ARTICLE 2
informed of its contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances of
1 TAÑADA VS. TUVERA
136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)
FACTS:
Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public
concern as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must
be published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of mandamus
to compel respondent public officials to publish and/or cause to publish
various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementations and
administrative orders.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the
dismissal of the case, contending that petitioners have no legal personality
to bring the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any
law or statute becomes valid and enforceable.
HELD:
Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in
the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its
effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give the general public
adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and
conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be
no basis for the application of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat.
It would be the height of injustive to punish or otherwise burden a citizen
for the transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even
a constructive one.
The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published
in the Official Gazette…. The word “shall” therein imposes upon
respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the
constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter of public concern
is to be given substance and validity.
The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general
applicability is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a
person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically
general application which have not been published have no force and
effect.
2 TAÑADA VS. TUVERA
146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)
FACTS:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April
24, 1985. Respondent argued that while publication was necessary as a
rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise” as when the decrees
themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon
their approval.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general
applicability and laws which are not as to their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general
circulation.
HELD:
The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity
and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event
be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the
law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other date, without its
previous publication.
“Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application,
for strictly speaking, all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are
some that do not apply to them directly. A law without any bearing on the
public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or
as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably
affect the public interest eve if it might be directly applicable only to one
individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.
All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after
publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is
to inform the public of the content of the law.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made
in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their
effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom
of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical.
The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.
J. Cruz:
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of
skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious
pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding
unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication
intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The
furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or cut unless
the naked blade is drawn.
3 skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious
G.R. No. 187587               June 5, 2013
NAGKAKAISANG MARALITA NG SITIO MASIGASIG, INC. vs.
MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES - PHILIPPINE VETERANS
AFFAIRS OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
FACTS:
By virtue of Proclamation 423, Former President Carlos P. Garcia reserved
parcels of land in the Municipalities of Pasig, Taguig, Paranaque, Province of
Rizal and Pasay City for military reservation. Later on, Former President
Marcos issued a proclamation amending such publication, which excludes
certain area of the reserved land.
Again, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2476 that further amended
the proclamation that excluded the barangays of Lower Bicutan, Upper
Bicutan and Signal Village and a handwritten addendum which includes
Western Bicutan for the disposition of the area. The proclamation was
published in the Official Gazette without the handwritten addendum.
Demolition of illegal structures existed to prevent the area from the increasing
number of informal settlers. Members of petitioner Nagkakaisang Maralita ng
Sitio Masigasig, Inc. (NMSMI) and Western Bicutan Lot Owners Association,
Inc. (WBLOAI) filed for a Petition with Commission on Settlement of Land
Problems (COSLAP) praying for the reclassification of the areas they are
occupying as is already alienable and disposable. COSLAP ruled that the
handwritten addendum of President Marcos was not published thus the areas
occupied by the petitioners are in question alienable and disposable.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the handwritten addendum of President Marcos had the force
and effect of law though it was not included in the publication.
HELD:
No, if the legislature could validly provide that a law shall become effective
immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or
after an unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely that
persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result; and they would be so
not because of a failure to comply with it but simply because they did not
know of its existence. Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is
commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law
on prescription, which must also be communicated to the persons they may
affect before they can begin to operate.
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of
pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless
their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to
make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is
like a scabbarded saber that cannot feint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is
drawn. (Emphases supplied)
Applying the foregoing ruling to the instant case, this Court cannot rely on a
handwritten note that was not part of Proclamation No. 2476 as published.
Without publication, the note never had any legal force and effect.
4
G.R. No. 170338 December 23, 2008
VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO vs. THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC INFORMATION,
PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY, NATIONAL DEFENSE AND
SECURITY, INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS
TECHNOLOGY, and SUFFRAGE AND ELECTORAL REFORMS
FACTS:
Petitioners seek to disallow the Senate to continue with the conduct of the
questioned legislative inquiry on the issue of “Hello Garci” tapes containing
the wiretapped communication of then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
and COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano, without duly published
rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement.
The respondents admit in their pleadings and even on oral argument that the
Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been
published in newspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006. With
respect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress, however, of which the term
of half of its members commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was undertaken
for the publication of these rules when they first opened their session.
Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated
publication by arguing that the rules have never been amended since 1995
and, despite that, they are published in booklet form available to anyone for
free, and accessible to the public at the Senates internet web page, invoking
R.A. No. 8792.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A.
No. 8792 support their claim of valid publication through the internet.
HELD:
No. The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic
requirements of due process. Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be
the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law or rule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even
a constructive one.
The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No.
8792, otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support
their claim of valid publication through the internet is all the more incorrect.
R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as
the functional equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary purposes.
In other words, the law merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for
their being the original) of electronic data messages and/or electronic
documents. It does not make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules
and regulations.
Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could
not, in violation of the Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative
inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of
legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused the
publication of the rules, because it can do so only "in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure."
ARTICLE 3
5
G.R. No. 169364 September 18, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EVANGELINE SITON y SACIL
and KRYSTEL KATE SAGARANO y MEFANIA
FACTS:
Respondents were charged with vagrancy pursuant to Article 202 (2) of the
Revised Penal Code. That the respondents willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously wandered and loitered without any visible means to support
herself nor lawful and justifiable purpose. Instead of submitting their counter-
affidavits as directed, respondents filed separate Motions to Quash on the
ground that Article 202 (2) is unconstitutional for being vague and overbroad.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 202 (2) is vague.
HELD:
No, Article 202 (2) in this case, fails to give fair notice of what constitutes
forbidden conduct, finds no application here because under our legal system,
ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith. This
principle is of Spanish origin, and we adopted it to govern and limit legal
conduct in this jurisdiction.
6
Secretary Vincent S. Perez v. LPG Refillers Association of the Philippines
G.R. No. 159149/June 26, 2006 / Castro, J
FACTS. 1. Batas Pambansa Blg. 33, as amended, penalizes illegal trading,
hoarding, overpricing, adulteration, underdelivery, and underfilling of
petroleum products, as well as possession for trade of adulterated petroleum
products and of underfilled LPG cylinders.
2. The law also provides a monetary penalty of P20,000 to P50,000 against
those who violate the said law.
3. Circular No. 2000-06-010 was issued by the DOE to implement B.P. Blg. 33.
4. LPG Refillers assailed the circular as B.P 33, the delegating statute, does
not expressly penalize the acts enumerated in the circular.
5. RTC : Circular is nullified on the ground that it introduced new offenses not
included in B.P 33 6. Petition for Review on Certiorari to the SC

