ENTRANCE INTO THE

SUPREME DOCTRINE
SKANDHILA'SABHIDHARMAVATARA

BHIKKHU KUALA LUMPUR DHAMMAJOTI

Postgraduate Institute of Pali & Buddhist Studies

University of Kelaniya, Sri Lanka
1998

l
© Copyright 1998 Postgraduate Institute of Pali & Buddhist Studies
University ofKelaniya
Sri Lanka

ISBN 955-9098-52-7

This humble work is respectfully dedicated to

the Most Venerable Master Yin Shun
-the Fountain-head of inspiration
for Buddhist students and scholars
of Chinese descent all over the world

Printed by
Karunaratne & Sons Ltd
67, UDA Industrial Estate
Katuwana Rd,
Homagama.

l
Ill
11
 FOREWORD

The Abhidharmiivatiira is the compendium of Sarvastivada Abhidharma compiled

by the great Abhidharma master, Skandhila, around the 5th century A.D. It succinctly
summarizes all the basic categories of the Sarvastivada Abhidharma under a scheme
of eight Fundamental Principles (padiirtha), namely the five skandhas and the three
the two groups corresponding to the conditioned and unconditioned
elements of existence recognized by the Sarvastivada school.

Skandhila's Abhidharmiivatiira is now extant only in Chinese and Tibetan transla-

tions and in a fragmentary version in Tokharian. The English translation of the text
presented here by the venerable Professor K. Dhammajoti is based on Xuan Zang's
Chinese version. In preparing it the Venerable author has consulted the Tibetan
version of the text and its commentary as well, so as to make it, as far as possible, a
faithful representation of the original Sanskrit text. The copious notes and critical
comments accompanying the translation are all based on original sources in Sanskrit,
Chinese, Tibetan and Japanese. Those based particularly on the
Abhidharmamahiivibhii$ii and Sa111ghabhadra's Nyiiyiinusiirii should be of great
interest to scholars and students unable to read Classical Chinese.

Besides the annotated translation of the text we have here (appendix) an essay by
the author on the theory of sarviistitva. This theory which maintains the tritemporal
existence of all conditioned dharmas, the elements into which empirical reality is
analysed, is said to be the cornerstone of the Sarvastivada Abhidharma. A Theravada
critique of the theory and two of its qualified versions appear among the doctrinal
controversies recorded in the Kathiivatthu of the Pali Abhidhamma Pitaka- which
means that it was already in vogue in the third century B. C. What provoked much
opposition to the theory of sarviistitva was that it was alleged to be a veiled
recognition of the substance view which is radically at variance with the Buddhist
teaching on the non-substantiality of all phenomena. In point of fact, in the post-
Asokan era it became one of the hotly debated issues resulting in a bewildering
mass of arguments and counter-arguments which find mention in a host of literary
sources belonging to both the so called Hlnayana and Mahayana traditions. It must

I
 PREFACE
also be noted here that it was mostly the Sarvastivada version of dharma-realism
which was based on this particular theory that came in for criticism on the part of
the Madhyamaka. All this goes to show how important is the theory of sarviistitva
The present work is substantially based on a research work which I undertook in
for a proper understanding of both the Sarvastivada version of the Abhidharma and
1978, and submitted as my M.A. dissertation to the University ofKelaniya in early
the history of Buddhist thought particularly in the post-Asokan era. However, the
1979. One of the major difficulties in doing research in Sri Lanka is in getting up-
theory still remains one of the least understood. One possible reason for this situation
to-date access to modem works published overseas. At the time of my research, the
is that most of the writings which seek to clarify this theory are mainly based on
only publication accessible to me dealing directly with theAbhidharmiivatiira was
texts where it comes in for criticism. The great merit of the Venerable Professor
Professor H. Sakurabe's paper, "Abhidharmiivatiira by an Unidentified Author",
Dhammajoti's disquisition on the subject is that while eliciting material from sources
collected in The Nava Niilanda Mahiivihiira Research Publication, Vol. II (Patna,
belonging to both camps, it focuses particular attention on the Nyiiyiinusiirii of
1960). It was not until more than two years later that I was able to see H. Sakurabe's
Sarp.ghabhadra which is said to contain the best defence of the theory of sarviistitva.
Japanese translation (from the Tibetan), and Van Velthem's French translation en-

The Venerable Professor Kuala Lumpur Dhammajoti, the author of this work, has titled Le Traite de la Descente dans la Profonde Loi de /'Arhat Skandhila - thanks
to the kind effort of my Vietnamese friend Bhikkhu Dhammaviriyo in Los Angeles,
been on the academic staff of the Postagraduate Institute ofPali and Buddhist Studies
since 1982 and currently he serves as the Head of the Department of Buddhist Literary and my close friend and colleague, Dr. T. Endo. To these two esteemed friends, I

Sources. He specializes in the comparative study of Nikiiya/Agama texts in Pali, must express my gratitude at this appropriate juncture.
Sanskrit, Tibetan and Chinese, and the Abhidharma literature of the Northern and
Southern traditions. Among his major publications I must particularly mention The Some 19 years have elapsed since my first hasty attempt. In review, many Imper-
Chinese Version of the Dharmapada which was his doctoral thesis submitted to the fections have become more noticeable. Surely much improvement and revision in

University of Kelaniya. It incorporates the latest research on Dharmapada studies the light of recent related publications are to be desired. While it was difficult for
me to find the time for a thorough revision, I hope I have been able to make at least
and is acclaimed to be a distinct contribution to our knowledge of the genesis and
genealogy of the Dharmapada and the relative position of its various recensions. some improvement in this present publication, particularly in the translation. The
major difference between my original dissertation and the present publication,
The present work is substantially based on the Venerable Professor's dissertation
however, is the addition of an essay on the Vaibha$ika doctrine ofsarviistitva in-
for the M.A. Research Degree and we are most grateful to him for his kind permission
cluded in the appendix. I have also completely renumbered the paragraphs in an
to include it in the series of publications sponsored by the Postgraduate Institute of
attempt to better reflect the schematic structure of the original Chinese version.
Pali and Buddhist Studies.

I must especially thank my supervisor, Professor Y. Karunadasa, for his guidance

and encouragement, and to Venerable Dr. Kakkapaliya Anuruddha for his constant
encouragement and support. I am also very grateful to my student bhik$UJ.ll Chun Yi
(trliZ:.), for her devotion and extreme care in proof-reading- and more than proof-
Prof. Y Karunadasa reading, and her general assistance and support throughout the whole project. Ven-
27th November, 1997 Director, PGIPBS erable Lama P. Ogyan Tanzin, visiting lecturer in Tibetan Language and Buddhist

vii
VJ

l
Culture of the Institute, must also be thanked for his help in proof-reading the Ti- Contents
betan references.

In late 1977, I had the opportunity of reading the Chinese text ofAbhidharmiivatiira
at the feet of the Venerable Master Yin Shun (fPIIIPm§ffi), at his hermitage in Tai
Chung. It was an extremely memorable - albeit too brief- period of three weeks
FORWORD V
during which I was able to clarify many doctrinal points relating to those inAvatiira
PREFACE Vll
as well as those in Sarvastivada Abhidharma in general. At that time, the Venerable
ABBREVIATIONS 4
had already long stopped giving public lectures and classes owing to his advanced
age. I must express my most profound gratitude to him for allowing me to be ben-
efitted by his Wisdom. To him, in gratitude for his being the fountain-head of inspi-
ration for all young Buddhist students and scholars of Chinese descent throughout Part One: INTRODUCTION
the world, this humble work is respectfully dedicated.
I Abhidharmavatara as a Sarvastivada manual 13
Kuala Lumpur Dhammajoti itdc
II The Schematic Organization of Avatara. 15
Balapitiya, Sri Lanka.
Ill The Chinese and Tibetan Versions, and the present English
translation 20

IV The development of the Sarvastivada manuals 24

V The Abhidharmika and other subgroups within the

Sarvastivada 29

VI Avatara on the avijiiapti 35

VII Avatara on the caitasika 39

VIII Avatiira on the citta-viprayukta-sarrzskara 45

V111

l
2 3
 SKANDHILA'S ABHIDHARMAVATARA

ABBREVIATIONS Chinese tr. of Asm by Xuan Zang. Tz. Y. ed.

Asm (C)
(Nanking,1930)
Note: (i) All references of Chinese Tripitaka Texts are to the Taisho
editions, unless otherwise stated.
Avatiira *Abhidharmavatara by Skandhila.
(ii) All references ofPali works are to the PTS editions,
A vatiira(C) Chinese tr. of Avatara (T no.l554) by Xuan Zang
unless otherwise stated.

Avatara(J) Japanese tr. of A vatara by H. Sakurabe

A Atthakathii
Avatara(T) Tibetan tr. of A vatara (See Bib 17)

ADV Abhidharmadipa (with ed. P.S.

AVN Arthaviniscaya-siitra-nibandhana
J aini, 2nd ed. (Patna, 1977)

BAM Buddhist Analysis of Matter (See Bib 88)

AKB ofVasubandhu ed. P. Pradhan.
2nd. ed. (Patna, 1975)
BCSD Buddhist Chinese-Sanskrit Dictionary, ed Hirakawa A.

AKB(C) Chinese tr. (T no.1558) of AKB by Xuan Zang

BHSD Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary by F. Edgerton.
(New Haven, 1953)
AKB(F) L 'Abhidharmakosa de Vasubandhu by L. V. Poussin

Bib Bibliography
AmRS Abhidharmiimrta-rasa-siistra of Chinese tr.
(T no.l553).Translator unknown.
BSOAS Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Stud
ies, University of London
AmRS(S) Sanskrit restoration of AmRS by Santi Sastri

Compendium Compendium ofBuddhist Philosophy(See Bib 59)

As Atthasiilini (Dhs.A.)

Contra Contrast
Asm Abhidharmasamuccaya of Asa:ri.ga.

Cox,C Bib63

l 5
 SKANDHlLA'S AllHIDHARMJiVATJiRA

and Ireland

Bib92

Kathavatthu

Kathfivatthu Atthakatha

Madhyamagama cp jlfiJ no. 26)

Melanges Chinois et Bouddhiques, !'Institute Beige des

Hautes Etudes Chinoises, Bruxelles

Bib 103

*Mahaprajflaparamita-sastra no. 1509)

*Abhidharma-maha-vibhii$a-sastra
(T no. 1545)

Mahiivyutpatti ed. Sakaki,

R. (Tokyo, 1962)

Bib 107

*Abhidhanna-nyayanusara no. 1562)

Prajflapti-sastra no. 1538).

Paramatthamafljii.sa (Dhammapala's commentary on

Vism) Ed. M. Dhammananda. (Colombo, 1928)

l 7
 ENTRANCE INTO THE SUPREME DOCTRINE SKANDHILA 'S ABIIJDHARM AV ATARA

PrS Abhidharmaprakarm;a-sastra [liiJ W.l:l:"fiM t:l"blf:JiJE. soul Theory Bib 126

no.1542).
SPrS *Abhidhanna-samaya-pradipika-Siistra
PSP(C) *Paiicaskandha-prakaraJJa. no. 1613)

PTS The Pali Text Society, London. Study A study of the Sastras and Aca.ryas of the Sarvastivada
and Other Schools
PTSD The Pali English Dictionmy of the PTS (Bib 135)

SAg Sa1J1yuktagama @-(T99) T Taisho Shinshu Daizokyo. ed.

J.Takakusu, 1924-1932
Sakurabe Bib 120
Takakusu Bib 127
Sara *Sara-samuccaya-nama-abhidharmavatara-rika (See Bib 19)
Tatia Bib 128
SatS *Satyasiddhi-sastra Chinese tr. by Kumarajiva.
Tz.Y. ed. (Nanking, 1930) Tattvartha Bib20

SgPS Abhidharma-smigiti-paryaya-sastra TB Trirpsikiivijfiaptimiitratii-Bhii$ya (included in the

(T no. 1536) ViQl.sika et TriQl.sika, Part One) Ed. S.Levi (Paris, 1925)

Siddhi (C) *Vijfiaptimatrata-siddhi RX;r$.MiU® (T no. 1585). TSP Tattvasarpgraha- panjika (see Bib 21)

Siddhi (S) (= Siddhi) =TB Tz.Y Selected Chinese Tripitaka Texts ed. by Ou-Yang
Jian. (Nanking, 1930-1945)
Siddhi (T) Bib 143
UCR University ofCeylon Review, Peradeniya
SJD Sanskrit-Japanese Dictionary Ed. by U.
Ud Udiina
Wogihara et. al.

Vbh Vibhailga

8 9
 ENTRANCE INTO THE SL:rREME DOCTRINE
SKANDHILA'S AHHIDHARMAVATARA

V ism Visuddhimagga. Ed. D. Kosambi (Bombay, 1940)

VKS Abhidharma-vijiiiina-kaya-sastra §ifil

(T no.1539).

Vyakhya Sphutartha Abhidharma-kosa-}ytikhyii of Yasomitra

(Bib 8)

Watters On Yuan Chwang 's Travels in India by T. Watters

(London, 1904)

YBS YogiiciiJya-bhfimi-.Siistra of Asailga liltriiJUHffi:!:iQ§ifil (T

no. 1579).
Part One

INT RO DUCT I ON

10 11
1Abhidharmavatara as a Sarvastivada manual

Through the pioneering efforts of the Japanese scholars and western schol-
ars like Th. Stcherbatsky and Louis de la Vallee Poussin, the importance of
the study of Northern Buddhism has been acknowledged by many scholars.
Today, no serious researcher wishing to have an adequate understanding of
'early' I Buddhism can afford to ignore the valuable data embodied in the
Northern Buddhist literature, which are parallel to those in the Pali Canon.

Among these Northern Schools, the Sarvastivada was certainly the most pow-
erful one in north-west India at the beginning of the Christian era. A study of the
Sarvastiviida doctrines will throw light not only on the common tenets of early
Buddhism, but also on the origin of the Mahayana. In the history of Buddhism,
the two major Mahiiyiina schools, Madhyamaka and Y ogacara, had to confront
with the Sarviistivada : the Madhyamaka may be regarded partly as a radical
criticism of the so-called Hinayiina, particularly the Sarvastivada; and the
Yogacara, partly as a Mahiiyanist modification ofthe Sarvastiviida.

But advance in such studies has remained very slow, not least because of the
fact that very little of the original material is preserved in Sanskrit.
Fortunately, we possess Chinese translations of all the seven Abhidharma2
texts of the Sarvastivada and many other works of the Northern Schools.
One canonical Abhidharma text - Prajfiiipti-slistra - and several important
Indian commentaries are also preserved in Tibetan3. But these must remain
barred to those not versed in the two classical languages. To date, only a
very small number of these Chinese and Tibetan texts have been translated
into modern European languages. L.V. Poussin's monumental French trans-
lation of A in six volumes, 'Documents
d'Abhidharma'4, and the beginning portions of the Vijfilinakliya-slistra, and
E. Lamotte's 'Le Traite de l'Acte de Vasubandhu' ,5 etc., are, in this

13
regard, highly appreciated. In English, the great scholar Th. Stcherbatsky
has given his Soul Theory oftl1e Buddhists which is a translation of the
ninth chapter of AKB, and a partial translation of the argument on
Sarvastivada in Central Conception ofBuddhism and the Meaning of the
Word "Dl1arma". It is only quite recently that we have the following hand-
ful of welcome translations from the primary sources preserved in Chinese:
(1) Ch. Willemen's The Essence of Metaphysics: Abhidharmahrdaya (1975);
6 (2) Van Den Broeck's La Saveur deL 'lmmortel (* Amrtarasa-siistra)
(1977); (3) Van's Le Traite de la Descente dans la Profonde Loi De L'Arhat
Skandhila ( 1977); (4) 1. Armelin' s Le Coeur de la Loi Supreme ( 1978); ( 5)
Collett Cox's partial translation (1983) of chapter two of Sarpghabhadra's
*Nyiiyiinusiira, and (6) Leo Pruden's English translation of AKB(F) ( 1990).
Vasubandhu's AKB, valuable as it is as a masterly manual of Abhidharma
doctrines, is encyclopedic in scope and contains many obscure polemics the
understanding of which presupposes a fairly good background knowledge
of early Buddhist sectarian views. As such, it is difficult to understand even
with its admirably lucid translation into French and English. As Skandhila
puts it, "the terms and meanings in the Abhidharma, [are bewildering as] a
dense forest ( gahana )", and beginners are apt to get frustrated with them.
What we desperately need, then, is an English translation of an Abhidharma
manual which adequately summarizes the whole of the Sarvastivada doc-
trines in reasonably simple but accurate terms. Abhidhannavatiira appears to
have such merits. Besides, its presentation parallels that of AKB to which there-
fore it can serve also as an excellent introduction. It is perhaps for this reason
that L.V. Poussin has wrongly included this work as a commentary on AKB7.
This work, extant now in Chinese8 and Tibetan9 translations (and a frag-
mentary one in Tokharian)IO is an excellent compendium of the Sarvastivada
Abhidharma. In a scheme of eight padartha- five skandha and three asamslqta
14
_it succinctly II summarizes practically all the important Abhidharma cat-
egories of the school. In the concluding remarks, the author declares his
own attitude in the work: "In order to encourage the beginners (adi-karmika)
to take a keen interest in their studies, this treatise has been composed
succinctly, without the [usual] questions and answers [which characterize
doctrinal disputations]. Those who have not mastered (parijiiiita) the pro-
found characteristics of the Abhidharma, have indulged in compiling nu-
merous theoretical speculations (prapaiica). These they put forward, fabri-
cating objections, with the evil intention of slandering one another. [In do-
ing so], they are in fact slandering the Buddha's teachings (aptiigama)."l2
Indeed, throughout this short treatise, there is no evidence of any hostility
on the part of the author towards others holding views different from his.
Nevertheless, we do find an instance of mild criticism apparently directed at
the Here he calls those denying the reality, partially
or completely, of the caitta, "persons of lesser intelligence" and "deluded".
13
II The Schematic Organization of Avatiira
A vatara expounds the totality of the Sarvastivada doctrines under the fol-
lowing scheme of eight padartha or fundamental Categories: I nlpa-skandha,
li vedana-skandha, IIl sarpj1ia-skandha, IV saf!lskara-skandha - subdivided
into sa1pprayukta- and viprayukta-sa1pskara, V vijiiana-skandha, VI akiisii,
VII pratisaf!lkhyii-nirodha, VIII apratismpkhya-nirodha. These eight -the
five skandlw and the threeasaf!lskrta - Skandhila declares, "subsumes all
things (artha)" in the Buddhist system. One might wonder why Skandhila
does not adopt the well-established five-fold classification of riipa, citta,
caitta, viprayukta-smpskara and asmpskrta,with which he can equally or
perhaps even more conveniently subsume the Sarvastivada categories. This
is all the more to be expected since he seems influenced by PrS with which
this five-fold classification originated.
15
The reason could be that this eight-fold scheme spells out the three asarr1s/q'ta
and underlines their real existence, one by one, more explicitly in contrast to
the saf!lskrta dharmas grouped as the five skandha. Viryasridatta, authior
of another post-AKB work, the Arthaviniscaya-stltra-nibandhana, also eu-
logizes the teachers as 'well-versed in the padiirtha of the Sugata's siitras.'
(sugatasutrapadiirthavijiiiih) 14. Noteworthily, he also subsumes all saJ!lskrta
dharmas under the five upiidiina-skandha, of which the sal!lSkara-skandha
similarity comprises both the sa1flprayukta-sa1!1Skiira and viprayukta-
SG1!1Skiira. Moreover, like Avatiira, the SG1!1prayukta-sa1!1skiira comprises
all the other caitta except vedanii and sa1!1}iiii (vedanii-san:zjiie varjayitvii
ye 'nye caittiih).IS The question ofViryasridatta's affiliationl6 aside, his rep-
resentation of these doctrinal features and terminologies very
probably reflects certain emphasis and concern on the part ofthe
in this period. Yet another post-AKB polemic, ADV, contains
the following statement in the first chapter: vyiikhyiitii}J a.Jtau padiirthii}J -
SaJ?Jsf..:tii}J paiica trayasciisa1!1skrtii}J I etiiccaitatsarva'!l yaduta sa1!1skrta1!1
ciism?Jskrtm?J ceti 117. This work thus also uses this eight-padiirtha scheme
to outline the totality of their recognised dharmas. In the Sanskrit statement
quoted, the above-mentioned contrast is conspicuous : The "all" (sarvam)
recognized by the Sarvastivadin to exist truly comprises the saf!tsA.:ta dharmas
and the three (traya) asaf!lskrta.
It may further be noted that in AKB, Vasubandhu denies the reality of the
skandha as a whole18, as well as that of the asaf!lskrta. Sarpghabhadra re-
futes his denial of the asaf!lskrta at great length19. For the Sarvastivadins,
not only must the three - iikiisa, pratisaf!lkhyii-nirodha and apratisal?Jkhyii-
nirodha- be real; the pluralistic reality of the latter two must also be accepted.
The need for this emphasis seems to have been precipitated in the course of
a long drawn out debate on their reality; starting from the period of MVS,
among some Sarvastivadins themselves -particularly the (see
infra), and culminating around the time of AKB, during which the
16
had been hard-pressed to prove their reality. This intentional emphasis is
also evident in the modification of the definition of "Sarvastivadin I
sarvastivada": First, we see it given in AKB as follows20:
"Those who hold that 'all exists'- the past, the present and the future
- belong to the Sarvastivada. Those, on the other hand, hold that some
exist, viz. the present and the past karma which has not given fruit;
and none of those which have given fruit or the future exists, are fol-
lowers of the Vibhajyavada"
Next, in Sarpghabhadra's *Nyiiyiinusiirii 21, another post-AKB
polemic, an additional requirement for the definition is noticeable:
"It is only those who believe in the real existence of the three periods
of time, as discussed above, as well as of the three kinds of the Un-
conditioned (asm?Jskrta ), that can be considered as belonging to the
Sarvastivada."
This same requirement is also found in ADV22:
"Sarvastivada is so-called because it accepts [the reality of] the three
periods of time, distinguished on account of activity, and the three
reals [-the three Unconditioned] ... "
A commentary on AKB attributed to Sarpghabhadra (?), entitled chos mfwn
pa mdzod kyi bstan bcos kyi tshig le 'ur byas pa 'i rnam par bSad pa (Tohoku
no. 4091 ), preserved in Tibetan, too contains a definition with the same ad-
ditional requirement: gali dag 'das pa dan I ma 'a lis pa dan da !tar byuli ba
dan I dus la ma gtogs pa thams cad yod do ies smra ba de dag ni thams cad
yod par smra ba yin I
17
 .t.:\ 1 KA:\"Lt: L....:J U I Mt: ;')UlKt:il•lL UU\.. I KJ ..... l.:.

The fact that Avatara, as much as the Paiicastuka, attempts to deal with all
dharmas recognized by the Sarvastivada, summarily under a definite scheme
- particularly a five-fold classification - may well be an indication of the
influence of the Paiicavastuka ofPrS on Avatara. Skandhila tells us in his
prologue that he has composed a brief treatise to enable the beginners "to
enter with ease and delight into the deep whirlpool within the
ocean of the Abhidharma".23 In the
1555), Dharmatrata, too, remarks that Vasumitra has composed the
Paficavastuka so that those who are afraid of extensive learning and memo-
rization may gain understanding of the
means of a brief treatise24. The Paiicavastuka is in fact a self-contained
treatise and seems to have been popular as an independent treatise from the
Han dynasty to the time of Xuan Zang25.
All this suggests that the eight-padartha scheme cannot be considered an
innovation on the part of Skandhila. As a matter of fact, the classification of
all sarrzskrta dharmas under the five-skandha scheme - exactly the same as
the citta-samprayukta-samskiira-skandha. What is the citta-viprayukta-
sarpskiira-skandlJa'? The citta- viprayukta-dharmas are, namely: priipti,
asamjiii-samiipatti, nirodha-samiipatti, iisai!l}iiika,jivitendriya, nikiiya-
sabhiigatii, *upadhi-pratilambha (? ), *vastu-pratilambha (? ¥J:
), *iiyatana-pratilambha ),jiiti, sthiti,jarii, anityatii, niima-
kiiya, pada-kiiya, vyaiijana-kiiya; and all other such dhannas which
to the Paiicavastuka (T no. are citta-viprayukta. They are collectively named the citta-viprayukta-
sarpskiira-skandha. These two kinds [of sarpskiira] together receive
the name sarpskiira-skandha. What is the vijfiiina-skandha? The six
and samiinyalak$WJa by vijfiiina-kiiya .... "
The same five-skandha classification is also found in DSS26, and in AmRS27.
The latter moreover agrees with A vatiira in beginning the discussion on hetu-
pratyaya immediately after that on the viprayukta-sarpskiira.
Finally, we may also note that, as will be seen from the comparative chart
below, there is an exact parallel between the eight-padiiztha and the five-group

that in Avatara - is already found in the Sapta-vastuka ( ) of PrS: schemes, except for the case ofthe six vijfiiinakiiya. In the five-group scheme,

" ... What are the five skandha? The n£pa skandha, the vedanii skandha, these come under 'citta' which precedes 'caitasika'. This order, however, is
only natural in a more developed scheme which has incorporated the
the saf!z}iiii-skandha, the sm!Jskiira skandha, vijfiiina skandha .... What
is the nlpa skandha ? The ten nlpiiyatana and the dharmayatana- Abhidharmic concept of citta-caitta.:

samgrahfta-n£pa. What is the vedanii skandha ? The six vedana-kiiya A$tapadartha Paficavastu
(I) riipa-skandha (I) riipa
.... What is the saf!1}iia skandha? The six sarr1jiiii-kaya .... What is the
(II) vedanii-skandha---- '(II) citta (6 vijiiiina-kiiya)
saf!Jskiira skandha? This is twofold: the citta-saf!Jprayukta-sarrzskara-
(Ill) smpjfiii-skandha - - - - (III) caitasika
skandha and the citta-viprayukta-sm?tskara-skandha. What is the citta-
(IV) sa1pskiira-skandha -citta-samprayukta/
sm!Jprayukta-Saf!Jskiira-skandha? The citta-sartzprayukta-dharmas are,
-citta-viprayukta __ (IV) citta-viprayukta-
namely: cetana, sparsa, manaskara, chanda, adhimok$a, smrti, samadhi,
(V) vijfiiina-skandha (6 vijfiiina-kiiya) sa1pskiira
prajiia, sraddhii, vf1ya, vitarka, vicara, pramada, apramiida; the kusala-
three asarpskrta - - - - - - - - - - ( V ) three asa1pslqta
nu£/a, the akusala-nulla, the avyiikrta-nu£/a; all the sartzyojana, all the
bandhana, all the anusaya, all the upakle5a, all the pmyavasthiina; all
We must not leave out another possibility, however, for Skandhila's choice
that is jiiana, all that is all that is abhisamaya; and other such
of the five-skandha scheme: He could have done so simply in consideration
dharmas which are citta-sm!Jprayukta. They are collectively named

18 19

of the fact that it is the most ancient of all schemes of classifications, fre-
quently used by the Buddha Himself in His discourses. But convenient as it
may be, as a scheme of classification of dhannas, it was certainly n0t one
specifically tailored for the subsumation of all the important Sarvastivada
doctrines - a task that Skandhila appears to undertake. For this reason, in
A vatara, such doctrines as he tu, pratyaya, phala, the stages of purification
and spiritual progress, the planes of existence, etc. have to be fitted into the
scheme, often in a rather awkward manner.
We may remark in passing, that there exists a Pali Abhidhamma manual by
the same title: Abhidhammavatara28 by Buddhadatta of Uragapura, written
in the Cola country in India. It is the earliest of the non-canonical
Abhidhamma works in which an attempt has been made to systematize the
Pali Abhidhamma in the form of a manual. It was treasured as a beginners'
manual until it was surpassed by Anuruddha's Abhidhammatthasailgaha
around the twelfth century. Divided into twenty-four chapters, mostly in
verse, it represents the orthodox Theravada views of the Mahavihara; and as
such has little to compare with A vatara which is a synopsis of the Sarvastivada
doctrines.
III The Chinese and Tibetan Versions, and the present English translation
The Sanskrit original of A vatara is no longer extant. The present English
translation is made from the Chinese version .1\.]liif (T no.l554)
translated by Xuan Zang in 658 A.D. We have also consulted both the Pe-
king and Derge editions of the Tibetan version, rab tu byed pa chos mlion pa
la 'jug pa ies bya ba, given in Sanskrit as *prakaraQabhidharmavatara
(Tohoku no. 4098, Peking no. 5599), translated by Jinamitra, Danasila and
Ye-ses-sde, and its commentary entitled chos milon pa la 'jug pa rgya cher
'grel pa siiin po kun las btus pa ies bya ba, ( *Sara-samuccaya-nama-
abhidhannavatara-tikii, by the same translators (Tohoku 4097, Peking no.
20
SKANDHILA"S AlllliDfiARMAVATARA
5598 ). The Chinese and the Tibetan titles (given in both Tibetan and San-
skrit transliteration) together justify the Tohoku restoration as
Abhidharmavatara.
The advantage of using Xuan Zang's translations needs no explanation.
Though not fully error-proof and not as literal as the Tibetan translations in
general, they are on the whole very consistent. Besides, Xuan Zang's mas-
tery of Sanskrit as well as Buddhist doctrines is usually very dependable.
There is also the additional advantage of checking his renderings in this
work with those in his AKB(C) - which procedure of course is not always as
reliable as we would like it to be. In the case of the Tibetan version of A vatara,
one gets the advantage of a very high degree of literal-ness. But the transla-
tors are not always consistent in the use of technical tenninologies. In addition,
there are also textual corruptions in both the Peking and Derge editions.
In comparison with A vatara(T), A vatara(C) has, here and there, one or two
additional phrases or sentences, usually explanatory in nature. However,
this is not always the case. Thus, in the description of akasa, where A vatara
(C) has simply " ... vayu is supported by akasa ... ", A vatara(T) is a lot more
elaborate29: "Earth ... is supported ... on the Golden Mal).<;lala, ... the Golden
Mal).<;lala supported ... on Water ... Water supported ... on Wind ... Wind
supported ... on Space." As regards divergence- all doctrinally pertaining to
minor points - particularly noteworthy is the difference in the order of enu-
meration of some of the caitta (see infra). All this may suggest that Xuan
Zang, in some places, might have translated A vatara rather freely .3D Alterna-
tively, his collaborators in the translation project could have made some
readjustments or revisions on the the basis of his earlier renderings in AKB
(C). On the other hand, Xuan Zang is observed to be generally quite faithful
in his other translations - e.g. AKB - even though at the same time his habit
of adding explanatory sentences is well-known. We must also not leave out
the possibility that the Chinese and Tibetan translations were made from
two different Indian recensions, belonging to different periods, of the same
21
 ENTRANCE INTO TilE SUPREME DOCTRINE :'ll'>../\f-.,I.JMlL/\ :'"! 1\1:1-HLUHAI<.MAVA I AKA

treatise. In our discussions that follow, we have generally kept these two this controversy, it appears that originally the like the
possibilities in mind, rather than rejecting straight-away any additional sen- Theravadins, held these two factors to be simultaneously active, but modi-
tences in A vatara(C) as merely interpolations by Xuan Zang. fied their view under the influence of the criticism of the Kosakara ... .32

A vatara being a technical work, we have adhered to the principle of being as Thif> controversy, with the various examples and explanations, was already
literal as possible in our translation. Occasionally, however, we have had to found in MVS. Let us examine below the explanations given by
Sa111ghabhadra and the MVS compilers, to see how far Jaini's conclusion is
take slight liberty where a too literal rendering of the original would result in
justified:
unintelligibility. There are certain terms, such as dharma, buddha, etc., as
well as some technical terms for which it is difficult to find satisfactory Ny (p.394a): It is like equal parts of MVS (p.218c-2l9b ): Just like two
English correspondences, which we have preferred to leave untranslated. water and vinegar in combination: equal parts of vinegar and water
Generally, we have refrained from adding an "s" to pluralize Indian words, Although there is equality in combined and put into the mouth
substance, there is a predominance give rise to the [gustatory] con-
with a few exceptions such as "buddhas", "dharmas", and
in activity [of one over the other] ... sciousness sharply and slowly,
"sutras", etc. Within the citta, whichever of the [respectively]; likewise are vitarka
two dharmas, vitarka and vicara, pre- and vicam .... All these explanations
In the annotations, we have generally given full translations of the passages dominates in activity is to be com- show that vita1*a and vicara do not
we quote from the Chinese sources, particularly those from MVS and Ny. pared to vinegar; that whose activity come into activity simultaneously, as
is feeble, to water. Hence .... vitarka their activities predominate at differ-
We may be forgiven for our indulgence in such lengthy annotations at times,
and vicara, though co-existing in the ent times
for the reason that most of these material are not available in English. More-
citta, operate at different times.
over, they often contain valuable data which one simply cannot overlook if
one is to have, among other things, a proper historical perspective of the As is evident from the above quotations and the fuller translations given in
doctrinal evolution of the early schools. our annotations33, the were already well aware ofthe type of
criticism as levelled by the Sautrantikas, and replied to it. Moreover, both
We may here cite an example to illustrate this point. In AKB3l, the Sa:rnghabhadra and the MVS compilers assert that though vitarka and vicara
who consider vitarka and vicara to be two distinct dravya, de- co-exist, they are not simultaneously active in the sense that their activities
fine them as cittaudarikat<! and cittasiik$mata, respectively. The example predominate at different times. Thus, it is incorrect to speak of the later
they give suggests that the two operate simultaneously in one and the same as having modified their views under the influence of the
citta. The Sautrantikas, who regard the two caitta as mere prajiiapti for the Kosakara's criticism, since AKB was composed some three centuries after
gross and subtle states of the mind, criticize the conception as the compilation ofMVS.
impossible. Both Samghabhadra and the author of ADV defend the
standpoint. In the Introduction to ADV, P.S. J aini gives us a Many such supposedly "neo-Sarvastivada" doctrines are usually attributed
very comprehensive description of the controversy on these two caitta as to SaJ.Tlghabhadra. The main reason why some scholars are so apt to label
gathered from the Pali and Sanskrit sources. In conclusion, he says: "From

22 23
 INTO THE SUPREME DOCTRINE
them neo-Sarvastivada is often because of their presumption that the
Sarvastivada doctrines presented by Vasubandhu in AKB are those of the
orthodoxy. Accordingly, all variants from these found in post-
AKB works are believed to be revision. While we do not intend to claim that
there had been no evolution or even innovation in Sarvastivada doctrines
subsequent to AKB, the above example has amply demonstrated that, for a
proper perspective of this evolution, we cannot afford to ignore the valuable
data in pre-AKB Sarvastivada works, particularly MVS. Moreover, as
Sarpghabhadra often loudly protests in Ny, Vasubandhu is not always faith-
ful in his representation of the view-points. Another case in point
is the doctrine of "kiiritra". This is said to have gone through several stages
of development, culminating in Sa111ghabhadra' s revised version which de-
fines it as under the pressure from the Sautrantika theoreticians.
But a careful examination of this doctrine as presented in MVS and a cau-
tious perusal ofVasubandhu's inaccurate presentation will show that we
have to be more cautious in making such a claim. (See appendix).
IV The development of the Sarviistivada manuals 34
Although Buddhadatta'sAbhidhammavatara does not seem to be related, in
content, to Avatara, the fact that the two have the same title and a similar
aim, and appeared around the same period of time- the fifth century A.D.35
- suggests a common need felt by both the Theravadin and Sarvastivadin
Abhidharmikas during this period to compose such manuals for the sake of
the beginners.
In the case of the Sarvastivada tradition, their Abhidharma doctrines were
given a definite form in JPS, around the middle of the second century A.D.
There followed active and creative study, discussion, elaboration and sys-
tematization of these doctrines, the result of which was the compilation of
MVS by the Kasmirian Sarvastivadins36. In this gigantic work purporting to
24
SKANDHILA"S ABHIDHARMAVAT ARA
be a commentary on JPS are found, not only the JPS viewpoints upheld by
its compilers as orthodox, but also the heterodox views of the other
Sarviistivada acarya, as well as those held by other early Buddhist schools
and independent masters. In short, it is encyclopedic in scope.
But JPS and MVS, magnificent as they are, lack sufficient unity and system-
atization as a whole37. Besides, MVS contains frequent digressions from the
main point under discussion, and thus adds to the complication and confu-
sion for the beginners. In fact MVS itself, at the outset, states: "One should
seek, in the Abhidharma, the true characteristics of dharmas, and not the
order [of presentation] or the nidana. There is no fault if [a doctrine is
presented] earlier or later, or without a nidana"38. This nature of the
Abhidharma works is contrasted with that of the Siitra and the Vinaya which
are said to be concerned with order of presentation and nidana respectively
(loc.cit.). Thus, within such an Abhidharma tradition, and further restricted
by the absolute authority of the form and content of JPS, there was little
possibility for any major advance in doctrinal development and, especially
in the systematization of the Sarvastivada doctrines.
Nevertheless, such a state of affairs eventually brought about a significant
reaction from some of the more progressive doctors of the Sarvastivada, and
this led to a new line of development. These doctors deviated to varying
degrees from the Kasmirian orthodoxy known after MVS as the
and began to compose manuals aimed at being concise, lucid and systematic.
The earliest of such manuals that we possess in Chinese is AmRS by a cer-
tain which effectively serves as an introduction to JPS and MVS.
There is clear evidence39 that while AmRS derives its material from JPS,
MVS40 and PrS and other sources, it is basically inclined towards PrS and
the Gandhara school. The title itself "Amrta(-rasa)" suggests also a practi-
cal purport: At the end of the chapter on dhyiina, there is a description of the
meditational practices, with asucyanusmrti and anapanasmrti as the founda-
tion, which are said to lead to "the end of suffering.41" It states: "There are
25
 ENTRANCE INTO THE SUPREME DOCTRINE
two paths which lead to Nirval)a- (i) the contemplation of the impurity of
the body; (ii) the mindfulness ofbreathing ... "42 Thus, we may say that there
is in AmRS an emphasis on the need to return from purely scholastic discus-
sion to the aim of realizing Nirval)a (amrta).
After AmRS, this emphasis on practice and realization seemed to be lost.
But the new development of a free attitude in the selection of material with
the emphasis on organization and conciseness, was continued in a series of
manuals, in which a succeeding one partly inherited and readjusted with
new addition, the form and content of the preceding one. A vatara is one
of the latest of these manuals known to us. The following is a list of these
manuals extant in Chinese translations:
1 *Abhidharmamrta(-rasa)-sastra (T no.1553), by 2 fas., trans-
lator unknown.
2 *Abhidharmahrdaya (T no.1550) by Dharmasrl, 4 fas., tr. by
Sailghadeva et. al.
3 *Abhidharmahrdaya-sutra (? T no.1551) by Upasanta, 2 fas., tr. by
Narendrayasas.
4 *Abhidharmahrdayavyakhya (? T no.1552), by Dharmatrata, 11 fas.,
tr. by Sanghabhuti.
5 Abhidharmakosa-mula-kiirikii (T no.l560) by Vasubandhu, 1 fas., tr. by
Xuan Zang
6 Abhidharmakosabhii$yam (T no.1558) by Vasubandhu, l fas., tr. by
Xuan Zang (There is also an earlier translation (T no.1559) by
Paramartha)
7 *Abhidharmakosasastratattviirthii-tika (T no.l561) by Sthiramati, trans-
lator unknown.
8 *Abhidhanna-nyiiyiinusarii (T no.1562) by Sarpghabhadra, 40 fas., tr.
by Xuan Zang.
9 *Abhidharma-samayapradipika (T no.l563) by Samghabhadra, 40 fas.,
26
SKANDHILA'S AHHIDHARMAVATARA
tr. by Xuan Zang.
lO *Abhidharmiivatiira (T no.l554) by Skandhila, 2 fas., tr. by Xuan
Zang.
The next manual after AmRS to appear was *Abhidharmahrdaya by
Dharrnasri (or ), around 200 A. D. It was basically a
re-organisation of AmRS43 , with revision and addition. Its chief contribu-
tion lies in the composition of summary verses (probably added after the
original prose text) which expound the Abhidharma doctrines succinctly
and serve as a great aid to memorization. Doctrinally, it not only sympa-
thizes with the Gandharian views and other heterodox Sarvastivadin views,
but even adopts some of those held by the Vibhajyavadins. In this respect, it
may be regarded as the predecessor of AKB.
As a result of its summary verses, *Abhidhannahrdaya became very popu-
lar as a beginners' manual, and triggered off several works of a similar na-
ture purporting to be commentaries on it. The most important of these is the
*Abhidhannahrdayavyiikhyii Cmflili ) by Dharmatrata, which re-
vised and supplemented *Abhidhannahrdaya, with the intention ofbringing
the latter back in line with the orthodox (Kasmlrian) view
while being also tolerant towards certain heterodox views. This work shows
considerable development in the Sarvastivada doctrines and has attained
greater precision in definition. Many scholars believe that it is the immedi-
ate source of the monumental AKB45.
AKB represents the culmination of this new development. Known in India
also as "The Treatise oflntelligence (J[J@JIJ3ilifu )"46, it excels all the others in
respect of organization, scope, and presentation of arguments, and is a
treasure-house of all the essential doctrines that the early schools have hith-
erto developed. In this work, Vasubandhu provides full opportunity for the
Sautrantikas and other schools to argue against the His own
standpoint is, for the most part, that of the Sautrantika; and he often gives
27
 ENTRANCE INTO THE SUPREME DOCTRINE
little chance for the to answer their opponents. In reaction to
this, Saf!lghabhadra spent twelve years to compose Ny to dispute with the
Kosakara, leveling his criticisms chiefly against the contemporary Sautrantika
lead,er Sthavira Srllata and his pupil Rama. Saf!lghabhadra also composed
SPrS (half the size ofNy in Chinese translation) which consists mainly of
the defensive part ofNy. There is a partially preserved Sanskrit work ADV47
which is also an apologia for the orthodoxy against the
Its author holds many views identical with those of Satp.ghabhadra, and is
conjectured by P. S. Jaini to be his pupil Vimalamitra48. Professor J. W. de
Jong 49 , however, has pointed out that he could be the siistra master Isvara.
Thus we witness during this period the most acute controversy between the
Sarvastivadin on the one hand, and the Sautrantika and others on the other.
But with all these involved and subtle controversies comprising the greater
part of these works, their pragmatic value as beginners' manuals decreases
drastically. The beginners may feel bewildered and lost. Moreover, such
controversies did much damage to the Abhidharmika tradition as a whole
' Abhidharma, a pupil is unable to discern the dharma. In exact contrast to
especially at a time when this tradition was being greatly threatened by the
challenge of both the Sautrantikas and the Mahayanists. It was with such
considerations in mind, and perhaps also with the hope of bringing together
the eastern and western camps to face this challenge, that Skandhila com-
posed his Avatiira, aiming at the beginners. His personal affiliation will be
discussed below; suffice it to say here that in this work he shows no hostility
towards other Sarvastivadin views differing from his own50, though as we
have remarked above, he does make a critical allusion to the Sautrantika.
Indeed in much of the treatise, particularly the sections on the viprayukta-
saf!!skiira and asaf!!skrta, we sense a definite concern of the author to de-
fend the Sarvastivada against the Sautrantika.
Apart from the salutation verses in the prologue and a giithii quotation in §
4.6.6.2, the whole treatise is written in prose. It is succinct (only two fas. in
the Chinese translation), lucid, systematic and complete, covering all the
28
major doctrines of the Sarvastivada, and hence is ideal as a Sarvastivada
Abhidham1a manual for the beginners.
v The Abhidharmika and other subgroups within the Sarvastivada
In the general sense, the Abhidharmikas represent those who look upon the
Abhidharma sastras as superior to the siitras: To them, the real import of the
latter which is abhipriiyika (implicit), aupaciirika (conventional) and neyiirtha
(tentative), is to be understood through the former which is kllc.JalJika (defini-
tive) and nitiirtha (ultimate). Their most powerful critics- the Sautrantikas-
profess to take the siitras as the ultimate authority, rather than the Abhidharma
sastras.5I. For these Sautrantikas, the Abhidharma consists of certain sutras,
such as Arthaviniscaya-sfitra, dealing with the characteristics of dharmas
(dharma-lak.Ja7Ja)52. AKB represents the standpoint of the the
most established Abhidharmikas, as follows: na hi vinii abhidharmopaddena
sakto dharmiin praviceluf!! - Without the expositions in the
this, the author of Arthaviniscaya-slitra-nibandhana , who often favours the
Sautrantika standpoint, states- as if correcting the claims- na hi
vina siitropadesena 8i$yal) sakto dhannaip pravicetuJ!l - Without the exposi-
tions in the sutras, the pupil is unable to discern the dharma.53 As far as the
Abhidharmikas are concerned, Abhidharma is buddha-vacana,
in as much as it is none other than the discernment of the Buddha's teach-
ings in the sutras. JPS54 says:" ... one should therefore discern the meaning
of the sutras. As the Bhagavat has said: Animals find their final abode in the
forest; birds find their final abode in the sky; the ii1ya find their final abode
in nirviil}a; dharmas find their final abode in discernment." On this, MVS55
explains: "The wise ones should therefore skilfully discern the meaning of
the siitras, and should not understand them [merely] at face value. If one
does so, one will not only make the Noble Teachings appear contradictory,
but also generate topsy turvy views in one's own mind." But though
29
Abhidharma is admitted to be the interpretation of the sutras, it is claimed
that there is nothing in the Abhidharma which has not been taught by the
Buddha in essence.56 Indeed, for them, not only do the Abhidharma
ings represent the sutras in the real sense, they constitute the pr8mii1)8 of the
sutras :They are the true criteria on the basis of which one can ascertain as
to whether a particular sutra is ney8rth8 or nitarth8.57
What are the specific topics of concern common to all the Abhidharmikas?
MVS, fas. 2358 explains: "The meanings of the Abhidharma-pitaka should
be understood by means of fourteen things: the six he tu, the four pr8ty8y8,
smpgrah8, s8rpprayog8, s8m8nvag8m8, 8S81118nvag8ma Those who, by means
of these fourteen things, understand the Abhidharma unerringly, are called
Abhidharmikas; not [those who] merely recite and memorize the words.
Other masters say that the meanings of the Abhidh8rm8-pif8k8 should be
understood by means of seven things: hetu-k8us8ly8, pr8tY8Y8-k8us8lya,
svalak$al)a-k8us8ly8, samany8l8k$81)8-k8us8ly8,
s8rpgr8ha-8s8rpgr8h8-k8us8ly8, s8rppr8yog8-vipr8yog8-kaus8ly8,
S81118nvag8ma-8s8m8nviig8m8-k8us8ly8. Those who, by means of these seven
things understand the Abhidharma unerringly, are called Abhidharmikas;
not [those who] merely recite and memorize the words". Av8tara too, ex-
plains the c8itasik8 pr8jiia, as "the examination (up818k$81)8), as the case
may be, of the following eight kinds of dharma: s8mgr8ha, s8rppr8yog8,
sam8nviig8m8, hetu, pr8tyay8, ph8la, sv818k$81)8, samany8-18k$81)8."59
S8m8nvag8m8 is a topic of special importance for the Sarvastivada; it is not
developed in the 'present-only-exist" Abhidharma schools60. Phal8 had not
yet become an important topic at the time of MVS. Hence, the fundamental
topics common to all the Abhidharmikas comprise: svalak$81)8,
sam8ny8-l8k$81)8, S8rpgr8h8, smppr8yog8, hetu, pr8ty8ya61. And only those
who discuss and master these topics are entitled to be called Abhidharmikas.
The supreme Abhidharmika, according to the was Sakyamuni
Himselfb2.
30
rrower sense as found in MVS, however, the Abhidharn1ikas often
In the na ' . . . . . .
the Sarvastivada theoreticians. Sometimes, 1t 1s even used m spe-
fi
stand or , .
'fi tierence to the Kasmirian Thus, where MVS63 ascnbes
et tc re
osition that the rupa-dharma also have sabhiiga-hetu, to 'the mas-
the prop ' . . .
Kasmira' · the older version of thts work64 ascn bes 1t to the
ters o f ' _ . .
•Abhidharmikas ([liiJW.ltti:A.)'. But if the Abhidharmikas constituted the roam-
stream of the Sarvastivada, they did not exhaust the totality of the school. In
the time of MVS, the early who were the sfitradhara, with
Dharmatdita and Buddhadeva as the most eminent, also constituted a school
ofthought within the fold of the Sarvastivada. Even subsequent to MVS, the
leader, Kumaralata, who was instrumental in the evolution of
the into the Sautrantika, was known to subscribe to the view of
sarviistitva66.
It appears that while all Sarvastivadins were united in their common tenet of
the tri-temporal existence (sarviistitva) of the underlying essences of all
dharmas, at the beginning they did not explicitly call themselves
"Sarvastivadins" as such. Both they, as well as their opponents - the
Vibhajyavadins - seemed to continue for quite some time to assume the
status of the orthodox Sthaviravadins. In VKS which is probably composed
after Kvu67, around the beginning of the first century A.D., these believers
in sarviistitva disputed with Maudgalyaya (= Moggaliputta-tissa) represent-
ing the 'present-only-exist' view-point of the Vibhajyavadins, and with the
Pudgalavadins (= Vatsiputriya). Nowhere in this text did the Sarvastivadins
call themselves "Sarvastivadins" as such in the dispute. Instead, they called
themselves the "Yuktivadins" ( )when arguing with the
Vibhajyavadins, and "Sunyatavadins" ) when arguing with the
Pudgalavadins. But the evidence of this text alone is not sufficient as proof
that they never called themselves or were known as "Sarvastivadins" until
sometime after VKS. At any rate, there is inscriptional evidence of refer-
ence to the name "Sarvastivadins" in the Mathura Lion Capital dating from
31
 the beginning of 1st century A.D.68 Moreover even in the time ofMVS, we
still find them calling themselves by these appellations, as in the following
passage:69 " Question: Herein, who asks and who replies? Who raises objec.
tion, and who explains? Answer: The Vibhajyavi.idin asks and the Yuktiviidin
replies. The Vibhajyavadin raises objections and the Yuktivadin explains."
According to Vasumitra's Samayabhedoparacana-cakra70, the Sarviistivada
branched offfrom the Sthaviravada in the beginning part of the 3rd century
after the Buddha's demise. The exact date of this split, however, is unsettled,
not least because of the complication of the issue of the difference of the two
Buddhist chronolgies - the so-called "long" and "short" chronologies which
differ by about a century. Although in VKS, the existence of dharmas in the
three periods of time was already explicitly asserted and argued for, we have
to wait until JPS to find their fully developed theory of the everlasting exist-
ence of the svabhiiva of dharmas. In fact, it was JPS that established the
Sarvastivada dogma in a definite form. And it is for this reason that
Ki.ityayaniputra, author of JPS, was regarded by tradition as the founder of
the Sarvastivi.ida schooJ.71
From the beginning, differing viewpoints were found and even tolerated- as
long as they did not directly contravene the thesis of Sarvastivada - within
the school. To take just a few examples: Dharmatrata, Buddhadeva, Vasumitra
and the so-called 'four great Abhidharmikas of the Sarvastivada'
- each offered a different explanation as to how, given the theory that a
dhamm exists as an everlasting dravya, the difference in the three periods of
time can be accounted for.72 also did not go all along with the
orthodox Abhidharmikas in asserting that the totality of the Abhidharma is
buddha-vacana. To him, "all Abhidharma is explanations on the siitras. Such
and such an exposition is made on account of such and such a siitra; what-
ever that is not said in the siitras must be removed."73 With regard to the
caitasika, we find Buddhadeva and the denying their reality
apart from citta74. Dharmatri.ita held that all caitta are subsumable under
32
cetana-75·• while others acknowledged the real existence ofthe caitta apart
from the citta. With regard to the three aswflskrta, Buddhadeva76 and oth-
ers ac knowledged their reality; Dhannatrata held that iikiisa is unreaJ77; and
the denied the reality of all the three78.
But since JPS, the Kasmirian Sarvi.istivadins upheld the supreme authority
ofthe JPS system, and raised this work to the status of being the Buddha's
words79. As time went on, they assumed the position of orthodoxy and
became increasingly dogmatic and intolerant towards all other views not
compatible with the JPS system. Partly to consolidate their position as the
orthodox Sarvastivadins, they eventually compiled the encyclopedic MVS
which purports to be a commentary on JPS. In it, besides their own views,
those ofthe following Sarvastivi.ida schools of thought were also cited and
usually criticized and rejected: The Dar*intikas, the western masters
(piisciitya; also called 'the Venerables of the west' and 'the west-
ern sramalJa'), the foreign masters (bahirddaka; also called 'the masters
outside Kasmira', and the 'Gandharian masters'80). Even the so-called 'old
Kasmirian masters'S I were not spared.
Subsequent to the compilation ofMVS, the orthodox Kasmirians who based
themselves on it were known as the We must bear in mind,
however, that the views accepted by the were not necessarily
proposed by themselves for the first time. Many of them must have been the
achievement ofthe great Sarvastivada masters up to the time of the compila-
tion ofMVS. The term eventually came to connote the ortho-
dox Sarvastivi.idins, based mainly -but not exclusively- in Kasmira. It is
important to realize that not all of them necessarily subscribed to each and
every view sanctioned by the MVS compilers. Moreover, the evolving na-
ture of the views must also be recognized.
This dogmaticism and intolerance of the inevitably brought about
a reaction from the other Sarvastivadins. On the one hand, it resulted in the
split of the Sarvi.istivi.ida school into two major camps- the eastern one rep-
resenting the Kasmirian school and the western one representing the
33
Gandharian school. On the other hand, it compelled the sutra-centred The views of the western masters, foreign masters and Gandharian
work. ,
to co-operate with other holders of heterodox views including ecifically pointed out in MVS, are but a small number of hetero-
rnasters Sp
the Mahayana Sunyatavadins prevailing around the first and second centu-
dox view"93.
ries A.D.; and finally to change over to the 'present-only-exist' standpoint.
It was in this process that, a section among their radicals, the But the work which deeply influenced the basic attitude of these western
eventually evolved into the Sautrantika. masters was PrS whose importance for the Sarvastivadins was next only to
JPS. The new trend of development we have outlined in section III above
Although the appellations 'Gandharian masters', 'western masters', and 'for-
was in fact inherited from the tradition of PrS - tendency towards organiza-
eign masters' may suggest a considerable difference in the geographical lo-
tion, the essential, conciseness, and definition. It is for this reason that many
cation of these masters, they in actual fact mainly refer to the Sarvastivada
views found in PrS, such as 'four avyakrtamiila '94. 'four meanings of
masters west of Kasmira - the western masters - of Gandhara and Parthia,
anusaya'95, etc., were often attributed by the to the western or
with Gandhara as the centre. In AKB82, Vasubandhu speaks of the K.asmirians
foreign masters.
and the western masters where MVS83 has "masters of this country (
and "foreign masters )",respectively. In many places in
VI Avatiira on the avijfiapti
MVS, a certain view said to be held by one of these groups is also said, in
the same context or elsewhere, to be held by anotheJil4. However, we do
A vatara enumerates, as do JPS and some other Sarvastivada texts, eleven
come across one instance85 in MVS where the 'foreign masters' hold a
bhautika-rllpa: The five sensory faculties, the five corresponding objects,
slightly different view from the 'western masters'. It is with regard to the
and the avijiiapti. The same enumeration is also found in AKB. In fact, judg-
number of rllpa heavens: The say sixteen86; the western masters,
ing by Xuan Zang's translation, the descriptions for these eleven riipa in
seventeenS?; the foreign masters, who hold that there are nine distinct abodes
AJ<B96 - and for that matter, for most other topics - are very similar to those
in the riipadhatu88, eighteen89. Also, where MVS90 ascribes the view that
in A vatiira; and in a few places97 they are virtually identical. But there are
riipa have no sabhiiga-hetu to 'the foreign masters', Old MVS91 ascribes it
also significant differences which will be noted in due course. One of these
to 'the This may then suggest "foreign masters" possibly have
differences is with regard to the avijiiapti, the eleventh on the list of bhautika-
a broader connotation than "western master". We must of course, also allow
riipa.
for the possibility of individual differences in views even among the so-called
western masters or foreign masters themselves.
Since JPS, it has been one of the central tenets of the Sarvastivada that the
The western masters too studied JPS, though with a more critical attitude avijiiapti is a real entity, which partakes of the nature of rllpa. It is invisible
than the Kasmirians. They too, being Sarvastivadin Abhidharmikas, were (anirdarsana), non-resistant (apratigha), and included under the dharma-
not really opposed to the Kasmirians in a sectarian sense. The MVS compil- iiyatana- rather than in the riipa-ayatana. Moreover, it neither occupies space
ers held them in considerable regard, calling them 'the honoured ones of the nor has the nature of rupal)a.9R That is to say, it is a special kind of nlpa. The
west'92. Venerable Yin Shun observes that "the doctrines ofthe western asserts that the Buddha has spoken of three kinds of riipa in the
school are mostly the orthodox views of MVS and were absorbed in this sutras: (i) those which are sanirdarsana and sapratigha, (ii) those which are

34 35

anirdarsana and sapratigha, and (iii) those which are anirdar5ana and
apratigha. The avijiiapti is a riipa of the third category99. This avijiiapti con.
sists of an invisible, continuous series projected by a momentary corporeal
or vocal action. The thesis that karmic force can be of the nature of riipa, and
that riipa therefore is morally definable, makes interesting as much as prob.
lematic philosophy.
In MVS, we find that the early deny the reality of the avijiiapti.
lOO Two of their earliest expressions of denial are those by Bhadanta
Dharmatrata and Buddhadeva. The former asserts that "all riipa are
[subsumable as either] the asraya [or] the vi$aya of the five vijiianakaya"IOI,
and denies the reality of the dharmayatana-sawgrhita-riipa 102; the latter
denies the reality of the bhautika-riipa altogetherl03. It is to be noted that
DSS, one of the very earliest of the seven fundamental Sarvastivada
Abhidharma texts, too, makes no mention of the avijiiapti in all its discus-
sions on riipa. In AK.B, the Sautdintikas vehemently criticize this doctrine,
continuing the tradition of the early as to its denial.
The Sarvastivada definition of avijiiapti presented by Vasubandhu in AKB
is as follows:
vik$iptacittakasyapi yo'nubandhal) subhasubhal) I
mahiibhiitanyupiidaya, sa hyavijiiaptirucyate 11 104
In Ny, objects to this definition: "The Kosakara is unable to
describe the nature of the avijiiapti completely by this verse, for he says that
the avijiiapti is an anubandha. His own commentary says: "By anubandha is
meant a homogeneous series (yo'nubandha itiyal)pravahal) )105. Now, [the
avijiiapti of] the first moment cannot be described as a series; lest there be
the fallacy of over-generalization (atiprasailga). Thus, his definition defi-
nitely excluded the avijiiapti of the first moment. Moreover, a series is unreal;
and [to describe] the avijiiapti as unreal is contrary to the Abhidharma tenets.
Moreover, [the vijiiapti] projected by samadhi does not continue as a series
36
SKANDHILA"S ABHIDHARMAVATARA
in the vilcyipta and acittaka states- it would then not be avijfiapti ... "106. He
then gives the following verse definition which he claims to be free from
such faults:
krte 'pi visabhiige 'pi citte cittiityaye ea yat I
vyakrulpratigharrz riipaf!l sii hy avijfiaptir 11 107
(That [morally] defined, non-resistant riipa, which ex-
ists in the citta at the time of the action as well [as at
subsequent time], which is of a dissimilar as well [as simi-
lar moral] species, and also in the state without menta-
tion- this is conceded as avijiiapti.)
In SPrSI08, he replaces Vasubandhu's verse above with this, and explains
each term in the prose commentary. With regard to 'krte 'pi', he says: "
'krte 'pi' refers [by the word 'pi'] to those [avijfiapti which are] apart from
the action. Generally speaking, there are two kinds of bhautika-rii.pa which
are apratigha: The first kind arises in dependence on the vijfiapti; the sec-
ond on citta. Those which arise in dependence on vijiiapti are further divis-
ible into two kinds: Those which co-exist with the action (i.e. the vijiiapti)
and those which exist after the action has ceased. The words 'krte 'pi' are
given in order to include exhaustively all these different kinds of avijfiapti
having different svabhiiva and "109.
In Ny, Sa111ghabhadra summarizes: "In brief, the avijfi.apti is that apratigha
kusala or akusala nipa which arises in dependence on a specific corporeal
or voea I vynapt1
··- · karma, and on a specific kusala or akusala citta etc"IIO.
This definition may be compared with that given in Avatiira: "From a spe-
cific vijfi.apti, citta and [tetrad o:fj mahiibhii.ta, there arises [in the actor] a
continuous series of kusala or akusala riipa, which is non-cumulative, and
which perststs
· m · the states of sleep, wakefulness, distracted (vik$ipta) or
non-distracted (avilcyipta) citta, or non-mentation (acittaka). This is the char-
acteristic of the avijiiapti" 111 .
37
 ENTRANCE INTO THE SUPREME DOCTRINE
Although the author of Avatiira employs the tenn 'continuous series' in his
definition; he too, like Sarpghabhadra, takes the pain to remark further that
"there also exists avijiiapti which is momentary. It is with reference to all
the avijiiapti as a whole that we have described them as a continuous series.
"112
For the early Diir$tiintikas, as well as the Sautrantikas, karma is a volitional
activity. "All the corporeal, vocal, and mental karma are the one cetanii"l13.
In AKBII4, the Vaibhii$ikas offer eight reasons to prove the real existence
of the avijiiapti, which are all rejected by the Sautrantikas. One of them is
that if the avijiiapti does not exist, then one would not continue to be a
or a bhik!fW:l'i, etc., since one does not always possess the same kind
of kusala thought as when one was making the ordination vowsll5. Indeed,
in all these arguments, the Vaibhii$ikas are seen to lay the major emphasis
on the avijiiapti as sarrzvara - the invisible power produced within one who
is making the ordination vows, which subsequently restrains one from break-
ing these vows. It is the sine qua non for being an ordained person. This
same emphasis is also discernible in Ny, SPrS and ADV.
In Avatiira, this central emphasis on the avijiiapti as saqzvara is even more
conspicuous. It classifies, as do AKB 116, etc., the avijiiapti as sal?zvara,
asarrzvara, and naivasmrzvaraniism!lvara 117. It gives the only 'logical'
argument (yukti)118 that " it is by virtue of this [sarrzvara] that the status of
a bhik!ju etc., can be established. Were this non-existent, it would not be
legitimately established that there exist bhik$US etc."ll9
The original concept of the avijiiapti, however, might have begun as a me-
dium of preservation ofkarmic efficacy. In JPS, it is discussed in the fourth
grantha under the 'karma skandhaka' 120. In works as late as AKB, Ny and
ADV, it continues to be discussed principally in the context of karma. Hence,
there seems to have been a shift of emphasis in later works where it becomes
increasingly emphasized as sm!7vara.
38
SKANDHILA'S ARHIIlHARMAVATARA
VII Avatiiraon thecaitasika
The idea ofthe co-existence of mental states was already discernible in the
nikiiya and iigama 121. But there is very little classification of mental states
as such in them, apart from such simple groupings as the five indriya, the
seven anusaya, etc. Some scholarsl22 are of the opinion that in the
Sarviistivada Abhidharma, their classification really began with DKS. In
this work are found the following classes of caitasika: ( 1) the ten
mahiibhiimika dharmas, (2) the ten kle8amahiibhiimika (3) the ten
parittaklesabhiimika, (4) the five kle8a, (5) the five dr$ti, (6) the five
sparsa, (7) the five indriya, (8) the five dharmas, (9) the six
vijiiiina-kiiya, (I 0) the six sparsa-kiiya, ( 11) the six vedanii-kiiya, (12)
the six sarp.jfiii-kiiya, (13) the six cetanii-kiiya, and (14) the six
PrS (fas.2) inherited these classifications to which it added the 'ten
kusalamahiibhiimika'. These results were later inherited by MVS which fur-
ther enumerates the 'five akusalamahiibhiimika', the 'three
nirvrtiivyiikrtamahiibhiimika,' and the 'ten anivrtiivyiikrtamahiibhiimika'
(identical with the 'ten mahabhiimika ')124. These classifications were more
or less followed by the manuals subsequent to MVS. Venerable Yin Shunl25
, however, opines that (i) the 'ten mahiibhiimika' originated from JPSI26;
and (ii) the 'ten kusalamahiibhiimika were not found in PrS originally (the
older translations (T no.1541) does not mention them),
but were a later interpolation taken from MVS.127
A vatiira does not classify the caitasika at all. It simply enumerates them
under three skandha: vedanii, sarp.jnii and sarp.skiira. The two caitasika, vedanii
and sarp.jiiii, constitute the two respective skandha; all the remaining caitasika
are enumerated under the 'citta-smpprayukta-sal!Jskiira-skandh:i. This seems
to be an influence from Paiicavastuka, the first chapter of PrS, which also
enumerates the caitasika as citta-sap1prayukta dhannasl28. The following
comparative listings will make it evident that the enumerations in the two
Worksl29 closely parallel each other:
39
 SKANDHILA"S AtJHILJHAKMAVAIAKA
ENTRANCE INTO THE SUPREME DOCTRINE

PrS (Pancavastuka)130
vedanii, sa1J1}fiii, cetanii, spada,
manaskiira, chanda, adhimok$a.
smrti, prajfiii,
sraddhii, virya, vitarka, viciira,
apramiida, pramiida,
The kusala-rmila, the akusala-miila,
the avyiikrta-miila,
Avatara (C)
vedanii, samjiia, cetana, sparsa,
manaskiira, chanda, adhimok$a,
smrti, samadhi, prajfiii,
vitarka, viciira, sraddha, vlrya, hri,
apatriipya, apramiida, prasrabdhi,
avihi1]1Sa, upek$ii, priimodya,
nirveda, iisraddhya, kausidya,
pramiida,
The kusala-miila, the akusala-miila,
the avyiikrta-miila,
0 works also agree generally in their explanations of the caitasika,
.
t that those in Avatiira are of a more developed nature. In particular,
.
both enumerate the same four avyiikrta-mzlla;
. seven anusava . wtth .the same
subdivision into ninety-eight; ten jfiiina and eight k$iinti; ftfty-four
bhaviisrava133, etc. Both also classify sa1J1}fia as big, small, and immeasurable,
ive very similar definitions for thejnana; and explain 'anusaya' in the same
:our senses: m:m, anu--Jbandh, anu--Jsaiij, a nu--Jsi, and in the same orderl34.
The above discussion has been based on Avatiira(C). Howevever, there are
some minor differences between the Chinese and the Tibetan versions with
regard to the first twenty-three caitta of the sa1J1prayukta-sa1J1Skiira, as is
clear from the following listing:

Avatiira(f) Avatara(C)
All the SQI]lyojana, bandhana, Thesa1]1yojana, bandhana, anusaya,
cetanii, spada, manaskara, chanda, cetana, spada, manaskara, chanda,
anusaya, upaklesa, paryavasthiina, upakldas pwyasthiina,
adhimok$a. sraddha, virya, smrti, adhimo"'m, smrti. sqmiidhi. vrajiiii,
All that is jfiiina, all that is dr$(i, all The j1iana, the k$iinti samadhi. vrajfia.
that is abhisamaya,
vitarka, vicara, apramiida, vitarka, vicara, sraddha, virya. fu:L
And the other dharmas of this kind etc. wamada, nirveda, priimodya, apatrapya, apramada, prasrabdhi,
conjoined with citta prasrabdhi, avihiqzsa, hri. avihil]zsa, upek$ii. priimodya,
apatriivya, upek$fi nirveda, asraddhya, kausidya,
pramiida
We can see from the above comparison that theAvatiira enumeration is gen-
erally patterned on that of Paiicavastuka with slight modification and addi- In the above listings, the underlined items involve a difference in order in
tions which are due to the influence of later development in the caitta classi- the two versions, and the two bold-faced items - asraddhya and kauSidya -
fication such as the ten mahiibhzimika (from vedanii to prajfiii) and the ten are found in Avatara(C) only. It may well be that these differences result
kusala-mahiibhzimika 131 from Xuan Zang' s deliberate effort to reflect the classification into
mahiibhumika, kusala-mahiibhiimika, and klesa-mahabhilmika, as found in
In both enumerations, the klda are summarized at the end as "all the Saptavastuka ofPrSI35- an aspect that is in fact not Skandhila's concern-
sa1]1yojana, bandhana, anusaya, upaklda, paryavasthiina". As regards the having himself noticed the influence of PrS on Avatiira. But we must not
abhisamaya, Paiicavastuka simply says: "That which isjiiiina, that which rule out the possibility that the two versions might have been based on two
is dr$(i, is also named abhisamaya"l32 i.e. 'abhisamaya' is simply a collec- different originals. Besides, some questions remain to be answered with re-
tive term forjiiiina and dr$ti. gard to the former hypothesis. These include: ( 1) Why does Xuan Zang not

40 41
shift vitarka and viciira to either after virya (so as to align better
Paiicavastuka) or to just before the grouped items, kusala-miila, etc. (so as
,am.jna (§ 35) . . -- . --
nimitta-niimiirthaikyaJna sa:rpJna mtshan ma dan min dan don gcig tu
reflect their "aniyata" nature )? (2) Why does he not reposition vitarkayonib (p.69) ses pa 'i chos gan yin pa de ni rnam
apramiida and avil1irpsii- in this order, which is that of the kus par rtog pa 'i rgyu ste 'du ses ies
mabiibhiimika; or at least simply place apramiida after which he bya'ol
could have easily done since he is already shifting it? (3) The interpolation
vitarka(§ 50)
- if it be indeed an interpolation - of only iisraddhya and kausidya, and not
vitarko niima rtog pa ni sems rtsili ba 'i mtshan iiid
any other caitta, requires a more definite explanation than the simple suppo. do Ignis su na rtog pa ies kyan bya
sarpkalpa-dvitiya-niimii vi$aya-
sition that Xuan Zang possibly thinks these two together with pramiida are te I 'du ses kyi rlun gis bskyed na I
nimitta-prakiira vikalpi sa:rpjiiii-
sufficient to represent the klesa-mahiibhiimika. 'jug pa rnam parses pa rtsin ba 'i
pa vanoddha ta-vrtti]J., audiirika-
chogs lna 'jug pa 'i rgyu 'i chos so
paiica viijiiiina-kiiya-pra vrttihetu]J. (p.
It is also noteworthy that in the detailed descriptions of the caitasika, there
exist some very close resemblances between A vatiira on the one hand, and 81)

ADV, and Ny (also SPrS) on the other. The resemblances with ADV is
vicara (§51)
especially striking, as can be seen in the following examples of vedanii,
viciirastu dpyod pa ni sems iib pa iiid kyi
saJ!I}nii, vitarka, viciira, and virya:
manovijiiiinapravrttyanukiila]J (p.Sl) mtsan iiid de I yid kyi rnam parses
sa 171 sa r a - n i m a g n a s y a pa 'i 'jug pa dan mthun pa 'i chos so I
cetaso'bhyunnatir ityartha}J. (p.73)
ADVII Avatara (T)

vedanii (§ 32) virya(§53)

vedanii sukhiidistridho 'nubhavah I
trividha1p saJ71veditam iti paryiiya]J. I
v.ijiiiinasannipatajii
dharmayoni]J. kiiya -cittiivasthii-
vi8e$ab prahliidy-upatiipi tadubhaya-
viparitasca fT$1Jiihetur
vedanetyucyate (p.69)
tshor ba ni mymi ba rnam pa gsum
ste bde ba dmi sdug bsnal ba dan bde
ba yan ma yin sdug bs1ial ba yan ma
yin pa ste I gsum tshor bar gyur pa 'i
don gan yin pa 'o I ]J.dod pa dan mi
'dad pa dan giii ga Jas bzlog pa ste
reg pa 'i skye gnas can Jus dan sems
kyi gnas skabs kyi bye brag sim pa
dan gdon giii ga las bzlog pa ste I
srid pa 'i rgyu ni tshor ba ses bya 'o I
viryarp kusaliikusala-dharmotpiida- brtson 'brus ni dge ba dan midge
nirodhiibhyutsiiha]J., sa:rpsiira- ba 'i eh os sked pa dan 'gag par spro
nimagnasya cetaso 'bhyunnatir baste I 'khor ba 'i 'dmp du byin ba 'i
ityartha]J. (p. 73) sems mnon par ]J.byun ba 'i don gan
yinpa'ol
Yoshimoto Shingyo has also demonstrated the resemblances with regard to
those caitta which correspond to the ten mahiibhiimika.l36 He in fact sug-
gests that the author of ADV probably has actively consulted A vatiira in his
own treatise. 13 7

