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Mariano Artigas Mind of The Universe Understanding Science and Religion
Mariano Artigas Mind of The Universe Understanding Science and Religion
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The
Mind
of the Universe
Understanding Science
and Religion
Mariano Artigas
God can be referred to as “the mind of the universe” not in a pantheistic sense, but to
express the idea that our universe exhibits rationality, information, and creativity; that it
makes possible the existence of human beings who are strictly rational and creative; and
all this requires a divine foundation: a participation in God’s creativity.
Nature is very complex. Science is possible because we have learned to study particular
phenomena in isolation. This book explores the connection of the scientific perspective with
the broader concerns of the meaning of life .
For the first time in history we have a scientific worldview that provides a unified picture,
including all natural levels and their mutual relations. The new worldview provides a good
basis for renewed study of purpose in nature and can be used to argue in favor of a
personal God.
Fig. 3.1 Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle. When we try to measure two conjugate magnitudes such
as the position (x) of a particle and the momentum (p) of that particle at the same time, we cannot
surpass a certain limit of accuracy. Specifically, the product of the uncertainties in the measures of ‘‘x”
and “p” (represented as “Δx” and “Δp”) is equal to or greater than h/2π, which has a constant value
(“h” stands for Planck’s constant, and the value of “π” is 3.14159). Therefore, supposing that we
measure “x” with complete accuracy, our measurement of the momentum will be affected by an
uncertainty of h/2π. Though this principle refers to a limit in the accuracy of measurement, it is also
used as a positive heuristic to find new properties of the microphysical world.
within the target nucleons. Our search for such lumps within the target nucleons was undertaken in
1967.6
Note that in this case we are far from the usual epistemological discussions about the extent of
Heisenberg’s principle, which, in spite of the fact that it points toward a limitation in our knowledge, is
used here as a positive heuristic to uncover the existence of a new basic component of matter. This
example is not an isolated case. In fact, in the same report we can read:
According to Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, a narrow, or well-defined, mass implies a lifetime that is
long compared with that of most other subatomic particles.7
Other authors explain how they applied this reasoning, used when physicists try to detect particles
whose lifetime is very short, in their research:
The method of detection employed is an application of Werner Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle and it
consists in searching for an enhancement at a particular energy in the probability of interaction between
known particles. Such an enhancement is called a resonance. One expression of the uncertainty principle
relates the uncertainty in the energy at which the resonance is found to the lifetime of the particle being
created: the greater the uncertainty, the longer the lifetime.8
In a similar vein, in an article about the proofs of the existence of quarks inside the hadrons, we are
told:
A test particle colliding with a hadron at high energy inspects the behavior of the constituent quarks
over very small distances and during a very brief interval. This fact is established mathematically by the
6. Leon M. Lederman, “The Upsilon Particle,” Scientific American, 239, no. 4 (October 1978): 62.
7. Ibid., p. 64.
8. David B. Cline, Alfred K. Mann, and Carlo Rubbia, “The Search for New Families of Elementary
Particles,” Scientific American, 234, no. 1 (January 1976): 50.
Fig. 3.2 Natural levels. The physicochemical level provides the basis for the other levels. Living beings
possess the most sophisticated natural structures, and their existence requires the cooperation of the
physicochemical level, which provides the basic components; of the Earth and the entire biosphere,
which provide the immediate environment; and also the stars: the Sun provides light and energy for life
on Earth, and the heavy atoms were first produced within the stars and were spread when the stars
exploded.
Fig. 3.3 Genetic information as “materialized rationality.” DNA is structured as a double-helix consisting
of a sugar (S), a phosphate (P), and a nitrogen basis (A, C, G, T). Information is stored in the structure
of DNA and is deployed in answer to the needs of the organism, according to preestablished plans that
include highly sophisticated steps and a remarkable coordination. The storing, coding and decoding, and
deploying of genetic information show that dynamism and structure in nature are closely connected and
interwoven.
Tucked into the internal surface of the cell’s outer membrane, these versatile molecules coordinate
cellular responses to a multitude of signals that impinge from without.
To make possible our action and even our existence, our cells must communicate with one another, and
this communication is performed by chemical messengers. However, few messengers need to enter
the cell. Gilman explains that
most of the agents convey information through intermediaries. They issue orders by binding at the
outer surface of target cells to proteins that serve as specific receptors. Then, in a process called signal
transduction, the receptors, which span the cell membrane, relay the information to a series of
intracellular middlemen that ultimately pass the orders to the final executors.