ISSUES: W/N RTC erred in declaring the circular null and void and prohibiting
the implementation of the same ----
HELD: YES.
1. For an administrative regulation, such as
the Circular in this case, to have the force of penal law, (1) the violation of
the administrative regulation must be made a crime by the delegating statute
itself; and (2) the penalty for such violation must be provided by the statute
itself. 2. The circular complies with both requisites. For the first, the circular
merely enumerates the various ways by which the criminal acts enumerated
in B.P 33 may be committed. As to the second, B.P 33 provides a penalty of
P20,000 to P50,000 against those who violate the said law. 3. Under the
Circular, the maximum pecuniary penalty for retail outlets is P20,000, an
amount within the range allowed by law. However, for the refillers,
marketers, and dealers, the Circular is silent as to any maximum monetary
penalty. This mere silence, nonetheless, does not amount to violation of the
aforesaid statutory maximum limit. Further, the mere fact that the Circular
provides penalties on a per cylinder basis does not in itself run counter to the
law since all that B.P. Blg. 33 prescribes are the minimum and the maximum
limits of penalties. 4. Clearly, it is B.P. Blg. 33, as amended, which defines
what constitute punishable acts involving petroleum products and which set
the minimum and maximum limits for the corresponding penalties. The
Circular merely implements the said law, Victorias Milling Company Security
Commission
7 CSC and that, resultantly, the CSC must abdicate its appellate jurisdiction
G.R. No. 173615 October 16, 2009
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. CAYETANO A. TEJANO, JR.
FACTS:
The case stems from a number of alleged irregular and fraudulent transactions
made by respondent with the participation of eight (8) other employees of
petitioner. The PNB Board of Directors differed. In its Resolution No. 88, it
found that respondent’s gross neglect in giving unwarranted credit to PITC,
PGIC and KITC must serve as an aggravating circumstance in relation to the
offense of grave misconduct consisting of misappropriation of V&G funds
and must serve the penalty of forced resignation with forfeiture of benefits. It
appears that only herein respondent sought reconsideration but the Board of
Directors, in its Resolution No. 107, denied the same. Thereafter, respondent
appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC) and submitted his
Memorandum on Appeal.
In the meantime, the PNB had ceased to be a government-owned and
controlled corporation, and in view of its conversion into a private banking
institution by virtue of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 80. Despite this
development, the CSC issued Resolution No. 980716 dismissing respondent’s
appeal for being filed out of time.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration on which the CSC required
petitioner to comment. In its Comment, petitioner theorized that even granting
respondent’s appeal was filed on time, the same must, nevertheless, be
dismissed on account of the privatization of PNB which thereby removed the
case from the jurisdiction of the CSC.
ISSUE:
Whether E.O. No. 80 has the effect of removing from the jurisdiction of the
CSC the appeal of respondent which was already pending before the CSC at
the time the said law converted PNB into a private banking institution.
HELD:
No. While there is no denying that upon its privatization, the bank would
consequently be subject to laws, rules and regulations applicable to private
corporations — which is to say that disciplinary cases involving its employees
would then be placed under the operation of the Labor Code of the Philippines
— still, we cannot validate petitioner’s own interpretation of Section 6 of E.O.
No. 80 that the same must be applied to respondent’s pending appeal with the
without having to resolve the case to finality.
It is binding rule, conformably with Article 4 of the Civil Code, that,
generally, laws shall have only a prospective effect and must not be applied
retroactively in such a way as to apply to pending disputes and cases. This is
expressed in the familiar legal maxim lex prospicit, non respicit (the law looks
forward and not backward.) The rationale against retroactivity is easy to
perceive: the retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have
already become vested or impairs the obligations of contract and, hence, is
unconstitutional. Although the rule admits of certain well-defined exceptions
such as, for instance, where the law itself expressly provides for
retroactivity, we find that not one of such exceptions that would otherwise
lend credence to petitioner’s argument obtains in this case. Hence, in other
words, the fact that Section 6 of E.O. No. 80 states that PNB would be
removed from the coverage of the CSC must be taken to govern acts
committed by the bank’s employees after privatization.
8 Issue: 1.Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal?
JUAN G. FRIVALDO, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and
RAUL R. LEE, Respondents.[G.R. No. 123755. June 28, 1996.]
.Summary:Juan G. Frivaldo ran for Governor of Sorsogon again and won.
Raul R. Lee questioned his citizenship. He then petitioned for repatriation
under Presidential Decree No. 725 and was able to take his oath of allegiance
as a Philippine citizen. However, on the day that he got his citizenship, the
Court had already ruled based on his previous attempts to run as governor and
acquire citizenship, and had proclaimed Lee, who got the second highest
number of votes, as the newly elect Governor of Sorsogon.
Facts:1.Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the office of Governor
of Sorsogon in the1995 elections.2.Raul R. Lee, another candidate, filed a
petition... with the Comelec... praying that Frivaldo "be disqualified from
seeking or holding any public officeor position by reason of not yet being a
citizen of the Philippines," and that his Certificate of Candidacy be
cancelledand Comelec promulgated a Resolutiongranting the petition3.The
Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained unacted upon until
after... elections.Hi1s candidacy continued and he was voted for during the
elections. Upon completionof canvassing of votes,Frivaldo got the
highestnumber ofvote followed by Lee.4.Lee filed (supplemental)
petitionpraying for his proclamation as theduly-elected Governor of
Sorsogonand accordingly at 8:30 in the evening of June 30,1995, Lee was
proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.5.Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new
petition, praying for the annulment ofproclamation of Lee and for his own
proclamation.6.He alleged that on June 30, 1995, at 2:00 in the afternoon, he...
took his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after "his petition for
repatriation under P.D. 725 which he filed with the Special Committee on
Naturalization in September 1994 had been granted."7.As such... there was no
more legal impediment to the proclamation (of Frivaldo) as
governor8.Comelec First Division promulgated the herein assailed
Resolution... holding that Lee, "not having garnered the highest number of
votes," was not legally entitled to be proclaimed as duly-elected governor; and
that Frivaldo,... "having garnered the highest number of votes, and... having
reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June 30, 1995 under the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725(is... qualified to hold the office of
governor of Sorsogon"... hefurther contends that assuming the assailed
repatriation to be valid, nevertheless it could only be effective as at 2:00 p.m.
of June 30, 1995 whereas the citizenship qualification prescribed by the Local
Government Code "must exist on the date of his election,... if not when the
certificate of candidacy is filed.
2 If so, did it seasonably cure his lack of citizenship as to qualify him to be
proclaimed and to hold the Office of Governor
3. If not, may it be given retroactive effect? If so, from when?
Held:
1.Yes, it is validLegal Basis:1.PD 725 provided a new remedyand a new right
in favor of other "natural born Filipinos who (had) lost their Philippine
citizenship but now desire to re-acquire Philippine citizenship", because prior
to the promulgation of P.D. 725 such former Filipinos would have had to
undergo the tedious and cumbersome process of naturalization, but with the
advent of P.D. 725 they could now reacquire their Philippine citizenship under
the simplifiedprocedure of repatriationApplication:
There is nothing unjust or iniquitous in treating Frivaldo’s repatriation as
having become effective as of the date of his application, i.e., on August 17,
1994. This being so, all questions about his possession of the nationality
qualification —whether at the date of proclamation (June 30, 1995) or the date
of election (May 8, 1995) or date of filing his certificate of candidacy (March
20, 1995) would become moot
.2.No, citizenship qualification should be possessed at the time the candidate
(or for that matter the elected official) registered as a voter.Legal basis:Under
Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code," (a)n elective local official must be:*
a citizenof the Philippines;* a registered voterin the barangay, municipality,
city, or province . . . where he intends to be elected;* a resident therein for at
least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election;* able to read
and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect." * In addition,
"candidates for the position of governor . . . must be at least twenty-three (23)
years of age onelection day."Application: After all, Section 39, apart from
requiring the official to be a citizen, also specifies as another item of
qualification, that he be a "registered voter." And, under the law a "voter"
must be a citizen of the Philippines. So therefore, Frivaldo could not have
been a voter —much less a validly registered one —if he was not a citizen at
the time of such registration since he was really STATELESS at the time he
took oath of allegiance and even before that, when he ran for governor in
1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo wrote that he "had long renounced and had
long abandoned his American citizenship —long before May 8, 1995. At best,
Frivaldo was stateless in the interim —when he abandoned and renounced his
US citizenship but before he was repatriated to his Filipino citizenship."
4. The Court could have refused to grant retroactivity to the effects of his
repatriation and hold him still ineligible due to his failure show his citizenship
at the time he registered as a voter before the 1995 elections Concededly, he
sought American citizenship only to escape the clutches of the dictatorship. At
this stage, we cannot seriously entertain any doubt about his loyalty and
dedication to this country.Therefore, petition filed by Frivaldo is dismissed.
He is not a citizen of the Philippines and disqualified from serving as the
Governor of the Province of Sorsogon, vacancy shall be filled by the elected
Vice-Governor.
9 Magsaysay Viaduct, known as the Lower Agusan Development Project.
Bernabe vs Alejo
G. R. No. 140500 – 374 SCRA 180 – Civil Law – Preliminary Title –
Application of Laws – No retroactive effect if vested rights are impaired
Facts: The late Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with Carolina
Alejo. The son was born on September 18, 1981 and was named Adrian
Bernabe. Fiscal Bernabe died on August 13, 1993 leaving Ernestina as the
sole surviving heir. Therafter, Carolina in behalf of Adrian filed the aforesaid
complaint praying that Adrian be declared as acknowledged illegitimate son
of Fiscal Bernabe.
The RTC dismissed the complaint ruling that under the provision of the
Family Code, the death of the putative father had barred the action. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals ruled that in the interest of justice, Adrian should be
allowed to prove that he was the illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe since the
boy was born in 1981; his rights are governed by Article 283 of the Civil
Code. Hence, appeal was interposed in the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Family Code shall have retroactive effect.
HELD: Applying recent jurisprudence, the Supreme Court hold that Article
285 of the Civil Code is a substantive law as it gives Adrian the right to file
his petition for recognition within 4 years from attaining majority age.
Therefore, the Family Code cannot impair or take Adrian’s right to file an
action for recognition because that right had already vested prior to its
enactment.
ARTICLE 6
10
G.R. No. 187521 March 14, 2012
F.F. CRUZ & CO., INC. vs. HR CONSTRUCTION CORP.
FACTS:
FFCCI entered into a contract with the DPWH for the construction of the
FFCCI, in turn, entered into a Subcontract Agreement with HR Construction
Corporation (HRCC) for the supply of materials, labor, equipment, tools and
supervision for the construction of a portion of the said project called the East
Bank Levee and Cut-Off Channel in accordance with the specifications of the
main contract.
The subcontract price agreed upon by the parties amounted to
₱31,293,532.72. HRCC commenced the construction of the works pursuant to
the Subcontract Agreement.
HRCC submitted to FFCCI its first to fourth progress billing in the amounting
to ₱2,029,081.59, ₱1,587,760.23, ₱2,569,543.57 and ₱1,527,112.95
respectively.
HRCC sent FFCCI a letter dated December 13, 2004 demanding the payment
of its progress billings in the total amount of ₱7,340,046.09, plus interests,
within three days from receipt thereof. Subsequently, HRCC completely
halted the construction of the subcontracted project after taking its Christmas
break.
ISSUE:
Whether or not FFCCI, on its failure to demand the joint measurement of
HRCC’s completed works, had waived its right to ask for the conduct of the
same.
HELD:
Yes. As to what rights and privileges may be waived, the authority is settled:
 x x x the doctrine of waiver extends to rights and privileges
of any character, and, since the word ‘waiver’ covers every
conceivable right, it is the general rule that a person may waive any
matter which affects his property, and any alienable right or privilege
of which he is the owner or which belongs to him or to which he is
legally entitled, whether secured by contract, conferred with
statute, or guaranteed by constitution, provided such rights and
privileges rest in the individual, are intended for his sole benefit, do
not infringe on the rights of others, and further provided the waiver
of the right or privilege is not forbidden by law, and does not
contravene public policy; and the principle is recognized that
everyone has a right to waive, and agree to waive, the advantage of a
law or rule made solely for the benefit and protection of the
individual in his private capacity, if it can be dispensed with and
relinquished without infringing on any public right, and without
detriment to the community at large. x x x 36 (Emphasis supplied and
citations omitted)
Here, it is undisputed that the joint measurement of HRCC’s completed works
contemplated by the parties in the Subcontract Agreement never materialized.
Indeed, HRCC, on separate occasions, submitted its monthly progress billings
indicating the extent of the works it had completed sans prior joint
measurement. FFCCI did not contest the said progress billings submitted by
HRCC despite the lack of a joint measurement of the latter’s completed works
as required under the Subcontract Agreement.
11
Guy v CA
G.R. No. 163707. September 15, 2006
Facts:
Karen Oanes Wei, a minor by and through her mother Remedios Oanes, filed
a petition for letters of administration before the RTC of Makati. Respondents
alleged that they are duly acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei,
who died intestate in Makati on October 29, 1992, leaving an estate of
P10,000,000.00 consisting of real and personal properties. His known heirs
are his surviving spouse Shirley Guy and children, Emy, Jeanne, Cristina,
George and Michael, all surnamed Guy. Respondents are a asking for an
appointment of a regular administrator for the orderly settlement of Sima
Wei’s estate. They also want to appoint Michael C. Guy as Special
Administrator of the Estate. Petitioner is praying for the dismissal of the
petition for the reason that his deceased father left no debts and that his estate
can be settled without securing letters of administration. He argued that
private respondents should have established their status as illegitimate
children during the lifetime of Sima Wei.
Issues:
1. WoN private respondent’s petition should be dismissed for failure to
comply with rules on non-forum shopping?
2. WoN the Release and Waiver of Claim precludes private respondents from
claiming their Successional Rights?
3. WoN private respondents are barred by prescription from proving filiation?
Held:
1. Yes, the petition lacks merit. The law provides that certification of non-
forum should be executed by the plaintiff or the principal party. Failure to
comply means cause for a dismissal of the case. Merits of the case and the
absence of an intention to violate rule with impunity should be considered to
temper the strict application of the rules.
2. Private respondents cannot be bar from claiming successional rights. To be
valid and effective, waiver must be couched clearly and in unequivocal terms
to leave no doubt with regards to the intention of a party in giving up a right
or benefit legally pertains to. Waiver cannot be attributed to a person if it not
explicitly and clearly evinces intent to abandon a right. This case has no
waiver of hereditary rights.
3. Private respondents must not be barred from proving filiation because the
law provides that filiation of an illegitimate child is established by a record of
birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, or an admission by
means of a public document or a private handwritten instrument. Action for
recognition may be brought by the child during his/her lifetime. However,
action must be based upon open and continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate child.
12
G.R. No. 132834 November 24, 2006
RUPERTO LUCERO, JR., PABLO LUCERO and ANTONIO
TENORIO vs. CITY GOVERNMENT OF PASIG, as represented by the
Market Administrator
FACTS:
Petitioners were granted lease contracts to occupy stalls in the public market
of Pasig. In 1993, Pasig renovated its market facilities and passed Municipal
Ordinance No. 56 which mandated all stall occupants to fill up and submit
application forms which would serve as their lease contracts if approved.
Petitioners refused to apply for a new lease on their stalls. The Pasig
government filed a case for ejectment against them.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners may claim a vested right to the market stalls
they were occupying.
HELD:
No. The lease (and occupation) of a stall in a public market is not a right but a
purely statutory privilege governed by laws and ordinances. The city
government, through its market administrator, is not duty-bound to grant lease
privileges to any applicant, least of all those who refuse to obey the new
ordinance prescribing the rules and regulations for the market stalls.
Moreover, a public market is one dedicated to the service of the general public
and operated under government control and supervision as a public
utility. Hence, the operation of a public market and its facilities is imbued
with public interest.
ARTICLE 7
13
G.R. No. 156052 February 13, 2008
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), VLADIMIR ALARIQUE T.
CABIGAO and BONIFACIO S. TUMBOKON vs. HON. JOSE L.
ATIENZA, JR., in his capacity as Mayor of the City of Manila
FACTS:
Ordinance No. 8027 enacted by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Manila
reclassified the area from industrial to commercial and directed the owners
and operators of businesses disallowed to cease and desist from operating
their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the
ordinance. Among the businesses situated in the area are the so-called
“Pandacan Terminals” of the oil companies Caltex (Philippines), Inc., Petron
Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation.
However, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered
into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the oil companies in which
they agreed that “the scaling down of the Pandacan Terminals [was] the most
viable and practicable option.” In the MOU, the oil companies were required
to remove 28 tanks starting with the LPG spheres and to commence work for
the creation of safety buffer and green zones surrounding the Pandacan
Terminals. In exchange, the City Mayor and the DOE will enable the oil
companies to continuously operate within the limited area resulting from joint
operations and the scale down program. The Sangguniang Panlungosod
ratified the MOU in Resolution No. 97.
Petitioners pray for a mandamus to be issued against Mayor Atienza to
enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the immediate removal of the terminals
of the oil companies.
ISSUE:
Whether or not that t in passing Ordinance No. 8119, the Sanggunian did not
intend to repeal Ordinance No. 8027.
HELD:
Yes. Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute of
later date clearly reveals the intention of the legislature to abrogate a prior act
on the subject, that intention must be given effect.
These standards are deeply enshrined in our jurisprudence. We disagree that,
in enacting Ordinance No. 8119, there was any indication of the legislative
purpose to repeal Ordinance No. 8027. While it is true that both ordinances
relate to the same subject matter, i.e. classification of the land use of the area
where Pandacan oil depot is located, if there is no intent to repeal the earlier
enactment, every effort at reasonable construction must be made to reconcile
the ordinances so that both can be given effect.
14
Advocates for Truth in Lending, Inc. vs. BSP, et. al.
G.R. No. 192986 / January 15, 2013
REYES, J.
FACTS:
Advocates for Truth in Lending, Inc. and its President, Eduardo Olaguer claim
that they are raising issues of transcendental importance to the public and so
they filed Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 ROC seeking to declare that
the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Board (BSP-MB), replacing the
Central Bank Monetary Board (CB-MB) by virtue of R.A. No. 7653, has no
authority to continue enforcing Central Bank Circular No. 905, issued by the
CB-MB in 1982, which "suspended" the Usury Law of 1916 (Act No. 2655).
R.A. No. 265, which created the Central Bank (CB) of the Philippines,
empowered the CB-MB to, among others, set the maximum interest rates
which banks may charge for all types of loans and other credit operations,
within limits prescribed by the Usury Law.
In its Resolution No. 2224, the CB-MB issued CB Circular No. 905, Series of
1982. Section 1 of the Circular, under its General Provisions, removed the
ceilings on interest rates on loans or forbearance of any money, goods or
credits.
On June 14, 1993, President Fidel V. Ramos signed into law R.A. No. 7653
establishing the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) to replace the CB.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether the CB-MB exceeded its authority when it issued CB Circular
No. 905, which removed all interest ceilings and thus suspended Act No. 2655
as regards usurious interest rates. NO
2. Whether under R.A. No. 7653, the BSP-MB may continue to enforce CB
Circular No. 905. YES
RULING:
1. The CB-MB merely suspended the effectivity of the Usury Law when it
issued CB Circular No. 905.
The power of the CB to effectively suspend the Usury Law pursuant to P.D.
No. 1684 has long been recognized and upheld in many cases. As the Court
explained in the landmark case of Medel v. CA, citing several cases, CB
Circular No. 905 "did not repeal nor in anyway amend the Usury Law but
simply suspended the latter’s effectivity;" that "a CB Circular cannot repeal a
law, [for] only a law can repeal another law;" that "by virtue of CB Circular
No. 905, the Usury Law has been rendered ineffective;" and "Usury has been
legally non-existent in our jurisdiction. Interest can now be charged as lender
and borrower may agree upon."
By lifting the interest ceiling, CB Circular No. 905 merely upheld the parties’
freedom of contract to agree freely on the rate of interest. It cited Article 1306
of the New Civil Code, under which the contracting parties may establish such
stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient,
provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or
public policy.
2. The BSP-MB has authority to enforce CB Circular No. 905.
Section 1 of CB Circular No. 905 provides that, "The rate of interest,
including commissions, premiums, fees and other charges, on a loan or
forbearance of any money, goods, or credits, regardless of maturity and
whether secured or unsecured, that may be charged or collected by any
person, whether natural or juridical, shall not be subject to any ceiling
prescribed under or pursuant to the Usury Law, as amended." It does not
purport to suspend the Usury Law only as it applies to banks, but to all
lenders.
Petitioners contend that, granting that the CB had power to "suspend" the
Usury Law, the new BSP-MB did not retain this power of its predecessor, in
view of Section 135 of R.A. No. 7653, which expressly repealed R.A. No.
265. The petitioners point out that R.A. No. 7653 did not reenact a provision
similar to Section 109 of R.A. No. 265.
A closer perusal shows that Section 109 of R.A. No. 265 covered only loans
extended by banks, whereas under Section 1-a of the Usury Law, as amended,
the BSP-MB may prescribe the maximum rate or rates of interest for all loans
or renewals thereof or the forbearance of any money, goods or credits,
including those for loans of low priority such as consumer loans, as well as
such loans made by pawnshops, finance companies and similar credit
institutions. It even authorizes the BSP-MB to prescribe different maximum
rate or rates for different types of borrowings, including deposits and deposit
substitutes, or loans of financial intermediaries. Act No. 2655, an earlier law,
is much broader in scope, whereas R.A. No. 265, now R.A. No. 7653, merely
supplemented it as it concerns loans by banks and other financial institutions.
Had R.A. No. 7653 been intended to repeal Section 1-a of Act No. 2655, it
would have so stated in unequivocal terms.
Further, the lifting of the ceilings for interest rates does not authorize
stipulations charging excessive, unconscionable, and iniquitous interest. It is
settled that nothing in CB Circular No. 905 grants lenders a carte blanche
authority to raise interest rates to levels which will either enslave their
borrowers or lead to a hemorrhaging of their assets. Stipulations authorizing the banks name from First United Bank United Coconut Planters Bank
iniquitous or unconscionable interests have been invariably struck down for (UCPB).
being contrary to morals, if not against the law.
In November 2000 then President Joseph Estrada issued Executive Order
15 (E.O.) 312, establishing a Sagip Niyugan Program which sought to provide
G.R. Nos. 147036-37 April 10, 2012 immediate income supplement to coconut farmers and encourage the creation
Petitioner-Organizations, namely: PAMBANSANG KOALISYON NG of a sustainable local market demand for coconut oil and other coconut
MGA SAMAHANG MAGSASAKA AT MANGGAGAWA SA products. The Executive Order sought to establish aP1-billion fund by
NIYUGAN (PKSMMN), COCONUT INDUSTRY REFORM disposing of assets acquired using coco-levy funds or assets of entities
MOVEMENT (COIR), BUKLOD NG MALAYANG MAGBUBUKID, supported by those funds. A committee was created to manage the fund under
PAMBANSANG KILUSAN NG MGA SAMAHANG MAGSASAKA this program. A majority vote of its members could engage the services of a
(PAKISAMA), CENTER FOR AGRARIAN REFORM, reputable auditing firm to conduct periodic audits.
EMPOWERMENT AND TRANSFORMATION (CARET),
PAMBANSANG KATIPUNAN NG MGA SAMAHAN SA At about the same time, President Estrada issued E.O. 313, which created an
KANAYUNAN (PKSK); Petitioner-Legislator: REPRESENTATIVE irrevocable trust fund known as the Coconut Trust Fund (the Trust Fund).
LORETA ANN ROSALES; and Petitioner-Individuals, namely: This aimed to provide financial assistance to coconut farmers, to the coconut
VIRGILIO V. DAVID, JOSE MARIE FAUSTINO, JOSE industry, and to other agri-related programs. The shares of stock of SMC were
CONCEPCION, ROMEO ROYANDOYAN, JOSE V. ROMERO, JR., to serve as the Trust Funds initial capital. These shares were acquired with CII
ATTY. CAMILO L. SABIO, and ATTY. ANTONIO T. CARPIO vs. Funds and constituted approximately 27% of the outstanding capital stock of
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE, SMC.E.O. 313 designated UCPB, through its Trust Department, as the Trust
SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, PRESIDENTIAL Funds trustee bank. The Trust Fund Committee would administer, manage,
COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, THE SOLICITOR and supervise the operations of the Trust Fund. The Committee would
GENERAL, PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS FEDERATION, designate an external auditor to do an annual audit or as often as needed but it
INC. (COCOFED), and UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK may also request the Commission on Audit (COA) to intervene.
(UCPB)
To implement its mandate, E.O. 313 directed the Presidential Commission on
FACTS:  Good Government, the Office of the Solicitor General, and other government
On June 19, 1971 Congress enacted R.A. 6260 that established a Coconut agencies to exclude the 27% CIIF SMC shares from Civil Case 0033, entitled
Investment Fund (CI Fund) for the development of the coconut industry Republic of the Philippines v. Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., et al.,which was then
through capital financing. Coconut farmers were to capitalize and administer pending before the Sandiganbayan and to lift the sequestration over those
the Fund through the Coconut Investment Company (CIC) whose objective shares.
was to advance the coconut farmers interests. For this purpose, the law
imposed a levy ofP0.55on the coconut farmers first domestic sale of every 100 ISSUE:
kilograms of copra, or its equivalent, for which levy he was to get a receipt Whether or not Section 2 of P.D. 755, Article III, Section 5 of P.D. 961, and
convertible into CIC shares of stock. Article III, Section 5 of P.D. 1468 are unconstitutional.

In 1975 President Marcos enacted P.D. 755 which approved the acquisition of
a commercial bank for the benefit of the coconut farmers to enable such bank
to promptly and efficiently realize the industry's credit policy. Thus, the PCA
bought 72.2% of the shares of stock of First United Bank, headed by Pedro
Cojuangco. Dueto changes in its corporate identity and purpose, the banks
articles of incorporation were amended in July 1975, resulting in a change in
HELD:
Yes. Section 2 of P.D. 755, Article III, Section 5 of P.D. 961, and Article III,
Section 5 of P.D. 1468 completely ignore the fact that coco-levy funds are
public funds raised through taxation. And since taxes could be exacted only
for a public purpose, they cannot be declared private properties of individuals
although such individuals fall within a distinct group of persons.

But, since coco-levy funds are taxes, the provisions of P.D.s 755, 961 and
1468 as well as those of E.O.s 312 and 313 that remove such funds and the
assets acquired through them from the jurisdiction of the COA violate Article
IX-D, Section 2(1)69 of the 1987 Constitution. Section 2(1) vests in the COA
the power and authority to examine uses of government money and property.
The cited P.D.s and E.O.s also contravene Section 2 70 of P.D. 898 (Providing
for the Restructuring of the Commission on Audit), which has the force of a
statute.
16
G.R. No. 164527 August 15, 2007
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ vs. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, R-
II BUILDERS, INC., R-II HOLDINGS, INC., HARBOUR CENTRE
PORT TERMINAL, INC., and MR. REGHIS ROMERO II
FACTS:
On March 1, 1988, then-President Cory Aquino issued Memorandum order
No. (MO) 161 approving and directing implementation of the Comprehensive
and Integrated Metropolitan Manila Waste Management Plan.  During this
time, Smokey Mountain, a wasteland in Tondo, Manila, are being made
residence of many Filipinos living in a subhuman state.
As presented in MO 161, NHA prepared feasibility studies to turn the
dumpsite into low-cost housing project, thus, Smokey Mountain Development
and Reclamation Project (SMDRP), came into place.  RA 6957 (Build-
Operate-Transfer Law) was passed on July 1990 declaring the importance of
private sectors as contractors in government projects.  Thereafter, Aquino
proclaimed MO 415 applying RA 6957 to SMDRP, among others.  The same
MO also established EXECOM and TECHCOM in the execution and
evaluation of the plan, respectively, to be assisted by the Public Estates
Authority (PEA).
To summarize, the SMDRP shall consist of Phase I and Phase II.  Phase I of
the project involves clearing, levelling-off the dumpsite, and construction of
temporary housing units for the current residents on the cleared and levelled
site.  Phase II involves the construction of a fenced incineration area for the
on-site disposal of the garbage at the dumpsite.
Due to the recommendations done by the DENR after evaluations done, the
JVA was amended and restated (now ARJVA) to accommodate the design
changes and additional work to be done to successfully implement the
project.  The original 3,500 units of temporary housing were decreased to
2,992.  The reclaimed land as enabling component was increased from 40
hectares to 79 hectares, which was supported by the issuance of Proclamation
No. 465 by President Ramos.  The revision also provided for the 119-hectare
land as an enabling component for Phase II of the project.
Subsequently, the Clean Air Act was passed by the legislature which made the
establishment of an incinerator illegal, making the off-site dumpsite at
Smokey Mountain necessary.   On August 1, 1998, the project was suspended,
to be later reconstituted by President Estrada in MO No. 33.
On August 27, 2003, the NHA and RBI executed a Memorandum of
Agreement whereby both parties agreed to terminate the JVA and subsequent
agreements.  During this time, NHA reported that 34 temporary housing
structures and 21 permanent housing structures had been turned over by RBI. 
ISSUE:
Whether the operative fact doctrine applies to the instant petition
HELD:
Yes. As the new Civil Code puts it: "When the courts declare a law to be
inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall
govern. Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid
only when they are not contrary to the laws of the Constitution." It is
understandable why it should be so, the Constitution being supreme and
paramount. Any legislative or executive act contrary to its terms cannot
survive.
In addition, prohibition does not lie against the NHA in view of petitioner’s
failure to avail and exhaust all administrative remedies. Clear is the rule that
prohibition is only available when there is no adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.
More importantly, prohibition does not lie to restrain an act which is already a
fait accompli. The "operative fact" doctrine protecting vested rights bars the
grant of the writ of prohibition to the case at bar. It should be remembered that
petitioner was the Solicitor General at the time SMDRP was formulated and
implemented. He had the opportunity to question the SMDRP and the
agreements on it, but he did not. The moment to challenge the Project had
passed.
17
G.R. No. 176951 November 18, 2008
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) vs. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS
FACTS:
During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33
municipalities into cities. However, Congress did not act on bills converting
24 other municipalities into cities.
During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009
that amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the
annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city
from P20 million to P100 million. After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House
of Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted Joint Resolution No.
29 which sought to exempt from the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills
were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended
without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.
During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint
Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for
approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution.
Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed,
through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The House of
Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also approved the
cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Cityhood Laws is unconstitutional.
HELD:
Yes. The fact of pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress limits the
exemption to a specific condition existing at the time of passage of RA 9009.
That specific condition will never happen again. This violates the requirement
that a valid classification must not be limited to existing conditions only.
In the same vein, the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws gives the 16
municipalities a unique advantage based on an arbitrary date − the filing of
their cityhood bills before the end of the 11 th Congress - as against all other
municipalities that want to convert into cities after the effectivity of RA 9009.
Furthermore, limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the
requirement that the classification must apply to all similarly situated.
Municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities
cannot convert into cities, while the 16 respondent municipalities can. Clearly,
as worded the exemption provision found in the Cityhood Laws, even if it
were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, would still be
unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.
ARTICLE 8
18
G.R. No. 100776 October 28, 1993
ALBINO S. CO vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 was filed by
the salvage company against petitioner. The case eventuated in petitioner’s
conviction of the crime charged on the basis that a check issued merely to
guarantee the performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P.
Blg. 22. Pending litigation, Ministry of Justice Circular No. 4, which excludes
guarantee check from application of B.P. Blg. 22, was subsequently reversed
by Ministry Circular No. 12 which ruled that a check issued merely to
guarantee the performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P.
Blg. 22. 
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ministry Circular No. 12 declaring the guarantee check will no
longer be considered as a valid defense be retroactively applied.
HELD:
No. The principle of prospectivity has also been applied to judicial decisions
which, "although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what
the laws mean, . . . (this being) the reason why under Article 8 of the New
Civil Code, 'Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form a part of the legal system . . .'"
This is after all a criminal action all doubts in which, pursuant to familiar,
fundamental doctrine, must be resolved in favor of the accused. Everything
considered, the Court sees no compelling reason why the doctrine of mala
prohibita should override the principle of prospectivity, and its clear
implications as herein above set out and discussed, negating criminal liability.

