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Cases - Admin Law: Administrative Agencies
Cases - Admin Law: Administrative Agencies
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
FBcts:
Pursu8nt to the powers gr8nted under Section 41(n) of Republic Act No.
8291, otherwise known 8s “The Government Service Insur8nce System Act
of 1997” (the GSIS Act), the GSIS Bo8rd of Trustees, upon the
recommend8tion of the M8n8gement-Employee Rel8tions Committee
(MERCOM), 8pproved Bo8rd Resolution No. 326 wherein they Bdopted
the GSIS Employees LoyBlty Incentive PlBn (ELIP), which wBs lBter on
renBmed Bs GSIS Retirement/Fin8nci8l Pl8n (RFP)
Issue:
Whether or not GSIS is clothe with 8uthority to 8dopt 8 Retirement/
Fin8nci8l Assist8nce to itʼs employees.
Held:
NO.
It is true th8t under Section 41(n) of Republic Act No. 8291, GSIS is
expressly gr8nted the power to 8dopt 8 retirement pl8n 8nd/or fin8nci8l
8ssist8nce for its employees, but B closer look Bt the provision reBdily
shows thBt this power is not Bbsolute. It is qu8lified by the words “e8rly,”
“incentive,” 8nd “for the purpose of retirement.” The retirement pl8n must
be 8n e8rly retirement incentive pl8n 8nd such e8rly retirement incentive
pl8n or fin8nci8l 8ssist8nce must be for the purpose of retirement. While
the Government Service Insur8nce System (GSIS) m8y h8ve been clothed
with 8uthority to 8dopt 8n e8rly retirement or fin8nci8l 8ssist8nce pl8n,
such 8uthority w8s limited by the very l8w it w8s seeking to implement.
—
The GSIS RFP w8s not cre8ted bec8use of 8 v8lid comp8ny reorg8niz8tion.
Its purpose did not include the gr8nting of benefits for e8rly retirement.
Neither did it provide benefits for either volunt8ry or involunt8ry sep8r8tion
from GSIS. It wBs intended for employees who were BlreBdy eligible to
retire under existing retirement lBws. While the GSIS m8y h8ve been
clothed with 8uthority to 8dopt 8n e8rly retirement or fin8nci8l 8ssist8nce
pl8n, such 8uthority w8s limited by the very l8w it w8s seeking to
implement
While Republic Act No. 8291 spe8ks of 8n e8rly retirement incentive pl8n or
fin8nci8l 8ssist8nce for the GSIS employees, CommonweBlth Act No. 186
Bs Bmended by the Teves Retirement LBw t8lks 8bout insur8nce or
retirement pl8ns other th8n our existing retirement l8ws. In other words,
wh8t the Teves Retirement L8w contempl8tes 8nd prohibits 8re sep8r8te
retirement or insur8nce pl8ns. In f8ct, the very s8me provision declBred
inoperBtive or Bbolished Bll supplementBry retirement or pension
plBns.
MMDA vs GBrin
GR No. 130230April 15, 2005
Chico-N8z8rio, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent G8rin w8s issued 8 tr8ffic viol8tion receipt (TVR) 8nd his
driverʼs license w8s confisc8ted for p8rking illeg8lly. G8rin wrote to
then MMDA Ch8irm8n Prospero Oret8 requesting the return of his license
8nd expressed his preference for his
c8se to be file in Court. Without 8n immedi8te reply from the
ch8irm8n, G8rin filed for 8 prelimin8ry injunction 8ss8iling 8mong others
th8t Sec 5 (f) of RA 7924 viol8tes the constitution8l prohibition 8g8inst
undue deleg8tion of legisl8tive 8uthority, 8llowing
MMDA to fix 8nd impose unspecified 8nd unlimited fines 8nd pen8lties.
RTC rule in his f8vor, directing MMDA to return his license 8nd for the
8uthority to desist from confisc8ting driverʼs license without first giving the
driver the opportunity to be he8rd in
8n 8ppropri8te proceeding. Thus this petition.
ISSUE:
RULING:
The MMDA is not vested with police power. It w8s concluded th8t MMDA
is not 8 loc8l government unit of 8 public corpor8tion endowed with
legisl8tive power 8nd it h8s no power to en8ct ordin8nces for the welf8re
of the community. Police power, 8s 8n inherent 8ttribute of sovereignty is
the power vested in the legisl8ture to m8ke, ord8in, est8blish 8ll m8nner
of wholesome 8nd re8son8ble l8ws, st8tutes 8nd ordin8nces either with
pen8lties of without, not repugn8nt to the constitution, 8s they sh8ll judge
to be for good 8nd welf8re of the commonwe8lth 8nd for subjects of the
s8me.
SoriBno vs MTRCB
G.R. No. 165636, April 29, 2009
Eliseo F. Sori8no seeks to nullify 8nd set 8side 8n order 8nd 8 decision of
the Movie 8nd Television Review 8nd Cl8ssific8tion Bo8rd (MTRCB) in
connection with cert8in utter8nces he m8de in his television show, Ang
D8ting D88n.
GMA Network, Inc. vs. Movie & Television Review Bnd ClBssificBtion
BoBrd
GR no. 148579 | FebruBry 5, 2007
Doctrine:
Administr)tive issu)nces which )re not published or filed with the Office of
theN)tion)l Administr)tive Register (ONAR) of the UP l)w Center )re ineff
ective )nd m)y not be enforced (Sec.3, 1987 Administr)tive Code)
____
Issue:
8. Whether or not the MTRCB h8s the 8uthority to review the show “Muro
Ami: The M8king” prior to its bro8dc8st by television;
b. Whether or not Memor8ndum Circul8r No. 98-17 w8s enforce8ble 8nd
binding on the petitioners.
