 Section 56 of Contract Act, 1872 does not apply when the alleged frustrating event

arises from the breach of a party

Banarasi Prashad vs. Mohiuddin Ahmad & Ors.; AIR 1924 Pat 586
Page 590-591

sum of Rs. 4,000 with interest against the representatives of the mortgagor
Birjan Chaudhury. Defendant No. 9 is the son and defendants 13 to 15 are the
grandsons of Birjan Chaudhury. Defendants 10 to 12 are the grandsons of
Baijnath Chaudhury. The plaint does not allege that Baijnath and Birjan were
joint but, on the contrary, specifies their shares in the property and therefore
they were presumably separate. The liability would, therefore, be confined to the
sons and grandsons of Birjan. Various objections to this liability were urged by
the learned Vakil for these respondents. First it was suggested that the cause of
action arose in 1907 when the loan became repayable and that the suit was
barred by time. But by the terms of the ijara the money became repayable
in Jeth1314 and every subsequent Jeth, and the cause of action under a
usufructuary mortgage would arise only on dispossession. Secondly, it was said
that after the interest of Birjan Chaudhury had been sold by the Civil Court on a
date not specified in the plaint the covenants of the ijara became impossible of
performance and, therefore, these respondents are protected by section 56 of
the Contract Act. Section 56, however, has no application to such circumstances
as these where the impossibility, if any, is due to the default of the contracting
party himself. Thirdly, it was said that under section 73 of the Transfer of
Property Act, the plaintiff had a charge upon the surplus sale-proceeds after the
sale for arrears of Government revenue. This is true and he might have followed
the surplus sale proceeds of the property. But he was not bound to do so and
the existence of this statutory charge is no bar to his seeking a decree against
the successors of Birjan Chaudhury. The decree, however, must be limited, to
the assets of Birjan Chaudhury in the hands of these defendants. Finally it was
said that there must be an account of the rent of Rs. 75 a year reserved in
the ijara and that unless it is proved by the plaintiff that this rent was regularly
paid, he is not entitled to the full sum of Rs. 4,000. But this question does not
arise on the pleadings. Paragraph 10 of the written statement of the defendants
9 and 10 says:

“The plaintiff has no right to obtain a decree for the ijara money,

inasmuch as he has failed to make any allegation about the payment of the
rent reserved, and to produce any account for the period of ijara.”
There is no allegation that the rent was not paid. This question was not put in
issue and no evidence was given about it and the point is not open to the
respondents.

 There must, therefore, be a decree against respondents 9 and 13 to 15 for a

sum of Rs. 4,000 with interest at 1 per cent, per mensem from the 28th March,
1918, until the date of the decree; the amount of the decree to carry future
interest at 6 per cent, per annum and to be realizable only from the assets of
Birjan Chaudhury, the mortgagor, which have come to the hands of these
defendants. To this extent the appeal is decreed with costs against defendant 9
and 13 to 15 and is dismissed against the other defendants, with costs to
defendants 1, 2 and 3. The costs will be in proportion to success.

Maritime National Fish Ltd. vs. Ocean Trawlers, Ltd.; AIR 1935 PC 128
Para 12
12. A reference to the record in the House of Lords confirms Lord Sumner's view
that the Court below had not considered the point, nor had they evidence or material
for its consideration. Indeed in the war time the Admiralty, when minded to requisition
a vessel, were not likely to give effect to the preference of an owner, but rather to the
suitability of the vessel for their needs or her immediate readiness and availability.
However the point does directly arise in the facts now before the Board and their
Lordships are of opinion that the loss of the St. Cuthbert's licence can correctly be
described, quoad the appellants as “a self-induced frustration”. Lord Sumner in 1926
AC 497 at p. 507 quotes from Lord Blackburn in 6 AC 38 , who at p. 53 refers to a
“frustration” as being a matter “caused by something for which neither party was
responsible”: and again (p. 508) he quotes Brett, J's. words which postulate as one of
the conditions of frustration that “it should be without any default of either party.” It
would be easy but is not necessary, to multiply quotations to the same effect. If either
of these tests is applied to this case, it cannot be predicated that what is here claimed
to be a frustration, that is, by reason of the withholding of the licence, was a matter
for which the appellants were not responsible or which happened without any default
on their part. In truth, it happened in consequence of their election. If it be assumed
that the performance of the contract was dependent on a licence being granted, it was
that election which prevented performance, and on that assumption it was the
appellants' own default which frustrated the adventure: the appellants cannot rely on
their own default to excuse them from liability under the contract. On this ground,
without determining any other question, the appeal should be dismissed with costs.