ARTICLE 13
15
G.R. No. L-50654 November 6, 1989
RUDY GLEO ARMIGOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS, CRISTITO
MATA, and JUDGE L. D. CARPIO, in his capacity as Judge of the Court
of First Instance of Davao del Sur, Branch V
FACTS:
Cristito Mata filed a complaint for the collection of damages and attorney's
fees. After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of Mata. A copy of the
decision was received by the petitioner on 8 June 1977, and the following day,
9 June 1977, he filed a notice of appeal with the said municipal court, and on
24 June 1977, he completed the other requirements for the perfection of an
appeal, including the filing of an appeal bond and the payment of the appellate
court docket fee. However, when the case was elevated to the Court of First
Instance for the consideration of the appeal, the presiding judge thereof ruled
that the appeal was filed beyond the reglementary period; consequently, he
dismissed the appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appeal was beyond the reglementary period.
HELD:
Yes. The rule stated in Article 13 of the Civil Code to the effect that "In
computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day included"
is similar, but not Identical to Section 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure which
provided that "Unless otherwise specially provided, the time within which an
act is required by law to be done shall be computed by excluding the first day
and including the last; and if the last be Sunday or a legal holiday it shall be
excluded", as well as the old Rule 28 of the Rules of Court which stated that
"In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by the Rules of Court,
by order of a court, or by any other applicable statute, the day of the act, event
or default after which the designated period of time begins to run is not to be
included. The last day of the period so computed is to be included, unless it is
a Sunday or a legal holiday, in which event the time shall run until the end of
the next day which is neither a Sunday or a legal holiday." In applying this
rule, the Court considered the day as synonymous with the date and we find
no cogent reason to adopt a different view.
While it is true that rules of procedure are to be interpreted liberally so that the
real matter in dispute may be submitted to the judgment of the court, and that
the trial court is vested with discretion to allow or admit an appeal filed out of
time, this discretion is not unconditional. There must be justifiable reason to
warrant such action, since the perfection of an appeal in the manner and
within the period laid down by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional,
and in the absence of any justifying circumstance, the court has no jurisdiction
to approve or admit an appeal filed out of time. In the instant case, the
petitioner failed to prove, or even claim, that his failure to appeal on time was
due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence.
ARTICLE 15
16
G.R. No. 140500 January 21, 2002
ERNESTINA BERNABE vs. CAROLINA ALEJO as guardian ad litem
for the minor ADRIAN BERNABE
FACTS:
The late Fiscal Ernesto A. Bernabe allegedly fathered a son, named Adrian
Bernabe, with his secretary of twenty-three (23) years, Carolina Alejo. When
Fiscal Bernabe and his wife died, their daughter, Ernestina, was their sole
surviving heir. Carolina, in behalf of Adrian, filed a complaint praying that
Adrian be declared and acknowledged as illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe
and that Adrian be given his share in Fiscal Bernabe’s estate, which is now
being held by Ernestina.
ISSUE:
Whether Adrian’s right to an action for recognition had already vested prior to
the enactment of the Family Code.
HELD:
Yes. A vested right is defined as "one which is absolute, complete and
unconditional, to the exercise of which no obstacle exists, and which is
immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon a contingency x x x."
Respondent however contends that the filing of an action for recognition is
procedural in nature and that "as a general rule, no vested right may attach to
[or] arise from procedural laws."
Applying the foregoing jurisprudence, we hold that Article 285 of the Civil
Code is a substantive law, as it gives Adrian the right to file his petition for
recognition within four years from attaining majority age. Therefore, the
Family Code cannot impair or take Adrian’s right to file an action for year because that would be more than 21 365-day cycles. "Not more than 21
recognition, because that right had already vested prior to its enactment. years old" is not equivalent to "less than 22 years old," contrary to petitioner's
claims. The law does not state that the candidate be less than 22 years on
17 election day.
G.R. No. 124893 April 18, 1997
LYNETTE G. GARVIDA vs. FLORENCIO G. SALES, JR., THE ARTICLE 19
HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ELECTION
OFFICER DIONISIO F. RIOS and PROVINCIAL SUPERVISOR NOLI 18
PIPO G.R. No. 120639 September 25, 1998
BPI EXPRESS CARD CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
FACTS: RICARDO J. MARASIGAN
The Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) elections nationwide was scheduled to be
held on May 6, 1996. Petitioner applied for registration as member and voter. FACTS:
The Board of Election Tellers, however, denied her application on the ground Marasigan was a holder of a BPI credit card.  Due to his delinquency in
that petitioner, who was then twenty-one years and ten (10) months old, payment, immediate demand was given by BPI for him to pay account. 
exceeded the age limit for membership in the Katipunan ng Kabataan. Marasigan then issued a postdated check. 
Petitioner filed a "Petition for Inclusion as Registered Kabataang Member and The check was thereafter kept in custody by BPI and the card was temporarily
Voter" with the MTC. In a decision dated, the said court found petitioner suspended.  Marasigan after eating in Café Adriatico tried to use his card to
qualified and ordered her registration as member and voter in the Katipunan pay but it was dishonored.  
ng Kabataan. The Board of Election Tellers appealed to the RTC. The
presiding judge, however, inhibited himself from acting on the appeal due to ISSUE:
his close association with petitioner.  Whether or not there was abuse of right on the part of petitioner.

Petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of Chairman, HELD:
Sangguniang Kabataan. In a letter, Election Officer Dionisio F. Rios No. To find the existence of an abuse of right Article 19 the following
disapproved petitioner's certificate of candidacy again due to her age.  elements must be present (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is
Petitioner, however, appealed to COMELEC Regional Director Filemon A. exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring
Asperin who set aside the order of respondents and allowed petitioner to run. another. 
Rios issued a memorandum to petitioner informing her of her ineligibility and
giving her 24 hours to explain why her certificate of candidacy should not be We do not dispute the findings of the lower court that private respondent
disapproved.  suffered damages as a result of the cancellation of his credit card. However,
there is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal
ISSUE: invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt or harm which results from
Whether or not petitioner is eligible to run. the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the
damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances
HELD: in which the loss or harm was not the results of a violation of a legal duty. In
No. The provision that an elective official of the SK should not be more than such cases, the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone, the
21 years of age on the day of his election is very clear. The Local Government law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not
Code speaks of years, not months nor days. When the law speaks of years, it is amount to a legal injury or wrong. These situations are often called damnum
understood that years are of 365 days each. The phrase "not more than 21 absque injuria. 
years of age" means not over 21 years, not beyond 21 years. It means 21 365-
day cycles. It does not mean 21 years and one or some days or a fraction of a
We therefore disagree with the ruling of the respondent court that the dishonor
of the credit card of the private respondent by Café Adriatico is attributable to
petitioner for its willful or gross neglect to inform the private respondent of
the suspension of his credit card, the unfortunate consequence of which
brought social humiliation and embarrassment to the private respondent. It
was private respondent's failure to settle his obligation which caused the
suspension of his credit card and subsequent dishonor at Café Adriatico. He
cannot now pass the blame to the petitioner for not notifying him of the
suspension of his card.
19
G.R. No. 174269 May 8, 2009
POLO S. PANTALEON vs. AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL,
INC.
FACTS:
After the Amsterdam incident that happened involving the delay of American
Express to approve Pantaleon credit card purchases worth US$13,826.00 at
the Coster store, Pantaleon commenced a complaint for moral and exemplary
damages before the RTC against American Express. He said that he and his
family experienced inconvenience and humiliation due to the delays in credit
authorization. RTC rendered a decision in favor of Pantaleon. CA reversed the
award of damages in favor of Pantaleon, holding that AmEx had not breached
its obligations to Pantaleon, as the purchase at Coster deviated from
Pantaleon's established charge purchase pattern.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent caused damage to the petitioner.
HELD:
Yes. It should be emphasized that the reason why petitioner is entitled to
damages is not simply because respondent incurred delay, but because the
delay, for which culpability lies under Article 1170, led to the particular
injuries under Article 2217 of the Civil Code for which moral damages are
remunerative. Moral damages do not avail to soothe the plaints of the simply
impatient, so this decision should not be cause for relief for those who time
the length of their credit card transactions with a stopwatch. The somewhat
unusual attending circumstances to the purchase at Coster – that there was a
deadline for the completion of that purchase by petitioner before any delay
would redound to the injury of his several traveling companions – gave rise to
the moral shock, mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social
humiliation sustained by the petitioner, as concluded by the RTC. Those
circumstances are fairly unusual, and should not give rise to a general
entitlement for damages under a more mundane set of facts.
20
G.R. No. 156168 December 14, 2004
EQUITABLE BANKING CORPORATION vs. JOSE T. CALDERON
FACTS:
Calderon accompanied by his friend, Ed De Leon went to Gucci Department
Store in Hongkong. He purchased several Gucci items and used his Visa card
pay on credit. The saleslady, in the presence of his friend and other shoppers
of different nationalities, informed him that his Visa card was blacklisted.
Calderon sought the reconfirmation of the status of his Visa card from the
saleslady, but the latter simply did not honor it and even threatened to cut it
into pieces with the use of a pair of scissors.
Deeply embarrassed and humiliated, and in order to avoid further indignities,
Calderon paid cash for the Gucci goods and items that he bought. Upon his
return to the Philippines, and claiming that he suffered much torment and
embarrassment filed a complaint for damages against EBC.
In its Answer, EBC denied any liability to Calderon, alleging that the latter’s
credit card privileges for dollar transactions were earlier placed under
suspension on account of Calderon’s prior use of the same card in excess of
his credit limit, adding that Calderon failed to settle said prior credit purchase
on due date, thereby causing his obligation to become past due. Corollarily,
EBC asserts that Calderon also failed to maintain the required minimum
deposit of $3,000.00.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is liable for moral damages.
HELD:
No. In law, moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation and similar injury. And, certainly, respondent could not have
justifiably assumed that petitioner must have reinstated his card by reason
alone of his having deposited US$14,000.00 a day before he left for
Hongkong. As issuer of the card, petitioner has the option to decide whether
to reinstate or altogether terminate a credit card previously suspended on
considerations which the petitioner deemed proper, not the least of which are
the cardholder’s payment record, capacity to pay and compliance with any
additional requirements imposed by it.
On a final note, we emphasize that "moral damages are in the category of an
award designed to compensate the claim for actual injury suffered and not to
impose a penalty on the wrongdoer."
ARTICLE 21
21
G.R. No. L-20089 December 26, 1964
BEATRIZ P. WASSMER vs. FRANCISCO X. VELEZ
FACTS:
Beatriz Wassmer and Francisco Velez decided to get married. Invitations were
printed and distributed to relatives, friends and acquaintances. The bride-to-
be's trousseau, party dresses and other apparel for the important occasion were
purchased. Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower girl were prepared. A
matrimonial bed, with accessories, was bought. Bridal showers were given
and gifts received. Two days before the wedding date, Francisco left a note for
his bride-to-be saying "Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes
it ... ". The next day, he wired plaintiff: "Nothing changed rest assured
returning soon." But he never returned and was never heard from again.
ISSUE:
Whether or not defendant may be held liable.
HELD:
Yes. It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to which acts not
contrary to law may be perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for Article
21 of said Code provides that "any person who wilfully causes loss or injury
to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."
Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere
breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a
wedding and go through all the above-described preparation and publicity,
only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite
different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for
which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with
Article 21 aforesaid.
22
G.R. No. 190846 February 3, 2016
TOMAS P. TAN, JR. vs. JOSE G. HOSANA
FACTS:
During the marriage of Jose and Milagros, they bought a house and lot.
Milagros sold to Tomas the subject property, as evidenced by a deed of sale
executed by Milagros herself and as attorney-in-fact of Jose, by virtue of a
Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed by Jose in her favor. The Deed of
Sale stated that the purchase price for the lot was P200,000.00. After the sale,
TCT No. 21229 was cancelled and TCT No. 32568 was issued in the name of
Tomas.
Jose filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale/Cancellation of
Title/Reconveyance and Damages against Milagros, Tomas, and the Register
of Deeds of Naga City. In the complaint, Jose averred that while he was
working in Japan, Milagros, without his consent and knowledge, conspired
with Tomas to execute the SPA by forging Jose’s signature making it appear
that Jose had authorized Milagros to sell the subject property to Tomas.
In his Answer, Tomas maintained that he was a buyer in good faith and for
value. Tomas filed a cross-claim against Milagros and claimed compensatory
and moral damages, attorney’s fees, and expenses for litigation, in the event
that judgment be rendered in favor of Jose.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Jose must return the consideration of the Deed of Sale.
HELD:
Yes, the consideration stated in the deed of sale remains sufficient evidence of
the actual amount the petitioner paid and the same amount which should be
returned under the principle of unjust enrichment.
Unjust enrichment exists "when a person unjustly retains a benefit at the loss
of another, or when a person retains money or property of another against the
fundamental principles of justice, equity, and good conscience." The
prevention of unjust enrichment is a recognized public policy of the State and
is based on Article 22 of the Civil Code. 
The principle of unjust enrichment requires Jose to return what he or Milagros
received under the void contract which presumably benefitted their conjugal
partnership.