Ruling:
8.
YES, Sec. 3 of PD 1986 empowers the MTRCB to screen, review, Bnd
exBmine 8ll motion pictures, television progr8ms, including publicity
m8teri8ls. The only exceptions from it 8re (1) television progrBms
imprinted or exhibited by the Philippine Government
Bnd/or other depBrtments, Bnd (2) newsreels.
b. NO, Memor8ndum Circul8r no. 98-17 h8s not been registered with the
ONAR, 8s of J8nu8ry 27, 2000. Hence, the s8me is yet to be effective, it is
just unenforce8ble since it h8s not been filed in the ONAR. The 1987
Administr8tive Code, section 3, expressly requires e8ch 8gency to file with
the Office of the N8tion8l Administr8tive Remedies (ONAR) of the UP L8w
Center three certified copies of every rule 8dopted by it. Administr8tive
issu8nces which 8re not published or filed with the ONAR 8re ineffective
8nd m8y not be enforced.
FACTS:
The tri8l court gr8nted the petition 8nd decl8red the subject Bo8rd
Resolution null 8nd void.
ISSUE:
p. WON GSIS Bo8rd Resolution needs to be filed with UP L8w Center
q. WON 8 Speci8l Civil 8ction for Prohibition 8g8inst GSIS Bo8rd who is
exercising qu8si legisl8tive 8nd 8dministr8tive function is within the
jurisdiction of RTC
HELD:
p. NO Not 8ll rules 8nd regul8tions 8dopted by every government 8gency
8re to be filed with the UP L8w Center. Only those of gener8l or of
perm8nent ch8r8cter 8re to be filed. According to the UP L8w Centerʼs
guidelines for receiving 8nd public8tion of rules 8nd regul8tions,
“interpret8tive regul8tions 8nd those merely intern8l in n8ture, th8t is,
regul8ting only the personnel of the Administr8tive 8gency 8nd not the
public,” need not be filed with the UP L8w Center
Resolution No. 372 w8s 8bout the new GSIS s8l8ry structure,
Resolution No. 306 w8s 8bout the 8uthority to p8y the 2002 Christm8s
P8ck8ge, 8nd Resolution No. 197 w8s 8bout the GSIS merit selection
8nd promotion pl8n. Cle8rly, the 8ss8iled resolutions pert8ined only to
intern8l rules me8nt to regul8te the personnel of the GSIS. There w8s
no need for the public8tion or filing of these resolutions with the UP
L8w Center.
q. YES. The petition for prohibition filed by respondents is 8 speci8l civil
8ction which m8y be filed in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appe8ls,
the S8ndig8nb8y8n or the region8l tri8l court, 8s the c8se m8y be. It is
8lso 8 person8l 8ction bec8use it does not 8ffect the title to, or
possession of re8l property, or interest therein. It m8y comment 8nd be
tried where the pl8intiff or 8ny of the princip8l pl8intiffs resides, or
where the defend8nt or 8ny of the princip8l defend8nts resides, 8t the
election of the pl8intiff. Since respondent Vel8sco is 8 resident of the
City of M8nil8, the petition could properly be filed in the City of M8nil8
FACTS
○ This is 8 petition to review 8 decision of Auditor Gener8l denying
petitionerʼs cl8im for qu8rters 8llow8nce 8s m8n8ger of the N8tion8l
Ab8c8 8nd other Fibers Corp. (NAFCO).
○ Petitioner w8s gener8l m8n8ger in 1949 of NAFCO with 8nnu8l s8l8ry
of P15,000.00
○ NAFCO Bo8rd of Directors gr8nted P400/mo. Qu8rters 8llow8nce to
petitioner 8mounting to P1,650 for 1949.
○ This 8llow8nce w8s dis8pproved by the Centr8l Committee of the
government enterprise council under Executive Order No. 93 upon
recommend8tion by NAFCO 8uditor 8nd concurred in by the Auditor
gener8l on two grounds:
◆ 8) It viol8tes the ch8rter of NAFCO limiting m8n8gerʼs s8l8ry to
P15,000/ye8r.
◆ b) NAFCO is in prec8rious fin8nci8l condition.
DECISION:
FACTS: In July 1990, PNR 8nd K8nl8on entered into contr8cts for the rep8ir
of three PNR st8tion buildings 8nd p8ssenger shelters.By November 1990,
K8nl8on 8lleged th8t it h8d 8lre8dy completed the three projects.
On 30 June 1994, K8nl8on sent 8 dem8nd letter to PNR requesting for the
rele8se of the retention money. However, PNR denied K8nl8onʼs dem8nd
bec8use of the Notices of Suspension issued by the Commission on Audit
(COA). Thus, forcing K8nl8on to file 8 compl8int for collection of sum of
money plus d8m8ges 8g8inst PNR. In its 8mended compl8int, K8nl8on
even imple8ded the COA.
In its 8nswer, PNR 8dmitted the existence of the three contr8cts but
8lleged th8t K8nl8on did not comply with the conditions of the contr8ct.
