Clusivity Typology and Case Studies of Inclusive-Exclusive Distinction by Elena Filimonova

Clusivity
Typological Studies in Language (TSL)

A companion series to the journal Studies in Language
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Volume 63
Clusivity: Typology and case studies of the inclusive–exclusive distinction
Edited by Elena Filimonova
Clusivity
Typology and case studies of
the inclusive–exclusive distinction
Edited by
Elena Filimonova
University of Konstanz
John Benjamins Publishing Company

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Clusivity : Typology and case studies of the inclusive–exclusive distinction /

edited by Elena Filimonova.
p. cm. (Typological Studies in Language, issn 0167–7373 ; v. 63)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Grammar, Comparative and general--Clusivity. 2. Typology
(Linguistics) I. Filimonova, Elena. II. Series.
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Contents
Preface vii
Introduction ix
Elena Filimonova
Part 1 Case studies on special problems of
1. Understanding inclusives 3
Michael Daniel
2. Inclusive–exclusive as person vs. number categories worldwide 49
Balthasar Bickel and Johanna Nichols
3. Syncretisms involving clusivity 73
Michael Cysouw
4. Only you? Philological investigations into the alleged
inclusive–exclusive distinction in the second-person plural 113
Horst J. Simon
5. Inclusive and exclusive in free and bound person forms 151
Anna Siewierska and Dik Bakker
6. Inclusive imperative 179
Nina Dobrushina and Valentin Goussev
7. A typology of honorific uses of clusivity 213
Michael Cysouw
8. Exclusive pronouns in American Sign Language 231
Kearsy Cormier
Part 2 Areal and family portraits of
9. Inclusive–exclusive in Austronesian: An opposition of unequals 261
Frantisek Lichtenberk
10. The inclusive–exclusive distinction in Tibeto-Burman languages 291
Randy J. LaPolla
vi Contents
11. Inclusive–exclusive distinctions in the languages of central-western

South America 313
Mily Crevels and Pieter Muysken
12. Inclusive and exclusive in Turkic languages 341
Irina Nevskaya
1 3. Development of an inclusive–exclusive distinction: A possible loan
scenario in Mosetenan 359
Jeanette Sakel
14. The inclusive and exclusive in Shuswap: A background investigation 381
Jan P. van Eijk
•
15. Clusivity cross-linguistically: Common trends and possible patterns 399
Elena Filimonova
Index 425
Preface
The idea for this book came up at a typological workshop on personal pronouns
which we had in Konstanz in December 2000 (partly supported by the Deutsche
Forschungsgemeinschaft (German Research Foundation)). One point of departure
for this workshop had been the collection of generalizations about person mark-
ing as documented in the Konstanz Universals Archive (http://ling.uni-konstanz.
de/pages/proj/sprachbau.htm). Amongst others we got several papers focusing
on the inclusive–exclusive opposition, and these seemed sufficiently interesting to
continue along these lines. Though this is a widespread feature familiar from de-
scriptive grammars and frequently figuring in typological schemes and diachronic
scenarios, no comprehensive exploration of it was available so far. Revised versions
of these conference contributions are complemented by several chapters that have
been solicited afterwards. I believe we received a well-balanced and coherent col-
lection dealing with inclusive–exclusive from typological, diachronic, and areal
viewpoints. It is hoped that the book will become a standard reference for the in-
clusive–exclusive opposition, filling the longstanding gap in the typology of person
marking.
Apart of the authors, a few people contributed in particular to make the present
volume possible.
I am indebted to Frans Plank for his encouragement and valuable advice espe-
cially at the initial stage while compiling the volume.
I thank Michael Cysouw for his help in organising the workshop and particularly
for careful reading and incisive remarks on the earlier drafts of the chapters.
Many thanks to Mikhail Daniel for detailed, vivid and fruitful discussions of per-
son marking that we had over the last few years. This book benefited a lot from his
painstaking comments.
The editor
Introduction
Elena Filimonova
The terms “inclusive” and “exclusive” are traditionally used to denote forms of per-
sonal pronouns which distinguish whether an addressee (or addressees) are in-
cluded in or excluded from the set of referents which also contains the speaker. Ref-
erentially, both inclusive and exclusive forms are non-singular, but some inclusives
may structurally count as a solitary unit and align paradigmatically with referen-
tially singular pronouns. In such cases, the paradigmatic opposition shifts from sin-
gular vs. non-singular to unit vs. augmented.
Although unattested in western Eurasia, at least synchronically, an inclusive–
exclusive distinction in pronominal systems is quite common in other areas of the
world (cf. Schmidt 1926, Nichols 1992, Plank 2003; even for Proto-Indo-European
it has been assumed by Ivanov 1981, among others). It seems to have been first rec-
ognized in the 16th century in Spanish grammars of Indigenous South American
languages (Haas 1969, Hardman-de-Bautista 1972). However, despite this long
tradition and much improved descriptive work on individual languages showing
this distinction, much remains unclear about its crosslinguistic distribution, dia-
chrony, typological connections, and theoretical significance.
It is precisely these issues that will be addressed in the present volume. The vol-
ume consists of two parts. The first part is devoted to theoretical questions, includ-
ing case studies on special problems of the inclusive–exclusive distinction, while
the second part presents in-depth areal and family surveys.
In particular, the following topics are discussed.
The first issue of interest is the paradigmatic status of the opposition. Tradition-
ally, the inclusive–exclusive opposition has been considered a subdistinction within
the first person. The question is whether this is semantically and structurally well
substantiated, and whether it is universally invariant. An alternative would be to
categorize inclusive and exclusive forms as separate categories in person paradigms,
or else to associate them with non-first persons (inclusive with second person and
exclusive with third person). Mikhail Daniel’s chapter starts off the volume by pre-
senting a thorough study that argues against aligning the distinction as an append-
age within the first-person non-singular. Daniel attempts a cognitive analysis of the
inclusive. Building on Plank (1985) he presents the person hierarchy (locutive hier-
archy in his terms) that underlies the absence/presence of inclusive within the pro-
nominal system of a language.
In contrast to Daniel, Balthasar Bickel and Johanna Nichols are less rigorous in
their analysis of the inclusive–exclusive distinction. They propose a tripartite clas-
sification of inclusive–exclusive oppositions considering the way the contrast may
Elena Filimonova
refer to person and number categories. Based on a sample of 293 languages, they
trace the distribution of the three types across the globe and see the explanation
for the current distributional patterns as lying in the migration of different peoples
around the Pacific.
Michael Cysouw undertakes a morphological analysis of inclusive and exclu-
sive forms. He presents a collection of possible syncretic patterns in the paradigms
with the inclusive–exclusive distinction, i.e. of the cases where inclusive or exclu-
sive share the same form with any other personal pronoun or person marker. His
research aims to show that a widely recognized connection between inclusive and
second person is exaggerated, and at least morphologically the inclusive could
equally be associated with all other persons.
Horst J. Simon considers the question of whether a distinction of inclusive and
exclusive is limited to forms referring to the speaker plus/minus the addressee or
whether there is also an analogous contrast for second person, distinguishing be-
tween inclusion and exclusion of non-participants of the speech act. Such second-
person inclusive–exclusive forms have occasionally been claimed to exist, but the
validity of such claims is not beyond doubt.
Anna Siewierska and Dik Bakker present a detailed study of the inclusive–
exclusive contrast in free pronouns vs. bound person markers. Based on a sample
of 394 languages, they account for the observed patterns using grammaticalization
theory. They also attempt to find a correlation between the presence of the oppos-
ition with independent and bound pronominal forms, coming to a (possibly disil-
lusioning) conclusion that there is none.
An in-depth study of the bound markers is continued by Nina Dobrushina and
Valentin Goussev. They examine how the inclusive–exclusive opposition relates to
mood; in particular, whether imperatives are especially conducive to this distinc-
tion. They suggest a few generalisations distinguishing person marking in impera-
tive from that of indicative.
Like other personal pronominal forms, inclusive and exclusive can be used
non-literally, for instance as honorifics or as generic pronouns. Michael Cysouw
presents a cross-linguistic survey of honorific usages of inclusive and exclusive
forms, demonstrating positive and negative connotations of the forms used with
first- and second-person references. His study aims to refute one of the earlier gen-
eralizations about extended meanings of the inclusive–exclusive forms which as-
serts that inclusives express less social distance, when used honorifically, than their
exclusive counterparts.
The next intriguing question is whether inclusive–exclusive is limited to spo-
ken language or whether it is also found in sign language. The evidence found con-
firms that sign languages can have this distinction too. This raises the question of
whether such a distinction in a sign language is dependent on the same distinction
in a corresponding spoken language, and whether generalizations made for spoken
languages can be extended to sign languages. Kearsy Cormier presents a unique
study of the opposition in American Sign Language, demonstrating that the dis-
Introduction xi
tinction there is based on quite another principle than in the spoken language.
The chapters in the second part of the volume are intended to shed light on the
areal typology and diachrony of the inclusive–exclusive opposition. The areal and
family surveys of the opposition can be divided into two subgroups.
The first group of chapters present general areal and family portraits of the op-
position, where each individual study examines the contrast from a new perspec-
tive. Surveying Austronesian languages, Frank Lichtenberk questions the equal
status of inclusive and exclusive members of the opposition and supports his argu-
ment with an analysis of additional meanings of the inclusive and exclusive forms,
and also of the course of historic changes of the opposition.
Randy J. LaPolla presents a survey of Tibeto-Burman languages and focuses on
morphological patterns of inclusive and exclusive forms in terms of markedness.
His study of 170 Tibeto-Burman languages and dialects reveals that within this fam-
ily the exclusive is mostly less marked and historically prior to the inclusive form.
He also determines that the inclusive–exclusive contrast cannot be reconstructed
to Proto-Tibeto-Burman or mid level groupings and is therefore an innovation.
Mily Crevels and Pieter Muysken’s contribution surveys central-western South
American languages. They focus on an alignment of the inclusive in the pronominal
paradigm to ascertain how it coheres with the other three persons, in an attempt to
reconstruct a four-person system. Considering the morphological structure of the
distinction, they also speculate on the unidirectional historical development of the
opposition in these languages, in line with the First Person Hierarchy suggested by
Cysouw (2003).
The chapter by Irina Nevskaya is of a different kind. She aims to dispel the con-
fusion in the usage of inclusive and exclusive terms in the descriptions of Turkic
languages. According to her, the only grammatical sphere where these terms are
applicable are the imperatives.
The other studies use areal and family perspective to analyse the inclusive–exclu-
sive distinction in separate languages and families. Jeanette Sakel examines the first
person plural inclusive cross-reference marker in an unclassified language family
Mosetenan consisting of two languages Mosetén and Chimane and argues that this
marker entered the family by diffusion. She discusses several possible loan scenarios.
Jan P. van Eijk investigates the background of the opposition in Shuswap that
stands alone in Salish languages because of its inclusive–exclusive contrast. He eval-
uates different versions of how it may have originated, and in particular, whether it
goes back to Proto-Salish or possibly results from a diffusion or spontaneous inter-
nal development.
Finally, a concluding chapter by Elena Filimonova sums up the major results of
the volume as well as the observations of the earlier typological literature, particu-
larly emphasizing universals implicating the distinction of inclusive and exclusive.
Before we proceed to the substantial part of this volume, a note on terminology

used in the book is due at this point. As mentioned above, this volume was preceded
xii Elena Filimonova
by a pronominal workshop. The discussions we had there were unusually stimulat-

ing and productive, resulting in, among other things, the birth of a new term denot-
ing the phenomenon of inclusive–exclusive distinction and comprising simultan-
eously both members of the opposition. The new term is clusivity. As with many
other felicitous terms, it is difficult to assign authorship to a particular person now,
but most people from the workshop say Viktor Elšík first coined the term. In any
case, the term seemed so apt that it was readily accepted by all discussants who par-
ticipated in the debates. Most contributors to the present volume who attended the
workshop use this term in their chapters. And may be after the launch of this book it
will become generally accepted.
References
Cysouw, M. 2003. The paradigmatic structure of person marking. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Haas, M. 1969. ‘Exclusive’ and ‘inclusive’: A look at early usage. International Journal of
American Linguitstics 35: 1–6.
Hardman-de-Bautista, M. 1972. Early use of inclusive/exclusive. International Journal of
American Linguitstics 38: 145–6.
Ivanov, V.Vs. 1981. Slavjanskij, baltijskij i rannebalkanskij glagol: Indoevropejskie istoki (The
Slavic, Baltic and Early Balkan verb: Indoeuropean sources). Moskva: Nauka.
Nichols, J. 1992. Linguistic diversity in space and time. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Plank, F. 1985. Die Ordnung der Personen. Folia Linguistica 19: 111–76.
Plank, F. 2003. The selective elaboration of nominal or pronominal inflection. In F. Plank
(ed.), Noun phrase structure in the languages of Europe, 253–87. Berlin: Mouton de
Gruyter.
Schmidt, P. W., S.V. D. 1926. Die Sprachfamilien und Sprachenkreise der Erde. Heidelberg:
Winter.
Part 1
Case studies on special problems of
Chapter 1
Understanding inclusives
Michael Daniel
Moscow State University
The chapter introduces a model of pronominal number, person, and clusivity. The model
places pronominal number among various non-singular categories and explains the dif-
ference between languages with and without inclusives by positing different hierarchies
of speech act roles (locutive hierarchies) underlying pronominal marking mechanisms.
The hierarchies suggested are {Speaker = Addressee} for inclusive systems and {Speaker >
Addressee} for pronominal systems lacking inclusives. Inclusives are treated as a separate
person. Rare systems with apparent ‘inclusive = second person’ homophony (Nama, Algon-
quian, Otomi, Sanuma) are explained by the {Addressee > Speaker} hierarchy.
Keywords: inclusive, clusivity, person, pronominal number, locutive (personal) hierarchies
1. Introduction
The inclusive is traditionally explained as an elaboration of the meaning of the first-

person plural pronoun ‘we’. When present in a language (inclusive languages
below), the opposition of ‘we’ inclusive and ‘we’ exclusive, it is said, is intended to
specify whether the reference of ‘we’ includes (inclusive) or excludes (exclusive)
the addressee. The same difference is disregarded, at the level of the pronominal
marking, in other languages (non-inclusive languages below). Apparently, this
approach assumes that both ‘we’ inclusive and ‘we’ exclusive are first-person pro-
nouns. My main point is to show that this assumption is not true.
The idea that the inclusive may not be a first-person pronoun is not new. Many
have admitted that the ‘first-person assumption’ is not universally true. My point,
however, is that it is universally false. In other words, inclusive in all inclusive lan-
guages should be considered not as a subcategory within the first person, but as a
person on its own, separate from what is traditionally called ‘we’ exclusive in the
same way as ‘you.pl’. This claim will essentially be based on an analysis of personal
reference in general and inclusive reference as its particular occurrence.
As I am going to show that the inclusive is not a first-person pronoun, I will ad-
here to an existing, though somewhat peripheral, practice, using the term inclu-
sive or inclusive person instead of the more widely adopted term first-person
inclusive. I will also claim that, from the point of view of what personal pronouns
mean, ‘we’ in non-inclusive languages corresponds, so to speak, to ‘we’ exclusive
in inclusive languages. Although ‘we’ in non-inclusive languages is used instead of
Michael Daniel
both inclusive and ‘we’ exclusive in inclusive languages, it should not, I will argue,
be viewed as merging of the inclusive and ‘we’ exclusive. Therefore I will not refer
to ‘we’ in non-inclusive languages by the occasionally used term neutral ‘we’, which
in a way assumes such a neutralizing merging. I will refer to it simply as ‘we’, when
necessary adding in non-inclusive languages. Accordingly, I will argue that ‘we’
exclusive is in a way the only real first-person plural in inclusive languages (which
follows from the inclusive not being the first person) and corresponds to ‘we’ in non-
inclusive languages. In other words, I will try to show that, despite functional dis-
tinctions, ‘we’ exclusive is basically the same linguistic unit as ‘we’ in non-inclusive
languages. However, calling traditional ‘we’ exclusive simply ‘we’ would certainly
confuse the reader, who is used to the traditional way of calling things. I will thus
have to refer to what is commonly called ‘we’ exclusive in inclusive languages by the
awkward ‘we’ in inclusive languages (traditional exclusive).
To sum up terminological complications, I will use inclusive instead of first-
person inclusive, ‘we’ (in non-inclusive languages) instead of neutral ‘we’ and
‘we’ in inclusive languages (traditional exclusive) instead of ‘we’ exclusive.
I hope that these choices, although generating some inconveniences to readers, will
in the end seem justified.
To prove my point, I will briefly discuss data from different languages showing
that there is not enough typological evidence of the formal connection between
the inclusive and ‘we’ (Section 2). I will try to provide a model of the pronominal
number and person categories which is both logically and typologically consist-
ent (Sections 3 and 4). I will show that there are problems and phenomena which
can not be acceptably tackled from within the traditional approach and which are
explained by the suggested model (Section 5, on the person-asymmetry paradox,
and Section 7, on inclusives apparently homophonous with second-person plural).
I will show (Section 6) that the questions of the difference between pronominal
reference in inclusive and non-inclusive pronominal systems and the question of
the reason for the presence of the inclusive in some languages and its absence from
others make sense for this model and can be answered by introduction of hierarch-
ical ordering of the speech act participants basically identical to Plank’s Referenz-
Hierarchien in Plank (1985) or, in the terms of this chapter, locutive hierar-
chies (Kibrik 1997).
Most of the chapter deals with independent pronouns, and I refer to affixal pro-
nominal marking only occasionally. Although I see no apparent reason why my ar-
guments should fail in case of pronominal affixes, a special study would be needed
to prove this claim (cf. Filimonova, this volume).1
2. Morphological evidence
If the traditional approach to the inclusive were correct, one could expect that in
many languages the inclusive pronoun and the first-person singular and/or plural
(traditional exclusive) pronoun would be in a regular morphological connection.

To match the traditional model, they should ideally be produced from one pronom-
inal stem (first person) by adding special markers (exclusive and inclusive); data
from languages that derive inclusives from the first-person singular would also be
helpful.
An examination of inclusive morphology cross-linguistically would be a wor-
thy topic for a separate investigation; cf. Forchheimer (1953), who addresses this
problem. A major complication is that morphological relatedness is a vague notion,
especially in pronominal systems. Registering the presence of phonological ma-
terial common to two items is not in itself very informative. First, it is unclear how
much of this material suffices an argument in favor of morphological relatedness:
one phoneme, two phonemes, more? Second, the two items may have a significant
common segment, while the correlation is not regular and the rest of the inclusive
pronoun is not identifiable with any meaningful morphological element (irregular
relatedness). Finally, even when the morphemes involved are identifiable and oc-
cur outside the inclusive–exclusive distinction, the derivation may be irregular in
the sense that inclusive (exclusive) meaning is not predictable from the morpheme
combination in question. It is hard to draw a natural line to delimit morphologic-
ally independent inclusives from inclusives that are irregularly derived from other
pronouns. The results presented below are thus rough and preliminary.
My language sample, which is basically a subset of the 200+200-language sam-
ple of the World Atlas of Linguistic Structures (Haspelmath, Dryer, Gil & Comrie
2005, below referred to as WALS) and includes not quite one hundred inclusive
languages, shows that there is no typologically consistent connection between in-
clusive and first person. Inclusives are morphologically independent in more than
80 languages. This figure, however, includes both languages in which the inclusive
has nothing in common with other pronouns and those in which the presence of
some common material seems to be occasional and irrelevant, at least synchronic-
ally. The rest of the sample manifests some kind of morphological analyzability of
inclusives.
In Otomi (Oto-Manguean, South America), the inclusive is produced by adding
second-person affixes to the first-person stem (Hekking & Andrés de Jesús 1984).
In Nama (Khoisan, Africa) it is the other way round, with the first-person suffix be-
ing added to the second-person stem (Hagman 1977). In various Algonquian lan-
guages, the inclusive is formed by a combination of the second-person prefix with
a first-person suffix (e.g. Ojibwa and Passamaquoddy) or the second-person pre-
fix with the inclusive suffix (e.g. Plains Cree); the stem is person- and number-in-
different (Bloomfield 1956; Leavitt 1976; Wolfart 1973). In Pitjantjatjara (Glass &
Hackett 1970), and less clearly in Yuchi (Wagner 1933–8) and Lealao Chinantec
(Rupp 1989), inclusives are formed by the addition of an inclusive possessive affix to
the first-person stem.
All these languages show a similar pattern, which can be summarized as follows.
Pronominal forms are combinations of segments (suffixes, prefixes, and stems)
Michael Daniel
iffering as to the pronominal reference they specify. The reference of the form is
d
a function of the references of its components, defined differently in different lan-
guages. In the case of the inclusive in Pitjantjatjara, for instance, the stem indicates
the inclusion of the speaker, while the affix is more specific, indicating the inclusion
of both the speaker and the addressee (Glass & Hackett 1970: 47, 49). The reference
of the whole form is as specific as its most specific component, thus being inclusive.
(Languages like Otomi and Nama, where inclusives are not so easy to analyze, are
examined in greater detail below in Section 7.) Although not all combinations of
stems and suffixes (or prefixes and suffixes) are possible, their references are best
viewed as independent. Therefore, although inclusives do use a first-person com-
ponent in e.g. Nama or Otomi, I do not consider such systems as instances confirm-
ing that the inclusive is a first-person category.
In Lahu, a Tibeto-Burman language of China, the inclusive stem is a compound
of the first‑ and second-person singular stems (in this order) and thus is regularly
related to both persons (Matisoff 1973). This is not the same case as e.g. Nama
above, because compounding of pronominal stems is not a regular way to form pro-
nouns in Lahu. The reverse order of the stems is attested in Tok Pisin, an English-
based creole (Dyachkov 1987). In Garo (India, also Tibeto-Burman), the inclusive
also seems to be a combination of the second-person singular pronoun ‘you.sg’ and
the first-person plural pronoun ‘we’, though the relatedness in this case is not com-
pletely regular (Burling 1961). Even if we admit that compounding is a regular mor-
phological process in these languages, they do not confirm the thesis of a special
connection between inclusive and second person, because the second person is
equally involved.
In the Carib language Macushi, uurîkon ‘you.sg and I’ is produced by suffixing a
collective suffix ‑kon to the first-person singular uurî. The first-person plural (trad-
itional exclusive) anna is morphologically independent. The pronoun uurînîkon
‘you.sg, I, and other(s)’ is produced from uurîkon ‘you.sg and I’ by insertion of a
suffix -nî- between the stem and the collective pluralizer. A slightly different pro-
cess is observed in the second person: cf. singular amîrî vs. plural amîrî nîkon. The
collective suffix ‑kon is primarily used on possessed nouns to indicate the plurality
of the possessor, although it is also used in nominalizations and in some other con-
texts. The first vowels of the pronouns of the respective persons are identical to pos-
sessive prefixes. That suggests that the inclusive and second-person pronouns prob-
ably represent the ‘possessive’ pattern of pronominal forms, with the person coded
as possessor, at least diachronically (Abbott 1991: 99).
In Limbu, a Tibeto-Burman language in Nepal, ani ‘you.sg, I, and other(s)’ is in-
dependent (although perhaps related to the first singular aŋga ‘I’). The inclusive
anchi ‘you.sg and I’ is derived from ani by a nominal dual affix ‑chi. Now, the first-
person non-singular pronouns (traditional exclusive) are derived from the inclu-
sive non-singulars of the same number by an ‘exclusivizer’ ‑ge, also found in the
first-person non-singular (traditional exclusive) verbal forms (van Driem 1987:
25). In the closely related language Kulung, the situation is similar, except that kas
‘you.sg and I’ is not regularly derived from the kei ‘you.sg, I, and other(s)’ (Tolsma
1999: 30). Interestingly, Dumi, another closely related language within the same
group (Kiranti), displays a much more widespread pattern, with the first-person
non-singulars (traditional exclusives) aŋkɨ (plural) and antsɨ (dual) probably re-
lated to, but not derived from, the inclusives iŋki and intsi. Cf. also the first-person
singular aŋ (van Driem 1993: 80).
The famous special case is Gooniyandi. Here, the same pronoun is used for
‘you.sg, I, and other(s)’ and first-person dual (with no difference as to whether it is
inclusive or exclusive). It is questionable whether this pronoun is inclusive at all; see
the discussion in McGregor (1989), and see also Filimonova (this volume).
In other words, the inclusive is derived from the first person in only three lan-
guages of the WALS sample (which does not include Kulung). These languages are
Macushi, Limbu and Gooniyandi. Schematically, this derivation is represented
in Table 1.
Note that there is only one language that derives the inclusive from the first-per-
son singular: Macushi. This is in a drastic contrast with the first-person plural (trad-
itional exclusive) formation. Out of my sample of about 250 languages, some 20%
derive the first-person plural from the first-person singular by a regular morpho-
logical process (Daniel 2005). Assuming inclusives are first-person pronouns does
not explain the data from Limbu and Gooniyandi better than assuming they are a
separate person.
Another relevant observation is that in inclusive languages with no number cor-
relation (e.g. Imonda (Seiler 1985)) or optional number marking (e.g. Aymara
(Hardman-de-Bautista, Vásquez & Yapita Moya 1974)) the unmarked first-person
pronoun with plural reference is exclusive, inclusive being coded by a separate pro-
noun. To sum up, from the typological perspective traditional ‘we’ exclusive is, so to
speak, much more a plural of ‘I’ than is the inclusive.
Sections 3 and 4 are attempts at a rigorous definition of the categories of pro-
nominal number and person. As I will try to show, building a consistent model of
pronominal reference leads to the conclusion that the inclusive is not a first-person
pronoun, thus providing the empirical data presented above with a robust theoret-
ical framework.
Table 1. Inclusives derived from the first person
Macushi a. ‘you.sg and I’ ← ‘I’ (collective suffix)

b. ‘you.sg, I, and other(s)’ ← ‘you.sg and I’
Gooniyandi c. ‘you.sg and I’ = ‘I and one other person’
Limbu e. ‘you.sg, I, and other’ → ‘I and other but not you’ (‘exclusivizer’)
f. ‘you.sg, I, and others’ → ‘I and others but not you’ (‘exclusivizer’)
Michael Daniel
3. Definition of the pronominal number
Number in personal pronouns is not identical to number in nominals. Number in

nominals is typically additive,2 i.e. a plural noun typically refers to a set formed by
summing up one and the same object (dogs = ‘dog + dog +. . .+ dog’). In referential
terms, the plural reference of the form dogs is homogeneous, where each element of
the plural form is referred to by its singular correlate (the singular form of the word).3
Pronominal number is different, as has been pointed out by numerous scholars
(e.g. Jespersen 1924; Benveniste 1966; Corbett 2000 and many others). The pro-
noun ‘we’ is universally called first-person plural, which suggests it is a plural of
the first-person singular ‘I’. However, the first-person plural pronoun ‘we’ does
not mean ‘speaker1 +. . .+ speakern’, but ‘speaker + other people’. The second-per-
son plural ‘you.pl’ can be interpreted both as ‘addressee1 +. . .+ addresseen’ or ‘ad-
dressee1 +. . .+ addresseen + other people’ or as ‘addressee + other people’. Thus,
pronominal number lacks additive-ness (referential homogeneity); rather, it is
referentially heterogeneous. The problems are as follows: (a) whether ‘we’ is
a plural of ‘I’ and (b) if it is, in what sense (same for ‘you.sg’ ~ ‘you.pl’). Let us con-
sider these problems in turn.
Is ‘we’ a plural of ‘I’?

The easiest way to solve the problem would be to suggest that ‘we’ is not a plural of
‘I’. First, one could say that differences between singular and plural reference do not
constitute a pronominal category at all (see section a of Table 2). This is supported by
the pronominal systems of languages in which singular and plural pronouns are not
morphologically analyzable, e.g. Lezgian, North-Caucasian (zun ‘I’ ~ čun ‘we’; wun
‘you.sg’ ~ kün ‘you.pl’ (Haspelmath 1993: 184)). Lezgian personal pronouns behave
as if they were totally unrelated lexical items. It would not make much sense, on the
basis of Lezgian alone, to introduce pronominal person and number categories.
Second, one may admit that singular vs. plural number is a lexical category of
personal pronouns, i.e. one can argue that personal pronouns split into singular and
plural lexical items, but there is no correlation between singular and non-singu-
lar personal pronouns. In other words, ‘we’ is plural but not a plural of ‘I’, ‘you.pl’ is
plural but not a plural of ‘you.sg’ (see section b of Table 2). Indeed, there are numer-
ous languages in which the plural personal pronouns use a stem different from that
of the singular pronoun of the respective person, but attach nominal (or dedicated)
plural suffixes, e.g. Russian (ja ‘I’ ~ m‑yNomPl ‘we’; ty ‘you.sg’ ~ v‑yNomPl ‘you.pl’).4
It is obvious that each of these two approaches is based on data from different
languages, in both cases quite numerous. As far as our problem is concerned, their
evidence is contradictory. More than that, there is a (relatively small) number of
languages which contradict both solutions in that the plural personal pronouns are
formed from the singular personal pronouns of the same person by adding a plural
suffix (e.g. Mandarin Chinese wǒ ‘I’ ~ wǒ‑menPl ‘we’; nı̌ ‘you.sg’ ~ nı̌‑menPl ‘you.pl’
Table 2. Morphological coding of number in personal pronouns

a. Lezgian b. Russian c. Mandarin Chinese
(−number, −person) (+ number, −person ) (+ number, + person)
Sg Pl Sg Pl
1 ‘I’ ‘we’
‘I’, ‘you.sg’, ‘we’, ‘you.pl’ ‘I’, ‘you.sg’ ‘we’, ‘you.pl’
2 ‘you.sg’ ‘you.pl’
(Li & Thompson 1981: 40, 134)), and thus the existence of both pronominal number
and person is morphologically coded in the language.
Table 2 shows that various languages provide contradictory evidence as to the
existence of person and number categories in personal pronouns. Mandarin Chi-
nese pronouns suggest that there is both number and person. Russian consistently
marks number (singular vs. plural personal pronouns) but lacks any regular pattern
of person marking. Finally, Lezgian does not show a regular pattern of marking of
either of the two categories.
A tempting solution would be to say that different languages vary in that they can
have categories of pronominal number and/or person, or they can have neither of
the two, depending on the pronominal morphology. The categories of pronominal
number and person would then become language specific, as shown in Table 2.
This solution is hard to refute. Nevertheless, it is traditionally assumed that
number and person exist in all languages (except those in which pronouns are
number-indifferent, like Imonda (Seiler 1985)), independently of whether plural
pronouns are derived from singular pronouns or the two sets are completely unre-
lated. In other words, most linguists assume that the underlying categorial struc-
ture of e.g. Lezgian pronouns is essentially the same as that of Mandarin Chinese
pronouns; it is just that Mandarin Chinese reflects this structure in its morphology
while Lezgian does not. Though it seems that this assumption has not been effec-
tively proven, I share this assumption and adopt it in the rest of this chapter. Once
there exist pronominal forms which convey the meanings ‘we’ and ‘I’ and/or ‘you.pl’
and ‘you.sg’, the pronominal number (as well as person) opposition does exist, and
I will consider it to be a grammatical category. In what follows, I suggest a universal
model of plural personal pronouns, taking this assumption for granted.
(1) Assumption: ‘we’ is a plural of ‘I’; ‘you.pl’ is a plural of ‘you.sg’.
Relation between pronominal and nominal plurality

Once Assumption 1 is adopted, the second problem arises: in what sense is ‘we’ a
plural of ‘I’? A tempting but simplistic approach would be to say that pronominal
plurals are basically the same category as nominal plurals.
It could be argued on one hand that a referentially homogeneous, or additive,
interpretation is also available for ‘we’, e.g. when several people are speaking in
10 Michael Daniel
chorus, or when a paper is written by several people together, or, to put it in a more
general way, when several persons are co-authors of the same speech act (see Cor-
bett 2000; Cysouw 2001 for discussion). For ‘you.pl’, the homogeneous interpret-
ation seems to be quite frequent. This provides one of the possible solutions to the
problem. The homogeneous plural reading of a plural personal pronoun is the core
one, while the heterogeneous plural reading is a secondary one (we should, further,
try to investigate the reasons why this secondary reading emerges).5 Then pronom-
inal number is only different from nominal number in having an additional, pe-
ripheral meaning.
However, this choral usage of ‘we’ (‘mass-speaking’ in terms of Cysouw 2001) is
itself so obviously peripheral that it is by no means likely to be the core reading. It
is limited to few pragmatic types of situations, as texts written by several people or
speaking during common prayers. One can not even be sure that these pragmatic
contexts exist in all cultures.6 Furthermore, it is hard to provide any strong argu-
ments in favor of the secondariness of the non-additive reading of ‘you.pl’ (‘ad-
dressee + some other people’). Unlike heterogeneous and homogeneous readings
of ‘we’, of which the latter is most unusual if exists at all, neither of the two read-
ings seems to be more expectable for ‘you.pl’.7 Arguing that plurals of personal pro-
nouns are primarily additive does not seem to be the correct way to solve the prob-
lem. Non-additive readings are either default (in the first person) or at least equally
probable (in the second).8
Another way to solve the same problem would be to say that plurality is in fact a
wider category which covers both homogeneous nominal and heterogeneous pro-
nominal number. This category would be an opposition of singular vs. plural refer-
ence, independently of the referential homo- or heterogeneity. Thus, both dogs and
we are plurals in that they refer to a set comprising more than one element.
Homogeneous and heterogeneous plurals are indeed subtypes of plurality un-
derstood in this wider sense. However, there are several arguments against saying
they constitute a single grammatical category. First, pronominal and nominal plu-
rals are different both from the point of view of their respective meanings, or, to
be more precise, their reference structure (heterogeneous vs. homogeneous plural
reference) and formally (in most languages pronominal plurality is not coded in
the same way as nominal plurality). Typologically, there seems to be no reason to
combine different meanings expressed by different linguistic means in one gram-
matical category.
Second, if homogeneous and heterogeneous plurals are members of the same
category, what triggers the choice between homogeneous and heterogeneous plural
interpretation? One could explain why ‘we’ is referentially heterogeneous. In-
deed, there is typically one speaker, and a homogeneous, or additive, interpretation
(‘speaker + . . . speaker’) is not likely. On the other hand, it is totally unclear why
nominal plurals are typically additive: certainly the heterogeneous reading ‘dog
and someone/something else’ is not incompatible with the lexical meaning ‘dog’; cf.
Daniel & Moravcsik (2005).
Understanding inclusives 11
The issue is further complicated by two facts. The second-person plural appar-
ently has homogeneous readings (cf. however, n. 7). On the other hand, there are
actually many cases of heterogeneous plural reference with nouns. The famous
case is that of the so-called associative plurals (known by a great many other
terms).9 In a vast number of languages, a proper name or kin term or, more rarely, a
common human noun X plus a basic (additive) plural marker or a dedicated asso-
ciative plural marker designates a set including the referent of the noun X and
some other people associated with him or her. Schematically, it is ‘X and his/her
associate(s)’ (Moravcsik 2004; Daniel & Moravcsik 2005). Other relatively wide-
spread examples of non-homogeneous nominal plurals are similatives, forms
which designate a class of objects whose prototypical member is the referent of
the stem (Daniel 2000), and dyadic kinship terms (Merlan & Heath 1982; Evans,
forthcoming). All of these forms have plural reference10 and designate sets some
of whose elements are not referred to by the stem. Thus all of them are referentially
heterogeneous plurals. Use of a cover term designating all these heterogeneous plu-
rals has been suggested. This term could be representative11 plurals (for a general
discussion of these forms see Daniel 2000; Daniel & Moravcsik 2005). In the most
general terms, a representative plural form designates a group which includes the
referent of the singular correlate of this form.
In other words, heterogeneous (alias representative) plurality is not restricted to
pronominal plurals. It is also available for some nominals, an example being associ-
ative plural formation. Because of this similarity, some scholars have even claimed
that plural personal pronouns are instances of associative plurals (Barulin 1980;
Cysouw 2001: 66–7). A nice argument in favor of this point of view is found in Can-
tonese. Associative plurals are formed by combining a proper name with the third-
person plural pronoun kéuihdeih (as in Mandarin). This pronoun, however, may
be contracted to -deih, which is identical to the dedicated personal pronoun plural
marker; cf. ngóh ‘I’ ~ ngóhdeih ‘we’, léih ‘you.sg’ ~ léihdeih ‘you.pl’. Thus, the same
marker is used to express pronominal and associative plurality (Matthews & Yip
1994: 79, 83). Similarly, plurality of the first (but not the second) person pronoun in
Marind is optionally marked by an otherwise associative plural marker ke; cf. nok
‘I’ ~ nok (ke) ‘we’, Jasu ke ‘Jasu and his children, his family, or his friends’ (Drabbe
1955: 28, 138).
However, the meaning ‘the speaker and his/her associate(s)’ is by no means the
most frequent reading of the pronoun ‘we’, which makes a straightforward identifi-
cation of the pronominal plurals with associative plurals dubious. The pronoun ‘we’
may refer to any set of persons in which the speaker is one of the elements. Plurals of
personal pronouns cover a wide range of different pragmatic meanings,12 of which
the associative reading is just one element. In a typology of plurals, plurals of per-
sonal pronouns are representative rather than specifically associative.
The typological survey of representative plurals carried out in Daniel (2000)
allows the formulation of a preliminary distributional display of the homoge-
neous and heterogeneous types of plurality among personal pronouns and different
12 Michael Daniel
Table 3. The availability of additive vs. representative readings of plural in different lexical classes
First Second Proper Kin Common Non-human

person person names terms human nouns ‘object’ nouns
Additive ? ‘you.pl’
(homogeneous)
Representative ‘we’ ‘you.pl’ associative, associative, associative, (associative?)

(heterogeneous) similative similative, similative similative
dyadic
classes of nouns. This distribution is shown on Table 3.13 Deep gray marks areas in
which the relevant reading is always available to the lexical class in which it is so to
speak its typologically default option of plural reference (given that its plural exists
at all). Thus, second person, if the pronoun is not number-indifferent, can always
have both additive and representative readings. This is why it is shown in deep gray
in both rows.14 Light gray marks areas in which the relevant plural of the lexical
item is present in some languages, but absent from others. This is the case of e.g. kin
terms, which may or may not have representative plural forms. The question mark
indicates that the additive reading of ‘we’ is highly peripheral.
As this table shows, there is an obvious overlap in the distribution of additive and
representative plurals. The fact that many lexical classes have both additive and rep-
resentative plurals (quite often conveyed by different markers) shows that, typo-
logically, these two types of plurality are better be considered as separate categories.
Before providing a definition of pronominal plurality, let us sum up this section.
I assume that plural personal pronouns are plurals of the respective singular pro-
nouns of the same person. However, this plurality can not be identified with the
additive plurality typical of nominals. It is a manifestation of a separate category of
representative plurals (often, though not universally, also present in nouns in the
guise of associative plurals and similar categories). Thus, a definition of pronom-
inal plurals should be based on a definition of representative plurals:
(2) Definition: A representative plural designates a set which includes the
referent of the respective singular form (focus) and some other elements.
The representative number correlation is then ‘X’ ~ ‘a set which includes X’ (as
opposed to additive ‘X’ ~ ‘a set of Xs’). I will call X the focus or the focal refer-
ent of the pronominal plural form. The focus of a pronoun is a referent (defined
in terms of speech act roles) whose presence is indispensable in all usages of the
pronoun (except some displaced usages; cf. discussion in Zwicky 1977). The other
members of the group will be called non-focal referents of the pronoun.
Now consider the correlation between ‘I’ and ‘we’. Since ‘we’ designates a group
of people which includes the referent of ‘I’, according to this definition the relation
between ‘we’ and ‘I’ qualifies as singular vs. representative plural, the speaker being
the focus of ‘we’. The same is true for ‘you.sg’ ~ ‘you.pl’; the focus of the latter is the
addressee.
(3) Statement (follows from the Definition 2 and Assumption 1): ‘we’ is a
representative plural of ‘I’ whose focus is the speaker; ‘you.pl’ (in its non-
additive reading) is a representative plural of ‘you.sg’ whose focus is the
addressee.15
4. Definition of the category of person
In the singular, the person is determined by the role of the referent of the pronoun
in the speech act. It is the first-person singular if the pronoun refers to the speaker,
the second-person singular if the pronoun refers to the addressee, and the third
person if the pronoun does not refer to any of the speech act participants.
The person of the plural pronoun is a slightly more complicated issue because it
refers to a group of people who may relate to the speech act in different ways. For in-
stance, a group designated by ‘we’ can include the speaker and a non-locutor,16 and
it has to be made explicit why its person should be first (because the speaker is in-
cluded) rather than third (because a non-locutor is included). The model of pro-
nominal plurality suggested above gives a convenient way to define the person of
the plural pronoun. One should apply the same rules as in the singular — only to the
focus of the pronoun.
(4) Definition: The person of the plural pronoun is determined by its focus. It
is first person if the focus is the speaker, second person if the focus is the
addressee, and third person if neither.
Now the person of ‘we’ and ‘you.pl’ is determined in a consistent and intuitively
natural way. According to Statement 3 above, the pronoun ‘we’ (= ‘a group includ-
ing the speakerFocus’) is first person because its focus is the speaker, and the pronoun
‘you.pl’ (= ‘a group including the addresseeFocus’) is second person because its focus
is the addressee.17
(5) Statement (follows from definition 4 and statement 3): ‘we’ is a first-per-
son pronoun; ‘you.pl’ is a second-person pronoun.
From this point of view, to determine what the person of the inclusive pronoun is
is the same as to determine what its focus is, given that ‘inclusive’ equals ‘a group in-
cluding the addressee and the speaker’. To start with, the inclusive is not a represent-
ative plural of ‘I’ or ‘you.sg’, because it is not sufficiently defined either as ‘a group
which includes the speaker’ or as ‘a group which includes the addressee’. For the in-
clusive, neither definition suffices. Therefore, within our system of definitions, it is
neither a first nor a second-person pronoun. To put it differently, the first-person
plural is a pronoun designating a group which includes the speaker and the second-
14 Michael Daniel
person plural is a pronoun designating a group which includes the addressee, with-
out any further specifications. The inclusive indicates that the group includes both
the speaker and the addressee and thus does not qualify as either.
(6) Statement (follows from definition 4 and definition 3): The inclusive is
neither first nor second person.
This conclusion is less intuitively obvious than Statement 5. It contradicts the
traditional approach, even though both statements follow from the same defin-
itions. Out of the two components of the inclusive, the traditional approach focuses
on the inclusion of the speaker and considers the inclusion of the addressee as a
secondary feature. The structure of the inclusive is then ‘[a group which includes
the speaker]1st Plural, [which also includes the addressee]Inclusive. It is not clear what
supports foregrounding the speaker while backgrounding the addressee (obviously,
not typological evidence on morphological relatedness between inclusive and the
first person; see Section 2 above). In Section 6 below I will show that this idea is
probably at odds with the very nature of inclusive languages.
Statement 6 provides no positive clue as to what the focus of the inclusive pro-
noun is. One could suggest that it has no focus at all, being crucially different from
other personal pronouns. In this case, we should either admit that inclusive can not
be characterized in terms of person or we should try to make the definition of per-
son more sophisticated (Definition 4 above). However, there is a much more nat-
ural way to explain what inclusive is if one admits that the focus should not neces-
sarily consist of only one element. The focus of the inclusive pronoun comprises
both the speaker and the addressee: ‘inclusive’ = ‘a group including {the speaker
and the addressee}Focus’.18 This definition of inclusive focus would make it remark-
ably similar to the first‑ and second-person foci. The set {speaker, addressee} is ob-
ligatorily included in any inclusive reference, and the definition of the inclusive
as ‘speaker, addressee, and other(s)’ may easily be rewritten as ‘{speaker and ad-
dressee} and other(s)’.
This approach is well supported by the data from languages with singular align-
ment of ‘you.sg and I’ pronoun (minimal vs. augmented number systems). Some
inclusive languages formally distinguish between two inclusive meanings, ‘you.sg
and I’ vs. ‘you.sg, I, and other(s)’. A number of papers (Conklin 1962; Greenberg
1988, and many others) describe systems in which the first-inclusive meaning is
best viewed as a member of the singular rather than the non-singular pronominal
paradigm. In McGregor (1989) this phenomenon was felicitously called singular
alignment of the dual inclusive. It has been suggested that in these languages the
category of pronominal number is replaced by another category distinguishing be-
tween minimal vs. augmented.
Indeed, any set referred to by a first-person pronoun includes {speaker} as its
subset, on one hand, and there is no smaller subset of the set {speaker} which can
be referred to by a first-person pronoun, on the other. In this sense, ‘I’ is the min-
imal first person. Similarly, ‘you.sg’ is the minimal second person. Note that in both
Table 4. Weri personal pronouns (adapted from Greenberg 1988: 5)
Minimal ~ augmented system Viewed traditionally
Sg Du Tri Pl
1 ne ten‑ip ten 1 Excl ne tenip ten

Incl tepir tëar‑ip tëar Incl tepir tëarip tëar
2 në ar‑ip ar 2 në arip ar
3 pë pëar‑ip pëar 3 pë pëarip pëar
the first (traditional exclusive) and the second person, minimal means singular. It
is different with inclusives. Obviously, for the inclusive, the minimal category is
{speaker, addressee}. Augmented pronouns are pronouns that, apart from the min-
imal subset, also include other referents. Table 4 shows that the Weri pronominal
system is much more adequately described in terms of minimal vs. augmented than
in traditional number terms.
In pronominal systems like that of Weri, it is especially clear that the focus of
the inclusive is bicomponential. In these systems, the notion of minimal is basically
identical to that of the focus. I have said above that the focus is an element whose
presence is obligatory for all occurrences of the pronoun. Obviously, there is a one-
to-one correspondence between this definition and the definition of the category of
minimal.19 The data from Weri and similar languages are useful because they make
the fact that the inclusive focus is bicomponential and consists of both the speaker
and the addressee clear at the level of morphological paradigms.20
In this section, I have defined the person of plural personal pronouns on the basis
of the notion of focus, an element whose presence is obligatory for all occurrences
of this pronoun. This resulted in rather natural and intuitive conclusions for the first‑
and second-person plural pronouns. However, the same method, when applied to
inclusives, produced a result that is not in line with the traditional analysis and thus
is much less natural and intuitive. Indeed, the inclusive proves to be a separate person
rather than a subcategory of the first person. For a paper attempting a formalization
of the existing terminological apparatus, the fact that this result goes against the intu-
ition of many linguists is in itself a very good reason to doubt the approach. However,
later in Section 9 I will show why I think that this is one of the rare cases where intu-
ition is better admitted to be wrong and based on false implicit assumptions of the
universal character of language-specific concepts and thus should be rejected.
5. Person-asymmetry paradox and related problems
There is a problem which I have tried to avoid until now. In non-inclusive languages,
the reference structure of the plural pronouns is as follows. The pronoun ‘we’ may
refer to any group which includes the speaker. The pronoun ‘you.pl’ refers to any
16 Michael Daniel
Table 5. Reference structure of plural pronouns in non-inclusive languages (traditional

view)
‘I’ (= ‘the speaker’) ‘we’ (= ‘a group which includes the speaker’)

‘you.sg’ (= ‘the addressee’) ‘you.pl’ (= ‘a group which includes the addressee but
does not include the speaker’)
group which includes the addressee but does not include the speaker. This is
reflected in Table 5.
In non-inclusive languages, there is an apparent asymmetry between the pair ‘I’
~ ‘we’ and the pair ‘you.sg’ ~ ‘you.pl’. The first-person plural pronoun, i.e. ‘we’, indi-
cates only that the referent of the corresponding singular pronoun, i.e. ‘I’, is included
in the reference. The second-person plural pronoun, ‘you.pl’, apart from conveying
a similar meaning, also seems to indicate that the speaker is not included. Presum-
ably, the personal pronoun encapsulates two grammatical categories, pronominal
number and person. The ‘non-inclusion of the addressee’ component of the mean-
ing should then be attributed to either of these two categories. The distribution of
person and number component is clear in the first-person plural: it is ‘group which
includesNumber the speakerPerson’.
If one now says that the non-inclusion of the speaker in the second-person plural
(‘group which includesNumber the addresseePerson but not the speaker?’) is conveyed by
the number category, that would cause an asymmetry in our pronominal number
model. The meaning ‘group which includes X’ is additionally specified by saying
that the speaker is not included. In this case, we are forced to admit that the number
correlation is not identical in the two persons and the category of pronominal
number does not exist.
If we say that the non-inclusion of the speaker is conveyed by the category of per-
son, what becomes asymmetrical is the person category in the first vs. second per-
son. In addition, we actually admit that this component is also present in the sec-
ond-person singular, i.e. ‘you.sg’ = ‘the addressee, but not the speaker’, which does
not seem to be a natural solution.
Let us see now what happens in inclusive languages, as presented in Table 6. The
semantic component of ‘non-inclusion’ is common to both ‘we’ (traditional ‘we’
Table 6. Reference structure of plural pronouns in inclusive languages (traditional view)
‘I’ (= ‘the speaker’) ‘we’ (= ‘a group which includes the speaker but does not include
the addressee’)
inclusive (= ‘a group which includes the addressee and the
speaker’)
‘you.sg’ (= ‘the addressee’) ‘you.pl’ (= ‘a group which includes the addressee but does not
include the speaker’)
exclusive) and ‘you.pl’ and can be defined as ‘but not including the other locutor’.
Thus, the correlation between ‘I’ and ‘we’ is identical to that between ‘you.sg’ and
‘you.pl’, so that the asymmetry present in non-inclusive languages is avoided.
However, it is still necessary to attribute this component either to the category
of pronominal number or to that of person. If one admits that the exclusion of the
other locutor is a component of the pronominal number category, one has to re-
consider the notion of pronominal number which we have constructed in the pre-
vious sections. Indeed, ‘but not including the other locutor’ component is by no
means predictable from the general representative model ‘group which includes X’.
Another option would be to say that it is contained in the person category. Although
this approach is more robust,21 it does not solve the problems arising in non-inclu-
sive languages (see Table 6).
Is there any way to preserve the categories of number and person as we have de-
fined them above for both inclusive and non-inclusive languages?
6. Locutive hierarchies22
The obvious solution is the ordering of person assignment rules. Cf. the two sets of
rules in Table 7, with (a) and (b) responsible for non-inclusive and inclusive lan-
guages, respectively.
This approach is apparently effective in that it correctly and in a plain way de-
scribes the use of person categories. Essentially, it was used in e.g. Hollenbach (1970)
(although in the guise of a Venn diagram rather than as spelled-out hierarchical
rules). It was also considered in Zwicky (1977) as an option, and then rejected. In
the most of the linguistic literature, however, the rules of person assignment remain
implicit (see discussion in Plank 1985).
However, the category of person as a result of the application of hierarchical as-
signment rules is very different from other grammatical categories. Above, I have
defined the grammatical person of the plural pronoun as its focus’s speech act
role. With assignment rules, it is unclear where exactly the notion of person is hid-
Table 7. Hierarchical person assignment rules
a. Non-inclusive languages. b. Inclusive languages

0. If the group includes both speaker and
addressee, assign inclusive
1. If
the group includes the speaker, 1. If the group includes the speaker, assign
assign 1st person 1st person (traditional exclusive)
2. If the group includes the addressee, 2. If the group includes the addressee, assign
assign 2nd person 2nd persona
3. Assign 3rd person 3. Assign 3rd person
a The mutual ordering of the rules 1 and 2 for inclusive languages is irrelevant.
18 Michael Daniel
den. Person as assigned by means of hierarchical rules, although not contradict-

ing Definition 4 above, does very well without any definition altogether. Table 7 ef-
ficiently and sufficiently defines what person is — except that person thus defined
does not look like a grammatical category. It is a result of an operation of assign-
ment rules rather than a semantic grammatical category such as number or tense. Is
there any way to avoid this complication and to preserve the category of person in
its ‘grammatical category’ version?
Following Zwicky (1977) and Plank (1985), I make an attempt to extract the
hierarchical component from Table 7 and then to introduce it as a separate hier-
archy. This hierarchy would be used as a rule controlling the applicability of plural
personal pronouns instead of forming a part of the definition of person, ordering
the application of the assignment rules.
As I pointed out before, the focal referent of a representative plural form often
displays some kind of dominance within the group this form designates. This is
most clearly seen in the case of the associative plural forms that are typically formed
on the nominals referring to the male or female head of the family, with male refer-
ents preferred to female referents in some languages, or referring to the leader of a
group rather than to one of its dominated members (Daniel 2000; Moravcsik 2004).
Similative plurals are formed on a nominal which is considered to be a prototypical
and most salient element of the class (e.g. tiger rather than fox for predatory ani-
mals). In each case, there is a dominance-based rule which chooses one of the elem-
ents of the group to be the focal referent of the representative plural form. In other
words, all representative plurals tend to be based on some kind of hierarchy con-
trolling the choice of the focus.
A similar model can be suggested for plural personal pronouns. As I have argued
above, the focus of the first-person plural pronoun is the speaker, and the focus of
the second-person pronoun is the addressee. The focus of the inclusive is both the
speaker and the addressee.
If a group includes the speaker but not the addressee and if it is necessary to des-
ignate this group with a plural personal pronoun, this pronoun will be ‘we’. To put
it differently, out of a group which includes the speaker and non-locutors, the only
element that may become a focal referent is the speaker, while non-locutors may not.
This can be generalized as a hierarchical rule {Speaker > Non-Locutor}. If a group
includes the addressee but not the speaker, it is only the addressee who may become
the focus, while non-locutors may not. This corresponds to a rule {Addressee > Non-
Locutor}. Finally, in a non-inclusive language like English, if a group includes both
the speaker and the addressee, the plural personal pronoun which is applicable is
again the first-person plural ‘we’. That means that the addressee may not be chosen
as a focus in the presence of the speaker, or, in the form of a hierarchy, {Speaker >
Addressee}. A combination of the segments of the hierarchy obtained so far (cf. a
similar buildup of a hierarchy in Plank 1985) gives the following result:
{Speaker > Addressee > Non-Locutor}

In inclusive languages, the rules for designating the group which, of the two locu-
tors, includes only the addressee and the group which, of the two locutors, includes
only the speaker are exactly the same. The rule which is applied when the group in-
cludes both locutors is, however, different. In this case, both the speaker and the
addressee are included in the focus of the pronoun. In other words, the addressee
may not become the only focus in the presence of the speaker (as in non-inclusive
languages), but (unlike the pattern in non-inclusive languages) the speaker may
not become the only focus, either. This is interpretable as the following fragment of
the hierarchy: {Speaker = Addressee}. Merging it with the two other fragments, we
come to the following hierarchy:
{Speaker = Addressee > Non-Locutor}
These hierarchies of (non-)locutors, alias locutive hierarchies, are actually the
rules for the choice of the focal referent. As I show now, this allows the extraction
of the ‘other locutor’s non-inclusion’ component of pronominal meaning from the
model of reference structure of the plural personal pronoun (see Tables 5 and 6
above), making these structures parallel in the first‑ and second-person plural and
thus preserving the categories of pronominal number and person as defined in the
above sections. In other words, this allows us to avoid dealing with ordered assign-
ment rules as listed in Table 7.
The second-person plural pronoun ‘you.pl’ is not applicable to a group which in-
cludes both the speaker and the addressee not because its reference structure con-
tains an additional component ‘but not the speaker’ (see Table 5 above) or because it is
applied after the rule 1 (see Table 7) but because its application would require choos-
ing the addressee to be the focus of the group, while it is hierarchically impossible in
the presence of the speaker. One could say that the pronoun ‘you.pl’ indicates the in-
clusion of the addressee but is only applied in the absence of the speaker because the
latter is the preferred focus, and the pronoun ‘we’ should be used in this case.
The fact that the second-person plural pronoun may not include the speaker in
its reference must not be built into the definition of the plural pronoun itself, nor is
it necessary to order the rules of person assignment. All one has to do is to follow
the general principle of representative plural reference structure, which says that it
is only the dominating element of the set which may be chosen to be the focus.
Similar rules, but based on a different hierarchy, explain the use of personal pro-
nouns in inclusive languages. The first-person plural pronoun ‘we’ (traditional ex-
clusive) or the second-person plural pronoun ‘you.pl’ may not be applied to a group
including both the speaker and the addressee, not because they include the com-
ponent ‘but not the other locutor’ (cf. Table 6), or because they are applied after the
rule 0 in Table 7 but rather because applying them would violate the locutive hier-
archy presumably at work in these languages. Just as with the ‘you.pl’ pronoun, first-
person plural pronoun in an inclusive language indicates only the inclusion of the
speaker, without any specific claims made as to the exclusion of the addressee. How-
ever, it is actually applied exclusively in the absence of the addressee. Using it to des-
20 Michael Daniel
ignate a group which includes the addressee would mean choosing the speaker to
be the focus in the presence of the addressee and thus would violate the {Speaker =
Addressee} hierarchy.
An interesting corollary of the above argument is that the traditional ‘we’ ex-
clusive is, grammatically, a complete analogue of ‘we’ in non-inclusive languages.
Traditionally, ‘we’ exclusive is described as ‘a group including the speaker, but not
including the hearer’. The suggested model allows it to be represented simply as
‘a group including the speaker’, the non-inclusion of the addressee being derived
from the locutive hierarchy at work in inclusive languages.23 Thus, both ‘we’ in non-
inclusive languages and the traditional ‘we’ exclusive in inclusive languages are de-
scribed as ‘a group including the speaker’. However, because of the differences in the
locutive hierarchies, ‘we’ in non-inclusive languages is applied to any group which
includes the speaker, while in inclusive languages it is applied only in the absence
of the addressee. In other words, they are grammatically (semantically) identical
without being so functionally. This is the reason why I designate ‘we’ exclusive as
‘we’ (traditional exclusive) throughout the chapter.
This terminological suggestion is in complete accordance with the data from
those languages in which the traditional ‘we’ exclusive is a formal plural of ‘I’ (as in
Barasano (Jones & Jones 1991: 20, 31)). It is unclear why a lexical item referring to ‘a
group including the speaker but not the hearer’ should be coded as a formal plural
of the lexical item referring to ‘the speaker’.
Locutive hierarchies are to be distinguished from personal hierarchies. In sev-
eral studies, personal reference is described in terms of the ordering of personal cat-
egories. The hierarchy here is {I person > II person} (for non-inclusive languages).
What was suggested above is a hierarchy of speech act participants, not persons.
Personal hierarchies are used by Hollenbach (implicitly) and Zwicky (Hollenbach
1970; Zwicky 1977). It seems that only Zwicky and Plank (1985) are fully aware of
the difference between personal and locutive hierarchies; Plank considers locutive
hierarchies to be the primary notion and uses it to define person hierarchies. Cf. the
two approaches in Table 8.
The difference between ordering locutors and ordering persons is crucial (al-
though only Zwicky and Plank explicitly discuss this choice). To define person as
an ordinary grammatical category, one needs to get rid of hierarchical assignment
Table 8. Person-assignment rules (for non-inclusive languages)
Locutive hierarchies (Plank) Personal hierarchies (Zwicky)

If the group includes the speaker, assign First attempt to assign 1st person
1st person
Otherwise, if the group includes the If not applicable, attempt to assign 2nd person
addressee, assign 2nd person
Otherwise assign 3rd person Otherwise assign 3rd person
rules. To get rid of them, one has to have the hierarchy deal with the speech act par-
ticipants, not persons. Otherwise, the definition of person remains bound to the
hierarchical relations between them: to explain what person is, it is necessary to ex-
plain how it is assigned, which would involve a personal hierarchy.
In this chapter, only locutive hierarchies are used; they control the choice of the
focal member of the group and thus the applicability of pronouns. Within this ap-
proach, no personal hierarchies are needed at all.
In this section, I have argued that there is a hierarchy controlling the choice of
the focal referent that underlies any kind of person marking device, including the
independent personal pronouns analyzed in this chapter. The hierarchy is defined
in terms of the speech act roles Speaker, Addressee, and Non-Locutor and is re-
ferred to as locutive hierarchy. It is supposed to replace the structural ordering of
the rules suggested in Zwicky (1977) and Plank (1985), considered at the begin-
ning of this section. Definition 4 in Section 4 above states that the person of the
plural pronoun is determined by the person of its focus. When a group of people is
to be referred to by means of a pronoun, the speaker follows the hierarchy in choos-
ing one of the members of the group as the focal referent. In turn, this choice de-
termines the appropriate grammatical person category. Crucially, the hierarchy is
different in inclusive and non-inclusive languages. The former use {Speaker = Ad-
dressee},24 while the latter use {Speaker > Addressee}.
Now, the natural question is whether these two options of locutive hierarchies ex-
haust all possibilities of arranging locutors. Why are there no languages which dis-
play a pattern opposite to that present in the non-inclusive languages, viz. {Addressee
> Speaker}? Such a language would use one pronoun (or pronominal marker) for any
group which includes the addressee, irrespective of whether the speaker is included
or not. In the model suggested above, that would be ‘a group including the addressee’
with the addressee in focus, thus by definition simply second-person plural. The
other pronoun (or pronominal marker) would be used to designate a group which
includes the speaker but does not include the addressee. In the traditional model,
this pronoun would be ‘we’ exclusive. In the model suggested above, that would be ‘a
group including the speaker’ pronoun with the speaker in the focus, thus first-per-
son plural by definition. Using only two pronouns, such languages would lack the in-
clusive. The difference from the non-inclusive languages considered above would be
which of the two pronouns is used to designate a group including both the speaker
and the addressee. The hierarchy {Addressee > Speaker} would make the addressee
the preferable focus, and thus the second-person pronoun would be used. Obvi-
ously, a diagnostic feature of these languages in traditional terms would be apparent
homophony of the second-person plural and inclusive. See Figure 1.
A somewhat unexpected answer is that these languages do exist, and the pio-
neering importance of Zwicky (1977) and Plank (1985) is exactly that both consid-
ered Algonquian data, discussed below, from the point of view of their impact on
the general theory of personal reference. I will start by considering the systems with
‘hybrid inclusives’, in which the ‘homophony’ in question is reflected only in affixal
22 Michael Daniel
SpeakerBoth Addressee Speaker Both Addressee Speaker Both