Accordingly, the CA correctly ordered Jose to return the amount of
P200,000.00 since this the consideration stated in the Deed of Sale and given
credence by the lower court. Indeed, even Jose expressly stated in his
comment that Tomas is entitled to recover the money paid by him in the
amount of P200,000.00 as appearing in the contract.
ARTICLE 22
23
G.R. No. 195670 December 3, 2012
WILLEM BEUMER vs. AVELINA AMORES
FACTS:
Petitioner, a Dutch National, married respondent, a Filipina. After several
years, the RTC declared the nullity of their marriage on the basis of the
former’s psychological incapacity as contemplated in Article 36 of the Family
Code. Consequently, petitioner filed a Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal
Partnership praying for the distribution of their properties claimed to have
been acquired during the subsistence of their marriage. In defense, respondent
averred that, with the exception of their two (2) residential houses on Lots 1
and 2142, she and petitioner did not acquire any conjugal properties during
their marriage, the truth being that she used her own personal money to
purchase Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 out of her personal funds and Lots 2055-A
and 2055-I by way of inheritance.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner was unjustly enriched.
HELD:
No. As held in Frenzel v. Catito, a case also involving a foreigner seeking
monetary reimbursement for money spent on purchase of Philippine land, the
provision on unjust enrichment does not apply if the action is proscribed by
the Constitution.
24
G.R. No. 149615 August 29, 2006
IN RE: PETITION FOR SEPARATION OF PROPERTY ELENA
BUENAVENTURA MULLER vs. HELMUT MULLER
FACTS:
Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller were
married in Hamburg, Germany. The couple resided in Germany at a house
owned by respondent’s parents but decided to move and reside permanently in
the Philippines. By this time, respondent had inherited the house in Germany
from his parents which he sold and used the proceeds for the purchase of a
parcel of land in Antipolo, Rizal and the construction of a house. The
Antipolo property was registered in the name of petitioner, Elena
Buenaventura Muller.
Due to incompatibilities and respondents alleged womanizing, drinking, and
maltreatment, the spouses eventually separated.
Respondent filed a petition for separation of properties. The court granted said
petition. It also decreed the separation of properties between them and ordered
the equal partition of personal properties located within the country, excluding
those acquired by gratuitous title during the marriage. With regard to the
Antipolo property, the court held that it was acquired using paraphernal funds
of the respondent. However, it ruled that respondent cannot recover his funds
because the property was purchased in violation of the Constitution.
The respondent elevated the case to the CA, which reversed the decision of
the RTC.  It held that respondent merely prayed for reimbursement for the
purchase of the Antipolo property, and not acquisition or transfer of
ownership to him.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent is entitled to reimbursement of the funds used for the
acquisition of the Antipolo property.
HELD:
No. Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states:
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or
conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
It has been held that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit
that to be done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done
directly. He who seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes into equity
must come with clean hands. The latter is a frequently stated maxim which is
also expressed in the principle that he who has done inequity shall not have
equity. It signifies that a litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity on
the ground that his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or
fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in issue.
Thus, in the instant case, respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the
ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the
property despite the constitutional prohibition.
25
G.R. No. 143958 July 11, 2003
ALFRED FRITZ FRENZEL vs. EDERLINA P. CATITO
FACTS:
Alfred Fritz Frenzel is an Australian citizen of German descent. He was so
enamored with Ederlina Catito that he bought her numerous properties such as
house and lot in Quezon City and in Davao City. He also put up a beauty
parlor business in the name of Ederlina. Alfred was unaware that Ederlina was
married until her spouse Klaus Muller wrote a letter to Alfred begging the
latter to leave her wife alone.
Ederlina had not been able to secure a divorce from Klaus. The latter could
charge her for bigamy and could even involve Alfred, who himself was still
married. To avoid complications, Alfred decided to live separately from
Ederlina and cut off all contacts with her.
Alfred wrote to Ederlinas father, complaining that Ederlina had taken all his
life savings and because of this, he was virtually penniless. He further accused
the Catito family of acquiring for themselves the properties he had purchased
with his own money. He demanded the return of all the amounts that Ederlina
and her family had stolen and turn over all the properties acquired by him and
Ederlina during their coverture.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner could recover the money used in purchasing the several
properties
HELD:
No. The sales of three parcels of land in favor of the petitioner who is a
foreigner is illegal per se. The transactions are void ab initio because they
were entered into in violation of the Constitution. Thus, to allow the petitioner
to recover the properties or the money used in the purchase of the parcels of
land would be subversive of public policy.
Futile, too, is petitioner's reliance on Article 22 of the New Civil Code which
reads:
Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any
other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of
the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.
The provision is expressed in the maxim: "MEMO CUM ALTERIUS DETER
DETREMENTO PROTEST" (No person should unjustly enrich himself at the
expense of another). An action for recovery of what has been paid without just
cause has been designated as an accion in rem verso. This provision does not
apply if, as in this case, the action is proscribed by the Constitution or by the
application of the pari delicto doctrine. It may be unfair and unjust to bar the
petitioner from filing an accion in rem verso over the subject properties, or
from recovering the money he paid for the said properties.
26
G.R. No. 170479 February 18, 2008
ANDRE T. ALMOCERA vs. JOHNNY ONG
FACTS:
Plaintiff Johnny Ong tried to acquire from the defendants a "townhome"
described as Unit No. 4 of Atrium Townhomes in Cebu City. As reflected in a
Contract to Sell, the selling price of the unit was P3,400,000.00 pesos, for a
lot area of eighty-eight (88) square meters with a three-storey building. Out of
the purchase price, plaintiff was able to pay the amount of P1,060,000.00.
Prior to the full payment of this amount, plaintiff claims that defendants
Andre Almocera and First Builders fraudulently concealed the fact that before
and at the time of the perfection of the aforesaid contract to sell, the property
was already mortgaged to and encumbered with the Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP). In addition, the construction of the house has long been
delayed and remains unfinished. On March 13, 1999, Lot 4-a covered by TCT
No. 148818, covering the unit was advertised in a local tabloid for public
auction for foreclosure of mortgage. It is the assertion of the plaintiff that had
it not for the fraudulent concealment of the mortgage and encumbrance by
defendants, he would have not entered into the contract to sell.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was any delay, the same was incurred by respondent
because he refused to pay the balance of the contract price.
HELD:
No. For failure of one party to assume and perform the obligation imposed on
him, the other party does not incur delay.
Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, we find that respondent is
justified in refusing to pay the balance of the contract price. He was never in
possession of the townhouse unit and he can no longer be its owner since
ownership thereof has been transferred to a third person who was not a party
to the proceedings below. It would simply be the height of inequity if we are
to require respondent to pay the balance of the contract price. To allow this
would result in the unjust enrichment of petitioner and FBMC. The
fundamental doctrine of unjust enrichment is the transfer of value without just
cause or consideration. The elements of this doctrine which are present in this
case are: enrichment on the part of the defendant; impoverishment on the part
of the plaintiff; and lack of cause. The main objective is to prevent one to
enrich himself at the expense of another. It is commonly accepted that this
doctrine simply means a person shall not be allowed to profit or enrich
himself inequitably at another's expense. Hence, to allow petitioner and
FBMC keep the down payment made by respondent amounting
to P1,060,000.00 would result in their unjust enrichment at the expense of the
respondent. Thus, said amount should be returned.
27
G.R. No. 183984               April 13, 2011
ARTURO SARTE FLORES vs. SPOUSES ENRICO L. LINDO, JR. and
EDNA C. LINDO
FACTS:  28
On October 31, 1995, Edna Lindo was able to obtain a loan from Arturo
Flores. The loan was secured by a Real Estate Mortgage over a real proper
under her and her husband's name without the consent of the latter. Partial
payments were made by her through checks but the same were dishonored. As
a result, the creditor filed a complaint against her for foreclosure of the
mortgage with damages.
The court dismissed the case as the mortgage was void for having been
executed without the necessary consent of the husband, despite the SPA
executed later by the husband for the wife. It must be noted that the SPA was
executed only a few days after the wife entered into the contract of loan with
mortgage. The court however ruled that the subsequent execution of the SPA
cannot be made to retroact to the date of the execution of the real estate
mortgage.
ISSUE: 
Whether or not Edna Lindo may unjustly enrich herself.
HELD:
No. The main objective of the principle against unjust enrichment is to
prevent one from enriching himself at the expense of another without just
cause or consideration. The principle is applicable in this case considering that
Edna admitted obtaining a loan from petitioners, and the same has not been
fully paid without just cause. The Deed was declared void erroneously at the
instance of Edna, first when she raised it as a defense before the RTC, Branch
33 and second, when she filed an action for declaratory relief before the RTC,
Branch 93. Petitioner could not be expected to ask the RTC, Branch 33 for an
alternative remedy, as what the Court of Appeals ruled that he should have
done, because the RTC, Branch 33 already stated that it had no jurisdiction
over any personal action that petitioner might have against Edna.
Considering the circumstances of this case, the principle against unjust
enrichment, being a substantive law, should prevail over the procedural rule
on multiplicity of suits. The Court of Appeals, in the assailed decision, found
that Edna admitted the loan, except that she claimed it only amounted to
₱340,000. Edna should not be allowed to unjustly enrich herself because of
the erroneous decisions of the two trial courts when she questioned the
validity of the Deed. Moreover, Edna still has an opportunity to submit her
defenses before the RTC, Branch 42 on her claim as to the amount of her
indebtedness.
G.R. No. 158143 September 21, 2011
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK vs.
ANTONIO B. BALMACEDA and ROLANDO N. RAMOS
FACTS:
PCIB filed an action for recovery of sum of money with damages before the
RTC against Antonio Balmaceda, the Branch Manager of its Sta. Cruz, Manila
branch. In its complaint, PCIB alleged that Balmaceda took advantage of his
position and fraudulently obtained and encashed 31 Manager’s checks. PCIB
moved to be allowed to file an amended complaint to implead Rolando Ramos
as one of the recipients of a portion of the proceeds from Balmaceda’s alleged
fraud.
Since Balmaceda did not file an Answer, he was declared in default. On the
other hand, Ramos filed an Answer denying any knowledge of Balmaceda’s
scheme. According to Ramos, he is a reputable businessman engaged in the
business of buying and selling fighting cocks, and Balmaceda was one of his
clients. Ramos admitted receiving money from Balmaceda as payment for the
fighting cocks that he sold to Balmaceda, but maintained that he had no
knowledge of the source of Balmaceda’s money.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the principle of unjust enrichment is applicable.
HELD:
No, to substantiate a claim for unjust enrichment, the claimant must
unequivocally prove that another party knowingly received something of
value to which he was not entitled and that the state of affairs are such that it
would be unjust for the person to keep the benefit. Unjust enrichment is a term
used to depict result or effect of failure to make remuneration of or for
property or benefits received under circumstances that give rise to legal or
equitable obligation to account for them; to be entitled to remuneration, one
must confer benefit by mistake, fraud, coercion, or request. Unjust enrichment
is not itself a theory of reconvey. Rather, it is a prerequisite for the
enforcement of the doctrine of restitution. (emphasis ours)
Ramos cannot be held liable to PCIB on account of unjust enrichment simply
because he received payments out of money secured by fraud from PCIB. To
hold Ramos accountable, it is necessary to prove that he received the money
from Balmaceda, knowing that he (Ramos) was not entitled to it.
ARTICLE 26
29
G.R. No. 171365 October 6, 2010
ERMELINDA C. MANALOTO, AURORA J. CIFRA, FLORDELIZA J.
ARCILLA, LOURDES J. CATALAN, ETHELINDA J. HOLT,
BIENVENIDO R. JONGCO, ARTEMIO R. JONGCO, JR. and JOEL
JONGCO vs. ISMAEL VELOSO III
FACTS:
This case is an off-shoot of an unlawful detainer case filed by petitioners. In
said complaint for unlawful detainer, it was alleged that they are the lessors of
a residential house which was leased to respondent. The action was instituted
on the ground of respondent's failure to pay rentals. Respondent denied the
non-payment of rentals and alleged that he made an advance payment when he
paid for the repairs done on the leased property.
Petitioners argued that respondent had no cause of action against them
because the MeTC decision in the unlawful detainer case was a matter of
public record and its disclosure to the public violated no law or any legal right
of the respondent. Moreover, petitioners averred that the respondent's present
Complaint for Breach of Contract and Damages was barred by prior judgment
since it was a mere replication of respondent's Answer with Compulsory
Counterclaim in the unlawful detainer case before the MeTC. The said
unlawful detainer case was already judicially decided with finality.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the act imputed by petitioner violates Article 26 of the Civil
Code.
HELD:
Yes. Petitioners are also expected to respect respondent's "dignity, personality,
privacy and peace of mind" under Article 26 of the Civil Code.
The philosophy behind Art. 26 underscores the necessity for its inclusion in
our civil law. The Code Commission stressed in no uncertain terms that the
human personality must be exalted. The sacredness of human personality is a
concomitant consideration of every plan for human amelioration. The
touchstone of every system of law, of the culture and civilization of every
country, is how far it dignifies man. If the statutes insufficiently protect a
person from being unjustly humiliated, in short, if human personality is not
exalted - then the laws are indeed defective. Thus, under this article, the rights
of persons are amply protected, and damages are provided for violations of a
person's dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind.
ARTICLE 31
30
G.R. No. 133978 November 12, 2002
JOSE S. CANCIO, JR., represented by ROBERTO L. CANCIO vs.
EMERENCIANA ISIP
FACTS:
Petitioner, assisted by a private prosecutor, filed three cases of Violation of
B.P. No. 22 and three cases of Estafa, against respondent. The Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor dismissed Criminal Case No. 13356, for Violation of
B.P. No. 22 covering check no. 25001151 on the ground that the check was
deposited with the drawee bank after 90 days from the date of the check. The
two other cases for Violation of B.P. No. 22 were filed with and subsequently
dismissed by the Municipal Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga, Branch 1, on
the ground of "failure to prosecute."
Meanwhile, the three cases for Estafa were filed with the Regional Trial Court
after failing to present its second witness, the prosecution moved to dismiss
the estafa cases against respondent. The prosecution likewise reserved its right
to file a separate civil action arising from the said criminal cases. On the same
date, the trial court granted the motions of the prosecution. Thus-
Upon motion of the prosecution for the dismissal of these cases without
prejudice to the refiling of the civil aspect thereof and there being no comment
from the defense, let these cases be dismissed without prejudice to the refiling
of the civil aspect of the cases.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the case is an independent civil action.
HELD:
Yes. Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not
yet commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon
application with the court trying the latter case. If the application is granted,
the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule
governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.
Anent the independent civil actions under Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of
the Civil Code, the old rules considered them impliedly instituted with the
civil liability ex-delicto in the criminal action, unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes
the civil action prior to the criminal action. Under the present Rules, however,
the independent civil actions may be filed separately and prosecuted
independently even without any reservation in the criminal action. The failure
to make a reservation in the criminal action is not a waiver of the right to file a
separate and independent civil action based on these articles of the Civil Code.
In the case at bar, a reading of the complaint filed by petitioner show that his
cause of action is based on culpa contractual, an independent civil action.
31
G.R. No. L-46496             February 27, 1940
ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and
propietor, and
NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD vs. THE COURT OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC.
FACTS:
Ang Tibay was a manufacturer of rubber slippers. There was a shortage of
leather soles, and it was necessary to temporarily lay off members of the
National Labor Union. According to the Union however, this was merely a
scheme to systematically terminate the employees from work, and that the
shortage of soles is unsupported. It claims that Ang Tibay is guilty of unjust
labor practice because the owner, Teodoro, is discriminating against the
National Labor Union, and unjustly favoring the National Workers
Brotherhood, which was allegedly sympathetic to the employer. The Court of
Industrial Relation decided the case and elevated it to the Supreme Court, but
a motion for new trial was raised by the NLU. But the Ang Tibay filed a
motion for opposing the said motion. 
ISSUE
Whether or not the union is entitled to a new trial.
HELD:
Yes. By and large, after considerable discussions, we have come to the
conclusion that the interest of justice would be better served if the movant is
given opportunity to present at the hearing the documents referred to in his
motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue involved.
The legislation which created the Court of Industrial Relations and under
which it acts is new. The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not
entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result.
Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be and the same is hereby
granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the Court of
Industrial Relations, with instruction that it reopen the case, receive all such
evidence as may be relevant and otherwise proceed in accordance with the
requirements set forth hereinabove.
ARTICLE 32
32
G.R. No. 82380 April 29, 1988
AYER PRODUCTIONS PTY. LTD. and McELROY & McELROY
FILM PRODUCTIONS vs. HON.IGNACIO M. CAPULONG and JUAN
PONCE ENRILE
FACTS:
Petitioner is an Australian film maker, and his movie production company,
Ayer Productions, envisioned, sometime in 1987, for commercial viewing and
for Philippine and international release, the historic peaceful struggle of the
Filipinos at EDSA. The proposed motion picture entitled "The Four Day
Revolution" was endorsed by the MTRCB as and other government agencies
consulted. Ramos also signified his approval of the intended film production.
It is designed to be viewed in a six-hour mini-series television play, presented
in a "docu-drama" style, creating four fictional characters interwoven with
real events, and utilizing actual documentary footage as background. David
Williamson is Australia's leading playwright and Professor McCoy is an
American historian have developed a script. Enrile declared that he will not
approve the use, appropriation, reproduction and/or exhibition of his name, or
picture, or that of any member of his family in any cinema or television
production, film or other medium for advertising or commercial exploitation.
petitioners acceded to this demand and the name of Enrile was deleted from
the movie script, and petitioners proceeded to film the projected motion
picture. However, a complaint was filed by Enrile invoking his right to
privacy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the right to privacy was violated.
HELD:
No. The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case between
the constitutional freedom of speech and of expression and the right of
privacy, may be marked out in terms of a requirement that the proposed
motion picture must be fairly truthful and historical in its presentation of
events. There must, in other words, be no knowing or reckless disregard of
truth in depicting the participation of private respondent in the EDSA
Revolution. There must, further, be no presentation of the private life of the
unwilling private respondent and certainly no revelation of intimate or
embarrassing personal facts. The proposed motion picture should not enter
into what Mme. Justice Melencio-Herrera in Lagunzad referred to as "matters
of essentially private concern." To the extent that "The Four Day Revolution"
limits itself in portraying the participation of private respondent in the EDSA
Revolution to those events which are directly and reasonably related to
the public facts of the EDSA Revolution, the intrusion into private
respondent's privacy cannot be regarded as unreasonable and actionable. Such
portrayal may be carried out even without a license from private respondent.
ARTICLE 33
33
G.R. No. 161075 July 15, 2013
RAFAEL JOSE-CONSING, JR. vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
Petitioner negotiated with and obtained for himself and his mother, Consing,
various loans from Unicapital Inc. (Unicapital). The loans were secured by a
real estate mortgage constituted on a parcel of land (property) covered. In
accordance with its option to purchase the mortgaged property, Unicapital
agreed to purchase one-half of the property and the other half of the property
was purchased by Plus Builders, Inc. (Plus Builders).
Before Unicapital and Plus Builders could develop the property, they learned
that the title to the property was in the names of Po Willie Yu and Juanito Tan
Teng. Unicapital demanded the return of the amount paid to and received by
de la Cruz and Consing, but the latter ignored the demands.
Consing filed Civil Case for injunctive relief, thereby seeking to enjoin
Unicapital from proceeding against him for the collection of sum of money on
the ground that he had acted as a mere agent of his mother. Unicapital then
initiated a criminal complaint for estafa through falsification of public
document against Consing and de la Cruz. Unicapital also sued Consing for
the recovery of a sum of money and damages, with an application for a writ of
preliminary attachment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not civil action may be independently filed.
HELD:
Yes. A perusal of Unicapital’s complaint in the Makati civil case reveals that
the action was predicated on fraud. This was apparent from the allegations of
Unicapital in its complaint to the effect that Consing and de la Cruz had acted
in a "wanton, fraudulent, oppressive, or malevolent manner in offering as
security and later object of sale, a property which they do not own, and
foisting to the public a spurious title." As such, the action was one that could
proceed independently of Criminal Case No. 00-120 pursuant to Article 33 of
the Civil Code, which states as follows:
Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical
injuries a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from
the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil
action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and
shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
34
G.R. No. 108017 April 3, 1995
MARIA BENITA A. DULAY, in her own behalf and in behalf of the
minor children KRIZTEEN ELIZABETH, BEVERLY MARIE and
NAPOLEON II, all surnamed DULAY vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS,
Former Eighth Division, HON. TEODORO P. REGINO, in his capacity
as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court National Capital Region,
Quezon City, Br. 84, SAFEGUARD INVESTIGATION AND SECURITY
CO., INC., and SUPERGUARD SECURITY CORPORATION
FACTS:
Due to a heated argument, Benigno Torzuela, the security guard on duty
at Big Bang Sa Alabang carnival, shot and killed Atty. Napoleon Dulay.
Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the deceased Napoleon Dulay filed
an action for damages against Benigno Torzuela for wanton and reckless
discharge of the firearm and Safeguard Investigation and Security Co., Inc.,
(Safeguard) and/or Superguard Security Corp. (Superguard) as employers
for negligence having failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a
family in the supervision and control of its employee to avoid the injury.
Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of his duties, and was
committed with deliberate intent (dolo), the civil liability therefor is governed
by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, which states:
Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of a felony. —
Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Superguard and Safeguard commited can be civilly liable even
if Benigno Torzuela is already being prosecuted for homicide.
HELD:
Yes. It is well-settled that the filing of an independent civil action before the
prosecution in the criminal action presents evidence is even far better than a
compliance with the requirement of express reservation (Yakult Philippines v.
Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 357 [1990]). This is precisely what the
petitioners opted to do in this case. However, the private respondents opposed
the civil action on the ground that the same is founded on a delict and not on a
quasi-delict as the shooting was not attended by negligence. What is in dispute
therefore is the nature of the petitioner's cause of action.
Private respondents further aver that Article 33 of the New Civil Code applies
only to injuries intentionally committed pursuant to the ruling in Marcia v. CA
(120 SCRA 193 [1983]), and that the actions for damages allowed thereunder
are ex-delicto. However, the term "physical injuries" in Article 33 has already
been construed to include bodily injuries causing death (Capuno v. Pepsi-Cola
Bottling Co. of the Philippines, 121 Phil. 638 [1965); Carandang v. Santiago,
97 Phil. 94 [1955]). It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the
Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries but also
consummated, frustrated, and attempted homicide (Madeja v. Caro, 126
SCRA 293 [1983]). Although in the Marcia case (supra), it was held that no
independent civil action may be filed under Article 33 where the crime is the
result of criminal negligence, it must be noted however, that Torzuela, the
accused in the case at bar, is charged with homicide, not with reckless
imprudence, whereas the defendant in Marcia was charged with reckless
imprudence. Therefore, in this case, a civil action based on Article 33 lies.
ARTICLE 37
35
G.R. No. 182836 October 13, 2009
CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION vs.
HON. ACCREDITED VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR ALLAN S.
MONTAÑO and NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA NG CENTRO
STEEL CORPORATION-SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE
PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS (NMCSC-
SUPER)
FACTS:
Hortillano, an employee of Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation filed
a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident
Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA). The employer/petitioner denied the claim. Atty. Montaño found that
there was no dispute that the death of an employee’s legitimate dependent
occurred. The fetus had the right to be supported by the parents from the very
moment he/she was conceived. Therefore, the fetus was already a dependent,
although he/she died during the for bereavement leave with pay and other
death benefits because no death of an employee’s dependent had occurred.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the unborn child has juridical personality.
2. Whether or not the unborn child is a legitimate dependent.
HELD:
1. Yes. We need not establish civil personality of the unborn child
herein since his/her juridical capacity and capacity to act as a person
are not in issue. Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be
the subject of legal relations, is inherent in every natural person and
is lost only through death.
2. Yes. It is apparent that according to the Family Code and the afore-
cited jurisprudence, the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child attaches
upon his/her conception. In the present case, it was not disputed that
Hortillano and his wife were validly married and that their child was
conceived during said marriage, hence, making said child legitimate
upon her conception.
36
G.R. No. 161434 March 3, 2004
MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR. vs.
The COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE
(a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR.) and VICTORINO X. FORNIER
FACTS:
Petitioners sought for respondent Poe’s disqualification in the presidential
elections for having allegedly misrepresented material facts in his certificate
of candidacy by claiming that he is a natural Filipino citizen despite his
parents both being foreigners. COMELEC dismissed the petition, holding that
Poe was a Filipino Citizen. Petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC, contending that only the Supreme Court may resolve the basic
issue on the case under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987
Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Poe was a Filipino citizen.
HELD:
Yes. Under the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force in the Philippines
from 08 December 1889 up until the day prior to 30 August 1950 when the
Civil Code of the Philippines took effect, acknowledgment was required to
establish filiation or paternity. Acknowledgment was either judicial
(compulsory) or voluntary. Judicial or compulsory acknowledgment was
possible only if done during the lifetime of the putative parent; voluntary
acknowledgment could only be had in a record of birth, a will, or a public
document.
In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of discretion has
been committed by the COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the matter of
whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn,
depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would
have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the
alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino
citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of
Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in
1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year
1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos,
Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of
any other evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death,
such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en masse
Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship
(of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe,
father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime
respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose
fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate
or illegitimate.
But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that
respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on
hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be
held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of
candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus
Election Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the
Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present
their position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been
material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs.
COMELEC, must not only be material, but also deliberate and willful.
ARTICLE 38
37
G.R. No. 120600 September 22, 1998
ERNESTO C. DAWSON, LOUIS P. DAWSON, JR., BENJAMIN C.
DAWSON, JOSEPHINE DAWSON SOLIVEN, RALPH D. CUDILLA,
ELIZA C. ISIP and LARRY D. ISIP vs. REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
QUEZON CITY and JUDGE OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 85
FACTS:
Louis P. Dawson offered to buy on installment from the SISKA
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, per contract to sell, a parcel of land in
Quezon City. Louis died intestate. Upon his death, the petitioners assumed the
rights and obligations of deceased Louis in the contract to sell, paying in full
the selling price of the lot from their own funds, which payment was
completed in 1978.
With said full payment, SISKA executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of
deceased Louis, instead of in favor of the petitioners who assumed and to
whom [were] transferred the rights and obligations of Louis upon his death.
Because of the obvious error, the petition for the cancellation and correction
of the title and the issuance of a new title in the names of herein petitioners.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the property become part of the estate of Louis.
HELD:
No, the said property did not become part of the estate of Louis P Dawson.
Necessarily, partition is not the remedy to determine ownership thereof and to
consolidate title in herein petitioners.
Hence, we agree with the following assertion of the solicitor general: "Having
stepped into the shoes of the deceased Louis P. Dawson upon his death in
June, 1971 with respect to the said contract, and being the ones who continued
the installment payments of the selling price from their own funds until its full
payment in 1978, petitioners necessarily became the lawful owners of the said
lot in whose favor the deed of absolute sale should have been executed by
vendor Siska Development Corporation." 
CITIZENSHIP
38
G.R. No. 135083 May 26, 1999
ERNESTO S. MERCADO vs. EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO and
the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
FACTS:
Mercado and Manzano were both candidates for Vice-Mayor of Makati in the
May 11, 1998 elections. Based on the results of the election, Manzano
garnered the highest number of votes. However, his proclamation was
suspended due to the pending petition for disqualification filed by Mercado on
the ground that Manzano was a citizen of the United States.
From the facts presented, it appears that Manzano is both a Filipino and a US
citizen. However, in a subsequent resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the
disqualification of the respondent was reversed. Respondent was held to have
renounced his US citizenship when he attained the age of majority and
registered himself as a voter in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified to hold public elective office in
the Philippines. 
HELD:
No, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when,
as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more
states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states.
To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a
Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another
country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines
and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental
reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are
concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything
which he may have said before as a dual citizen.
RA 9225
39
G.R. No. 162759 August 4, 2006
LOIDA NICOLAS-LEWIS, GREGORIO B. MACABENTA,
ALEJANDRO A. ESCLAMADO, ARMANDO B. HEREDIA, REUBEN
S. SEGURITAN, ERIC LACHICA FURBEYRE, TERESITA A. CRUZ,
JOSEFINA OPENA DISTERHOFT, MERCEDES V. OPENA,
CORNELIO R. NATIVIDAD, EVELYN D. NATIVIDAD vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
FACTS:
Petitioners are dual citizens by virtue of Republic Act No. 9225 - Citizenship
Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003, allowing one to retain or re-
acquire Phil. Citizenship who want to exercise their right to suffrage under the
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 (R.A. 9189). The COMELEC denies
on the ground that they fail to meet the qualification of 1-year residency
required by the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not dual citizens may exercise their right to suffrage as absentee
voters.
HELD:
Yes, there is no provision in the dual citizenship law - R.A. 9225 - requiring
"duals" to actually establish residence and physically stay in the Philippines
first before they can exercise their right to vote. On the contrary, R.A. 9225, in
implicit acknowledgment that "duals" are most likely non-residents, grants
under its Section 5(1) the same right of suffrage as that granted an absentee
voter under R.A. 9189. It cannot be overemphasized that R.A. 9189 aims, in
essence, to enfranchise as much as possible all overseas Filipinos who, save
for the residency requirements exacted of an ordinary voter under ordinary
conditions, are qualified to vote. Thus, wrote the Court in Macalintal:
It is clear from these discussions of the … Constitutional Commission that [it]
intended to enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino citizens abroad who
have not abandoned their domicile of origin. The Commission even intended
to extend to young Filipinos who reach voting age abroad whose parents’
domicile of origin is in the Philippines, and consider them qualified as voters
for the first time.
40
G.R. No. 160869 May 11, 2007
AASJS (ADVOCATES AND ADHERENTS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE FOR
SCHOOL TEACHERS AND ALLIED WORKERS) MEMBER -
HECTOR GUMANGAN CALILUNG, Petitioner vs. THE
HONORABLE SIMEON DATUMANONG, in his official capacity as the
Secretary of Justice
FACTS:
Petitioner filed the instant petition against respondent the official tasked to
implement laws governing citizenship. Petitioner prays that a writ of
prohibition be issued to stop respondent from implementing Republic Act No.
9225, entitled "An Act Making the Citizenship of Philippine Citizens Who
Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent, Amending for the Purpose
Commonwealth Act No. 63, As Amended, and for Other Purposes." Petitioner
avers that Rep. Act No. 9225 is unconstitutional as it violates Section 5,
Article IV of the 1987 Constitution that states, "Dual allegiance of citizens is
inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is correct.
HELD:
No. To begin with, Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of
a policy and it is not a self-executing provision. The legislature still has to
enact the law on dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225,
the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the
status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries
of origin even after their naturalization. Congress was given a mandate to
draft a law that would set specific parameters of what really constitutes dual
allegiance. Until this is done, it would be premature for the judicial
department, including this Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual
allegiance.
Neither can we subscribe to the proposition of petitioner that a law is not
needed since the case of Mercado had already set the guidelines for
determining dual allegiance. Petitioner misreads Mercado. That case did not
set the parameters of what constitutes dual allegiance but merely made a
distinction between dual allegiance and dual citizenship.