42 43
 .I::!N IKANL-t:::. iN IV II'UI"'H::
There are two eaitasika in A vatara which deserve our special attention : de,
light ( !V\, pramodya) and disgust , nirveda ). They are mentioned in
some earlier works such as DSS and SgPSt38; and are already considered as
independent eaitasika in MVSI39. But they have never been properly in,
eluded in the enumeration of eaitta, except in A vatara, Ny and SPrS. ADV
also alludes to theml40.
In AKB, Vasubandhu enumerates the ten kusalamahabhiimika in the foJ,
!owing verse:
sraddha 'pramada.f:J hrirapatrapa/
miiladvayamahirpsa ea viryarp ea kusale sadii/1 25 //141
Sa111ghabhadra remarks in both Ny and SPrS142, that the two 'ea' in the
above verse indicate that delight and disgust are also to be included under
the kusalamahabhiimika. He explains further that "it is because the modes of
activity of delight and disgust are mutually contradictory, and [hence] can-
not be eo-nascent, that they have not been directly indicated here [in the
verse]: They do not [strictly] fulfill the condition ofbeingkusalamahiibhiimika
[which requires that they be eo-nascent with the other kusalamahiibhiimika
in all the kusala eitta] ... The two 'ea' have been mentioned in order to indi-
cate that these two [eaitta] do not operate together, being mutually contra-
dictory in their modes of activity."143
A vatiira enumerates these two eaitasika immediately after If we
compare the ten eaitta from sraddhii to disgust in A vatiira with the ten
kusalamahiibhiimika in AKB, it would seem as if the two kusala-miila (alobha,
in the latter list have been replaced by delight and disgust inAvatara
list. Probably, under the influence of PrS, the author of A vatara includes
alobha and in the context of 'the kusala-miila, the akusala-miila, the
avyakrta-miila'; and replaces them with delight and disgust which he, as
well as Sa111ghabhadra, considers to be subsumable under the
44
}olsalamahiibhiimika- even though he is in actual fact not concerned with
lassifications. On the other hand, the first ten caitasika from vedanato
sueh C
prajii8 correspond exactly to the ten mahabhiimika in AKB144.
The descriptions of delight and disgust in A vatara are also similar to those
given in Ny 145. Other instances of similar descriptions between the two
works are those with regard to hri, apatrapya, the senses
of 'anusaya', and the definition of nivaral)a 146.
There are altogether forty-eight eaitasika enumerated in A vatara. They com-
prise (i) twenty-five enumerated singly - vedana, sarpjiia, cetana, sparsa,
chanda, manaskiira, smrti, samiidhi, prajiia, vitarka, vieara,
sraddhii, virya, hri, apatrapya, apramiida, prasrabdhi,
pramodya, nirveda, asraddhya, kausidya, pramada; and (ii) twenty-three
enumerated under collective items such as the kusala-miila, the anusaya,
etc. (some of them are repeated under two or more collective items)- alobha,
147, Jobha, moha, miina, vieikitsii, miitsarya, mayii, mada,
pradiisa, vihirpsii, upaniiha, siithya, styana, middha, auddhatya, kaulqtya, ahri,
anapatrapya, krodha,
VDI Avatiira on the citta-viprayukta-salfJSkiira
One distinct feature of this work is the author's very determined effort to
prove that the eitta-viprayukta-sarpskara cannot but exist as real entities. To
better appreciate this deep concern on the part of the author, as well as
Satpghabhadra and the author of ADV, it should be remembered that from
the beginning, even within the broadl48 Sarvastivada tradition itself, this
doctrinal category- the eitta-viprayukta-sarpskara- had not been unanimously
accepted, either as regards their reality (as a dravya having a svabhava) or as
regards their total number. Thus, in MVS, we find that Bhadanta
Dhannatratal49 and the early acaryasi50 deny the reality of the
45
 whole viprayukta-saJ!lskaraskandha. Buddhadeva considers all the
srupskrta-dhannas to be subsumble under either the mahabhiita (as in the
case of the riipa) or citta (as in the case of the citta-caitta), 151 which of
course, is tantamount to the denial of any such category as the citta-
viprayukta-dharmas which are conjoined neither with riipa nor citta. Yet he
seems to concede a relative reality to at least some of them, such as prapti,
152 jivitendriya and nikiiyasabhagata.l53
JPS, esteemed as the supreme authority by the Kasmirian Abhidharmikas
'
speaks explicitly of "riipa", "citta", "caitasika-dharma" and
"citta-viprayukta-saJ!lskiir£1' in its discussion on vipiika-hetu.154 However,
we find neither clear definitions nor a definite list of them here, but only
scattered descriptions of nikayasabhagatii, 155 jivitendriya, 156 jati, sthiti,
jarii, anityata, 157 pf(hagjanatva 158 and priipti.l59 In both DSS and PrS, we
find sixteen enumerated; and in Amrtarasa-siistra, seventeen. It seems that
not until Abhidharmahrdaya that the number is more or less fixed at fourteen.
AKB too enumerates fourteen, as does PrS whose list differs from AKB one
only in replacing apriipti with pf(hagjanatva. Significantly, our A vatiira gives
the same fourteen as in AKB, though in a different order.
But the number of these viprayukta-sarpskiira seems never to have become
absolutely fixed at fourteen in the Sarvastivada tradition.J60 Ny a post-AKB
work, adds one more, samagri, to the AKB list; while ADV another post-AKB
work, speaks of thirteen in its verse, 161 though in its prose commentary it
actually explains the same fourteen in the same order, as in AKB. It is four-
teen as does AKB. This suggests the close contemporaneity between A vatiira
on the one hand, and AKB, Ny and ADV on the other.
This is the period when, challenged by the severe criticism from the
Sautrantikas, particularly with regard to the reality of these viprayukta-
SaJ!lskara, the Sarvastivada Abhidharmikas felt tremendous pressure to give
clear definitions and proofs of these dhannas as real entities. The larger part
46
ofthe controversies in AKB is in fact concerned with this. by
the serious objections posed by Vasubandhu in his AKB, Ny, SprS and
AfJV became all the more determined to defend their position against the
sautdintikas. Saqtghabhadra devoted much space in both his works, invok-
ing scriptural authority and applying logical arguments, to establish their
reality. The author of ADV is just as determined and emphatic in this regard,
explicitly declaring his intention to prove their svabhiiva.l62 Skandhila too
inspite of his avowed intention to steer away from controversies, cannot
help sharing the same concern - and it would seem - to the same degree.
As we have pointed out above, the definitions of several caitta in our A vatiira
are almost verbatim identical with those in ADV; those ofthe rest also being
very similar to those in Ny and ADV. The same is true for the definitions
and explanations of all the fourteen viprayukta-sarpskiira. Below, we shall
now quote side by side some instances of close reseblance betweenAvatiira
and ADV with regard to the explanations of the vipraynkta-saJ!lskiira. It
must, of course, be remarked that A vatiira definitions are also on the whole
quite similar to those in AKB and Ny. In our annotations (infra, Part Three)
we have shown instances where Sarnghabhadra's explicit replacement of
Vasubandhu' s interpretations finds echo in A vatara. As regards the
viprayukta-saJ!lskara, a case in point is the question of the Buddhas' obtain-
ment of nirodha samiipatti: Samghabhadra (Ny, p.402a) objects to
Vasubandhu's statement (AKB 11, p.70) that they obtain it at the very same
time as the , and instead explains in the same manner as does
Skandhila. (Infra, Part Two, §4.6.4.3). But the resemblances with ADV is so
striking in some cases -not withstanding that the relevant A vatara passages
are translations - that we cannot help conjecturing that in their Sanskrit origi-
nal, some of these A vatara explanations must have been essentially identi-
cal with those in ADV. To facilitate comparison, we quote the Tibetan rather
than the Chinese, as the former is known to be generally more faithful to the
original.
47
[p rapt i] prap t a ( rn a)m a
samanvagamo Jabha iti paryaya]J ...
"dharmavatta vyavasthiti]J ".
dharma]J khalu tridha, kusa[Jah] ...
163 (ADV, p.87. Cf. Sal!lghabhadra's
definition quoted in Vyakhya (p.148)
idam asyeti jiiana-cihna!Jl
pratilabdha-dharmavipraiJiisa-
karaiJaip ea praptirity acarya-
smpgha bhadra]J.)
[jivitendriya] ayurjivitam ity
anarthantaram I uktarp
hyabhidharme "jivitendriyarp
katamat? traidhatukamayu]J" iti I
tatpuna]J gatiprajiiapty upadanarp
vipakajasvabhavatvatl uktarp hi siitre
"nifV!1te vipake naraka iti saqUdJy§!Jl
gacchatil evarp yavan naivasaJiJjiia-
niisamjiiiiya tan opagasarpkhyiirp
gacchati" itil na ciinyadindriyarp
vipiika}af!l traidhiituka vyiipyasti
yajjanmaprabandhii 'vicchedena
vartamiinarp gatiprajiiaptyupiidiinarp
syiit, anyatra jivitendriyiit /. ..
iigamiidyuktitas ea I iigamastiivad
ayam - "iiyurii§miitha vijiiiinarp yadii
kiiyal!l jahatyami I apaviddhastadii
sete yathii kii§thamacetanam 11"
sarval!J hi jivitendriyarp kama-
dhatavavasyarp kayendriyo§ma-
48
chos 'di dailldan pa iiid du (do in
Siira) ies iles par bsiiad pa 'i rgyu ni
'thob pa 'o I 'di na ni gdon mi za bar
eh os m am pa gsum ste I dge ba dan
mi dge ba dail I luil du ma bstan pa
'o /. .. de mams gail dag la yod pa de
dag ni chos 'di dailldail pa 'o I de'i
dilos po ni chos 'di dail ldan pa iiid
do I de 'i iles par bsiiad pa 'i rgyu 'i
chos gail yin pa de ni 'thob pa ste I
riied pa dailldan pa ies kyan bya 'ol
khams gsum pa 'i tshe silon gyi ]as
kyis phails pa skye mched drug gi
rgyun 'brei ba gnas pa 'i rgyur gyur
pa I 'gro bar gdags pa 'i rgyu gan yin
pa de ni srog gi bdail po ies bya 'o I
chos milon pa Jas kyan srog gi dbail
po gail ie na I khams gsum pa 'i tshe
yin no ies gsuils so I tshigs su bead
pa las kyail I tshe dail drod dail mam
par ses pa I de dag nam iig Jus bor
ba I de tshe spans nas si ba ni I dper
na siilla sems med biin I ies 'byun
nol mdo Jas kyail mam par smin pa
mnon par grub na sems can dmyal
ba ies bya ba 'i grans su 'gro ba de
biin duI 'du ses med 'du ses med
min skye mched du 'gro ba 'i bar
gyi grans su 'gro 'o ies 'byail no I
srog gi dbail po ma gtogs par gail
skye ba'i rgyun mi 'chadpar 'gyur
sahacari§IJU I tattvavasyarp vijiiiina- ba 'gro bar gdags pa 'i rgyu khams
sahavarti niipi cak§uriidindriya- gsum la khyab pa 'i dba11 po gzan
sahavarti I riipadhiitau tu sarval!l med do I 'gro bar gdags pa 'i rgyu 'i
kiiyiidipaiicendriya-sahavarti I na chos med du zin na, gzugs med par
cvavasyarp cittasahacari§IJa I skyes pa mams I dge ba dan bsgribs
ariipyadhiitau tu sarvarp pa daiJ I sa 'og ma pa 'i zag pa med
vijiiiinasahavarti, anyatra nirodha- pa 'i sems milon du byed pa na, 'chi
samiipatte]J I jivitendriyarp 'pho dail skye bar thar (thal) bar
gatiprajiiaptyupiidiinam astiti 'gyurrol
dravyam I anyatilii hi kusalanivrtte
cetasi nirmalo(Je) vii'dhobhaume
tadgatiprajiiaptyupiidiina-vipiikajarp
kirp kalpyeta yatsadbhiiviidasau tato
na pracyuta]J syiit ? na ea sakyarp
prat1jiiiitum aniisra m a]
dhobhiimivijiiiinabijarp tad gati-
sa1JI}fiaptyupiidiinarp kalpayitum,
aniisravasya cittasya samucchediiya
pravrttatviit I na ciinyadvijiiiinam
tadbhaumal!l sakyarp kalpayiturp
m ano vijii iinadh iitu- vya ti ri kta-
syiin iikiiram iil am ban a sya
vijfiiinasyiiprasiddhatviit I
manodhiituriti cet I na I
manovijiianadhiitor eviivasthiintare
tannamaprajiiapte]J I
(ADV, p.97f)
In Ny, p.404c, there is an argument
by Sarpghabhadra which is very
close to the last paragraph above. See
tr. in infra, note 509.
49
 L r>..I",L'I\._t:. ll'i 1\.1 I
[sabhiigatii ]
sabhagata nama dravyaml sattvanam
ekartharucih sadrsyahetubhiitam I
nikaya-sabhiiga ityasya sastrasaiiJjiia
I sa punarabhinna bhinna ea I
164
abhinna sarvasattvanaf!J
sattvasabhagata I sa pratisattvaf!J
sarve$v-atmasnehahararatisamyat I
bhinna punaste$ameva sattvanatp
d h a t u b h fi m i g a t i y o n ij a t i -
stripurti$Opasakabhik$U-
saik$asaik$adinam ekartha-
rucitvabheda-pratiniyamahetul) I
tasyarp khalvasatyatp sarval}'anal}'a-
loka vya vahiirasatpkara
prasajyeta. (ADV, p. 89) (Ny, p.400a
, Skt text cited in Vyakllya, p.l59):
sarirendriyaSaf!1Sthiina-Ce$taharadi-
sabhiigya-karaiJam anyonyabllir
abhisaf!Jbandhanimitlaf!J ea
sabhiigatetyaciiryasaf!Jghabhadra;1
) ...
atha prthagjanatvasyasyasca kal)
prativise$al) I prthagjanasabhiigata
khalflktarfipa I p(thagjanatvam tu
sarvanarthakarabh fit am iti
sumaha1ps tadvise$a/:1
aptavacanenapi tadanyatvasiddhi/:1 I
uktaf!J hi bhagavata - "saced
itthatvamagacchati manu$yaiJiim
sabhagatiif!J pratilabhate" iti I na
ne UU'L IIC:INJ::
skal ba miiam pa iiid ni sems can
rnams kyi don gcig la 'dod pa 'i rgyu
'o I de yan tha dad pa ma yin pa daiJ
tha dad pa 'o I de la tha dad pa ma
yin pa ni I sems can thams cad bdag
la chags pa da1i I kha zas 'dod par
sems can so sor mthun pa gaiJ yin
po'o I tl1a dad pa ni khams daiJ sa
daiJ 'gro ba daiJ skye gnas dan I rigs
dan bud med daiJ skyes pa daiJ I dge
sloiJ daiJ dge bsnen daiJ I slob pa daiJ
mi slob pa la sogs pa 'i bye brag gis
tha dad pa de rnams kyi don gcig la
'dod pa 'i 1ies pa 'i rgyu 'o I de med
du zin na, 'phags pa daiJ 'phags pa
ma yin pa daiJ I 'jig rten gyi tha snad
thams cad 'dres pa 'i skyon du 'gyur
ro I so so'i skye bo iiid daiJ I so so'i
skye bo 'i skal ba mnam pa nid la I
tha dad du dbye ba ci yod I 'dod pa
mthun pa 'i rgyu ni skal ba miiam pa
iiid ces bsad do I so so 'i skye bo iiid
ni gnod pa thams cad kyi 'byuiJ gnas
su gyur pa 'o I ' ... gian nas kyaiJ gal
te 'dir 'on na ni I mi rnams daiJ ska/
ba miiam pa iiid rab tu 'thob po ies
I
rgya eh er gsuiJs so I so so 'i skye bo
nid la ni, de ]tar thob pa daiJ 'dor ba
med de I de bas na de bye brag sin tu
che 'ol
50
caivarp prthagjanatvaip pratilabhyate
va tyajyate va I
(ADV, p.90; cf. also similar argu-
ment in Ny, p. 400b (tr. in note 513).
[iisaiPiiiika ]
asaJ!ljiiis attve$u deve$iipapannanaf!1
yaccittopacchedidharman taraf!J
viprayuktaf!J vipakajam utpadyate
tadasarpjiiikaf!J niima I yena
tatropapannaniif!J cittamanagatve(te)
'dhvani kaliintararp sannirudhyate,
notpattuf!Jlabhate I tatpunarekiintena
vipiikajasvabhiivam I kasya vipiika;1
? asaf!Jjiiisamiipattel) piirakasya
karmaiJa/:1 I ke$tz pu [nastat] ?
devanikiiye$U bbavati ltadaha
"asaJ!1jili$u I asaf!Jjnisattvii nama
deva brhatphala-devanikaya-
sazpgrhita dhyanantarikavat I"
kif!1 punaste naiva kadacit S8f!1jiiino
bhavanti ? bhavantyutpattikiile
cyutikale ea ... I te ea tato
dirghasvapnavyutthitii iva cyutvii
kiimadhiitavupapadyante, nanyatra I
ta d up a pan n an am a v a sy a rp
kiimavacarii 'paraparyaya-
vedaniyakarma-sadbhiivat I
Ya th o ttaraka ura van iif!1 ( IJiif!1)
devopapatti-vedaniyaf!J karmeti 11
(ADV, p.91)
51
'du ses med pa 'i sems kyi khrod I
lha rnams kyi nail du skyes pa rnams
kyi sems dan sems las byuiJ ba 'i gcod
pa 'i chos gianmams par smin pa las
byun ba I 'du ses med pa 'i snoms par
pa 'i mam par smin pa 'i bras bu
gaiJ yin pa, de ni 'du ses med paste I
lha 'bras bu che ba ies bya ba gaiJ
yin pa de dag gi phyogs gcig pa ni
du ses med pa ste I dper na, bsam
gtan dan po 'i phyogs gcig ni bsam
gtan khyad par can Ita bu 'o I der
skyes pa de dag kyan 'chi 'pho ba
dan skye ba 'i 'dus na ni 'du ses yod
do I gian gyi tshe ni sems med par
gnas so I nam 'chi 'pho ba de'i tslw
na yaiJ yun riiJ du giiid kyis log Jog
pa las sans pa biin du I de nas si
'phos nas 'dod pa 'i khams kho nor
skyes te I gian duni ma yin no I der
skyes pa mams la 'dod par gtogs pa'i
lan graJis gian na my01i bar 'gyur
ba'i Jas gdon mi za bar yod pa 'i phyir
te I dper na byan gi sgra mi siian pa
rnams la lhar skye ba myon bar 'gyur
ba 'i las yod pa Ita bu 'o I

[sthiti]
... etanyeva vineyaprayojanavasat
sfitre sthityanyathiitvamekikrtya
triiJyuktiini l ... tato
bhagavatii'nyathiitviikhyayii jarayii
sahoktii sririva kalakariJyiinubaddhii
samvegiinukfilii bhaviwatitye$0 'rtha
[vi]$ayo drsyate I tasmaccatvari ...
yadi hi dhannasya sthitin:m(ma) syiit,
tasyiitmanyavasthitasya hetviikhyal)
saktiprabhiivavi8e$O na syiit I
anityatagra[ sta]sya ea notpakti-
saktirityatasca kriyiif!l na kuryiit I
kriyii'bhiivatphaliibhiivah syiit I ...
(ADV, p.l04f)
Uara]
unmi$ito hi dharmo jiiyate hr$ita}J
phalamiik$ipatiti I tasya yadi jarasii
saktirna vihanyeta sa dvitiyamapi
phalamiik$ipeta I na ea saknoty-
iik$eptum I tasmiidgamyate
kascijjariikhyal) satrustam
jarjarikrtyopahrtasiimarthyam
anityatiipisiicyal) samarpayatiti
yuktam uktam 'saktihiiner
jariisiddhil)' iti (ADV, p.l06)
52
... chos gnas na 'bras bu gian 'phen
nus par 'gyur ro I de bas na gan gi
dban gis, 'bras bu 'phen pa 'i chos
de ni, gnas pa ies bya 'o I de med
du zin na 'phen par mi 'gyur ro I ... Ji
skad du jig rten gyi mgon pos kyan
... ies gsuns pa Ita bu 'o I gnas pa ni
'dir 'dui ba 'i dban gi phyir tel skyo
[1] ba skyed pa 'i phyir, bcom Jdan
'das kyis dpal can ma dan rna nag
ma 'grogs pa biin du gnas pa dan
rga ba 'grogs par gcig tu bsdus te
gnas pa gian du 'gyur ba ies gsuf:Js
so I (A vatiira(C) adds: "Therefore,
there are definitely four samskrta-
lak$aiJa ")
rga' ba ni 'bras bu giiis pa 'phen nus
pa la gnod pa 'i rgyu 'o I gal te chos
gafl 'bras bu 'phen nus pa de la gnod
pa 'i rgyu med du zin na chos de 'bras
bu du ma 'phen nus par 'gyur te I de
ita na ni skad cig par mi 'gyur ro I
SKANDHlLA'S AHHIDHAKMAVJ\IAKA
[nama-kay4
viprayuktiil;l khalu niimiidayal)
sarpskiiraskandha-samgrhitiil;l I viik
tu riipaskandha-sarpgrhitii
viiggirniruktirityartha]J I te ea
tadadhinotpattayo nirukty-
adhiniirthapravrttayasca jiiiinavad
arthasya pratinidhisthiiniyiil;l I nimkti
[}J}niima samjiiii lniirthiiiJii(nii)m
ekasarpjiiatviit I yathii tu
cak$urvijiiiina-kiiyiidaya}J paiica-
riipiidyiiyatta vrttayal), tadvatte 'pi
'viik-chabdiidhinajanmiinal;l' /. ..
sviirthapratyiiyanarp kriyii ... tatra
niimaparyiiyal;l sam}iiiikaraiJaJ?1 yathii
ghata iti lpadaparyiiyo viikyam lyathii
ghato drsyata iti ... vyaiijana-
paryiiyo'k$araJ?1 yathii ka iti... sabdo
hi paramiinu(IJu)samcayal) I sa
priipyiirtham prakiisayet pradipavat
... na sabdo 'rthaJ?J pratyiiya[ya]ti ...
tadyathii jiiiinaJ?J cak$uriidin
hetiinapek$yiirtl1af?J vibhiivayati
tadvanniimiidayo 'pi gho$iidin
hetiinapek$yiirtham pratyiiyayanti...
l ... atra mimiiJ?1Sii(saka)-
vaiyyakaraiJau pratyacak$a(k$ii)te ...
tau pratyabhidhiyate I
tiidiitmyam pratighiititviit...
sphotiikhyo niiparo gho$iicchabdo
prasiddhyati 1... uktaJ?J hi
bhagavatii - "tathiigatiiniimutpiidiin
53
da ni mifl gi tshogs la sogs pa br:fod
par bya 'ol de la gaf:J dag flag mams
la 1iag(rag) Jas te skye ba I ses pa biin
du don gyi tshul gyis gnas Ita bu 'i
mam par ran gi don klwn du chud
par byed pa I 'du ses dai:J/ nag dai:J I
yi ge 'i bm ies m am grmis gian gyis
bljod par bya ba I de dag ni I go rims
biin du min dafll tsllig daf:J/ yi ge
mams ses par bya 'ol dper na mig la
sogs pa la rag !as te I skye ba mig gi
mam parses pa la sogs pa I gzugs la
sogs pa 'i don gyi tshul gyis gnas Ita
bu 'i m am par pa rail gi don klwi:J du
clwd par byed pa rnams biin no I flag
gi sgras ni don bljod par mi 'gyur te
I ... nag tu bljod pas ni me 'i mifl bljod
pa yin no I mig gis ni me'i don kh01i
du cllud par byed de I de'i blo skyed
do ies bya ba 'i tlla tshig go I sgra ni
thogs pa dai:J bcas pa dai:J I de Jas gian
du brda sprod pa bas brtag go ies
yofls su brtags pa yan ma grub pa 'i
phyir I de ]as don khoi:J du chud par
brtag pa mi rigs so I sgra dai:J mifl
dafl don dan I ses pa chos bii po 'di
dag ni no bo gcig pa 'dra bar snan no
I de la gzugs sgra ies bya ba la sogs
pa 'o I tshig ni yi ge'i 'bruji siied
kyis I 'dod pa 'i don yofls su rdzogs
par 'gyur ba ste I dper na sdig pa
 I IU t ne LJUL I K.INt:.

namapadavyaiijana-kayan.1m utpado thams cad mi bya 'o ies bya ba la of dharmas which are "not conjoined with citta" (i.e. nlpa and the asaf!1Skrta)
bhavati" ... ye dhatv- sags pa tshigs su bead pa dail I ... yi _in a merely negative sense- and that of dharmas which form a well-defined
aya tanaskandhadya vadyotakaste ge ni 'di Jta ste I "a" ies bya ba yi ge category known as the citta-viprayukta-saf!1skiira, distinct from nipa, citta,
prathamaqJ eva ...(p. 'bru gcig go I ... drail sroil chen pos caitta and the asaf!1skrta.l68
108-113) kyail dge sloil dag de biin giegs pa
'jig rten du byuil nasI mili dail tshig The dharma,priipti, in its articulate sense as one of the viprayukta-saJ!zskara
dail yi ge 'i tshogs rnams ses so ies at a somewhat later stage - as opposed to the early stage when it was used in
gsuils te I plwil po dail skye mched a general sense - may have originated out of a pragmatic concern of the
dail khams dail I ... la sags pa 'i ies Sarvastivadins: It seems to have originally referred to the prapti of iiTya-
bya bar dgoils so I ... de bas na mi1i gi dharmas, on the basis of which the ii1ya can be properly distinguished from
tshogs la sags pa yod pa iiid do I the prthagjana. This stage of development may have taken place shortly
after the compilation of JPS, and before MVS. However, even in the later
Abhidharma texts like AKB, ADV, Ny and our Avatara, we can still sense
We would also like here to offer a few comments with regard to these
this central concern which forms the chief argument for the necessary exist-
viprayukta-samskara:
ence of priipti as a real entity. Thus, Avatiira gives the following as the only
(1) It can be noticed that in all the lists of viprayukta-sarpskara - logical argument:
Sarvastivada and Y ogacara - that are extant, prapti invariably stands in the "Ifpriipti were non-existent, when klesa like raga, etc. arise, the saik:;a
first place. This suggests that the viprayukta-sarpskara, with its properly ar- being without the aniisrava-citta ought not to be an arya. [Likewise],
ticulated signification, could have originated with this dhanna. However, when a prthagjana gives rise to a kusala or an avyakrta-citta, he ought
this does not necessarily mean that prapti was the first dharma to be recog- to be at the moment said to be vftariiga. Moreover, there being no
nized as "not conjoined with citta." For, one of the oldest Abhidharma priipti ofNirval)a for the iirya and the prthagjana, both of them will
usastras, the * Sariputrabhidharma- which apparently had once been in In- be similar to each other and both ought therefore to be called
dia, the fundamental Abhidharma text of the Purvasthaviravada, the prthagjana or iirya."
Vibhajyavada and the Vatsiputriya sects - already mentions an indefinite
list. "jati, etc. up to the naivasarpjiianasarpjiia-jiiami'. But the mention there That at the stage of its dogmatic finalization as a citta-viprayukta-saf!1skara
is made in explaining that the dham1a-ayatana comprises dharmas which are dharma, priipti has to do with spiritual attainment, can also be seen in the
either "conjoined with citta ( {A§h!. )"or "not conjoined with citta ( notion of apriipti. This is said to be oposite to priipti; and prthagjanatva is
i'§}J! )"165. That is, this indefinite list headed by jati does not yet seem to defined as the apriipti of iirya-dharmas. In this latter definition, the
represent citta-viprayukta-sar!Jskara as articulately defined by the Vaibha$ikas typically allowed themselves to be dictated by the dogma of
Sarvastiviidins.l66 It is perhaps in the Jiianaprasthana-sastra that we can for JPSt69. This is to such an extent that they had to consistently and dogmati-
the first time clearly discern the establishment of this Sarvastivada category. cally explain their assertion of apriipti being never pure (anasrava) as sim-
167 There seems however to have been a temporal gap between the concept ply a Vaibha$ika postulate - one that is a corollary of the JPS definition.

54 55
 ENTRANCE Jt-;TO THE SUPREME DOCTRJNE
In later times, however, prapti came to be defined as the dharma which
effects the relation of any dharma to a living being (santana), and two more
tenus pratilambha (or liibha) and samanvagama then came to be explained
in connection with prapti. Though the two terms, in their technical articula-
tion, certainly came to be connected with priipti at a comparatively late
period to which Avatiira certainly belongs; in our text they are still regarded
as synonyms of prapti as is clear from our quotation above, even though
they are at the same time used to designate two different cases of the latter.
ADV, too, like Avatiira 170 clearly states: "priiptir nama samanviigamo
liibha iti If this is to be considered an ambiguity, it is already so
in MVS: In fas. 157 of this work, it quotes the Prajiiapti-siistra to show that
priipti, samanviigama and /abha are synonyms "differing in sound but not
in meaning".I7I But in fas.l62 of the same work, seven differences between
priipti and samanviigama are enumerated.
(2) Among the examples quoted above for comparison, the lengthy de-
scription onjivitendriya is perhaps the best illustration of the very close
resemblance between Avatiira and ADV. In fact as the editor of ADV172
has pointed out, the statement "jivitendriyaf!l gatiprajiiaptyupiidiinam astiti
dravyam" with the issuing argument found in both works is a rejoinder to
the following view of the Kosakara:
evaf!! hyuktam abhidharme 'jivitendriyaT?7 katamat I
traidhiitukamiiyuriti I' etaccaiva najiiiiyate iiyur niima ka e$a dharma
iti ... ya if$nta7Jo vijiiiinasya cadhiirabhuto
I ... nahi niistiti britmo na tu dravyiintaram I kil!l tar hi I traidhiitukena
karmm:zii nikfiyasabhiigasya I yiivaddhi karmal}ii
krto bhavatyetiivantaf!l
kii/amavasthiitavyamiti tiivat so 'vafi$thate tadiiyurityucyate sasyiiniif!l
piikakiiliivedhavat k$iple$U sthitikiiliivedhavacca I ... eval!l tu
varl}ayanti dravyiintaram eviiyurastiti.l73
56
SKANDHILA"S ABHIDHARMAVATARA
This is then a very clear indication that Avatiira is post-AKB, being in some
places at least, a response to the Kosakara's challenge.
(3) According to H. Sakurabe, Avatiira explains nikiiya-sabhiigatii as sattva-
sabhiigatii, but AKB mentions also the dharma-sabhagatii, as does Ny. This,
he believes, "may suggest the Abhidharmiivatiira 's possibly preceding
vasubandhu."I74 However, the fact is that Avatiira mentions neither the term
"sattva-sabhiigatii" nor "dharma-sabhiigatii". but simply the general term
nikiiya-sabhiigatii. Ny (p. 400b) simply repeats the AKB sentence "
dharma-sabhiigatii punal] skandhiiyatanadhiitutai]"(AKB, p.67), with no
elaboration. ADV, too, in its description of sabhiigatii, uses almost identical
terms as inAvatiira, and makes no mention whatsoever of dharma-sabhiigatii
though the following remark by P.S. Jainil75 in his introduction to ADV
would give one the wrong impression that ADV does mention it :
" .... The category of siimiinya ... creeps up in the Vaibhal?ika
category of the viprayukta, under the guise of sabhiigatii, ... divided
into sattva-sabhiigatii (which is common to all beings - abhinna) and
dharma-sabhiigata (which is found in smaller groups like men, women,
layman, monks, etc.) (note 2: Vide ADV, p.89)."
In this remark, Jaini seems also to have misunderstood the dharma-sabhiigatii,
wrongly equating this with the bhinna, "found in smaller groups like men ...
"As a matter offact, although AKB does speak of the abhinnii sabhiigatii as
sattva-sabhiigata, it mentions the dharma-sabhiigatii after explaining both
the abhinna and bhinna divisions pertaining to sattva. AKB, Ny, Avatiira as
Well as ADV, all speak of sabhiigatii as either abhinna or bhinnii. But in all
the four worksl76, this division is discussed in connection with the (nikiiya)
sabhiigatii of sattva. Thus AKB, p.67: sattviiniil!l siidrsya'!7 nikiiyasabhiiga
ityasyiil] siistre sa'!7jiiii/ sa punar abhinnii bhinnii ea/ abhinnii sarvasattviiniil!l
sattvasabhiigatii... bhinnii punasle$iimeva sattviiniil!l dhiitubhtimi- ...
pratiniyata/ dharmasabhagata puna}) skandhayatanadhiitutal) I It is notewor-
thy that in its very similar description with many sentences identical with
57
 ENTRANCE INTO THE SUPREME DOCTRINE
those in the AKB passage, ADV does not even refer to dharma-sabhagatal7?.
As is clear from the quotation above, in the only place where
dharma-sabhagata occurs in AKB and Ny, it is explained as "as applied to
'skandha', 'ayatana', and 'dhatu', " - i.e. dharmas belonging to a sentient
being (there is no sabhagata for non-sentient beings like crops, plants, etc.
178) have the same particular' skandha-ness', 'ayatana-ness' or 'dhatu-ness'
on account of the dharma-sabhagata.
Moreover, in spite of the implication in Jaini's remark above, the concept of
the sabhagatii is quite different from that of the
siimanya. We must remember that sabhiigatii does not refer to the concept of
the reality of the whole as imposed on discrete, momentary dharmas. The
themselves regard only the smallest discrete components as
paramiirthasat, and not their combination.179 As clearly defined in A vatiira,
Ny and ADV, sabhagatii is a real entity within each sentient being, an inner
force which causes the similarity 180 in members of a group like sentient
beings, human beings, etc. It is not the generality conceived as real. It is
therefore no wonder that the author of ADV, points out the foolishness of
the Kosakara who attempts in vain to compare this sabhiigatii with the
siimanya; for, he says, the similarity is only like that obtaining
between payasa (milk porridge) and vayasa (a crow). 181
IXAvatiira and Ny (and SPrS)
Tradition tells us that Skandhila was Sarpghabhadra' s teacher.l82 The truth
or otherwise, of this tradition can be tested partially by an examination of
the convergence or divergence between the major doctrinal expositions of
A vatara and Ny (and SprS, which is essentially an abridgement ofNy). One
thing that we can say with certainty is that, in some respects at least, Skandhila
is less a hard-core than Sarpghabhadra, for we observed several
points of divergence between his views and those known to belong to the
58
SKANDHILA'S AlliiiDHARMAVATARA
as we have noted in our annotations. However, these do not
pertain to the fundamental doctrines such as the thesis of sarviistitva. Among
the points of convergence, we may note the following:
(i) The details in the descriptions of some of the caitta. An example of
these is the definitions of hii and apatriipya (Cf. Part Three, notes
330,332)
(ii) The two caitta, delight and disgust, are included in the caitta-enu-
meration of these two works, but not in any other work extant. (supra,
Part One, § VII)
(iii) The description of the citta-viprayukta-salpskiira, and also the
same unmistakable stress that they must be real. (supra, Part One, §
VIII)
(iv) The description of the avijiiapti (supra, Part One, §VI)
(v) The description of the asamsk,-ta.
We have discussed all these points, except the last one which will be consid-
ered here. Just as, in the case of some other central doctrines like
avijiiapti and the citta-viprayukta-salpskiira, had not been unanimously ac-
cepted by all the Sarvastivadins alike from the start, the same is also true for
the case of the three asalpskrta. Even in JPS whose authority is upheld by
the Kasmirians, we find mentioned only the two nirodha but not akiisa.l83.
In AKB, the reality of all the three asalpskrta as dravya is denied by the
Sautrantikai84. In reply to the Sautrantika criticism, Sarpghabhadra argues
at great length185 in Ny to defend the position. His arguments
for the three asalpskrta are very similar to those found in A vatiira. This, as
We have remarked above( supra,§ II), is an indication that A vatiira probably
belonged to the same post-AKB period as Ny when the were
59
 ENTRANCE INTO THE UUL l KIN!!

hard-pressed to prove the realities of the three asarpskrta. [otherwise] be produced, causing it 'gog pa ies bya ste /. .. gan dag skye
never to arise ... bar 'gyur ba de dag gis thob/90 na
Among the three, the reality of the apratisarpkhyii-nirodha and iikiisa is es- mi skye ste I des de dag 'gag par
pecially contentious. The generally explains the apratisarpkhya. cessation and exhaustion are two 'gyur ba 191 .. ./ (A va tiira(C): "The de-
nirodha as an entity acquired for a dharma's arising.l86 However, the notion different names of the same ficiency in conditions is also due to
that this nirodha is a positive force which actually obstructs the arising is not substance .... The sutra says: "a the force of this nirodha. Hence there
completely missing in MVS.I87 In Ny, Sarpghabhadra argues emphatically srotaiipanna has exhausted [existence definitely exists a real entity named
to make the point that the apratisarpkhyii-nirodha is a real entity which is in] hell, the animal realm and the in- apratismpkhyii-nirodha")
capable of obstructing absolutely the arising of the dharma concemed.l88 fernal region." Now, it is not the case
Sarpghabhadra's more positive definition of the apratisarpkhyii-nirodha has that he is already capable of aban- yan dge sl01i 'di'i sems can dmyal
been regarded by some as neo- It is to be noted that the very doning the durgati, since he has not ba mams zad do I dud 'gro rnams zad
same emphasis is also found in A vatiira which, moreover, gives the same yet been detached with regard to the do I yi dvags mams zad do ies gsuns
scriptural quotations as support. (See quotations below.) kiimadhiitu ... so I so sor brtags pa ma yin pas 'gog
pa 'i dnos po 'o I (See tr. for the Chi-
As regards iikiisa, Sarpghabhadra refutes the Sautrantika criticism in detail, nese which is even closer to Ny)
quoting the siltras and applying logical arguments to prove that it must exist
as a real entity. His whole argument, which we have translated fully in our ikii&a (Ny, p.429b):
annotations 189, reads very much like a commentary on the corresponding Thus, the sutra says: " ... nam mkha' ni, bsags pa 'i rdzas skye
passage in Avatiira. To facilitate easy comparison we shall quote below part Nevertheless, iikiisa becomes mani- ba I de'i skabs 'byed pa I de'i bdag
of his arguments on the apratisarpkhyii-nirodha and iikiisa, alongside with fest by reason of light. "Hence, the nid ni nam mkha 'o I de med du zin
those in A vatiira . of iikiisa - i.e. light - is defi- na bsags pa 'i rdzas mi skye ba khor
nitely manifest. It is for this reason nar 'gyur ro I kye gau ta ma ... rlun
Apratisarpkhyii-nirodha that he goes on to say these words. ci la brten I rlun nam mkha' la 'o I
(Ny, p.434b-435a): That is, the Buddha first says that kye gau ta ma I nam mkha' ci la brten
iikiisa is without support. This so that I bram ze ha can thal ches te I dri ba
the Brahmal).a would not harbour mams kyi mtha 'rtogs par minus par
The apratisaipkhyii-nirodha is not so sor brtags pas 'gog pa Jas gian such doubt: "Now, the Bhagavat has 'gyur ro I 'on kyan snan ba yod pas
merely the deficiency in conditions. It pa I ma 'ons pa 'i chos skye ba la gtan said that viiyu was supported by nam mkha' mnon no I nam mkha' ni
is a distinct dharma, acquired by rea- du bgegs su gyur pa 'i chos so sor iikasa. How can one prove that iikiisa gzugs med pa I bstan du med pa I
son of the deficiency in conditions. brtags pas 'gog pa med par rkyen ma [really] exists?" In order to dispel his thogs pa med pa yin na I de ci la brten
This dharma has the special potency tshan ba iiid kyis thob pa gan yin pa doubt, the Buddha goes on to say par 'gyur I 'on kyan snmi ba yod pas
of obstructing the dharma which may de ni I so sor brtags pa ma yin pas those words. If iikiisa is non-existent, nam mkhar ses so ies I bde bar gsegs

60 61
what [is manifested] by reason of pas kyan gsuns so I terms of and Skandhila avoids the notion of
light? Light is material, visible and (Avatara(C) has the following altogether, and speaks only in terms of The
resistant; if there were no iikiisa, by tional paragraph : "Therefore, we three he proposes represent three ascending degrees of generality
what can it be accomodated? There- know that there really exists the or universality. The examples he gives make this point evident: An example
fore, when the Bhagavat says, asaf!!skrta, iikiisa. If this entity were ofthe specifically-common characteristic is the nlpaf}a of all rupa; examples
"Neverheless, iikiisa becomes mani- non-existent, what is there to support of the partially-common characteristic are anityatii and dul;khatii; examples
fest by reason of light," it shows that viiyu? What is the basis for the ofthe universally-common characteristic are nairiitmya and siinyatii.
light, a rnpa, can serve as the really- sertion [that it is] "immaterial", etc.?
existent of iikiisa. What is it that is discerned by reason We may understand the basis of his classification as follows: Riipaf)a is
of light? ... ") specific to the rilpaskandha in contrast to the other four skandha and the
asarrzskrta; but it is a characteristic common to all the different varieties of
,.Upa. When we get down to the subdivisions of say, varf}a-riipa, there are
Like some other explanations given by Sarpghabhadra, his explanation here
still the further sub-divisions into blue riipa-paramiif}u, yellow riipa-
that apratisaf!lkhyii-nirodha is not the mere absence of conditions for the
paramiif}U, etc.; so that what is svalaksaf}a for varf}a-ntpa now becomes the
arising of a certain dharma, but a positive entity having the power of ob-
for the paramiiiJU of the various colours. Finally, when
structing this arising, is alleged by some to be "neo-Sarvastivada" (See also,
we get down to the different dravya of a given varf}a, say blue; what is
supra, § III). But as we have seen above, a similar notion is also discernible
for a blue varf}a paramiif}U may also be regarded as the siimiinya-
in Avatiira. As a matter of fact, the compilers ofMVS192 already explained
la/qaiJa for all the blue paramiif}U each of which has a distinct dravya. Ana-
in such terms : "This apratisaf!1khyii-nirodha is only acquired with regard to
lyzing in this manner, we arrive at the equation: = svabhiiva =
the anutpatti-dharma of the future period. Why? This nirodha is originally
dravya. This is a conclusion, found also in MVS which says:
meant for obstructing absolutely a saf!!skrta dharma's arising. The priipti of
"The svabhiiva of dharmas are none other than the of dharmas.
this [nirodha ] arises upon the non-arising of the said dharma [which has
Siimiinya-lak$af}a is homogeneity." It is probably in consideration of the
been thus obstructed].
relativity in the definitions of the svalak$af}a and of a
given dharma that Skandhila prefers to speak in terms of different degrees
of siimiinya-lak$af}a only.
X Avatiira on the characteristics of the sarrzskrta dhannas
The second degree of generality in his lak$af}a -classification is termed
There is one doctrinal point in Avatiira which appears to be unique to it, and partially-common, because characteristics like anityatii and dul;khatii etc.,
hence in some sense an innovation. At the end of the discussion on riipa, are common to all saf!!skrta dharmas, but not to the asaf!lskrta. The highest
Skandhila remarks that the characteristics of dharmas are generally classifi- degree of generality, exemplified by nairiitmya and Hmyatii, is applicable
able as (i) specifically-common, (ii) partially-common, and (iii) universally- to all; both the saf!1skrta and asaf!!skrta dharmas alike.l93
common. Thus, instead of the usual two-fold Abhidharmic classification in

62 63
Skandhila' s avoidance of the concept of sv818k$81)8 is also visible in his
explanation of the m8hiibhiit8 as 'dhiitu'. He says: "They are called dl1iitu as
they sustain (dhr) their specifically-common characteristics (sv8-siimiiny8_
18k$81)8) and the upiidiiy8 riip8."194 The corresponding explanation in AKB
is identical with this, with the only and significant difference that in place of
"specifically-common characteristics," we have simply "sv818k$81)8":
sv8l8k$8l)Opiidiiy8riip8dhiiral)iit. Skandhila, however does not seem to think
that the dh8rm8-l8k$81)8 are confined to these two alone for he says only
that "there are in brief three kinds" of dh8rm8-l8k$81)8.
While Skandhila's formulation of the threefold dh8rm8-l8k$81)8 may in a
sense be regarded as an innovation - at least as far as the terminologies are
concerned - the three basic ideas underlining the formulation are already
found in MVS. These are: (i) Sv8l8k$81)8 pertains to a single entity, and
siimiiny8-l8k$81)8 pertains to what is common to more than one entity. In the
final analysis the sv8l8k$81)8 of an entity is the same as its sv8bhiiv8. (ii) The
relativity of the meanings of sv8l8k$81J8 and siimiiny8-l8k$81)8. (iii) The
siimiiny8-lak$Bl)8 in their real sense are the universal characteristics like
n8iriitmy8 and siiny8tii, pertaining to all dharmas. We may compare these
ideas with the following passages from MVS:
"The analysis of the 18k$81)8 of one entity is the analysis of sv8lak$81)8.;
the analysis of the 18k$81)8 of a multiplicity of entities is an analysis
of siimiiny8-l8k$81)8. ... Further, the analysis of each individual sk8ndh8
is an analysis of sv8l8k$81)8; the analysis of two or three [or more J
sk8ndh8 is an analysis of siimiiny8-18k$al)8 ... Further, the pr8}iiii not
subsumed under the sixteen iikiir8 [of the four Noble Truths J mostly
analyses sv818k$81)8. The pr8}fiii subsumed under the sixteen iikiir8
analyses siimiiny8-l8k$81)8 only ... "l95 (Cf. Ny, p.675b: "The contem-
plation of sv8l8k$81)8 is the analysis that a given dharma is different
from the other dharmas. The contemplation of siimiiny8l8k$81)8 is the
analysis that a given dharma is not different from the other dharmas")
64
"There are innumerable differentiations of svalak$WW and siimiinya-
lak$WW. Thus, the mahiibhlita, prthivi, is a svalak$a!Ja as well as a
siimiinya-lak$a!Ja: It is a svalaksa!Ja in contrast to the [other] three
mahiibhiita; it is a siimiinyo-lo/{$of}a because all prthivi-dhiitu [have]
the characteristic of hardness (kiirhinya). The mohiibhuto and the
bhautika-rupo together constitute the riio-skandho. This rfipo-skondho
is a svolak$aFJO as well as a siimiinyo-lok$O!JO: It is a svolak$O!JO in
contrast to the other four skondha; it is a siimiinyo-lak$01JO because
all rtipo have the characteristic of rupalJO. The five upiidiino-skondha
collectively constitute the dul}kho-sotyo. This dul}kha-satya is a
svalak$o1Jo as well as a siimiinyo-lak$a!Ja: It is a svolok$al'}a in con-
trast to the other three sotya. It is a siimiinyo-lok:Jal'}o because all
skondha have the characteristic of affliction. To contemplate on this
common nature of affliction is to contemplate on dul}khatii as well as
anityatii, siinyatii and nairiitmyo ... "l96
It is interesting to observe that the author of Poficovostuko-vibhii$ii, too,
recognizes the relativity of svolo/cyarJa and siimiinya-lak$a!JO. He endorses a
view attributed by "some people" that" ... The obstructibility ofrupo is both
a svolok$o!Jo and siimiinyo-lak$WJO: Relative to the other four skondha it is
a svolak$a!Jo; relative to the eleven varieties having the nature of riipo, it
becomes a siimiinyo-lak:Jaf}a ... "197 It is, however, difficult to say whether
Skandhila, who is certainly influenced by Poficavastuka, is also influenced
by the tradition of the study of this text.
XI The Date, Authorship and Affiliation of Avatara
The author of Avotiiro appears in Chinese transliteration as Se (/Sai) Jian Di
Luo ( )198 or Suo Jian Di Luo )199 or Se Jian Tuo Luo
( )200. Nanjio20 I suggests the original Sanskrit to be 'Sugandhara'.
But Samuel Beal202 restores it as 'Skandhila' which is also adopted by Tho-
65
 mas Watters203, Bagchi204 and others. Now we know that 'se- jian- tuo' is a
transliteration for skandhila. 'Suo' sometimes transliterates the 'sa' phoneme,
as in 'sah8( %'liP1 )' 'Di' can be a transliteration for 'dhl as in 'di dijia' (!fu
J,g;Jim dhitika). 'Luo' can be a transliteration for 'ra' or' la', as in 'Luo Hou
( )' for Rahula. Hence, 'Skandhila' is a very reasonable restoration for
'Se Jian Di Luo'. Nanjio might have been guided by the consideration that
in some editions the third letter is 'Tuo' (W8) which can be a transliteration
for 'd' as in 'tuo luo piao' for dravya); or 'da', as in 'tuo na'
, for d8na); or 'ta', as in 'tuo luo' ()it;i_l, for t8ra); or again 'tuo luo'
for dhara). But it is difficult to find an instance where 'se/sai' 'Se
Jian Tuo Luo' transliterates 'su', though we know that it does
for' sa', as in 'suo he' (%'Eflir, for sah§). According to Xuan Zang's disciples,
'Se Jian Di Luo' is translatable as 'Wuh Ruh' ('l.g:/\_) which means 'awaken
into' or 'awakening/realization -entering.' Unfortunately we do not get any
help in this regard from the two Tibetan versions which mention nothing
about the author.
As regards this problem of authorship, I-I.Sakurabe expresses his doubt that
"whether 'Sa-chien-ti-lo' is a transliteration ofSkandhila or ofSugandhara,
or even if it would be that of another name of a similar sound we can hardly
think that it might be translated into Chinese as Wu-ju: apprehension - enter-
ing". In spite of his remark, as we have seen, from a consideration of pho-
netic transliteration, 'Se Jian Di Luo' very probably stands for 'Skandhila'.
Besides, we also find some evidence in the AKB(C) which points to the
authenticity of 'Wuh Rub' (= Wu-ju) as being Xuan Zang's translation for
Skandhila or some such derivative from --J skand: (i) Xuan Zang transliter-
ates 'praskandi' as 'bo luo se jian ti' i.e., 'Skandi' as 'se jian
ti' (ii) He translates the line, 'sunyat8m asya cittarp na praskandati'
as ' r:f:r /f gg•j.g: /\. ' (does not awaken into sunyat§); i.e. He translates
'praskandatl by the very same two characters 'Wu Ru' ('IN/\.) as those said
to be his translation for the name of the author of A vatara. Moreover as H.
Sakurabe himself has pointed out205, the authorship by 'Se Jian Di Luo' was
66
already recognized by Kai Yuan Shi .Tiao Lu a Buddhist
TTl"pitaka
.
catalogue compiled only seventy two years after Xuan Zang's trans-
lation of A vatara.
There is no extant Sanskrit source which provides us with any information
concerning Skandhila. Nor can we find any mention of him in the Indian
work, The Biography of Vasubandhu, translated into Chinese (T no.2049)
by Paramartha. It is only from the later tradition of Xuan Zang and his dis-
ciples that we learn something about him. In his Records of Travels in India
(:k,gi§ T no.2087) Xuan Zang calls him a 'great Abhidharmika' ( 7:;.
and tells us that he composed in KasmlraZhong Shi Fen Vibl18$8('TB.
but makes no mention of Avatara. However, the Tibetan and
Sanskrit titles of A vat8ra given by its translator - rab tu byed pa chos mnon
pa la 'jug pa ies bya ba, and *prakaraJ.18bhidharmavatara, respectively-
together may suggest that this Zhong Shi Fen Vibh8$8 is possibly none
other than our A vat8ra .. Perhaps when Xuan Zang calls it a "vibh8$a'', he is
not actually giving its proper or full title.206 Still, in this case, it remains to
be explained why the title that he gives in his Records is not at all reflected
in that of his translation. One possible answer is that Xuan Zang or the In-
dian tradition considered A vat8ra to be a beginner's commenatry - vibh8$8-
on PrS, as it expounds all the Sarvastivada categories under the same scheme
of the five-skandha plus the three asaipskrta, as in PrS (See supra, Part One,
§ II). But if indeed Skandhila himself actually intended it to be a commen-
tary on PrS, it would be strange that neither his prologue nor epilogue in the
Chinese and the Tibetan versions contains any reference to the name of PrS
or its author Vasumitra. As an alternative, this Zhong Shi Fen Vibh8$8 could
have been a commentary on PrS, the title of an earlier Chinese translation of
which is Zhong Shi Fen Abhidham1a-s8stra (Xif!J)t[)i1Jilflt!'t§ifu T no.l541).
The following story is found in the Chinese commentaries on AKB(C), written
by Xuan Zang's disciples Pu Guang and Fa Bao, as well as in the later com-
mentary by Yuan Hui on the k8rik8:207
67

Vasubandhu went in disguise to Kasmlra to study the Sarvastivada doctrines.
He stayed there for four years during which time he often refuted the
Sarvastivada doctrines with the Sautrantika doctrines. At that time, there
was an arhat named Wu Ru (Skandhila), who was Sarpghabhadra's teacher.
Unable to answer the sharp questions put by Vasubandhu, Wu Ru then ad-
vised the latter to flee lest he should be harmed by those Kasmlrian
Sarvastivadins who had not been detached from desire (vitariiga). After re-
turning to Gandhara, Vasubandhu lectured on MVS daily and composed
Abhidharmako.fa-kiirikii based on these lectures. When the 600-giithii text
was sent to Kasmira, all the Kasmirians down from the king were delighted.
But knowing the real affiliation ofVasubandhu, Wu Ru told the Kasmlrians
that the text did not really present the Sarvastivada viewpoints, and that they
could ask Vasubandhu to compose his own commentary on the kiirikii so as
to see the truth of what he said. Thereupon, the king invited Vasubandhu to
do so with a handsome reward. Vasubandhu complied with the request and
produced his commentary (AKB) which proved the truth ofWu Ru's words.
In the above story, we learn that (i) Wu Ru was a Kasmirian Sarvastivadin,
and an established Abhidharmika. (ii) He was regarded by tradition as an
arhat. (iii) He was Sarpghabhadra's teacher. (iv) Vasubandhu had some con-
tact with him doctrinally, and it was he who discovered Vasubandhu's real
identity. (v) He was sympathetic to Vasubandhu and advised him to flee.
H. Sakurabe is sceptical about the above story of the connection between
Skandhila on the one hand, and Sarpghabhadra and Vasubandhu on the other.
But he adduces the following five points as internal evidence to prove that
the author of Avatiira is "contemporary with or a little earlier than" AKB:208
( 1) In the Sarvastivada Abhidharma, it is in the last phase of development
"that the five-phala theory comes to regard phala in general and to be con-
nected with the four-pratyaya and six-hetu theories. In Abhidharmiivatiira,
we can see this last phase of the theory development. (2) In the earlier texts
like PjS, the three tenus, priipti pratilambha and samanviigama, are explained
68
SKANDHILA'S ABHIDHARMAVATARA
as identical in meaning. Avatiira, as do AKB, Ny and SPrS, represents a
later development in which pratilambha and samanviigama are "explained
not as synonyms of priipti but to represent the two stages ofpriipti activities.
, (3) It was not beforeAbhidharmahrdaya that the number of citta-viprayukta-
came to be fixed at fourteen. "We find the very fourteen
sa mskiira
.
cittaviprayukta-sar,tskiiras enumerated here in theAbhidharmiivatiira, which
cannot be, therefore, ranked with those of early works." (4) AKB, for the
first time, explains the nikiiya-sabhiigatii as being two-fold: sattva-sabhiigatii
and dharma-sabhiigatii. In A vatiira, only the former is mentioned. "
Saq1ghabhadra's two sastras follow the Kosa in this connection. It may sug-
gest the Abhidharmiivatiira 's possibly preceding Vasubandhu." (5)" In the
Abhidharmiivatiira, the theory of paramiif}u is not explained. It may not,
however, claim that the text goes prior to the Mahiivibhii$ii, that is consid-
ered the earliest of the Sarvastivada texts explaining the paramiif}u theory."
Let us examine these arguments of Sakurabe, one by one:
Point (1) and point (3): Sakurabe of course intends here only to prove the
close contemporariness between AKB and Avatiira.; and not that the latter
predates the former. As for point (1), attention may also be drawn to
Skandhila's definition ofprajiiii: It is "the examination, as the case may be,
of the following eight kinds of dharmas: sar,tgraha, sar,tprayoga,
samanviigama, hetu, pratyaya, phala, siimiinya-la/cya7Ja". In this
definition, he seems to have consciously addedphala after hetu andpratyaya,
to the traditional list as found in MVS. This undoubtedly reflects the stages
of development at which 'phala' has become a fundamental topic of impor-
tance, as sa'!lgraha etc, and at which it is discussed in connection with hetu
and pratyaya. As for point (3), cf. supra, §VIII.
Point (2): This does not seem adequate as a proofthatAvatiira is "contem-
porary with or a little earlier than" AKB. While MVS, in fas.157, quotes PjS
to show that the three terms priipti, pratilambha and samanviigama are iden-
69
' :i
11
 ENTRANCE INTO THE SUPREME DOCTRINE
tical in meaning; fas.162 of the same work enumerates seven differences
between prapti and samanvagama. (See infra, Part Three, note 474).
Point (4): This point cannot prove that Avatara precedes AKB at all; for
ADV, which is definitely post-AKB, also does not mention the dhamw-
sabhagata. As a matter of fact, A vatara mentions neither "sattva-sabhagatii"
nor "dham1a-sabhagatii', but simply "nikaya-sabhiigatii''. Dham1a-sabilagatii
is a subset of nikiiya-sabhiigatii- the key terminology here with which
Skandhila seems contended - as applied to dharmas pertaining to sattva It
is not applicable to dhannas outside the stream of a sattva. (Cf. supra, Part
One, §VIII).
Point (5): The suggestion here seems to be that since A vatiira does not con-
tain a theory of paramiiiJu, it probably predates AKB. But this in itself is not
sufficient proof. A vatiira is intended to be a succinct treatise; Skandhila could
have left this topic out because he did not consider it to be of primary impor-
tance as a Sarvastivada doctrine.
H. Sakurabe is not alone in proposing that A vatiira predates AKB. Many
scholars209 who refer to this work do likewise. J. Kato21 o observes that
A vatiira speaks of those who slander one another by indulging in controver-
sies without having mastered the Abhidharma doctrines. Accordingly, on
the assumption that A vatiira predates AKB, he goes so far as to assert that it
was in A vatiira that we see clearly for the first time a vigorous rebuttal to
those who challenged the Abhidharma views. Collett Cox211 too, states
similarily : "Opposition to the Abhidharma corpus is not explicitly identi-
fied until the Abhidharmiivatiirasiistra... and the Abhidhamwkosabhii$ya."
Concerning the questions of the chronological relationship betweenAvatiira
and AKB, and the authenticity of the above-mentioned tradition derived
from Xuan Zang, let us first note that A vatiira reveals throughout a general
resemblance to AKB, ADV and Ny. This has been demonstrated in sections
VI to IX above in considerable details, particularly as regards their descrip-
70
SKANDHILA'S ABHIOHARMAVATARA
tions of avijiiapti, the caitta and the asa1pskrta. We saw that this resem-
blance is sometimes very striking between A vatiira on the one hand; and
ADV and Ny on the other. In many instances, their definitions are verbatim
or essentially identical.
Moreover, we have observed that all these three works show a persistent
effort to prove the realities of the viprayukta-sazpskiira and the asa1pskrta,
often quoting the same scriptural passages and applying very similar logical
arguments. As we have remarked in section IV above, in spite ofSkandhila's
avowed detennination to steer clear from controversies in his brief treatise
aimed at the beginners; he too, like the authors of ADV and Ny, could not
afford to ignore the criticisms levelled by the Kosakara. In short, all the
three works betray a common concern about these challenging criticisms, as
well as the determination to refute them and establish the Sarvastivada tenets.
In addition, we have pointed out (supra, Part One,§ II) that bothAvatiira
and ADV employ the same a$ta-padartha scheme for a summary exposition
of the categories. Futhermore, the term padartha in the sense of
the fundamental and true doctrinal categories of Buddhism is attested in at
least one more post-AKB treatise, AVN.
In the preceding sections, we have also seen that some statements and argu-
ments in ADV, A vatara and Ny, are unmistakably rejoinders to criticisms
found in AKB. A case in point is the practically identical descriptions on
jivitendriya given by ADV and Avatara ( supra, Part One, § IX). As P.S.
Jaini has pointed out, the statement, "jivitendriyam gatiprajiiapty-
upadanamastiti dravyani' with the issuing argument, is a rejoinder to the
Sautrantika view of the Kosakara - also occuring in AVN212 - that ayu is
"traidhiitukena karma.IJ.ii nikayasabhagasya stl1itikalavedha/1". In Ny, too,
We find Sarp.ghabhadra213 criticizing this same view in similar terms. One
more similar instance may be cited here with regard to upek$ii and manaskara.
(See infra, Part Two, §4.5.18 and Part Three, n.337.)
71
 ENTRANCE INI 0 I He SUPREME DOCTRINE
All these, therefore, conspire to indicate that, contrary to Sakurabe' s sugges-
tion, A vatara was most likely composed a little later than AKB.
In the above story given by Xuan Zang's disciples, we learn that Skandhila
was the teacher of Sarpghabhadra, and that Vasubandhu had had certain
contact with Skandhila during his four years in Kasmira. Fa Bao214 even
tells us that Vasubandhu had studied under Skandhila during this period.
Now, there is nothing substantial to decide one way or the other concerning
the authenticity of all these infonnation. Nevertheless, the fact that in many
places A vatara resembles quite closely AKB, Ny and ADV, suggests that
there may after all be some truth in them - at least as regards the possibility
of both Vasubandhu and Sarpghabhadra having had some doctrinal connec-
tion with Skandhila whom Xuan Zang describes as a "great Abhidhannika.
" It is not unreasonable to infer that the three authors were probably contem-
poraries. Furthermore, since in many places A vatara resembles ADV most
closely, we are inclined to think either that it is probably chronologically
closer to ADV than Ny, or that the author of ADV and Skandhila are doctri-
nally more aligned with each other. In the absence of any extant work- other
than these two - which contains such identical or near identical statements
and arguments as observed by us; we may even justifiably assume a borrow-
ing by one from the other. This might have occurred either because they
were close contemporaries - and possibly in the same geographical region,
or because they had some sort of teacher-pupil relationship, direct or indirect.
215
But, if in many places Skandhila's arguments resemble those in Ny and
ADV whose authors were both hard-core was Skandhila too,
an orthodox The answer is not as straight-forward as it may
seem.
First of all, the content of A vatara proves beyond doubt that he was a
Sarvastivadin Abhidharmika. His acceptance of the realities of avijfiapti,
72
·s AHHI!JHARMA V AT ARA
the caitta, the viprayukta-sarpskara, all the three asarpslqta, the six hetu, the
four pratyaya, the five phala, etc., is clear evidence of his affiliation. Par-
ticularly explicit in this regard is the following well-known statement in
A vatara(C)216, of the central thesis of sarvastitva: "Thus, although the es-
sential nature (svabhava) of a conditioned dharma always exists (sarvadast1),
its function is not permanent (nitya)." But to situate him more precisely
within the school ofSarvastivada is a more difficult task: Was Skandhila an
orthodox Kasmirian as the Chinese accounts make him ? Or was
he a member of the "western masters" or "outside masters" who were com-
paratively more liberal? There are clear indications of both in A vatara
In the description of the avyalqta-miila, Skandhila says:
"These four non-defined roots are acknowledged by us ( § pfiifr ), for
in the meditators, there may be dominance in craving
(trgwttara-dhyayin), or speculations or conceit
(manottaradhyayin); and these three are [in turn] produced by reason
of ignorance. The [however] acknowledges only three
non-defined roots; namely, non-defined craving, ignorance and [the
veiled-non-defined and non-veiled-non-defined] (infra, Part Two, §
4.5.26b; Avatarn(C), p.982c).
The corresponding passage in A vatara(T) does not contain the contrasting
words "by us" and but the acknowledgement of four instead
of three avyakrta-miila suffices to exclude Skandhila from the Kasmirian
camp. This controversy, as to whether there are three or four avyalqta-miila,
are also found in MVS, AKB, ADV and Ny217, the greatest detail being
given in MVS. All these works agree with A vatara(C) that the Kasmirian
acknowledge only three avyalqta-miila. As regard the other view
that there are four avyalqta-miila; AKB, ADV and Ny tell us that it is held
by the foreign masters, while MVS says the western masters. But as we have
explained earlier (supra, Part One, §V), the two appellations in actual fact
Usually stand for one and the same school of thought known generally as the
73
 EN.IKANU:.. IN IU IXJCUUNI::::. SKANDHILA"S ABHIDHARMAVATARA

western masters or the Gandharian masters. follows:

J(aSroirians and Skandhila Western /foreign masters
Again, in the description on samadhi, we find the statement - this time oc-
curring in both the Chinese and Tibetan versions: "The say ...
(1) thirty-three anusaya are twenty-seven are sarvatraga; sixty-
", very much as if the author is simply conveying the opinion of another
sarvatraga; sixty-five asarvatraga five asarvatraga; six may be either
school.
(Part Two,§ 4.5.29.11.2) (cf. MVS p.9lb-c)

There are also other points with regard to which Skandhila differs from the
(2) five phala (Part Two, §§ 5x.2.1- nine phala (cf. MVS, p.629c-630b)
- Inclusion of styiina and auddhatya, in the two upper dhiitu,
5x.2.5)
agreeing with PrS218; three smells, again agreeing with PrS, instead of four
as given in MVS219; same four meanings of anusaya, given in the same
(3) sixteen riipa heavens (Part Two, western masters: seventeen; foreign
order as in PrS - MVS gives three, and tells us that the four-fold interpreta-
§ 4.5x.4) masters: eighteen (cf. Part Three, n
tion belongs to the western masters;220 inclusion of the notion of "cetasa
iirak$ii'' in the defintion of apramiida, agreeing with the MahasaQlghika.221 214)

Thus, in practically all cases where Skandhila deviates from the Kasmirians,
he aligns himself with PrS; and in some of these cases we know definitely (4) four conditions for relinquish- Additional 5th one: Vanishing ofthe
that his views coincide with those of the western/foreign masters. ment of saf!1vara (Part Two, § 1.2. 7. Dharma (cf. Part Three, note 276)
Accordingly, it is very likely that Skandhila is not an orthodox 7)
but belongs to the Gandharian or western school of thought. Moreover,
Skandhila's five-skandha-plus-three-asa1pslq-ta taxonomy- with which he (5) tenpmyavasthiina (Part Two, §4. eight given in PrS (cf AKB V, p.312)
organizes his whole treatise - also appears to have been influenced by PrS 5.33)
which the western school holds in high esteem (cf. supra, Part One, § 11, §
VII). Finally, as we have remarked above, the possibility remains that In addition to these internal indications, Xuan Zang's tradition also tells us
Skandhila once composed a Vibhii$a on Zhong Shi Fen which could be a that Skandhila was a Kasmirian master.
reference to PrS. If indeed the phrase "acknowledged by us" occuring in
Avatiira(C) in the discussion of the avyiikrta-miila was an integral part of the We may conclude that on the basis of the available data we have examined
Sanskrit original, and not Xuan Zang's interpolation, we would certainly above, there are two possibilities as regards Skandhila's affiliation: (I) He
have concluded decisively that Skandhila was a western/foreign master. Was a western I foreign master who shared certain views with the Kasmirians.
This is quite possible considering that the western school of thought was
We are prevented from reaching such a decisive conclusion mainly because never as dogmatic and rigid as the Kasmirian (11) He was a
some ofSkandhila's views are known to be also those of the Kasmirians, in more progressive and open-minded Kasmirian who was in some respects
contradistinction to those of the westerners/foreign masters. These are as inclined towards the western school of thought. In this connection, the story

74 75
 ENTRANCE INTO THE SUPREME DOCTRINE

that Skandhila was sympathetic towards Vasubandhu after discovering the

latter's real identity, and that the latter once studied under him -possibly
because Skandhila was one of the more progressive among the Kasmirian
masters - may well contain a core of truth. Moreover, we have one such
example in the case ofDharmatrata, author of *Abhidharmahrdaya-vyiikhya
(T28, no.l552 ). He was a Gandharian according to Xuan Zang222, who nev.
ertheless generally upheld the view-points, while at times allow-
ing himself to have certain heterodox views including some opposed to the
MVS standpoints.223

A consideration of these two possibilities suggests the implication that there

had probably been a greater mutual flow of ideas between the two
Sarvastivada centres than we are used to understand: We need to recognize
the evolving nature of doctrines - doctrines included - and be Part Two
cautious not to imagine the so-called tenets' to be too rigidly
fixed. The well-known fact of the differences in the corresponding places in THE ENGLISH TRANSLATION
the different Chinese versions of the is good
evidence for this. 224 Moreover, we should realise here that, as Venerable
Yin Shun 225 has pointed out, much of the so-called western views have
been absorbed into MVS as the orthodox views, so that we should not too
hastily presume what actually constitutes these so-called Western views as
opposed to the views ..

77
76
 226[ Preliminaries]

[Salutation to the Triple Gem]

Homage to the Omniscient One (sarvajiia ),

The Buddha-Sun227, The Taintless Disc.
[His] Words' radiance doth shatter
The mind's darkness, of gods and men
- The source of evil abodes.228

Homage to the Store229

Of the Omniscient's Words
Which by Abhidharma norms230
Uproot [one's] ignorance(moha)
Of the Marks ofDharmas.

Homage to the Kindlers

Of the bright[ Abhidharma] lamp231
Which lights up the Muni's words
Veiled by the darkness of false assertions
By those of lesser intelligence.

[The purpose of this treatise]

There are some of great intelligence, who are capable of fully grasping the
letters (pada) and meaning (artha) of the teachings of the King of Sages
(munindra-pravacana )232. [But], hindered by various mundane engagements,
they are susceptible to regression from what have not been actually attained
(apriipta-parihm;11)233. There are others oflesser intelligence, who, no sooner

79
 than hearing the terms and meanings in the Abhidharma, [bewildering as] a
dense are frightened away. Nevertheless, the desire for proper
understandmg IS always present in both cases.
It is with the intention of enabling them to enter with ease and delight into
the deep whirlpool within the ocean of the characteristics of dharmas
the Abhidharma, that I have composed the present
treatise [and named it Entrance Into the Abhidharma].
0 [Enumeration of the eight padartha]
In the system of the Well-gone One (Sugata), there are eight Categories
1 matter (riipa ), 2 sensation (vedanii ), 3 ideation (sa!Jl}iiii ), 4
condttwnmgs (sa!Jlskiira )234, 5 consciousness ( vijfl.iina ), 6 Space (iikiisa ), 7
cessation through discrimination (pratisa!Jlkhyii-nirodha ) and 8 cessation
independent of discrimination (apratismpkhyii-nirodha ). These subsume
all things (artha).
I The Category of Matter (rflpa-padartha)
Matter is of two kinds: TheGreat Elements (mahiibhiita)235 and thederived
matter ( upiidiiyariipa lbhautika).
1.1 four Great Elements, i.e.Earth prthivi), Water (ap), Fire (tejas)
and (vayu) spheres (dhiitu). They are called spheres (dhiitu)236 as they
sustam (dhr) their specifically-common characteristic (sva-siimiinya-laksana)
237 d h ..
t e secondary matter238. These four Great Elements have respectively,
(kha:a, kiithinya), humidity ( sneha), heat ( and mobility ( iraiJ.§)
thetr specific nature (svabhiiva)239; and perform respectively, the func-
twns of supporting (dhrti), cohesion (sa!Jlgraha), maturation (pakt1) and ex-
80
tension (vyiiha).
TheY are called the Great Elements because of their being both great and
having the nature of an Element (bhiita)240. Thus space [though great], is
not included among the Great Elements, as by 'Element' is meant the abil-
ity to produce its own fruit (svaphala)241. They are said to be 'great' as they
are found in all secondary matter. Thus, there are only four Great Elements
because (j) there is no use for [any] more, and (ii) there will be inaptitude
[with regard to the fullfilment of the four functions if any one of them is
Jacking]; as in the case of a couch [which has four and only four] legs.242
1.2 The derived matter243 are of eleven kinds :(1) eye (cak$u) (2) ear (srotra),
{3) nose (ghriil:za), (4) tongue (jihvii), (5) body (kiiya), (6) the visible (riipa),
(7) sound (sabda), (8) smell (gandha), (9) taste (rasa), (1 0) a part of the
tangibles and (11) non-information matter (avijiiapti-
ritpa). They are called derived matter because they exist in relation to the
Great Elements244; that is to say, they arise in dependence on the Great Ele-
ments (mahiibhiitiini upiidiiya)245.
1.2.1 Among these [derived matter], the eye is the basis (iisraya) for visual
consciousness Its function is the seeing of visible, and
its essence consists of subtle matter(prasiida-riipa). The auditory, gustatory,
olfactory and tactile faculties are to be understood in the same manner.
1.2.2 The visible is of two kinds: and shapes(sa7psthiina)247.
Thus, the Bhagavat has spoken of bad colours and bad shapes. Among them,
there are twelve kinds ofvisibles which are colour: blue (nila), yellow (pita),
red (lohita), white (avadiita), cloud (abhra), smoke (dhfima)248, dust (rajas),
mist (mahikii), shadow (chiiyii), sun-light (iitapa), luminosity (iiloka) and
darkness (andhakiira)249. There are eight kinds ofvisibles which are shapes:
long (dirgha), short (hrasva), square (vrtta), round high
(unnata), low (avanata), even (siita), uneven (visiita). [Thus, we have a total
of twenty kinds ofvisibles)250.
81
1.2.2.1 Herein, mist is the water vapour (nihiira) from the earth. Sun-light is
the radiance (prabhii) of the sun. Luminosity is that of the moon, stars, fire,
herbs, gems and lightning251 etc. Shadow is that which is born from obstruc-
tion to sun-light and luminosity [by an object], and where other visibles
[remain] visible252; darkness is the contrary to this, [i.e. where there is no
visibility at all].
1.2 .2.2 A square shape is that whose boundary is square253. A round shape
is one [whose boundary] is circular. A regular shape is even. An irregular
shape is uneven.
Other visibles will not be explained as they can be easily understood. These
twenty kinds are the objects( vi$aya) of the visual consciousness as well as
the mental consciousness induced thereby.
1.2.3 There are two kinds of sound, differentiated as to whether they are
caused by the Great Elements which are appropriated [by consciousness]
(upiitta-mahiibhiita-hetuka), or by those which are not appropriated (anupiitta-
mahiibhiita-hetuka)254. What is integrated into the human organism
(iitmabhiiva) is said to be appropriated [by consciousness], which is to say,
conscious; otherwise they are said to be unappropriated. Those produced by
the former are said to be caused by appropriated Great Elements - sounds of
speech and the hands, etc. Those produced by the latter are said to be caused
by unappropriated Great Elements- sounds of wind, the forest, etc.
1.2.3 .1 These two kinds are subdivided into four, according as whether they
relate to a being or not(sattviikJJyii asattviikhyii): Among the first kind of
sound, human speech relates to a being, the other sounds do not relate to a
being. Among the second kind of sounds, the speech of an apparitional be-
ing relates to a being, the other sounds do not relate to a being.
82
1.2.3.2 These again are divisible as being agreeable or disagreeable
(manojna, amanojiia), thus making a total of eight different kinds of sounds255
which are all objects of the auditory consciousness and the mental conscious-
ness induced thereby.
1.2.4 There are three kinds of smell: good, bad and neutral (sama)256. That
which nourishes the Great Elements of the sense faculties is said to be a
good smell. That which does damage to them is said to be a bad smell. That
which does neither the one nor the other, is said to be neutral. All these three
kinds of smell are the objects of the olfactory consciousness and of the men-
tal consciousness induced thereby.
1.2.5 There are six kinds of taste: sweet (madhura), sour (iimla), salty (lavaiJa),
pungent (katuka), bitter (tikta) and astringent (ka$iiya). All these six kinds
are the objects of the gustatory consciousness and the mental consciousness
induced thereby.
1.2.6 There are seven items which form part of the tangibles
(spra$tavyaikade8a)257: smoothness (slak$IJatva), coarseness (karkasatva),
heaviness (gurutva), lightness (laghutva), coldness (sita), hunger (jighatsa)
and thirst (pipiisii).
1.2.6.1 What is soft (mrdu) is said to be smooth, its meaning being an
agreeable tangible. What is hard and rough (patU$8) is said to be coarse .
What can be weighed is said to be heavy; otherwise light258. Coldness, hun-
ger and thirst are, respectively those under whose oppression, there arises a
desire for warmth (U$IJiibhilii$akrt), food (bhojaniibhilii$akrt) and drink
(piinabhilii$akrt).259 In the last three cases, the cause is designated by the
name of its effect (kiiral)e kiiryopaciira). It is like when one says: "The ap-
pearance of Buddhas is bliss"260, etc. [when in fact bliss is the effect of the
Buddha's appearance in the world)261.
83

1.2.6.2 Smoothness results from predominance (ud- ..Jbhii)262 of the Water
and Fire Elements in the agglomeration of the Great Elements; coarseness,
of the Earth and Wind Elements; heaviness, of the Earth and Water Elements;
lightness, of the Water and Wind Elements, coldness, of the Water and Wind
Elements; hunger, ofthe Wind Element; thirst of the Fire Element263.
[Unmanifest or non-information matter ( avijiiapti-rftpa)]
1.2.7 An action which can by itself inform (vijfitlpayati) [others)264 a spe-
cific variation in the mind and thought-concomitants
(citta-caitta) [of the doer], is one that is information vijfiapti265. An action
which is of the same species as the informing-action - [being also material
and an action] -but incapable of [such] an information, is one that is non-
infonnation, avijfiapti. This is a designation, via negativa, for a thing which
is analogous in nature to, [and yet different in some respects from,] another.
Thus, one calls a ksatriya, a non-briihma1Ja, etc.
1.2. 7.1 The characteristic of avijiiapti is as follows: From a specific infor-
mation action, thought (citta) and [tetrad of] Great Elements, there arises [in
the actor] a continuous series of wholesome or unwholesome (kusala,
akusala) matter, which is non-cumulative, and which persists in the states of
sleep, wakefulness, distracted thought, non-distracted (avilqipta)
thought, or 'unconsciousness'(acittaka)266.
1.2.7.2 This is avijiiapti. It is by virtue ofthis that the status of a
etc., can be established. Were this non-existent, it could not be legitimately
established that there exist etc.
1.2.7.3 [As for scriptural support], the Bhagavat, for instance, [has this in
view when he] says that the merit of one who performs the meritorious act
of material giving(aupadhika-pu1Jyakriyiivastu) increases incessantly.267
84
SKANDHJLA'S ABHIDHARMAVATARA
}.2.7.4 Generally speaking, this non-information matter is of three kinds:
(i) restraint(samvara), (ii) irrestraint(as8J!lvara) and (iii) neither restraint nor
irrestraint( naivasaf!1vara -nasaf!l vara).
1.2. 7 .4.1 Restraint is divided into three: 268) restraint,
meditation(dhyana) restraint and pure(anasrava) restraint.
1.2. 7.4.1.1 Discipline restraint is further divided into eight: restraint,
restraint, sramaiJ.era restraint, sik$Bmiina restraint, SiiimaiJ.eri
restraint, upasaka restraint, upasika restraint and upavasa(!upavasastha)
restraint. These eight kinds of restraint belong (pratisaf!lyukta) to the sense-
sphere(kamadhatu) alone.
1.2.7.4.1.2 The meditation restraint is a [non-information] matter which
·co-exists (anuvartaka) with the concentrations(samadhi) of the
fine-material-sphere(rupa-dhatu). It belongs to the fine-material-sphere alone.
1.2.7.4.1.3 The pure restraint is a [non-information] matter which co-exists
with the pure concentrations(anasrava-samadh1). This does not belong to
any of the three spheres.269
1.2.7.4.2 There arises a continuous series of unwholesome non-information
matter in the following persons: butchers, hunters, bird-catchers, robbers,
prison-wardens, elephant-catchers (naga-bandhaka), those who cook dogs
(sva-paka), deer-trappers (vagurika)270 and executioners (vadhya-ghiitaka).
This is the non-information matter of irrestraint.271
1.2.7.4.3 The continuous series of various wholesome or unwholesome non-
information matter generated by the following acts is of the class of neither
restraint nor irrestraint272: the building of vihiira, stiipa and sailghariima etc.,
worshipping caitya, burning incense, scattering flowers, singing religious
hymns of praise, making wishes, etc; as well as striking (tat;fana)273, etc.
85
 t.N I KANCt: IN I U I Ht IJUCTRINl:.
1.2.7.5 There is also some non-information matter which is momentary. It
is with reference to the non-information matter as a whole that we have
described it as a 'continuous series' (pravaha)274.
[The acquisition and relinquishment of the three kinds of non-information]
1.2.7.6 The discipline restraints are acquired275 [in each case] by making
vows to undertake them. The first seven kinds last until the end of one's life.
The eighth kind lasts for one day and one night.
1.2.7. 7 The first seven are terminated by [any of the following] four condi-
tions276: (i) the giving up of the training that one has undertaken
(sik$iipratyakhyana), (ii) death (mrtyu)277, (iii) the cutting off of the three
roots of wholesomeness (kusalamiila-samuccheda), and (iv) the simultaneous
arising of both the [male and female] sex organs ( ubhayavyaiijanotpatti,
dvivyaiijanodaya). The eighth discipline restraint is terminated by [any of
the] aforesaid four conditions, or by the end of the night.
1.2.7.8 The meditation restraint, belonging to the wholesome thought per-
taining to the fine-material-sphere, is acquired when this wholesome thought
is acquired278, and terminated when it is relinquished [i.e. when one is out of
the meditation]. The same is true for the acquisition and termination of the
pure restraint which follows those of the pure thought279.
1.2.7.9 The irrestraint is acquired by both doing (kriyayii) and wilfully un-
dertaking to do (abhyupagamena) [an unwholesome act]. It is terminated by
[any of] the following four conditions280: (i) the undertaking of restraint, (ii)
death, (iii) the simultaneous arising of both sex-organs, and (iv) when the
wholesome thought of the fine-material-sphere is acquired spontaneously
( dharmatii-pratilambhika) [when the world system is about to be destroyed,
as under this situation, the wholesome dharmas are all intensified spontane-
ously]28I.
86
1.2.7.10 The intermediate (madhyastha = saipvarasarpvara-vinirmukta =
11aivasarp.varanasarpvara) non-information is acquired by one of three ways:
(i) By doing an action; as for instance with a pure and ardent thought one
worships a stiipa with hymns; or out of intense defilement, one strikes [at
other persons or things]. (ii) By wilful undertaking, as for instance when one
vows thus: "I shall never eat before having first made a maiJ(lala for the
Buddha" etc.282 (iii) By the act of giving, as for instance building monaster-
ies, making beds and seats (sayanasana), putting up parks and making offer-
ings to the etc. This non-information matter is terminated when the
originating thought (samutthiina-citta) and the thing [by making which the
non-information matter is induced], are completely destroyed.
1.2.7.11 All this non-information matter, and the aforementioned five fac-
ulties of vision etc., are the objects cognizable by mental consciousness
alone283. With this, the exposition of the first Category, matter, is concluded.
[The characteristics of dharmas]
1.3 [A further explanation is to be added], however, concerning the charac-
teristics of dharmas(dharmalak$a1Ja). They are, in brief, of three kinds: (i)
specifically-common characteristic (13 (ii) partially-common char-
acteristic and (iii) universally-common characteristic
284.
1.3 .I The specifically-common characteristic [is exemplified by that of matter
(riipa)]. It is called riipa because it deteriorates, or because it obstructs. This
is to say that it is subject to being oppressed or hurt285 riipaiJiya ?)286.
As the Dharma-king said, "Oh the riipa-upiidiinaskandha is so named
because it is subject to deterioration. What causes the deterioration? As soon
as it is touched by the hand it deteriorates ...287. This is like giving the name
'horse' (asva) to [an animal] which moves speedily (asum ayat1), and 'cow'
(go) to one which goes (gacchat1), etc.
87