Addressee
a. Speaker > Addressee b. Speaker = Addressee c. Addressee > Speaker
Figure 1. Locative hierarchies: does the third option exist?
marking, and then I will proceed to the only language I know of which displays the
same pattern in morphologically simple independent pronouns. I then consider
some more disputable cases.
Michael Cysouw (Cysouw 2001; Cysouw, this volume, a) presents a collection of
examples of what he calls ‘inclusive = second person’ syncretism. Cysouw’s sample
includes all of the languages of my own sample except Otomi. The interpretation of
the data is different (see discussion below).
7. {Addressee > Speaker}
North America: pronominal prefixes in Algonquian

Algonquian languages show a (statistically) unusual pattern of forming independ-
ent personal pronouns of different persons and numbers from the same stem. This
pattern of pronominal morphology occurs in the Americas but is rare elsewhere
(exceptions are Koromfe, Mundari, Aleut and some other languages, see Daniel
2005). In Algonquian, an independent pronoun consists of a number-indifferent
person prefix, a person- and number-indifferent stem, and a plural person suffix
(absent in singular pronouns). Independent personal pronouns distinguish be-
tween an inclusive and a first-person plural (traditional exclusive) form. However,
it is neither prefixes nor suffixes that convey this distinction. The inclusive meaning
results from a combination of the second-person prefix with a first-person plural
suffix. See the independent personal pronouns and pronominal marking in Table 9.
Suffixal marking works as follows. One and the same suffix is used in first-person
plural (traditional exclusive) and inclusive. The other is used in second and third
person plural. This is the same scheme as applied in non-inclusive languages like
Russian or English (except that, once the speaker is not included, there is no differ-
ence between a group which includes the addressee and non-locutors and the one
that includes non-locutors only, and the same suffix ‑wa· is used). The resulting
hierarchy for the suffixes is {Speaker > Addressee = Non-Locutor}.
The prefix n‑ is used in first-person singular and plural (traditional exclusive).
It can be seen that the prefix k‑ is used in the second-person singular, the second-
erson plural, and the inclusive. As traditional Algonquian studies put it, the affix
p
k‑ is used whenever the addressee is referred to (see an overview of the many use-
ful formulations suggested by Algonquianists in Zwicky 1977), minimally the ad-
dressee alone, and irrespective of whether the speaker is included or not. The other
prefix is used when the group (which may again consist of only one member) in-
cludes the speaker, but not the hearer. This is apparently what we are looking for to
posit a locutive hierarchy {Addressee > Speaker}, except that there is no difference
between plural and singular reference.
We thus have two different orderings of the two locutors in the systems of suf-
fixes and prefixes. In neither of them are the speaker and the addressee equally im-
portant, and thus there is no special inclusive suffix or prefix. However, a combin-
ation of a second-person prefix which indicates the presence of the addressee with
a first-person (plural) suffix which indicates the presence of the speaker gives an in-
clusive meaning to the whole form. This leads Mithun to call such inclusives ‘hybrid’
(Mithun 2000: 70–1), meaning hybridization of the first‑ and second-person mean-
ings. This term will be applied below to similar data from other languages.
Other Algonquian languages show variations on the same theme. Potawatomi
has similar structure of the inclusive, according to Hockett (1966). Passamaquoddy
shows the same structure of personal pronouns except in the third person (Leavitt
1996). Fox pronouns are either (emphatic pronouns) structurally identical to those
given by Bloomfield for Ojibwa or (elsewhere) different in having a special incre-
ment (suffix) in all singular forms (Dahlstrom 1988). (Alternatively one can say the
stem is reduced in the plural). Plains Cree has the same system of prefixes. However,
the plural suffixes are different in the first person (traditional exclusive) and inclu-
sive pronouns (Wolfart 1973: 15–16). The locutive hierarchy in Plains Cree is thus
{Addressee > Speaker} for prefixes, but {Speaker = Addressee} for suffixes (as in in-
clusive languages). By the way, this shows that the peculiar morphological structure
of the Algonquian independent pronoun is by no means a special device to convey
Table 9. Independent personal pronouns of Eastern Ojibwa (based on Bloomfield 1956)
Sg Pl
1st n‑i·n n‑i·nu‑wi
1‑pron 1‑pron‑1.pl
inclusive k‑i·nu‑wi
2‑pron‑1.pl
2nd k‑i·n k‑i·nu‑wa·
2‑pron 2‑pron‑non.1.pl
3rd w‑i·n w‑i·nu‑wa·
3‑pron 3‑pron‑non.1.pl
Note: The gloss ‑pron stands for the number- and person-indifferent stem ‑i·n(u)‑ which is used in
all person–number forms. The plural suffix -wa· is used in both second- and third-person plural and
is glossed as ‑non.1.pl.
24 Michael Daniel
inclusive meaning, as might seem at first glance. Indeed, the {Addressee > Speaker}
hierarchy in prefixes is active in Plains Cree, although the inclusive meaning does
not need a hybridization to be manifested, as it is already displayed by the plural
suffixes.
It seems that there is no alternative, equally consistent analysis of the Algon-
quian data. One could suggest that the person–number meanings are conveyed by
a circumfix, or claim that the prefix k‑ is homophonous between inclusive and sec-
ond person. Both these approaches are based on the traditional view that pronom-
inal systems may be either inclusive or non-inclusive of the European type and the
inability to abandon this view in order to analyze unusual linguistic structures. As
soon as we try to isolate the prefixes and start to consider the effects of the prefixes
on the reference of the plural pronouns, the only model applicable is that of the
{Addressee > Speaker} locutive hierarchy. This model led to a correct description of
the Algonquian pronominal studies as early as Bloomfield’s grammar (Bloomfield
1956), although he was probably unaware of the theoretical value of his rules; one
must also mention Hockett (1966). As far as I know, the first linguist who consid-
ered the impact of the existence of such systems on the general theory of pronom-
inal systems was Zwicky, followed by Plank, see discussion of Zwicky (1977) and
Plank (1985) below.
South America: pronominal suffixes in Otomi

The system of personal pronouns of the Oto-Manguean language Otomi (Hekking
& Andrés de Jesús 1984) is different but is also best explained in terms of an in-
teraction of two different locutive hierarchies. The pronoun consists of a person
stem and a person–number suffix. Unlike Algonquian, Otomi distinguishes be-
tween two non-singulars: duals and plurals. One and the same stem is used in both
non-singular numbers. This stem is clearly though irregularly related to the singu-
lar stem of the same person, being its reduction (first-person singular nugögi, non-
singular nug[ö]‑; second-person singular nuäi, non-singular nua‑). The same stem
is used in the first person (traditional exclusive) and inclusive pronouns. The other
stem is used in the second non-singular forms only. The non-singular personal suf-
fixes are, on the contrary, common to the inclusive and the second-person plural
forms (‑wi in the inclusive and the second-person dual, ‑hu in the inclusive and the
second-person plural, ‑be in the first-person dual, and ‑he in the first-person plural,
traditional exclusive). The same rules govern the structure of the personal posses-
sives. One possessive marker (apparently, a proclitic) precedes a possessed nom-
inal in the first person and the inclusive (ma). Another marker precedes a possessed
nominal to mark second-person possession (ir). The markers are number-indiffer-
ent. (See Table 10. For each person/number, the possessive marking pattern and the
independent pronoun form are given. stem indicates the position of the nominal
stem in a possessive construction. The glosses 1nonsg and 2nonsg designate non-
singular stems of personal pronouns.)
Table 11. Independent pronouns and possessive markers in Otomi (adapted from Hekking
& Andrés de Jesús 1984)
Sg Du Pl
1 Possessive ma stem‑[gö] ma stem‑[gö]‑be ma stem‑[gö]‑he
1poss stem‑1poss 1poss stem‑1poss‑1du 1poss stem‑1poss‑1pl
Pronoun nugögi nug[ö]‑be nug[ö]‑he
1sg 1nonsg‑1du 1nonsg‑1pl
Incl Possessive ma stem‑[gö]‑wi ma stem‑[gö]‑hu
1poss stem‑1poss‑2du 1poss stem‑1poss‑2pl
Pronoun nug[ö]‑wi nug[ö]‑hu
1nonsg‑2du 1nonsg‑2pl
2 Possessive ir stem‑[ge] ir stem‑[ge]‑wi ir stem‑[ge]‑hu
2poss stem‑2poss 2poss stem‑2poss‑2du 2poss stem‑2poss‑2pl
Pronoun nuäi nua‑wi nua‑hu
2sg 2nonsg‑2du 2nonsg‑2pl
In other words, for any group which includes the speaker, irrespective of the in-
clusion or the exclusion of the addressee, the stem nug[ö]- is used. For any group
which includes the addressee but does not include the speaker, a second-person
non-singular stem is used, nua-. The choice of the stem of the personal pronoun
is controlled by the {Speaker > Addressee} locutive hierarchy. The same hierarchy
controls the choice of the preposed possessive marker. On the other hand, the same
non-singular personal suffix is used for any group which includes the addressee, ir-
respective of whether it does or does not include the speaker (‑wi in the dual, ‑hu
in the plural). Any group which includes the speaker, in case it does not include
the addressee, is designated by another non-singular suffix (‑be in the dual, ‑he
in the plural). This rule is applied in the choice of person–number suffixes in both
independent pronouns and possessive constructions and is apparently based on
the locutive hierarchy {Addressee > Speaker}. As in Algonquian, no inclusive func-
tion can be ascribed to any particular affix, the inclusive meaning resulting from
the combination of the first-person non-singular stem with the second-person non-
singular suffix. Otomi is thus another example of hybrid inclusive systems.
South Africa: pronominal stems in Nama

The third example of a hybrid inclusive system is from yet another area, the South
African language Nama (Khoisan). Its pronominal morphology recalls the Otomi
personal pronoun system just considered, except that the hierarchies exchange
their morphological loci (Hagman 1977: 86–8).
Nama pronouns distinguish three numbers plus feminine vs. masculine vs.
common gender, except in the first-person singular, where the gender opposition
26 Michael Daniel
is not present.25 Singular pronouns do not display regular correlations with non-
singular stems. Non-singular stems consist of a person–number stem and a person–
number–gender suffix. The same stem is used in second-person non-singular and
inclusive forms (saá‑). Another stem is used in all first-person non-singular forms
(traditional first-person exclusive, sií‑). The affixes sharing the same number and
gender meanings are common to first-person non-singular (traditional exclusive)
and inclusive forms (‑kxm̀ for masculine dual, ‑m̀ for feminine or neutral dual, ‑ke
for masculine plural, ‑se in feminine plural, ‑tà in common plural).26 See Table 11.
In other words, one and the same non-singular stem (saá‑) is used for any group
including the addressee, irrespective of whether the speaker is or is not included in
it. Another stem (sií‑) is used for all groups which include the speaker but do not
include the addressee. The choice of the stem is thus directed by the {Addressee >
Speaker} locutive hierarchy. On the other hand, one and the same suffix is used for
Table 11. Independent personal pronouns in Nama (adapted from Hagman 1977)
Sg Du Pl
1masc tiíta sií‑kxm̀ sií‑ke
1sg 1nonsg‑1du.masc 1nonsg‑1pl.masc
1fem tiíta sií‑m̀ sií‑se
1sg 1nonsg‑1du.fem 1nonsg‑1pl.fem
1com sií‑m̀ sií‑tà
1nonsg‑1du.com 1nonsg‑1pl.com
incl masc saá‑kxm̀ saá‑ke
2nonsg‑1du.masc 2nonsg‑1pl.masc
incl fem saá‑m̀ saá‑se
2nonsg‑1du.fem 2nonsg‑1pl.fem
incl com saá‑m̀ saá‑tà
2masc saáts saá‑kxò saá‑kò
2sg.masc 2nonsg‑2du.masc 2nonsg‑2pl.masc
2fem saás saá‑rò saá‑sò
2sg.fem 2nonsg‑2du.fem 2nonsg‑2pl.fem
2com saá‑rò saá‑tù
3masc //i~ip //i~i‑kxà //i~i‑ku
3sg.masc 3nonsg‑2du.masc 3nonsg‑2pl.masc
3fem //i~is //i~i‑rà //i~i‑tì
3sg.fem 3nonsg‑2du.fem 3nonsg‑2pl.fem
3com //i~i‑rà //i~i‑ǹ
any group including the speaker, irrespective of whether the addressee is included
or not, and another one for any group which includes the addressee in case it does
not also include the speaker (of course, for the same number and gender). The hier-
archy is {Speaker > Addressee}. Thus, the logic of the paradigm is the same as in
Otomi, except that in Otomi it is the choice of the suffixes which is governed by the
{Addressee > Speaker} hierarchy, while the {Speaker > Addressee} hierarchy works
on stems. Yet another system produces inclusives by combining the second-person
non-singular category with the first-person non-singular.
Note also the interpretation of Haacke (1977: 53): “the semantic feature ‘com-
municatory status’ which indicates involvement in discourse, makes allowance for
the possibility to interpret sa [+speaker/+addressee] and sa [-speaker/+addressee]
according to their common feature: the addressee is always involved, regardless
of the involvement of first or second person.” He then continues: “This fact alone
should be cause enough to accommodate these so-called ‘pronoun-stems’ as lexical
formatives”, most probably meaning that in no language can a pronominal elem-
ent have second-person reference irrespective of the (non)inclusion of the speaker.
He is therefore unlikely to be familiar with the Algonquian data. Hence it is all the
more amazing how similar his description of the personal reference of ‘formative’
sa (Hagman’s saá) is to the classical description of the reference of the prefix k- in
Algonquian.
A note on hybrid inclusives

The empirical data considered in this chapter overlap significantly with the data ex-
amined in (Cysouw, this volume, a). As sometimes happens, the conclusions of the
two analyses are very different. In particular, there are two arguments that Cysouw
puts forth against analyzing the hybrid inclusives discussed above as based on an
‘inclusive = second person’ homophony.
First of all, Cysouw proposes that in some of the languages under analysis affixes
which I consider to be person–number markers can in fact be considered as number
markers with limited distribution over persons, or person-restricted number mark-
ers (Cysouw, this volume, a; Cysouw, p.c.). For instance, Otomi ‑hu (‑wi) is inter-
preted not as a marker of second-person plural (dual), but as a plural (dual) marker
whose usage is restricted to the second person and the inclusive. Consequently,
these markers are not homophonous between inclusive and second person simply
because they are not person markers at all. For Cysouw, the decision whether the
marker is a person–number marker or a restricted plural marker depends on the
diachronic analysis of the data in question.
Consider however the Otomi plural pronouns nug[ö]‑he ‘we’ (traditional exclu-
sive) and the inclusive nug[ö]‑hu. These two pronouns, different in person, are dis-
tinguished only by suffixes. Whatever these suffixes used to be, it seems that now
they convey person meanings (i.e. mark personal reference). Similar examples are
easy to find in Tables 9 and 11 (Ojibwa and Nama, respectively).
28 Michael Daniel
English Algonquian Algonquian

(‘added reference’ (‘simultaneous
approach) reference’ approach)
you and us k‑i·nu‑wi k‑i·nu‑wi
Addressee Speaker Addressee Speaker Addressee Speaker

and probably and probably and probably and probably and probably and probably
others others others others others others
Figure 2. Various hybrid inclusives analyses
Even when he admits that the relevant markers are person markers, Cysouw does
not consider hybrid inclusives to be a convincing case of connection, or syncretism,
between the second person and the inclusive. The inclusive meaning of such forms
is produced, he argues, by a combination of first‑ and second-person markers, so
that one does not need to posit inclusive reference for the second-person marker.
As I understand this argument, Cysouw claims that in hybrid inclusive forma-
tions the second-person morpheme refers to a group including the addressee, not
the speaker, the speaker being referred to by the first-person morpheme. The refer-
ence of the form on the whole is, then, distributed between affixes and results from
the addition of the references of the morphemes included in it. Cf. the inclusive
reference of the English you and us. The reference of this NP is inclusive, but no-
body would claim that the second-person English pronoun is inclusive. Thus, for
Cysouw, hybrid inclusives appear to be essentially similar to coordination in that
their references are summed up to form the reference of the whole pronoun (see
Figure 2).
However, the ‘summed reference’ approach does not seem to simplify matters, and
sometimes may even be inapplicable to hybrid inclusives. Why should a double per-
son marking scheme be used in first person (traditional exclusive) and second per-
son? Surely we do not say that I and we convey exclusive meaning. Why should the
second-person k‑ rather than the first-person n‑ be used in Algonquian inclusives?
This needs special rules no less complicated (if not more so) than the locutive hierar-
chies suggested above (cf. Plank 1985 on ordering of pronominal coordinands).
A further complication is that the Algonquian k‑i·nu‑wi can refer to ‘speaker and
addressee’. The suffix ‑wi is plural and thus refers to both the speaker and the ad-
dressee. This shows that simple summing-up is not enough to explain what happens.
Indeed, the addressee is referred to twice, by the number-indifferent second-per-
son prefix (for which the addressee is the focal referent) and by the first-person–
number suffix (for which the addressee is the non-focal referent), as in Russian
constructions of the type my s toboj (lit. “we and you” = ‘you and I’). These con-
structions are widely know (under the names of plural pronoun coordination
(Schwartz 1985; Schwartz 1987), inclusory pronominals (Lichtenberk 2000;
Haspelmath, forthcoming; etc.), but have been posited only for syntactic construc-
tions, not word forms such as hybrid inclusives.
Third and most important, there are cases in which there is direct evidence that
the second-person element in a hybrid inclusive does include the speaker in its
reference. For instance, the Otomi pronoun nug[ö]‑wi ‘speaker and addressee’ uses
the affix -wi. Assuming that this affix is a dual second-person marker rather than
a dual marker restricted to the second person (see the discussion above), its refer-
ence includes the speaker as a non-focal referent, because otherwise it could not
be dual (see Table 10). Similarly, the reference of the second-person non-singular
stem saá‑ in Nama necessarily includes the speaker when this stem is used in the
pronouns saá‑kxm̀ ‘speaker and addressee (both male)’ and saá‑m̀ ‘speaker and ad-
dressee (not both of them male)’ (see Table 11).27
Back to South America: independent pronouns in Sanuma

We have seen the hierarchy {Addressee > Speaker} working on the morphological
level in Algonquian prefixes, in Otomi suffixes, and in Nama stems. However, the
resulting word form on the whole can always be successfully described as first-per-
son (traditional exclusive), inclusive, or second person. Let us now proceed to the
case in which the looked-for hierarchy is manifested most clearly because there is
no necessity to look into the morphological structure of personal pronouns.
In the Amazonian language Sanuma (Yanomam), the pronominal system is de-
scribed as manifesting three person categories: exclusive, inclusive, and second
person. The grammatical statement observes, however, that the inclusive pronoun
is homophonous with the second-person plural pronoun28 (Borgman 1990: 149).
Sanuma pronouns are morphologically unanalyzable (see Table 12).
Instead of positing homophony of two separate lexemes, one could say that
(ka)makö is used for any group that includes the addressee, irrespective of whether
it does or does not include the speaker. We can simply call this pronoun second-
person plural. If the group includes the speaker, and only if it does not include the
addressee (who assumes the highest position in the locutive hierarchy), the speaker
is chosen to be the focus, and the other personal pronoun (which we may call first-
Table 12. Sanuma personal pronouns: two approaches
kamisa, sa ‘I’ kamisamakö, samakö ‘we’ kamisa, sa ‘I’ kamisamakö, samakö ‘we’
kamakö, makö ‘inclusive’
kawa, wa ‘you.sg’ kamakö, makö ‘you.pl’
kawa, wa ‘you.sg’ kamakö, makö ‘you.pl’
Traditional Approach {Addressee > Speaker} Approach
30 Michael Daniel
person plural) is chosen. Thus, the choice of the pronoun to be used is controlled
by the {Addressee > Speaker} locutive hierarchy. Just as in case of Algonquian and
other hybrid inclusives, there seem to be no way to avoid ‘homophony description’
except positing an {Addressee > Speaker} hierarchy.
Borgman declares kamakö to be homophonous between the inclusive and the
second person. However, when describing the use of ‘we’ in non-inclusive languages
a speaker of an inclusive language would probably claim that this pronoun is hom-
ophonous between the first person (traditional exclusive) and the inclusive. The lo-
cutive hierarchies model exposes the similarity between these two approaches and
shows that Borgman’s suggestion is inadequate.
Sulawesi. Inclusive shift?

In the languages considered above, the locutive hierarchy {Addressee > Speaker} is
manifested in the morphology of basic independent personal pronouns. In some
Sulawesi languages, the same hierarchy can be applied to explain the usage of per-
sonal pronouns in the polite register. I will consider pronominal marking in Konjo.
Similar systems are reported in Macassarese and Buginese, which are closely related
to Konjo (Friberg 1996).The Konjo personal pronouns are number-indifferent. The
first-person singular category is identical to the first-person plural (traditional ex-
clusive). The first-person inclusive is also used for second-person honorific. Two
more pronominal categories are second-person familiar and third person (see Ta-
ble 13).
Now, let us consider Konjo pronominal marking as encompassing two different
sub-systems, polite and familiar registers. See Table 14, where the two registers are
Table 13. Konjo personal marking (Friberg 1996: 138)
Ergative proclitics Absolutive enclitics Free pronouns Possessive

1sg/1pl.exc ku‑ ‑a nakke ‑ku
1pl.inc/2hon ki‑ ‑ki gitte ‑ta
2f nu‑ ‑ko kau ‑nu
3 na‑ ‑i ia ‑na
Table 14. Politeness shift in Konjo
Informal speech Polite speech

1 nakke nakke 1
Inclusive gitte gitte
2
2 kau gitte
3 ia ia 3
Hierarchy {Addressee = Speaker} {Addressee > Speaker}
put in two different columns (the table only shows free pronouns, but other person
marking devices can be presented in the same way).
As follows from the data shown in Table 16, again, in polite speech the pronoun
gitte is used for any group which includes the addressee, irrespective of whether the
group to be designated does or does not include the speaker. In polite speech, the
addressee is the preferred focus as against the speaker. Therefore, both uses of gitte
in polite speech can be considered to be instances of second person. The pronoun
nakke is the first-person pronoun, indicating the inclusion of the speaker but ap-
plied only in the absence of the addressee. The Konjo pronominal system in the po-
lite register is thus identical to the pronominal prefix system in Algonquian: both
are number-indifferent and both are controlled by the {Addressee > Speaker} locu-
tive hierarchy.
In Konjo, the choice between the two hierarchies ({Addressee = Speaker} vs. {Ad-
dressee > Speaker}) depends on the register (informal or polite, respectively). It is
not surprising at all that the polite register switches to the {Addressee > Speaker}
hierarchy, increasing the rank of the addressee.
It is important to make the following note. I argued that in the cases of Algon-
quian, Otomi, Nama, and Sanuma positing the hierarchy {Addressee > Speaker} is
the only consistent way to account for the pronominal morphology, at least syn-
chronically. This is not the case with Konjo (and other Sulawesi languages).
The use of the inclusive as a second-person honorific is attested in many lan-
guages of the world (for a comprehensive analysis see Cysouw (this volume, b)). It
can be considered together with various displaced usages of ‘we’ in non-inclusive
languages when it has second-person reference, as in e.g. adult-to-child or doctor-
to-patient communication. All these usages seem to establish an in-group relation
between the speaker and the addressee (like doctor-to-patient or adult-to-child
communication) with various consequences, from politeness to rudeness. Al-
though the predicate strictly speaking only applies to the addressee (How do we feel
today), ‘we’ (or the inclusive pronoun) thus refers to the group-hood of the speaker
and the addressee or their common involvement in the situation (Now we have to
take the pill).
An inclusive which is used in this way can formally refer to the addressee alone.
With the politeness shift this should be impossible. The {Speaker = Addressee} →
{Addressee > Speaker} process, which results in the use of the inclusive as the sec-
ond-person plural pronoun, is not supposed to change the number category of the
pronoun, so that the reference of a polite second-person pronoun originating from
the inclusive must remain plural. Unfortunately, specifically in the case of Konjo
this does not help at all, because Konjo has number-indifferent pronouns and in
grammars of those languages that distinguish pronominal number it is often not
specified whether the inclusive used as a honorific second person can have singu-
lar reference.
Notably, Friberg’s own explanation of the system seems to opt for the hierarchy
shift decision: “The use of first person reflects the fact that the speaker excludes
32 Michael Daniel
the hearer, while the use of second-person honorific reflects his inclusion” (Friberg
1996: 138). This explanation, though not altogether clear, is strongly reminiscent of
the traditional Algonquianist approach to Ojibwa person marking.
A glimpse of other hierarchies

The data presented above illustrate more-or-less convincing cases of ‘inclusive =
second person’ homophony. As Cysouw (this volume, a) notes, various other hom-
ophonies occur. At least some of them can be explained by means of yet other locu-
tive hierarchies. I will only briefly mention these cases here. For a survey of data, see
Cysouw’s comprehensive sample in this volume.
In the Athabaskan languages Navaho (Young & Morgan 1985: 8) and Slave (Rice
1989: 253), there is no inclusive and second-person plural is identical to first-per-
son plural. This means that the choice of a plural pronoun is not sensitive to any dif-
ferences between groups, provided that at least one of the locutors is included. The
hierarchy which controls the choice of the focal referent of the plural pronoun does
not operate on the distinction speaker vs. addressee vs. non-locutor, but simply on
locutor vs. non-locutor. Naturally, the hierarchy controlling the choice of the focus
is formulated as {Locutor > Non-Locutor} (and the respective plural personal pro-
noun can be called locutive).
Similarly, one can explain the ‘we’ in inclusive languages (traditional exclusive)
= ‘you.pl’ pattern. This is frequent, according to Cysouw, in the Austronesian lan-
guages of and around Timor. Again, there is no difference between locutors. The
choice of the focus of a plural pronoun shows no sensitivity to the speaker vs. ad-
dressee opposition. What they are sensitive to is whether both or only one of the
locutors is included. Thus, the hierarchy is {Both Locutors > Single Locutor > None
of the Locutors}.
8. Previous studies of locutive hierarchies
This section briefly discusses previous studies addressing problems of locutive hier-
archies and their interaction with personal reference.
That the relative ordering of locutors can differ from the one which is so often im-
plicitly admitted to be universal has been argued by e.g. Kibrik and Filimonova. The
paper by Kibrik (1997) is an analysis of several person-marking systems, including
the extremely sophisticated verbal person-marking system of Alutor, a Chukotko-
Kamchatkan language. Without going into details, Kibrik’s idea is that implement-
ing ‘non-canonical’ locutive hierarchies allows a significant reduction in the degree
of complexity of the description. In her several publications (Filimonova 1997; Fili-
monova 1999), Filimonova considers various ways in which the addressee’s sali-
ence is manifested, including e.g. inverse constructions; later in Filimonova (2002)
it is further argued that, at least in the case of Aymara, this probably reflects key
extra-linguistic components of the speakers’ worldview; also see below. The treat-
ment closest to the subject of the present chapter is her analysis of derivation of the
inclusive pronoun from the second-person stem (Yokuts, Algonquian). She focuses
on cases presenting irregular or diachronic correlations rather than the morpho-
logically regular manifestations of this hierarchy, presented in this chapter.
The paper by Hollenbach (1970) is dedicated to the analysis of the notion of the
inclusive.29 Hollenbach’s main claim concerns the alleged connection between the
inclusive and the third person and is of no relevance to the present discussion. What
is important, however, is that she considers the usage of personal pronouns to be
controlled by a personal hierarchy. The personal hierarchy is presented in a form of
a configuration of overlapping Venn diagrams and is essentially identical to a hier-
archical ordering of the person assignment rules. Importantly, different configur-
ations are suggested for inclusive and non-inclusive languages.
A pioneering paper by Arnold Zwicky (Zwicky 1977) suggested what is probably
the earliest interpretation of the Algonquian pronominal system within the gen-
eral framework of personal reference. Analyzing person marker assignment, he ad-
mits that the non-canonical hierarchy of locutors (Zwicky’s referential units) {Ad-
dressee > Speaker} would solve the problem. However, Zwicky proceeds to insist on
the universalily of the {Speaker > Addressee} hierarchy. He suggests that the prob-
lem should rather be solved by implementing a non-canonical hierarchy of (some-
what roughly) grammatical persons, {II > I}, which overrides the universal hier-
archy of locutors at what he calls the ‘morphosyntactic’ level. I do not introduce the
whole discussion of Zwicky’s paper into the main body of the chapter; putting the
criticism instead into a note.30 Zwicky’s main focus is on Algonquian prefixes, and
he does not consider ordinary inclusive systems.
In a paper by Filimonova (Filimonova 2002), a totally different aspect of hierar-
chies dealing with person marking is considered. The aim of this paper is to show
that locutive hierarchies31 are not only present in linguistic structures, but are also
observable in cultural concepts and thus are not an abstract product of linguistic
analysis.32 (Similar implications are also considered in Plank 1985.) Starting from
an examination of morphosyntactic phenomena in Aymara, she then proceeds to
an extra-linguistic model of Aymara interpersonal communication. Linguistically,
Filimonova deals with manifestations of locutive hierarchies that are totally differ-
ent from the one considered in the present chapter or by Zwicky. She discusses rel-
ative overtness of the first and second-person marking in 1A → 2P and 2A → 1P
transitive constructions, relative diachronic stability of the material of the first‑ and
second-person markers, and relative frequency of textual occurrence of first‑ and
second-person pronouns (Aymara being a pro-drop language). Although drawing
linguistic implications from the cultural background is always risky, the extralin-
guistic operation of the {Addressee > Speaker} hierarchy in Aymara, if supported by
data from other cultures, is important counter-evidence against Zwicky’s assump-
tion that the hierarchy of referential elements (or locutors) {Speaker > Addressee}
is universally true.
34 Michael Daniel
A model to which my analysis is particularly close, even identical up to a certain

point, is that suggested in Plank (1985). Both Zwicky and Plank explain person as-
signment by means of hierarchical rules. Both (unlike Hollenbach) consider the
Algonquian pronominal system as crucial evidence (Plank also mentions several
other languages, including Otomi, but focuses on Algonquian data). However, Hol-
lenbach considered these hierarchical rules to be applied directly to persons, not
speech act participants. Zwicky, after considering both options, also prefers to or-
der persons. On the contrary, Plank insists that the hierarchical ordering applies to
speech act participants (Sprechakt-Rollen), not linguistic persons (Personen),
and thus deals with locutive hierarchies (Referenz-Hierarchien based on speech
act categorization) rather than hierarchies of grammatical persons (based on mor-
phosyntaktische Personen-Kategorisierungen). Unlike Zwicky, he applies
hierarchical rules to explain rules controlling the use of the inclusive pronoun, pos-
iting the {Speaker = Addressee} fragment of the hierarchy. He also mentions several
cases in which an {Addressee > Speaker} hierarchy is manifested. Plank considers
personal reference as only one of the multiple playgrounds of locutive hierarchies,
investigating personal pronouns among various other manifestations of locutive
hierarchies. I believe, however, that the hierarchy that controls person assignment
used in his paper does not allow for an account of the category of person similar to
that for other grammatical categories. The view of pronominal number and person
defined in terms of representative plurality (Sections 3 through 6) in combination
with the positing of locutive hierarchies triggering the choice of the focal referent
(thus controlling applicability of only one of the personal reference elements) cov-
ers this gap.
Important counter-arguments against the analysis in Section 7 are presented in
Cysouw (this volume, a). Actually, the latter refutes all studies of the reasons un-
derlying the formal identity of inclusives and second-person plural pronouns. Cy-
souw’s arguments follow several lines. According to him, hybrid inclusives are not
good evidence for an ‘inclusive = second person’ homophony because such inclu-
sives result from a combination of second-person and first-person reference. Thus,
inclusive reference results from summing up references of the first‑ and second-
person markers (as in you and us), none of the elements is inclusive by itself, and the
second person does not include the speaker in its reference. I agree that there is no
inclusive material involved. However, explaining inclusive reference by summing-
up of the first and second-person reference is problematic for some languages. For
more details, see Section 7. There, I explain why another of Cysouw’s objections,
that some of the elements discussed are number affixes with limited distribution ra-
ther than person–number affixes, also seems questionable.
The other argument is that in fact all other kinds of homophonies (Cysouw’s syn-
cretisms) also happen. The inclusive may be homophonous with the third person,
and the first person (Cysouw’s and traditional exclusive) may be homophonous
with the second person or the third person. If all these cases do occur, in addition to
‘inclusive = second person’ homophony, there is no special need, he argues, to pro-
vide a systemic explanation for the latter, because all the rest is left unexplained any-
way. This is an especially strong argument because even if one counts all the cases of
‘inclusive = second person’ homophony which Cysouw rejects (hybrid inclusives),
the number of the known cases remains very low.
The answer to this latter argument is that the present chapter does not have the
rare cases of ‘inclusive = second person’ homophony as its starting point. In an
attempt to build up a consistent model of pronominal plurals, I came to the ne-
cessity of positing different locutive hierarchies for non-inclusive and inclusive
languages: {Speaker > Addressee} and {Speaker = Addressee}, respectively. This
model is completely independent of the homophony phenomena. However, there
is the third possible hierarchy {Addressee > Speaker}, and it provides a functional
explanation for the homophony cases. Of course, one may doubt whether these
few cases need a functional explanation at all, since they constitute only one of the
types of personal syncretisms (homophonies) occurring in the languages of the
world, but if we do start looking for an explanation, {Addressee > Speaker} is the
most plausible one.
Although the number of these cases does not, strictly speaking, seem to be neg-
ligible (five languages of the main WALS sample of 200 languages, this sample be-
ing, within reasonable limits, representative), it is really quite low: cf. the 2:1 ratio
of non-inclusive to inclusive languages in the same sample. Does this necessarily
mean that they are linguistically irrelevant? On the contrary, the very fact that their
number is so low is very instructive. Different cognitive factors contribute to the sa-
lience of the speaker and addressee and their relative ranking. The fact that the non-
inclusive languages are more frequent than the inclusive languages, and that the
latter in turn are by far more frequent than languages with apparent homophony
of the inclusive and the second person, can be interpreted as an indication that the
cognitive factors foregrounding the speaker are stronger and outweigh the factors
foregrounding the addressee. Languages are thus typically (though not universally)
egocentric (see Figure 3).
{Speaker > Addressee} > {Speaker = Addressee} >> {Addressee > Speaker}
Figure 3. Cross-linguistic frequency of locutive hierarchies
9. A note on the tradition
Coming back to the traditional vision of the inclusive, we may ask the following
question: given that there is no apparent typological evidence that the inclusive is a
first-person pronoun, what made us linguists think that the inclusive is a first-per-
son pronoun in the first place?The traditional view of the inclusive as a subcategory
of the first person can be understood as a two-step model of the speaker’s choice of
personal pronoun. Allegedly, the speaker first checks whether the group includes
36 Michael Daniel
Yes Inclusive
Is the addressee
Yes First person included?
Is the speaker
No Exclusive
included?
No Non-first person
Figure 4. Inclusives, traditional view
the speaker (first person if yes), and only after that checks whether it also includes
the addressee (inclusive if yes). See Figure 4.
In other words, the traditional approach calls the inclusive a first-person pro-
noun because it implicitly considers the inclusion of the speaker to be its primary
feature, and the speaker to be the primary member of the group. The reason for this
becomes obvious within the approach suggested above. Indo-European languages
are non-inclusive, and thus rank the speaker higher than the addressee. Because
Indo-European languages are the point of departure of traditional linguistic studies,
the hierarchy {Speaker > Addressee} is adopted as a universal principle of human
cognition and projected onto inclusive languages, which makes the inclusive a sub-
category of the first-person category. Meanwhile, as I have shown above, it is pre-
cisely the replacement of the {Speaker > Addressee} hierarchy with the {Speaker =
Addressee} hierarchy that conveniently explains the principles of personal refer-
ence in inclusive languages.
Except for the projection of the non-inclusive model of personal reference, the
scheme in Figure 4 is totally arbitrary. Compare the claim in Plank (1985) that the
traditional model is not less effective when put upside down: see Figure 5. Here, in-
clusive becomes a subcategory of the second person, and we have first person, in-
clusive second person, and exclusive second person. Both schemes are equally ef-
fective — and equally arbitrary.
Yes Inclusive
Is the speaker
Yes Second person included?
Is the addressee
No Exclusive
included?
No Non-second person
Figure 5. Inclusives, through the looking glass

To sum up, the traditional approach to inclusives is based on an Indo-European,

or, more broadly, non-inclusive linguistic intuition. Although the past decades of
the typological research already have taught us a lot about the amazing typological
diversity of languages, one should still be ready to discover that some basic, impli-
cit component of linguistic theory may in the end turn out not to be universal.33 The
egocentricity of human language is a widespread but not universal feature of pro-
nominal marking (see Figure 3 above).
10. Summary
In this chapter, I have tried to provide a general model of pronominal plurals and
personal reference and to fit into this model what is known about inclusives. I pre-
sented different arguments in favor of classing inclusives as a separate person rather
than a subcategory of the first person. I considered the peculiar phenomenon of in-
clusives that are apparently homophonous with the second person.
In Section 2, I showed that there is not enough typological evidence to say that
inclusives tend to be morphologically related to first-person exclusives. Most inclu-
sives use independent stems. Only in unique cases are they regularly related to the
first-person pronoun.
In Section 3, I showed that pronominal plurality is different from the basic plu-
rals significantly enough to posit a special category, representative plural, of which
pronominal plurals are an instance.
In Section 4, I suggested a definition of the person of a plural pronoun that was
based on the understanding of pronominal plurality introduced in Section 3. Ac-
cording to this definition, the inclusive is clearly a separate person.
In Section 5, I considered some complications suggesting that a consistent inter-
pretation of pronominal plurals as discussed in Sections 3 and 4 needs to rely on hi-
erarchies of speech act participants (locutive hierarchies), introduced in Section 6.
Inclusive and non-inclusive languages use different locutive hierarchies: {Speaker =
Addressee} and {Speaker > Addressee}, respectively.
Section 7 considers rare examples of the third possible hierarchy, {Addressee >
Speaker}, in several languages, apparently manifested as homophony between the
alleged inclusive and the second-person plural. I suggested that these languages in
fact lack the inclusive altogether.
Section 8 reviews other scholars’ approaches to locutive hierarchies and ‘inclu-
sive = second person’ homophonies, as well as their use of the {Addressee > Speaker}
hierarchy.
In Section 9, I explained the European stereotype of person marking underlying
the traditional view of the inclusive as a first-person subcategory as a projection of
the pattern of non-inclusive languages.
In brief, the points made in the present chapter may be summarized as follows:
38 Michael Daniel
• Inclusive is universally a separate, fourth person.

• In languages with apparent homophony of the inclusive and second-person pro-
nominal marker, there is actually no inclusive, the item in question being a sec-
ond-person pronoun. The ‘inclusive usage’ of this pronoun to designate groups
including both the speaker and the addressee is similar to the ‘inclusive usage of
we’ in non-inclusive languages.
• The difference between ordinary non-inclusive and inclusive languages and lan-
guages with apparent homophony of inclusive and second person may be in-
terpreted as a difference in the locutive hierarchies controlling the choice of the
plural pronoun.
• The traditional approach is based on the assumption of the universal egocentric-
ity of human language. A cross-linguistic analysis of pronominal systems shows
that, although the egocentric pattern is indeed more widespread, it is by no means
universal. The addressee is often ranked equal to the speaker, and in a few cases
even outranks the latter.
Notes
1. I would like to thank all those who read this chapter at its different stage of preparation.
Considering how long it took to take its present shape, if it were a baby and not a chapter
it would now be almost able to speak for itself. And if it is finally able to speak, this is to a
great extent owing to the constructive impatience of Elena Filimonova, indefatigable edi-
tor of this volume, to numerous stylistic improvements made by Barry Alpher, to many a
friendly smack by Michael Cysouw, to kind attention from Edith Moravcsik, Frans Plank,
and Andrei Kibrik, and to many other people who less directly contributed to the concep-
tion and development of the chapter. As to the defects that still remain, quite naturally, the
chapter takes after its author.
2. The term additive plurality (Russian additivnaja množestvennost′) was first sug-
gested in Barulin (1980).
3. Or, in this case, each element of the plural form is also the referent of the stem.
4. The declension of the Russian personal pronouns is not consistently nominal. Nomina-
tive, dative, and instrumental use masculine nominal plural endings, (adnominal) genitive
functions are fulfilled by adjectival possessive forms, and other cases (in the plural actually
one syncretic case) are specifically pronominal. Cf. Nominative m‑y ‘we’ ~ slon‑y ‘elephants’;
Dative n‑am ~ slon‑am; Instrumental n‑ami ~ slon‑ami; Accusative-Prepositional n‑as but
Genitive-Accusative slon‑ov, Prepositional slon‑ax. Same endings are used in the second-
person plural.
5. One could e.g. argue that this is a result of the presumption of the unique referent, as was
done for nominal associative plurals in Daniel (2000); Daniel & Moravcsik (2005).
6. Apart from its pragmatic peripherality, there is one more point which is not mentioned
in discussions of the ‘choral’ we. It is actually unclear how one could prove that in the case
of speaking in a choir each speaker actually conceptualizes himself as a multiple speaker. It
is equally plausible that every speaker uses the first-person plural pronoun ‘we’ to desig-
nate a group including himself, with the only difference that many people do it in unison; cf.
J espersen (1924). In other words, we should decide whether we are dealing with one single
speech act or with several speech acts made in unison. It is not obvious whether there could
be any linguistic evidence in favor of one or the other point of view.
7. On the other hand, these two meanings of ‘you.pl’, apparently equally probable and fre-
quent, may not be admitted to be ‘equally important’. Indeed, if these two readings of, say,
Russian vy or French vous were unrelated and equal, they would be expressed by two dif-
ferent forms in at least a noticeable number of the languages of the world. However, cross-
linguistic evidence shows that there is no language which uses different pronouns for ‘ad-
dressee + other people’ and ‘addressee + addressee +. . .+ addressee’. Two notable exceptions
which were previously known to typologists are convincingly contested in Simon (this vol-
ume), who, however, claims that Bavarian German probably is a true exception. Despite the
extraordinary data from Bavarian, it is thus most likely that one of the two readings is the
core one. Similarly, no language is reported to use different inclusive pronouns depending
on whether the group to be designated includes a single addressee and non-locutor(s) or
multiple addressees. Thus, the difference between a group that includes only addressees and
a group that includes both addressee(s) and non-locutor(s) is (almost) universally disre-
garded in pronominal marking. The conclusion would be that, grammatically, second-per-
son plural is always conceptualized as ‘a group of people which includes the addressee(s)’,
without specifying the actual number of the addressees. Its structure is thus identical to that
of the first-person plural.
8. Of course, the notions of speaker and addressee should probably be decomposed and
thought of in more exact terms. The speaker can use ‘we’ referring to himself and several
people who are not present and aware of what he says, or he may speak on behalf of a group
of people which has authorized him to do so, or he may be a representative speaker of a
group of people standing by his side, or he may even be speaking in unison with some other
people. The situation with the notion of the addressee is not different. I can look at and talk
to several people simultaneously, or I can talk to them in turn, the whole speech act be-
ing addressed to all of them, or I can talk to one person addressing my speech act to him
and to a group of absent people whom I associate with the direct addressee of my speech
act. Such analysis may lead to considering the oppositions addressee vs. non-locutor and
speaker vs. non-locutor as scalar rather than binary. Consequently, the uses of ‘we’ and ‘you.
pl’ would be considered as more/less homogeneous (heterogeneous). However, the scale-
ness of these oppositions is not relevant to the present discussion, because it is not reflected
in the linguistic structure, at least at the level of pronominal morphology. I will assume that
both first‑ and second-person plural pronouns have referentially heterogeneous plurals (in
the case of the second-person plural, at least as one of two options).
9. Russian linguistics is particularly abundant in terms for associative plurals, including
vydelitel′naja množestvennost′ (emphasizing plurals), ograničennaja množest
vennost′ (limited plurals), soprovoditel′naja množestvennost′ (plurals of accompa-
niment), and, especially, representativnaja množestvennost′ (representative plurals);
see Daniel (2000); also cf. elliptical plurals and plurals a potiori in Indo-European
linguistics and plurals of approximation in Jespersen (1924).
10. Dyadic kinship terms sometimes tend to be used in predicative position and thus to de-
note kinship relations rather than groups of people.
11. This is a direct translation of the Russian orientalist term reprezentativnaja
množestvennost’, used in a series of Russian descriptive grammars, including e.g. Nivkh
40 Michael Daniel
and Kabardian (Panfilov 1962; Kumakhov 1971), and theoretical studies (Panfilov 1977). In
these grammars, the term is used for what I call associative plurals. It is convenient to ap-
ply it in a wider sense to all kinds of heterogeneous plurals (similatives, etc.), preserving
the term associative plural for the specific meaning ‘X and his associates’. Indeed, in most
cases the named element of the group designated by a heterogeneous plural form in a way
represents the whole group. It is a socially dominant member of the group in the case of
associative plurals, the prototypical referent in the case of similative plurals, and the senior
rather than the junior member of the kin pair (group) in the case of dyadic kinship terms.
In a group designated by a plural personal pronoun, the element designated by the singu-
lar counterpart may also be interpreted as salient. For instance, for a group designated by
the pronoun ‘we’ the referent of its singular correlate, i.e. the speaker, may be understood as
pragmatically dominating over the other members of this group, the addressee and/or non-
locutors (see Section 6).
12. A taxonomy of the meanings of ‘we’ (as well as ‘you.pl’) is worth a special study. Apart
from associative reading ‘the speaker and his associates’, the list would include locutive
usage ‘the speaker and the addressee’ in non-inclusive languages (There are too many people
here, we’ll talk about that later), anaphoric usage ‘the speaker and another person just men-
tioned’ (I met Nino in the square and we went to a cafe), class usage ‘the speaker and an
open class of people whose member he is’ (We Russians are not what we thought we were),
autoethnonymic usage ‘the speaker and the ethnic group he belongs to’ (We had been liv-
ing on these hills since the 14th century), etc.
13. This table may in fact be considered as a typological extension of a chart suggested in
Corbett (2000: 86) to describe the distribution of plural meanings across English nominals.
Some classes of nominals are excluded from the table as irrelevant to the present discussion,
such as mass nouns, which may have their own specific plural readings (Corbett’s recatego-
rization effects).
14. Note that adopting the view that the representative reading is primary also for ‘you.
pl’ — see discussion in n. 7 — would eliminate the lamentable discontinuity of the dark gray
area in the first line of the table (additive plurals).
15. I skip the problem of the third person plurals. Their position in the model is somewhat
problematic. Logically, there are several possibilities: (a) the third-person pronoun has a
non-locutor as its focus; (b) the third-person pronoun designates a group which does not in-
clude either of the two locutors, without saying anything about its focus; (c) languages vary
in that in some of them (a) is true and in others (b) is true.
16. I will use the term non-locutor in the sense of neither the speaker nor the addressee,
as was done in Curnow (1997); Kibrik (1997).
17. That in its additive plural reading ‘you.pl’ = ‘addressee +. . .+ addressee’ is also a second-
person pronoun does not need special comments.
18. Cf. Hollenbach (1970: 31): “An extended inclusive (=‘you.sg, I and other(s)’ — M. D.)
usually has first and second persons in focus, and third person is out of focus.”
19. The difference is that minimal is a paradigmatic pronominal category, while focus is the
category of pronominal reference. Focus is present in plural pronouns of all languages. The
minimal category, on the other hand, is present only in those pronominal systems that align
‘you.sg and I’ with singular pronouns.
20. This analysis is less obvious in languages in which ‘you.sg and I’ is aligned with dual
Table 15. Pronominal systems of Weri (from Greenberg 1989: 5), Niue (from Polinskaya
1995: 48) and Even (from Nedyalkov 1996: 200–1)
Weri (minimal ~ augmented) Niue Even

Minimal Unit augmented Augmented Sg Du Pl Sg Pl
1st ne ten‑ip ten au taua tautolu bi: bu:
Inclusive tepir tëar‑ip tëar maua mautolu mut
2nd në ar‑ip ar koe mua mutolu hi: hu:
3rd pë pëar‑ip pët, pëar ia laua lautolu
pronouns and even somewhat problematic in languages in which there is only one inclu-
sive pronoun for both ‘you.sg and I’ and ‘you.sg and I and other people’ (see Table 15). The
problem of the focus of the inclusive in such languages and its connection to the category of
pronominal number was addressed in Daniel (2001). Anyway, in all inclusive languages the
subset {speaker, addressee} is the obligatory component of all occurrences of the inclusive
(except displaced usages) and is, at least in this sense, its focus.
21. Note that this approach, too, leads to the conclusion that the inclusive is not a first-per-
son pronoun. Indeed, in this approach the category of person becomes ‘including X but not
the other locutor’. The first person is anything which ‘includes the speaker but not the other
locutor (addressee)’, which is obviously wrong with inclusives.
22. From Section 6 on, the present chapter continues the discussion started in Zwicky
(1977); Plank (1985). When I suggested the model of pronominal reference based on locu-
tive hierarchies (Daniel 2000) I was not aware of the fact that basically the same approach
of ordering locutors was considered by Zwicky and especially Plank much earlier. I will ad-
dress differences in Section 9 below.
23. Zwicky (1977) implicitly suggests the same. Indeed, while the inclusive in his formal-
ism is rendered by [+I,+II], the exclusive is simply [+I], not [+I,-II] as in many other ap-
proaches.
24. See the end of Section 7 below for a discussion of a structurally different manifestation
of the {Speaker = Addressee} pattern in Athabaskan.
25. The common gender is present only in non-singular forms and designates a group in-
cluding people of different biological sex.
26. Haacke (1977) argues against the traditional view that the forms represented in the table
are full pronouns. He suggests that these are syntactic constructions rather than word forms,
including a nominal, or lexical, formative (traditional stem) and a nominal designant (trad-
itional suffix). However, as he agrees that in this context the formatives have personal refer-
ence, this complication does not seem to have direct impact on what will be said below.
27. A case that is interesting in this respect is that of Maybrat, which Cysouw discusses with
reference to Dol (1999) and classes together with the hybrid inclusives discussed above. Dol
observes that, although the language does not have a separate inclusive category, inclusive
reference may be achieved by combining free and bound pronoun, i.e. by a combination of
a second-person plural pronoun with a first-person plural verbal agreement marker. Com-
pare the following examples from Dol (1999: 70–1):
42 Michael Daniel
(i) a. amu p‑kah ora

we 1pl‑burn garden
‘We (excl) burn a garden’
b. anu n‑nor p‑awiya
you.pl 2‑think thing‑interrog
‘What do you think?’
c. anu p‑kias ania
you.pl 1pl‑tell each.other
‘You (and we), we tell each other’
Unfortunately, it is unclear whether the first example (a) is indeed obligatorily exclusive.
For Cysouw, this construction is similar to hybrid inclusives in that the inclusive refer-
ence is summed up from the references of different person-marking devices. Therefore,
the reference of the second-person pronoun does not include the speaker. What is crucial,
however, is whether the last Maybrat example can refer to only two people (addressee plus
speaker). If it can, the reference of the plural pronoun anu includes the speaker, thus mani-
festing the {Addressee > Speaker} locutive hierarchy.
28. “In the first-person plural there is also the distinction of exclusive and inclusive, ex-
cluding or including the listener or listeners. First-person plural inclusive and second-per-
son plural have the same pronoun and only context determines which referent is intended”
(Borgman 1990: 149).
29. Among others, Hollenbach gives several examples relevant to the discussion in the pre-
vious section. These include the Algonquian language Potawotomi with reference to Hock-
ett (1948) (the structure of the inclusive is the same as in other Algonquian languages), Chol
(Mayan) with reference to Warkentin & Whittaker (1970), which is different from Algon-
quian in that the inclusive uses a first-person prefix with a second-person suffix, and Kiowa,
a Tanoan language in Oklahoma which uses the same affix for both the inclusive and the
second person in one of the person series (reference to Merrifield 1959). Note that she pro-
vides all these examples only to show that, morphologically, the inclusive is not necessar-
ily a first-person pronoun but sometimes is related to the second person (which is allegedly
manifested by these examples). She then proceeds to her main topic: the cases in which the
inclusive is a compound of the first and second person or related to the third person.
30. Zwicky posits two linguistic levels. One is the semantic, or reference, level and deals with
referential elements including 1 (the speaker), 2 (the addressee) and 3 (non-locutor). The
other is the morphosyntactic, including I person, II person, and III person. He then suggests
the use of the following rules:
Scheme 1. Zwicky’s assignment principles. First version. (Zwicky 1977: 717)

Use the first person (I) pronoun we for any reference set with the referential
element 1;
Otherwise, use the second person (II) pronoun you for any reference set with
the referential element 2;
Otherwise, use the third person (III) pronoun they.
To get rid of the rules’ ordering, Zwicky suggests these correspondence principles provided
with a hierarchy of reference:
Scheme 2. Zwicky’s assignment principles. Second version (correspondence principles +

hierarchy of reference). (Zwicky 1977: 718)
Principle 1. I is associated with 1.
Principle 2. II is associated with 2.
Principle 3. III is associated with 3.
Hierarchy of reference: 1>2>3
The hierarchy is supposed to make up for the absence of rule ordering, just as I suggested in
Section 6. However, it is left implicit exactly how the hierarchy of reference operates. Appar-
ently, what the hierarchy says is that the rule which deals with referential item 1 is applied first,
then the rule that deals with referential item 2; the rule dealing with referential item 3 comes
last. This means that the speaker first checks the presence of himself, then of the addressee. In
this case, it is indeed irrelevant in what order we apply the correspondence principles. The ap-
plicability is defined by the hierarchy of reference. This brings us back to the model suggested
above in Section 6 and fills the gap. Otherwise, Zwicky’s approach up to this point seems
identical to that suggested in the present chapter. After this the discrepancies emerge.
Preliminarily, he ascribes a universal character to this hierarchy. Zwicky claims that the
hierarchy 1>2>3 operates in both inclusive and non-inclusive languages. That seems quite
problematic. Whether Zwicky considers the inclusive to be a separate person (as I think he
does) or a subcategory of the first person, there should be a separate correspondence prin-
ciple for the inclusive. Nowhere in the paper is a full list of correspondence principles for
inclusive languages put forward. The putative correspondence rule for I+II morphosyntac-
tic (inclusive) person assignment in Zwicky’s formalism would probably be: I+II is associ-
ated with 1+2 and should apply before other rules in Scheme 2 above. I see no way how the
hierarchy of reference 1>2>3 can be responsible for the precedence of this rule over the other
rules in the sense it is for the mutual precedence of the three rules in non-inclusive languages.
Zwicky then proceeds to an analysis of Algonquian pronominal marking. Considering
various aspects of person marking, he states: “<. . .> we see that the three prefixes cannot
be associated with the three grammatical persons in the ordinary way, since the *ke‑ forms
cover inclusive first person as well as second person” (Zwicky 1977: 721). The problem is as
follows: which component of the model suggested by Zwicky is responsible for this? As or-
dering of persons is mentioned by many Algonquianists, he starts by investigating whether
they mean morphosyntactic person (I, II, III) or referential, or semantic person (1, 2, 3). As
it turns out, different authors mean different things, and most of them do not try to distin-
guish between the two sets of persons. Furthermore, he writes “At any rate, it is clear that the
Algonquian pronominal prefixes involve a hierarchy of persons, in some sense of person. If
this is a hierarchy of referential (or semantic) person, then we are in trouble, since our puta-
tively universal hierarchy is 1>2>3, but here the hierarchy is 2>1>3” (Zwicky 1977: 722).
To preserve the universality of the hierarchy of referential persons (i.e. speech act partici-
pants), Zwicky claims that the Algonquian hierarchy deals not with the referential hierarchy,
but somehow with correspondence principles described above. He suggests a very pecu-
liar, somewhat algebraic solution. The morphosyntactic persons are re-analyzed componen-
tially: inclusive is [+I, +II], exclusive is [+I], II (second person) is [+II], III (third person)
is [+III]. An additional hierarchy of componential features is constructed: +II>+I>+III. As
Zwicky says, this hierarchy puts together “second-person forms with first-person inclusive
forms, as against first-person exclusive forms” (Zwicky 1977: 723). This it indisputably does.
Also, it is obviously a hierarchy of morphosyntactic (i.e. grammatical) persons, rather than
referential elements (i.e. speech act participants), just as Zwicky intended.
44 Michael Daniel
What is unclear to me is how this hierarchy, when added to the correspondence principles
and the allegedly universal hierarchy of referential elements (Scheme 2) above, provides for
a correct assignment of person categories to referential sets. It seems that Zwicky admits the
existence of the inclusive in Algonquian. At least, this problem is not explicitly discussed in
the paper, and the morphosyntactic person I+II is posited for these languages. Moreover, if
he did not consider k‑ to be homophonous between the inclusive and the second person, he
would not need to use componential analysis of morphosyntactic persons, as there would
not be either the exclusive or the inclusive, but simply ‘we’ and ‘you.pl’. Then there would
be four correspondence principles instead of the three mentioned below, in accord with the
number of morphosyntactic persons. Unfortunately, as I mentioned before, nowhere in this
paper are these four correspondence principles operating in inclusive languages made expli-
cit. This has prompted me to put forward a version of them on my own. I provide two ver-
sions, depending on whether one believes that Algonquian has the inclusive or not:
How does the hierarchy of morphosyntactic personal features work? We agree that the
hierarchy of reference works the following way: of two rules containing two referential items,
the rule which contains the more highly positioned item is applied first. It seems that the
hierarchy of morphosyntactic personal features should work similarly: of two rules con-
taining two morphosyntactic persons, the rule which contains the morphosyntactic person
containing the more highly positioned feature is applied first. Indeed, this hierarchy yields a
correct person assignment for Algonquian, but only in case the hierarchy of reference is not
applied. The hierarchy of reference and the hierarchy of morphosyntactic personal features
are contradictory. According to the former, principle 1 is applied before principle 2, while
according to the latter, principle 1 is applied after principle 2. The system of person assign-
ment simply does not work with two hierarchies. It seems that the only way to apply both
hierarchies is not to determine the applicability of the rules, but to order them. Then, indeed,
the referential hierarchy first orders the correspondence principles as 1, 2, 3 and then the
morphosyntactic hierarchy re-orders them as 2, 1, 3; see Table 16.
Several counter-arguments arise. First, Zwicky has introduced the hierarchy precisely in
order to avoid ordering rules and to replace them with applicability conditions. The solu-
tion which he then suggests again has recourse to ordering. Second, from the point of view
of a functional (and any other dynamic) linguistic model, it is much more natural to apply
restrictions to what conditions the assignment (i.e. referential units) rather than to what is
assigned. Third, the model seems over-sophisticated. Dispensing with the assumption of the
universality of the {Speaker > Addressee} hierarchy does the same trick much more easily.
Table 16. Hierarchy of morphosyntactic personal features (active in Algonquian):