Gilman tells us that many extracellular messengers have been already discovered and adds that
a great many messengers rely on just one class of molecules, called G proteins, to direct the flow of
signals from the receptor to the rest of the cell.
The crucial properties of G proteins were identified in the late 1970s at the University of Virginia; Gilman
has continued his work at the University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center at Dallas. He states:
Fig. 4.1 Organizing principles. The exclusion principle formulated by the Nobel Prize winner Wolfgang
Pauli holds that two fermions cannot be found in an identical quantum state within the same system. As
a consequence, electrons in all atoms are distributed in different levels following characteristic patterns.
The result of this distribution is that atoms possess well-defined internal structures, which determine
their chemical interactions and the physical properties of bigger systems. Therefore, the Pauli exclusion
principle, an ordinary physical law, acts as a kind of organizing principle. Such organizing principles are
internal to the natural world and can be, at the same time, the intended result of divine creation.
Davies asserts that:
If we accept that there exists a propensity in nature for matter and energy to undergo spontaneous
transitions into new states of higher organizational complexity, and that the existence of these states is
not fully explained or predicted by lower level laws and entities, nor do they “just happen” to arise for
no particular reason, then it is necessary to find some physical principles additional to the lower level
laws to explain them. . . . We seem to be on the verge of discovering not only wholly new laws of
nature, but ways of thinking about nature that depart radically from traditional science.21
Davies does not provide examples of such principles that are generally accepted. This is hardly
surprising, since he refers to radically new ways of thinking that do not exist as yet. He distinguishes
different possible organizing principles and analyses several proposals that he considers too strong.
These include some encompassing the entire cosmos, such as Roger Penrose’s hy-
21. Ibid., p. 142.
Fig. 4.2 Four levels of teleology. These four meanings of finality are mutually connected. The first is
always present in the second; both are present in the third; and the first three are present in the fourth.
Something can be the end of a process without being the goal of any tendency, a value for any subject,
or the purpose of an intelligent plan. In contrast, if the purpose of a plan exists, there must also exist, as
its necessary conditions, a value for a subject, a goal of a tendency, and the end of the process. Every
level presupposes the previous ones and adds something new.
Fig. 4.3 Teleology and predictability. A future outcome can be predicted even though there are in
principle many different paths that can be chosen, every one of which would apparently lead to different
results, provided the paths are located within a stable organization. Thus an airplane moving off the
North Pole will always reach the South Pole exactly, whatever particular route it may take, provided it
always moves South.
different parts occupy a well-determined place in the whole. What is really new is the knowledge that
these formations are the outcome of spontaneous natural processes and that the present state of our
world is the result of an entire series of such processes. The present worldview includes a general
perspective and some detailed explanations of a few particular processes. Future advances will surely
provide more details.
Patterning, the production of new spatiotemporal patterns, is therefore one of the main features of the
cosmic process of self-organization. Patterning is the result of interactions, new combinations, new
arrangements; in this sense, it should not be considered mysterious. However, we face an enormous
series of successive processes of patterning in which increasingly organized systems are produced that
finally make possible our existence as human beings. Therefore, it is not the lack of knowledge about
the processes and their mechanisms, but rather the new kind of knowledge that leads us to think about
finality and divine agency. The more the sciences progress, the more they provide us with knowledge of
the process of self-organization that clearly suggests the existence of a divine source of power and
perfection.
This perspective is most coherent with the Christian doctrine of a universe that has been created
unfinished and has been given to human beings so that they may collaborate with God in carrying this
world to its ultimate end, finding their own fulfillment in the effort spent to humanize and divinize the
world. The natural sciences now place before us an open future. This not only means that we, by
exercising our freedom, are responsible for the future of humankind, but also that nature itself enters
this project as an essential element. The evolution of nature has played a central role in the production
of the present state of affairs. Now, natural evolution has been replaced by an evolution based on
science and in the use of the powers of nature by man.
Scientific creativity is proof of our singularity. It shows that we possess dimensions that
transcend the natural ambit and can be labeled as spiritual. A purely materialist view leads
to an image of the human being that cannot explain the unity of our experience and our
scientific achievements .
Fig. 5.1 Logical asymmetry between verification and falsification. (1) “All swans are white” is a general
empirical law. (2) We find confirmations of this law, represented by A, B, C, D, and so on. However
numerous these instances are, they will never be sufficient to “verify” the general laws because we can
never be sure that we will not find new contrary instances. Hence we conclude that we can never verify
a general empirical law. (3) A single instance contrary to the law is enough to conclude that that law
contains some error. Therefore, a single contrary instance permits us to ‘‘falsify” the law. This is a
feature of logic; therefore, it holds in every particular case that we can never definitively verify general
empirical laws, but we can falsify them.