1.3 ·?The partially-common characteristic is [exemplified by] impermanence
(amtyata) and unsatisfactoriness (dulJ,khata) [of all conditioned (sal!Jskrta)
dharmas ], etc.
1.3.3 The universally-common characteristic is [exemplified by] soulless-
ness (nairatmya) and emptiness (siinyat§) [of all dharmas], etc. In this man-
ner, one is to understand the three characteristics with regard to all dharmas.
11 The Category of sensation (vedanii-padiirtha)
2.. There are three kinds of experience (anubhava): (i) pleasurable (sukha),
(u) unpleasurable (du.Qkha) and (iii) neither pleasurable nor unpleasurable
(adu.Qkha-asukha). These are the experiencing of three results of contact
( spar8anubhavana)288.
2.1 They are produced by the different psycho-physical states born of con-
tact which are [respectively] desirable (i$ta), undesirable (ani$ta) and neither.
Their characteristics are [respectively] joy, sorrow and neither, with regard
to the object.
2.2 They are named sensation (vedan§) because they are the cause of crav-
ing ( t($1J.§). As the Bhagavat has said, :"conditioned by contact, there arises
sensation; conditioned by sensation, there arises craving''289
2.3 They are also divided into six, following the six kinds of cons.ciousness:
i.e. sensation born of visual contact, etc., up to sensation born of mental
contact. Those which are eo-nascent with the [first] five consciousnesses are
named 'physical sensations'; those which are eo-nascent with mental con-
sciousness are named mental sensation.
88
SKANDHlLA'S ABHIDHARMAVATARA
.4 On account of the different faculties (indriya), a fivefold division is
2
established: the faculties of pleasure (sukha), displeasure (du.Qkha), joy
(sal111lanasya), sorrow (daurmanasya) and equanimity (upek$8). The pleas-
ant physical sensations, and the pleasant mental sensation of the third medi-
tation290 [where owing to the absence of the five consciousness there is no
physical sensation], are named the faculty ofpleasure (sukhendriya). Being
pleasant (siita) means being beneficial (anugriihika). The unpleasant physi-
cal sensations are named the faculty of displeasure (du.Qkhendriya). Being
unpleasant (asiita) means being harmful (upaghiitika). All the pleasant men-
tal sensations, with the exception of that in the third meditation, are named
the faculty of joy (saumanasyendriya). The unpleasant mental sensations
are named the faculty of sorrow (daurmanasyendriya). The physical and
mental sensations which are neither pleasant nor unpleasant are named the
faculty of equanimity ( upek$endriya). The detailed explanation on these is
to be found under the expositions on faculties (indriya)291, etc.
Ill The Category of ideation (sa,.jnii-padiirtha)
3 This is that which comprehends, by combining conceptually (sal!J-.Yjnii)
the appearance(nimitta), name(niima) and signification(artha) [of a dharma].
That is, with regard to matter like blue, yellow, long and short [figures], etc.;
sounds like those of a conch-shell, a drum, etc.; smells like those of
gharu-wood and musk etc., tastes like those of saltiness and bitterness etc.,
tangibles like those of hardness and sftness etc., dharmas like males and
females, etc. - it comprehends them, { in each case], by conceptually com-
bining together (eka-.Yjnii) their appearances, names and signification. It is
the cause of reasoning vitarka) and investigation viciira)300. Thus, this is
named ideation.293
3.1 It is divided into six after the six consciousnesses, as in the case of
sensation294. It is [again] differentiated into three, according as it is small,
89
 ENTRANCE INTO THE SUPREME DOCTRINE
big or immeasurable. That is, when it has [only] a few objects, it is named a
'small ideation' (paritta-sarpjilii); when it has big dharmas like Mount Surneru
etc., as its objects, it is named a 'big ideation' (mahii-sarpjfia); when it has
the abode of infinite space (akiisanantyayatana) etc., as its objects, it is narned
an 'immeasurable ideation' ( apramii1Ja-sarpjfiii)295.
3.2 The differentiation of these three ideations may also be made after the
three spheres of existence296.
IV [The Category of conditionings (sa.,skiira-padartha)J
4 There are two kinds of conditionings: conditionings conjoined [with
thought] ( citta-sarpprayuktasa£!Jskara), and conditionings disjoined [from
thought] ( citta-viprayukta-sarpskara).
4.1 The conjoined conditionings are the following thought-concomitants
( caitta):volition ( cetana), contact ( sparsa), predilection ( chanda),mental ap-
plication (manaskiira),resolve (smrti), concentration
(samiidh1),understanding (prajfiii)297; reasoning ( vitarka),investigation
(viciira), faith(sraddha), vigour (vil}'a), modesty (hri), shame (apatriipya),
diligence (apramada), calm (prasrabdhi )298, harmlessness (avihirpsii), equa-
nimity (upek$§), delight (pramodya ?), disgust (nirveda ?)299,faithlessness
(asraddhya), slackness (kausidya), non-diligence (pramiida); the roots of
wholesomeness (kusala-miila),the roots of unwholesomeness (akusala-miila),
the non-defined roots (avyiikrta-miila);the fetters (sarpyojana), the bandages
(bandhana), the proclivities (anusaya), the secondary defilements (upaklesa),
the envelopments (paryavasthana), the outflows (iisrava), the floods (ogha),
the yokes (yoga), the clingings (upiidiina), the corporeal ties (kiiya-grantha),
the hindrances (nivaraJJa); the knowledges (jfiiina), the receptivities (k$iintl),
etc)OO
90
SKANUHILA'S ABHIUHARMAVATARA
4.2 These are said to be conjoined because of their being on a par (san1ata)
with thought in five respects301. [i.e. because they both] (i) have the same
basis (iisraya), (ii) have the same object (iilambana), (iii) have the same
rnode of activity (iikara), (iv) are simultaneous, and (v) because each of them
has, [in a given conjunction (samprayoga)] only one substance (dravya)302.
4.3 The disjoined conditionings are those which do not conform to the [five
conditions above, and which belong to the category of neither material nor
mental]303. They are [fourteen in number], namely: acquisition (priipt1),
non-acquisition (apriipti ), the ideationless-attainment (asarpjiiisamiipatti),
the cessation-attainment (nirodha-samiipatt1), ideationlessness (iisamjiiika),
the vital faculty (jivitendriya), the group-homogeneity (nikiiya-sabhiiga), pro-
duction (jat1), duration (sthit1), deterioration (jar§), impermanence (anityat§),
the collection of words (niimakiiya), the collection of complete phrases
(padakiiya), and the collection of syllables (vyaiijanakiiya), etc.
4.4 All these conjoined and disjoined conditionings are collectively named
the "aggregate of conditionings" (sarpskiira-skandha). Thus has the Great
Sage (Mahiir$1) declared, "the agglomeration of the aggregate of conditionings
is like the trunk of a banana tree. "304
IVa [The conjoined conditionings (citta-sa1f2prayukta-sa.,skiira)]
4.5 [The definitions of the caitta are as follows:]
4.5.1 Volition (cetana) is that which renders thought [karmically] creative
(abhisarpskiira ) - it is the mental karma. This is also to say that it moves
forth prasyanda) thought305. It is differentiated into three kinds: wholesome,
unwholesome, and non-defined (avyiikrta).
,.I
91
I
 10 I DOCTRINE
4.5.2 Contact (sp8rs8) is that which is born of the coming together
(s8rpnipiit8}8) ofthe faculty, the object and consciousness, and which en.
abies thought to come in contact with the object. It has the characteristic of
enlivening the thought-concomitants (c8it8sik8 dh8rmo jiv8n8lak$8IJ8l;J)306.
It is differentiated into three after the three sensations: that which accords
with307 (i) the pleasurable sensation (sukh8-ved8niy8). [(ii) the unpleasurable
sensation (dul;lkh8-ved8niy8), (iii) the neither pleasurable nor unpleasurable
sensation (8dul;lkhiisukh8-ved8niy8)].
4.5.3 Predilection (ch8nd8) is the liking for an undertaking (kartu-kiim8tii).
It accords with vigour (viry8), [arising from the thought308]: "I shall make
such and such an undertaking. "309
4.5.4 Mental application (m8n8skiir8) is that which alerts (ii---./ bhu;) thought
i.e. it directs thought towards an object. It is also the holding in thought
(s8m8nviihiir8)31 o of an object which has earlier been experienced
(piirviinubhiit8)311, etc. There are three kinds of mental application: that of a
trainee (s8ik$8), of a non-trainee (8s8ik$8), and of one who is neither a trainee
nor a non-trainee (n8ivas8ik$8-niis8ik$8)312. The outflow-free mental appli-
cations in the seven trainees313 are named mental applications of trainees.
The outflow-free mental application in an arhat is named mental applica-
tion of a non-trainee. The mental application with outflows [in an ordinary
person] is named mental application neither of a trainee nor a non-trainee.
4.5.5 Commitment (8dhimok$8) is the affirmation ( EPQJ- 8V8dhiir8IJ8) with
regard to an object, i.e. it enables one to be free from diffidence with regard
to an object being perceived (citt8S}'8 vi$8}'iip8tis8rpkoc8) 314.
4.5.6 Mindfulness smrti) is that which enables thought to remember an ob-
ject clearly (cittasyiirthiibhil8p8nii)315; i.e. not to forget what has been done
(/qt8), is now being done (kriy8miin8), or will be done in the future (k8rt8V}'8)
316.
92
.5.1 Concentration (s8miidh1) is that which causes thought to be focussed
4
on an object. It controls the monkey-like thought so that it operates (v8Tt8te)
on one object alone317. The says thus: Just as a snake that is con-
fined in a bamboo pipe does not move in a crooked manner, thought, when
concentrated (s8miihit8), proceeds upright318.
4.5.8 Understanding (pr8jiiii) is the discernment (pr8vic8}'8) of dharmas. It
is the examination (up8l8k$a1)8), as the case may be, of the following eight
kinds of dharmas: inclusion (sarpgrah8) conjunction (sarpprayoga), endow-
ment (s8manviig8ma), causes (hetu), conditions (pr8t}'8}'8),fruitions phala),
specific-characteristic (svaJak$aiJa),common-characteristic (siimiiny8lak$8IJ8)
319.
4.5.9 Reasoning vitark8) has the characteristic of causing thought to be
gross with regard to an object (citt8udiiryal8k$8IJ8). it is also named dis-
criminative reflection (s8rpk81padvitiyaniimii). Struck by the wind of ide-
ation (sarpjiiiip8v8noddh8t8)320, it operates (vartate) in a gross manner. It is
this dharma which serves as the projecting cause (p8iicavijiiiina-prav_rtti-hetu)
of the five consciousnesses321.
4.5.1 0 Investigation ( viciir8) has the characteristic of causing thought to be
subtle. It is this dharma which serves as the cause that accords with the
operation of mental consciousness on its object (manovijiiiin8pr8v{tty8nukii18-
hetu)322.
4.5.11 Faith (sr8ddhii) is that which causes the clarification of thought
(cetasal;J prasiid8l;1) with regard to its object. It is named faith on account of
being receptivity based on direct realizationabhismppraty8}'8)323 to the Three
Jewels, the cause-effect relationship (hetupha18-samb8ndha) and the exist-
ence (astitva)324 [of dhannas].lt is a dhanna which removes mental turbid-
ity (kiilu$y8)325. Just as a water cleansing gem (ud8k8prasiid8k8maiJI), when
Placed inside a pond, at once clarifies the turbid water; likewise, the faith-gem
93
 within the mind-pond at once gets rid of all its turbidities. Faith to the
Buddha's attainment of Enlightenment, to the Dharma as being
well-expounded (svakhyata), to the Saq1gha as being endowed with good
conduct (supratipanna), as well as todependent-origination
pratitya-samutpada), the true nature of dharma (dhamJatii)326 which is not
understood by the heretics (tirthika) - such is the domain of activities of
faith.
4.5.12 Vigour (vi.rya) has the nature of being energetic (abhyutsaha) in the
production and cessation, [respectively], of the wholesome and unwhole-
some dharmas. That is, it goads the thought of those sunk in the mire of
transmigration (sarpsarapaJikanimagnasya cetaso 'bhyunnatirityarthah) to get
out quickly327.
4.5 .13 Modesty (hri) is that which conforms to the proper328. It is produced
on account of the dominant influence of oneself and of the Dharma329. It is
a mental freedom (citta-vasitii) opposed to theemanation ofcraving
( By virtue of this, one abides respecting virtues and the
virtuous330.
4.5.14 Shame (apatrapya) has the cultivation of virtues as its precondition
(gul)abhavana-purvika). It being opposd to the emanation of delusion
(moha-ni$yanda)331, one [possessing it] scorns at lowly dharrnas. By virtue
of this, one dreads evil (avadye bhayadarsJ)332.
4.5.15 Diligence (apramada) is the cultivation of the wholesome dharmas
(kusaladharma-bhavanii). It is opposed to non-diligence (pramada), and is
of the nature of guarding (arak$ii) thought333.
4.5.16 Calm (prasrabdh1) is the aptitude of the mind (cittakarmal)yatii)334. It
is opposed to torpor (styana), and accords with the wholesome dharmas.
94
.5.17 Harmlessness (avihirpsii) is the mental goodness (citta-bhadratii)335.
4
BY the force of this, one does not harm others, and becomes averse to the
hartJlful activities in which others indulge336.
4.5.18 The equilibrium of thought (citta-samatii) is named equanimity
(upek$ii}. as it is the equanimity with regard to the aversion to the untrue and
the inclination towards the true. By the force of this, the thought neither
inclines towards nor turns away from the true and the untrue [respectively];
abiding in equilibrium, as a scale in perfect balance337.
4.5.19 Delight (pramodya ?)338 is gladness and inclination339. Seeing the
virtue in what conduces to centrifugal process (nivrtti-bhagiya) one's thought
aspires for it, and accords with the cultivation of the wholesome. Because of
the presence of this dharma, one's thought rejoices in [The thought-
concomitant] conjoined with this is named 'mental application to delight'.
4.5.20 Disgust (nirveda ?) is repulsion (udvega)340. Seeing the faults in
what conduces to the centripetal process (pravrtti-bhagiya) one's thought
becomes averse to it, and accords with detachment (vairiigya). Because of
the presence of this dharma, one is disgusted with sa1psiira. [The thought-
concomitant] conjoined with this is named 'mental application of disgust'341.
4.5.21 Faithlessness (asraddhya) is the non-clarity of thought
(cetaso 'prasada). It is a dharma opposed to the faith (sraddhii)342 mentioned
above.
4.5.22 Slackness (kausidya) is the non-energetic-ness of thought (cetaso
niibhyutsaha); it is opposed to the vigour (virya)343 mentioned above.
4.5.23 Non-diligence (pramada) is the non-cultivation of wholesome dharmas
(kusalanam dharmiiiJiimabhavanii), and is opposed to the diligence (apramada)
3
44 mentioned above. It is the inability to guard thought.
95
J
 These last three dharmas, faithlessness etc., are not classified under the classes
of proclivities (anusaya), envelopments (paryavasthana) and taints (mala),
since their faults are light and they are easily abandonable145.
4.5.24 There are three roots of wholesomeness (kusalamiila): (i) non-greed
(alobha), a dharma opposed to greed (lobha); (ii) non-hatred
i:
dharma opposed to hatred and (iii) non-delusion (amoha), a dhanna
opposed to delusion (moha) and having the aforementioned understanding
(prajfHi) as its specific nature (svabhava)346. These three dharmas are named
the roots of wholesomeness, because they are wholesome in their specific
nature, and are also productive of other wholesome dharmas. 'Wholesome'
means 'secure' (k$ema), as [what is kusala] can bring about the germs of
desirable existence and of liberation. Or again, 'wholesome' means
being skillful through training (sik$ita), by reason of which one can, [for
example,] produce beautiful images. Thus, in the world people call an artist
kusala for producing beautiful images347.
4.5.25 There are three roots of unwholesomeness (akusalamiila): greed
(lobha), hatred and delusion (moha), which are counteracted by the
previous three [roots of wholesomeness]. i.e. the greed belonging to the five
classes (panca nikaya) [ ofabandonables] in the sense-sphere; the hatred be-
longing to the five classes [ofabandonables]; and the thirty-four forms of
ignorance (avidya) in the sense-sphere348, excluding those conjoined
withsatkayadr$ti 349. These three dharmas are named the
roots of unwholesomeness because they are unwholesome in their specific
nature and are also productive of other unwholesome [dharmas]. The word
'unwholesome' means 'insecure as [what is unwholesome] can
bring about the germs of an undesirable (ani$ta) existence. Or again, 'un-
wholesome' means 'unskilful through lack oftraining by reason
of which one [for example] produces bad images. Thus, in the world, people
call an artist akusala for producing unattractive images.
96
4.5.26a There are four non-defined roots (avyiikrta-milla): craving (tr$nii),
speculation (dr$!i), conceit (miina), and ignorance (avidyfi)350. i.e. (i) the
greed belonging to the five classes [of abandonables] in both the fine-material
and immaterial spheres; (ii) the twelve speculations in both the fine-material
and immaterial spheres, together with the satkiiyadr${i and antagriihadr$!i
a in the sense-sphere; (iii) the conceit belonging to the five classes [of
abandonables] in both the fine-material and immaterialspheres; (iv) all forms
of ignorance in the fine-material and immaterial spheres, together with the
those conjoined with the satkiiyadr${i and the antagriihadr${i in the sense-
sphere.
4.5.26b These four non-defined roots are acknowledged by us ( § ),
for in the meditators, there may be dominance in craving (fF$lJOtfara-dhyiiyin ),
or speculations (dr$tyuttaradhyiiyin), or conceit (miinottaradhyiiyin)351; and
these three are [in turn] produced by reason of ignorance. The
[however] acknowledges only three non-defined roots; namely, non-defined
craving, ignorance and [the veiled-non-defined and non-veiled-non-defined]
352 understanding (prajfiii). [Among the six fundamental defilements of
craving, hatred, conceit, ignorance, speculations and doubts; hatred is not
included in the non-defined roots as it is found only in the sense-sphere, and
is always unwholesome]. Doubt and conceit [are also excluded, for they] are
not dharmas which are roots, being unfirm (asthira) and upward-moving
(unnati) respectively353.
4.5.26c They are said to be non-defined as they cannot be defined as being
either wholesome or unwholesome. They are also undefinable as either [pro-
ductive of] desirable or undesirable fruit. They are named non-defined roots
because they are non-defined by nature and are also productive of other
non-defined defiled dharmas or non-defined [non-veiled] dhannas.
4.5.27 There are nine fetters (Sa!?lYO)ana): lust (anunaya) , hostility
(pratigha), conceit, ignorance, speculations, irrational adherence
(paramar.Sa), doubt, jealousy (ir$yii) and avarice (miitsmya)354.
97
4.5.27.1 The lust fetter (anunaya-smpyojana) is the greed of the three spheres.
It is named lust as it has the characteristic of attachment like melted lacquer
[which adheres to things easily]. Lust itself is the fetter, therefore it is named
lust-fetter.
4.5.27.2 The hostility fetter (pratigha-saipyojana) is the hatred be-
longing to the five classes [of abandonables]. It is named hostility as it is
characterized by the delight in harming (aghata)355 and not being benevo-
lent tosentient beings etc. [It brings about futureunsatisfactoriness ], just like
bitter seeds356. Hostility itself is the fetter, therefore it is named hostility-fetter.
4.5.27.3 The conceit fetter (mana-smpyojana) is the conceit in the three
spheres. It is named conceit as it is characterized by mental elevation (unnat1)
when one compares one's own virtues with those of others, as in the case of
an arrogant person depreciating others358. It is further
divided into seven kinds: (i) mana, (ii) atimana, (iii) manatimana, (iv)
asmimana, (v) abhimana, (vi) iinamiina, (vii) mithyiimiina. These [seven]
arise, [when one compares oneself with others] with regard to the following:
clan (kula), lineage (gotra), wealth (dhana), appearance (var,Qa), strength
(ba/a), observance of the precepts (sila), learning (bahusrutya), skill in the
arts and crafts (silpa) etc359.
4.5.27.3.1 If, [with regard to any of these], others are inferior and one claims
that one is superior, or if others are equal to one, and one claims that one is
equal; the mental elevation so produced is named mana 360.
4.5.27.3.2 If others are equal to one, and one claims one is superior, or if
others are superior and one claims one is equal; the mental elevation so
produced is named atimana. If others are superior, and one claims one is
superior, the mental elevation so produced is named miinatimana.
98
4.5.27.3.3 If one clings to the five aggregates of grasping
(paficopadanaskandha) as the Self(.iitma) or what pertains to the Self(atmiya),
the mental elevation so produced is asmimana.
4.5.27.3 .4 If one has not attained the distinctive acquirement (
ofthe fruit of stream-entry (srotapatt1) and one claims that one has, the men-
tal elevation so produced is abhimana.
4.5 .2 7. 3. 5 If others excel one greatly, in respect of clan and lineage, etc.,
and one claims that one is only a little inferior; the mental elevation so
produced is named iinamana.
4.5.27.3.6 If one claims that one has virtues when in reality one has not, the
mental elevation so produced is named mithyamana.
These seven kinds of conceit are collectively named the conceit-fetter.
4.5.27.4 The ignorance fetter (avidyii-smpyojana) is the nescience (ajfiiina)
in the three spheres. It is characterized by non-discernment. It is named a-
vidyii- non-knowledge, because it is opposed to vidya- knowledge; like a
blind man [who is deprived of knowledge of the visible world]. This is an
expression negating (prati---/ sidh) the opposite (pratipak$a). It is like calling
one who are not friends (mitra), enemies (a-mitra); and words which are not
true (rta), etc., untrue words (anrta)361, etc. Ignorance itself is the fetter,
therefore it is named ignorance-fetter.
4.5.27.5 The speculation fetter is the three speculations,
namely: antagrahadr$ti and mithyiidr$ti.
4.5.27.5.1 The defiled understanding (kli$ta-prajfiii) which clings to the idea
that there truly exists the Self and what pertains to the Self in the five aggre- ·
99

gates of grasping when in actual fact it does not exist, is named satkiiyadr$ti.
'kiiya' means accumulation. It is sati- existing, and it is kiiya; therefore it is
named satkiiya - existing accumulation362, which is none other than the five
aggregates of grasping. The speculation which arises with regard to this is
named satkiiyadr$ti.
4.5.27.5.2 The defiled understanding, which clings to the ideas of annihila-
tion (uccheda) and eternality (Siisvata) with regard to these five aggregates
of grasping when there is in fact neither, is named antagriihadr$ti, as it is a
clinging (griiha) to the two extremes (anta).
4.5.27.5.3 If the defiled understanding clings decisively to the non-existence
of karma, the fruit of karma, liberation, and the path which leads to the
attainment of liberation, denying their reality, it is named mithyiidr$ti.
These three speculations are [collectively Jnamed the speculation-fetter.
4.5.27.6 The irrational adherence fetter (pariimarsa-sarpyojana) consists of
two irrational adherences -those to speculations (dr$tipariimarsa) and to
abstention and observances (silavratapariimarsa) [as ends in themselves, rather
than means to emancipation}
4.5.27.6.1 The three aforementioned speculations and the five aggregates
of grasping, while in fact not excellent, are irrationally adhered to as being
excellent - this defiled understanding is the irrational adherence to specula-
tions. The meaning of irrational adherence (pariimar8a) is seeking (parye$a1Jii)
and obstinate attachment (abhinivesa).
4.5.27 .6.2 Abstention refers to the refraining from infringement of precepts
(dau}Jsilya-virat1). Irrational observances refer to the practices of [the ways
of] crows, chickens, wild beasts (mrga), dogs; of being naked, pulling out
the hair (kesolluiicana), fasting, lying on ashes; or repeatedly bathing in riv-
100
::tii..ANUHILA:, AHHIUHAKMAVA.IAKA
ers which are falsely imagined to accrue merit and eradicate evils; or surviv-
ing on roots, fruits, grasses, vegetables and herbs alone; or again applying
ashes on the body, keeping hair-buns etc. -all these are called observances
(vrata)363. The irrational adherence to abstention and observances is the de-
filed understanding which erroneously grasps at these two - abstention and
observances - as paths leading to purification when in reality they are not.
The learned ones among the brahmins mostly cling to these as paths of puri-
fication but they are unable to attain ultimate purity.
These two irrational adherences are named the irrational adherence-fetter.
4.5.27.7 The doubt fetter vicikitsii-sarpyojana) is that which causes hesita-
tion (vimat1) in the mind with regard to the Four Noble Truths. It is like [a
man] being undecided when confronted with an intersection or a straw-man.
[In the first case he is uncertain as to which is the right way to take; in the
second case, he is uncertain - when seeing from afar or in darkness - as to
whether it is a real man or simply a straw-man)364. Likewise, there arises
hesitation as to the truth or falsehood of the [Truth of] U nsatisfactoriness
dul,lkha); etc. The doubt itself is the fetter, therefore it is named the doubt-
fetter.
4.5.27.8 The jealousy fetter (ir$yii-sarpyojana) is that by virtue of which the
mind becomes unable to bear the excellences of others: When others acquire
respect, offering, wealth, learning and other excellences, [a person having
this fetter] becomes envious - This is the meaning of being unable to bear.
Jealousy itself is fetter, therefore it is named the jealousy-fetter.
4.5.27.9 The avarice fetter (miitsarya-sarpyojana) is that which causes the
mind to be hoarding with regard to one's own belongings and wealth. [It is
the mental attitude]: "What belongs to me must not go to others." The ava-
rice itself is the fetter, therefore it is named the avarice-fetter.
101
 cN"IKANCE INTO THE DOCTRINE
4.5.27.10 The meaning offetter is bondage bandhana).365 As the Bhagavat
has said, "It is not the eyes that fetter the visible (riipa); nor the visible, the
eye. The greed of desire ( chanda-raga) therein is said to be the fetter. Just as
it is not the black bull that fetters the white bull; nor the white bull, the black
bull" and so on. 366
4.5.28 The fetters that have been described above are also the bandages
(bandhana), as the meaning of the two terms are identical. In the sutra, how-
ever, it is further mentioned that there are three bandages: (i) the greed bond-
age (raga-bandhana), which comprises all greed, and is characterized by
what has been described of the lust fetter; (ii) the hatred bondage
(dve$a-bandhana), which comprises all hatred, and is characterized by what
has been described of the hostility fetter; and (iii) the delusion bondage
(moha-bandhana), which comprises all delusion, and is characterized by what
has been described of the ignorance fetter.
4.5.29 There are seven proclivities (anusaya): (i) sensual-greed proclivity
(kama-raga-anusaya), (ii) hostility proclivity (pratigha-anusaya), (iii)
existence-greed proclivity (bhava-raga-anusaya), (iv) conceit-proclivity
(mana-anusaya), (v) ignorance proclivity (avidya-anusaya), (vi) speculation
proclivity (dr$ty-anusaya), (vii) doubt proclivity (vicikitsa-anusaya).367 The
individual characteristics of these seven have been explained in the descrip-
tion of the fetters. However, they are also to be classified under the spheres
(dhatu) [in which they are found], their modes ofactivity akara), and their
classes (nikaya, prakara).
4.5.29.1 Sensuality greed is so named as it is greed (raga) for sensual desire
(kama). This greed itself is the proclivity, therefore it is named sensual-greed
proclivity.368 There are five of this, belonging to the five classes in the
sense-sphere only, namely: the sensual-greed proclivity abandonable by in-
sight into unsatisfactoriness (dul)kha-darsana-prahatavya) and so on up to
that abandonable by cultivation (bllavana-prahatavya).369
102
SKANDHILA "S ABHIDHARMAVATARA
4 .5.29.2 The hostility proclivities are likewise five, belonging to the five
classes of abandonables in the sense-sphere only.
4.5.29.3 There are ten existence proclivities belonging to the five classes of
abandonable of the fine-material and immaterial spheres only. The greed in
the two higher spheres is given the name existence-greed because (i) it oper-
ates inwardly (antannukhapravrttatvat), and (ii) it is for the sake of stopping
the [erroneous] notion that [the attainment of] the meditations of the
fine-material and immaterial spheres constitutes liberation
(mok$a-saf!ljiiavyavrttaye).370
4.5.29.4 There are fifteen conceit proclivities (mananusaya), belonging to
five classes of each of the three spheres.
4.5.29.5 The same applies to the ignorance proclivities (avidyanusaya).
4.5.29.6 There are thirty-six speculation proclivities, there being twelve in
each of the three spheres, as follows: In the sense-sphere (i) all the five
speculations abandonable by insight into unsatisfactoriness; (ii) only two
speculations, namely mithyadr$ti and dr$tiparamarsa, abandonable by in-
sight into the origin and cessation [ofunsatisfactoriness] (iii) only three specu-
lations, namely mithyadr$ti, dr$tiparamarsa, and silavrataparamarsa,
abandonable by insight into path [leading to the cessation of
unsatisfactoriness] -thus totalling twelve. The same applies for the two higher
spheres. Thus in all there are thirty-six speculation-proclivities.
4.5.29.7 There are twelve doubt proclivities: four belonging to the four
classes of each of the three spheres, namely: those abandonable by insight
into unsatisfactoriness, its origin, its cessation, and thepath leading to
itscessation, respectively.
103
 ENTRANCE INTO THE SUrREME DOCTRINE
4.5.29.8 Among these proclivities, the sensual-greed and the hatred pro-
clivities are classifiable with respect to the different classes (nikaya) only,
and not to the spheres dhatu) or the modes of activity (akara). The
existence-greed, doubt, conceit and ignorance proclivities are classifiable
with respect to the spheres and classes, but not to the modes of activity. The
speculation proclivities are classifiable with respect to all these three [i.e.
spheres, classes and modes of activity].
4.5.29.9 The difference in their modes of activity is as follows: The specula-
tion which is activated by the erroneous notion of the Self and what pertains
to the Self ( atmatmiya-akara-pravartita) is named The specu-
lation which is activated by that of annihilation and eternality
(sasvatoccheda-akara-pravartita) is named The speculation
which is activated by that of non-existence (abhavakara-pravartita) is named
The speculation which is activated by that of 'excellence'
( is named The speculation which is
activated by that of purification is namedsilavrataparamarsa.
4.5.29.10 The term proclivity (anusaya) [is to be understood in four senses]:
371 (i) In the sense of minuteness as it is difficult to detect their arising;
(ii) In the sense of 'binding along with' (anu-.Vbandh) as they proceed to-
gether with the psycho-physical series sarptana), like the image of a bird
moving in the sky (khacara) being followed by a fish moving in water
(jalacara);372 (iii) In the sense of 'adhering with' (anu-.Vsaiij), as they are
like the oil in sesame seeds or the grease in a morsel of food; (iv) In the
sense of 'developing in concordance with' (anu-.Vsi), as they develop con-
cordantly with regard to the five aggregates of grasping, when they take
objects (alambanato 'nuserate) and when they are conjoined
(samprayogato'nuserate). "Developing in concordance with" means grow-
ing by ways of taking objects and of being conjoined with thethought-
concomitants.
104
SKANDHILA'S ABHIDHARMAVATARA
4.5.29.11 These seven kinds of proclivities, when subdivided with respect
to the spheres, the modes of activity and the classes, become ninety-eight in
number, [as follows]:373 In the sense-sphere, (i) there are ten proclivities
abandonable by insight into [the truth of] unsatisfactoriness, namely:
satkiiyadrni, antagriihadp(i, mithyiidp{i, dt${ipariimada,
Sf{avratapariimarsa, doubt, greed, hatred, conceit and ignorance. (ii) There
are seven proclivities abandonable by insight into the origin [of
unsatisfactoriness ], namely the aforementioned ten less the satkiiyadt$(i,
antagriihadt$!i and silavratapariimada, (iii) These seven proclivities are
also abandonable by insight into the cessation [ofunsatisfactoriness]. (iv)
There are eight proclivities abandonable by insight into the path [leading to
the cessation ofunsatisfactoriness], namely aforementioned seven, with the
addition of Silavratapariimar5a. (v) There are four proclivities abandonable
by cultivation, namely: greed, hatred, conceit and ignorance. Thus, the total
number of proclivities in the sense-sphere is thirty-six. There are thirty-one
proclivities in the fine-material sphere, namely the thirty-six in the sense-
sphere, less the hatred under each of the five classes. The same applied to
the immaterial sphere [proclivities]. Thus the total number of proclivities
[in the three spheres] is ninety-eight.
4.5.29.11.1 Among these, eighty-eight are abandonable by the path of in-
sight (dar5anamiirga-prahiitavya) and ten by the path of cultivation
(bhavaniimiirga-prahiitavya )374
4.5.29.11.2 Thirty-three are said to be universal (sarvatraga), namely the
speculations, doubt, together with the ignorance conjoined with these two,
and theunique ignorance (iivel}ikiividyii); which are found in each [of the
three] spheres, and which are abandonable by insight into unsatisfactoriness
and its origin.375 The rest are non-universal (asarvatraga).
4.5.29.11.3 Eighteen take outflow-free objects (anasrava-alambana), namely:
the mithyiidt$(i, doubt, together with the ignorance conjoined with them,
105
 ENTRANCE INTO THE SUPREME DOCTRINE
and the unique ignorance; which are in each of the three spheres, and which
are abandonable by insight into the cessation ofunsatisfactoriness and the
path leading to it. As these eighteen take the cessation nirodha) and the path
miirga) as their objects, they are said to take outflow-free objects. The rest
[of the proclivities] all take objects withoutflow siisra va-iilambana). Here
'
those which take objects with outflow become intensified in concordance
with (anuserate) the objects they take and the [mental] concomitants with
which they are] conjoined. Those which take outflow-free objects become
intensified only by being conjoined with [the thought-concomitants of] their
own group [i.e. with those of their own class and spheres].
4.5.29.11.4 Nine take unconditioned objects (asal!Jskrtiilambana) namely,
the mithyiidr$ti, doubt, together with the ignorance conjoined with them,
and the unique ignorance; which are in each [of the three] spheres, and which
are abandonable by insight into the cessation [ofunsatisfactoriness]. They
are said to take unconditioned objects as they take the Truth of Cessation
(nirodha-satya) as object. The rest all take conditioned objects
(sal!Jskrtiilambana).
4.5.29.11.5 Ten proclivities arise sequentially376, as follows:
4.5.29.11.5.1 First, owing to ignorance, one does not understand the [Four
Noble] Truths (iitida eva tiivadavidyiiyogiit satye$U sa muhyatJ)377. That is,
there is the disinclination with regard to [the examination378 of the Truths
of] Unsatisfactoriness, etc., up to the disinclination with regard to that of
the Path (dul)khamasmai na rocate yiivat miirgastatal)).
4.5.29.11.5.2 From not understanding, there arises doubt- Having listened
to both the true and the false [teachings], one becomes doubtful (miit;fhasya
pak$advayal!J smtvii vicikitsotpadyate): "Is it unsatisfactoriness or not?" etc.,
up to "Is it the Path or not?"379
106
SKANDHILA'S ABHlDHARMAVATARA
4.5.29 .11.5 .3 From this doubtfulness, there arises false speculation - Meet-
ing with evil companions, one, from hearing the false [teachings] and think-
ing erroneously, gives rise to erroneous conclusions (mithyii-niscaya): "There
is no gift (niisti dattam), no sacrifice (niisti i$tam), no oblation (niisti hutam)
380", etc.
4.5.29.11.5.4 From this false speculation, there arises satkiiyadr$ti: One
denies that there is unsatisfactoriness in the [five] aggregates of grasping,
and clings to [the view] that there are the Self and what pertains to the Self.
4.5.29.11.5.5 From satkiiyadr$ti, there arises antagriihadr$ti, as one then
clings to the extremities of eternality or annihilation of the Self.
4.5.29.11.5.6 From antagriihadr$ti, there arises silavratapariimarsa, as one
then believes that the extreme to which one clings to is conducive to purifi-
cation (yam eviintal!J grhQiiti tena suddhipratyiigamaniit).
4.5.29.11.5.7 From silavratapariimarsa, there arises dr$tipariimarsa, as one
[then] beleives that this being conducive to purification, is the best (agra).
4.5.29.11.5.8 From this d!$fipariimarsa, there arises greed, as one then be-
comes deeply attached to one's own speculations (svadr$tiiv abhi$vailgiit).
4.5.29.11.5.9 From this greed, there arises conceit, as one, being deeply at-
tached to one's own speculations, becomes arrogant and despises others
4.5.29.11.5.1 0 From this conceit, there arises hatred: Being arrogant with
one's own speculations, one is unable to tolerate others' [which are contrary
to one's] and definitely gives rise to resentment. Or, this resentment may
arise when, with regard to one's own speculations, one adopts [one] and
gives up [another]381.
107
 ENTRANCE INTO TilE SUPREME DOCTRINE
Such is the order [of the arising] of the ten proclivities.
4.5.30 There are three causes for the arising ofthe defilementskle.Sa): (i)
owing to the proclivities not having been abandoned, (ii) owing to improper
mental application (ayonisomanaskiira), (iii) owing to the objects, [which
accord with the defilements], coming into one's range of experience
(pratyupasthita, iibhiisagata)382. Thus generally speaking, the defilements
come into play by virtue of a cause (hetu), of the application of effort prayoga)
and of the objects vi$aya). In some cases, however, a defilement may arise
by virtue of the objects (vi$ayabalaiva) alone, [as in the case of an arhat
susceptible to relapse (parihiil)adharmaka).383
4.5.30.1 The defilements (klesa) are so named because they perturb and
afflict - klisnantiti kle5ii1))384 the psycho-physical series. These
[defilements] are none other than the proclivities.
4.5 .31 The defilements are also called secondary defilements (upaklesa).385
There are also secondary defilements comprising all the other defiled thought-
concomitants included under the aggregate of conditionings, as they are in-
cluded under the same aggregate as the defilements. [But they are not named
defilements as they are not fundamental]386. What, then are these? They are:
deceptiveness (miiyii), pride (mada), harmfulness (vihim$ii),depravity
pradiisa),enmity (upaniiha), dissimulation (siithya),387 etc. -There are innu-
merable kinds of them, as explained in the Noble Teaching.
4.5.31.1 Deceptiveness (may§) is the deluding of others (paravaiicana).
4.5.31.2 Pride (mada) has the nature of being arrogant and caring for no-one
(cetasal) paryiidiinarp)3SS, which results from an attachment to one's own
physical appearance, strength, lineage3 89, purity of precept, learning and
eloquence, etc.390
108
4.sJ1.3 Harmfulness ( vihirps§) is the harming of others, as a result of which
one practises the acts of beating and scolding etc.391
4.5.31.4 Depravity (pradiisa) is the clinging to various reproachable things
(sifvadyavastu-drdhagrahita), as a result of which one would not accept any
rightful admonition (nyaysasamjiiapt1).392
4.5.31.5 Enmity ( upaniiha) is the harbouring of hatred within and not letting
go of it, which results from the repeated thinking over of the objects of
anger.393
4.5.31.6 Dissimulation (siithya) is the crookedness of the mind (cittakautilya)
394.
4.5.32 These six, being born of the defilements and gross in their defiling
nature, are named defilement taints (kle5a-mala).395
4.5.32.1 Among the six, deceptiveness and pride are the emanations
(ni$yanda) of greed, as they are derived from greed (ragiinvaya).
4.5.32.2 Harmfulness and enmity are the emanations of hatred, as they are
derived from hatred ( dve$anvaya).
4.5.32.3 The depravity taint is just the emanation of dr$tipariimar5a, as he
who clings to his own speculations as being the best vexes himself as well as
others.
4.5.32.4 The dissimulation taint is just the emanatin of the various specula-
tions, as those in whom speculations predominate are mostly dissimulative;
thus, it is said, "By crookedness (kutila) is meant the evil speculations (piipikii
dr$tl)".396
109
These taints and envelopments, as well as the remaining defiled thought-
concomitants included under the aggregate of conditionings, are all named
secondary defilements, as they are born of the defilements.397
4.5.33 There are ten envelopments: torpor (styan8), drowsiness (middha),
restlessness (8uddhaty8), remorse (k8ukrty8), jealousy (ir$yii), avarice
(mats8ry8), immodesty (8hri), shamelessness (8n8tr8pii), anger (kroddh 8),
concealment (mr8k$8).398
4.5 .3 3.1 Torpor is the lack of aptitude (8k8rm8ny8tii) of the psycho-physical
series. It is the heaviness (gurutii) [of the mind and body ].399
4.5.33.2 Drowsiness is the inability to sustain the psycho-physical series
(kay8citt8s8rpdhar81)as8m8rth8). It causes mental compression
(abhisarpk$epa). This is classified as an envelopment only when it is defiled.
400
4.5.33.3 Restlessness is that which causes non-tranquility of the mind
(8vyupasama).40I
4.5.33.4 [Properly speaking] kaukrtya is the being of that which is badly
done (kuk(tabhava). [But] a distinct thought-concomitant, which arises by
taking this kauk(tya [in its proper sense] as its object (kauk(tyalambana), is
given the name kaukrtya. Its meaning is remorse (vipratisara). This is the
case of giving the name of the cause to its fruit. It is just like giving the name
'emptiness' (siinyatii) to that which takes emptiness as its object, and 'impu-
rity' (asubha) to that which takes impurity as its object. Similarily in the
world, one speaks [ofthe inhabitant (sthanin)] in terms ofthe habitat (sthiina),
as when one says, "coming from all the villages, towns", [meaning the people
coming from these places).402 It is classified as an envelopment also onlY
when it is defiled.403
110
_s.33.5-6 The characteristics of jealousy and avarice have already been
4
discussed in the section on fetters (§§ 4.5 .27 .8, 4.5.27 .9).
4.5.33.7 Immodesty is that which causes disrespect (agauravatii) to virtues
and those who are virtuous. It is a dharma opposed to respectfulness:404
4.5.33.8 Shamelessness is [that which causes] one not to see the fearful
consequences of evil (abh8yadarsitv8). It is capable of leading to [rebirth in]
the low planes of existence (durgat1). [Here] evil (iivadya) means that which
is condemned by the good ones (vigarhit8rp s8dbhi]J).405
4.5.33.9 Anger is, excluding hostility and harmfulness, that which causes
hatefulness (iighiita) with regard to the sentient and the non-sentient.406
4.5.33.10 Concealment (mrak$8) is the hiding of one's own evil.407
4.5.33.11 These ten are given the name 'envelopments' as they envelop
one's psycho-physical series. Among them, torpor, drowsiness, and immod-
esty are the emanations of ignorance. Remorse is the emanation of doubt.
Shamelessness, avarice, and restlessness are the emanations of greed. Jeal-
ousy and anger are the emanations ofhatred.408 Concealment is the emana-
tion of craving409 and ignorance (fT$1)iividyii-ni$yanda).4lO
4.5.33.12 The modes of activity of the thought-concomitants are subtle
(siik$ma). It is difficult enough to analyse each individual series [of a single
thought-concomitant], how much more so when they co-exist in a moment
(k$B1)a).4ll Those affine intelligence (m8timat) who have, on the basis of
the Buddha' s412 teachings, understood the differences in their nature by ob-
serving the differences in their effect, expound them to the students without
falsification (aviparita). There are, however, some oflesser intelligence who
do not have the opportunity of receiving personal instructions from those
masters who explain the Buddha's wordsm without falsification. As a result,
Ill
....
i
 they are deluded as regards [the nature of] the thought-concomitants, and
deny [their real existence] asserting that there exist only three or that they do
not exist at all. 414
4.5.34 There are three kinds of outflows (asrava): sensuality outflow
(kamasrava), existence outflow (bhavasrava) and ignorance outflow
(avidyasrava).415
4.5.34.1 The sensuality outflow consists of all the defilements and envelop-
ments in the sense-sphere, with the exception of ignorance. There are alto-
gether forty-one entities (dravya), namely: thirty-one proclivities and ten
envelopments. 416
4.5.34.2 The existence outflow consist.s of all the defilements and envelop-
ments in the fine-material and immaterial spheres, with the exception of
ignorance. There are altogether fifty-four namely: twenty-six pro-
clivities [- thirty-one proclivities less five forms ofmoha -] in each of the
!.
I
two upper spheres, as well as torpor and restlessness.418 The name exist-
ence outflow is given to the [defilements ofthe] two [upper] spheres collec-
tively, because they all (i) are morally non-defined (avyalqtatvat), (ii) oper-
ate inwardly (antannukhapravrttatvat) and (iii) pertain to the stage of con-
centration ( samahitabhiimikatvat). 419
4.5.34.3 The ignorance outflow consists of all the ignorance in the three
spheres. There are altogether fifteen entities, [namely, the ignorance belonging
to each of the five classes of abandonables, in each of the three spheres].
Ignorance is separately classified as an outflow etc., as it is the root (miila)
of all forms of existence.420
4.5.34.4 The outflows are so named because they keep (asayant1) beings for
a long time in the three spheres of existence, [thus] hindering their progress
towards liberation421. Or, because they cause beings to flow round (asravanti)
112
from the highest plane of existence (bhavagra) to [the lowest], the A vici
hell. Or, because they incessantly discharge (k$ar) inexhaustible impurities
through the six wound-like entrances [-the six sense faculties-] of beings
($adbhir ayatanavranai]J).422
4.5.35 There are four floods (ogha): sensuality flood (kamaugha), existence
flood (bhavaugha), speculation flood (dr$tyogha) and ignorance flood
(avidyaugha).423
4.5.35.1 The sensuality flood consists of all the sensuality outflows, with
the exception of the speculations. There are altogether twenty-nine entities
(dravya).
4.5.35.2 The existence flood consists of all the existence outflows exclud-
ing the speculations. There are altogether thirty entities.
4.5.35.3 The speculation flood consists of the [twelve] speculations in [each
ot] the three spheres. There are altogether thirty-six entities.
4.5.35.4 The ignorance flood consists of the conjoined and the unique
(aveiJika) ignorance [of the five classes ofabandonables] in [each of] the
three spheres. There are altogether fifteen entities.424
4.5.35.5 They are given the name floods as they drift away the good things
of beings, as does a flood.425
4.5.36 There are four kinds of yoke (yoga). Their descriptions are as those
on the floods. They are given the name yokes as they join (sle$ayant1) be-
ings onto [the burden of] unsatisfactoriness in the various planes of exist-
ence (gat1), births (yom) and stages (bhiinn). That is: they join [beings] onto
the various forms ofunsatisfactoriness (du]Jkha), great or small. 426
[End of fascicle one]
113

4.5.37 There are four kinds of clinging (upiidiina): sensuality clinging
(kamopiidiina), speculation clinging clinging to abstentions
and vows (silavratopiidiina), and Soul-theory clinging (iitmaviidopiidana).
4.5.37.1 The sensuality clinging consists of the sensuality floods, with the
addition of ignorance. There are altogether thirty-four entities, namely: five
categories each, of greed, hostility, conceit and ignorance; four doubts; ten
envelopments.427
4.5.37.2 The Soul-theory clinging428 consists of the existence flood, with
the addition of ignorance. There are altogether forty entities, namely: ten
each, of greed, conceit, ignorance; eight doubts; as well as torpor and restless-
ness.429
4.5.37.3 The speculation clinging consists of all the [five] speculations ex-
cluding the irrational adherence to abstentions and vows. There are alto-
gether thirty entities.430
4.5.37.4 The clinging to abstentions and vows are none other than the irra-
tional adherence to abstention and vows. There are altogether six entities:431
Among the five speculations, the irrational adherence to abstentions and
vows is singled out and given the name clinging, because (i) this alone is a
foe to the Noble Path (miirga-pratidvandvitviit), and (ii) it deceives both the
householders and those who have left the homelife (ubhayapak$a-
vipralambhaniit) - deceived by this, the householders believe fasting, con-
suming air, and falling from mountain cliffs, etc., to be the paths leading to
heavens (svargamiirga-samjiiif); deceived by this, those who have left the
homelife believe the complete abandoning of agreeable objects
(i$tavi$ayaparivaijana) and the practice of asceticism (dhiitagul)a-samiidiina)
to be the means of purification (suddhl).432
114
I'
.5.37 .5 The meanings of clinging are as follows: (i) 'Fuel (indhana)', be-
4
cause it enables the fire of karma to continue blazing and growing. Just as
when there is fuel, the fire can keep blazing; likewise when there are defile-
ments, the karma of beings can grow. (ii) 'Forcefulness' (patutva). (iii) "En-
velopment". Just as a silk-worm within a cocoon envelops itself [with its
silk-threads] to death; likewise, beings enveloped by the four clingings go
round the cycle of births and deaths losing their wisdom-life.433
4.5.38 There are four bodily ties (kiiyagrantha): bodily tie of covetousness
(abhidhyii-kiiyagrantha), bodily tie of malice (vyiipiida-kiiyagrantha), bodily
tie of irrational adherence to abstentions and vows
(silavratapariimarsa-kiiyagrantha), and bodily tie of dogmatism
(idarpsatyiibhinirvesa-kiiyagrantha). The greed belonging to the five classes
[of abandonables] in the sense-sphere constitute the first bodily tie. The ha-
tred belonging to the five classes [of abandonables] in the sense-sphere con-
stitute the second kiiyagrantha. The six silavratapariimarsa constitute the third
kiiya-grantha. The five dr$tipariimar$a constitute the fourth
They are given the name kiiyagrantha as they variously tie round sentient
beings. The meaning is the complete entrapping of the [psycho-physical]
complex (kiiya) ofbeings.435
4.5.39 There are five kinds of hindrances (nivara1,1a): sensual-desire
(kiimacchanda), malice ( vyiipiida), torpor-drowsiness (styiina-middha),
restlessness-remorse (auddhatya-kaukrtya) and doubt ( vicikitsii).436 The
greed belonging to the five classes [of abandonables] in the sense-sphere
constitute the first hindrance. The hatred belonging to the five classes [of
abandonables] in the sense-sphere constitutes the second hindrance. The tor-
por and the unwholesome drowsiness in the sense-sphere constitute the third
hindrance. The restlessness and the unwholesome remorse in the sense-sphere
constitute the fourth hindrance. The doubts belonging to the four classes [of
abandonables] constitute the fifth hindrance.437 They are given the name
hindrances because they are the obstacles for the Noble Path, for detachment,
115

and for the two roots of wholesomeness which are preparatory (pniyogikci)
for [the achievement of] these two.43&
4.5x [The spheres, planes of existence, births, stages]
4.5x.l Earlier on(§ 4.5.36), it was mentioned that [beings] suffer in the
various spheres, planes of existence, forms of birth, and stages. We shall
now explain what these spheres, planes of existence, births and stages are.
4.5x.2 There are three spheres (dhiitu): the sense-sphere (kiimadhiitu), the
fine-material sphere (riipadhiitu) and the immaterial sphere (iiriipyadhiitu).
4.5x.3 The sense-sphere comprises twenty regions,439 as follows:
(A) (a) Eight great hells: (i) Sarpjiva, (ii) Kiilasiitra, (iii) (iv)
Raurava, (v) Mahii-raurava, (vi) Tapana, (vii) Pratiipana, and (viii) A vici;
(b) the plane of animals (tiryaiic); (c) the plane of ghosts (preta)- These
constitute the ten [undesirable regions]. (B) Four human regions in the four
continents: (i) Jambii-dvipa [in the south], (ii) Videha [in the east], (iii)
Godiiniya [in the west], and (iv) Kuru [in the north]. (C) Six heavens of
sensuality, namely: (i) Ciitunnahiiriijakiiyika, (ii) (iii) Yiima,
(iv) (v) Ninniil)a-rati, and (vi) Paraniimitavasavartin. Thus we have
a total of twenty regions.
4.5x.4 There are sixteen regions in the fine-material sphere as follows: (A)
Two regions in the first dhyiina, namely (i) Brahma-kiiyikii, (ii)
Brahma-purohita. (B) Three heavens in the second dhyiina, namely: (i)
Parittiibha, (ii) Apramiil)iibha, (iii) Abhiisvara, (C) Three heavens in the third
dhyiina, namely: (i) Parittasubha, (ii) Apramiil)asubha, (iii) Subhalqtsna, (D)
Eight heavens in the fourth dhyiina, namely: (i) Anabhraka, (ii) PUI)yaprasava,
(iii) Brhatphala, (iv) Abrha, (v) Atapas, (vi) Sudrsa (vii) Sudarsana, (viii)
116
SKANDHILA'S ABHIDHARMAVATARA
The number of heavens [in the fine-material sphere] is not eigh-
teen [as asserted by other masters], since the two heavens, Mahiibrahma and
}.sarpjiiin do not form separate regions, [being merely an elevated abode in
the Brhatphala heaven and the Brahma-purohita heaven, respectively (§4.6.
5.2)].440
4.5x.5 Although in the immaterial sphere, there is no [spatial division into]
upper and lower regions, there are four different dimensions of existence
[into which beings may be born], namely: (i) the dimension of infinite space
(iikiisiinantyiiyatana), (ii) the dimension of infinite consciousness
(vijiiiiniinantyiiyatana), (iii) the dimension of no-thing-ness
(iikirpcanyiiyatana), and (iv) the dimension of
neither-ideation-nor-non-ideation (naivasariljiiiiniisariljiiiiyatana). 441
4.5x.6 There are five planes of existence: (i) hell (naraka), (ii) animals
(tiryaiic), (iii) ghosts (preta), (iv) deities (deva) and (v) humans
442
4.5x.7 There are four forms ofbirths, namely: (i) birth from eggs (al)(iaja),
(ii) birth from wombs (jariiyuja), (iii) birth from moisture (sarpsvedaja) and
(iv) apparitional birth (upapiiduka).
4.5x.8 There are eleven stages (bhiim1), namely: (i) the sense-sphere, (ii)
the not-yet-reached stage (aniigamya-bhiin11), (iii) the intermediate dhyiina
(dhyaniintara), (iv)- (vii) the [four] dhyiina [in the fine-material sphere],
and (viii)- (xi) the four [dimensions of existence] in the immaterial sphere.
4.5x.9 [Of the eleven stages], the sense-sphere and the bhaviigra stages are
always with outflows. The remaining nine stages may either be outflow-free
or with-outflows. The aforementioned spheres, planes and births, are al-
Ways with-outflows.
ll7
 ENTRANCE INTO THE SUPREME DOCfRINE
[The knowledges and receptivities]
4.5.40 There are ten kinds ofknowledges (jiiana), namely: the knowledge
of dharma (dhanna-jiiana), the subsequent knowledge (anvaya-jiiana), the
conventional knowledge (sarpvf(i-jiiiina), the knowledge of others' mind
(paracitta-jiiiina), the knowledge of unsatisfactoriness (du}J.kha-jiiiina), the
knowledge ofthe origin (samudaya-jiiiina), the knowledge of the cessation
(nirodha-jiiiina), the knowledge of Path (marga-jiiiina), knowledge of ex.
haustion (k$aya-jiiiina), knowledge of non-arising (anutpiida-jiiiina). 443
4.5.40.1 The knowledge ofthe dharma comprises (i) the outflow-free knowl-
edge with regard to the conditionings (sarpskiira) of the sense-sphere; and to
their cause, cessation, their preparatory path (prayoga-miirga), their irresist-
ible (anantarya) path, their path of liberation (vimukt1), their path of ad-
vancement (viSe$a);444 and (ii) the outflow-free knowledges with regard to
the stage of the knowledge of the dhanna.445 Beings from the beginningless
time (anadikala) have constantly (nityam) been obsessed by the attachment
to the Self (atmagraha). [By virtue of this knowledge], one now, for the very
first time, sees the [true nature of all] dharmas; thus it receives the name
'knowledge of the dharma". 446
4.5.40.2 The subsequent knowledge comprises (i) the outflow-free knowl-
edge in the conditionings of the fine-material and immaterial spheres; and in
their cause, their cessation, their preparatory path, their irresistible path, their
path of liberation, their path of advancement; and (ii) those in the stage of
the subsequent knowledge. It receives the name 'subsequent knowledge' as
its arising follows that of the knowledge of the dharma.447
4.5.40.3 The conventional knowledge comprises those understanding which
are with-outflows. It is named conventional knowledge as it operates mostly
on things of conventional existence (sarpv,-tisad-vastu) such as jugs, garments,
etc.448 This knowledge is of two kinds: defiled and undefiled.
118
SKANDHILA'S ABHIDHARMAVATARA
.s.40.3.1 The defiled ones are again two-fold: those which are of.the
4
nature of speculation (d!$ti) and those which are not. The
be five speculations - satkayadr$ti, antagrahadr$ti, mlthyadr$ti,
and silavrataparamarsa. The latter comprises the understand-
conjoined with doubt, greed, hatred, conceit, ignorance, anger, harmful-
ness, etc.
4 .5.40.3.2 The undefiled ones are also two-fold: (i) wholesome, (ii) non-
veiled-non-defined (anivrtavyiikf(a). The non-veiled-non-defined ones are
not speculations as they are not of the nature of judgement (samtiralJa); they
are both understanding and knowledges. The wholesome ones, if co-exis-
tent with the five [sensory] consciousnesses are also not speculations;449
and are both understanding and know ledges. If [however] they co-exist with
the mental consciousness, they belong to the category of conventionally-right
speculations (laukiki-sarpyak-dr$ti), as well as being understanding and
knowledges.450
4.5.40.4 The knowledge of others' mind (paracitta-jiiana) is a knowledge
born of concentration (samadhija). It knows the mind and thought-concomi-
tants (citta-caitta) of others belonging to the sense-sphere and the fine-material
sphere, and some of the outflow-free mental states, which are present and
similar in kind .451
4.5.40.4.1 This knowledge is of two kinds: outflow-free and with-outflows.
The ones with outflows can know the mind and thought-concomitants of
others belonging to the sense-sphere and the fine-material-sphere. The out-
flow-free ones may either belong to the category of the 'knowledge of the
dharma (dharmajiianapak$a) or to that of the 'subsequent knowledge'
(anvayajiianapak$a). The former ones know the mind and thought-concomi-
tants [of others] belonging to the category ofthe 'knowledge ofthe dharma'.
The latter ones know the mind and thought-concomitants [of others] be-
longing to the category of the 'subsequent knowledge'.
119
 ENTRANCE INTO TilE SUPREME DOCTRINE
4.5.40.4.2 This knowledge does not know matter, the Unconditioned, the
conditionings disjoined from the mind. It also does not know the mind and
thought-concomitants pertaining to the past, the future, and the immaterial
sphere;452 or to those who are superior (utkranta) [to the intending knower]
when considered from the point ofview of faculty, stage, or the [states of
attainment of the noble] persons (arya-pudgala).453
4.5.40.5 The knowledge ofunsatisfactoriness (duiJkha-jiiana) is the out-
flow-free knowledge which realizes, with regard to the five aggregates of
grasping as fruit (plwla), their [four] aspects (akara) of being impermanent
(anityataiJ), unsatisfactoriness (duiJkhataiJ), emptiness (siinyataiJ) and soul-
lessness ( anatmataiJ). 454
4.5.40.6 The knowledge of origin (samudaya-jiiana) is the outflow-free
knowledge which realizes, with regard to the five aggregates of grasping as
cause (hetu), their [four] aspects of being cause (hetuta})), origin
(samudayataiJ), successive causation (prabhavataiJ) and condition
(pratyayataiJ).455
4.5.40.7 The knowledge of cessation (nirodha-jiiana) is the outflow-free
knowledge which realizes, with regard to the cessation of these [aggregates],
the [four] aspects of being cessation (nirodhataiJ), calm (siintataiJ), excel-
lence (praiJitataiJ) and escape (niiJsaraiJataiJ)456
4.5.40.8 The knowledge of the path (marga-jiiiina) is the outflow-free knowl-
edge which realizes, with regard to the path which is the counteraction
(pratipak$a) to these [aggregates] and which leads to Nirviil).a, its [four] as-
pects of being path (margataiJ), right method (nyayataiJ), course of practice
(pratipattitaiJ), conducive to exit (nairyiiiJikataiJ).457
4.5.40.9 The knowledge of exhaustion (k$aya-jiiiina) is the outflow-free
knowledge which gives rise to the realization of exhaustion when it reflects
120
SKANDHILA 'S ABHIDHARMA VAT ARA
tbus: "The unsatisfactoriness has been [fully] known by me; its origin has
been annihilated by me; its cessation has been realized by me; the path [lead-
ing to its cessation] has been [fully] cultivated by me."458
4.5.40.10 The knowledge of non-arising (anutpada-jiiiina) is the outflow-
free knowledge which gives rise to the realization of non-arising when it
reflects thus: "The unsatisfactoriness has been [fully] known by me; there is
no more to be known .. The path [leading to its cessation] has been [fully]
cultivated by me; there is no more to be cultivated. "459
4.5.40.11 These last two knowledges, [i.e. the knowledges of exhaustion
and of non-arising,] are not of the nature of speculation (dr$fl), as they do
not make judgement (asaf!JtiraiJatvat).460 The knowledge of others' mind is
always of the nature of speculation. The remaining six knowledges may be
either of the nature of speculation or not of the nature of speculation;461
4.5.40.12 The conventional knowledge is always with outflows. The knowl-
edge of others' mind may be either with outflow or outflow-free. The re-
maining eight knowledges are always outflow-free.
4.5.40.13 The knowledge of cessation takes only the Unconditioned as its
object (asaf!Jskrtalambana). The know ledges of others' mind, of
unsatisfactoriness, of origin, and of the path, take only the conditioned as
their objects. The remaining five know ledges may take either conditioned
or the Unconditioned as their objects.
4.5.40.14 The knowledges ofunsatisfactoriness and of origin take only ob-
jects with outflows. The know ledges of cessation and the path take only
outflow-free objects. The remaining six knowledges may take either out-
flow-free objects or objects with outflows.
121
 ENTRANCE INTO THE SUPREME DOCTRINE
4.5.40.15 The knowledge of the dharma exists in six stages (bhiim1), namely: ·
the four [fundamental] dhyiina, the not-yet-reached stage and the intennedj.
ate dhyiina. The subsequent knowledge exists in nine stages, namely the
aforementioned six stages and the first three of the immaterial dhyiina. The
knowledge of others' mind exists in four stages, namely the four
tal] dhyiina. The conventional knowledge exists in all the stages. Among the
remaining six know ledges; those belonging to the category of the knowl-
edge of the dharrna exist in six stages, and those belonging to the category of
the subsequent knowledge exist in nine stages.462
4.5.41 There are eight kinds of receptivities (k$iinti), i.e. (i) the receptivity
to the knowledge of the dharma (dharmajiiiina-k$iintJ) with regard to
unsatisfactoriness, its origin, its cessation and the path [leading to its cessa-
tion]; and (ii) the receptivity to the subsequent knowledge
(anvayajiiiina-k$iinti), with regard to the same.
4.5 .41.1 These eight are distinct kinds of understanding (prajiiavise$a) which
conduce to the knowledges of certitude (niscaya) [free from doubt]. They
are named receptivities as they are receptive (k$am)463 to the Four Noble
Truths of unsatisfactoriness, etc. Among the various kinds of receptivities,
these eight are exclusively of the nature of the examination of dharma. They
are speculations and understanding, and not know ledges in their own-nature.
The meaning of knowledge is certitude. In these eight, the desire to investi-
gate (pari---./i$) has not ceased; and as they are not yet capable of judging
decisively, they are not named knowledges.464
4.5.41.2 The receptivity to the knowledge of the dharma with regard to
unsatisfactoriness (du}J.kha-dharmajiiiina-k$iintl) ceases at the same time as
the acquisition (priipt1) of the ten proclivities abandonable through insight
into unsatisfactoriness (dubkhadarsana-praheya), in the sense-sphere. [Im·
mediately following this], the knowledge of the dharma eo-arises with the
disconnection-acquisition (visa1J1yoga-priiptl) of these [proclivities]465. The
122
SKANDHILA"S ABHIDHARMAVATARA
receptivity constitutes the irresistible path (iinantarya-miirga), and the knowl-
edge constitutes the liberation path (vimukti-miirga); [they are two succes-
sive moments: the first, when the proclivity is being counteracted; the second,
when the proclivity has been fully abandoned].466 [Together], they counter-
act the ten kinds of proclivities abandonable through insight into
unsatisfactoriness, in the sense-sphere, just as [in getting rid of a thief], one
man stays indoors and drives the thief out, while the other closes the doors
so as to prevent him from entering again.467
4.5.41.3 The receptivity to the subsequent knowledge with regard to
unsatisfactoriness (dul)kha-anvayajiiiina-k$iinti) ceases at the same time as
the acquisition of the eighteen proclivities abandonable through insight into
unsatisfactoriness, in the fine-material and immaterial spheres [Immediately
following this], the subsequent knowledge with regard to unsatisfactoriness
eo-arises with the disconnection-acquisition of these [proclivities]. The rest
of the description is as above.
[The abandonment of defilement and spiritual attainment]
4.5.42 These four [moments of] thought effect a direct comprehension
(abhisamaya ffl.ll) of the Truth ofUnsatisfactoriness in the three spheres.
Similarily, there are four [moments of] thought for each of the [Truths of]
Origin, Cessation and the Path.
4.5.42.1 These sixteen [moments of] thought effect a direct comprehension
of the Four Truths, [resulting in] the abandonment of the eighty-eight pro-
clivities abandonable through insight (darsana-praheya), and the attainment
of the fruit of stream-entry (srotaiipatti-phala).46S
4·5.42.2 There remain ten kinds of proclivities abandonable by cultivation
(bhiivana-praheya) - four in the sense-sphere and three each, in the
fine-material and immaterial spheres. The four kinds of proclivity in the
123
 ENTRANCE INTO THE SUPREME DOCTRINE
sense-sphere is like a bundle of straw grouped into nine parts - from the
upper-upper (adhimiitriidhimiitra) division to the lower-lower (mrdumrdu)
division. Their counteractive paths (pratipak$a-miirga) -the irresistible paths
and liberation-paths - are likewise divided into nine: from the lower-lower
division which counteracts the upper-upper division of proclivity, etc., up to
the upper-upper division which counteracts the low-lower divisions of
clivity.
4.5.42.2.1 When [the first] six divisions [of proclivity] are gotten rid of, one
acquires the fruit of once-retumership (sakrdiigiimi-phala).
4.5.42.2.2 When all the nine divisions are gotten rid of, one acquires the
fruit ofnon-retumership (aniigiimi-phala).
4.5.42.2.3 Just as in the case of the four proclivities in the sense-sphere
which are divided into nine, corresponding to which there are also nine divi-
sions of the counteractive paths of irresistibility and liberation. Likewise,
there are four stages (bhiim1) each, in the fine-material and the immaterial
spheres; and in each of these stages, both the counteractive [paths] and the
[proclivities to be] counteracted have nine divisions. The proclivities in these
stages are gotten rid of progressively. When the lower-lower division in the
stage of the existence-peak (bhaviigra) is gotten rid of, one acquires the fruit
of arhatship.
4.5.42.3 The [three] paths in between the four fruits and the preceding path
of insight ( darsana-miirga) are named the four progresses (pratipanna). Ac-
cordingly as the fruit it precedes, it is named the progress towards that par·
ticular fruit.
4.5.42.4 Thus, there are [altogether] eight noble persons, namely four pro·
gressing towards (pratipannaka) [the fruits] and four dwellers in the fruits
(phalastha). These progresses and fruits are divided into six by reason of the
difference in the [practitioners'] families (gotra), as follows:
124
4 .5.42.4.1 Worldlings (prthagjana) belonging to the families of blunt (mrdu)
and sharp (tik$J;JB) faculties, in the [first] fifteen thought-moments of enter-
ing into the path of insight, receive the names of faith-pursuer
(sraddhiinusiirin) and doctrine-pursuer (dharmiinusiirin), respectively469.
4.5.42.4.2 The same two persons, on reaching the path of cultivation - i.e.
from the sixteenth thought-moment up to the stage of Vraja-like concentra-
tion (vajropama-samiidh1) - receive the names of faith-liberated
(sraddhiidhimukta) and speculation-attained (dr$tipriipta) respectively.470
4.5.42.4.3 The same two persons, on reaching the stage of the non-trainee
(asaik$a)- i.e. from the first [moment ofthe] knowledge of exhaustion up to
the final thought-moment (carama-citta)- receive the names of contingently-
liberated (samayavimukta) and non-contingently-liberated (asamayavimukta)
respectively. 471
4.5.43 The word "etc" [in the list ofconditionings conjoined with the minds]
(§ 4.1) refers to the fact that the different categories of thought-concomi-
tants are innumerable. They are named thought-concomitants (caitasika) as
they exist in dependence on the mind (citta), just as 'mine' (iitmiya) [indi-
cates that which exists in dependence on the 'I' (iitman)]. All these thought-
concomitants receive the name of 'conjoined conditionings'.
IV(b) Conditionings disjoined from the mind
( cittaviprayukta-sa1f1S/cara)
4.6 The disjoined conditionings are opposed [in nature] to those
[conditionings} discussed above. They comprise acquisition (priipt1), etc.
472
125
 .6.1.3 This acquisition is of two kinds: (i) The obtainment (labha,
4.6.1 Acquisition is the cause (kara1,1a) which permits the affirmation: 'One 4
pratilambha), at the present moment of what has not been acquired (prapta)
is in possession of a certain dharma' (dharmavat).473 There are three kinds
nvhat has been lost (vihina); (ii) the possession (samanvagama) of what
of dharmas: pure (subha), impure (asubha) and non-defined (avyalqta). The 0
haS been obtained (pratilabdha) and not lost. Non-acquisition (aprapt1) is the
pure d.harmas comprise faith etc.; the impure, greed, etc.; and the non-defined,
the mmd of transformation (nirmii1,1acitta), etc. One who possesses [any of] contrary to this.48l
these dharmas is said to be 'in possession of the dharma'. The cause of
certitude for such an assertion, is named acquisition (priipt1), obtainment
4.6.1.4 Of what dharmas are there acquisitions and non-acquisitions? There
(liibha, pratilabha), and possession (samanviigama).474
are acquisitions and non-acquisitions [of dharmas] of one's own series
(svasaf!ltiina), and of the two cessations, fpratisaf!lkhyii- and apratis8f!lkhyii-
nirodha]. There are no [acquisitions of dharmas of] the series of another
4.6.1.1 [It is necessary that acquisition exists as a real entity (dravya)]. Were
person, as no-one can possess dhannas belonging to a different person; or of
it non-existent, when defilements like greed etc., manifest (sammukhi-J bhii)
a non-series, [i.e. a non-sentient] as no-one can possess dharmas not belong-
in a trainee (saik$a), he would not be an arya, since he is then without an
ing to a sentient being; or of the [Unconditioned,] Space (iikiisa), of which
outflow-free mind. [Similarily,] when a wholesome or non-defined mind
no-one can have possession. What do not have acquisition, likewise do not
arises in a waddling (prthagjana), he ought then be known as one who is
already detached (vitariiga), [i.e. an iirya]. Moreover, in the absence ofthe have non-acquisition.482
acquisition ofNirval)a, the iirya and the worldlings would be mutually alike,
4.6.1.5 There are three kinds of acquisitions: (i) acquisitions [which eo-arise
and ought to be both named 'worldlings' or 'arya'. 475
with the dharmas acquired (sahaja)] like a shadow which follows the figure.
(ii) Acquisitions [which are anterior to the dhannas acquired (piirvajii I
4.6.1.2 [There is ample scriptural evidence for the existence of this real
agraja)], like the leading bull (vr$abha) in front [of the herd]. (iii) Acquisi-
dharma named acquisition]. Thus, the Dharma-king has said, "By reason of
tions [which are posterior to the dharmas acquired (pasciitkiilajii)], like a
the arising (utpiida), the obtainment (pratilambha), the possession
( samanvagama) of the ten dharmas of a non-trainee,476 one is named an iirya calf which follows behind [the mother].483
who has completely abandoned the five members477 [of the lower section of
4.6.1.6 The first kind of acquisitions are mostly like those of non-veiled
the fetters (paiica-avarabhiigiya-saf!lyojana)], ", etc.478 Again, the Bhagavat
non-defined dharmas. The second kind are mostly like those of the sense-
has said, "0 among beings who possess wholesome and unwhole-
sphere wholesome dharmas484 at the moment when one who has 'fallen'
some dharmas, I perceive that in their mental series, the wholesome and
from a higher stage to be reborn (pratisaf!ldhi) in the sense-sphere. The third
unwholesome acquisitions increase infinitely." [Again, He] has spoken thus,
kind are mostly those of the understanding (prajiia) produced by listening
"0 you should not make any comparison as regards the superiority
(smtamayi), by reflection (cintamayi) etc., excluding the simultaneous acqui-
or inferiority of beings. You should not falsely imagine the depth or shal-
lowness of the virtues of the persons. "479 Hence we know that apart frorn sitions.
the dharmas, there are definitely [their] acquisitions which are real entities.
480

127
126
 4.6.1. 7 Here, a brief commentary [as to which dharmas have which
kinds of acquisition] is in order: The wholesome and unwholesome matter
belonging to the sense-sphere have simultaneous and posterior, but not an.
terior acquisitions. All the non-veiled-non-defined dharmas and the
veiled-non-defined information matter (nivrtavyakrta-vijfiapti-riipa), have
only simultaneous acquisitions excluding the supernormal faculties ofvi.
sion and audition ( srotiibhijfi§) and the transformation-thought
(nirmiiiJa-citta) [which, being strong (balavat) and achieved through a spe-
cial effort can have all the three kinds of acquisitions); and
excluding a small part among the arts and crafts (sailpasthanika) and deport-
ment (airyiipathika) which have been intensely practised485. They do not
have anterior and posterior acquisitions an account of their feebleness
(durbalatvat). All the remaining dharmas can have the posterior, anterior
and simultaneous acquisitions.486
4.6.1.8 The acquisition of a wholesome dharma can be wholesome only.
The acquisition of an unwholesome dharma can be unwholesome only. The
acquisition of a non-defined dharma can be non-defined only.
4.6.1.9 The acquisition of a sense-sphere dharma [belongs] to the ssense-
sphere only. The acquisition of a fine-material sphere dharma [belongs] to
the fine-material sphere only. The acquisition of an immaterial sphere dharma
[belongs] to the immaterial sphere only.
4.6.1.1 0 The acquisitions of outflow-free dharmas may belong to any of the
three spheres, or they may be outflow-free.487 By outflow-free dharmas are
meant the Truth of the Path (miirga-satya) and the three Unconditioned
dharmas, as all of them do not belong to any of the three spheres
(apratisaf!lyukta). The acquisition of the Truth of the Path is outflow-free
only; the acquisition of the cessation independent of discrimination
(apratisaf!lkhya-nirodha) may belong to any of the three spheres. As for the
acquisition of the cessation through discriminaton (pratisaipkhya-nirodha):
128
(i) It may belong to the fine-material sphere or the sphere, ac-
cordingly as the nirodha is acquired by a path of the fine-matenal sphere or
of the immaterial sphere [-It is with outflows if the cessation is acquired by
an worldling by means of a mundane-path (laukika-miirga); and outflow-
free if acquired by an iirya]. (ii) It is outflow-free when the cessation is
acquired by an outflow-free path. Thus, in general the acquisitions or out-
flow-free dharmas are four-fold.
4.6.1.11 The acquisitions of the trainee dharmas (saik$a-dhanna) [ - dharmas
pertaning to a trainee-] are of the trainee type only. The acquisi-
tions of non-trainee dharmas [- dharmas pertaning to a non-trainee-] are of
the non-trainee type (asaik$i) only. The acquisitions of neither-trainee-nor-
non-trainee dharmas [ - dharmas pertaning to a one who is neither a trainee
nor a non-trainee-) (naivasaik$aniisaik$a) are of three kinds. [This is because]
the neither-trainee-nor-non-trainee dharmas comprise those which are with
outflows and the Unconditioned- The acquisitions of the dharmas with out-
flows and of the cessation independent of discrimination are of the type
neither-trainee-nor-non-trainee only. For the cessation
through discrimination: if it is brought about by a trainee path, its acquisi-
tion is of the trainee type only; if it is brought about by a non-trainee path, its
acquisition is of the non-trainee type only; if it is brought about by a mun-
dane path, its acquisition is of the neither-trainee-nor-non-trainee type only.
4.6.1.12 The acquisitions of dharmas abandonable through insight are of of
the type abandonable through insight only. The acquisitions of dharmas
abandonable through cultivation are of the type abandonable through culti-
vation only. The acquisitions of the non-abandonable (aheya) dharmas are
of two types: abandonable through cultivation and non-abandonable. [This
is because] the non-abandonable dharmas comprise the Truth of the Path as
Well as the Unconditioned- The acquisition of the Truth of the Path is of
the non-abandonable type only. The acquisitions of cessation independent
of discrimination are of the type abandonable through cultivation only, as
129
they are non-defiled and without outflows. As for the cessation
through discrimination: (i) if they are brought about by a mundane path
their acquisitions are of the type abandonable through cultivation only; (ii)'
if they are brought about by an outflow-free path, their acquisitions are of
the non-abandonable type only.488
4.6.2 [The nature of the non-acquisitions}
4.6.2.1 All non-acquisitions are of the non-veiled-non-defined nature only;
489 unlike the case of the acquisitions described above, which are differen-
tiated in nature.
4.6.2.2 However, each of the past and future dharmas has non-acquisitions
belonging to the three periods of time [past, present, future]. For the present
dharmas, they have no present non-acquisitions, as acquisitions and
non-acquisitions are contradictory to each other in nature [and hence do not
eo-arise]; and as it is impossible that what can be possessed in the present
moment is not possessed.490 They have, however, past and future
non-acquisitions.
4.6.2.3 Dharmas belonging to the sensuality, fine-material, and immaterial
spheres, as well as the outflow-free dharmas, each has non-acquisitions be-
longing to the three spheres. There can be no outflow-free non-acquisitions,
as there is in a non-acquisition, the worldling-quality (p[thagjanatva) [which
is never outflow-free]. Thus it is said, [in the Jiianaprasthana-sastra] "What
is the worldling-quality? It is the non-obtainment (alabha) of the dharmas of
the Noble Ones (aryadharma)."49l Now, this non-obtainment is just a syn-
onym for non-acquisition. Besides, all non-acquisitions being of the
non-defined nature only, cannot be outflow-free.492
130
4.6.3 [The ideationless attainment (asal!Jjfii-samiipatti)J
4 .6.3.1 When one has been detached with regard to the third, but not to the
fourth dhyana, there is a disjoined dharma, named the ideationless attainment,
[which can cause] the cessation of the thought and thought-concomitants of
one in the stage of the fourth dhyana. Although all thought and thought-
concomitants are ceased when one produces this attainment; it [specificaly]
receives the name 'Ideationless' as it is [practised} for the special purpose of
eradicating ideations (sarp.jiiii).493 It is like the name 'Knowledge of Others'
Thought [given to that knowledge specially concerned with the knowing of
others' mind, even though it knows both the thought and the thought-con-
comitants of others].
4.6.3 .2 This Ideationless attainment is wholesome, and is subsumed under
the fourth dhyana. It is produced in the series of a non-arya only, for it is
produced with the thought of seeking liberation [falsely conceived as the
state ofideationlessness]. The arya, [on the other hand], think of this state as
an evil plane of existence (apaya) and are deeply disgusted with it.494 [From
the point ofview of retribution] it is necessarily retributed- It is retributable
in the following existence only (upapadya vedaniya).495 It is acquired by
exerting effort (prayoga-labhya) and not by detachment ( vairagya-
labhya)496.
4.6.4 [The cessation attainment (nirodha-samiipatti)]
4.6.4.1 When one has been detached with regard to the abode of no-thing-
ness (akirp.canyayatana), there is a disjoined dharma [which can cause] the
cessation of the thought and thought-concomitants of one in [the stage of]
the existence-peak497. As it causes the even (sama) continuation of the Great
Elements it is named the cessation-attainment (nirodha-samapatti).498
'
131