Ram Kumar Agarwalla v. PC Roy; AIR 1952 Cal 397

Para 36-38

36. The only question that was raised was whether the deft was excused from
performance or whether the contract became impossible of performance owing to the
requisition of the stock of rice. The requisition was made sometime in November, 1943
after the contract had been broken & the rights of the parties had crystallised. That
requisition did not happen during the time of performance & had no effect on the
rights of the parties. It is true that” by the letter of 16-2-1944, the plff. called upon
the deft, to take delivery of the rice within a fortnight. That letter was not replied to.
The deft, did not agree to take delivery within a fortnight. That letter merely contained
an offer which was not accepted. It had not the effect of reviving the contract which
had already been broken & the rights under which had already accrued. That letter had
not the effect of extending the time for performance unless the offer contained in that
letter was accepted by the deft. The result was that the rights which had accrued on 5
-10-1943 were not affected either by the requisition or by the letter of 16-2-1944. The
trial proceeded on the footing that the breach occurred on 5-10-1943. In those
circumstances, it was not open to the learned Judge to hold that the time for
performance had been extended. The requisition did not therefore make the
performance of the contract impossible & did not affect the rights of the parties—
37. Assuming that non-availability of wagons was the basis of the contract, the
deft, had to satisfy the Court that it made diligent efforts to secure wagons. Self-
induced frustration does not excuse performance. The learned Judge has found that the
deft, did its best to secure wagons. The evidence on this point was given by Sudhendu Bose
& P.C. Roy.
Bose says that he went to Katihar & saw the District Traffic Superintendent 3 or 4
times in August 1943. He tried to get wagons but did not succeed. (Q. 84-91). The
deft, company applied for wagons in writing & he had copies of such application (Q.
137-140). No copy was produced. P.C. Roy said that it was not his responsibility to get
wagons & he never agreed to supply wagons (Q. 38, 74). He however tried to secure
the wagons & saw one Mr. Basu & one Mr. Asrani (Q. 82, 86). He told them that he
wanted wagons but no wagons could be supplied. (Q. 91-2). He did not apply to the
Regional Controller of Wagons, who was responsible for the allotment. (Q. 146-7). He
applied to the Chief Commerciial Manager, Transportation, (Q. 150) & submitted to
him forms after signing them. No attempt was made to produce those applications.
But a letter dated 21-7-1943, written by the Divisional Superintendent Lalmonirhat, to
the deft, was produced purporting to be a reply to a letter of the deft. It is impossible
to connect this letter with any application by the deft. for wagons.
38. In my opinion, the evidence adduced is absolutely insufficient to prove that the
deft, made any serious endeavour for getting wagons. No copy of application made for
securing wagons was produced. It is common knowledge that for securing wagons,
written applications have to be made. Bose admitted that written applications had
been made. Roy also said that written applications were made. No copy was produced.
No attempt was made for production of the original applications by the Railways.