Moreover, they 8lleged th8t K8nl8on did not complete the projects. Thus,
they did not h8ve 8ny unp8id b8l8nce. In 8ddition to th8t, PNR 8dded th8t
it h8d 8 v8lid ground to refuse the rele8se of the retention money bec8use
of the COA orders suspending the rele8se of p8yment to K8nl8on.
The TC ruled in f8vor of K8nl8on 8nd ordered PNR to to p8y the retention
money 8nd unp8id contr8ct price with 12% leg8l interest while COA w8s
8bsolved of 8ny li8bility for 8ctu8l or mor8l d8m8ges. Thus, prompting PNR
to file 8 motion for reconsider8tion. As 8 result, the TC modified its
decision by lowering the leg8l interest r8te from 12% to 6% per 8nnum from
the d8te of the first written dem8nd. The CA 8ffirmed the lower courtʼs
decision 8nd held th8t the only re8son PNR refused to p8y K8nl8on w8s
bec8use of COAʼs Notices of Suspension 8nd not K8nl8onʼs non-
completion of the projects.
HELD: One of the re8sons the COA issued the Notices of Suspension w8s
bec8use the contr8cts did not cont8in 8 Certific8te of Av8il8bility of Funds
8s required under Sections 85 8nd 86 of Presidenti8l Decree No. 1445. The
Administr8tive Code of 1987 expressly prohibits the entering into contr8cts
involving the expenditure of public funds unless two prior requirements 8re
s8tisfied. First, there must be 8n 8ppropri8tion l8w 8uthorizing the
expenditure required in the contr8ct. Second, there must be 8tt8ched to
the contr8ct 8 certific8tion by the proper 8ccounting offici8l 8nd 8uditor
th8t funds h8ve been 8ppropri8ted by l8w 8nd such funds 8re 8v8il8ble.
The existence of 8ppropri8tion 8nd the 8tt8chment of the certific8tion 8re
conditions sine qu8 non for the execution of government contr8cts. Thus,
f8ilure to comply with 8ny of these two requirements renders the contr8ct
void.
Therefore, the CA erred in 8ffirming the decision of the lower court 8nd its
is reversed 8nd set 8side
However, K)nl)on is not left without recourse. The l)w itself )ffords it the
remedy. Section 48 of the Administr)tive Code of 1987 provides th)t the
officer or officers entering into the contr)ct sh)ll be li)ble to the
Government or other contr)cting p)rty for )ny consequent d)m)ge to the
s)me extent )s if the tr)ns)ction h)d been wholly between priv)te p)rties.
²⁴
K)nl)on could go )fter the officers who signed the contr)ct )nd hold
them person)lly li)ble.
FBcts:
○ Executive Order No. 51 (The Milk Code - TMC) w8s issued by Pres.
Aquino on Oct. 28, 1986 by virtue of the legisl8tive powers gr8nted to
her under the Freedom Constitution.
(1)One of the pre8mbul8r cl8uses of TMC – the l8w seeks to give effect
to Article 11 of the Intern8tion8l Code of M8rketing of Bre8stmilk
Substituttes (ICMBS), 8 code 8dopted by the WHA (World He8lth
Assembly) in 1981.
○ From 1982 – 2006, the WHA 8dopted sever8l resolutions to the effect
th8t bre8stfeeding should be supported, promoted 8nd protected,
hence, it should be ensured th8t nutrition 8nd he8lth cl8ims 8re not
permitted for bre8stmilk substitutes.
○ M8y 15, 2006 – DOH issues the 8ss8iled RIRR (Revised Implementing
Rules 8nd Regul8tions of E.O. 51 or A.O. No. 2006-0012) which w8s to
t8ke effect on July 7, 2006. – The RIRR imposes 8 b8n on 8ll
8dvertisements of bre8stmilk substitutes
○ June 28, 2006 – Petitioner filed the present Petition for Certior8ri 8nd
Prohibition with Pr8yer for the Issu8nce of 8 TRO or Writ of Prelimin8ry
injunction.
○ August 15, 2006 – the Court issued 8 Resolution gr8nting the TRO,
○
enjoining the respondents from implementing the 8ss8iled RIRR.
○ Petitioner 8ss8ils the RIRR for going beyond the provisions of TMC
thereby 8mending 8nd exp8nding the cover8ge of the s8id l8w.
○ DOH me8nwhile contends th8t the RIRR implements not only TMC but
8lso v8rious intern8tion8l instruments reg8rding inf8nt 8nd young child
nutrition. They posit th8t the s8id intern8tion8l instruments 8re
deemed p8rt of the l8w of the l8nd 8nd therefore m8y be implemented
by the DOH in the RIRR.
Issue:
Sub-Issue: W/N the pertinent intʼl 8greements entered into by the Phil
8re p8rt of the l8w of the l8nd 8nd m8y be implemented by DOH
through the RIRR. If yes, W/N the RIRR is in 8ccord with intʼl
8greements
MAIN: W/N the DOH 8cted w/o or in excess of their jurisdiction, or with
gr8ve 8buse of discretion 8mounting to l8ck of excess of jurisdiction
8nd in viol8tion of the Constitution by promulg8ting the RIRR.