4.6.4.2 It belongs to the existence-peak stage, produced through exertion
(priiyogika), and is wholesome. It is retributable in the following exist-
ence (upapadya-vedaniya), or in the existence after the next (aparaparyiiya.
vedaniya), or not necessarily retributable (aniyata-vedaniya). It is not neces-
sarily retributable because [it is possible that] having produced this
attainment, one then attains ParinirvliQa without having acquired its retri-
bution (vipiika). This attainment can effect the retribution of the four [men-
tal] aggregates [only] in the existence-peak stage, as the latter is immaterial
in nature.499
4.6.4.3 Only the iirya are capable of producing this attainment, not the ordi-
nary people, for it is produced by virtue of the arya-path. The iirya, in order
to dwell in bliss in the present life (dr$ta-dhanna-sukha-vihiiriirtha) seek to
produce this attainment. The worldlings, [on the other hand,] dread it as [the
state of] annihilation ( ucchedabhirutva); and, being without the strength of
the iirya-path, are incapable of producing it.SOO The iirya obtain it through
exertion (prayoga), and not by detachment.501 It is only in the case of a
Buddha Bhagavat that its obtainment is said to be by [the mere fact of] detach-
ment: At the very moment of obtaining the Knowledge of Exhaustion, He is
already capable of producing this attainment at will - the qualities (gWJa) of
a Buddha are not through any exertion; they appear before Him as soon as
He desires them - it is [in this sense] that He is said to have obtained it.502
4.6.5 [The ideationlessness (iisarrifiiika)]
4.6.5.1 For those born among the deities who are ideationless beings
(asarpjfiisattve$U deve$iipapanniiniirp) there is a dharma named
ideationlessness (iisarpjiiika) which causes the cessation of the thought and
thought-concomitants.503 It is a real entity (dravya). It is said to be 'born of
retribution' (vipiikaja), being the retribution-fruit (vipiikaphala) of the
ideationless-attainment, and [therefore] non-defined.
132
31'1o.f'\l..,.l.JIJliL...rl. '-' nu•''"-"'',.,_,..,,.,,.T,,,,,,,,,
4.6.5.2 The heaven named the Ideationless Heaven is an elevated abode in
the Great-fruit heaven (brhatphala), just as [in the heaven of the
Brahmapurohita of the first dhyiina, there is an elevated abode named] the
Intermediate Dhyiina (dhyiiniintara) [which is the residence of the
Mahiibrahman deities].
4.6.5.3 These ideationless beings are so named because [though] they pos-
sess ideation at birth and death, they are without it in between. At the time of
death, they produce mentation anew, like one waking up after a long sleep.
Shortly after, they pass away to be reborn in the sense-sphere, [and nowhere
else); for those who are to be born in the Ideationless Heaven necessarily
possess a karma retributable in the sense-sphere in the existence after the
next; just as those who are to be born in the Uttarakuru necessarily possess a
karma which will lead to rebirth in a heavenly plane of existence.504
4.6.6 [The vital faculty (jivitendriya)]
4.6.6.1 A [real entity] projected by previous karma, serving as the cause
for the uninterrupted series of the six entrances (iiyatana) [of the human
personality], and forming the basis for the designation (prajiiapt1) of the four
births and the five planes of existences - this is named the vital faculty. It is
also called the life-principle (ayu). sos
4.6.6.2 Thus it is said in the Abhidharma506: "What is the vital-faculty? It is
the life-principle of the three spheres of existence." It has a substantial essence,
and sustains heat ( ii$ma) and consciousness ( vijfiiina); as the giithii goes,
"When Life, heat, and consciousness,
- these three dharmas - leave the human body;
The abandoned body lies stiff,
Unconscious like a log"507
133
 1::-NJKANLI:! IN !U IHt:- :SUt'KI:!Mt:: DOCTRINh
4.6.6.3 It has also been said in the sutra thus: "When the retribution has
been experienced, it is called hell (nirvrtte vipiike niiraka iti sarpkhyiirn
gacchat1), and so on, up to the plane of neither-ideation-nor-non-ideation".
Now, apart from the vital faculty, there could be no any other dharma of the
nature of a faculty, found in all the three spheres (traidhiitukavyiipya), con-
tinuing uninterrupted for a given period of existence, and forming the basis
for the designation of the four births and the five planes of existence.508
4.6.6.4 [A being] born in the immaterial-sphere, when he gives rise to (i) a
wholesome or defiled thought pertaining to his own stage (bhiim1) or to a
higher one, or (ii) an outflow-free thought pertaining to a lower stage- at
these times, by means of what [apart from the vital faculty] can [his existence,
a retribution which is necessarily always with-outflows and non-defined in
nature], be designated [in terms of birth and plane of existence, since in this
case there exist neither the five material entrances constituting the body retrib-
uted by karma, nor the non-defined mental consciousness retributed by
karma]? When [a being] born transformationally (upapiiduka) into a heav-
enly plane of existence gives rise to a wholesome or defiled thought, we
ought to say that he is dead. And when [later on] he gives rise to a non-defined
thought, we ought to say that he is born anew - Such are the serious incon-
gruities if one denies the existence of the vital faculty [as a real entity].509
4.6.7 [Group-homogeneity (nikiiya-sabhiigatii)]
4.6.7.1 The group-homogeneity is the cause for the similarities in striving
and inclination among sentient beings (sattviiniimekiirtharuci}J
siidrsyahetubhiita). This is subdivided into two: (i) non-differentiated [or
general] (abhinna), and (ii) differentiated [or particular] (bhinna).
4.6. 7 .1.1 In the first case, all sentient beings equally have self-attachment
(iitmasneha), are similarity nourished by food, and have similar inclinations
(rati) - This cause of sameness (siimya) is named the [general]
134
AI::JHIUHARMA.VATARA
group-homogeneity. Each [sentient being] has within him his own
group-homogeneity.
4.6.7.1.2 In the second case, sentient beings may belong to different spheres,
stages , planes of existence, births, caste (jiiti); they may be male, female,
upasaka, trainee, non-trainee, etc. Within each being [of a given
category], there is a dharma which is the distinguishing cause
(pratiniyamahetu) for the similarity in striving and inclination [among mem-
bers of the same category] . This is named the group-homogeneity. If this
were non-existent, there would be confusion in all the conventional usages
(lokavyavahiira) such as 'iirya', 'non-iirya' etc.SI o
4.6.7.2 What difference is there between the worldling-quality
(prthagjanatva) and the group-homogeneity of worldlings
(p[thagjana-sabhiigatli) ? The cause for the homogeneity in inclination etc.,
is said to be their homogeneity (sabhiigatli). The worldling-quality; [on the
other hand,] is that which causes the doing of all unprofitable [ - i.e., evil -]
things (sarviinarthakarabhiita). Thus, it is said in the sutra, "0 I say
that there is not the slightest evil (piipakii akusalii dharmii}J) which the fool-
ish, uninstructed (asrutavant) worldlings are incapable of committing". Again,
the Bhagavat has said, "If he comes [back] to the human world and acquires
the human-homogeneity sabhiigatli) .... "511 Now, [unlike the
case of homogeneity,] it is not the case that at the times of birth and death,
there is the acquisition and relinquishment, respectively of the waddling-
quality: [One remains a worldling in sarpsiira until one becomes an iirya].
Hence, there is a [vast]512 difference between the
worldling-quality and the homogeneity.513
[The four characteristics ofthe conditioned dharmas)514
4.6.8 When dharmas are produced, there is a force of internal cause which
makes them achieve their specific activities (v[ttil vyiipiiral siimarthya).515
135
 l:!.f'i IK/\i'IILtii"'I\J INt UULI KIN I:!
It is this internal cause that is called the production-characteristic Uiiti-
lak§aiJa).516 The causes of production of dharmas are two-fold: (i) internal
and (ii) external. The former is the production-characteristic and the latter
comprises the six causes (hetu) or the four conditions (pratyaya).517 If the
production-characteristic were non-existent, the conditioned dharmas would
be just like the [unconditioned] Space, etc., which in spite of the assemblage
of external causes and conditions, never arises. Or, [the unconditioned
dharmas] like Space etc., are also capable of arising and hence become con-
ditioned in nature. This indeed is a great incongruity. Thus, we can infer
from this that there exists a distinct production-characteristic.518
4.6.9 The cause which enables [a dharma] to stay temporarily, so as to be
able to project a distinct fruit, is named the duration-characteristic (sthit1):
When a conditioned dharma is staying temporarily, it has the power of pro-
jecting a distinct fruit, enabling it to stay temporarily. This internal cause for
[a dharma to exercise its] power of projecting a distinct fruit- is named the
duration-characteristic.519 If this duration-characteristic were non-existent
' supports the conditioned dharmas and make them stay, and to which beings
when the conditioned dharmas are staying temporarily, they ought not be
further able to project a distinct fruit.520 Hence, it can be inferred that there
exists a distinct duration characteristic.
4.6.10 Deterioration Uarii) is that which impairs (vi-...Jhan) [a dharma's]
activity of projecting fruit, rendering it incapable of further projecting an-
other distinct fruit.521 If a conditioned dharma did not have the change- [or
deterioration-] characteristic which impairs its activity,
how is it that it does not keep on projecting one distinct fruit after another,
and thus leading to ad infi"nitum?522 Besides, if this be the case [a condi-
tioned dharma] ought not be momentary (k$aiJ.ika) in nature. Hence we can
infer from this that there exists a distinct [dharma named] the
deterioration-characteristic.
136
4.6.11 Impermanence (anityatii) is the which causes a present dharma,
whose activity having been impaired [by the deterioration-characteristic] to
enter into the past: There exists a distinct dharma named disappearance- [or
impermanace-] characteristic (vyaya-Jak$aiJa) which causes [a dharma] to
go from the present into the past.523 If this were non-existent, dharmas ought
not to disappear. Or, [the unconditioned dharmas like] Space, etc., would
also disappear [just as do the conditioned ones].
4.6.ll.a These four are the conditioned-characteristics of the conditioned
(samskrtasya sarpskrtalak$al)iim)524 [A dharma] possessing these four
conditioned-characteristics is said to be conditioned. This is not the case for
Space, etc.525
4.6.1l.b The Bhagavat, however, has said: "There are three conditioned
characteristics of the conditioned. The arising (utpiida) of the conditioned
can be known. Their disappearance (vyaya) and duration-change (sthity-
anyathiitva) can also be known".526 [Duration is the characteristic which
easily get attached; unlike the other three characteristics which cause the
transitoriness of the conditioned dharmas, helping them traverse through the
three periods of time]. Thus, in order that beings to be trained (vineya) may
get disgusted with the conditioned, [the Bhagavat did not enumerate dura-
tion separately as one of the four characteristics] - The two characteristics,
duration and change, are spoken of together as one; just as 'Sri' [the goddess
of prosperity] and Kiilakarl)i [ the goddess of bad luck], [so that beings do
not get attached to the former]. Thus, there are definitely four characteristics
ofthe conditioned.527
4.6.1I.c It is not the case, [as the Sautrantika assert, that these four charac-
teristics] are identical in substance with the conditioned dharmas
characterised. If they had exactly the same substance; [the consequence
Would be that] just as the characterised and the characteristics are identical
j
137
in substance, the characteristics [themselves] ought also not be
mutually-different.528 If so, dharmas ought to be produced when they are
actually disappearing; and disappearing when they are being produced. Or,
they are never produced at all.529
4 .6. 11 .d These four primary characteristics being themselves
conditioned, like the dharmas they characterize, possess four secondary char-
acteristics viz: production-production (jiiti-jiit1), etc. up to
impermance-impermanence (anityatii-anityatii).
4.6.ll.e This, however, does not lead to an infinite regression. Each of the
four primary characteristics characterizes eight dharmas; [but] each of the
secondary characteristics can characterize only one dharma. [Now it has to
be understood that] when a dharma is produced, nine dharmas, including
itself, eo-arise: the dharma itself, the four primary characteristics and the
four secondary characteristics. Among the primary characteristics, produc-
tion (jiit1) produces the other eight dharmas excluding itself. Among the
secondary characteristics, production[ -production] (jiiti-jiit1) produces only
the primary production, of all the nine dharmas; owing to its weakness [com-
pared with the primary production]. The same applies to the [primary] dura-
tion, deterioration, and impermanence [on the one hand, and the three corre-
sponding secondary characteristics on the other).530
4.6. 11 .f The primary characteristics are [established as being conditioned
(sazpskrta)] on the basis of the dharmas [they characterize], and the second-
ary characteristics are [established as being conditioned (sarpslqta)] on the
basis of the [primary] characteristics: By virtue of the [primary] characteris-
tics, the dharmas can manifest their functions ({'F ffl zuo yong); by virtue of
the secondary characteristics, the [primary] characteristics can manifest their
functions. And what are these functions ? They are: production, duration,
deterioration and destruction. What is produced, etc., is the activity (J}J
for the projecting of a fruit.53l
138
4.6.1l.g Thus, although the essential nature (svabhiiva) of a conditioned
dharrna always exists (sarvadiist1), its function is not permanent (nitya). It
achieves its function by the force of the four characteristics, the internal
causes, and the external causes: 532
The groups of words (niima), phrases (pada), syllables (vyanjana)
4.6.12 Words, phrases and syllables are those which are produced with the
support of speech (vac), and which causes the understanding [in each case]
of a corresponding import (sviirtha-pratyiiyaka)533, in a similar manner as
knowledge (jiiiina) manifests with the representation of an object (artha) [it
cognizes]534. These are the synonyms, respectively, for ideation (samjiiii),
sentence (viikya) and phoneme Just as visual consciousness etc.,
are produced with eyes etc., as their support; manifesting with the represen-
tation of the object, the visible etc., and [thus] comprehend their respective
objects. The same applies to words, etc.
4.6. 13 It is not the case that vocal sound can directly express the import,
[for] it cannot be that when one utters the word 'fire', one's mouth is imme-
diately burnt! Words like 'fire' etc., must rely on speech for their production.
From these words the import of fire etc., are then expressed.535
4.6.14 By 'expressing' is meant producing in others a comprehension
(buddh1) of the import to be illumined (dyotita). It does not mean that [the
word] unites with the import. As sound is resistant, and as the eternal sound
falsely held by the grammarians ( vaiyiikara1}ena parikalpita) are unreason-
able536, there cannot be any dharma [such as sound], apart from these three
-Words, phrases and syllables - which are capable of expressing a corre-
sponding import. These four dharmas - sound, word, import and knowledge
-however, appear to be identical in form, [though they are in fact distinct
'
entities].
139
j
'
'
 l!N IKAN'Ll: IN IV KJNt:
4.6.14.a Here, by a word is meant an ideation, like that pertaining to matter,
etc. By a phrase is meant that which expresses complete meaning; as for
example the verse "Not to do evil .",etc. In the world, people also utter
[such statements as] "Devadatta, drive the white cow here for milking.", etc.
By a syllable is meant a phoneme like 'a', 'i', etc. When the three are as-
sembled into their collection (samukt1), they are known respectively as a
group (kiiya) [of words, of phrases, and of syllables.]. 537
4.6.14.b [There are scriptural evidence to prove that these three dharmas
are real]. Thus the Great Sage has said. "0 when the Tathagata has
arisen in the world, there are the groups of words, phrases and syllables
which can be known." This refers to those of the [Four} Truths (satya), the
[Three] Jewels (ratna), the [five] aggregates (skandha), the [twelve] entrances
(ayatana), the [eighteen] spheres (dhatu), the [four] fruit of the ascetic
(sramaiJaphala), the dependent origination (pratitya-samutpada), etc.m
Again, the Bhagavat has said, "The Tathagata acquires such and such groups
of words, phrasess and syllables". This refers to those pertaining to the
dharmas unique to the Buddha (aveiJika-buddha-dharma) obtained by the
Tathagata, etc.539
4.6.14.c The word "etc" [in the list ofdisjoined conditionings] (§ 4.6) indi-
cates that there are subdivisions among the categories discussed herein. Thus
ends the [exposition of the] Category of conditionings (samskiira-padiirtha).
V The Category of Consciousness (vijnana-padartha)
5 The discriminative cognition (prativij.iiapt1), in a general manner, of an
object-substance vastu) such as a visible etc., [without its par-
ticular details], is named consciousness (vij.iiiina). That is, the present activi-
ties540, [of vision etc.] with regard to the six [external] objects of vision,
140
etc., which arise with the accompanying assistence of the visual faculties,
etc. (indriya-sahakiira), and which apprehend visibles and other objects only
generally are named consciousnesses.
5.1 That which is able to apprehend the particular characteristics of [an
object] is named a thought-concomitant, such as sensation, etc. Conscious-
ness does not have this activity; it serves only as the support [for the thought-
concomitants]. The activity of consciousness exists only in the present mo-
ment within the single moment of which discriminative cognition
takes place.
5.2 Consciousness also receives the names of 'mind' (manas) and 'thought'
(citta). It is also that by which the fundamental essence of a sentient being
(miila-sattva-dravya) may be designated.54l Its activity is the discriminative
cognition of the visibles and other objects. It is divided into six types by
reason ofthe [six] different faculties [ofvision etc., and the six] different
objects. These are named visual consciousness etc., up to
mental consciousness (mano-vij.iiiina).542 The Buddha Himself has spoken
of its characteristic in the sutra: It is named consciousness because ,.,
.,
it cognizes discriminatively (vijiiniiti).543 Hence, we know that its character-
istic is discriminative cognition.
(The six causes, the five fruits and the four conditions]
Sx Earlier on, in our discussion on the characteristics of the conditioned,
We have said: "The causes of production of dharmas are two-fold: (i) inter-
nal, (ii) external. The former is the production-characteristic and the latter
comprises the six causes or the four conditions" (§ 4.6.8). Now, we must
consider: What are these causes and conditions?
',
Sx.l There are six causes: (i) conjoined cause (sa1pprayuktaka-hetu), (ii)
co-existent cause (sahabhii-hetu), (iii) homogeneous cause (sabhaga-hetu),
(iv) universal cause (sarvatraga-hetu), (v) retributive cause (vipiika-hetu),
141
j
'
'
'
(vi) efficient cause (karaiJa-hetu).544
5x.l.l The thought and thought-concomitants which are mutually con-
joined with one another and which apprehend a common object, are named
conjoined causes - E.g. thought with sensation, etc.; sensation, etc., with
[ideation], etc.;545 sensations, etc., with thought; in each case [the mental
dharma] cannot be [a conjoined cause] for itself.546
5x.1.2 The conditioned dharmas which are the fruits of one another, or
which together bring about a common fruit are named co-existent causes _
E.g. the mahiibhiita; the [conditioned dharmas which are] characterized
and the [four] conditioned characteristics; the thought and the
thought-accompaniments (cittiinuvartin). These are [in each case co-existent
causes] for one another.547
5x.1.2.1 The distinction between the conjoined cause and the co-existent
cause [may be illustrated] by the example of a caravan of merchants: The
merchants, by rendering mutual assistance to one another, are able to pass
through a risky road - this is co-existent cause. They consume the same food
and drinks - this is conjoined cause.548
5x.1.2.2 The thought-accompaniments [mentioned above] comprise the
thought-concomitants, the dhyiina-restraint, the outflow-free restraint, and
the conditioned characteristics. They are so named because, [with respect
to time:] (i) they belong to the same period of time (adhvan)as the thought;
they (ii) arise, (iii) stay, (iv) cease, together with thought. [ With respect to
fruit:] they have (v) the same fruit, (vi) the same uniform emanation and
(vii) the same retribution. [With respect to their moral definability:] they are
(viii) wholesome, (ix) unwholesome or (x) non-defined, accordingly as [the
moral nature of] the thought [with which they accompany]. For these ten
reasons, they are called thought-accompaniments.549
142
sx.1.3 The dharmas born anteriorily (agraja) and belonging to a given stage
(bhiimt) and class (nikiiya) are - in a similar manner to seed dhannas- the
homogeneous causes for the similar posterior dharmas, [belonging to the
same stage and class]. [Thus, a dharma in the sense-sphere and abandonable
by insight into the truth of suffering, is the homogeneous cause only for a
later dharma in the sense-sphere and similarity abandonable ].550
5x.1.4 The universal dharmas (sarvatraga-dharma) born anteriorily, in a
given stage, are the universal causes to the posterior, defiled dharmas be-
longing to the same stage.55t
5x.1.5 All unwholesome dharmas and the wholesome dhannas which are
with-outflows, are the retributive causes for their retribution.552
5x.1.6 When dharmas are produced, they have all dharmas, excluding them-
selves, as their efficient causes. They are [efficient causes] either [in the
sense ofbeing] non-obstructive [to their arising] (avighnabhiiva) or [in the
sense ofbeing] capable of producing [the dharmas].553
Sx.2 These six causes have all the conditioned [dharmas}554 as their fruits,
as [the latter] are produced by them. [These fruits are as follows]:
Sx.2.1 The conjoined causes and the co-existent causes acquire the fruits of
manly action [This fruit is so named] because by the
force of this[- the manly or virile action (puru$akiira)], that[- the fruit-] is
produced.555
Sx.2.2 The homogeneous causes and the universal causes acquire the
Uniform-emanation fruits ). It is said to be 'uni-
form' the fruit is similar to the cause. It is further said to be an
'emanation" ( mE ) because it is produced from the cause.556 The fruit itself
being the uniform-emanation, it is named a uniform-emanation fruit.
143
 Cl"t 11'\.f'l.l"t\..-C Jl"' J V I ne "'Ur.l\C.M.l:! UU\...1 1'(,11'111:!

5x.2.3 The retributive causes acquire the retribution fruits (vipiika-phala). [VI The Category of Space (iikaSa-padartha)]
[The word vipiika is explained thus:] 'vi' because the fruit is dissimilar to
the cause; and 'pac' because it is matured and fit for being experienced.557 6 Space (iikiisa) has the characteristic of accomodating resistant things; as
The fruit itself being the retribution, it is named the retribution fruit. It per- it is by the dominant (adhipat1) force of this that they are capable of being
tains to sentient beings (sattviikhyii) only, and is non-defined in nature.sss produced, and as it is the nature of Space to be accomodative.564If it were
non-existent, there ought not be the production of resistant things, since
5x.2.4 The efficient causes acquire the fruits of dominance (adhipati-phala). there would be nothing to accommodate them.
[The word 'fruit of dominance' is explained thus:] by force ofthis domi-
nance (adhipat1), that is produced. For example, the visual faculty etc., with 6.1 Thus, the Bhagavat has said. "0 briihmaiJa, Wind is supported by Space.
regard to visual consciousness etc.; the farmer etc., with regard to the crops " The briihmaiJa asked, "By what is Space supported?" The Buddha further
told him, "Your question is unreasonable. Space is immaterial (iiriipyin),
etc - From the anterior dominance, the posterior dharma is produced. Being
the fruit ofthe dominance, it is named a 'fruit ofdominance'.559 invisible (anirdarsana) and non-resistant (apratigha); what can be its support?
Nevertheless, Space can be known [to exist] on account of the existence of
light. "565
5x.2.5 The cessation through discrimination (pratisaJp.khyii-nirodha), an
unconditioned, is named disconnection fruit ( visaJp.yoga-phala).560
6.2 Therefore, we know that there really exists (dravyasat) the uncondi-
[Although] it is not produced by the Path, [it is still said to be a fruit because]
tioned Space. If this substance were non-existent, on what can Wind be sup-
it is acquired by virtue of the Path. [i.e. by means of the Path, the practitioner
ported? What is the basis for the assertion [that it is] "immaterial," etc?
obtains the acquisition (priipt1) ofthe disconnection].561 The fruit itselfbe-
What is it that is discerned by reason of light? - The discernment of [such
ing the disconnection, it is named the disconnection fruit.
absolutely non-existent entities as] a tortoise's hair (kaurmasya roJp.IJa) can-
not be on account of inference (anumiina).566
5x.3 There are four conditions (pratyaya): condition qua cause
(hetu-pratyaya), uniform-immediate condition (samanantara-pratyaya), con-
dition qua object (iilambana-pratyaya), and condition of dominance
(adhipati-pratyaya).562 Excluding the efficient cause, the other five causes
[VII The Category of the cessation through discrimination
are named the conditions qua cause. All past and present thought and thought-
(pratisaTfJkhyii-nirodha-padiirtha )]
concomitants, excluding the last thought (caramaJp. cittaJp.) etc. of an arhat,
are named the uniform-immediate conditions. All dharmas receive the name
7 The absolute annihilation (atyanta-prahiiiJa) of all unsatisfactoriness
conditions qua object. Those [dharmas] of the nature of efficient cause
(dul_lkha) [past, future and present] is named cessation through discrimina-
(kiiraiJa-hetutii) are named conditions of dominance.563
tion (pratisaJp.khyii-nirodha).567 What is unsatisfactoriness? Births and deaths.
568 Thus, the Bhagavat has said, "The very production of becoming (bhiiva)
is said to be unsatisfactoriness." The becomings are synonymous with births

144 145
 and deaths. When no becoming is produced, it is said to be the absolute
annihilation of unsatisfactoriness. accordance with the three different elements - of abandonment, detach-
:ent and cessation (prahiiiJa-dhiitu, viriiga-dhiitu, nirodha-dhiitu)573 - they

ue established as three. In accordance with the abandonment . of

7 .I The cessation through discrimination is that which causes the
unsatl.sfactoriness and the origin ofunsatisfactoriness, and also accordmgly
non-production ofunsatisfactoriness- [A real entity which is a positive Pres-
as the nirval)a] with or without remainder (sopadhise$a, nimpadhiSe$a); they
ence:] like a dike holding back the water or a screen blocking the wind.s
69 are established as two. From the point of view of the abandonment of births
By discrimination (pratisarpkhyii) is meant the discriminating
and deaths collectively, it is established as one.574
(pratisarpkhyiina). It is a special kind of wholesome understanding
(kusalapra}fiii-vise$a). The cessation through discrimination is the name given
7.4 The cessation through discrimination has many synonyms, such as ex-
to that cessation acquired through the repeated discriminating of this [under-
standing] with regard to theFour Noble Truths.570 haustion (k$aya), detachment (viriiga), cessation (nirodha), nirvaQ.a, etc.575
Thus, it is said in the Manu$yaka-siitra, "0 the four immaterial
aggregates and [the material aggregate comprising] the eyes and the visibles
7.2 There are innumerable entities [of the cessations through discrimination],
etc., taken collectively, are called a human being. Herein is the ideation
accordingly as the amount of abandonables which is innumerable571. If there
(sarpjii§)- the names: sattva, manuja, nara, miinava, etc. Herein is the asser-
were only one [cessation for all the abandonable dharmas], it would become
tion (pratijii§): "I see the visibles, etc., with my eyes, etc." [Herein] is the
useless ( vaiyarthyarp syiit) to cultivate the [counteractive] paths that are to
of various conventional manners ofspeech ( vyavahiira) : "This
follow, once one has acquired the first path . [i.e, once one has realised
venerable (iiyusmana) has such a name, he belongs to such a caste (jati),
(siik$iit- Vkr) the cessation of the first defilement abandonable by the insight
such a lineage (gotra)", etc. These, 0 are mere ideations (sarpjfiii-
into the Truth of Unsatisfactoriness ( dul}kha-darsanaheya-klesa-nirodha),
miitraka), mere manners of speech ( vyavahiira-miitraka). All these dharmas
as he would have at the same time realized the cessations of all the other
areimpermanent anitya), conditioned sarpskrta), and dependently arisen
classes of defilementJ. If one maintains that one at first realizes partially and
pratityasamutpanna). This being so, there is unsatisfactoriness:
not completely, it should follow that one cessation consists of several parts.
unsatisfactoriness at the time of being produced jiit1), unsatisfactoriness in
[But to conceive of] an entity consisting of several parts is illogical. [Hence,]
staying sthiti) etc. With regard to all these unsatisfactoriness, the
it is proper to say that there are as many cessations through discrimination as
completeabandonment (ase$aprahiiiJa), casting aside (pratinil}sarga), expur-
there are dharmas with outflows, since this accords with logic.572
gation ( vyantibhiiva),576 exhaustion (k$aya), detachment ( viriiga), cessa-
tion (nirodha), appeasement (vyupasama), disappearance (astarpgama); the
7.3 [However,] in accordance with the different [counteractiveJ paths, [the
non-linking-up (apratisandh1) with [any] other [unsatisfactoriness]- this is
cessations through discrimination] are established as eighty-nine. In accor-
known as the absolute non-arising (atyantiinutpiida). It is extremely tranquil
dance with the [different] abandonment-knowledges (prahiiiJa-parijiiii) they
(siinta), excellent (praiJita): namely, the casting aside of all substratum
are established as nine. In accordance with the five different classes [of
(sarvopadhi-pratinil}sarga), the exhaustion of craving (fT$IJiik$aya), detach-
abandonables J they are established as five. In accordance with the different
ment ( viriiga), cessation (nirodha), nirviiiJa."577
fruits [of spiritual cultivation], they are said to be four- stream-entry, etc.

146
147
7.5 [In the above sutra], 'casting aside of all substratum', means that in this
cessation, there is the complete relinquishment of the unsatisfactoriness of
the five aggregates of grasping (paiicopiidiina-skandlla). 'Exhaustion of crav-
ing' means that, in this cessation, all cravings are presently exhausted. It is
'detachment' because, when one has acquired this cessation, one is com-
pletely freed from the defiled dharmas. It is 'cessation' because when one
has obtained this cessation, all unsatisfactoriness cease. It is 'nirva:t:J.a' be-
cause when one has realized this cessation, the defilement-fire of all calami-
ties is extinguished.578
VIII The Category of the cessation independent of discrimination
(apratisalflkhyii-nirodha-padiirtha)
8 The cessation independent of discrimination (apratisaJ!1kllyii-nirodha) is a
distinct dharma (dllarmiintara) which absolutely obstructs (atyanta-vighna-
bhiita) the production of a future dharma.
8.1 It is acquired simply by the deficiency m the conditions
(pratyayavaikalyiit) [necessary for the production of the dharma,] not through
discrimination (na pratisaJ!1kllyayii labllyate). For example, when the eye
and the mind are focusing on a particular visible, the other visibles, sounds,
smells, tastes and tangibles all 'wither away' [into the past] (atyayante). As
a result of the acquisition of these cessations, the five sensory consciousnesses
which had these [other objects] as conditions, become absolutely obstructed,
and remain in the future, never to arise again, [being incapable of appre-
hending past object].579 The deficiency in the [necessary] conditions is also
due to the force of this cessation. Hence, there definitely exists a real entity
named 'cessation independent of discrimination' .580
148
8.2 [There are also scriptural supports for the existence of this entity]. For
example, the Bhagavat has said, "If, at that moment the pleasurable sensa-
tion (sukha-vedanii) appears, the other two sensations [- unpleasurable and
neutral-] cease". Now, what can this cessation be apart from the [cessation
independent of discrimination], since it definitely is not [the cessation of]
impermanance or the cessation through discrimination?581 Again, it is said
in the sutra, "0 if one attains stream-entry, one has exhausted [re-
births in] hells, the infernal regions and the animal region. The exhaustion
here refers to the cessation independent of discrimination, since at the mo-
ment one has not acquired the cessation through discrimination for the re-
tributive dharmas.582
[IX Concluding remarks]
In order that the beginners (iidi-karmika) may take a keen interest in their
studies, this treatise has been composed succinctly, without the [usual] ques-
tions and answers [which characterize doctrinal disputations]. Those who
have not mastered (parijiiiita) the profound characteristics of the Abhidharma,
have indulged in compiling numeroustheoretical speculations prapaiica).
These they put forward, fabricating objections, with the evil intention of
slandering one another. [In doing so], they are in fact slandering the Buddha's
teachings (iiptiigama). Thus, the Bhagavat has said, "There are two kinds of
people who slander the Buddha's Teachings- (i) Those who, not having
faith, generate hostility (pradve§a) towards them; and (ii) those who, though
having faith, grasp them wrongly (durgrallita)."
149
 AI:SHIUHAKMAV!\.IAK/\

Part Three

ANNOTATIONS
 AHHIUHARMAVATAKA

1 Many scholars have raised the question as to what 'early Buddhism' reatly constitutes. By
•early'. here, we mean 'pre-Mahayana'.

2 DSS (T no.l537), SgPS (T no.l536), PjS (T no.l538), PrS (T no.l542), DKS (T no.1540),
VKS (T no.l539), JPS (T no.l544).

3 See Mizuno.K., EnB, pp. 68ff; Takakusu, J. JPTS, 1904-5 (pp.67-145)

4 MCB,V(l937),pp.l-157.

5 Tr. ofVasubandhu's KarmasiddhiprakaraiJa, MCB, IV (1936), pp. 207 ff.

6 Even though we know of the existence of this work, we still to date have no access to it.

7 AKB(F) VI (p.xviii).

8 T no.!554.

9 Peking edn. No. 5599 (Vol. 119).

10 E. Sieg, W. Siegling: Tocharische Sprachreste I. Berlin und Leipzig, 1912.

Pave! Poucha: Institutiones tocharicae, Pars H (Monografie archivu orientalhino, XV, Prague
1956), pp. 12-14. Taijun lnoguchi, Monumenta Serindica, vol. IV; Kyoto 1961, pp. 336-342.

I! In 2 fascicles (about 9 Taisho pages) in its Chinese version.

12 T no.l554 (p.989a).

13 T no.l554 (p.9845b).

14 AVN (p.71).

IS AVN (p.85 f, p.88 0.

!6 As Professor N. H. Samtani (AVN, pp.l40 ff) explains, the author quotes

lllld Sautrantika views, often without committing himself to the position of either. Accordingly,
his sectarian affiliation is difficult to ascertain, even though on the whole he could be consid-
ered to lean more toward the Sautrantika side.

!53
 tN IKANC.t:.IN I U 1 tit ;:)Ut"Kl:.ME UOCrKlNI:::.
SKANDHILA'S ABHIDHARMAVArARA

17 ADV (p.4). 33 See infra. Part Three, note 97 for the almost complete translation of the discussions given
in Ny and MVS.
18 AKB (p.l4): tasmadriisivadeva skandha/:1 prajnaptisanta/:11 See SaJ11ghabhadra's refuta.
tion inNy (pp. 343C - 345a). 34 For more details on the special features of the texts discussed herein, and their contribu-
tion to the development in Sarviistiviida thought, see Study, pp.469ff.
19 See Ny, p.429 ff, where Sa111ghabhadra vehemently refutesVasubandhu's denial ofthe
reality of the asarpskrta. Cf. Also our translation (Infra, Part Three, note 566). 35 We shall show later on that the author of A vatiira was contemporary with Vasubandhu
whose date we consider to be around the fifth century (for a good recent discussion on the
20 AKB (p.296) : ye hi sarvamastiti vadanti atitamaniigata!)J pratyutpanna!)J ea te date ofVasubandhu, see IAKB, pp. ii ff). Buddhaghosa who according to the Burmese tradi-
1 ye tu kecidasti yat pratyutpannamadattaphalar!J eiitita!)J karma ki!)Jcinnasti tion was born in the fifth century (Hackmann, Buddhism as a religion, Probstain, 1910, p.86),
yaddattaphalamatitamaniigata!)J eeti vibhajya vadanti te vibhajyaviidina}J I was contemporary with Buddhadatta, author of Abhidhammavatiira (B. M. Barua, 'Buddhadatta
and Buddhaghosa: Their contemporaneity and Age', in UCR, voi.III, Nov. 1945)
21 Ny (p.630c).
36 Xuan Zang (T no.2087, pp. 886b-887a) tells us that MVS was compiled at the so-called
22 ADV (p.259): icchaty adhvatraya!)J yasmiit krtyatas ea dhruvatrayam I sarviistiviida 'Third Council' sponsored by King of Gandhara. (He asserts the same thing in the
ityuktastasmad...! epilogue to his translation of MVS.) But modern reseachers in Japan and China have found
that Kani$ka is referred to in MVS (p.593a) as a past king of Gandhiira. Their view is that
23 Infra, Part Two. MVS was compiled by the followers of the Katyiiyaniputra tradition, around the 2nd century
A.D. This view is supported by a statement in MPPS (fas. 2). See Study, pp.220ff; EnB, vol.
24 T no.1555 (p.989b). I, fas. I, p.80f.

25 The earliest translation of this treatise is one by An Shi Gao (T no.l551) in 148.A.D. 37 In MVS, (p.7a-b) we find recorded the attempt by certain Sarviistivada masters to justify
In the Tang dynasty, Fa Cheng made another translation of it (T no.l556), while Xuan Zang the sequence of the eight grantha into which JPS is divided. MVS follows this sequence of
translated Dharrnatriita's vibhii$ii (T no.l555) on it. presentation.

26 DSS (p.50lb). 38 MVS (p.l c).

27 AmRS (p.969a). 39 See Study, pp. 479-486.

28 Edited by A.P. Buddhadatta in Buddhadatta 's Manuals, I {PTS) 40 As Bhadanta one of the "four great Sarvastiviida Abhidharmika" was pre-
MVS, the author of AmRS must be a different whose date is probably not far from
29 See infra, Part Three, note 565. the completion ofMVS (Cf. Study, p. 486).

30 Nakamura (Indian Buddhism , p.l12, n. 94) goes so far as to assert that Xuan Zang 41 AmRS (p. 975b).
"translated it rather arbitrarily."
42 ibid, loc. cit. Cf. also MVS (p.662c) which speaks of these two meditations as "the
31 AKB II (p.60). true amrta-door for the entry into the Buddha-dharma"

32 ADV, Introduction (p. 87). 43 Cf. Study, pp. 493ff

154 155
 ENTRANCE INTO TilE SUPREME DOCTRINE

S9 Infra, Part Two, §4.5.8. Cf. also ADV 11 (p. 70): dhi/:1 prajiiii dharmasarpgrahiidy-
44 Cf. Study, pp. 520fT.
upalak$a!JaS vabhii vii
45 Cf. T. Kimura, A Study of the Abhidharma Siistras , 1922, pp. 259-324: IAKB • p.xxx·
60 Cf. infra, Part Three, note 472.
EnB, vol I ,p.73f; etc '

46 According to Pu Guang (T41, p.la). 61 Cf. Study, p.39f

62 MVS, fas. 105 (p.542c). The Theravadins also describe the Buddha Himself as the first
47 with Vibhii$iiprabhiivrtti, critically edited with notes and introduction
A.bhidhammika (As, p.\7: sammiisambuddho 'va pathamataram iibhidhammiko)
by P.S. Jam• (Patna, 1977, 2nd edition).

63 MVS (p.88).
48 ibid, p. 132f. But elsewhere (EnB, vol. I fas. I, p.57), Jaini says, "We therefore c a n
ascribe this work either to Sarrtghabhadra, or to one of his disciples, particularly Vimalamitra".
64 Old MVS, p. 72c.
49 J.W. de Jong, "L'Auteur de I' Abhidharmadipa", in Buddhist Studies, ed. G. Schopen
65 In AKB, Ny and ADV, the appellations and 'Sautriintikas' are used inter-
(Berkeley, 1979), p. I I 6.
changeably. The early in the time of MVS, however, were Sarvastiviidins. They
broke away from the Sarviistivada and evolved into the Sautrantikas around the 2nd and 3rd
50 See infra, Part Two,§§ 4.5.7, 4.5.26b, 4.5x.4, etc.
century A.D. See Introduction, §V.

51 Yasomitra {Vyakhya, p.ll ), a professed Sautrantika, defines "Sautrantika" as follows: ye

66 Cf. ADV (p.277).
sutrapriimiil)ikii na siistrapriimiil)ikii/:1 te sautriintikii/:1.

67 Cf. L.V Poussin, Le temps et le pudga.Ja dans le Vijiiiinakiiya

52 op. cit., loc. cit.: sutra-vise$ii eva hy arthaviniscay'iidayo 'bhidha.rma-sarpjfiii/:1.
(p.344 f).

53 AKB I (p.3 ). This contrast is pointed out by N. H. Samtani in his edition of the
68 Cf. E. Lamotte, Histoire du Bouddhisme lndien (Louvain, \958), p.578
Arthaviniscaya-sutra and its Commentary (nibandhana) (Patna, 1971 ), p.l40 f, in a discus-
sion on the Sautrantika leaning of the commentator.
69 MVS (p.43a).

54 JPS (p.922c).
70 T49 (p.l5b).

55 MVS (p.l45c).
71 MPPS (p.9b).

56 Cf*Tattviirthii(Peking No. 5875, Tohoku No. 4421): bye brag tu smra ba mams na re ...I
72 MVS (p.8c)
bcom ldan 'das kyis ma bstan pa ni 'ga' yafl chos mflon par spros pa yod pa ma yin no I

73 MVS (p.326b).
57 Cf. Ny (p.330a).

74 ibid (p. 730a, 661 c, 8c etc ).

58 MVS (p.ll6b).

75 MVS (p. 8c).

157
156
 76 ibid (p. 662a).
2 · ard was also given to 'the honoured Darstiintikas
.. ( though not to the
9 d'
yibbajyavii ms.
77 ibid (p. 388c).

78 ibid (p. 161 a). 93 Study (p. 31 0 ).

PrS (p. 693a); see infra, Part Three, note 353.

79 MVS (p.l a). 94

ibid (p. 702a); see also infra, Part Three, note 371.
80 Other schools of thought outside the Sarvastivada cited include: the Vibhajyavada, 95
Mahasarpghika, Dhannagupta, Mahlsasaka, Kiisyaplya, Viitslputrlya, Sthaviraviida, etc. The
96 AKB I (p.9-11); IV (pp.4,13,14,17, 26-30,36-38,40, 41).
views of the following individual iiciiryas are also cited: Jlvala, Ghol?a-vam an,
1
K{iemadatta, Viil?pa, Viimalabdha, Smighavasu, Dharadatta, Dharmanandin and Pun:tayasas.
97 E.g.: AKB 1 (p.l O); A vatiira, infra, Part Two, §§ 1.2.2 - 1.2.6.2

81 We also find the appellations; 'the old Abhidharmikas' and 'the old foreign masters'. [n
98 Cf. MVS (p.395a).
this connection, we must bear in mind that the doctrines of the and the western
masters etc., were evolving all the time, and therefore that MVS views and the Vaibhiil?ikas
do not always have the same connotation. See also infra, §XI. 99 Cf. D iii.217; Vibha!iga, pp.13,64. For this controversy, see MVS (p.634c); AKB IV (p.
196).
82 AKB (p.28).
100 MVS (p.383b).
83 MVS (p.368a).
101 ibid, toe. cit.

84 See examples quoted in Study (p.306).

102 ibid (p. 662b).

85 ibid (p. 307).

103 ibid, fas. 127 (p.66lc); fas. 142 (p.730b).

86 AKB 1!1 (p. Ill); Ny (p.475a).

104 AKB I (p.8).

87 MVS (p. 85b).

105 AKB I (p.8).

88 MVS (p. 784b).

106 Ny (p. 335b). Yasomitra (Vyakhya, p.30ff) quotes this objection and refutes it.

89 From Ny (p.457a), we learn that the Sautriintika Sri lata also holds that there are eighteen
107 Ny (p. 335c). The Sanskrit is quoted in Vyakhya (p.32). The Chinese version in
rfipa heavens.
Ny and SPrS) differs slightly in having ("bhautika!upiidiiya in natu_re")- posstbly an
interpretive rendering of Xuan Zang- where the Sanskrit has rilpam. On SPrS
90 MVS (p.87c).
· s·. "The words "bhautika in nature" is not meant for dtsttngtushmg . [the
(p .782 a ) exp Iam .
avijnaptl] from the mahiibhfita; for the mahiibhfita are not apratigha in nature. It only dtstm-
91 Old MVS (p.72c).
guishes from the non-rfipa, to indicate that it is of the nature of riipa, bemg subsumed m the
riipa-skandha among the five skandha."

158
159
 I 08 SPrS (pp. 781 c-782a). !25 Study (p. 164 f).

I 09 ibid, toe. cit.

126 JPS. fas. I (p.920c).

110 Ny (p.335b).
127 See also, Mizuno, p.290.

ill Infra, Part Two, § 1.2. 7. I 128 Sapta-vastuka, Ch.4 ofPrS, also enumerates the caitta in the same manner. DSS (p.500c),
an earlier work than PrS. also discusses the Slll?Jprayukta caitta and the citta-viprayukta-
112 Infra, Part Two, § 1.2. 7.5. samskiira similarity as Pancavastuka ofPrS. Venerable Yin Shun opines that this is due to
the influence of PrS (Study, p.l59 f). K. Mizuno remarks that Avatiira exposition on the
113 MVS (p.581 a). (Cf. also ibid. p. 96a) In contrast, the Vaibhii:?ikas make a distinction caitta represents a return to that found in the canonical Abhidharma texts, rather than an
between cetanii karma and cetayitvii ka1ma (AKB IV, p.192). inheritance of that of MVS and the manuals subsequent to it. (Mizuno, p.308).

114 AKB IV (pp. 196 ff). 129 PrS (p.692b-c. p.699b); Avatiira, Part Two, §4.1

115 ibid (p. 196 f): prcltimok..w-sat?lWtra.l:c£/pi na sycld asatyiimavijiiaptau 1 na hi 130 PrS (pp. 692c-694a); T no.1541 (p.634c); also AmRS (p.970a).
samiidiiniidzirdhvart'l tadasti, yeniinyamanasko 'pya111 bhik,w/1 .1yiit veti 1
131 These two classes are also found elsewhere in PrS (fas. 2, p. 698c); see also infra, Part
116 AKB IV (p. 205). Three, notes 299 and 30 I.

117 Infra, Pa11 Two, 1.2. 7.4- 1.2. 7.4.1 132 PrS (p.694a).

118 The other argument given is one from scriptural authority: The Buddha has spoken of 133 The enumerate fifty-two in AKB. See infra, Part Three, note 417.
the incessant growth of merit of one who performs meritorious acts (see infra, Part Two, § 1.
2.7.3). 134 PrS (p. 702a); AKB (p. 308); infra, Part Three, note 371.

119 Infra, Part Two,§§ 1.2.7.2- 1.2.7.3 135 PrS (p.698c). Van Ve1them firmly believes that this is so (Avatiira(F), p.XVI f).

120 JPS, fas. 12. (pp. 977 ff). 136 Yoshimoto Shingyo, op.cit., pp.854 ff.

121 For example, cf. the Mahiivedalla sutta (M I, 293): ''yii ciivuso vedan[i yii ea saiifiii 137 ibid. (p.859).
yanca vhitiiirwm, ime dhammii samsatthii no vinibhujitvii n{/nii karafJ(//rr. " Cf. also MAg.
211 (T26, p. l9lb) for the Chinese version. 138 DSS (p.492c); SgPS (p.374b-c). See also infra, Part Three, note 341.

122 E.g., Mizuno, p.285, p.287 f( 139 MVS (p.420c and pp. 981c-982a). See also infra, Part Three, note 341.

123 DKS (pp. 614b-c). 140 E.g., p.371.

124 MVS, fas. 42 (p. 220a). 141 AKB li (p.55).

160 161
142 Ny (p.391b); SPrS (p.800a). ]60 In the Yogaciira works around this period (i.e. 4th and 5th centuries); we find twenty-three
in Abhidhannasamuccaya and twenty-four (with the addition of asamagri) in
143 SPrS (p. 800a). See also infra, Part Three, note 341 for the full quotation. no.l614).

J 44 AKB !I (p.54 ). See also infra, Part Three, notes 299, 30 I and 345. !61 ADV (p.85): priiptyiidayastu sa'!lskarii viprayuktiistrayodasa I

145 Cf. Ny (p.391 b); also SPrS (p.800a). See also infra, Part Three, note 341. !62 ADV !I (p. 85).

146 See infra, Part Three, notes 330, 332, 335, 337, 436. 163 Unfortunately this description is interrupted, as the following folio is lost (ADV, p. 87).

14 7 amoha = pmjiiii; Cf. infra, Part Two, §4.5.24 ]64 Corresponding passage in AKB II (p.67 ) reads ' ... asya siistre SIIJ!1jnii'.

148 i.e., the Sarvastivada as comprising not just the mainstream Abhidharmikas- Kasmlrians, 165 T 1 no.548 (p. 528b-c).
Gandharians and other so-called Western and Foreign masters, but also the early
acaryas. 166 Yasomitra explains the doctrinal significance of each of the components (citta-,
viprayukta-, sa111skiira) of the term: cittaviprayukta iti cittagrahaiJam
149 MVS (p. 730b). cittasamanajiitiyapradarsaniirtham, cittam iva cittena ea viprayuktii ityartha., kim ea te$81!1
samiinajatiyatii'!l, yadariipino 'mi bhavanti. riipitviid eva hi viprayuktve'pi riipam na
150 MVS (p. 198b). viprayuktvaniima Jabhate I yad viimi$iim niimariipamiti niimatvam tat te$iim cittena
samiinajiitiyatvam caittii api cittena tulyajiitiyii. te tu cittena sahii/ambane samprayuktii.
151 MVS(p. 730b,p.661c). tadvise$111Jiirtham viprayuktagrahaiJam asa'!lskrtamapi tatsamanajiitiyama I niilambanatveneti
tatparihiiriirtha111 sa'!lskiiragmhiiiJam I (Vyakhya, p. 142). In a similar manner, Sarpghabhadra
152 Cf. MVS (p. 316b). (Ny, p.396c) explains that the three components together uniquely define citta-viprayukta-
sa'!lskiira as a distinct doctrinal category: citta- to signify that like citta, these dharmas are
153 Cf. MVS (p. 97a). not riipa; viprayukta- to signify that the caitta, though also not of the nature of riipa, are to be
excluded as they are sai!Jprayukta; sa111skiira- to signify that the asai!Jsk{ta, though not of the
154 JPS (p. 920c, p. 921c). *Siiriputriibhidharma (T no.1548, p. 528c) already speaks of the nature of riipa and not saJ!1prayukta with citta, are also to be excluded.
dharmiiyatana as being either 'citta-sa'!lprayukta' or 'citta-viprayukta'.
167 Though this category also occurs similarily in DSS (T26, p.500c), one of the earliest
155 JPS (p. 92lc). Sarvastivada canonical Abhidharma texts, it is likely to have been an influence from PrS (See
Study, p. 159f).
156 JPS (p.921 c).
168 In the light of this understanding, the following remark by P.S. Jaini (op. cit. p.94) may
157 JPS (p. 926a-b). not be entirely justifiable, "Thus the category of the citta-viprayukta-saJ!1skiira was not nec-
essarily a invention; it was known as early as the time of the Kathiivatthu and was
158 JPS (p. 929a). accepted by several major and minor schools." Moreover, the citta-vippayutta-dhammas
mentioned in the DhammasailgaQi and the Kathiivatthu do not refer to what the
159 JPS (p. 1008a-b ). Understand as citta-viprayukta-sai!Jskara as such; and the mention of jivitendriya, held by
Pubba-seliyas and Sammitlyas as citta-vippayutta dhamma, was made in Buddhaghosa's corn-

162 163

J
 SKANDHILA"S ABHIDHARMAVATARA

mentary of a period far removed from that of Katyayaniputra's JPS (around 150 B. C.). ]84 AKB 11 (p.92): swvam eva aswrrskrtam adravyam iti I

169 JPS (p.928c). The Sanskrit quoted in AKB 11 (p.66) is as follows: prthagjwratva'!l 185 His arguments amount to one whole fascicle in the Chinese translation.
katamat I iiiJ'mfharmiiJ.uim aliihha iti.
186 For example. see MVS (p.J64b); AKB I (p.4).
170 Avatara (C) (p.986b): "One who is endowed with (samanviigata) these dharmas is said
to "have the dharmas' (dharmavat): the definite cause for this assertion is called priipti. 187 Cf. MVS(p.l64b-c).
ltihha and samanvclgama". Also via negativa {p. 986c): "This aliihha is the synonym for
apntpti." 188 See infra, Part Three n.580, n.58l. n.482.

171 MVS (p. 797a). 189 Infra. Part Three, note 566.

172 ADV (p. 98. n.3). J90 Both the Peking and Derge edn have thos (sic)

173 AKB 11 (p. 73 f). The author of Arthavini.kaya-nihandhana also explains jivitendriya
similarily as "piirvakarmiividdham". See AVN (p. 150).
174 Sakurabe (p. 367).
175 ADV, Introduction, p. 95f.
176 AKB (p. 67); Ny (p. 400b): ADV (p. 90); Avatiira (C) (p. 987b). In the case ofNy, the
two terms are not given explicitly, though the division is evident enough.
177 See also. infra, Part One. Section XI.
191 By that, they become obstructed." This doctrinally important sentence is not
rendered by Sakurabe- Avatara(J), p. 175: .::.ft &[{,• " •L•PJT] let f.., -cf..,*?·
This Tibetan sentence should correspond to the Chinese in Avatiira(C): El3 JJ
192 MVS (p.164c).
193 Doctrinally. the last exemplification need not be considered a contradiction to the
central thesis of.mn•iistitva; for there are rooms for interpretation as regards the two terms,
even among the Sarvastivada Abhidharmikas themselves (for e.g., cf. MVS, p.45a-b). Thus,
Vasurnitra says: " 1 do not categorically say that all dharmas are .Mnya; [but] I categorically
say that all dharmas are aniitman." (ibid, p.45b)

178 Cf. AKB (p. 68). 194 See also, infra. Part Three. note 236.

179 E.g. MVS (p. 42a). 195 MVS (p.217a).

180 See Ny (p.400a-b ), which argues for its reality as a force - a cause whose reality can be 196 ibid (p.405b).
proved from its observable effect.
197 T no.1555 (p.990b).
181 ADV (p. 90). P.S. Jaini, however. seems to think that the Ko8akiira is right in this regard
(see ADV Intr. p. 96). 198 T no.2156 (p.557b).

182 See infra, section on authorship. 199 T no.2087 (p.887c).

183 JPS (p.23b). 200 T no.l554 (p.980b).

164
165

J
 <1'1 KAr.cto JN J U I He SUPREME DOCTRJNE

201 Nanjio, no. 1291, p.284b. 216 This is not found in Avatara(T).

202 Beal, S., Buddhist o{the Western World (London, 1906), Vol. 11, p.l98. 217 See infra, Part Three, note 353.

203 Watters, T, on Yuan Chwang's Travels in India (London, 1904), Vol. I, p.280. 218 See infra, Part Three, note 418.

204 Bagchi, P., Le Canon Bouddhique en Chine, Tome lie, p.492. 219 Cf. infra, Part Three, note 256.

205 Sakurabe (p.361 ). 220 See infra, Part Three, note 3 71.

206 Cf. Velthem (Avatara(F), p.XII) states with no reservation thatAvatclra is a commen- 221 Cf. infra, Part Three, note 333.
tary on PrS, and Xuan Zang here refers to the longer title PrakarwJiihhidharmii1'£1tiira : ..
Skandhila ecrivit sur le Prak<-www un petit commentaire en huit chapitres, 222 T no.2087 (p.881 a).
intitule, au long, Prakara!Jiihhidharmiivat{tra, et en bref, Abhidhanniivatclm."
223 Cf. Stm(v (pp.522 ft).
207 See for instance, the account in Yuan Hui 's commentary (T no.l823, pp.814a-b). The
whole account by Pu Guang has been translated into English by H. Sakurabe (op. cit., pp. 224 For an extensive discussion on these differences, see Watanabe Baiyu, Ulm abidatsuma
362-4). ron no kenkyll (Tokyo, 1954), Section IV, pp.253 ff.

208 H. Sakurabe (pp.365-7). 225 ibid. (p.310).

209 Hirakawa A., A Histmy of Indian Buddhism, En g. tr., Groner, P. (Delhi, 1993), p.136;
Kato J., A Study l?{the Sautrclntika (Japanese) (Tokyo, 1989), p.18; Cox C., Disputed Dharmas
-Early Buddhist Theories on (Tokyo, 1983), p.35; Kritzer, R, 'Cittaviprayukta-
in the Abhidharma and Yogacara', IBK, Vol. 43, No.!, p.516 f; etc.
210 Kato J, op.cit., p.l8 f.
226 Avatiira(T) begins by giving the title in the Sanskrit original aspra ka ra !Jii bhi dha rmii
ha tii ra nii 111a, followed by its Tibetan translation, rab tu byed pa chos 1111ion la 'jug pa ies
bya ha
227 Cf. tathiigatc'idizl'a in AKB (p.478). sans rgyas iii ma in Avatara(T) suggests buddha-
iiditya

211 Cox C., op. cit. (p.l7, n.l9). 228 Avatara(T): lha mi 'i s1iili gi mun pa 1ian smi rtsa.

212 AVN, p.l50. 229 Avatiira(T): gnas ,gyur (cl.vraya-bhlita). Sara (p.l3-2): Why [are they so-called]? Be-
cause they are the support (giir gyur, iidhiim-bhllta ) of the essence of the iigama and
213 See infra, Part Three, note 509.
230 Avatara(T): chos 1111ion tshul.
214 T41 (p.458a).
231 Siira: By lamp (dipa) is meant the abhidharma; for on account of this, the truths are
215 At least in the case ofSarnghabhadra, another critic of the Kosakara, we are inclined to illumined. Cf. MVS (p.67lb): "The Abhidharma is the mirror, lamp's radiance, and light of
this possibility in understanding the close resemblance between Avatiira and Ny and the sutras. What has not been declared in the slitras is herein declared; not revealed, herein
SPrS With regard to some of the doctrinal explanations in these works. See infra, Part One § revealed."
XI.

166 167
 tN,KA!"t'Lt.INIU I Hl:. DOCTRINE
232 Avatiira(T): thub pa 'i dbmi po 'i gsun rah
233 There are three types of parihfi!Ji priipta-, apriipta-, and upabhoga-. AKB (p. 377).
apriipta-parihii!Ji refers to spiritual regression {!loss ) in the sense of not attaining the dis-
tinctive qualities of the attainment concerned (apriipta-parihiiiJityadi priipyaiJ! gii1Jllt'!1 na
priipnoti).
234 In Avatiira, the caitta are enumerated under the three skandha: vedanii, saritjiiii and the
cittasaiJ!prayukta-saiJ!skiira. The early tradition as represented by Buddhadeva
and Dharmatriita, and the later Sautriintika tradition, as a whole, denies the existence of the
caitta as separately existing real entities. For Dharmatriita," the caitta are [but] the subdivi-
sion of cetanii" (MVS, p.8c). For Buddhadeva, "the caitta are none other than citta itself'
(ibid, p.661c; also Ny. p.395a). Ny records the teaching ofthe Sautriintika leader Sriliita
(quoted as "the Sthavira" in Ny), which is but a modification of Dharmatrata's view, as
follows: "There are only three caitta [: vedaml, sar11jiiii, cetana] (Ny, p.388b) and, "The
saiJ!skaraskandha comprises cetanii alone- the samskiim, manaskiira etc., all have cetanii as
their essential nature" (Ny, p. 339b). We learn from Sarpghabhadra that in his time the Bud-
dhist masters were quite divided as regards the number of real caitta- some said there are
none, some three, some four, some ten, and some fourteen (Ny, p.395a) .
The *SatyasiddhHflstra too, apparently inherits Buddhadeva's idea when it says. "vedana,
Salflfiiii and smflskiira etc., are the various names of the citta- thus we know that only the
citta [exists], apart from which there is no caitta." (T32, pp.274c-275a)
235 In all his translations, Xuan Zang consistently renders 'mahiibhiita ' as :;*.:fjl
The older rendering is simply :;*.: .
236 Ny (p.335c): "For what reasons are these Great Elements named Elements? Because
they are the place of origin of all riipadharma. It is also from the Great Elements [themselves]
that the Great Elements are produced. In the world, the places of origin are called dhiitu; as
for instance, the mines of gold etc., are said to be the dhiitu of gold etc. Or, because they are
the place of origin of various types ofunsatisfactoriness they are said to be dhiitu;
example as before. According to some: they are named dhcltll because they sustain (dhr) the
own-characteristics of the Great Elements and secondary matter." See also AKB(F) I (p.21,
n.l).
237 Avatiira(T): khams dag ni ran dan pyi 'i mtshan 'dzin pa ... - would suggest that the
translators understood the compound 'sva-siimiinya 'as a dvanda: sva- siimiinya-/ak.yal}ll·
This is also the rendering in both Avatiira(F) (p.2) and Avatiira(J) (p 129). Siira too proceeds
168
to distinguish between svalak,wna and sclmlinya-laksana, giving as illustration, respectively,
the characteristic of hardness ofprthivl and ani(vatcl of all conditioned dham1as. Nevertheless,
we have not come across other instances where the definition of dhiitll, in the context of
mahabhrlta or dharma, involves the aspect ofsllmiinya-lak;;a,w. Thus AKB l (p.2), for the
definition of dharma, gives: svalakswya-dhiira!Jiid dharma!1. ; also: ete catvclrah
svalaksanopadclyanlpadham!uld dlu/tavai> catvari mahclbhlilLini. (p.l2) As the for Elements
are unique dhannas, the inclusion of in their definitions does not seem to
be appropriate. The post-AKB Ny (p.335c) also does not indicate the existence of such a
usage.The original was likely to have been a compound: S\'a-sclmclnya-lak,wna , which is in
fact consistent with the classification of the three types of of dhanna in Avatclra
(see infra ).
238 tlt!.t'it § ::!J<tfl&?rdi1:1 Xuan Zang's rendering of the corresponding sentence
"svalak,\'([I_!Opadclya-rlrpa -dharma" in AKB(C) (p.3b) is word for word identical except for
the word ;l-!;(sclmclnya).
In this treatise, the characteristics of dharmas are divided into three: specifically-common
characteristic, partially-common characteristic and universally-common characteristic (Part
Two,§§ 1.3, 1.3.1 ). As far as we know, such a classification is unknown in all the other
extant Abhidharma books of the Theraviida and the northern schools.
239 MVS (p.663b): ""Question: Earth is of the characteristics (lak,wna) of both kham and
r!rpa ... Wind is of the characteristics of both irm_ul and rlrpa. How is it that one dharma has
two characteristics? Answer: There is no fault that it does, as by this principle, one may
designate one dharma by numerous characteristics ... Some other masters say: ''There are two
lak,w1w; and sclmc/nya-lak,wJw. khara, sneha, and irwya are the
The riipwya is the siimiinya-lah;ww. These two kinds of laksa1w not being contradictory to
each other, there is no fault in designating a dham1a [by them]."
240 MVS (p.663a) says that the compound 'mahiibluita' should be taken as a karmadhara
swniisa, as in the case of malulhhtlmi, and nwhiinljan etc. They are both malul and bhfita,
hence named mahclbhrlta.
241 This last sentence, potentially very informative in terms of doctrine, is however not
found in Avatiira(T). In the doctrine, all smrskrta dharmas have this capability,
and it is by virtue of this capability, technically called kiiritra, that a SW!lskrta dharma is
distinguishable as being present, as opposed to being past or future (see supra, Introduction)
The Bhadanta (= Dharmatriita) says, "Space though being great, is not blulta in its nature, as
it is non-productive. The other, the sm11skrta dharmas, although capable of being considered
169
j
 tN I KANL-1::. IN J U I Ht:. l)(JC rRINI:.
hhftta, are not great in their nature, as their characteristics are not common [to all material
dharmas]. Thus, Space is not classified as mahahMita" (MVS, p.662b-c). See also Ny (p.
336a).
242 Ny (p.336b): " .... There are only four Great Elements, no more, no less. The
says thus: If less [than four] there will be inaptitude; if more [than four] it will serve no
purpose. Thus, there are only four, like the legs of a couch." MVS (p .. 663a) records the same
explanation, attributed to 'certain masters'.
243 MVS (p.665a) on the differences between the mahiibhrtta and the bhautika: "The
Abhidharmika says: the mahiihhlita are anirdar.i·ana, the bhautika sanirdarsana or
aniradadana. The mahiihhrlta are sapratigha or apratigha. The mahiibhtita are siisrava, the
bhautika siisrava and aniisrava. The mahiibhllta are avyakrta, the bhautika are kusala,
or avyc'ikrta. The mahiihhllta are kiimadhiitu-pratism!i)'Ukta, the bhautika are
kiimculhcltu-pratiswJi)'llkta, riipiulhiitu-pratism?i)'Ukta or apratisaiJi)'llkta. The mahiibhlita are
naiva.l:aiki'Clnii.\:aik:ja, the bhautika are saik,sa, a.i:aik.m, or naiva.\:aik,wnii.l:aik,w. The mahiibhlita
are bhiivaniiheya, the bhautika are bhiivanc'iheya or aheya. The malulbhuta are subsumed
under the duMha- and samudaya-satya. The bhautika are subsumed under the duMha-,
samudaya-, and mclrga-satya. The mahiibhrtta are avipiika, the bhautika are or
The mahiibhftta are not karma, the bhautika are or are not karma. Thus, the characteristics of
the mahZihhiita differ in innumerable ways from those of the bhautika.
244 Avatara(T): 'hyuil ha dag /as 'byuil has na 'hywi ha /as gyur pa- they are bhautika
because they come into existence from the hhrtta.
245 MVS (p.663a) "Question: In what sense [are they] dependent (uplidaya) [on the
mahiibhfita] (mahclhhiitani upcldiiya)? Is it in the sense of [having the mahiihhrtta as] cause
(hetu), or in the sense of [having them as] conditions (pratyaya)? .... Answer: It should be
said thus: it is in the sense of [having them as] cause. Question: These [mahiibhiita], with
regard to the secondary nlpa (upiidiiyanlpa), do not have [the functions of] any of the five
hetu [besides being kiirm:ra-hetu in as much as they do not hinder the arising of the bhautika],
how are they the cause?" Answer: although [the meaning of] any ofthe five hetu, sabhiiga-hetu
etc., are lacking, they are hetu in five other senses: i.e. janana-hetu, ni.1'raya-hetu,
upastamhha-hefll, upahrlflhar;a-hetu." AKB 11 (p.l 02 f) says the same, and
defines each of these five hetu. See also ibid I (p.8).
246 A vatara(T): mig ni mig gi rnam par pa 'i rten Ita bu - "eye is that which is of the
appearance of the basis for visual consciousness".
170
SKANDHILA 'S ABHJDHARMAVATARA
247 For the Sautrantika, only varr;a is real; ,\'CII!lsthiina is a mental fabrication. See note 265
below.
248 The order in our text is: smoke, cloud; but the other Chinese versions reported in the
footnote give cloud, smoke, which is the standard order. Avatara(T) also agrees with the
latter: sprin dai! du ha dwi
249 AKB I (p.6) explains the last eight as being derived from the first four- i.e. the first four
are the primary colours: tatra caturvidho niliidibl tadhhedcl anyel.
250 Certain other masters add to make twenty-one kinds of riipa (AKB, p.6; MYS,
p.64a}.
251 AKB I (p.6) has the same list of examples, but without the last item 'lightning', which
however is found in AKB(C) (p.2c).
252 Avatiira(T) has only: grib ma ni gailna gzugs dag snmi ba'o., corresponding to AKB I
(p.6): chiiyii yatra l'ltpcl!ulm dadanam. Xuan Zang, however, gives the same rendering in
AKB(C) as he does here.
253 Avatara(T): !ham pa ni gru hi:i 'o- A square is that which has four corners (caturasra).
254 According to De La Vallee Poussin, upcltta and anupcltta of AKB have the same mean-
ings as the Pali upiidinna, anupiidinna respectively. He further remarks that there is a confu-
sion regarding the ajjhattika-nlpa and the upiitta-riipa (AKB(F) I (p.63.n I). Professor Y.
Karunadasa (BAM, pp. I 03-107}, however, points out that (i) the meaning given to the term
ltpiidinna by Dhammasailgar;i (p.21 1, p.255) and the Pali commentaries are different; and
(ii) the meanings given by both AKB and Dhammaswigw;i again differ from that given in the
sutta (M.!. pp. 188f, 421 ff etc.). In the sutta, upcldinna-rtipam = (JjjhatfaiJ1 paccattw!l riipalfl;
and upiidinna is further explained as tanh1lpiidinna, as in the main, it is one's own body that
one appropriates with craving. As regards (i) "to sum up the difference: while the
Dhammaswiga!ii uses upcldinna to denote all resultant states of kamma, mental as well as
material, the Kosa uses upiitta to designate those nlpa-dharmas which the mind and the
mind-factors take as their support." (loc. cit.)
There is one ritpa which according to the is anupiitta: the avijnapti-l'llpa; since it
is Without mass (wmlrta) and non-obstructive (apratigha) and therefore cannot be the sup-
Port of citta-caitta. Cf. "avijnaptiramtpiittikli" (AKB IV, p.200).
171
 ENTRANCE JNTO THE SUPREME DOCTRJNE
255 The eight-fold division of sound is also found in MVS (p.64b). According to some: the
sounds produced by the appropriated Great Elements and those by the unappropriated Great
Elements may, in each case, be either agreeable or disagreeable. The same applies to the
sounds produced by sentient (sattviikhyii)- mahiibhrtta and by non-sentient (asattviikhyii) _
mahiibhiita. Thus we get a total of eight kinds of sounds (ibid).
256 AKB I (p.7) gives a four-fold division: good smell, bad smell, even (sama) smell and
uneven (vi,mma) smell. It also mentions this three-fold division as given by PrS (PrS
' 'p.
692c). MVS (p.64c) also says, "Thegandhiiyatana is four-fold: good smell, bad smell, even
smell, uneven smell.:" This is another instance where Skandhila as a Sarvastivada master
differs from the MVS compilers.
The A!thasiilini (p.320) makes a two-fold division of smell: (i) sugandha or irthagandha, (ii)
duggandha or ani!!hagandha.
257 These seven are also known as the or secondary tangibles. There
are altogether eleven kinds in the Sarvastivada school (see AKB I, p.7), the
other four being the Great Elements known as the bhiita-spra.Jtavya. Bhadanta Dharmatrata,
however, while recognizing the separate existence of the bhautika apart from the malulbhtita,
denies the reality of the bhautika-spra:j(avya and the dharmiiyatana-riipa. (MVS, p.662b)
Note that although the seven spra$(avya are enumerated as "part of the spra:j(avya", the four
mahabhzlta are not enumerated with these but listed separately. In this respect, it
is similar to PaficaskandhaprakaraiJa (p.l) which also enumerates the four mahiibhzlta sepa-
rately, and before the enumeration of the eleven upiidiiya-rzlpa (also Cf. IAKB, p.xix)
The Theraviida school recognises no secondary tangibles, and enumerates only threephottabba:
namely the four mahiibhiita excluding apo-dhiitu which is considered not capable of being
touched. Cf. Compendium (p.ll5, n.6 ).
258 See same explanation in AKB I (p.7).
259 Thus, these three tangibles designated as coldness, hunger and thirst are not mere sensa-
tions, but real dharmas which are able to cause the sensations. See also n.263 below
260 Cf. Dhammapada 194: sukho buddhiinam uppcldo
261 These explanations are essentially identical with those given in AKB 1 (p.7): .Hak:p;atvalJl
mrdutcl/ karka.fatVCif!l gurutvaf!1 yena bhllviis tulyante/laghutvaf!l viparyayiit/ sitartl
172
jighatsii bhojaniibhiW,wkrtl(pipiisii kiiraiJe kiiryopacariitl
yathii
"buddhiinclf!1 sukhautpadah sz1khii dharma;ya deiwnal. .. " iti
262 Avatiira(T): !;as che (According to Derge edn, p.l54)
263 MVS (p.665a) gives the same explanations for these seven secondary tangibles. It then
continues, "Question: From the predominance of what is there smoothness etc., up to thirst?
some say: smoothness etc., [in each case,] is not due to the one-sided predominance of [any]
mahclbhiita. It is only owing to the mahiiblulta being of different nature that there is pro-
duced the effect of smoothness etc., up to thirst. Other masters say: From the predominance
of Water and Fire, there is smoothness. From the predominance of Earth and Wind, there is
coarseness. From the predominance of Fire and Wind, there is lightness. From the predomi-
nance of Earth and Water there is heaviness ... From the predominance of Water and Wind,
there is coldness. From the predominance of Wind, there is hunger- because of the predomi-
nance of Wind, there is agitation causing the dissipation offood, inducing the hunger-tangible;
the desire for food is thus produced. From the predominance of Fire, there is thirst- because
of the predominance of Fire, there is oppression from heating up, causing the dissipation of
what has been drunk, and inducing the thirst-tangible; the desire for drink is thus produced"
But while MVS does not comment clearly which of the two views- predominance of substance,
predominance of effect- represents the orthodox Vaibhii(lika standpoint, Sal)1ghabhadra (Ny.
p.355b) criticizes the Kosakiira for giving the latter view as the view. According
to Sal)1ghabhadra, the orthodox view is that of predominance of substance.
264 Avatara (T): gian la rig par byed pa
265 In the beginning part of AKB IV, (see also AKB(F) IV, p.3.n.2; p.4 ff), there is dispute
among the Siimmitlyas and the Sautrantikas as to what constitutes the
kiiyavijiiapti. For the Siimmitlyas, it is movement (gati). The argue against this
on the ground that all saf!1skrta dharmas being k.yal}ika, motion is unreal. They establish
instead, the saf!lsthiina-riipa, i.e. the particular disposition of the body when certain
kiiyavijfiapti karma is being performed. This in turn is refuted by the Sautriintikas who ac-
knowledge the reality ofvariJa-riipa alone, and not that of.w.tf!1.slhiina-riipa which is regarded
as a prajfiapti. For the Sautriintikas, the underlining substance of the corporeal and vocal
vl}fiapti karma, as much as that of the mental karma, is nothing but the caitta named cetaml.
Cf. Introduction for more detail.
In Avatara, 'vijfiapti' stands for both 'vijiiapti-nlpa' and 'vijfiapti-karma'. 'Avijiiapti' stands
for both 'avijiiapti-nlpa' and 'avijiiapti-karma'.
173
266 Avatclra(T): de 'i mtshan iiid ni rnam par rig byed dan sems dmi 'byun ba chen po 'i bye
brag gis 'phans pal rnam par ma gye1is pa dan! de ma yin pa 'i sems dan sems med pa yan 1111i
stel gan dge ba dan midge ba 'i gzugs kyi rgyun
Sal]lghabhadra's definition in Ny (p.335b): "The avijiiapti is that non-obstructive whole-
some or unwholesome matter which arises in dependence on a specific corporeal or vocal
karma, and on a specific wholesome or unwholesome citta etc." Sal]lghabhadra criticizes
Vasubandhu's definition and explanations on avijiiapti. See also supra, Introduction, §Vl.
Cf. AKB I {p.8): yo 'nubandhaiJ !mbha.\·ubhal] mahctbhfltc"inyupcldiiya, sa
hyavijiiaptirucyate. Also Cf. PSP (p.3 ): vijiiaptisamiidhisambhiitar11 riipam anirdadana/!1
apratigham
A vik,1·ipta citta is one which is different in nature from that which induces the avijiiapti.
AKB I (p.8): tadanyacittasyiipi. Ny (p.335a): "By vik,vipta citta is meant
the ak1dala and avyiikrta-citta; the other citta are avik,1·ipta". The acittaka states refer to the
states of meditation known as the asamjiiisamc/patti and nirodhasamclpatti (AKB I. p.8)
267 Cf. Madhyamclgama 7 (TI, pp.427c-428b) and Ekottarclgama 40.7 (T2, p.74lb-c). The
quote this Mahc/cunda-s!itra as one of their proofs for the existence of the
avijiiapti: vrddhirapi coktii, "ebhib saptabhir aupadhikaiiJ pur;yakriyavastubhiiJ
samanvclgata.\ya kulaputrasya kuladuhiturvii, carato vel svapato vc/ vii
jclgrato vel, satatasamitam abhivardhata eva pur;yam upajiiyata eva pur;yam. evam
niraupadhikair" iti. na cclv(jiiaptimantarer;iinyamanaso'pi pur;yll.lyabhivrddhiryujyate, (AKB
IV, p.l96).
'Upadhi' refers to the material gifts offered to the sal]lgha. The merit issuing therefrom is
called 'aupadhika pu(Jya'. The niraupadhika punya consists in the devotee's wholesome joy
which he experiences in the presence of the Buddha or His sravaka, or in listening to them.
See also the more extensive citation of the Mahiicunda-szitra in AKB(F) (p.l5, n.l ).
268 AKB IV (p.207) gives four synonyms for priitimok:;a: Hla, sucarita, karma, smrtvara.
Only the first vljiiapti and avijiiapti receive the name (and 'fundamental
karmapatha'), however, because only the vijiiapti and av!jiiapti at the first moment of mak-
ing the ordination vows are efficacious in rejecting the various transgression (prcltimok,var;a).
"In the moments which follow, [up to the time of its relinquishment] it is
saqJVara only, not subsequent (pr,1·tlwr!1) [actions], not fundamental karmapatha"
(ibid).
174
z69 The is the .Wa in the ktlnwdhlitu; the dhyclnasaf!tvara is the .Wa in
the riipadhcltu; and the aniisravasai!1Vara is the anclsrava si'la (AKB IV, p.205).
Av(i1iapti may be found in the kamadhiitu and the nipadhatu, but not the iinipyadhatrt where
the mahiibhzita from which the m•ijiiapti is derived is lacking (AKB IV, p. 201 ). The explana-
tion for the absence of avljiiapti-nipa in the arripyadluitu is as follows: "It is in order to
counteract the daul].fi(va that .l:ila (= samvara = avijiiapti) exists
Now belongs [only] to the kclmadhiitu; and the linipyadhiitu is far removed (diira)
from the kc/madhiitu by the four distances (dziraui): cl.i:raya, prakclra, c7lambana, pratipak,w"
(ibid).
Sal]lghabhadra (Ny, p.545b-c) criticizes Vasubandhu for the latter's statement: "anipye:;u
niisti, bh!itclbhiivclt saying that this explanation can exclude the siisrava avijiiapti; but not the
aniisrava av!Jiiapti, which being aniisrava and thus apratisar!lyukta, may be derived from
the mahclbhzita of another dhaw. He offers his own explanation thus:
"[The avijiiapti] is definitely not found in the ariipyadhatu, as in the clnipyadhc/tu there is the
suppression of the ideation of nipa (vigatanlpasanljiicltviit). It is by the aversion for all n1pa
that one enters into the arllpyasanulpatti There-
fore, in that samiipatti, nipa cannot be produced. (Cf also AKB IV, p.201) Or, [one may also
explain it thus:] It is only where corporeal and vocal [karma] operate, that corporeal and
vocal restraints (sw!Jvara) exist.
270 MVS (section on karma, p.607a-b) gives a very similar list of twelve, the last one of
which, vc/gurika is alone left in its transliterated form This suggests the ambiguity
of the Sanskrit term. In the explanation of each of the twelve items, it says, "There is a type of
tiryak named vcigura, belonging to the species of pythons, which swallows up merchants in
the wilderness. Some people professionally kill these vagura and earn their living by charg-
ing the merchants for the job. These professionals are called vagurika. Some say that by
wlgura is meant traps; those who set up traps to catch sentient beings for their living are
called viigurilw. Some say: the hunters are called vclgurika. There is, for instance, a giithii
which goes like this:
'When the deer have got out of the suffering of the viigurika,
They would never again re-enter the vagura.
When the wise have discarded worldliness to go forth,
They would never return to the oppression of dul]kha' ."
271 A person with samvara (samvarastha) may, however, produce an akusala avijiiapti
When a momentum of defilement persists in him. Likewise, one with asaf!!vara
175
J
 '" ' ' J v I I If: .:lLTKt:i't-1l:. LJUL lKJ:\t:
(a.\W?Jvarastha) may produce a kll.l'ala avijliapti when a momentum of religious conviction
(prasiida-vega} persists in him (AKB IV, p.21 0).
272 i.e. There are vijiiapti and avij1iapti for both the asa111Vara and the
nuii'USW!1Wiranclsaqn•ara. The latter comprises tl1e ku.\:ala and aku.l:ala karma other than the
samvara and the asamvara.
The naivasamvara-niisw!Jvara l'ijliapti, however, does not necessarily give rise to avijiiapti.
In the case it does- when the samurthclna-citta is a strong volition (tfvra-cetand} the avijiiapti
is either ku.\:ala, produced by an act of abstention; or produced by an evil act of
killing etc. If a feeble cetana (mrdu-cetanii} produces a vijiiapri whether ku.\·ala, akusula or
avyiikrta, there is no aFijiiapti except when the vijiiapti is an aupiidhikap11!1Yakriyii-vastu or
a karmapatha (AKB IV, p.2ll ). AKB IV (p.21 0): yo naivaSW!JVare nasamvare sthitai1 sa
madhyastlwh I tasya niiva.\yam avijliaptirasti lvasya tvasti, ...1
273 Avatara(T) here has: khu tshur dmi thcil lcag- punching and slapping
274 This additional qualification on the nature of avij1!apti is noteworthy. See supra Intro-
duction § VI.
275 AKB IV (p.2ll ): The priitimok$a-samvara is acquired by paravijiiiipuna.: information
of others and information by others. The 'para' may be either the samgha- in the case of
bhiksu-, bhiksunf- and .\:ikmmii1ul- SCII!1Vara; or a pll{/gala- in the case of the other five types
of SW?n•ara.
For the ten types of upasw!1pad according to the Sarvastivada, see ibid; AKB(F) IV (p.60f et
notes).
276 MVS (p.608c) gives the same four conditions. !t further tells us: "the Vinayadhara
assert that the time of the disappearance of the Dharma constitutes the 5th condition: At the
time of the disappearance of the Dharma, all the .iiksii. pravrajyd, upaSW!lpad, sfnulbandha,
and karma-wlcana completely cease. Therefore the sw?n•ara are also relinquished at that
moment" The MVS compilers, while not straight-forwardly rejecting this last condition, of-
fer their own interpretation on it. According to Pu Guang (T 41, p.235c), this condition is held
by the Dhannagupta. It is to be noted that this same condition is also enumerated as the 5th in
*Ahhidlwnnahrdaya (T No. 1550, p.814a): I. Giving up ofthe training, 2 trangression of
Hla, 3 death, 4 when false views predominate, 5 when the Dharma vanishes. We may assume
that this condition is one well recognized by the Gandharian/ Foreign (bahirde/wka)
Sarvasti vada masters.
176
277 AKB JV (p.222): By the relinquishment of one's nikiirasabl!iiga:
278 AKB IV (p.211 ): The dhyclnasamvara is acquired when one acquires the sc/srava citta
of the four maula and siimantaka dhyiina of the fine-material plane. The am/sravasamvara is
acquired with the same dhyana when the citta is aniisram (i.e. fom1ing part of the path, AKB
IV, P.205). The aniisrava citta exists in the following six bhfimi: the four dhyiina, the
dhyclnclntara and the aniigamya (see Part Two, 4.5x.9)
According to the Sarvastivada, aku.\:ala dharmas are found in the k£/madlultu only. But the
asserts that all the three types- ku.\:a/a, aku.iala, avyclkrta- are found in all the
three dhc/tu (MVS, p744b)
279 The dhyiinasamvara and amlsravasGI!JVara are both born ofsamiidhi {samadhija- AKB
IV, p.200) and are said to be mental co-existents (citfllnuvartin - AKB IV, p.208). The
is not a mental co-existent. because it persists in the aku.l:ala and avyakrta
citta as well as in the acittaka state, though the original citta of the person who took the
vows was, necessarily, ku.\:ala (AKB I, p.8). See also supra Pm1 Two,§ 1.2.7.4.1.
1, 1.2.7.4.1.2, 1.2.7.4.1.3
280 AKB IV (p.225) gives only the first three conditions: a.WIJ1Varab
sa1!1Va1·dptimrtyudvi1yaiijanodayai(1.
MVS (p.608c) divides saf!Jl'(ll'ctpti into two, and thus gives four conditions: (i) under1aking
the priitimok..msm?!ll(lra; (ii) acquisition of dhyiinasaq1vara; (iii) dvi1yalijanodaya; (iv) relin-
quishment of one's nikayasablulga.
281 Cf. AKB(C) VIII (p.l52a); AKB VIII (p.459); MVS (p.779b). The term
dharmatclprcltilambhikaSila is used generally in contrast to the samt'idclnaS!Ia which is ac-
quired by making a commitment to the abstention from certain actions as in the case of the
See also AKB(F) IV (p.49, n 3); VIII (p.217, n.2).
282 Cf. AKB IV {p.222) :" I will not eat before paying homage to the Buddha", etc.
283 The prasiida nlpa which constitutes the first five sensory organs in the proper sense, is
also cognizable by thought only. It is transparent (accha), non-obstructive, and not percep-
tible by the first five senses (atindriya) (AKB I, p.33.)
284 For these three Avatara(T) gives: rail gi spyi, phyogs kyi spyi, and zad par gyi
spyi. The corresponding Sanskrit could be sva-siimiinya, pradda-siimiinya, and krtsna-
177
J
si.imiinya (zad par translates krtsna). This three-fold classification of dharma-lakya!w is in
contrast to the usual two-fold one into sva-lak,w!Ja and siimi.inya-lak,w!w. See supra Intro-
duction§ X.
285 lt is noteworthy that ·l·gj in Xuan Zang's rendering connotes an aspect of mental affliction,
while Avatara(T) here hasgiig par 'gyur ha (subject to decay). For the explanation of ritpaiJya
(in cl:iraya-hhiita-ritpm:uit(nlpa!l)'mn)), Mvy 2084 gives gzugs su yod pa, and giig su run ha;
for that of nlpa(ui (in .1par!ia-ritpa1Jcl), Mvy 7546 gives gzugs su run pa.
286 In AKB(C), Xuan Zang renders nlpa!Jal rilpayati by both 'l"iii and which makes it
difficult for us to be certain about their Sanskrit original in this sentence. However, judging
by the fact that in the sutra quotation that follows immediately, he renders nlpyate by ?? , it
seems likely that here too the term translates -.Jnip. It is therefore possible that Xuan Zang
uses both terms here to translate nlpaiJa. This becomes all the more likely since Avatara(T)
here has simply gzugs su run has na gzugs ies hya, which most probably translates "riipyata
iti rfipa ",since immediately following this,gzugs Slll111i has translateS the SUtra line "rlipyata
iti..." See also the preceding note. The only Sanskrit corresponding to the second term in
AKB(C) is bcldhana ..
287 The sutra is quoted in the AKB I (p.9) as follows: uktm11 hlwgavati.i "nlpyate riipyata iti
ityucyate I kena nlpyate I pii!Jispar.Senclpi spr$!0
nipyata" iti vista raJ; I Cf. Chinese Smnl'ltktagama (T2, p.\1)
The Pali version in S. Ill, 86, is : ruppatiti kho hhikkhave tasma nipa111 ti vuccati I kena
ruppati I siten a siril!lSapasampassena mppati I
288 Avatara(T): tshor bar gyur pa 'i don (sa111Veditam ), which agrees with the
definition in ADV (See following note). This suggests that the original here may simply be
saqweditam corresponding to ®:t.f1, the additional characters being explanatory.
289 We find an almost identical description of vedani.i in ADV !I (p.69): vedanii
sukhcldistrividho 'nubhaval; I trividhaf!! Saf!!veditamiti pmyiiyal; I i$!iini.:;tobhayaviparita-
dharmayonil; kiiyacittiivasthaviSe,wb prahliidyupatapi
taduhhayaviparfta.ka I forms. It is of three kinds: small ideation, big ideation, immeasurable ideation." See also the
290 The pleasant mental sensation in the third dhyiina alone is given the name sukhendriya,
because, unlike those in the kc/madhiitu and the first two dhyiina, it is free from the attach-
ment to priti (priti-vitariigatvi.it), being calm and serene (AKB 11, p.4l ).
178
291 This could be an allusion to the indriya-ko!w-sthi.ina, chapter 11 of AKB. If so. this would
be an important evidence that this work is post-AKB. However, the corresponding line is
missing in Avatara(T).
292 Whereas Xuan Zang uses the same two characters in what we have rendered as irlrO
'comprehends by conceptually combining', Avatiira(T) has brda ses pa (saJ?!-..J;iili) and gcigs
pa (ekajiicl), respectively. Scira explains brda as gcig tu bsdus pa 'i gnas. Avatiira(T)
also differs in mentioning SW!Ijiici as the cause of only vitarka : rnam par rtog pa 'i rgyu
Cf. The very close definition in ADV 11 (p.69): nimittaniinuirthaikyajiiii swniiicl vitarkayonih
1 Also Cf. AKB I (p.l 0):
nimitlodgraha!Jam asau sar!l}iiiiskandhal;.
VKS cited in Nyciyahinduplirvapak.w.I"W!1Hepa (see AKB(F) I, p.28, n.l) says that the visual
consciousness only perceives the blue (nilw!l}clmiti) but does not know: "This is blue" (no tu
nilaf!! iti). In other words, whereas vijiii.ina (= citta = manas) represents pure perception,
sai?Jjiici represents definite ideation (Cf. Stcherbatsky, Central Conception of" Buddhism, p.
16). See also following notes.
293 Detennination presupposes a proper investigation and understanding which is why our
text calls ideation the cause ofvitarkiJ and vici.ira. Cf. Ny (p.384b): "That which causes the
determination and grasping of the diverse forms (nimitta) of male, female etc., is named ide-
ation."
Siddhi(C) ( p.\1 c) also says, "'Ideation has, with regard to the objects; the grasping of forms as
its nature, and the designating of diverse manners of speech as its function. 1t is only after the
determination of the particular characteristics of the objects that there arise the diverse man-
ners of speech."
294 i.e. Ideation produced by visual contact, ... ideation produced by mental contact.
295 Cf. The Tibetan version of the PaiicaskandhaprakaraiJa (PSP. p.3 23, 24 ): saf!!)iiii katamii?
I scl trividha: parittcl mahadgatii apramiinii ea I (Last line not found
in the Chinese version). See also PrS (p.693a): "Ideation has the nature of the grasping of
following note.
296 This last classification according to the dhiitu is absent in Avatara(T).
Cf. As m, p.5: parittci SW?ljJic/ katamci I yathii kcimadhcltlll!l smrrjiinati 11 mahadgatii SW!l}lici
179