3. SCIENTIFIC CONSTRUCTS
The role of interpretation and creativity at all levels of empirical science becomes even more evident
when we realize that even the most elementary concepts used in science cannot be derived from
observation and logic alone.
Let us consider, for example, the concepts of mass, time, and temperature, some of the most basic ones
in the entire field of science. They are closely related to ordinary experience; nevertheless, to make
them useful to science, they must be defined in such a way that they may be submitted to mathematics
and may also be measured using adequate empirical instruments. These involve difficulties that can be
solved only by the use of subtle methods, including conventional stipulations.
Thus, to measure the value of temperature we must use a law that relates temperature to some
observable effects (such as the dilatation of a liquid or a gas). But, how can we establish such a law if
we do not know yet how we should measure temperatures? A similar difficulty arises regarding the
other concepts. In the case of time, we must know that some periodic motion exists whose duration is
always the same, so that it can serve as a basic reference for measuring the duration of other motions;
we then find, however, a similar difficulty. Indeed, we may wonder how we can know that a concrete
motion is repeated regularly if we do not yet know how we can measure time. If we consider mass, we
should add that, according to the theory of relativity, the mass of a body no longer has a fixed value,
because it changes accord-
Fig. 5.2 Scientific truth. Truth means correspondence between our statements and reality. Different
kinds of scientific constructs correspond to reality in different ways. (A) Experimental laws, such as
Ohm’s law, express a relationship between measurable magnitudes. Ohm’s law expresses a relationship
between three electrical magnitudes: potential (V), resistance (R), and intensity (I). Insofar as we
accept the concepts usually used in electricity, this relationship holds in any electrical circuit and can be
considered as true. (B) General principles are supposed to hold in a great variety of circumstances.
Thus, the principle of conservation of energy should hold for any natural process. Until now, whenever
this principle has failed, scientists have introduced new previously unknown factors. This strategy has
been useful until now, but if applied to other cases it could lead to undesirable conventionalist positions.
In relativity theory, taking into account the equivalence between mass and energy, we should speak
about the conservation of mass-energy. (C) The existence of particular spatial or temporal patterns,
such as the double-helical structure of DNA, can sometimes be proved beyond any reasonable doubt.
We can find, however, that in some particular cases there can exist single-helical DNA.
Construction and test, as they are used in empirical science, presuppose a realist perspective.
Theoretical constructs refer to real situations and are used to explain them, and methods of empirical
testing serve to prove the explanatory claims of theories. An antirealist perspective would fail to account
for the real achievements of the scientific method and even for its fallibilistic aspects.
The realism presupposed by the scientific method does not involve many specific philosophical subtleties.
It is centered on the possibility of obtaining true knowledge about reality. Scientific progress shows that
this presupposition is basically correct; indeed, instrumentalism and relativism do not fit well with the
realist aim of the scientific enterprise or with its results and applications: therefore, we can say that
epistemological realism is retrojustified by scientific progress and that it is also refined and enlarged.
The refinements refer to the subtleties involved in scientific practice. The
This is the only occasion I know of in which Popper explicitly said that we can be “pretty sure” of the
truth of some scientific statements. Obviously, it is more difficult to assess the truth of abstract
theoretical systems such as Newton’s mechanics and Einstein’s relativity.
certitude, and theoretical constructs. If we introduce necessary qualifications, we may realize that, in
many cases, we can obtain a knowledge that is quite certain.
As a matter of fact, fallibilists usually admit some kind of realism, and they also admit that scientific
results, even though not established with certainty, possess a value that transcends the merely
instrumental level. Popper, usually considered the main supporter of fallibilism, admits a high dose of
realism and argues that science is a strong reason in favor of realism in a way that practically coincides
with my argument:
We can then assert that almost all, if not all, physical, chemical, or biological theories imply realism, in
the sense that if they are true, realism must also be true. This is one of the reasons why some people
speak of “scientific realism.” It is quite a good reason. . . . However one may look at this, there are
excellent reasons for saying that what we attempt in science is to describe and ( so far as
possible) explain reality. We do so with the help of conjectural theories; that is, theories which we
hope are true (or near the truth) . . . our conjectural theories tend progressively to come nearer to the
truth; that is, to true descriptions of certain facts, or aspects of reality.45
Because strong fallibilism can easily lead to confusion, when we speak of fallibilism we should make
clear whether we refer to its weak or its strong ver-
45. Karl R. Popper, Objective Knowledge , cit., p. 40.
Fig. 6.2 A scheme of scientific progress. Karl Popper used to represent the progress of science by
using this tetradic scheme: we begin with a problem P1, propose a tentative theory T T1 to solve it,
criticize the theory and proceed to error elimination E E1, arrive at a new problem P2, and so on.