Held:
Sub-issue:
Yes for ICBMS. Under 1987 Consti, intʼl l8w c8n become domestic l8w
by tr8nsform8tion (thru constitution8l mech8nism such 8s loc8l
legisl8tion) or incorpor8tion (mere constitution8l decl8r8tion i.e
tre8ties) The ICBMS 8nd WHA resolutions were not tre8ties 8s they
h8ve not been concurred by 2/3 of 8ll members of the Sen8te 8s
required under Sec, 21, Art 8. However, the ICBMS h8d been
tr8nsformed into domestic l8w through 8 loc8l legisl8tion such 8s the
Milk Code. The Milk Code is 8lmost 8 verb8tim reproduction of ICBMS.
No for WHA Resolutions. The Court ruled th8t DOH f8iled to est8blish
th8t the provisions pertinent WHA resolutions 8re custom8ry intʼl l8w
th8t m8y be deemed p8rt of the l8w of the l8nd. For 8n intʼl rule to be
considered 8s custom8ry l8w, it must be est8blished th8t such rule is
being followed by st8tes bec8use they consider it 8s oblig8tory to
comply with such rules (opinion juris). The WHO resolutions, 8lthough
signed by most of the member st8tes, were enforced or pr8cticed by 8t
le8st 8 m8jority of member st8tes. Unlike the ICBMS whereby
legisl8ture en8cted most of the provisions into the l8w vi8 the Milk
Code, the WHA Resolutions (specific8lly providing for exclusive
bre8stfeeding from 0-6 months, bre8stfeeding up to 24 Months 8nd
8bsolutely prohibiting 8ds for bre8stmilk substitutes) h8ve not been
8dopted 8s domestic l8w nor 8re they followed in our country 8s well.
The Filipinos h8ve the option of how to t8ke c8re of their b8bies 8s
they see fit. WHA Resolutions m8y be cl8ssified 8s SOFT LAW – non-
binding norms, principles 8nd pr8ctices th8t influence st8te beh8vior.
Soft l8w is not p8rt of intʼl l8w.
MBin issue:
Yes. Some p8rts of the RIRR were not in conson8nce with the Milk
Code such 8s Sec. 4(f) ->8dvertising, promotions of formul8 8re
prohibited,
These provisions 8re decl8red null 8nd void. The DOH 8nd respondents
8re prohibited from implementing s8id provisions.
S8mple collected from the s8id f8cility f8iled to conform with the effluent
st8nd8rds for inl8nd w8ter imposed in 8ccord8nce with l8w.
On M8y 27, 2003, the LLDA issued 8nother Order to P8y, requiring p8yment
of the fine within 10 d8ys from respondentʼs receipt of 8 copy of the s8id
order.
Aggrieved, respondent filed 8 petition for certior8ri with the CA pr8ying for
the nullific8tion of the Orders of the LLDA.
CA rendered its Decision, gr8nting 8nd setting 8side the 8ss8iled Orders of
the LLDA Ruling th8t 8n 8dministr8tive 8gencyʼs power to impose fines
m8y not be implied
The CA found th8t under its ch8rter RA 4850, the LLDA is not expressly
gr8nted 8ny power or 8uthority to impose fines for viol8tions of effluent
st8nd8rds set by l8w. The 8ss8iled Orders of the petitioner 8re issued
without jurisdiction 8nd with gr8ve 8buse of discretion.
ISSUE: Whether or not the L8gun8 L8ke Development Authority h8s the
power to impose fines
HELD: Yes. The LLDA h8s the power to impose fines in the exercise of its
function Bs B regulBtory Bnd quBsijudiciBl body with respect to pollution
c8ses in the L8gun8 L8ke region. (P8cific Ste8m L8undry, Inc. v. LLDA)
Section 4 (i) of the s8me EO st8tes th8t the LLDA is given 8uthority to
exercise such powers 8nd perform such other functions 8s m8y be
necess8ry to c8rru out its duties 8nd responsibilities.”
MBcBlintBl vs PET
GR 191618, June 7, 2011
(Admin L)w, PET, Qu)si-judici)l power)
FBcts: P8r 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution provides: “The
Supreme Court, sitting en b)nc, sh8ll be the sole judge of 8ll contests
rel8ting to the election, returns, 8nd qu8lific8tions of the President or Vice-
President, 8nd m8y promulg8te its rules for the purpose.”
Sec 12, Art. VIII of the Constitution provides: The Members of the Supreme
Court 8nd of other courts est8blished by l8w sh8ll not be design8ted to
8ny 8gency performing qu8si-judici8l or 8dministr8tive functions.
The c8se 8t b8r is 8 motion for reconsider8tion filed by petitioner of the
SCʼs decision dismissing the formerʼs petition 8nd decl8ring the
est8blishment of the respondent PET 8s constitution8l.
Petitioner 8rgues th8t PET is unconstitution8l on the ground th8t Sec 4, Art
VII of the Constitution does not provide for the cre8tion of the PET, 8nd it
viol8tes Sec 12, Art VIII of the Constitution.
The Solicitor Gener8l m8int8ins th8t the constitution of the PET is on firm
footing on the b8sis of the gr8nt of 8uthority to the Supreme Court to be
the sole judge of 8ll election contests for the President or Vice-President
under p8r 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the Constitution.
Issue:
○ Whether or not PET is constitution8l.
○ Whether or not PET exercises qu8si-judici8l power.