katanul I yathil nlpadhiit11m sal!1.fiinclti 11 apramii!1CISC/1!1}1icl katamii I yatha
vijiiiin{inan(FiiyatanC/1!1 SCIIJ1jclniiti 11 akiiicanasmJ1jiill katama I yatha
clkiiicanyiiyatanam SW17jtlniiti 11
297 These eight caitta together with vedaml and samjiW, form the ten mahiihhiimika of the
The order of enumeration in our text differs from that in AKB ll (p.54); and is
the same as that in MVS (p.220a). lt is also the same as that in PrS (p.698b) and DKS (p.
614b ), except for the interchange between chanda and manaskclra.
298 Other good renderings may include: pliancy, aptitude. etc. We have opted for 'calm' as
this word seem to better reflect both the Chinese which conveys the sense of lightness
and calm -and the Sanskrit.
299 These ten caitta - .l:raddhcl, vlt:va, hri, apatulpya, apramiida, pra.l:rahdhi, avihii!JS{i,
upek,wl, prclmodya (?)and nirveda (?)- appear to correspond to the ten kll.l-ala-mahiihhrlmika
in AKB 11 {p.55), with, however, alobha and adv9a replaced here by prlimodya and nirveda.
The order of enumeration in MVS (p.220b) and PrS (698c) is: .iraddht/, vi(va. hri, apatriipa,
alobha, adve,w, apramiida, avihimsii.
300 The list in Avatara(T) lacks iisraddhya and and lists pramclda after apramiida.
The m:vakrta-nulla are also not enumerated here, though they occur in the definitions on the
caitta that follow. See supra, Introductions VII.
30 I AKB II {p.62) : paiiciibhifJ
For the various meanings ofsw.nprayoga given by the Sarvastivada masters and others, see
MVS (pp. 79c-81 b, 270a-b ), etc.
"The Venerable Vasumitra says: means mutually giving rise to each other. Ques-
tion: If so, are the cak,wvijiliina and manovijiiiina, which also mutually give rise to each
other, SW!Jprayukta? Answer: [No, because] they differ in their They are saf!Jprayukta
only if they have the same and mutually give rise to each other ... The Bhadanta
[Dharmatrata] says: The meaning ofsal!lprayoga is companionship or association. The vijiiiina
and the caitta are .l'm!lprayukta only if they mutually accommodate each other, eo-arise, and
take the same object. The Venerable one says: The meaning of.wf!Jprayoga is the
sameness [with regard to] iilambana, iikiira and kriyii. Why? Because the .wf!Jskrta
dharmas are by nature feeble; they are capable of giving rise to an effect only by their mutual
support of strength. There has not been any case where a mahiihhrlmika-dharma produces an
effect all by itself.." (ibid, p.81a-b)
180
SKANDHILA·s ABHIDHARMAVATARA
In spite of this questionable attribution (Cf. Study, pp.255ff) of the meaning of 'companion-
ship' to Dharmatrata, he in reality, together with other Darstantikas, asserts that the cifla-caitta
arise successively, and not simultaneously, like a group of merchants who pass through a
narrow road one by one (ibid. pp. 79c, 270a, 493c, 745a, etc.,). For them. samprayoga means
not simultaneous association but the association or 'companionship' of two mental dharmas
one immediately following the other without anything else in between the successive pro-
ductions of the two. No explanation by Buddhadeva, who is also one of the 'Four great
Abhidharma masters of the Sarvastivada' is given here, as according to him, the caitta are
none other than citta itself. (MVS, 66 I c; See also supra, n.234 ).
As to whether a citta can be conjoined with another citta, the Vaibhasika answers in the
negative: "A citta may be conjoined with the caitta; the caitta may also be conjoined with
[other] caitta; the caitta again may be conjoined with a citta. There can be no conjunction
(saq1prayoga) between one citta and another. as no two citta eo-arise within one [and the
same] person" (ibid. 79c, 270a)
Of the five conditions for SW!lprayoga, the Yogacara omits the last one in their definition of
the term (see, e.g. Siddhi(C), fas. 3). See also the following note.
302 Thus, the caitta vedanii may be either a pleasurable, unpleasurable or neutral one; but
there cannot be more than one vedancl at a time conjoined with the citta. (Cf. AKB 11, p.62)
MVS {p.80b-c) "Question: What is the meaning ofsm!Jprayoga? Answer: san1prayoga means
samatii. Question : The caitta may be more or less : There are more citta, less
citta; more citta, less nivrtci1:viikrta cilia; more nivrtiilyiikrta citta, less anivrravvtikrta
citta; more kiimadlultu citta, less rftpadlultu citta; more nlpadlult11 citta, less iinlpyadhcitu
citta; more siisrava citta, less anclsrava citta. -How then can the meaning of saq1prayoga be
samata? Answer: It is samatii in the sense of sameness of substance (dravya-samatcl). If, in
a citta, there are two vedanii, one salfljiia etc., it cannot be called samata. But in a citta, there
is [conjoined only] one vedanii, one swnjiiii; likewise for the other caitta, [cetanii etc.]. There-
fore we say sal!lprayoga means samata."
303 Cf. AKB 11 (p.62): ime samskarii na cittena samprayuktii, naca riipasvabhiivii iti
cittavipmyuktii ucyante. However, it would seem that at an earlier stage before the full-
fletched development of the citta-viprayukta-saf!Jskiira, the term 'citta-viprayukta' had had a
broader connotation- See n.472 below.
304 Cf. S iii 142.
181
 ENTRANCE INTO THE SUPREME DOCTRINE
305 Avatara(T): sem kun tu gvo ·; ies bya ha 'i don gail yin pa 'o. Cf Siddhi (T) (p.l8): sems
pa ni sems m lion par 'du b_ved pa yid gyo bar hyed paste I gail yod na khah !oil gi dban gis
fcags gyo ha biin du dmigs pa la sems gyo har hyed pa 'o. Siddhi (S): cetana cittiihhisw?lskiiro
manasa.l:ce.$rii yayiim satyiimiilamhanaf!l prati cetasa/J prasyanda iva bhavati
ayaskiintava.l:iidayaiJ prasyandavat I. Comparing 'gyo' in Avatara(T) with both Siddhi (T)
and Siddhi (S) clearly suggests that the 'kun tu gyo' here corresponding to Xuan Zang's
rendering as m!WJ , corresponds to prasyanda. Contra Avatilra(F) (p.l5 et n.7).
Sarpghabhadra's definition in Ny (p.384b) bears resemblance to those in both Avatiira and
Siddhi(S): "Cetanii is that which causes citta to do ku.\·ala, akzt.l:ala and avyiikrta [karma],
resulting in good, bad and neutral [vipclka]. On account of the existence of cetanii, thought
has the activity of moving forth (fflbfPt'l) with regard to the object. It is like a magnet,
owing to the force of which, iron can move forth."
Cf. AKB I1 (p.54): cetanii cittiibhism,nskiiro manaskarma. Cf. also Ny (p.384b). Also Cf.
Dhammapala' s definition : citta-payoga, citta-kiriyii, iiyfihananti attho. yathiihi
kiiya-vaci-payoga viiHiatta, evam citta-payoga cetanii (Pm, p. 592).
306 Cf. ADV 11 (p.69) : vi,\'(/yendriyavUiiiinasannipiitajcl cittasya
caitasikadharmojivana/aksaiJab spar.l:al}.
In the perceptual process, spada represents the stage where there just begins to be some
content of the awareness of the percept. lt is the first contact of the mind with the object. But
it is not yet definite perception which is represented by saf!ljiicl (See supra, note 68).
For the Sautrantika, spada is not an independent entity, but merely a designation for the
coming-together of the sensory faculty (indr(va), the object (vi,wya, artha), and the con-
sciousness induced (vijiiiina). They support their contention with the following quotation
from the siitra (AKB Ill, p.l43) : "'iti ya triiyiiniil?l dharmci!Jiif!l saf!!gatih saf!!nip{ttab
samavclyab m spadaiJ." But the argues that it is a real, distinct dharma born of
the coming together of the three (triiyclnii1.n saf!inipiitiijjiitii indriyiirthavijiiiiniiniim), saying
that the siitra quoted by the Sautrantika above is a different version from that in their own
Canon (ibid). Our text explains the Sarvastivada position further: spariw is at the same time
that which enables the mind to come into contact with the object.
Besides the Sarvastivada, the Theravada Vism, xiv, 134) and the Yogacara (e.
g. Siddhi, fas. 3 p.ll b; it also says, as does our text, that sparsa enables the citta-caitta to
contact the objects) too, hold sparsa to be a distinct -though of course unreal from the
Yogacara viewpoint - dharma born of the coming together of the three.
182
SKANDHILA'S ABHIDHARMAVATARA
We find a similar argument in M VS (p. 983c-984 ): "There are some who hold that the caitta
are none other than citta itself. There are others who assert that sparsa is none other than the
[coming-together of] indriya. vi,mya, and vijiiiina. To refute their opinions. we show that the
caitta are not the citta. There is a separate drm:va of the which is conjoined with the
citta .
"Question: The .1pada conjoined with the [first] five sensory consciousnesses arises from the
indriya. visaya and vijiiclna [which equally exist] in the present: It is said to be a 'spada
(born of] the coming-together of the three- this is admissible. [But in the case of] the sparsa
conjoined with manovljiiiina, the indriya is past, the vi.$aya may be [present, past orl future,
the vijiiiina is present" how can it be said to be a spada (born of] the coming-together ?
Answer: There are two kinds of coming-together: (i) coming-together in the sense of eo-arising
and mutually not separated from each other; (ii) coming-together in the sense of not mutually
contradictory, and co-operating in achieving one and the same thing ... This is why the Ven-
erable [explains 'coming-together' in the latter sense]" (See also MVS, p.760a-b;
AKB. loc.cit.)
Our text states further that spai'Sa has the characteristic of enlivening the caitta. This descrip-
tion is also found in the ADV (p.69) whose definition agrees most closely with that of our
text: vi,\'(/yendriyavijii(/na sannipiitajii cittasya caitasikadharmo jfvanalak.$GIJab
307 Van Velthem 's rendering as "retribution en sensation agn?ables"
(Avatara (F), p.l5) is misleading. For the it should mean a sparsa "conjoined
with sukha-vedanii", for it is in respect of samprayuktatva that sukhavedaniya-spada.
duiJkhavedaniya-spar!ia and adul}kha-asukha-vedaniya-.1par.\:a are established." (MVS, p.
760c). See also AKB 11 (p.45}: sukhasamprayuktalj spar.i-ab sukhavedaniyaiJ.
308 Cf. Avatara(T): 'di ies bya ha bya 'o siiam pa gaillas bywi ba
309 Cf. ADV (p.69): chandaiJ kartuMmatii vity{ingahhfitab /Siddhi(C) (fas.5, p.28a): "What
is chanda? It has as its nature, the aspiration for a desired object; and it serves as the basis for
vf1ya."
310 Corresponding to ·teN' , Avatara(T) has sems pa (sic; sems 'dzin pa ?); but here, this (if
not a textual corruption) can hardly be the usual rendering forcetanii. The Chinese term most
Probably corresponds to samanviihara (Cf. SJD, p.l413 -notably the two renderings: 'I:Q:;fr: ,
) in ADV (and also possibly avadhiirYIIJU in Siddhi(S) or dhiira1Jalavadhiira1Ja in Asm/
183
 l::.r\ I.KA:\lLl:.- 1!\.J U I HL :::,L 1-"KI::::.:\1l::. UUll KJ:\:1.:
1
Yyakhya)- see following note. Contra Avatiira(F) (p.15) which gives anusmara1111.
311 Cf. ADV (p. 90) : manusklirah
Also Yyakhya (p.l27f): cetasa clbhoga iti. Mamhane cetasa clvmjanam.
avadlu/ra!W/11 iry art/wiz. Siddhi(S) gives a similar definition, with an elaboration on
avadhiira!1CI- directing citta again and again on the same object:
I ahhuicmamiihhogah I iilambane yena cittamahhimukhlkrivate I sa prmariilamhane citta-
dhiiranakarmcl I cittadhclrunam punasratrail'{t/amhane pwwh plma.fcitrw:vclvarjanam ... Asrn
(p.6): mwwsHirah katwnah I cetasa lihhogah I ctlamhanacittadhclrwyakarmakah I
lt may be noted that* Ahhidharma-hrdaya-vy<ikhycl (T no.l552, p.881 a) renders the term as
, defined as "the alerting of awareness/realization with regard to an object
When the mind is alerted to an object, there arises in the mind a familiar image (of a previ-
ously experienced object) which matches this object. This is the alerting of the mind.
312 This three-fold division is also given by PrS (p.693b)
313 i.e. The four plwla-pratipannaka of stream-entry (smta-llpatti), once-returnership
(sakrdligiimin) non-returnership (aniigiimin) and arhatship. and the corresponding phala ex-
cluding the ar!wt-phala.
314 Avatara(T): m os pa ni sems .vu! rnams la mos paste yu! la ma zum pa zes hya ha 'i don
gw1 yin pa 'o. The mere repetition of m os pa (the first corresponding to adhimok,w; the sec-
ond possibly adhimukti- as in AKB and ADV). unfortunately, does not help at all!
Cf. ADV (p.90) cittasya visaye 'dhimuktiradhimokso ruci-dl'itiviinilma cittasya
vi.yayclpratism!lkocalak:sana!l. AKB 11 (p.54) has only: adhimok,w 'dhimukti. But AKB (C) 11
(p.19a) reads: '"adhimukti is the affirmation with regard to an object
the same as the first part of the definition given in our text. This, however, may be another
instance of Xuan Zang' s tendency to supply additional explanations in his translation.
Yyakhya (p.l28) : adhimuktis tadcllamhunasya gunato 'vadlulranam rucir iti anye I
yathiinikayaJ!l yogiia/ra-cittllh.
PSP(C) (ii.f&;f;$ ) : :T.:1PJ ltiffiJIP
quoted by Yasomitra (Vyiikhya p.309) reads :
tathaivadhlirm;am. -which shows clearly that in Xuan Zang's translation, corresponds to
avadhclra1w (even if avadhclral}a in other cases may not be always rendered by him by the
same Chinese characters).
184
The commentary (JWlii.fiMfiilii, p.851c) on the PSP(C) says: "What is adhimokya? It is the
affirmation with regard to an ascertained object (ni.\:cite vi.yaye) as it is cognised. '[With
1 regard to] the ascertained object' means with regard to the five skandha etc.: In accordance
with the Bhagavat's saying "nlpa is like a form, vedana is like a bubble, smnjiiii is like a
mirage. sm!lskiira is like a banana tree, vijiiclna is like an illusory object" (Cf.Khandha Samyllfta
pupphavagga, sutta no.3 ) -they are accordingly ascertained. Or, in accordance with the
svabhiiva belonging to the particular dharmas, one accordingly gives rise to ascertainment.
The meaning of ascertainment is confirmation ( = avadhiirm;a). It has the func-
tion of [enabling the perceiver] not to be misled or influenced by other [objects].
Cf. a similar explanation given in Siddhi(C) (fas.5, p.28b) which further states: "Therefore,
)." [with regard to] a doubtful object, adhimukti is completely absent. Nor is there adhimukti
when the mind is undecided."
SafTlghabhadra (Ny, p.384b) gives the same definition as our Avatiira. It flll1her mentions the
opinion of certain Sarvastiviida masters who explain thus: "adhi means predominance (
), moksa means liberation ). This [caitta] enables the mind to operate freely, unobstructed,
with regard to the object; like adhi.\ila etc." This explanation is criticized in Siddhi (loc. cit.)
Adhimok$a is perhaps one of the most problematic term. Considering the various descrip-
tions given in these Abhidharma texts, however, it seems to have the following connotations
(some of which probably not entirely distinct from others ): ( i) affirmation I commitment I
acceptance (ii) decisiveness I detennination I resolve; (iii) conviction I faith; (iv) liking I
inclination; (v) mental freedom (resulting from the eradication of indecision). It may be noted
that this term seems to bear some similarities particularly with and chanda - the
relationship of the three is explained by Samghabhadra (see note on below). MVS
(p.26a) speaks of faith as being of two aspects: faith in the sense of acceptance/ affirmation
(ffiUJ); and faith in the sense of liking I inclination
)"which is
315 Avatara(T): sems kyi miwn par htjod pa fiid
316 Cf. ADV Il (p.69): cittavyclpclrclnlpli smrtih I cittasyarthllhhilapancl
AKB II (p. 54): smrtir-
iilambaniisa
Sanskrit of this, as 3 17 Cf. ADV lil (p. 70) : cittasyaikllgratii swniidhiJcittasthitilaksa!wh
katamah! ni.\·cite vastuni
318 Cf. MVS (p.539a); T 25 (p.234a).
185

319 Cf. ADV Il (p. 70) : dhilt prajii{/ dharmasaf!lgrahiidyupalalqw;asvabhiivii. Also Cf. Al<B
Il (p.54) : matilt prajiiil dharmapravicayaft.
Avatara(T) also mentions the figure eight, though samanviigama is missing in its enumeration.
320 must be a misprint for l1J. (to strike), as is clear from the very close definition in ADV
(see following note).
321 See following note on vialra.
322 Avatara(T) here does not have the word hetu :yid kyi rnam par .\·es pa 'i 'jug pa dan
mthun pa 'i chos- a dharma which accords with the operation of manovijiiiina.
Cf. ADV (p.81) : kal; punaraym,n vitarkal; ko w'i viciiralt ? vitarko niima cittaudiiryala/cyaiJal;
sat!"kalpadvit'iyaniimii vi!iayanimittaprakiiravikalp'i saf!!Jiiiipavanoddhatavrttil;
audclrikapaiicavijiiiinakiiyapravrttihetult I viciirastu cittasaulcymyalak.miJO manovijiiiina-
praw·ttyanukzilalt I
In AKB 11 (p.60), vitarka and viciira are defined by the as cittaudiirikatii and
cittasfik.mwtii, respectively. These are considered by them as two distinct, substantially ex-
isting dharmas which cause the grossness and subtleness, respectively, of cilia. The example
they give (occurring also in MVS, see quotation below) suggests that the two operate simul-
taneously in one and the same citta. This is criticized by the Sautrantika as being impossible.
as according to them, vitarka and viciira are not real entities but merely two designations for
the gross and subtle states of citta. Their difference is one of degree, not of kind (jiitihheda).
Vasubandhu explains that their operation is not simultaneous but alternate (pwyiiye!Ja).
Both SaJTlghabhadra and the author of ADV defend the standpoint against this
criticism with the explanation that the assert the co-existence of the two, but
not their simultaneous predominance in activity.
Ny (p.394a): " ... [Objection:] Grossness and subtleness being mutually contradictory, vitar/«J
and viciira should not be eo-nascent in the same citta. [Answer:] Although the substances of
the two co-exist in one and the same citta, the predominance of their activities differ in time.
Hence they do not contradict each other. It is like equal parts of water and vinegar in combi-
nation: Although there is equality in substance (i.e. quantity), there is a pre-dominance in
activity [of the one over the other]. In a gross citta, the activity ofviciira is impaired as a
result of the predominance of the activity of vitarka; so that though [the former] exists, it is
difficult to detect it. In a subtle citta, the activity of vitarka is impaired as a result of the pre-
186
.. A :"'» AtlHIUHAKMI\VAlAK.A
dominance of the activity ofvicc'ira; so though [the former] exists, it is difficult to detect
it (this example also occurs in the MVS passage quoted below).
"One might argue that this analogy is not valid in as much as the activity of vinegar predomi-
nates at all times. This objection is not reasonable. I do not say definitely that the vinegar is to
be compared to vitarka, and water, viciira; only that which predominates in activity is like
vinegar: Within the citta, whichever of the two dharrnas, vitarka and viciira, predominates in
activity, is to be compared to vinegar; that whose activity is feeble is to be compared to water.
Hence it is not the case that one and the same citta is at once gross and subtle; as vitarka and
viciira, though co-existing in the citta, operate at different times."
This controversy, with the various examples and explanations, was already found in MVS {p.
2J8c-219b}: " ... What is the difference between vitarka and viccira? Answer: The mental
grossness is named vitarka, mental subtleness is named vicilra ... Question: What is meant by
mental grossness and subtleness? Some explain: This means the grossness and subtleness
[of] thought. If one explains thus, then vitarka and viciira ought to have citta as their specific
nature (svabhiiva) [i.e. they are the citta itself] (see Ny, loc.cit) Besides, they also cannot be
conjoined [with each other in the same citta], as one and the same thing cannot be at once
gross and subtle. Others explain: This means that when the citta is gross, there is vitarkatii;
when the citta is subtle, there is viciiratii. If one explains thus, it would mean vitark.a and
viciira do not co-exist in one and the same citta, since thecitta is gross and subtle at different
moments (k,w!Ja). Comment (This represents the opinions of the compilers ofMVS): One
should explain thus : This means that within one and the same citta, the grossness is named
vitarka, the subtleness is named viciira. If one explains thus, it shows that within one citta
there are both vitarka and viciira- vitarka causes the citta to be gross; vicilra causes the citta
to be subtle."
"Question : How is it that in one citta, two dharmas, one gross and one subtle, do not contra-
dict each other? [Answer:] Because they perform different functions. Vitarka is sharp by
nature and vialra is blunt by nature; together they assist the one citta. Therefore, though one
is gross and the other subtle, they do not contradict each other."
"Question: How are the characteristics of grossness and subtleness of vitarka and viciira
like? ... Again, just like two equal parts of vinegar and water combined and put into the
mouth, give rise to the [gustatory] consciousness sharply and bluntly, [respectively]; like-
Wise are vitarka and viciira ... PrS says :• Just like when a big bell, a small bell, or a copper or
iron vessel, is struck, its sound spreads out, first gross and then subtle. (Cf. Milindapaiiha, p.
65; As III,-200; Vism IV, p.88); likewise are vitarka and viciira . .' All these explanations
show that vitarka and viciira do not come into activity simultaneously, as their activities
187
become predominant at different times."
"Some explain thus: It is like fermented curd placed on top of cold water. and shone by
sunlight. Owing to the water and the sun, it becomes neither melted nor co-agulated. Likewise,
in one and the same citta there exist both vitarka and viciira; [the citta] sustained by the force
of the two, becomes neither gross nor subtle. (This example is the one given in AKB 1!, p.60).
Hence, vitarka and vicclra are mutually conjoined. Vitarka causes the cifta to be gross; viciira
causes it to be subtle."
P.S. Jaini remarks (ADV, p.87) : "From this controversy, it appears that originally the
like the Theravadins, held these two factors to be simultaneously active, but
modified their view under the influence ofthe criticism of the Kosakara." But from the pas-
sage in MVS quoted above, it should be very clear that already at the time of MVS (some 300
years antedating AKB), (i) the were already aware of the type of criticism as
given by the Kosakara; (ii) they held that vitarka and viciira are co-existent but not simulta.
neously operative -or, more accurately, that the activity of one of them predominates at a
time.
323 We follow Xuan Zang's rendering of as the first two
characters of which (translating 'ahhi') clearly stresses the sense of direct realization, or
clarity (in the sense of something appearing right in front of oneself).
324 Avatara(T) here does not have astitva. However, this occurs in definitions given in other
.l:iistra. E.g. Asm (p.6): sraddha katamii I
prase/do 'hhilt7sii I. Xuan Zang's version of the commentary (* Ahhidharmasamuccaya-
vyclkhyZi) explains: "With regard to real existents jj'jl' ) there arises faith in the manner of
activity of receptivity ( ,V.W} ) ... "
325 Cf. ADV Il (p. 71): .l:raddlul prasado
cittaklilusyapanayl I tadyathodakaprasadako sarasi sarval!l
kalu.yyamapalriylicchatamlllpcldayati tadvaccittasarasi .l:raddhiimaniriti I
Cf. Also AKB Il (p.55) .\:raddhcl prasadal1l
ityaparel. The Pali tradition ( e.g. As Ill, 213 ) has similar descriptions.
The Siddhi(C) (fas.6, p.29c) says: This [dharma] is by nature clear and it clarifies the citta
etc. [But], as the citta is by far more important [than the caitta], one gives it the name •clari·
fication of citta'. It is like a water-cleansing gem which clarifies turbid water. (caitta like) hri
etc .. though being ku.l:ala, do not have the characteristic of clarification. This does, and so
188
there is no fault of confounding it with [other kuJala caitta]. Moreover, all the defiled dharmas
have their individual characteristics. [Among them], only is characterized by
turbidity, and further causes other caitta to be turbid; like an utterly filthy thing which dirties
both itself and others. Sraddhii is just the contrary to that, hence it has clarification as its
characteristic."
on the relationship between chanda, adhimukti and Ny (p.391 a) says: ".l:raddha is
that which serves as the basis for chanda, and an aid for adhimukti."
326 Avatara(T): rten ciir 'brei har 'hywi ha 'i chos iiid
327 Cf. ADV II (p. 73) : viryaf!J
sa"f/Jsiiranimagnasya cetaso 'hhyrtnnatorotyarthah.
Ny (p.391 b): "vil)'a is that which protects and discards respectively, one's virtues and faults
which have already arisen; and that which causes to arise and not to arise, respectively, one's
virtues and faults which have not yet arisen. lt is the non-slackness of the mind." Also Cf. TB
( ll.abc).
328 Both here, and Avatara(T): rigs pa, would suggest nyiiya, though unlikely to be in the
sense of logic (contra Avatara(F), p.17).
329 B is clearly a misprint for§ (svatma I cltma)- Cf. ADV (p.73): I
akiityakaraiJe lajja.lapatrapyantu parapekyaml Also, PSP (p.5): katamii ? cltmiinaf!1
dharmw!J vadhipath11 la.ija. PSP(C) (p. 852a): L:liiJWfr? § i<i'l L Hd:tt'i'i'
1:. ... Contra Avatara(F), p.l7: "Le respect (hrl) est engendre par une maitrise personnelle
(atmadhipatyqja) sur les dharma confhrmes a la logique ... "
MVS (p.l 07a) speaks of the following three kinds of tldhipatya : "I atmadhipatya, 2
lokcldhipatya 3 dharmadhipatya. Atmildhipatya - This is like the case of one who has not
abandoned the klda, and who is confronted with an evil object; in order to protect himself.
he does not give rise to evil actions. [thinking,] "I must not fall into the durgati as a result of
such [actions]". Lokildhipatya- This is like the case of one who has not abandoned the klda,
and who is confronted with an evil object; for the sake of protecting the world. he does not
give rise to evi I actions. [thinking,] "I must not be blamed by the world as a result of such
[actions]". According to some, [such a person thinks thus,] "Let beings in the world not do
evil actions as a result of me." Dlwrmadhipatya -This is like the case of one who has not
abandoned the klda, and who is confronted with an evil object; for the sake of protecting the
Dharma, he does not give rise to evil actions, [thinking,] "Let not the world vilify the True
189
Dharma as a result of me."" See also the following note. MahasiiiPghika. This is of interest to us, as our text includes this idea of the MahasiiJ11ghika
in its definition. This is perhaps another indication that the author of our text is not an ortho-
330 The definitions given in Ny (p.391 a) for hri and apatriipya are almost identical to those dox
in our text. : "hri is that which inclines towards the proper. It is produced by the two kinds of
dominant influence: of oneself and of the Dharma. it is opposed to the emanation of and However, it must be noted that the same idea forms part of the definition found in the Yogiicara
is of the nature of mental freedom." texts. Thus, Asm (p.6) also describes it as protective of citta from siisrava dhannas:
"apramcldah I ycl dharmiinciJ!!
Siddhi(C) (fas.6. p.29c) : "What is hri? Under the dominant influence of one's self-respect bh[lvanii siisravebhyasca I
and of esteem for the Dharma. one reveres the virtuous and the good, feels shame towards
one's faults. counteracts ahri and ceases evil actions." Likewise YBS (p.760c): "apramiida: One having acquired it protects one's citta
from the dharmas which obstruct one's delight in the escape [from saiJISiira]. It constantly
PSP (p.6): hrih atmanmr dharmm?l widhipatil?l krtwlvadyena lajjii. Same defini- induces the cultivation of kusa/a dharmas."
tion given by TB (\I abc)
See also the following note. 334 In AKB I! (p.55), the as does our text, as cittakarmm:zyatii.
This is criticized by the Sautriintika who points out that the sutra also mentions kiiyaprasrahdhi.
331 Cf..Avatara(T) here, which is in instrumental case (expressing a reason}: gti mug gi The replies that the siitra speaks of this just as it speaks of "kiiyiki vedancl",
rgyu mthun pa 'i dgrar gyur pas though in actual fact all vedanii are mental.

332 Ny ( p.391a): "apatnlpya has, as its precondition, delight in cultivating virtues. It is
opposed to the emanation of moha. and abhors evil dharmas".
Siddhi(C) (fas.6, p.29c): ''What is apatrclpya? [That which is produced] under the influence
of the world. It has the nature of easily resisting evil, and the activity of counteracting
anapatriipya and ceasing evil actions. That is: under the dominant influence of the censure of
the world, one easily resists evil, has shame in one's wrong doing, counteractsanapatriipya
and ceases all evil actions."
PSP (p.6): apatrapii katamii? lokmr adhipafil?l krtvii parato'vadyena lajjii. Practically the
same definition in TB ( ll.abc)
MVS (p. I 80a-b} sums up the difference between hri and apatriipya thus: "In one who has
[mental] freedom there arises [moral] fear; this is hri. With regard to the evil, one
fears [their consequences] deeply; this is apatrlipya. Again, where there is respect. it is hri.
Where there is fear in wrong-doing. it is apatriipya." (Cf. AKB 11, p.59: ahriragumtii; avadye
Ny (p.39lb) and ADV also respond to this criticism of the Sautriintika. ADV !I (p.72):
prccirahdhiscittakarmm}yatii I I sii tu tadiinukiilyiidbodhywigasahdaiJl
labhate I tadyathii prltil] I pritisthiiniyiisca dharmiih prltihodhyatigamuktaJ!I hhagavatii I.
PrS (p. 700a), however, already speaks of two kinds of prasrabdhi, physical and mental.
Also Cf. PSP (p.40) : prasrabdhi/1 katamii ? kiiyacittakarmatiyatii.
The Theravadin explains the word kiiya as niimakhandha (Vism. XIV. 144).
335 is an error as is clear from the Avatiira(T), as well as from the defintion in Ny
- See following note.
336 Avatiira(T): rnam par mi 'tshe ba ni I gian la gnod pa hyed pa la m lion par dga' ha dmi
mi mthun pa 'i sems bian po iiid de I gati gi dbati gis gian la rnam par tho mi 'tshams pa 'o -
"AvihiiJlsii is the citta-bhadratii averse to the delight in harming of others, by the force of
which one does not harm others." This definition is substantially the same as that in our text,
though not identical in the sequence of description.

Cf. Ny (p.39Jb): Harmlessness is mental goodness ( ). AKB !I (p.73): avihiq1sii

333 Cf. ADV !I (p. 71) : kni'aladharmahhclvanii aviherhanii. ADV 11 (p. 73) : avihiJ!!scl sattviivihefhana.
AKB !I (p.55) gives the same definition as ADV IJ and adds,"cetasa
.\"litre parhanti." AKB(F) (p.l5 7, n.3) notes that this different nikiiya refers to the

190 191

33 7 PrS (p. 700a) defines upek,>cl as: ''physical equilibrium, mental equilibrium; physical
uprightness, mental uprightness; non-alertness(ami'bhogata); the state of abiding in calmness."
The description of anclbhogatiJ in this Sarvastivada definition occurs in AKB Il (p.55) as the
definition: "upek:jcl cittasamatii cittiiniibhogatii." The Sautrantika objects to this
definition for it implies that cannot possibly co-exist with manaskiira as two of the ten
kusalamahiibhr11nika dharmas, since manaskiira is defined as "cetasa The
replies that there is no contradiction as there can be ahhogatii towards one object
and anabhogatii towards another.
In PSP (p.7), Vasubandhu also defines upek,1ii as cittiiniihhogatii. In the 11/piivacara kusalakathii
(Chapter III) of As. too, it is used as one of the defining characteristics. ADV Il (p.72) does
not discuss this problem, and more or less repeats the definition in AKB.
Samghabhadra, however, deliberately leaves out this part of the definition. His definition
(Ny. p.391a) is as follows: "upeksii is mental equilibrium (cittasamatcl). It is opposed to
auddhatya. Induced by conformity to what is proper, it enables citta not to go off the track (9
this is the meaning on the other hand, "is that which causes
the mental disquietude which, when conjoined with it, goes off the track )." (SPrS,
p.800c).
Samghabhadra further defends (Ny, p.392b) the assertion of the two caitta being
co-existing, by way of explaining the co-existence ofupek,1ii and virya. "There is no fallacy
that [the two] are eo-nascent, as they are not mutually contradictory. One who abides in the
proper, incessantly gives rise to actions which conform to what is proper. This is vilya. At the
very same moment, [the mind} in equilibrium discards actions which do not conform to what
is proper. This is upek,vii. Again, with regard to actions which conform to what is proper and
those which do not, upek,vcl is like a balance held [in equilibrium]; there is equality (samatii)
in the proceeding [in the actions which conform to what is proper] and in the stopping [of the
actions which do not]. Therefore, upek,wl and vi1:va mutually accord with each other; they do
not oppose each other in their giving rise to the ku.{a/a and their stopping of the akusa/a,
respectively. This fallacy exists only if, with regard to [one and the same] iilamhana, the one
takes and the other abandons, thus opposing each other.
"Thus. in this manner, we establish our explanation against the Sautrantika criticism that
manaskiira and being ofthe nature iihhogatii and aniihhogatii respectively, ought to
be mutually contradictory".
Samghabhadra's explanation is to be compared to that in our text: both omit the teJ11l
192
J r..DniU!lAKMAVAtAK.A
aniihhogatli; both use the illustration of the balance, though they differ as regards some of the
details in their explanations of this equanimity.
338 The Tibetan equivalent for Ji:l\ here is "'mchog Ill dga' ha", which, in AKB (T) may either
corresponds to prc/m(}(zl'a or pramoda. See also following note.
339 frJ;: 161 may well be just a single term or a compound. A vatiira(T) has mgu ha (raiijana ?)
d{//i rab tll dga 'ha ?) te, which suggests possibly a Sanskrit compound.
340 Both and yid'bywi ha in Avatara(T) suggest udwga.
341 Besides enumerating delight and disgust in the opposite order to that in our text, Avatara
(T) also defines them a little differently. In particular, it does not mention nivrtti-bhiigiya and
These two caitta, though occuring in some early Sarvastivada works, are
never properly included under the caitasika classification along with other caitta, except in
our text, Ny and SPrS. See supra, Introduction
Disgust is described, for instance, in SgPS (p.374b-c) as a dharma induced by a vigorous
intention to disengage oneself from the akusala corporeal, vocal and mental actions, and to
cultivate the ku.\:ala counterparts. This intention arises after a deep observation (sam-anu- .Jpas)
of the causes- pramlida and apramiida, respectively- for the k1t.\:a/a and akH.I:ala actions in
which oneself and others have been fully engaged.
Delight is discussed for instance, in the DSS (p.492c-493c) under the fourth hodhyw1ga,
priti. lt is explained as arising form each of the six anusmrti of Buddha, Dharma, SaJTlgha,
sila, diina, and deva. As a result of this delight, priti etc. arise, one after another.
In MVS, these two are already considered as independent caitta. Regarding delight:" ... other
masters say that this priti-apramiina has delight as its svabhiiva. The essential nature of
delight is not vedana; (?) there is a distinct caitta [named delight] which is conjoined with
the citta .. ." (op.cit, p.420c). Regarding disgust: "Question: What is the essential nature of
the disgust that has been thus spoken of? Is it alohha or prajiia?. As regards this, some say
that the essential nature of disgust is alobha. Some say it is prajiid. [our] comment: One
should say that the essential nature of disgust is neither alobha nor prajiiiJ; there is a distinct
caitta named disgust, which is conjoined with the citta ." (op. cit, p.981c-982a)
In AKB 11 (p.55), Vasubandhu enumerates the ten ku.{alamahiihhiimika (?)in the following
Verse:
"Jraddhii 'pramiida]J hrirapatrapii I
193
L
 I:::N !KANC'I:.INIU IHt:. lJUCTRINt::: ;)r\.1"\J'IIL.IniLPt. ;:-, f\fjMIUHAKMAVAIAKA

m!iladvayamahii!ISa ea vilyal!l ea kusale sada I/ JPS lists the following ten as the klef;amahclhhzimika: a.i:raddhya, kau.i:i((va, musitasmrtitii,
vik.\"epa, avit(va. a.l'(fl!lprajanya, ayonL\'Oinanaskiira, mithylidhimo"'m, auddhatya andpramclda.
In both of his works. Ny (p.39lb) and SPrS (p.800a). SaJTlghabhadra remarks that the two (AKB. loc.cit.)
'ea' in the verse indicate that delight and disgust are also to be subsumed under the
kusalamahabluimika. SPrS (loc.cit.): "With the two 'ea' in the verse, delight and disgust are 346 Avatiira(F) (p.19), appears to have wrongly attributed prajiiii as the svabhiiva of all the
also to be subsumed. Disgust is a wholesome mind. It is the aversion (vaimukhya) which three roots.
results from a careful observation of the true nature of the dharmas as having immeasurable
faults, and which accords with the greed-free mind. That [eaitta] which is conjoined with this 347 Cf. ADV I (p.l7): kah pmvi!Javat /vipclkahetilvaupamiko
is named 'mental application to disgust'. Delight is a wholesome mind. It is the aspiration
I evamakusalo 'pi I 11
which arises with the support of a seeking for the escape from and counteraction for, the
MYS (pp. 740c-741 a) lists various opinions on the meanings of 'kusala' 'akusala' and
faults; and which accords with a mind set on realization. This is not the sensation of joy, as it
'avyiikrta ·,among which the third opinion. and part of the first, correspond to those given in
also manifests in the anilgamya bhzimi etc., where there is no joy. That [eaitta] which is
our text:" Question: What is meant by 'ktdala', 'akusala' and 'avy(lkrta'? Answer: A dharma
conjoined with this is named 'mental application to delight'. There are some who assert that
is said to be ku.i:ala which is to be subsumed as being skillful. which effects a desirable fruit,
delight is the name given to the feeble fonn of joy. This assertion is invalid. for it should also
and which is by nature secure. 'To be subsumed as being skillful' indicates the miirga-satya.
apply to pra!;rabdhi etc; there is no reason why this should be a different case: Why is joy
'Effects a desirable fruit' indicates the A dharma is said to be akusala which
alone spoken of as having feeble and strong forms and not pra.i:rabdhi etc.?
is to be subsumed as being unskillful, which effects an undesirable fruit, and which is by
nature insecure; these indicate part of the and samudaya-sarya. What is opposed to
It is because the modes of activity of delight and disgust are mutually contradictory, and
these two classes is said to be avyiikrta .[third opinion:] some say: A dharma which can
[hence] cannot be eo-nascent, that they have not been directly indicated here [in the verse] :
produce the germs of a desirable existence and ofliberation, is said to be ku.i:ala. A dharma
they do not fullfil the condition of being ku.i:ala-mahiibluimika. There is the faculty of joy
which cannot produce the germs of a desirable existence and of liberation, is said to be
which operates together with disgust. [But] there is definitely no delight which operates to-
akusala. What is opposed to these two classes is said to be avyiikrta ."
gether with disgust. The two 'ea' have been mentioned in order to indicate that these two do
not operate together, being mutually contradictory in their modes of activity."
The various meanings of are discussed in MVS fas. 112 (p.582b): "Three
ku.i:ala ml7la: alobha, amoha . These three ku.i:ala nnila are all obtainable in one citta;
342 Cf. AKB II (p.56) : (/..i:raddhyal!l cetaso I Also Cf. ADV 11
not all the three aku.\-ala mftla are obtainable in one eitta ... Again, the ku.\-ala-mlila are
(p. 74) : {i.i:raddhyal!l cittilprasiida(! I gw;avatsu
sal!lprayukta with all ktdala citta; the three akusala mrt!a are not saq1prayukta with all the
'narthitvaf!l ea/ citta .

343 Cf. AKB 11 (p.56): kausidyaf!l cetaso nilbhyutsiiho I Also ADV Il (p.74)
"Question: Why are they named ku.i'ala mrzla ? What are the meanings of kusala-mtila?
: kausidyaf!l I
Answer: 'Ku.i'ala-miila' means' that which produces the ku.i'ala', 'that which nourishes the
lo!.l·afa', 'that which develops the kusala', 'that which makes the kusa/a grow', 'that which is
344 Cf. ADV 11 kusa!aniif!l dharmill}iimabhiivanii I
beneficial to the kusa/a', 'that which sustains the kusala', 'that which causes the
dharmah I AKB 11 (p. 56) : ku.i:aliinilf!l dharmil!Jilmabhiivanii 'pramiidavipafqo
lozsala-dharmas to spread far and wide.' Parallel meanings of the 'aku.i'ala-miila' are given
I in ibid, (p.579c).

345 It is noteworthy that this remark is missing in Avatara(T).

On ku.i:ala-karma, akusala-karma and avyakrta-karma, AKB IV (p.227) says: ""'semaf!l karma
kusafam yadi:j(aviplikat!J nirviir;apriipakal!l ea I ea
In the AKB 11 (p.56) and Ny (p.391 b). iisraddhya, kauSidya, pramiida are listed as
I tiibhyilmitaratkarma naiva
. moha, sryana
klesamahiibh!Jmika, together w1th - and auddharya. ADV II (p. 73) 1·1sts s1rn
· ilanly,
veditavyam I /'
except that the term mrl{ihi is given in place of the term moha.

194 195
 t:.N l KA:\!Ct IN I U l Ht UUC IKLNL:.

348 All the kle!;a in the nlpa and iirfipya-dhatll are avyiikrta. (See MVS, p.260b-c) The avyiikrta-prajiicl includes the nivrtiivyiikrta-prajiiii and the anivrtc'ivyiikrta-prajiiii. The
nivrtiivyakrta-praji1ii comprises the satkclyadn·ri and in the kclmadhiitu, as
349 There are altogether thirty-six forms of avidyii in the kiimadhiiru; but those conjoined well as the belonging to the five nikiiya [of prahcltm:va] in the rzlpadhcltu and
with satkiiyadr,,·ti and are not but nivrtiivycikrta (see AKB IV, p.205). ariipyadhcltu. The anivrtiivyclkrta-prajiicl comprises the prajiicl which eo-arises with the
For the various reasons given in MVS for satkiiyadrsti (and hence antagriihadt",l'!i which ai,:vclpathika, sailpasthc!nika, vipclkaja, and nirmclnacitta (Cf. Vyakhya V, p.464). The
follows from it) being avycikrta, see MVS (p.259c-260b ). Also Cf. AKB(F) V (p.42, n.l ). comprises the avidyii conjoined with the and antagriihadr.yfi in
the riipadhcltu and iirllpyadhiitu . .
350 The Sautriintika leader, Sthavira Sri lata (Ny, p.618c) denies the existence of the
"The western masters say that there are four avyt!krta-nnlla: dr.yti, mc'ina, and
avyiikrta-mt/la; "There is no as there is no scriptural evidence for it."
avidyii. The comprises the f!':f!Jc'i belonging to the five nikclya [of prahiitavya).
The avyiikrta-drsti comprises the and antagrclhadr,1·ti in the kiimadlultu, as well
351 A trs!Juftaradhyclyin is one who practises dhyiina with excessive f!'$1Jii
as the five dr$[i in the rzlpadhcltu and iirllpyadhiitu. The avyclkrta-mclna comprises the mclna
or being dominated by f!',I'!Jil The other two terms
belonging to the five nikiiya [of prahiitavyaJ in the nlpadhcltu. The avytikrta-avidyii com-
are to be similarily understood.
prises the conjoined with the and in the kiimadhiitu, as
well as the belonging to the five nikiiya [of prahiitavya] in the nlpadhiitu and
Vyakhya (p.464 ): iti I ya iisvadanii-saf!1pmyukta-dhyclna- clnlpyadhiitu ."Question: Why do the western masters include mc'ina as an avyclkrta-mllla?
dhyiiyi sa I yo dhyiina-nHraye!Ja utpiidayati I sa dr,,·ty- Answer: They say that by nulla is meant that which is firm and strong; and nulna is firm and
uttara-dhyclyi I miinottara-dhyiiyi ea lyas tena manyate lclhhyaham a.1ya dhyclnasya niinye strong, therefore it is included as a nulla. lt is by the force ofmiina that the Yogclcii1ya lose a
fatheti sa miinottara-dhyc'iyi I huge amount of their merits."

The Yogacara explanations for the three terms are similar to those above. But to these three, "Question: Why do the masters of this state (i.e.Kasmira) not include it as a nulla? Answer:
they add a vicikitsottaradhyiiyin. See YBS fas. 12 (p.335b) These masters say that a nulla is that which tends downwards; miina causes the mind to move
upwards and does not conduce to moving downwards, therefore it is not included as a miila."

352 It is noteworthy that Avatclra(T) does not make this remark asserting the acknowledgement
of four roots, in contrast to the See the MVS passage quoted in the following
note. Also Cf. Vyakhya V (p.464).
353 AKB V (p.291 f) gives us the same information regarding this difference in opinion as to
whether there are three or four avyiikrta-nulla. It further says that the Kasmirian masters hold
the first, and the foreign masters (Biihyaka) hold the second. The explanation given by the
Biihyaka for their inclusion of miina is the same as that found in our text. All these are also
found in ADV V (p.246t) and Ny (p.618b-c)
In Ny (loc.cit), we get the following additional information: (i) Whereas the Kasmirian
includes the anivrtclvyclkrta-prajiiii as avyiikrta-mllla, the Bahyaka does not do
so. The latter argues that the anivrtiivyakrta-prajiiii are weak and therefore cannot be miila
which according to them must be firm.
"Question: Why do the masters of this state include the anivrtc'ivyiikrta-prajiicl as
avyiikrta-m1lla? Answer: These masters say a nulla is that which serves as a supporting cause
(niiiraya-hetu). Since the nivrtii1:wlkrta-prajiiii excels in being the supporting cause, it is in-
cluded as a nulla. Question : Why do the western masters not include it as a nulla? Answer:
They say a nulla is that which is firm and strong; the anivrtiivyakrta-praji1cl is weak, therefore
it is not included as a nulla."
"Question: Why do both the masters here and the western masters not include vicikitsc'i as
? Answer: Both say that a m1lla is that which abides fixedly; vicikitscl does not
abide fixedly as it operates in two directions (dvi-mukhin), therefore it is not included as a
m1lla ... "
Asm(C) (p.37) also names the same four avycikrta-miila, with similar explanations as those
given by the western masters. But with regard to avidyci, it says, "As a result of avidyii, [the
dhyiiyin] is sullied by the defilement of vicikitsottaradhyiina." See also supra, lntr. § XI.

The whole discussion occurs in MVS (p.795a-c): "The Kasmirian says that
354 Cf. AKB V (p.309) : nava
there are three avyiikrta-miila: prajiiii, and The avyiikrta col11·
mar.iavicikitser:jyiinultsaryasai!J.J'()ianiini.
prises the belonging to the five niktiya [of in the nlpadhcltll and ariipyadhiilll·

196 197
355 Avatara(T) : kun nas mnar sems clearly permits restoration of iighiita. Cf. definition in the sense of real existence and non-unity. This drni clings to the idea of 'I'; but the 'I' in
Asrn in following note. reality does not exist. In order to avoid the idea that this dr:f!i arises without an existing
object, the object of this dr:fti is designated by the word 'sat' ... "
356 Avatara(T): tsha ha - suggests karuka .
He then criticizes the Sautrantika explanation: "[According to the Sautrantika, is] so
Asm (p.44ff) explains all nine swnvoyana as bringing about and being
designated in order to prevent the ideations of permanence and unity, as there must first be
sw!lprayukta, which is probably why pratigha-saf!Iyojana is described here as being like a
these ideations before one cling to 'I'. If so, what is the use of the label 'sat; the word 'kciya'
bitter seed- Asm (p.45): pratighasam_wJjanW!l kata mat I sattve$11 dubkhe
alone is sufficient to prevent the ideation ofpermancence. So it should be simply designated
ea dharme,1·u citta.1ya vihii!1Sii I pratighasamyojanenu saf!Iprayukto pratighanimitte:ju
I anupek,wyii ea I tena as 'kiiyadr:f!i'. There is no dharma which is permanent and capable of being accumulated;
SW!I)'Ujyate 11 . what is the use of qualifying 'kiiya' with 'sat' [which supposedly means] 'perish'?"

357 Avatara(T): sl.yes bu retis pa 363 Cf. AKB V (p.282): ahetau I

tadyathii na heturlokancim I tam ea hetw.n pasyati I agnijalapravescidaya.ka na
358 AKB 11 (p.61) : yena kenacit parato vi.\·esaparikalpena cetasa svargasya tlil!l ea heflll/1 I

359 Avatara(T) lists seven things : ms dati rigs dati gzugs daill nor dati thos pa dati 1 tshul ADV V (p.231) gives a similar definition, but further explains Hla and vrata separately:
khrims dwi lbzo la sogs pa dag ... here most probably corresponds to rus and rigs. In sillll!l tvutriignihotrcinu:j{hiinaiJ1 pratijuhotycidyiistisro 'ntarwigakriycih,
Abhidharmako.\·ahhii,1ya, Xuan Zang translates kula-gotra with these two characters (AKB taduhhayasya Hlam I yathoktam 'jariimw:val!l
(C), p.44a ; AKB, p.ll9) vaitatsatral!l yadagnihofrct1J1 juhoti iti.

360 The definitions of all the seven types of miina here are identical with those in AKB (p. vratam - iigneyamagnipariearanarp hi ,vthiidyanusthiinam apclf!l
284 f). Also Cf. ADV (p.236). sukradaivatyatviit I ja{iivatciraiJam I athava govratiidini
sudhyate mucyata I
361 Cf. AKB Ill (p.l41) : yathii mitravipmyaye1Ja tadvipak,l'(lhhiitah kascidamitro bhavati
na tu yah ka.seidanyo mitriinniipi I rtal!l eocyate satyam I tadvipak.yahhittarp Also cf. commentary to PSS(C) (p.853a): ".Wavratapariimada- With regard to .fila, vrata,
viikyamanrtam bhavati I adharmiinarthiikiirycidayasea I and the skandha forming their basis; one considers them to be purity Uuddhi), liberation
evamavidya 'pi pratidvandvabhiitadharmiintaramiti I (mo"'l'(l), and escape SUa- having first [been misguided by] evil views, one
abstains from the seven kinds of evil. Vrata- those of cows, dogs, plucking one's own hairs,
362 The explanation given here is the same as that given by the in AKB V (p. holding a forked staff, the slil!lkhya-samiidhi and prqjiW ... "
281 ). The Sautrantika, on the other hand, explains 'sat' as 'perish' (sidati < ..Jsad). He defines
satkayadr:f!i as follows: "sidatiti sat I kiiyaf; skandha I saeciiyarr 364 Cf. Siira (p.I32/518); MVS (p.258c).
kaya.keti satk<iyaf; I satkaye (loc.cit). The Tibetan rendering, here as
also generally elsewhere, likewise has the meaning of an accumulation of perishable: 'jig 365 MVS (p.258a) "What is the meaning ofswnvojana? Answer: saf!l)'Ojana means :bond-
tshogs la Ita ha. age, 'joining up with unsatisfactoriness and 'mixing with poison'." (See also AKB
(F) V, p.81, n.4).

Samghabhadra (Ny, p. 605c) defines it as follows: "By the force of the hetu and teaching, the
prthagjana clings to the idea of 'I' and 'mine' with regard to the five upiidiinaskandha. This Sal]lghabhadra also gives the first two meanings above in his explanation (see the following
note).
dr$!i is named the 'sat' :because existing. 'kiiya' means accumulation, i.e. in
the sense of agglomeration and accumulation. The kaya is sat, hence the name satkaya, i.e. in

198 199
 SKANDHILA ·s ABHIDHARMAVATARA

366 Sarpghabhadra (Ny, p.642c) quotes two sutras to explain the meaning ofsalflyo;ana.
The standpoints of the various schools as to whether the anusaya are cittaviprayukta or
The first one is the same one as that in our text, which occurs in the Sa{iiyatana Sw!Jyutta, cittasamprayukta may be summarized in the following chart (see Yin Shun, IS Vm, p.I30):
samudda vagga 5 and 6, (Salflyutta 35, 191 ): "seyyathiipi iivuso kiilo ea balivaddo odiito ea
balivaddo ekena diimena vel yottena vii salflyuttii assu ... na kho iivuso kiilo balivaddo odcltassa *Sariputrabhidharma (fas. I, p.526c
balivaddassa salflyo;analfl, na pi odiito balivaddo kiilassa balivaddassa Salflyojanm!J, yena
ea kho te ekena diimena vel yottena vii salflyuttii !alfl tattha Salflyo_janam. evameva kho iivuso
na cakkhu riipiinalfl salflyojanalfl, na nlpii cakkhussa salflyojanalfl yan ea tadubhayalfl paticca
uppajjati chandariigo !alfl tattha salflyojanalfl."

367 Same order as given in AKB V (p.277) and JPS (p.929b).

AKB (loc.cit) : ta ete .)·atf.anu!;ayiib sfltre riigasya dvidhii bhedalfl krtvii 1

pratighiinuJayo avidyanusayo
dt:ffyamdayo vicikitsanusaya iti I neither cittasol!Jprayukta
nor viprayukta
The order given in the Pali sutta and Abhidhamma texts (D Ill 254, etc; Vibhailga, 383, etc)
is : kiimariiga, paJigha, di!fhi, vicikicchii, miina, bhavariiga, avii}ii.
Vatsiputriya (Ny, p.599b)----------->ot--_::"" both citta.w1f1prayukta and
viprayukta
368 i.e. The compound 'kamanlga-anu!;aya' is to be taken as a karmadhiiraya. This is the
interpretation. But the Sautrantika disagrees; he interprets the compound as a
genitive tadpuru,w. AKB V (p. 277f) : kathamidaf!l}iicltavyalfl kiimariiga Vibhajyavada (Ny, p.599b)
kiimariigiinusayah iiho.ivit kclmariigasyiimeiwyaiJ / ... kiimariiga eviimdaya
iti vaibhii:jikiib I ... evalfl tu siidhu yathii sautrclntikiimll"!'l ... I kiimariigasyiinusaya/:t
iti I
For the philosophical implications of these different standpoints, see Yin Shun, op. cit. (pp.
Cf. also ADV V (p.20 f); Ny (pp.596 ff). 129-137); ADV, Introduction, (pp.l 01-11 0).

The interpretation is in accordance with their standpoint that the are
cittasal"!'lprayukta. To interpret the compound as a genitive would imply that the
are cittaviprayukta, which is the opinion of the Mahasamghika and the Vibhajyavada.
For the Sautrantika, the anui;aya are neither cittasalflprayukta nor eittaviprayukta; for they
are not real entities but merely prajnapti for the klda-blja. When the klda are in a dormant
state, they are named anusaya; when they manifest their activities, they are named
paryiivasthiina. The Sautrantika defines klda-bija as : "iitmabhclvasya kldajii
(AKB V, p.278)
369 The five classes (pafica-nikiiya, paiica-prakiira) of abandonables are (i)
rahcl tavya, ( i i) samudaya -dadana-pra hiita vya, ( i i i)
nirodha-dadana-prahiitavya, (iv) miirga-dai'Sana-prahiitavya, (v) bhiivanii-prahiitavya. The
first four correspond to klesa which are abandoned through insight into each of the Four
Noble Truths. The fifth corresponds to those abandoned through repeated practice (bhiivanii).
By abandoning (prahii1Ja) a klda is meant the relinquishment of the prclpti of the klda. (Cf.
AKB 11, p.36)
370 Cf. AKB V (p.279) : riipiiriipyadhiitujo riigo bhavariiga/:1 krta/:1 I kim kiira1Jamevalfl
krta/:1 I

371 Out of the four senses given in our text, the (MVS, p.257a) gives only three
for the meaning of the term 'anusaya', i.e. without that of anu-.,Jsafij. The explanation in
terms of four senses is attributed to the foreign masters (ibid, p.257b; see also Introduction§
VIJ).

200
201
 ENTRANCE INTO THE SUPREME DOCTRINE SKANDHILA 'S ABHIDHARMAV AT ARA

PrS (p.702a) gives the same four senses as in our text, which are found in AKB duf:Jkha- d-p ..... kr, pra, av, ma, v, sd, ad, md, drp, sp : 10}
The order of enumeration in AKB V follows exactly that in PrS: anu, si ( . samudaya- d-p.. kr, pra, av, ma, v, md, drp, 7
anu- ..Jbandh. nirodha- d-p ........ kr, pra, av, ma, v, md, drp, 7 36
miirga- d-p .......... kr, pra, av, ma, v, md, drp, sp 8
Cf. ADV (p.220): anuserata ityanusaya/.1 I See also quotaion from ADV in following note
bhiivanii-p ......... kr, pra, av, ma, 4
For Samghabhadra's explanations for' anusaya' (Ny, p.64lc), see AKB(F) V (p.78, n.l). ·
V. V.
372 Cf. ADV V(p.220): le$iif!l nirukti/.1 santananugata dhatricailamalavav 2 2 +

n
anubandhantiti va'nusaya/.1, khacarajalacaravat I duf:Jkha - d-p ....... br, av, m a, V, sd, as, md, drp, sp,
samudaya -d-p ... br, av, m a, v, md, drp
This example is also found in Ny (p.641 c): "Some say: ' anubandha', as their prapti con. riiJ11Jdhdtu nirodha -d-p ....... br, av, m a, V, md, drp 31
stantly follow along, like a fish moving in the ocean follows the image of a bird moving in the miirga -d-p ......... br, av, m a, v, md, drp, sp
sky.". bhiivana -d-p ...... br, av, ma, 3

This also occurs in MVS (p.257a-b), as the example given by the for the explana- +
tion of' anubandhana': "The meaning of anusaya is anubandhana, as it is like the image of du/.lkha -d-p ....... br, av, ma, v, sd, ad, md,
one moving the sky ( khacara =bird) being followed by one moving the water ( jalacara =fish <hp, 'P = 9 }
samudaya -d-p ... br, av, ma.,. v, md, drp = 6
). 'One moving the sky' is a bird; 'one moving the water' is a fish. [Once] there was a bird
ariipya- nirodha -d-p ....... br, av, ma, V, md, drp = 6 31
wishing to cross the ocean by the power of its wings. In the ocean, there was a fish which was
dhiitu miirga -d-p ........ .br, av, m a, v, md, drp, sp 7
able to observe it well. The fish reflected thus, 'There is no bird capable of flying across the
bhiivanii -d-p ..... br, av, m a, 3
ocean except for the courageous, swift, and powerfully winged bird-king." So it immediately
pursued the bird's image. [Eventually], the bird fell into the water out of exhaustion, and was V. V. u u tL l.l
swallowed up by the fish. Likewise, the anusaya constantly gives rise to their prapti in all 1.Q 15. 15. .ll 36 98
situations; and as soon as an ayoniso-manaskiira appears [in one], one experiences a
nai/.l$yandika or vipaka-phala." Total : 5 kr + 10 br + 5 pra + 15 av + 15 ma + 12 v + 36 dr = 98 anusaya

373 The subdivision of the seven anusaya into ninety-eight was probably made for the first
time in JPS (p.929c, etc). It is also found in PrS (p.702a, etc.) which was probably a later
insertion, after the composition of JPS (Study, p.l48f). The extant Sarvastivada Abhidharma
works subsequent to JPS adopt this scheme of classification. The Vibhajyavadin denies this
classification of ninety-eight, saying that the sutra speaks only of seven (Ny, p.602c).
Abbreviations: d= darsana, p = prahiitavya (du/:lkha-d= dufJkhadar8anaprahiitavya, etc.)
kr = kiima-riiga, br = bhavaraga, pra = pratigha, av = avidyii,
ma = miina, v = vicikitsa, sd = satkiiyadf$ti, ad = antagriihadf$ti,
drp = dr$tipariimarsa, sp= silavrtapariimarsa, dr = dr$ti

375 Cf. AKB V(p.286 f): du/Jkhasamudayadarsanaprahiitavyii df$!ayo vicikitsii catabhisca

Besides the seven-fold and ninety-eight-fold classifications, PrS (p.702a-b) also gives a
twelve-fold classification: Among the seven anusaya, dr$ti is subdivided into five- satkiiyad($ti,
antagrahadr$ti, mithyadr$fi, dr$tiparamarsa, silavratapariimarsa; and bhaviinusaya is subdi·
vided into rfipariigiinusaya, arfipya-raganusaya. For a summary of the discussion on anusaya
in PrS, see AKB(F) V (p.9, n.5).
Baf!lprayuktii avidyii avel)iki ea duf:Jkhasamudaya-prahiitavye ciividyii I itime ekadasanusayfi/.1
sabhiigadhiitusarvatragiif:J I sapta dr$!YD dve vicikitse dve avidye sakalasvadhiitviilambanatviit
I
Since there are eleven in each of the three dhiitu, we get a total of thirty-three.

374 The distribution of the ninety-eight anusaya over the five nikiiya and the three dhit!J Xuan Zang's translation of this contains a more elaborate explanation of 'sarvatraga' : "As
may be summarized with the following chart: they have the strength of moving all over (sarvatraga) the five nikiiya in their own dhatu and
bhiimi, these eleven all receive the name 'sarvatraga'. That is: the seven df$ti, the two vicikitsii,
the two avidyii. -these eleven [i] take as objects all the dharmas belonging to the five nikiiya

202 203
 ENTRANCE INTO THE SUPREME DOCTRINE

){uan Zang's translation of"nlisti i,1·tam" as (AKB(C), p.88b) is mistaken. He seems

in own dhatu and bhiimi; [ii] operate as anusaya (anuserate) with regard to all of them· to have taken i.y(a to be the p.p. from ..Ji$ to desire, to wish; and not from ...Jyaj, to sacrifice. He
and [m] serve as the cause for the production of defiled dharmas in all the fivenikiiya 0 ' gives the same translation for the term, in the same context, in other Sarvastivada Abhidharma
. .. .
bas1s of these three they are sarvatraga"' (AKB (C) V, p.l Olc). Ny works (e.g. JPS, p.954c, SgPS, p.374a; etc.)
(p.611 a), also contammg th1s same explanatiOn, m1ght have been the basis for Xuan
lb.. . . angs
z ,
ea oratiOn m AKB(C). Ny c1t.) further mentiOns the opinion of certaimciiryas _which 381 The same Chinese characters, in AKB(C) (p.l07b) cor-
he reJects- that out ofth.ese thirty-three, only twenty-seven aresarvatraga, the other six are respond to grhlte tyaktliyiil!l dve$amicchanti ... (AKB, p.305)- which
not always sarvatraga( ht. 'Have to be distinguished' (vibhaktavya)). would suggest that the sense intended here is: With regard to one's own speculations, resent-
ment arises toward what has been abandoned in preference to a different speculation.
376 The same order of enumeration and almost identical (prose) explanations for the arising
of the ten anusaya are found in AKB V (p.304 f); Ny (p.638b-c); SPrS (p.903c-904a). 382 Ny (pp. 639a-640b) records a lengthy argument between the and the
The verses in AKB V (loc.cit.) are:
concerning the reality of this which is said to appear in the range of expe-
mohiikiiiJkt?ii tato mithyiidf$tilJ satkiiyadrktataJJ(32cd) rience of the person in whom the klda is about to arise. The calling himself the
tato'ntagrahaiJam tasmiicchiliimarsab tato drsab I Nyayavadin ) asserts as usual that all objects are reaL The on the
riigah svadrt?tau manasca ityanukramab 1{33) contrary, argues that since pleasure and displeasure are products of human discrimination
The corresponding verses in ADV V (p.294 f) are:
with regard to the objects, the latter cannot be real.
[357] mohiitsatkiiyadrktasyii antagrahekf?BIJBf!l tatab I
kiiQk!?fimithyekf?a!Jaf!! tasyiib Siliimar5astato drsab 11
383 Cf. AKB V (p.305 f) :
[358] riigab svadrsi miinasca dve$o'nyatra pratiiyate 1
pratyupasthitiit
}iieyab pravrttibiihulyiidevamef?iimanukramab 11
ayoniSo manaskiiriit lde8ah
tadyatha rliglinusayo 'prahir;o kamaragapmyavasthliniylika dharmli
Both the enumeration (moha=avidyii -> satkiiyadr$!i -> kiiilkf?iFvicikitsii -> mithyiidf$!i ->
abhasagatli bhavanti tatra cliyondo manasklira evalfl kiimarliga utpadyate I tlinyetlini
sllavrata-pariimarsa-> riiga, mana, pratigha) and explanations here (ADV, p.295) differ
yathiikramalfl hetuvi,wyapraayogabaliini/ evalfl anyo 'pi utpadyata iti veditavyo yah
somewhat from those of our text.
saf!lpilnJ.akaral}Q/J //34 11
kadiicitkila I na hetubalena I yathii parihlir;adharmakasylirhata
377 The same four character,11Nrrf::f-f, in AKB(C) (p.l 07a) translatessatye$U sa muhyati
iti I
in AKB (p.304), so that we can be sure "does not understand" here- as in AKB(C) _means"
Cf. also ADV V (295 f):
is confused about (muhyatr)"
lde8a utpadyate Wcitsaf!lpiln:tai/J kiiral}Qistribhil} II
kascit tribhirutpadyate I kascid dvabhylimiti I tatra
378 See following note.
hetubalalfl sabhligasarvatraglidihetubhlivanii 'gatotpattaye vartamlinaprliptyutsarge
meghikiidinidar.Sanat I manaskiirlidisalflnidhanam I pratyayabalam
379 Cf. Ny (p.638b) (= SPrS, p.904a):" ... Disinclination with regard to the examination of
aparzjiiiitavi$aylibhasagamana111 nidar.§anamarhatparihiir;isiitramiti 11 See also ibid (p. 296,
the dubkha [-satya] ... As a result of not understanding, one lacks the capacity for examination;
n.2); MVS {p.313b-c). Avatara(T) does not mention the latter case of"vi$ayabalenaiva ".
on hearing both [the right and wrong] path, one then becomes doubtful .. "

384 Xuan Zang breaks up into two terms and . However, Avatara(T) has only
380, The description of the content ofmithyiidr$tihere differs from that in AKB, Ny and
iion mons par byed pa, which seems to correspond to a verbal form> , probably klisnanti.
SPrS. AKB V (p.304): vicikitsiiyii mithyadr$tib pravartate I salJlsayitasya mithyiisramaQB
Cf. ADV (p.219): klisnantiti kldiih
(sravaQa)cittiiniif!! mithyiiniscayotpatteb I niisti dubkhamityevamiidi 1
However, AKB IV (p.247), onmithyiidf$ti-karmapatha, describes mithyiid!$tiin the sarne
terms: subhe casubhe ea karmaiJi yii niistiti dr$tib sii mithyadr$tib 1 tadyathii "niisti dattaP.I•
niisti$tam, niisti hutaf!l, niisti sucaritaf!!, niisti duscaritamityevamiidi yiivannasanti Joke'rhants"

205
204
385 The term 'upakkilesa' in Piili seems to represent an earlier usage than 'kilesa' which
occurs rarely in the earlier works in thepitaka (Cf. PTSD; Pande, Origins of Buddhism, P.
39)
Cf. AKB V (p.312) : upak/esii/:1 vaktavyii/:1 !tatra ye yiivat klesiiupaklesii api te I cittopaklesanat
/See also following note
386 Cf. AKB V (p.312): ye'pyanye kle8ebhya}J kli$tii dharmii/:1 sarpskiiraskandba-
sarpgrhitiiscaitasikiista upaklesiiste punarye k$udravastuke pathitii/:1 AKB(C) V (p.l 09b) adds
:"As they arise following (upa) the klesa, they are also calledupaklesa. They are not called
klesa because they are not fundamental".
Cf. Asm (p.47): upaklesastu ye klesiiste upklesii api bhavanti I upaklesiistu na klesii/:1 1 klesiin
sthapayitvii tadanya}J kli$ta/:J sarpskiiraskandhasarpgrhita/:1 sarvascaitasiko dha1ma}J 1
387 AKB V (p.313) explains these six underk/e8ama/a.
3 88 A vatiira(T) has gian la mi Jtos par sems yoil su gtugs pa, corresponding to cetasa}J
paryiidiina.
389 Avatiira(T) suggests that here, the two should be taken together to
correspond to the Tibetanngs.
390 Cf. AKB II (p.61) :yen a kenacit para to vise$aparikalpena cetasa unnatii;J. miina}J I madastu
svadharme$veva raktasya yaccetasa}J paryiidiinam I yathii madyaja evam riigaja}J I
saipprahar$8l}avise$o mada ityapare I
According to AKB (loc.cit.), then, whereasmiina is the arrogance in measuring others with
one's superiority, real or imagined,mada is the self-aggrandisement resulting from the at-
tachment to one's own virtues. Vyiikhyii (p.l41) quotes Saf!'lghabhadra's definition:ya/J
svadhanne$V eva raktasya darpa-cetasa}J paryiidiiniit kusa/ii-dhanna-kriyiibhya/:1 pratisal!lhiirab
mada iti iiciirya-Sarpghabhadrai;J.. (Cf. Ny p.394c). La Vallee Poussin gives a different read-
ing of the Sanskrit (AKB(F) Vol.!, p.176, n.3)
391 Cf. AKB V (p.313): vihethanarp vihirpsii yena prahiirapiirusyiidibhi/:1 pariin vihethayate
392 Same definition in AKB V (p.3!3).
393 Cf. AKB V (p.313) : iighiitavastubahulikiira upaniiha}J. AKB (C) V (p.l 09c) describeS
upaniiha in identical wordings as our text.
206
NY (p.646c) :'There is a difference in characteristic between upaniiha and krodha: krodha is
Jike a birch-bark fire which is forceful; but its surviving force is weak. 11paniiha is like the
heat in a room in winter, which is light; but its surviving force is strong. Because of this,
some describe upaniiha as that which is produced subsequent to the subsidence of krodha
and which pollutes the mind."
394 Avatiira(T) adds: de 'i dhan gis gian nas gian brgyud cin gud du 'dren te gsal bar mi
rtogs par hyed po 'o ("By virtue of that, one evades [the question], going from one thing to
another, not enabling a clear understanding"). Cf. AKB V (p.313): cittakauti(valfl siithaf!1
yena yathiibhfitalfl parisphutalfl vii pratipadyate (translated in AKB
(C), p.l09c). Here is an unusual instance ofXuan Zang's subtraction, rather than addition?
395 AKB(C) V (p.l 09c) has identical wording as our text here -possibly an addition by
Xuan Zang. AKB V (p.313) says simply : p11nal; k/damaliiniim, without this
additional elaboration, which is also not inAvatiira(T).
396 AKB V (p.314) :"kilfl kllfilalfl pclpikii giithiivacaniid Yll}yate I siithya'!1
I "
397 This additional remark is not found in Avatiira(T). Cf. the very similar sentence in AKB
(C) V (p.l 09c ): "These mala and paryavasthiina arise from klesa, therefore they are all named
upaklda", which is missing in AKB V.
398 AKB V (p.312) (so also ADV V (p.308)) gives the same list of ten as the
list, and remarks that PrS (p.693c) lists only the first eight asparyavasthiina.
The Theravada mentions only sevenpariyutthiina which are the same as the seven anusaya:
kiimariiga, patigha, miina, di!thi, vicikicchii, hhavariiga, avijjii (Vbh p.383).
399 Cf. AKB Il (p.56) : styiinalfl katamat? ya kiiyag11rutii cittagurutii kiiyiikarma!Jyatii
cittakarma!Jyatii I ktlyikalfl styiinw'!l caitasikalfl styiinamityuktam ahhidharme I Cf. also ADV
lJ (p. 74) : styiinalfl kiiyacittiikarmw;yatii I
In the Theraviida Abhidhamma, thlna is always accompanied by middha. Definitions- thina:
"yii cittassa akalyatii akammaiiiiatii, oliyanii salliyanii . thiyitattam cittassa"; middha: "yii
kiiyassa (kiiya = niima-kiiya) akalyatii akammaiiiiatii ... middhalfl pacaliiyikii, soppalfl supinii
supitat!alfl "
207
400 Cf. AKB V(p.312) : kiiyasal!JdhiiraiJasamarthaseittiibhisamk[iepo middham 1 tattu
klifitameva paryavasthiinam /Cf. also ADV V (p.309) : kiiyaeittiikarma[Jyata middharp
eittiibhisal!Jkfiepa]J svapnakhyab; sa tu k/ifita eva paryavasthanam I
Both middha and kaukrtya are classified in AKB Il (p.57,58) as among the following eight
aniyata dharmas : kaukrtya, middha, vitarka, vieiira, riiga, pratigha, miina (Cf. IAKB, p. xii,
n.23; p.xiv). According to the may be either kusala, akusala or avyiikrta;
kaukrtya ( §4.5.33.4) may be kusala or akusala. But according to some,kaukrtya may also
be avyakrta(Ny, p.394b).
40 I AKB V (p .312) : auddhatyam eetaso 'vyupasamah Similarly in ADV V (p.309) :
eittavyupasantirauddhatyam
402 Cf. AKB I! (p.57) : kimidal!J kaukrtyal!J niima I kukrtasya bhiivah kaukrtyam I iha tu
puna]J kaukrtyalambano dharma]J kaukrtyamueyate eetaso vipratisara]J I tadyathii
silnyatiilambanal!J vimok$amukhal!J silnyatetyueyate asubhiilambanaseiilobho 'subha iti 1
loke'pi ea dr$ta]J sthanena sthiininamatidesa]J sarvo griima iigatab sarvo desa iigata iti 1
sthiinabhi1lal!J ea kaukrtyam vipratisarasya I phale vii hetilpaeiiro 'yam I yathoktal!J "$a(limiini
sparsayataniini pauriiiJal!J karma veditavyam" iti tSee also the following note.
403 Cf. AKB V (p.312): tat (middham) tu kli$tameva paryavasthiinam I kaukrtyarp ea !See
also n.402 above.
MVS (p.l91 b) gives the following- tetra lemma concerning kauk[tya, which shows
clearly that it may be either kusala or akusala: (i) a kusala kaukrtyawhich arises with regard
to an akusalasthiina, as in the case of someone regretting having done something bad (ii) an
akusa/a kaukrtyawhich arises with regard to akusa/asthana, as in the case of someone regret-
ting having done something good (iii) akusala kaukrtya which arises with regard to a
kusalasthiina, as in the case of someone regretting not having done a good deed well enough
(iv) an akusala kaukrtyawhich arises with regard to anakusalasthiina, as in the case of some-
one regretting not having done a bad deed well enough.
404 Cf. AKB li (p.59) : gu!Jefiu guiJavatsu ciigauravata apratisatii abhayamavasavartitii
iihrikyal!J gauravapratidvandvo dharma]J /I
405 Cf. AKB 11 (p.59) : avadyal!J niima yadvigarhitaf!J sadbhib I tatrabhayadarsitii
'napatriipyam I bhayamatriini$fal!J phalal!J bhiyate'smiiditi I
The question is then raised (loc. cit.) concerning the meaning of abhayadarsitva' : Is it
'abhayasya darsitani or 'bhayasya adarsitani? The questioner asserts that in the first case
208
one has a (defiled) prajfia(seeing wrongly); and in the second, ignorance (not seeing). The
answer is that this expression signifies neither seeing (wrongly) nor not seeing, but arupakle§a
dharrna (which is the cause of the two).
406 Cf. AKB V (p.312) : vyapadavihiipsiivarjitah sattvasattvayoriighiita]J krodhab ,Cf. also
ADV V (p.309): pariipakaranimittodbhavo'parityiigayogena caiJ(ffbhiivab krodha]J If or a
distinction between upaniiha and krodha, see n.393 above.
407 Cf. AKB V(p.312): avadyapracehiidanam mrak[ia/.1 Also, ADV V (p.308) : avadyal!J
ehiidayata]J eittiipalepo mrakfiab ; eitta/!1 mrakf$ayatiti mrakfia}J I
408 Cf. AKB V (p.312); MVS (p. 245c).
409 :R here is Xuan Zang's translation oftr$IJii, rather than riiga (as is more often the case).
Avatara(T) here has sred pa daii ma rig- clearly corresponding to tr$TJiividyii. See also fol-
lowing note.
410 Regardingmrak$8, AKB V (p.313) records the following disagreement:
mralcye viviida}J
trHJiinib$yanda ityeke I avidyiini/J$yanda ityapare I ubhayorityanye I yathiikramarp
jiiiitiijiiiitiiniimiti I
Vyakhya (p.494) : riij'iidibhir jfiiitiiniif!l mrak$avatam pudgaliiniil!J mrak$as tr!iTJii-ni$yandab I
mii me liibha-satkiiro na bhavi$yatiti I ajfiatiiniim avidyii-ni$yanda}J karmasvakatiim
asraddadhiina}J tad avadya/!1 praechiidayati I na parasyiif!ltike visuddhy-arthal!J desayatity
evam ubhaya-ni$yando mrak$a ity eke I
The same disagreement is also recorded in MVS (p.245c). The third opinion above (lbhay01?
is given there as the comment of the compilers of MVS: "One should say thus: It is the
of both [tr!iiJii and avidy§j: It may be either due to craving for reputation and gain,
or due to ignorance, that one conceals one's evil."
Following this section, Avatara(T) adds: dri ma rnam pa bcu po de dag mams kyali ne ba 'i
iion mons pa zes bya 'o- "There are ten mala; they are also known as upaklesa". We may
note that in the enumeration oftheeaitta above(§ 4.1), mala is not mentioned- both Avatiira
and Avatara(T) enumerate asrava immediately after paryavasthiina.
411 Cf. AKB 11 (p.54): si1k$mO hi eittacaittanal!J vise[ia}J I sa eva du]Jparicehedab praviihe[ivapi
tavat kil!l punab kfia1Je$U ... /Cf. also ADV 11 (p.70 f) :siik$ma}J khalu cittaeaittiiniif!l vise$0
209
duravadhiiro tiivad ... kimm1ga punaramllrtiinii1.n cittacaitasikiiniiq1 dharmiiiJiim auddhatya, and gives the total as fifty-four. This is in conformity with PrS which also in-
ekakaliipavartiniil!l sa tu hetuphalasvahhcivairmatimadbhirabhytihya iti 11 cludes the paryavasthiina in thebhavasrava. When asked why they do not follow PrS in this
regard, the of Kasmlra answers that the twoparyavasthana are not mentioned
412 Avatara(T): bcom Idem 'das kyi.1·- bhagavatal;. because they are not independent (ibid, loc.cit.). Vyakhyil:xplains that they are not indepen-
dent because they are associated withraga, etc.
413 Avatara(T): dbe bar g.i·egs pa 'i gswi rab- sugatasya pravacanam
This question occurs in MVS (p.248b): "Question: Why is it that whereas thqJaryavasthana
414 This criticism is clearly directed at the some of whom assert are in the kamasrava, ogha, yoga and upadana; they are completely excluded in thebhavasrava,
that only citta exists apart from which there is no caitta, while others (represented by Sthavira etc? Some say that the paryavasthiina are also included in the bhaviisrava, etc., up to
Srilata in Ny, p.388b, 284b, etc.) acknowledge only the three mahclbhiimika-dharmas: vedanii, atmaviida-upiidiina PrakaraiJa-piida-siistrasays, "What is bhaviisrava? All the sarpyojana,
swnjiii'i, cetanc'i. See supra, n.234. bandhana, anusaya, upaklesa and paryavasthiina in the riipa and iiriipya dhiitu, excluding the
avidya. One should say thus: Because theparyavasthiinain the upper dhiituare few and not
Ny (p.395a) : "Some assert 'there exists only the citta; there is no caitta apart independent, they are not enumerated asbhaviisrava, etc., up to atmaviida-upadana"
from it .. Among those who assert the separate existence of caitta, there arise much contro-
versies: some assert there are only three mahiibhrtmika-dharmas, [vedanii, swnjna, cetanii]; SaJT!ghabhadra (Ny, p.640c) explains thus: "Thek/esa in the two upper dhiitu, excluding
some assert there are four; some, ten; some, fourteen .. " See also Introduction, §VII. moha- fifty-two dravya- are collectively named bhaviisrava i.e., twenty-six fundamental
klesa in each of the two upper dhiitu.
415 Same three in AKB V (p.306) and ADV V (p.297). The acknowledge only
two iisrava : avidyiismva and as they consider the former to be the root of "Although there also exist styiina and auddhatya in the riipa and iiriipya dhiitu, the
the piirviinta-pratftyasamutpiida and the latter that of apariinta-pratityasamutpiida (MVS. paryavasthiina should not be classified according todhiitu, as the paryavasthiina in the upper
p. 245a) dhiitu are few and not independent. Therefore only theklesa are mentioned as the bhaviisrava.
If the paryavasthiina are also classified according todhiitu, then bhaviisrava comprise fifty-
Cf. Vism (Paf\filibhumi): Iassa kho bhavacakkassa avijjii tal}hii ciiti dve dhammii m!ilanti six dravya. Hence PrS says: "What is bhavasrava? ... "
veditabbii: tadetal!l pubbantii haranato avijjii mlilmr vedaniivasiinam, aparantasandhiinato
taf}hii mlilm?l jariimaraiJ{tvasiinanti duvidhm!J hoti. Cf. also ADV V (p.298): bhaviisrava]J catu$paiiciisad dravyiiiJi I riigamiinau virpsati]J I B$fau
vicikitsii]J I caturvif!1sati dr$tyo'vidyiirp hitvii I dve ea paryavasthiine styiinauddhatyiikhye,
416 Cf. AKB V (p.306) : vmjayitvii 'nye kiimiivacariil; kleiiil; saha paratantratviit. I
kiimiisravo veditm;va I paiicaprakiiriimavidyiif!l
hitvii dasa paryavasthiinclni I Same number in ADV V (p.297). 419 Cf. AKB V (p.306) : kirp puna]J kiiraiJarp riipiirfipyiivacarii anusayii]J samasyaiko
bhiiviisrava ukta]J I ... te hyubhaye'pyavyiikrtii antarmukhapravrttii]J samiihitabhiimikiisceti
417 There is a variant reading of 'fifty-two'; but Avatara(T) comfirms 'fifty-four'. This · trividhena siidharmyer:Jaikatiih I
latter figure would make it a non-Kasmlrian view which gives fifty-two- MVS (p.243c):
'The hhaviisrava have fifty-two entities of the nipa- and iinipya- dhiitu as their svabhiiva: 420 Cf. AKB V (p.306 f) : ... ityavidyediinif!1 traidhiitukyiividyiisrava iti siddham I tani
ten rclga, ten miina, twenty-four dr,5fi, and eight vicikitsii.' See also the following note. paficiidasa dravyiiTJi I kirp kiiralJamasau prthagvyavasthiipyate I sarve$iif!1 hi te$iil!l
mii.Jamavidyetyisraval) p,-thak 113611
418 Cf. AKB V(p.306) : nipiinipyiivacarii avidyiivarjyii bhaviisravo 421 Avatlira(T): khams gsum du 'jog ste mya flan las 'da' ba 'i bar chad byed pa 'i phyir:.
dvclpaiiciisaddravyiif}i I riipiivacariil; paiicaprakadividyii1'!7 hitvii I "because they keep [beings] in the threedhiitu, and obstruct Nirval).a"
iinipyclvacariil; $CI(IVil!lsatil; I
422 AKB(C) V (p.l 08a) explains the meaning otasrava in virtually identical words as those
We note that our text includes the two pm:vavasthiina in the two upper dhiitu, styiina and in our text. AKB V (p.308) reads : iisayanti saf!1siire isravanti bhaviigriidyiivadavicil!l

210 211
 SKANDHILA'S ABHIDHARMAVATARA

$adbiJirayatanavraQairityasravah I
ADV {p.299) gives the same total and break down :... kiimaugha ekannatri1)1sat dravyiiryi I
riigapratighamiinii/:1 paficadasa I viciktsascatasrah I dasa paryavasthiinaniti I
Cf. ADV (p.220): abiJaviigramupiidiiya yiivadavici1)1 sravanti sravayanti va
bhavaugho '$(iivirpsatirdravyiiQi I riigamanii virpsati/:1 I vicikitsii 8$(au I df$tyoghaf:J !faljtrirpsad
cittasantatimityasravii!1
dravyiiQi I avidyaugha/:1 paiicadasadravyiiQi I evameva yoga dra!ffavyii/:1 11

The MVS (p.244a-b) gives six meanings ofiisrava: (i) to keep/detain- they keep beings in
425 Cf. AKB V (p.308) : harantityoghah.
the three spheres of existence; (ii) to moisten or soak- just as when seeds are soaked in a wet
vessel, they give rise to sprouts; likewise thekarma-seeds when soaked in the k/esa-vessel
MVS (p.247a) gives three meanings: theklesa etc., are called ogha because they cause beings
give rise to future existences; (iii) to discharge or ooze- just as water oozes from a spring,
to revolve in sarpsara by (i) drifting them about, (ii) pouring onto them torrentially, (iii)
and milk from breast; likewise theiisravaooze from the six wounds ofbeings' (iv) to confine
submerging them (in the ocean ofsa1)1siira).
-just as when confined by others, one is unable to travel everywhere at will, likewise beings
are confined by klesa to move round the variousdJJatu, gati, and yoni, and are unable to move
426 Cf. AKB V (p.308) : sle$ayantiti yogiih;AKB V (p.220) : yojayantiti yogiih . Cf. also
freely towards the nirviiQa-dhatu; (v) to bewitch - just as when one is bewitched by a
MVS (p.247b); ADV (p.298).
spirit, one says what should not be said, does what should not be done, and thinks what
should not be thought; likewise beings bewitched by theklesa give rise to evil corporeal,
427 Cf. AKB V (p.307): kiimayoga eva sahiividyayii kiimopiidiinam catustri1)1saddravyiiQi I
vocal and mental acts; (vi) to intoxicate- just as when one has consumed too much of alcohol
riigapratighamiinii'vidyiivirpsatirvicikitsiiscatasro dasa paryavasthiiniini I
derived from roots, stems, branches, leaves, flowers, fruits etc., one does not know what
should or should not be done, one is immodest f(lhri), shameless (anatriipa), topsy-turvy, and
428 MVS (p.248a): Question: Why is it namediitmaviidopiidiina? Is it by reason ofiikiira or
indulgent.
by reason ofiilambana? If it is by reason ofiikiira, then the satkiiyadr$fishould be named
iitmaviidopadiina as it is activated by the mode ofatman (iitmiikiirapravartita). If it is by
The Sabdavadins explain that 'a' means '[from] here up to there', 'srava' means 'flowing'.
reason of iilambana, then, all dharmas being withoutiitman, how can one speak of a
The klesa are called 'iisrava' because they carry beings adrift insaJ!lsiiraup to bhaviigra(ibid.
'iitmaviidopiidiina'? "
loc.cit.).