[+II] > [+I] > [+III]
Zwicky believing in Algonquian inclusive Would-be Zwicky not believing in Algonquian

inclusive
Principle 0. I+II is associated with 1+2
Principle 1. I is associated with 1 Principle 1. I is associated with 1
Principle 2. II is associated with 2 Principle 2. II is associated with 2
Principle 3. III is associated with 3 Principle 3. III is associated with 3
Hierarchy of reference: 1>2>3
31. In her paper, Filimonova calls them person hierarchies. However, when addressing
cognitive and cultural aspects of these hierarchies, she actually deals with locutive rather
than personal hierarchies, in terms of my argument against Zwicky’s position (see the pre-
vious note). In different parts of the paper, she alternatively considers the problem as one of
ranking of persons or of speech act participants.
32. She tests her hypothesis that “the person hierarchy is not an ‘artificial’ concept developed
by linguists to describe different structural constraints but rather a cognitive parameter in-
herent to the worldview of the corresponding language society” (Filimonova 2002: 199). I
must admit that in the present chapter locutive hierarchies are much more of a descriptive
tool than an element of a cultural model.
33. Cf. an interesting point concerning the traditional numbering of persons made, again,
in Plank (1985) and recently in Filimonova (2000, 2002). What is the raison d’être of the ex-
isting terms first person and second person? One could suggest that in classical trad-
ition these terms come from an a priori ordering of the locutors according to the egocentric
model. The speaker is ego and thus more important, and the first person; the addressee is
second in importance and is thus the second person. However, as Filimonova pointed out,
within the Aymara ‘pragmatic grammar’ the addressee is the preferred locutor, with special
speech avoidance strategies to avoid directly mentioning him. One could say, she argued,
that if the classical linguistic tradition had started from within the Aymara linguistic culture,
‘you’ would be the first person and ‘I’ would be the second person.
If one tries to make the terms second and first person more functional and rooted in the
linguistic structure, as Plank did in Plank (1985), it would make sense to apply the term
first person to the pronoun whose focus has the higher status in the locutive hierarchy at
work in the language in question. The term second person would then be applicable to the
pronoun whose focus is the second member of the hierarchy. In European languages, the
speaker is the preferred focus and the hierarchy is {Speaker > Addressee}. This is consistent
with the terms first and second person in their actual use in quite a natural way. In languages
like Sanuma, where the hierarchy is the opposite, it would make sense to reverse the usage.
One would call ‘you.sg’ and ‘you.pl’ first person and ‘I’ and ‘we’ second person. In inclu-
sive languages, the terms are not applicable in any meaningful way because the locutors are
equal and neither is a preferable focus.
The suggested usage, although much more consistent and linguistically meaningful, has
little chance of survival. Most likely, whether or not the reader agrees with the idea of cross-
linguistic variation of the ordering of the locutors, the traditional numbering of the persons
is here to stay.
The very term inclusive (= ‘inclusive of the addressee’) reflects the history of the term
rather than what I believe to be its correct interpretation. Luckily, one may reinterpret in-
clusive as ‘inclusive of both locutors’, as opposed to the first and second person which in-
clude only one, i.e. to understand inclusive in its ‘including more than usual; comprehen-
sive’ meaning.
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Chapter 2
Inclusive–exclusive as person vs.
number categories worldwide
Balthasar Bickel Johanna Nichols
University of Leipzig University of California, Berkeley
Using a balanced sample of 293 languages, we propose a new classification of types of inclu-
sive–exclusive oppositions based on how the inclusive–exclusive opposition is worked into
person–number categories, and trace their geography and likely history. Inclusive–exclu-
sive oppositions are significantly frequent in the large Circum-Pacific linguistic area, as is the
least common type, the minimal/augmented type. Within this large area, inclusive–exclu-
sive oppositions are significantly more frequent toward the south. This worldwide geograph-
ical distribution can be explained by early population movements around the Pacific and by
likely transitions from type to type of inclusive–exclusive systems. This chapter builds on our
previous work on typology, linguistic geography, and ancient population movements.
Keywords: number, minimal/augmented, linguistic geography, enclave, type shift, population
movement, Circum-Pacific language area
1. Introduction
The geography of inclusive–exclusive oppositions in first-person pronouns is dis-

tinctive, with unusually clear inter-areal continuities. For all their intimate connec-
tion to interpersonal pragmatics, inclusive–exclusive oppositions are not compa-
rably frequent everywhere: they are common in the Americas, near-universal in
Australia, common in eastern Asia, rare in the rest of Eurasia, fairly rare in Africa.
This geography, however, is based on the gross presence vs. absence of any inclu-
sive–exclusive opposition in the grammar at large, when the proper comparanda
are particular types of inclusive–exclusive oppositions and particular grammatical
paradigms. Here we look at the first of these two comparanda and propose a new
classification of morphological and semantic types of inclusive–exclusive opposi-
tions. We then trace the geography of those types and explain the modern geogra-
phy by positing likely transitions from type to type, as well as two unusual develop-
ments, each of which happened to occur in a center of spread so that their modern
ranges and frequencies considerably deviate from what is expected by chance. The
survey reported here uses a genealogically based sample of 293 languages which
also aims at wide geographical coverage, drawn from the Autotyp database (Bickel
& Nichols 2002 ff.).
50 Balthasar Bickel and Johanna Nichols
2. Three kinds of inclusive–exclusive oppositions
For purposes of inter-areal comparison it is most useful to have a typology consist-

ing of few and fairly discrete types, so that, in principle, all types have a statistical
chance of occurring with at least fair frequency in all areas. If the types are numer-
ous, area-specific high frequencies of different types will be unlikely to occur and
low frequencies of some types will be universal and hence not useful for compari-
son. We propose a three-way typology of inclusive–exclusive systems, classifying
them by the way in which the inclusive–exclusive opposition is worked into per-
son–number categories. Our classification differs from that of Cysouw (2003) in
using fewer types (a sampling necessity) and in dealing with person and number
in what may appear to be a very traditional fashion. (We agree with Cysouw that
“plural” in pronouns is really a group category rather than a true plural. That said, we
use the term plural for ease of wording.) We name two of the three types for exem-
plar languages using them: thus we have a Chechen type, a Belhare type (named for
our own current field languages), and (using an established term) the minimal/aug-
mented type.
The commonest and probably best known type of inclusive–exclusive system is
the Chechen type, in which the first-person plural (or dual and plural), and no other
number or person category, is subdivided into exclusive vs. inclusive forms:
(1) Chechen (Nakh-Dagestanian, Caucasus)
Singular Plural
1 so excl. txo
incl. vai
2 hwo shu
3 i/iza ysh
(2) So (Kuliak, East Africa; Serzisko 1992)
Singular Plural
1 aya excl. inia
incl. isia
2 piya pitia
3 ica itia
Most systems with a dual number belong to one of the two other types described
below, but an example of the less common Chechen type with a dual comes from
Garawa:
(3) Garawa (Garawan; northern Australia; Furby 1972: 2)
Singular Dual Plural
1 ngayu excl. ngali nurru
incl. nunggala ngambala
2 ninjdji nimbala narri
3 njulu bula yalu
Inclusive–exclusive as person vs. number categories worldwide 51
In all of these systems, neither the form nor the meaning of the inclusive and exclu-
sive category are shared by any other person or number category; they are isolated
subcategories of the nonsingular number category. The other two types of inclusive–
exclusive oppositions treat exclusive and/or inclusive not as unique or isolated sub-
categories of number but as members of person categories, as shown in the sharing
of roots or stems across a segment of the person–number pronominal paradigm.
Somewhat less frequent cross-linguistically than Chechen-type systems are those
which treat the inclusive–exclusive distinction on a par with the basic second vs.
third distinction rather than as a subcategory of nonsingular first persons. In such
a system, the exclusive has a singular value, just as other persons do. Singular in-
clusive forms cannot exist, because the inclusive minimally denotes a dyad consist-
ing of speaker and addressee. The diagnostic feature of this type is that first-person
singular is construed (and morphologically marked) as the singular of an exclusive
marker, and there is a gap in the paradigm at the intersection of singular and inclu-
sive. Below are examples from Belhare and Kipeá Kiriri showing that the exclusive
pronouns have a common root element in all or both number categories, while the
inclusive is different (and is often not very well characterized as a formal person cat-
egory). We call this type the Belhare type.
(4) Belhare intransitive verb agreement (Kiranti, Sino-Tibetan; Nepal)
Excl -ŋa -chi-ŋa -i-ŋa
Incl -chi -i
2 -ga -chi-ga -i-ga
3 Ø- N-. . .-chi N-
In Belhare the element -ŋa identifies the exclusive stem in all three numbers. (The
inclusive is zero-marked.)
(5) Kipeá Kiriri (Brazil; Mamiani 1877: 7–8)
Independent Prefixal
Singular Plural Singular Plural
Excl hietçã hietçã-de hi- hi-. . .-de
Incl ketçã(a) ku-. . .(-a)
2 ewatçã ewatçã-a e- e-. . .-a
3 i-/s- i-. . .-a/s-. . .-a
In Kipeá Kiriri the independent pronoun hietçã and the prefix hi- mark the exclu-
sive in both singular and plural.1
Considerably less common than either Chechen or Belhare systems, but still well
attested, are languages which distinguish minimal vs. augmented number: the
minimal inclusive is referentially dual, while the minimal exclusive, second-per-
son, and third-person forms are referentially singular. In Northern Australian lan-
guages, a third term, unit augmented, is sometimes distinguished. This translates
as trial for the inclusive and dual for the other persons.2 The diagnostic feature of
minimal/augmented systems is an additional dual or trial number found only with

first-person inclusive forms. Unlike in Belhare systems, there is no paradigm gap in
minimal/augmented systems. Both inclusive and exclusive have the same number
oppositions as the second and third person. This type of system treats not only the
exclusive but also the inclusive as a pure person category that intersects with what-
ever number category or categories the language has.
(6) Hocak (a.k.a Winnebago; Siouan) subject agreement (root xé ~ xa ‘bury’;
Lipkind 1945)
Minimal (-Ø) Augmented (-wi)
Excl ha-xé ‘I bury him’ ha-xa-wí ‘we (they and I) bury
him’
Incl hĩ-xé ‘thou and I bury him’ hĩ-xa-wí ‘we (you and I) bury him’
2 ra-xé ‘thou buriest him’ ra-xa-wi ‘you bury him’
3 xé ‘he buries him’ xa-wí ‘they bury him’
(7) Rembarrnga pronouns (N. Australia; Dixon 1980: 352 after McKay 1978)
Minimal Unit augmented (-pparraʔ) Augmented (-ə)
Excl ŋənə yarr-pparraʔ yarr-ə
Incl yəkkə ŋakorr-parraʔ ŋakorr-ə
2 kə nakorr-parraʔ nakorr-ə
3 masc nawə parr-pparraʔ parr-ə
3 fem ŋatə parr-pparraʔ parr-ə
This type might be called the Maranao/Sierra Popoluca type, using Cysouw’s ex-
emplar labels based on the following systems (reorganized into traditional number
categories, but otherwise from Cysouw 2003):
(8) Maranao (Cysouw 2003: 139, citing McKaughan 1959)
Minimal Augmented
Excl ako kami
Incl ta tano
2 ka kano
3 sekanian siran
(9) Sierra Popoluca (Cysouw 2003: 149)
Excl ʔa-
Incl ta-
2 mi-
3 Ø-
Note that every language with a minimal/augmented system also has a Belhare-
type system (since both extend the inclusive–exclusive opposition to a system of
at least two numbers), but the converse is not true. In our coding as reflected in the
counts below, we have coded a language as having a Belhare system only if it did not
also have a minimal/augmented system, and as having a Chechen system only if it
did not also have a Belhare system. That is, we sought and coded types in this order:
(10) minimal/augmented > Belhare > Chechen
starting with the most specific type and progressing to the less specific types only if
there was no more specific type.
Our survey sought inclusive–exclusive oppositions wherever they might be
found: in independent pronouns, verb agreement affixes, and possessive affixes. In
most languages the pronominal system is the same in all form categories, but a few
languages distinguish inclusive–exclusive in one paradigm but not in another and
even fewer have one subtype of inclusive–exclusive system in one part of the gram-
mar and another subtype in another. For instance, Belhare has a Chechen system in
its independent pronoun and possessive prefix series. In these rare cases we have
counted an inclusive–exclusive system as present even if it is only present in part of
the grammar, and we have coded subtypes as we coded types, above. Thus, if a lan-
guage has minimal/augmented marking anywhere, we code it as a minimal/aug-
mented language.3
3. Linguistic geography: hypotheses
Inclusive–exclusive systems are found in about 40 percent of the world’s languages

(based on our 293-language sample) and occur with fair frequency in most conti-
nents. Table 1 shows the frequencies of the different types, by continent (or other
continent-like area) and worldwide.
Table 1. Frequencies of inclusive–exclusive oppositions and the three subtypes, by conti-
nent.
N Any type Chechen Belhare Min/aug

Africa 41 8 (20%) 4 (10%) 3 (7%) 1 (2%)
Europe–Mesopotamia 26 3 (12%) 3 (12%) 0 0
N Asia 15 4 (27%) 3 (20%) 0 1 (7%)
S and SE Asia 28 14 (50%) 9 (32%) 2 (7%) 3 (11%)
Australia 30 24 (80%) 14 (47%) 2 (7%) 8 (27%)
New Guinea–Oceania 54 22 (41%) 16 (30%) 3 (6%) 3 (6%)
West Coast N America 34 10 (29%) 3 (9%) 6 (18%) 1 (3%)
Eastern N America 15 4 (27%) 1 (7%) 1 (7%) 2 (13%)
Central America 15 7 (47%) 3 (20%) 3 (20%) 1 (7%)
S America 35 20 (57%) 8 (23%) 9 (26%) 3 (9%)
Total 293 116 (40%) 64 (22%) 29 (10%) 23 (8%)
Note: Percentages are rounded and within areas. For the individual assignment of languages to types,
continents and areas, see the electronic appendix, but note generally that Europe-Mesopotamia in‑
cludes the Caucasus and the Near East; Southeast Asia includes the islands up to about the Wallace
Line; Central America also includes all of Mexico.
Map 1: Geographical Distribution of inclusive/exclusive distinctions
No incl–excl. distinction Chechen type
Belhare type Minimal–augmented type
no incl/excl distinction Chechen Type Belhare Type Minimal/augmented Type
Map 1. Geographical distribution of inclusive–exclusive distinctions
The map suggests (a) a concentration of inclusive–exclusive opposition in the

broader Pacific region, with skewed balances of subtypes within this region, and
(b) a greatly depressed frequency of all types in most of Eurasia. Both patterns point
toward large areas that are known from other typological variables and that reflect
early population movements. We therefore extensively tested hypotheses deriving
from such areas. In the following we give a brief review of the linguistic popula-
tion history underlying these areal patterns (Nichols 1992; Nichols 1997a; Nichols
1997b; Nichols 2000; Nichols 2002a; Nichols 2003a, b; Nichols & Peterson 1996;
Nichols & Peterson 2005).
3.1. The Circum-Pacific area: Ancient Sunda and the Pacific Rim
There are two (and perhaps three) broadly areal populations, each apparently re-
sulting from an ancient migration and colonization episode that spread local areal
features widely around the Pacific as a series of movements brought people from
eastern Asia into the Pacific islands from Southeast Asia and into the Americas
from Northeast Asia. The earliest of these language populations, which we call the
Ancient Sunda population,4 evidently formed in ancient Southeast Asia just be-
fore, or in the early stages of, the initial expansion to the near Pacific islands, New
Guinea, and Australia. Linguistic features of this population are ergativity and sim-
ple consonant systems with one manner of stop articulation (see Nichols 1997b). By
now, some 50,000 years after the initial expansion of the Ancient Sunda population,
the set of linguistic features characterizing it is most common in the far periphery
of the expansion zone: Australia, sometimes highland and southern but not north-
ern New Guinea, eastern North America, and South America.
Later, as glaciation was ending, the Pacific Rim population spread to Melanesia
and coastal New Guinea (but not to Australia) and to the western Americas, chiefly
the Pacific coast. It has spread far inland from landfall or entry points, but its lin-
guistic markers have not yet reached the far periphery in great numbers. Pacific
Rim linguistic features include numeral classifiers, elaborate possessive classifi-
cation (Nichols & Bickel 2005), and, chiefly in the Americas, personal pronouns
with n in the first person and m in the second (Nichols & Peterson 1996; Nichols &
Peterson 2005). The boundary between the Ancient Sunda and Pacific Rim popula-
tions is not sharp, and Pacific Rim features such as head marking, lack of overt noun
pluralization, and inflectional noun incorporation extend into northern Australia
and interior North America. Perhaps these features were carried by the very earliest
phase of the Pacific Rim spread, or perhaps they are simply more prone to diffusion
than the others and have spread somewhat beyond the Pacific Rim boundaries.
These ancient population movements are responsible for the formation of mod-
ern transcontinental linguistic areas, so we will speak of the Pacific Rim and An-
cient Sunda language areas. For purposes of linguistic-geographical surveying and
hypothesis-testing we have set up sample areas on strictly geographical grounds, as
follows:
(H1) The Pacific Rim area includes the Pacific coastal strip, up to the major coast
range, of the Americas, eastern Asia, and New Guinea (and to some extent
also northern Australia), as well as the northern Melanesian islands and the
outer Pacific islands.
(H2) The Ancient Sunda area is southern Australia, highland and southern New
Guinea, eastern North America, and interior and southern South America.
(H3) A general term for the entire vast region harboring the Ancient Sunda and
Pacific Rim areas is the Circum-Pacific area, which comprises all of the
Americas, Australia, all of New Guinea, and all of the Pacific islands, as well
Southeast Asia and northern coastal Asia.
The progression of population movements within the Circum-Pacific area leads one
to expect areal differentiation reflecting population change and language change
over time. Specifically, one might hypothesize the following three differentiations:
(H4) Within the Circum-Pacific area, western and the eastern parts (respectively
eastern Asia plus the Pacific, and the Americas). These two large may have de-
veloped independent profiles once the great population movements slowed
down.
(H5) In the Americas, the South and the North, reflecting earlier (Ancient Sunda)
vs. later (Pacific Rim) migration waves. The earliest one is likely to have spread
to the far southern periphery; the later one is most in evidence closer to the
entry point (today’s Alaska).
(H6) In the Americas, eastern vs. western regions, again reflecting earlier (An-
cient Sunda) vs. later (Pacific Rim) migration waves. Again, the earlier wave
would have spread entirely across both North and South America to the At-
lantic coast; the later one would be most in evidence in the west, nearer to the
Alaskan entry point.
3.2. Eurasia
Eurasia is a large area, but most of northern Eurasia — specifically, Europe, inner
Asia, and Siberia more generally — show a good deal of continent-wide areality
(Jakobson 1971 [1931]; Austerlitz 1970; Bickel & Nichols 2005a, b, c). The main and
proximate cause of this areality is the great language spreads in the vicinity of the
steppe (Indo-European, Uralic, Tungusic, Turkic, Mongolian), which have obliter-
ated much of the linguistic diversity that must have been present in pre-Neolithic
times. In addition, much of northern Eurasia is high-latitude, continental interior
land with marked seasonality, factors that depress both structural and language-
family diversity (Nichols 1992: 13–24).
Some of the typological variables that exhibit northern Eurasian areality have
systematic exceptions in the Himalayan and Caucasian enclaves — for example,
obligatory possession, bipartite stems, multiple verb agreement, and high degrees
of verbal synthesis (Bickel & Nichols 2003, 2005c; Nichols & Bickel 2005) — and
most of these enclave features show significant overlap with the Circum-Pacific dis-
tributions. They are apparent relics of westward extensions of Ancient Sunda popu-
lations that occurred before the general typological profile of northern Eurasia was
flattened by the steppe spreads.
This leads us to expect the following specific Eurasian patterns:
(H7) A distinctive typological profile of northern Eurasia (Europe and North Asia)
as against the rest of the world.
(H8) A differentiation between the Eurasian enclave and the rest of Eurasia (except
the Pacific coast, which belongs to the Circum-Pacific area).
(H9) Similar typological profiles in the Eurasian enclaves and in the Circum-
Pacific area.
4. Results
In the following we test these hypotheses, as well as ancillary hypotheses suggested

by the visual impression of the map. We found no evidence for Hypotheses H1 and
H2 (Ancient Sunda vs. Pacific Rim differentiation), no evidence for Hypothesis H6
(east–west differentiation within the Americas), and no evidence for Hypotheses
H8–H9 (Eurasian enclaves). For all other hypotheses we found significant evidence
either in the gross presence of inclusive–exclusive oppositions, or in the distribution
of specific types of the oppositions. We discuss these two sources of evidence in turn.
4.1. Global linguistic geography: inclusive–exclusive vs. none

We first analyze the worldwide distribution of inclusive–exclusive systems as a
whole, without regard to their particular subtypes. Table 2 summarizes the signifi-
cant findings. While there is no evidence for distinct Pacific Rim and Ancient Sunda
Table 2. Significant areal asymmetries of inclusive vs. exclusive distinctions, regardless of
subtype
Incl.–excl. Incl.–excl. Areal difference test

distinction distinction (Fisher’s Exact,
absent present 2‑tailed)
Circum-Pacific (H3) 113 (53%) 99 (47%) p < .001
Rest of the World 64 (79%) 17 (21%)
North America (H5) 35 (71%) 14 (29%) p = .014
South and Central America 23 (46%) 27 (54%)
Europe and N Asia (H7) 34 (83%) 7 (17%) p = .002
Rest of the World 143 (57%) 109 (43%)
Note: Percentages are rounded and within areas.
populations, the Circum-Pacific cover area (Hypothesis H3) evidences highly sig-
nificant areality. The gross presence of inclusive–exclusive oppositions also con-
firms Hypotheses H5 (latitudinal differentiation of the Americas) and Hypothesis
H7 (distinct areality of Eurasia).
The visual impression of the map suggests a particularly high concentration of
inclusive–exclusive oppositions in Australia, mirroring the latidunal cline pre-
dicted and found in the Americas (cf. Hypothesis H5). The difference between Aus-
tralia and the rest of the world is statistically significant (Fisher’s Exact, p < .001):
in our sample, Australia has 80 percent languages (24 out of 30) with the oppos-
ition, as opposed to a world average of only 35 percent (92 out of 263). Like Aus-
tralia, South and Central America have an increased frequency of inclusive–exclu-
sive oppositions not only in comparison to the north, but also in comparison to the
world average: South and Central America have 54 percent (27 out of 50) languages
with the opposition, yielding a significant difference to the world average (Fisher’s
Exact, p = .026)
The visual impression of the map would also lend support to Hypotheses H8 and
H9 suggesting an enclave distribution of inclusive–exclusive oppositions in Eurasia:
inclusive–exclusive oppositions are present in 27 percent (3 out of 11) of the sample
languages in the Caucasus and in 10 percent (2 out of 20) of the sample languages
in the combined area of Europe, Mesopotamia and Inner Asia; but like the visual
impression, the percentages are deceptive. Fisher’s Exact test performed on the raw
numbers results in p = .32, which means the frequency differences are close to what
one expects from the frequency differences in the total distribution. (Counting the
Himalayas together with the Caucasus as part of the enclaves and, consequently,
South Asia as part of the area surrounding the enclaves also fails to reach signifi-
cance: p = .53.)5 The most parsimonious conclusion from this is that the visual clus-
ters of inclusive–exclusive systems in the Caucasus and Himalayas are the acciden-
tal consequence of the relatively higher numbers of sample languages in these areas
of high genealogical diversity. But we will discuss another possible interpretation
below in Section 5.2.
4.2. Areal linguistic geography: different kinds of inclusive–exclusive

oppositions
Table 1 above suggests that Chechen systems and Belhare systems both occur with
good frequency in nearly all areas. Only in Europe are Belhare systems lacking; but
inclusive–exclusive systems of any kind are extremely rare there. Chechen systems
are more frequent than Belhare systems in most areas; only in the Americas do Bel-
hare systems regularly outnumber or tie Chechen systems. (They are tied in Af-
rica, but the frequencies of both are very low there.) This is predicted by Hypothesis
H4, and the findings are summarized in Table 3: the western half of the Circum-
Pacific area (comprising Australia, New Guinea, Oceania, Southeast Asia, and East-
ern Coastal Asia and termed West Pacific in Table 3) is significantly different from
Table 3. West Pacific vs. Americas (Hypothesis H4)
Chechen Belhare Areal difference test

(Fisher’s Exact, 2‑tailed)
Americas 15 (44%) 19 (56%) p < .001
West Pacific 38 (88%) 5 (12%)
Americas 15 (44%) 19 (56%) p < .001
West Pacific 38 (88%) 5 (12%) p < .001
Note: Percentages are rounded and within areas
the eastern half (the Americas). Consistent with this, we find a concentration of
Belhare systems in the Americas that is significantly higher than the world average,
and, conversely, the western Circum-Pacific shows a significantly increased fre-
quency of Chechen systems.
Minimal/augmented systems have a Circum-Pacific distribution (confirming
Hypothesis H3), with a salient frequency peak in Australia, chiefly northern Aus-
tralia. Outside of the Circum-Pacific area they are vanishingly rare, apparently non-
existent except for Africa, where our sample has one token in Margi (Hoffmann
1963: 73–5)6 (Table 4).
4.3. Summary of findings

The overall picture emerging from these analyses is the following:
(i) a large-scale Circum-Pacific distribution characterized both by increased fre-
quencies of gross inclusive–exclusive distinctions and by the more specific
development of the minimal/augmented subtype;
(ii) within the Circum-Pacific area, a latitudinal cline with more cases of inclu-
sive–exclusive distinctions in the southern than in the northern parts, reach-
ing its peak in Australia (80%) and South/Central America (54%);
Table 4. Pairwise comparison of minimal/augmented system frequencies
Min/aug Min/aug Areal difference test

absent present (Fisher’s Exact, 2-tailed)
Circum-Pacific 170 (90%) 18 (10%) p = .03
Australia 17 (70%) 7 (30%) p = .001
Note: Percentages are rounded and within areas.
(iii) w
ithin the Circum-Pacific area, a division into a western and an eastern half,
the western half characterized by Chechen systems and the eastern half char-
acterized by Belhare systems; and
(iv) a significantly low frequency in northern Eurasia (17%).
We did not find evidence in our sample for a difference between eastern and west-
ern/coastal regions in North America (cf. Hypothesis H6), nor for clear differentia-
tion of a distinct Pacific Rim area (as opposed to the wider Ancient Sunda area or as
opposed to the rest of the world), nor for a Eurasian enclave distribution (Hypoth-
eses H8 and H9).
5. Discussion
There are two global historical factors that explain the distribution we found to be
significant. We take these up in turn: Section 5.1 discusses factors accounting for
the Circum-Pacific high frequency of inclusive–exclusive pronouns, the latitudi-
nal cline within it, and the distribution of subtypes within this area; Section 5.2 dis-
cusses factors explaining the northern Eurasian low frequency.
5.1. The Circum-Pacific distribution

We take the high frequency of gross inclusive–exclusive distinctions in the Circum-
Pacific area as evidence that high frequency of inclusive–exclusive oppositions
characterized the Ancient Sunda population. The very high frequency in Australia
must reflect the heavily Ancient Sunda heritage of Australia, pushed to near-abso-
lute by the general continent-wide areality of Australia. South America, far from
the Alaskan point of entry to the Americas, must also have a heavily Ancient Sunda
heritage, and this is consistent with its higher frequency of inclusive–exclusive op-
positions. Thus in both Australia and South America inclusive–exclusive opposi-
tions are most frequent in those populations that were least affected by the later Pa-
cific Rim immigrations.
The subdivision of the Circum-Pacific area into a western half with a preference
for Chechen systems and an eastern half with a preference for Belhare systems is
likely to reflect more recent developments that started once the Ancient Sunda mi-
grations lost importance and populations became more independent. After this
time, there must have been an increased trend in the Americas to develop Belhare
systems, which we assume occurred by specialization of first-person singular mark-
ers as exclusive markers. There was also a distinct and very strong trend in the West
Pacific to develop Chechen systems, presumably by analogical leveling of general
first-person markers or by phonological obliteration of the morpheme unity of first-
person singular and exclusive markers in Belhare systems. The different directions
of development were simply due to random drift.
All three scenarios are likely, and can be readily illustrated by reconstructed de-
velopments in various families. We illustrate by Tibeto-Burman data. LaPolla’s sur-
vey (this volume) suggests that many Tibeto-Burman exclusive markers are spe-
cialized first-person singular markers (e.g. PTB *ŋa ‘1sg’ > ŋa ‘exclusive’ in many
daughter languages including Belhare, Akha, Sixing, etc.), i.e. specialized from ‘ex-
clusive of any person except the speaker’ to ‘exclusive of the addressee’. Develop-
ments of Chechen systems from Belhare systems are exemplified by phonological
splitting of ŋa ‘exclusive’ and ŋa ‘first-person singular’ that destroys the morphe-
mic unity between the two, either partially as in Guiqiong (Qiangic) ŋø 35 ‘1sg’ vs.
ŋɔ 33‑zi 55 ‘1pl.excl’ vs. ŋø 35-ɲi 33pi 35 ‘1dl.excl’, or completely as in Zaiwa (N. Burmish)
ŋo51 ‘1sg’ vs. ŋa55-moʔ ‘1pl.excl.’ vs. ŋa55-nik 55 ‘1dl.excl’ (LaPolla, this volume). An-
other process that produces the same type of system is analogical leveling with the
result that PTB *ŋa covers all first-person forms and loses any notion of exclusion:
compare, for example, Balti (Bodish) ŋa ‘1sg’ vs. ŋa-tʃa ‘1pl.excl.’ vs. ŋa-taŋ ‘1pl.incl.’
Thus, from a general point of view, transitions toward Belhare and Chechen sys-
tems are both equally likely, and it is reasonable to assume that both have occurred
in the Circum-Pacific area (and elsewhere). But in this area at least, transitions to-
ward Belhare systems have never been as common as transitions toward Chechen
systems: even where they are best represented, namely, in the Americas, Belhare
systems reach only 56 percent, whereas Chechen systems reach 88 percent in their
highest concentration, that is, the West Pacific.
Minimal/augmented systems, on the other hand, are most likely to have devel-
oped as analogical extensions of Belhare systems across numbers (removing the
paradigm gap characteristic of Belhare systems). Where minimal/augmented sys-
tems are found, they must mostly have been innovations. Our geographical find-
ings suggest that this innovation has happened very rarely and only once to a degree
that the innovation acquired areal viability. This was in the Circum-Pacific region,
and the wide geographical distribution makes it most likely that the innovation
took place in the early stages of the Ancient Sunda expansion. Minimal/augmented
systems remain at all common only where supported by local areality, as appears
to have occurred only in northern Australia (cf. Table 4, which shows that the local
areality of Australia is significant at the α = .001 level).7
Inclusive–exclusive oppositions in general are much less common in New Guinea,
where the Ancient Sunda heritage has generally been swamped by the younger Pa-
cific Rim heritage, and it is reasonable to assume that areal pressure has pushed
them to near-zero. However, they have subsequently been reintroduced into New
Guinea, in the last few thousand years, in languages of the northern coast as a con-
sequence of Austronesian contact. The Austronesian language family emanated
ultimately from the vicinity of Taiwan, and like many Southeast Asian languages
Proto-Austronesian happened to have an inclusive–exclusive opposition. (For the
early settlement and colonization and recolonization of Melanesia and New Guinea
see Bellwood 1979; Blust 1985; Ross 1988; Spriggs 1992; Pawley & Ross 1993; White
1996; Spriggs 1997; Kirch 2000.) If this scenario is correct, we would expect the
northern coast of New Guinea to show more cases of inclusive–exclusive opposi-

tions than the highlands and the south, which indeed is the case (71% vs. 10%, Fish-
er’s Exact p < .001; cf. Map 2).
This distribution, with an Ancient Sunda feature better attested on the New
Guinea coast than in the interior, is reversed in all other instances of Ancient Sunda
features that we are aware of: head-marking type, numeral classifiers, possessive
classification, lack of number marking in nouns, low frequency of ergative align-
ment, and more complex consonant systems are all more common in northern
coastal New Guinea than in the highlands and the highland frequency resembles
that of Australia (Nichols 1997b).
5.2. The Northern Eurasian area and deviations from it

The greatly depressed inclusive–exclusive frequencies in northern Eurasia reflect
the great language spreads in the vicinity of the steppe, which have led to areal-
ity in other typological variables as well (cf. above, Section 3.2). As a result of these
spreads, the entire continent is dominated by the chance low frequency of inclusive–
exclusive oppositions that has happened to characterize the few northerly Eurasian
families that have undergone large-scale spreading.
Our sample does not reveal statistically significant evidence for the Himalayas
and the Caucasus forming enclaves in Eurasia (cf. Hypothesis H8 and H9 in Section
3.2). There are three interpretations of this non-significance:
(i) O ne interpretation is that the westward extension that brought Ancient Sunda
features across southern Eurasia was somewhat earlier than the areal consol-
idation of inclusive–exclusive distinctions in Ancient Sunda, while features
such as high degree of synthesis, found in Ancient Sunda and the Eurasian en-
claves, arose earlier and were carried westward. Even if relatively late in the An-
cient Sunda population, the inclusive–exclusive opposition reached high fre-
quency early enough to be included in the spread around the Pacific all the way
to South America. This interpretation would suggest that there were at least
two distinct large waves of westward population movements, each with its own
typological profile. So far, there is no ancillary evidence in support of this.
(ii) An alternative interpretation suggests that inclusive–exclusive distinctions
originally did have the same westward extensions as the other Ancient Sunda
features and originally did manifest the same enclave effects and near-zero
presence in interior northern Eurasia, but that the evidence for this has been
leveled out due to secondary and more recent losses in the enclaves and gains
in interior northern Eurasia.
(iii) Of course, it is always possible that there is nothing of interest in the frequen-
cies of inclusive–exclusive in the Caucasus and Himalayas.
There is some suggestive evidence supporting the second scenario. Two language
families of interior northern Eurasia that do exhibit inclusive–exclusive opposi-
Map 2: New Guinea and Northern Australia
No incl–excl. distinction
Belhare type
Chechen type
Minimal–augmented type
Map generated by
http://atlas.geo.cornell.edu/ima.html
no incl/excl
Map 2. New Guinea distinction
and Northern Chechen Type
Australia Belhare Type Minimal/augmented Type
tions are Tungusic and Mongolian, both of which originated in the eastern reaches
of their present ranges and in the Pacific Rim or Circum-Pacific area (for their pre-
histories see Janhunen 1996). Thus it appears that a secondary, relatively recent dif-
fusion of a Circum-Pacific feature into the interior has leveled the Eurasian fre-
quencies somewhat. In the Caucasus, there is suggestive evidence that now-extinct
prehistoric languages in geographically distant parts of the mountains had inclu-
sive–exclusive oppositions. Svan, a southwestern highland language representing
one branch of the Kartvelian family, has an inclusive–exclusive opposition in verb
subject agreement, but as no other Kartvelian language has this it cannot be recon-
structed for Proto-Kartvelian (Harris 1991: 35–6, 43).8 Many Nakh-Daghestanian
languages have an inclusive–exclusive opposition, but for Proto-Nakh-Daghesta-
nian only a first-person plural pronoun can be reconstructed, which yields the ex-
clusive in Nakh but the inclusive in Daghestanian (Nichols 2003b). Therefore no in-
clusive–exclusive opposition can be reconstructed for Proto-Nakh-Daghestanian,
and it seems that Proto-Nakh and Proto-Daghestanian innovated the opposition
separately. Independent innovation of inclusive–exclusive oppositions seems not
to be common, so it is at least plausible that the opposition was diffused separately
from different neighbors into pre-Svan in the southwest, Proto-Nakh in the south-
east, and proto-Daghestanian in the east. Then there may have been three separate
language groups with inclusive–exclusive oppositions in the ancient southern Cau-
casus, and if 100 percent of the extinct language groups whose existence can be in-
ferred from possible contact phenomena had the opposition it is likely that more
did. Thus the ancient Caucasus may have been a local hotbed of inclusive–exclusive
oppositions.9
The other major enclave in Eurasia, the Himalayas, shows a similar picture: the
only sample languages in this enclave having an inclusive–exclusive oppostion are
Tibeto-Burman, but the opposition does not reconstruct to Proto-Tibeto-Burman.
Rather, as LaPolla (this volume) shows, there are multiple, formally heterogenous
independent innovations in various branches. It is likely that these innovations
were supported by areal pressure from Circum-Pacific languages to the southeast
(specifically Austroasiatic, where four out five of our sample languages have the op-
position, and where it is likely to reconstruct to at least the two major branches:
see below) and, in the western Himalayas, from languages to the south (specifically,
Dravidian, where the opposition is well-reconstructed for the protolanguage even
though several daughter languages have lost it: Steever 1998). Suggestive evidence
for this comes from the particular subtype of the inclusive–exclusive opposition: for
all its formal diversity, there is a distinct trend in Tibeto-Burman for an increased
frequency of Belhare systems. This is a trend in which Tibeto-Burman significantly
deviates from the average distribution in Old World languages (though still not as
strongly as American languages; see Table 3 above): LaPolla’s survey in this volume
suggests that among the Tibeto-Burman languages that have an inclusive–exclu-
sive distinction, about 40 percent (25 out of 62) have a Belhare system. In other Old
World languages in our sample, only about 20 percent (10 out of 52) of the languages
with an inclusive–exclusive distinction have a Belhare system. A Belhare system is

precisely what is reconstructed for Proto-Dravidian (Steever 1998), and Dravidian
influence — or influence through any kind of shared prehistoric areality — might
therefore help explain the Tibeto-Burman deviation from the Old World standard.
(11) Proto-Dravidian pronouns (Steever 1998)
Singular Plural
Excl yā yām
Incl nā-m (or ñā-m)
2 nī nī-m
3 tā tā-m
Proto-Austroasiatic pronouns have not been reconstructed yet, but an inclusive–
exclusive opposition is reconstructed for the Mon-Khmer branch which comprises
half of the family tree and most of the daughter languages (Diffloth 1994: 319), and
is likely to be reconstructable in the Munda branch (Anderson 2001 and p.c.). It
is likely that Austroasiatic shows a balance of non-Chechen vs. Chechen systems
similar to that of Tibeto-Burman. In our database, about half of the languages have
Belhare systems.
Thus, there is a distinct possibility that like the Caucasus, the ancient Himalayas
were part of a hotbed of inclusive–exclusive oppositions. The ultimate root of the
Himalayan hotbed is either distinct local sources in Southwestern Eurasia or the
ancient, ultimately Circum-Pacific, source of the enclave effects discussed above.
6. Long-term diachrony
In the previous sections, we explained the current non-accidental distributions

by appeal to ancient sources of population movements. This presupposes that the
frequency distributions of inclusive–exclusive oppositions are historically robust
enough to survive over a time span of at least 20,000 years, the minimum age pre-
sumed for the Ancient Sunda population (Nichols 2000, 2002a). In the following we
provide evidence that this historical stability assumption is plausible, and that spe-
cifically, this stability results from a combined effect of areal diffusion and inherit-
ance.
Inclusive–exclusive oppositions are prone to areal diffusion, and what diffuses is
often the opposition itself, not the specific pronominal forms that code it in the do-
nor language (Jacobsen 1980). Beyond that, inclusive–exclusive systems (or their
absence, as the case may be) are also quite stable in language families (Nichols
1995). Nichols 2002b calculated retention rates for an inclusive–exclusive oppos-
ition in those families that have it, for 25 old families with a median age of about
4500 years (Table 5).10
Though inclusive–exclusive oppositions are genealogically quite stable, their sta-
bility evidently depends on areal factors, for the survival rate is greatest in areas
Table 5. Retention rates for inclusive–exclusive in 26 language families (based on a sample
consisting of 2 to 11 languages per family, one per major branch).
Area Families Retention

Eurasia and Africa 7 31%
Australia, New Guinea, Oceania 8 79%
Americas 11 64%
Total 26 60%
Note: The source for this is materials for Nichols (1995). Retention is indicated by the mean percent
of daughter languages per family that have inclusive–exclusive oppositions.
where the opposition is most frequent. And in any event the high frequency of in-
clusive–exclusive oppositions in areas of Ancient Sunda heritage cannot be due en-
tirely to inheritance, as it would take an inheritance rate of over 95 percent of the
daughter languages per 5000 years to preserve inclusive–exclusive oppositions in
their attested frequencies in the languages of the Americas and the Pacific for a
period of time as great as the age of the Ancient Sunda population (Nichols 2002b),
and this degree of fidelity in transmission is not found in any well-sampled old
family in our database, either for inclusive–exclusive or for any other typological
feature.
Ninety-five percent fidelity in inheritance at the stock level means that, some
5000–6000 years after a protolanguage with an inclusive–exclusive opposition dis-
perses, 95 percent of its daughter languages retain the opposition, and likewise for
every other stock. Alternatively, for 95 percent of the stocks there is 100 percent
retention in the daughter languages. If half of the stocks have a 95 percent reten-
tion rate and half do not, the overall figure will be much less than 95 percent. We
surveyed the stocks in our database to see whether this 95 percent retention rate
for inclusive–exclusive is approached in the world’s languages. Our database is not
very well designed for this survey: we have representatives of most stocks but not
of enough of their major branches to estimate retention across the entire stock very
accurately. Nonetheless we made a first stab. We surveyed all stocks for which we
have representatives of two or more major branches (there were 52 of them), and we
chose one language per major branch or, where we had the data, one language per
subbranch. The null hypothesis is that inclusive–exclusive oppositions are nearly
always inherited, and the survey seeks to falsify that by showing that some stocks
have less than 95 percent transmission fidelity or that under 95 percent of the stocks
have 100 percent transmission fidelity. Therefore, in order to favor the null hypoth-
esis, whenever we had a choice of languages for a surveyed branch we chose a lan-
guage that does have an inclusive–exclusive opposition, if there was such a language
in that branch. (Further favoring the null hypothesis is the fact that our database
includes a good deal of data designed to show what kinds of inclusive–exclusive
oppositions exist, taken from the literature on inclusive–exclusive oppositions and
therefore comprising only languages that do have the opposition.) With this sam-
pling technique, some language families are charted as having 100 percent consist-
ency in inclusive–exclusive oppositions (though in reality they have some daughter
languages without the opposition, which are not in our sample).
Ten of our families, and six that we judged to be old — about 5,000 years or more,
or of roughly Indo-European-like antiquity (though of course most such reckon-
ings are not very precise) — achieved 100 percent fidelity by this count. They are
shown in Table 6. These ten represent about 20 percent of our 52 families, much less
than the needed 95 percent. The old ones are of primary interest here; they number
six, or about 12 percent of the families (and 25 percent of the 24 old or probably old
families), again much less than 95 percent. The old families in Table 6 all come from
Southeast Asia, Oceania/New Guinea, and the southern Americas, and they repre-
sent 22 percent of the families in those areas, again far from 95 percent. It must be
concluded, therefore, that inheritance of inclusive–exclusive oppositions is not re-
motely close to 95 percent. Therefore it is nowhere near consistent enough to make
it possible for modern frequencies of the opposition to reflect direct inheritance of
the situation 50,000 years ago or earlier.
Five of these six old families have from two to four languages representing them
in our survey, but one of them — Austronesian — has many (up to eight represent-
atives, depending on how branches are subclassified, and 15 languages in all) and
therefore provides an example of a large language family that actually does achieve
a high retention rate for the inclusive–exclusive opposition (see also Lichtenberk,
this volume). The linguistic prehistory of Austronesian is unique in that many of
the languages have developed in relative isolation and most have had no contact ex-
cept with close sister languages. This suggests that the strongest factor favoring re-
tention of an inclusive–exclusive opposition is lack of contact (or contact only with
close sisters). The higher retention rate in areas with higher overall frequencies of
inclusive–exclusive (Table 5) shows that contact with unrelated or distantly related
Table 6. Language families in our database with 100% retention of inclusive–exclusive
oppositions across lower branches, and their areas and approximate ages.
Family Area Age

Mongolian Asia young
Tangkic Australia young
Border New Guinea ?
Caddoan N. America young to medium
Austroasiatic SE Asia old
Austronesian Oceania old
West Papuan New Guinea old?
Mixe-Zoque Mexico old?
Cariban S. America old
Macro-Ge S. America old
Note: The table is sorted by estimated age. Young = Romance-like, old = Indo-European-like.
languages that have the opposition favors retention of the opposition, but the case
of Austronesian indicates that non-contact favors retention even more strongly.
We therefore hypothesize that the factors favoring preservation (as opposed to
loss) of an inclusive–exclusive opposition are, in order,
(i) isolation, or contact only with close sisters;

( ii) areal support (from unrelated or distantly related languages).
The Austronesian language family is a wonderful natural laboratory, but unfor-

tunately for statistical purposes it is unique. The only other clear case of a well-
described language isolated for millennia is Tiwi, a language isolate of Bathurst
and Melville Islands off the northern Australian coast. Tiwi preserves the inclusive–
exclusive opposition expected in a language of the Ancient Sunda population, and
this is at least consistent with our hypothesis about isolation, but since Tiwi is a gen-
etic isolate and the time of its last contact with the mainland is unknown its case is
hardly probative. The three known languages of the Andaman Islands (Great An-
damanese, Jarawa, and Onge) are unrelated to any others and may well have been
out of contact with the mainland for millennia, and two of them have inclusive–ex-
clusive oppositions (there is no information yet on Jarawa) (Manoharan 1997; Abbi
2003). The Tasmanians, the longest-isolated population known, probably spoke six
or more different languages (Crowley & Dixon 1981), but the scant materials avail-
able for Tasmanian contain no first-person plural pronouns. The only other known
cases of long isolation are the language of the Veddas of Sri Lanka (undescribed)
and the unknown language of Sentinel Island (uncontacted), one of the Andaman
Islands. These cases are all problematic because they involve genetic isolates or lan-
guages of unknown affiliation for which we cannot know whether the inclusive–
exclusive oppositions are innovations or retentions.
7. Conclusions
We have shown that the worldwide current geographical distribution of inclusive–

exclusive distinctions can be explained by early population movements around
the Pacific, movements which started out from the Ancient Sunda region (today’s
Southeast Asia) and have left the most salient traces in Australia and South America.
The same Ancient Sunda prehistory also accounts for the distribution of minimal/
augmented systems (with a minimal vs. augmented number distinction), though
this subtype gained historical robustness and areal viability only in Australia. Bel-
hare and Chechen systems are two other subtypes of inclusive–exclusive distinc-
tions, and they can apparently develop into each other with equal ease. In the Cir-
cum-Pacific area, however, the West strongly favored developments of Chechen
systems, while the East shows a more balanced distribution of these subtypes. These
developments are probably due to drift.
Acknowledgments
For help with data collection, we thank David Petersen and Alena Witzlack-Maka
revich, and for useful comments on an earlier draft, we are grateful to Michael
Cysouw.
Notes
1. According to Mamiani (1877: 58), there are no independent third-person pronouns in the
language; the verbal prefixes suffice.
2. This terminology was first proposed by McKay (1978). The analysis, using different terms,
goes back to Forchheimer (1953: 93) and Thomas (1955); see Cysouw (2003: 87ff.) for the
history.
3. The database is available as an electronic appendix at http://www.uni-leipzig.de/~autotyp.
4. The Sunda Islands and Sunda Strait are in the western Malay Archipelago. This is the ap-
poximate area from which the Ancient Sunda population originated, not the regions where
it is now found.
5. All of this should be interpreted as an important caveat against the reliability of visual
representations or frequency reports without proper statistical analysis. Notice that the map
also gives the visual impression that inclusive–exclusive systems form a narrow band across
central Africa, but this too is non-significant statistically (Fisher’s Exact test comparing this
area with the rest of Africa results in p > .99).
6. Cysouw (2003: 140), in a much larger set of languages than our sample, finds more ex-
amples in Africa.
7. Inclusive–exclusive systems of all kinds, and especially Belhare and minimal/augmented
systems, in different ways all move away from a strict opposition of singular vs. plural in
pronominal systems. In the future we plan to survey correlations between number categor-
ies and inclusive–exclusive types in the world’s languages. It is striking that the Circum-Pa-
cific area has many languages with no overt number distinctions in nominals and many lan-
guages with inclusive–exclusive systems, especially of the more unusual types.
8. There is a formally similar allomorphy of first-person plural object agreement forms in
Old Georgian. Dondua (1938), Klimov and Alekseev (1980: 133), and sources in Georgian
which they refer to regard the allomorphy and the resemblance to Svan as sound evidence
for reconstructing an inclusive–exclusive opposition for Pre-Old Georgian. In Old Georgian,
as Dondua shows, one object prefix has both inclusive and exclusive functions with good fre-
quency while the other has chiefly exclusive functions. Gulyga (1979) argues that the func-
tion was not inclusive–exclusive but a different opposition, one contrasting a purely deic-
tic first person to one based on fixed membership in some class or category (the meaning
of French nous autres). Given the non-compositional nature of Kartvelian morphology (for
Georgian see Gurevich 2003), in which, among other things, allomorphy of one affix signals
the presence of another category, we suspect that the original distinction in the Svan and Old
Georgian object affixes was conditioned by the person of the subject. In any event we agree
with Harris and Gulyga that an inclusive–exclusive opposition cannot be reconstructed for
Proto-Kartvelian. The Svan development is then an innovation, possibly contact-based.
9. Kartvelian and Nakh-Daghestanian are very old families: Kartvelian is probably of
re‑Bronze Age antiquity and Nakh-Daghestanian seems to be associated with the earliest
p
agriculture in the eastern Caucasus. At the times of their dispersals societies in the area were
smaller and simpler than in the Bronze Age and later, so it is entirely likely that the Caucasus
then harbored a larger number of indigenous language families than it has supported in his-
torical times.
10. Ages of families are highly approximate, of course, and this is the median of those ap-
proximate figures.
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Nichols, J. & Peterson, D. A. 2005. Personal pronoun systems with /m/ and /n/. In
M. Haspelmath, M. Dryer, D. Gil and B. Comrie (eds), 544–9.
Pawley, A. K. & Ross, M. D. 1993. Austronesian historical linguistics and culture history. An-
nual Review of Anthropology 22: 425–59.
Ross, M. D. 1988. Proto Oceanic and the Austronesian languages of western Melanesia. Can-
berra: Australian National University [Pacific Linguistics C 98].
Serzisko, F. 1992. Sprechhandlungen und Pausen: Diskursorientierte Sprachbeschreibung am
Beispiel des Ik. Tübingen: Niemeyer [Linguistische Arbeiten 282].
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T. Dutton, M. D. Ross & D. Tryon (eds), The language game: Papers in memory of Don-
ald C. Laycock, 417–26. Canberra: Australian National University [Pacific Linguistics C
110].
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Steever, S. B. 1998. Introduction to the Dravidian languages. In S. B. Steever (ed.), The Dra-
vidian languages, 1–39. London: Routledge.
Thomas, D. D. 1955. Three analyses of the Ilocano pronoun system. Word 11: 204–8.
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(eds), Prehistoric mongoloid dispersals, 303–8. New York: Oxford University Press.
Chapter 3
Syncretisms involving clusivity
Michael Cysouw
Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology
The inclusive and exclusive are commonly considered to be kinds of first-person plural. In
this chapter, I will investigate whether they deserve this name by looking at syncretisms be-
tween clusivity and other person markers. Such syncretisms are rare, but a thorough investi-
gation has resulted in a large enough sample to allow for some conclusions. It turns out that
the exclusive is often syncretic with the first-person singular, and can thus indeed be consid-
ered a kind of first-person plural. In contrast, the inclusive cannot. The often claimed link be-
tween inclusive and second person turns out to be spurious. This claim probably only arose
because of selected attention for those syncretisms arguing for such a connection, but disre-
garding all other syncretisms that argue against it. In this survey, all possible syncretisms are
considered, resulting in the observation that the inclusive/second-person syncretism does
not occur more often than others.
Keywords: syncretism, second person, third person, minimal/augmented, clusivity
1. Introduction
The commonly used name for the inclusive is ‘inclusive first-person plural’ and for
the exclusive ‘exclusive first-person plural’. Such long names are not only cumber-
some, but it is also questionable whether they describe the correct approach to the
linguistic categories in question. It is not at all clear whether inclusives and exclu-
sives are a kind of first person. Semantically, an inclusive refers to both first and sec-
ond person, so it could just as well be analysed as a kind of second person. An exclu-
sive refers to both first and third person and could thus just as well be considered a
third person.
It is regularly claimed in the literature, in particular with reference to Algon-
quian languages, that some languages consider the inclusive to be a kind of sec-
ond person (e.g. Zwicky 1977: 720–3; Plank 1985: 141–3; Hewson 1991: 862–5;
Noyer 1992: 155–7). Such languages are then contrasted to the widespread struc-
ture showing a pronoun we, in which inclusive reference is part of first person (be-
cause the meaning of English we can be interpreted as being both inclusive and
exclusive). In this argumentation, there are two possibilities for human language:
either a speaker-centered perspective (as in English) or an addressee-centered per-
spective (as in Algonquian). In this chapter, I will present a typological argument
showing that this opposition is misled. It is well known that the English-type we
74 Michael Cysouw
pronoun is extremely common among the world’s languages. In constrast, I will

show that the Algonquian-type inclusive/second-person combination is extremely
rare. If this rarity is considered of central importance for our theory of language,
then other rarities should also be taken into account. For example, it turns out that
inclusive–third-person combinations are just as common as the Algonquian type
inclusive/second-person combination.
In this chapter, I will present a large collection of examples in which the inclusive
or the exclusive is exactly like another person marker in the same paradigm. Such
cases are important to establish a theory of language. If a particular language uses
the same morpheme for various apparently unrelated functions or meanings, it is
possible that the various meanings have accidentally merged. Or they have a com-
mon origin, but the synchronic usages are too different to warrant a unified analysis.
In any case, the proper null‑hypothesis should be that formally homophonous mor-
phemes in a language have a unified meaning — until reasons are found that prove
this hypothesis wrong. This order of examination is crucial for the empirical basis
of linguistic analysis. Two meanings might look different from our current under-
standing of linguistic structure, yet this understanding could be wrong — or short-
sighted. Apparently accidentally homophonous morphemes in any language can
be used to empirically test our understanding of linguistic structure. If two mean-
ings turn out to be homophonous in language after language, then this is an argu-
ment to reconsider the original analysis.
From the present collection, it turns out that the exclusive is regularly hom-
ophonous with the first-person singular. In contrast, the inclusive is hardly found
to be homophonous with the first-person singular. So there appears to be some
correspondance between the first person and the exclusive, but not between the
first person and the inclusive. Further, there are examples in which the inclusive is
homophonous with the second person and examples in which the exclusive is hom-
ophonous with the third person — both options that appear to make sense seman-
tically. However, these semantically transparent syncretisms are just as frequently
attested as the contrasting opaque syncretisms, viz. inclusive with third person and
exclusive with second person. There is thus no reason to assume a special connec-
tion between any of these categories. Specifically, the inclusive does not have a spe-
cial relationship to the second person.
This chapter is organised as follows. In Section 2, I will discuss some methodo-
logical considerations. The Sections 3 to 6 are the basis of the present chapter. In
each of these sections, a long list of cases with a particular syncretism involving
clusivity is presented and discussed. Section 3 discusses syncretisms between clu-
sivity and first person. Section 4 discusses syncretisms between clusivity and sec-
ond person. Section 5 discusses syncretisms between clusivity and third person. All
theoretically possible syncretisms are attested, though only the one between ex-
clusive and first person seems to be frequent enough to be typologically worth of
further considerations. Finally, Section 6 discusses some special syncretisms be-
tween inclusive and exclusive. The characteristics of all these cases are summarised
Syncretisms involving clusivity 75
and analysed in Section 7. I will argue there that there is typologically no reason to
give the syncretism between the inclusive and the second person a special status.
This particular syncretism might make sense semantically/cognitively as it puts the
addressee at the centre of the person marking, yet this syncretism is just as rarely
found as other syncretisms, which are semantically/cognitively intransparant. In
Section 8, I will discuss some attempts from the literature to make sense of the vari-
ous syncretisms. I will criticise the appeal to purportedly widespread (or even uni-
versal) linguistic characteristics to explain a highly exotic and probably just inci-
dental syncretism. Explanations should be on the same level of generalisation as
the phenomenon that they try to explain. Common phenomena need more sweep-
ing generalisations, while incidental phenomena should be approached with a situ-
ation-specific explanation.
2. Methodological musings
This chapter consists of a collection of languages in which the morpheme that is

used for inclusive or exclusive reference is also used for other kinds of person refer-
ence. The similarity between the marking of these different referential values should
not be merely approximately, but the match has to be exact within the phonological
structure of the language in question. The problem with approximate similarity is
that it is notoriously difficult to handle. Should the number of phonemes that are
different be counted, or maybe the number of phonemes that are identical, or both?
Should the phonetic likeliness of the differing morphemes be valued? Even if one
would find a suitable quantification of approximate likeliness, then it is still ques-
tionable whether this means anything. If two morphemes in a language differ in
only one phoneme (e.g. English me, we, he and she), then they are of course closely
alike, but the difference is still salient for the speakers of a language. To avoid this
methodological muddle, I have decided to restrict my investigation to cases of exact
likeliness (like the English you-singular and you-plural).
The main body of this chapter will be a rather dry survey of languages that dis-
tinguish between an inclusive and an exclusive morpheme, yet either of those mor-
phemes is exactly homophonous with another marker in the same person para-
digm. Morphologically separatistic number markers are not considered as part of
the person paradigm. I include examples of syncretism from all available kinds of
person marking, whether they are independent pronouns, inflectional or clitic per-
son marking, or pronominal possession. I did not include examples in which the
overlap of marking is found in an inflectional paradigm for only one verb class (or
noun class). The homophony should minimally be present in all instantiations of a
particular paradigm — though it can (and often will) not be found throughout all
paradigms of person in the whole language.
Combination of categories in a paradigm can be called a structural ambigu-
ity, a syncretism, or simply a homophony. I will use the term syncretism, which is
76 Michael Cysouw
intended as a neutral empirical cover‑term for all observed cases (cf. Luraghi 2000).
Also, I do not distinguish languages in which this syncretism is a meaningful ambi-
guity, which reflects the conceptualisation of reality of a particular speech commu-
nity, from those cases in which the syncretism is only an incidental result of phono-
logical merger. Even when a syncretism is an incidental merger, then it is still part of
the synchronic structure of a language, which is used by some human community
of speakers. The simple, yet arduous task that I have set myself is to collect all cases
that have such a syncretism and then to analyse these cases synchronically and dia-
chronically. Two questions will be asked for every language that will be described in
this chapter. First, is there any obligatory way in which the syncretism is disambigu-
ated? It turns out that in many cases there is no obligatory instrument in the lan-
guage structure that disambiguates the possible meanings of the syncretism. Only
in those cases in which there is obligatory marking to disambiguate the syncretism,
this strategy will be explicitly noted in this chapter. If there is no obligatory disam-
biguation, this will in most cases simply not be mentioned. The second question
that will be asked for every language is whether the syncretism can readily be ar-
gued to be the result of a (recent) historical merger. If, for example, a phonological
merger caused two erstwhile different morphemes to become identical, the result-
ing syncretism can be argued to be an incidental effect. A problem is that there are
no historical data available for most languages that will be discussed in this chap-
ter. To investigate the history of the syncretisms attested, I will draw either on close
relatives (as in comparative reconstruction) or, incidentally, on language‑internal
(ir)regularities (as in internal reconstruction).
The present collection of cases is a result of rather ad hoc sampling. The problem
with a consistent sampling strategy (cf. Rijkhoff & Bakker 1998) is that the kind of
syncretisms that I am interested in is uncommon among the world’s languages. In
a standard typological sample, these syncretisms would not even appear, or only as
exceptions. This touches on a central problem with strict sampling procedures in
typology. A sample can show which linguistic types are common among the world’s
languages, but it cannot be used to analyse a type that is possible, yet uncommon. It
is good practice to amend each large‑scale typology with a detailed investigation of
uncommon types. A fine example of this method is the article on gender/number
marking by Plank & Schellinger (1997). This article starts with the well‑known
Greenbergian universals, which state that gender distinctions in the plural imply
gender distinctions in the singular. However, the authors then show that, on closer
inspection, a large set of ‘counter-examples’ exists. By collecting these ‘exceptional’
examples a deeper understanding of the possible variability of human language can
be reached.
Likewise, for this chapter I started from a large‑scale typological investigation of
person marking (Cysouw 2003) in which syncretisms between clusivity and other
person categories turned out to exist, yet to be uncommon. To further investigate
the possible variability of human language, I amended the examples from that study
with cases described in other publications and asked colleagues for any examples
they happened to know of. Then I closely investigated the families and linguistic
areas in which these syncretisms were attested. Clusivity is known to be an areal
phenomenon (Jacobsen 1980; Nichols 1992; Cysouw 2005), so investigating areas
known to show clusivity is prone to turn up more examples. By cyclically ques-
tioning specialists and investigating specific linguistic areas and/or families, I was
able to expand the collection to the present size. However, it should not be forgot-
ten that, notwithstanding the rather large collection of cases that will be presented
shortly, the occurrence of a syncretism between clusivity and other person categor-
ies is typologically uncommon.
3. Clusivity and first person
3.1. Introduction
Traditionally, inclusive and exclusive marking are seen as specifications of the first-
person plural. In this section, I will test this traditional approach empirically by
searching for syncretisms between the inclusive and the first-person singular (Sec-
tion 3.2) and between exclusive and first-person singular (Section 3.3). If inclusive
and exclusive are indeed a kind of first person, then I expect to find languages that
show a formal similarity between those categories. The most extreme form of simi-
larity is complete identity, as surveyed in this chapter. Such complete identity does
not occur frequently, but it is possible to find some examples among the wide var-
iety of structures among the world’s languages. The result of this survey is that ex-
amples of inclusive/first-person syncretisms are much rarer than examples of an
exclusive/first-person syncretism. This shows that the exclusive is indeed a kind of
first person, but the inclusive is not (cf. Daniel, this volume).
3.2. Inclusive = first person