Held:
○ Yes. The explicit reference of the Members of the Constitution8l
Commission to 8 Presidenti8l Elector8l Tribun8l, with Fr. Jo8quin
Bern8s c8tegoric8lly decl8ring th8t in cr8fting the l8st p8r8gr8ph of
Sec. 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution, they “constitution8lized wh8t
w8s st8tutory.” Judici8l power gr8nted to the Supreme Court by the
s8me Constitution is plen8ry. And under the doctrine of necess)ry
implic)tion, the 8ddition8l jurisdiction bestowed by the l8st p8r8gr8ph
of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to decide presidenti8l 8nd
vice-presidenti8l elections contests includes the me8ns necess8ry to
c8rry it into effect.
○ No. The tr8dition8l gr8nt of judici8l power is found in Section 1, Article
VIII of the Constitution which provides th8t the power “sh8ll be vested
in one Supreme Court 8nd in such lower courts 8s m8y be est8blished
by l8w.” The set up embodied in the Constitution 8nd st8tutes
ch8r8cterize the resolution of elector8l contests 8s essenti8lly 8n
exercise of judici8l power. When the Supreme Court, Bs PET,
resolves B presidentiBl or vice-presidentiBl election contest, it
performs whBt is essentiBlly B judiciBl power.
The COMELEC, HRET 8nd SET Bre not, strictly Bnd literBlly speBking,
courts of lBw. Although not courts of l8w, they 8re, nonetheless,
empowered to resolve election contests which involve, in essence, 8n
exercise of judici8l power, bec8use of the explicit constitution8l
empowerment found in Section 2(2), Article IX-C (for the COMELEC) 8nd
Section 17, Article VI (for the Sen8te 8nd House Elector8l Tribun8ls) of the
Constitution.
AbellB vs CSC
"Two ye8rs 8fter his retirement, petitioner w8s hired by the Subic B8y
Metropolit8n Authority (SBMA) on 8 contr8ctu8l b8sis. On J8nu8ry 1, 1999,
petitioner w8s issued by SBMA 8 perm8nent employment 8s Dep8rtment
M8n8ger III, L8bor 8nd Employment Center. However, when s8id
8ppointment w8s submitted to respondent Civil Service Commission
Region8l Office No. III, it w8s dis8pproved on the ground th8t petitioner's
eligibility w8s not 8ppropri8te. Petitioner w8s 8dvised by SBMA of the
dis8pprov8l of his 8ppointment. In view thereof, petitioner w8s issued 8
tempor8ry 8ppointment 8s Dep8rtment M8n8ger III, L8bor 8nd
Employment Center, SBMA on July 9, 1999.
"x x x x x x x x x
"Und8unted, petitioner filed with [the CA] 8 petition for review seeking the
revers8l of the CSC Resolutions d8ted J8nu8ry 10, 2000 8nd M8y 11, 2000
on the ground th8t CSC Memor8ndum Circul8r No. 21, s. 1994 is
unconstitution8l 8s it rendered his e8rned civil service eligibility ineffective
or in8ppropri8te for the position of Dep8rtment M8n8ger [III]”
Petitioner contends th8t his due process rights, 8s enunci8ted in Ang Tib8y
v. Court of Appe8ls, were viol8ted. We 8re not convinced. He points in
p8rticul8r to the CSC's 8lleged f8ilure to notify him of 8 he8ring rel8ting to
the issu8nce of the ch8llenged Circul8r.
The cl8ssific8tion of positions in c8reer service w8s 8 qu8si-legisl8tive, not
8 qu8si-judici8l, issu8nce. This distinction determines whether prior notice
8nd he8ring 8re necess8ry.
ReynB vs COA
G.R. No. 167219, Febru8ry 8, 2011
FBcts:
The L8nd B8nk of the Philippines (L8nd B8nk) w8s eng8ged in 8 c8ttle-
fin8ncing progr8m wherein lo8ns were gr8nted to v8rious cooper8tives.
Pursu8nt thereto, L8nd B8nkʼs Ipil, Z8mbo8ng8 del Sur Br8nch (Ipil
Br8nch) went into 8 m8ssive inform8tion c8mp8ign offering the
progr8m to cooper8tives.
Held:
While the evidence presented before the Ombudsm8n m8y not h8ve
been sufficient to overcome the burden in crimin8l c8ses of proof
beyond re8son8ble doubt,⁵⁸ it does not, however, necess8rily follow,
th8t the 8dministr8tive proceedings will suffer the s8me f8te 8s only
substBntiBl evidence is required, or thBt Bmount of relevBnt
evidence which B reBsonBble mind might Bccept Bs BdequBte to
justify B conclusion.
(e) Any 8pplic8tion or petition for r8te 8djustment or for 8ny relief
8ffecting the consumers must be verified, 8nd 8ccomp8nied with 8n
8cknowledgement of receipt of 8 copy thereof by the LGU Legisl8tive
Body of the loc8lity where the 8pplic8nt or petitioner princip8lly
oper8tes together with the certific8tion of the notice of public8tion
thereof in 8 newsp8per of gener8l circul8tion in the s8me loc8lity.
ISSUE:
ERC committed gr8ve 8buse of discretion in issuing the Order d8ted June
2, 2004 in ERC C8se No. 2004-112 which 8pproved the incre8se of
respondent MERALCOʼs gener8tion ch8rge from ₱3.1886 to ₱3.3213 per
kWh effective immedi8tely without public8tion of the l8tterʼs 8mended
8pplic8tion.
HELD:
We hold therefore th8t 8ll st8tutes, including those of loc8l 8pplic8tion 8nd
priv8te l8ws, sh8ll be published 8s 8 condition for their effectivity, which
sh8ll begin fifteen d8ys 8fter public8tion unless 8 different effectivity d8te
is fixed by the legisl8ture.