"Answer: It is not named iitmaviidopiidiina by reason of iikiira or iilambana, as this would

423 Cf. AKB V (p.307); ADV V (p.298t).
entail the above-mentioned fallacies. Theklesa in the kiimadhiitu, excluding the dr!fti, are
designated as kiimopiidiina The klesa in the riipa and iiriipya dhiitu, excluding the dr$ti, are
424 Avatara(T) mentions the figure I Jtsa brgyad po, as the total number of dravya
designated as iitmaviidopiidiina."
of avidyaugha- which is definitely a textual corruption. The I 08, however, is the total num-
ber of dravya constituting all the fourogha given by the even though our text
"Question: Why is this so? Answer: Thek/esa in the kiimadhiitu are named kiimopiidiina
gives a total of 110.
because they arise in dependence on sexual desire, external objects (ti$aya), various objects
of enjoyment (bhoga), and the bodies of other beings. Thek/e5a in the riipa and iiriipya dhiitu
MVS {p.247a) explains this figure as follows:" What do these fourogha have as their svabhiiva
are named iitmaviidopiidiina because they are of an opposite nature and arise internally"
? Answer: They have I 08 dravya as their svabhiiva, as follows: The kamaugha have twenty-
nine dravya of the kiimadhiitu as their svabhava- five raga, five pratigha, five miina, four
"Further, in effecting (nir- "vrt) the internal body, theklesa in the kiimadhiiturequire sexual
vicikitsii, ten paryavasthiina; the bhavaugha has twenty-eight dravya ofthe riipa- and
desire, require external objects, require objects of enjoyments, require a second [being]; thus
dhiitu as their svabhava- ten raga, ten mana, eight vicikitsii; the dr:?tyogha has thirty-six
they are designated as kiimopiidiina The k/esa in the riipa- and iiriipya- dhiitu operate in a
dravya of the three dhatu as their svabhiiva- twelve dr$ti, each, of the kiima-, riipa- and
manner opposite to this in effecting the internal body; thus they are designated as
iiriipya- dhiitu; avidyaughahas fifteen dravyaofthe three dhiituas their svabhiiva- the avidyii
iitma viidopiidiina."
of each of the five classes ofprahiitavya of the kama-, riipa- and ariipya- dhatu."

212
213
 ENTRANCE INTO THE SUPREME DOCTRINE
"Further, in effecting the internal body, theklesa in the kamadhatu depend solely on non-
concentration, and mostly rely on external operation and external activities; thus they are
designated as kamopadana The klesa in the riipa- and ariipya- dhatu, in effecting the internal
body, depend on concentration, and mostly rely on internal operation and internal activities;
thus they are designated asatmavadopadana"
"Further, the klesa in the kamadhatu can effect neither huge physical bodies nor great life-
span; thus they are designated askamopadana The klesa in the riipa- and ariipya- dhatu can
effect huge physical bodies, like those of theakani$tha deva which are 16,000 yojana tall;
and great life-span, like those in thenaivasaf!J}iianiisarpjnayatan<j which are 80,000 mahii-
kalpa. Thus they are designated asatmavadopadiina."
429 Cf. AKB V (p.307): bhavayoga eva sahiividyaya atmaviidopadiinam B$(atrif!Jsaddravyiivi
I riigamiiniividyiistrif!JSadvicikitsii a$(aul Note that this figure (thirty-eight) differs from that
in our text.
430 Cf. AKB V (p.307): dr$tiyogacchilavrataf!1 ni$k!$YB dr$tyupadiina!)1 trirpsaddravyfiiJi 1
431 Cf. AKB V (p.307): si/avratopiidiinaf!J $Br/gravyaiJi karmadr$tibhyo ni$kf$tam I
As in the case of yoga, our text gives a total of 110. This time,AvaHira(T) fully agrees with
our text. MVS (p.247b), however, gives 108- as do AKB (p.307) and ADV (p.299 f)-
differing with regard to iitmavadopadawhich comprises thirty-eightdravya in MVS.
432 Cf. AKB V (p.307) miirgapratidvandvitvadubhayapak$avipralambhanacca I grhiiJO'
pyanena vipralabdha anasanadibhib svargamargasaf!J}iiaya pravrajitii
api$(avi$ayaparivarjanena suddhipratyagamanaditti /Cf. Also ADV (p.300); MVS (p.248a).
'sbyafls pa 'i yon tan yari dag par blaris pa; in A vatara(T) here, together with the Chinese
confirms 'dhfita-guiJa-samiidiimi.
433 Cf. AKB V (p.308): upagrhiJantiti upiidanani.
The three meanings given in our text also occur among the following definitions given in
MVS (p.247c): "They are namedupadana because of three reasons: because they (i) grasp,
(ii) collect, and (iii) select. And again, because of two reasons they are namedrpadana: (i)
they cause karma to blaze up- the upadiina cause the karma-fire of beings in the fivegatito
be constantly ablaze; (ii) their mode of activity is forceful i.e. their mode of activity
214
SKANDHfLA'S ABHIDHARMAVATARA
is extremely daring.
"Question: What is the meaning ofupiidiina? Answer: the meaning ofupiidana is (i) 'fuel'
... ; (ii) envelopment ... (these two are the same as those in our text); (iii) harming- Just as
when the body is repeatedly pierced by sharp poisonous thorns, it becomes ruined; likewise
when the dharma-body of a being is repeatedly pierced by the poisonousthorns of klesa, it
becomes ruined."
434 This topic is not disussd in AKB. These four are already in the Palisutta- Cf. S V (p.
59); D lii (p.230). It occurs in ADV V{p.305) as follows:
punaranye bhagavatii siitre-
[370] dvipalcyagranthaniid granthiiscatviira}J samudiihrtii}J I
abhidhyiikhyiistathii pariimadadvaya171 tathii 11
tatra grhi abhidhyayii vi$aye$U grathitastadvyiighiitakartr$u vivadamiirabhamiino
dve$eiJiinubadhyate I pravrajitab silavratapariimarsagrathitastadapaviidasravaiJiididameva
satyamiti satyiibhinivesapariimar8ena df$tiparamarsakhyena badhyate I iti catvaro bhavanti I
I (Cf MVS, p.292a).
Asm (p.48): granthiiscatviirab I abhidhyakayagrantha}J vyiipiidakiiyagranthab
si/ a V ra taparamarsakiiyagran tha}J ta tsatyabhin i ve8opiidanakiiyagran thasca I
samiihitamana]Jsvabhiivasya kiiyasya parigranthiirthena grantho veditavyab I ten a kim bhavati
I caturvidharp cittaf!J vik$ipyate I cittadi$U anunayahetob cittaf!l vik$ipyate I vivadavasfU$U
apratipattihetob cittaf!J vik$ipyate I duskarasilavratadubkhaheto]J cittaq1 vik$ipyate I ayoniso
jfleyasantiraiJahetob cittarp vik$ipyate !I
MVS (p.248c) enumerates them in the same order, and gives a total of twenty-eighdravya as
their svabhava: five each, of the five classes ofprahatavya in the kamadhiitu, for abhidhya
and vyiipiida kiiyagrantha; six for belonging to two classes
of prahiitavya in each of the three dhiitu; twelve for idaf!lsatyiibhinivesa-kiiyagrantha, be-
longing to the four classes ofprahatavya in each of the three dhatu.
435 According to DA on thesangitipariyiiya-sutta, 'kaya' here refers to niima and riipa:
ganthanavasena ganthii. vattasmirp niimakayaflcevo riipakiiyanca ganthati, bandhati,
pa/ibhandhatiti. So also Vism, p.683. But according to Dhammapala qyettiprakarana,
NayasamuHhiinaviira, p.I69),' kiiya' here refers to niimakiiya: abhijjhiiya namakiiyarp
ganthatiti ghattetiti attho.
MVS (p.248c) gives two meanings ofgrantha: (i) kaya-bandhana, (ii) pratisaf!ldhi-bandhana.
215

ENTRANCE INTO THE SUPREME DOCTRINE
436 Cf. AKB V (p.318) yiini .nitre panca nivarm:riini uktiini kiimacchando vyiipiidah
styiinamiddhamauddhatyakauJcrtyaiJl vicikitsii ea I Abhidhammatthasangaha adds avijja
the list, making six nfvarw:ra (See Compendium, p.172 and note).
MVS (p.l94c-195a): "As is said in the sutra, there are five nivaral)a: ( i ) kiimacchanda, (ii)
vyiipiida, (iii) styiina-middha, (iv) auddhatya-kaukrtya, (v) vicikitsii. There may be some
who harbour doubt [thinking that] there are only five In order to dispel this doubt,
it is shown here that outside these five nivaral)a, there is a sixth, i.e. avidyiinivaral)a, ... [But]
although avidyiinu.faya is also a nivaral)a, it is not mentioned among the five nivaral)a
owing to its heaviness; the Bhagavat has separately designated it as the sixth nivaral)a:
avidyii is separately mentioned because it is heavy compared to the previous five nivaral)a
which are of equal strength." For the reason for the order of enumeration of the five, see ibid,
p.250c; AKB(F) V, p.l 00, n.3.
437 The five nivaral)a are found in the kiimadhiitu alone, as they are purely akusala. Cf.
AKB V (p. 318): "keva/o 'yaiJl pariptin;o pan ea nivaral)iinf"
I
kiime nivara1J(ini
niinyatra dhiitau I
438 Ny (p.648c) gives the same definition. MVS (p.249c) gives the following six mean-
ings for the term nivaral)a: to block (same description as in our text), to cover, to break, to be
ruined, to fall, to recline.
439 Same as in AKB III (p.lll ).
440 Same as in AKB HI (p.lll ), except that AKB adds the Mahiibrahma heaven to make
seventeen regions. The enumeration of sixteen regions represents the Kiismirian view: saha
tanniviisibhil; sattvail; .yo{iaseti kiismiriil; I brahmapurohite.yveva kila
mahiibrahmal)ah parigaf}a iviibhinivrttamekaniiyakaiJl natu bhumyantaramiti I
The enumeration of seventeen regions represents the view of the western masters (MVS, p.
85b). The Sautriintika, (Sriliita) on the other hand considers the two as regions and hence
enumerates eighteen (Ny, p.457a), as do the foreign masters who hold that there are nine
distinct abodes in the fourth dhyiina (MVS, p.784b).
441 Cf. AKB IIf (p.ll2): nahyarnpiTJii'!l sthiinamasti I atitiiniigatavijnaptyarnpil)o hi dharmii
iiddasthii iti niyamal; I sa tu ... upapattibhedena caturvidha iirupyadhiitul; I yaduta
iikiiSii na n tyiiyatanaiJl vUfiiiniinan tyiiyatanam iikiiJlcanyiiya tanaiJl naivasaiJl}fiii-
niisaiJl)niiyatanam iti I
216
;') AtsHIUHAKMAVAJ AKA
442 Cf. AKB Ill (p.ll4 ).
443 Cf. AKB VII (p.394); AD\' VII (p.373).
MVS (p.546b ff) discusses the eightjniina- the first eight in our text- enumerated in JPS.
While justifying the total of eight enumerated therein as being in conformity to that enumer-
ated by the Buddha Himself in the sutra, it comments that the number may also be variously
enumerated - ranging from two to ten - in different contexts in the siistras as well as the
siitras, and this does not constitute any contradiction with regard to The
enumeration of eight in JPS is said to be a discourse in the Middle (madhya-desanii), chosen
for the reason that it fully subsumes all the jfiiina: The enumeration often, though likewise
fully subsuming alljnana, is an elaborative discourse (vistare!Ja desanii), while that of two is
a discourse in brief (Sa1Jl4iptenalsa1Jl4epato desana).
444 i.e. the paths (=the thought moments) which are superior (visi$(a) to the fruits already
acquired (Cf. AKB V, p.61; VI, p.32, p.65).
445 The same descriptions for the two are found in PrS (p.693c), JPS (p.957b), SgPS (p.
393c ). The one in JPS is quoted in Vyiikhyii (p.616 f): tathii hi siistra uktaiJl dharma:jiiiinaiJl
katamat I kiima-pratisaiJlyllkte$11 SGIJlskiire.yu yad aniisravaf11 jiiiinaiJl I kiima-
pratiSGI!!YllktiinaiJl saiJlskiiriil)iif!l hetau yad aniisravmp.jniinam I kiima-pratisaiJlyuktiiniirrz
saiJlskiiriil)iiJ?'I nirodhe yad aniisravat!l jniinaiJl I kiima-pratisaq1yuktiiniiJ?1 samskiiriil}iif!I
prahiil)iiya marge yad aniisravaiJl jfiiinaiJl. I idam ucyate dharma-jniinam I api khalu dharma-
jiiiine dharma-jiiiina-bhlimau ea yad aniisravaiJl jiiiinam I idam ucyate dharma-jiiiinam. If
446 Cf. AKB VI (p.350): prathamato dharmatattvajnaniiddharmajiiiinam I
tadanvayiidtirdhval!l dul;khiilambanamanvayajniinam I tathaiviinugamaniit !.
Yyiikhyii (p.542) explains: prathamato dharma-tattva-jfiiiniid iti iidito duhkhiidi-dharma-
tattva-jliiiniid ityarthal; I tad-anvayatviid iti tad-dhetukatvad ityarthal; I
The meaning seems to be this: The fundamental spiritual error is the or iitmagriiha.
By means of this dharmajfiiina (at the moment of dharmajiianak$iinti ) one for the first time
sees truly (yathiibhlitam) that the so-called iitma is nothing apart from the conditioned
dharma - substantially real according to the Abhidharmika - and hence becomes an iirya-
pudgala. This is the first realization of the true nature ofdharma (dharmatattva). Vyiikhyii
explains this dharmatattva as the unsatisfactoriness (dul;kha), etc., of the dharma.
MVS (p.547c-548a; Cf. also p.380b): "Question: Why is it named dharmajniina? Answer:
217
 t:.NIKANU:.JNJV JH.t.;)Ut'Kt:.Mt:. AI::IHIUHAK.MAVATARA

The [object-] substance ofknowledge are the dharma ( i.e. it discerns the dharma), therefore
it is named dharmajiiiina. Question: If so, why are the other know ledges, whose [object-]
substances are also the dharma, not named dharmaj1iiina? Answer: Although the [object-]
substances of all knowledges are the dharma, yet only one of them is designated dharmajiiiina.
Just as: the substances of the eighteen dhiitu, the twelve iiyatana, the seven bodhywiga, ...
are the dharma; and yet [in each case] only one receives the designation dharrna [-
dharmadhiitu, dharnu/yatana, dharmapravieaya, respectively, ... ]. The same applies here;
therefore it should not be criticized."
"And again, the dharmajiiana has only one name i.e. the common name; the other know ledges
[each] has two names, the common name and the specific name. It is for the sake of distinc-
tion that the specific name is mentioned. And again, it is named dharmajfiiina because it
discerns the dharma for the first time. That which discerns the dharma subsequently is named
anvayajiiiina. And again, it is named dharmajiiana when one acquires the
dharmiivetyaprasada-sm?Jprayukta:iiiiina ) for the first time. When one ac-
quires it subsequently, it is named anvayajiianam. And again, it is named dharmajfiiina as it
is the [for the first time] with regard to the phenomenal dharma. That which
is acquired subsequently is named anvayajiiiinam ... ".
c). See also following note.
447 Ny (p.735c) records an opinion held by certain masters that 'anvaya' here means com-
parison ( .tt:tl'f ): the comparison of facts not directly perceived with those which are directly
perceived. lt receives the name anvyajiitlna as it is subsumed under inference (anumclna ).
Salflghabhadra argues against this opinion, saying that in the siitra both dharma and
anvayajiilina are spoken of as capable of seeing truly etc. Yyiikhyii (p.542) explains
tad-anvaya as taddhewka - having the dharmajiiclna as cause - thus dissenting from the
view.
Harivarrnan (SatS, p.245) too rejects the Sarviistivada definition above and declares his ad-
herence to the sutra when giving the same opinion thus: "The know ledge of the present
dharma is named dharmaj1iana. As it is said in the sutra, the Buddha told A.nanda, ' With
regard to these dharma, see thus, know thus, penetrate thus. Know the past and future [dharma
] also thus. The knowledge of the remaining- i.e. the past and future- dharmas is named
anvayajiiiina . ... dharmajiiclna is ( JR. "J!i' ). Following this dharmajiiclna one
deliberates and knows inferentially- this is called anvayajiiclna." See also the preceding
note.

These explanations on dharmajtiiina tally with that given in our text, and pohibit us from 448 It can also have as objects the svalak:jarW and sclnu/nyalak:;ar;a of dharma -Cf. AKB
rendering it as "knowledge of the Doctrine" (contra Velthem, p.45). It is dharmajiiiina in the (C) VII (pp.2b and lOb); Ny (p.735c); MVS (p.548b).
sense of 'knowledge of the true nature of dharma' -which is nairiitmya. The attainment of
this brings one to the point of no-return - one becomes an arya-pudgala, never to relapse 449 MYS (p.490c): "Question: why is the prajiia which is conjoined with the five
again (according to the Sarviistiviida and others) to become a prthagjana. Its pivotal impor- vijiiiina-kiiya not dr,1·ri? Answer: That whose iikiira is sharp (tik,I·IJa) and which enters
tance is comparable to the Mahiiyiina notion of the attainment of deeply in to the alambana, therefore it is not named Again, because can dis-
which effects an irreversibility such that the bodhisattva will never regress to spiritual individu- criminate and this prajiiii cannot; because dr,wi can have svalak.Jar;a as objects;
alism: The doctrine of nairiitmya for the Abhidharmika is as central as that for the can have (dharma ot] the three periods of time and the a.I"W?Jskrta as objects, and this prajiiii
Mahiiyiinist. can have only the present [dharma] as objects; because can apprehend objects repeatedly,
and this prajfic/ can apprehend objects for only a kyar;a; because deliberates and exam-
In the MVS explanations quoted above, one describes the dharmajiiiina as the ines the iilambana, and this prajfiii does not."
dhann(/vetyaprasiida-sw?Jprayukta-jiiiina, where dharma appears to mean the Buddha's Doc-
trine. When explaining dharmiivetyaprasiida, the canonical abhidharrna texts (e.g., SPrS. 450 For the distinction among hcynti,jiiiina, and drsti, all of which have the caitta prajfiii
fas. 6; DSS, fas. 2) refer unambiguously to the Dharma taught by the Buddha, as being well- as svabhiiva, Cf. AKB VII (p.391 ):
spoken etc.- the usual formula for Dharma as the second of the triratna. This
may present problem to our understanding of dharmajfiiina as given above. However, for the kin1 najfiiinaq1 samyagj11iinam ea na /
Vaibhii:?ika, dharmiivetyprasiida in concrete terms refers to the aniisrava-,fraddh(/ which has niimalii 4iintayojiiclnwp
as its iilambana the following: the three aniisrava-indriya and .faik._w- and asaik._m-dharma in tatpraheyasya vicikitsii / santira!1£itmakatviit
the body of the pratyeka-buddhas; the two aniisrava-indriya and other saik:;a-dharma in the yathii ea dr:;tirna jiiiinamevw11
body of the bodhisattva; and the three Truths- samudaya, nirodha. (MVS, p.533b- k._sayiinutpiidadhirna drk /

218 219
 ENTRANCE lNTO THE SUPREME DOCTRINE

k.,1·aya:iiiiinamanutpiidajiiiina111 ea na I Van Velthem wrongly takes IJH here to correspond to viSe,l'a (it could however be ),
which he then wrongly interprets as 'espixes'. Neither can Avatara(T), which gives mchog,
tadanyobhayathiirya dhi/J
here clearly an adjective, justify this interpretation. The AKB passage quoted above would
kyiintik.,1·ayiinutpiidajiiiinehhyo 'nyii 'niisravii prajiiii jiiiinmr1 ea/
suggest utkriin ta.
anya jniinaJtl
laukiki prajiiii sarvaiva jiiiinam I 454 Similar definition given in JPS (p.957b) and PrS (p.694a). Cf. also Vyakhya (p.617):
drsa3ca /I 1 11 akiirato duiJkhasamudayajiiiine iti I iikiirata eva niilambunata/J paiicopiidlinaskandha-
paiica laukiki ea I /aukiki anyii na tayor abhedclt I tathii hi siistre uktal!l - "dubkhajnclnW!l katamat?
/jiiiina111 ciinyii ea I paiicopiidiinaskandhiin anityato dul;khatab s1inyato 'ncltmata.\:ca manasikurvato
yadanclsrava111 jiiiinam "I
Cf. also MVS (pp. 489b-493b). See also Dhammajoti, K., "The Abhidharma Controversy on
Visual Perception", in Recent Researches in Buddhist Studies, pp. 70- 117. 455 Similar definition given in JPS (p.957b), and PrS (p.694a)

451 Avatiira(T): titi tie 'dzin !as skyes pa 'i .\:es pa gati gian dag sems dati sems /as byun ha
da ltar byun ha pa dan 'dra ha 'dod pa dan I zag pa med pa kha cig .\:es pa gati yin pa 1
Similar definition given in PrS (p.694a) and JPS (p.956b)
Cf. also Vyiikhya (p.617; see also the preceding note): tathii hi sclstra ukta111 "
samudayajiilinaf!1 katamat I siisrava111 hetuka111 hetutal;
pratyayata.l:ca manasikurvato yad aniisravlll!l jiilinam" I

Contra Velthem 's (p.4 7) translation. The Tibetan, .\:es pa dati 'dra ha, may suggest the
rendering: "which are similar in kind to the knowledge [of the knower]". Siira explains that
'similar' here means 'similar in nature' - a siisrava-paracittajiiiina knows the siisrava-
cittacaitta of others; an aniisrava-paracittajiiiina knows the aniisrava-cittacaitta of others.
Similar and more elaborate explanations are given in MVS (p.515c).
456 Similar definition given in JPS (p.957b) and PrS (p.694a). Cf. also Vyiikhyii (p.617):
clkiiriilamhanato nirodhamiirgqjiiiine iti I iikiiratas c 'cihu!lhanatasca nirodhamiirgajiiiine
vyavasthiipye/e I tathii hi uktam "nirodhamargajiiiina1rr katamat I nirodhal!l
pra!Jitato nil;sara!Jatasca manasikurvato yad anosravwn jiiiinam I
457 Similar definition given in JPS (p.957b), and PrS (p.694a)

452 Cf. MVS (pp.515b-517a). See also the following note.
453 Thus, the paracittajiiiina of the .\:raddhiivimukta and samayavimukta ii1ya do not know
the thoughts of the and asamayavimukta iirya who are of stronger faculties. In
terms of the states of spiritual attainments, the paracittqjiiiina of an inferior iirya does not
know the thoughts of a superior iirya, in the following order : aniigiimin, arhat,
pratyekabuddha, SOI!IYllksW!i buddha.
Cf. Vyiikhyii (p.617): tathii hi siistra uktW[l "... miirgajliiinal!l katamat? miirgal!l miirgato
nyiiyatab pratipattito nait:vii1Jikatasca manasikurvato yad aniisravajiiiinam "I
MVS (p.409c) gives various reasons as to why, of the four iikiira, only miirga is used for the
name ofthisjiiiina. One of the reasons given is: Because nyiiya may be confounded with the
sense of"logic", pratipatti may be either siisrava or aniismva, naiyiinika may refer also to
Nirviil)a.

Cf. AKB VII (p.393): tasya pwwraya111 niyamaiJ 458 Cf. AKB VII (p.394): katamat? duiJkhm!l me parijiiotamiti jiiniiti I
bhiimya/cyapudgalotkranta'fl na vetti tat 115 11 samudayaiJ prah'il}o miirgo hhiivita iti jiiniiti I tadupiidiiya yat jiiiinm.n
bhzimyatikriinta111 na jiiniititi I adharadhyiinabhllmikenottaradhyiinabhiimikam darsana111 vidyii huddhirhodhil; prqjnli iiloko 'hhisamayam idam ucyate k,myajiitmam I Similar
indriyiitikriinta111 na jiiniiti I sraddhiidhimuktasamayamuktamiirgeiJa definitions in PrS (p.694a) and SgPS (p.376a).
dr$fipriiptiisamayavimuktamiirgal!1 pudgalotkriintal!l na jiiniiti I aniigiimyarhac
chriivakapratyekahuddhabuddhamiirgiil}iimadharel}ottaral!l na jiiniiti I
MVS (p.528c-529a): "One should say thus: lt is because it arises in one who has exhausted
atitiiniigata/?1 vartamiinaparacitta-caittavi,l·ayatvot I ki111 ea bhiiyal;
all klesa that it is named knowledge of exhaustion. Question: if so, then anutpcldajiiiina and
ta 'nya'fl
the asaik!fi should also be called know ledges of exhaustion. Answer: It is named
paracittajniinamanvayajniinapakifYlll!l cittal!l na jiinoti I
ea na jiinciti I kiimadhiitiirdhvadhatuprati{pa] knowledge of exhaustion only if it arises for the first time in one who has exhausted all kle!ia
... I Cf. also MVS (p.515b-c).

220 221
 and if it exists in all cases .The .\"W!l.Yagdrsfi, though existing in all cases, does not
arise for the first time. The anlllpiidaj1iiina does not exist in all cases, as the samayavimukta
iilya do not possess it; it also does not arise for the first time, as its appearance necessarily
follows that of k,wyajiiiina. "
"Some say that it is named knowledge of exhaustion because it has exhaustion as its object.
Question: lt has the Four Noble Truths as objects; how can it be that it has exhaustion as
object? Answer: By reason of the excellence of exhaustion, the knowledge is named after it
alone: i.e. Among the Four Truths, the Truth of Cessation (nirodha-satya) is most excellent,
being of the nature of Nirval)a, and being wholesome and permanent. [Accordingly], the
knowledge which has this as its object is named after it. Hence it receives the name knowl-
edge of exhaustion."
459 Cf. AKB Vll (p.394): anutpiidajiiiinw_n katamat I me parijiiiila111 na
par(j1ieyamiti jiiniiti ye/vat miirgo hhiivito na punarhhiivitavya iti I tadupiidiiyeti vistareiJoktaf!l
i;iistre I Similar definitions in PrS (p.694a) and SgPS (p.376a).
460 MVS (p.489b): "There are again others who assert that the ksaya- and amttpiida-jiiiina
are also of the nature of In order to counteract their assertion, we show that these [two]
have ceased reasoning, and do not judge (asantira!Ja) any more- (hence] arejiiiina and not
MVS (p.489b ff) defines prajiiii, dr.yfi andjiiiina; and explains their inter-relationship. It
gives the defining characteristics of jiiiina as being full, ultimate, thorough knowing.
Dharmatrata requires that "it is only the thorough seeing of a thing that can be qualified as
jiiiina". According to is derived through repeated examination. (See Dhammajoti,
op. cit., pp. 77 ff).
461 The figure, six, is problematic: Besides the last two, and paracittajiiiina, there should be
seven remaining; not six! Avatara(T) differs a little here: pa 'di giiis rtogs pa ma yin pas
Ita ha 'i hdag iiid ma yin no I !hag ma gian ni Ita ha 'i bdag 1iid du 'gnth po I: "These two, not
being of the nature of reasoning, are not of the nature of dr,l·ti; it is [thus] established that the
rest are of the nature of
It seems that either Xuan Zang miscalculated to give the figure six, or the Chinese and Ti-
betan versions genuinely differ here. According to MVS (p.546c): the last two are not of the
nature of the other eight "are of the nature of bothjiiiina and drsti ". Apart from the
apparent miscalculation, however, Xuan Zang's (possibly) interpretive rendering is not nec-
essarily erroneous : Apart from the last two, the other eight may be of the nature of of
the eight,paracittajiiiina is exclusively of this nature., the remaining seven may be either..
222
462 Cf. AKB VII (p.402).
463 The Chinese R:"!ii'F here conveys the sense of patiently approving/affirming.
464 k;>clnti may be regarded as a lower degree of insight than jiiiina which is a thorough,
decisive insight. It investigates but is still not exempted from doubt with regard to the object
cognized; it catches the klda, but cannot cut it. It is by thejiiiina, exempt from doubt, that the
klda are cut(§ 4.5.41.2). Cf. MVS (p.490b).
According to the Bhadanta (Dharmatrata), "only that which sees a thing thoroughly is desig-
nated asjiiiina. It is not the case that at first, when the arises, one sees a thing thoroughly;
hence although the aniisrava k:jiinti are in actual factjiiana, they are not named as such."
(ibid). Cf. also AKB(F) VII (p.l, n.2b ); note 460 above.
465 Avatara(T): eh os pa ymi de dag gi mya 1ian !as 'das pa 'i riied pa nas hzwi ste skye
'o : "And dharmc1jiiiina arises following the obtaining of nin'iiJ:w (=cessation =
nirodha = viSW!1yoga) of these
466 AKB VJI (p.352) explains: The are called the irresistible path as they cannot be
obstructed (antarayitum asakyatviit) in the cutting (viccheda) of the priipti of the kle!;a. The
jiiiina are called vimuktimiirga because in those who are thus liberated from the priipti of
these kle!;a, they eo-arise with the
sa 111 ghabhadra (Ny, p.690a) criticizes: "If so, the vimukti-miirga should also be named
iinantarya, in as much as its eo-nascence also cannot be obstructed. Rather, one should ex-
plain thus: it is called iinantwya because there exists no antara (nothing in between); iinantarya
itself is the miirga, hence the name iinantmya-miirga. The meaning is that there is not any
miirga of the same species which can come in between , preventing it from becoming the
condition for the [arising] of the vimukti-miirga; for the iinantwya-miirga all last only one
k,miJa, while the vimukti-miirga may continue as a series ... "
MVS (p.465c): "There are some, like the western who hold that only the iinantarya-
miirga abandon the priipti of the anusaya; only the vimukti-miirga can realize
their nirodha. They assert thus: The kle!;a can be abandoned only by the iinantarya-miirga,
their nirodha can be realized only by the vimukti-miirga. In order to counteract their assertions,
we show that the iinantarya-miirga can abandon the kle!;a, because they block the priipti of
the klda so that they do not continue; they can also realize the nirodha, because they induce
the vism!Jyoga-priipti so that they may arise. The vimukti-miirga are only said to realize
nirodha, as they appear together with the visaf!lyoga-priipti."
223
 AKB (p.352): (p.545): Yatha (prabhavita) par !'aspiration (adhimok,sa): on l'appelle done J;raddhcl-adhimukta. Lorsque
dvabhyam ekena cauro ni$kasyate, dv1tiyena tadapravesiiya kapiita/:1 pidhiyate. la prajn{i domine (ascete defacultes aigues), l'ascete est 'inj(Jrme ·par/a vue speculative
on I 'appelle done (AKB(F) VI, p.l96). However, this does not justify
468 According to the Sarvastivada, theabhisamaya of the Four Truths is a gradual p
Th Th -d - - · rocess. the translation "inj(mned par lafoi" as given by Van Velthem (AKB(F), p.53).
e erava a and the Mahasaf!lghtka, on the other hand hold that it is abrupt The ·
. . ' · stxteen
thought moments ofthe abh1samayaaccordmg to the Sarvastivada are shown below:
The commentary on this in Vyakhya (p.549) is as follows: sraddha 'dhikatvena
I. duhkhe dharmajiianak$iinti
2.
3.
4.
dharmajiiana
anvayajiiiinak$iinti
anvayajiiiina
} duf:lkhasatya
adhimok:;;aprabhiivitatv{ic chraddha
iti krtva /... prajn{i 'dhikatvena
lsraddhii 'dhiko mukta/:1 'dhimukta
I Accordingly, we have
rendered the term as "faith-liberated". We may also note the corresponding term saddhiivimutta
5. samudaye dharmajiiiinak$iinti in Pali Canon (M 1.478; A 1.74, etc.), which definitely means "liberated through saddhii".

darsana 7.
miirga 8.
6. dharmajiiiina
anvayajiiiinak$iinti
anvayajiiiina
9. duhkhanirodhe dharmajiiiinak$iinti
} samudayasatya MVS (p.280a) has a somewhat more elaborative explanation on the two terms: "Question:
Why is he named sraddhadhimukta ? Answer: He is so named on the account of the fact that

}
10. he acquires through .l:raddhii. That is, through the .i:raddhii subsumed un-
dharmajiiiina
11. anvayajiiiinak$iinti nirodhasatya der the dadana-miirga , he acquires the subsumed under the bhiivana-
12 anvayajiiiina marga; through the .sraddhii subsumed under the pratipannaka-miirga , he acquires the
13. , duhkhapratipak$amiirge dharmajiiiinak$iinti] sraddhcldhimolqa subsumed under the phalastha-marga. Further, with sraddhii as the precon-
14. dharmajiiiina dition, that pudgala' s citta is liberated from three sarrzyojana, thus he is named a
15. anvayajiiiinak$iinti - miirga-satya Question: why is he named dn'fi-prapta ? Answer: He is so named on the
bhiivanii- 16. anvayajiiiina bhiivanii-miirga
account of the fact that he attains dr,!i through That is, through the dr{'ti subsumed
miirga (Cf. AKB VI, p.350f.)
under the dadana-marga, he attains the subsumed under the bhavanii-mclrga; through
the dr,l'!i subsumed under the pratipannaka-marga, he attains the subsumed under the
469 The former are relapsible- i.e., can fall back from their spiritual attainment; the latter
phalastha-miirga. Further. with dr,1·ti as the precondition, that pudgala's citta is liberated
are not (MVS, p.319a). The fom1er enter theii1ya-miirga having first practised samatha, and
from three saJ?1yojana, thus he is named a dr!ffi-priipta".
in them samatha is predominant The latter do so having first practisedvipasyanii; and in
them vipasyaniiis predominant (MVS, p.279c). Various other distinctions on the two types
471 For the definitions of these terms, Cf. MVS (p.278a ff).
of persons are also given (ibid, p.279c-280a).

For the various differences between the samayavimukta and asamayavimukta-arhat given in
470 AKB (p.354) explains:sraddhiiprajiiiidhikatvena adhimok$adr$fiprabhiivitatvM Xuan
MVS, see op. cit. fas. 101 (p.524c- 526a).
Zang gives: -"In these twoii1ya, sraddhii and prajiiii, respectively, predominates; thus they
are prominently marked by the distinctive namessraddhiidhimukta and dr$tipriipta".
§ ( 4.5.42) to (4.5.42.4.3) concerning the gradual abandoning of k/e.i:a and the corresponding
attainments may be summarized by the chart below (see following page):
Poussin, basing himself on the Sanskrit line quoted in the Vyakhya, renders as follows:
"Lorsque la foi (sraddhii) predomine (ascete de facultes molles), l'asccte est 'informe'

224 225
 "-D.t11U.HA.K..MAVA l AKA

3 marga 6pudgala* kleia counteracted te!fiil!l cittena lyadanlpiiJo 'mi bhavanti I nipitvttd eva hi viprayuktatve 'pi
nlpm!l lW viprayuktatve niima /ab hate lyad vii niimatvaf!l I tat
sraddhiinusiirin (mrdu> ' cittena sanulna:iiitZvatvam I caillii api citlena I te tu eittena sah 'clfamhane
· srotilpatti-
(15th moment)
j, ..
dharmiinusiirin (tiksna prattpannaka samprayukt{ts tad-vi.\:esamlrthm!t asw11skrtam api tat-.l·amiina:jiitiyam
aniilambanatveneti tat-parilulrclrtham I (Vyakhya, p.l42f).
hhiivanii-miirga: sraddhiidhimukta
(16th moment (tik,I'IJa) - - 88 darsanaheya
The various enumerations and descriptions found in the Sarvastivada canonical Abhidharma
vajropama samiidhi) sakrdiigami-
pratipannaka texts show that they were as yet unsystematized at that stage. In some of them, we find the
term cittaviprayukta-dharma, evidently having a broader connation than the term
sakrdiigiimiphala -first 6 divisions of
citlaviprayukta-sm!7skiira as systematized in the relatively later texts. Thus, PrS (p.714a):
aniigiimi- hhiivanttheya-klesa
prattpannaka "What are the eittaviprayukta dharma? They are the dharmas which are not caitta ... i.e. the
in kiimadhiitu
rfipa, the asw17skrta, and the eittaviprayukta-sm!Jskclra."
amlgcimiphala - all 9 divisions of
arhatpratipannaka hhttvaniiheya-kle.l;a PSP (p.692) gives a list as follows: "priipti, {tsmnji'iikasamiipatti, nirodhasamiipatti, iisai1Jjiiika.
in kamadhiitu nikayasabhiigatii, ?)-prclpti(lpmtilclhha?). vastll-priipti {lpratillibha?) (?J#-
), iiyatana-priipti (lpratilclhha? ). jiiti, jarli, sthiti, anityatii, nc1makiiya, padakiiya,
asaikJa-mttrga: samayavimukta all hhiivaniiheya kleia
(mrdu)} vyaiijanakliya, and all the other dharmas of this kind which are disjoined from the mind."
arhatphala - in rfipiinlpya-dhiitu
(I st asamayavimukta up to the weakest
divsion in hhaviigra
In the Ny (p.396c) Sarnghabhadra names another viprayukta dharma called 'union' ( ¥0-@r
to caramaf!l cittam)
siimagrf) after the AKB list of fourteen. MVS (p.313b) mentions a disunion CfrD-@r asiimag1i
) as a dharma of the viprayukta-SmrJskiira, which is the svabhiiva of Sw17gha-bheda. In this
*AKB VI also gives a seven-puc/ga/a classification: sraddhiinusiirin, dharmttnusiirin, connection, it is important to note that Yasomitra 's comments (Vyakhya, p.J42) on the word
sraddhttdhimukta, drJrpriipta, prajiiiivimukta, uhhayatobhiigavimukta. "ea" in "eeti" of the AKB stanza above: ea-.\:ahda
In Pali (e.g. M.I, Kitagiri sutta), there is a six-puggala classification: saddhttnusiirin,
pradadanilrthab I SWJ7gha-bheda-prahhrtayo (underline ours) hi dravyata.\: eitlaviprayuktii
dhammiinusiirin. saddhiivimutta, dirthippatta, kttyasakkhin, paiiiiiivimutta,
i!fycmte iti.!. This makes it very likely that the .wlmagri added at the very end of the AKB list
uhhatobhiigavimutta. Same six found in VKS (p.535b- c). Cf. AKB VI (p.353 ff).
does refer to a force effecting the Sa111gha's harmony, opposed in nature to the asiimagri

472 AKB ri (p.62) enumerates the following fourteen, which are the same as those de- mentioned in MVS.
scribed inAvatiira.
viprayuktiistu Slii!Jsldiriib priiptyapriipti sabhiigat{i I ADV 11 (p.85) gives only thirteen, in its verse leaving out asarhj1iisamiipatti of the AKB list;
iisariJjiiikm!J samiipatti jivifW!I ea 11 35 11 though in the prose commentary fourteen are actually enumerated.

niima kiiyiidaya.keti
Asm (p.l 0) gives the following list: prc7ptirasmnjiiisamiipattirnirodhasamc7pattiriiswhjiiikat!1
.iivitendriyaf!lnikiiyasahhiigat{tjiitiljariisthitiranityatcl niimakliyiib padakayiib vyaiijanakclyiib
Yasomitra explains the term cittaviprayukta as follows: cittaviprayuktc7 iti cittagrah{//;af!l
PrthagjanatvwJt pravrttib pratiniyamo yogab javo 'nukramab kiilo swnkhyc7 siimagri
eitta-samiina:iiit(va-pradar;'aniirtham I citlam iva cittena ea vipmyuktii ityarthab I ki1!1 ea
ea /To this list, the (T no.1614, p.855), notably, adds one more, asiimagri.
See supra, Introduction § VIII, for a discussion on the in Avatiira.

226 227
473 AvaHira(T): chos 'di danldan pa iiid d11 (Siira has do) ies lies par bsiiad pa 'i rgy 11 ni
'thob pa 'o. See also the following note.
474 Cf. ADV (p.87): priipt(i)rniima samanwigamo liibha iti .... I 'dharmavatta
vyavasthitib' I khalu tridhii klda[liib} ... This is also comparable with
Sa!Jlghabhadra 's definition quoted in Vyakhya (p.l48) idam asyeti jiiiina-cihnaf!J pratiliibdha-
ea pniptirity
This is also found in Ny (p.398b) as follows: " ... Since bija [as maintained by the Sautrantika]
does not exist, we know that the priipti as acknowledged [by us] definitely possesses a [dis-
tinct] function; as it is the cause by virtue of which a dharma which has been acquired is not
lost, and as it is the marker of the knowledge (jiiiina-cihna) that "this belongs to that person"
(idam asyeti ). Since its [distinct] function is established, we know that it has a distinct sub-
stance. Thus, both the substance and function of the acknowledged priipti are bilaterally
established (prasiddha)"
PrS (p.694a) defines priipti as dharmli!Jiim JPS (p.l 008a-b) gives neither a precise
definition nor a detailed discussion for this term; consequently, later Sarvastivada masters
interpret it variously.
There is no Pali correspondence for the concept of prlipti. The Pali terms corresponding to
liihha and samanviigama, though occuring in Kvu (ix,l2). do not mean the same as in the
Sarvastivada Abhidharma. They are referred to as samanniigata-paiiiiatti and
pafillihha-paiiliatti in KvuA(ix.l2). See also AKB(F) II (p.l79, n.l ).
MVS, fas 157 (p. 797a) quotes PjS to support its assertion that the three terms, prlipti,
pratilamhha and samanviigama are identical in meaning. However, MVS, fas 162 (p.823a)
gives the following seven differences between priipti and samanviigama: "Some say: The
names themselves are different: one namedpriipti, the other samanviigama. Some say: The
acquisition ofwhat has not been acquired is namedpriipti. The acquisition of what has
already been acquired is samanviigama. Some say: the acquisition at the very first instance is
named prlipti. The subsequent repeated acquisition are named samanviigama. Some say:
the possession (sam-anu-ii -Vgam) of what has not been previously possessed is named
priipti . The possession of what has already been possessed is named samanwigama. Some
say: What did not previously belong to one, now belongs to one- this is namedpriipti. what
has already belonged to one now [continues to] belong to one- this is namedsamanvagama.
Some say: the acquisition at the first instance is namedpriipti. The non-relinquishment of
what has already been acquired is named samanviigama. Some say: The initial obtaining
(pratilamhha, liibha) is named priipti. The not-losing of what has already been acquired is
228
named samanviigama. Hence, whereas priipti applies to the first moment, samanviigama
applies to both the first and subsequent moments."
475 In AKB II (p.63) too, the argues for the reality ofpriipti as the cause of
establishment (vyavasthiihetu) ./(Jr the difference between the prthagjana and the iirya: ...
I asatyii111 hi priiptau laukikamlinasiiniimiityaprthagjaniiniimiiryii ime
prthagjanli ima iti na syiid vyavasthlinam ! ... etaccaiva kathw11
klda esiimaprahil}a iti I priiptau satyiimetatsidhyati tadviganu/vigamiit I Cf. also the argu-
ment in very similar terms in MVS (p 796b-c).
476 The ten comprise the eight members of the Noble Eight-fold Path,
plus saf!Jya!,rvimukti and samyagjiiiina (Cf. A V 222).
477 They are the last five of the ten .mf!Jyojana: nlpariiga, iinipyariiga, auddhatya, miina,
avidyii; the first five- Hlavrataparamada, vicikitsii. kiimacchanda, vyiipiida-
having been abandoned at the stage of anagiimin.
478 Cf. AKB 11 (p.63): prtlptirniimiisti kii!JCit bhiiviintaramiti I kuta etat I iiha s!itrlit I
slitre hyuktw.n "sa e,l"iil!l dasiiniim dharmiiniimutpiidiit prati/ambhat
samanviigamiidiiryo hhavati paiiciiligaviprahi!Ja" iti vistarab I
479 Avatara(T) seems a little different here: yail dge slm1 dag gwi zag 'di ni chos dge ba
rnams dali midge ba rnams daii yali ldan no ies gsulis te I sems can dag gi sems kyi rgyun la
dge ba dali midge ba 'i thob pa bsags pa dpag tu med pa dag gzigs nasI gtso bo mchog gis
dge sloii dag gali zag gis tshod ma hzuii iig I gaii zag la tshad kyali ma 'dzin cig ces rgya cher
gsulis sol-" Again it has been said [by the Bhagavat], "0 bhiksus, this pudgala is in posses-
sion of ku.\·ala and ak1dala dharmas." Having seen that the kusala and akusala priipti are
accumulated infinitely in the citta-santati of sentient beings, the Supreme One (jyenha) has
said, "0 bhikhus, apudgala should not measure, apudgala should not be measured", etc."
480 This last sentence in the form of a conclusion is not found in Avatara(T).
For the controversy on the reality of priipti between the on the one hand and the
Sautrantika and Yogacarin on the other, see AKB II (p.62f); Ny (p.397a-398c); Siddhi(C),
fas.l (p.5a); YBS, fas.52 (p.586a).
MVS (p. 796b-c) records a similar controversy on samanviigama between the and
the "And again, there are some who assert that samanviigama is not a truly
existing dharma. The for example, asserts thus: When sentient beings are not
separated from the dharma, they are said to be in possession (samanviigata) [of that dharma].
229
This [possession] has no real substance, and is merely a relative concept. It is just like when
the five fingers are folded together, we call it a fist; as soon as they are separated, it is no more
a fist. Thus it does not really exist. Likewise, when sentient beings are not separated from the
dharma they are said to be in possession [ofthat dharma]; as soon as they are separated from
it, they are no more in possession of it. Thus it does not exist substantially."
"Question: Why do they make such an assertion? Answer: On the basis of the sutra. The
sutra for instance, says that a cakravartin possesses the seven treasures (saptaratna-
samanviigata). If this possession really exists, then one would possess the bodies of other
beings and of the non-sentients: If the cakravartin possesses the wheel-treasure (cakraratna)
and the divine-jewel-treasure (mm;i-ratna), there would be a confusion (lit.: destruction :t1i
) of dharmas, [as he would become at once] both a sentient and a non-sentient. If he possesses
the elephant-treasure (hasti-ratna) and the horse-treasure there would be a con-
fusion of gati, [as he would become at once] both a human and an animal. If he possesses the
woman-treasure (strf-ratna), there would be a confusion of bodies, [as his body would at
once be] that of a male and of a female. If he possesses the house-holder-treasure (grhapati-
ratna) and the general-treasure (parimlyaka-ratna) there would be a confusion of duties<*
:ffi). [as he would at once be] a king as well as an official. Since there should not be these
incongruities, 'possession' does not exist as a real entity."
"In order to refute the above proposition [that possession is unreal], we show that possession
exist as a real entity. If possession does not exist as a real entity, the sutra would be contra-
dicted. lt is said [in the sutra], for example, that a possesses the eight factors, and that
an arhat who has exhausted all outflows (k,l'il}iisrava) possesses the ten factors. Now if
possession is unreal, when a siisravacitta appears in the iit}'a, and when he is in the acittaka
state, he would not be in possession of the iit:vamiirga of the three periods of times. How
then can he possess the eight or ten factors - all the factors being aniisrava ? "
"And again, if possession does not exist as a real entity, there would be contradiction with
other sutras which say that apudgala possesses and akusala dharmas. Now if posses-
sion is unreal, when he gives rise to an dharma, he should not be possessing either
[the kusala or ak1dala dharmas]."
"And again, ... contradiction with other sutras which say that if a possesses the seven
wonderful dharmas ... , as all the seven have prajiiii as their nature; and no two prajiiii eo-arise,
not to speak of seven ... . And again, contradiction with other sutras which say that the
Tatluigata ... possesses the ten bala ... , as all the ten have prajiiii as their nature ... "
"And again, there are other incongruities: prthagjana ought to be said to be freed from the
defilements in the triple-spheres; and the at·hat ought to be named prthagjana: At the moment
230
when a prthagjana gives rise to a ku.i:ala or anivrtiivyiikrta citta, there is presently no k/e!;a
within him and he further possesses no past or future kid a- should he not then be said to be
freed from the defilements in the triple-spheres? [Likewise], at the moment when an arhat
gives rise to a siisrava citta or when he is in the acittaka state, there is presently no clrya-miirga,
and he moreover possesses no past or future [a1:va-mclrga]- should he not then be a prthagjana.
there being no iil}'a-dharma ? If these be the case, there would be serious incongruities.
Hence [we conclude that] possession definitely exists as a real entity."
"Question: If possession exists as a real entity, how would one explain the scriptural passage
quoted by the Answer: They (i.e. the Sarvastivada masters) explain that [in this
case], possession signifies 'mastery' (va.i:itva). i.e. the cakravartin's mastery over the seven
treasures is designated as his 'possession'. It is not the same as possession of the
eight factors, etc."
"There are again others who assert that although possession exists as a real entity, non-pos-
session does not. In order to refute their proposition, we show that if non-possession is
unreal, possession should also be unreal; as it is relative to non-possession that one speaks of
possession. Just as, relative to night, one establishes day; relative to darkness, one establishes
brightness; and all are real entities. So also is the case of possession and non-possession."
481 Cf. AKB 11 (p.62): dvividhii hi prclptir apriiptavihfnasya ea pratilahdhena ea
I vipwyayiidapriiptiriti siddham I See also, the discussion in MVS quoted in
note 472.
482 Cf. AKB II (p.62 f): kll.l:va puna rime priiptyapriipti I
priiptyapriipti svasa,rtiina-patitiinii,r
na parasaqJtiinapatitiimlm I nahi ka:,·citsamanviigatafJ niipyasw?Jtatipatitiiniim/
na hyasattvasl1111khyiitm}1 I ... I asa'!lskrte.yupunah praptyapriipti
nirodhayo/:111 36 !I
... akii.i:ena tu niisti I tasmiidasya niisti prapti/J I yasya ea niisti
priiptistasyiipriiptirapi niistiti siddhclntafJ I
483 This three-fold division, with the same examples- "the shadow following the substance",
etc- are found in MVS (p.3IIc).
484 Avatara(T): kusa/a and akusala dharrnas.
485 Ny (p.399a): For instance, the ailyapathika of the Buddhas and Asvajit; or the
.i:ai/pasthiinika of Visvakarmadeva.
231
 SKA:--IDHILA"S ABHIDHARMAVATARA

486 Some of the explanations given here are found in ADV (p.87t); unfortunately, the
ccount of being disgusted with ideations that one enters this samiipatti. The prthagjana are
whole of folio 46 is lost so that we cannot determine the extent of agreement between these
capable of being disgusted with sensations (vedancl); for it is on account of being attached
explanations and those in Avatiira. Also Cf. AKB 11 (p.67); MVS (p. 797a-b); Ny (p.398c f).
to sensations that they enter into samiipatti."

487 AmRS (p.979c), probably representing the view of the western masters, asserts that
494 Cf. AKB !I (p.69}.
"priipti are always siisrava and tridlultu-pratismnvukta."

495 Cf. AKB 11 (p.69): kzdalii sati

488 Cf. AKB 11 (p.64 f).
upapadyavedyaiva
I na dr:Jtadharmapmyclyavedanzyii niipi aniyatii I yo 'pyeniimutpiidya
489 Ny (p.399a) elaborates further on the nature of apriipti. Also Cf. MVS (p. 799c-800a);
parihiyate so 'pi kiliiva.(Yal?l ptmamtpiidyasm?J)iiisattve:Jftpapadyata iti I ala eva talliibhi
ADV (p.88).
niyiinWJ!l niivaknlmati I

490 Ny (p.399a): "[They] definitely do not have present non-acquisitions; for a present
496 Cf. ADV (p.92 f); AKB (p.68 f).
dharma and [its] non-acquisition do not operate simultaneously. According to some: a present
dharma does not have a present non-acquistion because the two are contradictory in nature".
497 Sal]lghabhadra (Ny, p.401b) explains the term 'bhaviigra': "Because the body retrib-
Cf. MVS (p. 799a):" ... Because a dharma that can be possesed (sam-anu-ii- Vgam) is neces-
uted in the naiva-sm!l)iiclniismrl}iiiiyatana is by virtue of the karma of the highest grade, it is
sarily possessed at the present moment; and becausepnlpti and apriipti, being mutually con-
said to the peak of existence or the edge of existence; just as the edge of a tree is said to be the
tradictory, do not arise simultaneously." It can be seen that both reasons given by Skandhila
peak/top of the tree.
here are views held by the compilers of MVS. Sarnghabhadra ascribes Skandhila 's first ex-
planation to "Some", but does not criticize it- which may be noteworthy; as this could be an
498 MVS (p.775b): "Why is this nirodha called a samiipatti? lt is called a samiipatti
indication in favour of the traditional account which makes Skandhila the teacher of
because with regard to the nirodha dharmas, there is no obstruction, no rejection; one expe-
Sarnghabhadra. Avatara(T) is brief here : da ltar bywi ba rnams kyi ni giiis paste I lhan cig
riences it at will, and personally realizes it. For this reason the Bhagavat has said that [whereas]
skyes pa med do I- giving only the first explanation.
nirodha is momentary, samiipatti is continuous."

491 Cf. JPS (p. 928c ); also MVS (p.232b ).

"Question: A samllpatti is that which causes the thought to be even (sama). But in this case
there is no mentation (acitta), how can it be named a samclpatti? Answer: there are two kinds
MVS (p.232c) explains that the view, "prthagjanatva is the non-obtainment of all iirya-
of samclpatti: (I) that which causes the thought to be even, (11) that which causes the mahc"ibhrtta
dharmas", does not amount to the fallacy that all beings are to be called prthagjana. In doing
to be even. Although the asmrt)iii- and nirodha-samiipatti interrupt the even-ness of mind,
so, it distinguishes the following two types of apriipti: (I) One type is common, the other
causing it not to continue, they induce the even-ness ofmahiihhlita, causing them to manifest.
unique. The unique one is prthagjanatva; the common one is not. (I!) One type has been
Hence they are called samiipatti."
impaired or rendered inoperative the other, not so. The latter is prthagjanatva;
the former is not. (III) The non-acquistion of all ii1ya-dharmas are of two kinds- one arises
Also Cf. AKB 11 (p.73): katham samiipattitvam I mahiibhtltasamatiipiidaniit I
with a prthagjana sal?ltiina as its supporting basis; the other arises with an iirya-saJ!lliina as
samiipatticittena eel tiii?J samiipadyante samiigacchatiti I
its supporting basis. The former is prthagjanatva; the latter is not.

499 Cf. AKB II (p. 70): kiilayorvedyii upapadyavedanzvii ciiparapmyclyavedaniycl

492 This additional explanation is not in A vatara(T).
ea I ea vipiika'!l prati kadclcinna vipacyate I yadiha parinirwly,lt I tasyii hi bhaviigre
Catuhskandho I
493 AKB Il (p.69) explains the name asaJ!l)iiisamiipatti as follows:
samiipattirasaJ!l)iiii I Sarnghabhadra (Ny, p.40la) adds:" as it is on

232
233
 ENTRANCE INTO THE SUPREME DOCTRJNE
500 We may note that Sarpghabhadra (Ny, p.40lc) ascribes this explanation to "certain
other masters", and rejects it as unreasonable. He gives a different explanation: "[Whereas]
the a.\'GI!liiii-samclpatti is obtained by the prthagjana only, and this nirodha-samiipatti is ob-
tained by the iiiJ'a only. For [an prthagjana] still has not abandoned the hindrance pertaining
to his own hhftmi, to the arising of nirodha-samiipatti. One who has not transcended the
dar!ianaheya kle5a in the hhaviigra, is absolutely incapable of producing the nirodha-samiiparti.
Now, it is not the case that the prthagjana can transcend the dadanaheya of the bhavclgra.
Hence it is only the ci1:va who can obtain the nirodha-samiipatti.". Cf. also. MYS (p. 779c ff).
50 l Cf. very similar description in ADV !I (p. 93 ): nirodhasamiipattirapi cittacaittiinii'!i
dharmii!Jiil?l kaiicitkiilamutpattisannirodhinf I sii punariyw,n vihiirasal?l}iiiipiirvake!Ja
manasikiire!Ja nirvii(wsadi'Saql sa/flmukhlkriyate 1
'hhaviigrajii' ceym11 I ... I upapadyavedanfyii ciiparapm:viiyavedan(vii ea 1
anZvatavedanfyii ceyam I yo hyetiimutpiidya parinirviiti sa niisyii vipiikw11 pratisw.nvedayate
I tasyii hi hhaviigre catuskandhako vipciko vipacyate I iirya.kaitclmutpiidayilw!l
I I iil)•asyiipi
ceym!l prayogalahhyii na vairiigyalahhyeti I
Also Cf. AKB !I (p.70); Ny (p.40lb-c).
Whereas the asal!l}iii-samiipatti is produced in the fourth dhyiina which is material (belong·
ing to the riipadhiitu), the nimdha-sanulpatti is produced in the hhavclgra which is immate·
rial (belonging to the linipyadhiitu). Hence the prthagjana fear that it is annihilation (uccheda),
though in actual fact there still remain, in the nimdha-samiipatti, the niklyasahhiiga, the
jivitendriya, and other
502 Cf. AKB ll (p. 70). Samghabhadra (Ny, p.402a) objects to Yasubandhu's statement (loc.
cit.) that the Buddhas obtain it at the very same time as the k,myajiiiina (k.yayajiiiinasamiinaf!l
kiilal!l huddhii hhagavanta encll!llahhante), and explains in the same manner as Skandhila
does here.
503 AKB (p.68): lt temporarily (kiihlntaral!l) prevents the arising of any mental activity, as
a dam which prevents the flow of a river (naditoyasa'!inirodhavat).
504 These descriptions on iisarnjiiika are essentially identical with those in ADV (p.9l) and
AKB {p.68).
505 Contra Yelthem's translation (Avatara(F), p.62).ln particular, his reference to the doe·
trine of avipram/Sa here (loc cit, n.l62) is unjustifiable.
234
SKANDHILA'S ABHIDHARMAVATARA
Avatara(T): khams g.wm pa 'i tshe sfwn &:vi /as kyispluuis pa skye mched drug gi rgyun 'brei
ha gnas pa 'i rgyur g_vur pa I 'gm bar gdags pa 'i rgyu gmi yin pa de ni srog gi hdan po ies
bya 'o I-" The clyur of the three dhiitu which is projected by previous karma, which serves as
the cause (hetu-bhlita) for the steady continuation of the six liyatana, and which is the cause
for the designation of the gati; is namedjivitendr(va"
The Theravada has twojivitendriya: (I) An which sustains all citta and
cetasika. It is one of the seven sahha-citta-s(/dhara!Ja-cetasika. (ii) A riipa-fivitendriya which
sustains the kamma-samutthiina-riipa. it is an upiidii-nipa included in the rzipakkhandha.
The on the other hand, has only onejivitendriya which is cittaviprayukta and
applicable to both niima and nipa dharmas. P.S. Jaini ("Development of the theory of the
viprayukta sw11skiiras", BSOAS, 1959, Vol. xxii, pt.3) argues that the origin of these two
traditions is to be traced to the account on ayu in the Mahiivedalla sutta, M (See also the
controversy in Kvu pp.394ff). Cf. also ADV 11 (p.97, n.4); KvuA. VllllO; Compendium (p.
!56); BAM (p.59 f).
506 MVS (p.732b); PrS (p.694a); JPS (p.993b).
507 Cf. AKB 11 (p. 73):jfvitaql katamat I
iiyurjivitam
eval!l hyukramabhidharme "jivitendriyw11 katamat ltraidhiitukamiiyur" iti I etaccaiva na
jiiiiyate ayurniima ka dharma iti I
iidhiira yal} I
idanwktw11 hhagavatii
"iiyunl:pnii 'tlw vij1iiinw11 yada kiiyarrr jahatyami I
apaviddhastadii .\·ete yathii iti 11
tad ya ii$ma1JO vijiiiinasya ciidhiirabhfito dhanna!1 sthitihetustadiiyu]J I Cf. also ADV (p. 97 f).
The corresponding Pali verse occurs in S lil (p.l43 ):
iiyu usmii ea viiiiiiiiJliiJl yadii kliyw!l jahantimat!l I
apaviddhu tadii seti parahhatfal!l acetanwrJ 11
508 Cf. almost identical description in ADV 11 (p.97): uktm!l hyahhidharme- "jivitendriyw!l
katamat I traidhiidhukamiiyu!1" iti I tatpuna(1 'gatipn!jiiaptyupiidiinal!l' vipiikajasvabhavatviit
luktw11 hi s1itre- "nirvrtte vipake niiraka iti samkhyc/111 gacchati I eval!l yiivannaivasaq1}iicl-
niisamjiiayatanopagasal!1khyiiql gacchati" iti I na ciinyadindriyal!l vipiikajal!l
fraidhiitukavyiipyasti yqjjanmaprahandM 'vicchedena vartamiinaq1 gatiprajiiaptyupcldclnal!l
syiit, anyatrajfvitendriyclt I ADV (p.97 f) continues to prove the reality of this dharma both
by scriptural authority and logical reasoning ((/gamcldyuktitasca).
235
 ENTRANCE INTO THE SUPREME DOCTRINE

510 Cf. a very similar passage in ADV 11 (p.89): sahhclgatcl nclnw dravyam I
509 A transformationally-bom being arises and perishes together with all the indriya sattviinclmekartharuchi(1 s{ulr!;yahetuhhiitam I nikclyasahhclga i(va.IJ'O I se/
(samagrendriya) (Cf. AKB 11, p.48). punarabhinna hhinncl ea I ahhinml sarvasattvclnc/1!7 .wttvasablulgatZi I sli pratisattval!1
sarvesvcltmasnehlihclraratisamyclt I hhinml punastesLimeva sattviinclm dhatuhhiimigatiyonijliti-
ADV I1 (p.98): sarvam hijivitendriym11 ktlmadhiitiivavasyw_n stripuru . I ta.1yiim
tattvava.\yaf!1 vijiiiinasahavarti nlipi cak,wrlidindriyasahavarti I rupadhlitau tu sarva'!l khalvasatyci!J1 prasajyeta.
kliyiidipaiicendriyasahavarti lna tvava.\yam cittasahacaris!Ja I iinlpyadhiitau tu sarva'!l
vijiianasahavarti, anyatra I jivitendriyal!l gatiprajiiaptyupiidiinam astiti Cf. a similar definition of Samghabhadra quoted in the Vyakhya (p.\59 ):
dravyam I anyathii hi kusalanivrtte cetasi nirmale vii 'dhohhaume tadgatiprajnapty- wmasthiinacestclhclrcldisiibhagyakara(lal!1, anyonyclhhirahhisamq1handhanimittaf!7 ea
uplidclnavipclkajarrz kil!l kalpyeta yatsadhhlivcldasau tato /1(/ ;,yiit ? na ea sakya'!l (also given in Ny, p.400a). Ny (p.400a): 'sa' (homoge-
pratijniitum a niisravii!Jii [m a]dhobh zlm ivijiiiinahijwrz tadgatisa!J1jiiaptyupiidiinm!1 kalpayitum, neity r<1]), because of the mutual similarities in physical appearances, functions [of the indriya)
aniisravasya cittasya samucchedaya pravrttatvat I na ciinyadvijiiiinmrz and desire. 'Bhclga' means cause (nimitta). There is a distinct real entity which is the cause
kalpayituf!1 manovijiianadhaturyatiriktasyanaMramalamhanasya vijiiclnasyiiprasiddhatvat of this homogeneity. hence it is named sahl1£1ga.
lmanodhiituriti cet I na I manovij1ilinadhiitoreviivasthantare tanniimaprajnapteb I
Cf. also AKB 11 (p.67). The AKB (loc. cit) also speaks of dharmasahlulgatcl which does not
P.S. Jaini ( ADV It p.98, n.3) remarks that the argument )ivitendriymrz gatiprajiiaptyupadiinam seem to occur in any other extant Sarvastivada .\:astra except Ny (p.400b) and SPrS (p.
astiti dravyam" is a rejoinder to the following view of the Koskara AKB 11 (p.74): " ... nahi 805c).
niistiti hriimo na tu I kilrz tarhi ltraidhatukena nikiiyasahhiigasya
sthitikclhlvedha(Jiyavaddhi karma!Ja nikayasahhagasyLivedhah krto bhava(vetavantwp 511 This is also cited by AKB !I (p.68), ADV 11 (p.90- see following note). The Vyakhya
klilamavasthLitavyamiti tavat so 'vati,l·thate tadayurityucyate I sasyanclf!1 piikakiilavedhavat (p.l59) cites the sutra as follows: prliniitipiiteniisevitena hhiivitena bahulikrtena
k.yipte,wsthitiklilavedhavacca /. .. evw11 tu var!Jayanti dravyantaramevclyurastiti I narakeszlpapadyate I sa ced itthatJJfl!am agacchati sabhiigatiil!l prclpnoti
pni!Jcllipliteniilpayur hhavati ... See AKB(F) Il (p.\98, n.2) for other references.
This Sautriintika view that iiyu is the 'nikayasabhclgasya sthitikallivedha' is also criticized
by Sarpghabhadra (Ny, p.404c): "That ayu exists as a real entity has been proved in the 512 Avatara(T): de bye hrag .\:in tu che 'o I
section dealing with the Here, we shall just question the Kosakara thus: Where there
are not the five internal nlpayatana, projected by karma, there may sometimes not be the 513 Cf. a very similar passage in ADV Il (p. 90): atha
sixth clyatana, mcmas projected by karma (which is avyakrta)- That is, in the case where one I prthagjanasabhclgatcl khal!lktanlpcl I prthagjanatWII!1 !11
continues to give rise to a kli,vta viji1iina, or kuiwla-sclsrava or anclsrava vijiiana -there is no swwlnarthakarahhlltamiti sumahclt!1Stadvi.\:e!faf11 clptavacanenapi I uktmrz
force (clvedha) which is a vipclka projected by karma; what is there to be called ayu? If hi hhagavatii- "sa ceditthatvamiigacchati sahhiigatli1J1 pratilahhate" iti I na
there is in this case a karma-vipaka which always exists uninterrupted from the moment of caivwrz prthagjanatvwrz pratilahhyate vii tvczjyate vel/ As noted by P.S. Jaini (loc cit., n.4),
conception until death, then we may say that there is a force namedjivitendriya projected by this seems to be a rejoinder to the Kosakara (AKB 11, p.67 f)
kam1a, by virtue of which a being continues to exist during a determined period of time. But
such a vipiika force is not found in this case, how then can we say there exists here a Cf. also Ny (p.400b ): "Isn't the prthagjanatva none other than the sabhiigatii of a prthagjana
jivitendriyaT' ? This is not so, as they accomplish different things: The sahhclgatii is the cause for the
mutual similarities in body, shape, activity and desire. The prthagjanatva is the cause for
Cf. also AKB 11 (p.73): .... me/ hMtt sarvm!1 vijii[tnamiimara!Jiidvipclka iti I The being a prthagjana, and is opposed to the possession of the iirya-mllrga. At the time when
maintains that iiyu sustains ii.pna and vijiiclna, and is the duration-cause (sthitihetu) of the one enters in to the niyama there are both the obtainment and relinquishment with regard to
samtclna. This clyu is projected and sustained by karma. Vijiiana cannot be sustained by nikclya-sabhiigatcl; but with regard to prthagjanatva, there is only relinquishment and no
karma , for in this case all the vijiiclna from conception to death would be vipclka (which is obtainment."
always non-defined). Hence the necessity for iiyu which, sustained by kam1a, sustains zi,vma
and vijiiclna.
237
236
 514 Cf. AKB 11 (p. 75): etclni hi Saf11skrtasya catviiri lak,wl}tini I yatraitiini bhavanti ,\'a
dharmah swpskrto I I tatrajiitista111 dharma'f!l}anayati sthitih
sthtipayati jarii jarayati anityatii viniisayati I
Sal]'lghabhadra (Ny, pp.405c ff) argues at great length for the reality of the four sm!lskrta
laksal}a. See also MVS (pp.l99c ff); AKB 11 (pp. 75 ft). . de ni gnas pa ies bya 'o I- "sthiti is the cause for the temporary duration [of a sa117skrta
515 Cf. AKB does not make any distinction among the various types of activities/ functions
/potencies of dharmas. Thus, AKB 11 (p. 76 ): kimida'f!l vrttiriti I ki/ritrm/1
Sarpghabhadra, however, distinguishes between vrtti ( and kiiritra ( {'J:IfJ }. Skandhiia
too uses these two different terms. But it is not sufficiently evident that he intends the same
contradistinction. See also notes 519 and 529 below.
516 Sal]'lghabhadra (Ny, p.405c) definesjiiti-lak,wl}a as follows: "Herein,jiiti- This is a
distinct dharma which is the predominant cause of non-obstruction at the stage of arising of
the samskiira; for it induces them, enabling them to arise. 'Inducing them' refers to the fact
that at the time of their arising, this dharma serves as their predominant condition. While the
arising of the saq1skrta are all called production (jiiti), this name 'jiiti' is given solely on
account of its being the predominant cause of non-obstruction at the stage of the arising of
the saf!lskiira" See also note 530 below.
517 Cf. AKB 11 (p. 79): nahi vine/ hetupratyayasiimag1:viijiitirjanikii bhavati I AKB(C)
adds:" thus, the future [dharmas] do not arise at once." This same additional sentence is
found in Ny, to which, SaJTlghabhadra further adds: serves as the eo-na-
scent proximate cause (iisanna-kiiral}a), and produces the produced -the sa'f!lslq·ta-dharma.
But [their production is not brought about by alone]; this must be assisted by the
assemblage of the previous causes of their own species as well as other external conditions.
This is just like the case of a seed and earth serving as distinctive cause and conditions
(hetupratyaya-vi!;e,w), [together] assisting the production of sprout, etc."
MYS (pp.202c-203a) explains thus: " Question: When the sm11skrta dharmas arise, do they
arise on account of the fact that they are in themselves of the nature of arising (
j:_ ), or on account ofbeingjoined withjiiti-lak-'!·w;a? Answer: .. They arise on account ofthe
fact that they are in themselves of the nature of arising ... But, though they are in themselves
of the nature of arising, they cannot arise without being joined withjiiti-lak,ml}a . ... At the
time of their is their predominant cause of production. Just as, a destruct·
ible dharma is destroyed by a cause of destruction, and an abandon able dharma is abandoned
by a cause of abandonment; a producible dharma is produced byjiiti-lak,ml}a."
238
518 Contra Vel them (p.65), who joins this last sentence with the next which should belong
to the description of sthiti. Cf. Avatara(T) quoted in following note.
.
519 Cf. Avatara(T): gnas pa ni 'bras hu gian 'phen pa 'i dus lyi gnas kyi rgyu ste I eh os gnas
na 'bras bu gian 'ph en 1111s par 'gyur ro /de has na gwi gi dbail gis 'bras hu 'ph en pa 'i eh os
dharma] for projecting a distinct phala."
Sal]'lghabhadra's definition (Ny, p.405c): "sthiti is a distinct dharma which is the predomi-
nant cause of non-obstruction for the SW!lskrta, which have been produced but not yet
destroyed, to project their own fruit" (Cf. MVS, p.20lc). This means that sthiti is a necessary
. and in fact the predominant condition - for a conditioned dharma to exercise its kiiritra,
defined by the as the activity for projecting a dharma's own nisyanda-phala (Ny,
p.409c, etc.)
Cf. MVS (p.20lc): "By the force ofsthiti-lak,wl}a. the sa117skiira, having arisen, are capable
of grasping their own fruit (this is 'phala-grahana' = and grasping the {/[ambana.
By the force ofjarii and anityatii, there is no more activity after one If
were non-existent, there ought not be the cause-effect series of the ;,;a111skiira, and the citta-
caitta dharmas ought not have any iilambana ", See also note 530 below.
520 Cf. ADV (p.l 05): yadi hi dharmasya sthitirna syiit, tasyiitmanyavasthitasya
na syiit I ea kr(Viil!l na kuryiit
I kriya 'hhiil'tttphaliibhiiva(l syiit I phaliirtha.i:ciiyamurambhah I tasmiidiistikairniistikapak.W'f!l
sthitih pratigrhyata iti siddham /I
Cf. also Ny (p.4 I I c): "Nor do we say that the samsk{/ra, having been produced, stay on
eternally. If so, why do you say that there is duration after the SW!lskrta dharmas have been
produced? By 'there is duration', is meant 'temporary staying': The sw!lskiira, at the time
when they are disappearing, stay temporarily; they cannot be said to stay at the time when
they have disappeared or when they are being produced, as [at these times], they are without
kiiritra. As we have mentioned earlier (Cf. ibid. p.41l b), it is only at the time of disappearing
that the samskiira possess the ktiritra of See also note 530, and the SPrS pas-
sage cited in note 529.
521 SaJTlghabhadra's definition (Ny, p.405c): "anyathiitva is a distinct dharma which is the
cause for the sal]'lskrta to be different in the subsequent [moment] from the previous [moment],
in their continuation as a series." See also note 530 below.
239
 522 Cf. ADV 11 (p.l 06): unmi,1·ito hi dharmojiiyate hr,1·ital; phalamiik,1·ipatiti I tasya Yad; 530 Cf. AKB 11 (p. 76}: bhavanti ljiitijiitil;
jarascl i;aktirna vihanyeta sa I na ea I tasmad anityatcl 'nityatcl iti I namt caturlak.yafl! pnlpnoti I te.ylil?1
gamyate satrustal?1 jatjarfkrtyopahrrasiimarthyamanityatclpi.\·iicyijh punaranyajiityiidiprasmigclt I na prc7pnoti I yasmclt I
samwpayatiti yuktamuktam 'saktihiinerjariisiddhil1' iti I · te
jiitycldimlma!ftiisu vrttih I kimidaJ?! vrttiriti I kiiritram purusakclral; I
523 Sa111ghabhadra's definition (Ny, p.405c): "anizyatii is a distinct dharma which is the jiitijiityiidiniii?J caikatra dharme kathm?Jlq·tvii iitmanii navamo hi dhanna utpadvale lsiirdhm11
predominant cause for the destruction of a eo-nascent sw!lskrta [dharma]". See also note 530 laksaficlnulak,wr;aira:jtclbhil; I tatra jcltiriitmanw!l virahayyiinyana:j(au dharmclnjanayati I
below. jiitijcltil1 punast<7mevajcltim I tadyatha kila kiicit kukuti bahfmyapatyiini prajiiyate kcicidalpcinil
tadvat sthitirap_w7tmclnm!J dhamuln sthiipayati sthitisthitist11 tiimeva
524 For the Vibhajyavadin, these four are asw!Jskrta; for Dharmagupta. three are sthitim I evam jarii api yathiiyogyw!l yojye I tasnulnna hhavatyanavasthclprasmigal;
saf?Jskrta, anityatcl is (see MVS, p.l98a).