41
G.R. No. 182701 July 23, 2008
EUSEBIO EUGENIO K. LOPEZ vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
and TESSIE P. VILLANUEVA
FACTS:
Petitioner Lopez, a dual citizen, was a candidate for the position of Chairman
of Barangay Bagacay, San Dionisio, Iloilo City. He was eventually declared
the winner. Respondent Villanueva filed a petition praying for the
disqualification of Lopez because he was ineligible from running for any
public office. Lopez argued that he is a Filipino-American, by virtue of the
Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003. He said, he possessed
all the qualifications to run for Barangay Chairman.
COMELEC issued the Resolution granting the petition for disqualification of
Lopez from running as Barangay Chairman. COMELEC said, to be able to
qualify as a candidate in the elections, Lopez should have made a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC is correct.
HELD:
Yes. Petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the cited law. This
new law explicitly provides that should one seek elective public office, he
should first "make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath."
Petitioner failed to comply with this requirement. We quote with approval the
COMELEC observation on this point:
While respondent was able to regain his Filipino Citizenship
by virtue of the Dual Citizenship Law when he took his oath of
allegiance before the Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate
General’s Office in Los Angeles, California, the same is not enough
to allow him to run for a public office. The above-quoted provision
of law mandates that a candidate with dual citizenship must make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. There is
no evidence presented that will show that respondent complied with
the provision of R.A. No. 9225. Absent such proof we cannot allow
respondent to run for Barangay Chairman of Barangay Bagacay.
For the renunciation to be valid, it must be contained in an affidavit duly
executed before an officer of law who is authorized to administer an oath. The
affiant must state in clear and unequivocal terms that he is renouncing all
foreign citizenship for it to be effective. In the instant case, respondent
Lopez’s failure to renounce his American citizenship as proven by the absence
of an affidavit that will prove the contrary leads this Commission to believe
that he failed to comply with the positive mandate of law. For failure of
respondent to prove that he abandoned his allegiance to the United States, this
Commission holds him disqualified from running for an elective position in
the Philippines. (Emphasis added)
While it is true that petitioner won the elections, took his oath and began to
discharge the functions of Barangay Chairman, his victory cannot cure the
defect of his candidacy. Garnering the most number of votes does not validate
the election of a disqualified candidate because the application of the
constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of
popularity.
42
G.R. No. 99358 January 30, 1995
DJUMANTAN vs. HON. ANDREA D. DOMINGO, COMMISSIONER
OF THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION, HON. REGINO R. SANTIAGO
and HON. JORGE V. SARMIENTO, COMMISSIONERS BUREAU OF
IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION
FACTS:
Bernard Banez, the husband of Marina Cabael, went to Indonesia as a contract
worker. Banes was converted to Islam and married petitioner in accordance
with Islamic rites. Petitioner and her two children with Banez, (two-year old
Marina and nine-month old Nikulas) arrived in Manila as the "guests" of
Banez. The latter made it appear that he was just a friend of the family of
petitioner and was merely repaying the hospitability extended to him during
his stay in Indonesia. Banez executed an "Affidavit of Guaranty and Support,"
for his "guests". As "guests," petitioner and her two children lived in the house
of Banez. Petitioner and her children were admitted to the Philippines as
temporary visitors under Section 9(a) of the Immigration Act of 1940. Marina
Cabael discovered the true relationship of her husband and petitioner. She
filed a complaint for "concubinage" against the two. This case was, however,
dismissed for lack of merit. The immigration status of petitioner was changed
from temporary visitor to that of permanent resident under Section 13(a) of
the same law. Petitioner was issued an alien certificate of registration.
Not accepting the set-back, Banez' eldest son filed a letter complaint with the
Ombudsman, who subsequently referred the letter to the CID. On the basis of
the said letter, petitioner was detained at the CID detention cell. She later
released pending the deportation proceedings after posting a cash bond.
Thereafter, she manifested to the CID that she be allowed to depart voluntarily
from the Philippines and asked for time to purchase her airline ticket.
However, she a change of heart and moved for the dismissal of the deportation
case on the ground that she was validly married to a Filipino citizen.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an alien married to a Filipino have the right of residency in the
Philippines.
HELD:
No. There is no law guaranteeing aliens married to Filipino citizens the right
to be admitted, much less to be given permanent residency, in the Philippines.
The fact of marriage by an alien to a citizen does not withdraw her from the
operation of the immigration laws governing the admission and exclusion of
aliens (United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shauhnessy, 338 US 537 94 L. Ed. 317,
70 S. Ct. 309 [1950]; Low Wah Suey v. Backus, 225 US 460 56 L. Ed. 1165,
32 S. Ct. 734 [1912]; Annotations, 71 ALR 1213). Marriage of an alien
woman to a Filipino husband does not ipso facto make her a Filipino citizen
and does not excuse her from her failure to depart from the country upon the
expiration of her extended stay here as an alien (Joaquin v. Galang, 33 SCRA
362 [1970]).
Under Section 9 of the Immigration Act of 1940, it is not mandatory for the
CID to admit any alien who applies for a visitor's visa. Once admitted into the
country, the alien has no right to an indefinite stay. Under Section 13 of the
law, an alien allowed to stay temporarily may apply for a change of status and
"may be admitted" as a permanent resident. Among those considered qualified
to apply for permanent residency if the wife or husband of a Philippine citizen
(Immigration Act of 1940, Sec. 13[a]). The entry of aliens into the country
and their admission as immigrants is not a matter of right, even if they are
legally married to Filipino citizens.
ARTICLE 48
43
G.R. No. 142840 May 7, 2001
ANTONIO BENGSON III vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C. CRUZ
FACTS:
The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the
constitutional requirement that “no person shall be a Member of the House of
Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen.”
Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in Tarlac in
1960 of Filipino parents. In 1985, however, Cruz enlisted in the US Marine
Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath
of allegiance to the USA. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship
for under CA No. 63 [(An Act Providing for the Ways in Which Philippine
Citizenship May Be Lost or Reacquired (1936)] section 1(4), a Filipino citizen
may lose his citizenship by, among other, “rendering service to or accepting
commission in the armed forces of a foreign country.”
Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was
erased by his naturalization as a U.S. citizen in 1990, in connection with his
service in the U.S. Marine Corps.
In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under
RA 2630 [(An Act Providing for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by
Persons Who Lost Such Citizenship by Rendering Service To, or Accepting
Commission In, the Armed Forces of the United States (1960)]. He ran for
and was elected as the Representative of the 2nd District of Pangasinan in the
1998 elections. He won over petitioner Bengson who was then running for
reelection.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with
respondent HRET claiming that Cruz was not qualified to become a member
of the HOR since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI,
section 6 of the Constitution.
HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto and
declaring Cruz the duly elected Representative in the said election.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American
citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition
of Philippine citizenship.
HELD:
Yes. Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship. As a mode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship,
naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On
the other hand, naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine citizenship
is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63. Under this law, a former Filipino
citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain
qualifications and none of the disqualification mentioned in Section 4 of C.A.
473.
Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those
who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces; services in
the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II; (3) service in the Armed
Forces of the United States at any other time, (4) marriage of a Filipino
woman to an alien; and (5) political economic necessity.
As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation
simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place
where the person concerned resides or last resided.
44
G.R. No. L-2007 January 31, 1949
WILLIAM CHIONGBIAN vs. ALFREDO DE LEON, in his capacity as
Commissioner of Customs, JOSE GALLOFIN, in his capacity as
Collector of Customs of the Port of Cebu, and VICENTE DE LA CRUZ,
in his capacity as General Manager of the Philippine Shipping
Administration, respondents: PHILIPPINE SHIPOWNERS'
ASSOCIATION
FACTS:
In 1925, Victoriano Chiongbian, a Chinese citizen and father of the herein
petitioner William Chiongbian, was elected to and held the office of municipal
councilor. This fact is sufficiently established by the evidence submitted to
this Court; by the findings of the National Bureau of Investigation cited in
Opinion No. 27, s. 1948, of the Secretary of Justice; and as admitted by
respondents in their pleadings. It is also shown and admitted that at the time of
the adoption of the Constitution, petitioner William Chiongbian was still a
minor.
It is conclusive that upon the adoption of the Constitution, Victoriano
Chiongbian, father of herein petitioner, having been elected to a public office
in the Philippines before the adoption of the Constitution, became a Filipino
citizen by virtue of Article IV, section 1, subsection 2 of the Constitution.
William Chiongbian, the herein petitioner, who was then a minor, also became
a Filipino citizen by reason of subsection 3 (Article IV) of the Constitution,
his father having become a Filipino citizen upon the adoption of said
Constitution. This is also in conformity with the settled rule of our
jurisprudence that a legitimate minor child follows the citizenship of his
father.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner William Chiongbian is a Filipino citizen
HELD:
No, it may be said that the members of the Constitutional Convention could
not have dedicated a provision of our Constitution merely for the benefit of
one person without considering that it could also affect others. When they
adopted subsection 2, they permitted, if not willed, that said provision should
function to the full extent of its substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but
in conjunction with all other provisions of that great document. They adopted
said provision fully cognizant of the transmissive essence of citizenship as
provided in subsection 3. Had it been their intention to curtail the transmission
of citizenship in such a particular case, they would have so clearly stated.
45
G.R. No. 187567 February 15, 2012
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NORA FE SAGUN
FACTS: 
Respondent Nora Fe Sagun is the legitimate child of Albert S. Chan, a
Chinese national, and Marta Borromeo, a Filipino citizen. She was born in
Baguio City and did not elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority. At the age of 33 and after getting married to Alex Sagun, she
executed an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Said
document was notarized by Atty. Cristeta Leungon but was not recorded and
registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City.