Ganga Saran vs. Firm Ram Charan Ram Gopal; AIR 1952 SC 9
Para 7-9

7. Even apart from the construction of the agreement, it seems to us that the plea
of the respondents must fail on their own admissions. The defendant has stated in his
evidence that he had not sold the 61 bales of cloth to any other person at the time he
received the telegraphic notice of £0-11-1941 {Exhibit l). On his own admission
therefore, he was in a position to supply 61 bales of the contracted goods at the time
when the breach of the agreement is alleged to have happened, That being so, we are
unable to hold that the performance of the contract had become impossible. The
matter however does not rest there. Guruprasad, a clerk of the Mills Company, who is
the second witness for the defendants, has made an important statement to the
following effect:
“The customers all place their requirements before the sales Manager. If the
goods required are ready, they are sold to the customers and if they are not ready
and if the customer wants them to be manufactured 1hey are delivered to the
customers after manufacture. An order book is maintained ct the Mills.” .
Such being the practice which prevailed in the Victoria Mills, ft was for the
defendants to show I that an order for the manufacture of the contracted goods was
placed with the Mills and yet the Mills failed to supply the goods. No such evidence has
however been offered by the defendants. The High Court -has surmised that it might
not have been possible to supply the goods within the period mentioned in the
agreement, but there is no material to support that statement.
8. In these circumstances, this is obviously not a case in which the doctrine of
frustration of contract can be invoked. That doctrine has been explained in a number
of cases, some of which are referred to in the judgment of the High Court, but the
latest pronouncement with regard to it is to be found in the speech of Viscount Simon
in British Movietonews Ltd. v. London & District Cinemas Ltd., (1951) 2 All ER 617 in
which the Lord Chancellor referred with approval to the following enunciation of the
doctrine by Earl Loreburn in a previous case :
“... a Court can and ought to examine the contract and the circumstances in
which it was made, not of course to vary, but only to explain it, in order to see
whether or not from the nature of it the parties must have made their bargain on
the footing that a particular thing or state of things would continue to exist. And if
they must have done so, then a term to that effect will be implied, though it be net
expressed in the contract. ... no Court has an absolving power, but it can infer from
the nature of the contract and the surrounding circumstances that a condition which
is not expressed was a foundation on which the parties contracted.”
9. It seems necessary for us to emphasize that so far as the Courts in this country
are concerned, they must look primarily to the law as embodied in Ss. 32 and 56,
Indian Contract Act, 1873. These sections run as follows:
“32. Contingent contracts to do or not to do anything if an uncertain future event
happens cannot be enforced by law unless and until that event has happened.
If the event becomes impossible such contracts become void.”
“56. An agreement to do an act impossible in itself is void.
A contrast to do an act which, alter the contract is made, becomes impossible,
or, by reason of some event which the promisor could not prevent, unlawful,
becomes void when the act becomes impossible or unlawful.
******
The enforcement of the agreement in question was, as we have already pointed out,
not contingent on the happening of an uncertain future event, nor does the present
case fall within the second paragraph of S. 56, which is the only pro vision which may be said
to have any relevancy to the plea put forward by the respondents. Clear-y, the
doctrine of frustration cannot avail a defendant, when the non-performance of a con-
tract is attributable to his own default.

Jwala Prasad v. Jwala Bank Ltd.; AIR 1957 All 143 @ 146
Para 20-21
20. The words of this section “by reason of some event which the promisor could
not prevent” are significant. Section 56 cannot apply to cases of non-performance of the
contract due to events happening because of the default of the contracting party
himself, vide Maritime National Fish Ltd. v. Ocean Trawlers Ltd., AIR 1935 PC 128 at p.
130 (G).
21. It is not disputed that the winding-up of the Bank followed the direction of the
Government of India prohibiting the Bank to stop accepting further deposits, because
of the activities of the Bank jeopardising the interests of depositors, in the
circumstances it cannot be said that the Bank went into liquidation by reason of an act
which the Bank could not control. In fact the Bank itself was responsible for bringing
about the state of affairs which compelled the court to order its winding-up.

Para 73-80

73. The view of Mr. Justice Upadhya was that the Company was under no liability to
pay the salary-money claimed.
74. The first question which arises is whether the winding-up order operates as a
dismissal of Sri Jwala Prasad. No notice of dismissal was actually served on him to this
effect by the official liquidator. The position seems to have been accepted in England
that an order for the compulsory winding-up of a company determines the powers of
Directors and effects their discharge and that it also puts an end to the employment of
a Managing Director: See 1893-1 Ch. D 724 at p. 730 (A) and Fowler v. Commercial
Timber Co., 1930-2 KB 1 : 99 LJ KB 529 (J).
75. So far as the Indian Companies' Act is concerned, there is no express provision
regarding the discharge of Directors or the dismissal of a Managing Director upon a
company going into liquidation, but it is evident from the relevant sections of the
Indian Companies' Act that the consequences of winding-up are that the Directors can
no longer discharge their duties.
76. The liquidator takes into his custody, or under his control, all the property,
effects and actionable claims to which the company is entitled and all such property
and effects of the company are deemed to be in the custody of the court as from the
date of the order for the winding-up of the company. See Section 178 of the Indian
Companies Act (Act VII) of 1913 and S. 456 of Act No. 1 of 1956.
77. The liquidator in a winding up by the court has the power, with the sanction of
the court, to carry on the business of the company, so far as may be necessary, for the
beneficial winding up of the company. (See Section 179 of the 1913 Act and S. 457 of
the 1956 Act). Section 179 of the old Act and S. 457 of the present Act also indicate
the powers of the liquidator which are to be exercised with the sanction of the court. It
is enough to quote these provisions to show that there is very little left which the
Directors or a Managing Director can do after a company has been wound up.
78. In these circumstances, the winding-up order virtually brings the office of the
Directors and Managing Directors to an end and it may be said that they cease to hold
their office once a winding up order is passed for they cannot carry on the business of
the company themselves. (See 36 Ind Cas 617 : AIR 1917 Mad 260 (1) (B)). So far as
the servants of the company are concerned under S. 172(3) of the previous 1913 Act,
the order of winding up constituted a notice of discharge to the servants of the
company except when the business of the company is continued.
79. Under S. 87-B(e) of the previous Act upon a winding—up order being made any
contract of management or managing agency is determined, though without prejudice
to the Managing agent's right to recover any money on account of the premature
contract of management.
80. In England, the principle applicable to the case of a servant or Manager whose
services are determined by an order of winding up was applied to the case of a
Managing Director. See 1916-2 Ch 309 (C). The view that a winding up order operates
as a wrongful dismissal of a Director was expressed in 1910-1 Ch 336 (D). In that
case, it was held that the defendant Director was no longer bound by a covenant which
restricted him from carrying on or being engaged or interested in the same business
which the company was doing before winding up.

Gambhirmull Mahabirprasad v. The Indian Bank Ltd.; AIR 1963 Cal 163
Para 51
51. I shall now consider if the agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant
No. 2 for arranging re-shipment of the goods was discharged or the performance
thereof was frustrated or rendered impossible by the failure of the plaintiff or its
agents to provide for a proper Export licence or by enemy action or by orders for
evacuation from Burma. I have held that there was no failure on the part of the
plaintiff or its agents to provide for a proper Export licence. The licence was received
by the Burma Company as an agent of the defendant No. 2, it appears from the evidence on
record, on the 2nd February, 1942. Lacey has said in question 213 that
the Burma Company had shipped hundred tons of rubber on the 19th February, 1942.
On this evidence of Lacey it would be reasonable to conclude that the Burma Company
after receiving the export licence on the 2nd February, 1942 had sufficient time to
arrange for re-shipment of the goods. Indeed Lacey has said in question 63 that if
Export licence had been received on the 7th February, 1942 re-shipment could
possibly have been effected in the premises I hold that the agreement between the
plaintiff and the defendant No. 2 for arranging re-shipment was not discharged nor
was its performance frustrated or rendered impossible either by failure on the part of
the plaintiff or its agents to provide for a proper Export licence or by enemy action or
by orders for evacuation from Burma. It should be remembered that the parties
entered into the contract in the unsettled conditions created by the Second World War
in view of the international situation the agent of the defendant No. 2 should have
foreseen the consequences of the delay in re-shipment of the goods: vide Monarch
Steamship Co. Ltd. v. Karlshamns Oljefabriker, (1949) AC 196. The delay in re-
shipping cannot be covered up by the plea of frustration. If at all, it is a case of self-
induced frustration.