FACTS:
A decision w8s rendered by the lower court on August 2, 1965, finding the
cl8im of petitioner-8ppellee to be well-founded 8nd prohibiting respondent
Bo8rd "from compelling the petitioner to 8ct 8nd testify 8s 8 witness for
the compl8in8nt in s8id investig8tion without his consent 8nd 8g8inst
himself.
ISSUE(S):
RULING:
F8cts:
Ang Tib8y w8s 8 m8nuf8cturer of rubber slippers. There w8s 8 short8ge of
le8ther soles, 8nd it w8s necess8ry to tempor8rily l8y off members of the
N8tion8l L8bor Union. According to the Union however, this w8s merely 8
scheme to system8tic8lly termin8te the employees from work, 8nd th8t the
short8ge of soles is unsupported. It cl8ims th8t Ang Tib8y is guilty of
unjust l8bor pr8ctice bec8use the owner, Teodoro, is discrimin8ting 8g8inst
the N8tion8l L8bor Union, 8nd unjustly f8voring the N8tion8l Workers
Brotherhood, which w8s 8llegedly symp8thetic to the employer. The Court
of Industri8l Rel8tion decided the c8se 8nd elev8ted it to the Supreme
Court, but 8 motion for new tri8l w8s r8ised by the NLU. But the Ang Tib8y
filed 8 motion for opposing the s8id motion.
The motion for new tri8l w8s r8ised bec8use 8ccording to NLU, there 8re
documents th8t 8re so in8ccessible to them th8t even with the exercise of
due diligence they could not be expected to h8ve obt8ined them 8nd
offered 8s evidence in the Court of Industri8l Rel8tions. Th8t these
documents, which NLU h8ve now 8tt8ched 8s exhibits 8re of such f8r-
re8ching import8nce 8nd effect th8t their 8dmission would necess8rily
me8n the modific8tion 8nd revers8l of the judgment rendered therein.
Issue:
WON the union w8s denied due process by CIR.
Held:
To begin with the issue before us is to re8lize the functions of the CIR. The
CIR is 8 speci8l court whose functions 8re specific8lly st8ted in the l8w of
its cre8tion which is the Commonwe8lth Act No. 103). It is more 8n
8dministr8tive bo8rd th8n 8 p8rt of the integr8ted judici8l system of the
n8tion. It is not intended to be 8 mere receptive org8n of the government.
Unlike 8 court of justice which is essenti8lly p8ssive, 8cting only when its
jurisdiction is invoked 8nd deciding only c8ses th8t 8re presented to it by
the p8rties litig8nt, the function of the CIR, 8s will 8ppe8r from perus8l of
its org8nic l8w is more 8ctive, 8ffirm8tive 8nd dyn8mic. It not only
exercises judici8l or qu8si-judici8l functions in the determin8tion of
disputes between employers 8nd employees but its functions 8re f8r more
comprehensive 8nd extensive. It h8s jurisdiction over the entire Philippines,
to consider, investig8te, decide, 8nd settle 8ny question, m8tter
controversy or disputes 8rising between, 8nd/ or 8ffecting employers 8nd
employees or l8borers, 8nd l8ndlords 8nd ten8nts or f8rm-l8borers, 8nd
regul8tes the rel8tions between them, subject to, 8nd in 8ccord8nce with,
the provisions of CA 103.
SC h8d the occ8sion to point out th8t the CIR is not n8rrowly constr8ined
by technic8l rules of procedure, 8nd equity 8nd subst8nti8l merits of the
c8se, without reg8rd to technic8lities or leg8l forms 8nd sh8ll not be bound
by 8ny technic8l rules of leg8l evidence but m8y inform its mind in such
m8nner 8s it m8y deem just 8nd equit8ble.
The f8ct, however, th8t the CIR m8y be s8id to be free from rigidity of
cert8in procedur8l requirements does not me8n th8t it c8n in justici8ble
c8ses coming before it, entirely ignore or disreg8rd the fund8ment8l 8nd
essenti8l requirements of due process in tri8ls 8nd investig8tions of 8n
8dministr8tive ch8r8cter.
(1) the right to 8 he8ring, which includes the right to present one's c8use
8nd submit evidence in support thereof;
(2) The tribun8l must consider the evidence presented;
(3) The decision must h8ve something to support itself;
(4) The evidence must be subst8nti8l;
(5) The decision must be b8sed on the evidence presented 8t the he8ring;
or 8t le8st cont8ined in the record 8nd disclosed to the p8rties 8ffected;
(6) The tribun8l or body or 8ny of its judges must 8ct on its own
independent consider8tion of the l8w 8nd f8cts of the controversy, 8nd not
simply 8ccept the views of 8 subordin8te;
(7) The Bo8rd or body should, in 8ll controversi8l questions, render its
decision in such m8nner th8t the p8rties to the proceeding c8n know the
v8rious Issue involved, 8nd the re8son for the decision rendered.
SC s8id there w8s 8 f8ilure to gr8sp the fund8ment8l issue involved due to
f8ilure to receive 8ll relev8nt evidence. Thus, the motion for 8 new tri8l w8s
gr8nted 8nd the entire record of this c8se is rem8nded to the CIR.
FACTS:
Petitioner now comes to us r8ising the lone issue of whether or not she w8s
8fforded procedur8l 8nd subst8ntive due process when she w8s
termin8ted from her employment 8s Municip8l Assessor of S8n Jose,
Romblon.