Respondent applied for a Philippine passport. Her application was denied due
to the citizenship of her father and there being no annotation on her birth
certificate that she has elected Philippine citizenship. Consequently, she
sought a judicial declaration of her election of Philippine citizenship averring
that she was raised as a Filipino and she is a registered voter of Precinct No.
0419A of Barangay Manuel A. Roxas in Baguio City and had voted in local
and national elections as shown in the Voter Certification. She asserted that by
virtue of her positive acts, she has effectively elected Philippine citizenship
and such fact should be annotated on her record of birth so as to entitle her to
the issuance of a Philippine passport.
After conducting a hearing, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision on
April 3, 2009 granting the petition and declaring respondent a Filipino citizen.
Upon payment of the required fees, the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City is
hereby directed to annotate [on] her birth certificate, this judicial declaration
of Filipino citizenship of said petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent has effectively elected Philippine citizenship in
accordance with the procedure prescribed by law.
HELD:
No. Be that as it may, even if we set aside this procedural infirmity, still the
trial court’s conclusion that respondent duly elected Philippine citizenship is
erroneous since the records undisputably show that respondent failed to
comply with the legal requirements for a valid election. Specifically,
respondent had not executed a sworn statement of her election of Philippine
citizenship. The only documentary evidence submitted by respondent in
support of her claim of alleged election was her oath of allegiance, executed
12 years after she reached the age of majority, which was unregistered. As
aptly pointed out by the petitioner, even assuming arguendo that respondent’s
oath of allegiance suffices, its execution was not within a reasonable time
after respondent attained the age of majority and was not registered with the
nearest civil registry as required under Section 1 of C.A. No. 625. The phrase
"reasonable time" has been interpreted to mean that the election should be
made generally within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority.
Moreover, there was no satisfactory explanation proffered by respondent for
the delay and the failure to register with the nearest local civil registry.
46
G.R. No. 120295 June 28, 1996
JUAN G. FRIVALDO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and RAUL
R. LEE
FACTS:
Juan G. Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the office of Governor
of Sorsogon. Raul R. Lee, another candidate, filed a petition with the Comelec
praying that Frivaldo "be disqualified from seeking or holding any public
office or position by reason of not yet being a citizen of the Philippines", and
that his Certificate of Candidacy be canceled. Comelec promulgated a
Resolution granting the petition. The Motion for Reconsideration filed by
Frivaldo remained unacted upon until after the elections. So, his candidacy
continued and he was voted for during the elections held on said date.
Lee filed in said SPA, a (supplemental) petition praying for his proclamation
as the duly-elected Governor of Sorsogon. Comelec en banc directed "the
Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sorsogon to reconvene for the purpose of
proclaiming candidate Raul Lee as the winning gubernatorial candidate in the
province of Sorsogon. Accordingly, Lee was proclaimed governor of
Sorsogon.
Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition praying for the annulment of
the proclamation of Lee and for his own proclamation. He alleged that he took
his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after "his petition for
repatriation under P.D. 725 which he filed with the Special Committee on
Naturalization in September 1994 had been granted".
ISSUE:
Whether or not the repatriation of Frivaldo is legal.
HELD:
Yes., there is cogent reason to hold that Frivaldo was really STATELESS at
the time he took said oath of allegiance and even before that, when he ran for
governor in 1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo wrote that he "had long
renounced and had long abandoned his American citizenship -- long before
May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless in the interim -- when he
abandoned and renounced his US citizenship but before he was repatriated to
his Filipino citizenship."
Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before the elections of 1995 have
not been effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic that such
findings of the Commission are conclusive upon this Court, absent any
showing of capriciousness or arbitrariness or abuse.
ARTICLE 50
47
G.R. No. 191970 April 24, 2012
ROMMEL APOLINARIO JALOSJOS vs. THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and DAN ERASMO, SR.,
FACTS:
Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City. He Migrated to Australia and
acquired Australian citizenship. At the 35 years old, he returned to the
Philippines and lived with his brother in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. Upon his
return, he took an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
was issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship. He then
renounced his Australian citizenship in September 2009.
He acquired residential property where he lived and applied for registration as
voter in the Municipality of Ipil. A petition for the exclusion of Jalosjos' name
in the voter's list was then filed by Erasmo, however it was denied by both
MCTC and RTC.
When Jalosjos filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Governor of Zamboanga
Sibugay Province, Erasmo filed a petition to deny or cancel said COC on the
ground of failure to comply with R.A. 9225 and the one year residency
requirement of the local government code. COMELEC ruled that Jalosjos
failed to comply with the residency requirement of a gubernatorial candidate
and failed to show ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish his
domicile in Ipil.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Jalosjos failed to present ample proof of a bona fide
intention to establish his domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
HELD:
To hold that Jalosjos has not establish a new domicile in Zamboanga Sibugay
despite the loss of his domicile of origin (Quezon City) and his domicile of
choice and by operation of law (Australia) would violate the settled maxim
that a man must have a domicile or residence somewhere.
While the Court ordinarily respects the factual findings of administrative
bodies like the COMELEC, this does not prevent it from exercising its review
powers to correct palpable misappreciation of evidence or wrong or irrelevant
considerations. The evidence Jalosjos presented is sufficient to establish Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibugay, as his domicile. The COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion in holding otherwise.
Jalosjos won and was proclaimed winner in the 2010 gubernatorial race for
Zamboanga Sibugay. The Court will respect the decision of the people of that
province and resolve all doubts regarding his qualification in his favor to
breathe life to their manifest will.
FC ARTICLE 1
48
G.R. No. 167684 July 31, 2006
JAIME O. SEVILLA vs. CARMELITA N. CARDENAS
FACTS:
Jaime O. Sevilla filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage
to Carmelita N. Cardenas for their marriage was vitiated by machination,
duress, and intimidation employed by the respondents Carmelita and her
father. He was forced to sign a marriage contract with Carmelita before a
minister of the Gospel, Rev. Cirilo D Gonzales. Moreover, he alleged that
there was no marriage license presented before the solemnizing officer as
certified by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar. Actually, it was certified 3
times on the following dates: March 11, September 20, 1994 and July 25,
2000 that marriage license no. 2770792 was nowhere to be found.
On the other hand, Carmelita refuted these allegations and claims that they
were first civilly married and thereafter married at a church. Both were
alleged to be recorded in Local Civil Registrar and NSO. He is estopped from
invoking the lack of marriage license after having been married to her for 25
years.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a valid marriage license was issued in accordance with law to
the parties prior to the celebration of the marriage.
HELD:
Yes, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of non-issuance of
Marriage License No. 2770792. It can also mean, as we believed true in the
case at bar, that the logbook just cannot be found. In the absence of showing
of diligent efforts to search for the said logbook, we cannot easily accept that
absence of the same also means non-existence or falsity of entries therein.
Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans
toward the validity of the marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds.
The courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly
repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight.
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and
strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage
as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the validity of the marriage.
49
G.R. No. 186400 October 20, 2010
CYNTHIA S. BOLOS vs. DANILO T. BOLOS
FACTS:
Cynthia Bolos filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to
Danilo Bolos under Art. 36 of the Family Code. Judgment was rendered by
the RTC declaring the marriage as null and void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
Danilo then filed with the CA a petition seeking to annul the orders of the
RTC. The CA reversed the decision of the RTC. The appellate court in its
decision stated that the requirement of a motion for reconsideration as a
prerequisite to appeal under A.M. 02-11-10-SC (Rule On Declaration Of
Absolute Nullity Of Void Mariages And Annulment Of Voidable Marriages)
is not applicable in this case since the marriage of Cynthia and Danila was
solemnized before the Family Code took effect.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the phrase "under the Family Code" in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
refers to the word "petitions" rather than to the word "marriages."
HELD:
No. The Court finds Itself unable to subscribe to petitioner’s interpretation
that the phrase "under the Family Code" in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to
the word "petitions" rather than to the word "marriages."
A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free
from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or
interpretation. There is only room for application. As the statute is clear, plain,
and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied
without attempted interpretation. This is what is known as the plain-meaning
rule or verba legis.
This Court is not unmindful of the constitutional policy to protect and
strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage
as the foundation of the family.
Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but
a social institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State finds no
stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The break up of
families weakens our social and moral fabric and, hence, their preservation is
not the concern alone of the family members.
50
G.R. No. 158298 August 11, 2010
ISIDRO ABLAZA vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in the RTC in Cataingan, Masbate a
petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted
on December 26, 1949 between his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and
Leonila Honato.
The petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had
been celebrated without a marriage license, due to such license being issued
only on January 9, 1950, thereby rendering the marriage void ab initio for
having been solemnized without a marriage license. He insisted that his being
the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died without any issue entitled
him to one-half of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before his
death, thereby making him a real party in interest; and that any person,
himself included, could impugn the validity of the marriage between
Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after the death of Cresenciano, due
to the marriage being void ab initio.
On October 18, 2000, the RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that
petition is filed out of time and that petitioner is not a party to marriage.
Motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the dismissal order of the RTC on the ground that the action
must be filed by the proper party, which in this case should be filed by any of
the parties to the marriage. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner is a real party in the action to seek the declaration of
nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother.
HELD:
Yes. Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was
contracted on December 26, 1949, the applicable law was the old Civil Code,
the law in effect at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the rule
on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as having the right to initiate
the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC had absolutely no application to the petitioner.
The old and new Civil Codes contain no provision on who can file a petition
to declare the nullity of a marriage, and when. Accordingly, in Niñal v.
Bayadog, the children were allowed to file after the death of their father a
petition for the declaration of the nullity of their father’s marriage to their
stepmother contracted on December 11, 1986 due to lack of a marriage
license.
FC ARTICLE 10
51
G.R. No. 103047 September 2, 1994
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND
ANGELINA M. CASTRO
FACTS:
Angelina M Castro and Edwin Cardenas had a civil wedding without the
knowledge of Castro’s parents. Hence, no parental advice was secured from
the latter’s parents since it was a ‘secret marriage‘. But Cardenas was able to
procure the requirements including the marriage license. They did not live
together immediately after the marriage but later on cohabited for four months
and bore a child. They parted and the child was adopted by Castro’s brother
with the consent of Cardenas.
Castro filed a petition for judicial decree of nullity of marriage with Edwin
Cardenas on the ground that no Marriage License was ever issued to them
prior to the solemnization of their marriage. Edwin failed to file an answer and
was declared in default.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by Castro
establishing non-issuance of marriage license sufficient enough to grant a
decree of nullity of marriage.
HELD:
Yes. At the time the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the
law governing marital relations was the New Civil Code.
The fact that private respondent Castro offered only her testimony in support
of her petition is, in itself, not a ground to deny her petition. The failure to
offer any other witness to corroborate her testimony is mainly due to the
peculiar circumstances of the case. It will be remembered that the subject
marriage was a civil ceremony performed by a judge of a city court. The
subject marriage is one of those commonly known as a "secret marriage" — a
legally non-existent phrase but ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage
celebrated without the knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of either or
both of the contracting parties. The records show that the marriage between
Castro and Cardenas was initially unknown to the parents of the former.
Surely, the fact that only private respondent Castro testified during the trial
cannot be held against her. Her husband, Edwin F. Cardenas, was duly served
with notice of the proceedings and a copy of the petition. Despite receipt
thereof, he chose to ignore the same. For failure to answer, he was properly
declared in default. Private respondent cannot be faulted for her husband's
lack of interest to participate in the proceedings. There was absolutely no
evidence on record to show that there was collusion between private
respondent and her husband Cardenas.
It is noteworthy to mention that the finding of the appellate court that the
marriage between the contracting parties is null and void for lack of a
marriage license does not discount the fact that indeed, a spurious marriage
license, purporting to be issued by the civil registrar of Pasig, may have been
presented by Cardenas to the solemnizing officer.
52
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390 April 11, 2002
MERCEDITA MATA ARAÑES vs. JUDGE SALVADOR M. OCCIANO
FACTS:
Judge Salvador Occiano, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court
of Balatan, Camarines Sur, solemnized the marriage of Mercedita Mata
Arañes and Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license at
Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction.
When Orobia died, the petitioner’s right to inherit the “vast properties” of
Orobia was not recognized, because the marriage was a null. She also cannot
claim the pension of her husband who is a retired Commodore of the
Philippine Navy.
Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent judge for his
illegal acts and unethical misrepresentations which allegedly caused her so
much hardships, embarrassment and sufferings.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Judge erred in solemnizing the marriage outside his
jurisdiction and without the requisite marriage license.
HELD:
Yes. In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is
limited to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing
the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is
contrary to law and subjects him to administrative liability. His act may not
amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage
out of human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for
violating the law on marriage.
Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without
the requisite marriage license. In People vs. Lara, we held that a marriage
which preceded the issuance of the marriage license is void, and that the
subsequent issuance of such license cannot render valid or even add an iota of
validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage
license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a
marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he
solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this respect, respondent judge acted
in gross ignorance of the law.
53
G.R. No. 183896 January 30, 2013
SYED AZHAR ABBAS vs. GLORIA GOO ABBAS
FACTS:
Syed Azhar Abbas filed for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with
Gloria Goo-Abbas on the ground of absence of marriage license. Syed and
Gloria were married in Taiwan. When they arrived in the Philippines, a
ceremony was conducted between them solemnized by Rev. Mario Dauz and
witnessed by Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez and Mary Ann Ceriola. During the
ceremony, he and Gloria signed a document. Syed claim that he did not know
the nature of the ceremony until Gloria told him that it was a marriage. In the
marriage contract of Syed and Gloria, it is stated that Marriage License No.
9969967 was proven by the MCR being issued to other couple.
 