Para 56
56. The fact that damages are difficult to estimate and cannot be assessed with
certainty or precision does not relieve the wrong-doer of the necessity of paying
damages for his breach of duty, and is no ground for awarding only nominal damages.
A distinction must be drawn, however, between cases where the difficulties are due to
uncertainty as to the causation of damage, where questions of remoteness arise, and
cases where they are due to the fact that assessment of damages cannot be made
with any mathematical accuracy. Lack of relevant evidence may make it impossible to
assess damages at all, as where the extent of the loss is dependent upon too many
contingencies, and in such cases, where the liability is established, nominal damages
only may be awarded. Where it is established, however, that damage has been
incurred for which a defendant should be held liable the plaintiff may be accorded the
benefit of every reasonable presumption as to the loss suffered. Thus the Court, or a jury
doing the best that can be done with insufficient material, may have to form
conclusions on matters on which there is no evidence, and to make allowance for
contingencies even to the extent of making a pure guess; this is of common
occurrence in claims made, for example, in respect of pain and suffering, loss of
expectation of life, and the loss of a chance of winning a price; Halsbury's Laws of
England, 3rd Edition, Vol. 11, page 226, Article 394.

D.R. Mehta v. Tin Plate Dealers; AIR 1965 Mad 400

Page 4-5
which the plaintiff agreed to take 25 tons of Electrolytic tin plate waste Waste from the
Bombay stock. But in the month of July the plaintiff received a letter, Ex. B-15,
wherein it was stated that in regard to 30 tons of Electrolytic tin plate Cobbles it would
be supplied at the next arrival of the steamer, and with regard to 25 tons of
Electrolytic tin plate waste Waste the plaintiff should make arrangements to take
delivery of the stock at Bombay office. But the plaintiff did not take delivery of the 25
tons of the Electrolytic tin plate waste Waste from the Bombay office. Therefore in
regard to this contract the plaintiff did not take any further steps to purchase the stock
from the respondent. Nor did the respondent take any steps to file a suit against the
plaintiff for damages for breach of contract. Therefore from the correspondence that
passed between the plaintiff and the respondent in respect of these two transactions
we are convinced that they are two separate contracts, and it cannot be said that
either there was a novation or substitution of contract in the place of the original
contract for 30 tons of Electrolytic tin plate cobbles.
When once we have come to the conclusion that they are two separate contracts, we
have to consider whether the respondent had committed a breach of contract in
respect of the supply of 30 tons of Electrolytic tin plate cobbles. It is clear that the
respondent did receive the goods of Electrolytic tin plate cobbles from America
between the months of July and August when the Deputy Iron and Steel controller
served a notice on him directing him not to remove or permit the removal of
Electrolytic tin plate cobbles from their stockyards or from any other part of the
company's premises to any place outside the precincts of such stockyard. This notice
Was served on them in August, 1957. Now the
Page: 78
respondent wanted to rely on this letter to plead that the contract to supply 30 tons of
Electrolytic tin plate cobbles to the plaintiff had become impossible of performance
and that there was no breach of contract on their part. On the other hand, if there was
no order in force, they would have delivered the goods to the plaintiff. A reading of the
Control Order only indicates that the respondent is prohibited from removing the
goods from the stockyard. They are not prohibited from selling the goods. They could
have taken permission from the Iron and Steel Controller to supply the materials to
the plaintiff as per their contract entered into in the month of April, 1957. They made
no attempt to apply to the concerned officers to supply the goods to the plaintiff. We
do not think that this is a case of impossibility of performance. There is no material
placed on behalf of the respondent that they sincerely attempted to sell the goods to
the plaintiff after obtaining the permission of the Steel Controller. Or they could have
written a letter to the plaintiff that they were ready and willing to supply the goods,
and could have kept apart tht 30 tons of Electrolytic tin plate cobbles in their
stockyard and as soon as the restriction was removed by the Iron and Steel Controller
they would supply them, or would sell or keep the goods in their godown on his behalf
subject to some terms and conditions for retaining the goods in their godown on his
behalf.
It is settled law that before we apply the principle that the contract has become
impossible of performance, the first duty is to ascertain the facts forming the basis of
the contract and see how far the change in the circumstances is such as to remove the
very foundation of the contract itself. The Court must as a fact determine whether the
circumstances did exist and if so whether they are sufficient to hold that the parties are
absolved from their obligations under the contract. It is the essence of the doctrine
that the event which causes frustration must have occurred without the fault of either
party. Therefore the Court ought to see whether it is a case of self-induced frustration
in which case there could be no defence at all. In Bank Line Ltd v. Artur Capel and Co.,
, Lord Sumner observed at page 452 :
“I think it is now well settled that the principle of frustration of an adventure
assumes that the frustration arises without blame or fault on either side. Reliance
cannot be placed on a self-induced frustration; indeed, such conduct might give the
other party the option to treat the contract as repudiated.“
In another case, viz., Mirji Mulji v. Cheong Yue Steamship Co.. , Lord Sumner quotes
a passage from the judgment in Dahl v. Nelson Donkin and Co., , where Lord
Blackburn refers to frustration as being a matter caused by something for which
neither party was responsible. Lord Sumner also referred to the observation of Brett J.,
in Jackson's case , that one of the conditions of frustration is that “ it should be
without any fault of either party.” In Maritime National Fish Ltd., v. Ocean Trawlwers
Ltd., , Lord Wright in delivering the judgment of the Board observed that the essence
of frustration is that it should not be due to the act or election of the party and it
should be without a fault of either party. In Galliakotwala and Co., v. Narasimhan and
Bros , Krishnaswami Nayudu J., held :
“In a case where a defence of frustration is raised what the Court has to consider is
not whether one party or the other has done anything from which responsibility for
any breach of contract could be ascertained, but to see whether the circumstances
pleaded did exist which could reasonably be considered as sufficient to hold that
the parties are absolved from their obligations under the contract.”
The short facts in that case are the following: At the relevant time of the contract
there was a control which prohibited expert of starch outside the district or province
except on permits. The defendants, who were the sellers had in the first instance
applied for an export permit, but unltimately withdrew the application. The defendants
pleaded that they tried to secure the licence but as they were not able to get it, there
was impossibility of performance. This contention was repelled by the learned Judges,
who observed as follows at page 380 :

Page: 79
“It will not be open in such a case for a party, whose duty it is to apply for permit, to
refuse to apply for permit, or to withdraw the application, as in the present case, and
then plead that the contract has become discharged by reason of the prohibition
against export relying upon the control order. There was no refusal of permit in the
present case, but no opportunity was given to the authorities to grant a permit in vfew
of the defendants' conduct in withdrawing the application. The absence of a permit to
export in this case could reasonably be considered to be the cnnsequence of the
defendant's withdrawal of the application. The defendant's liability to perform the
contract therefore is due to their own default and it would not be open for them to
plead frustration.”

Boothalinga Agencies v. V.T.C. Poriaswanmi Nadar: AIR 1969 SC 110

Para 12
12. Counsel on behalf of the respondent, however, contended that the contract was
not impossible of performance and the appellant cannot take recourse to the
provisions of Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act. It was contended that under
clause 1 of the Import Trade Control Order No. 2-ITC/48, dated March 6, 1948 it was
open to the appellant to apply for a written permission of the licensing authority to sell
the chicory. It is not shown by the appellant that he applied for such permission and
the licensing authority had refused such permission. It was therefore maintained on
behalf of the respondent that the contract was not impossible of performance. We do
not think there is any substance in this argument. It is true that the licensing
authority could have given written permission for disposal of the chicory under clause
1 of Order 2-ITC/48, dated March 6, 1948 but the condition imposed in Ex. B-9 in the
present case is a special condition imposed under clause (v) of para (a) of Order 2-
ITC/48, dated March 6, 1948 and there was no option given under this clause for the
licensing authority to modify the condition of licence that “the goods will be utilised
only for consumption as raw material or accessories in the licence holder's factory and
that no portion thereof will be sold to any party”. It was further argued on behalf of
the respondent that, in any event, the appellant could have purchased chicory from
the open market and supplied it to the respondent in terms of the contract. There is no
substance in this argument also. Under the contract the quality of chicory to be sold
was chicory of specific description— “Egberts Chicory, packed in 495 wooden cases,
each case containing 2 tins of 56 1b. nett”. The delivery of the chicory was to be given
by “S.S. Alwaki” in December, 1955. It is manifest that the contract, Ex. A-1 was for
sale of certain specific goods as described therein and it was not open to the appellant
to supply chicory of any other description. Reference was made on behalf of the
respondent to the decision in Maritime National Fish, Limited v. Ocean Trawlers,
Limited . In that case, the respondents chartered to the appellants a steam trawler
fitted with an otter trawl. Both parties knew at the time of the contract that it was
illegal to use an otter trawl without a licence from the Canadian government. Some
months later the appellants applied for licences for five trawlers which they were
operating, including the respondents' trawler. They were informed that only three
licences would be granted, and were requested to state for which of the three trawlers
they desired to have licences. They named three trawlers other than the respondents',
and then claimed that they were no longer bound by the charter-party as its object
had been frustrated. It was held by the Judicial Committee that the failure of the
contract was the result of the appellants' own election, and that there was therefore no
frustration of the contract. We think the principle of this case applies to the Indian law
and the provisions of Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act cannot apply to a case of
“self-induced frustration”. In other words, the doctrine of frustration of contract cannot
apply where the event which is alleged to have frustrated the contract arises from the
act or election of a party. But for the reasons already given, we hold that this principle
cannot be applied to the present case for there was no choice or election left to the
appellant to supply chicory other than under the terms of the contract. On the other
hand, there was a positive prohibition imposed by the licence upon the appellant not
to sell the imported chicory to any other party but he was permitted to utilise it only
for consumption as raw material in his own factory. We, are accordingly of the opinion
that Counsel for the respondent has been unable to make good his argument on this
aspect of the case.

Ved Prakash Gupta v. Shishu Pal Singh; AIR 1984 All 288
Para 16

16. In Boothalinga Agencies v. V.T.C. Poriaswami Nadar (AIR 1969 SC 110) it was
held that the doctrine of frustration does not apply to a self induced frustration. The
defendant-appellant having chosen not to obtain the necessary permission during the
period within which he was under an obligation to perform the contract he could not
invoke the doctrine of frustration in his favour. In Mugneeram Bangur & Co. Pvt. Ltd.
(AIR 1965 SC 1523) (supra) the contract was not found to be discharged and it was
held that “if the performance of the contract is rendered unlawful either for a
determinate period of time or for an indeterminate period of time the contract would
not stand discharged unless the ban on its performance existed on the day or during
the time in which it has to be performed. I have already held that time was not of the
essence of the contract and the restriction on transfer was only temporary. There was no
absolute ban on the performance of the contract during the period 1-1-1973 to 31-
3-1973. The transfer could be made with the permission of the competent authority.
The contract in the circumstances did not stand discharged.