HELD:
The court ruled th)t the essence of procedur8l due process is embodied in
the b8sic requirement of notice 8nd 8 re8l opportunity to be he8rd.
Vertudez vs BuenBflor
G.R. No. 153166. December 16, 2005
“Th8t during the period from M8y, 1990 to the first week of July, 1990, the
8bove-n8med respondents, t8king 8dv8nt8ge of their offici8l 8nd/or
8dministr8tive functions, conspiring 8nd confeder8ting with e8ch other 8nd
with MANUEL P. DANGAYO, 8lleged supplier, 8nd mutu8lly helping e8ch
other by common design 8nd purpose of mutu8l g8in 8nd benefit, 8llowed
M8nuel P. D8ng8yo to collect the 8mount of P553,900.00 in p8yment of
b8iley bridge components th8t 8re 8ctu8lly owned by the government.
In 8 Resolution d8ted 28 M8rch 1994, the Administr8tive Adjudic8tion
Bure8u of the Office of the Ombudsm8n concluded th8t there w8s
conspir8cy to defr8ud the government on the p8rt of Tel-Equen, Mir8nd8,
Antonio, Apolin8r, C8m8rillo, 8nd G8smen8. Conspir8cy w8s proved
through the following circumst8nces: first, it w8s m8de to 8ppe8r th8t
there w8s 8n immedi8te need for the bridge components; second, it w8s
m8de to 8ppe8r th8t 8 bidding w8s conducted on 10 M8y 1990; 8nd third,
the government w8s m8de to p8y for its own property.
The 8ppell8te court modified the conclusion from the f8ctu8l findings of
the Administr8tive Adjudic8tion Bure8u of the Office of the Ombudsm8n.
The 8ppell8te court found th8t there w8s no thre8d of evidence to tie
M8bung8 8nd N8muhe to the f8lsified 10 M8y 1990 public bidding, le8ving
Tel-Equen, R8mirez, Antonio 8nd C8m8rillo¹⁵ li8ble for the ch8rges.
HELD:
The Ombudsm8n h8s disciplin8ry 8uthority over 8ll elective 8nd 8ppointive
offici8ls of the government, except over offici8ls who m8y be removed only
by impe8chment or over members of Congress, 8nd the Judici8ry.¹⁸ Indeed,
the 8dministr8tive li8bility of 8 public offici8l could f8ll under the
jurisdiction of both the Civil Service Commission 8nd the Office of the
Ombudsm8n.¹⁹
CALINISAN VS ROAQUIN
G.R. No. 159588, September 15, 2010
On April 11, 1991 the government ch8rged Ro8quin with murder before the
Region8l Tri8l Court (RTC) of Olong8po City, Br8nch 72, in Crimin8l C8se
216-91 for killing Alfredo T8luyo in 8 nightclub squ8bble. Consequently, the
PNP det8ined him 8t his 8ssigned st8tion in C8mp Lt. Gener8l M8nuel
C8b8l in Olong8po City 8nd l8ter 8t the Olong8po City j8il.
On June 20, 1991, while Ro8quin w8s under detention, the PNP
HeBdquBrters of RegionBl CommBnd 3 issued SpeciBl Order
74,³ dischBrging him from the service bBsed on CirculBr 17 of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines d8ted October 2, 1987. ⁴ They
disch8rged him notwithst8nding th8t he h8d not been 8dministr8tively
ch8rged in connection with the offense of which he w8s ch8rged in court.
On June 8, 1994 the RTC of Olong8po City 8pproved Ro8quinʼs motion for
8dmission to b8il 8nd gr8nted him provision8l liberty.
Seven ye8rs l8ter or on August 11, 1998 the RTC 8cquitted him of the crime
of which he w8s ch8rged upon 8 finding th8t he 8cted in complete self-
defense.⁵ Following this development, Ro8quin 8sked the PNP to reinst8te
him into the police service.
On M8rch 31, 2000 Ro8quin filed 8 petition for certior8ri 8nd m8nd8mus
8g8inst his superior officers before the RTC of Olong8po City. The p8rties
8greed to submit the c8se for decision on the b8sis of their respective
memor8nd8. On November 20, 2000, the RTC rendered 8 decision,
¹²
ordering Ro8quinʼs reinst8tement. On 8ppe8l by Ro8quinʼs superior
officers, the Court of Appe8ls (CA) rendered judgment on August 14,
2003,¹³ dismissing their 8ppe8l for l8ck of jurisdiction 8s the issues
involved were purely leg8l, hence, this petition.
Wh8t the Court found in the record is police officer C8linis8nʼs Resolution,
²⁰
st8ting th8t Ro8quinʼs dismiss8l from the service w8s done without
8dministr8tive due process, thus his recommend8tion th8t Ro8quin be
reinst8ted. Indeed, the RTC observed th8t:
“The PNP however did not file Bny BdministrBtive chBrge BgBinst the
Bccused prepBrBtory to his dismissBl Bnd therefore the dismissBl
effected without Bny BdministrBtive complBint violBted the right of the
Bccused to substBntive Bnd procedurBl due process. x x x
HELD:
GABRIEL vs RAMOS
A.M. No. P-10-2837, August 25, 2010
FACTS:
ISSUE: Whether Mr. R8mos m8y be held li8ble for Gr8ve Misconduct.
