement gave way to theworld-wide
depression which became part of the inheritance of Pilsudski's successors.
Neither could any one political party come to a lasting agreement with the
other toward any workable solutions for Poland's titanic problems. Both
ends of the nation's political spectrum worked against the concept of
national unity by narrowly adhering to their own individual interpretation
of their country's welfare, to the exclusion of the other. Instead of con
solidating forces in the interest of the State, the eternal curse of Poland's
factionalism became more pronounced. A semblance of political unity in
the face of theGerman threat occurred too late to reverse the deterioration
affecting Poland's national fabric.
Even ifRydz had been fortunate enough to be one of those rare the
oretical geniuses of the strategical caliber of the nineteenth-century Ger

76For example, Alojzy Horak, Edward Rydz: Generalny Inspektor Sit Zbrojnychi Naczel
ny Wodz przed ipodczas kampanii wrzesniowej (Edward Rydz: Inspector General of the
Armed Forces and Commander-in-Chief before and during the September Campaign), bro
chure reprinted in Biblioteka Polski Podziemnej (Polish Underground Library), Artykuty i

przedruki z pism podziemnych w Kraju (Articles and Reprints from the Underground
Writings in Poland) (London: Holborn Viaduct, n.d.), pp. 3-31.

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50 The Polish Review

man General, Carl von Clausewitz, or the Swiss Baron, Antoine Henri de
Jomini, Poland's chronic poltical disunity coupled with its industrial
underdevelopment and insufficient armaments practically guaranteed the
September, 1939 defeat. In the face of a superior technological foe, Poland
could do little without the activation of commitments and substantial
armaments assistance from the Western Powers. The alternatives por
tended partition. "Would you please glance at the map," the Marshal
responded to an interviewer, less than twomonths before the outbreak of
hostilities:

Our situation and our history make the defense of our freedom a vital problem
which has always been of the greatest concern to all Poles. We experienced what it
means to live without freedom and we shall rather die than lose our freedom

again.... As far as our army it is a good army although

is concerned, it is not as big
as the German army_In any event, as far as we are concerned we will fight for the
maintenance of our independence even without allies.77

Not even Pilsudski could have avoided Poland's inevitable defeat as the
Western Powers failed to move against Germany. Perhaps, ifRydz suc
ceeded where others had failed, in stemming theGerman tide, the history
written by his countrymen might have treated this gifted soldier and under
rated patriot in a more sympathetic manner. The tragedy of theman and
nation lay in the huge amounts of hope and endeavor which were forged
from the flames of independence, only to end in such complete ruin.
The object of rebuke from those who once served him, the aged and
sicklyMarshal devoted his remaining life energies toward the restoration
of the land that he once helped to fashion. Two distinct periods of Poland's
physical extinction preceded the Marshal's birth and death. A sense of
tragic futility regarding Poland's uncertain destiny, which appeared to
oppress others, rarely affected theMarshal. The one important element, he
believed, that guaranteed the perpetuity of national existence remained the
Polish people. Rydz belonged to that generation of patriots who selflessly
gave of themselves to restore and preserve their nation. As participants in
Poland's resurrection, theyjealously guarded their prerogatives indefining
their nation's welfare, entrusting it to only a select few. Following more
than a century of extinction, Poland's reappearance on themap of Europe
could not bring with it the immediate maturation of a national political
consciousness nor an indigenous school of military thought. During this
uncertain era of experimentation, who is to say that decisions, other than
those decided upon by Rydz and his collaborators, would have altered
Poland's fate? The most that anyone could offer, as theMarshal so aptly

niGazeta Polska, July 20, 1939.

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Marshal Smigly-Rydz in
Exile_51

stated, were "honest intentions and desires tomake real efforts."78The rest
remained outside the realm of human capability.

^Smigty-Rydz's Speech of Nov. 10,1936, J.P.I. M'SS\Smigly-Rydz Archives/Pismo Pana

Marszatka (Marshal's Writings).

COOPERATION between KENT STATE UNIVERSITY

and UNIVERSITY OF WARSAW

Kent State University inOhio has signed an agreement with the University
ofWarsaw which provides foran exchange of faculty and advanced doctoral
students and includes cooperation in more than a dozen fields of research.
Prof.Glenn A. Olds, President of Kent State University, said inannouncing
the agreement: "The agreement is significant because of our location. Be
cause of our strong Polish constituencies in northeastern Ohio, we can, I
believe, make this one of our strongest exchange programs in time."
President Olds also noted that the new agreement, "will have a strong

impact on further development of our Ethnic Heritage Program."

The Kent State/University ofWarsaw agreement provides forcooperation
in the following fields of research: administration and management, history,
mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, geology, education, journalism,
political science, philosophy and social sciences. Other fields may be added
later.

FOR MORE INFORMATIONCONTACT:

University News Service
Kent State University
Kent, Ohio 44242
Phone 216-672-2727

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