As far as I have been able to find, there is only one language that has a regular syn-
cretism between an inclusive and the first-person singular. In the so‑called ‘Past II
stative’ paradigm in Binandere, a Goilalan language from New Guinea, the suffixes
for both first-person singular and inclusive are ‑ana. In contrast, the exclusive suffix
is ‑ara. All other tense/aspect paradigms show exactly the same syncretism (Capell
1969: 16–31). This syncretism is probably a relatively recent addition to the para-
digm, as two close relatives, Orokaiva and Korafe, have exactly the same form of the
suffixes, yet without an inclusive–exclusive opposition. The ‘indicative Mid Past B’
from Orokaiva has a first-person singular -ana and a first-person plural -ara (Hea-
ley et al. 1969: 62). The present indicative from Korafe has a first-person singular -
ena and a first-person plural -era (Farr & Farr 1975: 747–9). The structure of Binan-
dere is quite possibly the result of an extension of an original first-person singular
reference of -ana. However, the fact that Binandere is worldwide the only presently
78 Michael Cysouw
known example of a complete identity between inclusive and first-person singular

indicates that the inclusive cannot systematically be regarded as a kind of first per-
son. In contrast, the long list of examples of exclusive/first-person syncretisms, to
be presented next, shows that the exclusive is a kind of first person.
3.3. Exclusive = first person

The syncretism between exclusive and first-person singular is particularly prom-
inent among the world’s languages. There are a few clear areal clusters of this syn-
cretism. It is found in a few restricted areas among native American languages and
among the Papuan languages of New Guinea. Except for these two macro-areas,
there are various incidental examples.
All examples of an exclusive/first-person syncretism in North America are at-
tested in prefixal person paradigms. In all these cases, the exclusive is disambiguated
from the first-person singular by a number affix. This pattern is found throughout
the Central and Eastern branches of Algonquian, e.g. in Eastern Ojibwa (Bloom-
field 1956: 44), Southwestern Ojibwe (Schwartz & Dunnigan 1986: 305), Meno-
mini (Bloomfield 1962: 36–40), Cree (Wolfart 1996: 399–400) and Passamaquo-
ddy‑Maliseet (Leavitt 1996: 9–10). The exclusive/first person is marked by a prefix
n(i)- in contrast to a prefix k(i)- for the inclusive (this inclusive is in turn identi-
cal to the second person, cf. Section 4.2). Another example of an exclusive/first-
person syncretism is found in Winnebago, a Siouan language. In Winnebago, the
‘agentive’ inclusive is marked by a prefix hi- while the first person and exclusive are
both marked by a prefix ha‑. This syncretism can be disambiguated by the use of a
number suffix -wi’.1 This syncretism appears to be a singularity among the Siouan
languages. Most other Siouan languages use the same prefix for both inclusive and
exclusive in contrast to a different prefix for the first-person singular (e.g. in Man-
dan, Mixco 1997: 8; see also Section 6.3 below). However, the same syncretism as
in Winnebago is also found in the Caddoan languages, which might be distantly re-
lated to the Siouan languages (Chafe 1976). In Caddo, the inclusive is marked by a
prefix yi- and the exclusive/first person is marked by a prefix ci-. Again, the exclu-
sive and first-person singular are disambiguated by number affixes (Chafe 1976: 65–
70; 1990: 66–7). The same syncretism is also found in the Caddoan languages Wi-
chita (Rood 1996: 600) and Pawnee (Parks 1976: 164–75).
In Mesoamerica, a few examples of an exclusive/first-person syncretism are at-
tested in independent pronouns. In the Mixtecan languages, there is an ongoing
development in which the exclusive independent pronoun (and the second-per-
son plural pronoun) is reinterpreted as an honorific pronoun, used for humble
self-reference. This change can be inferred from the variation among the Mixtecan
languages. In some languages, there is a clear exclusive pronoun, apparently with-
out honorific usage (e.g. Jamiltepec Mixtec, Johnson 1988: 114–16; Ayutla Mix-
tec, Hills 1990: 209–10). In some languages, this pronoun can be used for exclusive
reference and for humble self-reference (e.g. Coatzospan Mixtec, Small 1990: 413–
14; Silacayoapan Mixtec, Shields 1988: 406–7). Finally, there are a few languages, in
which the formerly exclusive pronoun is solely used for humble self-reference and
not for exclusive reference anymore (e.g. Chalcatongo Mixtec, Macaulay 1996: 138–
43; Ocotepec Mixtec, Alexander 1988: 263–4; Yosondúa Mixtec, Farris 1992: 134–
5; Diuxi-Tilantongo Mixtec, Kuiper & Oram 1991: 341). The inclusive pronoun is
not affected by this change. In this last set of languages, the formerly first-person
singular pronoun is now used both for the exclusive and for the first-person sin-
gular. This exclusive/first-person syncretism in the independent pronouns can be
disambiguated by other linguistic means, but that does not appear to be obligatory.
For example, Macaulay (1996: 81) remarks on Chalcatongo Mixtec that: “plurals
. . . may be marked by addition of the prefix ká- to the verb stem when the subject
is plural, and/or by various syntactic means.” An exclusive/first-person syncretism
is also found in Chocho, a Popolocan language (Veerman-Leichsenring 2000: 325–
7).2 Other Popolocan languages do not show this syncretism. The Popolocan lan-
guages are only distantly related to Mixtecan (both are part of Oto-Manguean), but
the Chocho language is spoken in the direct vicinity of the above mentioned Mix-
tecan languages with an exclusive/first-person syncretism (in the western part of
the Mexican state of Oaxaca). The syncretism in Chocho is thus probably a result of
language contact. Also in Mesoamerica, inflectional exclusive/first-person syncre-
tisms are found in Sierra Popoluca, a Mixe‑Zoque language (Foster & Foster 1948:
17–19; Elson 1960: 207) and in Huave, a Huavean language (Stairs & Hollenbach
1969: 48–53; see also Section 5.2). In both languages, number suffixes disambiguate
the exclusive from the first-person singular.
In South America, the exclusive/first-person syncretism is attested as an areal fea-
ture in central Peru. It is found in all Campa languages, a subgroup of the Arawakan
family, both in the independent pronouns and in the verb inflection (e.g. Ashen-
inca, Reed & Payne 1986: 324–7; Nomatsiguenga, Wise 1971: 647; Caquinte, Swift
1988: 61–2). The same syncretism, both in pronouns and inflection, is also attested
in Jaqaru (Hardman 1966: 79) and the closely related language Aymara (Hardman
2001: 105–19). Surrounded by Aymara-speaking population, the closely related
language Uru and Chipaya have the same syncretism in their pronominal prefixes
(Crevels & Muysken, this volume). A further example of this structure is the inflec-
tion from Tarma Quechua (Adelaar 1977: 89–93, 127–8). In Huallaga Quechua, a
close relative of Tarma Quechua within subgroup I of the Quechuan languages, the
exclusive is disambiguated from the first-person singular by the obligatory add-
ition of the nominal plural marking -kuna. The areal distribution of these languages
is striking. All are spoken in close vicinity of each other in central Peru, extend-
ing eastwards into Bolivia. The pronominal systems of these languages are strongly
alike: they are all ‘4-person’ systems, consisting of first, second, third person (with-
out singular/plural distinction) and a separate inclusive. Within each of their gen-
etic families, these languages are unique in having such a structure. Their similarity
is thus clearly the result of areal influence. Also in South America, but outside this
area in Peru, an exclusive/first-person syncretism is also found in the independent
80 Michael Cysouw
pronouns and verbal inflection of Canela-Kraho, a Gé language from Brazil (Popjes

& Popjes 1986: 175) and in the inflection of Maká, a Mataco‑Guaicuruan language
from Paraguay (Gerzenstein 1994: 83–97).
In New Guinea, the exclusive/first-person syncretism is attested regularly among
independent pronouns. In Nimboran (Anceaux 1965: 167) and in the Border lan-
guages Imonda (Seiler 1985: 44) and Amanab (Minch 1991: 31–2) the first-person
singular pronoun is also used with exclusive reference, but there is a different pro-
noun for inclusive reference. In Nimboran, the verb inflection has the same syncre-
tism, although there are number affixes that disambiguate the exclusive from the
first-person singular (Anceaux 1965: 83–91).3 These languages are all spoken in an
area around the border between Irian-Jaya and Papua New Guinea on the northern
side of the Island.
More examples of the exclusive/first-person syncretism are attested among the
Tanna languages, a subgroup of Austronesian spoken in Vanuatu. The five Tanna
languages, Kwamera, Lenakel, North Tanna, Southwest Tanna and Whitesands, all
have the same prefix for first person and exclusive. Both meanings are regularly
differentiated by number affixes (Lynch 1967; 1978: 45; Lindstrom & Lynch 1994:
10). Other languages closely related to Tanna do not have this syncretism (e.g. Ura,
Crowley 1998: 21; see also Section 5.2).
An exclusive/first-person syncretism is also found in Tiwi, a language spoken
on a little island near Australia. The subject prefix in transitive constructions is
ngi(mpi)- for first-person singular and for exclusive reference (Osborne 1974: 38;
Lee 1987: 173). In Warrwa, a Nyulnyulan language from mainland Australia, the
actor prefix nga/ka- is used both for first person and exclusive, in contrast to a prefix
ya- for inclusive (McGregor 1994: 41). This syncretism is a recent merger because in
Bardi, a close relative of Warrwa, the forms for first-person singular ŋa- and exclu-
sive aŋ- are still differentiated (Metcalfe 1975: 123). In Nyulnyul, another close rela-
tive of Warrwa, the inclusive and exclusive marking has merged, using the formerly
inclusive prefix ya- (McGregor 1996: 40–1; see also Section 6.3 below).
Finally, three geographically scattered cases with an exclusive/first-person syn-
cretism are the subject prefixes from Svan, a South Caucasian language (Tuite 1997:
23, disambiguated by number suffixes), the subject prefixes from Ngiti, a Nilo-Sa-
haran language (Kutsch Lojenga 1994: 190–3, 220) and the independent pronouns
from Chrau, a Mon-Khmer language. The first-person pronoun in Chrau “may be
used as plural without modification . . . but plurality is often indicated by preposing
kha or khay” (Thomas 1971: 138). In all these scattered cases, close relatives do not
show an inclusive/first-person syncretism.
3.4. Summary
There is a clear asymmetry between the two possible syncretisms reviewed in this
section. Judging from the many exclusive/first-person syncretisms attested, the ex-
clusive can indeed be seen as a special kind of first person. In contrast, the solitary
example of an inclusive/first-person syncretism indicates that the inclusive is not a

kind of first person. However, the inclusive might be a kind of second person. This
option will be taken up in the next section.
4. Clusivity and second person
4.1. Introduction
In this section, examples of syncretisms between clusivity and second person are
presented. First, in Section 4.2, the possibility of a syncretism between inclusive
and second person is discussed. There are indeed such syncretisms, yet the number
of examples is not overwhelming. In Section 4.3, some apparent cases of an inclu-
sive/second-person syncretism are dismissed, because the inclusive forms are com-
binations of first- and second-person marking. Finally, in Section 4.4, a survey is
presented of syncretism between exclusive and second person. From a semantic
point of view, the existence of such syncretisms is strange because exclusive and
second person do not have any referential overlap. Still, such syncretisms exist and
are about as frequent as inclusive/second-person syncretisms.
4.2. Inclusive = second person

The notoriously recurring example in the literature of a syncretism between inclu-
sive and second person is the Algonquian family (e.g. Zwicky 1977: 720–3; Plank
1985: 141–3; Hewson 1991: 862–5; Noyer 1992: 155–7). The crucial phenomenon
in Algonquian is the occurrence of a person prefix ki‑ for both inclusive and second
person. This is found throughout the Central and Eastern branches of Algonquian,
e.g. in Eastern Ojibwa (Bloomfield 1956: 44), Southwestern Ojibwe (Schwartz &
Dunnigan 1986: 305), Menomini (Bloomfield 1962: 36–40), Cree (Wolfart 1996:
399–400) and Passamaquoddy‑Maliseet (Leavitt 1996: 9–10). The pronominal pre-
fixes can be reconstructed for Proto-Algonquian (Bloomfield 1946: 97–9; Goddard
1990: 108) and probably the inclusive usage of ki‑ as well (Richard Rhodes, p.c.). In
contrast, the syncretism is not attested in Blackfoot, where ki‑ is only used for sec-
ond person and not for inclusive reference (Frantz 1991: 22). It is important to real-
ise that this syncretism in Algonquian is always disambiguated by various number
suffixes, also distinguishing some person categories (see the end of section 4.3 for a
discussion of the implications of the existence of these suffixes).
Besides the Algonquian languages, it turns out to be rather difficult to find good
examples of a syncretism between inclusive and second person. The following ex-
amples are all incidental cases within their linguistic family. A particularly fine case
is the independent pronoun paradigm from Sanuma, a Yanomam language from
Venezuela/Brazil. In Sanuma, the pronoun (ka)makö is used for both inclusive as
well as second-person plural reference. The contrasting pronoun samakö is used
82 Michael Cysouw
for exclusive reference (Borgman 1990: 149). There is no verbal inflection, nor any
other linguistic device that disambiguates this syncretism. Also in South America,
though independent from Sanuma, an inclusive/second-person syncretisms is also
attested in the independent pronouns and the verbal prefixes of Itonama, an isolate
from Bolivia (Camp & Liccardi 1965: 332, 375; Crevels & Muysken, this volume). A
further example of this syncretism is found in Lavukaleve, an East Papuan language
from the Solomon Islands. The pronominal prefix me‑ is used both for inclusive and
second-person plural (Terrill 2003: 242–4). This syncretism is probably the result
of a recent merger. The closely related language Savosavo differentiates between an
inclusive mai and a second-person plural me (Todd 1975: 813). Fourth, the second-
person plural agent pronominal prefix -bà from Kiowa, a Tanoan language from
North America, is also used to mark inclusive (Watkins 1984: 113). The closely re-
lated language Southern Tiwa does not mark clusivity (Allen & Frantz 1978: 11).
Fifth, the Kiranti (Tibeto‑Burman) language Kulung has a dual suffix ‑ci, just as all
other Kiranti languages. However, in Kulung, the inclusive and the second-person
dual are not marked by any other morphological device, leaving an inclusive/sec-
ond-person syncretism (Tolsma 1997: 107). Sixth, the Papuan language Inanwatan,
spoken on the Bird’s Head (Irian Jaya), has an inclusive/second-person plural syn-
cretism in the independent pronouns for object íwe, emphatic subject dewawaro
and oblique íga(dara), though there is no syncretism for subject pronouns nor for
the possessive pronouns (de Vries 2004: 27–9). The same syncretism is also found
in the person prefixes on verbs (de Vries 2004: 36). The inclusive–exclusive distinc-
tion is very likely introduced individually into various languages in the Bird’s Head
by Austronesian contact. In the case of Inanwatan, the exclusive subject pronoun
níiti appears to be the original first-person pronoun, and the inclusive dáiti is made
on the basis of the second-person singular áiti by adding the possessive plural pre-
fix da-. However, this only happened for the subject pronouns. In all other para-
digms, the new inclusive category became simply coded alike to the second person
plural.4 Finally, the direct object prefixes from the non‑Pama‑Nyungan language
Tiwi in Australia use a prefix mani‑ both for inclusive and second-person plural
(Osborne 1974: 39; Lee 1987: 180)
There are two more languages with a syncretism between inclusive and second
person. In both these languages, the syncretism is attested in a phonologically re-
duced variant of the personal pronouns. The syncretism is not attested in the full
forms, so the syncretism in the reduced forms can readily be interpreted as example
of an ongoing merger. The first case is Diola‑Fogny, an Atlantic (Niger‑Congo) lan-
guage from Senegal. In this language, verbs have prefixal bound pronouns. The
short versions of these prefixes show a prefix u‑ for both inclusive and second-per-
son singular.5 However, the inclusive meaning is obligatorily disambiguated from
the second-person singular by a suffix ‑a(e) (Sapir 1965: 90–1, see also Section 5.3).
The second case of an inclusive/second-person syncretism in reduced pronouns
is attested in Acehnese, a Chamic language spoken in Northern Sumatra (Indo-
nesia). The full forms of the independent pronoun clearly distinguish an inclusive
(geu)tanyoe from a second-person (informal) gata. However, the corresponding

clitics are identical, either ta‑ as a prefix or -teu(h) as a suffix (Durie 1985: 117).
4.3. Dismissing other apparent inclusive/second-person syncretisms

There are a few languages for which an inclusive/second-person syncretism is
claimed in the literature, but I will argue that these syncretisms are only superfi-
cial phenomena for two different reasons. First, there are a few languages that have a
number marker, which happens to be found only in the inclusive and in the second-
person plural. This might look like an inclusive/second-person syncretism, but the
syncretism is not found in the person marking, but in the number marking. This is,
for example, the case in Quechua. Mannheim (1982: 147) claims an inclusive/sec-
ond-person syncretism for Quechua. There is indeed an identical suffix ‑cis both in
the inclusive and in the second person in some of the Quechuan languages (cf. Pot-
tier 1963; van de Kerke 1996: 120–5). However, this is neither a syncretism of the
complete person markers (the inclusive suffix is ‑ncis and the second-person plural
suffix is ‑nkicis), nor is it found in all Quechuan languages. Originally, the suffix ‑cis
has been combined with the second-person singular ‑n‑ki to form the second-per-
son plural ‑n‑ki‑cis. The suffix ‑cis can probably be related historically to a particle
indicating abundance (Cerrón Palomina 1987: 271). Another example of a number
marker that is attested only in the inclusive and the second person is the suffix ‑Vmu
from Muna, a Western Malayo‑Polynesian language from Sulawesi (van den Berg
1989: 51, 53, 81). This is not counted as a syncretism here because the real person
markers are prefixes, the suffix ‑Vmu being probably best analysed as a number suf-
fix, which only happens to be used in the inclusive and the second person. The per-
son prefixes of Muna will appear later on in Section 5.2, because these prefixes have
a syncretism between inclusive and third person.
The second reason why some claims for an inclusive/second-person syncretism
from the literature are not included here is that the apparent syncretism is, on closer
inspection, only part of the story. The problem is that inclusive marking in some
language is a combination of first- and second-person marking. A clear example of
such a combination is the inclusive pronoun yumi — made from the English pro-
nouns you and me — as attested in Tok Pisin and some other English based Creoles
in the Pacific (Mühlhäusler 1986: 161). This is of course no syncretism between in-
clusive and second person. It could just as well be called a syncretism between in-
clusive and first person. In fact, the inclusive meaning is established neatly compo-
nentially by combining first- and second-person morphology into one word.
There are numerous variants on this theme. A more detailed discussion of this
phenomenon is presented under the heading ‘A note on hybrid inclusives’ in section
7 of Daniel (this volume). He argues that there are different kinds of componential-
ity involved, an analysis which I subscribe. However, a finer-grained differentiation
does not lessen the point that these inclusives use a combination of first- and sec-
ond-person markers (however complicated the semanic details), and can thus just
84 Michael Cysouw
as well be considered a kind of first person as a kind of second person. They cannot
be used to argue for a special link between inclusive and second person.
A nice illustration of a componential construction is the inclusive marking from
Maybrat, a West Papuan language from Irian Jaya. To express the inclusive, the
second-person plural independent pronoun anu is used, so it might look like there
is an inclusive/second-person syncretism. Actually, the inclusive “is expressed by
using the free pronoun anu followed by a verb that takes a first-person plural per-
son prefix p‑” (Dol 1999: 70), as illustrated in (1). The inclusive is marked by a com-
bination of second and first-person marking, so there is no special connection be-
tween inclusive and second person.
(1) Maybrat (Dol 1999: 71)
anu p‑kias ania
2pl.pron 1pl‑tell recip
‘You (and) we, we tell each other.’
This problem is of importance for the case of Khoekhoe (=Nama/Damara), a Khoe
language from Namibia.6 In this language, it appears as if the so‑called ‘pronominal
root’ saa shows a syncretism between inclusive and second person. I will argue that
this is not the case (in contrast to an earlier claim in Cysouw 2001: 151). The cen-
tral problem is that saa only has the inclusive interpretation in combination with a
first-person clitic attached to it. In this combination, the inclusive meaning can be
constructed componentially from the constituting parts ‘you’ + ‘we’, just as the Tok
Pisin inclusive yumi consists of the parts ‘you’ + ‘I’. The meaning of saa is only ‘you’
and the apparent syncretism with the inclusive is a result of the combination with a
first-person clitic. I will present two arguments for this analysis of Khoekhoe, a syn-
chronic and a diachronic one.
For the synchronic argument, it is important to understand the structure of
Khoekhoe person marking. The main device for person marking in Khoekhoe is
the pronominal clitic (called ‘person–gender–number marker’ (PGN) by Hagman
1977, but ‘nominal designant’ (Nd) by Haacke 1977). These clitics do not mark clu-
sivity. Besides these clitics there are also pronominal roots. The pronominal roots
(among them saa) only occur sparingly, and if they occur, they are almost always
followed by a pronominal clitic. The only constructions in which the roots are not
followed by a clitic is when marking pronominal possession, and then the only pos-
sible reference of saa is second-person singular (Hagman 1977: 36; Haacke 1977:
47–8). The only way to get inclusive reference is by a combination of second-person
saa with a first-person non‑singular clitic (Hagman 1977: 43–4).
For the diachronic argument it is important to realise that Khoisan is not a gen-
etic unit. At the present stage of knowledge, it consists at least of three families and
a few isolates (Güldemann & Vossen 2000). As explained above, Khoekhoe is part
of the Khoe family (formerly ‘Central Khoisan’). The pronominal clitics can be
confidentially reconstructed for proto‑Khoe (Vossen 1997: 377). The reconstruc-
tion of the pronominal roots is less straightforward (Vossen 1997: 368). However,
it is clear that clusivity is not part of the reconstructed pronominal roots in pro-
to‑Khoe — it is an innovation of Khoekhoe. Güldemann (2002: 51–3) argues that
clusivity in Khoekhoe is borrowed from a language of the !Ui‑Taa family (‘Southern
Khoisan’). Following this proposal, the only pronominal roots to be reconstructed
for proto‑Khoe are *tii for first person and *saa for second person (Güldemann ar-
gues here against Vossen 1997: 368). Khoekhoe has borrowed the exclusive root *sii
from !Ui-Taa, using its own second-person root *saa together with the pronominal
clitics to form the missing inclusive (as described above).
It turns out that real inclusive/second-person syncretism is only attested in the
Algonquian family and in a few incidental cases. However, the Algonquian case is
not beyond doubt. In the Algonquian languages, the inclusive/second-person syn-
cretism in the prefixes is obligatorily disambiguated by suffixes for all non-singu-
lar categories. These suffixes might be considered plural suffixes, as they only oc-
cur in the non-singular. However, they have different forms for first (-min), second
(-m) and third person (-wak) plural. Taking the history of the Khoekhoe person
marking as an guide, one might speculate that clusivity was not part of proto‑Algic
(just as it is not found in the other major northern American families Salish, Atha-
bascan, and Eskimo‑Aleut). Its history could have been as follows. First there were
person suffixes without marking clusivity and later the person prefixes, also with-
out clusivity, were innovated. The new inclusive category was made by combining
the second-person prefix with the first-person suffix. The reason for this innova-
tion might have been contact (e.g. with the Iroquoian languages, which all have
a clear inclusive–exclusive opposition). In this interpretation, the Algonquian
inclusive is a semantically transparent combination of first- and second-person
markers, and I would not consider it a case of inclusive/second-person syncretism.
However, the comparative details of Algonquian person marking have to be inves-
tigated more closely to backup this speculation. Untill a clear decision to the con-
trary, I will interpret the Algonquian prefixes as a case of an inclusive/second-per-
son syncretism.
To summarise, inclusive/second-person syncretisms exist among the world’s
languages but the number of examples is not overwhelming. The question now re-
mains how frequent other theoretically possible syncretisms involving clusivity are.
As I will show below, the other possibilities are at least as common as the inclusive/
second-person syncretism.
4.4. Exclusive = second person

Syncretism between exclusive and second person are particularly prominent
among Austronesian languages on and around the island Timor. In various lan-
guages of the Timor subgroup of Central Malayo‑Polynesian, the subject prefix m‑
is used for exclusive as well as for second-person singular and plural. This is found
in Lamalera (Keraf 1978: 74–6), Dawanese (Steinhauer 1993: 133), Kisar (Blood
1992: 3), Sika (Lewis & Grimes 1995: 605) and Roti (Fox & Grimes 1995: 615). This
86 Michael Cysouw
syncretism is probably an accidental merger of the proto Central Malayo‑Polyne-

sian prefixes ma‑ for exclusive, mi‑ for second-person plural and mu‑ for second-
person singular (Blust 1993: 258–9). These prefixes are, for example, still differenti-
ated in Kola (Takata 1992: 54).
A syncretism between exclusive and second-person plural is also found in vari-
ous Western Oceanic (also Austronesian) languages. It is found in the subject pre-
fix a‑ from Yabem (Ross 1995: 707), the subject prefix m‑ from Sobei (Sterner 1987:
37), the object suffix ‑mi and the possessive clitic amia from Mekeo (Jones 1998:
150–1, 208–10, 230) and the inalienable possessive suffix ‑min from Central Buang
(Hooley 1995: 734). Interestingly, there is also one Western Oceanic language in
which the syncretism between exclusive and second person is found in independent
pronouns, namely in Nehan (Todd 1978: 1183–6). The pronoun for exclusive and
for second-person plural is ingam. This might seem a rather different construction
as in the Austronesian languages mentioned so far. However, the first- and second-
person pronouns of Nehan appear to be constructed on the basis of a root ing‑. The
syncretism thus consists only of the suffix ‑am. This is probably the same merger as
the other Austronesian syncretisms that have been discussed. In the Remote Oce-
anic language Buma, the subject prefixes show an exclusive/third-person syncre-
tism both in the dual (-ba) and in the plural (-pi/pe). The same syncretism is also at-
tested in the Micronesian languages Ulithian and Trukese. In Ulithian, the subject
pronoun xa can be used for reference to the exclusive as well as to the second-per-
son plural (Sohn & Bender 1973: 42, 101–5). In Trukese, the comparable syncreted
subject pronoun is jëwy (Dyen 1965: 12). Following the tradition of Micronesian
descriptions, these markers are called ‘(short) subject pronouns’, but they seem to
be obligatorily present before each verb, so they are probably better not interpreted
as independent pronouns, but as proclitics, or maybe even as prefixes.
Outside of the Austronesian stock, there are three examples of a syncretism be-
tween exclusive and second person. The first of these is found in the southern dia-
lect of Udihe (called Bikin), a Tungusic language from Russia, in which the suffix
‑u marks for both person categories (Nikolaeva & Tolskaya 2001: 212). In an older
survey of the Tungusic languages, Benzing (1955) does not find this syncretism in
any Tungusic language. He differentiates for Udihe between a suffix ‑u for exclu-
sive and a suffix ‑hu for second-person plural (Benzing 1955: 1078). However, ac-
cording to Nikolaeva & Tolskaya (2001: 51), there is no phonemic /h/ in southern
Udihe. In northern Udihe, the original /h/ is conserved as a pharyngealisation of
the following vowel, so in this variant there is still a difference between a plain ‑u for
the exclusive and a pharyngealised ‑u for second-person plural. In southern Udihe,
the pharyngealised vowels have become long vowels, but vowel length is being lost,
especially word‑finally, leading to the syncretism of the exclusive and the second-
person plural (I. Nikolaeva, p.c.)
The final cases of an exclusive/second-person syncretism are found among the
non‑Pama‑Nyungan language from northern Australia. The first is attested in
Burarra. The intransitive prefixes nyirri‑ (for dual) and nyiburr‑ (for plural) mark
both for exclusive and second person (Glasgow 1984). In the closely related lan-
guage Ndjébbana (McKay 2000: 240), the exclusive and second person are distin-
guished, but the difference consists only of an initial lamino‑palatal nasal for the
exclusive (njirri‑ for unit augmented and njarra‑ for augmented) versus an initial
apical‑alveolar nasal for the second person (nirri‑ for unit augmented and narra‑
for augmented). These two sounds appear to have merged in Burarra, leading to
the present syncretism between exclusive and second person. The other example
is Tiwi, which presently has no known close relative. The intransitive prefixes from
Tiwi are identical for exclusive and second-person plural: ngimpi‑ for non‑past and
nginti‑ for past (Osborne 1974: 38; Lee 1987: 173).
4.5. Summary
As shown in Section 4.2, it is not very common, outside the Algonquian languages,
for inclusives and second person to be identical. Among the fifteen cases presented,
the best cases are Sanuma, Itonama, and Inanwatan, in which the syncretism is at-
tested in the independent pronouns. There are a few examples, discussed in Section
4.3, which, on closer inspection, do not turn out to be examples of real syncretism
between inclusive and second person. A central argument to disqualify apparent
syncretism is the fact that the inclusive is a combination of first- and second-per-
son markers.
The sixteen cases presented in Section 4.4 show that it not at all unheard of that
there is a syncretism between exclusive and second person. Among these cases,
there is even one language (Nehan) that shows this syncretism in its independ-
ent pronouns. All examples appear to be cases of relatively recent merger, because
closely related languages do not have the same syncretism. Only in the Timor fam-
ily, various (but far from all) closely related languages show the same syncreted per-
son-marking structure. However, even if all examples are historical coincidences,
this still leaves open the question why the semantically rather disparate categories
‘exclusive’ and ‘second person’ are not disambiguated. Apparently, there is no abso-
lute need to do so.
Comparing the two collections, there appears to be no reason to consider the in-
clusive/second-person syncretism to be more ‘regular’ than the exclusive/second-
person syncretism. For both syncretisms, almost all examples are inflectional, but
incidental examples (Sanuma/Itonama, Inanwatan, and Nehan, respectively) show
that it is also possible for independent pronouns to have either syncretism. Further,
both syncretisms are generally found in isolated cases (meaning that close rela-
tives do not have the same syncretism), except for one genetic group for either syn-
cretisms in which the syncretism is widespread (Algonquian and Timor, respect-
ively).
88 Michael Cysouw
5. Clusivity and third person
5.1. Introduction
As shown in the previous section, it is possible for the inclusive and for the exclu-
sive to be identical to the second person. The logical next question is whether it is
also possible for the inclusive or exclusive to be identical to the third person. As will
be shown in this section, it is indeed possible to have either an inclusive/third-per-
son syncretism (Section 5.2) or an exclusive/third-person syncretism (Section 5.3).
Further, the number of cases and the general structural characteristics will turn out
to be much alike in both syncretisms. The empirical evidence for these two syncre-
tisms will even turn out to be comparable to the syncretisms with second person
as surveyed in the previous section. All four theoretical possibilities are roughly
equally common and show a comparable world-wide distribution.
5.2. Inclusive = third person

A syncretism between inclusive and third person is consistently found in the sub-
ject prefixes of the Tanna languages from Vanuatu. Genetically, these languages
belong to the Central‑Eastern Oceanic branch of the Austronesian stock. The five
Tanna languages — Kwamera, Lenakel, North Tanna, Southwest Tanna and White-
sands — all have a syncretism between the inclusive and the third person non‑sin-
gular, using a prefix k‑ for both referential categories (Lynch 1967: 46–8; Lindstrom
& Lynch 1994: 10–12; Lynch 1978: 45). The Tanna languages are a subgroup of the
Southern Vanuatu family and for Proto‑Southern Vanuatu, Lynch (1986: 274) re-
constructs an opposition between an inclusive prefix k(V)‑ and a third-person plural
prefix γ-.This opposition is still attested in Ura, another language from the South-
ern Vanuatu family, where the inclusive prefix is (g)ur‑ and the prefix for third-per-
son plural (γ)ir‑ (Crowley 1998: 21). The syncretism in the Tanna languages is thus
a relatively recent merger. However, this syncretism in the person inflection does
not cause the independent pronouns to be used for disambiguation. For example,
Lynch notes about Lenakel that there is a “homophony between k‑ ‘first inclusive’,
and k‑ ‘third non‑singular’; which of these is actually present is almost always deter-
mined by the context” (Lynch 1978: 45). The same merger is also attested in Atchin,
a language from the North and Central Vanuatu family, showing that this merger
is not a singularity of the Tanna languages. In Atchin, the suffix for inalienable pro-
nominal possession is ‑r for both the inclusive and the third-person plural. The pos-
sessive pronouns that are used for alienable possession are derived from these suf-
fixes and consequently show the same syncretism (Capell and Layard 1980: 55–6).
Still within Oceanic, this syncretism is found in Nalik, a Western Oceanic lan-
guage from New Ireland and in Buma, a Remote Oceanic language from the Santa
Cruz islands. In Buma, the subject prefixes show an inclusive/third-person syncre-
tism both in the dual (‑la) and in the plural (-li/le). In Nalik, the prefixal subject
marker di(a)‑ is used for both inclusive and third-person plural (Volker 1998: 47–
51). The speakers of Nalik are well aware of this syncretism, which is proven by the
fact that the syncretism is taken over by some speakers into their variant of Tok Pi-
sin, replacing the Tok Pisin inclusive independent pronoun yumi by the Tok Pisin
third-person plural pronoun ol (Volker 1998: 48). Another example of this syncre-
tism is found in Muna, a Western Malayo‑Polynesian language from Sulawesi (In-
donesia), distantly related to the previous cases within the Austronesian stock. In
Muna, the subject prefix do‑ is used for both inclusive and third-person plural (van
den Berg 1989: 53). The potential ambiguity does not result in an obligatorily used
personal pronoun: “the personal pronouns are optionally used . . . to emphasise the
subject of a verbal predicate, in addition to the subject marker” (van den Berg 1989:
82). Roughly within the same area, yet genetically unrelated to the previous cases,
this syncretism is also attested in Hatam, a West Papuan language from the Bird’s
Head (Irian Jaya). Both the subject prefix i(g)‑ (Reesink 1999: 51) and the prefix i(p)‑
for inalienable possession (Reesink 1999: 48) are used for inclusive as well as for
third-person plural.
At the other side of the world, a syncretism between inclusive and third person
is attested in the pronominal prefixes from Huave, a Huavean language from Mex-
ico. There is massive allophony in these pronominal prefixes, but in all allophones
the inclusive is identical to the third person. This indicates that the syncretism is not
a random merger, though there is no comparative information to shed light on the
history of this structure. The syncretism is obligatorily disambiguated by various
suffixes that mark non‑singular (Stairs & Hollenbach 1969: 48–53).
A special case is the extinct language Tupínambá, a Tupí language from Brazil.
We only know about this language because two missionaries described it in the 16th
and 17th century. From these descriptions, Rodrigues (1990) extracts the fact that
the subject prefixes ya‑ and o‑ can be used both for inclusive and for third per-
son reference, yet only in transitive clauses. No syncretism is found in intransitive
clauses, ya‑ is consistently used for inclusive and o‑ for third person (Rodrigues
1990: 396). In this usage, the prefixes are identical to the reconstructed active pre-
fixes from Proto‑Tupí‑Guaraní (Jensen 1990: 120). However, in transitive senten-
ces in Tupínambá, both these prefixes can be used for inclusive as well as for third
person. The precise interpretation of the transitive use of these prefixes remains
somewhat mysterious, though Rodrigues argues that it is related to the marking
of focus. No contemporary Tupí language has been described to show this syncre-
tism, so the old Tupínambá grammars are the only source of information (see Sec-
tion 7 for a summary of the analysis by Rodrigues). The independent pronouns
from Tupínambá show exactly the same referential structure as the prefixes with the
same syncretism between inclusive and third person (Rodrigues 1990: 396, 402).
Finally, mention has to be made of the Kiranti (Tibeto‑Burman) language in this
context. The dual in the Kiranti languages is marked using a suffix ‑ci (e.g. Athpare,
Ebert 1997a: 23–38; Camling, Ebert 1997b: 16–24) or ‑ti (e.g. Dumi, van Driem
1993a: 95–9). The exclusive suffix is generally explicitly marked in contrast to the
90 Michael Cysouw
other persons (in Athpare with ‑ciŋa, in Camling with ‑cka and in Dumi with ‑ti).
As a result, the inclusive dual suffix is identical to both the second- and third-per-
son dual. The second-person dual is disambiguated by root changes and a prefix
(t)a‑ (except for Kulung, see Section 3.2). There remains a complete syncretism be-
tween the inclusive dual and the third-person dual in Athpare, Camling and Dumi
(see van Driem 1993b; 1997; 1990 for a comparative analysis of the Kiranti person
markers).
5.3. Exclusive = third person

A syncretism between exclusive and third person is attested in the Cariban language
Wai Wai. The pronominal prefix for both exclusive and third person is n(î)‑, as op-
posed to the prefix for inclusive, which is t(î)‑ (Hawkins 1998: 178–9). The syncre-
tism between exclusive and third person is regularly disambiguated by the use of an
exclusive independent pronoun amna. Exactly the same structure is also found in
the closely related language Hixkaryana (Derbyshire 1979: 146–9). In a survey of the
Cariban family, Derbyshire (1999) notes that a syncretism between exclusive and
third person appears to be the rule in the Cariban family: “except for Makushi and
Kuikúro, the [exclusive] prefix is identical in form and function with third person,
and a free pronoun ana (or cognate) is always present [to mark exclusive reference,
M. C.]” (Derbyshire 1999: 32).7 The languages that have an exclusive/third-person
syncretism in this survey by Derbyshire are Kariña (=Carib), Tiriyó (=Trio), Cari-
jona, Kashuyana, Wai Wai, Hixkaryana, Waimiri‑Atroari, Arekuna, Akawaio, Way-
ana, Dekwana, Bakairí and Txikão.8 The exceptions to this Cariban idiosyncrasy,
Makushi and Kuikúro, both have innovated specialised marking for the exclusive.
These innovations have been independent developments because these languages
are neither close relatives within Cariban nor spoken in each other’s neighbourhood
and the innovative exclusive morphemes are not cognate. The language Panare also
does not have this syncretism because the inclusive–exclusive distinction has been
lost in the prefixes (Gildea 1989; Derbyshire 1999: 32–3). The loss of clusivity has re-
sulted in an even more extensive syncretism as the already syncreted exclusive/third
person prefix has expanded its meaning to cover also inclusive reference. The same
development has taken place in Kapón and Pemón (S. Gildea, p.c.).
Besides the Cariban languages, there are a few incidental cases that also show a
syncretism between exclusive and third person. It is, for example, found in Shuswap,
a Salish language from Canada. None of the other Salish languages has an oppos-
ition between inclusive and exclusive, and it is consequently not part of a recon-
struction of the pronominal elements of Proto‑Salish (Newman 1980: 156; Davis
2000). In Shuswap, however, the third person suffix ‑əs is also used for the exclusive;
the inclusive is marked by ‑ət, the equivalent of the Proto‑Salish first-person plural
suffix *‑at. The syncretism between exclusive and third person can optionally be dis-
ambiguated by the morphologically independent element kwəxw for the exclusive
(Kuipers 1974: 45, 59).9 The origin of this construction is not yet conclusively re-
solved. Van Eijk (this volume) argues that the existence of clusivity in Shuswap is the
result of influence by neighbouring Algonquian languages. Van Eijk proposes that
the independent element kwəxw is related to the proto‑Salish second-person subject
clitic *kəxw. This clitic has been reanalysed as a first-person marker kwu in Kalispel
and Okanogan. In Shuswap, the combination of this person marker with a third per-
son inflected verb results in an exclusive reference.10 Another example of this syn-
cretism in America is attested in Kiowa, a Tanoan language of Southwestern USA.
In Kiowa, the exclusive agent prefix è‑ is identical to the inverse third person mark-
ing (Watkins 1984: 113). In the closely related language Southern Tiwa, which does
not mark clusivity, the first and third person non‑singular are identical (in‑ for dual
and i‑ for plural, Allen & Frantz 1978: 11). This correspondence is analysed by Wat-
kins (1984: 127–8) as a sign of the historical relationship between the languages.
Two other examples of this syncretism come from New Guinea, yet from opposite
corners of this linguistically diverse island. First, it is attested in Binandere, a Goila-
lan language from southeastern New Guinea. There are many different tense‑aspect
variants of the verbal person suffixes in this language, but in all these paradigms,
the exclusive is identical to the third-person plural. The large variety of paradigms
showing this syncretism in this language indicates that it is not a recent merger but
a structural property of the language (Capell 1969: 16–31; see also Section 3.2). Two
closely related languages, Orokaiva (Healey et al. 1969: 62) and Korafe (Farr & Farr
1975: 747–9), both have a comparable syncretism between first-person plural and
third-person plural but without a separate inclusive. Second, a syncretism between
exclusive and third-person singular is attested in Hatam, a West Papuan language
from the Bird’s Head, the northwestern end of New Guinea. The inalienable posses-
sion prefix for both exclusive and third-person singular reference is ni(p)‑. The ver-
bal subject prefixes are almost identical to these prefixes for inalienable possession,
yet the third-person singular on verbs is zero, so that the exclusive–third person
syncretism is not found in the subject prefixes (Reesink 1999: 48, 51).
Finally, I know of two cases with an exclusive/third-person syncretism in Af-
rica. In Diola‑Fogny, an Atlantic (Niger‑Congo) language from Senegal, verbs have
prefixal bound pronouns (cf. Section 4.2 above). The short versions of these pre-
fixes show a prefix a‑ that is used for both exclusive and third-person singular. This
recent merger is not disambiguated by any other linguistic material (Sapir 1965:
90–1). In Buduma, a Chadic (Afro-Asiatic) language from Chad/Nigeria, both the
exclusive and the third-person plural are marked with the prefix yə- and this syn-
cretism is normally not disambiguated by the linguistic marking (Awagana 2001:
62–3). Such a syncretism is not found in any other Chadic language.
5.4. Summary
There are fifteen examples with a syncretism between the inclusive and the third
person, as described in Section 5.2. Among these, there is one narrow genetic fam-
ily in which all members have the same syncretism (the Tanna languages). In some
92 Michael Cysouw
of the fifteen languages, the syncretism is obligatorily disambiguated (in particular

in Huave), but in most cases this does not seem to be the case. In Nalik, this syncre-
tism appears to be a completely normal and accepted part of the linguistic aware-
ness within the speech community. This can be concluded from the fact that the
same syncretism is taken over into their dialect of Tok Pisin. In general, the syncre-
tism between inclusive and third person is just as common and normal as the inclu-
sive/second-person syncretism that has been discussed in Section 4.2.
The set of syncretisms between exclusive and third person, as described in Sec-
tion 5.3, has the same characteristics. There are slightly more examples with this syn-
cretism (nineteen languages) due to its widespread occurrence in the Carib family.
In the Cariban languages, the syncretism is regularly disambiguated by use of an in-
dependent pronoun for the exclusive. However, the syncretism is not obligatorily
disambiguated in the remaining four examples, which are found widely dispersed
throughout the world’s languages. To summarise, there seems to be no typological
reason to consider either the inclusive/third person or the exclusive–third person
syncretism to be more common than the other or more common than the previously
discussed syncretisms inclusive/second person and exclusive–second person.
6. Mixes of inclusive and exclusive
6.1. Introduction
The final syncretism involving clusivity to be discussed in this chapter are syncre-
tisms between inclusive and exclusive reference. The most obvious kind of such a
syncretism is a morphemes like the English pronoun we, which is used for all inclu-
sive and all exclusive reference. Such syncretisms are common and will not further
be considered here because there is simply no clusivity marked at all. In this section,
cases will be considered in which there is clusivity marked in some sense, but the
difference between the various morphemes involved do not follow along the stand-
ard division between inclusive and exclusive.11 The best way to approach these curi-
ous divisions is by starting from a minimal‑augmented person marking system. In
a minimal‑augmented system, there are three different forms for ‘we’. First, there is
the ‘minimal inclusive’, which is only used with reference to the speech‑act dyad of
speaker and one addressee — also called ‘dual inclusive’. Second, there is the ‘aug-
mented inclusive’, which is used for all other inclusive reference. This ‘plural in-
clusive’ is used with reference to three or more participants, including at least the
speaker and the addressee. The third form for ‘we’ in a minimal‑augmented system
is the exclusive. Such a tripartite division is well-attested world-wide (Cysouw 2003:
139–40). On the basis of this division, two special kinds of syncretism can be char-
acterised. On the one hand, there are languages in which the minimal inclusive is
combined with the exclusive into the referential value of one morpheme; a differ-
ent morpheme marks for the augmented inclusive only (Section 6.2). On the other
hand, there are cases in which the augmented inclusive is combined with exclusive,
contrasting to a separately marked minimal inclusive (Section 6.3).
6.2. Minimal inclusive = exclusive

The best described case of a syncretism between minimal inclusive and exclusive is
attested in Gooniyandi, a non‑Pama‑Nyungan language from northwestern Aus-
tralia. The minimal‑inclusive/exclusive pronoun is ngidi and the augmented inclu-
sive pronoun is yaadi (McGregor 1989; 1990: 167–73). McGregor uses the terms
‘restricted’ and ‘unrestricted’, respectively, to refer to these crosslinguistically un-
usual combinations of referential values. Exactly the same distinction if attested in
the closely related language Bunuba (Rumsey 2000: 70–2). In Bunuba, the mini-
mal‑inclusive/exclusive combination is expressed by the pronoun ngiyirri. The two
different meanings of this pronoun are optionally disambiguated by a dual suffix
‑way or a plural suffix ‑yani. The pronoun for augmented inclusive in Bunuba is
yaarri. In both Gooniyandi and Bunuba, the verbal inflection shows the same syn-
cretism (Rumsey 2000: 80–8; McGregor 1990).
The Gooniyandi‑type syncretism is rare cross‑linguistically, yet it is not com-
pletely unheard of. Another example of this syncretism is found in Yaouré, a Mande
language from Ivory Coast. There are two different forms for the first-person plural
with a division of meaning that is alike to the one in Gooniyandi: “kàà, which has an
inclusive reference (the speaker and a group of listeners) and kʊ̄, which has either
a dual reference (you and I) or an exclusive reference (the others and I)” (Hop-
kins 1986: 192). The pronoun kàà is the odd one out, as its morphophonological
behaviour is different from all other pronouns. Probably, this pronoun is a recent
addition to the pronominal paradigm. The syncretism as found in Yaouré is a sin-
gularity among the Mande languages — no other case is presently known in this
family (V. Vydrine, p.c.). However, there are some other Mande languages that have
a (non‑syncreted) minimal‑augmented paradigm, viz. Dan (Doneux 1968: 45–7)
and Northern Looma (V. Vydrine, p.c.; cf. Greenberg 1988: 2, citing Prost 1967).
Also in Africa, though completely unrelated to the Mande languages, this same
structure is found in two neighbouring, but unrelated, languages in southern Chad.
The occurence of this unusual structure in these two languages makes a good argu-
ment for areal influence. Both Tumak (a Chadic language, belonging to the Afro-
Asiatic stock) and Sar (a Sara-Bagirmi language, belonging to the Nilo-Saharan
stock) have two different pronouns to be translated in to English as we. In Tumak,
the pronoun nà is glossed as ‘nous (duel ou exclusif)’ and the pronoun dì is glossed
as ‘nous (inclusif)’ (Caprile 1975: 31). The first pronoun is used for all dual reference
and all exclusive reference, which boils down to the same thing that has been called
minimal-inclusive/exclusive syncretism here. The second pronoun is probably only
used for inclusives with more than three persons (although the source is not explicit
in this point). In Sar, the pronoun jìi is glossed as inclusive and the pronoun jìì as ex-
clusive, though it is added that all dual reference is done with the exclusive pronoun
94 Michael Cysouw
(Palayer 1989: 202). The distinction between the two forms is made even more expli-
cit in the discussion of the verbal inflection, where it is said that the prefix j- is used
for the dual inclusive and all exclusive reference, and the circumfix j-. . .-i is used for
the inclusive plural, there being three or more referents (Palayer 1989: 208).
Finally, the same minimal‑inclusive/exclusive syncretism is also found in the
independent pronouns from Kunimaipa, a Goilalan language from the southeast-
ern tip of Papua New Guinea. In this language, there are two different forms for
‘we’. The pronoun rei is used for the combination minimal inclusive and exclusive.
The pronoun rari is used for the augmented inclusive (Pence 1968; Geary 1977: 17–
18). There is an optional suffix ‑pi, a dual/trial marker that can can partly be used
for disambiguation. The combination rari‑pi is an inclusive trial. However, this
number suffix cannot be used for disambiguation of the different meanings of the
pronoun rei as the pronoun rei‑pi can still be both minimal inclusive and exclu-
sive dual (Geary 1977: 17). This bivalent dual/trial usage of the suffix ‑pi indicates
that there is a relation to a so‑called unit‑augmented paradigm, with the suffix ‑pi
marking unit‑augmented (cf. McKay 1978). This is confirmed by the closely related
language Weri, which has a unit‑augmented type paradigm with a suffix ‑ip mark-
ing unit‑augmented (Boxwell 1967: 36). The particular syncretism of Kunimaipa is
probably the result of a merger of an erstwhile minimal‑augmented paradigm.
6.3. Augmented inclusive = exclusive

Greenberg (1988: 9) was the first to explicitly note the possibility of a contrast be-
tween minimal inclusive (‘I and you’) on the one hand and a syncretism of aug-
mented inclusive (‘I, you and other’) and exclusive (‘I and others’) on the other hand.
He called this structure the ‘Assiniboine‑type’ after the Siouan language in which he
observed this phenomenon. In Assiniboine, the syncretism is produced by the spe-
cial usage of the plural suffix ‑pi. The pronominal prefix u̹ k‑ is used for all first-per-
son plural reference. The plural suffix ‑pi is normally used together with u̹ k‑, except
in case of minimal inclusive reference (Levin 1964: 31–2). The independent pro-
nouns of Assiniboine are made from the same affixes and show the same structure
(Greenberg 1989: 457). The situation is identical in the closely related Siouan lan-
guage Lakhota. Both the verbal inflection (Rood & Taylor 1996: 465) as well as the
independent pronouns (Van Valin 1977: 74–5; cf. Rood & Taylor 1996: 454) show
this particular syncretism. Also the prefixes from Ioway-Oto show the same struc-
ture (Whitman 1947: 242). The main point of doubt remains about the obligato-
riness and reference of the crucial number suffix ‑pi. For example, Rood & Tay-
lor(1996: 469) notes that the suffix -pi in Lakhota is used with object reference in
transitive constructions. If this suffix is not obligatorily coreferential with the per-
son prefixes (and the sources are not very explicit in this respect), then these ex-
amples are not prime cases of an augmented inclusive/exclusive syncretism.
Even if the Siouan cases would be disqualified, there are still some other examples
of this syncretism attested in the world’s languages. The clearest cases are found
among the non‑Pama‑Nyungan languages in northwestern Australia. I know of ex‑

amples in Tiwi (Tiwian), Burarra (Burarran) and in various Nyulnyulan languages.
In Tiwi, the independent pronoun muwa is used for minimal inclusive and the pro‑
noun ngawa is used for the combination augmented inclusive/exclusive (Lee 1987:
101). In the description of Tiwi by Osborne (1974: 54), a pronoun ngagha is ob‑
served for augmented inclusive. The difference between the two descriptions might
be accounted for by dialectal differences or it could be the result of recent changes.
In young people’s speech (as also described by Lee 1987), the loss of the marking of
clusivity has progressed even further. The minimal inclusive muwa has been lost as
well, which results in a complete loss of any marking of clusivity in the independent
pronouns (Lee 1987: 101–3). In Burarra, the minimal inclusive pronoun is ngar‑
ripa. The referential structure of the combined augmented inclusive/exclusive pro‑
noun is somewhat complicated by the existence of a unit‑augmented series in the
paradigm (cf. McKay 1978). The combination unit‑augmented‑inclusive/exclu‑
sive‑dual is marked by the pronoun nga‑tippa and the combination augmented‑in‑
clusive/exclusive‑plural is marked by the pronoun nga‑yburrpa (Glasgow 1964:
110–11; 1984: 15). This syncretism in Burarra is disambiguated by the use of per‑
son prefixes. However, these prefixes have a syncretism between exclusive and sec‑
ond person (see Section 4.4 above). Comparison with the closely related language
Ndjébbana (McKay 2000: 171, 203) shows that this syncretism probably arose rela‑
tively recently by a merger of a lamino‑palatal and a dorso‑velar nasal.
Other cases of this syncretism in Australia are attested in the Nyulnyulan lan‑
guages. The clearest case is the subject prefixes from Bardi. In Bardi, the minimal
inclusive prefix is a‑ and the prefix for the combination augmented‑inclusive/exclu‑
sive is aŋ‑ (Metcalfe 1975: 123). This syncretism can optionally be disambiguated
by the use of independent pronouns, which show a complete minimal‑augmented
paradigm (Metcalfe 1975: 49–50, 203).12 This particular syncretism is indirectly at‑
tested in the language Nyulnyul, in which the marking is structurally identical to
the examples of the Siouan languages as discussed above. In Nyulnyul, the pronom‑
inal prefixes themselves do not show the syncretism — the prefix ya‑ simply marks
for all first-person plural reference (McGregor 1996: 40–1). But McGregor notes
that the plural marking can be left out for minimal inclusive reference only, leaving
an augmented-inclusive/exclusive syncretism: “[ya‑] occasionally occurs without
the number marking prefix [‑rr‑] when it refers to the speaker‑hearer dyad: that is,
when reference is made to the 1&2 minimal category” (McGregor 1996: 40). How‑
ever, judging from the example shown in (2), it is not obligatory for plural mark‑
ing to be left out with minimal inclusive reference. This syncretism is not attested in
the Nyulnyulan language Warrwa. In this language, there is a regular difference be‑
tween an inclusive ya‑ and an exclusive nga/ka‑ prefix (McGregor 1994: 41, see also
Section 3.3).
96 Michael Cysouw
(2) Nyulnyul (McGregor 1996: 42)

ngay a juy ya‑li‑rr‑jid derby‑ung
1sg.pron conj 2sg.pron 1pl‑irr‑pl‑go place‑all
“You and I might go to Derby.”
Further, there are two cases of this syncretism in New Guinea. One example is at-
tested in Kunimaipa, a Goilalan language from Southeastern Papua New Guinea.
In the imperfect, a suffix ‑paine marks for minimal inclusive and a suffix ‑ka marks
for the combination augmented inclusive/exclusive. The same syncretism is also at-
tested in the perfect suffixes, yet here the referential values of the suffixes are even
more messed up (Pence 1968: 110; Geary 1977: 26). The other example is found in
the independent pronouns of Hatam, a West Papuan language from the Bird’s Head
(the westernmost part of New Guinea). There are two pronouns to be translated
into English as we in Hatam. In Reesink (1999: 40–1), the pronoun sa(ni) is simply
glossed as ‘dual’ without further specification, but in Reesink (2002: 3) it is explic-
itly noted that this pronoun is only used for dual inclusive. The remaining combin-
ation of augmented inclusive and exclusive is marked by the pronoun nye(ni).
The final examples of this kind of syncretism come from America. In Guató, a
Macro‑Gé language from Brazil, the pronominal inflection is a mix of pre‑ and
suffixes. Clusivity is marked by two prefixes, the prefix ga‑ for minimal inclusive
and the prefix dʒa‑ for the remaining combination of augmented inclusive and ex-
clusive reference. The independent pronouns consist of the same person markers
affigated to a root -ó(kó)‑ and show the same syncretism (Palácio 1986: 366–70).
This structure of Guató appears to be a singularity within the Macro‑Gé languages
(Rodrigues 1999: 186–7). Finally, in Pech, a Chibchan language from Honduras,
the first-person pronoun patàs is glossed as “dual” and the pronoun untàs as “plural”
(Holt 1999: 40). However, in the discussion of the verbal inflection, it is made ex-
plicit that the gloss “dual” is only a shorthand for “first-person-dual-[inclusive]”,13
which means that the other pronoun probably has a combined augmented inclu-
sive/exclusive reference (Holt 1999: 49).
6.4. Summary
There are six languages presently known to me of the peculiar syncretism that com-
bines the reference of minimal inclusive with the reference of exclusive into the
marking of one morpheme. The other structure, combining augmented inclusive
with exclusive, is likewise uncommon — eleven examples are attested. However,
both sets of languages are geographically and genetically diverse, which warrants
the conclusion that both syncretisms are real possibilities of human language, al-
beit rare ones.
In contrast to the syncretism between clusivity and second/third person, there
are many examples of independent pronouns among the presented mixes of inclu-
sive and exclusive reference. Five out of six languages with the minimal-inclusive/
exclusive mix have this syncretism in their independent pronouns. The other syn-
cretism is attested in independent pronouns in seven out of eleven languages.
7. Analysis of the syncretisms attested
In total, 123 cases of a syncretism involving clusivity have been discussed in this
chapter, as summarised in Table 1 (see the appendix for a complete listing). How-
ever, many of these languages have been mentioned twice (viz. the Algonquian
languages, the Tanna languages, Huave, Binandere, Kiowa, Diola‑Fogny, Burarra,
Buma, and Kunimaipa), one language has been mentioned three times (Hatam)
and one language has even been mentioned four times (Tiwi). Subtracting these,
there are 100 different languages that have (at least) one of the syncretisms dis-
cussed. Relative to the 6,703 languages as mentioned in the thirteenth edition of
the Ethnologue (Grimes 1996: 955), this amounts to 1.5% of the world’s languages.
I expect there to be more cases among the Austronesian languages and among the
non‑Austronesian languages of New Guinea. Also in the Tibeto‑Burman family
and among the native languages of Mesoamerica I expect more languages with syn-
cretisms to exist than have been summarised here. My informed guess is that the
kind of syncretisms that were discussed in this chapter are to be found in about 2 to
3 percent of the world’s languages. This low proportion indicates that the phenom-
enon reviewed in this chapter is typologically rare among the world’s languages.
Still, 2 to 3 percent of the world’s languages represent a high number of cases. This
indicates that it is not at all impossible for a human language to have any of these
syncretisms reviewed. Even stronger, given that only about 40% of the world’s lan-
guages have some kind of clusivity (cf. Bickel & Nichols, this volume; Siewierska &
Bakker, this volume), the present 100 cases are 3.7% of all languages with some kind
of clusivity. Incorporating a factor two for all yet unknown or undescribed cases,
Table 1. Summary of examples discussed
No. of No. of Independent Inflectional

families languages pronouns marking
Inclusive = first person 1 1 0 1
Exclusive = first person 21 40 15 32
Inclusive = second person 10 15 3 13
Exclusive = second person 7 16 1 15
Inclusive = third person 8 15 1 15
Exclusive = third person 7 19 0 19
Minimal inclusive = exclusive 5 6 5 4
Augmented inclusive = exclusive 8 11 7 9
Total 67 123 32 109
(Multiple occurrences subtracted) (47) (100) (32) (91)
98 Michael Cysouw
this amounts to about 7% of the languages with some kind of clusivity. Such propor-
tions are at least worth the establishment of a sub-class.
There is a clear asymmetry between the inclusive/first person and the exclusive/
first-person syncretism. The inclusive/first-person syncretism only occurs in one
incidental case. In contrast, the exclusive/first-person syncretism is relatively wide-
spread. It is attested in fourty languages belonging to twenty-one different linguis-
tic families. This indicates that the exclusive can be seen as a kind of first person, but
the inclusive cannot. The exclusive/first-person syncretism is even attested in the
independent pronouns of fifteen languages. I assume that speakers of a language
are much more consciously aware of their independent pronouns than of their in-
flectional person marking. Under this assumption, the ubiquity of exclusive/first-
person syncretisms among independent pronouns emphasises the conclusion that
the exclusive is a kind of first person (cf. Daniel, this volume).
The frequency of occurrence of the next four syncretisms (inclusive–second per-
son, exclusive–second person, inclusive/third person and exclusive–third person)
are strikingly similar. Each of these syncretisms is attested in about fifteen to twenty
languages belonging to about eight different families. They occur thus clearly less
often than the exclusive/first-person syncretism. Still, all four syncretisms occur in
various cases, well dispersed throughout the world’s languages. For each syncre-
tism, there is also at least one group of genetically related languages in which the
syncretism is widespread, which indicates that all four syncretisms are not neces-
sarily diachronically instable. Finally, almost all examples are found in inflectional
paradigms — the examples among independent pronouns are incidental cases. The
important conclusion that can be drawn from these occurrences is that the seman-
tically transparent combinations (inclusive–second person and exclusive–third
person) are not different from the semantically opaque combinations (inclusive/
third person and exclusive/second person).
The last two syncretisms discussed show an unusual combination of referential
values. They are both really rare, just a few examples belonging to a few families are
attested, yet these few examples are found in all corners of the world. The reasons
for both these syncretisms are thus more than incidental. The fact that both syncre-
tisms are rather often attested among independent pronouns stresses the fact that
these syncretisms are a real possibility of linguistic structure, albeit rare ones. In the
next section I will discuss the various explanations that have been brought forward
for the existence of these syncretisms.
8. Explaining the anomalies
The question now remains why the uncommon syncretisms exist. As I have shown,
various kinds of syncretisms involving clusivity are uncommon, yet they exist in
more than one case (so it is not enough to invoke coincidence to explain the exist-
ence) in various geographically dispersed part of the world (so one cannot resort to
contact for an explanation). To explain the existence of the various syncretisms, it is