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage of Syed and Gloria is valid.
HELD:
No. It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage license or a copy
thereof to the court. Neither could the other witnesses she presented prove the
existence of the marriage license, as none of them applied for the license in
Carmona, Cavite. Her mother, Felicitas Goo, could not even testify as to the
contents of the license, having admitted to not reading all of its contents.
Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says, "The absence of any of the
essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except
as stated in Article 35(2)." Article 35(3) of the Family Code also provides that
a marriage solemnized without a license is void from the beginning, except
those exempt from the license requirement under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2,
Title I of the same Code. Again, this marriage cannot be characterized as
among the exemptions, and thus, having been solemnized without a marriage
license, is void ab initio.
54
G.R. No. 155733 January 27, 2006
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATES OF THE
DECEASED JOSEFA DELGADO AND GUILLERMO RUSTIA
CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA vs. HEIRS OF
MARCIANA RUSTIA VDA. DE DAMIAN
FACTS:
In 1917, Guillermo Rustia proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado but whether a
marriage in fact took place is disputed. According to petitioners, the two
eventually lived together as husband and wife but were never married. To
prove their assertion, petitioners point out that no record of the contested
marriage existed in the civil registry.
Luisa Delgado, sister of Josefa, filed a Petition on Letters of Administration of
the estate of deceased Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia. Such letter was
opposed by Marciana Rustia, a sister of Guillermo, claiming that they should
be the beneficiaries of the estate.
The trial court then allowed Guillerma Rustia, a legitimate child of Guillermo,
to intervene in the case as she claimed that she possessed the status of an
acknowledged legitimate natural child. Later, Luisa Delgado said that the
spouses were living together without marriage. Luisa Delgado died and was
substituted dela Rosa, petitioner in this case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Josefa and Guillermo contract marriage.
HELD:
Yes, although a marriage contract is considered a primary evidence of
marriage, its absence is not always proof that no marriage in fact took
place. Once the presumption of marriage arises, other evidence may be
presented in support thereof.
Petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of marriage of Guillermo Rustia
and Josefa Delgado. In this jurisdiction, every intendment of the law leans
toward legitimizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together apparently in
marriage are presumed to be in fact married. This is the usual order of things
in society and, if the parties are not what they hold themselves out to be, they
would be living in constant violation of the common rules of law and
propriety. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. Always presume marriage.
55
G.R. No. 206220 August 19, 2015
LUIS UY vs. SPOUSES JOSE LACSAMANA AND ROSAURA
FACTS:
Luis Uy filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Documents with
Damages against respondents Petra Rosca, and spouses Jose Lacsamana and
Rosaura Mendoza. In the Complaint, Uy alleged that he was the lawful
husband of Rosca. He stated that they lived together as husband and wife from
the time they were married in 1944 until 1973 when they separated and lived
apart.
Uy alleged that he and his wife acquired a residential land evidenced by a
Deed of Sale from the Spouses Manuel. The sellers' OCT No. 0-2840 was
cancelled and TCT No. T-24660 was issued in the name of "Petra Rosca,
married to Luis G. Uy."
Rosca, on the other hand, testified that sometime before or during World War
II, she and Uy cohabited and settled in Batangas. The couple attempted to
formalize their marital union with a marriage ceremony. However, the
celebration was not consummated because of the bombings which occurred on
the day of the ceremony. Likewise, they were unable to secure a marriage
contract.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a valid marriage between Uy and Rosca.
HELD:
No, Uy was not able to present any copy of the marriage certificate which he
could have sourced from his own personal records, the solemnizing officer, or
the municipal office where the marriage allegedly took place. Even the
findings of the RTC revealed that Uy did not show a single relevant evidence
that he was actually married to Rosca. On the contrary, the documents Uy
submitted showed that he and Rosca were not legally married to each other.
56
G.R. No. 169766 March 30, 2011
ESTRELLITA JULIANO-LLAVE vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, HAJA PUTRI ZORAYDA A. TAMANO and ADIB
AHMAD A. TAMANO
FACTS:
Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married Estrellita twice –
initially under the Islamic laws and tradition and, subsequently under a civil
ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge. In their marriage contracts, Sen.
Tamano’s civil status was indicated as “divorced”. Since then, Estrellita has
been representing herself to the whole world as Sen. Tamano’s wife, and upon
his death, his widow.
Private respondents, in their own behalf and in behalf of the rest of Sen.
Tamano’s legitimate children with Zorayda, filed a complaint with the RTC
for the declaration of nullity of marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano
for being bigamous. The complaint alleged that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda
under civil rites, and that this marriage remained subsisting when he married
Estrellita.
ISSUE:
Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano was
bigamous.
HELD:
Yes. The Civil Code governs the marriage of Zorayda and the late Sen.
Tamano; their marriage was never invalidated by PD 1083. Sen. Tamano’s
subsequent marriage to Estrellita is void ab initio.
The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in
1958, solemnized under civil and Muslim rites. The only law in force
governing marriage relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims alike
was the Civil Code of 1950, under the provisions of which only one marriage
can exist at any given time. Under the marriage provisions of the Civil Code,
divorce is not recognized except during the effectivity of Republic Act No.
394 which was not availed of during its effectivity.
Estrellita claims that only the husband or the wife in a void marriage can file a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. However, this interpretation
does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy.
Since our Philippine laws protect the marital union of a couple, they should be
interpreted in a way that would preserve their respective rights which include
striking down bigamous marriages.
57
G.R. No. 152577 September 21, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CRASUS L. IYOY
FACTS:
Crasus married Fely and begot five children. After the celebration of their
marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was “hot-tempered, a
nagger and extravagant.” Fely left the Philippines for the USA, leaving all of
their five children to the care of respondent Crasus. Sometime in 1985,
respondent Crasus learned, through the letters sent by Fely to their children,
that Fely got married to an American, with whom she eventually had a child.
Fely had five visits in Cebu City but never met Crasus. Also, she had been
openly using the surname of her American husband in the Philippines and in
the USA. Crasus filed a declaration of nullity of marriage.
On her Answer, Fely alleged that while she did file for divorce from Crasus,
she denied having herself sent a letter requesting him to sign the enclosed
divorce papers. After securing a divorce from Crasus, Fely married her
American husband and acquired American citizenship. She argued that her
marriage to her American husband was legal because now being an American
citizen, her status shall be governed by the law of her present nationality.
ISSUE:
Whether or not abandonment and sexual infidelity constitute psychological
incapacity.
HELD:
No. Using the guidelines established by the afore-mentioned jurisprudence,
this Court finds that the totality of evidence presented by respondent Crasus
failed miserably to establish the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife
Fely; therefore, there is no basis for declaring their marriage null and void
under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
The only substantial evidence presented by respondent Crasus before the RTC
was his testimony, which can be easily put into question for being self-
serving, in the absence of any other corroborating evidence. He submitted
only two other pieces of evidence: (1) the Certification on the recording with
the Register of Deeds of the Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus
and Fely, such marriage being celebrated on 16 December 1961; and (2) the
invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, in which Fely used
her American husband’s surname. Even considering the admissions made by
Fely herself in her Answer to respondent Crasus’s Complaint filed with the
RTC, the evidence is not enough to convince this Court that Fely had such a
grave mental illness that prevented her from assuming the essential
obligations of marriage.
58
G.R. No. 168785 February 5, 2010
HERALD BLACK DACASIN vs. SHARON DEL MUNDO DACASIN
FACTS:
Herald Dacasin is an American, and Sharon Del Mundo Dacasin is a Filipino,
were married. They have one daughter, Stephanie, born on 21 September
1995. Sharon sought and obtained from Illinois court a divorce decree against
Herald. In its ruling, the Illinois court dissolved the marriage of petitioner and
respondent, awarded to respondent sole custody of Stephanie and retained
jurisdiction over the case for enforcement purposes.  Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the National
Herald and Sharon executed in Manila an Agreement for the joint custody
Stephanie. The parties chose Philippine courts as exclusive forum
adjudicate disputes arising from the Agreement. Respondent undertook
obtain from the Illinois court an order "relinquishing" jurisdiction
Philippine courts.  residence in the Philippines. They begot two children but the parties were
Herald sued Sharon in the RTC to enforce the Agreement. Herald alleged that
in violation of the Agreement, Sharon exercised sole custody over Stephanie.  against petitioner, asking that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of
ISSUE:
Whether the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of petitioner’s suit and
enforce the Agreement on the joint custody of the parties’ child.
HELD:
No. The trial court has jurisdiction to entertain petitioner’s suit but not to
enforce the Agreement which is void. However, factual and equity
considerations militate against the dismissal of petitioner’s suit and call for the
remand of the case to settle the question of Stephanie’s custody.
Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law. At the time petitioner filed his
suit in the trial court, statutory law vests on Regional Trial Courts exclusive
original jurisdiction over civil actions incapable of pecuniary estimation. An
action for specific performance, such as petitioner’s suit to enforce the
Agreement on joint child custody, belongs to this species of actions. Thus,
jurisdiction-wise, petitioner went to the right court.
Indeed, the trial court’s refusal to entertain petitioner’s suit was grounded not
on its lack of power to do so but on its thinking that the Illinois court’s divorce
decree stripped it of jurisdiction. This conclusion is unfounded. What the
Illinois court retained was "jurisdiction x x x for the purpose of enforcing all
and sundry the various provisions of [its] Judgment for Dissolution."
Petitioner’s suit seeks the enforcement not of the "various provisions" of the
divorce decree but of the post-divorce Agreement on joint child custody.
Thus, the action lies beyond the zone of the Illinois court’s so-called "retained
jurisdiction."
FC ARTICLE 26
59
G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985
ALICE REYES VAN DORN vs. HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as
Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON 
of
to FACTS:
to Petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of
to the United States. They were married in Hongkong and established their
divorced in Nevada, United States and the petitioner had remarried also in
Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn. Private respondent filed a suit
her business in Ermita, Manila and be declared with right to manage the
conjugal property.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner and private
respondent in Nevada is binding in the Philippines where petitioner is a
Filipino citizen.
HELD:
Yes, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute
divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public police
and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
national law.  In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent
from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce
dissolves the marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband
of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as
petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is
bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is
estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right
over the alleged conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to
be considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's
obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just.
Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and
fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not
continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She
should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice
are to be served.
60
G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989
IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL vs. HON. CORONA IBAY-
SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the
City Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING
FACTS:
Petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen married private
respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national at Federal Republic of
Germany. They lived together in Malate, Manila and had a child named
Isabella Pilapil Geiling.
Unfortunately, after about three and a half years of marriage such connubial
disharmony eventuated in Erich initiating divorce proceeding against Imelda
in Germany. He claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they
had been living apart. On the other hand, petitioner filed an action for legal
separation before a trial court in Manila.
The decree of divorce was promulgated on the ground of failure of marriage
of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to the petitioner. More
than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, Geiling filed two
complaints for adultery alleging that while still married to Imelda, the latter
had an affair with a certain William Chia and Jesus Chua.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondent can prosecute petitioner on the ground of
adultery even though they are no longer husband and wife.
HELD:
No, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and
concubinage the person who can legally file the complaint should be the
offended spouse, and nobody else.
We are convinced that in cases of such nature, the status of the complainant
vis-a-vis the accused must be determined as of the time the complaint was
filed. Thus, the person who initiates the adultery case must be an offended
spouse, and by this is meant that he is still married to the accused spouse, at
the time of the filing of the complaint.
61
G.R. No. 221029
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARELYN TANEDO
MANALO
FACTS:
Manalo, a Filipino citizen, filed a case for divorce in Japan against her
husband, a Japanese national. After due proceeding, a divorce decree was
rendered by the Japanese court. Thereafter, Manalo filed a petition for
cancellation of entry of marriage in the Civil Registry, by virtue of a judgment
of divorce rendered by a Japanese court. The petition was later amended and
captioned as a petition for recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment.
ISSUE:
Whether a Filipino citizen has the capacity to remarry under Philippine law
after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad.
HELD:
Yes. A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more harm
than good. If We disallow a Filipino citizen who initiated and obtained a
foreign divorce from the coverage of Paragraph 2 Article 26 and still require
him or her to first avail of the existing "mechanisms" under the Family Code,
any subsequent relationship that he or she would enter in the meantime shall
be considered as illicit in the eyes of the Philippine law. Worse, any child born
out such "extra-marital" affair has to suffer the stigma of being branded as
illegitimate. Surely, these are just but a few of the adverse consequences, not
only to the parent but also to the child, if We are to hold a restrictive
interpretation of the subject provision. The irony is that the principle of
inviolability of marriage under Section 2, Article XV of the Constitution is
meant to be tilted in favor of marriage and against unions not formalized by
marriage, but without denying State protection and assistance to live-in
arrangements or to families formed according to indigenous customs.
If the opposing party fails to properly object, as in this case, the divorce
decree is rendered admissible a written act of the foreign court. As it appears,
the existence of the divorce decree was not denied by the OSG; neither was
the jurisdiction of the divorce court impeached nor the validity of its
proceedings challenged on the ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
fact or law, albeit an opportunity to do so.
62
G.R. No. 224548
MARLYN MONTON NULLADA vs. THE HON. CIVIL REGISTRAR
OF MANILA, AKIRA ITO, SHIN ITO AND ALL PERSONS WHO
HAVE OR CLAIM ANY INTEREST
FACTS:
In 1997, Marlyn and Akira, a Japanese national) got married, in Japan. The
document was registered with both the Office of the Local Civil Registry of
Manila and the then National Statistics Office, Civil Registry Division.
The union of Marlyn and Akira resulted in the birth of a child, Shin Ito. Their
relationship, however, eventually turned sour and so they later decided to
obtain a divorce by mutual agreement. In 2009, Akira and Marlyn secured a
divorce decree in Japan. The Divorce Certificate that was issued by the
Embassy of Japan in the Philippines.
Hence, Marlyn sought a recognition of the divorce decree in the Philippines
by filing a Petition for registration and/or recognition of foreign divorce
decree and cancellation of entry of marriage that was filed under Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court, in relation to Article 26 of the Family Code. Akira did not
file an Answer to the petition, notwithstanding summons by publication.
ISSUE:
Whether, under the same provision [Art. 26], a Filipino citizen has the
capacity to remarry under Philippine law after initiating a divorce proceeding
abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who
is capacitated to remarry.
HELD:
Yes. When this Court recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated
and obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues
of child custody and property relation, it should not stop short in likewise
acknowledging that one of the usual and necessary consequences of absolute
divorce is the right to remarry. Indeed, there is no longer a mutual obligation
to live together and observe fidelity. When the marriage tie is severed and
ceased to exist, the civil status and the domestic relation of the former spouses
change as both of them are freed from the marital bond.
To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who,
after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was
rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a
corrective measure to address an anomaly where the Filipino spouse is tied to
the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or
her country. Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce
proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and
capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result: the
Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino who
initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like
circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated
proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not make a distinction. In
both instance, it is extended as a means to recognize the residual effect of the
foreing divorce decree on Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses
are severed by operation of the latter's national law. (Emphasis ours)
VOID MARRIAGES
63
G.R. No. 132524 December 29, 1998
FEDERICO C. SUNTAY vs. ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY * and
HON. GREGORIO S. SAMPAGA, Presiding Judge, Branch 78, Regional
Trial Court, Malolos, Bulacan
FACTS:
Petitioner, Federico, is opposing respondent’s Isabel, his granddaughter, for
her petition for Petition for Letters of Administration over the estate of
Cristina, Federico’s wife, who died without leaving a will. Isabel’s father
Emilio, had predeceased his mother Cristina. The marriage of Isabel’s parents
had previously been declared by as “null and void.” Federico anchors his
opposition on the fact, that his son, Emilio had his marriage judicially
declared null and void alleging that Isabel has no right to succeed by right of
representation as she is an illegitimate child.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage of respondent Isabel's parents was void.
HELD:
Yes. Parenthetically, it is an elementary principle of procedure that the
resolution of the court in a given issue as embodied in the dispositive part of a
decision or order is the controlling factor as to settlement of rights of the
parties and the questions presented, notwithstanding statement in the body of
the decision or order which may be somewhat confusing,  he same is not
without a qualification. The foregoing rule holds true only when the
dispositive part of a final decision or order is definite, clear and unequivocal
and can be wholly given effect without need of interpretation or construction-
which usually is "the case where the order or decision in question is that of a
court not of record which is not constitutionally required to state the facts and
the law on which the judgment is based."  the month of February 1982. The case clearly falls under Section 3 of Article
Assuming that a doubt or uncertainty exists between the dispositive portion
and the body of the decision, effort must be made to harmonize the whole
body of the decision in order to give effect to the intention, purpose and
judgment of the court.
64
G.R. No. 201061 July 3, 2013
SALLY GO-BANGAYAN vs. BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR.
FACTS: 
Benjamin and Sally developed a romantic relationship. However, Sally’s
father was against the relationship so Sally brought Benjamin to an office
where they signed a purported marriage contract. Sally, knowing Benjamin’s
marital status, assured him that the marriage contract would not be registered.
When Sally filed criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of public
documents against Benjamin, using their simulated marriage contract as
evidence. Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent
marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the trial court on the
ground that his marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it lacked the formal
requisites to a valid marriage.
ISSUE:
Whether the marriage between Benjamin and Sally are void for not having a
marriage license.
HELD:
Yes. We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and
Sally null and void ab initio and, at the same time, non-existent. Under Article
35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized without a license, except those
covered by Article 34 where no license is necessary, "shall be void from the
beginning." In this case, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was
solemnized without a license. It was duly established that no marriage license
was issued to them and that Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match the
marriage license numbers issued by the local civil registrar of Pasig City for
35 which made their marriage void ab initio. The marriage between Benjamin
and Sally was also non-existent. Applying the general rules on void or
inexistent contracts under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are
absolutely simulated or fictitious are "inexistent and void from the beginning."
Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the trial court’s ruling that
the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was null and void ab initio and non-
existent.
65
G.R. No. 224638 April 10, 2019
ROLANDO D. CORTEZ vs. LUZ G. CORTEZ
FACTS:
Petitioner was invited to a birthday party of respondent's cousin at the latter's
house, and after consuming three bottles of beer, he became dizzy and passed
out. When he woke up, he was already in a room with respondent and was
clad only in his underwear and they were covered with a blanket.
Respondent's brother suddenly entered the room and said "May nangyari na
pala sa inyo, dapat panagutan mo iyan." He then went home to his mother's
house in disbelief.
Petitioner claimed that at about the same time, he was already scheduled to
work abroad as a seaman. While at the airport, he was stopped by a hold-
departure order issued by the POEA because of respondent's complaint as she
was then pregnant. He was forced by respondent's brothers to marry
respondent. They went to the POEA to submit their marriage contract and he
was able to leave for his seaman duty. They never had a honeymoon nor
sexual intercourse.
Petitioner averred that while he was abroad, respondent gave birth. When he
came back to the Philippines, he was forced to attend the child's baptism. He
never lived with respondent since his return until his departure. While
overseas, he was shocked to learn from respondent that she had given birth
again. He tried to religiously give support despite his doubts and reservations.
However, he came to know that respondent had a husband and a child, thus,
he suspended giving support to respondent and the two children. However,
respondent filed a case of abandonment against him but was later dismissed,
as they executed a compromise agreement for the support of the children
Petitioner claimed that: upon his return to the Philippines, he subjected
himself to a semenal examination which showed that he had low sperm count
and did not have the capacity to impregnate a woman; he continued giving
financial support to avoid being harassed, but stressed that he never cohabited
with respondent; and he claimed that they got married not out of love but
because of respondent's desire to ensure material support for herself and the
children.
ISSUE:
Whether the either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated to
comply with their essential marital obligations which would result in the
nullity of their marriage.
HELD:
No, both parties undoubtedly comprehend the nature and importance of their
spousal and parental duties. The letters of respondent-appellee to petitioner-
appellant attached to his Reply dated 9 October 2003 - demonstrate the
former's capacity and willingness to understand and forgive the latter even
after he had committed infidelity to their marital union. Petitioner-appellant
described respondent-appellee to be deceitful and manipulative; yet, in
contrast, she asked for his forgiveness for being a nagging wife and for being
jealous. In Our view, these are not the qualities of a person who is
psychologically incapacitated to understand and comply with the essential
marital obligations espoused under the law.
We find that the report failed to show how petitioner's personality traits
incapacitated him from complying with the essential obligations of marriage.
On the contrary, the report established that because petitioner was forced to
marry respondent without love, he had no intention to do his full obligations
as a husband. Mere "difficulty," "refusal," or "neglect" in the performance of
marital obligations or "ill will" on the part of the spouse is different from
"incapacity" rooted on some debilitating psychological condition or illness
66
G.R. No. 184063 January 24, 2011
CYNTHIA E. YAMBAO vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and
PATRICIO E. YAMBAO
FACTS:
After 35 years of marriage, petitioner filed a petition praying to declare their
marriage null and void. In her petition, petitioner narrated that, since the
beginning, her and respondent’s married life had been marred by bickering,
quarrels, and recrimination. Later, respondent became insecure and jealous
and would get mad every time he would see petitioner talking to other people,
even to her relatives. When respondent started threatening to kill petitioner,
she decided to leave the conjugal abode and live separately from him. She
then consulted a psychiatrist who concluded that respondent was indeed
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is psychologically incapacitated.
HELD:
No. This Court finds it impossible to believe that, there was nothing but
heartache and strife in their over 35 years of marriage. To be sure, respondent,
perhaps with a little more effort on his part, could have been more helpful and
could have made life that much easier for his wife. The fact that he did not,
however, does not mean that he is psychologically incapacitated to discharge
his marital obligations, as to give the Court a reason to declare the marriage
null and void.
67
G.R. No. 168335
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NESTOR GALANG
FACTS:
Respondent and Juvy contracted marriage. The respondent worked as an
artist-illustrator while Juvy stayed at home as a housewife. They have one
child.
 