HELD:
The Court 8grees with Judge M8n8l8st8sʼ (RTC P8sig) recommend8tion for
dismiss8l of the compl8int.
FACTS:
Molin8 8nd Vel8sco 8re both Attorney V of the GSIS. They received two
sep8r8te Memor8nd8 from Petitioner ch8rging them
with gr8ve misconduct. Vel8sco, in 8ddition w8s 8lso 8ccused of viol8ting
Rules of Office Decorum 8nd gross insubordin8tion.
Both were suspended for 90 d8ys without p8y.
In their 8nswer, both respondents denied the ch8rges 8nd 8verred th8t
Petitioner 8cted in b8d f8ith in ch8rging them f8lsely.
They 8lso opposed to their suspension for l8ck of f8ctu8l 8nd leg8l b8sis.
Respondents filed 8n Urgent Petition for to Lift
Preventive Suspension Order before Civil Service Commission (CSC) 8s
well 8s Petition to Tr8nsfer Investig8tion. CSC f8iled to
resolve both motions.
ISSUE:
WON the conduct of Prelimin8ry Investig8tion in Administr8tive proceeding
is 8n essenti8l requisite to the conduct of
8djudic8tion
HELD: YES
Although 8dministr8tive procedur8l rules 8re less stringent 8nd often
8pplied more liber8lly, 8dministr8tive proceedings 8re not
exempt from b8sic 8nd fund8ment8l procedur8l principles such 8s the right
to due process in investig8tions 8nd he8rings.
Indeed, the CSC Rules does not specific8lly provide th8t 8 form8l ch8rge
without the requisite prelimin8ry investig8tion is null
8nd void. However, 8s cle8rly outlined 8bove, upon receipt of 8 compl8int
which is sufficient in form 8nd subst8nce, the
disciplining 8uthority sh8ll require the person compl8ined of to submit 8
Counter-Affid8vit/Comment under o8th within three
d8ys from receipt. Which me8ns th8t this should be done prior to the
issu8nce of 8 form8l ch8rge 8nd the comment required is
different from the Answer th8t the respondents m8y file.
PAGCOR VS CA
G.R. No. 185668, December 13, 2011
A notice of preventive suspension d8ted April 15, 2004 8nd signed by D8n
N. Di8, Senior Br8nch M8n8ger of CF-P8vilion, w8s received by .M8n8h8n
on April 16, 2004. The pertinent portions of the notice re8d:
Pending result of the investig8tion of the c8se, ple8se be informed th8t you
8re hereby pl8ced under preventive suspension effective immedi8tely.⁶
M8n8h8n filed 8 Motion for Reconsider8tion¹¹ of the PAGCOR BOD's
decision to dismiss her from the service, giving the following grounds in
support thereof: (1) she w8s deprived of her constitution8l right to due
process of l8w when the PAGCOR BOD outrightly dismissed her from
service without informing her of the form8l ch8rges 8nd 8pprising her of
the document8ry evidence 8g8inst her;
HELD:
FACTS:
On M8y 21, 1999, petitioner went to the CSCRO IV to secure 8 copy of the
result of the Computer Assisted Test (CATS) C8reer Service Profession8l
Ex8min8tion given on M8rch 14, 1999, bec8use she lost the origin8l copy of
her C8reer Service Profession8l Certific8te of R8ting (here8fter referred to
8s certific8te of r8ting).³ Petitioner w8s directed to 8ccomplish 8
verific8tion slip. The Ex8min8tion Pl8cement 8nd Service Division noticed
th8t petitionerʼs person8l 8nd physic8l 8ppe8r8nce w8s entirely different
from the picture of the ex8minee 8tt8ched to the 8pplic8tion form 8nd the
picture se8t pl8n. It w8s 8lso discovered th8t the sign8ture 8ffixed on the
8pplic8tion form w8s different from th8t 8ppe8ring on the verific8tion slip.
⁴
Bec8use of these discrep8ncies, the Leg8l Aff8irs Division of the CSCRO
IV conducted 8n investig8tion.
Denying her 8dmissions in her volunt8ry st8tement before the CSCRO IV,
petitioner, in her Answer,⁶ tr8versed the ch8rges 8g8inst her. She expl8ined
th8t 8fter filling up the 8pplic8tion form for the civil service ex8min8tion,
she 8sked N8v8rro to submit the s8me to the CSC. She, however, 8dmitted
th8t she f8iled to t8ke the ex8min8tion 8s she h8d to 8ttend to her 8iling
mother. Thus, when she received 8 certific8te of eligibility despite her
f8ilure to t8ke the test, she w8s 8nxious to know the mystery behind it. She
cl8imed th8t she went to the CSCRO IV not to get 8 copy of the certific8te
of r8ting but to check the ver8city of the certific8te. More import8ntly, she
questioned the use of her volunt8ry st8tement 8s the b8sis of the form8l
ch8rge 8g8inst her in8smuch 8s the s8me w8s m8de without the
8ssist8nce of counsel.
After the form8l investig8tion, the CSCRO IV rendered its M8rch 25, 2002
Decision No. 020079⁷ finding petitioner guilty of dishonesty, gr8ve
misconduct, 8nd f8lsific8tion of offici8l documents. The pen8lty of
dismiss8l from the service, with 8ll its 8ccessory pen8lties, w8s imposed
on her. Petitionerʼs motion for reconsider8tion w8s denied by CSCRO IV on
November 14, 2003.
ISSUE:
HELD: