The Singular Universe and the Reality of Time

A Proposal in Natural Philosophy

Roberto Mangabeira Unger and Lee Smolin

Cambridge (UK) /New York: Cambridge University Press, xxi + 543 pp. ISBN 978-1-107-07406-4 (Hbk.),
£19.99.

The point of departure of this book lies in the conviction that the presently dominant
physical cosmology is in a deep crisis, because it cannot do justice to the seminal
discovery that our universe has a history. This is due to the fact that it illegitimately
extrapolates the so called Newtonian paradigm to the whole cosmos. In order to give
cosmology a new orientation, we need a philosophy of nature that reflects on
scientifically known nature as a whole, illuminating it at the same time with the help of
extra-scientific considerations. The «temporal naturalism» sustained by the authors
hinges upon three main pillars:

1. The singularity of the universe. There is only one universe at each moment.
This contradicts the multiverse thesis, but not that of a ramified universe, because the
point being questioned is whether affirming the coexistence of parallel, causally
unrelated universes is a scientific tenet. The possibility that the present universe has
been preceded by other universes, whose causal influence would be traceable in this
one, is not to be excluded either. That requires that the initial singularity be understood
not from an «ontic», but from an epistemological point of view, namely as a limit to the
applicability of our theories and not as an actual infinity in nature. In any case, the main
idea is that plurality has to be replaced with succession (rather than with cyclic forms)
and transformation.

2. The inclusive reality of time. Time is real; as a matter of fact, it is the most
real feature of nature. There is nothing, not even matter or space, which is more
fundamental that time; that’s why it cannot be an emergent reality. Furthermore, it is
inclusive: everything which exists is affected by time, and that means that everything
changes, including change itself.

Time does not begin at the singularity which marks the beginning of the present
universe; it rather extends indefinitely backwards as we keep going back from our
universe to the previous ones. But it does not have an absolute beginning nor is it
eternal; it suffices to state that time in indefinite. In order to affirm the historical
character of the universe, it is necessary to acknowledge the irreversibility of time and
to assign reality to the temporal modes (past, present and future), among which there
must be causal connections. Understanding the universe as a history implies lastly
another important requirement: the existence of a global cosmic time or, equivalently, of
a privileged observer, something which seems to be at odds with the relativity of
simultaneity and with the general theory of relativity. According to the authors, this is
only an apparent problem, as there are alternative formulations of general relativity,
especially the so called shape dynamics, which make it possible to defend convincingly
the existence of such a global cosmic time.

3. The selective realism of mathematics. It is of the utmost importance to clarify

the relation between mathematics and cosmology. A middle way between the view
which attributes to mathematical objects an autonomous existence in a world parallel to
– and, to a given extent, isomorphic with – the physical world (Platonism), on the one
hand, and the view which understands such objects as mere human inventions
(conventionalism), on the other, has to be found. Broadly speaking, Unger and Smolin
propose that mathematical systems are the result of modelising natural systems under
abstraction from such important features as particularity and temporality. And then
these mathematical systems develop with autonomy. The reference of mathematical
systems to the original natural systems progressively fades, so that their applicability to
nature is never guaranteed. The same factor responsible for the great power of
mathematics, namely its forgetfulness of particularity and temporality, explains its
ambivalent relation to the natural world. That’s why mathematics must be seen as a
heuristic tool for the exploration of the natural world rather than an infallible guide
towards knowledge of the intimate nature of reality.

There is no doubt that the combination of these three postulates represents a

serious challenge to today’s cosmology. And they still imply a fourth relevant thesis:
physical laws, which are usually formulated as eternally valid mathematical relations,
must be subject to time and change as well, notwithstanding that their stability is so
great that it leads us to think that they are immutable. If previously unknown spheres of
reality have emerged during the history of the universe, it is then legitimate to think that
there was a time in which the laws governing them did not exist either, so that these are
the result of a transformation. Assuming that the universe may present phases and
regions of greater stability, while others are more turbulent and characterized by rapid
change, we may even speak of the co-evolution of physical phenomena and the laws
governing them. But this leads us to a difficult conundrum: does the evolution of
physical laws obey any meta-law? Or does it take place in a completely arbitrary way?
In the first case, we end up with the same problem we had at first, but on a higher level,
and there is a serious risk of embarking upon a regressus ad infinitum; in the second
case, it is difficult to avoid the impression that the universe is nothing but a chaos. The
authors devote considerable efforts to this question.

The book sets up with a four-handed introduction, in which all these ideas are
sketched. Next, Unger and Smolin develop them separately; Unger strikes a more
philosophical key, while Smolin pays more attention to scientific details. Unger’s
presentation is more than twice as long as Smolin’s (347 vs. 163 pages). The book
concludes with 20 additional pages, in which some divergences between the authors are
made explicit. Unger’s style is clear and precise, but too reiterative. The chapter he
devotes to expounding the thesis of the inclusive reality of time is very interesting,
although he is not able to convincingly justify the objectivity of temporal modes. Other
excellent pages are those in which he explores the relation between causality and law,
sustaining that causality is previous to law, that law is nothing but a particularly stable
form of causality; every law expresses causal relations, but not all causal relations have
the form of law. Causality has to do directly with time and change; therefore, it is also a
basic feature of nature. Smolin’s part is more difficult to read, due in part to the
overflow of information, sometimes of relatively high technical character. I would
highlight Chapter 6 of this part, where Smolin thoroughly examines different
possibilities for conceiving an evolution of physical laws regulated by general principles
and mechanisms (natural cosmological selection, principle of precedence, etc.). The
precise status of such principles and mechanisms is one of the points of disagreement
with Unger, who thinks that identifying them contradicts the spirit of the argument they
are trying to develop. Smolin’s Chapter 5, devoted to the relation between mathematics
and nature, is also very illuminating. Another difference between both authors concerns
the use of the Leibnizian principle of sufficient reason, which Smolin presents as the
basis of his reasoning, while Unger sees in it a concession to metaphysical rationalism.
They also disagree on the question of whether the role of philosophy of nature should be
restricted to the sharp discrimination between the empirical core of physical theories
and the metaphysical gloss that usually accompanies them, as well as on the question of
how to proceed concretely in the case of the general theory of relativity and the semi-
Riemannian geometry.

In spite of it being 150 pages too long, I have a very positive impression of this
book. It is one of those readings that provide food for thought; there is no doubt that it
will fuel an interesting debate in cosmology. But let me put forward two critical
observations: (1) the philosophy of time expounded by both authors is not convincing,
because the problem of the «now» and of the objectivity of the temporal modes is not
dealt with deeply enough and because the ontological priority of time over space is
merely postulated, not justified; and above all (2) it remains far from clear how the
definition of time as the most fundamental and original feature of reality is compatible
with the relationalism that, following Leibniz, Mach and Einstein, the authors profess.
In this tradition, space and time do not have any substantiality, because they result from
the relations between material phenomena and events. I reckon that Smolin is closer to
relationalism than Unger.

To conclude, I would say a few words about the theological relevance of this
proposal of philosophy of nature. In 1970 W. Pannenberg published an outstanding
essay entitled «Kontingenz und Naturgesetz», in which he states that the description of
the universe as contingent and historical will not be convincing as long as laws of nature
are seen as expression of an enigmatic and eternal mathematical necessity. The book
under review offers an extraordinary chance of developing the immense potentialities
for a theology of nature contained in Pannenberg’s oeuvre, which is also significant
enough to dialogically confront two huge challenges that Unger and Smolin’s thesis
poses to theology: naturalism and the rejection of the idea of creation.