Theories should always be evaluated by considering how well they solve the problems they are intented
to solve. No scientific theory is absolutely complete or definitive, even though we may progress in our
attempt to reach theories closer to the truth.
This insight leads to an attitude which is always open to new findings. Nevertheless, one-sided
insistence on the “negative” side of the procedure (error elimination) would leave unexplained the
positive value of our findings.
Fig. 6.3 Science and scientism. Sir Arthur S. Eddington, the British astronomer who directed the teams
that observed in 1919 the binding of light rays under the effect of gravity (the first important test of
Einstein’s general relativity), compared the reach of scientific theories with the size of the holes of a net.
An ichthyologist using a net whose holes are one square foot in size can say nothing about the
existence and properties of fish that measure less than a foot. In a similar vein, the study of
spatiotemporal patterns by means of magnitudes and repeatable experiments cannot by itself affirm or
deny the existence and value of metaphysics, spirituality, and religion. Thus scientism, which claims that
we cannot find meaningful knowledge outside empirical science, is not itself a consequence of empirical
science. It is rather the result of illegitimate extrapolations and, insofar as it presents itself as a
consequence of science, it is a deceptive and contradictory kind of pseudoscience.
ic knowledge because I think that this is the only picture that represents the real value of empirical
science, so that we should take it as the most suitable partner in the science–religion dialogue.
The very use of the method of empirical science presupposes, at least implicitly, a minimal dose of
realism, namely that we possess the ability to attain a cognitive grasp on the natural world. In this line,
Jarrett Leplin has written:
At least a minimal epistemic realism, holding that science can achieve theoretical knowledge, is crucial
to rationality at the level of method. Specifically, I claim that unless the researcher presumes there to be
some truth of the matter as to whether the entities and processes he theorizes about or experiments on
exist and as to what their properties are, unless he treats such questions as epistemic objectives in the
organization and direction of his work, much of that work is pointless and arbitrary. At best it is
guesswork that cannot be construed to instantiate rationally grounded, generalizable principles.61
61. Jarrett Leplin, “Methodological Realism and Scientific Rationality,” Philosophy of Science , 53
(1986): 32.
The meaning of science is twofold: pursuit of truth and service to humankind. The new
worldview presents a creative universe that has made possible the existence of creative
intelligent beings who are, at the same time, carriers of insignificance and grandeur.
Fig. 7.1 Scientific values. Considered as a human enterprise, natural science carries within itself a
double set of values: constitutive values, which refer to the general goals of natural science, namely, the
search for truth (epistemic values) and for a controlled dominion over nature (pragmatic values) and
institutional values, which refer to the social aspect of science. Some particular values of each kind are
listed here.
Fig. 7.2 Creativity and interpretation in empirical science. In empirical science we seek to know
nonapparent features of nature. Therefore we must build up models and submit them to test. This
requires a high dose of creativity and interpretation. These illustrations here are two characteristic
computer pictures, the typical result of very sophisticated processes and calculations. They were
obtained at the European Laboratory of Nuclear Physics (CERN: Geneva, Switzerland) by a team of more
than 100 physicists who worked to detect the particles W and Z. Physicists are able to interpret this kind
of picture as if they could see the traces of different kinds of subatomic particles, and they deduce the
existence of invisible particles from the observable effects they produce. In this case the pictures show
the decay products of the W and Z particles, whose existence was confirmed, using these and similar
pictures, in 1983. Carlo Rubbia and Simon van der Meer received the 1984 Nobel Prize for physics for
this discovery. (Photographs used by permission of CERN, Geneva.)
grouped pairwise into three families interacting via electroweak and interquark forces. All physicists
agree that the Standard Model cannot be the full picture, with too many free parameters that can only
be measured by experiment, and with the observed pattern of particle masses unexplained. But like a
waterproof watch, the Standard Model had no visible crack to pry the case apart and get at the
mechanism inside.58
58. Gordon Fraser, “Standard Model Hamburger,” Cern Courier, 37 (1997), No. 7 (September 1977): 1.