The respondent filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage
with Juvy, under Article 36 of the Family Code. He alleged that Juvy was a
kleptomaniac and a swindler. He claimed that Juvy stole his ATM card and
his parents’ money, and often asked money from their friends and relatives on
the pretext that Christopher was confined in a hospital. According to the
respondent, Juvy suffers from mental deficiency, innate immaturity, distorted
discernment and total lack of care, love and affection towards him and their
child.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Juvy suffered from psychological incapacity that prevented
her from complying with her essential marital obligations.
HELD:
No. These unfounded conclusions cannot be equated with gravity or
incurability that Article 36 of the Family Code requires. To be declared
clinically or medically incurable is one thing; to refuse or be reluctant to
change is another. To hark back to what we earlier discussed, psychological
incapacity refers only to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.
68
G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995
LEOUEL SANTOS vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS
FACTS:
Leouel and Julia exchanged vows before Municipal Trial Court, followed by a
church wedding. Julia gave birth to a baby boy. The ecstasy did not last long,
Leouel averred because of the frequent interference by Julia's parents in their
family affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start a "quarrel" over many
other things.
Julia left for the United States of America to work as a nurse despite Leouel's
pleas to so dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, Julia called up
Leouel for the first time by long distance telephone. She promised to return
home but she never did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the United States,
he desperately tried to locate Julia. Having failed to get Julia to somehow
come home, Leouel filed with the regional trial Court a complaint for
"Voiding of marriage Under Article 36 of the Family Code"
ISSUE:
Whether or not psychological incapacity is attendant to the case at bar.
HELD:
No, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly in cognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family
Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect
and fidelity and render help and support.
69
G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA
FACTS:
Roridel and Reynaldo were married and has a son. After a year of marriage,
Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and
a father since he preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on
whom he squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for aid and
assistance, and was never honest with his wife regarding their finances,
resulting in frequent quarrels between them; that Reynaldo was relieved of his
job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the
family. In October 1986, the couple had a very intense quarrel. As a result,
their relationship was estranged.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the finding of psychological incapacity is proper.
HELD:
No. There is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is
an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright
"refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere
showing of "irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no
wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the
parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is
essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological (nor physical) illness.
70
G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997
CHI MING TSOI vs. COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI
FACTS:
Ching married Gina at the Manila Cathedral. Contrary to her expectations,
that as newlyweds they were supposed to enjoy making love but Ching just
went to bed and went to sleep. There was no sexual intercourse between them
during the first night. The same thing happened on the next days. They stayed
in Baguio City for four days for their honeymoon but there was no sexual
intercourse happened between them, since Ching avoided her. She claims, that
she did not even see her husband's private parts nor did he see hers.
Ching admitted that since their marriage until their separation there was no
sexual contact between them. But, the reason for this was that every time he
wants to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him and
whenever he caresses her private parts, she always removed his hands
ISSUE:
Whether or not the refusal to have sexual communion is a psychological
incapacity.
HELD:
Yes. Petitioner admitted that he did not have sexual relations with his wife
after almost ten months of cohabitation, and it appears that he is not suffering
from any physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to
consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality
disorder which to the mind of this Court clearly demonstrates an 'utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage'
within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code.
71
G.R. No. 136490 October 19, 2000
BRENDA B. MARCOS vs. WILSON G. MARCOS
FACTS:
Wilson Marcos and Brenda Marcos first met sometime in 1980 when both of
them were assigned at the Malacanang Palace, she as an escort of Imee
Marcos and he as a Presidential Guard of President Ferdinand Marcos. They
got married twice, first was on September 6, 1982 and on May 8, 1983 and
blessed with five children. After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the
military service in 1987 and then engaged in different business ventures that
did not succeeded. Due to his failure to engage in any gainful employment,
they would often quarrel and as a consequence, he would hit and beat her. He
would also inflict physical harm on their children. In 1992, they were already
living separately. On October 16, 1994, when Brenda saw him in their house,
she was so angry that she lambasted him. Wilson then turned violent,
inflicting physical harm on her and even on her mother who came to her
aid. On October 17, 1994, she and their children left the house and sought
refuge in her sister’s house. On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself to
medical examination at the Mandaluyong Medical Center. Thus, petitioner
filed for annulment of marriage in the RTC assailing Article 36 of the Family
Code. The court ruled the respondent to be psychologically incapacitated to
perform his marital obligations. But the Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the RTC because psychological incapacity had not been
established by the totality of the evidence presented. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the totality of the evidence presented in the present case was enough
to sustain a finding that respondent was psychologically incapacitated.
HELD:
No. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to
provide material support to the family and may have resorted to physical
abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion
of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that
his "defects" were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they
are incurable.
Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost
his job and was not gainfully employed for a period of more than six years. It
was during this period that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give
material and moral support, and even left the family home.
Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not
to the inception of the marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence
showing that his condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully
employed as a taxi driver.1âwphi1
72
G.R. No. 164493 March 10, 2010
JOCELYN M. SUAZO vs. ANGELITO SUAZO and REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
Jocelyn and Angelito’s marriage was arranged and they were married on in a
ceremony officiated by a Mayor. Without any means to support themselves,
Jocelyn and Angelito lived with Angelito’s parents after their marriage. They
had by this time stopped schooling. Jocelyn took odd jobs and worked for
Angelito’s relatives as household help. Angelito, on the other hand, refused to
work and was most of the time drunk. Jocelyn urged Angelito to find work
and violent quarrels often resulted because of Jocelyn’s efforts. Jocelyn left
Angelito. Angelito thereafter found another woman with whom he has since
lived. They now have children. Ten years after their separation, Jocelyn filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code, as amended.
ISSUE:
Whether there is basis to nullify Jocelyn’s marriage with Angelito under
Article 36 of the Family Code.
HELD:
There is no basis to nullify the marriage. Unfortunately, we find Jocelyn’s
testimony to be insufficient. Jocelyn merely testified on Angelito’s habitual
drunkenness, gambling, refusal to seek employment and the physical beatings
she received from him – all of which occurred after the marriage. This is a
clear evidentiary gap that materially affects her cause, as the law and its
related jurisprudence require that the psychological incapacity must exist at
the time of the celebration of the marriage.
73
G.R. No. 166562 March 31, 2009
BENJAMIN G. TING vs. CARMEN M. VELEZ-TING
FACTS:
Benjamin and Carmen fell in love, and they were wed when respondent was
already pregnant with their first child. Benjamin passed the medical board
examinations and thereafter proceeded to take a residency program to become
a surgeon but shifted to anesthesiology after two years. Then Benjamin
completed the preceptorship program for the said field and, he began working
for Velez Hospital, owned by Carmen’s family, as member of its active staff,
while Carmen worked as the hospital’s Treasurer.
Carmen filed a verified petition praying for the declaration of nullity of their
marriage.  In her complaint, Carmen stated that prior to their marriage, she
was already aware that Benjamin used to drink and gamble occasionally with
his friends. But after they were married, petitioner continued to drink
regularly and would go home at about midnight or sometimes in the wee
hours of the morning drunk and violent. He would confront and insult
respondent, physically assault her and force her to have sex with him. There
were also instances when Benjamin used his gun and shot the gate of their
house.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Benjamin is suffering from psychological incapacity.
HELD:
Respondent failed to prove that petitioner’s "defects" were present at the time
of the celebration of their marriage. She merely cited that prior to their
marriage, she already knew that petitioner would occasionally drink and
gamble with his friends; but such statement, by itself, is insufficient to prove
any pre-existing psychological defect on the part of her husband. Neither did
the evidence adduced prove such "defects" to be incurable.
74
G.R. No. 150677 June 5, 2009
RENATO REYES SO vs. LORNA VALERA
FACTS:
Renato So, a 17-year old high school student and Lorna Valera, a 21-year old
college student cohabited for about 19 years since they fell in love with each
other before they decided to get married. Five years into marriage, Renato
filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage for lack of essential and
formal requisites as he was merely asked by Lorna to sign a blank marriage
application form and marriage contract and that no marriage ceremony took
place. Renato claimed that Lorna suffered psychologically incapacity by her
refusal and failure to cohabit and make love with him, does not love nor
respect him.  Lorna would refuse to let him in if he comes home late and in
several instances, he has to sleep in his car. Lorna also refused to practice her
profession by selling her dental equipment that he bought and provided.
Instead she joined him in his electronics business and interfered in his
decisions that would sometimes make him lose face before his employees.  FACTS:
Renato presented clinical psychologist, Dr. Cristina Rosello-Gates who
testified that Lorna suffers from Compulsive Behavior Patterns – evident in
her marijuana habit, gambling and habitual squandering of Renato’s money.
Dr. Gates also testified that Adjustment Disorder and Compulsive Behavior
Patterns already existed before her marriage to Renato and that they are
continuing and irreversible.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lorna is psychologically incapacitated.
HELD: 
No. Shorn of any reference to psychology, we conclude that we have a case
here of parties who have very human faults and frailties; who have been
together for some time; and who are now tired of each other. If in fact the
respondent does not want to provide the support expected of a wife, the cause
is not necessarily a grave and incurable psychological malady whose effects
go as far as to affect her capacity to provide marital support promised and
expected when the marital knot was tied. To be tired and to give up on one’s
situation and on one’s husband are not necessarily signs of psychological
illness; neither can falling out of love be so labeled. When these happen, the
remedy for some is to cut the marital knot to allow the parties to go their
separate ways. This simple remedy, however, is not available to us under our
laws. Ours is still a limited remedy that addresses only a very specific
situation – a relationship where no marriage could have validly been
concluded because the parties, or one of them, by reason of a grave and
incurable psychological illness existing when the marriage was celebrated, did
not appreciate the obligations of marital life and, thus, could not have validly
entered into a marriage. Outside of this situation, this Court is powerless to
provide any permanent remedy.
ARTICLE 40
75
A.M. No. MTJ-92-706 March 29, 1995
LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA vs. JUDGE FRANCISCO F.
BRILLANTES, JR., Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 28, Manila
Judge Brillantes became a lawyer in 1963. He married Zenaida Ongkiko in
1965, albeit without marriage license. In 1991, he married Yolanda De Castro
in civil rites in Los Angeles, California. In the same month, complainant Lupo
Atienza with whom Yolanda De Castro has two children, saw Judge Brillantes
sleeping in his house. Said house was purchased by him in 1987. Upon
inquiry, the houseboy told him that De Castro has been cohabiting with Judge
Brillantes.
Judge Brillantes asserts that Article 40 of the Family Code does not apply to
him since his first marriage was in 1965 and therefore not covered by the
Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a subsequent marriage can be conducted even without a
judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage.
HELD:
No. Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of
the Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first
marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code, said Article is given
"retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired
rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This is particularly
true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown
any vested right that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case.
Respondent passed the Bar examinations in 1962 and was admitted to the
practice of law in 1963. At the time he went through the two marriage
ceremonies with Ongkiko, he was already a lawyer. Yet, he never secured any
marriage license. Any law student would know that a marriage license is
necessary before one can get married. Respondent was given an opportunity to
correct the flaw in his first marriage when he and Ongkiko were married for
the second time. His failure to secure a marriage license on these two
occasions betrays his sinister motives and bad faith.
76
G.R. No. 138509 July 31, 2000
IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS vs. ISAGANI D. BOBIS
FACTS:
Respondent contracted a first marriage with one Maria Dulce B. Javier.
Without said marriage having been annulled, nullified or terminated, the same
respondent contracted a second marriage with petitioner Imelda Marbella-
Bobis and allegedly a third marriage with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez.
Based on petitioner's complaint-affidavit, an information for bigamy was filed
against respondent. Sometime thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for
the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage on the ground
that it was celebrated without a marriage license. Respondent then filed a
motion to suspend the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy invoking
the pending civil case for nullity of the first marriage as a prejudicial question
to the criminal case.
ISSUE:
Whether the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a
previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal case for
bigamy.
HELD:
No. In the light of Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent, without first
having obtained the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, can not
be said to have validly entered into the second marriage. Per current
jurisprudence, a marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration of such
fact before any party can marry again; otherwise the second marriage will also
be void. The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first
marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent was for
all legal intents and purposes regarded as a married man at the time he
contracted his second marriage with petitioner. Against this legal backdrop,
any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that
respondent entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first
marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the
determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial
question. As stated above, respondent cannot be permitted to use his own
malfeasance to defeat the criminal action against him.
77
G.R. No. 127406 November 27, 2000
OFELIA P. TY vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, and EDGARDO M.
REYES
FACTS: 
In 1977, Reyes married Anna Maria Villanueva in a civil ceremony. They had
a church wedding in the same year as well. In 1980, the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court declared their marriage as null and void; the civil
one for lack of marriage license and the subsequent church wedding due to the
lack of consent of the parties. In 1979, prior to the JDRC decision, Reyes
married Ofelia. Then in 1991, Reyes filed for an action for declaration of
nullity of his marriage with Ofelia. He averred that they lack a marriage
license at the time of the celebration and that there was no judicial declaration
yet as to the nullity of his previous marriage with Anna. Ofelia presented
evidence proving the existence of a valid marriage license including the
specific license number designated.
ISSUE:
Whether the decree of nullity of the first marriage is required before a
subsequent marriage can be entered into validly
HELD: 
No, we must note that private respondent’s first and second marriages
contracted in 1977 and 1979, respectively, are governed by the provisions of
the Civil Code. Moreover, we find that the provisions of the Family Code
cannot be retroactively applied to the present case, for to do so would
prejudice the vested rights of petitioner and of her children.
Petitioner wants her marriage to private respondent held valid and subsisting.
She is suing to maintain her status as legitimate wife. In the same breath, she
asks for damages from her husband for filing a baseless complaint for
annulment of their marriage which caused her mental anguish, anxiety,
besmirched reputation, social humiliation and alienation from her parents.
Should we grant her prayer, we would have a situation where the husband
pays the wife damages from conjugal or common funds. To do so, would
make the application of the law absurd. Logic, if not common sense, militates
against such incongruity. Moreover, our laws do not comprehend an action for
damages between husband and wife merely because of breach of a marital
obligation. There are other remedies.
78
G.R. No. 132529 February 2, 2001
SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑO vs. SUSAN YEE CARIÑO
FACTS:
In 1969 SPO4 Santiago Cariño married Susan Nicdao Cariño. He had 2
children with her. In 1992, Santiago contracted a second marriage, this time
with Susan Yee Cariño. In 1988, prior to his second marriage, Santiago is
already bedridden and he was under the care of Yee. He died 13 days after his
marriage. Thereafter, the wives went on to claim the benefits of Santiago.
Nicdao was able to claim a total of P140,000.00 while Yee was able to collect
a total of P21,000.00. In 1993, Yee filed an action for collection of sum of
money against Nicdao. She wanted to have half of the P140k. Yee admitted
that her marriage with Santiago was solemnized during the subsistence of the
marriage Santiago and Nicdao but the said marriage between Nicdao and
Santiago is null and void due to the absence of a valid marriage license as
certified by the local civil registrar.
ISSUE
Whether or not the judicial declaration of nullity of marriage is needed to
claim her share.
HELD:
Yes, the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, having
been solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being one of
the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly
void ab initio.
It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however, that since the
marriage of petitioner and the deceased is declared void ab initio, the “death
benefits” under scrutiny would now be awarded to respondent Susan Yee. To
reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage,
there must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous
marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage,
otherwise, the second marriage would also be void.
Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous
marriage of the deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the
second marriage of the deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains
that their marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree
declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void.
Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise,
void ab initio.
79
G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010
GERBERT R. CORPUZ vs. DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The
SOLICITOR GENERAL
FACTS:
Gerbert was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship
through naturalization, Gerbert married Daisylyn, a Filipina. Due to work and
other professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the
wedding. He returned to the Philippines to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked
to discover that his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and
disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce and
was granted. The divorce decree took effect a month later. Two years after the
divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love. Gerbert
went to Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on
his and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce
decree, an official of the NSO informed Gerbert that the marriage between
him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law.
ISSUE:
Whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to
aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a
foreign divorce decree.
HELD:
An action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is
not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds
that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare
that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage.
No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for the
alien spouse, whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his
national law.
80
G.R. No. 183824 December 8, 2010
MYRNA P. ANTONE vs. LEO R. BERONILLA
FACTS:
Myrna Antone alleged that she and Leo were married in 1978. However, Leo
contracted a second marriage with Cecile Maguillo in 1991. The prosecution
filed the Information a criminal case of Bigamy.
Pending the setting of the case for arraignment, Leo moved to quash the
Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense
because his marriage with Myrna was declared null and void as of April 2007
and became final and executory on May 2007. Leo argues that since the
marriage had been declared null and void from the beginning, there was
actually no first marriage to speak of. Thus, absent the first marriage, the facts
alleged in the Information do not constitute the crime of bigamy. The
prosecution argued that the marriage of Myrna and Leo on 1978 was not
severed prior to his second marriage on 1991, for which bigamy has already
been committed before the court declared the first marriage null and void on
2007.
ISSUE:
Whether the declaration of nullity of the first marriage after contracting the
subsequent marriage is immaterial in the crime of bigamy.
HELD:
No. In a catena of cases, the Court has consistently held that a judicial
declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be
contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and
immoral.
To conclude, the issue on the declaration of nullity of the marriage between
petitioner and respondent only after the latter contracted the subsequent
marriage is, therefore, immaterial for the purpose of establishing that the facts
alleged in the information for Bigamy does not constitute an offense.
Following the same rationale, neither may such defense be interposed by the
respondent in his motion to quash by way of exception to the established rule
that facts contrary to the allegations in the information are matters of defense
which may be raised only during the presentation of evidence.
81
G.R. No. 188775 August 24, 2011
CENON R. TEVES vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and DANILO
R. BONGALON
FACTS:
On 26 November 1992, a marriage was solemnized between Cenon Teves and
Thelma Jaime-Teves After the marriage, Thelma left to work abroad and
would only come home to the Philippines for vacations. In 2002, Thelma was
informed that her husband had contracted marriage with a certain Edita
Calderon. It was confirmed when she went to NSO and verified a marriage
contract between her husband and Edita. In 2006, the uncle of Thelma, filed a
complaint accusing petitioner Cenon of bigamy. During the pendency of the
criminal case for bigamy, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the marriage
of petitioner and Thelma null and void on the ground that Thelma is
physically incapacitated. Petitioner Cenon appealed before the CA contending
that the court a quo erred in not ruling that his criminal liability had already
been extinguished.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner may be held guilty for the crime of Bigamy.
HELD:
Yes. Settled is the rule that criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon
the commission of the offense, and from that instant, liability appends to him
until extinguished as provided by law, and that the time of filing of the
criminal complaint (or Information, in proper cases) is material only for
determining prescription. The crime of bigamy was committed by petitioner
on 10 December 2001 when he contracted a second marriage with Edita. The
finality on 27 June 2006 of the judicial declaration of the nullity of his
previous marriage to Thelma cannot be made to retroact to the date of the
bigamous marriage.
ARTICLE 41
82
G.R. No. 184621 December 10, 2013
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARIA FE ESPINOSA
CANTOR
FACTS:
Sometime in January 1998, Jerry F. Cantor left his wife Maria Fe Espinosa
Cantor after a violent quarrel. After more than four years of not seeing or
hearing from Jerry, Maria Fe filed a petition for the declaration of
presumptive death of her husband. She alleged that she conducted a diligent
search for her husband and exerted earnest efforts to find him. The RTC
granted her petition. Dissatisfied with the ruling, the OSG filed the present
petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Maria Fe have a well-founded belief that Jerry was dead.
HELD:
No, mere absence of the spouse (even for such period required by the law),
lack of any news that such absentee is still alive, failure to communicate or
general presumption of absence under the Civil Code would not suffice. This
conclusion proceeds from the premise that Article 41 of the Family Code
places upon the present spouse the burden of proving the additional and more
stringent requirement of "well-founded belief" which can only be discharged
upon a showing of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to
ascertain not only the absent spouse’s whereabouts but, more importantly, that
the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead.
In the case at bar, the respondent’s "well-founded belief" was anchored on her
alleged "earnest efforts" to locate Jerry, which consisted of the following: (1)
She made inquiries about Jerry’s whereabouts from her in-laws, neighbors and
friends; and (2) Whenever she went to a hospital, she saw to it that she looked
through the patients’ directory, hoping to find Jerry.
These efforts, however, fell short of the "stringent standard" and degree of
diligence required by jurisprudence.
. 
83
G.R. No. 145305 June 26, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. REDANTE SANTOS y CRUZ
FACTS:
On April 9, 1998, around ten o’clock in the evening, the victim Danly Santos,
then only thirteen (13) years old, was sleeping with her younger half-sister in
the rented house of her stepfather. Danly woke up when she felt someone
fondling her private parts. She saw that it was appellant fondling her.
Appellant then told Danly not to make any noise otherwise he would kill her.
Thereafter, appellant covered Danly’s mouth with his hand, removed her
shortpants and t-shirt, spread Danly’s legs, and raped her. Danly felt pain at
the penetration.
Appellant figured in a stabbing incident and was brought to the Rodriguez
Hospital. Appellant insisted that Danly should stay and look after him there. A
neighbor of Danly’s mother saw both appellant and victim at the hospital by
chance. The neighbor reported this matter to Dolores, Danly’s mother.
Thereafter, Danly told her mother that appellant raped her. They promptly
went to the police authorities to file the corresponding complaint against
appellant.
ISSUE:
Whether or not appellant is guilty of qualified rape for being the stepfather of
the victim.
HELD:
Yes. Annulment of judgment is the remedy when the Regional Trial Court's
judgment, order, or resolution has become final, and the "remedies of new
trial, appeal, petition for relief (or other appropriate remedies) are no longer
available through no fault of the petitioner."

HELD:
No. The prosecution failed to establish the relationship of Danly as the
stepdaughter of appellant since the prosecution did not offer in evidence the
marriage certificate between appellant and Danly’s mother.1âwphi1 If
appellant and Danly’s mother were not legally married, a common-law
relationship between appellant and Danly’s mother would obviously exist.
However, the Information did not allege a common-law relationship between
appellant and Danly’s mother but rather a legitimate relationship since the
Information described Danly as appellant’s stepdaughter

Because of the disparity between the facts alleged in the Information and the
facts proven in court on the real relationship between appellant and Danly, we
cannot hold appellant liable for qualified rape but only for simple rape.

84
G.R. No. 187061 October 08, 2014
CELERINA J. SANTOS vs. RICARDO T. SANTOS

FACTS:
RTC granted the prior petition of Ricardo that his wife, Celerina, be declared
presumptively dead. According to Ricardo, due to business reverses, Celerina
convinced him to allow her to work as domestic worker in Hongkong. She left
and was never heard from her again. He exerted efforts to locate Celerina, but
the same proved futile. 12 years had passed since the time she left abroad and
the filing of the petition.

On November 17, 2008, Celerina filed a petition for annulment of the RTC
decision declaring her presumptively dead with the Court of Appeals.
According to her, she learned about Ricardo’s petition only in October, 2008.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an action for annulment of judgment is proper because the
declaration of presumptive death is obtained fraudulently.