Factual notes NEW ELUCIDATION ‘The editor wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness to J. A. Reuscher for the material which has been derived from his notes to his translation of Kant’s Nova Dilucidatio (Beck, 1986, pp. 106-9) and incorporated in the following notes: 2, 6, 8,9, 10, 11, 12, 13, T4, 15, 10, 23s 24, 25, 20, 27, 31, 33, 35s 36, 37s 38) 40, 41, 42, 49, 52, 53, $6, 60, 66. This material has been reprinted by permission of the publisher from Lewis White Beck et al., Kant’s Latin Writings: Translations, Com- ‘mentaries and Notes (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 1986. All rights reserved.), Pp. 106-9. 1 The dissertation was defended for Kant by a certain Christoph Abraham Borchard, who composed the dedication, which was printed on the back of the title page of the first edition (published by J. H. Hartung of Kénigsberg in 1755) of this work, and which has not been included in the text itself in the Academy edition (although it is cited by Lasswitz in his introduction to the work [AK 1:565]). The dedication ran: “To the Most Illustrious, Most Noble and Most Excellent Lord, Lord Johann von Lehwald, Field Marshall to the August King of the Prussians, Supreme Commander of the Fortresses of Pillau and Memel, Most Worthy Knight of the Celebrated Order of the Black Eagle, Most Vigilant General of the Infantry. To the Incomparable Hero, to his Lord and Most Gracious Patron, are dedicated, with the senti- ment of deepest obligation, these pages as proof of his gratitude and loyalty for the many favours received by your most humble servant Christoph Abra- ham Borchard,” 2 Cf. Inquiry (1764), Third Reflection, §§2 & 3 (AK 2:292~6). 3. CE. False Subtlety (1762), §1 (AK 2:47), where Kant distinguishes between affirmation and negation as two fundamental logical forms of judgement. In §2 of that treatise (AK 2:49), he goes on to speak of two basic rules of syllogistic reasoning, one for affirming, and one for negating, syllogisms. Neither of the two basic rules admits of noncircular proof. 4 Throughout his life Leibniz entertained the project of the ars characteristca, the art of representing ideas, both simple and complex, so as to display both the internal constitution and structure of ideas and their relationship to each other by means of signs or conventional symbols (Leibniz sometimes employ- ing an arithmetical and sometimes an algebraic notation). A fully developed «ars characteristica would constitute a perfect logical language transcending all natural languages and embodying a complete system of algorithmic logic, Leibniz envisaged the ars characteristica as an organon, analogous to geometry, for facilitating the discovery and extension of material truth. Leibniz’s ars 4710 ay n 13 4 15 16 y 18 19 20 21 23 4 FACTUAL NOTES TO PAGES 8-18 characteristica influenced, among others, Lambert in his Neues Organon (3764) and anticipated Frege’s Begriffchrift (Conceptual Notation’ (Halle: 1879]).. Leibniz’s ars characteristica was never fully developed; his thoughts on the matter are contained in a variety of papers and essays, of which the most important are: Dissertation on theArt of Combinations (1666) (Loemker, pp. 73~ 84); On the General Characteristic (ca.1679) (Loemker, pp. 221-8); On Univer- sal Synthesis and Analysis, or the Art of Discuvery and Judgement (16792) (Loem- ker, pp. 229-34) and Tivo Studies in the Logical Calculus (1679) (Loemker, pp. 235-47). For alater statement of Kant’s critical estimate of Leibniz’s project, see Inquiry (1764), First Reflection, §§2 & 3 (AK 2:278-82). Cf. Aesop, Fabulae ad litteram digestac, LXW; see also La Fontaine, Fables choisies mises en vers (1668) (Livre V, Fable TX: Le labourieur et ses enfants), The final words of the Fable sum up its sense: Mais le pére fut sage / De leur montrer avant sa mort / Que le travail est un trésor Cf. Boerhaave, Elementa chimiae (1724) (Vol. 1, p. 119). Kant cites this view of Boerhaave’s in Directions in Space (1768) (AK. 2:377)- CE. Daries, Introductio in artem inveniendi (1742). The symbolic equation is also found in Baumgarten, Metaphysica (1739), §9 (7th edition: 1779). Cf. Inaugural Dissertation (1770), §27 (AK 2:413—15), where Kant maintains that real possibility cannot be inferred from the logical modalities. See also §14 (AK 2:398-402) and §28 (AK 2:415-17). See also Negative Magnitudes (1763) (AK 2:165-204). Excluding Wolff, however. Cf. Wolff, Philosophia prima (1729), §8. CE. Descartes, Principia philosophiae (1644), (II, §§63-4 and IV, §28). Kant’s account of Descartes’s views is not entirely accurate CE. Wolff, Philosophia prima (1729), §56. CE. Crusius, Dissertatio de usu et limitibus (1743), §§11 & III et passim, CE. Wolff, Philasophia prima (1729), §309; also Theologia naturalis (1736-7), §28; see also Baumgarten, Metaphysica (1739), §820 (in the 7th edition: 1779). Kant’s critique of the Cartesian ontological proof is restated at greater length in The Only Possible Argument (1763) (AK 2:78-9) and more briefly in the Inquiry (1764) (AK. 2:297). Cf. Wolff, Philasophia prima (1729), §303- Kant’s proof of the existence of God from the possibilty of things is restated at greater length in The Only Possible Argument (1763) (AK. 2:77-87; see especially AK 2:83) and more briefly in the Inquiry (1764) (AK 2:296~7). CE. The Only Possible Argument (1763) (AK. 2:83-4) for another statement of the view that there can be only one absolutely necessary being. The same view is also stated in the Znaugural Dissertation (1770), §18 (AK 2:407-8). CE. Wolff, Philasophia prima (1729), §303- Kant uses the same example —that of a triangle having three sides —as illustration of the principle of identity in Proposition TV of this section (AK 1:392 footnote). CE. Descartes, Meditationes (1641), Meditato V. See Proposition VI, Scholium (AK 1:394). CE. Crusius, Entmourf (1745), §31 CE. Crusius, Entiourf (1745), §§83 & 380. 41825 26 oT 28 29 30 3 32 33 35 36 37 38 39 40 " 2 FACTUAL NOTES TO PAGES 19-32 Cf. Wolff, Philosophia prima (1720), §70. Cf. Baumgarten, Metaphysica (1739), §20 et passim (7th edition: 1779). CE. Daries, Elementa metaphysica (1743), Praccognitio, §6. CE. Crusius, Dissertatio de usu et limitibus (1743); also Anmeisung verniinfig =u Leben (1744), §1643 Weg 2ur Gewissheit (1747), 8154. CE. note 27 above. CE. note 28 above. CE. Crusius, Entwurf (1745), §126 (2nd edition: 1753). ‘The Stoics, while maintaining the freedom and autonomy of the soul, also developed a doctrine of strict determinism or fatalism. Derived from the pre-Socratic philosophers (especially Heraclitus, Democritus, and Leucip- pus), the doctrine of fate is found in the teachings of the earliest Stoics. The classic statement of Stoic fatalism is found in Chrysippus. To him Gellius attributed the following statement: ‘Fate is a certain eternal and inflexible sequence and concatenation of things which snakes its way along and weaves its path through the eternal series of consequences from which it is fash- ioned and out of which it is constituted’ (Noctes Atticae |‘Autic Nights’), VII, 2). This passage is quoted by Kant later in this discussion (cf. note 35). For further statements of the Stoic view of fate, see Seneca, De Providentia (V, vili) and Cicero, De Fato, XVI Kant may have in mind here the fact that Crusius’s charge that determinism impairs freedom and morality is a repetition of that against Wolff, which had led to the latter’s dismissal from the University of Halle in 1723. Chrysippus of Soli or Tarsus (ca. 280-206 8.C.): Stoic logician who laid the foundations of propositional logic. Cf. Diogenes Laertius, VI, 7. ‘This passage is a paraphrase of a passage which is cited by Crusius in his, Dissertatio de usu et limitibus (1743), and which contains the definition of fate ascribed by Gellius to Chrysippus in the Noctes Atticae (Attic Nights’) VIL, 2. A translation of the passage is to be found in note 32 above. Cf. Crusius, Entourf (1745), §§125-6 (and edition: 1753) CE. Leibniz, Théodicée (1710), §1325 of. Wolff, Verninftige Gedancken von Gott, der Welt and der Secle des Menschen (1719), §5755 ¢f. Baumgarten, Metaphysica (1739), §707 (in the 7th edition: 1779). CE. Crusius, Entwurf (1745), §126. CE. ‘Refutation of the Arguments’ of the present work (AK 1:406). See also Dreams (1766) (AK 2:33 footnote); Critique of Pure Reason (1781/1787) A320 / B376 (AK 4:203~4 / AK 3:249-50); also Anthropology (1798) (AK 7:135-7) and the Logic (1800), Introduction (AK 9:33). CE Wolff, Poychologica empirica (1732), §9335 cf. Baumgarten, Metaphysica (1739), §704 (7th edition: 1779). The theory of freedom expounded here by Kant is in part a repetition of and in part an improvement on Wolfi’s theory in Verniinftige Gedancken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen (1719), §§511,521, and §970. Kant, in the Critigue of Practical Reason (1788) (AK 5:95-T01) rejects this theory as a ‘wretched subterfuge’ as sustaining a freedom ‘no better than that of a turnspit, which when once wound up also ‘carries out its motions of itsel” CE. Crusius, Enturf (1745), §269 and §§271-3 (in the 2nd edition: 1753). This is the first of Kant’s attempts to demonstrate the general conservation 4198B 4 45 47 48 49 50 31 52 53 FACTUAL NOTES TO PAGES 33-5 principle. Later proofs are found in the Inaugural Dissertation (1770), §30 (AK 2:417-19) and the Critique of Pure Reason (1781/1787) Ar82-9 / B225-32 (AK 4:124-8 / AK 3:162-6). ‘The smaller elastic body is repelled by the larger while imparting its force to the latter. If one were to add up the absolute quantity of motion, regardless of its direction, of the repelled smaller body and of the moving larger body, a sum would result which exceeds the quantity of the original motion. But the correct calculation involves subtracting the quantities of motion in different directions. The best way of understanding this is to consider the motion of the centre of gravity of the system consisting of both bodies: the quantity of motion of that centre will then be found to obey the conservation principle here formulated by Kant. In the case of an object which is inducing motion in another object which is at rest relative to the first, the second object in turn will be returned to a state of rest by the resistance due to yet another object (or objects), where this resistance equals the original force exerted by the first object. CE. On Fire (1755) (AK 1:383-4). CE. Hales, Vegetable Staticks (1727), Chapter VI of which contains a number of references to experiments with gunpowder. Kant’s library contained a German translation of this work. See also Hales, Aitempt to Analyse the Air (1727). Kant’s mention both of the elastic matter of air and igneous matter refers to a view which treats phenomena such as fire or heat and magnetic and electric charges as ‘subtle matters’ or as substances, a view which he holds himself and discusses in On Fire (1755), Propositions I-V (AK 1:371~5) and Propo- sition VIII (AK 1:376-8). See also Physical Monadology (1756) with its discus sion of an elastic medium in Proposition XIII (AK 1:486). CE. Leibniz, Monadologie (1714), $56, where the case is maintained that, as a result of the connection between all created or finite substances, every single such substance stands in relations which express all others. Therefore, Leib niz maintains, every particular created substance is a perpetual living mirror of the universe. In §57 he observes that each created substance is but a perspective of a single universe, varied according to its point of view which differs for each such substance. In this context, the metaphor of a stronger light stands for the notion of degree of apperception; differences in perspec- tive are, it turns out, differences in degrees of apperception. Baumgarten enunciated the principle of consequence in his Metaphysica (739), §23 (in the 7th edition: 1779). CE. Proposition XII (AK 1:410-11). Leibniz. originated the principle of the identity of indiscernibles. Formula- tions of the principle are found in First Truths (ca. 1680-4), Discours de la métaphysique (1686), Chapter IX; and in the Monadologie (1714), §9 (cf. Loemker, pp. 267-71, 303-30, and 643~53 respectively). CE. Critique of Pure Reason (1781/1787) A263~6 / B319-22 (AK. 4:171-2 / AK 3:216-18); see also Az80-2 / B336-8 (AK 4:180-1 / AK 3:226-7).. CEA Collection of Papers (1717). See in particular Leibniz’s Paper IV, §3 and. Paper V, §21 (Loemker, pp. 687-91 and 696~717 respectively). 42056 37 58 59 61 62 63 64 65 66 68 FACTUAL NOTES TO PAGES 36-44 CF. notes 51 and 52 above. ‘This principle can be viewed as foreshadowing the Second and Third Anal- ogy of the Crinigue of Pure Reason (1781/1787) Ar89~215 / B232~62 (AK 3:166-83 / AK 4:128-43). CE Wolff, Philosophia prima (1729), §§721-2; Baumgarten, Metaphysica (1739); §704 (7th edition: 1779). ‘This is the earliest of Kant’s many refutations of material idealism. Entirely different arguments are employed in the Inaugural Dissertation (1770), §11 (AK 2:397) and the Critique of Pure Reason (1787) A366~80 (AK 4:230-8). CE. Leibniz, Monadologie (1714), §78; see also Leibniz’s letter to des Bosses of 16 June 1712 (Gerhardt [P], Il, 450-2). See also Inaugural Dissertation, §22 (AK 2:409). Cf. Crusius, Weg zur Gewissheit (1747), §§79-81 CE. Inaugural Dissertation (1770), §§16—22 (AK. 2:406-10) for a fuller ver sion of the thesis of Proposition XIIL A similar statement of this Leibnizian view of space is found in Living Forces (1747) (AK 1: 23~4) and in Physical Monadology (1756), Proposition V, Scholium (AK 1:480), Proposition VI (AK 1:481), and Proposition VII (AK 1:481). ‘On other actual and possible worlds, see Jnaugural Dissertation (1770), Sec~ tion IV (AK 2:406~10). CE. The Only Possible Argument (1763) (AK 2:124-7) for a fuller statement of this proof of the existence of God. See also the earlier argument in this dissertation in Proposition VII (AK 1:395~6). ‘The Manichaeans, named afier the Persian Mani or Manichaeus (216-276 8.¢.), maintained that there were two independent principles, one of good (ight) and one of evil (darkness), which were personified by Ormuzd and Abriman respectively In his later Motion and Rest (1758), Kant accepts the Leibnizian conception of space as constituted by relations between finite substances (AK 2:16). In Physical Monadology (1756), Kant defends the view that both the spatial extent and the mass of physical monads in space are functions of forces of repulsion and attraction, with space itself not a substance but an appearance of the external relations of substances. Cf. Plpsical Monadology, especially Proposition VII (AK 1:481-2) CE. Wolff, Philosophia rationalis (1728), especially §5 58, where physical influ- ence is defined as the transfer of some reality from one substance to another. A theory of physical influence had also been defended by Kant’s teacher Martin Knutzen, in his Commentatio philasophica de commercio mentis et ‘comporis per influsum physicum explicando (‘Philosophical ‘Treatise concerning the Interaction between Mind and Body explained by means of Physical Influence’) (1735). See also Inaugural Dissertation (1770), §§16-22 (AK 2:406-10).. CE. note 58 above. Cf. Malebranche, De la recherche de la vérité (1674-5), (2 vols.), Book VI, Part Il, Chapter 3. (Cf. Ocwores de Malebranche, edited by G. Rodis-Lewis [Paris: 1979], Vol. 1, 643-53.) aFACTUAL NOTES TO PAGES 51-6 PHYSICAL MONADOLOGY ‘The editor wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness to L.. W. Beck for the material which has been derived from his notes to his translation of Kant’s Monadologia physica (Beck, 1986, pp. 133~4) and incorporated in the following notes: 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 13, 15, 16, 19, 24, 26, 29, 30. This material has been reprinted by perm sion of the publisher from Lewis White Beck et al., Kant’s Latin Writings: Transla- tions, Commentaries and Notes (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 1986. All rights reserved.), pp. 133-4. 1 A good example of the mediation of geometry is provided in Kant’s summary found in the preface to the Universal Natural History (1755) of the Newtonian world picture, as it applies to the solar system (AK. 1:243-6). At one point (AK 1:243), Kant characterises the sun’s gravitational influence on the plan- cts as in a manner ‘established . .. by geometry’. 2 CE Virgil, Beloga, VII, 26-8: quid non speremus amantes? / iungetur iam npphes equis, acceogue sequenti / cum canibus timidi venient ad pocula damnae ['for what may we lovers not hope? / Griffins may now with mares mate, and in the age to come / timid deer with hounds shall drink’). 3 For Kant’s use of these terms as synonyms, cf. Wolff, Cosmologia generalis (1730), §§183-6. CE. Leibniz, Monadologie (1714), §36. 5 The most important philosopher not to accept the principle of sufficient reason was Crusius. Cf. Crusius, Dissertatio de usu et limitibus (1743) 6 The proof of this theorem is based on that of Jacques Rohault found in his Traité de physique (‘Treatise on Physics’) (Paris: 1671). The same proof is found in Keill, Introductio ad veram physicam (1702), pp. 22-3. Rohault uses his proof to demonstrate the infinite divisibility of matter. 7 According to Crusius, physical lines consist of a series of smallest sub- stances; mathematical lines consist of simple points which are, however, purely imaginary, abstract, and physically unreal. Cf. Crusius, Entourf (1745). §§50, 105, and §§115-19. 8 See note 6 above. 9 Cf. Second Antimony in the Critigue of Pure Reason (1781/1787) Agz4 / 3551-2 (AK 3:357-8), where Kant distinguishes between ‘matter is infi- nitely divisible? and ‘matter consists of an infinite number of parts’. The former is opposed to the teaching of the present work, but itis the later which he calls the ‘dialectical principle of monadology’, maintaining that it would be true if appearances were things in themselves. Cf. Critique of Pure Reason (1781/1787) A442 / B469-70 (AK 3:306). See also Metaphysical First Principles (1786) (AK 4:504-5). 10 This repeats Euler’s criticism of monads considered as infinitely small parts of bodies: If monads are extended, however small they may be, they are divisible; but if they are infinitely divisible (ie., without magnitude), then no composition of them can be extended. Cf. Euler, Gedancken vom den Ele- imenten der Kinper (1746). 11 Rohault used the sort of proof which Kant gives for Proposition IIT in order to show that bodies, located in space, are infinitely divisible. See note 6 above. 422n 13 14 5 6 20 au 22 33 24 25 26 7 FACTUAL NOTES TO PAGES 57-64 Leibniz held that space and time are not substances. In First Truths (ca. 1680-4) (Loemker, pp. 267-71) he writes: ‘Space, time, extension and ‘motion are not things but well-founded modes of our consideration, Exten- sion, motion, and bodies themselves, in so far as they consist in extension and motion alone, are not substances but true phenomena, like rainbows and parhelia’ (Loemker, p. 270). ‘On the internal determination of substance, see the Third Amphiboly of the Concepts of Reflection: The Inner and ‘The Outer: Critique of Pure Reason (1781/1787) A265~6 / By21—2 (AK 4:172 / AK 3:217-18). Concerning space and inner determination, see also New Elucidation (1755), Proposi XII, Application (AK 1:415). CE. Dreams (1766) (AK 2:320~1), where Kant distinguishes between ‘being in space’ and ‘filling or occupying space’. Cf. Baumgarten, Metaphysica (1739), §223- Cf. Keill, Jntroductio ad veram physicam (1702), p. 43 see also Epistola in qua legesattractionis aliague physices principia traduntur (1708) (in The Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, XXVI, 97-110). Kant ought to have said, ‘why, at some given distance’. What he actually says is, mathematically and physically, incorrect. If repulsive force did not decrease over distance, physical monads would permanently and with constant force repel each other at all distances. Repul- sive force originates from individual physical monads and spreads outwards. Such force will also at some particular distance be balanced by an attractive force and, in this sense, cease at that distance. If none of this were so, Kant goes on to explain, bodies would not have any ‘cohesive structure’, Cf. the Scholium appended to the present discussion. CE. Metaphysical First Principles (1786) (AK. 4:517-23), where Kant asserts that proof of the inverse-distance laws of forces is a ‘purely mathematical problem with which metaphysics is no longer concerned’. See note 16 above. The volume of a sphere is equal to 477°/3 with r being the radius of the sphere. Hence, given the relation between force and volume which Kant has just been talking about, this particular inverse-ratio law follows. Kant ought to say: ‘it will be the spherical surface towards which the attrac- tion is exercised at a given distance’. What he actually says makes no sense, cither mathematically or physically. This is the well-known Newtonian inverse-square law of attraction. In the Critique of Pure Reason (1781/1787) A173~4 / B215—16 (AK 3:156-7 / AK 4:119-20), Kant discusses differences in degree of forces between qualitatively different bodies of the same extensive magnitude. In the present discussion, he simply assumes that the ratios of the attractive and the repul- sive forces are always identical for all qualitatively different kinds of funda- mental, simple bodies. See note 24 above CE. Newton, Principia mathematica (1687), Book III, Proposition VI, espe- cially Corollaries 3 & 4. CE. Keill, Introductio ad veram physicam (1702). 42328 29 30 31 32 33 FACTUAL NOTES TO PAGES 64-75 Cf. Leibniz, Hypothesis physica nova (‘A New Physical Hypothesis’) (1671) (Gerhardt [P], IV, 177-210). Cf. Descartes, Principia philosophiae (1644), Part IIL, §§90-3 Kant, in arguing against Descartes, is adapting to his own purposes the latter’s account of the origin of subtle matters through the attrition and friction of grosser matters. Cf. Descartes, Principia philosophiae (1644), Part II, §§46-50. CE. Kant’s account of fire or heat and of magnetic and electric fluids, an account which treats such phenomena as ‘subtle matters’ or as substances, in On Fire (1755), Propositions I-IV (AK 1:3714) and Propositions VII-VIIL (AK 1:376-8). Cf. Proposition X, Scholium (AK 1:485) above. Kant is once more alluding to the doctrine of subtle matters, the materia medians. See note 31. OPTIMISM ‘The editor wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness to Menzer (AK 2:462) espe- cially for material in notes 11 and 12, and to Tonelli (1956), pp. 198-204 for materi 1 10 2 in notes 9, 10, 11, and 12. Leibniz developed this doctrine in his Théodicée (1710). For the origins of the dispute to which Kant here alludes see the introduc- tion to this translation, pp. Iv-hi. CE. The Only Possible Argument (1763) (AK 2:153). Kant’s definition of relative perfection is the same as Wolff’s definition of perfection in general. Cf. Wolff, Philosophia prima (1730), §503; see also Meier, Metaphysik (1755-9), 804. CE. The Only Possible Argument (AK. 2:90). Kant’s definition of absolute perfection is the same as that offered by Crusius. Cf. Crusius, Entiurf (1745), §180; see also Reinhard, Vergleichung (1757), Pp. 45 & 46. Cr. Negative Magnitudes (1763) (AK 2:176). Reinhard’s prize-winning essay was published by the Prussian Royal Acad- emy in 1755. Reinhard translated and published his essay at Leipzig in 1757 under the title Vergleichung. Kant’s library contained a copy of this, translation, ‘The view here attacked by Kant is to be found in Reinhard, Vergleichung (0757), pp. 62 and 63. Kant’s reference to a ‘further elucidation’ reserved for ‘another occasion’ is probably an allusion to the development of the idea of negative and positive qualities, which was to appear in Negative Magnitudes (1763). ‘The opponents of optimism included Bayle, Le Clerc, Wolff, Daries, and Crusius. ‘The analogy between the concepts of the most perfect world and the greatest number was maintained in Crusius, Entwurf (1745), §386, and Reinhard, Vergleichung (1757), p. 68. For a statement of precisely this view, cf. Crusius, Entourf (1745), §388, and 24FACTUAL NOTES TO PAGES 7: -91 Reinhard, Vergleichung (1757), p. 83. Kant returns to this issue in The Only Possible Argument (AK 2:153). 13 Cf. The Onty Possible Argument (AK 2:153)- 14 Cf. The Only Possible Argument (AK 2:153)- 15 Kant employed Meier's Auszug (1752) as the basis for his lectures on logic. It is this work to which Kant is here alluding. 16 Kant is alluding to Baumgarten’s Metaphysica (1739). Baumgarten’s Initia (1760), his chief work on ethics, did not appear until a year after the publica- tion of Kant’s Optimism (1759). 17 Kant first lectured on physical geography in 1756. The programme of his lectures is found in West Winds (1757) (AK 2:1~12). Since no suitable textbook existed on the subject, Kant employed his own notes. Kant’s lec- tures on physical geography were eventually published, with Kant’s approval, by Rink in 1802 (AK 9:151~436). 18 Kant probably based his lectures on mathematics and mechanics on two of Wolff's works, both of which were in Kant’s library: Auscug (1713-15) and Auuszug aus den Anfangs-Griinden (1749) FALSE SUBTLETY ‘The editor wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness to Lasswitz. (AK 2:466-7) and ‘Tonelli (1957) for some of the information in the Introduction, and to Ferrari (Alquié, Vol. I, pp. 1495-9) especially for material in notes 1, 22, 25, 30, 32, 34 35, and 36; to Lasswitz (AK 2:467), especially for material in notes 17 and 41; to ‘Tonelli (1959), pp. 204-9, especially for material in notes 3, 20, 36, and 37; and to Zac, pp. 125-9, especially for material in notes r1, 12, and 13. 1 Vernunfischluss: cf. Logic (1800), §§56-8 (AK 9:120-1), §§59-80 (AK 9:121~31), and §§85-93 (AK 9:133-6). Kant distinguishes Vernunfischlisse (it: ‘inference of reason’) from Schliisse der Urtheilskraft (lit: ‘inferences of judgement’); for the latter, ef. Logic (1800), §§81-4 (AK 9:131-3). 2 Merkmal: cf. Logic (1800), Introduction VIII (AK 9:58~61). Kant offers the following definition: ‘A characteristic mark is that in a thing which consti- tutes a part of the knowledge of that thing. . .. Accordingly, all our concepts are characteristic marks, and all thinking is simply representing by means of characteristic marks’ (AK 9:58). 3 Ch. Meier, Auszug (1752), §§292-3; see also A. F. Hoffmann, Vérmunfilehre (Theory of Reason’) (Leipzig: 1737), pp. 3 and 4. 4 Realerklirung: cf. Logic (1800), §106 (AK 9:143). Kant offers the following definition: ‘Real definitions (Sach-Erkldrungen oder Real-Definitionen] are... definitions which, in so far as they present the possibility of the object in terms of its internal characteristie marks, are such as to be sufficient for knowledge of the object in respect of its internal determination’, Kant main- tains that real definitions of empirical objects are impossible. 5 CEJ. G. Sulzer, Analyse dela raison in Histoire de VAcadémie royale des sciences ct belles lettres de Prusse (Berlin: 1758), p. 438. 6 “The characteristic mark of a characteristic mark is also the characteristic mark of the thing itself.’ Cf. Logic (1800), §63 (AK 9:123). 42510 un 2 3 a 15 16 y 18 19 20 an 22 23 24 25 26 27 FACTUAL NOTES TO PAGES 91-5 “That which conflicts with a characteristic mark conflicts with the thing itself” Cf. Logic (1800), §63 (AK 9:123). ‘The full statement of the rule runs: dictum de omni et mullo Chat which is said of all and of none’). Cf. Logic (1800), §63 (AK 9:123), where Kant offers the following formulation: “That which belongs to or contradicts the species or Kind also belongs to or contradicts all the objects which are contained under that species or kind? This principle derives from the principle of categorical syllogisms: nota notae est nota rei ipsius; repugnans notae, repugnat rei ipsius (cf. notes 6 and 7 above). “That which is said of all’. Cf, note 8 above. “That which is said of none’. Cf. note 8 above Unmitielbare Schhisse: conversion, subalternation, and contraposition. logische Umkehrung: cf, Logic (1800), §51 (AK. 9:18). Contraposition: of. Logic (1800), §54 (AK 9:119). Cf. Logic (1800), §65 (AK 9:125). Cf. Logic (1800), §65 (AK. 9:125). ‘Mixed syllogism’. As Lasswitz suggests (AK 2:48), the sense of the sentence requires the addition of the clause woh! jedoch einen vermengten ‘though he would presum- ably have a mixed syllogism’). Cf. Wille, Kant-Studien, VII, 336. ‘The words ‘this syllogism’ refer to the syllogism ‘Nothing which is perish able... cited above. Cf. Logic (1800), §65 (AK 9:125). ‘This view is also stated by C. Thomasius, Introductio ad philosophiam aulicam (Introduction to Court-Philosophy’) (Leipzig: 1688), pp. 163, 167-8, and 171, and by Crusius, Weg cur Gewissheit (1747), §§330—: CE. Logie (1800), §69 (AK 9:129), where Kant says: ‘The rule of the first figure is that the major premise should be a universal proposition, and that the ‘minor premise should be an affirmative proposition.” ‘The syllogism is in BARBARA; the first figure has three other modes: CELARENT, DARI, and FERIO. CE. Logic (1800), §71 (AK 9:127), where Kant says: ‘In the second figure the minor premise stands correctly; the major premise must therefore be con- verted and converted in such a way that it remains universal. This is only possible if it is universally negative. If, however, it is affirmative it must be counterposed. In both cases the conclusion is negative.” ‘Mixed syllogism’, ‘The syllogism is in cesare. The method employed by Kant will not work for the only other valid mode of the second figure, namely Baroco, for the conversion of the major premise yields a particular affirmative proposition and no conclusion can be drawn from two particular premises. CE. Logic (1800), §72 (AK 9127), where Kant says: ‘In the third figure the major premise stands correctly: the minor premise must, therefore, be con- verted but converted in such a way that an affirmative proposition results. But this is only possible if the affirmative proposition is particular; it follows that the conclusion is particular’. ‘By logical conversion’. 42628 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 37 38 39 40 41 2 8 “4 45 47 48 FACTUAL NOTES TO PAGES 96-105 Kant’s syllogism is in the mode of DARAPTI, which is converted into DARIL “The method will not work for DISAMIS. C£. Logic (1800), §65 (AK 9:125). ‘This method will not work for BOKARDO: the major premise cannot be converted; the conversion of the minor premise yields a particular proposi- tion and thus no conclusion can be drawn. C£. Logic (1800), §72 (AK 9:128), where Kant says: ‘In the fourth figure, if the major premise is universal and negative it can be converted simply, and likewise the minor premise, if it is particular; the conclusion is therefore negative. If, on the other hand, the major premise is universal and affirmative, it can either be converted only per acridens or counterposed; the conclusion . therefore, either particular or negative’. Kant thus admits only syllogisms in the negative modes of the fourth figure, namely, CAMENES, FESAPO, and FRESISON, The positive modes, BRAMANTIP and DIMARIS, are rejected as invalid, Kant’s syllogism is in FRESISON. By ‘syllogism of the second kind’ Kant means an affirmative syllogism. Kant’s syllogism is in nRaMANmIE. Kant is alluding to Crusis, Wag 2ur Gewissheit (1747). This view was already stated in C. Thomasius, Iniraductio ad philosophiam 4aulicam (Introduction to Court-Philosophy’) (Leipzig: 1688), pp. 163, 167— 8, and 171, and in Crusius, Weg sur Gewissheit (1747), §§330-5- Kant’s claim that the doctrine of the four figures ofthe syllogism was un cally accepted by everyone is simply not true, Even Aristotle recognised the superiority and primacy of the first figure. Cf. Logic (1800), Introduction V and VIII (AK 9:35 and 61~4). The same account of clarity and distinctness is found in Meier, Auseug (1752), 99143 and 147. den ersten Parag: Kant means §1 CE. Logic (1800), §§88 and 89 (AK 9:134). Kant is referring to Meier, Versuch (1749), and stating views similar to those in Reimarus’s Ailgemeine Betrachtungen (1762), §22. “To any subject whatever there belongs a predicate which is identical to the subject itself” “To no subject whatever does there belong a predicate which contradicts the subject itself” “The characteristic mark of a characteristic mark is the characteristic mark of the thing itself” Cf, Logic (1800), §63 (AK 9:123). “The opposite of a characteristic mark is opposed to the thing itself.” A slightly different formulation of this principle is presented at the beginning of §2 of this present work (AK 2:49). See also Logic (1800), §63 (AK 9:123), CE. Inguiry (1764), Third Reflection, §3 (AK 2:295). Kant is alluding to Leibniz and Wolff who claim that all truths derive from the single principle of contradiction. Kant attacks this view in the New Elucidation (1755), Proposition I (AK 1:388 & 389) and in the Inquiry (1764), ‘Third Reflection, §3 (AK 2:294) Kant is probably alluding to Crusius. For a brief critique of Crusius’s views 427FACTUAL NOTES TO PAGES 111 ~12 on indemonstrable propositions cf. Jnguiny (1764), Third Reflection, §3 (AK 2:295). THE ONLY POSSIBLE ARGUMENT ‘The editor wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness to Menzer (AK. 2:470) for some of the information in the Introduction, and to the Encyclopaedia Britannica, especially for material in notes 134, 135, and 136; to the Eng‘opaedia Filosofia for ‘material in note 375 to Menzer (AK 2:471~3), especially for material in notes 18, 10, 20, 46, 49, §2, $3, 56, 57, 66, 77, 78, 85, 94, 95, 100, 119, 131, 140, 141, 146, and to Zac (Alquié, 1986, Vol. 1, pp. 1508-26), especially for material in notes 1, 9, 145 15, 20, 22, 23, 31, 32, 38; 39, 46, 48; 56, 58, 59, 60, and 63. 1 ‘Do not contemptuously dismiss these gifts of mine, prepared by me for you with faithful care, until you have understood them.’ (Lucretius, De rerum natura, I, 52 & 53). It has been pointed out that Kant fails to ‘complete’ the quotation with the two lines which immediately follow: Nami tibi de summa cacli ratione deumque / Disserere incipiam et rerum primordia pandam .. (or 1 am about to expound to you the ultimate nature of the heavens and of the gods, and to lay before your eyes the principles of things’) 2 Demonstration: of. Logic (1800), Introduction, IX (AK g: 71), where Kant says: ‘A proof which is the ground of mathematical certainty is called a demonstration ...” The essential elements of any proof whatever are its ‘matter and form, or the argument (Beweisgrund) and its consistency (Conse quenz). "The difference between a demonstration and an argument is thus one of form, and corresponds to the distinction berween Definition and Enklirung (cf. note 4 below). Kant defines the notion of a demonstration in the Critique of Pure Reason (1781/1787), A734 / B762 (AK 3:481): ‘Only an apodeictic proof, in so far as it is intuitive, can be called a demonstration’. Kant there goes on to maintain that only mathematics can contain proofs which are at once intuitive and apodeictic and thus demonstrations in the strict sense of the term. 3 Beweisgrund: the entry in Grimm simply lists the single Latin equivalent, ‘argumentum, and cites the tile of this present work of Kant as a paradigm of its use. Lewis and Short contrast argumentum (which appeals to facts) and ratio (which appeals to reasons). See note 2 above for the distinction between Beweisgrund and Demonstration. 4 Definition: Kant employs the terms Definition and Evklarung as synonyms in this work. Both terms have been translated by ‘definition’. In the Critique of Pure Reason (1781/1787) A729 & 730 / B737 & 758 (AK 4:478 & 479), Kant distinguishes the two: only Definitionen are strict definitions, for they alone are capable of distinctness and completeness; this latter characteristic they owe to their being the product of synthesis and are thus arbitrary or stipulative (willkirlich: “the product of will and deliberate choice’). Only mathematical concepts are capable of definition in this strict sense. Evklir- ungen, which are the product of analysis, do not admit of this degree of distincmess and completeness. The justification for translating both Defini- tion and Erklarung by the single English equivalent, in spite of Kant's distinc 42810 " 3 4 15 16 FACTUAL NOTES TO PAGES 114-19 tion, is to be found in the following fact, to which Kant himself draws attention towards the end of the above passage (A730 / B78) (AK 4:479): there is only one native German word (Erklarung) for Exposition, Explikation, Deblaration, and Definition, and hence, says Kant, ‘we may relax the strict- ‘ness of the requirement that philosophical Erkliinungen be denied the honor- ifie tile of Definitionen’. ‘The work appeared anonymously in March 1755; it was reviewed that same year and by 1756 Kant’s authorship had become publicly known. Very few copies of the book reached the public, however, because the publishers went bankrupt and the entire stock of the firm was seized by the courts. Kant did not prepare a second edition of the work, though he did commission Gensichen to prepare an abbreviated edition of the book. These extracts appeared, with Kant’s approval, in April 1791. The Seventh Reflection of the Second Section of the present work (AK 2:137~51) also contains a brief outline of the contents of the work. ‘The full title of the work by Lambert referred to by Kant was: Kosmologische Briefe iber die Einrichtung des Weltbaues; it was published at Augsburg in 1761, six years after Kant’s own work. The same year saw the publication of a second work by Lambert on astronomy: Insigniores orbitae cometarum proprie- tates (Augsburg: 1761). In a letter to Kant, dated 13 November 1765 (AK 10:53), Lambert assures Kant that he had arrived at one of the central ideas of the thesis of the Universal Natural History (1755), the wheel-like form of the Milky Way, as early as 1749. This letter also contains an allusion to Wright of Durham. ‘The pagination relates to the original 1763 edition. Kant is referring to the Seventh Reflection of the Second Section (AK 2:137-51). Kant is again referring to the original edition. The errors, and thus the list to which Kant here alludes, were eliminated from later editions. Leibniz, of whom Kant is possibly thinking, held the opposite view. Cf Leibniz, Méditations sur la connaissance, a verité et les idées (1784). Kant makes the same point in his Inquiry (1764), First Reflection, §3 and Second Reflection (AK 2:280 & 283). As instances of wholly unanalysable concepts Kant there lists: representation, being next to, being after. As instances of only partially analysable concepts he lists: space, time, the feel- ing of the sublime, of beauty, of the repulsive, pleasure, displeasure, desire, and revulsion CE, Negative Magnitudes (1763), Preface (AK 2:167 & 168) and Inquiry (1764), First Reflection (AK 2:276-83). ‘Logical relation’, Merkmal: ef. Logic (1800), Introduction, VIT (AK 9:58~61) and Note 2 to False Subtlety (1762). CE. Critique of Pure Reason (1781/1787) As92~602 / B620-30 (AK 3:397- 403) for a discussion of the distinction between the logical and the existential senses of the term ‘being’, CE. Inquiry (1764), First Reflection, §3 and Second Reflection (AK. 2:280 & 283) and note 10 above. It has been suggested that Kant’s account of Spinoza derives from the 429” 18 19 20 ar 22 23, 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 3I FACTUAL NOTES TO PAGES 120-30 misleading article on Spinoza in Bayle’s Dictionnaire historique et eritique Rotterdam: 1702). Fora later and lengthier statement of the thesis that existence is not a real or determining predicate cf. Critique of Pure Reason (1781/1787) Aso2-602 / B620-30 (AK 3:397-403)- CE. Wolff, Philosophia prima (1730), 81745 also Verniinfige Gedanken von der Welt (1720), §14. CE. Baumgarten, Metaphysica (1739), 855 (314 edition: 1750). CE Crusius, Entwurf (1745), §§46-8 (and edition: 1753). ‘The eternal Jew, Ahasuerus: a legendary figure doomed to live until the end of the world for having taunted Jesus on his way to the cross. According to the mediaeval chronicler, Roger of Wendover (in his Fiores historiarum), the wandering Jew had been the doorkeeper of Pontius Pilate; he had struck Jesus on his way to crucifixion and urged him to go faster; Jesus had replied: “Igo and you will wait until I return’ CE. Crusius, Entirurf (1743), §844-8 (2nd edition: 1753). Cf. Leibniz, Monadologie, 844. In the Critique of Pure Reason, this was to become the transcendental ideal (cf. B385-6 [AK 3:398-9)). CE. Inquiry (1764), First Reflection, §3 (AK 2:280), Nominal-Erklirung: cf. Logic (1800), §106 (AK. 9:143). Kant there employs two terms as synonyms: Namen-Evelirung and Nominal-Erklarung; elsewhere he also uses a third term: Worterkldrung. Kant defines nominal definitions as definitions ‘which contain the meaning which is arbitrarily [willeilich: ‘the product of a deliberate and voluntary choice’] attributed to a certain term [Namen: ‘name’, and which therefore designate only the logical essence of their object, or which serve merely to distinguish it from other objects’. Kant later adds, in Note 2 (AK 9: 144), that ‘empirical objects admit only nominal definitions’ Realerklirung: cf. Logic (1800), §106 (AK 9:143). Kant there employs two terms as synonyms: Sack-Frkliirung and Real-Definition. Kant defines real definitions as definitions ‘which, by displaying the possibility of the object in terms of its inner characteristic marks, are sufficient for knowledge of the object from the point of view ofits inner determinations’. Kant later adds, in Note 2 (AK 9: 144), that real definitions ‘derive from the essence of the thing, the first ground of its possibility. [They] thus contain that which at all times belongs to the thing the real essence [Realwwesen] of the thing. ... Real definitions must always be sought in the things of morality... . There are real definitions in mathematics, for the definition of an arbitrary [willkiirtichen: “the product of a deliberate and voluntary choice’] concept is always real?” It is not entirely clear to which passage Kant is referring by the words ‘the final reflection of this work’. He probably means the Third Section (AK 63 and especially 156 & 157). CE. Logic (1800), §106 (AK. 9:143) and note 26 above CE. Logic (1800), §106 (AK 9:143~4) and note 27 above, Cf. Motion and Rest (1758) (AK 2:23~4), Physical Monadology (1756) (AK 1:480-3), and Negative Magnitudes (1763) (AK 2:179-80 and 193-5). 43032 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 2 8 FACTUAL NOTE! ‘0 PAGES 130-8 Cf. Negative Magnitudes (1763) (AK 2:282-302). Cf. Negative Magnitudes (1763) (AK 2:171-2; 175-6). CE Negative Magnitudes (1763) (AK 2:171-2; 179-80). CE. Kant’s later critique of the cosmological argument in the Critique of Pure Reason (1781/1787) A603—14 / B631—42 (AK 3:403-10). CE. Kant’s discussion of the concept of all-sufficiency at the end of the Eighth Reflection of the Second Section (AK 2:154). ‘The identity of reality and perfection had been maintained by Spinoza (Ethuca [1677], Book Il, Definition 6, and Book IV, Preface), Leibniz (Quod ens perfectssimum exsistt), and Wolff (Theologia naturalis [1736~7], Volume II, §5). This amounts to a critique of Spinoza’s pantheism. See note 16 above. CE. Wolff, Philosophia rationalis (1728), §195. CE. Kant’s later critique of the physico-theological argument in the Critique of Pure Reason (1781/1787) A620-30 / B648~s8 (AK 3:413~19). CE. Euclid, Elements, Book Ill, Theorem XXXV: ‘If in a circle two straight lines cut one another, the rectangle contained by the segments of the one is equal to the rectangle contained by the segment of the other. Cf. Euclid, Elements, Book Il, Theorem XXXVI: ‘Ifa point be taken outside a circle and from it there fall on the circle two straight lines, and if one of them cut the circle and the other touch it, the rectangle contained by the whole of the straight line which cuts the citcle and the straight line inter- cepted on it outside the point and the convex circumference will be equal to the square on the tangent.” Proof that a series of particles sliding down a series of chords from the highest point of a fixed vertical circle will, assuming the absence of friction, all take the same time. A B Let ABC be the circle; let AC be one of the chords; let CN be horizontal. Let AC = sand let ACN = a. The interval occupied in sliding down AC is 2s gt, som 431“4 45 46 FACTUAL NOTES TO PAGES 139-42 But AC = AB sin a; that is, s/sin a = AB = 2r, the length of the radius being 1. Hence, the interval in question is r 2 V 7 seconds, which is the same for each chord ‘The proof of this claim is as follows: Let A and B be two concentric circles, and let X’be the ring formed by A and B. Let r be the radius of the smaller circle, s the radius of the larger circle, and ¢ the tangent which touches B and cuts the circumference of A at its two extremities: r< A Peees ees-r Area of inner circle = mr Area of outer circle = me ‘Area of ring = n(s- r) Cf. Kant’s Theory of the Winds (AK. 1:492~4) and the Physical Gengraphy, §68 (AK 9:290). CE. Maupertuis, Essais de cosmologie (Leyden: 1751), where what is called the principe de la moindre quantité d'action is formulated in the following terms dans le choc des corps le mouvement se distribue de manizre, que la quantité d'action, ‘que suppose le changement arrive, est la plus petite qu'il soit possible. Dans le repos les comps, qui se tiennent en équilibre, dotvent étre tellement situés, que s'il leur arvivait quelque petit mouvement, la quantité d'action serait la moindre. For an account of the universalisation of this principle, see also: Accord des différentes dois de la nature (1744). See also Les lois duu mouvement et du repos (1746). See note 46 above. aupertuis in his Essais de Cosmologie (1751) rejects both the metaphysical proof of God’s existence (as lying beyond his competence) and the teleologi- cal proof (as involving an illegitimate use of an otherwise sound principle). He bases his proof on the ultimate unity of the laws of nature and, in particular, on his own principle of the least quantity of action. Maupertuis’s 4329 31 52 53 56 37 FACTUAL NOTES TO PAGES 143-56 proof is strongly reminiscent of some of Kant’s own arguments in The Only Possible Argument (1763). ‘The precise wording of the title was as follows: Si la verité des principes de la satique et de la mécanique est nécessaire ou contingent. The problem was set in 1756 for the 1758 prize, but the lack of suitable submissions led to the prize not being awarded. ‘The problem was set a second time in 1758 for the 1760 prize, but again no satisfactory entries were received, and the prize was never awarded. Kant had already elaborated this thesis in his three essays on earthquakes, composed on the occasion of the 1755 Lisbon earthquake, Cf. Terrestrial Convulsions (1756) (AK. 1:417-27); Earthquake (1756) (AK. 1:429~61); Fur- ther Reflection (1756) (AK 1:463-72); See also Plysical Geography (1802), Part 1, Section 2, §§49 & 51 (AK 9:260-3 & 268-70). Kant is referring to John Ray's Miscellaneous Discourses (1692), of which the second edition appeared under the title Three Physical-Theological Discourses (1693). Kant is alluding to Whiston’s A New Theory of the Earth (1696), of which a German translation appeared in 1713. Kant’s meaning is not immediately clear. Indeed, Hartenstein, Rosenkranz, and Schiele assume that ‘tro’ must be a misprint for ‘ro’, This revision is adopted without comment or explanation by Festugitre and Zac. Menzer rightly rejects the emendation (AK 2:475). Kant is not saying, as the emendators must assume, that for every married couple there are 108 people who are unmarried. What he must be saying is that in a random sample of 110 adults there will be two who are married 10 each other. Cf. Johann Peter Siissmilch, Die gitiliche Ordnung (and edition: 1761-2), p. 118 et passim. ‘Menzer informs us (AK 2:472) that Kant has adopted the figure ‘110’ on the basis of Stissmilch’s assertion: ‘If, however, one is willing to take agricultural villages, such as those in Brandenburg and Finland, the ratio of 1 to 108 up to 115 may be employed.’ On p. 121 the figure for Berlin is given as 110, with the comment: “This agrees almost completely with the villages of Brandenburg,” ‘The Cartesian theory of vortices to account for the orbits of the planets was abandoned as a result of the criticisms made of the theory by Newton who argued in the Principia mathematica that the theory was incompatible with the empirical facts. For example, the tails of comets were unaffected by the vortices; vortices would in any case be superfluous if the theory of universal gravitation were true. CE. On Fire (1755) (AK 1:369-84 and especially 376-84). It is Kant’s conviction that the medians materia elastica fils all space, including the spaces between the atoms, and accounts for the phenomena of heat, electricity, magnetism, and the tensile qualities of metals. See also Physical Monadology (1756), Proposition XIII (AK 1:486) Kant is probably alluding to Des Herr Joseph Monti Abhandlung vom ‘Schimmel (‘Here Joseph Monti’s Treatise on Mildew’) in the Hamburger Magazin, vol. XIX (1757), pp. 563-87. Cf Maupertuis, Conjectures sur la formation du foetas published in Mémoires de 43339 60 6 62 FACTUAL NOTES TO PAGES 156-62 académie rayale des sciences (Pavis: 17.44): Lorsqu’on méle de Vargent et de V'esprit de nitre avec du mercure et de Vea, les parties de ces matitres peuvent elles-mémes ‘organiser pour former une végétation si semblable & un arbre qu'on n'a pas pu lui refuser le nom d’Arbre de Diane . .. Depuis la découverte de cette admirable végéta- tion, Vom en a trowcé plusieurs autres; l'une, dont Ie fer est la base, mite si bien un arbre qu'on y voit non seulement un tron, des branches et des racines, mais jusqu'a des feuilles et des fruits. CE. Critique of Judgement (1790), §81 (AK 5:421-4). CE. Critique of Judgement (1790), §81 (AK 5:42), where Kant calls this theory Occasionalism; he rejects it as unphilosophical, for cach organic being is construed as the product of a miracle. CE. Buffon, Histoire naturelle (1740-1804), Vol. I, ptii, p. 71. Buffon offers an account of the formation of the foetus in terms of moules intérieurs (inter nal moulds or matrices’) the organic molecules contained in the seeds of the two sexes are, once the fluids are mixed, arranged and united by attraction in moulds or matrices; from this the foetus develops. See also Kant’s Critigue of Judgement (1790), §81 (AK 5:422-3). Kant calls this theory Praestabilism (prestabilism’) of which he distinguishes two versions: (1) Evolutionstheorie (theory of unfolding’): the theory of individual preformation; (2) Jrcalu- tionstheorie (‘theory of enfolding’): better known as the theory of epigenesis: the theory of generic preformation. Each organic being is regarded accord- ing to the former theory as the educt ofits begetter, according to the latter as the product, Cf. Buffon, Histoire naturelle (1740-1804), Vol. I, ptii: De la reproduction en ginéral, p. 71. Ch. Maupertuis, Conjectures sur la formation du foctus (1744), see note 57 above. CE. Critique of Judgement (1790), §81 (AK 5:421-4) Kant is alluding to the theory of epigenesis according to which the germ or embryo is created entirely new by the procreative power; the theory is op- posed to individual preformationism. Cf. Critique of Judgement (1790), §81 (AK §:421-4). CE. Critique of Pure Reason (1781/1787), A623 / B65 (AK 3:415~16). Kant is alluding to John Hill, the author of the celebrated A General Natural History (1748-52), who communicated many of his experiments to the Ham- burger Magazin during the period 1753 to 1758. Kant is reiterating the point made at the end of the Second Reflection of the Second Section (AK 2:103) Kant discusses the same issue at greater length in the preface to the Univer- sal Natural History (1755) (AK 1:221~31). CE. Physical Geography (1802), Part I, Section 2, §§42-6 (AK 9:241-56). Cf. Physical Geography (1802), Part I, Section 2, §59 (AK 9:276-9). Kant is alluding to Whiston’s A New Theory of the Earth (1696). Kant’s view of Newton is, in this connection, something of an oversimplifica~ tion. Newton in fact attached considerable theological importance to the necessity for divine intervention (in initiating the order and motions of the planets of the solar system, and preventing, by periodic corrections, its de- line into disorder and chaos). Such was also the view of Clarke. 434