G.R. No.
L-10195 December 29, 1916 denying each and all of the allegations thereof and of the defendants' special defense. The
YU CON, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GLICERIO IPIL, NARCISO LAURON, and JUSTO SOLAMO, defendants-appellants.
Felix Sevilla y Macam for appellants.
Juan Singson and Dionisio Jakosalem for appellee.
ARAULLO, J.:
The purpose of the action brought in these proceedings is to enable the plaintiff to recover
from the defendants jointly and severally the sum of P450, which had been delivered by
the plaintiff to the first and third of the above-named defendants, master and supercargo,
respectively, of a banca named Maria belonging to the second defendant, to be carried,
together with various merchandise belonging to the plaintiff, from the port of Cebu to the
town of Catmon of the Province of Cebu. By virtue of the contract executed between the
said second defendant and the plaintiff, the money and merchandise were to be
transported by the said craft between the points above-named in consideration of the
payment of a certain sum for each voyage. The money disappeared from said craft during
the night of October 18, 1911, while it was anchored in the port of Cebu and ready to sail
for its destination, Catmon, and was not afterwards found. The plaintiff based his action on
the charge that the disappearance of said sum was due to the abandonment, negligence,
or voluntary breach, on the part of the defendants, of the duty they had in respect to the
safe-keeping of the aforementioned sum.
The defendants, besides denying the allegations of the complaint, pleaded in special
defense that the plaintiff, at his own expense and under his exclusive responsibility,
chartered the said banca, the property of the defendant Lauron, for the fixed period of
three days, at the price of P10 per diem, and that, through the misfortune, negligence, or
abandonment of the plaintiff himself, the loss complained of occurred, while
said banca was at anchor in the port of Cebu, and was caused by theft committed by
unknown thieves. They further alleged that said defendant Lauron, the owner of
the banca merely placed this craft at the disposal of the plaintiff for the price and period
agreed upon, and did not go with the banca on its voyage from Catmon to Cebu. As a
counterclaim, the defendants also asked that the plaintiff be ordered to pay the freight
agreed upon, which had not yet been paid, amounting to P80, plus the sum of P70, as an
indemnity for the losses and damages caused them by the attachment of the banca,
issued at the instance of the plaintiff upon filing his complaint. They also prayed for the
additional sum of P100, for the deterioration of the said banca, and also that of P200 for
other deterioration suffered by the same since November, 1911, and which had not been
paid for. Finally, the defendants asked to be absolved from the complaint.
Before commencing the hearing of this case, the defendants made a verbal motion asking
that the plaintiff be declared in default, with respect to the counterclaim filed by them in
their answer. On the same date, the plaintiff presented his answer to said counter claim,
aforementioned motion was overruled by the court, and the defendants excepted.
At the termination of the trial, the court, in view of the evidence adduced, held that there
was no room to doubt that the sole cause of the disappearance of the money from the
said banca was the negligence of the master and the supercargo, the defendants Ipil and
Solamo, respectively, and that the defendant Narciso Lauron was responsible for that
negligence, as owner of the banca, pursuant to articles 589, 587, and 618 of the Code of
Commerce, the plaintiff therefore being entitled to recover the amount lost. Judgment was
rendered on April 20, 1914, in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants jointly and
severally for the sum of P450, with interest thereon at the rage of 6 per cent per annum
from the date of filing of the complaint, October 24, 1911, with costs. The plaintiff was
absolved from the defendant's counterclaim. From this judgment the defendants excepted
and at the same time moved for a new trial. Their motion was denied, to which ruling they
also excepted, and, through the proper bill of exceptions, entered and appeal to this
Supreme Court. In their brief they allege that the trial court erred:
1. In applying articles 586, 587, and 618 of the Code of Commerce in favor of the
plaintiff;
2. In overruling the motion for default presented by the defendants and in sentencing
the defendants jointly and severally to pay the plaintiff the amount mentioned in the
judgment; and
3. In absolving the plaintiff from the defendant's counterclaim.
The evidence shows that the plaintiff Yu Con, a merchant and a resident of the town of
San Nicolas, of the city of Cebu, engaged in the sale of cloth and domestic articles and
having a share in a shop, or small store, situated in the town of Catmon, of said province,
had several times chartered from the defendant Narciso Lauron, a banca  named Maria
belonging to the latter, of which Glicerio Ipil was master and Justo Solamo, supercargo, for
the transportation of certain merchandise and some money to and from the said town and
the port of Cebu, that, on or about the 17th of October, 1911, the plaintiff chartered the
said banca from the defendant Lauron for the transportation of various merchandise from
the port of Cebu to Catmon, at the price of P45 for the round trip, which merchandise was
loaded on board the said craft which was then at anchor in front of one of the graded fills
of the wharf of said port; that in the afternoon of the following day, he delivered to the
other two defendants, Ipil, and Solamo, master and supercargo, respectively, of the afore-
named banca, the sum of P450, which was in a trunk belonging to the plaintiff and was
taken charge of by said two defendants, who received this money from the plaintiff, for
the purpose of its delivery to the latter's shop in Catmon for the purchase of corn in this
town; that while the money was still in said truck abroad the vessel, on the night of the
said 18th of October, the time scheduled for the departure of the Maria  from the port of
Cebu, said master and said supercargo transferred the P450 from the plaintiff's trunk,
where it was, to theirs, which was in a stateroom of the banca, from which stateroom both
the trunk and the money disappeared during that same night, and that the investigations,
made to ascertain their whereabouts, produced no result.
The facts are also admitted by the aforementioned master and supercargo, two of the
defendants, that they received from the plaintiff said P450, which sum was in the latter's
own trunk which was placed outside the stateroom of the banca, for the reason, as they
said, that there was no room for it inside the stateroom; that these defendants therefore
transferred said money to their trunk, which was inside the stateroom, and that this trunk
and the P450 therein contained disappeared from the boat during the night of that same
day; that said sum had not been found or returned to the plaintiff; that the plaintiff, being
on the banca in the afternoon of that day, when his trunk containing the P450 was carried
aboard, and seeing that said two defendants, who had the key of the trunk, has removed
said sum to their trunk inside the stateroom, charged them to take special care of the
money; that the master Ipil assured the plaintiff that there was no danger of the money
being lost; and that, final, during the night in question, both the master and the
supercargo and four cabin-boys were aboard the banca.
It was likewise proven by the affidavits made by the master Ipil, the supercargo Solamo,
and the cabin-boys of said vessel, Juan Quiamco and Gabriel Basang, before the provincial
fiscal of Cebu on the day following the commission of the theft, which affidavits were
presented at the trial as Exhibits A, 3, 4, and 5, and by the testimony given at the trial by
the defendants Ipil and Solamo, that both said cabin-boys and the other two, Simeon
Solamo, and said cabin-boys ad the other two, Simeon Solamo, and Eulalio Quiamco,
knew of the existence of the money in the trunk inside the stateroom and witnessed its
removal to said trunk from the plaintiff's; that the last two cabin- boys above-named, in
company with the master and the supercargo, conveyed the plaintiff's trunk, in which the
money was previously contained, from the plaintiff's shop to the banca; and that no
person not belonging to the vessel knew that the money was in the trunk inside said
stateroom.
According to the testimony of the master Ipil himself he slept outside the stateroom that
night, but a cabin-boy named Gabriel slept inside. The latter, however, was not presented
by the defendants to be examined in regard to this point, nor does it appear that he
testified in respect thereto in his affidavit, Exhibit 5, before referred to, presented by the
defendant's own counsel. The master Ipil and the supercargo Solamo also testified that
they left the cabin-boy Simeon Solamo on guard that night; but this affirmation was not
corroborated by Solamo at the trial, for he was not introduced as a witness, and only his
affidavit, Exhibit 2, taken before the fiscal of Cebu on the day following the commission of
the crime, was presented by the defendants. This affidavit, which should have been
admitted and not rejected, as was done by the court and excepted to by the defendants,
shows that Simeon Solamo stated that he was not designated to do guard duty that night,
but that on the morning of the said 19th of October, that is, the next day, all agreed that
affiant should say that he was on guard, though it was not true that he was.
Finally, said two defendants, the master and the supercargo, gave no satisfactory
explanation in regard to the disappearance of the trunk and the money therein contained,
from the stateroom in which the trunk was, nor as to who stole or might have stolen it.
The master of the banca  merely testified that they, he and the supercargo, did to know
who the robbers were, for, when the robbery was committed, they were sound asleep, as
they were tired, and that he believed that the guard Simeon also fell asleep because he,
too, was tired. The second defendant gave the same testimony. Both of them testified that
the small window of the stateroom had been broken, and the first of them,  i.e., the
master, stated that all the window-blinds had been removed from the windows, as well as
part of the partition in which they were, and that the trunk in which the money was
contained could have been passed through said small window, because, as this witness
himself had verified, the Chinaman's trunk, which differed but a little from the one stolen,
could be passed through the same opening. The chief pilot of the harbor of Cebu, Placido
Sepeda, who officially visited the said banca, also stated that the small wooden window of
the stateroom was broken, and that he believed that in breaking it much noise must have
been produced. However, no evidence whatever was offered by counsel for the defendants
to prove that it might have been possible to remove the trunk from the stateroom through
the opening made by the breaking of the small window, neither was the size of the trunk
proven, in relation to the Chinaman's to which the defendant master referred in his
testimony, so that it might be verified whether the statement made by the latter was true,
viz., that it might have been possible to remove from the stateroom through said opening
the trunk in which the P450 were contained, which sum, the same as the trunk, its
container, had not been found, in spite of the investigation made for the purpose.
Furthermore, it was not proven, nor is there any circumstantial evidence to show, that the
robbery in question was committed by persons not belonging to the craft.
It is therefore beyond all doubt that the loss or disappearance, on the night
aforementioned, of the P450, the property of the plaintiff, which, were in the possession of
the defendants, the master and the supercargo of the banca Maria, occurred through the
manifest fault and negligence of said defendants, for, not only did they fail to take the
necessary precautions in order that the stateroom containing the trunk in which they kept
the money should be properly guarded by members of the crew and put in such condition
that it would be impossible to steal the trunk from it or that persons not belonging to the
vessel might force an entrance into the stateroom from the outside, but also they did not
expressly station some person inside the stateroom for the guarding and safe-keeping of
the trunk, for it was not proven that the cabin-boy Gabriel slept there, as the master of
the vessel, Ipil, stated, nor that the other Cabin-boy, Simeon Solamo, was on guard that
night, for the latter contradicted the statements made by the two defendants on this point.
On the contrary, it was proven by the master's own statement that all the people of the
vessel, including himself and the supercargo Solamo, slept soundly that night; which fact
cannot, in any manner, serve them as an excuse, nor can it be accepted as an explanation
of the statement that they were not aware of what was then occuring on board, if the
trunk was actually stolen by outsiders and removed through the small window of the
stateroom, a detail which also was not proven, but, on the contrary, increases their
liability, because it is very strange that none of them, who were six and were around or
near the stateroom, should have heard the noise which the robbers must have made in
breaking its window. All of these circumstances, together with that of its having been
impossible to know who took the trunk and the money and the failure to recover the one
or the other make the conduct of the two defendants and of the other members of the
crew of banca, eminently supicious and prevent our holding that the disappearance or loss
of the money was due to a fortuitous event, to force majeure, or that it was an occurrence
which could not have been foreseen, or which, if foreseen, was inevitable.
It is unquestionable that the defendants Glicerio Ipil and Justo Solamo were the carriers of
the said P450 belonging to the plaintiff, and that they received this sum from the latter for
the purpose of delivering it to the store of the town of Catmon, to which it had been
consigned. Under such circumstances, said defendants were the depositaries of the
money.
Manresa, in his Commentaries on the Civil Code (Vol. 10, p. 773), in treating of the
provisions of the said code concerning transportation by sea and by land of both persons
and things, says:
Liability of carriers. — In order that a thing may be transported, it must be delivered to
the carrier, as the Code says. From the time it is delivered to the carrier or shipper until
it is received by the consignee, the carrier has it in his possession, as a necessary
condition for its transportation, and is obliged to preserve and guard it; wherefore it is
but natural and logical that he should be responsible for it.
The Code discovers in the relation of all these elements the factors which go to make
up the conception of a trust, and, taking into account that the delivery of the thing on
the part of the shipper is unavoidable, if the transportation is to take place, esteem
that, at least in certain respects, such trusts are necessary.
The said two defendants being the depositaries of the sum in question, and they having
failed to exercise for its safe-keeping the diligence required by the nature of the obligation
assumed by them and by the circumstances of the time and the place, it is evident that, in
pursuance of the provisions of articles 1601 and 1602, in their relation to articles 1783
and 1784, and as prescribed in articles 1770, of the Civil Code, they are liable for its loss
or misplacement and must restore it to the plaintiff, together with the corresponding
interest thereon as an indemnity for the losses and damages caused him through the loss
of the said sum.
With respect to the other defendant, Narciso Lauron, as he was the owner of the vessel in
which the loss or misplacement of the P450 occurred, of which vessel, as aforestated,
Glicerio Ipil was master and Justo Solamo, supercargo, both of whom were appointed to,
or chosen for, the positions they held, by the defendant himself, and, as the
aforementioned sum was delivered to the said master, Ipil, and the merchandise to be
transported by means of said vessel from the port of Cebu to the town of Catmon was
laden by virtue of a contract executed by and between the plaintiff and the owner of the
vessel, Narciso Lauron, it behooves us to examine whether the latter, also, should be held
to be liable, as requested by the plaintiff in his complaint.
Said vessel was engaged in the transportation of merchandise by sea and made voyages
to and from the port of Cebu to Catmon, and had been equipped and victualed for this
purpose by its owner, Narciso Lauron, with whom, as aforesaid, the plaintiff contracted for
the transportation of the merchandise which was to be carried, on the date hereinabove
mentioned, from the port of Cebu to the town of Catmon.
For legal purposes, that is, for the determination of the nature and effect of the relations
created between the plaintiff, as owner of the merchandise laden on said craft and of the
money that was delivered to the master, Ipil, and the defendant Lauron, as owner of the
craft, the latter was a vessel, according to the meaning and construction given to the word
vessel in the Mercantile Code, in treating of maritime commerce, under Title 1, Book 3.
The word vessel  serves to designate every kind of craft by whatever particular or
technical name it may now be known or which nautical advancements may give it in
the future. (Commentaries on the Code of Commerce, in the General Review of
Legislation and Jurisprudence, founded by D. Jose Reus y Garcia, Vol., 2 p. 136.)
According to the Dictionary of Legislation and Jurisprudence by Escriche, a vessel is any
kind of craft, considering solely the hull.
Blanco, the commentator on mercantile law, in referring to the grammatical meaning of
the word "ship" and "vessels," says, in his work aforecited, that these terms designate
every kind of craft, large or small, whether belonging to the merchant marine or to the
navy. And referring to their juridical meaning, he adds: "This does not differ essentially
from the grammatical meaning; the words "ship" and "vessel" also designate every craft,
large or small, so long as it be not an accessory of another, such as the small boat of a
vessel, of greater or less tonnage. This definition comprises both the craft intended for
ocean or for coastwise navigation, as well as the floating docks, mud lighters, dredges,
dumpscows or any other floating apparatus used in the service of an industry or in that of
maritime commerce. . . ." (Vol. 1, p. 389.)
According to the foregoing definitions, then, we should that the banca  called Maria,
chartered by the plaintiff Yu Con from the defendant Narciso Lauron, was a "vessel",
pursuant to the meaning this word has in mercantile law, that is, in accordance with the
provisions of the Code of Commerce in force.
Glicerio Ipil, the master of the said banca  Maria, must also be considered as its captain, in
the legal acceptation of this word.
The same Code of Commerce in force in these Islands compares, in its article 609,
masters with captains. It is to be noted that in the Code of Commerce of Spain the
denomination of arraeces is not included in said article as equivalent to that of masters, as
it is in the Code of these Islands.
Commenting on said article, the aforementioned General Review of Legislation and
Jurisprudence says:
The name of captain or master is given, according to the kind of vessel, to the person
in charge of it.
The first denomination is applied to those who govern vessels that navigate the high
seas or ships of large dimensions and importance, although they be engaged in the
coastwise trade.
 Masters are those who command smaller ships engaged exclusively in the coastwise
trade.
For the purposes of maritime commerce, the words "captain" and "master" have the
same meaning; both being the chiefs or commanders of ships. (Vol. 2, p. 168.)
Article 587 of the Code of Commerce in force provides:
The agent shall be civilly liable for the indemnities in favor of third persons which arise
from the conduct of the captain in the care of the goods which the vessel carried; but
he may exempt himself therefrom by abandoning the vessel with all her equipments
and the freight he may have earned during the trip.
Article 618 of the same Code also prescribes:
The captain shall be civilly liable to the agent and the latter to the third persons who
may have made contracts with the former —
1. For all the damages suffered by the vessel and its cargo by reason of want of skill or
negligence on his part, If a misdemeanor or crime has been committed he shall be
liable in accordance with the Penal Code.
2. For all the thefts committed by the crew, reserving his right of action against the
guilty parties.
The Code of Commerce previous to the one now in force, to wit, that of 1829, in its article
624, provided that the agent or shipowner should not be liable for any excesses which,
during the navigation, might be committed by the captain and crew, and that, for the
reason of such excesses, it was only proper to bring action against the persons and
property of those found guilty.
Estasen, in his work on the Institutes of Mercantile Law (Vol. 4, p. 280), makes the
following remarks, in referring to the exposition of reasons presented by the Code
Commission which prepared and presented for approval the Code of Commerce now in
force, in which exposition of reasons were set forth the fundamental differences between
the provisions contained in both codes, with respect to the subject-matter now under
discussion. He says:
Another very important innovation introduced by the Code is that relative to the liability
for misdemeanors and crimes committed by the captain or by members of the crew.
This is a matter of the greatest importance on which a variety of opinions has been
expressed by different juris-consults.
The old code declares the captain civilly liable for all damage sustained by the vessel or
its cargo through lack of skill or care on his part, through violations of the law, or
through unlawful acts committed by the crew. As regards the agent or shipowners, it
declares in unmistakeable terms that he shall in no wise be liable for any excesses
which, during the navigation, may be committed by the captain and the crew.
Upon an examination, in the light of the principles of modern law, of the standing legal
doctrine on the non-liability of the shipowner for the unlawful acts, that is, the crimes
or quasi crimes, committed by the captain and the crew, it is observed that it cannot be
maintained in the absolute and categorical terms in which it is formulated.
It is well and good that the shipowner be not held criminally liable for such crimes or
quasi crimes; but the cannot be excused from liability for the damage and harm which,
in consequence of those acts, may be suffered by the third parties who contracted
with the captain, in his double capacity of agent and subordinate of the shipowner
himself. In maritime commerce, the shippers and passengers in making contracts with
the captain do so through the confidence they have in the shipowner who appointed
him; they presume that the owner made a most careful investigation before appointing
him, and, above all, they themselves are unable to make such an investigation, and
even though they should do so, they could not obtain complete security, inasmuch as
the shipowner can, whenever he sees fir, appoint another captain instead.
The shipowner is in the same case with respect to the members of the crew, for,
though he does not appoint directly, yet, expressly or tacitly, he contributes to their
appointment.
On the other hand, if the shipowner derives profits from the results of the choice of the
captain and the crew, when the choice turns out successful, it is also just that he
should suffer the consequences of an unsuccessful appointment, by application of the
rule of natural law contained in the Partidas, viz., that he who enjoys the benefits
derived from a thing must likewise suffer the losses that ensue therefrom.
Moreover, the Penal Code contains a general principle that resolves the question under
consideration, for it declares that such persons as undertake and carry on any industry
shall be civilly liable, in default of those who may be criminally liable, for the
misdemeanors and crimes committed by their subordinates in the discharge of their
duties.
The Code of Commerce in force omits the declaration of non-liability contained in the
old code, and clearly makes the shipowner liable civilly for the loss suffered by those
who contracted with the captain, in consequence of the misdemeanors and crimes
committed by the latter or by the members of the crew.
It is therefore evident that, in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Commerce in
force, which are applicable to the instance case, the defendant Narciso Lauron, as the
proprietor and owner of the craft of which Glicerio Ipil was the master and in which,
through the fault and negligence of the latter and of the supercago Justo Solamo, there
occurred the loss, theft, or robbery of the P450 that belonged to the plaintiff and were
delivered to said master and supercargo, a theft which, on the other hand, as shown by
the evidence, does not appear to have been committed by a person not belonging to the
craft, should, for said loss or theft, be held civilly liable to the plaintiff, who executed with
said defendant Lauron the contract for the transportation of the merchandise and money
aforementioned between the port of Cebu and the town of Catmon, by means of the said
craft.
Therefore, the trial court did not err in so holding in the judgement appealed from.
The plaintiff having filed his answer to the cross-complaint as soon as the defendant
presented their motion for] a declaration of the plaintiff's default in connection with said
cross-complaint, and it being optional with the court to make in such cases the declaration
of default, as provided in section 129 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the said court did not
incur the second error assigned by the appellants in their brief.
Lastly, as the banca Maria  did not make the trip she should have made from the port of
Cebu to the town of Catmon, on the occasion in question, through cases chargeable, as
has been seen, to the captain and the supercargo of said banca, to wit, because of the
loss, theft of robbery of the P450 belonging to the plaintiff, and as a contract was made for
the transportation of the said sum and the merchandise from one of said points to the
other, for the round trip, and not through payment by the plaintiff of the wages due the
crew for each day, as alleged by the defendants, for the proofs presented by the latter in
regard to this point were insufficient, as the trial court so held, neither did the latter incur
error in overruling the cross-complaint formulated by the defendants in their answer
against the plaintiff.
Therefore, and for all the reasons above set forth, we affirm the judgment appealed from,
with the costs of this instance against the appellants. So ordered.
G.R. No. 115286 August 11, 1994
INTER-ORIENT MARITIME ENTERPRISES, INC., SEA HORSE SHIP, INC. and
TRENDA WORLD SHIPPING (MANILA), INC., petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and RIZALINO D.
TAYONG, respondents.
Marilyn Cacho-Naoe for petitioners.
Wilfred L. Pascasio for private respondent.
FELICIANO, J.:
Private respondent Captain Rizalino Tayong, a licensed Master Mariner with experience in
commanding ocean-going vessels, was employed on 6 July 1989 by petitioners Trenda
World Shipping (Manila), Inc. and Sea Horse Ship Management, Inc. through petitioner
Inter-Orient Maritime Enterprises, Inc. as Master of the vessel M/V Oceanic Mindoro, for a
period of one (1) year, as evidenced by an employment contract. On 15 July 1989,
Captain Tayong assumed command of petitioners' vessel at the port of Hongkong. His
instructions were to replenish bunker and diesel fuel, to sail forthwith to Richard Bay,
South Africa, and there to load 120,000 metric tons of coal.
On 16 July 1989, while at the Port of Hongkong and in the process of unloading cargo,
Captain Tayong received a weather report that a storm code-named "Gordon" would
shortly hit Hongkong. Precautionary measures were taken to secure the safety of the
vessel, as well as its crew, considering that the vessel's turbo-charger was leaking and the
vessel was fourteen (14) years old.
On 21 July 1989, Captain Tayong followed-up the requisition by the former captain of
the Oceanic Mindoro for supplies of oxygen and acetylene, necessary for the welding-
repair of the turbo-charger and the economizer. This requisition had been made upon
request of the Chief Engineer of the vessel and had been approved by the shipowner.
On 25 July 1989, the vessel sailed from Hong Kong for Singapore. In the Master's sailing
message, Captain Tayong reported a water leak from M.E. Turbo Charger No. 2 Exhaust
gas casing. He was subsequently instructed to blank off the cooling water and maintain
reduced RPM unless authorized by the owners.
On 29 July 1989, while the vessel was en route to Singapore, Captain Tayong reported
that the vessel had stopped in mid-ocean for six (6) hours and forty-five (45) minutes due
to a leaking economizer. He was instructed to shut down the economizer and use the
auxiliary boiler instead.
On 31 July 1989 at 0607 hrs., the vessel arrived at the port of Singapore. The Chief
Engineer reminded Captain Tayong that the oxygen and acetylene supplies had not been
delivered. Captain Tayong inquired from the ship's agent in Singapore about the supplies.
The ship agent stated that these could only be delivered at 0800 hours on August 1, 1989
as the stores had closed.
Captain Tayong called the shipowner, Sea Horse Ship Management, Ltd., in London and
informed them that the departure of the vessel for South Africa may be affected because
of the delay in the delivery of the supplies.
Sea Horse advised Captain Tayong to contact its Technical Director, Mr. Clark, who was in
Tokyo and who could provide a solution for the supply of said oxygen and acetylene.
On the night of 31 July 1989, Mr. Clark received a call from Captain Tayong informing him
that the vessel cannot sail without the oxygen and acetylene for safety reasons due to the
problems with the turbo charger and economizer. Mr. Clark responded that by shutting off
the water to the turbo chargers and using the auxiliary boiler, there should be no further
problems. According to Mr. Clark, Captain Tayong agreed with him that the vessel could
sail as scheduled on 0100 hours on 1 August 1989 for South Africa.
According to Captain Tayong, however, he communicated to Sea Horse his reservations
regarding proceeding to South Africa without the requested supplies, and was advised by
Sea Horse to wait for the supplies at 0800 hrs. of 1 August 1989, which Sea Horse had
arranged to be delivered on board the Oceanic Mindoro. At 0800 hours on 1 August 1989,
the requisitioned supplies were delivered and Captain Tayong immediately sailed for
Richard Bay.
When the vessel arrived at the port of Richard Bay, South Africa on 16 August 1989,
Captain Tayong was instructed to turn-over his post to the new captain. He was thereafter
repatriated to the Philippines, after serving petitioners for a little more than two weeks. He
was not informed of the charges against him.
On 5 October 1989, Captain Tayong instituted a complaint for illegal dismissal before the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration ("POEA"), claiming his unpaid salary for
the unexpired portion of the written employment contract, plus attorney's fees.
Petitioners, in their answer to the complaint, denied that they had illegally dismissed
Captain Tayong. Petitioners alleged that he had refused to sail immediately to South Africa
to the prejudice and damage of petitioners. According to petitioners, as a direct result of
Captain Tayong's delay, petitioners' vessel was placed "off-hire" by the charterers for
twelve (12) hours. This meant that the charterers refused to pay the charter hire or
compensation corresponding to twelve (12) hours, amounting to US$15,500.00, due to
time lost in the voyage. They stated that they had dismissed private respondent for loss of
trust and confidence.
The POEA dismissed Captain Tayong's complaint and held that there was valid cause for
his untimely repatriation. The decision of the POEA placed considerable weight on
petitioners' assertion that all the time lost as a result of the delay was caused by Captain
Tayong and that his concern for the oxygen and acetylene was not legitimate as these
supplies were not necessary or indispensable for running the vessel. The POEA believed
that the Captain had unreasonably refused to follow the instructions of petitioners and
their representative, despite petitioners' firm assurances that the vessel was seaworthy for
the voyage to South Africa.
On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission ("NLRC") reversed and set aside the
decision of the POEA. The NLRC found that Captain Tayong had not been afforded an
opportunity to be heard and that no substantial evidence was adduced to establish the
basis for petitioners' loss of trust or confidence in the Captain. The NLRC declared that he
had only acted in accordance with his duties to maintain the seaworthiness of the vessel
and to insure the safety of the ship and the crew. The NLRC directed petitioners to pay the
Captain (a) his salary for the unexpired portion of the contract at US$1,900.00 a month,
plus one (1) month leave benefit; and (b) attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent (10%)
of the total award due.
Petitioners, before this Court, claim that the NLRC had acted with grave abuse of
discretion. Petitioners allege that they had adduced sufficient evidence to establish the
basis for private respondent's discharge, contrary to the conclusion reached by the NLRC.
Petitioners insist that Captain Tayong, who must protect the interest of petitioners, had
caused them unnecessary damage, and that they, as owners of the vessel, cannot be
compelled to keep in their employ a captain of a vessel in whom they have lost their trust
and confidence. Petitioners finally contend that the award to the Captain of his salary
corresponding to the unexpired portion of the contract and one (1) month leave pay,
including attorney's fees, also constituted grave abuse of discretion.
The petition must fail.
We note preliminarily that petitioners failed to attach a clearly legible, properly certified,
true copy of the decision of the NLRC dated 23 April 1994, in violation of requirement no.
3 of Revised Circular No. 1-88. On this ground alone, the petition could have been
dismissed. But the Court chose not to do so, in view of the nature of question here raised
and instead required private respondent to file a comment on the petition. Captain Tayong
submitted his comment. The Office of the Solicitor General asked for an extension of thirty
(30) days to file its comment on behalf of the NLRC. We consider that the Solicitor
General's comment may be dispensed with in this case.
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that confidential and managerial employees cannot be
arbitrarily dismissed at any time, and without cause as reasonably established in an
appropriate investigation. Such employees, too, are entitled to security of tenure, fair
standards of employment and the protection of labor laws.
The captain of a vessel is a confidential and managerial employee within the meaning of
the above doctrine. A master or captain, for purposes of maritime commerce, is one who
has command of a vessel. A captain commonly performs three (3) distinct roles: (1) he is
a general agent of the shipowner; (2) he is also commander and technical director of the
vessel; and (3) he is a representative of the country under whose flag he navigates. Of
these roles, by far the most important is the role performed by the captain as commander
of the vessel; for such role (which, to our mind, is analogous to that of "Chief Executive
Officer" [CEO] of a present-day corporate enterprise) has to do with the operation and
preservation of the vessel during its voyage and the protection of the passengers (if any)
and crew and cargo. In his role as general agent of the shipowner, the captain has
authority to sign bills of lading, carry goods aboard and deal with the freight earned, agree
upon rates and decide whether to take cargo. The ship captain, as agent of the shipowner,
has legal authority to enter into contracts with respect to the vessel and the trading of the
vessel, subject to applicable limitations established by statute, contract or instructions and
regulations of the shipowner. To the captain is committed the governance, care and
management of the vessel. Clearly, the captain is vested with both management and
fiduciary functions.
It is plain from the records of the present petition that Captain Tayong was denied any
opportunity to defend himself. Petitioners curtly dismissed him from his command and
summarily ordered his repatriation to the Philippines without informing him of the charge
or charges levelled against him, and much less giving him a chance to refute any such
charge. In fact, it was only on 26 October 1989 that Captain Tayong received a telegram
dated 24 October 1989 from Inter-Orient requiring him to explain why he delayed sailing
to South Africa.
We also find that the principal contention of petitioners against the decision of the NLRC
pertains to facts, that is, whether or not there was actual and sufficient basis for the
alleged loss of trust or confidence. We have consistently held that a question of "fact" is,
as a general rule, the concern solely of an administrative body, so long as there is
substantial evidence of record to sustain its action.
The record requires us to reject petitioners' claim that the NLRC's conclusions of fact were
not supported by substantial evidence. Petitioners rely on self-serving affidavits of their
own officers and employees predictably tending to support petitioners' allegation that
Captain Tayong had performed acts inimical to petitioners' interests for which, supposedly,
he was discharged. The official report of Mr. Clark, petitioners' representative, in fact
supports the NLRC's conclusion that private respondent Captain did not arbitrarily and
maliciously delay the voyage to South Africa. There had been, Mr. Clark stated, a
disruption in the normal functioning of the vessel's turbo-charger and economizer and that
had prevented the full or regular operation of the vessel. Thus, Mr. Clark relayed to
Captain Tayong instructions to "maintain reduced RPM" during the voyage to South Africa,
instead of waiting in Singapore for the supplies that would permit shipboard repair of the
malfunctioning machinery and equipment.
More importantly, a ship's captain must be accorded a reasonable measure of
discretionary authority to decide what the safety of the ship and of its crew and cargo
specifically requires on a stipulated ocean voyage. The captain is held responsible, and
properly so, for such safety. He is right there on the vessel, in command of it and (it must
be presumed) knowledgeable as to the specific requirements of seaworthiness and the
particular risks and perils of the voyage he is to embark upon. The applicable principle is
that the captain has control of all departments of service in the vessel, and reasonable
discretion as to its navigation. It is the right and duty of the captain, in the exercise of
sound discretion and in good faith, to do all things with respect to the vessel and its
equipment and conduct of the voyage which are reasonably necessary for the protection
and preservation of the interests under his charge, whether those be of the shipowners,
charterers, cargo owners or of underwriters. It is a basic principle of admiralty law that in
navigating a merchantman, the master must be left free to exercise his own best
judgment. The requirements of safe navigation compel us to reject any suggestion that
the judgment and discretion of the captain of a vessel may be confined within a
straitjacket, even in this age of electronic communications. Indeed, if the ship captain is
convinced, as a reasonably prudent and competent mariner acting in good faith that the
shipowner's or ship agent's instructions (insisted upon by radio or telefax from their offices
thousands of miles away) will result, in the very specific circumstances facing him, in
imposing unacceptable risks of loss or serious danger to ship or crew, he cannot casually
seek absolution from his responsibility, if a marine casualty occurs, in such instructions.
Compagnie de Commerce v. Hamburg is instructive in this connection. There, this Court
recognized the discretionary authority of the master of a vessel and his right to exercise
his best judgment, with respect to navigating the vessel he commands. In Compagnie de
Commerce, a charter party was executed between Compagnie de Commerce  and the
owners of the vessel Sambia, under which the former as charterer loaded on board the
Sambia, at the port of Saigon, certain cargo destined for the Ports of Dunkirk and
Hamburg in Europe. The Sambia, flying the German flag, could not, in the judgment of its
master, reach its ports of destination because war (World War I) had been declared
between Germany and France. The master of the Sambia decided to deviate from the
stipulated voyage and sailed instead for the Port of Manila. Compagnie de Commerce sued
in the Philippines for damages arising from breach of the charter party and unauthorized
sale of the cargo. In affirming the decision of the trial court dismissing the complaint, our
Supreme Court held that the master of the Sambia had reasonable grounds to apprehend
that the vessel was in danger of seizure or capture by the French authorities in Saigon and
was justified by necessity to elect the course which he took — i.e., to flee Saigon for the
Port of Manila — with the result that the shipowner was relieved from liability for the
deviation from the stipulated route and from liability for damage to the cargo. The Court
said:
The danger from which the master of the Sambia  fled was a real and not merely an
imaginary one as counsel for shipper contends. Seizure at the hands of an "enemy of
the King" though not inevitable, was a  possible outcome of a failure to leave the port of
Saigon; and we cannot say that under the conditions existing at the time when the
master elected to flee from that port, there were no grounds for a "reasonable
apprehension of danger" from seizure by the French authorities, and therefore no
necessity for flight.
The word "necessity" when applied to mercantile affairs, where the judgment must in
the nature of things be exercised, cannot, of course, mean an irresistible compelling
power. What is meant by it in such cases is the force of circumstances which determine
the course a man ought to take. Thus, where by the force of circumstances, a man has
the duty cast upon him of taking some action for another, and under that obligation
adopts a course which, to the judgment of a wise and prudent man, is apparently the
best for the interest of the persons for whom he acts in a given emergency, it may
properly be said of the course so taken that it was in a mercantile sense necessary to
take it. (Emphasis supplied)
Compagnie de Commerce contended that the shipowner should, at all events, be held
responsible for the deterioration in the value of the cargo incident to its long stay on board
the vessel from the date of its arrival in Manila until the cargo was sold. The Supreme
Court, in rejecting this contention also, declared that:
But it is clear that the master could not be required to act on the very day of his
arrival; or before he had a reasonable opportunity to ascertain whether he could hope
to carry out his contract and earn his freight; and that he should not be held
responsible for a reasonable delay incident to an effort to ascertain the wishes of the
freighter, and upon failure to secure prompt advice, to decide for himself as to the
course which he should adopt to secure the interests of the absent owner of the
property aboard the vessel.
 The master is entitled to delay for such a period as may be reasonable under the
circumstances, before deciding on the course he will adopt. He may claim a fair
opportunity of carrying out a contract, and earning the freight, whether by repairing or
transhipping. Should the repair of the ship be undertaken, it must be proceeded with
diligently; and if so done, the freighter will have no ground of complaint, although the
consequent delay be a long one, unless, indeed, the cargo is perishable, and likely to
be injured by the delay. Where that is the case, it ought to be forwarded, or sold, or
given up, as the case may be, without waiting for repairs.
A shipowner or shipmaster (if communication with the shipowner is impossible), will be
allowed a reasonable time in which to decide what course he will adopt in such cases as
those under discussion; time must be allowed to him to ascertain the facts, and to
balance the conflicting interests involved, of shipowner, cargo owner, underwriter on
ship and freight. But once the time has elapsed, he is bound to act promptly according
as he has elected either to repair, or abandon the voyage, or tranship. If he delays, and
owing to that delay a perishable cargo suffers damage, the shipowner will be liable for
that damage; he cannot escape that obligation by pleading the absence of definite
instructions from the owners of the cargo or their underwriters, since he has control of
the cargo and is entitled to elect. (Emphasis supplied)
The critical question, therefore, is whether or not Captain Tayong had reasonable grounds
to believe that the safety of the vessel and the crew under his command or the possibility
of substantial delay at sea required him to wait for the delivery of the supplies needed for
the repair of the turbo-charger and the economizer before embarking on the long voyage
from Singapore to South Africa.
Under all the circumstances of this case, we, along with the NLRC, are unable to hold that
Captain Tayong's decision (arrived at after consultation with the vessel's Chief Engineer)
to wait seven (7) hours in Singapore for the delivery on board the Oceanic Mindoro of the
requisitioned supplies needed for the welding-repair, on board the ship, of the turbo-
charger and the economizer equipment of the vessel, constituted merely arbitrary,
capricious or grossly insubordinate behavior on his part. In the view of the NLRC, that
decision of Captain Tayong did not constitute a legal basis for the summary dismissal of
Captain Tayong and for termination of his contract with petitioners prior to the expiration
of the term thereof. We cannot hold this conclusion of the NLRC to be a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to an excess or loss of jurisdiction; indeed, we share that conclusion
and make it our own.
Clearly, petitioners were angered at Captain Tayong's decision to wait for delivery of the
needed supplies before sailing from Singapore, and may have changed their estimate of
their ability to work with him and of his capabilities as a ship captain. Assuming that to be
petitioners' management prerogative, that prerogative is nevertheless not to be exercised,
in the case at bar, at the cost of loss of Captain Tayong's rights under his contract with
petitioners and under Philippine law.
ACCORDINGLY, petitioners having failed to show grave abuse of discretion amounting to
loss or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the NLRC in rendering its assailed decision, the
Petition for Certiorari is hereby DISMISSED, for lack of merit. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

In this connection, it is specially relevant to recall that, according to the report of Mr.
Robert Clark, Technical Director of petitioner Sea Horse Ship Management, Inc.,
the Oceanic Mindoro  had stopped in mid-ocean for six (6) hours and forty-five (45)
minutes on its way to Singapore because of its leaking economizer. Equally relevant is the
telex dated 2 August 1989 sent by Captain Tayong to Sea Horse after Oceanic
Mindoro had left Singapore and was en route to South Africa. In this telex, Captain Tayong
explained his decision to Sea Horse in the following terms:

I CAPT. R.D. TAYONG RE: UR PROBLEM IN SPORE (SINGAPORE) I EXPLAIN AGN TO

YOU THAT WE ARE INSECURITY/DANGER TO SAIL IN SPORE W/OUT HAVING SUPPLY
OF OXY/ACET. PLS UNDERSTAND HV PLENTY TO BE DONE REPAIR FM MAIN ENGINE
LIKE TURBO CHARGER PIPELINE, ECONOMIZER LEAKAGE N ETC WE COULD NOT FIX IT
W/OUT OXY/ACET ONBOARD. I AND MR. CLARK WE CONTACTED EACH OTHER BY
PHONE IN PAPAN N HE ADVSED US TO SAIL TO RBAY N WILL SUPPLY OXY/ACET UPON
ARRIVAL RBAY HE ALSO EXPLAINED TO MY C/E HOW TO FIND THE REMEDY W/OUT
OXY/ACET BUT C/E HE DISAGREED MR. CLARK IDEA, THAT IS WHY WE URG
REQUEST[ED] YR KIND OFFICE TO ARRANGE SUPPLY OXY/ACET BEFORE SAILING TO
AVOID RISK/DANGER OR DELAY AT SEA N WE TOOK PRECAUTION UR TRIP FOR 16
DAYS FM SPORE TO RBAY. PLS. UNDERSTAND UR SITUATION. (Emphasis partly in
source and partly supplied)