525 Cf. AKB I1 (p.75): etiini hi SUI!Jskrtasya catviiri lak,wfliini lyatraitiini hhavanti sa
dharmal; saJ?!skrto I I
526 Cf. SAg 12. 21; A I 152.
527 Cf. ADV (p.l 04 f): ... etiinyeva siitre sthityanyathiitvam ekikrtya
triflyllktiini!.. tato bhagavatii 'nyathliM7khycwiifaraycl sahokta sririva kiilakarflyiinuhaddhii
SW!1Vegiinukrilii hhavi,lytitye,I'O 'rtha- [viJ:wyo dr.(vate tasmiiccatviiri I Also Cf. AKB rr (p.
75); MVS (p. 20la-c).
528 We may express this mathematically:
If w = S, x = S, y = S, and z = S; where S is constant;
then, w = x = y = S.
529 ln AKB If (p. 78), the Sautrantika argues to the contrary that if, apart from the character-
ized conditioned dharmas, the four characteristics exist as real entities, then a conditioned
dhama should at once be arising, staying, deteriorating and ceasing. The Vaibha;;ika answers
with his usual thesis that though the four co-exist, they exercise their activities at different
times. See also MVS (p.200a).
Saf!lghabhadra (SPrS, p.81 Oa-b) explains: " ... The four characteristics exercise their activi-
ties at different stages (avastlul): At the time when a dham1a is arising, thejiiti-lak,wna exer-
cises its activity. When [this dharma] has reached the stage of having arisen , the three-
sthiti,jarii and 1yaya- exercise their respective activities at the same time. Thus, the four
characteristics exercise their activites at different times, and there is no fallacy that one and
the same dharma at the same time arises, stays, deteriorates and ceases."
MVS (p.200c-20la} gives similar arguments. As to why each anulak..wfia can only operate
on one dharma (i.e., a mftla-lak,wrw) whereas each miila-lak.yafia can operate on eight dharmas,
the answer is a straight forward one: "it is so by virtue of the very nature of dharmas
(dharmat(/)." According to Samghabhadra (Ny, p.406a-b), this is "because of their differ-
ence in activity (vrtti lvylipiira I siimarthya )".
531 As far as Xuan Zang's rendering is concerned the term (gong neng) here could
correspond to sclmarthya lvrtti (and some other terms, excluding Mritra, which express the
activity or potency of a dharma.). This term is used a1ticulately in contrast by Saf!lghabhadra
(See following note below). However. the description given here is not adequately clear as to
whether the same contrast as emphasized by Sa111ghabhadra is also intended here. In AKB
(C), Xuan Zang renders k!tya as F§ (vong). and clearly refers to it also as ftffi (zuo yong)
which Xuan Zang unfortunately also uses to translate other Sanskrit terms such as 1yclpiira
and kriyii. The brevity of Avatara(T) here is also unhelpful in this connection. it gives only:
mtshan iiid rnams ni rtsa ha 'i chos la gnas po 'o I rjes su mthun pa 'i mtshan iiid dag ni
mtshan iiid rnams la gnas so I - corresponding to the first sentence in the whole paragraph
we have rendered.
532 Like the previous paragraph, this whole paragraph too has no correspondence in Avatara
(T).
Whereas in AKB 11 (p.76), vrtti, kiiritra and puru,wkiira seem to be synonymous,
Sa111ghabhadra makes a distinction between vrtti ( J;}J1Jg gong neng) and kiiritra ( f'J=ffl zuo
yong) in Ny (p.409a-b): "Although the saf!Jskrta-dharmas are assisted by various external
causes and conditions, they must be assisted internally byjati, sthiti,jarii, anityatii as proxi-
mate causes, before they can traverse through time. The sm!Jskrta-dharmas may be divided

240 241
into three types relative to their different stages (avasthii): They differ with respect to the its capability to serve as the direct condition for destroying a dharma's kiiritra of projecting
projection of fruit - they have not yet acquired it, are acquiring it, or have already ceased its own fruit."
[projecting]. These SW!lskrta -dharmas may again be divided in to two types: those which
have kiiritra and those which have only their essential substances (svahhiiva, dravya). The 533 Sal]lghabhadra (Ny, p.413c ft) argues against the Kosakara that niima, etc., are pro-
former are the present [dharrnas], and the latter are the past and future dharrnas. Each of duced with the supp011 of speech, but are in themselves real entities, and not just of the same
these again may be divided into two types as their activity (vrtti) may either be predominant essential nature as that of speech.
or weak: If a sw17skrta-dharma serves as a cause projecting itsown fruit, it is said to be
(exercising its] kliritm. !fit serves as a condition (pratyaya) assisting a different (dharrna], it 534 Avatara(T): ses pa biin du don &,'Vi tshul gyi gna.1· Ita hu 'i rnam par ran gi don khon du
is said to be [exercising its] activity ... At the stage when the dharrna is being produced,jilti ehud par hyed pa I- ''Just likejiiiina which causes the understanding ofsvartha (sviirtha-
serves as the internal condition, to give rise to the dharma; when this dharma reaches the pmty,lyana) in the form of a representation of the artha Uiiii.navad arthasya pratinidhisthii.niyiib).
stage of having been produced, it is said to have arisen. When a dharma is ceasing, sthiti " -which is very close to the description in ADV quoted in the following note.
serves as the internal condition, making it stay in order to project its own fruit; when this
dharrna reaches the stage of having ceased, it is said to have projected its own fruit. At the 535 Cf.ADVII(p.l08f):
very stage whn a dharrna is ceasing, anityatii serves as the internal condition, to disintegrate I
the dharrna; when this dharma reaches the stage ofhaving ceased, it is said to have disintegrated. sa7tJjfiiidyaparanamanastrayo 11
Deterioration (jarii, anyathiitva) is to be understood similarily." Cf. note above khalu sm?tsktlmsk.handasm?tgrhitiil; I viik tu riipaskhandhasm11grhitii
I te ea tadadhinotpattayo
Also (ibid, p.409c t): "If a SW!lskrta-dharma serves as a cause for the projection of its own pratinidhisthiiniyiih I nirukti/lJ} niima sa'!l}na I niirthiiniimekasm?t}natviit
fruit, it is said to be [exercising its] kiiritra. !fit serves as a condition assisting [in the producting I yathii tu cak,wrvijnclnakiiyiidayafl tadvatte 'pi
of the fruit of] a different [series], it is said to be[ exercising its] activity ... All present [dharrnas] 'viikehahdcidhinajanmiinafl' I ata.koktam - "villi niimni pravartate. niimiirthaf!l dyotayati I
can serve as cause for the projection of their own fruits. [But] not all present [dharrnas] can "iti. !bid (p.lll ): jniinavat ltadyathiijiiiinm11 hetllnapek.,l·yiirthaf!l vihhiivayati,
serve as auxiliary conditions for [dharmas] belonging to a different species: The in tadvanniimiidayo 'pi hetlinapek.yyilrthaf!l pra(viiyayanti I
darkness or one whose activity has been impaired, cannot serve as a condition which assists
the arising of visual consciousness. The karitra [of the eak,l·u], on the other hand, is not Cf. also AKB II (p.80):
impaired by darkness, as it can without fail serve as the cause for the projection of the future niimakiiyiidayal} I ...
Hence, there is a difference between kiiritra and activity (cf. also MVS, p.393c). naite I hi viik, na ea gho:JamiitreiJiirthiil; pratiyante I kim tarhi I van
However, with regard to the production o a fruit within the same series, there is a projecting nilmni pravarttate I niimiirthaf!l dyotayati 1...
power which may or may not be definite; it is called a ktlritra as well as a activity. If[a
power], with regard to the production of the fruit within a different series, can serve only as 536 Velthem 's tr. (p.68) seems wrong here: Le son etant resistant est
toujours saisi par ce/ui qui preehe, mais eomme. strictement par/ant, il n 'e.ff'eetue rien ..." (!)
a condition assisting its arising- this is an activity, not a karitra.". Cfalso Ny (p.631 c). See
also, Appendix.
53 7 Cf. AKB II (p.80): tatra saJ?l}iiiikaraf}af!l nclma I tadyathii riipaf!J ityevamii.dib I
viikyaJ?l padaf!l yavatli 'rthaparisamilptistadyathii "anityii bata sm;1skarli" ityevamiidi yena
Sal]lghabhadra (SPrS, p.809b-c) defines these four lak.$atta in terms of a dharma's
kriyiigllf}f,lakiilasm?thandhavisesii gamyante I tadyathii a, ii, ityemmiidi
( '1 I ffl):" vrtti gong neng) refers to the activity of serv- I ... ea samjnodiniif!J samuktayo niimadikilyiil; I Cf. also ADV Il (p.l09).
ing as a direct condition ... The vrtti of jiiti is its capability to serve as the direct (silk,filt)
condition ( enabling [a dharrna] to give rise to its kiiritra of projecting its own fruit ... 538 Cf. ADV I I (p.ll3 ): prathamiistu huddhotpiida eva pravartante niinyadeti I uktaJ?l hi
The vrtti of sthiti is its capability to serve as the direct conditi l on enabling a dharrna to stay bhagavau/ - "tathagatliniimutp,ldilnnilmapadavyanjanakliyilniimlllpildo bhavati" ityetasmiit
temporarily and project its own fruit... The vrtti ofjarii is its capability to serve as the direct niyatodbhiivaniid sarvajfia iti gamyate 11
condition for impairing a dharrna's karitra of projecting its own fruit. The vrtti of anityatil is ye hyapauru,seya dhlitw/yatanaskandhiidyavadyotakiiste prathamaf!J huddhavi,wyii eva I
tadavahodhiieea hhagaviinsarvajna ityabhidhiyate I

242 243
 SKANDHILA"S ADHIDilARMAVATARA

Saf!lghabhadra (Ny, p.413c ), having invoked the authority of slitra passages in support of the
view that niima etc., exist as real entities apart fromsabda, goes on to prove the The Theraviida tradition likewise holds the three terms to be synonymous- Vism xvi 82:
same by logical reasoning (yukt1): "Sometimes one gets the sound but not the phoneme; viiifiiil}arp cittarp mano ti atthato ekam
sometimes one gets the phoneme but not the sound. Hence we know that they differ in
substance. The first case is that of hearing the sound and not comprehending thmrtha: It is 543 Cf. M. I, 43: vijiiniiti vijaniititi kho avuso tasmii vififiiil)anti vuccatiMAg, 211 (TI, p.
observed that some people listen to others' words vaguely, and then ask, "what did you say? 790c): , '
" It is all because they have not comprehended the syllables uttered. How then can one assert
that the syllables are not different from the sound? The second case is that of comprehending 544 Cf. AKB IT (p.82):
the artha without hearing the sound: It is observed that some people, without hearing the kiiralJaf!'l sahabhuscaiva sabhiigal} I
actual words spoken by others, know what they are saying by watching the movement of
sarvatrago vipiikiikhyal} If 49 If
their lips etc. This is al because they have comprehended the syllables uttered. This proves
that the syllables must be different from the sounds. Again, it is observed in the world that
people recite mantra silently, hence we know that the syllables of amantra differ from the
545 : "vedanii etc., with vedana etc.". But since the next line states clearly that
sound ofmantra. Again it is observed in the world that, of two debaters whose articulation of a mental dharma cannot be conjoined with itself (Also Cf. MVS, p.235a, etc), the
the sound is similar, one loses and the other wins. This cause of losing and winning must ( vedanii) must have been a misprint. Contra Vel them (p.71. He also wrongly joins the fol-
exist separately from the sound. Again as the objects f/i$aya) of the dham1a-pratisa1?1Vidand lowing line with the description onsahabhii-hetu !).
nirukti-pratisamvid (Cf. AKB VII, p.418f) are different, we know that the phonemes are
distinct from sound. Hence, [we may conclude from all this that] sound is merely the articu- Avatara(T): sems ni tshor ba nas ses rab kyi bar dag gi'o I ses rab kyan sems kyi'd- "Citta
lation of a language; and its form is not differentiated. The inflection therein must be made in is [the sal!lprayukta-hetu} of vedanii etc., up to prajiiii. Prajiiii [etc.,] also are [the sarpprayukta-
dependence on ka, ea, ta, ta, pa, etc. The phoneme must be uttered by means of vocal sound. hetu] of citta."
When the phonemes are joined together,niima is produced. niima having been produced, it
can illuminate the artha. Hence, we assert the following [causal] sequence: Vocal sound
546 Cf. AKB I! (p.88): saf!'lprayuktakahetustu I
gives rise to niima; niima illuminates artha. Therefore, it is universally established thatniima
evarp sati bhinnakalasantanajiiniimapyanyonyasarpprayuktakahetutvaprasailga}J I
is different from sabda. lt should be understood here thatsabda is that which utters, and
ekiikiiriilambaniistarhi I evamapi sa eva prasanga}J I ekakii/iistarhi I evam tarhi sati
ak$ara is that which is uttered;artha is neither. Thus they are established without confusion.
bhinnasantiinajaniimapi prasailgo navacandriidlni pasyatiim tasmiittarhi
samiisrayii}J /1 53 I I
539 The last explanatory sentence is not in A vatan(T).
547 Cf. AKB li (p.83):
sahabhuryemithal}phalii/.1 I
540 Though the Chinese term isffffl (zuo yong) the Sanskrit of which could well bekiiritra,
mitha}J piiramparayeTJa ye dhannii}J parasparaphaliiste parasparah sahabhiiheturyatha kathaml
the description does not reflect the usage ofkiiritrn as stressed by Saf!lghabhadra. Hence our
bhiltavaccittacittiinuvartilaqaiJ.alalqyavat If /50 I
preference to render it as activity, reserving the term function for the latter sense.
catviiri mahiibhiitiinyanyonyal!l sahabhiihetu}J I cittam cittanuvartiniilp dharmiiTJiirp te 'pi tasya
I sarpskrtalak$al)iini /ak$yasya so 'pi te$iim I eval!l ea krtvii sarvameva sam$krtam
541 Cf. A vatiira(T): dan po 'i sems can gyi rdzas gdags pa 'i rgyu
sahabhiiheturyathiiyogam I viniipi ciinyonyaphalatvena dharmo 'nulak$BI)iinarp sahabhiihetuma
tani tasyetyupasal!lkhyiitavyam If
542 Cf. ADV I (p.8): svavi$ayiilambanakriyapek$ayii vijiiiiniintarotpiidaniidisaktyapek$Yii
caikasya v{ifiiinasya tridhii nirdesa}J kriyate- 'manascittai?J vijfiiinam ea' ityaniigatasyiitltasyapi
The AKB explains 'sahabhii' to mean 'being mutually fruit of one another', while also
bhiitabhiivinyii samjfiayii vyapadesa}J I evam sati "a$tiidasadhiitavastraiyadhvika}J"
recognizing the meaning of 'together bringing about a common fruit' as part of the definition.
ityabhidharmagrantho 'pyanulomito bhavati I siitre 'pi coktam - "yatpunastadbhavati cittamiti
MVS fas.17 (p.85b) does no seem to give the former meaning explicitly:
vii mana iti vii" iti vistara}JI Also Cf. AKB I (p.ll ).

244
245
 ENTRANCE JNTO THE SUPREME DOCTRJNE SKANDHILA"S ABH\DHAitMAVATARA

"Question: What is the svabhclva of sahabhii-hetu? Answer: all satpskrta-dharmas ... Ques- sadr.W sadrsc/niil?l dharmiil}iif!l sabhiigahetustadyathii
tion: What is the meaning of 'sahabhft'? Answer: 'sahabhit' means: 'not mutually apart', kn\:aliiniimanyonymp avyiikrttlniiiJl nipamm:vclkrtm?l paneiiniim I
'together bringing about a common fruit', 'mutually according with each other', Thissahabhii-
hetu is definitely to be found in the three periods of time, and produces thepuru,wkiiraphala". kim sarve sadr.\:iinc/1!1 I netyciha I ki111 tarhi I
See also the following note. For the Sautrantika, hetu and phala cannot co-exist simulta-
neously (Ny, p.42l b). svo nikiiyo hhriscai!iiil?l ta ime svanikclyabhuva(1 I ... I te 'pi 1w sarve I ki111 tarhi I

548 Cf. AKB 11 (p.88 ): sahabhfthetllrapi I atha kenarthena
kena I anyonyaphalclrthena sahabl1lihetuf1 1
sahasclrthikiinyonyabalamiirgaprayiil}avut I sw!Jprayogiirthena
I te,wimeva siirthikclniitJl samiiminnapiiniidiparibhogakriyiiprayogavat
I ekeniipi hi vinii sw·vel}a na saiJlprayt!ivanta I sahhiiga-hetu (MVS, p.682c). Sthavira Srilata, however agrees with the
Also Cf. MVS (p.8l b): "Question: What is the difference between sm11prayuktaka and
sahablui- hetu? Some say that there is no difference, as in one [and the same] k,wl}a, vedanii
and smpjiiii etc., are both types of hetu. Therefore, in this regard, one should say thus: What-
ever are swpprayuktaka-hetu are also sahahlui-hetll; there exist some sahahhti-hetu which
are not smpprayuktak-hetu, viz. the viprayuktaka-sahabhii-hetu. Thus there is a difference
between the two causes ... [Their differences]: satJiprayuktaka-hetu means 'companionship';
sahablui-hefll means having a common phala. The first means having the same c"Hraya, iikclra
and clfamhana; he second means having the same jiiti,jarcl, sthiti, ani(vatii, pfwla,
and vipiika The first is like holding a stick, the second is like perfonning an action having
held the stick. The first is like [a group of people] joining hands together; the second is like
crossing a torrent having held hands together. The first means mutually according with one
another; the secondmeans not being mutually apart."
549 Cf. AKB 11 (p.83 f): ke punarete cittclnuvarttino I ptltih(iavat I
eaittii dvau sa,:varau tqii,: eetaso ea I
sarve I dhyiinasaiJlvaro 'nlisrava.\·anlvarasfe:flil?l ea yejii(viidayaseittasya
ea I ete dharmii.kittiinuvarttina ucyante I kathamete cittamanuparivarttante lsamiisatah
11 51 11
ka/astiivaccittenaikotpiidasthitinirodhatayii ekiidhvapatitatvena ea I phaliidibhir
I prirvakastvek(dabda(l sahclrthe veditavvah I
ku.\: a I ii kid alii vyci krtae i !le kusa lci k tda I cl vycl krta tayci I .ev.a t?l da sa bh i
kiirw;aiscittiinuparivarttina ucyante I Cf. also MVS, (p. 787b-c).
550 Cf. AKB 11 (p.85):
pa.\:eimiiniimutpanniinutpanmlniil!l sabhiigahetrtb I aniigatii naiva
I evamatite I
The early and the western masters both hold that nlpa-dharma have no
that
ritpa-dharma too can have sahhiiga-hetu (Ny, p.445a)
551 Cf. AKB Il (p.89): svahhzimikc/(1 prirvotpanniih sarvatragii pakimiinciiJl
dharmiil}iil?l sarvatragahetuh I ... klinadharmasclmiinyakclra(wtveniiym?l
prthak vyavasthiipyate I
Cf. also MVS (p.80a): "What is sarvatraga-hetu ? lt is all the past and present sarvatraga
anu.\:aya and their conjoined and co-existent dharmas. "
552 AKB 11 (p.89) explains that avyiikrta dhannas are not retributive because of their weak-
ness. The aniisrava dhannas are not retributive because they are not moistened through l!":f!JG.
The pure, non-bound (aprati.Wli?IJ'llkta) dhannas are not retributive because a retribution must
belong (be bound) to a partiular sphere- ku.\:alasiisravii.ka dharmii I
vipiikadharmatvclt I kasmiidavyiikrtct dharmii(1 vipiikaiJI na nirvarttayantil durhalatviit I
I rrs!Jiinahhi.yyanditatwl! I anahhi!iyanditasiirabijavat I
aprati.\"(/f!IYUktii hi kit./1 pratisaiJl)'Uktal!l I
vidhatviinnirvarttayanti I I
553 Cf. AKB 11 (p.82): sw!Jskrtasya hi dharmasya
kiiral}aheturutpiidayati I avighnabhiiviisthiiniit I
Cf. MVS (p.l 04a): "What is Answer: Conditioned by cak!;u and riipa,
eakyuvijniina is produced. This eak,wvijli(t/la has as its kiiral}a-hetu the calcyu, the nlpa, the
dharmas conjoined with it, the dharmas co-existent with it; as well as srotra, sabda,
srotra-vijiiiina ... manas, dhannas, manovljiiiina; all the dhannas which are material (nipin),
immaterial, sanirdariana, anirdariana, sapratigha, apratigha, siisrava, aniisrava, saiJlskrta,
asmpskrta etc.- all dharmas excluding itself ... Why not just say that kiiral}a-hefll comprises

246 247
 ENTRANCE INTO THE SUPREME DOCTRINE

559 Cf. AKB 11 (p.94): tasytidhipajw11 phalwrz I anavara!Jabhavamatre!Javasthitasya

all dharmas excluding itself? Answer: If one says thus, then the asm!1skrta would also have
kimadhipatyam I etadeva I wigibhavo 'pi cclsti kclral}ahetostadyatha "paiicasu vijiianakiiye.yu
as they not been excluded [in the definition]. Question: If so why not say
dasanclmilyatanllnciJ!I bluljanaloke ea karmanam I srotradinamapyasti cak,l'llrvijiianotpattau
that karwJa-hetu compnses all sai!ISkrta dharmas excluding itself? Answer: If one says thus
parW?lPWJ'CIJadhipatyam I .\:rutvii drasruktlmatotpatte" ityevamadi yqjyam I
then the asaJTlskrta dharmas would not be kiirana-hetll ... " ibid, (p.107b): "What is the
ing of' kiira!Ja'? kiirana [here] means 'non-obstructive', 'accomplishing something' ( 1§ PJr
m;)" 560 Cf. AKB 11 (p.96):
visaf!lyoga}J lcyayo dhiyii 115711
k.yayo I prajiia I tena pratisal!lkhyii nirodho visal!l)'ogaphalamityuktal!l bhavati
554 Avatara(T) has an additional phrase: "and part of the asai!Jskrta"- 'dus byas J,.yi chos
thams cad dmi 'dus ma byas la gcig go I I

56 I Cf. AKB Il (p. 91 ): sai!Jskrtasyaiva dharmC/.\ya hetuphale bhavata(l I

55 5 Cf. AKB 11 (p. 9 5 ): sahabhftsal!lprayuktakahetvo(l puru,wkiiraphalam 1
niisa1{1Slqtasya te 1155 11
pum.yabluiwlvyatirekiit pum,wkiira(l pum,w eva I tasya phalctl!l pauru,mm I ko 'yw.n pum.yaktlro
kilrz kara!Jam I paiicavidhapha/asm!Jbhawlcca l. .. kasyedanil!l
nama lyasya yat kiiritram I puru;illktlra iva hi puru,wkllra/1 I Also, ibid (p.96):
yadballljjllyate yattatphalar11 puru,wktlrajam 1 tatphalm11 kathw11 va margwya phalam I tadbalena prapte(l I

562 Cf. AKB Il (p.98):

556 Xuan Zang's explanatory rendering by breaking the two compounded
, though not unjustifiable in terms of the essential meaning of the term is
catviirah pratyayii uk.tii}J I
I slltre I pratyayatii(1 I hetupratyayatii samanantarapratyayata atambana-
hardly to be expected to have its literal correspondence in the sm.nskrta, which is an explana-
pratyayata adhipatipratyayatii ce" ti I pratyay{ljiiti pratyayatii I
tiOn on the single word ni,1yanda, meaning an emanation or' out-flowing'. Avatiira(T) has
Simply: rgyu dan 'dra ha 'i chos ni mthun pa i.es bya 'o I- "a dharma similar to the hetu
is said to be a Cf. also MVS (p.79a-c): " ... These six hetu are not mentioned in the sutras. The sutras speak
of the four only: viz: hetu-pratyayatc/ etc., up to adhipati-pratyayatii ... There are
again some who say that the six hetu are also mentioned in the siitras; i.e., in the Ekottarllgama.
Cf. AKB 11 (p. 9 5): hetorya(l sadrso dharma(l sa I tadvatha
A long time having passed, the particular sutra have now been lost (antarhita). The Vener-
sabhllgasarvatragahetvo(l I yadi sarvatragahetorapi samllnam phalam
able Kiityiiyaniputra and others, by the power of their pranidha-jiiana, perceived the sutra
sabhclgahetoreve. I yasmtlt hh1lmita(l casya slldt:IYW!l natu prakiirata(11yasya
passages which deal with the six hetu, and compiled them in their Abhidharma treatises ...
tu praktlrato 'pi sadr.iya111 so 'bhyupagamyata eva sabhagahetu(l 1
Other masters say that although not all the six hetu as such are spoken of together in order, in
any sutra; their mention is found here and there scattered in the various siitras ... Hence these
557 Avatiira(T): rgyu dan mi 'dra bar smin pa ni rnam par smin paste I -"That which
six hew are taught by the Buddha."
matures (pac) differently from the hetu is viplika-phala."

563 Cf. AKB 11 (pp. 98-1 00): tatra ... ktlra!Jahetuvmjyii(l paiica hetavo hetupratyaya(l /...
558 Cf. AKB Il (p.95): anivrtavyakrto hi dharma(l ...
a rh a ta h pasc i m a napiisyotpa n n else i ttaca itta (1 samana n ta rapra tyaya I
sattviikhya}J vyiilq-todbhava}J I
samascayamanantarasca pratyaya iti samanantarapratyaya(l I ...
kusalakusalm!J hi vipakai!J prati vyakara!Jadvyakrtal!l I tasmlldya uttarakiilam bhavati na
saha niintarw11 sa vipaka(l I etad vipaka.1ya laksanam 1 ibid , (p .89)·. ath a v1pa
· -ka· 1·11· k o ·r th a.h
iilambanaf!l sarvadharmii}J ...
. .
yathayogwn cak,wrvi)Jianasya sasm,nprayogasya nlpam I srotravijiillnasya sabda(l I
I piiko vipiika(l I tu het1lna111 sadi"Sa(l pclka(l 1
ghra!Javijiiclnasya gandha(l I jihvavijiiiinasya I kiiyavijiWnasya I
manov1jiianasya san•adharma(l ! .. lya eva kiiraiJahetu(l sa ladhiko 'ywrz
Also Cf. MVS (p.l03c): "What is the meaning of 'vipaka'? Answer: it means 'maturing
pratyaya ityadhipatipratyaya(l I
(pac) into a different (vi) species: A ku.\:ala or aku.\:ala hetu producing an avyiikrta-pha/a. '
paka' means .

249
248
MVS (p. 79a) mentions two opinions regarding the question as to whether the hetu are to be
subsumed under the pratyaya, or conversely : (I) The two mutually subsume each other- the
first five he tu= hetu-pratyaya; kiirm;a-hetu =the other three pratyaya. (2) The hetu are to be
subsumed under the pratyaya, and not conversely- the first five hetu = hetu-pratyaya;
kiirw:za-hetu = adhipati-pratyaya; the samanantara-pratyaya and the iilamhana-pratyaya are
not subsumed under any hetu.
564 Cf. note 339. Also Cf. AKB I (p.3 ): yatra n'ipasya
565 The paragraph that follows is not found in Avatiira(T).
Cf. siitra quoted by Sa!]lghabhadra (Ny, p.429b- see note 339 below). The siitra quotation in
A vatara(T) is a more elaborate one: "0 Gautama, on what is earth supported? The Golden
0 brahmin. On what is the Golden maf1\lala supported? On Water. On what is
Water supported? On Wind. On what is Wind supported? On Space. 0 Gautama, on what is
Space supported? 0 brahmin, you have gone too far, unable to understand the limit of the
questions. Nevertheless, Space becomes manifest on account of the existence of light. Being
immaterial, invisible, and non-resistent; on what can Space be supported. Nevertheless, on
account of the existence of light, Space is known."
Cf. MAg, no. I 59 llnJi!JDMifli]}jflt:ql (TI, p.682a), where the Buddha in reply to the question of
Briihmal)a -"What is Space supported on?"- says, "Space has no support; it [is known to]
exist only by reason of the sun and the moon." Also Cf. MAg, no.l93 fF.Wlif.!ifl!l'.jjflf.:1il.(Tl, p.
745c) where the say in reply to the Buddha, " ... Space is immaterial (atiipin), invis-
ible and non-resistant (apratigha), therefore that artist and his pupil cannot, by
means of this, paint figures in space and colour them with colours ... " This sutra is also cited
in MVS (p.388b ). The Piili version is found in the Kakact'ipama sutta, M I, 21.
Cf. Yyiikhyii (p.l5): uktal!l hi bhagavatii I prthivf bho Gautama kutra prati,l'{hitii I prthivi
I ap-maf1\lalm!l bho Gautama kva prafi!'!hitat,n I viiyau
prati,l'fhilal!llviiyur bho Gautama kva I I bho Gautama
kutra prati,l'fhitam I atisarasi mahii-briihmm;iitisarasi mahiihriihmaf1a I briihmafla
aniilamhanam iti vistaral; I tasmiid asty iti I see quotation below)
566 See Sarnghabhadra's argument below. Contra Van Yelthem: "On sait par la que ..."-
apparently taking Jlt here to be an error for .l:t .
Cf. Vyiikhya (p.l5) which, commenting on "tatr 'iikiisam aniivrtir ... yatra n'ipa.1ya gati/J'' in
AKB 11 (p.3) explains: tad apratyak,I'({-Vi,l'({yatviit anya-dhamiiniivrtyii anumiyate. na tv
iivarm;iibhiivamiitram. I ata eva ea vyiikhyiiyate lyatra rtlpmya gatir iti I
250
Sarpghabhadra devotes much space (one fas. in the Chinese tr.) in the Ny to argue with the
Kosakiira, attempting to prove the reality of the three aswnskrta. We shall give below a
translation of his argument for the reality of iikiisa, part of which reads as if it is an elabora-
tion of§§ 6, 6.1, 6.2, of our text. Cf. also the argument in MVS (pp.388b-389c)
for the reality of iikiisa as distinct from the
Ny, fas.l7 (pp.429a-430a): "As to their statement 'clkiisa is merely the absence
(sprasravyiibhavamcltramiikc'isam I tadyathii hyandhakiire pratiglu'itamavindanta
/ ... AKB II,p.92), we also accept that is the absence ofspm,l'{avya, as
has no tangibillity. [But] what hetu have you to prove your statement that is
merely the absence of and does not exist as a separate dravya ?"
"We have already proved that when people in darkness do not encounter any resistant object,
they say that it is Is not this hetu sufficient to prove its non-existence?"
"One cannot by this hetu alone prove that is definitely non-existent: They say only that
it is clkii.\-a, not an obstacle. How do we know that they speak of the absence ofsprastavya
alone as iik!'i.fa? People in the world, for instance, say, 'this issukha, not dul;kha'. Now, how
can it be that the absence of alone is said to be sukha? You might argue: 'No, it is a
false analogy- the activities of the two vedanii, duhkha and sukha, being harmful and benefi-
cial respectively, are distinct. [On the other hand], not accomplishing anything at all,
cannot be perceived like sukha'. [But] if so, the above he tu given by you would be useless,
since now you are proving the non-existence of iikii.va by the assertion that it absolutely
accomplishes nothing."
"Now, one definitely cannot take as necessary hetu, that the absence of obstruction is said to
be to prove that iikii!;a consists of nothing but the absence of spra!f{avya. Thus, the
Kosakiira here has no hetu capable of proving that iikiisa is definitely non-existent. Moreover,
the siitra says that the asaf1l. iikii.va, accomplishes something; therefore it is not incom-
parable to sukha: Thus, the Bhagavat says, ' Wind is supported by iikc'isa; it has no activity,
has a support, and is not appropriated by the thought'. (Cf. MYS, p.389a: The a.I'W?l,l'hTta
has no activity [directly], but it can serve as the proximate adhipati-pratyaya for the various
"Moreover, the n'ipa, light, is the lak!faiJa of iikiisa, hence we know iikiisa exists as a real
entity. Thus the siitra says, ' ... Nevertheless, Space becomes manifest by reason of light '.
Hence the of Space- i.e. light- is decisively shown. It is for this reason that the sutra
goes on to say these words: The Buddha first says that Wind is supported by iikii.\:a; subse-
quently He says that iikii.\:a is without support. This is so that the [to whom the
251

Buddha is speaking (see reference given in note 338] would not harbour such doubt: ' Now
the Bhagavat has said that the Wind was supported by But how can one prove that
[really] exists?'. In order to dispel his doubt, the Buddha goes on to say those words.
If were non-existent, what [is manifested] by reason of light? Light is material (riipin),
visible (sanirdar!wna) and resistant (sapratigha); if there is no iikii.1'a, by what can it be
accommodated? Therefore when the Bhagavat says ' Nevertheless, Space becomes manifest
by reason of light', it shows that light, a nlpa, can serve as the truly-existent lak.JGIJa of
The Sthavira [Srilata), however, not comprehending the import of this sutra, replies
thus,' If iikc/sa becomes manifest by reason of light, it ought to be included under the nlpa-
dharma' - How does he arrive at such a conclusion?"
"Moreover, iiktHa ought to exist as a real entity, because it is described in the sutra just as the
thought is: Thus, the sutra says, ' iikiisa is immaterial, invisible and non-resistant By what
can be supported?'. Now there cannot be such words of differentiation with regard to [abso-
lutely non-existent things as] the iitman or the hare-horn etc."
"As to this, he explains that those words are uttered in direct response to the [briihmana's]
question. Just as when the sutra says," Well subdue the iitman, the iitman is the support.' But
if those words were indeed uttered in direct response to the question, [the Buddha] should not
have spoken thus; He should simply have said, ' 0 hnlhmana, is without a substance,
by what can it be supported?' Moreover, He should not have said, • Nevertheless, iikiHa
becomes manifest by reason oflight' - The piirviinta is not spoken of as being discernible;
the doer of an action is not spoken of as perceivable (upa- Ylahh) - and yet these are to be
known as direct replies which accord with truth. If, with regard to a non-existent, one speaks
in the manner of speaking of an existent, then it becomes meaningless (anartha) speech.
Moreover, the example cited cannot serve as a proof, as the iitman to be subdued refers to the
thought (citta)- this has been considered in detail [earlier] (ibid. p.260c; Cf. also AKB(C) I.
p.39a) when discussing the meaning of 'iidhyiitmika'. If the words· immaterial' etc., do not
have a [corresponding] real object (artha), how can the example cited be valid? [The thought
is also described as being immaterial etc.]
"Furthermore, as regards the Sthavira's assertion: 'If had any real substance at all, it
would be eternal and hence the resistant nlpa would never be produced; or one ought to
subsume it as sal!lskrta, as do the Vatsiputriya's- This is an assertion made without careful
consideration, because [the iikc/sa] imagined by him indeed cannot accomodate other resis-
tant riipa. It is not the case that the dravya can be obstructed by other resistant rupa so
that it must give way to other riipa being produced- which would imply that it is impermanent.
On the other hand, because is accomodative by nature and not rflpa by nature, it does
not have to give way. [But} the ukc/.i:a-dhiitu, being an obstructible nlpa, necessarily gives
252
SKANDHILA'S ABHIOHARMAVATARA
way when other riipa are being produced. That is to say: the is a fine rupa;
although not obstructing others, it is obstructed by others, and is so classifiable as imperma-
nent and saT?Jskrta. has the laksaiJa of being neither obstructive to others nor being
obstructible by others, at the time when rupa-dharma are being produced - How can it be
classified as impermanent and sal!lskrta'? As iikii.\·a co-exists harmoniously with rltpa, it
does not arise or perish at the different stages [of the 11/pa]."
"As to the fact that there is resistance in the walls etc., it is because there are resistantnlpa in
it which obstruct others. This is not the case with the asal!lskrta iikiisa; since there is no
[resistant riipa] therein. The akc/.i:a-dhiitu riipa is fine and light and cannot obstruct others; as
soon as it is excluded through being obstructed by other gross nlpa, it gives way. Such is the
nature ofsapratigha riipa: When a given space is occupied by one, it cannot be occupied by
another. The differs from the iikiisa-dhiitu in being apratigha; how can it be consid-
ered as impermanent like the latter."
"Moreover, as regards his assertion: ' If iikiisa exists as a real substance, it ought to become
saf!Jskrta, as this does not differ from the -This is an empty assertion without
any truth, for the Bhagavat Himself says that they differ: Thus the sutra says,' iik.iHa is imma-
terial, invisible and non-resistant.' It also says, ' when one is detached with regards to nlpa,
the aka.i:a-dhatu is abandoned together with the four [mahiibhuta; the vijiiiina-dhiitu is not
said to be abandoned]' {also cited in ibid, p.347b). Now, if iikii/w-dhiitu does not differ rrom
which is immaterial, invisible and non-resistant, it ought also to be the same. It ought
to be, like vijiiiina-dhiitu, said to be abandoned when one is detached with regard to the
arupya-dhlltu. Moreover, the sutra says, 'the iikiisa-dhiitu accomplishes the 1yavahiirapuntsa
'; and also says,' Nevertheless iikiisa becomes manifest by reason of light'. Now, if
iikiisa-dhiitu is none other than iikiisa, and light is none other than ; then would
the sutra not be saying [in effect]: ' Nevertheless, light becomes manifest by reason of light'?
Hence we know there is a difference [between the two]."
"Moreover the sutra says, ' Among all dharmas, whether the samskrta or the asamskrta,
detachment (vairagya) is supreme.' In this sutra, dharmas are said to be of two kinds; the
asaf!lskrta being dharmas cannot be said to be non-existent, as without dravya, they ought
not be of the nature of dharmas. The words, 'asamskrta' show that they comprise many
dravya; therefore there must be clkll.i:a and apratisal!lkhyii-nirndha from which one can be
detached before they may be described in pluralistic terms, as apart from these there is no
other asamskrta. Hence this iikiisa-dhatu is not identical with akii.\·a. The Sthavira, without
reflection, asserts that the two are not different."
253

ENTRANCE INTO THE SUPREME DOCTRINE
"There are other iicciiJ'G who assert: ' iikii.fa does not exist as a distinct dravya; for it is with
regard to the absence of resistant riipa that one gives rise to the idea (huddhi) of space.' Their
assertion is illogical. In fact, it is by this very hetu that one can prove that iikii.\·a exists as a
distinct dravya: This is because there exists, at a location different from that occupied by the
resistant nipa, a distinct iikiisa which serves as the iilamhana for huddhi of space; and be-
cause where there is no iilambana, buddhi cannot arise. Hence their assertion is mere empty
words. Furthermore, [by the same token], one can also say : ' There exists no resistant riipa
as a distinct dravya; for the huddhi of nipa arises where there is no space.' Yet this cannot
prove the non-existence of ritpa. Hence, they are unable to prove, [in this manner,] that iikiisa
does not exist."
"Should they say that rltpa, possessing drm:va, are cognizable; then the same ought to be true
of for it can be cognized through inference: Just as cak,l'll, etc., though not cognizable
through direct perception are known to possess dravya through inference
(anwniina) from the fact that they possess activities. Likewise, as iikii.i·a too possesses activ-
ity - as mentioned above - one knows through inference that it possesses dravya. Hence
exists as distinct dravya."
Elsewhere (ibid. p.34 7b ), SafTlghabhadra gives the following brief argument for the reality of
cikii.\·a. "apart from the clkiisa exists as a drm:Ya. Therefore, the Bhagavat has
said, 'iikii.\:a is non-material, invisible, nonresistant; what can be its support? Nevertheless,
becomes manifest by reason of light.' The meaning of this sutra is that though iikii.\:a
has no support, it accomplishes something: it accomodates all light. And as the effect (phala)
reveals le cause (hetu), we know [by inference that] it possesses a drmya. If iikcl.\:a doesn't
exist, there ought not be liht. Since there is light which is a type ofnipa apprehen-
sible by the cak.yu-vijfiiina, therefore exists, since it accomodates light etc. Hence it is
well proved that iikiisa exists as a drm:va . ... "
The argues in MVS fas. 75 (p.388c) that the reality of iikii.\:a is established not
only on scriptural evidence. "It is also perceived throughpraryaksa-pramii(la: If iikii.\:a does
not exist, all existent things would find no accomodation; since there is [in fact] accomodation
for the existent things, we know clkiisa exists .... "
ibid (p.388c-389a}: "Space truly exists. One cannot say that it does not exist simply because
one does not know. Question: If so, What is the activity of Space? Answer: The asaf!1skrta
iikclsa does not have any activity [directly]. However, it can serve as the proximate adhipati-
pratyaya for the various (empty space in the ordinary sense as distinct from
akasa as an asaf!Jsk{'ta). These various can serve as the proximate adhipati-pratyaya
for the various mahclhhlita. These various mahiihh1ita can serve as the proximate adhipati·
254
.::J 1\.I:JHIUHA.K.MAVAJ 1\KA
pratvaya for the sa-pratigha hhautika riipa, etc. These various sa-pratigha hhautika l'lipa
can serve as the proximate adhipati-pratyaya for the citta-caitta-dharma. Now, if Space did
not exist, it will be impossible to establish this sequential chain of cause-effect."
567 In. AKB 11 (p.92), the quotes the following sutra (Cf. SAg, T2, p.l82b) to
support his view that the abandoning of all kle.\:a is called nirvclna (= pratiSW?1khyii-nirodha
= visw?1yoga-phala) "pwicemiinindriya!1i lisevitiini hhavitiini hahulikrtiiny atitiimlgata-
pratyupannasya duhkasya prahii(liiya sw11varttanta " iti I prahci(1W?1 hi nirvcl(lam .. .l
Samghabhadra representing the Sarvastivada view point remarks that nirviina is not simply
the state of freedom from duhkha. Skandhila too. states further (see following para, *7.1) that
pratism?1khyii-nirodha is a real entity that causes the cessation of du(lkha. Sarnghabhadra
(Ny, p.432c): " I shall never acknowledge that the very cessation of all duhkha itself is called
nirvii(la. I acknowledge that as a result of the ceasing of duhkha, there is acquired a
pratisaf!1khycl-nirodha which is distinct from the duhkha and miirga; it is this that can be
called nirvc'i(la. If the nirodha does not exist separately, there would be the aforesaid incon-
gruity -i.e., that an w·hat ought to have klda, or one in the ought to be already
free from klda- since there would be no difference [between the two}later on".
Cf. also a similar argument for the reality ofnirvii(la in ibid (p.432b}:" ... the lak.,w(la is none
other than the dravya (= svahhiiva). Now since nirvii(la has the lak,w(la of being nirodha,
etc., it is established that it has a drm)'a."
568 Xuan Zang generally translates sw17siira by j::JE. However, we may note that this term
is here preceded by the plural particle Also, Avatara(T} has only "birth" (s/,ye ha ni
sdug bsiwllo)
569 Avatara(T) has only: rlwi rgyu ha thogs par hyed pa brag Ita bur gnas pa gwi yin pa I
"That which stays as a rocky hill blocking the movement of wind". However, like our text,
Siira also has the other simile: chu · bah pa bcili ha Ita /m
570 Cf. AKB I (p.4): ya(1 sclsravairdharmairvism?I)'Oga/1 sa pratisw?ikhycl-nirodhah I
dubkhiidiniimiiryasatyc7nc71?1 pratisaq1khyiincll!l pratisaq1khycl priipyo
nirodhah pratism17khyiinirodhab I Cf. see also same definition in MVS (p.161 a).
571 Of the two nirodha - pratism!1khycl- and apratisaf?1khycl- -which is more numerous?
MVS (p.l64) explains that the latter is more numerous because its quantity is in accordance
with that of the saf?1skrta dharmas, whereas the quantity of the former is only in accordance
with that of the siisrava dharmas.
255
 J:.N I KAl\!Lt. H\;1 lJ l HI:: DOCTRINE SKANDHILA'S ABHIDHARMAVA I AKA

5 72 Cf. AKB I (p.4): ki111 punareka eva sarvesiiJ'!l siisravii!Jiil!l dharmiiiJiif!i 577 The Chinese version of this sutra is found in SAg(312), p.89c. There seems to be no
I netyiiha I kil'!l tarhi I Pali equivalent of it. The slitra is quoted in Ch.IX of AKB (p.465) by Vasubandhu to show
prthak prthak I that the pll£/gala is a mere prajnapti. In Stcherbatsky's translation of the same from the Tibetan,
yiivanti hi swnvogculravya(Zi tiivanti Vi.\'ai!!)'Ogadravyii!Ji I anyathii hi it appears as the • Ajita sennon' (Soul Theory, p.26). It is also quoted in AKB 11 (p.93} by the
kldanirodhasiik,riit karal}iit prasalveta I sati caiva'!1 Sautrantika to show that nirvii!Ja is a pure non-existent (ahhiivamiitra ). The Sanskrit text
.1yiit I quoted in AKB is as follows:

Also Cf. Ny (p.332b): "Some assert that the dhannas to be abandoned have one and the same AKB (p.465): praWva tiipii(1i cotpadyate cak.Jurvijiiiinm'!ll triiyii!Jctl'!l sa11mipiitah
pratisw!lkhyii-nirodha. The Abhidharmika says [the pratisaq1khycl- nirodha] are different spadab I sparsasahajcltii vedanii sari1jiiii cetanii itime catviiro rftpf!Jab
accordingly as thesm'!lyoga-mstu are different. If the abandonables were to have one and the skandhii/;cak.Jurindriyalll ea riipametiivanmamt$yatvamucyate I atreym'!l satiljiiii sattvo naro
same nirodha, then when one realizes the nirodha corresponding to the stage of the manu,1:vo miinavasca pudgalojivojantztriti I atreyw'!l pratijiiii aha111
does one also realize the nirodha of the other klda? If one does, nlpiil}i pa.vyamiti I atriiyaq1 vyavahiira i(vapi sa iiyu,1·miineva111niima evaq1jiitya evaf!l gotra
it would be useless to cultivate the counteraction to [these] other [kle.l:a]. If one does not, it evamiihclra evaf!JS tisaJ!!vedi eva 111dirghiiyu r eva l'!!Cira s th i ti ka
would imply that one realizes a part of an entity and not the rest of it; which is opposed to evamiiyu!1paryanta iti I iti hi sa111jfiiimiitrakam evaitad evaitat
reason, as there would be the fallacy of [one nirodha consisting of] parts ... " The last part of I sarva ime anityiib sm'!lskrtcl.ueti tii!1 pratitvasamutpannii" iti I
the argument is also found in our text and in MVS (p. 161 c). but lacking in AKB.
AKB (p.93 ): "yat pratinibsargo ksayo
573 Cf. AKB VI (p.389). viriigo nirodho vyupa.:,amo 'sta1!1gama!1 anyasya ea
I etat k(.\)iintametatpra(JflaJ1l yaduta
Sarpghabhadra (Ny, p.734a) comments that in actual fact these three dhatu do not differ in virclgo nirodho nirviil}am" iti I
substance. though each of the aswrskrta entities is metaphorically said to be having the three
aspects: As each of them is acquired through the abandoning (prahiil}a) of the eight .lm!1J'Ojana, For the Tibetan and the Mahclvastu versions (ii, 285), see AKB(F) 11 (p.284, n.4).
it is called aprahiil}a-dhiitu; as each of them is acquired through detachment (vairc/t,_>va) from Sarpghabhadra (Ny, p.433a) replies to the Sautrantika (see second AKB passage above) as
rclga, it is called a vairiiga-dhatu; as each of them is acquired through the cessation (nirodha) follows: " The sutra quoted cannot be used to prove that nirvii!Ja is abhiivanultra. This siitra
of the skandha, it is called a nirodha-dhiitll. speaks only with reference to the time when one enters into nirupadhi.:,e,m-nirvii!Ja: At this
stage, allupadhi are completely abandoned, relinquished, etc."
For the various interpretations on the three terms by the Sautrantika and the different
Sarvastivada masters, see ibid. loc. cit.; MVS (pp.l47c-148b); AKB(F} VI (p.301, n.2). 578 Whereas Xuan Zang explains nirvli!Ja as the extinction of defilement, probably adding
the traditional simile of the fire being extinguished; Avatara(T), according to the Tibetan
574 The first three kinds of classifications are not found in A vatara(T). interpretation of the tenn as the transcendence of sorrow (mya tian /as 'das pa), explains it in
terms of the transcendence of all klesa, calamities and harm: 'di thoh na gnod pa thams cad
575 MVS (p.l63a) gives the following thirteen synonyms for pratiSGJ!1khyii-nirodha, to- daiJ I 'rshe ha thams cad dan I iion mons pa thams cad !as 'das pas I mya iJan {as 'das pa 'o I
gether with various interpretations for each of them: (I) Nirvci!Ja, (2) The Dissimilar C:fP.l -the fire simile is not to be seen.
tl'i ), (3) (4) Non-manifest (]f:l!M. (5) The Most Excellent. (6)
Penetration Of!ll!). (7) Arhat, (8) Non-intimate (:;riiJli:), (9) Non-cultivated, ( l 0) The 579 Cf. AKB I (p.4):
Lovable, (11) The Proximate, (l2) The Wonderful (praJJita), (l3) The Exit (nihsaral}a). utpiidiityantavighno 'nyo nirodho 'pratisal(lkhyayii 11611
aniigatclnii111 dharmii1Jclmutpiidasycltyantavighnabhlito visa111yogiidyo 'nyo
576 MVS (p.67b, etc) explains this as the relinquishment of the priipti of k/e.1:a. so j1ratisaJ'!lkhyiinirodhab lnahyasau pratism'!lkhyayii lahhyate I kiq1 tarhi I pratyayavaikalyiit
I yathaikarzipavyclsaktacak.mrmanaso yiini riipa11i al(vayante

256 257
 t:.J>o; I Kf\f\jLr. JJ'II J U I Hr. ;"').L't"Kt:Mt J.JU'L l KJNt ::!1 AI:JHIUHAKMAVA 1/\K/\

tadiilambanaib parlcabhirvijiiiinakiiyairna "i:akya111 punamlpallum I nahi te atftarn

I sa te.JiimapratiSGI!lkhyiinirodhaiJ pmtyayavaika(vlit priipyate 1

580 The Sautriintika asserts that apratisal!lkhyii-nirodha is not a real entity but simply the
deficiency in pratyaya for the production of a particular dharma. In this context, the last
sentence of this paragraph here- which stresses the positive potency of this nirodha- is note-
worthy. Saq1ghabhadra argues against this Sautriintika assertion (Ny, p.434b): " ... The defi-
ciency is merely a non-existence A non-existent dharma is incapable
of obstructing an existent: When later on the necessary pratyaya happen to assemble together,
what dharma will there be which is capable of preventing (the said dharma, which failed to
arise earlier on,] from arising again? Yet it is impossible for a dharma which abides among the
un-arisen (anutpanna) dharmas to still arise later on. Hence there must exist [a real dharma]
capable of obstructing the pratyaya absolutely. It is not the mere deficiency in pratyaya that
causes the absolute non-arising." This positive description by Saq1ghabhadra is considered a
'neo- neo-Sarviistiviida' doctrine by many scholars. However, such a positive
emphasis is already found in MVS (p.l64b-c- See Study, p. 703f).

581 Saq1ghabhadra (Ny, p.434c-435a) argues for the real existence of the apratiSa!!lkhyii-
nirodha as distinct from those of the pmtism?lkhycl-nirodha and the of dharmas. The
APPENDIX
distinction between the three are also found in JPS (p.923b) and MVS (p.l61 a). JPS (loc. cit.)
explains that the pratisamkhyii-nirodha are the nirodlw which are vi.WI!l)'Oga. The
apratism!lkhycl-nirodha are those which are not visaJ?Iyoga. The anityatii-nirodha are the dis-
persing, decay, breaking up, disappearance, of the sa1!1skiira. This differs
from the apratisaf!!khycl-nirodha which is the liberation from diseases, calamities, affiictions
etc.: It is not the subduing, abandoning and transcending of desires.

582 This last sentence is not found in Avatiira(T).

Cf. Ny (p.435a): " ... Moreover, cessation and exhaustion are two different names of the same
substance. The sutra says that a srotculpanna exhausts [existence in] the three durgati. There-
fore, we know that there is a distinct entity which is the apratisal!lkhyii-nirodha, as this ex-
haustion is definitely not inclusible under other nirodha: The sutra says: • A srotaclpanna has
already exhausted [existence in] hells, has already exhausted [existence in] the animal realm,
has already exhausted [existence in] the hungry-ghost realm ... • Now, it is not the case that he
is already capable of abandoning (pra-..Jiul) the durgati: since he has not yet been detached
from the riiga with regard to the kclmadhcltu, and the durgati are said to be abandoned only
when one has completely been detached from kiima-riiga .... Nor does the word • exhaustion
• here refer to the anityatii-nirodha, since what is exhausted is all as yet produced. Hence, it
is proved that there definitely exists a distinct dharma named apratisarrkhyii-nirodha. As a
result of this dharma being acquired, the durgati are made absolutely incapable of being
produced.
258 259
 The Theory of Sarviistitva

I. Definition of Sarvastivada and Sarvastivadins

lnspite ofvarious doctrinal disagreement- some of considerable importance

- the various subgroups within the Sarvastivada school were united in their
central tenet of Sarvastivada. It seems to have been a genuine belief on the
part of the Sarvastivada that "sarvam asti" was what the Buddha Himself
had taught. It became a problem- i. e., philosophically- only when they
came to be questioned by their opponents as to the exact implication of their
doctrine of sarviistitva. As we have remarked above (supra, Introduction, §
IV), even after they had eventually articulated this doctrinal position suffi-
ciently to be established as a distinctive school, they seemed to have contin-
ued to assume the position of the orthodox Sthaviravada.

The working out of the implication of this thesis was still visible even as late
as the time of Ny. The whole confronation came to be zeroed in on the
dispute between Sarvastivada versus Vibhajyavada. In AKB, their main
opponents, the Sautrantikas, belonging to the Vibhajyavada camp, propose
that the Sarvastivadin way of understanding 'sarviistitva' is not the only
possible one. Indeed it is a bad interpretation of the notion. For the
Sautrantikas, one could say 'all exists (sarvam asti)' only in this manner:
The past dharmas have existed; the future dharms will come into existence;
the present dharmas are existing. Alternatively, one could also say 'all ex-
ists' in the sense in which the sutra (cf. sabba-sutta in Sa1?1yutta-nikya) says
so: Everything that is within the range of perception - within the twelve
iiyatana (and nothing more)- can legitimately be said to exist.

In this work, the school that eventually came to be known by the name of
Sarvastivada is represented by Vasubandhul as defining their position as

261
follows:
"Those who hold 'all exists' -the past, the present and the future- be-
long to the Sarvastivada. Those, on the other hand, who hold that some
exist, viz. the present and the past karma which has not given fruit; and
none of those which have given fruit or the future exist, are followers of
the Vibhajyavada"
(Ye hi sarvamastiti vadanti atftamanagatmrt pratyutpannal!l ea te
I ye tu kecidasti yat pratyutpannamadattaphalal!l catfta/?1
karma kil!lcinnasti yaddattaphalamatftamanagatal!l ceti vibhajya
vadanti te I )
In Sa111ghabhadra's Ny2, a post-AKB polemic in defence of the
orthodoxy, an additional requirement for the definition is noticeable:
"It is only those who believe in the real existence of the three periods of
time, as discussed above, as well as of the three kinds of the uncondi-
tioned (asaf?lskrta), who can be considered as belonging to the
Sarvastivada"
This same requirement is also found in ADV3:
"Sarvastivada is so-called because it accepts [the reality of] the three
periods of time, distinguished on account of activity, and the three reals
[-the three uncontioned] ... "
(icchaty adhvatrayal!l yasmat krtyatas ea dhruvatrayam/
sarvastivada ityuktastasmad.. ./1)
The additional requirement seems to confirm our suggestion that even as
late as the time ofNy, the orthodox Sarvastivadins were still struggling to
define themselves.4 According to the *Samayabhedoparacana-cakra, most
of the early Buddhist sects had accepted the doctrine of sarvastitva, even
though they seemed to have disputed endlessly on what it really meant for
them in each case. It seems possible that even as late as the time of AKB and
262
Ny, they were still some Buddhists, both within and without the broad
Sarvastivada lineage- including some sections of the Sautrantika
- who would accept the doctrine in a revised or different version from that
adopted by the orthodox It is perhaps because of this that
Sarpghabhadra felt it necessary to distinctly dissociate the from
the others whom he could not accept as real Sarvastivadins in any sense. In
Ny, he names them as follows: The Pudgalavadins, called by him "the
Superimposers or Additionists" (Samaropavadins)" on account of their ac-
ceptance of the reality of the pudga/a in addition to that of the dharmas in
the three times; the Vibhajyavadins; the who accept only the
reality of the twelve ayatana of the present the Prajfiaptivadins who
deny the reality of even the dharmas of the present; the Vainasikas (or who
hold that all dhannas are without svabhava, like empty flowers. Sautrantikas,
here referred to as the are singled out by Sa111ghabhadra
who denies that they qualifY as Sarvastivadins; for their view "differs from
the Vainasikas by just a mere
11. The four main theories of Sarvastivada
The major question the Sarvastivadins have to answer is: Given the thesis
that all dharmas in the three periods of time equally exist, how do the
Sarvastivadins differentiate- how can they account for our experience of the
difference- as regards 'past dharmas', 'present dharmas' and 'future dharmas'
? Each of the 'Four Great Acarya' of the Sarvastivada offers an explanation.
We quote below, the relevant passage in the A 6:
"The Venerable Dharmatrata says that there is change in mode ofbeing
(bhava-anyathiitva). The Venerable says that there is change
in characteristic (la/qal}a-anyathatva). The Venerable Vasumitra says
that there is change in state (avasthii-anyathiitva). The Venerable
Buddhadeva says that there is change in [temporal] relativity
(anyathii-anyathatva).
263
"The advocator of difference in mode of being says that when dharmas
operate (pra-vrt) in time, they change on account of their modes of
being (bhiiva); there is no change in substance. This is like the case of
breaking up a golden vessel to produce another thing - there is only
change in shape, not in varr/a-nlpa. It is also like milk, etc. turning into
curds, etc. - only the taste, digestibility, etc., are given up; not the
varYia-rupa. Similarly, when dharmas enter into the present from the
future, though they give up their future mode of existence and acquire
their present mode of existence, they neither lose nor acquire their sub-
stantial essence (AKB: dravya-bhiiva). Likewise, when they enter the
past from the present, although they give up the present mode of exist-
ence and acquire the past mode of existence, they neither give up nor
acquire their substantial nature.
"The advocator of difference in characteristic says that when dharmas
operate in time, they change on account of characteristic ); there
is no change in substance. A dharma in each of the temporal periods has
three temporal characteristic; when one [temporal] characteristic is
conjoined, the other two are not severed. This is like the case of a man
being attached to one particular woman - he is not said to be detached
from other women. Similarly, when dhannas abide in the past, they are
being conjoined with the past characteristic, but are not said to be sev-
ered from the characteristics of the other two temporal characteristics.
When they abide in the future, they are being conjoined with the future
characteristic, but are not said to be severed from the characteristics of
the other two temporal characteristics. When they abide in the present,
they are being conjoined with the present characteristic, but are not said
to be severed from the characteristics of the other two temporal
characteristics.
"The advocator of difference in state says that when dharmas operate in
time, they change on account of state (avast ha); there is no change in
264
substance. This is like the case of moving a token [into different
positions]. When placed in the position (avasthii) of ones, it is signified
as one; placed in the position of tens, ten; placed in the position of
hundreds, hundred. While there is change in the positions into which it
is moved, there is no change in its substance. Similarly, when dharmas
pass through the three temporal states, though they acquire three differ-
ent names, they do not change in substance.
"In the theory proposed by this master, there is no confusion as regards
substance; for the three periods are differentiated on the basis of kiiritra
"The advocator of difference in [temporal] relativity says that when
dharmas opyrate in time, they are predicated differently [as future,
present, or past], relative to what precedes and what follows (cf. AKB:
'nya ucyate avasthiintarato na
there is no change in substance. This is like the case of one and the same
woman who is called a 'daughter' relative to her mother, and a 'mother'
relative to her daughter. Similarly, dharmas are called 'past' relative to
the succeeding ones; 'future' relative to the preceding ones; 'present'
relative to both."
Ill. Remarks on the four theories and Frauwallner's observations
Professor Erich Frauwallner has studied the historical development of the
Sarvastivada system for many years. He has carefully examined all the avail-
able sources - Sanskrit, Chinese and Tibetan - and offered important insight
into the doctrinal development of the school. His observations, therefore,
deserve our attention. As regards the above four theories, Frauwallner be-
lieves that their order of presentation represents the actual chronological
265
 CJ'IIJ'\.!"'.I"'LI:-H'tiV lfl.t: o:!!UrK.t:.Mr. UU\.., I KINt:.
order of development of the theories of "sarviistiviida", each subsequent
one attempting to avoid the mistakes in the earlier explanation.? He further
asserts that Vasumitra's theory as given above in fact is an equation, on the
part of the Sarvastivada masters, of two originally different theories, by two
different Vasumitra: The older Vasumitra proposed, as did the other three
great iiciiTya mentioned above, that dharmas migrate through the different
stages of time, which was very similar to the subsequent theory of eternal
time (kiila) proposed by certain
the latters' acknowledgement of the eternality of time. When the theory of
eternal time was introduced into the Sarvastivada system due to foreign
influences, it was soon rejected by the
plain the difference between the times solely in terms of the kiiritra of dharmas
as proposed by another Vasumitra. The older "Vasumitra's doctrine, which
assumes the migration of things through the stages oftime, is, even if it does
not have a concept of time, closely related to the doctrine of the
and Vibhajyavadin, whereas the doctrine of efficacy, which does not recog-
nize stages of time and denies migration through them, is no less opposed to
it than to the doctrine of the Indeed, the relationship between
them is almost that of thesis and antithesis."
As regards Frauwallner's assumption of the chronological order of the de-
velopment of these theories, we may concede its possibility considering,
among other things, the conspicuous fact that Vasumitra's theory, though
fully approved and adopted by the
first. However, we must observe that the earliest extant source is probably
the * Vasumitra-sal!lghrhita-siistra (T no. 1549, p. 724 ), by a certain
Vasumitra of around 1st century A.D. This work predates MVS, and is very
likely to have been consulted by the compilers of the latter.9
Baiyii WatanabeiO, the author of this work enumerates four theories in the
following order: 1 avasthii (/lli); 2 lak{;al}a (Hf); 3 bhiiva
though in a different order- to the four theories related
266
but without
who then sought to ex-
is not enumerated as the
According to
4 apek$ii
::,1\.ANUttJLA.;::,. AtjMIUMA.K.M/\V/\1 !"'.JV'\
by MVS. The passage (punctuations ours) in question is follows:
"... • o
: o ... : : o M
f-'f;Ji\:§5?,: ... : :
m- , • o "
Unfortunately, its Chinese translation by Sa111ghabhuti (384 A.D.) is not
sufficiently clear for an absolutely definite identification of the theories briefly
described therein with those of the four iiciirya. Nevertheless, it is evident
enough that Watanabe has misinterpreted the passage. First,
;If/!] ("may or may not arise")"- identified by Watanabe as the first, equat-
ing "arise" with "avasthii"- cannot be one of the theories. The author here is
only explaining how we can experience the sal!lskrta dharmas - how we
know them as phenomenal existents in the different times - given that they
abide in their intrinsic nature in the three times. The answer is that "they
may or may not arise": When they arise at the present moment, they are
cognized as present; in the past and future times, they do not arise.
Immedaitely after this, he introduces the four theories (underlined by us)
with the phrase ("the explanation for this is"). This same phrase
occurs again in the elaboration of the 4th theory which is not accounted for
by Watanabe.
Judging by the context and the style of rendering of the translator, we be-
lieve that very probably, the four theories enumerated herein are, in the or-
der of their enumeration ("punctuated" by the phrase "M 1 lak{;ana-
anyathiitva of 2 bhiiva-anyathiitva of Dharmatrata; 3 anyathii-
anyathiitva ofBuddhadeva; 4 avasthii-anyathiitva ofVasumitra. In any case,
the first theory does not seem to be that of Dharmatriita. This observation
(129 would contradict Frauwallner's assumption of the chronological order. The
fact that all extant accounts subsequent to MVS agree with the latter's order
267
 t:.:'ll JN l V I Ht:. ;)Ut'Kt.Mt UUL J KIN I:
of may simply mean that AKB was influenced by the authority
ofMVS as representative ofthe orthodoxy; and Ny, ADV, TSP ,
etc. are either commentaries on AKB or were influenced by it.
This also means that Dhannatrata' s theory was not the first - and least satis-
factory- attempt, as Fraulwallner's observation! I implies. It seems clear
enough to us that Dharmatrata, as much as the other three acarva, is con-
cerned to show the integrity of the dharma 's svabhava!dravya, despite
Frauwallner' s assertion that Dharmatrata 's explanation "was soon abandoned
because no one wanted to accept a change of this type in the essence of
things." 12 It is probable that there had been different Vaibhasika masters
. '
responding variously to the four theories; though all indications are that
Vasumitra's theory in terms of kiiritra is the favoured one. In MVS, only
Vasumitra's theory is fully approved of. Dharmatrata's theory is the last of
the remaining three to be criticized; in the following words:
"What is the so-called bhiiva apart from the svabhava of the dharma?
Thus, [this theory] too is unreasonable. When SWJ1skrta dhannas arrive
at the present time from the future adhvan, their anterior bhava should
cease; when they arrive at the past time from the present adhvan, the
posterior bhava should arise: There is arising of the past and ceasing of
the future - how can this accord with logic?"
This, however, is unfair; for Dharmatrata, bhava is not meant to have any
ontological status. It is our mental superimposition on the empirical aspect
of the dharma as it is exposed to our experience: It is as arbitrary as the
designation- in Vasumitra's theory- of the different positions into which
the token is moved. Vasubandhu criticizes this theory even more severely,
branding it a Sarpkhya theory of pari1Jama.13 However, it is even more
unfair, as the theory does not suggest a unitary eternal substance as the
Sarpkhya does. As a matter of fact, in the two older translations of the
no criticism on Dharmatrata's theory is to be
268
found; and in the oldest translation, only Buddhadeva's theory is criticised
in general terms as being the most confusing designation of adhvan. More-
over, in spite of the critical comment in MVS, made in the context of con-
trasting Vasumitra's explanations with the other three, the compilers ofMVS
did not seem to have treated Dharmatrata's view as being on a par with the
theory of the Sarpkhya.l4 (See tr. of the passage below - § VI).
We shall return to this important passage later on. For the time being, it may
be observed that here, Dharmatrata is quoted alongside with Vasumitra-
whose views the orthodox compilers revere most. The fact that both their
views are not criticized, implies that the compilers do not consider the two
interpretations of pari1Jiima as contradictory.
Samghabhadra15 objects to Vasubandhu's criticism ofDharmatrata's theory,
maintaining that this theory is in part the same as Vasumitra's. As a matter
of fact, Saq1ghabhadra utilizes this theory as an indispensible tool for the
defence. In AKB, the Sautrantika ridicules the posi-
tion that the svabhiiva of a dharma exists at all times but at the same time its
bhava is not permanent (AKB, p.298: svabhaval} sarvada casti bhavo
nitya.ka Sarpghabhadra defends this position, rather than object-
ing to any misrepresentation of the doctrine on Vasubandhu's
part- as he does in many other places. This may suggest that between the
time ofMVS and AKB, Dharmatrata's bhiivanyathiitva theory could have
been accepted by the along with Vasumitra's theory in terms of
karitra. In Saq1ghabhadra's defencel6 here, he actually utilizes both theories:
" The essential nature of a dharma remains always; its bhava changes:
When a saf!lskrta dharma traverses through adhvan, it gives rise to its
karitra in accordance with the pratyaya, without abandoning its sub-
stantial nature; immediately after this, the karitra produced ceases. Hence
it is said that the svabhiiva exists always and yet it is not permanent,
since its bhava changes."
269
Elsewhere (Ny, p.632c), he states in similar terms:
''There is no change in essential nature, but it is not the case that the
bhava of dharmas do not vary. The essential nature and the bhiiva are
neither different nor identical. Thus, the svalak$WJ.a ( = svabhiiva ) of
a dharma remains at all times, while its special kiiritra asrise
and cease." (For further details, see below).
As evidence for his assertion that the second Vasumitra who proposes the
kiiritra theory- unlike the earlier Vasumitra- does not teach migration of
dharmas in time, Frauwallner cites the following MVS passage:
"[Questioner: ] ... Thus the Venerable Vasumitra says: 'The saf!lskiira
have no coming, nor do they have going; being momentary in nature,
they do not stay either.' Now, since the saf!lskiira do not have any char-
acteristics of coming and going, etc., how is the differentiation of the
three to be established? Answer: The differentiation of the
three is established in terms of kiiritra. It is on this very basis
that they are said to have migration.: That is, when a samskrta-dharma
has not yet exercised its kiiritra, it is said to be future. When it is exer-
cising its kiiritra, it is said to be present. When its kiiritra has ceased, it
is said to be past.. .. " (MVS, p.393c).
But, Frauwallner does not account for the sentence, "It is on this very basis
that they are said to have migration." In any case, even without this sen-
tence (which does not occur in the two older translations), one cannot claim
to have sufficient reason here for asserting that this supposedly second
Vasumitra does not allow any sense of migration of the dharma. Besides, we
must remember that the whole concern of all these Sarvastiviida iicii1ya is
precisely to account for our empirical experience of the activities of dharmas
-i.e., of their "passage" in time- given that their essential identities never
change. By the same token, the supposedly "older Vasumitra" too surely
does not preach migration in a literal sense. His example of the different
270
designations that a token acquires in accordance with the different significa-
tions that one assigns to a given position clearly shows that his avasthii are
intended to be relative notions: They are distinctions that we superimpose in
our perception, even though, of course, this perceptual experience is not
without an objective aspect in the causal process: The distinctions are made
possible by virtue ofthe kiiritra of the dharma.
There are other places in MVS where Vasumitra is represented as speaking
in terms of migration. Thus, on the three he explains:
"jiiti causes dharmas to enter from the future into the present ... jarii
and anityatii cause dharmas to enter from the present into the past."
(MVS, p.l2lb).
Elsewhere, the compilers ofMVS (p.200a-b), explain that one can equally
speak of change or non-change of saf!lskrta-dharmas. One can say that they
do not undergo change - which entails, among other things, that they do not
"migrate" - from the point of view that dharmas always remain unchanged
in their individual essential nature. One can also say that they undergo change,
from the point of view that they arise when potency is acquired and cease
when potency is lost. It further explains:
"There are two kinds of change - that of essential nature, and that of
kiiritra. From the view-point of essential nature, one should say that
saf!Zskiira do not change, there being no variation in their essential nature.
From the point of view of kiiritra, one should say that saf!lskiira also
change- When a dharma is in the future it has not yet acquired its kiiritra;
when it reaches the present, it acquires its kiiritra; when it has entered
into the past, its kiiritra has already ceased; hence there is change ... "
(loc. cit.).
Neither is it necessarily true that Buddhadeva's explanation, enumerated
lastly in MVS, is a subsequent attempt to avoid the philosophical difficul-
ties entailed in the other three. The dates of all the four iicarya are still
271
 unsettled 17, and F rauwallner himself does not offer any suggestion in this
regard. Furthermore, we disagree with Frauwallner that "finally, the last two
teachers, Vasumitra and Buddhadeva, avoided not only anything that touched
on the essence of things itself, but moreover derived the difference of things
in the different stages of time exclusive(vfi'om external connections (italics
ours)." (op. cit., p.l89). The contrast is perhaps overdone. In Buddhadeva's
example, the designations of "mother" and "daughter", while being our
superimposition, is nevertheless not purely subjective. We perceive a mother
or a daughter because of the different functions- biological or otherwise- in
the respective cases. In the case of s lak$GJ:Ianyathatva, as Vener-
able Yin Shun IS has pointed out, his time-characteristics are quite compa-
rable with the Vaibha$ika doctrine of the and should there-
fore have been in principle acceptable to the Vaibha$ika.
In brief, we may conclude from the MVS account, that some differences in
matters of details and expressions not-withstanding, all the four theories in
fact agree on the following points: (1) The substantial nature of a dharma
remains unchanged. (2) Temporal distinctions are superimposed by us in
our experience of the dharmas appearing in the phenomenal world. (3) All
explain this distinction by means of an aspect of the dharma which does not
have any reality in itself apart from the dharma. Accordingly, we can neither
go along with Frauwallner that "the relationship between [the two explana-
tions by the two supposedly different Vasumitra] is almost that of thesis and
antithesis."; nor that the four theories in the order and manner in whch they
are enumerated in MVS represent the actual historical sequence of develop-
ment of the theory of sarvastivada, one superceding another.
IV. The theory of kiiritra
Following Vasumitra's theory, the Vaibha$ika argues that a dharma is present
when it exercises its karitra , future when its kiiritra is not yet exercised;
272
past when it has been exercised. But this leads to some philosophical diffi-
culties both as regards the exact nature and ontological status of karitra as
causal karitra, as well as its relationship with the dharma itself. Many mod-
ern scholars assert that, confronted with the Sautdintika criticism,
Sa111ghabhadra innovated a "neo-Vaibha$ika" doctrine of karitra. To deter-
mine the extent to which one can justifiably call Samghabhadra's explana-
tions an innovation, let us begin by examining what he actually has to say in
this regard. We present below some of the major points of controversies in
this connection between the and the Sautrantika. The dialogue
given herein is on the whole a more or less literal translation from passages
in Ny (cf. Ny, pp.63lc-633b):
Sautriintika objection: If karitra is the determining characteristic for the
differentiation of past, present and future dharmas, then [you have such
problems as the following]:
I. A present but 'non-participating' eye (tatsabhaga-calcyu), such as an
eye in darkness, etc., which does not exercise its karitra of seeing, can-
not be called present.
2. Should you say that such an eye nevertheless has the karitra of both
phala-pratigrahatJa (acquiring causal efficiency for an effect) and
phala-dana (actually producing an effect), then you have to admit that
a past homogeneous cause (sabhaga-hetu), etc., being capable of
phala-dana, has karitra. This means that it is demi-present.
Sa:rpghabhadra's reply: The potencies (sakti/ samarthya) of dharmas
are oftwo kinds, karitra and activity (vrtti/vyapara). It is only the ac-
tivity of inducing or projecting a dharma's own fruit =
phala-pratigrahatJa I phala-parigrahal}a) that is called karitra. This
does not exhaust the set of activities of a given dharma; it also has ac-
tivities which are not karitra. Thus, in darkness, the eye's activity of
273
 t.N I KANLt. IN I U I Ht ::"1-Ut"KJ:.Mt:. UU'I... I NC'IIC.
seeing rfipa is impaired by darkness. But its kiiritra of inducing a fruit
is not impaired, so that even in darkness, the eye can induce the produc-
tion of itself [in the next moment]. This kiiritra always exists at the
present moment; for it is solely on the basis of kiiritra that the present is
established[- i.e. designated]. Those [dharmas which have arisen and]
whose kiiritra have ceased, do not become become asal!lskrta.l9 [But]
their capability to causally contribute (fit!.1t!Z9'1'!E - cf.
*Tattviirthii : rgyur gyur pa 'di dag gi nus pa iiid) to the arising of a
different entity po gian skyes pa la ) -this is not kiiritra,
but activity; because it is only at the present moment that a dharma can
induce a fruit, because an asal!lskrta cannot induce its own fruit, and
because it is only the inducing of a dhanna's own fruit that is called
kiiritra. Thus, that the Sutrakara (i.e. Vasubandhu) in his explanation
includes the activity ofphala-diina as kiiritra as well - this is very much
because he has not properly understood the abhidharma tenets! For,
although a past cause can produce a fruit (phala-diina), it does not have
kiiritra, and hence there is no confusion (sm!Jkara) of the times.20
Sautrantika: If a dharma is always existent in its essential nature, it should
be able to exercise its kiiritra at all times - what obstruction is there so
that this dharma-substance can only exercise its kiiritra at the present,
and not other times: There being no difference as regards a dharma's
essential nature in the three periods of time, what prevents it from re-
maining in one identical empirical nature/modality/form (bhiiva) at all
times?
There are ample examples in the world where, for a
given substance, there exist various forms or modalities. Thus, there are
feelings (vedanii) which are pleasant, unpleasant and neutral; fires which
appear as straw-fire, husk-fire, wood-fire. etc.
274
Sautriintika: [I may phrase my objection this way:] In our school, we
hold that when the necessary conditions obtain, conditioning forces arise
not having existed previously. But these conditions are various, and
they at times assemble together and at times do not. Accordingly,
dharmas do not keep arising eternally. On the other hand, your school
concedes that conditioning forces and the various conditions are ever
Tibetan in present substantially. As you do not admit that dharmas come into ex-
istence without any pre-existence, what can prevent them from being
always present ?
As we have argued before, an identical substance can
manifest in different forms/modes - this point is sufficient to counteract
your objection. Should you be obstinate, let me ask you a
counter-question: In your doctrine of santati-pari1Jiima (progressive
change of a series), it is conceded that the conditioning forces (sal!lskiira)
and their causal conditions become different from moment to moment,
even though there is no difference in essential nature between the pre-
ceding and the succeeding ones. Now, there being no modification in
their causal conditions in the preceding and succeeding moments, what
prevents them from arising identical from moment to moment?
That is, the conditioning forces of the previous moment arise at the
same time as their conditions, and without diminution in their essential
nature, cease together with the conditions. It is by the force of this cause
that the fruit is produced in the subsequent moment: It should not be
different in form/species from the previous cause, since the two kinds
of generative conditions, of the same species or not of the same species,
are not differentiated between the preceding and succeeding moments.
What condition is there then, which constitutes an obstruction causing
the modification in the two moments? Should you assert that this is so
by virtue of the nature (dharmatii) of the conditioned dharmas, then
275
 t:.J-..1 KAI-..\.._13 II .... IU LNt. :)Ut'Kt:.MC LJUL I KIN I::.
why don't you concede the same with regard to the kfiritra of a dhanna?
Sautriintika: You concede that the conditions are always existent. Accord-
ingly, the kfiritra produced should also be always existent.
Srup.ghabhadra: This objection is not reasonable. For even though there
is always the assemblage of conditions, it is observed that sometimes a
fruit does not result from the conditions. This is like the case of [your
doctrine of] impregnation-or the case of the eye, etc.: You do not con-
cede that a fruit arises from a cause that has ceased, after a time interval.
The different b1ja induced by various causes exist at the same time within
a santati, and yet their fruits do not eo-arise at all times ... Now, since at
all times all the causes exist, what prevents the various fruits from eo-
arising always ? ... Again, although the conditions for the eye, etc. are
always present, yet visual consciousness, etc., do not always arise.
Sautriintika: According to our school, a series undergoes a progressive
transformation, and can only give rise to a fruit when some specific
conditions obtain.
S3.111ghabhadra: Then you should also concede the same in the case of
kfiritra. A dharma can have the capacity for inducing or projecting (fi-
a fruit only in dependence on the forces of various conditions-
which may be simultaneous or otherwise, pertaining to its own species
or otherwise. This capacity is called kfiritra.
As a matter of fact, I am not clear as to what you mean by the term
'kfiritra' in your objection. [Let me define:] kfiritra is that special ca-
pacity that is produced when the assemblage of conditions obtains for a
given future dharma. That very dharma having the kfiritra is said to be
present. When the kfiritra ceases, it is said to be past. It is not the case
276
SKAI\DHILA"S ABH!DHARMAVATARA
that in the previous and subsequent moments, there is any difference in
the dharma's essential nature.
The kfiritra of a dhanna is neither identical with it nor different from it.
The former arises in dependence on conditions, and exists for only one
moment (present) while the latter persists through time. This is much
like the case of the series of a dharma: A series consists in the
non-interrupted arising of a dharma from moment to moment. This se-
ries is not different from the dharma itself, being without an esential
nature other than that of the dharma. It is also not identical with the
dharma itself, lest there be a series which consists in just one moment.
Neither can we say that it is non-existent since it is observed to produce
some effect. Likewise, the distinctive kfiritra at the present moment is
neither different from the dharma, as it does not have an essential na-
ture apart from the dharma; nor is it identical with the dham1a, as there
are times when only the essential nature exists without kfiritra. Nor can
we say that it is non-existent, for when the kfiritra has arisen, it can
project a phala. (Cf. TSP, p.509: na kfiritraT?J dharmfid anyat,
tadvyatireke!Ja I nfi 'pi dharmamfitram,
svabhfivfistitvepi kadficid abhfivfit I na ea na kfiritrasya
prfigabhfivfit I ). The following stanza [summarizes] this:
The santati has no distinct essence,
[But] a distinct effect is conceded;
Kfiritra is to be understood likewise.
Thus, [with it] the times are established.
(Cf. TSP, loc.cit.: santatikfiTYW?l ce.y{al!l. na vidyate sfipi
kficit ltadvad avagaccha yuktyfi 'dhvaSaJ?1Siddham //)
We can [also] find examples in [the notions of] cause-effect relationship,
of conjunction, and of the purity of citta, etc. Hence, although in the
past, present and future, a dharma 's essential nature is the same, its
277
 ENTRANCE INTO THE SUPREME DOCTRINE
modes ofbeing (bhiiva) are different. Accordingly, we have established
the distinction of the three times [on the basis of kiiritra]."
We may summarize the important points made by Sarpghabhadra in the above
dispute, as follows:
1. Sarpghabhadra is very articulate in contrasting the term kiiritra with the
other terms expressing the various other types of causal activities or poten-
cies of a dharma. These latter terms include vyiipiira, kriyii, vrtti, siimarthya,
sakti, etc. In such a contrasting context in Ny, Xuan Zang also very consis-
tently renders kiiritra as zuo yong ( {'F m), as distinct from gong neng (J}J fjg)
for the terms denoting activities other than kiiritra.
It is important to observe, however, that in other contexts, both in AKB(C)
and MVS, he is unfortunately not so consistent. Thus, comparing his AKB
(C) and Ny, with AKB, Vyakhya and TSP, it can be seen that his rendering
of gong neng corresponds to prabhiiva, vrtti, siimarthya, sakti, and vyiipiira.
The last one can be adduced from TSP (p. 506):
in comparison to i§J;t] fjg in Ny (p.631 c); and the rest from AKB and
AKB(C). However, he also renders vyiipiira as zuo yong.2l. Also, in MVS
(p.393c- see quoataion below), we have " ... The ... [at the
present moment], though without the zuo yong ofriipa-darsaniidi, definitely
has the zuo yong (note the two zuo yong).
2. kiiritra is defined as a dharma's capability of inducing the production of
its own next moment. This is called However,
elsewhere22 Sarpghabhadra also claims that although kiiritra is in actual fact
confined to alone, sometimes when the abhidharma sastras are
referring to an activity (e.g., that ofjiiti) which serves a proximate condition,
the term kiiritra is also expediently used.
3. All dharmas at the present moment have the function of Hence
kiiritra uniquely defines presentness, and it is in terms of kiiritra that the
278
SKANDHILA"S ABHIDHARMAVATARA
differentiation of the three times can be properly defined.
4. This same temporal differentiation can be explained in other words :
Each dharma is in a different avasthii (following Vasumitra) or bhiiva (fol-
lowing Dharmatrata)- future, present or past- depending on the presence or
otherwise of kiiritra - For Sarpghabhadra, avasthiinyathiitva and
bhiiviinyathiitva are the same as far as this point is concerned.
5. A dharma acquires its mode as present when the necessary assemblage of
various conditions obtains - which may be simultaneous with its arising or
otherwise, belonging to its own series or otherwise. (Ny, p.632b). When this
takes place, and only when this takes place, it becomes endowed with its
kiiritra. In its past and future mode, only its substantial essence exists, de-
void of kiiritra. Nevertheless, it can still causally contribute to the actual
production of some other dharmas. This latter potency is called activity.
6. kiiritra- likewise bhiiva- is neither different from nor completely identi-
cal with the svabhiiva I dravya of a dharma.
In addition to what can be gathered from the above dispute, there are other
important doctrinal points made by Sarpghabhadra elsewhere in his exposi-
tion on kiiritra. These are:
7. As Frauwallner23 has pointed out, Sarpghabhadra explicitly explains kiiritra
in terms of the theory of hetu-pratyaya:
"If a sarrzskrta dharma serves as a cause for the projection of its own
fruit, it is said to be [exercising its] kiiritra. If it serves as a condition
assisting [in the producing of the fruit of] a different [series], it is said to
be[ exercising its] activity (J}Jfjg) ... All present [dharmas] can serve as
cause for the projection of their own fruits. [But] not all present
[dharmas] can serve as auxiliary conditions for [dharmas] belonging to
279
 ENTRANCE INTO THE SUPREME DOCTRINE
a different species: The in darkness or one whose activity has
been impaired, cannot serve as a condition which assists the arising of
visual consciousness. The kiiritra [of the ], on the other hand, is
not impaired by darkness, as it can without fail serve as the cause for
the projection of the future Hence, there is a difference between
kiiritra and activity. However, with regard to the production of a fruit
within the series of its own species, there is a projecting power which
may or may not be definite; it is called a kiiritra as well as an activity. If
[a power], with regard to the production ofthe fruit within a series of a
different species, can serve only as a condition assisting its arising - this
is an activity, not a kiiritra.".24 (see also the following point).
8. In Sarpghabhadra's kiiritra theory, the four also play an
important role. These are defined by him in terms of a dharma' s
. We may say that according to Sa111ghabhadra, the
four together completely ensure that kiiritra can arise, and indeed
arise for just one This implies that they too - together with ktiritra -
are indispensible for the establishment of the difference ofthe three times:
"Although the SGI!Jskrta dharmas are assisted by various external
causes and conditions, they must be assisted internally by jiiti, sthiti,
jarii, anityatii as proximate causes, before they can traverse through
time .... "25
"Activity refers to that of serving as a direct condition ... The
activity ofjati is its capability to serve as the direct condition
enabling [a dharma] to give rise to its kiiritra of projecting its
own fruit. .. The activity of sthiti is its capability to serve as the direct
condition enabling a dhanna to stay temporarily and project its own
fruit... The activity ofjarii is its capability to serve as the direct condi-
tion for impairing a dharma's kiiritra of projecting its own fruit. The
activity of anityatii is its capability to serve as the direct condition for
280
SKANDHILA 'S ABHIDHARM AV AT Ai'..
destroying a dharma's kiiritra of projecting its own fruit."26
V. Sa.q1ghabhadra's theory- an innovation?
Having examined the importanat features of Sarpghabhadra' s ktiritra theory,
we shall now attempt to determine- within the limit of the data accessible to
us - the extent to which we may consider it an innovation.
Collet Cox27, observing that MVS uses the term zuo yong where, in the
same context, Sarpghabhadra clearly uses siimarthya, concludes: "This would
suggest that * does not recognise the clear distinction between
kiiritra and siimarthya proposed by Sarpghabhadra." But this conclusion
seems to have betted too much on Xuan Zang's consistency in rendering
these terms. (see above,§ IV, 1). Moreover, if what Sarpghabhadra claims
is true that the masters before him sometimes used the term kiiritra expedi-
ently (see above, §IV, 2), we may consider the possibility that the two con-
trasting causal functions had already been taught by at least some of the
Sarvastivada masters at an earlier stage, even though the usage of these terms
had not been strictly observed. Besides, there are actually several places in
MVS28 where zuo yong and gong neng are used side by side in the same
context, though we often can neither be too certain as to the degree of con-
trast nor the exact distinction intended. Thus, on the question as to why
dharmas do not arise and cease constantly, there being always the assem-
blage of causes and conditions- a question similar to one of the Sautrantika's
objections in AKB and Ny (see preceding section above)- MVS cites the
explanations by the various masters, and Buddhadeva's explanation is:
" Dharmas should have their zuo yong for arising and ceasing only
once in each. It would be useless if they arise repeatedly and cease
repeatedly .... Question: When the causes and conditions assemble
for the arising of dharmas; are the gong neng many or one ? ... Answer:
One can say they are many or that they are one ... The gong neng of
281
 t.NLKANLt:.INIU IHt.!'IUt'"K..t.Mt.UULIK.JNt:.
the causes and conditions can be considered as one in as much as they
together enable the dharmas to give rise to their zuo yong ..." (MVS, p.
105a)
Regarding the relationship between the karitra of a dharma and its svabhiiva,
as Frauwallner29 has shown, MVS already explained in the same manner as
Saq1ghabhadra:
"It cannot be said categorically that (contra Frauwallner: "with any
certainty that" - which is misleading) they are identical or different."
Frauwallner rightly observes that this important passage is not found in the
two earlier Chinese versions of the and is therefore possibly a
later addition30 - made somewhere after the two earlier recensions.
Frauwallner proposes that in the final stage of development ofthe kiiritra
doctrine before Sa111ghabhadra, karitra came to be equated with bhiiva, and
Satpghabhadra took over from here. However, from Saq1ghabhadra' s own
exposition, it can be seen that the absence or presence of kiiritra in fact
constitutes a different bhava in each case. No equation is asserted by him
here.
The doctrine that the karitra of phalak.Jepa (= phala-pratigrahana) uniquely
defines the present in contradistinction to the past and future times is also
already in MVS31 :
"Question: A etc. at the present moment has no
activity of seeing etc. They should therefore not be present. Answer:
Although they do not have the activities of seeing, etc., they defi-
nitely have the phala-pratigraha1Ja-karitra; for they are the sabhiiga-
hetu for the future dharmas: All saf!lskrta-dharmas at the present mo-
ment can serve as hetu for the pratigraha1Ja of As
this phala-pratigraha1Ja-karitra applies to all the present dharmas,
without any confusion (sa'?1kara), it is used as the basis for the estab-
282
lishment of the differentiation of past, present and future."
This important passage too is missing in the two earlier versions of the
and so is likewise possibly added after these two earlier recen-
sions, and before MVS. Moreover, the doctrine that of all
the six hetu in each case takes place solely at the present moment is also
found in MVS.32
Saq1ghabhadra protests very confidently that the abhidham1ikas do not teach
that the kiiritra includes phala-dana. (see above, § IV). Elsewhere he also
protests similarity that the has never taught that karitra has tem-
poral distinction33. Kiiritra in fact comes into being not having been, and
vanishes in a single moment of the present.34 Another equally confident
protest is that the Sautrantika bases his criticism on the wrong assumption
that teaches that the past and the future exist in the same manner
as the present. In fact, he says, this is a misrepresentation of the
position which is that the dhanna exists with a different bhava in each of the
three times. (see above, § IV, 3 ).
Basing on the representation views by Vasubandhu, Yasomitra
and and Kamalasila - all notably Sautrantikas or pro-Sautrantika
- some scholars seem to claim all too readily that the views un-
derwent radical transfonnation under the pressure of the Sautrantika criticism.
While understandably this could well be true in some cases, we must not
ignore these unambigous and confident protests by Sa1pghabhadra in arriv-
ing at our conclusions. Thus, like Frauwallner, Tatia also expounds the the
theory of sarvastivada in a manner that clearly suggests that karitra included
phaladana and which was then revised by Saq1ghabhadra to
include only the latter35. His exposition similarly suggests that the
taught the temporality of kiiritra.36 Unlike in the case of Frauwallner's inves-
tigation, however, Tatia's also does not have the merit of having consulted
283
the Chinese and Tibetan sources.
Samghabhadra's explanation ofthe sa1!1skrta-la/cya1Ja in terms of a dharma's
phaliik$epa-kiiritra, once again, is already attested in the following MVS
passage which, moreover, provides early evidence that the kiiritra theory
has already been explicitly linked with that of cause-effect :
"By the force of sthiti-lak$a1Ja, the sal!lskiira, having arisen, are ca-
pable of grasping their own fruit (this is 'phala-grahana' = phaliik$epa),
and grasping the iilambana. By the force ofjarii and anityatii, there is
no more activity after one k$ar.za. If sthiti-laksar.za were non-existent,
there ought not be the cause-effect series of the sal!lskiira, and the citta-
caitta dharmas ought not have any iilambana."37
All this taken into consideration, we must here dissent from others who are
fond of labelling Sarp.ghabhadra' s explanations on kiiritra as a
neo-Sarvastivada/ neo-Vaibhasika doctrine. To us, Sarp.ghabhadra's contri-
bution to the Sarvastivada theory of temporality in terms of kiiritra consists
essentially in his more articulate presentation and greater consistency in the
use of terminologies. He has considerably fine-tuned the theory. But this
does not amount to a novel interpretation, since practically all the important
doctrinal propositions he made in this connection were already found in the
time of MVS or earlier.
VI Bhiiva, svabhiiva, and the dharma
We saw from above(§ 11, §Ill) that each of the four main theories stresses
that through the three periods of time, the dravya (= svabhiiva) remains
unchanged. This is sarviistiviida or sarviistitva in a nutshell: But just pre-
cisely what is meant by a dharma's essence "not changing"? One thing is
certain that the theory does not amount to the Sarpkhya doctrine ofparir.zama.
Even Vasubandhu, the arch critic of the does not allege so.
284
But then, MVS seems to be obscure and even contradictory on this funda-
mental question when, on the one hand, it says that the essential nature does
not undergo change (see quotation in § Ill above), and on the other that
when dham1as undergo transformation - and hence is impermanent - it is
their very essential nature that are involved in the transfom1ation, as is stated
in in the following passage (MVS, p.l003c- 1004a):
"Question: Why are riipa and citta, etc. impermanent? Answer: They
are subject to parir.ziima and do not remain the same, how can they be
considered to abide permanently? Question: When it is held that their
essential natures arise and cease, how do you know the parir.ziima is not
the concealing and manifesting [ofthese essential nature]? The Vener-
able Vasumitra explains thus: If their is merely on account of
concealing and manifesting, then a baby in the embryo would have its
stages of childhood, youth, middle age and old age, all arising at once.
Yet [the fact is that] they arise sequentially. Thus we know that it is not
on account of the concealing and manifesting of the entities themselves
(ft - svariipa/ svabhiiva ?) that there is pari1Jiima . ... The Bhadanta
[Dharmatrata) explains: It is seen in the world that when conditions
assemble, a dharmas arises; when conditions are not in concord, a dharma
is destroyed. It is not the case that that which conceals and manifests
has such a difference (vise$a). Thus we know that the pari1Jiima is not
on account of the concealing and manifesting [of the entity itself]. It is
only on account of the essential mode's arising and ceasing. Furthennore,
when a dharma is undergoing parir.ziima, its previous and subsequent
modes (t§ - iikiira I iikrti I bhiiva ?) are different, and hence the entity
itself should also be different; since the mode and the entity itself are
the same. [On the other hand,] if a dharma abides permanently, then
even though there is differentiation in stage (avasthii) - those of con-
cealing and manifesting - there is no difference in its mode. Thus we
know that in the parir.ziima, the entity itself arises and ceases."
285
Prima facie, this passage may seem to utterly contradict the fundamental
Sarvastivada stanpoint that essential natures never change! But it actually
provides us with important clues for an answer to the question we have just
raised- nay, for an understanding of the very theory of sarviistitva: Not only
does it show that this theory differs from the Sarpkhya concept ofpariiJiima;
it also spells out explicitly that though the svabhiivaldravya is said to be
sarvadii asti, this does not entail that it is immutable or even permanent.
For, a dhanna's mode of existence and its essential nature are not different
'
so that when the former is undergoing transformation, so is its svabhiiva.
This, however need not be - and should not be - a contradiction to what
MVS says elsewhere that "from the view-point of essential nature, one should
say that do not change" (see above, § III). The same entity, not a
different one, remains throughout the times. In this sense there is no change
in svabhiiva or no anyathiitva. At the same time a dharma
keeps having a different mode of being; and each mode is actually a new -
but not different in terms of essence - dharma. In this sense there is change
or transformation of essential nature. To take Dharmatrata's examples: When
the same piece of gold is transfom1ed into different entities - a golden bowl,
cup, etc. -each time a brand new 'thing' or 'entity' results, though the essen-
tial nature of this selfsame piece of gold which is involved in the process of
transformation remains the same.
In the light of these MVS passages, we can now see that Sarpghabhadra's
insistence below, on the impermanence of svabhiiva is not really that much
innovative either:
39"[Svabhiiva is not permanent, for] whatever is permanent does not go
through time. Neither should [the Sthavira Srilata] say 'svabhiiva re-
mains constant ('tit§: 1.±)'40, for we concede that the bhiiva (::g'li.) of
an existent in the past, present and future varies."
4 1" .... [Our explanations] also have properly refuted the objection that
286
[our theory of sarvtistitva] implies the permanence of [a dharma' s] es-
sential nature. For, while the essential nature remains always, its avasthii
differs [in the stages of time] since there is change. This difference of
avasthii is produced on account of conditions, and it necessarily stays
no more than one Accordingly, the essential nature of the dharma
too is impermanent, since it it is not distinct from the difference [that
arises in it]. [But] it is only in an existent dharma that changes can obtain;
there cannot be change in a non-existent. In this way, therefore, we
have properly established the times."
The answer to the question we raised at the beginning of this section now
emerges more clearly: When the says that there is no change in
a dharma's svabhtiva/dravya when it "traverses" in time, they mean that its
integrity - its svalak:jar;a ( = svabhtiva ) - is untouched, and the essential
nature does not change from being an existent into a non-existent. It is not
that this essential nature is- mysteriously, as it were- totally uninvolved in
the temporal process: It is sarvadti asti, and yet anitya; non-temporal- i.e.
not temporal in the usual sense of the term, and yet not atemporal - i.e. not
totally transcending the temporal process. If this answer sounds ambiguous,
it is on account of the fundamental ambiguity that is necessarily implied in
the bhediibheda relationship that obtains between the svabhiivaldravya of a
dharma on the one hand, and its ktiritra and bhiiva on the other. But then,
for the and for that matter for all 'religious philosophers', such
fundamental ambiguity - wholly or partly derived from a long tradition of
experience and/or contemplation- must come first before logic; even if the
abhidhannikas at the same time find the logical tools indispensable for the
defence of their religious insight and convictions.
287
 Notes 17 The comparatively late tradition of Tibet gives in one place (Taraniitha, p.l5) the chro-
nological placing: Dharmatrata- Vasumitra- Buddhadeva. In another place (ibid.
p.I03), Dharmatrata- Vasumitra- Buddhadeva. But this second order is very
AKB,p.296 likely influenced by the order of enumeration of their theories in MVS. Venerable Yin Shun
(op. cit., p. p.268, p.271, p.274, p.285) gives the following dates: Dharmatrata- around the
2 Ny, p.630c. end of 2nd century B.C., contemporary or slightly earlier than Vasumitra; Buddhadeva- 10
B. C.-I 0 A. D., junior contemporary ofDharmatrata; Vasumitra: I 00 BC., after Kiityayaniputra
3 Ny, p.259. (but MVS (p.23lc) is divided as to whether his PrS precedes JPS or otherwise);
between I st & 2nd century AD, considerably later than Vasumitra.
4 See, supra, Introduction, § 1!.
18 Study, pp. 297ff.
5 Ny p.630c-631 a. A similar distinction between Sarvastivada and other schools ia also
made in ADV, p.257 f. 19 Cf. Ny, p.41 Ob: "A [dharma] whose ktiritra has ceased, relinguishes only its presentness;
the dharma's essential nature remains."
6 MVS, p.396a-b. For the corresponding Sanskrit passages, see AKB V, p.296 f.
20 Cf. Ny, p.409c f. We have translated this passage very literally, in view of its importance.
7 Frauwallner, pp.l88 ff. Frauwal\ner is not sure of a sentence here, and accordingly his rendering in this place seems
unintelligible. Cf. Sthiramati's *Tattviirthii : gwi yali 'gags pa skyes pa 'dus hyas kyi chos
8 Frauwallner seems to understand, in this context, that the and Vibhajyavadin rnams kyi mthu 'i khyad par dtios po gzan skyes pa la rgyur gyur pa 'di dag gi nus pa iiid hya
were different from the Sarvastivada (op. cit. p.191 ). Note that in the older version of MVS ha ma yin pa da !tar ba 'i gnas skahs kho na 'phalis pa 'i phyir I 'dus ma byas rnams kyis 'bras
(T no.1547, p.293c), this theory is said to be held by "the bu 'ph en pa mi 'thad pa ·; phyir ro I 'bras bu 'phen pa 'i bya ba m a yin no I

9 See Study, pp.382 ff. 21 Cf AKB(C), p.ll b: ffi which translates nirvyiipiira in AKB, p.31.

10 Watanabe Baiyu, Uhu ahidatsuma ron no kenkyft (Tokyo,1954), p.l86 f. 22 Ny, p.410a.

11 Frauwallner, p.l88 f. 23 Frauwallner, pp.199 ff.

12 Frauwallner, p.205 f 24 Ny, p.409c f( also cfibid. p.409a-b, and MVS, p.393c which is quoted above). Contra.
Frauwallner's tr. which is very misleading: "If this acts as a cause, it produces its effect. If it
13 AKB V, p.297. acts as a condition, it fosters a difference of property (bhiiva)." (Frauwallner, p.20l).

14 MVS, p.I003c- I004a. 25 Ny, p.409a-b.

15 Ny, p.631b. 26 SPrS, p.809b-c.; also cf. ibid, p.409a-c.

16 Ny, p.633c. 27 Cox C., Di,;puted Dharmas: Early Buddhist Theories on Existence (Tokyo, 1983), p.l57,
n.75.

288 289
28 E.g. M VS, p.l 05a, p.ll3b, p. 200a-b, p.480a-b. Select Bibliography

29 Frauwallner, p.197 f.
I Primary Sources
30 Frauwallner, p.l99. Frauwallner concedes that it is older than Vasubandhu.
I. Atiguttara-nikiiya, ed. Morris, R. and Hardy, E. (PTS, 1885
31 MVS. pp.393c-394a -1900)

2. Abhidhammattltasmigaho, ed. Kosambi, D. (Saranath, 1941)

32 MVS. p. I 08c. An alternative opinion as regards the kiiraiJa-hetu is also given here. This
is refuted in Ny. MVS (p.89b), as well as the two earlier recensions, already contains the
3. Abhidhammiivatiira , ed. Buddhadatta, A.P. {PTS, 1915)
rule that there must first be before there can be phaladiina: The
fruit must first be causally determined or "effectualized" before it can actually be produced . 4. Abhidharmadipa with vrtti , ed. Jaini, P.S. (Patna, 1959)

33 Ny, p.632b-c; contra Tatia, p.J04 5. Abhidharmakosa-kiirikii of Vasubandhu, ed. Gokhale, G. V.

JRAS, vol.22 (Bombay, 1946)
34 Ny. p.631 a. p.635a.
6. of Vasubandhu, ed. Pradhan, P. (Patna,
1967)
35 Tatia. pp.I00-102.
7. of Vasubandhu (Chapter I), ed. Ejima
36 ibid., p.I04. Y. (Tokyo, 1989)

37 MVS. p.201c. 8. Abhidharmakosa-vyiikhyii (Sphzqiirthii) of Yasomitra, ed.

Wogihara, U. (Tokyo, 1932- 36)
38 Cf. Ny, p.632c: "Although a dharma's essential nature remains; when specific conditions
9. Abhidharmasamuccaya of Asanga, ed. Pradhan, P.
obtain, or by virtue ofthe nature of things (dharmatii), a distinctive kiiritra arises not having
{Santiniketana, 1950)
been, and returns no where after having existed. The dharma 's essential nature is just as
before, its remaining always." 10. ed. Tatia, Nathmal (Patna,
1976)
39 Ny, p.630b.
11. Arthaviniscaya-sutra-nibandhana, ed. Samtati, N.H., (Patna,
40 According to the immediate context, this 'I'!£ must be the same as §1:-t - svabhiiva. 1971)
Poussin takes this to be bhiiva ("Sarviistivada", p.84)
12. Digha-nikiiya, ed. Rhys Davids, T.W. and Carpenter J.E. Vol.
I- Ill. (PTS, 1890- 1911)
41 MVS, p.632a.

13. Jiiiinabinduprakarm;a ofYasovijaya, ed. Sanghavi, S. Singh Jain

Series 16 (Calcutta, 1942)

14. Kathiivatthu, ed. Taylor, A.C. (PTS, 1894- 1897)

290 291
 At:5HlUNAK.MAV f\ I 1\KI\

15. Kathiivatthuppakara!}a Atrhakathii, ed. J. Minayeff. JPTS, Tr. Xuan Zar.,;

1889 (p. I -222)
Tr. Xuan Zang
16. Majjhima-nikiiya. I- IV, ed. Trenker V., Chalmers R., Mrs.
Rhys Davids. (PTS, 1888 -1925) 33. T no. I 54! Tr. Gut;abhadra et. al.

17. *Prakara!}iibhidharmiivatiira (rab tu byed pa chos rm1on pa la 'jug Tr. Xuan Zang
pa ies bya ba) {Tohoku no.4098, Peking no.5599) tr. by Jinamitra,
Danaslla and Y e-ses-sde 35. T no.I543 Tr. Sanghadeva et. al.

18. Sa'!lyutta-nikiiya, ed. Leon Feer. (PTS, 1884- 1898) 36. T no.l544 Tr. Xuan Zang

19. *Siira-samuccaya-niima-abhidharmiivatiira-fika (chos mnon pa la 37. T no.I545 Tr. Xuan Zang

'jug pa rgya cher 'grel pa siiin po kun /as btus pa ies bya ba)
(Tohoku no. 4097, Peking no. 5598) tr. by Jinamitra, Danaslla T no.l548 Tr. Dharmyasas et. al.
and Ye-ses-sde
T no.l550 Tr. SaJTlghadeva et. al.
20. *Tattviirthii (chos mnon pa 'i mdsod f..)'i bsad pa 'i rgya cher 'grel
pa don gyi de kho na iiid ies bya ba) by Sthiramati, tr. by T no.I552 Tr. Sailghavarman
Dharmapalabhadra (Peking No. 5875)
41. T no.l553 Tr. Unknown
21. TattvasaJ?zgraha of with Paiijikii ofKamalaSila, vols. I
-II Gaewad's Oriental Series, vols. xxx -xxxi (Baroda, 1226) 42. T no.l554 Tr. Xuan Zang

22. Vijiiaptimiitratiisiddhi Deux Traites de Vasubandhu, ed. Levi, S. 43. Tno.l555 Tr. Xuan Zang
(Paris 1925)
44. T no.l556 Tr. Fa Cheng

23. T no. I 45. Tno.l557 Tr. An Shi Gao

Tr. Buddhayasas and Zu Fo Nian

24. T no.26 Tno.l558 Tr. Xuan Zang

Tr. Saf!1ghadeva

25. T no.99 Tr. Gul)abhadra 47. T no.l559 Tr. Paramartha

T no.l25 Tr. Saf!1ghadeva 48. T no.l562 Tr. Xuan Zang

27. T no.1509 Tr. Kumarajiva 49. T no.l563 Tr. Xuan Zang

Tr. Xuan Zang T no.l579 Tr. Xuan Zang

Tr. Xuan Zang T no.l585 Tr. Xuan Zang

30. T no.l538 Tr. Dharmapala et. al. T no.2087 Xuan Zang

292 293
 1.,:;1'111 JJ"'I V j rtl:. LJUC

(T no.l605) Tr. Xuan Zang. Tz. Y. 66. Dhammajoti, K.,"The Abhidharma Controversy on Visual Perception", in Re-
Ed. (Nanking, 1930) cent Researches in Buddhist Studies, ed. Dhammajoti K, et. al.
(Colombo, 1997)
T no.l613 Tr. Xuan Zang
67. -"The Defects in the Arhat's Enlightenment - His and
T no.2051 Tr. Xuan Zang Viisanii", Buddhist Studies Vol. XXVII, (Hamamatsu, 1998), pp.65-
98.
55 a Sum cu pa 'i 'igrel pa (Tibetan version of Sthiramati 's
Teramoto, E, ed., (Kyoto, 1932) 68. Dutt, N., Buddhist Sects in India (Calcutta, 1977)

69. Edgerton, F., Buddhist Hybrid Sansf..Tit Dictionary (New Haven, 1953)
IT Secondary Sources
70. Frauwallner, E., -On the Date qfthe Buddhist MasterofLawasubandhu(Rome,
56. Aiyaswami, Sastri, N., Satyasiddhisiistra of Harivarman 2 (Baroda, 1978) 1951)
71 -Studies in Abhidhanna literature and the origins of Buddhist philo-
57. Armelin, 1., Le Coeur de la loi supreme. Traite de Fa cheng. sophical systems -En g. tr. by Sophie Francis Kidd (New York,l995)
Abhidharmahrdayasiistra de Dharmasri, (Paris, 1978)
72. Funanashi, I. and Lu Cheng, 'Abhidharmakosa-siistra', EnB, Vol. I, fas.l, pp.
58. Aung, S.Z., et. Mrs Rhys Davids, C.A.F, Points of Controversy (Kathiivatthu) 57-63
(PTS, 1915)
73. Hirakawa, A .• (Tokyo, 1974)
59. -Compendium ofPhilosophy (Abhidhammattha Smigaho) (PTS,
1910) 74. -"The meaning of 'Dharma' and 'Abhidharma'." in Indianisme et
Bouddhisme: Melanges offerts a Mgr Etienne Lamotte (Louvain,
60. Bareau, A., - "Les sectes bouddhiques du Petit Vehicule et. Leurs 1980), pp. I 59- 175
Abhidharmapi!aka" BEFEO, Vol XLIV, fas. I, pp. I -I!
75. - (Tokyo, 1975)
61. - Les Sectes bouddhiques du Petit Vehicu/e, (Saigon, I 955)
75a. -Buddhist Chinese-Sans/.,:rit DictionWJ', Vol. I & I I, (Tokyo,
62. Broeck, Jose van den, La Saveur de /'immortel (A- pi-t 'an Kan Lu Wei Lun). 1977)
(Louvain, 1977)
76. Hirakawa, A. et. al., Index to the parts I and 11 (Tokyo,
63. Cox, C., - Di:,puted Dharmas- Early Buddhist Theories q{Existence, (Tokyo, 1973- 1977)
1983) 77. -Index to the Part Three (Tokyo, 1978)

64. -"On the possibility of a Non-existent Object of Perceptual Conscious- 78. Jaini, P.S., 'On the Theory ofTwo Vasubandhus' BSOAS, Vol. XXI, Part One,
ness." Journal of the International Association ofBuddhist Studies, 1958, pp. 48 - 53
1988, pp. 31 -88.
79. -'Buddha's Prolongation of Life' BSOAS, Vol. XXI, 1958, pp. 546-
65. Demieville, Paul, "L 'Origine des sectes bouddhiques d'apn!s 552
Paramartha.", MCB Vol. I, pp.l4- 64. 80. -'The Sautrantika Theory ofbija' BSOAS, Vol. XXII, Part One, 1958,
pp. 236-249

294 295
 t:N l. KANL.t. lN l U J H.t. L>UCTRJNE
81. -'The Development of the Theory of ViprayuktasaJTiskiiras', BSOAS,
Vol. XXIl, 1959, pp. 531 - 547
82. -'The Vaibhii$ika theory of words and meanings', BSOAS, Vol. XXII,
Part One, 1959, pp. 95- 107
83. Jong, J.W. De, -'L' Auteur de I' Abhidharmadlpa', in Buddhist Studies by J.
W. De Jong, ed. G.Schopen (Berkeley, 1979), pp.609 -611
84. -'Buddha's Word in China', in But(dhist Studies by J. W. De Jong,
ed. G.Schopen (Berkeley, 1979), pp. 77 -I 01
85. -'Les Sutrapi1aka des sarviistivadin et des mulasarviistviidin', in
Buddhist Studies by J. W. De Jong, ed. G.Schopen (Berkeley, 1979),
pp. 229-236
86. -Review of La saveur de l'immortel (A-pi- tan Kan Lu Wei Lun),
translated and annoted by Jose van den Broeck. T'oung Pao,
{Louvain, 1980), pp. 277- 283
87. Kajiyama, Y. The realism of the Sarvastiviida school', in Buddhist Thought and
Asian Civilization, ed. Leslie Kawamura (California, 1977), pp. 114
- 131
88. Karuryadasa, Y., Buddhist Analysis of Matter (Colombo, 1967)
89. 'The Abhidhamma Theory of Paiiiiatti: The Category of the Nominal
and the Conceptual', Professor NA. Jayawickrama Felicitalion Vol
ume, Colombo 1987, pp.20-50
90. 'The Buddhist Theory of Double Truth', Kalyiini: Journal of Hu-
manities and Social Sciences of the University of Kelaniya (Sri
Lanka), Vols. HI & IV, (Colombo 1985), pp.23-55
91 'Vibhajyaviida versus Sarviistiviida: the Buddhist Controversy on
Time', Kalyiini: Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences of the
University ofKelaniya (Sri Lanka), Vol. II, (Colombo 1983), pp.l-
28
92. Kat6 J., 'Notes sur les deux maitres bouddhiques Kumaralata et SriHita' in
Indianisme et Bouddhisme: Melanges offerts aMgr Etienne Lamotte,
(Louvain, 1980), pp.l97- 213
296
SKANDHILA'S ABHIDHARMAVATARA
93. Kritzer, R., 'Cittaviprayuktasamskaras in the Abhidharma and Yogacara', in
IBK, Vol.43,No.l,p.516f
94. Lama Chimpa, et. Chattopadhyaya A., Tiiraniitha 's History of Buddhism in
India (Delhi, 1970)
95. La Vallee Poussin, Louis de, - The Way to NirviiiJa (London, 1925)
96. - L 'Abhidharmakosa de Vasubandhu Vols. I-VI (Paris, 1923)
97. - La Siddhi de Hiuan Tzang (translation of T no.1585)
(Paris, 1928)
98. - "Documents d 'Abhidharma", in MCB, V, 193 7, pp.7-l87
99. Lu Cheng, Collected Works on Buddhist Studies by Lu Cheng, 5 volumes
(Beijing, 1986)
100. Macgovem, W.M., A Manual ofBuddhist Philosophy, Vol. I (London, 1923)
I 0 I. Masuda Jiry6, "Origin and Doctrines of Early Indian Buddhist Schools" in
Asia Major, Vol. !I, 1925, pp. I - 78
I 02. Maung Tin, The Expositor (A!!hasiilini), revised and ed. Mrs Rhys Davids.
(PTS, 1920)
I 03. Mizuno, K., The Buddhist Theories ofcitta-caitta (Tokyo, 1978) (in Japa-
nese)
104. 'Abhidharma Literature', EnB, Vol.I, fas.I, pp.64-80
I 05. Mochizuki Shink6, Bukkyo Daijiten (Tokyo, 1958)
I 06. Mookeiji, S., The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux (Calcutta, 1935)
107. Nanjio B., A Catalogue of the Chinese Translation of the Buddhist Tripifaka
(Oxford, 1883)
108. Nakamura H., Indian Buddhism (Delhi, 1989)
I 09. Nanamo)i, The Path ofPurification (Visuddhimagga) (Colombo, 1956)
110. Nyiiyaponika, Abhidhamma Studies (Colombo, 1952)
297
 toN I KANCc IN I 0 !HE SUPREME DOCTRINE SKANUHILA'S ABHIUHAKMAVA I AKA

Ill. Nyayatiloka, Guide through the Abhidhammapitaka {Colombo, 1952)
112. Prasad, H.S., Essays on Time in Buddhism (Delhi, 1991)
113. Pruden, Leo M., Eng. tr. of L 'Abhidharmakosa deVasubandhu Vols. 1- VI by
La Valh':e Poussin, Louis de (Berkeley, 1988)
114. - Eng. tr. of Le Traite de la Demonstration de 'Acte
(Karmasiddhiprakarm:za) by Lamotte, E. (Berkeley, 1988)
115. Przyluski, J., 'Di'ir$ti'intika, Sautrantika and Sarvastivadin' !HQ, vol. XVI, 2,
1940, pp. 246- 54
116. - 'SautrantikaetDar$ti'intika' inRocznik 01jentalistyczny Vol.
VIII, (Paris, 1931 ),pp.14 - 24
117. Rahu1a, Walpola, "Pali as a Language for Transmitting an Authentic Reli-
gious Tradition" in Buddhist Studies in honour of Hammalava
Saddhatissa (Colombo, 1984), pp.211-218
127. Takakusu, J., 'On the Abhidharma Literature of the Sarvastivadins' JPTS,
1904- 1905, pp.67- 145
128. Tatia, N., 'Sarvastivada' Nava NiilandaMahiivihiira Research Publication,
Vol.ll, 1960,pp. 75-138
129. , Marcel van, Le Traite de la descente dans la profonde loi
(Abhidharmiivatiirasiistra) de l'Arhat Skandhila (Louvain, 1977)
130. Venkataramanan, K., 'Sammitiyanikaya Sastra' in Visva Bharati Annals V,
1953, pp.153 - 243
131. Watanabe Baiyu, Ubu abidatsuma ron no kenkyu (Tokyo, 1954)
132. Watanabe Fumimaro, "A Study of the Saf!lskiira Chapter in
Smr1yuktiibhidharmasiirasiistra" in Buddhist Studies in Honour of
Hammalava Saddhatissa (Colombo, 1984), pp.238 -248
133. Wintemitz, M., A History of Indian Literature, Vol. IJ (Calcutta, 1933)

118. Ratnayaka, Shanta, "Is Whitehead a Neo-Buddhist?" in Buddhist Studies in 134. Yan Pei, Vol. I- Il (Taipei, 1956)
honour of Hammalava Saddhatissa (Colombo, 1984), pp.219 -227

119. Rhys Davids, C.A.F., Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics

(DhammasailgaiJi) (London, 1900) 136. - Reprint (Taipei, 1974)

120. Sakurabe, H, 'Abhidharmavatara by an Unidentified Author' in Nava Niilanda 137. - Reprint (Taipei, 1974)
Mahiivihara Research Publication, Vol. II, 1960, pp. 359- 370
138. - Reprint (Taipei, 1974)
121. - 'Nyrlabidatsumaron. (Chibetto bun yori no wayaku).' in Hajime
Sakurabe, Bukkyo go no kenkyu (Kyoto, 1975), pp.l21 - 177 139. - (Taipei, 1978)

122. Sasaki, Genjun, Abidatsuma shiso kenkyu (Tokyo, 1958) 140. Reprint (Taipei, 1972)

123. -Linguistic Approach to Buddhist Thought (Delhi, 1992) 141. - fP (Taipei, 1989)

124. Stcherbatsky, Th., The Central Conception of Buddhism (Calcutta, 1956) 142. Yoshimoto Shingyo, Abidaruma shiso (Kyoto, 1982)

125. -The Conception of Buddhist NirviiiJa (Leningrad, 1923)

126. -The Soul Theory of the Buddhist (translation ofthe 9th chapter of
the Tibetan version oftheAbhidharmakosa bhii$yam) (Delhi, 1976)

298 299
 ENTRANCE INTU I He SUPReMe AI!HIDHARMAVATARA

Index
abandonable by cultivation 102, I 05, 123
abandonable by insight I 02. 103, 105, 106, 123, 143
abandonables 112, 120, 155
abandonment 2, 146, 157
abandonment of defilement 123
Abhidhamma 20, 200, 207, 296, 297
Abhidhammatthasailgaha 216
Abhidha1111a 7, 9, 10, 13, 14, 15, 18, 25, 27, 29, 30, 32, 36, 39, 54, 55, 67, 68, 70,
76, 79, 80, 149, 161, 167, 169, 181, 184, 185, 202, 205, 227, 228, 249, 275,
299
Abhidha1111adipa(=ADV) 4, 16, 22, 38, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52,
53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 60, 62. 63, 70, 71, 72, 73. 86, 154, 157, 163, 164,
178, 179, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 194, 195,
196, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 204, 205, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213,
214, 215, 217, 221, 223, 227, 228, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 239, 240,
243, 244, 254, 255, 256, 258, 262, 268, 288
Abhidha1111ahrdaya 14, 26, 27, 46, 69, 75, 176
• Abhidha1111ahrdayavyakhya 27
4, 14, 16, 17, 21, 23, 24, 27, 29, 35, 36, 38, 44, 46,
47, 55, 57, 58, 59, 64, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 75, 153, 154, 156, 157,
158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173,
174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 188, 190,
191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205,
206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 219, 220, 221,
222, 223. 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237,
238, 240, 241, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248. 249, 250, 251, 252, 255, 256,
257, 261, 262, 264, 265, 268, 269, 278, 281, 289
(Chinese version by Xuan Zang = AKB (C)) 184, 204, 206, 211
(Poussin's French version = AKB(F)) 4, 14, 171, 174, 176, 177,
179, 190, 196, 199, 202, 216, 223, 225, 237
Abhidha1111akosa-vyakhya (SphuJartha)( = Vyiikhyii) I 0, 48, 50, 156, 159, 163, 183, 184,
196, 197, 209, 21 L 217, 219, 221, 224, 225, 227, 228, 237, 250, 278
( = MVS ) 7, 16, 22, 23, 25, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 36, 39,
45, 55, 60, 63, 64, 68, 69, 73, 75, 76, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159,160, 161, 162,
164, 165. 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 175, 176, 177, 180, 181, 183,
185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 193, 195, 196, 199, 201, 202, 205, 208, 209,
210, 211, 212, 213,214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 220, 221, 222,223, 224, 225,
227, 228, 229, 231, 232, 234, 235, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 245, 246, 247,
248, 249, 250,251, 254, 255, 256, 258,263,266,268,269, 270, 271,278, 281,
282, 283, 284, 285, 288, 289, 290
• Abhidha1111amrta-rasa-siistra ( = AmRS) 4, 25, 26, 27, 154, 155, 161, 232
Abhidha1111aprakaraQa-siistra(=PrS) 8, 15, 18, 25, 35, 39, 41, 44, 46, 67, 74, 75, 153,
159, 161, 163, 166, 172, 179, 180, 184, 187, 191, 192,202, 207, 211, 217,
220, 221, 227, 228, 235,289
*Abhidharma-samaya-pradipika-sastra ( = SPrS) 2, 9, 28, 37, 38, 42, 44, 47, 58, 69,
159, 160,162, 166,192, 193,194,204,218,237,239,240,242,289
Abhidharmasamuccaya( = Asm )4, 5, 163, 179, 183, 184, 188, 191, 198, 206, 215,
227,291
Abhidha1111asamuccaya, Xuan Zang's Chinese version(= Asm(C)) 197
Abhidha1111a-sangiti-paryaya-sastra ( = SgPS) 8, 44, 153, 161, 193, 205, 217, 221, 222
Abhidharmavatara ( = Avatara) 2, 5, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 26, 28, 30, 35,
38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 52, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 61, 62, 65, 67,
68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 155, 159, 161, 164. 166, 168, 171, 176, 177, 182,
183, 185, 191, 196, 198, 209, 211, 220, 221, 222, 226, 227, 232, 234, 244,
248, 250, 255, 256, 258
Abhidharmavatiira,XuanZang'sChineseVersion (=Avatiira(C)) 5, 21, 41, 52, 61, 62,
164, 165
Abhidha1111avatara, French version(= Avatiira(F)) 161, 166
See also Van Velthem
Abhidharmiivatiira, H. Sakurabe's Japanese version(= Avatiira(J)) 165
Abhidharmiivatara, Tibetan version(= Avatara(T)) 5, 21, 41, 73, 167, 168, 169, 170,
171, 173, 176, 178, 179, 180, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 188, 189, 190, 193,
194, 196, 198, 205, 206, 207, 209, 210, 212, 214, 220, 223, 228, 229, 231,
232, 235, 237, 239, 241, 243, 244, 245, 250, 257
Abhidharma-vijnana-kiiya-siistra ( = VKS) 10, 31, 32, 153, 179, 226
Abhidharmika 1, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 46, 68, 72, 158, 165, 170, 217, 218, 256,283,
287
abhimiina 99
abhisamaya 18, 40, 123, 224
acittaka 37, 84, 174, 177, 230
acquisition 86, 91, 123, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129. 130, 135, 144, 148, 177,228
activity 22, 111, 138, 194, 214, 234, 238, 239, 240, 242, 244, 254, 273, 278, 282,
283
18, 40, 41. 45, 90, 92, 184, 185, 225
adhimukti 184. 185, 189
adhipati-pratyaya 249, 250, 251, 254, 255
45
aheya 129, 170
ahri, 45
akasa 3, 16, 21. 33, 60, 61, 62, 80, 127, 145, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254
akasa-dhiitu 251, 253, 254
akusala
- meaning of 96, 195
akusala-miila 90. 96
alambana 91, 144, 192, 213, 219, 239, 246, 254, 284
iilambana-pratyaya 249, 250
alobha 45
aniigiimi-phala 124

300 301
 ENTRANCE INTO THE SUPRtMt L>UC I KINt

anagamin 229 avastha-anyathatva 263, 267, 279

anantarya-marga 123, 223 avihif!lsii 40. 41, 42, 90, 95, 180, 191
anapatrapya 45 avijiiapti I, 35, 36, 37, 38, 59, 71, 72. 84, 159, 171. 173, 174, 175, 176;
anasrava 55, 85,177. 218, 220. 221, 223, 247 - characteristic of 3 7, 84
anatrapii I I 0 avijiiapti-rupa 81, 84
anger I 09, !I 0, Ill. 119, Ill avyakrta (non-defined)
anityatii 19. 46, 63, 65, 88, 91. 137, 138. 169, 227, 233. 238, 239, 240, 241, 242. - meaning of 97. 195
246, 258, 271, 280, 284 avyakfla-mlila 18, 73, 74, 90, 97, 180;
anityata-anityata 138 -the four avyakrtamlila 35, 97
anivrtavyakfla 119. 196, 231 ayatana 19, 35, 54, 58, 133. 140, 218, 227, 235, 236, 261. 263
annihilation 100, 104, 107. 132, 145, 146, 234 ayu 48, 133, 235,236
100, 104, 105, 107, 119, 196, 197,202,203 Bagchi, P. 166
138, 241 Buddhadeva 31, 32, 33, 36, 46, 168, 181, 263, 267, 269, 272, 281, 289
anumana 145, 219, 254 Bahyaka 196
anupatta 171 bahirdesaka 33
anupatta-mahabhuta-hetuka 82 bandhana 90
anutpadajiiana 222 bhautika 172
anusaya 18. 39, 40, 41, 45, 74, 75, 90, 96, 102, 104, 200, 201. 202, 203, 204, 211, bhautika-rupa 37
223, 226, 247; bhava 264, 266, 268, 269, 270, 274, 278, 279, 282, 283, 285, 2f:7, 290
- four senses of I 04 bhava-anyathatva 263, 267
anyathii-anyathiitva 264, 267 bhavagra 124,212, 226, 233, 234
anyathiitva 239. 242 bhedabheda 287
apatrapya 40, 41, 45, 59, 90. 94, 180, 190 births 2, 113, 116, 117, 133, 135, 145, 147;
266 -the four forms of births 117
apramada 18, 40, 41, 42, 45, 74, 90, 94, 95, 180, 190, 191. 193 bodily ties 115
apratisaf!lkhya-nirodha 15, 16, 60, 62, 127, 128. 148, 253, 258 bondage 90
apriipti 46, 55, 91, 127, 164, 232 buddhi 139, 254
arhatship 124 caitasika l. 19, 32. 39, 41, 42, 44, 125, 193
Arthaviniscaya-nibandhana ( = A YN ) 5, 16, 29, 71. 153, 156, 164, 166, 291 caitta 21, 22, 40, 41, 42, 43. 44, 46. 59, 71, 73, 90, 91, 161, 168, 180, 183, 185,
arya 55, 120, 126, 129, 131, 132, 135, 218, 220. 222, 224, 229, 231. 232, 234 192, 193, 194. 210, 219, 227, 298;
170 - definitions of 91
asamagri 227 calm 90
asamayavimukta 125 cessation 3, 61, 80, 91, 103. 106, 121, 123, 129, 130, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 222,
iisaf!ljiiika 19, 51, 91, 132, 227, 234 223, 255, 256, 258
asamjiiisamapatti 91, 232, 234 cessation independent of discrimination 3, 128. 129, 148, 149
asaf!lskrta 15, 16, 17, 19, 28, 33, 59, 62, 63, 67, 71, 73, 74, 154, 163, 219, 227, cessation through discrimination 3, 80, 129, 146, 147, 149
240, 251, 253, 254, 262, 274 cetanii 18, 38, 41, 45, 90, 91, 168, 173, 182, 183, 210, 257
asaf!lvara 38, 85, 175, 176, 177 chanda 18, 40, 41. 45, 90, 92, 102, 180, 183, 185, 189
asmimana 99 characteristics of dharmas 87
asraddhya 41' 42, 45, 90, 95, 180, 189, 194, 195 characteristics of the saf!lskfla dha1mas 62
asrava 90, 212 citta I, 18, 22, 39, 46, 54, 66, 69, 141, 144. 161. 162, 168, 174, 176, 177, 179, 181,
atemporal 287 183, 186, 187, 188, 191, 192, 193, 195, 209, 210, 227, 229, 235, 285, 298
auddhatya 45, 74, 110; 115, 192, 194, 211, 216, 229 cittanuvartin 142, 177
avadharal)a 92, 184 citta-saf!lprayukta 18, 19
avarice 97, I 0 I citta-saf!lprayukta-saf!lskara 90, 91
i citta-viprayukta I, 18, 19, 46, 59, 161
avastha 240, 242, 264, 266, 271. 279, 285, 287

302

J
citta-viprayukta-sa111skara 45, 54, 55, 90, 125, 163, 181 237, 242, 251' 252, 253, 254, 255, 268, 279, 284, 286, 287
clinging 90, 100, 109, 114, 115 dravya-samatli 181
- meaning of 115 duration 91, 138
conceit 73, 97, 98, 99, I 02, 103, I 05, I 07, 114, 119 dul:tkhatli 63, 65, 88
concentration 90 45
conditioned 73, 88, 135, 136, 137, 139, 141, 142, 143, 147, 169, 217, 239 1oo. 104, 105, I 07. I 09, 119, 202, 203
conditionings 2, 80, 90, 91, 120, 125, 140,275 125. 225, 226
conditions 2, 61, 75, 91, 93, 136. 141, 144, 148, 170, 176, 177, 204, 238, 242, 285, eight great hells 116
287; eight noble persons 124
- the four conditions (pratyaya) 136 emanation 109, Ill, 142, 190, 248
conjoined cause 141, 142 envelopment 90, 110, 115, 215
conjoined conditionings 90 equanimity 89, 90
-list of90 essential nature 269, 270, 271. 274, 277, 285, 286, 287
contact 90 eternal time
corporeal ties 90 - theory of 266
Cox, Collett 5, 70, 166, 281, 289, 294 exhaustion 61, 118, 120, 132, 125, 147, 148, 149, 221, 258
15, 16, 31. 32, 33, 34, 36, 38, 45, 157, 159, 162. 168, 177, 205, 210, existence-peak 124, 132
229, 231, 24 7, 263, 266, 288, 298 Fa Bao 67
266 faith 90
daurmanasya 89 faithlessness 90
defilement 97, 108, 109, 112, 115, 126, 230 fetters 90, 97,102.111,126
delight 44, 45, 59, 90, 95, 191, 193, 194 fine-material sphere 116
destruction 138 five planes of existence 117
detachment 95, 131, 132, 147, 253, 256 flood 90, 113, 114
deterioration 91, 138, 242 foreign masters 33, 34, 35, 73, 74, 158, 162, 196, 201, 216
Dharmagupta 158, 240 four fruits (phala) 124
dharmajnana 21 7, 218 four progresses (pratipannaka) 124;
80, 87 - See also pratipannaka
dharmanuslirin 125, 226 Frauwallner 6, 265, 266, 267, 270, 272, 279, 282, 283, 289, 290, 295
Dhammapala 182 function 80, 138. 187, 238
dharma-sabhligata 57, 58, 69, 70,237 Gandhiirian (masters) 27, 33, 34, 35, 74. 76
*Dharma-skandha-sastra ( = DSS) 6, 36, 44, 46, 153, 154, 161, 163, 193, 218 4, 25, 26, 32. 155, 180, 183, 263, 267, 272, 289
dharmata 275, 290 gong neng 241, 242, 278, 281
Dharmatrata 18. 26, 27, 31, 32, 33, 36, 76, 154, 168, 169, 172, 180, 20 I, 222, 223, Great Elements 80, 81, 82, 83, 84. 131, 168, 170, 172;
263. 267, 268, 269, 279, 285, 286, 289 - the four Great Elements 80
dharmavetyaprasada-samprayukta-jiiana 218 greed 96,105,107, Ill. 114,115,119,126, 194
dhiitu 6. 58, 64, 74, 80, 85, I 16, 140, 168, 169, 177, 179, 196, 202, 203, 204, 211, group-homogeneity 91, 134
213, 215, 218, 235, 254, 256 Harivarman 219, 295
*Dhatu-kaya-sastra ( = DKS) 160 harmfulness I 19
dhyana 25, 85, 116, 117, 122, l31, 133, 142, 177, 178, 196, 216, 234 harmlessness 90
diligence 90, 94 hatred 96, 98, 105, I 07. 109, Ill, 115, 119
disgust 44. 45, 59, 90, 95, 193, 194 hetu 19, 20, 30, 34, 46, 68, 69, 73, 93, 136, 141, 144, 170, 186, 245, 246, 247, 248,
disjoined conditionings (list) 91 249, 250, 251, 254, 273
displeasure 89 hetu-pratyaya 249, 250, 279
doubt 97, 101. 102, 103, 105, 111, 115, 119, 122,216,223 hindrance 90, 115, 234
dravya 22, 32, 45, 49, 50, 59, 63, 71, 91, 126, 132, 145, 183, 212, 214, 215, 236, Hirakawa A. 166

304 305
hostility 97, 114 klesa 40, 41, 42, 55, 108, 109, 146, 175, 189, 196, 200, 201. 205, 206, 207, 211,
hri 40, 41' 45, 59, 90, 94, 180, 188, 189, 190 212, 213, 214, 215, 223, 225, 226,229, 231, 234, 255, 256, 257;
ideation 2, 80, 89, 93, 133, 134, 139, 140, 142, 147, 175, 179, 199 -abandonment of 123;
ideationless-attainment 91, 131 - bhavana-(pra)heya (=bhavana(marga)-prahatavya) 102, 123,226
ideationlessness 91 - darsana-(pra)heya (=darsana(marga)-prahatavya) 102, 123, 226
ignorance 73, 97, 99, 102, 103, 105, I 11, I 13, I 14, 119, 209 - klesa counteracted and attaiment 226
immaterial sphere 1 I 7 knowledge 14, 90, 118, 120, 121, 122, 125, 131, 132, 139, 218, 219, 220, 221;
impermanence 88, 91 -ten kinds ofknowledges 118 ff
indriya 89 Kritzer, R 166
inference 2 I 9, 254 kriya 278
information 72, 85, I 28, 176, 196 kroddha 110
investigation 90 krodha 45
irrational adherence 97 263
irresistible path 123, 223 41, 90, 122, 218, 219, 223
irrestraint 85, 86 222
45, 101, 110 kusala 90, 96;
Jaini, P. S. 22, 28, 57, 71, 156, 163, 164, 188, 235, 236, 237, 291, 295 -meaning of96, 195
kusala-miila I 8, 42, 96
jara 19, 46, 52, 91, 136, 227, 238, 239, 240, 241. 242, 246, 271, 280, 284 267, 280;
jati 19, 46, 54, 91, 135, 136, 138, 147, 227, 238, 240, 241, 242, 246, 271, 278, 280 -the three of dharmas 87 f., 177 f.
jati-jati 138 263, 267,272
238 Lamotte, Etienne 157, 295, 298
jealousy 97 lobha 45
jivitendriya 19, 46, 48, 49, 56, 71, 91, 133, 163, 164, 227, 235, 236 lust 97
jiilina 90, 222, 223 mada 45, I 08, 206
Jnanaprasthana-sastra ( = JPS) 6, 24, 25, 29, 32, 33, 34, 35, 38, 46, 55, 59, 153, 155, mahabhiita 37, 46, 64, 65, 80, 82, 142, 159, 168, 169, 170, 172, 173, 175, 233, 253,
156, 160, 161, 162, 164, 194, 200, 202, 205, 217, 220, 221, 228, 232, 235, 254;
258, 289 - difference from bhautika 170
Jong, J. W. de 28, 156, 296 Mahlisai)lghika 158, 201, 224
joy 89 Mahayana 13, 34, 218
Kamalasila 283 Mahlsasaka 158
karal)a-hetu 249, 290 mlina 45, 98
karitra 24, 169, 238, 239, 241, 242, 243, 244, 265, 266, 269, 271, 272, 273, 276, manasklira 18, 40, 41, 45, 71, 90, 92, 180, 184, 192, 205
277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 287, 290; manlitimana 98
- theory of 272 ff. marga 106, 195, 201, 221, 255
"'Karmasiddhiprakaral)a-sastra 153 matsarya 45, 101, 110
Karu!)adasa, Y. 171 matter(riipa) 2, 5, 18, 62, 70, 80, 85, 87, 89, 140, 168, 174, 296;
Kasmirian 24, 25, 27, 31, 33, 46, 68, 73, 76 -primary matter 80 f.;
Kasyapiya 158 -derived (secondary) matter 81 ff.
Kathavatthu ( = Kvu) 7, 163, 228, 291, 294 mayli 45, 108
Kato J 70, 166 meditation restraint 86
Katyayaniputra 32, 164, 249, 289 mental application 90, 92
kaukrtya 45, 1 I 0, 115, 208, 216 middha 45, 110, 115, 207, 216
kausidya 40, 41. 42, 45, 90, 95, 180, 194 105, 1 19
kaya-grantha 90, 115 Mizuno, K. 7, 153, 160, 161, 297
Kimura, T. 156 mode of existence 264

306 307
modesty 90 Pancavastuka 39, 40, 42, 65, 161
moha 45 paramal)u 63. 69, 70
45, 110, Ill, 209 pariQiima 269. 275, 284, 285;
241 - theory of 268
naivasarpvara-nasaJ11vara 85 partially-common (characteristic) 62, 63, 87, 169
nama 243, 244 paryavasthiina 90, 209, 211
namakaya 91 pascatya 33
neither restraint nor irrestraint 85 phala 20, 30, 68, 69, 73, 75, 93, 143, 184, 208, 246, 248, 254
neo-Sarvastivada 23, 62, 258, 284 phala-diina 273, 274, 283, 290
60, 258, 273,284 phala-grahal)a 278,283, 284, 290
nikaya 202 phala-parigrahana 273
nikaya-sabhiiga 91, 177 phala-pratigrahaQa 273, 282
nikaya-sabhiigata 19, 46, 57, 69, 70, 134, 237 239, 242, 273, 278, 280, 282, 283
nirodha 3, 15, 16, 19, 47, 59, 61, 80, 106, 118, 127, 131, 144, 145, 147, 195, 201, phoneme 139, 140, 244
218, 221' 223, 233, 249, 255, 256, 257 phrases 91, 139, 140
nirodha-samapatti 91, 131, 233, 234 planesofexistence 2, 20, 113, 116. 117, 134
nirviit:ta 26, 29, 55, 95,120, 126, 147,211, 212,221.222,223, 255, 256,257,298, pleasure 89
299; possession 126, 127, 230, 237
- 257 potency 271, 279
nirveda 44, 45, 90 Poussin, L. de La Vallee 4, 13, 14, 157, 171, 224, 290, 297
109, 111, 143, 209, 239, 246, 248 - See also AKB(F)
nitya 53, 73, 139 pradasa 45
nivaral)a 90, 115, 216 Pradhan, P. 4, 291
nivaral)a 216 prajnii 18, 30, 40, 41, 64, 69, 90, 93, 96, 127, 157, 162, 186, 193, 195, 196, 209,
nivrtavyakrta 128, 195, 196 219, 221. 225, 230, 245, 249
non-acquisition 91, 130, 232; Prajnapti-sastra ( = PjS) 7, 68, 69, 153, 228
- nature of 130 Prajnaptivadin 263
non-defined 73, 112, 119 predilection 90, 92
non-defined roots 73, 90, 97 pramada 18, 40, 41, 42, 45, 90, 94, 95, 180, 193, 194
non-diligence 90, 94 priimodya 44, 45, 90, 193
non-information 81, 84, 86, 87 priipti 19, 46, 48. 54, 55, 62, 68, 69, 70, 91, 122, 125, 126, 144, 164, 201, 202,
non-trainee 126, 129 223, 227, 228, 229, 231, 232, 256
non-veiled-non-defined 119 prasrabdhi 40, 41, 42, 45, 90, 94, 180, 191, 194
*Nyayiinusiira(=Ny)2, 7, 14, 17, 22, 24, 28, 36, 37, 38, 42, 44, 45, 46, 47, 49, 50, pratilambha 19, 56, 68, 69, 127, 228
51, 55, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 64, 68, 70, 71, 72. 73, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, pratiliibha 126
159, 160, 162, 163, 164, 166, 168, 169, 170, 173, 174, 175, 179, 182, 185, pratipannaka (progresses/ progressing towards) 124, 184, 225, 226
186, 187, 189. 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 196, 198, 200, 201, 202, 204, 205, pratisarpkhyii-nirodha 15, 16, 145,223, 255, 256, 258;
206, 207, 208, 210, 211, 216, 219, 223, 227, 228, 229, 231, 232, 233, 234, - synonyms 256
236, 23 7, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 246, 247, 250, 251' 255, 256, 254;
257, 25R 261, 262, 263, 26R 273. 278, 281, 288, - 218,219
298 pratyaya 19, 20, 30, 68, 69, 73, 93, 136, 144, 170, 242, 249, 250, 258, 269
obtainment 47, 126, 132, 237 - the four pratyaya 249
ogha 90, 113, 211, 212, 213 predilection 90
outflow 90, 121, 126, 142 primary characteristics 138
padakaya 91 proclivities 90, 96, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 108, 122, 123, 124;
padartha 2. 3, 14, 16, 18, 19, 71, 80, 88, 89, 90, 140, 145, 148 - ninety-eight kinds of 105;

308 309
 - seven kinds of 102 f. 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 286
production 91, 138, 238 sai]lgraha 30
production-production Uiiti-jliti) 138 sai]ljfiii 2, 15, 18, 19, 41, 43, 45, 53, 80, 89, 90, 131, 147, 168, 179, 180,182, 185,
prthagjana 55, 125, 126, 135, 218, 229, 230, 232, 234, 237 m.m ·
prthagjanatva 46, 51, 55, 130, 135, 164, 227, 232, 237 sarpjfla-padiirtha 89
Pudgalaviidin 31, 263 sai]lkara 274
Pu Guang 67, 156, 166, 176 Siii]lkhya 268, 284, 286
238, 241 Siirnmitiya 173
Riirna 28 sai]lprayoga 30, 180, 181
reasoning 90 sai]lprayuktakahetu 246;
receptivity 90, 93, 122, 188 - difference from sahabhii- hetu 246
-eight kinds ofreceptivities 122 saJ11skiira I, 2, 18, 19, 28, 46, 59, 69, 73, 80, 90, 125, 168, 185, 227, 238, 239, 258,
resolve 90 270, 271' 275, 286
restraint 85, 86, 142 sai]lskiira-padlirtha 90
roots of unwholesomeness 90, 96 samskrta 2, 46, 52, 62, 63, 138, 147, 169, 180, 238, 239, 252, 267, 268, 269, 270,
roots of wholesomeness 86, 90, 96, 116 282, 284
tiipa 2, 15, 18, 19, 34, 36, 46. 62, 63, 75, 80, 85, 87, 169, 170, 171, 174, 177, 178, sai]lskrta-\ak::;al)a 280
185, 196, 213, 215, 227, 235, 247, 252 Samtani, N. H. 153, 156
63, 35, 178 sai]lvara 38, 75, 85, 174, 175, 176
rupa-padiirtha 80 SatT\yojana 97, 198, 199, 229
sabda 244 Siintarak::;ita 283
Sabdavlidin 212 santati 275, 276, 277
sabhiiga 31, 34, 50, 141, 170, 237, 245, 247 santati-paril)iima 275
sabhiiga-hetu 246, 247, 273, 282 Saptavastuka 41
sabhiigatli 237 *Siira-samuccaya-niirna-abhidharmlivatlira-Fka ( = Siira ) 8, 20, 48, 167, 168, 179, 199,
sahabhu 141, 245, 246 220, 228, 255
sahabhii-hetu 246; *Siiriputriibhidharma 201
-difference from sai]lprayuktaka 246 sarvadiisti 139
55, 126, 129, 170, 218, 230, 255 sarvastitva 31, 73, 165, 261, 284, 286, 287
sakrdliglimi-phala 124 Sarviistiviida I, 9, 13. 14, 15, 17, 18, 20, 23, 24, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 33, 35, 36, 39,
sakti 273, 278 45, 46, 54, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 73, 76,154, 155, 157, 158, 162, 163, 165, 172,
Sakurabe, H 5, 57. 66, 68, 69, 70, 164, 165, 166, 298 176, 177, 180, 182, 185, 192, 193, 201, 202, 205, 218, 219, 224, 227, 228,
samiidhi 18, 36, 40, 41, 45, 74, 85, 90, 92, 125, 177 231' 237, 255, 256, 261' 262, 263, 266, 270, 272,281' 283,284, 286, 288, 296;
slimagri 227 - definition of 261
samanantara-pratyaya 249, 250 - four main theories of 263
samanvligama 30, 48, 56, 69, 70, 93, 126, 164, 186, 228, 229, 231 sarvatraga 75, 105, 141, 143, 203, 204, 247
30, 63, 64, 65, 69, 168, 169, 178 sarvatraga-hetu 24 7
samiipatti 233 slisrava 177, 191, 220, 221, 232
Samliropavlidin 263 siithya 45
siimarthya 135, 241, 278, 281 100, 104, 105, 107, 119, 196, 197, 198, 202, 203, 213, 229
*Samayabhedoparacana-cakra 32, 262 sattviikhyli 82, 144
samayavimukta 125 sattva-sabhiigatli 57
Sai]lghabhadra 16, 17, 22, 24, 26, 28, 36, 37, 44, 45, 4 7, 49, 58, 59, 60, 62, 68, 72, *Satyasiddhisastra ( = SatS) 168, 201, 219, 295
154, 156, 163, 166, 168, 173, 174, 175, 182, 185, 186, 192, 194, 198, 206, saumanasya 89
211, 219, 227,232, 233, 234, 236, 237,238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, Sautrlintika 15, 22, 23, 24, 27, 28, 29, 31, 34, 59, 60, 68, 71, 137, 153, 156, 158,
250, 251' 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 262, 263, 269, 273, 274, 276, 278, 279, 168, 171, 173, 182, 186, 191, 192, 196, 198, 199, 200, 201. 210, 216, 228,

310 311
 1:-N I KANl...t: JN J U J N:t. Ut..J\...IK.INI::. :!11'\.ANtJHil.A·:s J\HHlUHAK.MAVAI AKA

229, 236, 240, 246, 256, 257, 258, 263, 261, 269, 273, 274, 275, 276, 281, svabhiiva 32, 242, 263, 268, 269, 270, 279, 282, 285, 286, 287, 291
283, 295, 298 18, 30, 63, 64, 65, 69, 93, 169, 178, 219, 270, 286, 287, 290
Schopen 156 syllables 91, 139, 140, 244
secondary characteristics 138 Takakusu, J. 153
secondary defilement 90 Tiiraniitha 289
sense-sphere 116 Tatia, Nathmal 9, 283, 284, 291, 292, 300
seven pudga1a 226u tatsabhiiga 273
shame 90 278, 282
silavrataparamarsa 100, 104, 105, 107, 115, 119, 199, 202, 215, 229 *Tattviirtha (by Sthiramati -Tibetan tr.) 274. 289
six causes 136, 141 Tattvasaf!lgraha-paiijikii ( =TSP) 268, 277, 278
six hetu 249, 283 temporal 263, 265, 279, 287
six pudgala 226 Theraviida 172, 207, 224, 235, 245
skandha 6, 14, 16, 19, 58, 63, 64, 67, 74, 140, 168, 185, 256 thlna 207
Skandhila 5, 14, 15, 18, 19, 20, 27, 28, 41, 47, 58, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, thought-concomitant 90, 104, Ill, 119, 125, 131, 132, 141, 142, 144;
70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 166, 172, 232, 234, 238, 255, 299 - definition of 125
slackness 90 three spheres 116
smrti 18, 40, 41, 45, 90, 92, 185 trainee 126, 129, 135
sorrow 89 ( = Siddhi = Siddhi(S)) 8, 181. 182, 183, 184, 185, 297
sound 66, 81. 82, 139, 172, 187, 244 iinamiina 99
Space 3, 21. 80, 81, 127, 136, 137, 145, 169, 170. 250, 251, 254 unconditioned 17, 120, 121, 127, 128, 129, 136, 137, 144, 145
sparsa 18, 41, 45, 90, 92, 178, 182, 183, 257 understanding 90
specifically-common (characteristic) 62, 64, 87, 169 universally-common (characteristic) 63
speculation 73, 97, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 109, 113, 114, 119, 121, 122, 125, 149, upadana 16, 48, 65, 90, 114, 211, 215
205 upadaya-riipa 64, 170, 172
speech 139, 147, 179, 243 upakkilesa 206
spiritual attainment 123 upaklesa 90, 206,209, 211
172 upaniiha 45
sraddha 45, 90, 180, 185, 225 upatta 171
225 upatta-mahabhiita-hetuka 82
sraddhiidhimukta 125, 225, 226 40, 41, 42, 44, 45, 89, 90, 95, 180, 192
sraddhanusarin 125,226 16, 17, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31,33, 34, 35, 38, 55, 57, 58, 59,
Sriliita 28, 158, 210, 216, 247, 252, 286 60. 63, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 93, 97, 153, 158,160, 161, 163, 169, 170, 171,
srotaapanna 258 173, 174, 180, 181, 182, 183, 186, 188, 191, 192, 196, 198, 200, 201, 202,
srotaapatti-phala 123, 226 205, 207, 208, 212, 218, 219, 229, 235, 236, 239, 240, 244, 247,251, 254,
stages 2, 20, 24, 69, I 13, 116. 117, 122. 124, 135, 240, 241 255, 262, 263, 266, 268, 269, 272, 283, 284, 287, 296
- the eleven stages 117 Vainiisika 263
Stcherbatsky, Th 13, 14, 179, 257, 299 vajropama-samiidhi 125
Sthaviraviida I Sthaviravadin 31, 32, 158, 261 YanYelthem 161, 166,221,234,243,218,225,239,245,250,299
Sthiramati 290 Yasubandhu 4, 16, 24, 26, 27, 34, 36, 44, 47, 57, 67, 68, 69, 72, 75, 153, 155, 186,
sthiti 19, 46. 52, 91, 136, 147, 227, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 246, 280, 284 192, 193, 257, 261, 268, 269, 274, 283, 284, 291, 292, 297
239 Vasumitra 18, 32, 67, 165, 180, 263, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 279, 285,
styana 45, 74, 94, 110, 115, 194, 210, 211, 216 289
subsequent knowledge 118, 122, 123 *Vasumitra-saf!lghrhita-siistra 266
substantial essence 264 Yiitslputriya 3 I, 158, 20 I, 252
sukha 89 vedanii 2, 15, 19, 40, 45, 80, 88, 168, 178, 180, 181. 183, 185, 191, 193, 210, 233,
Siinyatavadin 31 246, 257

312 313
vedanii-padiirtha 88
Vibhajyaviida I Vibhajyaviidin 27, 31, 32, 158, 159, 200, 20 I, 202, 240, 261, 262, 263, 266,
288
Viryasridatta 16
Visuddhimagga ( = Vism) 7, 10, 182, 187, 191, 210, 215, 245
viciira 18, 22, 40, 41, 42, 43, 45, 89, 90, 93, 179, 186, 187, 188, 208
vicikitsii 45, 10 I
vigour 90
vihiJTisii 45, I 09, 198, 206
vijniina 2, 10, 15, 18, 19, 48, 80, 133, 140, 141, 179, 180, 182, 183, 185, 219, 235,
236, 244, 254
vijfliina-dhiitu 253
vijnapti 36, 37, 173, 174, 176
*Vijnaptimiitratii-siddhi (Xuan Zang's compilation= Siddhi(C) ) 179, 185, 188, 190, 229,
236
vipiika 46, 51, 141, 144, 182, 195, 233, 246, 247, 248
virya 18, 40, 41, 42, 44, 45, 90, 92, 94, 95, 180, 183, 189, 192, 194
visaf!lyoga 249
visaf!lyoga-phala 249, 255
vital faculty 91, 133, 134
vitariiga 55, 68, 126
vitarka 18, 22, 23, 41, 42, 45, 89, 90, 93, 179, 186, 187, 188, 208
volition 90
vrtti 135, 238, 241, 242, 273, 278
vyanjanakiiya 91
vyiipiira 135, 241, 273, 278
vyaya 240
Watanabe Baiyu, 267,288,299
western masters 33, 34, 35, 73, 75, 158, 197, 216, 232, 24 7
words 91, 139, 140, 244, 296
WuRu 68
XuanZang 4, 5, 18, 20, 21, 22, 26, 27, 35, 41, 42, 66, 67, 70, 72, 74, 75, 154, 155,
159, 166, 168, 169, 171 178, 182, 184, 188, 198, 203, 204, 205, 207, 209,
222, 224, 241, 255, 257, 278, 281, 293, 294
Yasomitra 10, 156, 159, 184, 226, 227, 283, 291;
- See also Vyiikhyii
Yin Shun 34, 39, 76, 161, 201, 272, 289, 299;
-A Study ofthe Sostras and Aciilyas C?f the Sarviistiviida and Other Schools ( = Study
) 9, 155,156,157,158,159,161,163,167,180,202,258,291,292,302
yoga 90, 211
Yogiiciira 13, 54, 163, 181, 182, 191, 196
yoke 90
Yoshimoto Shingyo 43, 161, 299
Yuan Hui 166
Yuktiviidin 31
zuoyong 138,241, 244, 278, 281, 282

314

'
..-..__