possible to use a diachronic or a synchronic perspective.
From a diachronic perspective, an explanation amounts to clarifying how a syn-
cretism arose. Among the syncretisms reviewed in this chapter, by far the most ori-
ginated by an accidental merger (when diachronic or comparative data is available
at all). Only a few examples give some indication of other possible source of a syn-
cretism. For Caddo, Chafe (1990) argues that the inclusive was originally a defocus-
ing marker. As this marker was reanalysed as an inclusive, the formerly first-person
marker (used for both singular and plural) was reduced to only the first-person sin-
gular and the exclusive usage. The development resulted is an exclusive/first-per-
son syncretism. For the Mixtecan languages, I argued (see Section 3.2) that the
formerly exclusive pronoun was reanalysed as a first-person humble marker. The
first-person singular extended its meaning to include exclusive reference, leading
to an exclusive/first-person syncretism. For Carib, Meira (2002: 257) and S. Gil-
dea (p.c.) propose that the first-person plural pronoun was originally a noun, which
had third person agreement on verbs. As this noun grammaticalised to become an
exclusive pronoun, it retained the third person agreement. This results in an ex-
clusive/third-person syncretism in the Carib verbal inflection. However, this pro-
posal for the origin of the exclusive/third-person syncretism in Carib is not based
on any comparative evidence. It is a speculation about a possible structure in Pre-
Proto-Carib to explain the current syncreted structure. Finally, one could speculate
that a part of an erstwhile transparent combination loses its person-marking sta-
tus. For example, there are various examples of a first and a second-person marker
forming an inclusive (see Section 4.3). If the first-person marker would lose its per-
son-marking value, an inclusive/second-person syncretism remains. Such a history
might be fruitful to explain the origin of the Algonquian inclusive/second-person
syncretism.
Irrespective of origin, it is also an interesting question what a particular syncre-
tism synchronically means for the speaker of a language. The common occurrence
of the exclusive/first-person syncretism can readily be explained semantically. An
exclusive can be analysed as an associative plural, in which the first person is the
focal referent. The ‘others’, which are included in the reference of the exclusive are
non-focal participants in the speech act. It is semantically possible — and empiric-
ally widespread — for a language to reduce the marking of the exclusive to its focal
referent only, i.e. the first-person singular. In the same vein, it is tempting to pro-
pose semantic reasons for the transparent inclusive/second person (cf. Daniel, this
volume) and exclusive/third-person syncretisms. However, the empirical status of
these syncretisms is much more doubtful compared to the exclusive/first-person
syncretism. As set out above, there are clearly less cases and there are almost no
examples of independent pronouns showing these syncretism. However, the main
reason to object to a semantic analysis of these combinations is that the non-trans-
parent syncretisms (inclusive/third person and exclusive/second person) are just as
frequent as the semantically transparent ones.
100 Michael Cysouw
Rodrigues (1990) searched for an explanation of the inclusive/third-person syn-

cretism, which he described for Tupínambá. He analysed the correspondence be-
tween inclusive and third using the notion ‘no contrast between speaker and hearer’.
Both the inclusive as well as the third person treat speaker and addressee alike, by
either including both (inclusive) or excluding both (third person). In combination
with a notion of focus, Rodrigues claims to be able to explain the syncretism at-
tested in Tupínambá:
The verbal person marker o‑ means that third person is in focus and that there is
no contrast between the speaker and the hearer; that is to say, it means {(you, I, and
he)+f } as well as {he+f }. Analogously, ya‑ means that third person is out of focus and
that there is no contrast between the speaker and the hearer; it means {(you and I)+f
and he‑f }. (Rodrigues 1990: 402)
Although this reasoning is interesting, it is questionable whether such a general

semantic explanation is the right approach. If this explanation makes sense for
human language, then why is this syncretism not attested much more commonly
among the world’s languages? The same problem occurs with the explanation put
forward for the special syncretism of Gooniyandi (see Section 6.2) by McGregor
(1996).14 He proposes that the particular difference between yaadi and ngidi can be
explained as a special kind of inclusive–exclusive opposition, with the difference
that the inclusive (yaadi) has to include more than one addressee and the exclusive
(ngidi) only excludes groups of more than one addressee, but still includes reference
to one addressee:
Thus the system can be regarded as an inclusive/exclusive one. What is different

from the traditional or classical inclusive/exclusive system lies in the nature to the
thing that is included or excluded: in the traditional system it is the hearer or ad-
dressee; in the Bunaban system it is the hearers, an augmented group of addressees.
In the traditional inclusive/exclusive system you-singular is the ‘pivot’; in the Buna
ban system it is you-non-singular, or you-augmented. (McGregor 1996: 166)
Again my criticism: if it is indeed possible for human language to invoke the cross-
linguistically widespread semantic category of ‘you-non-singular’ to define the in-
clusive–exclusive opposition, then why is this not more regularly attested among
the world’s languages?
To conclude, explanations should always have the right level of generalisation.
Typological research is indispensable for determining the level of explanation,
which is needed to explain a particular phenomenon in a particular language. If
the phenomenon is rare cross-linguistically, then the explanation should not in-
voke universal characteristics, but use idiosyncratic reasons from the cultural or
linguistic history of the language and its speakers. Only if a phenomenon is com-
mon cross-linguistically, general semantic, functional or structural explanations
make sense.
Acknowledgements
The basic work on this chapter was conducted while I was at the Zentrum für allge-
meine Sprachwissenschft (ZAS) in Berlin. I am very grateful to Hein Steinhauer,
who first directed my attention to the strange syncretism in Kisar. This example
urged me to look further, ultimately resulting in the present collection. Misha
Daniel read earlier versions of this chapter with great care, as I did with his chapter
in this volume. We discussed our differences of opinion extensively, with the result
that not many of them remained. Further, I thank (in alphabetical order) George
van Driem, Jan van Eijk, Aone van Engelenhoven, Elena Filimonova, Spike Gildea,
Tom Güldemann, Sérgio Meira, Edith Moravcsik, Irina Nikolaeva, Richard Rhodes,
and Valentin Vydrine for help with the many details of the present chapter. Not-
withstanding their important input, the present content remains completely my
own responsibility.
Notes
1. It remains unclear from the description by Lipkind (1945) whether the Winnebago in-
clusive prefix is only used for the minimal inclusive or also for the augmented inclusive (cf.
Section 6.3 for other Siouan languages that make this difference). Greenberg (1988: 4–5, cit-
ing Susman 1943) claims indeed that the inclusive prefix can be used for both kinds of in-
clusive.
2. Veerman-Leichsenring (2000) does not use the term “inclusive”. She uses the term “col-
lective” instead, probably because this “inclusive” is not a first-person plural in Chocho, but
a separate category of person (p. 322). This is completely in concord with my argumenta-
tion. However, I hold on to the term “inclusive” and add that an inclusive is not normally a
kind of first-person plural.
3. Note that ‘the forms [with inclusive inflection] are similar to those of the third person
masculine dual . . . but differ from them in many cases by always having an accent on the a
of the actor morpheme’ (Anceaux 1965: 85–6).
4. From the survey by Voorhoeve (1975: 438–9) of the South Bird’s Head family (part of the
purported Trans New‑Guinea stock), it appears as if the language Puragi has an independ-
ent pronoun ididi that is used both for inclusive and for second-person plural. However, this
appears to be an error. In the original source (Cowan 1953: 22), the second-person plural
is the same as in Voorhoeve’s survey (though written idjidji), but the inclusive turns out to
be nidjidji. Probably, the missing initial nasal is a printing error in Voorhoeve’s article (cf.
de Vries 2004: 140).
5. The occurrence of the short version of the prefixes in Diola-Fogny is analysed as follows:
‘The full form is used . . . when the verb is neither contingent nor negative, and when it does
not take a second position prefix or the verbal proclitic connectives man and ban. In all other
situations the stripped form is used. . . . The stripped form may substitute for the full form
depending on the context. This transformation indicates an imperative, an interrogative or
the fact that emphasis is placed on the subject’ (Sapir 1965: 90–1).
6. Khoekhoe is the new name that the speakers themselves chose instead of the former
double name Nama/Damara. Rather confusingly, the name Khoekhoe is used for the
102 Michael Cysouw
language and Khoe for its linguistic family, formerly called Central Khoisan.
7. The syncretism between exclusive and third person is so ubiquitous among the Cariban
languages that it is sometimes taken for granted by the specialist in the field. Some descrip-
tions do not, or only covertly, note the syncretism. It is not noted at all, for example, by Gil-
dea (1998), nor in a paper on Tiriyó by Meira (2000a: 202–4), though in another paper
(Meira 2000b: 62), he confirms that there is an exclusive/third-person syncretism in Tiriyó.
In a paper on the reconstruction of the proto‑Carib independent pronouns, the syncreted
inflection is mentioned in a footnote (Meira 2002: 257, n. 3). In the description of the lan-
guage Carib (=Kariña) by Hoff, the existence of the syncretism is also hidden away in a foot-
note (Hoff 1968: 164, n. 44).
8. Derbyshire (1999) also includes Apalai in his list of Cariban languages with an exclusive/
third-person syncretism. However, the description by Koehn & Koehn (1986: 108) men-
tions two different forms, viz. exclusive ynan(y)‑ and third person n(y)‑.
9. The labialisation, as indicated by the superscript w is written as a superscript circle in the
original source on Shuswap by Kuipers (1974).
10. If the Shuswap pronoun kwəxw can be analysed as being originally a first-person mark-
ing, then the exclusive reference in Shuswap is marked by a semantically transparent com-
bination of first and third person reference. This would then not count as an exclusive/third
syncretism, just like transparent inclusives (made from a combination of first- and second-
person markers) were dismissed in Section 4.3.
11. There are a few cases in which clusivity is marked in a restricted part of the person-mark-
ing paradigm only. These will not be considered here as examples of syncretism. Clusivity
in the plural, but not in the dual is found in the independent pronouns from Gugu‑Yalanji
(Pama‑Nyungan, Australia, Oates & Oates 1964: 7), Jiarong (Tibeto‑Burman, China, Bau-
man 1975: 131–2, 276), Tuaripi (Eleman, Papua New Guinea, Wurm 1975: 515), Guhu‑Sa-
mane (Binanderean, Papua New Guinea, Richard 1975: 781) and Korafe (Binanderean, Pa-
pua New Guinea, Farr & Farr 1975: 734–5). There are also a few cases in which clusivity is
marked in the dual, but not in the plural. This is found in the independent pronouns from
Samo (Central and South New Guinea, Papua New Guinea, Voorhoeve 1975: 391–2) and
in the pronominal prefixes from the extinct language Coos (Coast Oregon, USA, Frachten-
berg 1922: 321).
12. Greenberg (1989), after discussing the case of Bardi, also notes the same structure in a
language called “Dampier land” (citing Cappell 1956: 87). This appears to be the same lan-
guage as Bardi.
13. In fact, there is an error in the source here, as it literally says “the first-person-dual-ex-
clusive morpheme . . . indicates ‘you and I (but not they)’ ” (Holt 1999: 49). The second part
of the sentence makes it clear that the word ‘exclusive’ should be read ‘inclusive’.
14. This explanation for Gooniyandi is proposed by McGregor to replace his earlier attempts
at an explanation (McGregor 1989; 1990).
Appendix
Survey of the examples with a syncretism involving clusivity as discussed
in this chapter.
Within the various kind of syncretisms, the languages are grouped by genetic family rela-
tionship. Different families that belong to the same overarching genetic unit are counted
separately when there does not appear to be a shared origin of the syncretism (e.g. various
branches of Austronesian are counted separately because the syncretisms are probably inde-
pendent developments in these branches). Some languages have the same syncretism both in
their independent pronouns and in their inflectional marking (e.g. Asheninca Campa). Such
languages are only counted once. In contrast, some languages have different kinds of syncre-
tism in their person marking (i.e. they appear in different sections, e.g. Tiwi or Hatam). Such
languages are counted more than once.
Inclusive = First person (Section 3.2): Found in 1 family (1 language)
Independent: ‑
Inflectional: Binandere (Central & Southeastern, Trans New Guinea)
Exclusive = First person (Section 3.3): Found in 21 families (40 languages)
Independent: Chalcatongo Mixtec, Ocotepec Mixtec, Yosondúa Mixtec, Diuxi-Tilantongo
Mixtec (all Mixtecan, Oto‑Manguean); Chocho (Popolocan, Oto‑Manguean); Aymara,
Jaqaru (Aymaran); Canela‑Kraho (Gé); Asheninca, Nomatsiguenga, Caquinte (all Campa,
Arawakan); Nimboran (Nimboran, Trans‑New Guinea); Imonda, Amanab (both Border,
Trans‑New Guinea); Chrau (Mon‑Khmer, Austro-Asiatic).
Inflectional: Winnebago (Siouan); Wichita, Caddo, Pawnee (all Caddoan); Menomini, Cree,
Fox, Eastern Ojibwe, Southwestern Ojibwe, Passamaquoddy‑Maliseet (all Algonquian);
Huave (Huavean); Sierra Popoluca (Mixe‑Zoque); Maká (Mataco‑Guaicuruan); Aymara,
Jaqaru (Aymaran); Uru, Chipaya (Uru-Chipayan); Canela‑Kraho (Gé); Tarma Quechua
(Quechuan); Asheninca, Nomatsiguenga, Caquinte (all Campa, Arawakan); Nimboran
(Nimboran, Trans‑New Guinea); Kwamera, Lenakel, North Tanna, Southwest Tanna,
Whitesands (all Tanna, Austronesian); Tiwi (Tiwian); Warrwa (Nyulnyulan); Svan (South
Caucasian); Ngiti (Central Sudanic, Nilo‑Saharan).
Inclusive = Second person (Section 4.2): Found in 10 families (15 languages)
Independent: Sanuma (Isolate), Itonama (Isolate), Inanwatan (South Bird’s Head, Trans-
New Guinea)
Inflectional: Menomini, Cree, Fox, Eastern Ojibwe, Southwestern Ojibwe, Passamaquod-
dy‑Maliseet (all Algonquian); Kiowa (Tanoan); Lavukaleve (East Papuan); Tiwi (Ti-
wian); Acehnese (Sundic, Austronesian); Diola‑Fogny (Atlantic, Niger‑Congo); Kulung
(Kiranti); Itonama (Isolate).
Exclusive = Second person (Section 4.4): Found in 7 families (15 languages)
Independent: Nehan (Western Oceanic, Austronesian).
Inflectional: Lamalera, Dawanese, Kisar, Sika, Roti (all Timor, Austronesian); Yabem, So-
bei, Mekeo, Central Buang (all Western Oceanic, Austronesian); Buma (Remote Oceanic,
Austronesian); Ulithian, Trukese (both Micronesian, Austronesian); Southern Udihe
(Tungusic); Burarra (Burarran); Tiwi (Tiwian).
104 Michael Cysouw
Inclusive = Third person (Section 5.2): Found in 8 families (15 languages)

Independent: Tupínambá (Tupí).
Inflectional: Kwamera, Lenakel, North Tanna, Southwest Tanna, Whitesands (all Tanna,
Austronesian); Atchin, Buma (Remote Oceanic, Austronesian), Nalik (Western Oceanic,
Austronesian), Muna (Sulawesi, Austronesian); Hatam (West Papuan); Athpare, Camling,
Dumi (all Kiranti, Tibeto‑Burman); Huave (Huavean); Tupínambá (Tupí).
Exclusive = Third person (Section 5.3): Found in 7 families (19 languages)
Independent: ‑
Inflectional: Kariña, Tiriyó, Carijona, Kashuyana, Wai Wai, Hixkaryana, Waimiri‑Atroari,
Arekuna, Akawaio, Wayana, Dekwana, Bakairí, Txikão (all Carib); Kiowa (Tanoan);
Shuswap (Salish); Binandere (Goilalan); Hatam (West Papuan); Diola‑Fogny (Atlantic,
Niger‑Congo); Buduma (Chadic, Afro-Asiatic).
Minimal inclusive = Exclusive (Section 6.2): Found in 5 families (6 languages)
Independent: Bunaba, Gooniyandi (both Bunaban); Yaouré (Mande); Sara (Sara-Bagirmi,
Nilo-Sagaran); Kunimaipa (Goilalan, Trans‑New Guinea).
Inflectional: Bunaba, Gooniyandi (both Bunaban); Sar (Sara-Bagirmi, Nilo-Saharan); Tu-
mak (Chadic, Afro-Asiatic).
Augmented inclusive = Exclusive (Section 6.3): Found in 8 families (11 languages)
Independent: Assiniboine, Lakhota (both Siouan); Hatam (West Papuan); Burarra (Burar-
ran); Tiwi (Tiwian); Pech (Chibchan); Guató (Macro‑Gé).
Inflectional: Assiniboine, Lakhota, Iowa (all Siouan); Bardi, Nyulnyul (both Nyulnyulan);
Hatam (West Papuan); Kunimaipa (Central & Southeast, Trans‑New Guinea); Pech
(Chibchan); Guató (Macro‑Gé).
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Society.
Chapter 4
Only you?
Philological investigations into the alleged inclusive–
exclusive distinction in the second-person plural*
Horst J. Simon
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
Does the language distinguish [. . .] inclusion v. exclusion of the third person

in the first or second person [. . .]? (from the Lingua questionnaire; Com-
rie & Smith 1977: 37)
The typological literature is divided over the question whether there exists a distinction be-
tween an inclusive and an exclusive pronoun in the second-person plural. In this chapter, I re-
examine all the available data concerning the pertinent languages. Thereby I show that the
empirical evidence for the category in question adduced so far is rather weak. However, new
data from Bavarian (Germanic) suggest that here the usage pattern of honorific pronouns of
address resembles the clusivity contrast, albeit intertwined with the grammatical category
respect. Methodologically, the chapter demonstrates that typological research based on large
samples should be supplemented by the application of traditional philological techniques in
order to avoid pre-mature claims concerning crosslinguistically rare features.
Keywords: second-person clusivity, inclusive and exclusive pronouns, honorific address, per-
son features, Bavarian, methodology of typology, grammaticalisation
1. Introduction: The problem
The present volume gives ample testimony to the fact that the distinction between
inclusive and exclusive forms in the first-person plural (and often in the dual, too)
is well researched and well-understood. There is no doubt that clusivity1 in the first-
person non-singular is a wide-spread category among the languages of the world.2
In contrast to that it is far from clear what the situation is like for the second person.
Is there anything like clusivity also in second-person pronouns? Is there a distinction
involving a second-person plural exclusive that refers to a set of addressees only {ad-
dressee . . .}, and — in opposition to this — a second-person plural inclusive that in-
cludes also non-speech-act-participants {addressee . . ., other . . .}? In other words:
Are there languages that distinguish two pronouns A and B such that A re-
fers exclusively to a multitude of addressees, whereas B refers to a group
consisting of addressee(s) plus other(s)?
114 Horst J. Simon
One should think that this is a straightforward empirical question to which one
can give a simple empirical answer. However, the typological literature is very much
divided over this seemingly simple question. All three possible types of answers
(‘no’, ‘maybe’, and ‘yes’) can be found, as can be seen from the following selection of
excerpts.
Answer type I: ‘No!’
Several authors maintain that no language with second-person clusivity exists. It
has even been assumed that such a distinction would render a language too com-
plex for human speakers to process, or that it could not be captured by humans’
genetically given grammatical feature system.
In all languages: if a form expresses the 2nd meta-person more-than-singu-
lar, then it includes in its meaning the 6th meta-person also. (Sokolovskaja
1980: 91; translated) [note: 2nd meta-person: ‘addressee(s)’; 6th metaperson:
‘addressee(s)+other(s)’; cf. p. 85f.]
My contention is that any language which provided more than one 2nd plural pro-
noun, and required the speaker to make substantial enquiries about the where-
abouts and number of those referred to in addition to the one person he was ac-
tually addressing, would be quite literally unspeakable. (Henderson 1985: 308;
emphasis added)
[. . .] nor does it seem that languages distinguish between a multiplicity of hear-
ers (2+2+ . . .), and a single hearer plus one or more others (2+3+ . . .). (McGre-
gor 1989: 443)
[. . .] and I assume that none exists.’ (McGregor 1989: 450, n. 8; emphasis added)
One generally unremarked fact is that second-person plurals never appear to make
a distinction between a plurality of addressees and combinations of one or more
addressees with non-ego, non-addressees, i.e., third persons. (Greenberg 1993: 14;
emphasis added)
There is no “exclusive/inclusive” distinction for the 2nd person: [. . .] there is no lan-
guage with simplex pronouns distinguishing {2} from {2, 3}, that is, an argument
picking out only hearers to the exclusion of non-hearers, {2} only. (Noyer 1997:
109)
[. . .] 2nd inclusive/exclusive distinction is not in fact attested, a result which con-
forms to the predictions of our geometry: we can encode no such contrast. (Harley
& Ritter 2002a: 37, n.7)
Answer type II: ‘Well, maybe. . .’

Methodologically conscious researchers admit that they might just happen not to
know of a relevant language, but that, naturally, such a language could exist — in
principle, somewhere. . .
[. . .] if any language distinguishes inclusive and exclusive second-person plu-
rals — I know of none that do, but expect that there are some — the forms would be:
[. . .] (Zwicky 1977: 729; emphasis added)
The alleged inclusive–exclusive distinction in the second-person plural 115
[. . .] what appears to be a universal principle, with a few rare and doubtful excep-
tions, namely that languages do not distinguish in what are usually called second-
person non-singulars between 2 and 3. (Greenberg 1988: 14; emphasis added)
[no particular language mentioned]
I cannot, in fact, produce a single example of a language which does make a clear
distinction between (2+2. . .) and (2+3. . .), but is obviously an empirical possibility
to whose occurence we should be alert. (Greenberg 1989: 454; emphasis added)
theoretically feasible, yet [. . .] unattested. (Cysouw 2002: 45)
Overall, it seems implausible, if not impossible, for a language to have a grammat-
icalized category 2+2 in the pronominal paradigm. (Cysouw 2003: 76; empha-
sis added)
One should also add a passage from Lyons (1968) where he speculates about the
possibility of a clusivity contrast in the second person, without any further indica-
tion of data:3
A distinction might also be made between an ‘inclusive’ and ‘exclusive’ use of the
‘second-person plural’ (in a slightly different sense of ‘inclusive’ v. ‘exclusive’). The
English pronoun you may of course be either singular or plural [. . .]. As a plural
form, it may be either ‘inclusive’ (referring only to the hearers present — in which
case it is the plural of the singular you, in the same sense as cows is the plural of cow)
or ‘exclusive’ (referring to some other person, or persons, in addition to the hearer,
or hearers). (Lyons 1968: 277)
Answer type III: ‘Yes!’

Interestingly and in striking contrast to the authors just mentioned, several linguists
who are concerned with the typology of person-number-paradigms have claimed
that they do in fact know examples of second-person clusivity. The first typologist
to draw attention to this distinction is Comrie (1980). Critisising Ingram (1978) for
not being able to cover all possible types of pronominal systems, he mentions the
case of an Oceanic language in passing (although he does not give a reference):
One pair of combinations not discussed is the opposition between 2nd person non-
singular inclusive (i.e. including some third person) and exclusive, which is at-
tested in Southeast Ambrym. (Comrie 1980: 837)
Some years later, Plank (1985) provides an insightful typological systematisation

of the category person. He takes great care not to confuse the grammatical category
‘person’ with its real world counterpart ‘speech act role deixis’. By systematically
holding these concepts apart, Plank deduces all conceivable relationships between
the two and exemplifies them with attested linguistic systems where possible. Con-
cerning second-person clusivity he writes:
Einige wenige Sprachen — unter ihnen das Abchasische [. . .] und das Südost-Am-
brynische (eine ostozeanische Sprache einer Insel der nördlichen Neuen Hebriden
[. . .]) — identifizieren formal nicht die Referenz-Mengen “{adr . . .}” und “{adr . . .,
unb . . .}”. (Plank 1985: 147)
116 Horst J. Simon
Plank quotes a grammar of Abkhaz by Hewitt (1979/1989a) and the afore-men-

tioned review by Comrie (1980) as references.
Next, a somewhat obscure formulation can be found in Hagège (1995):
[. . .] le Port-Sandwich (Nouvelles-Hébrides) distingue un inclusif et un exclusif
(duel, triel, pluriel) à la 1re et même aux 2e et 3e personnes, selon les solidarités de
groupes d’ego et de l’auditeur. (Hagège 1995: 119)
Apparently, Hagège claims that in the language concerned clusivity is a pervasive

category, applying to all three person values and to all three non-singular number
values.4
Furthermore, the existence of an inclusive–exclusive distinction in the second
person is explicitly maintained in a comprehensive survey of morphological cat-
egories by Mel’čuk (1994):
“vous exclusif ”, c’est “vous à qui je m’adresse mais personne d’autre”, et “vous
inclusif ” — “vous et d’autres”. (Mel’čuk 1994: 172)
However, despite rich factual details elsewhere in his comprehensive survey of mor-
phological differentiations, Mel’čuk does not give any hint as to which language he
has in mind here, nor does he provide a bibliographical reference.
For a great many cross-linguistic generalisations, the Universals Archive at the
University of Konstanz provides a neat overview of the suggestions made in the
literature so far. In our case, the relevant information is, naturally, part of the col-
lection of rare linguistic traits, the ‘Grammatisches Raritätenkabinett’. In this in-
ventory, the number of languages listed as possessing second-person clusivity has
changed every now and then over the last few years. However, the following group
(not incidentally coinciding with the languages mentioned above, of course) seems
to remain constantly in the list:
SE Ambrym, Port Sandwich, Abkhaz (?), Ghomala‘, Bavarian (?) (‘Das gramma-
tische Raritätenkabinett’ at http://ling.uni-konstanz.de:591/universals/introrara.
html; version of 11 June 2003)
A few other languages have been included occasionally in this somewhat unstable
listing; among them are: Ojibwe, Yokuts and Ordos Mongolian.
Now, what is the significance of all this? My short review of the typological litera-
ture on person-number-paradigms has shown that one finds a surprising amount of
disagreement concerning second-person clusivity. While some researchers down-
right deny its existence, others are more cautious and admit that they just do not
know enough facts to be sure. A third group even claims that clusivity is a real cat-
egory in the second person; these authors mention particular languages that they
believe to show the distinction.
Given the significant discrepancy of opinions on a seemingly simple empirical
question, I shall re-examine all the available data on second-person inclusives versus
exclusives in the respective languages. It will turn out that the arguments in favour
of the category adduced so far are not convincing — in fact, the discussion in the lit-
erature seems to be marred by misunderstandings and infelicities. However, I will

present new data from a German dialect, Bavarian, where the opposition between
two second-person plural pronouns might be interpreted as clusivity — albeit closely
intertwined with the grammatical fallout of politeness: the category of respect.
Before I plunge into the details of the relevant languages, let me point out the the-
oretical significance of the question this chapter examines.
2. Theoretical impact of the problem: morphosyntactic features
One of the goals of grammatical theory is to provide a universal set of features

(be they phonological or morphological or whatever else) that is comprehensive
enough to be able to describe all the grammatical facts of human languages. Never-
theless, one should try to keep this set as restrictive as possible in order to fulfil gen-
eral methodological requirements (Occam’s Razor, etc.) and to achieve the goals
of scientific study, such as to provide elegant and pervasive solutions (for a concise
critical discussion of these principles cf. Wasow 2002: 150–6).
In the context of pronominal paradigms, several linguists have suggested univer-
sal inventories of morphosyntactic features (which some of them claim to be pro-
vided directly by an innate Universal Grammar). Among these suggestions of fea-
ture inventories are the following:5
(1) [±ego]
[±tu] Silverstein ([1976]1986: 169)
[±sp]
[±hr] Ingram (1978: 226)
[±I]
[±you]
[±participant] Noyer (1997: 111 & 136–9)
The most recent — and most elaborate — discussion of person and number features
in pronouns can be found in two closely related papers by Harley & Ritter (2002a,
2002b). In contrast to the authors mentioned above, they argue for an inherently
structured array of features in form of a feature geometry that — so they say — not
only can describe all existing pronominal paradigms, but that also constrains the
order of acquisition of such paradigms in child language (see Figure 1).6
The interesting fact for our discussion is that none of the available proposals can
capture the difference between the alleged pronouns A and B whose crucial distin-
guishing factor is neither the speaker nor the addressee; this differentiation would
require some feature like [±other]. Noyer (1997: 110), e.g., explicitly excludes such
a feature because of the assumed non-existence of the A-B-distinction.7
Consequently, the empirical question under review in the present chapter turns
out to be of major theoretical importance. If Comrie, Plank etc. (cf. answer type
118 Horst J. Simon
Referring Expression (= Agreement/Pronoun)
participant individuation
Speaker Addressee Minimal Group class
Augmented Animate Inanimate/

Neuter
Masc. Fem.
Figure 1. Morphological feature geometry according to Harley & Ritter (2002a: 25; simi-
larly: 2002b: 486)
III above) are right in positing a clusivity distinction not only in first-person non-
singulars, but also in the second person, then the elegant analyses of the more
theoretically inclined linguists have to be thoroughly revised. In what follows, I will
go through each of the languages mentioned in the literature up to now, roughly
in the order in which they were introduced into the discussion. By doing so, I shall
look at the facts in more detail than can be accomplished in a broadly based typo-
logical investigation.
3. The data

3.1. South-East Ambrym
The first language reportedly exhibiting second-person clusivity is South-East Am-
brym, an Oceanic language spoken on the small island Ambrym in the Republic
of Vanuatu (formerly New Hebrides).8 It is mentioned in Comrie (1980: 837) and
Plank (1985: 147): However, neither gives any data or any references (Plank refers
to Comrie, though).
The only publications dealing specifically with South-East Ambrym are, to the
best of my knowledge, some short articles and a dictionary with a brief grammat-
ical introduction by a single author from 1968 and 1970.9 And, indeed, two differ-
ent second-person plural forms are listed in the dictionary, supplied with transla-
tion equivalents which explicitly refer to the clusivity distinction:
(2) xami ‘you (plural inclusive)’
xamim ‘you (plural exclusive)’ (Parker 1970: ix, 43)
No corresponding clusivity-forms are cited for the dual and the paucal, although
regular pronouns exist for these numbers in the other person categories; this is in it-
self already highly suspicious since clusivity thus remarkably disturbs the regularity
and symmetry of the paradigm. Furthermore, when it comes to subject–verb agree-
ment, Parker (on p. v) gives only a single second-person plural prefix on verbs: mu‑.10
So, how can we come to grips with the data in (2)? Well, several other sources
mentioning South-East Ambrym in passing provide pronominal forms that are
relevant for us: Paton (1971: 121) gives hami for South-East Ambrym and kami
for Paama (recall n. 8); similarly Ray (1926: 317, 335) already has the same form for
Paama and cami for ‘Ambrim’ (however, in this case, it is unclear which specific var-
iety is meant; it is probably from the north-west coast of the island); finally, Crowley
(1992: 38) lists kamī for this language.11 So far, so good. But where does Parker’s ex-
clusive pronoun xamim come from? Nobody seems to mention it.
However, Wilfred Tasso (an informant from Maat village who is a native speaker
of South-East Ambrym and whom Terry Crowley interviewed for me) says he uses
xamim while recognising xami as typical for Taveak and Utas villages; both are “se-
mantically equivalent” (T. Crowley, p.c.).12 This indicates that there might be some-
thing sociolinguistic or geographical about the two forms.
Fortunately, a fair number of dialect data are available for the island of Ambrym.
More than a dozen pronominal paradigms can be gleaned from the comparative
lists in Tryon (1976: 443) and Paton (1971: 105). Together with hints from other
sources (Ray 1926, Paton 1973, Tryon 1995, T. Crowley, p.c.), the following picture
emerges: The second-person plural pronouns in these lists all end either in a vowel
or in an -m. None of the varieties — with one noteworthy exception! — has both
forms. Interestingly, the geographical distribution of the types does not seem to be
arbitrary. Consider the map in Figure 2.13
Empty circle: 2nd p. plural pronoun ending in -V

Filled circle: 2nd p. plural pronoun ending in -m
Half circle: both forms reported
Figure 2. Geographical distribution of second-person plural pronominal forms on Ambrym

120 Horst J. Simon
Clearly, the empty circles (representing forms ending in a vowel) are scattered
over the whole island, clustering towards the edges of it. In contrast to that, the full
circles (symbolising the additional -m14) appear in an area along the south-west-
ern coast as well as in a place on the east coast.15 In the south-eastern corner of
Ambrym, where the alleged second-person clusivity language is spoken, we find
mostly vowel-final forms. Yet there is a highly significant complication concerning
one village: Maat. This is the only Ambrym variety about which I happen to have
conflicting data: Crowley (p.c.) tells me that his informant from this village uses
xamim, whereas Tryon (1976: 443) gives γami in his list. Coincidentally, Maat is
also the village where Parker’s two principal field work informants originally came
from (Parker 1968: 27).16 Moreover, it might be important that — unlike most other
places on Ambrym, and specifically those in the south-east — this village is some-
what inland, thereby possibly being nearer to the dialect boundary suggested by the
distribution of the dots on the map.17 And, lastly, there seem to have been a lot of
population movements of South-East Ambrym speakers — generally, and in par-
ticular with inhabitants of Maat, due to the volcanic destructions mentioned in n.
17. These relocations of speakers resulted, of course, in a certain amount of mixing
with speakers of other linguistic varieties of the region, subsequently blurring dia-
lectal distinctions.
In sum, it seems fairly reasonable to assume that Parker’s description of two ‘dis-
tinct’ second-person pronouns (which he takes to represent the clusivity contrast)
is in fact due to a conflation of two geographically defined systems. Presumably,
Parker was led to misinterpret some formal variation in his informants’ speech,
which was induced by dialect mixture, as being a grammatically significant oppos-
ition.18 I would therefore suggest to characterise the evidence for second-person
clusivity in South-East Ambrym as a myth which was introduced into the literature
because of insufficient analysis of the data. This language should therefore be dis-
missed from the list cited in section 1.
At this point, of course, the problem still remains how the morphology of the
pronoun with the final -m should be interpreted synchronically and diachronically.
While it is pretty clear that the two pronouns xami and xamim are representative
of two distinct linguistic systems (i.e., dialects), their formal differentiation must
somehow be explained. Considering that the historical reconstructions all lack a
final nasal, we can surmise that the last element in xamim is a later addition. Then,
naturally, the question arises whether this -m should be granted some morphe-
mic status of its own. In other words, should we interpret the younger form xamim
(which has been misinterpreted as an exclusive) as xami+m consisting of a second-
person plural pronoun plus some morpheme of yet unknown meaning?19
It is not unheard of that pronominal forms grow larger over time. At least two
variants of pronominal growth occur frequently: they arise through morphological
reanalysis or through the clarifying addition of some element.20 Both of these de-
velopments can be exemplified by changes in Germanic languages. The first one is
the case of wrong segmentation in a verb+pronoun sequence (quite common in
verb-second languages) as it has taken place in some Scandinavian languages (cf.,

e.g., Wessén 1969: 219f. for the history of the Swedish second-person plural ni) and
in some Swiss German dialects (cf. Marti 1985: 95 and 64, n.4, for Bernese Ger-
man): the final consonant of the verb form has been mis-interpreted as the first con-
sonant of the following pronoun (originally beginning with a vowel), thus giving
rise a preferred phonological CV-structure of the pronoun.21
The second type of pronominal growth occurs with extended pronouns, which
are often connected to the polite use of pronouns of address: When the use of a
second-person plural as a polite way of referring to a single addressee becomes
fully generalised at the expense of the old singular pronoun — as it happened, for
instance, in the history of English ye/you as a substitute for thou/thee — then the
number distinction in the second-person pronouns is lost. What many languages
(or rather their speakers) do as a remedy, is to invent a freshly pluralised form: In
the case of English, this leads to pronouns such as youse or y’all (cf. Hickey 2003 for
a recent overview); here, the additional element is a ‘normal’ plural morpheme as
also found on nouns or a generalising quantifier. Similarly, the Modern Dutch sec-
ond-person plural pronoun jullie goes back to a combination of jij (the old plural
form, now singular) plus lieden, a nominal element meaning ‘persons, people’ (cf.
Howe 1996: 209–11);22 this, in turn, is reminiscent of a semi-grammaticalised form
like you guys, as used by some speakers of American English. Finally, a number
of Romance varieties possess complex plural forms that are grammaticalised in
varying degrees:23 vosotros/vosotras (Spanish), vous autres (Colloquial French; cf.
Brunot 1965: 83), and voi altri (many Italian dialects; cf. Rohlfs 1949: 160f.). Some
Northern Italian dialects have also had considerable influence on the structurally
and lexically parallel pronominal systems in neighbouring isolated dialects of Ger-
man (South Bavarian and South Alemannic).24
Coming back to the problem of the South-East Ambrym pronominal long form,
one will want to speculate on the history of the -m: recall that the verbal prefix indi-
cating the relevant person–number-specification is mu-. Since the basic word order
in this language is SVO (cf. Crowley 2002b: 667 with examples), the possibility of re-
analysis after faulty segmentation is quite obvious. This argumentation is also sup-
ported by the fact that the complementary explanation is much less likely: the little
information on pluralising strategies in South-East Ambrym that is available does
not provide a basis for a pronominal extension along the lines just discussed.25 Thus,
apparently, we have an instance of morphological re-analysis parallel to the one
well-known in Germanic. This development did have consequences for the actual
phonological make-up of the form, but it did not have any relevance for the para-
digmatic organisation of South-East Ambrym pronouns.
3.2. Abkhaz
The second language that was brought to the attention of typologists interested
in second-person clusivity is Abkhaz, which belongs to the group of Northwest
122 Horst J. Simon
Table 1. Paradigm of plural personal pronouns in Abkhaz according to Hewitt (1979/
1989a: 157) and Hewitt (1989b: 48)
Abkhaz plural pronouns Inclusive or general Exclusive

First person ħa(rà) ħart
Second person š°a(rà) š°art
Third person darà
Caucasian languages and is spoken primarily in the Abkhaz province of Georgia. It

was first mentioned by Plank (1985: 147) in this context.
For Abkhaz, the widespread grammars of Hewitt (1979/1989a, 1989b) boast the
paradigm in Table 1. This seems to be a clear example of the category we are look-
ing for. However, Hewitt himself has some reservations. He writes: “. . . the strictly
inclusive forms may and usually do appear where one would expect the exclusives”
(Hewitt 1979/1989a: 156).26 This statement somewhat blurs the picture. Especially
when one notes that all the example sentences with a first or second-person plural
pronoun that are cited in Hewitt (1979/1989a) have the forms ħa(rà) and š°a(rà)
respectively, one starts to become suspicious.27 Moreover, the clusivity distinction
does not seem to exist in the person prefixes on verbs marking subjects and objects
(Hewitt 1979: 101–3), where only one second-person plural morpheme — albeit in
several guises — appears.28
In accordance with Hewitt’s own reluctance to fully accept the distinction be-
tween an inclusive and an exclusive pronoun is the fact that many grammars of Ab-
khaz do not mention the forms ħart and š°art at all (cf., among others, Dirr 1928:
43 and Klimov 1994: 64; for grammars not available to me, this is also confirmed
by observations by Michael Job, p.c.). Furthermore, none of the other closely re-
lated Northwest Caucasian languages that have been documented in Hewitt (ed.)
(1989) (i.e., West Circassian, East Circassian, and Ubykh) has comparable pro-
nominal forms, not even Abaza (which is merely “a divergent dialect” of Abkhaz)
(Lomtatidze & Klychev 1989: 101). Also, the special exclusive forms do not show up
in Chirikba’s (1996) data for the reconstruction of Common (North)West Cauca-
sian (p. 394); and Nichols (1992: 353) flatly states in this context: “There is no evi-
dence for an inclusive/exclusive opposition in this family.”
Nonetheless, there are some hints in the literature that might support the idea
of Abkhaz first and second-person clusivity. As early as the late 19th century, both
hara/švara and harth/švarth turn up in a grammatical description of this language:
in a comparative table of inflectional forms in Abkhaz and three Circassian dialects
(von Erckert 1895/1970: 281), they appear in brackets in the Abkhaz column — and,
significantly, already then with the label ‘exclusive’ attached to the latter forms.29
It is difficult to assess the exact functional load that the pronominal forms dis-
cussed here really carry. What is it precisely that Hewitt and von Erckert mean
when they write about ‘exclusives’? — Interestingly, there have been several more
linguistic works that feature the forms under consideration, but that — maybe be-
cause they were written in lesser known languages such as, for instance, Russian or
French — did not find their way into the Anglophone typological literature. How-
ever, these books and articles shed new and significantly different light on the mat-
ter of clusivity in Abkhaz. Among the books that allow us to view the problem at
hand from a different angle, is the comparative morphology of Northwest Cauca-
sian languages by Dumézil (1932). Here, one finds an interesting note:
A 1 pl. et 2 pl., on peut également dire har-t’, s°ar-t’ pour hara, s°ara; Uslar [a 19th
century grammarian of Abkhaz, HS] dit avec raison que ces formes sont plus défin-
ies; elles s’accompagnent volontiers d’un geste. (Dumézil 1932: 109, n. 2)
Dumézil states that the t’-form as such is “obscure” (p. 109); in any case, its func-
tion appears to be connected to the sphere of demonstrativity/definiteness/deter-
mination — as pointed out by his reference to a deictic gesture (in the original sense
of the word). In particular, the pronominal forms involving this ending seem to be
used in specialised emphatic contexts. In a similar vein, Lomtatidze (1987) stresses,
after reviewing some of the Russian literature on this subject, that the addition of
such a ‘demonstrative’ suffix is quite typical for Abkhaz; it occurs with singular pro-
nouns, too. When it comes to determining precisely what the relevant opposition
expresses, the following remarks from a grammar published by the Georgian Acad-
emy of Sciences give interesting hints:
The pronouns of the 1st ps.pl. ħara ‘we’ and the 2nd ps.pl. š°ara ‘you’ have paral-
lel forms: ħara/ħart and š°ara/š°art. ħara has an inclusive meaning, i.e. the speaker
includes also the listener into the ‘we’. The exclusive meaning, which excludes the
listener to whom the text is addressed, is formed with the personal pronoun ħara
‘we’ and the suffix -t, ħar-t (cf. Abaz. ħarabarat ‘we without thee’). In an analogous
way, the form for the 2nd ps.pl. is composed: š°ara ‘you’, š°ar-t (cf. Abaz. š°arabarat
‘you without me’). (Grammatika abxazskogo jazyka 1968: 35; translated for me
by Koyka Stoyanova)30
Here the description of the two first-person plural forms is quite straightforward:
apparently, we are dealing with the usual inclusive–exclusive distinction: [±ad-
dressee]. However, traditional clusivity does not seem to be a very felicitous con-
cept for Abkhaz (and Abaza). The reason is this: As soon as we turn to the sec-
ond-person forms, we run into problems; now we are facing the reverse situation,
i.e., reference to a group including the addressee(s) with the specific exclusion of
the speaker.31 In traditional person deictic terms, this would be a case of redun-
dancy (in fact, bordering on terminological self-contradiction): a second-person
plural entails the exclusion of the speaker anyway, otherwise it would be a first-per-
son plural. Taking into account that the relevant suffix -t also occurs in third-per-
son plural pronouns (Grammatika abxazskogo jazyka 1968: 36) makes it even less
convincing to argue for a simple clusivity opposition. Rather, a different interpret-
ation comes to mind: Taking up Dumézil’s above-mentioned idea of a deictic ges-
ture, one should indeed analyse these forms as emphatic — without reference to the
notion of clusivity.
124 Horst J. Simon
In fact, this is what the most recent grammatical description of Abkhaz now
s uggests, too: “At present, at any rate, the inclusive–exclusive category does not
seem to be existent in Abkhaz” (Chirikba 2003: 32). Therefore, when discussing
Abkhaz clusivity in the typological literature on the basis of Hewitt’s grammar, one
should bear in mind what he writes in the introduction of his grammar: “However,
responsibility for the interpretation of the materials provided by my wife or culled
from any other sources rests solely with me” (Hewitt 1979/1989a: 2).
3.3. Port Sandwich

The third language that has found its way into the typological literature on the pre-
tence that it possesses second-person clusivity is another Oceanic language from
Vanuatu, incidentally from Malekula, an island just about 10 miles west of the afore-
mentioned Ambrym: Hagège (1995: 119) mentions a language called Port Sand-
wich. Unfortunately, he does not give a reference for his claim, let alone any data.
Moreover, confusingly, Hagège speaks of clusivity in all three person values. So,
what can this mean?
The only piece of work that I know of that is concerned with this language is a
grammar by Charpentier (1979). In his discussion of the pronominal system (p. 49–
51), he presents the familiar Oceanic range of pronominal distinctions, i.e., dual,
trial and plural pronouns in all three persons and an inclusive–exclusive-differen-
tiation in the first-person non-singular forms.32 However, he lists only one second-
person plural pronoun: xamite (p. 50), which can possibly be segmented as xam-ite
(‘2-pl’), similarly as the first-person plural exclusive.
Yet, there is a long additional remark concerning a more unusual phenomenon,
namely a special distinction relating to different groups of non-speech-act-partici-
pants.33 In this context, Charpentier establishes an opposition which he labels as
“inclusif ” vs. “exclusif ”. Here he focuses on third-person plural and trial forms;34 the
plural ones are described as follows (p. 50f.):
(3) xate ‘“ils/elles” (de l’autre groupe, toi et moi étant ensemble)’ [in-
clusive]35
xamit ana ‘“eux” (les tiens, sauf toi)’ [exclusive]
Charpentier explicates that the relevant distinguishing factor has to do with the
social affiliations and the corresponding group solidarities of the speaker, the ad-
dressee and the group of non-speech-act-participants referred to (‘others’). He says
that the inclusive and the exclusive are used in the following situations, respectively:
– inclusive: “notre interlocuteur est supposé inclus à notre groupe”
– exclusive: “le locuteur et l’interlocuteur appartiennent à des communautés dif-
férentes, ce dernier se trouve inclus dans le groupe du premier et exclu de son
groupe d’origine” (Charpentier 1979: 50f.)
As an explanation for the importance of these concepts, Charpentier puts forward
the ‘aggressive’ character of traditional Melanesian societies:
Dans ces communautés guerrières, il convenait de bien se situer par rapport aux
siens et surtout par rapport aux autres. Lorsque l’on palabrait avec des “étrangers”, il
fallait distinguer les gens à qui l’on parlait des autres (ennemis potentiels). (Char
pentier 1979: 51)
It is hard to see why this phenomenon should have anything to do with clusivity (as
Hagège’s characterisation would have us believe). Therefore, quite independently
of the validity of Charpentier’s anthropological reasoning,36 it can be stated safely
that what we are dealing with here has nothing to do with the role-deixis underly-
ing the traditional concept of clusivity.37 Rather, the system seems to be governed
by factors that are similar to the ones underlying the use of socially deictic linguistic
elements in many (South)East Asian languages: In these systems, features such as
group allegiances of all persons involved in the conversation are of paramount im-
portance for the adequate usage of certain linguistic elements.
3.4. Ojibwe, Yokuts and a few other languages

In a few descriptive grammars and also in some more theoretically oriented stud-
ies, one can find mention of a ‘second-person inclusive’, where this label is applied
to a phenomenon not at all related to the one discussed in the present study (never-
theless, some of these languages are listed in the Konstanz Raritätenkabinett men-
tioned in the introduction). In these cases, one finds a certain type of syncretism in
the pronominal paradigm that involves a pronoun referring to {sp. . ., addr. . .}. Most
notoriously, the much-discussed Algonquian languages are mentioned in this con-
text (Ojibwe, Potawatomi, Cree etc.; American Mid-West); but also a few other ones
show up, e.g. Yokuts (Penutian; California) and Nama (Khoisan; Southern Africa).
The most recent instance of labelling this particular syncretism with the term
‘second-person inclusive’ occurs in Harley & Ritter (2002a) and (2002b); in these
articles, the phrase has even been promoted to the status of a chapter title.38 By way
of illustration consider the paradigm in Table 2 from Southwestern Ojibwe (ori-
ginal data from Schwartz & Dunnigan 1986: 296). In this language, both prefixes
and suffixes attach to a general pronominal stem, providing together the person
and number specifications of the pronoun. Morphologically speaking, the inclu-
sive plural form in the second line (kiinawint) shares one element with the first-per-
son plural and one with the second-person plural each. However, syntactically, the
Table 2. Paradigm of personal pronouns in Southwestern Ojibwe according to Harley &
Ritter (2002a: 34)
Singular Plural
1 n-iin n-iin-awint
2incl * k-iin-awint
2excl k-iin k-iin-awaa
3 w-iin w-iin-awaa
126 Horst J. Simon
inclusive plural clearly patterns with the second-person pronoun kiinawaa (as can
be seen in agreement behaviour).39 Thus the syntax is parallel to the pure person
prefixes (which appear also on verbs); these prefixes are therefore crucial for de-
termining the paradigmatic status of the forms: a group consisting of speaker and
addressee(s) receives the same prefix as a group consisting of addressees only or of
addressee(s) and other(s).40 This is what leads Harley & Ritter to the labelling indi-
cated in the left column in Table 2.
Such an analysis presupposes the universal validity of the alignment of gram-
matical person on the one hand and role deixis on the other hand as it is found in
more familiar languages such as the Indo-European ones:
(4) first person ⇔ speaker
second person ⇔ addressee
third person ⇔ other
However, this view has been challenged by various theoreticians of grammatical
person. Most notably, Plank (1985) has argued that one should maintain the con-
ceptual distinction between deictic role and morphosyntactic feature. The meth-
odological rationale behind this idea is to say that the ‘most relevant’ deictic role in
a system should determine to which pronominal form we assign the status of ‘first
person’. Looking then at the prefixes in the data presented in Table 2, one can estab-
lish a different person hierarchy for Ojibwe:41
(5) if [+addr] then k-
if [−addr, +sp] then n-
if [−addr, −sp] then w-
Here the decision whether or not the addressee(s) is/are in the group referred to
takes precedence over the question whether the speaker is referred to or not. In
other words, ‘addressee’ constitutes the highest deictic role in the system and re-
ceives the label ‘first person’, spelled out as k-; the prefix n-, on the other hand, is only
applied when the addressee is not in the reference set, but the speaker is; ‘speaker’
receives the value ‘second person’ then. Under this analysis, the clusivity distinction
in Ojibwe vanishes. Instead, we have a simple three person paradigm again, differ-
ing only in the assignment of speech act roles to grammatical persons.42
Now, of course, one might argue that the unusual person hierarchy in Algon-
quian is somehow an artefact of the concentration on prefixes on the analyst’s part;
one might therefore be led to believe that the picture would change if the suffixes
were taken into consideration as well. However, in languages from other families
a possible ‘suffix-complication’ (or anything similar) can be ruled out, simply be-
cause there are no relevant suffixes or the like; sometimes, there is no verbal inflec-
tion either. One such language, where the hierarchy just discussed can be seen very
clearly, is Sanuma (from the group of Yanomami languages, spoken in the Brazilian-
Venezuelian borderland). Here, the paradigm that can be gleaned from Borgman
(1990: 149) is as in Table 3:
Table 3. Paradigm of personal pronouns in Sanuma according to Borgman (1990: 149)
Singular Plural
sp (kami)sa kami
sp+addr * (ka)makö
addr (ka)wa (ka)makö
oth kama kama pö
The verbal description that Borgman offers for this paradigm reveals that he re-
mains firmly in the terminological web of grammaticographical tradition:
In the first-person plural there is also the distinction of exclusive and inclusive, ex-
cluding or including the listener or listeners. First-person plural inclusive and sec-
ond-person plural have the same pronoun and only context determines which ref-
erent is intended. (Borgmann 1990: 149)
This is also evident from the glossing of the only relevant example in Borgman’s
grammar:
(6) makö kali -palo mai kite
1pl.incl/2pl work -repet neg fut
‘We are not going to work’ or ‘You (pl) are not going to work.’ (Borgman
1990: 150)
Now, if it is only the context that determines the reference of the pronoun
(ka)makö,43 it would be more appropriate to give up the semantic distinction be-
tween {sp+addr} and {addr} for this language. Both sets of referents can only be re-
ferred to using the very same pronoun, anyway. Therefore, Sanuma provides an ex-
cellent example of a language with the speech act role ‘addressee’ at the top of the
person hierarchy, but lacking a clusivity opposition.
Besides the languages just discussed (to which a few more could be added), there
are some languages where there is no strict identity of the inclusive and the second-
person plural, but where we can nevertheless see strong connections between the
two categories — either in the way they are built morphologically or in their peculiar
syntactic behaviour. To give just two examples: First, in Yokuts, the inclusive pro-
noun may is derived from the same root as the second-person plural ma’an;44 the
second-person singular is ma’ (Newman 1944: 231f.). This leads Newman (1967:
197) to postulate a common noun theme (ma·) for these forms, which he glosses
as “second person”. Second, in Fula (Niger-Congo, spread over a large area in West
Africa), the relevant pronouns (and affixes) share a similar phonological structure
(cf. the paradigm in Arnott 1970: appendix 3, who even calls the inclusive pronoun
a “second person”); moreover the subject pronouns seem to share certain word or-
der characteristics when they enter interrogative clauses (thus contrasting with
the first-person plural form) (McIntosh 1984: 118). In sum, some languages dis-
128 Horst J. Simon
play similarities between second-person plurals and inclusives in a way that causes
some scholars to subsume the latter ones under second person, too.
Summarising the discussion of pronominal systems in Algonquian and Sanuma
as well as in the just mentioned languages Yokuts and Fula, we can say:45 No mat-
ter how we actually analyse these paradigms, there is no need for a feature [±other]
which would be required to distinguish the groups specified in the initial question
of this chapter. Either we stick to the traditional person/role-terminology (as Harley
& Ritter and others do); then we have a second-person clusivity distinction indeed,
albeit one that captures the inclusion vs. exclusion of the speaker instead of that of
the addressee; this notion of a second-person inclusive is then very different from
the one applied in the present approach. Or we adopt the idea advocated by Plank
and others;46 then we get a different person hierarchy, but can do away with the clu-
sivity distinction altogether (in these languages only, of course). What is most im-
portant for our present concerns: Either way, there is maximally one clusivity dis-
tinction in the paradigm; consequently, there is no need for a feature that explicitly
relates to the speech act role ‘other’.
3.5. Ghomala′
Somewhat less clear than in the afore-mentioned languages is the situation in
Ghomala′, a Grassfields Bantu language spoken in Western Cameroon. In this
case, the analysis must be based on very scanty evidence, even if one includes some
closely-related neighbouring languages.
The only primary source available for Ghomala′ is the paradigm of pronominal
forms printed in Wiesemann (1986: viii).47 Unfortunately, we know very little about
the functioning of this system apart from what can be gleaned from the bare format
of the paradigm. The relevant second-person forms are:
(7) a. po ‘2nd pl.’
b. poé ‘addr+oth (dual)’
c. poayʉ́ ‘addr+addr. . .+oth’
d. poapu ‘addr+. . .+oth+oth. . .’
What can be stated safely is that we are dealing with at least two types of pronouns
here: simplex ones and complex (or compound) ones.48 The latter ones are clearly
polymorphemic; they are created through the addition of a second morpheme plus
a linking element to the basic form. However, it is difficult to assess the exact piece
of information that the usage of one of the complex forms (7b–d) entails in compar-
ison to the simplex (7a). At any rate, the complex pronouns seem to combine two
pieces of information: The second morpheme somehow specifies the reference of
the first, more basic item. More specifically, the simplex pronoun po can refer to any
kind of group involving at least one addressee, but not the speaker (thus, it behaves
like a ‘normal’ second-person plural pronoun). If the speaker wants to be more ex-
plicit, s/he can use one of the forms (7b–d), as appropriate. The crucial point here
is that since po is not at all restricted to sets of addressees only, the use of any of the
other forms does not convey the clusivity contrast we are looking for (a similar line
of reasoning holds for the first-person non-singular pronouns, where the simple
pronoun does not represent anything like a ‘choric’ we, either).49
Moving away from second-person pronouns for a moment, one can even find
forms in the large paradigm of pronominal forms in Ghomala′ which seem to refer
to sets such as {sp+addr} and {sp+addr+oth} respectively (each with several forms
according to the particular number specification); although these are clearly first-
person pronouns, they must be mentioned here because — judging from the label-
ling in the paradigm — they appear to involve the possible feature [±other] alluded
to in section 2 above. However, even after a careful morphological examination of
the pronouns involved and a componential analysis, Cysouw (2003: 179f.) confesses
that the meaning differences between the various items in the paradigm remain ob-
scure. Fortunately, in a recent summary of previous work Wiesemann (2003, ms.)
explains that the forms seemingly involving all three persons in fact are “reserved
for special use, probably ceremonial, to specifically acknowledge the presence of
the ancestors”; if this statement captures the semantics correctly, these pronouns
express something quite special, which should not be subsumed under the notion
of person-deictic pronominal distinctions analysed in the present chapter.
For the time being, it will therefore be safe to keep in mind what Voorhoeve has
written in connection with a comparable paradigm in Bamileke, a very closely re-
lated language exhibiting compound pronouns:
The meaning of complex pronouns cannot be clearly distinguished from that of
simple plural ones. [. . .] However, the composition of the group of participants is
much clearer defined, if complex pronouns are used. It seems as if there are three
contrastive levels in the pronominal system [. . .]: singular simple pronouns con-
trasting to plural simple pronouns; and plural simple pronouns contrasting to dual
and plural complex pronouns. The pronominal system as a whole cannot be ana-
lysed with the methods of componential analysis, but the contrasting subsystems
can. (Voorhoeve 1967: 428)
Similarly, Parker (1986: 135) writes with reference to Mundani, yet another Grass-
fields Bantu language: “Complex forms are used only when needed to clarify which
members of a group are being referred to; otherwise, simple plural forms are pre-
ferred.”50
Apparently, the choice of the pronominal subsystem to be used in a particular
speech act is determined by factors best characterised as ‘pragmatic’ in the wider
sense. The large inventories of pronominal forms seem to allow optional choices
that serve to emphasise group relations, to pick out particular sub-groups, or to in-
clude special entities in the reference set. At present no clear indication exists that
we are dealing with a system primarily or even exclusively determined by straight-
forward role deixis alone. Therefore Cysouw’s (2003: 166) judgement should be
kept in mind: “Until more specific descriptions of these compound pronouns be-
come available, it seems best not to consider them as specific person markers.”51
130 Horst J. Simon
3.6. Mongolian and Mao Naga

There are two further languages where rumour has it that they possess second-person
clusivity: One is the Ordos dialect of Mongolian spoken in Inner Mongolia, China;
the other is a Tibeto-Burman language from the eastern edge of India: Mao Naga.
In the case of Mongolian (the Ordos dialect of which has only recently been in-
cluded in the list of the ‘Konstanz Raritätenkabinett’), the picture that presents itself
from a survey of the literature on various Mongolian varieties is somewhat unclear.
It is quite obvious that there is an inclusive–exclusive distinction in the first-per-
son plural — at least in most non-nominative case forms — in several varieties of
Mongolian (both contemporary dialects and older stages of the language).52 How-
ever, the situation is less transparent when we turn to second-person pronouns. In
none of the studies on Mongolian varieties mentioned in n. 52 is there anything de-
scribed that could be interpreted as second-person clusivity. With regard to the Or-
dos dialect of Mongolian specifically, one of the two descriptions available to me
does not mention clusivity at all (Soulié 1903: 44f.).53
Yet, strangely and confusingly, there are two independent remarks each concern-
ing one of the two main dialects already mentioned, Ordos and Khalkha, that could,
at first glance, be interpreted as referring to second-person clusivity. Neither of the
studies, to be sure, explicitly applies the clusivity concept for the second person.
One is the grammar of Khalkha by Beffa & Hamayon (1975).54 In this we find — as
expected — the familiar first-person plural inclusive and exclusive (albeit called
“collectif fortuit” and “collectif essentiel”, respectively; p. 161). Furthermore — and
this is the interesting piece of information — there is one cell in the paradigm where
we find two second-person plural pronouns: in the genitive (and only there!) (p.
162). One of the relevant forms is glossed as “de vous et des vôtres” (this might mean
‘inclusive’ in more traditional terminology); the other pronoun is described as: “se
rapportant à toutes les personnes auxquelles le discours s’adresse” (p. 163), which
might be interpreted as suspiciously similar to an ‘exclusive’. Regrettably, no ex-
ample of usage is given. The other study appeared as an introductory chapter to a
large collection of oral texts (songs, stories, speeches) in (Southern) Ordos Mon-
golian, explaining the morphology of the language in great detail: Mostaert (1937;
in particular p. XXI–LXV). Even though there is only one form listed in the para-
digm of personal pronouns itself (p. XXXII), one can find the remarkable note that
the genitive plural forms are “sporadiquement” replaced by alternative forms (p.
XXXIII). These replacements include a special affix (which, by the way, seems to be
identical to the one reported for the Khalkha dialect by Beffa & Hamayon), whose
function is described as follows: “indiquer un concept ou un groupe de concepts
appartenant d’une manière ou d’une autre au concept exprimé par le nom qui s’est
adjoint le suffixe” (p. XXXVI). The translation of the example contains the expli-
cation: “vous et les gens de votre maison”. Therefore the opposition is probably not
one of person deixis alone, but includes notions already encountered in the discus-
sion of other languages above.
Assessing the Mongolian evidence in general, we can state that whereas clusiv-
ity is almost omnipresent in the first-person plural, the literature is much less co-
pious for second-person clusivity. In fact, this distinction would appear only in a
small pocket of the paradigm — genitives — and even here, it is far from obvious
that what we are dealing with is clusivity in the strict sense at all. It seems better to
correlate the affix with the notion of ‘associativity’, something that can be similar to
but is not identical with the inclusive–exclusive difference — since it is more perva-
sive in the grammatical system and, above all, does not necessarily involve speech
act role deixis.
Finally, the most recent addition to the second-person clusivity list has been
made by Bhat (2004: 94). He maintains with regard to two different suffixes in Mao
Naga, both of which express some kind of plurality:
It is also possible to use these plural suffixes with the second-person pronoun in
Mao Naga. In this case, they appear to indicate a distinction between the inclusion
vs. exclusion of the third person. Giridhar (1994: 141) points out that ni-khru-müi
‘2-Pl1-person’ (2.Incl.Pl)’ would mean that all its referents are present; it cannot re-
fer to anyone who is not present (i.e., third person). On the other hand, ni-ta-müi ‘2-
Pl2-person’ (2.Excl.Pl) could refer to persons who are not present as well.
Although this statement seems reasonably clear, the original source upon which it
is based leaves at least some room for interpretation. In particular, there might be
more to these two forms than just a clusivity difference. This can be surmised from
the fact that the two affixes involved in the contrast (ta and khru) are not peculiar to
the pronominal system, but occur freely with all kinds of nominals (Giridhar 1994:
114ff.). Then the question arises what kind of contrast they actually encode. In this
context, it is worth quoting the original description in detail; Giridhar explains:
The essential point is that ta indicates a singularity of identity, and a plurality of
number which is homogeneous at some level of identity unlike -khru which signals
plurality both of identity and number, a plurality which is heterogeneous at some
level of identity. (Giridhar 1994: 140)
The affixes can be added not only to first- and second-person pronouns, but — as
already mentioned — also to nouns and third-person pronouns; for the latter ones,
one can find an instructive illustration:
Both pfotamüi ‘they (excl.pl)[’] and pfokhrumüi ‘they (incl.pl)’ can be used to refer
to the same referent, say, Indians as a whole, but NOT in the same frame of refer-
ence. pfotamüi would mean an exclusive subset of a larger set of nationality identi-
ties whereas pfokhrumüi would mean an inclusive mix of different intraset identi-
ties whatever they be. (Giridhar 1994: 140; emphasis original, HS)55
The two pronouns used here apparently possess the same referential potential:
Both can denote groups of non-speech-act-participants, ‘others’. Again, as al-
ready discussed in this chapter for other languages (cf. above on Port Sandwich
and Ghomala′), the relevant situations are distinguished by different group associ-
132 Horst J. Simon
ations and dissociations. And again, this means that we are dealing with a morpho-
semantic phenomenon that has much broader scope than just pronominal clusivity.
Thus, the distinction between the two second-person plural pronouns in Mao Naga
mentioned above seems to be a special case of describing particular group relations;
therefore the role deictic differentiation is only an ‘accidental’ side-effect.56
3.7. Bavarian
As I hope to have shown in the previous sections, the evidence for a clusivity dis-
tinction in second-person pronouns adduced so far is fairly weak. However, para-
doxically, there might be some more convincing data in a language that has not
been mentioned in this context until now:57 Bavarian, a dialect of German spoken
primarily in the south-east of Germany and in most parts of Austria.58
In this language, there are two quite distinct sets of second-person singular pro-
nouns (and corresponding verb forms and other inflectional elements, too); their
difference encodes the category of ‘respect’, i.e. grammaticalised politeness.59 To-
gether with a number distinction between singular and plural, the respect forms
yield the paradigm of pronouns of address in Table 4.60
Table 4. Paradigm of pronouns of address in Bavarian, preliminary version
Bavarian address Non-honorative Honorative

Singular du/=d Sie/=S
Plural eß/=ts (/ihr)
Here, we see a neutralisation of the respect category in the plural; in other words, all
groups of people are addressed in the same way, irrespective of which pronoun each
of the addressees would be entitled to receive if s/he were addressed alone.61 By way
of illustration cf. the extract from a drama in (8).62
(8) Excerpt from Zimmerschied (1983:166): ‘Der Besuch. Eine Alltagsszene’
Alwin: Auf den Schreck mix i A: ‘After this shock I’ll mix you [pl]
Eich no wos. something.’
Hausherr: Kannt i a normals H: ‘Could I have a normal wheat beer?’
Weizen hom?
Alwin: Hod’s Eana ned A: ‘Didn’t you [sg.hon] like it?’
g’schmeckt?
Hausherr: Scho, owa . . . H: ‘Well yes, but . . .’
Alwin: Na, iatzt moch i wos ganz A: ‘Hey, now I’ll make something
wos guad’s, really good,
des schmeckt Eich bestimmt. you [pl] will like that for sure.
Gem’s dawei Eana Glas’l da Give your [sg.hon] glass to
Rosmarie. Rosmarie in the meantime.’
Note that Alwin constantly switches between the singular honorative and the
plural, in accordance with the decision whether he addresses the landlord alone or
whether he includes the latter’s wife as well. This type of respect-neutralisation in
the plural, as shown in Table 4, is fairly wide-spread in colloquial German (at least
in the southern varieties).63
Now, the interesting point for our discussion is the following: Sometimes the Ba-
varian Sie-forms are used even in situations where a group is referred to (contrary,
thus, to what is said about eß/ihr in Table 4). This happens in exactly those circum-
stances where an addressee plus some absent other(s) are meant and where the ad-
dressee is someone who would be entitled to receive Sie if s/he were spoken to in a
singular context. And this different usage of eß/ihr and Sie is exactly the clusivity
distinction between the two pronouns A and B we are looking for. Consider the fol-
lowing two cases:
(9) a. A : exclusive: everybody referred to is actually present and can count
as addressee:
Hab-ts eß heid scho ohne mi ãgfangd?
have-2pl 2pl today already without me started
‘Have you already started without me today?’
b. B: inclusive: some of the people referred to are not present in the
speech situation (‘others’):
Über was ham=S heid gredt auf da Sitzung?
about what have.2sg.hon=2sg.hon today talked at the meeting
‘What did you discuss at the meeting today?’
A natural context for the utterance of (9a) would be: The speaker is late for a com-
mittee meeting; when s/he enters the room and asks whether the other commit-
tee members have already started the meeting, s/he naturally includes all (and
only!) people who are actually present in the situation; each of them counts as an
addressee of the speech act: {addr, . . .}. In contrast to that, imagine a case when the
speaker is so late that s/he actually misses the whole meeting; s/he could approach a
single committee member afterwards and inquire about the topics discussed. Here,
the reference of the pronoun of address includes not only the addressee him-/her-
self but also those persons who where at the discussion but happen not be present
in the current speech situation {addr, oth, . . .}. If the speech act participants are on
polite Sie-terms, Sie will be used in such a setting (9b), i.e., in reference to more than
one person — even though this pronoun has been assigned the value [singular] in
Table 4 above (therefore, the paradigm above is slightly misleading in this context;
cf. below). The essential difference in usage between the two pronouns of address in
(9a) and (9b) is one of inclusion vs. exclusion of the speech act role ‘other’: second-
person clusivity!
At first sight, there would seem to be a straightforward way to dismiss the pos-
sibility of clusivity here and to discuss away this quite natural sounding example.64
One could say that what we are dealing with in (9b) is not an instance of plural
134 Horst J. Simon
address at all; one might maintain that in this case the speaker in fact addresses a
single addressee (hence the ‘singular’ pronoun) and includes the other committee
members quasi metonymically. However, it can be shown that the set of entities re-
ferred to by Sie is indeed being conceptualised as a group, a mixed group consisting
of one addressee plus at least one non-speech-act-participant. The crucial examples
come from contexts where the minimal pairs involve verbs which inherently re-
quire a plural subject: in such contexts, a metonymic interpretation can be ruled
out. Relevant verbs in Bavarian include: se treffa ‘to meet each other’ (Standard Ger-
man: ‘sich treffen’) and ananandagrån ‘to start to argue with each other’ (Standard
German: ‘aneinandergeraten’).65
(10) a. A: excl.:
Griaß Eana Herr Müller, griaß Eana Herr Meier. Hab-ts enk eß heid
scho amoi troffa?
‘[polite greetings][hon]. Have you[2.pl.excl] (you[2.pl.excl.refl]) met al-
ready today?’
b. B: incl.:
Ah Herr Müller, was i Eana gråd frång woid übern Herrn Meier, ham-S
Eana heid scho amoi troffa?
‘[polite greeting][hon], what I just wanted to ask you about Mr. Meier.
Have you[2.pl.incl] (you[2.pl.incl.refl]) met already today?’
(11) a. A: excl.:
Sei-ts heid wieda amoi ananandagrån, eß zwoa?
‘Have you[2.pl.excl] started to argue yet again, the two of you[2.pl.excl]?’
b. B: incl.:
San-S heid wieda amoi ananandagrån, Sie und der anda, der wo scho
furt is?
‘Have you[2.pl.incl] started to argue yet again, you and the other one
who has already left?’
These contrasts make it inevitable that the paradigm in Table 4 has to be modified to
a certain extent. Instead of using a single cell for all instances of plurality, one has to
split up this part of the paradigm in order to accommodate the inclusive–exclusive
difference (see Table 5). Thus it seems that now, at last, we have found an instance of
the category of clusivity.
Table 5. Paradigm of pronouns of address in Bavarian, revised version
Bavarian address (revised) Non-honorative Honorative

Singular du/-d Sie/-S
Plural Inclusive eß/-ts (/ihr) Sie/-S
Exclusive eß/-ts (/ihr)
Nonetheless, there are at least two quite unusual aspects about this paradigm
which merit further reflection. First, quite strikingly, the distribution of oppositions
contradicts what classic markedness theory in the spirit of Jakobson and Greenberg
would lead us to expect. The additional category, clusivity, appears in the marked
value of the respect category, the honorative — although this is the place where one
would rather expect neutralisations, if anywhere.66 Second, there is a stunning ho-
monymy between the second-person singular honorative and the second-person
plural inclusive; and this holds true for all the other case forms of the two pronouns
and the correlated verb forms not listed here, too. In all likelihood this is no coinci-
dence. It seems quite obvious that there must be a deeper explanation for the curi-
ous shape of the paradigm — even if the clusivity contrast as such is well established.
At least two lines of reasoning suggest themselves.
First, since we are dealing with honorative pronouns, politeness considerations
can offer a possible explanation. At this point, the most influential theory of po-
liteness provides a useful framework (Brown & Levinson 1987). According to this
model, speakers constantly monitor their addressees’ desire to be left undisturbed
or to be flattered (negative and positive face, respectively); in accordance with a var-
iety of factors (among them the relative social standing of the people involved and
the weight of the face threat that a given speech act might impose), a speaker uses
one or another of alternative ways of expressing the very same speech act. In situ-
ations where the inclusive form of the second-person plural pronoun is used, more
often than not the group referred to will consist of only a single addressee plus some
other person(s). In circumstances like that, it will be quite likely that the speaker at-
tends to his/her addressee’s face wants more carefully than in circumstances where
there actually is a whole group of addressees present (i.e. an exclusive situation). It
will be potentially more embarrassing not to use the socially desirable polite form
in an inclusive context than in an exclusive one. Hence, speakers might ‘over-use’
the unambiguously marked singular honorative form and make it thus a kind of
inclusive.
Second, one should be aware of the possible influence of the standard variety.
Today, basically all speakers of Bavarian are bilingual in Standard German (what-
ever that means in the context of dialects). And in (northern non-colloquial) Stand-
ard German, the neutralisation pattern in the number-respect-paradigm is such
that respect outranks number (cf. n. 63). Since politeness often correlates with for-
mality (which typically entails less dialectally marked variants), many speakers will
tend to use more standard-like forms in situations where they address somebody
towards whom they wish to be polite. Therefore they will sometimes also accomo-
date to the usage norms of the standard variety even if the language they use is the
dialect. We might hence consider this to be a case of pragmatic code-switching.
Irrespective of the way we interpret the functional motivation behind the usage
patterns described in this section, it seems to be clear that the minimal pairs in (9),
(10), and (11) exist. They are the basic arguments for claiming a clusivity distinction
in Bavarian — although the category seems to be quite marginal to the system.67
136 Horst J. Simon
4. Conclusions
4.1. Summary
Our survey of languages reported to possess second-person clusivity is complete
now. It is time to take stock of the factual results this investigation has brought about
before I can draw a few general conclusions, reflect on methodological issues, and
suggest some prospects for further research.
First of all, on the level of the individual languages, it could be shown that — in all
probability — the vast majority of languages does not have an inclusive–exclusive
opposition involving two types of second-person plural pronouns in their gram-
matical system (although, of course, many do possess first-person clusivity).
For instance, comparative dialect data for South-East Ambrym made it quite
plausible that the original source for the claim (a short dictionary) mistakenly com-
bined two forms into one system, although their distribution was determined by
geography alone; then the two pronouns were erroneously assigned a semantic dis-
tinction.
Next, there is a certain terminological confusion concerning a number of lan-
guages from various corners of the globe which all involve a particular type of syn-
cretism (or at least a close morphological association): In those languages, the pro-
noun that is used to refer to a group including both speaker and addressee is identical
(or similar) to the one referring to (an) addressee(s) but excluding the speaker, the
common denominator thus being the addressee role. For this reason, there may be
a certain justification for calling this form a ‘second-person plural inclusive’ — un-
der the assumption that the addressee role automatically occupies the second-per-
son slot. However, one must be aware of the fact that by doing so one stands against
the terminological practice of the majority of researchers who reserve the term ‘sec-
ond-person plural inclusive’ for another type of inclusion: {addr+oth}. One way out
of this problem would be the radical re-assignment of speech act role and grammat-
ical person in these languages with the addressee taking the rank of first person. In
any case, what is linguistically most important is the fact that clusivity does not in-
volve the feature [±other] under such conditions, and thus that there is maximally
one clusivity opposition in the paradigm. Relevant languages are the Algonquian
ones (Ojibwe etc.), but also, for instance, Yokuts or Fula.
Some languages are more problematic to deal with: For these, one cannot dis-
cuss away the existence of pronominal differentiations that look similar to second-
person clusivity. That is, we can indeed find distinct forms; however, the function
associated with these forms is more general than just speech-act-role deixis. It is
not always clear from the available descriptions how the specific contribution of
the morphemes involved should best be described. At any rate, the semantic values
seem to revolve around notions like the distribution of speech act participants in
different social groups (i.e., in-group and out-group markers), or the indication of
different frames of reference, or maybe just simple emphasis. Presently, I am not in
a position to say whether the concepts involved in the various languages should all
be subsumed under the same heading or whether we are dealing with slightly dif-
ferent distinctions in the first place. In order to decide such an issue, much deeper,
anthropologically informed field-work will be necessary. It seems quite obvious,
however, that straightforward role deixis is not the key to understanding these pro-
nouns. Languages with relevant pronouns include Abkhaz, Mao Naga, Ordos Mon-
golian, and Port Sandwich.
Then there is a whole group of languages in West Africa (most importantly
Ghomala′) that exhibit extraordinarily large pronominal paradigms due to the fact
that they blow up the system with semi-grammaticalised complex pronouns. The
exact functional status of these forms is unclear at the moment. Yet, again, they
seem to emphasise particular relations within the social community or pick out
special sub-groups. It is not their primary function to specifically include or ex-
clude ‘others’ in groups of addressees.
Finally, a close examination of Bavarian revealed that we can find situa-
tions — that exactly fit the usage domain of second person — where there is a strong
tendency to use different pronouns. However, the distinction involves a pronoun
that is otherwise heavily grammaticalised as an honorific (i.e., it constitutes the
honorative value in the respect category). Because of this connection with polite-
ness, the influence of sociolinguistic and pragmatic factors must be taken into ac-
count. Whether one still wants to call this opposition ‘clusivity’ will depend on the
way one views the interaction of the various linguistic sub-systems; in any case,
functional pressures play a certain part here — aspects that, again, lie outside the
domain of role deixis. As a summary, consider Table 6.
So, reconsidering all the facts gathered in this chapter, one has to acknowledge
that the existence of a clusivity distinction in the second person is quite unlikely in
any language. On the contrary, the data rather clearly support the view that sec-
ond-person clusivity was introduced into the typological literature because of some
misunderstandings and infelicities — either due to a poor understanding of the
Table 6. Overview of second-person clusivity in all languages mentioned in the literature
Language Second-person clusivity Comment

with [± other]?
South-East Ambrym No Dialect conflation
Ojibwe, Fula, etc. No Terminological misunderstanding
Abkhaz, Port Sandwich, Not really Function: emphasis, marking of
Ordos Mongolian, Mao (intra- and inter-)group relations in
Naga, Ghomala′ social sub-groups, not necessarily
involving the feature [± other]
Bavarian Usage tendency Only in connection with ‘respect’
138 Horst J. Simon
rimary data or as a result of the inexact application of some basic morphoseman-

p
tic concepts.
4.2. Methodological considerations and prospects for further research

Now that the linguistic analysis proper is done, let me step back for a moment and
reflect on some methodological issues. In this chapter I have re-examined all the
languages that have been put forward in remarks concerning clusivity that involves
two second-person pronouns. In each case I have tried to gather as much informa-
tion as possible with regard to the particular language — not always an easy task
given that many of the languages are remarkably underdescribed; where suitable I
also collected some comparative data. In general, I tried to apply traditional phil-
ological methods when they seemed appropriate in the specific circumstances: in
this way, I could use arguments from comparative reconstruction, dialect geogra-
phy, and text philology, among others. In the vast majority of cases examined, it ap-
peared that the relevant clusivity distinction is in fact a chimera — most probably
at least.
Of course, one must not forget the pitfalls of the type of argumentation I prac-
tised: While it is relatively straightforward to say that something exists, the opposite
line of reasoning is much trickier. One can ‘prove’ that a certain phenomenon ex-
ists by simply pointing out an unmistakable instance of it; the contrary argument
actually does not work if one takes it literally. As is of course well known, negative
evidence is not easy to come by in empirical sciences, if at all. For instance in cor-
pus based linguistics (and hence in all philologically oriented historical linguistics),
one can never know why a certain structure is not found in the data. It is always pos-
sible that one is confronted with an accidental gap in the data and that the structure
in question might indeed exist; it might just happen to be missing in the particular
junk of language that one uses as material for the study. The very next piece of data
one takes into consideration could provide the example one is looking for.
For the discussion of clusivity in the present chapter, the problem of negative evi-
dence becomes relevant primarily at the macro-level of the languages of the world:
Over the past thirty years or so, a few languages have been included in the list step
by step (not many anyway, but nevertheless a few have). Even if one manages to dis-
credit the evidence for each of them (as I have tried to do in this chapter), one must
always be aware of the possibility that someone comes up with an hitherto little de-
scribed language (and there are many of those around) where the evidence for a
clusivity distinction in the second-person plural is overwhelming (in a sense this
is what I have played with in my analysis of Bavarian, where a small amount of im-
aginative ingenuity brought to light some startling facts about the pronominal sys-
tem). For the time being, however, no unambiguous case of a language with an ex-
clusively inclusive–exclusive distinction in second-person pronouns is in sight; the
burden of proof, therefore, lies with those who still wish to maintain that such an
opposition exists.
The discussion of pronouns in Bavarian (and to a certain extent also that pertain-
ing to Ghomala′ and the Grassfields Bantu languages in general) has brought up a
further problem: the notion of a ‘grammatical category’ as employed in the Jakob-
sonian tradition relies on the ideas of obligatoriness and paradigmatic organisa-
tion.68 If the use of a certain linguistic element is not compulsory in a certain con-
text, but nevertheless highly predictable and indeed somehow ‘normal’ (as is the
case with Bavarian Sie in second-person inclusive situations), then it is not entirely
clear how we should interpret these forms: Their use is governed by wide-ranging
functional motivations so that pervasive tendencies can be detected. Yet, from the
point of view of grammaticalisation, no clear cut-off point can be identified. It is
unclear at what point a distinction should be elevated to the status of a ‘real’ gram-
matical opposition, in particular if one of the forms involved occurs also some-
where else in the system (again, recall Bavarian). It is therefore no coincidence that
as soon as the discussion of data in this article could turn to native speaker judge-
ments (and did not have to rely on secondary sources — such as reference gram-
mars), interesting new facts came to light. The relevant forms are not fully gram-
maticalised; nevertheless speakers have strong intuitions about them. Would we
expect a writer of a reference grammar to mention these facts? If not, we should be
even more aware of the general possibility of circumstances comparable to those in
Bavarian in other languages. Only a thorough understanding and careful examin-
ation of the interplay of grammar and pragmatics can help us to prevent failure to
notice such semi-categories.
Finally, there remains the explanatory problem. The main thrust of the present
chapter is to argue that there is no language possessing second-person clusivity as
a fully grammaticalised category and that there is thus no need for a grammatical
feature contributing to this category. If this line of reasoning is valid, then the quite
natural question arises why that is so. An easy answer would be to say that a feature
[±other] is simply not provided by innate Universal Grammar, and that therefore
no such clusivity contrast can be mentally encoded.69 However, for those research-
ers who do not presuppose the all-encompassing UG-argument, this answer will be
unsatisfactory; for them, there will be the need to look for another kind of explan-
ation.
First of all, one observation concerning deixis might help to put the problem
into perspective: If there existed clusivity in the second-person plural, it would by
necessity involve reference to a set comprising addressees only (exclusive) in con-
trast to a set of addressees and others (inclusive). Now it seems that a cumulation
of a single participant role — as would appear in the exclusive pronoun — does not
occur anywhere else in a pronominal system: Apparently, no language has a spe-
cial grammaticalised pronoun for ‘choric’ we, distinguishing groups consisting of
a multitude of simultaneous speakers from other groups where the speaker role
is combined with the ‘addressee’ or the ‘other’ role.70 If there is more than one first-
person plural pronoun, we always have a distinction between the inclusion or ex-
clusion of the addressee; cumulation of the speaker role does not occur as a rele-
140 Horst J. Simon
vant factor. Presumably, this has to do with general principles of economy; or to put
it cognitively: Linguistically speaking, speaker and addressee — or rather the roles
they play in a conversational exchange — are always conceptualised as individuals,
even if they happen to be more than one person.71
Another starting point for an explanation might lie in considerations of polite-
ness. One of the reasons why so many languages distinguish clusivity in the first
person might be that in certain circumstances it can be quite impolite not to let the
addressee know whether s/he is included in the reference set or not. Consider a sen-
tence like (12):
(12) A to B: “C phoned to ask whether we’re going to the cinema tonight.”
In English, a language without a clusivity distinction, uttering a sentence of this
type can potentially cause embarrassment. (12) can have two interpretations, in
particular if world knowledge does not help to disambiguate (such as ‘B hates mov-
ies and therefore A and C sometimes go to the cinema together without B.’):
(12) a. Th
e question was whether A and B are going to the cinema. (inclusive
use of we)
b. The question was whether A and C are going to the cinema. (exclusive
use of we)
Thus, there can be situations where B is forced to ask whether s/he was meant to be
included in the reference set;72 of course, discussing such a question can sometimes
be quite awkward. Speakers (or rather: addressees) of languages with first-person
clusivity will not have any problems here. This might be one of the functional ad-
vantages of having clusivity.73 In the second person, however, clusivity would not be
relevant for this type of politeness reasoning: Here it would concern the speech-act-
role ‘other’ — a role that is much less important for polite considerations than the
addressee. Hence, there is less functional need and therefore less likelihood for sec-
ond-person clusivity to grammaticalise.
So, looking back on this chapter as a whole, we see that our quest for some more
thorough information concerning the possible existence of an inclusive–exclu-
sive distinction in the second-person non-singular has taken us around the whole
world. There have been rumours in the literature with respect to every linguistic
macro-area. A philologically informed close examination of each of the relevant
languages showed, however, that these reports have most probably been misguided.
Therefore, at present, it seems best to consider this grammatical category not even a
rarissimum, but rather a nonesuch (Bavarian!), if not a phantom.
Notes
* The idea for the present chapter occurred to me during a typologically informed investi-
gation of German pronouns of address in the late 1990s (Simon 2003a). Since then, I have
had the opportunity to present the material in talks to several audiences: at the pronouns
workshop in Konstanz in December 2000, at a workshop on deictics during the DGfS meet-
ing in Leipzig in March 2001, and at the ALT IV meeting in Santa Barbara in August 2001.
I wish to thank all the audiences for their helpful discussions. In particular, I’d like to single
out the hosts of the Konstanz workshop for creating such a stimulating atmosphere. Among
the people who provided me with pieces of data are Terry Crowley, Jost Gippert, Ton Goe-
man, Michael Job, Manfred Krifka, Bruno Lainé, Wolfgang Schulze, and Michael Cysouw
and Elena Filimonova (the last two also constantly encouraged me to finalise the chapter
and gave useful hints). Elke Ronneberger-Sibold suggested an idea for the analysis of the SE
Ambrym long form; Koyka Stoyanova and Iglika Goranova translated some pieces of Rus-
sian theoretical literature for me; Heike Wiese and Ulrike Freywald commented on the man-
uscript; the latter also drew the map in Figure 2. Thanks to them all. Last but not least, I wish
to thank the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation for a research fellowship which allowed
me the time and concentration to finally write up this chapter in the present form.
1. Thanks to Viktor Elšík for suggesting this very useful term at the Konstanz workshop.
2. For a discussion of the connections between pronominal clusivity and the somewhat
similar category of associativity cf. Corbett (2000: 101–11).
3. This is, in fact, the very first mention of such a contrast in the literature; note, however,
that Lyons’ terminological assignment of inclusive vs. exclusive is exactly opposite to the one
used in subsequent studies.
4. Here, it seems that an unusual notion of inclusive vs. exclusive is being employed; I will
discuss this and similar terminological confusions below.
5. I list only the person features as given by the authors. For discussions of technical details
of the feature inventories and the way they attribute to the attested paradigms, compare the
respective original papers.
6. For the mechanics of the model cf. the concise exposition in Harley & Ritter (2002a).
7. His extra feature [±participant] is not helpful because it would yield contradictory values
for the inclusive pronoun B.
8. There seems to be a general linguistic division between SE Ambrym and the other var-
ieties on the island (cf. Parker 1968: 39f., n.4); SE Ambrym is said to be more similar to
Paama on the neighbouring island than to the rest of Ambrym varieties (which are sub-
sumed under the name of Lonwolwol).
9. They were condensed and somewhat updated in Crowley (2002b).
10. Similarly, this is the only form listed in the paradigm in Parker (1968: 36). T. Crowley
(p.c.) confirms that mu- is the only possible prefix in this context.
11. The forms mentioned so far are nicely compatible with the forms reconstructed for
earlier stages of the languages: Crowley (1992: 38) reconstructs *qamuyu for the immedi-
ately preceding proto-language; for the southern neighbouring proto-language so to speak,
Lynch (1986: 267) has *gamiu. Also, the forms assumed for even older stages are quite simi-
lar (cf. Lynch, Ross & Crowley 2002: 67) and Zorc (1995: 1197).
12. In fact, Crowley (2002b: 662) lists both xami and xamim next to each other as appar-
ently optional variants.
13. Since none of the three maps of the island of Ambrym available to me (Paton 1971: iv,
O’Byrne & Harcombe 1999: 198, Crowley 2002b: 661) gives a complete picture of the vil-
142 Horst J. Simon
lages I have data for, this map conflates information from the ones just mentioned. Note,
however, that the original maps differ in some details: consequently, the exact location of
some of the places could not be determined for sure.
14. Recall from n. 11 that the reconstructed forms all lacked this final consonant.
15. Let me mention in passing that this distributional picture of forms on the roughly tri-
angular island looks suspiciously similar to what we find in dialect geography when an in-
novative form spreads from a centre outwards and where the outer edges still retain the old
form. However, this cannot be a good characterisation of the diachrony of the pronouns in
the varieties of Ambrym because this would entail an innovation by the volcanos. “It is really
difficult to imagine anything as silent, desolate and lifeless as the landscape of central Am-
brym” (O’Byrne & Harcombe 1999: 205); “I think you can be pretty certain that the centre
of the island was totally unpopulated. It is nothing but ash plain and a lake of boiling lava”
(T. Crowley, p.c.).
16. This is also confirmed by the fact that Parker’s forms generally correspond best to the
Maat variety as represented in Tryon (1976: 438–53).
17. The (former) exact location of the village of Maat is difficult to pin-point because it was
destroyed by a volcanic eruption in 1950. Consequently, most of its inhabitants were relo-
cated (O’Byrne & Harcombe 1999: 121, 198; Crowley 2002b: 660).
18. In an additional note to his first sketch of verbal morphology in South-East Ambrym,
Parker (1968: 40b) writes that he has found out about the existence of the form xami only
during his second field trip. In this publication, he describes it as a simple second-person
pronoun without further specification, while xamim (which he later calls ‘exclusive’) is said
to refer “to a group of definite size”; regrettably, he does not explicate what he means by this
characterisation.
19. Interestingly, in Abkhaz — to be discussed in detail in the following section — it is also
the so-called exclusive pronoun which is longer than its counterpart. Here the morphemic
status of the additional element is uncontroversial, if somewhat difficult to pinpoint in its ex-
act semantics; at any rate, it seems to have something to do with determination.
20. Michael Cysouw (p.c.) informs me that his ongoing research points to a further source:
‘reinforcement’ of the free form which can occur when verbal inflection becomes grammat-
icalised from (clitic?) pronouns.
21. I thank Elke Ronneberger-Sibold for first suggesting this connection to me. Howe (1996:
90f.) lists a number of comparable cases from other Germanic varieties; interestingly, by the
way, all of them are second-person pronouns (mostly non-singulars).
22. This morphemic pattern is also partly generalised to other person forms in some dialects
of Dutch, from where it was transmitted into Afrikaans as well (Howe 1996: 235–7).
23. Equivalent first-person plural forms exist, too.
24. Here, one meets forms like iar and iaråndre in Cimbrian Bavarian (cf. Tyroller 2003: 158),
and very similar forms in the Alemannic South Walser dialects (cf. Zürrer 1997: 159–62).
25. Moreover I know nothing about possible polite uses of address forms in South-East Am-
brym.
26. Likewise, Hewitt admits in the short version of the grammar: “Though they exist, the
exclusive forms [. . .] are not common” (Hewitt 1989b: 48). Sadly, it must be noted that,
more often than not, such reservations are lost when typologically oriented linguists quote
descriptive grammars. Bubenik (1993: 170), for example, simply gives Hewitt’s paradigm,
omitting the information about the rarity of the exclusive forms. Curiously, in his latest
overview of Northwest Caucasian languages, Hewitt (2005: 104) simply lists the relevant
forms without any further comment. He does not give any further information: neither con-
cerning semantic distinctions nor with regard to possible usage restrictions.
27. According to Hewitt (1979/1989a: 156), the -rà ending is entirely optional (?!); it seems
not to have any significance in the present context.
28. The alternative forms listed for the plural forms reflect phonologically driven allomor-
phy without any special morphosemantic content.
29. On the other hand, there are several other places in von Erckert’s book where one would
expect mention of the relevant distinction, but fails to find one: neither do the so-called ‘ex-
clusive’ forms ending in -th occur in the other paradigmatic listings of Abkhaz pronouns (p.
268 and p. 279) nor are they ever employed in the sample sentences.
30. The linguistic variety referred to in brackets is Abaza, the closely related dialect men-
tioned above.
31. And not, as one might be led to believe, exclusion of non speech-act-participants, i.e.
‘others’.
32. Oddly, Charpentier glosses plurals as “plus de quatre personnes” throughout. Since the
language has only trials (and not quadrals), it is most likely that what he means here actu-
ally is ‘more than three people’.
33. The description Charpentier offers is not very lucid; nevertheless it seems that this is the
place where Hagège got his information from.
34. There is no indication of a particularly second-person form, though.
35. This form xate is also the form given for this language in Tryon (1976: 447, 1995: 2: 262f.).
36. Incidentally, there is a striking parallel to this Charpentier type of argumentation in van
Ginneken (1954: 99), where the author speculates that consideration of alliances within and
without the clan-community might underlie the use of different plural pronominals in an
isolated dialect of Dutch.
37. This might also be the reason why Crowley (2002a: 652) does not mention anything in
this direction in his brief grammatical summary of Charpentier’s book.
38. The chapter in Harley & Ritter (2002b: 504f.) is an almost literal repetition from Harley
& Ritter (2002a: 33–5) — with very few exceptions. Strangely, the only major difference con-
cerns the omission of the note from Harley & Ritter (2002a: 37) where they acknowledge
the existence of the research tradition pertaining to the clusivity distinction as discussed in
the present contribution. . .
39. Harley & Ritter (2002a: 34f., 2002b: 505) refer in this context to the detailed analysis in
Déchaine (1999). Wunderlich (1997: 286–94) discusses similar data from a closely related
language.
40. Such a focus on prefixes can be traced back at least to Bloomfield’s treatment of Algon-
quian (1933: 256).
41. Plank exemplified his idea with comparable data from another Algonquian language,
Potawatomi.
144 Horst J. Simon
42. Cf. also Hewson (1991) and the contributions by Cysouw and by Daniel in the present
volume; the latter two provide further evidence from a great variety of languages against the
traditional, but all too simple identification of deixis and grammatical person. In particular
Daniel discusses such analyses at length.
43. The choice of long vs. short form seems to be influenced by factors such as clause type
and emphasis; at any rate, it has apparently nothing to do with grammatical person (Borg-
man 1990: 149–51).
44. Also noted by Jacobsen (1980: 213).
45. The same can be asserted in relation to Nama, which appears on Harley & Ritter’s list in
addition to Ojibwe (Algonquian) and Yokuts; cf. Cysouw (this volume) for discussion.
46. Which seems much more reasonable to me, at least in the case of complete identity of
forms as in Algonquian and Sanuma.
47. This description became quite famous since it claims to represent the largest inventory of
personal pronouns to be found anywhere (as such it is, e.g., cited in full by Sasse 1993: 670f.).
48. Apparently, compound pronouns are an areal feature typical of some of the Bantoid lan-
guages of Cameroon. A thorough discussion of the present knowledge concerning this phe-
nomenon can be found in Cysouw (2003: 166–84).
49. A clear statement in this direction can be found in relation to gaps in the paradigm in
Aghem, another language with complex pronouns: “In some [hypothetical] cases the same
persons would be combined, which is not possible, e.g. ‘you + you’” (Hyman 1979: 54). In
a similar vein, Cysouw (2003: 170, n. 4) dismisses the possibility of second-person clusiv-
ity in Aghem, too.
50. Sadly, Parker’s (1986: 136) pair of sentences which is meant to illustrate the usage restric-
tions on simple pronouns is not very helpful: the examples do not constitute a real minimal
pair since the number distinction plays a role here, too.
51. Given the enormous relevance of the Grassfields Bantu complex pronouns for a better
understanding of the workings of large pronominal paradigms, a focused study based on
fieldwork would be highly desirable.
52. Cf. e.g. Poppe (1974: 50) and Grønbech & Krueger (1976: 31) on the classical, literary
language, and Poppe (1951: 71, 1970: 125) on the Khalkha dialect, which is the basis of the
contemporary standard language. Hambis (1945: 18f.; on Written Mongolian) and Why-
mant (1926: 12; on Khalkha) list the relevant forms, too, but do not tell what their functional
difference is. Bosson (1964: 70) remarks, however, that “[t]he feeling for this difference in
meaning [first-person clusivity; HS] has nearly disappeared in Modern Mongolian, and, ex-
cepting in the genitive case, the inclusive form predominates in popular usage.”
53. However, this grammar makes a rather unreliable impression.
54. This is a fairly traditional description, despite the title of the series in which it appeared.
55. More examples demonstrating the effects of the two plural affixes can be found in the chap-
ter on number (Giridhar 1994: 114–16) and in the cited passage on pronouns (p. 140f.).
56. The only other source I could consult on Mao Naga does not talk about the affix -ta at
all (note that the author uses the language name ‘Sopvomā’ instead of Mao Naga): Grierson
(1903: 453) mentions merely -kru as a plural suffix for pronouns (similarly on p. 455); and
in the comparative vocabulary lists of related languages (p. 246f. and 480f.) no reflex of plu-
ralising -ta can be detected. [Unfortunately, Giridhar (1980), a grammar of an apparently

closely related language, was not available to me.]
57. With the exception of two brief sections in recent work by myself: Simon (2003a: 171–
5; 2004: section 3). It is apparently because of a preliminary version of the first-mentioned
study that Bavarian is referred to in the ‘Konstanz Raritätenkabinett’, cited in the introduc-
tion.
58. For detailed information on this language in general cf. e.g. Wiesinger (1989); a very
brief analysis of its address system can also be found in Simon (2003b: 106–9).
59. For in-depth discussions of the Bavarian respect data against a broad typological back-
ground cf. Simon (2003a: 167–87, 2004). That we are indeed dealing with a distinct gram-
matical category ‘respect’ is clear for a variety of morphosyntactic reasons, the most obvi-
ous one being the fact that the form Sie does not appear anywhere else in the pronominal
paradigm, not even as might be suspected in the face of Standard German data in the third-
person plural: here we have se; comparable formal distinctions hold for the agreeing verb
forms, too.
60. Note that the plural form ihr is a more modern, ‘urbanised’ variant of the traditional eß.
The distribution of these forms is based on geographical and social factors; it has no seman-
tic relevance at all (cf. Scheuringer 1990: 272f. and Merkle 1996: 123). Also, the distribution
of full forms vs. their clitic variants is organised according to syntactic principles and in-
volves factors such as stress and focus; the clusivity distinction does not play a role here.
61. This fact is somewhat surprising from the point of view of Standard German; cf. also
n. 63.
62. Here, the forms Eich and Eana are different case variants of ihr [pl] and Sie [sg.hon],
respectively. Context of the passage: Alwin and his wife Rosmarie are visited by their land-
lord and his wife Hase. Alwin offers home-made cocktails. During the whole scene, Alwin
is most submissive to the landlord (‘Hausherr’).
63. Cf. Merkle (1996: 131) for a remark in that direction; cf. also, e.g., Weber (1987: 161)
for rural varieties of Swiss German dialects around Zurich. This stands in stark contrast to
more formal varieties of Standard German (particularly in the north), where the pronom-
inal paradigm involves basically the same forms as urbanised Bavarian, but where the neu-
tralisation is the other way round: Here, Sie is used in all respect-contexts, the number of
addressees being irrelevant; the domain of usage of (Northern) Standard German ihr is thus
considerably smaller than in Bavarian (only a group of du-addressees).
64. Although I cannot produce an authentic example from a real (or fictional) piece of dis-
course, due to the infrequency of unambiguously relevant passages in the dialectal dramatic
literature (which does not abound in Sie-using characters, anyway), my interviews with na-
tive speakers of (rural) Bavarian unanimously confirmed the contrast: they could all differ-
entiate the two form-meaning-pairs.
65. Note that both verbs could also be construed with a comitative phrase (and would thus
again be suspect to a metonymic reading: se mid ebban treffa (lit. ‘to meet oneself with some-
body’) and mid ebban ananandagrån (lit. ‘to get close with somebody’). This construction
notwithstanding, without such a mid-phrase the real plurality of the verb is quite clear.
66. We are indeed dealing with a value pair ‘honorative/non-honorative’ in this case and not
with one which is the other way round (‘intimative/non-intimative’ or the like); for a discus-
146 Horst J. Simon
sion of markedness in similar Standard German data cf. Simon (2003a: 158–67), with the
classic arguments (language acquisition and language loss, range of usage etc.).
67. Note that strictly speaking this argumentation holds true only for the instances where
we have a single addressee in the inclusive. The ultimate test case for a clusivity distinction
would be in reference to a group consisting of more than one addressee plus other(s) ({addr,
addr, . . ., oth, . . .}). Unfortunately, however, the native speakers of Bavarian I consulted do
not have any intuitions about which pronoun to use in such a situation.
68. Cf. the exposition in Simon (2003a: 24–62).
69. This is the type of argumentation practised by many of the researchers mentioned in sec-
tion 2, most explicitly Harley & Ritter.
70. Cf. Cysouw (2003: 73f.) and recall the discussion concerning Ghomala′ in section 3.5
above.
71. Cf. also McGregor (1989: 440).
72. Note that — provided the language does not possess special logophoric markers — there
is no way to specify inclusion vs. exclusion of C in the reference set; that is, there is no com-
mitment in (12a) whether C is going to join A and B or not. This is due to the unavailabil-
ity of a [±other]-feature.
73. Though, of course, the general inclination towards vagueness due to negative face polite-
ness mentioned in section 3.7 somewhat contradicts this argumentation.
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Chapter 5
Inclusive and exclusive in free and
bound person forms
Anna Siewierska Dik Bakker
Lancaster University University of Amsterdam
It is generally recognized that in languages which have both free and bound person mark-
ers the semantic distinctions encoded in the latter may be less elaborate than those encoded
in the former. This is typically attributed to the process of grammaticalization which in add-
ition to a formal dimension also has a semantic one involving some semantic bleaching. The
present chapter examines to what extent free and bound person markers differ with respect
to the encoding of the semantic domain of inclusivity and to what extent less elaborate se-
mantic encoding correlates with reduction in morpho-phonological encoding. The investi-
gation is carried out on the basis of a cross-linguistic sample of 394 languages.
Keywords: person form, paradigm, grammaticalization, clitic, affix
1. Introduction
It is generally recognized that in languages which have more than one paradigm of
person markers the semantic distinctions encoded in each paradigm need not be
the same.1 Differences between person paradigms in the nature of the semantic dis-
tinctions expressed are seen to be particularly likely in languages, which have both
free and bound person markers. This is due to the fact that the latter are typically as-
sumed to derive from the former via the process of grammaticalization, which, in
addition to a formal dimension involving loss of independent morphological status
and phonological reduction, may also have a semantic dimension, reflected in de-
crease of semantic distinctions encoded (cf. Givón 1976; Lehmann 1982b: 233–41;
Bresnan & Mchombo 1986,1987; Siewierska 1999).2
While incidental examples documenting differences in paradigmatic structure
in line with the above abound in the literature, there do not appear to be any stud-
ies devoted specifically to this issue. The present chapter seeks to fill in this gap in
regard to the semantic dimension of inclusivity. It presents a detailed comparison
of the encoding of the distinctions involving the groupings of speaker and hearer
in free person markers and their bound counterparts in a cross-linguistic sample of
394 languages. The free person markers considered are morphologically indepen-
dent nominative or absolutive forms or, in the case of languages lacking such forms,
the so called cardinal forms that may be used as single word answers to questions
152 Anna Siewierska and Dik Bakker
such as “Who is coming?” The bound markers include weak pronouns, clitics and
affixes functioning as the arguments of intransitive (S) and transitive clauses (A and
P) and the possessors in adnominal possessive constructions (Poss).
The chapter is organized as follows. Section two presents and illustrates the ap-
proach to the domain of inclusivity that we have adopted and the nature of the se-
mantic distinctions that we have made within this domain. Section three provides
the data on the encoding of the domain of inclusivity in the free and bound per-
son forms among the languages in our sample concentrating in particular on the
paradigmatic differences encountered. In section four we consider to what extent
the differences in the encoding of inclusivity among reduced person forms are re-
lated to their degree of grammaticalization with respect to morpho-phonologi-
cal form, i.e. in relation to the weak pronoun vs clitic vs affix distinction and in re-
lation to Siewierska’s (1999) tripartite typology of person agreement markers, i.e.
pronominal, ambiguous and syntactic. Finally, section five offers some conclud-
ing remarks.
2. The inclusive–exclusive distinction
Our approach to the domain of inclusivity is strongly based on the illuminating

typology of person paradigms elaborated by Cysouw (2003) which takes as its point
of departure the eight person distinctions shown in (1).
(1) Singular Group
1+2 minimal inclusive
1+2+3 augmented inclusive
1 1+3 exclusive
2 2+3
3 3+3
In place of the familiar singular/plural distinction, this paradigm reflects a distinc-
tion between single persons and groups of more than one person. The singular cat-
egory subsumes markers which refer to exactly one person or object and the group
category markers that refer to more than one person or object, provided they are
not specified with respect to the number of participants (e.g. dual, trial, paucal) and
do not include within their scope regular reference to singular entities (Cysouw
2003: 66–72). We see that the paradigm differentiates between each of the three
persons in the singular, having a distinct marker for each of the three persons, 1, 2
and 3. In the group it makes a five-way distinction between the speaker- addressee
dyad 1+2, a configuration of the speaker, addressee and at least one other 1+2+3, a
grouping of the speaker and at least one other but not the addressee 1+3, a constel-
lation of the addressee and at least one other but not the speaker 2+3 and a grouping
of at least two third parties 3+3. Thus what is of relevance for the group categories
is not so much the number of participants, but their nature. Of particular signifi-
Inclusive exclusive in free and bound person forms 153
cance in the context of the present discussion is, of course, the three-way distinc-
tion within the group first-person complex. The traditional inclusive–exclusive dis-
tinction involves the separation of groups involving the speaker and addressee, i.e.
1+2 & 1+2+3 from those that involve the speaker and some other party but not the
addressee 1+3. In the paradigm in (1), however, the traditional category of inclu-
sive is further subdivided into 1+2 (minimal inclusive) and 1+2+3 (augmented in-
clusive).
Needless to say, the actual person paradigms found in languages are frequently
considerably less differentiated than the paradigm in (1). As far as the first-per-
son complex is concerned, some paradigms have no separate form for non-singu-
lar first person, i.e. they have no “we” as distinct from “I”. This is the case in Mura
Pirahã (2), a language isolate of Brazil, which according to Everett makes no dis-
tinction in regard to number of any type, not only in its person markers. The ex-
amples below are of the free forms.
(2) Mura Pirahãã (Everett 1986: 280–1)
1 ti
2 gíxai
3 hiapióxio
We will refer to paradigms such as that in (2) as exhibiting a nowe pattern.3 Other
paradigms have only one form for non-singular first person covering all three inter-
pretations, 1+2, 1+2+3 and 1+3. Such paradigms, which we will call unified we (unif
we) are familiar from English and most other European languages. For complete-
ness an example is given in (3) from Dagbani, a Gur language spoken in northern
Ghana.
(3) Dagbani (Olawsky 1999: 21)
Singular Group
1+2 ti
1+2+3 ti
1 ŋ 1+3 ti
2 a 2+2 yi
3an o 3+3an bE
3inan di 3+3inan di/ŋa
In yet other paradigms there is a special form for 1+2 & 1+2+3 but not for the ex-
clusive 1+3. This pattern will be called only inclusive (only incl). It is illustrated in
(4) from the Otomanguean language Chalcatongo Mixtec spoken in south-central
Mexico, Oaxaca. The paradigm in (4) is of the free person forms but the corres-
ponding clitics have the same paradigmatic structure.
(4) Chalcatongo Mixtec (Macaulay 1996: 139)

Singular Group
1+2 žó?ó
1 rú?ú 1+2+3 žó?ó
2 ró?ó
3m càà
3f nā?ā
3animal kɨtɨ
3supernatural í?a, íža
In Chalcatongo Mixtec, as in other languages exhibiting the only incl pattern, the
exclusive 1+3 combination is expressed by the first-person form accompanied by
non-singular number marking as shown in (5b) and (5c) where -rí is the first-per-
son clitic corresponding to rú?ú. Number is indicated in the language by a variety of
morphological and syntactic means including the addition of the prefix ka- to the
verb, as in (5b) and the use of the plural particle xina?a , as in (5c) or both.
(5) Chalcatongo Mixtec (Macaulay 1996: 139, 81, 114)
a. ni- žee-rí
compl-eat-1
‘I ate (it).’
b. ka-satiu-rí
pl-work-1
‘We’re working (exclusive of hearer).’
c. kužaa-ri núndua xina?á-ri
live-1 Oaxaca plural-1
‘We (exclusive) will live in Oaxaca.’
In the case of the inclusive person forms additional number marking is also typic-
ally found as in (6) but appears not to be obligatory.
(6) ni-ka-čaà-žó nùu bé?e
compl-pl-arrive-1 face house
‘We came to the house.’
A fourth type of subdivision of the first-person complex is the traditional inclusive–
exclusive distinction (incl/excl) involving the grouping of of 1+2+3 & 1+2 as op-
posed to 1+3. An example is given in (7) from the Nilo-Saharan language So.
(7) So (Carlin 1993: 79)
Singular Group
1+2 inia
1+2+3 inia
1 aya 1+3 isia
2 bia 2+3 bitia
3 ica 3+3 itia
And finally there is the three way split within the first-person nonsingular where
there are separate forms for the minimal inclusive, augmented inclusive and exclu-
sive. Such a three way distinction, which we will term minimal augmented (min/
aug) is found, for example, in the independent person markers of the Adamawa lan-
guage Koh, spoken in Cameroon and Chad.
(8) Koh (Glidden 1985: 230)
Singular Group
1+2 ná
1+2+3 nári
1 mì 1+3 bburu
2 mù 2+2 ì
3 ka 3+3 i
The above five subdivisions of the first-person complex have been captured by Cys-
ouw (2003: 98) in the first-person hierarchy as shown in (9).
(9) The first-person hierarchy
no we > unif we > only incl > incl/excl > min/aug
This hierarchy represents the successive differentiation of the first-person complex
from no separate form for we at all, through the presence of one undifferentiated
form of we, then of a special form of we just for the inclusive category, followed by
two different forms of we as in the traditional inclusive–exclusive distinction, and
culminates in the three way distinction shown in the maximally differentiated para-
digm in (1) above. This is depicted in Table 1 in the columns labelled (a) through (e),
respectively. (The — means absence of a form.)
Given the above typology of the first-person complex, the dimension of inclusiv-
ity is richer than under the traditional inclusive–exclusive distinction which covers
only the pattern in d), as it encompasses the possibilities of c) and e) as well.
The typology that we have adopted for this study differs from that of Cysouw’s
only in two minor respects, namely in the addition of two patterns both attested in
Cysouw (2003: 91) and also discussed earlier by Greenberg (1988: 9).4 The first of
these is what we have called the minimal inclusive pattern (min incl) in which there
is a separate from for the speaker-hearer dyad 1+2 and another form covering both
1+2+3 and 1+3.5 This is illustrated in (10) on the basis of the independent pronouns
Table 1. The subdivisions of the first-person complex in Cysouw’s (2003) hierarchy
a b c d e
1+2 A
A A
1+2+3 — A B
1+3 — B C
in the Austronesian language Uma, spoken by around 20.000 people in Sulawesi.

(10) Uma (Martens 1988: 169)
Singular Group
1+2 kita’
1+2+3 kai’
1 aku’ 1+3 kai’
2 iko 2+2 koi
3 hi’a 3+3 hira’
In the second additional pattern, which we will refer to as the augmented inclusive
pattern (aug incl), there is a special form for 1+2+3 and another form covering 1+2
and 1+3 as exemplified in (11) from Bunuba a language of Western Australia.
(11) Bunuba (Rumsey 1999: 138)
Singular Group
1+2 ngiyirri
1+2+3 yaarri
1 ngayini 1+3 ngiyirri
2 nginji 2+2 yinggirri
3 niy 3+3 biyirri
The two readings of ngiyirri can be distinguished by the addition of number suf-
fixes, the suffix ‑way for the 1+2 reading and the suffix ‑yani for the 1+3 reading.6
Neither, however, is obligatory. The augmented inclusive pattern is de facto simply a
dual vs plural distinction within the first person, as the 1+2+3 form is also used for
any combination of 1+3 other than that involving only two individuals. We have in-
cluded this pattern within the domain of inclusivity provided that the first-person
dual is the only category specifically covering two individuals in the person para-
digm. Otherwise we have recognized a distinct category of dual number.7 Thus un-
der our analysis the independent pronouns in a language such as Kapau, a Highland
language of Papua New Guinea, are taken to display a straightforward dual–plural
contrast, as shown in (12), and not an augmented inclusive pattern, though exactly
the same distinctions, within the first-person complex are made.
(12) Kapau (Oates & Oates 1968: 17, 45)
Sg Du Pl
1+2 yäl 1+2+3 nai
1 ni 1+3 yäl 1+3+3 nai
2 nti 2+2 qi 2+2+2 hai
3m ago 3m+3 aqoä’u 3m+3+3 aqoä
3f I 3f+3 isä’u 3f+3+3 i’yoä
In sum, our analysis of the distribution of the encoding of the inclusive–exclusive
distinction in free and bound person markers will be based on the subdivisions of
the first-person complex shown in Table 2.
Table 2. The subdivisions of the first-person complex in our typology
a b c d e f g
1+2 — A A A A A A
1+2+3 B B B
1+3 — A B C
It must be pointed out that neither of the two additional patterns that we have in-
cluded in our typology, i.e. pattern d) nor e) fits neatly into Cysouw’s first-person
hierarchy, as this hierarchy is conceived of as consisting of a series of interdepend-
ent choices such that a split in the inclusive category occurs only after the emer-
gence of a distinct exclusive category. This is not the case in either the min incl pat-
tern (d) or the aug incl pattern (e), as there is a special form for 1+2 and 1+2+3
respectively but no special form for the exclusive. In pattern d) the exclusive falls
in with the augmented inclusive, and in pattern e) with the minimal inclusive. Our
typology reflects the number of special forms used for the expression of the group-
ings of 1+2, 1+2+3 and 1+3 without overlap with the 1 person singular form. It may
be viewed as defining a hierarchy but only in the loose sense of the term. It does not
constitute a typological hierarchy. Therefore our typology is expressed in (13) as an
ordered grouping not in hierarchical form.
(13) 0 forms nowe (a)
1 form unified we (b)
only inclusive (c)
2 forms minimal inclusive (d)
augmented inclusive (e)
inclusive–exclusive (f)
3 forms minimal augmented (g)
3. The data
The data for our study of the relationship between the encoding of the inclusive–
exclusive distinction in free and bound person markers are drawn from a data base
on person markers and grammatical relations currently consisting of 394 languages.
The languages together with their areal distribution are presented in the appendix.8
We took a fairly liberal interpretation of what constitutes a person marker which
subsumes the celebrated noun-like expressions found in Thai, Vietnamese and
other South-East Asian languages. Accordingly all but one of the languages in the
sample (Mbay, a Nilo-Saharan language of southern Chad) emerged as having free
person markers. One other language, Acoma, does have free person markers, but
not for argument functions. As for bound person markers, we took into account
affixes, clitics and also so-called weak pronouns.9 The last of these are not actu-
ally either phonologically nor morphologically bound to a constituent. However, as
they are phonologically reduced forms and differ from free forms in syntactic distri-
bution (Bresnan 2001), we decided to group them together with clitics and affixes.10
A case in point is that of what Sohn (1975) calls the subjectives in the Melanesian
language Woleaian, which as shown in (14) function as person agreement markers.
(14) Woleaian (Sohn 1975: 150–51)
a. Gaang i ta weri-Ø
I 1sg not see-3sg
‘I did not see it.’
b. Gaami gai lag!
you:pl 2pl go
‘You(pl) go!’
c. John ye weri-Ø Mary
John 3sg see-3sg Mary
‘John saw Mary.’
Only bound person markers in S or A or P or Poss function were taken into ac-
count.11
The encoding of the first-person complex among all the languages exhibiting
free or bound person markers (for the first person) in terms of the typology pre-
sented in section two is shown in Table 3.
Before we proceed to consider these figures, a point of clarification is in order.
Although, ideally one should apply the typology outlined in (13), separately to para-
digms exhibiting a singular/group opposition and those in which there is a further
contrast involving higher numbers, i.e. the dual and/or trial or paucal, as in Cysouw
Table 3. Frequency of the encoding of the first-person complex in the five types of person
marker in the sample
N=394 Indep pro S marker A marker P marker Poss marker

NoWe 8 (2.0%) 26 (8.7%) 25 (8.3%) 37 (15.6%) 21 (8.5%)
UnifWe 224 (57.0%) 166 (55.0%) 165 (55.0%) 119 (50.2%) 135 (54.7%)
OnlyIncl 8 (2.0%) 15 (5.0%) 15 (5.0%) 11 (4.6%) 12 (4.9%)
MinIncl 6 (1.5%) 4 (1.3%) 4 (1.3%) 3 (1.3%) 3 (1.2%)
AugIncl 4 (1.0%) 2 (0.7%) 2 (0.7%) 2 (0.8%) 1 (0.4%)
Incl/Excl 124 (31.5%) 76 (25.0%) 74 (24.6%) 54 (22.8%) 68 (27.5%)
SplInclExcl 4 (1.0%) 3 (1.0%) 3 (1.0%) 4 (1.7%) 2 (0.8%)
MinAug 15 (3.8%) 8 (2.7%) 8 (2.7%) 7 ( 3.0%) 5 (2.0%)
Total 393 302 300 237 247
(2003), we have not done so. Consequently some of the encoding patterns in Table 3
must be understood as being relevant to whatever non-singular oppositions the
paradigm displays, be it just group, or group and dual or group and dual and trial
etc. This applies essentially to the unif we pattern, the incl/excl pattern and the min/
aug pattern. Significantly, we have included under the min/aug pattern the famous
five “we” paradigms found among some of the non-Pama Nyungan languages of
Australia (see e.g. McKay 1979).12 Under the traditional analysis these paradigms
are seen as having an inclusive–exclusive contrast in the dual and plural and an in-
clusive trial encompassing 1+2+3. Under Cysouw’s (2003: 265) analysis the trial is
treated as a special type of dual. Instead of a straightforward inclusive–exclusive op-
position in the dual and plural, there is an opposition between an augmented inclu-
sive vs exclusive, and the minimal inclusive 1+2 is undifferentiated. This is shown in
(15) on the basis of Mangarayi.
(15) Mangarayi (Merlan 1982: 102)
Sg Du (restricted) Pl (group)
1+2 ŋi
1+2+3 ŋa-r 1+2+3+3 ŋa-ļa
1 ŋaya 1+3 ŋi-r 1+3+3 ŋi-ļa
2 ñaŋgi 2+2 nu-r 2+2+3 nu-ļa
Paradigms which display other differences in the encoding of inclusivity across the
non-singular categories have been collapsed in Table 3 in the row labelled split in-
clusive–exclusive (split incl/excl). These include paradigms which are described as
displaying:
• an inclusive–exclusive distinction only in the plural, as in the Papuan language
Yava illustrated on the basis of the actor prefixes in (16);
(16) Yava (Jones 1986: 42)
Sg Du Pl
1+2 ririm- 1+2+3 wam-
1 sy- 1+3 ririm- 1+3+3 ream-
2 n- 2+2 ip- 2+2+3 wap-
3m p- 3+3 y- 3+3+3 w-
3f m-
• an inclusive–exclusive distinction only in the dual, as in the case of subject pre-
fixes in Tanimbili, an Oceanic language of Utupua Island, shown in (17);
(17) Tanimbili (Tryon 1994: 628)
Sg Du Pl
1+2 si- 1+2+3 misu-
1 nyi- 1+3 me- 1+3+3 misu-
2 nu- 2+2 mwa- 2+3+3 muku-
3 I- 3+3 ŋgi(li)- 3+3+3 ŋgu-
• a dual–plural contrast only within the inclusive category, as in the Ponapean free
person markers illustrated in (18) ;
(18) Ponapean (Rehg 1981: 158)
Sg Du Pl
1+2 kita 1+2+3 kitail
1 ngehi 1+3 kihit 1+3+3 kihit
2 kowe koh 2+2 kumwa 2+2+3 kumwail
3 ih 2+3 ira 3+3+3 irail/ihr
• a dual–plural contrast only within the exclusive category, as in the free (and also
clitic) forms in Yagua (19);
(19) Yagua (Payne 1990: 28–9)
Sg Du Pl
1+2 nayin 1+2+3 nayin
1 ráy 1+3 nááy 1+3+3 núúy
2 jiy 2+2 saadá 2+2+3 jiryéy
3 nii 3+3 naadá 3+3+3 riy
Let us now have a look at the figures in Table 3. We see that on the whole the
distribution of the patterns of encoding of the first-person complex across the five
types of person markers is strikingly similar. The two patterns which are of least in-
terest to us, as they fail to differentiate between the inclusion and exclusion of the
hearer in any way, have quite distinctive distributions. The nowe pattern is infre-
quent overall and also clearly less frequent in free person markers than in bound
ones. The unif we pattern is the dominant pattern overall and prevails in all five per-
son markers. Moreover its distribution within each type of person marker, given its
commonality, is about the same.
Turning to the five patterns that do distinguish between the inclusion and exclu-
sion of the hearer in one way or another, by far the most common is the traditional
incl/excl pattern. Depending on the person form in question, the straightforward
incl/excl pattern accounts for between 77% and 67% of the encodings of inclusiv-
ity, with the figure of 77% being manifested in the free forms. Of the three inclusive
patterns, the only incl is the most common and the aug incl the least.13 Interestingly
enough the only incl pattern is slightly more frequent in the bound person mark-
ers than in the free forms. Quite the opposite holds for the aug incl pattern. The split
incl/excl pattern is attested with all the markers, but again very infrequently. As for
the min/aug pattern, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, among the free person mark-
ers, it is the second most common form of encoding inclusivity but for the incl/excl
pattern. The difference in the frequency of the latter relative to the former is, how-
ever, around 8:1.
Having reviewed the overall distribution of the encoding of the first-person com-
plex in the five types of person markers, let us now turn to a consideration of the dif-
ferences in the encodings exhibited by the various types of bound person markers
relative to the free forms within languages. Only languages with both free and (at
least one type of) bound person markers will be considered. 14
Of the 330 languages which have both free and bound person markers, 179
(54%) have no encoding of the inclusive–exclusive domain. In other words, all the
relevant person markers in question are either of the nowe or unifwe type. Of the re-
maining 151 languages which do encode the inclusive–exclusive domain in some
subset of their person markers, 74 utilize the same pattern of encoding of the inclu-
sive–exclusive domain for the free person markers and whatever set of bound per-
son markers they display. Unsurprisingly, the most frequent pattern of encoding of
the domain of inclusivity which is manifested by all the person forms in these 74
languages (77%) is the incl/excl pattern. It is exhibited in 57 of the 74 languages. In
43 (60%) languages, the inclusive–exclusive distinction is encoded only once in the
paradigm, i.e. the various paradigms have no higher numbers. It is encoded twice
(plural and dual) in 9 languages and three times (plural, dual and trial or paucal) in
5 languages. All the other patterns of encoding are also attested throughout the per-
son paradigms found in languages, but rather infrequently. The relevant figures are
summarized in Table 4.
Moving on from similarities in the encoding of inclusivity to differences, there
are 77 languages which exhibit differences in the encoding of inclusivity among
the person markers that they have. The relevant differences may be grouped into
two types: increases in the distinctions encoded and decreases. The increases may
in turn be subdivided into introductions of the distinction and further elaborations.
The decreases, on the other hand, may be subdivided into complete loss of the dis-
tinction and reduction. Needless to say, whether a particular difference constitutes
a case of increase or decrease depends on which pattern one takes as one’s point of
departure. As we are interested in the encoding of inclusivity in bound forms as
compared to free forms, our point of reference will be the encoding pattern found
in the free forms. We will view as cases of introduction any difference involving free
forms manifesting a nowe or unifwe pattern and bound forms displaying one of the
other of the encoding patterns. A case of introduction is shown in (20) on the basis
Table 4. Uniform encoding of the inclusivity domain
Pattern of encoding of inclusive–exclusive domain Number of languages

Incl/Excl once in paradigm 43
Incl/Excl twice in paradigm 9
Incl/Excl three times in paradigm 5
Only Incl 6
Split Incl/Excl 2
Aug Incl 1
Min Incl 3
Min Aug 5
Total 74
of the Tibetan language Chepang, in which the free person markers have a unifwe
pattern, i.e. they do not exhibit any encoding of inclusivity, while the person affixes
have an incl/excl pattern in both the dual and plural.
(20) Chepang (Caughley 1982: 54–5)
Free Person suffixes
1 ŋa 1 -ŋa
2 naŋ 2 -naŋ
3 ?ow? 3 Ø
1+2; 1+3 ŋici 1+2 -ŋə-cə
2+2 niŋji 1+3 -təyh-cə
3+3 ?o?nis 2+2 -naŋ-jə
3+3 -ce
1+2+3; 1+3+3 ŋi 1+2+3 -ŋ-sə
2+2+3 niŋ 1+3+3 -təyh-?i
3+3+3 ?ow?iem 2+2+3 -naŋ-sə
3+3+3 -?i/sə
As instances of complete loss we will, in turn, consider any difference involving
nowe or unifwe in the bound forms and one of the other patterns in the free forms.
An example of complete loss is illustrated in (21) from the Mongolic language Daur
in which the free person markers display a simple incl/excl pattern while the S and A
person suffixes a nowe pattern.
(21) Daur (Wu 1996: 21, 27)

Free SA suffixes in non-past
1sg bi: 1sg bəəi-bi
2sg ši: 2sg bəi-ši
3sg in 3sg bəi-sul
1+2(+3) bed 1pl bəi-ba:
1+3 ba:
2pl ta: 2pl bəi-ta:
3pl a:n 3pl bəi-sul
The other differences between free and bound forms, i.e., those which we have clas-
sified as involving further elaboration, or alternatively reduction are listed in (22).
(22) a. when no higher numbers are involved
only incl vs all others (but for nowe, uniwe)
aug incl or min incl vs incl/excl, min aug
incl/excl vs min aug
b. when higher numbers are involved
incl/excl vs incl/excl du (tr pau) pl
split incl/excl vs inc/excldu (tr pau) pl
incl/excldu(trpau)pl vs min aug
An example of a reduction involving a min/aug pattern in the free forms and an incl/
excl one in the bound is given in (23) from Tiwi, a non-Pama-Nyungan language of
Northern Australia, in which the incl/excl pattern is found in the P suffixes. (The S/A
prefixes display a min/aug pattern, like the free ones.)
(23) Tiwi (Osborne 1974: 54, 27)
Free P prefixes
1 ŋia 1 məni-
2 ŋin̪ t̪a 2 mən̪ i-
3m ŋara 3 Ø-
3f ŋira
1+2 mua 1+2 mani-
1+3 ŋawa 1+3 məwəni-
1+2+3 ŋaya 1+2+3 mani-
2+2 nua 2+2+3 mani-
3+3 wuta 3+3 wəni
An instance of elaboration involving free person markers displaying a min incl pat-
tern and bound S/A markers with a min aug pattern is presented in (24) from the
West Papuan language Hatam.
(24) Hatam (Reesink 1999: 40)
Free SA prefixes
1 da 1 di-
2 na 2 a-
3 no(k) 3 Ø/ni-
1+2 sa 1+2 si-
1+2+3 nye 1+2+3 i(g)-
1+3 nye 1+3 ni-
2+2 je 2+2 ji-
3+3 yo(k) 3+3 i(g)-
Taking the patterns of encoding in free person markers as our starting point, the
number of languages exhibiting a decrease in the encoding of the inclusivity do-
main in some set of their bound person markers is nearly four times as large as that
displaying increases, namely 71 vs 15. This is what we would expect given the as-
sumption that bound markers originate from free ones and, in the process of gram-
maticalization, often undergo semantic bleaching.15 Semantic distinctions, how-
ever, may also be lost or reduced, over time, in free person markers. If this happens
after the development of bound person forms, the result may be that the latter may
manifest a distinction no longer in evidence in the former. Accordingly, the exist-
ence of increases in the encoding of inclusivity in bound markers vis a vis free forms
is not surprising. Nonetheless, since the potential loss of semantic distinctions in
free forms is likely to be due to factors other than grammaticalization, we may ex-
pect the increases to be far less common than the decreases. And this is indeed so.
There is, of course, also the possibility of an inclusive–exclusive distinction devel-

oping in the free forms after the emrgence of the bound. As discussed by various
scholars (e.g. Jacobsen 1980; Nichols 1992 and Sakel (this volume)), the inclusive–
exclusive distinction appears to be particularly amenable to borrowing. Although
typically instances of borrowing of the inclusive–exclusive distinction are not con-
fined to just free forms, this is precisely what has happened in the Khoekhoe lan-
guages (!Ora, Eini, Nama). According to Güldemann (2002) these languages have
borrowed from the !Ui-Taa-family (Southern Khoisan) the first-person nonsingu-
lar form si and in doing so innovated the inclusive–exclusive distinction in their
free forms. As we see in (25), on the basis of Nama, the bound forms in contrast to
the free exhibit no inclusive–exclusive opposition either in the dual or the plural.
(25) Nama (Hagman 1973: 83, 87)
Free Clitics
1sg m tiíta 1m -ta
1sg f tiíta 1f - ta
1+2m saákxm 1+2; 1+3m -kxm
1+2f saám 1+2; 1+3f -m/-ìm
1+2c saám 1+2; 1+3c -m/-ìm
1+3m siíkxm 1+2+3; 1+3+3m -ke
1+3f siím 1+2+3; 1+3+3f -se
1+3c sim 1+2+3;1+3+3c -tà
1+2+3m saáke
1+2+3f saáse
1+2+3c saáke
1+3+3m siítà
1+3+3f siíse
1+3+3c siíke
As for the distribution of the subtypes of increases vs decreases in the four kinds
of bound person marker, this is presented in Table 5. We see that the dominance of
decreases vs increases holds very clearly for each bound person marker, the differ-
ence between the two ranging from over three times in the case of S and A mark-
ers to nine times in the case of the Poss markers. The fact that Poss markers display
a slightly higher decrease in the encoding of the inclusivity domain vis a vis the
free personal pronouns may be in part due to the fact that they are more closely re-
lated to free possessive pronouns than to the personal ones. Another reason for the
above is that some languages have defective paradigms of bound possessor mark-
ers with bound forms only for certain person and/or number combinations. For ex-
ample in Lele (Frayzyngier 2001: 61), an East Chadic language spoken in Chad, Koh
Lakka (Glidden 1985), a Niger-Congo language of the Adamawa branch spoken on
the boarder of Chad and Cameroon and the North Australian language of the Daly
River family Maranungku (Tryon 1970: 16) there are bound possessor forms only
for singular possessors, while non-singular ones are expressed by free forms. In the
Table 5. Increases and decreases in the encoding of inclusivity in bound person markers rel-
ative to free person markers
Type of difference in the Smrk Amrk Pmrk Possmrk

encoding of inclusivity N=77 N=68 N=69 N=57 N=58
Introduction 9 (13%) 9 (13%) 5 (8.8%) 2 (3.4%)
Elaboration 2 (2.9%) 2 (2.9%) 2 (3.5%) 2 (3.4%)
Sum Increases 11 (16.2%) 11 (15.9%) 7 (12.3%) 4 (6.9%)
Loss 23 (33.4%) 22 (31.9%) 26 (45.6%) 25 (43.1%)
Reduction 13 (11.1%) 9 (13.0%) 9 (15.8%) 11 (19.0%)
Sum Decreases 36 (52.9%) 37 (53.6%) 35 (61.4%) 36 (62.0%)
Total diff 47 (69.1%) 48 (69.6%) 42 (73.6%) 40 (70.0%)
41 (
Papuan language Mountain Koiali (Garland & Garland 1975: 420) and the Brazil-
ian language Trumai (Guirardello 1999), by contrast, there are bound forms only
for the third-person singular and non-singular. Again free person markers are im-
ployed for the other person/number combinations. And in Adzera, an Austronesian
language spoken in the Morobe Province of Papua New Guinea, the bound posses-
sor forms distinguish only person but not number. Consequently, they are used in
conjunction with free forms, which, unlike, the bound display both a number con-
trast and an incl/excl pattern. The paradigms of the relevant Adzera free and bound
forms are given in (26) and examples of the co-occurrence of the bound froms with
the free in (27).
(26) Adzera (Holzknecht 1986: 96–8)
Free Poss
1 dzi -ŋ?-gan?
2 u/agu -m-gam
3 araŋan -n-gan
1+2 (+3) aga/agai
1+3 agal
2+2 agam
3+3 rib
(27) a. dzi gudzu-ŋ?-gaŋ?
1sg head-1-poss
‘my head’
b. agi gudzu-ŋ?-gaŋ?
1incl head-1-poss
‘our (inclusive) heads’
c. aga gudzu-ŋ?gaŋ?
1excl head-1-poss
‘our (exclusive) heads’
Among the decreases, the vast majority are instances of complete loss. This again
holds for each of the bound person markers. Although about three quarters of the
losses are relative to a straightforward incl/excl pattern, all the other possibilities
of complete loss are also attested in our data. An example involving min/aug and
nowe is presented in (28) from the previously mentioned Australian language Ma-
ranungku.
(28) Maranungku (Tryon 1970: 15–16)
Free Poss
1 ngany -ni
2 nina -la/-le/-li
3m nankuny -na
3f ngankuny -nga
1+2 ngangku
1+2+3 kitya
1+3 ngatya
2+2 nitya
3+3 witya
Given that bound markers for the S, A, P and Poss need not all develop at the
same time, nor from the same source, nor grammaticalize at the same rate, it is
difficult to have any strong expectations in regard to which markers should most
likely exhibit a decrease in the encoding of inclusivity vis a vis the free person forms.
The best contenders are indubitably markers of the S and A since they are typically
seen as developing before P markers or Poss markers. They could therefore be ex-
pected to have undergone more desemanticization than the P markers. However,
no strong correlations emerge from the data in Table 5. Among the 28 languages
with both bound A and P markers in which at least one of the two displays a de-
crease in the encoding of inclusivity vis a vis the free pronoun, there are only two
in which the SA marker shows less encoding of inclusivity than the P marker. The
first of these is the Austronesian language Yapese. We see in (29), that the SA weak
forms display reduced encoding of inclusivity as compared to the free forms; the
former exhibit an only incl pattern (there is a separate form covering 1+2 & 1+2+3
but the 1+3 forms are homophonous with the 1), the latter an incl/excl pattern both
in the dual and plural. The P markers, unlike, the SA markers, exhibit the same dis-
tinctions as the free forms.
(29) Yapese (Jensen 1977: 132–42)

Free SA P
1 gaeg gu -eeg
2 guur mu -eem
3 qiir i/Ø Ø
1+2 gadow da -dow
1+3 gamouw gu -mow
2+2 gimeew mu -meew

3+3 yow ra -row
1+2+3 gadaed da -daed
1+3+3 gamaed gu -maed
2+2+3 gimeed mu -meed
3+3+3 yaed ra -raed
The second language is the Australian language Nyulnyul, the person markers of
which are depicted in (30).
(30) Nyulnyul (McGregor 1996: 23, 40, 47)
Free SA P
Nonfut Fut
1 ngay nga- nga- -ngay
2 juy mi- wa-/mi- -juy/ji
3 kinyingk I- yu- Ø
1+2 yay ya- ya- -yay
1+2+3 yarrad ya- ya- -yarrad
1+3 yarrad ya- ya- -yarrad
2+2 kurr ku- wa- -kurr
3+3 irr/yirr i- yu- -yiir
According to McGregor (1996: 23), the free person markers of Nyulnyul formerly
displayed a min/aug pattern of encoding, with the form yadir used for 1+2+3. How-
ever, this form appears to have been lost, as it was lacking from McGregor’s corpus.
Consequently, we have classified the free person markers as displaying a min incl
pattern. This is also the pattern displayed by the P suffixes. The SA prefixes, on the
other hand, have a unif we pattern.16 As the paradigms in (29) and (30) illustrate, in
both languages the P markers are phonologically closer to the free forms than the S
and A markers.
The opposite situation to the above, that is more encoding of inclusivity in A
markers than in P markers occurs more frequently in our sample; it obtains in six
of the 28 languages. Three of these languages, however, display a nowe pattern, i.e.
they simply have no encoding of the first person at all, or no encoding of just the
first-person non-singular. Accordingly, the possibility of encoding inclusivity does
not arise. In another language, Hanis Coos, the P markers are always fused with the
A markers, which is what may underlie the lack of encoding of inclusivity in the P
markers. The remaining two languages which have less marking of inclusivity in P
forms than in A forms are: Guaraní (31) and Kwaza (32), an unclassified language of
Southern Rondonia, Brazil.
(31) Guaraní (Gregores & Suarez 1967: 131, 141)

Free A/S(A) P/S(P)
1 še a- če-
2 ne re- ne-
1+2 yané ya- yane-
1+2+3 yané ya- yane-
1+3 oré ro- yane-
2+2 peẽ pe- pene-
3 o- i-/iy-
(32) Kwaza (van der Voort 2000: 154, 163, 169)
Free SA P
1 si -da -ta
2 çyi -ça -nī’nā
3 ĩ -Ø -Ø
1+2 txana -a -eteja
1+2+3 txana -a -eteja
1+3 tsi’tsğε (si +tsε) -aça -eteja
2+2 çyi’tsε -ça(ça) -eteleçwa
3+3 ĩ -Ø -Ø
In both languages the free and SA forms display an incl/excl pattern, the P markers
a unifwe pattern. We have no explanation to offer for why there should be no mark-
ing of inclusivity in the P forms.
The situation in regard to increases in the encoding of inclusivity among S, A, P
and Poss markers relative to the free forms is analogous to that of decreases. No clear
statistical implications emerge from our data. Analogously to what we observed in
the case of the decreases, the overwhelming majority of the increases involve intro-
ductions rather than elaborations of the marking of inclusivity. The vast majority of
the introductions are relative to a unif we pattern in the free forms, as shown ear-
lier on the basis of Chepang. An introduction involving the other possibility, a nowe
pattern, is illustrated in (33) from the Tanoan language Kiowa in which the inclu-
sive–exclusive distinction is made only in the agentive prefixes. As (33) illustrates
the inclusive is homophonous with the second-person plural and the exclusive with
the third-person inverse.
(33) Kiowa (Watkins 1984: 100, 113, 115)
Free S prefixes
1 n à-
2 ám èm-
3 Ø-
3 inverse è-
1+2(+3) bà-
1+3 è-
2+2 bà-
3+3(hum) á-
4. The encoding of inclusivity and grammaticalization of

person markers
Although, as pointed out by Lehmann (1982a: 236), we should not expect there to
be an 100% correlation among all the various parameters of grammaticalization,
the assumption underlying grammaticalzation theory is that the semantic, mor-
phological and syntactic changes will tend to coincide. This suggests that the less
elaborate encoding of the inclusivity domain in some bound as opposed to free per-
son markers discussed above may have correlates on other dimensions of grammat-
icalization. We will consider two of these, namely the actual morpho-phonological
form of the bound person markers and their co-occurrence possibilities with cor-
responding NPs.17
The bound person markers that we have been considering may be grouped in
terms of their decreasing morphological independence and reduction in phono-
logical form as in (34), with degree of grammaticalization increasing from left to
right.
(34) weak > clitic > affix
All things being equal, the more grammaticalized markers from the point of view
of morpho-phonological form should also exhibit more evidence of decrease in the
encoding of the inclusivity domain, as compared to their free counterparts than the
less grammaticalized markers. In other words, there should be relatively more in-
stances of loss of the marking of inclusivity and reductions in the distinctions made
among the affixes than among the clitics or weak forms.
The distribution of the three types of bound markers among the languages in
the sample is very unbalanced as the affixes are overwhelmingly dominant and the
weak forms very poorly attested. This holds for all four types of person markers, the
S, A, P and Poss. Nonetheless, despite the skewed distribution, the relationship be-
tween morpho-phonological form and degree of encoding of the inclusivity do-
main (relative to free person markers) is as expected. This is documented in Table 6
on the basis of the S markers.
The differences between the types of encoding of inclusivity in S markers as op-
posed to free person markers in weak forms, clitics and affixes are marginal. They
do, however, go in the right direction. There are no instances of loss among the weak
forms and loss among clitics (2.2%) is marginally less frequent than in affixes (7%).
Slightly more robust is the relationship between the encoding of inclusivity in
bound forms relative to free forms and degree of grammaticalization when viewed
in terms of the tripartite typology of bound person markers in (35).18
Table 6. Differences in the encoding of inclusivity between free forms and S markers rela-
tive to morpho-phonological form
Type of difference in the encoding Weak Clitic Affix

of inclusivity N=296 N=5 N=45 N=246
Loss 0 (0%) 1 (2.2%) 18 (7.3%)
Reduction 1 (20.0%) 1 (2.2%) 11 (4.5%)
Increase 0 (0 1 (2.2%) 10 (4.1%)
No difference 4 (80.0%) 42 (93.3%) 207 (84.1%)
208
(35) pronominal agreement markers > ambiguous agreement markers >

syntactic agreement markers
This typology builds on the widely held position that there is no good basis for dis-
tinguishing between agreement and antecedent-anaphora relations, even when
cross-clausal (see e.g. Givón 1976; Moravcsik 1978; Lehmann 1982a,b; Corbett
1991; Andersen 1992). It is based on the co-occurrence possibilities between bound
person markers and their corresponding NPs. Pronominal agreement markers are
markers that are in complementary distribution with their corresponding NPs, be
it nominal or pronominal, in the same construction. One language which has such
person markers is the Carib language Macushi; note the presence of an S person
prefix aa- in (36b) as opposed to (36a).
(36) Macushi (Abbott 1991: 84)
a. u-yonpa-kon João ko’mamî-‘pî miarî
1-relative John remain-past there
‘Our relative John stayed there.’
b. aa-ko’mamî-‘pî asakîne wei kaisarî
3-remain-past two day up:to
‘He remained two days.’
Ambiguous agreement markers are markers which occur both in the presence and
the absence of a corresponding NP in the same construction as in the case of the S/A
prefixes in Gumawana (37), an Oceanic language spoken in the Milne Bay province
of New Guinea.
(37) Gumawana (Olson 1992: 326)
a. Kalitoni i-paisewa
Kalitoni 3sg-work
‘Kalitoni worked.’
b. i-situ vada sinae-na
3sg-enter house inside-3sg(inal)
‘He entered the inside of the house.’
And syntactic agreement markers are markers that necessarily require the presence
of a corresponding NP in the same construction. Such markers are very infrequent
outside western Europe. They are illustrated in (38) on the basis of Dutch.
(38) Dutch
a. Hans zie-t Kees elke dag.
Hans see-2/3sg Kees every day
‘Hans sees Kees every day.’
b. *(Hij) zie-t Kees elke dag.
he see-2/3sg Kees every day
‘He sees Kees every day.’
The increasing degree of grammaticalization from pronominal via ambiguous to
syntactic markers is reflected in their growing reliance on the presence of a cor-
responding NP in the same construction, from inability to co-occur with such an
NP to the inability to occur without such an NP. Given the above, we expect rela-
tively more instances of loss and reductions of the encoding of inclusivity relative
to free forms the further to the right we proceed on the hierarchy in (35). Accord-
ingly, we should find more instances of loss in syntactic markers than in ambiguous
ones, and more in the latter than in pronominal markers. That this is indeed so is
suggested by the figures in Table 7 again pertaining to S markers and excluding lan-
guages with bound forms only for the third person.
As in the case of the weak–clitic–affix distinction, the figures are heavily skewed
due to the fact that distribution of pronominal, ambiguous and syntactic agreement
markers is far from uniform. The vast majority of the bound person markers are
ambiguous ones. Pronominal markers are not uncommon, especially in the case
of P and Poss forms. Syntactic markers in turn are very rare and appear to be found
only in S or A functions. As the figures in Table 7 reveal, pronominal markers are
the least likely and syntactic markers the most likely to exhibit loss or reduction in
the encoding of inclusivity.
Table 7. Differences in the encoding of inclusivity between free forms and S markers rela-
tive to the tripartite typology of agreement markers
Type of difference in the encoding Pronominal Ambiguous Syntactic

of inclusivity N=296 marker N=32 marker N=257 marker N=7
Loss 0 (0%) 18 (7.0%) 2 (28.6%)
Reduction 3 (9.4%) 10 (3.9%) 0 (0%)
Increase 1 (3.1%) 10 (3.9%) 0 (0%)
No difference 28 (87.5%) 219 (85.2%) 5 (71.4%)
6
5. Concluding remarks
Our comparison of the encoding of inclusivity in free and bound person markers
has revealed that there is only a small difference in the frequency with which this
semantic dimension is encoded in free as opposed to bound person markers. Free
person markers are the most likely (42%) and P markers (34%) the least likely to
display some encoding of inclusivity. Nonetheless, this does not mean that the type
of inclusivity distinctions that are encoded in free and bound forms are necessar-
ily the same. We have seen that among the 330 languages in our sample which have
both free and bound person markers (of some type), the same pattern of inclusivity
encoding is manifested in only 74, i.e. 22%. In nearly a quarter of the relevant lan-
guages there are some differences in how inclusivity is encoded in the various per-
son paradigms. The vast majority of these differences involve presence of the en-
coding of inclusivity in free as compared to bound forms, though the reverse is also
found. More subtle differences, involving changes in the type of inclusivity encoded
are attested as well, such as that between minimal augmented and inclusive–exclu-
sive, or inclusive–exclusive and only inclusive etc.
The loss or reduction in the encoding of inclusivity in bound person markers as
compared to free ones correlates with two other facets of the grammaticalization of
bound person markers, namely changes in their morpho-phonological form and
their co-occurrence possibilities with corresponding NPs. The correlations are not
as strong as the parallel path hypothesis would lead one to expect, even assuming
Lehmann’s (1982b: 236) caevet, mentioned at the beginning of section 4. There are
at least two reasons for this. The first is the unbalanced distribution of affixes as
compared to weak forms and clitics, on the one hand, and ambiguous as compared
to both pronominal and syntactic markers on the other. The second is, the poten-
tial lack of a relationship between bound and free forms in some of the languages
considered. Although, bound forms typically derive from free forms, the free forms
in question are not necessarily those currently attested. The above notwithstanding,
the data do suggest that loss and reduction of the encoding of inclusivity are more
common among affixes than among weak or clitic forms, and more common among
syntactic and ambiguous markers than among pronominal ones. Thus, at least as far
as the encoding of inclusivity is concerned, the semantic parameter of grammat-
icalization is in tune with the morpho-phonological and syntactic. To what extent
this holds also for other semantic features encoded together with person, such as
number, gender, politeness etc. remains to be determined.
Abbreviations
1 first person
2 second person
3 third person
an animate
as(A) actor
c common gender
compl completive
du dual
excl exclusive
f feminine gender
hum human
inal inalienable
inan inanimate
incl inclusive
m masculine gender
min/aug minimal augmented
pau paucal
pl plural
poss possessed
ps(P) undergoer
sg singular
tr trial
unif unified
Appendix (N=394)
Africa (N=76)
Amharic, Ani, Arabic (Egyptian), Babungo, Bagirmi, Bambara, Bari, Beja, Berta, Bilin, Bu-
runge, Coptic, Dagare, Diola-Fogny, Dizi, Dogon, Dongolese Nubian, Doyayo, Ewe, Fula,
Fur, Geez, Grebo, Gude, Hamar, Hausa, Hebrew, Igbo, Iraqw, Kanuri, Katla, Kera, Kisi, Koh
(Lakka), Kolokuma (Ijo), Koma, Kongo, Koromfe, Koyra Chiini, Kreol (Mauritian), Krongo,
Kuku, Kunama, Lango, Lele, Luvale, Maale, Maba, Mbay, Mende, Mesalit, Mumuye, Mupun,
Murle, Nama, Nandi, Ndonga, Ngiti, Nkore Kiga, Noon, Nupe, Oromo (Harar), Pari, San-
dawe, Sango, So, Songhay (Koyraboro), Supyire, Swahili, Tamazight (Ayt Ndhi), Turkana, !Xu,
Yaoure, Yoruba, Zande, Zulu
Eurasia (65)
Abkhaz, Ainu, Akkadian, Albanian, Armenian (Eastern), Basque, Bawm, Brahui, Burushaski,
Byansi, Chepang, Chinese (Mandarin), Chukchi, Crimean Tatar, Dagur, Dong, Dutch, En-
glish, Evenki, Finnish, French, Garo, Georgian, German, Gilyak, Greek (Modern), Hindi, Hit-
tite, Hungarian, Hunzib, Ingush, Irish, Italian, Japanese, Ju chen, Kannada, Kashmiri, Ket,
Khalkha, Khasi, Korean, Kurdish (Central), Ladakhi, Lahu, Lak, Latvian, Lepcha, Lezgian,
Limbu, Lushai, Meithei, Mundari, Nenets, Ossetic, Persian, Polish, Remo, Russian, Sema, Spa-
nish, Sumerian, Turkish, Udihe, Welsh, Yukaghir (Kolyma)
South-East Asia (31)
Acehnese, Atayal, Burmese, Chrau, Hmong Njua, Indonesian, Kapampangan, Karo Ba-
tak, Kayah Li, Khmer, Khmu, Konjo, Larike, Makian (West), Mlabri (Minor), Muna, Paiwan,
Rawang, Sahu, Savu, Semelai, Sundanese, Taba, Tagalog, Temiar, Thai, Tidore, Tsou, Tukang-
Besi, Uma, Vietnamese
Oceania (17)
Anejom, Chamorro, Dehu, Fijian, Kiribatese, Kusaiean, Lavukaleve, Malagasy, Maori, Mono
Alu, Paamese, Palauan, Rapanui, Samoan, Tinrin, Ura, Yapese
New Guinea (48)
Abun, Adzera, Alamblak, Amele, Anem, Asmat, Au, Awtuw, Barai, Bukiyip, Daga, Dani (Lo-
wer Grand V), Ekari, Gapun, Gumawana, Hatam, Hua, Imonda, Kaliai Kove, Kapau, Kewa,
Kilivila, Kobon, Koiali (Mountain), Koiari, Maisin, Marind, Maybrat, Nakanai, Nasioi, Salt
(Yui), Selepet, Sentani, Suena, Tauya, Tawala, Tehit, Tigak, Tolai, Una, Vanimo, Wambon,
Wanuma, Waskia, Yava, Yeletnye, Yessan-Mayo, Yimas
Australia (29)
Arabana, Bandjalang, Broken, Cape York Creole, Gooniyandi, Guugu Yimidhirr, Kalkatungu,
Kayardild, Malakmalak, Mangarayi, Maranungku, Martuthunira, Maung, Ngalakan, Nganki-
kurungkurr, Ngiyambaa, Nunggubuyu, Nyulnyul, Panyjima, Pitjantjatjara, Tiwi, Ungarinjin,
Uradhi, Wambaya, Wardaman, Yidin, Yukulta, Yulparija, Yuwaalaraay
North America (54)
Achumawi, Acoma, Atakapa, Cahuilla, Chumash Barbareno, Comanche, Comox, Cora, Cree
(Plains), Greenlandic (West), Haida, Halkomelem, Hanis Coos, Jamul Tiipay, Karok, Kiowa,
Koasati, Kutenai, Lakota, Makah, Maricopa, Mohawk, Mountain Maidu, Navajo, Nez Perce,
Nootka, Oneida, Passamaquoddy, Quileute, Salinan, Seri, Slave, Southeastern Pomo, Squa-
mish, Souther Sierra Miwok, Takelma, Tepehuan (Northern), Tlingit, Tonkawa, Tsimshian
(Coast), Tunica, Umpqua (Lower), Wappo, Wasco-Wishram, Washo, Wichita, Wikchamni,
Wintun, Yaqui, Yuchi, Yupik, Yurok, Zoque (Copainala), Zuni
Meso-America (14)
Chalcatongo Mixtec, Chinantec Lealao, Chocho, Copala-Trique, Jakaltek, Jicaque, Otomi
(Mezquital), Pipil, Sierra Popoluca, Tarascan, Tetelcingo Nahuatl, Totonac (Misantla), Tzu-
tujil, Zapotec San Lucas
South America (60)
Abipon, Amuesha, Apurina, Araona, Arawak (Lokono Dian), Awa Pit, Aymara, Barasano,
Bororo, Bribri, Campa (Axininca), Candoshi, Canela Kraho, Capanahua, Carib, Cav-
inena, Cayuvava, Chacobo, Cubeo, Epena Pedee, Guaraní, Guaymi, Hixkaryana, Ika, Iquito,
Jaqaru, Karitiana, Kawesqar, Kwaza, Makuchi, Mapuche, Marubo, Mataco, Miskito, Nadeb,
Nambikuara, Ndyuka, Palikur, Paumari, Pech, Pirahã, Quechua Imbabura, Rama, Retu-
ara, Sanuma, Saramaccan, Selknam, Shipibo Konibo, Teribe, Tiriyo, Trumai, Urubu Kaapor,
Waorani, Warao, Warekena, Wari, Waura, Witoto (Muinan), Xokleng, Yagua
Notes
1. We will use the term ‘person marker’ rather than ‘pronoun’ as not all bound person forms
are pronominal, i.e. they cannot be used referentially.
2. This characterization of grammaticalization is, of course, a simplification. For a more
detailed analysis of the parameters of grammaticalization see Lehmann (1982a: 234–41;
1982b); Heine & Reh (1984: 16–46), Bybee et al (1994: 19) and Croft (2000: 157–65).
3. The labels for the various patterns of encoding of the first-person complex that we are
using are either directly taken over from Cysouw (2003) or are elaborations of his labels.
4. Our minimal inclusive pattern corresponds to Cysouw’s type P(f) and our augumented
inclusive pattern to his type P(g). Both patterns were attested very poorly in his sample but
are somewhat more common in ours and therefore have been included.
5. The only minimal inclusive pattern is referred to by Greenberg (1988: 9) as the Assini-
boine-type, but Assiniboine can only be regarded as displaying the only minimal inclusive
pattern if the separate number suffixes are taken into account. The paradigm of the actual
person prefixes is of the straightforward unified we type.
6. The same suffixes can also be added to the second- and third-person non-singular to
achieve a dual vs plural reading.
7. This is also the position taken by Corbett (2000) and Cysouw (2003).
8. As we are interested in how the inclusive–exclusive distinction is encoded in free and
bound forms, the sample is skewed in favour of languages which manifest the inclusive–ex-
clusive distinction. Therefore the overall frequency of the encoding of this distinction is about
10% higher than what is suggested by Nichols (1992) or Bickel and Nichols (this volume).
9. We took as definitive of clitc as opposed to affixal status of a form its ability to attach to
a variable host.
10. It is often difficult to determine whether a particular person marker is a clitic, e.g. a pro-
clitic to the VP or a weak pronoun.
11. In the case of Poss markers, somewhat arbitrarily, we took into account only markers
bound to the possessed, not to a classifier or an adposition.
12. These paradigms are often referred to as the unit augmented type. They are considered to
be extensions of the minimal augmented type with the 1+2 category being treated as a “sin-
gular”. For details see McKay (1979).
13. Crevels & Muysken (this volume) note that the only incl pattern is rather common among
the languages of central-western South America. It occurs in just over 20% of the languages
in the area which exhibit some marking of inclusivity.
14. We are not assuming that the current free and bound person markers in a language are
necessarily related. The latter may have developed from forms which are no longer in exist-
ence. It must also be noted that the free forms may in fact be based on the bound
15. It is worth mentioning in this context LaPolla’s (this volume) findings with respect to the
distribution of the encoding of inclusivity among the Tibeto-Burman languages. Of the 41
languages which encode the distinction among free forms only the Kiranti languages and
some Chin languages also encode the distinction among their bound forms.
16. In Nyulyul the non-singular SA prefixes occur with additional plural markers which may
be separated from the person prefixes by tense or mood prefixes. The ya- prefix sometimes
occurs without a plural marker in which case it denotes 1+2. The 1+2 reading, however, is
also available when there is an additional plural marker. Thus it appears that the ya-prefix,
definitely is a unified we one.
17. That semantic reduction should be accompanied by phonetic reduction is particularly
stressed by Bybee et al. (1994: 19).
18. This typology builds on the distinction between anaphoric and syntactic agreement dis-
cussed by Lehmann (1982a: 219) and the distinction between anaphoric and grammatical
agreement elaborated by Bresnan & Mchombo (1986, 1987).
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Chapter 6
Inclusive imperative*
Nina Dobrushina
State University Higher School of Economics, Moscow
Valentin Goussev
Institute of linguistics, Moscow
Imperative is the only verbal category whose clusivity pattern is typically asymmetrical. In
many languages, there is only one first-person plural imperative, which is inclusive, with no
exclusive alternative. This bias towards inclusives is natural: the imperative category is ad-
dressee-oriented and thus not readily compatible with exclusive semantics. We consider data
from languages with rare ‘unbiased’ imperative clusivity patterns using exclusive or neutral
(clusivity-indifferent) imperatives. Another conclusion is that the number opposition in
first-person non-singular imperatives (dual vs. plural) actually is singular vs. plural oppos-
ition that counts addressees. Most languages interpret non-singular first person imperatives
inclusively, as ‘speaker and addressee’ vs. ‘speaker and addressees’. Formally, the number
distinction in first person imperatives is grammaticalised as singular vs. plural.
Keywords: inclusive, exclusive, clusivity, imperative, addressee, (co)hortative
1. Introduction
Most work dedicated to the clusivity phenomenon has dealt with the independent
pronouns or, more rarely, with the verb “in general”; in the majority of cases, the
author has investigated only indicative forms. However, there is a part of the verbal
system in which the inclusive–exclusive distinction turns out to be much more im-
portant. This is the imperative.
Of all inclusives, the form which is most likely to appear in a language is the first-
person plural imperative. It expresses the exhortation to the addressee to carry out
an action together with the speaker. Along with requests or commands, the invita-
tion to a common action is one of the most frequent activities in human life. All lan-
guages we know of have a certain means to express it, using either a morphologically
dedicated form (like Tatar (Turkic) aš-ijk! ‘let’s eat!’) or some other means (like Eng-
lish Let’s go! or German Lass uns arbeiten! ‘let’s work!’). There is a great variety of la-
bels used for these forms; they are referred to as hortative (Bybee, Perkins & Pagliuca
1994: 179), exhortative (Chung & Timberlake 1985: 247), jussive (Palmer 1986: 111),
cohortative (van der Auwera & Ammann 2002), or first-person plural imperative
180 Nina Dobrushina and Valentin Goussev
( Xrakovskij (ed.) 2001: 24). Here, we adopt the last of these terms, assuming that,
despite an obvious particularity of meaning, these constructions have enough in
common with the usual second person imperatives to be called by the same term.
Not one of the numerous works dedicated to clusivity takes non-indicative verbal
forms into account. The present chapter seeks to attract attention to the inclusive for-
mation that is most widespread across languages, the inclusive imperative. Our aim
is to show that the imperative is more receptive to the inclusive–exclusive distinc-
tion than any other verbal form. It is typical for the imperative to distinguish between
exclusive and inclusive forms even if other moods do not make this distinction. We
shall try to show that this peculiarity of the imperative results from its semantics.
In Section 2 we consider the possible types of interaction between clusivity and
the semantics of the imperative. The exclusive meaning is not typical for the imper-
ative; however, dedicated exclusive imperative forms exist and we discuss their pos-
sible interpretations in Section 2.1. In Section 2.2, we cite examples of languages
that distinguish exclusive and inclusive forms in the imperative but nowhere else.
In Section 2.3, we proceed to the languages which have only one form in first-per-
son plural imperative — the inclusive one. Some examples of languages which
nevertheless make no distinction between exclusive and inclusive imperatives will
be cited in Section 2.4.
In Section 3, we argue that the imperative prefers the inclusive meaning. That
means that in the languages which have both inclusive and exclusive imperatives
the form of the inclusive imperative occurs much more frequently. Also, the inclu-
sive interpretation is more natural than the exclusive one in languages which allow
both interpretations. For instance, English let us work will normally be understood
as an invitation to work addressed to the hearer (at least some speakers accept this
interpretation only). The semantics of the imperative offers an explanation of why
the imperative prefers inclusivity.
Section 4 examines the forms of inclusive imperatives that are often called “first-
person dual” as opposed to “first-person plural”. Our survey of languages has shown
that the contrast of two inclusive imperatives in which the number of addressees is
grammaticalised is also very widespread. The distinction of inclusive imperatives
addressed to one person from those addressed to several persons is typical for lan-
guages which have no dual–plural opposition anywhere else. We refer to these op-
positions as minimal inclusive imperative vs. augmented inclusive imperative (in-
stead of dual vs. plural), at least in the languages which do not distinguish between
dual and plural. Thus, the inclusive imperative often distinguishes more categories
than other inclusives. We suggest an explanation for this fact.
2. Clusivity within and beyond the imperative
The main function of the imperative is to urge the addressee to perform an action.
Thus, the central form in the imperative paradigm is the second person. The first-
Inclusive imperative 181
person inclusive imperative is also common in the languages of the world, since the
addressee is one of its referents. While the second person imperative means that the
speaker requests the addressee to perform an action, the inclusive forms imply that
the speaker requests the addressee to perform an action together with himself (i.e.
with the speaker). Although somewhat less frequent, third person imperatives are
attested in most languages; here, the addressee plays a part of mediator between the
speaker and the non-locutor. As a rule, it is implied that he communicates the or-
der/request to the non-locutor or requests him to perform an action (Let him bring
the book = ‘Make him know that he has to bring the book’/‘make him bring the
book’). The first-person exclusive imperative, on the contrary, has no plausible im-
perative interpretation. Since this form combines the speaker and the non-locutor
in a group as opposed to the addressee, the latter cannot play a part of a mediator
between them, as in the third person imperative. The first-person singular is like-
wise incompatible with an imperative meaning. It is possible in some situations to
give an order to oneself. But then the speaker treats himself as a hearer, so the sec-
ond-person form is appropriate here; cf. Palmer’s (1986: 111) example Keep calm (=
I must keep calm). To the best of our knowledge, no language uses a first person im-
perative form in such contexts.
Thus, the imperative situation implies a set of specific relations between speech
act participants. In the following sections, we will consider how this is reflected in
inclusive–exclusive imperative morphology.
2.1. Exclusive imperatives

Though quite untypical, the exclusive imperative occurs in some languages. This
form is usually called imperative because it is formally (morphologically) homoge-
neous with genuine imperative forms. Indeed, there are languages which possess a
full paradigm of imperative forms, available in all person–number combinations.
For instance, Even (Tungusic) is very rich in imperatives. It has three imperative
paradigms. One of them is only available in the second person, first-person inclu-
sive, and third person, but the other two have all person–number forms, including
exclusive (Malchukov 2001). See the paradigms of the verb ga- ‘take’:
Imperative 1 Imperative 2 Imperative 3

SG 1 ga-da-k.u ga-d’inga-v
2 ga-li ga-da-j ga-nga-nri
3 (ga-gan) ga-da-n ga-d’inga.va-n
PL 1 inclusive ga-gar (ga-galda) (ga-da-t/ga-davur) ga-d’inga-vur
1 exclusive ga-da-k.un ga-d’inga-vun
2 ga-lra/ga-lilra ga-da-vur ga-nga-san
3 (ga-gatan) ga-da-tan ga-d’inga.vu-tan
As is clear from the table, both exclusive forms of Imperative-2 and Imperative-3
have the same marker as the rest of the imperative paradigms (-da-, -d’inga-).
What do the exclusive imperative forms mean — provided they cannot have any
plausible imperative interpretation? For one possible option consider evidence
from Even presented in the Malchukov’s comprehensive description.
The Even exclusive imperative in -da-k.un is said to be “semantically close to in-
dicative verb forms” (Malchukov 2001: 163). The main use of this form, like that of
the first-person singular, is to ask for permission or to give consent. In Malchukov’s
opinion, “there is certain evidence that first-person [. . .] forms in -da-ku [1st sg.]
and -da-kun [1st excl.] are currently developing into future indicative forms; for ex-
ample, they may be used in interrogative sentences to ask for permission [. . .] which
can be described as a deviation from their prototypical imperative function” (Mal-
chukov 2001: 172).
In our opinion, these usages of the imperative (deliberative questions and re-
quest for permission) do not necessarily indicate the development of the Even ex-
clusive imperative into future indicative. These meanings are quite common for
“central” imperative forms, such as first-person inclusive and second person (cf.
Goussev 2002: 196–7).
Thus, although incompatible with the core imperative meaning (a request to per-
form an action), exclusive forms share its peripheral meanings. These are basically
deliberative questions and, for the first person, requests for permission and state-
ments of intention.
We illustrate these meanings with data from Khakas (a Turkic language of South-
ern Siberia). There exist three forms of the first-person non-singular imperative.
Two of them are inclusive, distinguished by the number of the addressee: the form
in ‑aŋ1 refers to one addressee (traditionally called dual, cf. Baskakov 1975: 189),
while the form in -aŋar2 refers to several addressees (traditional “plural”). The third
form, in -ibïs, is cited among various other forms of the imperative in Baskakov
(ed.) (1975: 189) and Anderson (1998: 31–3). The former description does not pro-
vide any interpretation of this form, while the latter considers it as a “form of con-
sent”. Our field work in the Sagay dialect of Khakas (see n. 3) shows that in this dia-
lect the form in -ibïs functions as a first-person plural exclusive imperative in Even
(thus, it cannot be used in the context of consent).
Note, that, unlike Even, the Khakas form in -ibïs has no formal markers common
with other imperative forms, which is not surprising, since the Khakas imperative
paradigm has no common imperative marker at all:
Singular Dual inclusive Plural inclusive Exclusive
1 -îm -aŋ -aŋ-ar -ibïs
2 -∅ -ŋar
3 -sïn -sïn-nar
We consider the form in -ibïs to be an imperative on typological grounds. As is
shown below, this form has the same set of usages as the Even exclusive impera-
tive. The interrogative context is illustrated by example (1a), while (1b) is a request
for permission, and (1c) states an intention (-îps is the dialectal variant of the liter-
ary ‑ibïs):
(1) Khakas (personal fieldwork)3
a. Abakan-zar xajdî par-îps?
Abakan-lat how go-imp.1pl.excl
‘How can we get to Abakan?’
b. Pis seg’e polïs pîr-îps (šibe).
we you.sg.dat help give-imp.1pl.excl (part)
‘Let us help you/Do you want that we help you?’
c. Sîn ps-ke künek pîr, a pis sege sug axl
you.sg we-dat bucket give and we you.sg.dat water bring
pîr-îps.
give-imp.1pl.excl
‘Give us a bucket, we’ll bring you water.’
Cf. a similar example from Maba (Nilo-Saharan, Maban):
(2) Maba (Trenga 1947: 117)
Mi-ag né-ta-nu bur’-zi ka manél’ né!
you.sg-emph have.2sg-emph-cond do-imp we hear imp.1/3
‘If you have (something to say), say (it), we shall listen.’
The same range of meanings is characteristic of the form that can be referred to
as first-person singular imperative. Because it is more widespread than the exclu-
sive imperative, it is also usually identified on formal grounds. For instance, the
first-person singular imperative is found in most Turkic languages and is usually
marked in the same way as the first-person plural imperative. Compare these two
forms in Balkar (fieldnotes of Nina Dobrushina): bar-aj-ym (go-imp.1-sg), bar-aj-
yq (go-imp.1-pl). In its most common usage, the Balkar first-person singular im-
perative conveys the intention to perform an action and at the same time a request
for permission.
In Bamana (Niger-Congo, Mande), an indispensable element of the first-person
singular imperative situation “is the presence of a ‘higher-authority’ listener who is
expected in some way or other to endorse the action to be performed by the speaker”
(Bergelson 2001: 493). In Bamana, as well as in many other languages, a first-person
singular imperative utterance suggests that “instead of actually urging himself/her-
self to perform the action, the speaker rather applies to the listener for a permission
to do so” (ibid.).
A number of Russian hortative constructions are formed with the particle davaj,
derived from the verb davat’ ‘give’. This particle is used to build inclusive form of
the imperative, but it also occurs in several constructions which do not have the
addressee among their referents.
(3) Russian
a. Davaj ja je-j pozvon’-u.
part.sg I she.dat call.fut-1sg
‘Let me call her.’
b. Davaj on je-j pozvon’-it.
part.sg he she.dat call.fut-3sg
‘Let him call her.’
According to the analysis of Podlesskaya (2005), these constructions “are used in
the interactive register as the speaker’s request for the hearer’s approval”, particu-
larly to ask if the hearer has any objections.
The contexts of asking for permission and giving consent, typical for Even and
Khakas exclusive imperatives, are interpretable in terms of what is generally admit-
ted to be core imperative semantics. Indeed, both situations imply the participation
of the addressee; he is expected to permit the action. Thus, even those imperative
forms which don’t have the addressee among their referents still include an appeal
to the addressee. There is more evidence of the addressee’s role in the first person
imperative situation to be discussed in Section 4.1.
2.2. Inclusive vs. exclusive

The fact that some languages have an exclusive form of the imperative can be ex-
plained by a tendency to have a full imperative paradigm parallel to that of the in-
dicative.
This explanation, however, can be applied only to the languages which have an
opposition of inclusive and exclusive forms in other parts of language apart from
imperative (like Even). Amazingly, there are languages which mark this distinction
only in the imperative.
The first example is Khakas. In Khakas, neither pronouns nor possessive suffixes
nor non-imperative verb forms distinguish between inclusive and exclusive mean-
ings; see the personal pronoun paradigm and the present tense indicative forms in
Baskakov (ed.) (1975: 146, 201–2):
(4) Khakas
a. Pronouns
Singular Plural
1 mîn pis
2 sîn sirer
3 ol olar
b. present indicative forms of the verb at- ‘shoot’
Singular Plural
1 at-ča-m at-ča-bïs
2 at-ča-zïŋ at-ča-zar
3 at-ča at-ča-lar
In the imperative, as mentioned above, there exist three forms of the first-person
non-singular: 1Du inclusive (-aŋ), 1Pl inclusive (-aŋar), and 1Pl exclusive (-ibïs).
Here are examples from the Sagay dialect:
(5) Khakas, Sagay dialect (personal fieldwork)
a. Abakan-zar par kîl-eŋ.
Abakan-all go come-imp.1du.incl
‘Let’s (you-singular and me) go to Abakan.’
b. Abakanan-zar par kîl-eler.
Abakan-all go come-imp.1pl.incl
‘Let’s (you-plural and me) go to Abakan.’
c. Pis par kîl-îps Abakan-zar, a sîn mïnda xal
we go come-imp.1pl.excl Abakan-all and you.sg here remain
tur-Ø.
stand-imp
‘We (two or more) go to Abakan, and you stay here.’
The inclusive form in the latter example is also possible, but only when the speaker
changes the addressee:
d. Abakan-zar par kîl-eler, a sîn mïnda xal
Abakan-all go come-imp.1pl.incl and you.sg here remain
tur-Ø.
stand-imp
‘Let us (all) go to Abakan, and you (addressing to another person)
stay here.’
Cf. another pair of examples with a similar semantic distinction:
(6) Khakas (personal fieldwork)
a. Pis îb-zer par-îps šibe, am orəj.
we house-all go-imp.1pl.excl part now late
‘We’ll go home, it is late already’ (for instance, when a guest is speak-
ing to the host).
b. Îb-zer par-aŋ, am orəj.
house-all go-imp.1du.incl now late
‘Let’s go home, it is late already’ (a guest speaking to another guest).
The second example is West Greenlandic (Eskimo-Aleut). Its imperative paradigm
is illustrated below (we cite the markers for intransitive verbs):
(7) West Greenlandic (Fortescue 1984: 291)
a. Singular Plural
1 -la-nga Excl. -la-ta
Incl. -ta
2 -git -git-si
3 -li -li-t
Nowhere except in the imperative are inclusive and exclusive forms distinguished.
Compare the set of personal suffixes of intransitive verbs in the indicative (ibid.:
288):
b. Singular Plural
1 -vunga -vugut
2 -vutit -vusi
3 -vuq -pput
Thus, the distinction of inclusive from exclusive forms in Khakas and West Green-
landic imperatives cannot be explained by a tendency to comply with the general
pattern of person marking in the same language. We claim that the reason is that
the inclusive–exclusive distinction is of more importance in the imperative than in
any other part of language.
It seems that a similar system with an inclusive–exclusive distinction in the im-
perative only exists in Nanai (Avrorin 1959–61, II: 128, 130–5). However, three lan-
guages are not many. If the inclusive–exclusive distinction is so important for the
imperative, one might expect to find systems similar to those of Khakas and West
Greenlandic across the world. Apparently, the absence of such systems is due to the
fact that the imperative not only tends to distinguish between the exclusive and
inclusive meanings but also clearly prefers the latter.
2.3. Inclusive only

One can hardly imagine a language which would have no means of expressing ex-
clusive reference, i.e. of saying ‘we (without you)’, at all. However, for the imperative,
the lack of exclusives is typical.
Since a request is normally directed to the addressee and may not easily be ap-
plied to the speaker or non-locutors, exclusive forms may not have a standard im-
perative interpretation. It thus seems a plausible hypothesis that most languages
would not provide a means to convey an atypical meaning. This hypothesis is sup-
ported by our data. The inclusive interpretation of a first-person plural imperative
form is always the preferred one. Moreover, in the imperative, unlike with pronouns
and in other moods, most languages have no means to express the exclusive mean-
ing at all. This type of imperative system is rather widespread.4
We cite here the example of Spanish (like most European languages, Spanish nor-
mally does not mark clusivity). In Spanish, it is impossible to use first-person plural
imperative forms if the hearer is not involved in the action. Thus, the following ex-
amples are not well-formed:
(8) Spanish (César Montoliu-García, p.c.)

a. *Vámonos
y vosotros quedaos aquí.
go.imp.1pl and you.pl remain.imp.2pl here
?‘Let us go and you (pl.) remain here.’
b. *Hagamos
la comida y tú, mientras, descansa un poco.
do.imp.1pl the meat and you.sg while rest.imp.2sg a few
?‘Let us cook and you (sg.) take a rest in the meantime.’
The only way to make the first example correct is to break it into two sentences and
change the addressee; one would first speak to those who are going away and then
to those who stay:
(9) Spanish
Vámonos. Y vosotros quedaos aquí.
go.imp.1pl and you.pl remain.imp.2pl here
‘Let us go. And you remain here.’
Otherwise the present form is necessary. Note that the present tense does not im-
pose any restrictions on the involvement or non-involvement of the addressee:
(10) Spanish
Nosotros nos vamos y vosotros os quedáis aquí.
we refl go.prs.1pl and you.pl refl go.prs.2pl here
‘We are leaving ,and you will be staying here.’
With virtually all Spanish verbs (the only exception is ir ‘go’), the first-person plural
imperative is formally identical to the subjunctive. Note that in non-imperative us-
ages, the subjunctive is acceptable in both exclusive and inclusive contexts:
(11) Spanish
Nadie se cree que hagamos la comida mientras
nobody refl believe.prs.3sg that do.subj.1pl the meat while
tú descansas.
you.sg rest.prs.2sg
‘Nobody believes that we shall cook while you will rest.’
(Cf. example (8b), in which the form hagamos — formally the same — was impossi-
ble in an exclusive context.)
French has a similar system: in the imperative, forms like chantons ‘let us sing’
can only have an inclusive reading. But when used as present indicatives, the same
forms can have both meanings: [nous] chantons ‘we sing with you’ or ‘without you’.
In Hungarian (Finno-Ugric), the first-person plural imperative forms are only
used inclusively. So, a form like men-j-ünk ‘go-imp-1pl’ means an invitation to go
addressed to the hearer and cannot be used in reference to the speaker and a non-
locutor. In the latter case, the present form megy-ünk must be used.5
In Japanese, the first-person plural imperative has no exclusive interpretation:
(12) Japanese6
*Watashi-tachi
wa ik-oo ga anata wa koko ni noko-tte ne.
I-pl top go-imp.1 but you top here dat stay-conv part
‘We will go but you stay here.’
According to Sridhar (1990: 33–4), in Kannada (Dravidian) the first person impera-
tive form (with the suffix -o:Na) is only possible in an inclusive meaning, at least in
independent sentences.
In Aghul (North-East Caucasian, Lezgic), a combination of the hortative par-
ticle ša(w) (derived from the verb ‘to come’) and the infinitive/future of the main
verb is used only if the addressee is involved:
(13) Aghul (Solmaz Merdanova, p.c.)

ša(w) xin meʕni q’-a-s(-e)
part we.incl song make-ipf-inf-(fut)
‘Let us sing!’
According to Frajzyngier (2002: 274), in Hdi (Chadic) second person imperatives

have no overt subjects, while other forms of the imperative are used with pronouns.
Frajzyngier notes that “the only subject pronouns that can be added to the impera-
tive are first-person dual inclusive and first-person plural inclusive”. From this it fol-
lows that the first-person exclusive is impossible (together with third person imper-
atives).7
In Russian, the future indicative form is normally used in the first-person plural
imperative meaning. Although it is usually interpreted inclusively, some speakers
allow exclusive interpretation. Apart from the future indicative, there exists a dedi-
cated first-person plural imperative form, which is used for several addressees (or
for one addressee in polite register). It is formed by addition of the second-person
plural ending -te to the first-person plural future (=first-person plural imperative)
form: pojdem-te ‘let’s go (we all)’. This form is always inclusive; examples like (14)
are ungrammatical:
(14) Russian
*Pojd-em-te, a vy ostavaj-te-s’.
go.fut-1pl-2pl and you.pl remain.imp-2pl-refl
?‘Let’s go and you remain (here).’
Finally, let us cite the examples of Negidal (Tungusic) and Limbu (Tibeto-Burman).
Unlike the languages mentioned so far in this section, these two distinguish inclu-
sive and exclusive forms both in pronouns and in verbs. Again, the imperative is an
exception: it has no exclusive forms. Thus in Limbu, in which exclusive and inclu-
sive forms are distinguished in the first-person dual and plural indicative, only the
inclusive forms can drop their subject prefix (which is the only means to form im-
peratives; van Driem 1987: 184). For Negidal, see the paradigms of the present in-
dicative tense and of the imperative (the verb va- ‘kill’; Tsintsius 1997: 198):
(15) Negidal
a. Present Indicative
Singular Plural
1 vā-m Excl. vā-ya-vun
Incl. vā-ya-p
2 vā-s vā-sun
3 vā-ya-n vā-ya
b. Imperative
Singular Plural
1 vā-xta Excl. —
Incl. vā-ŋaj
2 vā-xal vā-xan
3 vā-ŋin vā-ŋi
In other words, languages usually distinguish between inclusive and exclusive im-
peratives, but most of them do so simply by not having exclusive imperatives at all.
2.4. No inclusive–exclusive distinction

There is one more possible type of first-person plural semantics. The so-called “neu-
tral”, or “unified”, first-person plural marker (which can convey both inclusive and
exclusive meanings) is widespread in non-imperatives (108 languages in the sam-
ple of Cysouw 2001): “The meaning of a morpheme like the English ‘we’ is best
characterised as a group of more than one person, including the present speaker,
but unmarked as to the other persons in the group” (Cysouw 2001: 75). In imper-
atives, the “unified” type is very rare. We know of three languages which are not
sensitive to the involvement vs. non-involvement of the addressee in first-person
plural imperative forms; see below in this section.
Compare the following Nganasan (Samoyedic) example from a legend:
(16) Nganasan
Ŋəmsu-muʔ bətə-bü-tü, əmə heliə kəi-təə kubu
meat-1pl remain-cond-3sg this other side-adj.loc hide.gen
təhuəd’aʔku-təni̮ ŋimiaʔ-kuə-mi̮ʔ . . . Tənə ŋimiaʔ-kə-tə,
remnant-loc drag-imp.fut-1pl.o you.sg drag-imp.fut-2sg.o
ńi-sy tonuntə-ʔ . . . Mi taa-j tonuʔ-kuə-mi.
neg-inf whip-cn we.du reindeer-acc.pl whip.up-imp.fut-1du.o
‘If some meat remains, we‘ll drag it on the side of this hide . . . You drag (the
meat) without whipping (the reindeer). . . We two, we’ll whip the reindeer.’
There are three brothers here who have just killed a wild reindeer. The elder brother
decides how its carcass (if any of it remains after they will have eaten) will be
brought home. First, he addresses both of his interlocutors, explaining to them the
way in which three of them will bring the meat. He uses the first-person plural form;
if he meant himself and only one of his younger brothers, the dual would be appro-
priate. Then, he addresses only the youngest (this is known from the context): it is
he who will drag the meat, and the two elder brothers (note the dual ending) will
whip the reindeers.
Here we see that the same form (except for the usual difference of dual and plural)
is used first in the inclusive meaning (‘we all’) and then in the exclusive one (‘we two
without you’).
An example in which the second person and the first person imperatives are used
in the same sentence is (17); compare the inadmissibility of such contexts in Span-
ish (8) and Russian (14) above:
(17) Nganasan
Təə ďaδikü mi̮-ŋi̮-ri, tə, mii büü-gü-ni.
that.gen to go-imp.2–du.s part we.du leave-imp.1–du.r
‘You (two children) go that way, and we (the speaker and his wife) are leaving.’
Similarly, in Upper Chuvash (Turkic) the same imperative form can be used in both
exclusive and inclusive contexts:
(18) Upper Chuvash (personal fieldwork)
a. Xuzana kaj-ar!
Kazan go-imp.1pl
‘Let’s go to Kazan!’
b. Ese jaška š ji, epir parank š ji-er
you.sg soup eat.imp.2sg we potato eat-imp.1pl
‘Eat the soup, and we (exclusive) will eat potato.’
c. — Man-ăn ăn-a čin-es kil j-mes-t j
I he-acc call-part.fut want-neg-prs.3sg
‘— I don’t want to invite him.’
— Epir ăn-a čin-er.
we he-acc call-imp.1pl
‘— Let us invite him then!’
In Balkar (Turkic), the first-person plural imperative form allows both inclusive
and exclusive interpretations:
(19) Balkar (personal fieldwork)
a. Üge bar-ajyq!
home go-imp.1pl
‘Let’s go home!’
b. Biz üge bar-ajyq, sen mïnda qal.
we home go-imp.1pl you.sg here stay.imp
‘We (exclusive) shall go home, and you, you stay here.’
Note that none of these languages distinguishes exclusive and inclusive forms in
pronouns or non-imperative verb forms.8
Nganasan, Chuvash, and Balkar exemplify the rare type of language whose first-
person plural imperative allows the exclusive interpretation as well as the inclu-
sive one. Nevertheless, the exclusive usage is so rare and atypical that it is not easily
found among the examples in descriptive grammars. The first-person plural imper-
ative form is generally understood as an appeal to the addressee, and other mean-
ings are not likely.
3. The preference for inclusivity
The following is a list of linguistic types according to how a language treats the
inclusive–exclusive opposition in the imperative and elsewhere.
• The language has both inclusive and exclusive imperatives, and clusivity occurs
elsewhere, e.g. in pronouns (Even).
• The language has an inclusive imperative only, and clusivity occurs elsewhere in
the language (Kannada, Aghul).
• The language has both inclusive and exclusive imperatives but lacks clusivity else-
where (Khakas, West Greenlandic).
• The language has an inclusive imperative only and lacks clusivity elsewhere
(Spanish, Hungarian, Japanese).
• The language has just the first-person plural imperative used both in- and exclu-
sively, and lacks clusivity elsewhere (Nganasan, Chuvash, Balkar).
What we did not find are languages which have an opposition of inclusive/exclu-
sive in pronouns or non-imperative verbs but do not distinguish clusivity in the
imperative. Presumably, they do not exist. Our hypothesis is that the inclusive-
exclusive distinction can not be absent in the imperative but present
elsewhere. The inclusive bias of the imperative is an effect of core imperative se-
mantics.
In all tense–aspect–mood categories except in imperative, the opposition be-
tween inclusive and exclusive (including first-person singular; cf. the bold line in
Figure 1) meanings is independent of the TAM categories. In We write or We walk,
the meaning of the present tense and that of the indicative mood remain the same
whether we write or walk with or without the hearer, so there are no particular rea-
sons to mark this distinction if it is not marked in the language anyway.
1Pl.excl
1Sg
1Pl.incl
2Sg 2Pl
3Sg 3Pl
Figure 1.
For the imperative, this opposition becomes crucial. As we said, the 1Sg and 1Pl
exclusive forms cannot be used in the standard imperative meaning. Roughly, we
can say that there can be no imperative above the bold line in the Figure 1.
4. Counting the addressees
The centrality of the role of the addressee in the imperative has another reflection
in the first-person plural imperative. The grammatical meaning that is most fre-
quently distinguished in the forms of first-person plural imperatives is the number
of addressees. Below, we consider the semantic and formal varieties of the first-per-
son plural imperative which deal with the number of addressees.9
4.1. Number distinctions in the first-person plural imperative

Apart from first-person plural imperative, many grammars mention the form of
first-person dual imperative. An example is the African language Dogon (isolate)
(Plungian 1995), in which the first-person inclusive imperative distinguishes be-
tween plural and dual forms:
(20) Dogon (Plungian 1995: 27)
a. yaa-mεŋ
go-imp.1pl
‘let’s go!’ (you-plural and me)
b. yaa-mɔ
go-imp.1du
‘let’s go!’ (you-singular and me)
In this section, we show that what is referred to as an opposition of dual and plural
is more likely to be an opposition of minimal vs. augmented inclusives.10 The min-
imal inclusive (= dual) imperative expresses exhortation to one addressee, thus re-
ferring to a group of two people, the speaker and the addressee. The augmented
inclusive (=plural) imperative expresses exhortation to the speaker and several ad-
dressees or one or more addressees plus non-locutor(s).
Minimal and augmented inclusive imperatives are opposed to basic inclusive
imperatives, which do not distinguish the number of referents. An example of a lan-
guage with a construction of the latter type is Aghul, which expresses the first-per-
son plural imperative by a combination of the particle ša(w) with the bare stem of
the main verb or its infinitive. This construction is used as an invitation to one or
more persons, and there is no grammatical means to make the construction less
ambiguous; see (21)).
Table 1. Semantic types of inclusive imperatives
Basic inclusive imperative The speaker + the addressee(s) / the addressee(s)

and non-locutor(s)
Minimal (=dual) inclusive imperative The speaker + the addressee
Augmented inclusive imperative The speaker + the addressees / the addressee(s)
and non-locutor(s)
(21) Aghul (Solmaz Merdanova, p.c.)

ša(w) xin meʕni q’-a-s(-e)
part we.incl song make-ipf-inf-(fut)
‘Let us sing!’ (you-singular or you-plural and me)
Different types of inclusive imperatives are presented in Table 1.
The contrast of minimal and augmented inclusive imperatives is very widespread
across languages. Many languages have minimal and augmented inclusive imper-
atives along with basic imperative, thus having three forms of inclusive imperative.
In this case, the basic inclusive appears to be formally less complex than minimal
and augmented inclusives, which are derived from the basic inclusive. For instance,
Hebrew uses a future indicative form with first-person plural imperative meaning:
(22) Hebrew (Malygina 2001: 274)
nelex
go.fut.1pl
‘Let’s go!’ (you-plural or you-singular and me)
This form can be modified with the particle bo’, which is an imperative of the verb ‘to
come’. In the singular, this yields a minimal inclusive imperative, while in the plural
it forms an augmented inclusive imperative:
(23) Hebrew (Malygina 2001: 274)
a. bo’ nelex
come.imp.2sg.m go.fut.1pl
‘Let’s go!’ (you-singular and me)
b. bo’-u nelex
come.imp.2m-pl go.fut.1pl
‘Let’s go!’ (you-plural and me)
Russian is another language that derives inclusives distinguished as minimal vs.
augmented from a basic inclusive. In Russian, several patterns of inclusive impera-
tive are present. Just as in Hebrew, the basic inclusive is expressed by a present or fu-
ture indicative:
(24) Russian
Pojd-em!
go.fut-1pl
‘Let’s go!’ (you-singular or you-plural and me)
Another possibility is a combination of the particle davaj (< second person impera-
tive of the verb davat’ ‘to give’) and the future, present, or infinitive of the main verb.
The singular and plural forms of this particle denote minimal and augmented inclu-
sive, respectively:
(25) Russian
a. Davaj pojd-em!
part.2sg go.fut-1pl
b. Davaj-te pojd-em!
part-2pl go.fut-1pl
Apart from constructions with the particle davaj(te), the Russian augmented inclu-
sive can also be formed by attaching a second-person plural marker to the first-per-
son plural of a present or future indicative verb. Compare (26a) and (26b):
(26) Russian
a. Pojd-em-te!
go.fut-1pl-2pl
‘Let us go!’ (you-plural and me)
b. Idi-te!
go-2pl
‘Go!’ (you-plural)
This form, however, is nowadays restricted to a number of verbs — first of all idti ‘go’
and its derivative pojti ‘go, leave’. Though pojdem-te formally matches pojdem, they
do not match semantically. While the first is an augmented inclusive form, the latter
is not specialised to the expression of a minimal inclusive meaning only. It can be
addressed to one or more persons, though the second usage is already nontypical
for it. We suppose that this form shows a preceding stage of grammaticalisation. We
would expect that pojdem is likely to shift to the expression of an appeal to a single
addressee only, thus developing into the minimal inclusive category.
The opposition of minimal vs. augmented inclusive imperatives is very common
across languages. Minimal and augmented forms are often formally derived from
a basic imperative, while the opposite direction of grammaticalisation is not ob-
served. The frequency of this opposition is much higher among imperatives than
among personal pronouns and non-imperative personal affixes. According to
Michael Cysouw’s data, the opposition of minimal vs. augmented inclusive in non-
imperatives is found only in 24 languages out of 257 (Cysouw 2001: 344). Indeed,
there are many languages which distinguish minimal and augmented forms in the
first person imperative only. That is the case with Dogon, Awa Pit (South-American,
Barbacoan), Khakas (Turkic), and many other languages. They have neither duals
nor a minimal/augmented opposition outside inclusive imperative forms.
The question arises, why is the opposition of minimal and augmented inclusives
so typical for imperatives?
By uttering a second person imperative, the speaker tries to cause somebody to
perform an action. This somebody is the subject of this action. So, the number ex-
pressed in the imperative form shows the quantity of causees and the quantity of
subjects at the same time, because all causees are subjects and vice versa.
The first-person plural is the only imperative form in which the number of cau-
sees does not match the number of subjects. Causees are addressees (or sometimes
addressees and non-locutors), but the action has to be performed by them together
with the speaker. The number of subjects is always greater than that of causees.
Which number is to be coded in the first-person plural imperative, then? Most
European languages (such as English and French) indicate only the number of
subjects; so English let’s go can refer to two persons (i.e. one causee) or more than
two (two or more causees). However, as we have seen, many languages (e.g. Rus-
sian) indicate both number values: that of the subjects (by use of the non-singular
form of the verb—pojd-em ‘go.fut-1pl’)—and that of the causees (by use of spe-
cial markers—davaj pojd-em ‘part.2sg go.fut-1pl’, davaj-te pojd-em ‘part-2pl
go.fut‑1pl’).
Remarkably, a similar opposition is found even in first-person singular impera-
tive, that is, in the form which does not have addressee among its referents. Cf. these
example from Russian:
(27) Russian
a. Davaj-ka ja je-mu pozvon’-u.
part.sg-part.imp I he-dat call.fut-1sg
‘Let me call him’ (an appeal to one addressee).
b. Davaj-te-ka ja je-mu pozvon’-u.
part-2pl-part.imp I he.dat call.fut-1sg
‘Let me call him’ (an appeal to several addressees).
As discussed above (cf. Section 2.1), although the addressee is neither the subject
nor the causee of the first-person singular imperative, the addressee still plays an
important role in the situation which is denoted by this form.
Thus, the number of the causees turns out to be so crucial for the imperative that
it is reflected in the opposition of minimal vs. augmented forms.
4.2. Formal patterns of inclusive imperatives

In this section, we consider inclusive imperatives of different types from a formal
standpoint. Our main interest is the contrast between minimal and augmented im-
peratives (Section 4.2.1). In Section 4.2.2 we discuss the difference between min-
imal augmented imperative systems and dual/plural inclusive imperative systems,
and in Section 4.2.3 we consider the means of expressing the basic inclusive imper-
ative in comparison with minimal and augmented inclusives.
4.2.1. Minimal inclusive imperative vs. augmented inclusive imperative

Cross-linguistically, minimal and augmented inclusive imperatives occur as both
morphological and syntactic categories. As mentioned above, the most common
pattern of correspondence between minimal and augmented inclusive imperatives
is the derivation of the augmented inclusive from the minimal.
The Northern Turkic languages Tuvan, Shor, Altai, and Khakas are often de-
scribed as distinguishing between dual and plural in the first person imperative
only (cf. Baskakov (ed.) 1975: 189). While the “dual” (=minimal) inclusive impera-
tive has a morphologically non-transparent marker, the plural inclusive is formed
as a combination of the minimal with the marker of plurality (‑lar/-nar/-tar), which
is common for all verbal paradigm as well as for nominals:
(28) Altai
1 -ajyn -aalyk/-alyk -aalyk-tar/-alyk-tar
2 -Ø/-gyn -yg-ar
3 -zyn -zyn/-zyn-dar
(29) Khakas
1 -оm -aŋ -aŋ-ar
2 -Ø -y-ŋar
3 -syn -syn-nar
Other Turkic languages, for example Turkmen and Yakut, derive the augmented
inclusive from the minimal by appending the marker of the second-person plural.
Like Tuvan, Shor, Altai, and Khakas, they distinguish dual and plural in the first
person imperative only. The Turkmen imperative affixes are cited below:
(30) Turkmen
1 - ajyn -aly -aly-ŋ
2 -Ø/-gyn -yŋ
3 -syn -syn-lar
In Yakut, there are two formal types of augmented inclusive marker, which are dis-
tributed dialectally: -yaγ-yŋ and -yax-aj-yŋ. Both of them are based on the minimal
inclusive form and contain the marker of the second-person plural:
(31) Yakut
1 -yym -yax -yaγ-yŋ/-yax-aj-yŋ
2 -Ø -yŋ
3 -dyn -dyn-nar
Note that Tuvan, Shor, Altai, and Khakas have no special marker of the second-per-
son plural in the imperative paradigm. The marker -lar/-nar/-tar is the only marker
of plurality used in imperatives in these languages, whereas Turkmen and Yakut

have two plural affixes in imperatives (-lar/-nar in the third person and -ŋ/-yŋ in
the second person). A tentative implication can be stated: when there is a choice be-
tween different plural markers it is the second-person marker that is chosen for the
augmented inclusive imperative.
The minimal/augmented inclusives opposition is found outside Turkic lan-
guages as well.
Luvale (Bantoid) suffixes the second-person plural pronoun to the minimal in-
clusive, thus forming an augmented inclusive imperative. The minimal inclusive
is identical to the first-person plural subjunctive. “When addressing another one,
the simple subjunctive is used, but when addressing a number, the second-person
plural absolute pronoun enu is suffixed” (Horton 1949: 130):
(32) Luvale (Horton 1949: 130)
a. Tw-imb-e mw-aso.
2sg-sing-subj cl-song
‘Let us sing a song’ (you-singular and me)
b. Tw-imb-enu mw-aso.
2sg-sing-subj.2pl cl-song
‘Let us sing a song’ (you-plural and me)
Note, that enu functions as a pluraliser in the second person imperative as well:
(33) Luvale (Horton 1949: 114)
a. linga
do
‘do!’ (you-singular)
b. ling-ĕ̀nu
do-2pl
‘do!’ (you-plural)
In Kanuri (Saharan), as in Luvale, the minimal inclusive imperative is identical to
the first-person plural form of the subjunctive mood. Apparently, the augmented
inclusive imperative is formed on the base of the minimal inclusive by appending
the second-person plural marker (Hutchison 1976: 53). See examples of imperative
forms of the verb ‘to go’ below:
(34) Kanuri (Hutchison 1976)
Inclusive minimal lèn-y-ê 2nd p. singular lèn-é
augmented lèn-y-ówó plural lèn-ówó
More often, the contrast of minimal and augmented inclusives is expressed syntac-
tically, by means of auxiliary words.
To express a minimal inclusive, Hebrew, Russian, and Chuvash use an auxiliary
word marked as a second-person singular imperative. An augmented inclusive is
expressed by means of a second-person plural imperative.
The imperative of the verb ‘to go’ forms minimal and augmented inclusive imper-
atives in Hebrew (Malygina 2001: 146). The combination of the basic inclusive and
the second-person singular imperative of the verb ‘to go’ is used for the minimal in-
clusive, while the augmented inclusive imperative is expressed by the basic inclusive
with the second-person plural imperative of the same verb (see examples (23a, b)).
In a similar manner, minimal/augmented inclusives are expressed by impera-
tives of the verb ‘to give’ in Russian. Those are added to the basic inclusive expressed
by the present or future indicative or to the infinitive:
(35) Russian
a. Spoj-em!
sing.fut-1pl
‘Let’s sing!’ (you-singular or you-plural and me)
b. Davaj spoj-em!
part.2sg sing.fut-1pl
‘Let’s sing!’ (you-singular and me)
c. Davaj-te spoj-em!
part-2pl sing.fut-1pl
‘Let’s sing!’ (you-plural and me)
Three inclusive imperatives are distinguished in Chuvash. Apart from the basic in-
clusive imperative (36a), there are minimal and augmented inclusives, which are ex-
pressed syntactically by the particle ajda (36b, c). This particle occurs in two forms:
with zero marking to express singular and with the second-person plural ending to
express plural.
(36) Chuvash (personal fieldwork)
a. Kunda lar-ar.
here sit.imp-1pl
‘Let’s sit here!’ (you-singular or you-plural and me)
b. Ajda kunda lar-ar.
part.sg here sit.imp-1pl
‘Let’s sit here!’ (you-singular and me)
c. Ajd-âr kunda lar-ar.
part-2pl here sit.imp-1pl
‘Let’s sit here!’ (you-plural and me)
This particle is not specialised for first person; it can be used with the second person
imperative as well:
d. Ajda kunda lar.
part.sg here sit.imp.2sg
‘Sit here!’ (you-singular)
e. Ajd-âr kunda lar-âr.
part-2pl here sit.imp-2pl
‘Sit here!’ (you-plural)
The same opposition is found in Éwé (Niger-Kongo, Kwa). While the main verb is in-
flected for a first-person plural subject, the auxiliary occurs in the singular or plural
form of the second person imperative, depending on the number of addressees:
(37) Éwé (Agbodjo & Litvinov 2001: 395)
a. na mí-yi
give we-go
b. mi-na mí-yi
you.pl-give we-go
In Luo (Nilotic), the contrast between minimal and augmented inclusives is ex-
pressed syntactically. The Luo minimal inclusive imperative is identical to the sec-
ond-person singular imperative, marking the distinction only with a pronoun:
(38) Luo (Schafer)
a. riNgí
run
‘Run!’ (you-singular)
b. wa riNgí
we run
‘Let’s run!’ (you-singular and me)
The augmented inclusive combines the second-person plural imperative and the
first-person plural pronoun:
(39) Luo
a. riNgí uru
run pl
‘Run!’ (you-plural)
b. wa riNg uru
we run pl
‘Let us run!’ (you-plural and me)
Thus, in Luo the person of the imperative construction is distinguished only by a
pronoun, while plural/augmented number is expressed with the marker of plurality
uru, which is opposed to zero in the singular/minimal.
In all the languages discussed above, the augmented inclusive imperative is de-
rived from the minimal inclusive by means of a plural or second-person plural
marker. In the languages to be discussed below, the augmented inclusive is not de-
rived from the minimal; however, its morphological marking is similar.
The South American language Awa Pit (Barbacoan) has two inclusive forms,
which are referred to as first-person dual and plural imperatives. However, Awa Pit
has no duals, either in verbal forms or in nominals (Curnow 1997: 244–9). Below,
we cite the first- and second-person imperative affixes:
(40) Awa Pit

Singular Minimal Augmented
1 -tu -pay -sh-ayŋ
2 -ti -t-ayŋ
While the first-person singular and minimal inclusive affixes cannot be easily seg-
mented, the first-person plural contains the marker ‑ayŋ, which is also used in the
second-person plural. Although the minimal inclusive does not serve as a base for
the augmented inclusive, the augmented inclusive marker can be analysed into sh-
and the plural marker -ayŋ.
In Dogon, not only is it the case that the augmented inclusive contains the marker
of plurality, but also that the minimal inclusive has a singular marker (Plungian
1995: 27):
(41) Dogon
Singular Minimal Augmented
1 — -mɔ -mεŋ
2 -∅ -ŋ
3 3Sg pronoun + verb-mɔ 3Pl pronoun + verb-mεŋ
An unusual grammaticalisation of inclusive imperatives is found in Makah
(North American, Wakashan) and Kabardian (North-West Caucasian). Inclusive
imperatives are formed as a second person imperative with a causative marker, a
second person subject marker, and a first-person plural object marker:
(42) Makah (Matthew Davidson, p.c.)
a. čaqšiƛudi’cux̣
čaq-šiƛ=’ap=’idi’cux̣ w
push-mom=caus=imp.2sg/1pl
‘Let’s push it!’ (you-singular and me)
The second person imperative with a first-person plural object has no causative
marker:
b. čaqšiƛidi’cux̣
čaq-šiƛ=’aƛ=’idi’cux̣ w
push-mom=imp.2sg/1pl
‘Push us!’ (you-singular)
Makah makes a distinction between one addressee and several addressees by means
of a singular or plural subject marker:
c. čaqšiƛudo’wacux̣
čaq-šiƛ=’ap=’ido’wacux̣ w
push-mom=caus=imp.2pl/1pl
‘Let’s push it!’ (you-plural and me)
Compare:
d. čaqšiqƛido’wacux̣
čaq-šiƛ=’aq=’ido’wacux̣ w
push-mom-imp.2pl/1pl
‘Push us!’ (you-plural)
The same construction for the inclusive imperative is found in Circassian languages,
e.g. in Kabardian:
(43) Kabardian (Kumaxov 1971: 239)
a. dy-ʁa-k’we
1pl-caus-go
b. dy-v-ʁa-k’we
1pl-2pl-caus-go
That is, the inclusive imperative forms are almost identical to the second-person
plural imperative of the causative verb; the only difference is the absence of a pro-
noun in the inclusive imperative construction:
(44) Kabardian
a. we dy-ʁa-k’we
you.sg 1pl-caus-go
‘permit us to go’
b. fe dy-v-ʁa-k’we
you.pl 1pl-2pl-caus-go
‘permit us to go’
Thus, the minimal inclusive imperative in Makah and Kabardian contains the sec-
ond-person singular marker, while the augmented inclusive has a second-person
plural marker.
Note that the exotic formal pattern of inclusive imperative observed in Makah
and Kabardian is just the inflectional analogue to syntactical constructions found
in many languages of the world, such as English let’s go (lit. ‘permit us to go’). The
parallel is even more clear with the Russian constructions Davaj spojem, Davajte
spojem (35b, c), which contain the semantically bleached causative verb inflected
for second-person singular or second-person plural, while the main verb contains
the first-person plural ending.
The observed formal patterns of minimal and augmented inclusive imperatives
are summarised in Table 2.
Thus, in all languages we have considered, the augmented imperative contains
some sort of plural marker. Moreover, many of them use the marker of the second-
person plural or, in case of analytical constructions, the auxiliary in the form of the
second-person plural imperative.
Table 2. Formal patterns of minimal vs. augmented inclusive imperatives
Minimal inclusive Augmented inclusive

Tuvan, Shor, Khakas, Altai dedicated* minimal + pl
Turkmen, Yakut dedicated minimal + 2pl
Luvale, Kanuri 1pl subjunctive 1pl subjunсtive + 2pl
Russian, Chuvash, Hebrew basic inclusive + imp.2sg basic inclusive + imp.2pl
Éwé, Luo 1pl verb form + imp.2sg 1pl verb form + imp.2pl
Awa Pit dedicated dedicated + pl
Dogon sg pl
Makah, Kabardian 1pl.subj + 2sg.obj causative 1pl.subj + 2pl.obj causative
* Non-analysable affixes are considered dedicated.
The minimal inclusive imperative is often morphologically primary, serving as a

base for the augmented inclusive. It is marked either as first-person plural or as first-
person plural plus second-person singular imperative. The Dogon minimal inclu-
sive contains a singular marker common for all persons.
4.2.2. Minimal/augmented vs. dual/plural
The opposition of minimal and augmented inclusive imperatives is often described
as an opposition of dual and plural numbers. Indeed, languages which have a dual/
plural opposition somewhere outside the imperative paradigm distinguish be-
tween the same semantic types of inclusive imperatives as the languages without
dual number. That is, the first-person dual imperative refers to a group of two per-
sons which contains one hearer and is thus semantically identical to the minimal
inclusive. Still, the difference between minimal/augmented and dual/plural inclu-
sive imperative systems is displayed in their paradigmatic and formal structure.
For instance, the Trans-New Guinea language Kobon has dual number in the
whole verbal paradigm, not excepting the imperative (Davies 1981: 23). It has the
following affixes for the imperative:
(45) Kobon
1 -ɨn/-in -ul -un
2 -Ø -ɨl -im
3 -aŋ -ɨl -laŋ
The morphological structure of the first-person forms is as follows. The marker -l-
stands for dual, and -n- stands for first-person plural (similar number markers are
attested in the first-person non-singular independent pronouns hol ‘we.two’, hon
‘we.plural’). It seems likely that -u- codes first-person non-singular. However, the
first-person dual imperative is just as complex as the first-person plural imperative.
The dual does not serve as a base for the plural, and the first-person plural contains
neither a marker of second-person plural nor a plural marker observed elsewhere
in the verbal paradigm.
Likewise, the opposition of dual and plural verbal forms is found in Yupik
( Eskimo-Aleut) in all verbal forms, including the imperative (Menovščikov & Vax-
tin 1990: 105). The imperative has a particular set of markers, not identical to any
of the indicative sets. Though the markers of dual and plural inclusive imperatives
have a lot in common, neither of the two is derived from the other, nor does the
plural inclusive contain the marker of plurality.
(46) Yupik
1 -liaŋa -λtuŋ -λta
2 -Ø, -i, -tyn -tyk
3 -li -lik -lit
In Fijian (Oceanic), Warembori (Lower Mamberamo), and Indonesian (Malayic),
inclusive imperatives distinguish between one and several addressees by use of first-
person dual and plural pronouns, respectively:
(47) Warembori (Mark Donohue, p.c.)
a. kui ki-ra
1du 1nsg-go
‘let’s go!’ (you-singular and me)
b. ki ki-ra
1pl 1nsg-go
‘let’s go!’ (you-plural and me)
Thus, the same semantic opposition (one addressee vs. several addressees) has dif-
ferent formal patterns depending on whether the language has or does not have
dual number as a grammatical category. Languages with dual number have no clear
formal correlation between minimal and augmented inclusives. The augmented
inclusive is not derived from the minimal, nor does it contain the second-person
plural marker. From the point of view of formal structure, ‘dual’ languages treat the
inclusive that refers to the speaker and one addressee as dual, thus counting the to-
tal number of referents. Languages which have no dual number tend to grammati-
calise the augmented inclusive as plural and the minimal inclusive as singular (Do-
gon, Luo, Makah, Kabardian) or as an unmarked form (Tuvan, Shor, Khakas, Altai,
Turkmen, Yakut, Awa Pit). What counts in these languages is not the total number
of referents, but the number of addressees (one vs. several). The best way to account
for this typology is to distinguish between dual/plural and minimal/augmented in-
clusive imperative systems.
4.2.3. The basic inclusive imperative

What are the formal patterns of the basic inclusive imperative, that is, the inclusive
imperative which does not distinguish the number of addressees?
The basic inclusive imperative is the most common type of inclusive imperative
in the languages of the world. There are languages which have the basic inclusive
imperative only, thus having no grammatical possibility of expressing the number

of the addressees. See the Aghul example above (21) and the Bagvalal (North-East
Caucasian, Avar-Andic) example below:
(48) Bagvalal (Dobrušina 2001: 331)
čã s’a-rā-Ra
tea drink-pot.inf-part
‘Let’s drink tea’ (you singular or you-plural and me)
Other languages have both basic and minimal/augmented inclusive imperatives.
All languages of this type that we are aware of express the basic inclusive imperative
morphologically and the minimal/augmented inclusive imperative syntactically:
(49) Balkar (Turkic) (personal fieldwork)
a. üge bar-ajyq
home go-imp.1pl
‘Let’s go home!’ (you-singular or you-plural and me)
b. kel üge bar-ajyq
part home go-imp.1pl
‘Let’s go home!’ (you-singular and me)
c. kel-igiz üge bar-ajyq
part-2pl home go-imp.1pl
‘Let’s go home!’ (you-plural and me)
The basic inclusive imperative is often a dedicated morphological form with a port-
manteau marker, which makes it impossible to speculate about its origin:
(50) Buriat (Mongolian) (Sanžeev et al. (eds) 1962: 249)
jaba-ja
go-imp.1pl
‘Let’s go!’ (you-singular or you-plural and me)
(51) Japanese (Alpatov 2001: 113)
Kumaso no kuni kara kaet-ta otoko ni kampaish-iyoo
Kumaso attr land from return-past man iobj drink-imp.1sg/pl
‘Let’s drink to a man who came back from the land of Kumaso!’
If there are no dedicated affixes for basic inclusive, the most common means to ex-
press this meaning is in the form of a first-person plural future indicative:
(52) Udmurt (Finno-Ugric) (Andrej Šluinskij, p.c.)
Myn-o-m sik-e.
go-fut-1pl forest-ill
‘Let’s go to the forest!’
(53) Hunzib (North-East Caucasian, Tsezic) (van den Berg 1995: 86, 241)
m-eL’-a
hpl-go-intent
‘Let’s go!’
What is important, among the forms of basic inclusive that we have observed, is that
we found neither forms with a second-person plural marker (like an augmented
imperative) nor forms with a singular marker (like a minimal inclusive). The excep-
tions are Finnish and Bagirmi (Central Sudanic), and the first is so only synchron-
ically.
Finnish has an obsolete form of the basic inclusive imperative (which is replaced
by the passive indicative in contemporary Finnish). This obsolete inclusive imper-
ative is “formed by appending the markers of the imperative and the second-per-
son plural to the stem followed by the first-person plural ending” (Sulkala & Kar-
jalainen 1995: 23). Cf. (54a) to (54b–d):
(54) Finnish
a. laula-kaa-mme!
sing-2pl.imp-1pl
‘Let’s sing!’ (you-plural or you-singular and me)
b. laula-Ø!
sing-imp
‘Sing!’
c. laula-kaa!
sing-2pl.imp
‘Sing!’ (you-plural)
d. laula-mme
sing-1pl
‘[we] sing’
At first, these forms appear to be morphologically identical to Luvale or Kanuri aug-
mented inclusive imperatives, but the order of affixes is unusual: in augmented in-
clusives that we have analysed, the second-person marker follows the marker of the
first-person plural, but not vice versa.
Synchronically, the morphological analysis suggested by Sulkala & Karjalainen
is perfectly correct, but the history of these forms shows another direction of de-
velopment. According to Hakulinen (1953: 223–4), -k- was a marker of imperative
forms of all persons and numbers. Having been lost in the second-person singular,
it remains in other forms. Thus, -kaa- is not the marker of the second-person plural
imperative but of the imperative independently of person. The diachronic analysis
of the first-person plural imperative should be laula-kaa-mme ‘sing-imp-1pl’. That
means that, diachronically, the Finnish first-person plural imperative form does
not contain the second-person plural marker.
Another example of the use of second-person plural in the marking of inclusive

imperatives is found in Bagirmi (Central Sudanic). Bagirmi uses the bare stem for
the second-person singular imperative and the marker -ki for the second-person
plural; this is a common second-person plural marker in all Bagirmi verbal forms:
(55) Bagirmi (Stevenson 1969: 85)
a. sa
‘Eat!’ (you-singular)
b. sa-ki
eat-2pl
‘Eat!’ (you-plural)
The Bagirmi first-person plural imperative is formed by combining the first-person
plural pronoun with the second-person plural imperative form of the verb:
c. je sa-ki
we eat-2pl
‘Let’s eat!’
Compare this with the first-person plural indicative form:
d. je sa
1pl eat
‘we ate’
Bagirmi is the only example of a language that uses the second-person marker in
the basic inclusive imperative that we are aware of.
4.3. Counting the addressees: conclusions

In Section 4, we observed formal patterns of inclusive imperatives. Three seman-
tic types of inclusive imperatives were considered. The basic inclusive refers to the
speaker, to the addressee(s), and, optionally, to non-locutor(s). The minimal inclusive
refers to a group including the speaker and one hearer, while the augmented inclusive
refers to a group including the speaker and the hearer(s) and/or non-locutor(s) with
a total number of referents greater than two. The opposition of minimal and aug-
mented inclusive imperatives was found to be very common in the languages of the
world. We analysed the formal structures of basic, minimal, and augmented inclu-
sives, and we show that different formal means are typical for these categories.
Basic and minimal inclusives are similar in that both of them use a portman-
teau marker or a first-person plural marker. This commonality seems to be a natural
consequence of the fact that the minimal inclusive often develops from the basic in-
clusive. However, minimal inclusive marking can involve certain markers which
are not found in the basic inclusive, such as the singular marker. The syntactic min-
imal inclusive is often a combination of a first-person plural form with the second-
person singular imperative of an auxiliary.
The augmented inclusive is usually built as a form of a minimal inclusive pro-

vided with a (second person) plural marker. Notably, the common plural marker is
used in those languages which have no dedicated marker for second-person plural
(Tuvan, Shor, Khakas, Altai). Another way to build augmented inclusives is to com-
bine the first-person plural imperative with the auxiliary in the second-person
plural imperative form. The marker of plurality also appears in those augmented
inclusive forms which are not derived from the minimal inclusive.
The use of a singular or second-person singular marker in the minimal inclusive
and a plural or second-person plural marker in the augmented inclusive shows that
number marking in these forms indicates the number of addressees, not the total
number of all referents. On the other hand, languages with dual number grammati-
calise an appeal to the speaker plus one hearer as a dual, and an appeal to the speaker
plus several hearers as a plural.
5. Conclusion
It has been observed about pronominal marking in general that there are very few
languages which have an inclusive but do not have an exclusive. This observation is,
however, inapplicable to imperatives. As we show in Section 2, most languages are
reported to have an inclusive first person imperative only, and some other ‘prefer’ an
inclusive reading. Only a few have a specified means to express an exclusive imper-
ative. We have argued that this follows from the nature of the imperative speech act.
In an imperative situation, the addressee plays a central role in that he is supposed
to carry out an intended action (for the second person imperative) or to act as a me-
diator to cause someone else to carry it out (for the third person imperative). The
exclusive, on the other hand, refers to the speaker and the speaker’s group, so that an
exclusive imperative would refer to an action to be carried out by the speaker and
his group. In such a situation, the addressee cannot even serve as a mediator. Conse-
quently, the exclusive (together with the first-person singular) is the least probable
imperative meaning, so that exclusive categories formally homogeneous to the im-
perative paradigm are extremely rare.
Moreover, even when an ‘exclusive imperative’ is present in a language, a thor-
ough analysis shows that consideration of the addressee continues to play an im-
portant role in its interpretation. Typical usages of the exclusive imperative are ask-
ing for the addressee’s permission or expressing consent to the addressee’s demand,
both of which introduce the addressee as a person on whom the intended action
strongly depends.
Considering the opposition of inclusive vs. exclusive in imperatives, we discov-
ered that there are no languages that have an opposition of inclusive–exclusive in
pronouns or non-imperative verbs but that do not distinguish clusivity in the im-
perative (Section 3). We suppose that the inclusive-exclusive distinction
cannot be absent in the imperative but present elsewhere.
There is another generalisation about person marking: “There can only be a split
inclusive [=the distinction of minimal vs. augmented] when there is already a spe-
cialised exclusive” (Cysouw 2001: 92). Again, this is inapplicable to imperatives. Ex-
clusive imperatives are very rare, while the opposition minimal/augmented in in-
clusive imperatives is found in many languages of the world (Section 4).
The question is, then, why do languages strongly tend to grammaticalise the
number of addressees in the first person imperative and to distinguish between
minimal and augmented inclusive imperatives even when not displaying any inter-
est in dual categories elsewhere? We argue for the following answer. The main aim
of an imperative speech act is to cause an action to be carried out. The more directly
the speaker influences the causee, the more likely he is going to succeed in his cau-
sation. The addressee, then, is the best possible causee. The augmented inclusive
imperative, however, may also include non-locutors, decreasing the ‘directness’ of
the causation. This is the most probable reason why the opposition of minimal vs.
augmented inclusive is crucial in the imperative.
Abbreviations
1, 2, 3 first, second, third person intent intentive
acc accusative iobj indirect object
all allative ipf imperfective
adj.loc locative adjective lat lative
caus causative loc locative
cl class marker m masculine
cond conditional mom momentative
conv converb neg negative
cn connegative nsg nonsingular
dat dative o objective conjugation
du dual part particle
emph emphatic pl plural
excl exclusive pot potential
fut future prs present
gen genitive r reflexive conjugation
hpl human plural refl reflexive
ill illative s subject conjugation
imp imperative sg singular
incl inclusive subj subjunctive
inf infinitive top topic
Notes
* We would like to express our deep gratitude to Barry Alpher who proofread this chapter
and immensely improved its style.
1. See Section 5 for a discussion of dual forms in the imperative.
2. -aŋar < -aŋ + -lar ‘Pl.’; morphologically, thus, this is the plural of the first-person inclusive
form. Such a structure is a very frequent one; see Section 5.
3. The Khakas examples were collected during fieldwork in the summer 2002. We thank our
colleagues from the Russian State University for Humanities for the possibility to join the
expedition.
4. We are not able to provide statistics, as there are problems with the explicitness of the data.
While in most grammars all examples of first-person plural imperative forms are clearly in-
clusive, it is almost never explicitly stated that they cannot be used exclusively.
5. Another possibility is to say hadd menjunk, with the particle hadd, literally ‘let.imp’. But
this is not a dedicated 1Pl exclusive form, because hadd can be added to other person forms
as well, with a meaning something like ‘permit me/him/us etc. to do something’. We thank
Istvan Granicz for the information on Hungarian.
6. This example was elicited for us by Yulia Koloskova.
7. There exists the subjunctive mood in Hdi, which can express an exhortation for all per-
sons; see Frajzyngier (2002: 279–85).
8. But Chuvash has dedicated inclusive imperative forms, too; see below, Section 5.2.1.
9. We assume that most of first-person plural imperatives which are discussed below are
inclusives. However, because of gaps in the descriptive grammars (see the Section 2.2), we
can be sure only about those forms which we have personally investigated. But taking into
account that most first-person plural imperatives are inclusive (even though we have been
unable to check it for all the languages we consider), we ignore the possibility that some of
the forms which will be discussed in this section might have an exclusive usage along with
the inclusive one.
10. This will provide an answer to the problem put forth in Xrakovskij (2002): why does Rus-
sian have obviously innovative forms of “dual” vs. “plural” in inclusive imperatives, while all
dual forms were lost in Russian a long time ago?
11. That the number of the causees is crucial to imperative constructions is supported by
other evidence. Many languages distinguish between second-person singular and second-
person plural in denoting the addressees of the imperative (cf. Dobrušina 2003). The cru-
cial difference between one causee and several causees is that of exposure of the causees to
the direct influence of the speaker. The second-person plural implies the inclusion of third
persons; not being involved in the speech situation, the third persons cannot be directly in-
fluenced by the speaker (cf. Kibrik, Kodzasov & Muravjeva 2000: 111).
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Chapter 7
A typology of honorific uses of clusivity
Michael Cysouw
Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology
In many languages, pronouns are used with special meanings in honorific contexts. The most
widespread phenomenon cross-linguistically is the usage of a plural pronoun instead of a
singular to mark respect. In this chapter, I will investigate the possibility of using clusivity in
honorific contexts. This is a rare phenomenon, but a thorough investigation has resulted in a
reasonably diverse set of examples, taken from languages all over the world. It turns out that
there are many different honorific contexts in which an inclusive or exclusive pronoun can
be used. The most commonly attested variant is the usage of an inclusive pronoun with a po-
lite connotation, indicating social distance.
Keywords: politeness, respect, syncretism, clusivity
1. Introduction
In his study of the cross-linguistic variation of honorific reference, Head (1978: 178)
claims that inclusive reference, when used honorifically, indicates less social dis-
tance. However, he claims this on the basis of only two cases. In this chapter, a sur-
vey will be presented of a large set of languages, in which an inclusive or exclusive
marker is used in an honorific sense. It turns out that Head’s claim is not accurate.
In contrast, it appears that inclusive marking is in many cases a sign of greater so-
cial distance, although the variability of the possible honorific usages is larger than
might have been expected. There are also cases in which an inclusive is used in an
impolite fashion or cases in which an exclusive is used in a polite fashion.
Specifically, I will discuss the usage of inclusives with polite second person refer-
ence in Section 2. In Section 3, I will present examples of inclusives with humble
first person reference. In Section 4, the slightly different usage of inclusives with
bonding first person reference will be discussed. All these usages of inclusives can
be characterised as having a polite connotation. In contrast, I will present some ex-
amples of inclusives with impolite first person reference in Section 5. Then there are
also some languages in which the exclusive functions as a polite first person, as dis-
cussed in Section 6. Finally, all examples discussed are summarised and some gen-
eralisations are proposed in Section 7.
Although all these usages are attested, they are not all attested equally frequently.
However, inferences from frequency are only to be taken with great caution. The
data that form the basis for this chapter are inherently skewed for various reasons.
214 Michael Cysouw
First, the present compilation of cases is the result of rather ad-hoc collecting. I
started from some cases, which I encountered during a typological investigation
of person marking (Cysouw 2003). Investigating the linguistic areas and genetic
families of those cases has subsequently enlarged this set. The present collection
is large and varied enough to pass as a cross-linguistic sample, yet the procedure
that lead to this sample is not one of controlled sampling (cf. Rijkhoff & Bakker
1998). Second, it is rather difficult to find information on honorific usage in refer-
ence grammars and other published works on ‘exotic’ languages. Except for a few
studies that are explicitly devoted to the subject of honorific reference, I had to work
on a basis of short indications about possible honorific usages of clusivity markers
as they were made in grammars and other descriptive works. Often no more than a
comment in passing is given, saying for example only that the inclusive is used for
honorific address. When and under which circumstances such honorific address is
used remains often enigmatic from the source. Also, when a source does not give
any information on possible honorific usages of a clusivity marker, this should by
no means be regarded as absence of such usage. The social aspects of language use
are often disregarded in language description.
I will use the politeness framework of Brown & Levinson (1987) to analyse the
linguistic variation attested. Specifically, the notions of positive and negative po-
liteness are of central importance. Positive politeness “anoints the face of the ad-
dressee by indicating that in some respects, [the speaker] wants [the address-
ee’s] wants” (Brown & Levinson 1987: 70). In other words, being positively polite
roughly amounts to share the addressee’s attitudes. Negative politeness “consists in
assurances that the speaker recognizes and respects the addressee’s . . . wants and
will not . . . interfere with the addressee’s freedom of action” (Brown & Levinson
1987: 70). In other words, being negatively polite roughly amounts to leave the ad-
dressee alone as much as possible. I will use these two purportedly universal forces
in human interaction to bring order into the various kinds of honorific usage of
clusivity.
The main body of this chapter consists of a large collection of cases that show
honorific use of clusivity.1 In the final section, I will propose some generalisations
over the present collection of cases. With this survey, I hope to stimulate new de-
scriptions of honorific reference in human language — possibly with the result that
the present generalisations become null and void. If so, then I will consider my mis-
sion complete.
2. Inclusive as a polite second person (negative politeness)
In the Western Malayo-Polynesian languages of central and southern Sulawesi (In-

donesia), the use of the inclusive as a polite second person is particularly promin-
ent. The pronominal elements themselves differ widely between the individual lan-
guages, which indicates that the shared usage of the inclusive as honorific originated
A typology of honorific uses of clusivity 215
after the languages had differentiated from the proto-language. It is probably a con-
tact-induced loan translation that has spread throughout the region. In Muna, the
inclusive pronoun intaida is used for second person honorific reference (van den
Berg 1989: 81). The inflectional subject markers show a difference between do- for
inclusive and to- for second person honorific. However “the do- forms can also be
used for the second-person singular, in which case they have a rather formal con-
notation. Their use does not imply politeness but rather aloofness; the form is espe-
cially suitable for addressing foreigners” (van den Berg 1989: 51). In Konjo, the pro-
nominal paradigm has been strongly reduced, leaving only four different pronouns:
a first person nakke, a second person kau, a polite second person gitte and a third
person ia. The first person has an exclusive connotation. Relating to the present
topic, the polite second person can be used with an inclusive meaning: “the Konjo
pronominal system differentiates only person, not number or gender. . . . The use
of first person reflects the fact that the speaker excludes the hearer, while the use of
the second person honorific reflects his inclusion” (Friberg 1996: 138, fn. 2). These
pronouns are not very frequently used; the “free form pronouns occur mainly for
emphasis in Konjo. . . . The person-marker clitics serve to clarify what the seman-
tic subject (and object) of the verb are” (Friberg 1996: 138). These person-marking
clitics, however, show exactly the same honorific usage as the free pronouns. Fur-
ther, the inclusive pronoun is used for polite second person reference in the Su-
lawesi languages Bajau (Verheijen 1986: 15, 19), Wolio (Anceaux & Grimes 1995:
577) and in Sa’dan (mentioned by Blust 1977: 11).
Additional evidence for this usage can be found in some languages in central and
southern Sulawesi, in which the inclusive–exclusive opposition is vanishing or has
already disappeared. The exclusive pronoun is disappearing and the formerly inclu-
sive pronoun is used both for all first-person plural reference and for polite second
person reference. For example, in Makassarese, the pronoun (i)katte is explained in
the dictionary of Cense (1979: 312–13) as being basically a first-person plural in-
clusive, though nowadays often used instead of the vanishing exclusive pronoun
(i)kambe. As a second referential possibility, (i)katte can also be used as a polite sec-
ond person (Matthes 1858: 69–70). In Bugis, the pronoun (id)ikәŋ is a general first-
person plural, although it can have an exclusive connotation. Another first-person
plural pronoun, idi’, without exclusive connotation, can be used as a second person
honorific (Sirk 1979: 107–8; Matthes 1875: 197–8):
ikәŋ and idikkәŋ in general express the notion of plurality (= ‘we’). . . . The pronoun
idi’, for the first person, means, likewise, ‘we’, but it is also used as an honorific form,
for the second person (= ‘you’). . . . The notions of inclusive/exclusive are practi-
cally unexpressed in the language of the traditional literature of Bugis. Among the
pronouns of the first person, ikәŋ, idikkәŋ and ia’ [but not idi’, MC] can have an ex-
clusive value. (Sirk 1979: 107–8, my translation)2
Likewise in Banggai, the pronoun ikita is used for the first-person plural. There is
no mention of an inclusive–exclusive distinction in the grammar of van den Bergh
216 Michael Cysouw
(1953: 44), although historically this pronoun is clearly related to the inclusive pro-
noun *(k)ita from proto-Austronesian. In Banggai, this pronoun is also used for po-
lite second person reference. Van den Bergh claims that this honorific function is a
loan translation from Bugis. He also recorded a native explanation for this use:
As an explanation why the first-person plural was used as a honorific plural, we
were told thus: ‘if we address a person higher in rank with ikita and we acciden-
tally say something unpleasant, then he cannot become angry that easily, because
we have also included ourselves in the unpleasantness. (van den Bergh 1953: 44,
fn. 1, my translation)3
In Tukang Besi, spoken on a small island within range of Sulawesi, the pronoun
ikita, also clearly a reflex of the proto-Austronesian inclusive *(k)ita, is the normal
first-person plural. It is also used for honorific reference: “respect may be paid to a
group of people addressed, or a greater degree of respect paid to an individual by
the use of the first-person plural forms” (Donohue 1999: 114). The original exclu-
sive pronoun kami is used with a paucal connotation, although paucal reference is
also often made by use of ikita (Donohue 1999: 113–14).
Outside Sulawesi, yet within the same area (and also within the Austronesian
stock), honorific usage of the inclusive is also found in the Timorese language Te-
tun. The inclusive pronoun ita “is also used as polite pronoun for second-person
singular . . . [yet] in practice ita is used rather little as a second-person pronoun”
(van Klinken 1999: 113; cf. Williams-van Klinken et al. 2002: 26). The same is at-
tested in North Maluku Malay (Donohue & Smith 1998: 70–1). Other examples
are attested in Toba Batak, Duri, Palu and in Sulawesi Malay. These cases are dis-
cussed extensively in the next section, because the inclusive is used both for the sec-
ond and first person in an honorific sense. Finally, distantly related to these cases
within the Austronesian stock, a comparable use of the inclusive is found in Mala-
gasy (Brown & Levinson 1987: 203, citing E. O. Keenan, p.c.) and in Hawaiian: “in
greetings in Hawaiian, the inclusive first-person dual is considered a polite form of
address” (Head 1978: 178, citing Kahananui & Anthony 1970: 7). A discussion of
many of these cases from a slightly different perspective is presented by Lichtenberk
(this volume, Section 2.3).
Blust (1977: 11) presents additional evidence for the usage of an inclusive for po-
lite address. He mentions the Austronesian languages Old Javanese, Coastal Sal-
uan (Loinan) and Bimanese as examples in which the formerly inclusive kita has
become the regular second-person singular, without honorific connotation. Blust
rightfully argues that such cases represent the endpoint of a ‘politeness shift’, in
which an erstwhile form for polite address becomes the default second person ref-
erence — alike to the other politeness shifts that he has proposes for the history of
Austronesian (Blust 1977: 8–12).
Completely independently from these cases in the Austronesian stock, the use
of the inclusive as a second person honorific is also found in the Ainu language
in Japan: “the inclusive forms of the first-person plural are used as second-person
onorific forms” (Shibatani 1990: 28). The same usage of the inclusive is also at-
h
tested in Limbu, a Kiranti (Tibeto-Burman) language from Nepal:
It is a common speech habit when talking to people with whom one is unacquainted
or vis-à-vis whom one must retain a demeanour of respect to use the inclusive ra-
ther than second-person forms. The apparent psychological reasoning behind the
polite inclusive is that one implicates and, if such be the case, incriminates oneself
in the verbal scenario. It is also polite by virtue of being less direct than the second
person. (van Driem 1987: 221)
Another case of this honorific usage is found in the Cuzco variant of Quechua, spo-
ken in Peru. The suffix -nchis “forms an inclusive for which there are two pragmat-
ically governed interpretations, first-person inclusive plural and second person po-
lite” (Mannheim 1982a: 147; 1982b: 457). In a detailed study of plural reference in
Cuzco Quechua, Lefebvre (1975; 1979) describes in more detail in which situations
the inclusive is used as a polite second person:
first-person plural inclusive may also be used instead of second-person singular in
order to indicate deference or respect. This form is found in my data for addressing
a stranger, a person from a different social status, or for addressing a person in a for-
mal context. (Lefebvre 1975: 28)
Finally, Brown & Levinson (1987: 201–3) describe the same phenomenon for the
Dravidian language Tamil, spoken on Sri Lanka, where the inclusive naam is used
as a ‘super-honorific’ form of address. This is a particularly interesting case, as the
same pronoun is also used for high-ranked self-reference (cf. Section 4). Brown &
Levinson explain the honorific address with the inclusive pronoun naam as a reac-
tion to the high-ranked self-referential use of this same pronoun:
In village usage [naam] is the pronoun used by lower-status persons to higher-caste
persons, especially in FTAs [Face Threatening Acts]. . . . In such a dyad, the higher-
status person is likely to refer to himself with the ‘royal “we” ’ ‑ that is, with naam.
So the use of the same pronoun to refer to the same referent by a different (lower-
rank) speaker could be seen as a dramatic point of view operation in which the in-
ferior adopts the superior’s point of view. (Brown & Levinson 1987: 202)
The last few cases show that the usage of an inclusive for polite second person refer-
ence can be found dispersed throughout the world’s languages, and is not restricted
to the Austronesian stock, among which it is nonetheless particularly prominent.
Not all sources give information on the situations in which the inclusive can be
used as a polite form of address. Yet, if there is an elucidation on the circumstance
of usage, then the inclusive seems to be preferred in formal situations in which it is
necessary to give deference to the addressee. Of course, the usage of an inclusive as
a form of address is a kind of negative politeness, because it is a less direct way to re-
fer to the addressee than a second-person pronoun. However, this does not yet ex-
plain why the inclusive can be used to express a difference in rank/status. Brown &
Levinson (1987) also note this problem and they have to resort to quite exotic pro-
218 Michael Cysouw
posals to explain the existence of this usage of the inclusive, explanations like the
one for Tamil naam discussed above or like the following metaphor of ownership:
[A] possible source is the idiom of ownership: the master owns his servants, and
they ‘possess’ him as their master. So to address him as ‘you and I’ is to convey the ab-
sorption of the inferior in the superior’s domain. (Brown & Levinson 1987: 202).
These explanations seem somewhat far-fetched. What is missing in Brown & Levin-
son’s work is the inherent asymmetry between speaker and addressee. The speaker,
simply by the fact of being speaker, exercises control over the speech situation. The
action of speaking itself is inherently threatening the negative face of the addressee.
By using an inclusive form, the speaker offers to disregard this inherent supremacy.
The speaker implicitly abases himself by including himself in the reference. The dif-
ference between speaker and addressee is softened by explicitly including both par-
ticipants together in the reference. Interpreted this way, using an inclusive instead
of a second-person form is a way to give deference ‑ one of the many ways to be neg-
atively polite (cf. Brown & Levinson 1987: 178–86).
3. Inclusive as a humble first person (negative politeness)
A related kind of honorific usage of the inclusive is found in Sawu, a Central Malayo-
Polynesian language spoken on the island Sawu, to the west of Timor (Indonesia),
as described by Walker (1982). He says to “have textual evidence that dii, normally
first-person plural (inclusive), is also used as a ‘polite’ form for first-person singular”
(Walker 1982: 11). Probably, a polite first-person singular is supposed to mean a
deferential form of self-reference. If so, this boils down to the same social effect as a
polite form for the second person as discussed in the previous section. Both usages
of the inclusive are ways of expressing the same social setting, in which the speaker
is lowering himself relative to the addressee. The idea that polite first and second
person reference are related is nicely illustrated by Toba Batak, a Sundic language
from Sumatra (Indonesia). The inclusive pronoun hita “is also used in place of ho
[second-person singular] and au [first-person singular] when the speaker wishes
expressly to be polite or when the kinship relationship is not known” (van der Tuuk
1971: 218). To express politeness in Toba Batak, both first and second person refer-
ence can be replaced by the inclusive pronoun. The same situation is apparently at-
tested in the Sulawesi languages Duri (Valkama 1995: 49–50) and Palu (Donohue &
Smith 1998: 73, citing P. Quick, p.c.), and in the Malay variety spoken in South and
Southeast Sulawesi (Donohue & Smith 1998: 71–2). Some more examples are dis-
cussed by Lichtenberk (this volume, section 2.2).
Additional evidence for this deferential usage of the inclusive is found in a few
Polynesian languages, in which the erstwhile inclusive has lost its clusivity com-
pletely and has become a special kind of first-person singular. In the Polynesian lan-
guages, the proto-Austronesian inclusive *(k)ita has been extended with number
markers, leaving the bare form available for exaptation. In Samoan, for example,
the inclusive plural is ‘itātou and the inclusive dual is ‘itā‘ua, both consisting of the
formerly inclusive marker ‘ita and a number suffix -tou for plural and -‘ua for dual.
The bare inclusive marker ‘ita has become a special form of the first-person singular
expressing humility: “the emotional first-person singular forms ‘ita and ta’ita fre-
quently indicate self-abasement, humility, or an appeal for help, but they are above
all an indication of affect showing that the speaker is emotionally involved in the
situation” (Mosel & Hovdhaugen 1992: 121). Likewise in Tongan, where the pro-
nouns kita and its variant te are used for first-person singular reference “in the lan-
guage of humility” (Churchward 1953: 127). The same phenomenon is also found
in the Outlier Polynesian languages Mae and Nukuoro (Krupa 1982: 69–72) and
Niuafo’ou (Early 2002: 850). Finally, Besnier (2000), in the description of the Poly-
nesian language of Tuvalu, is particularly keen to disentangle the cultural context of
speech-acts. Here, it becomes clear that the pronoun kita can serve both for second
person and for first person reference, comparably to the case of Toba Batak that was
discussed above:
[kita] serves as a strongly affective index, connoting feelings of affection and empa-
thy (alofa) when it refers to a second-person entity or to one’s home island. Alterna-
tively, when it refers to the first person, it connotes feelings of helplessness, vulner-
ability, and self-abasement (fakaalofa, i.e. feelings that bring about feelings of alofa
in others). (Besnier 2000: 388)
The explanation for this humble usage of the inclusive is identical to the explanation
for the usage of the inclusive for polite address in the previous section. The inher-
ent asymmetry of the speech situation is an important factor. By way of speaking,
the speaker has power over the speech situation. The usage of an inclusive instead
of direct self-reference is a kind of negative politeness, in which the speaker abases
himself by giving up his powerful position.
4. Inclusive as a bonding first person (positive politeness)
Requests are situations in which politeness is particularly important. In Tzeltal, a

Mayan language from Mexico, the “inclusive is often used to soften requests, as if
pretending that [the addressee] wants the object or action requested as well. And
equally to soften offers, pretending that [the speaker] is as eager as [the addressee]
to have the action performed” (Brown & Levinson 1987: 127). The speaker invokes
nearness between speaker and addressee by using an inclusive in such speech situa-
tions — a strategy to show positive politeness. The usage of the inclusive in a request
is exemplified in (1a). An example in an offer is presented in (1b). In both cases, the
inclusive is used with first-person singular reference.
220 Michael Cysouw
(1) Tzeltal (Mayan, Brown & Levinson 1987: 127)

a. hmahantik ʔaʔk’uʔ
‘[Can] we (inclusive) borrow your blouse.’ (i.e. ‘can I ?’)
b. ya hp’is-tik ta lok’el
‘We (inclusive) will go fetch it.’ (i.e. ‘I will’)
In Tamil, the inclusive is most appropriately used as a form of self-reference in situ-
ations that require positive politeness. “One speaks as if everything were shared be-
tween members. Thus for instance between equals a speaker may refer to his wife
as namma sarasu (‘our (inclusive) Sarasu’)” (Brown & Levinson 1987: 203, cf. 119–
20).
In the West Papuan language Galela, spoken on Halmahera (Indonesia), the in-
clusive pronoun can be used in requests with self-reference. An example of this use
is presented in (2). Formally, the second prefix na- is an inclusive marker. However,
in this example the addressee is not included in the reference; the inclusive form is
used here with exclusive reference.
(2) Galela (West Papuan, Shelden 1991: 166)4
pipi na-na-hike
money 2pl.subj-inc.obj-give
‘Please give us some money’
As an explanation, Shelden (1991) argues that this use is a way to relieve embarrass-
ment on behalf of the speaker:
[This sentence] might be spoken in a situation where a man asks members of an-
other family to give money to his own family. . . . His own family is referred to by na-
[inclusive], which is interpreted to mean ‘exclusive polite’. Sociolinguistically, what
happens is that by including the addressee grammatically, the man relieves his em-
barrassment for having to ask for money. (Shelden 1991: 166)
This explanation is reminiscent of the clarification that was presented for the po-
lite use of the inclusive in Bugis (see Section 2). In both cases, mention is made of
avoidance of unpleasantness. In Bugis, including yourself when addressing some-
one — using the inclusive instead of a second-person form — can relieve the force
of any unpleasantness for the addressee because it is shared. In the present case of
Galela, including the addressee when referring to yourself — using the inclusive in-
stead of a first person — causes any unpleasantness on your own side to be likewise
shared and thereby lessened.
By using an inclusive, both speaker and addressee are depicted as being equally
involved in the situation. In some of the examples presented in this section, this
apparent equality is used to redress the threat to the positive face of the speaker
(e.g. Galela). In other cases, the expressed equality is used to express a bond be-
tween speaker and addressee. The addressee is formally part of the reference of
an inclusive, so using an inclusive is a potential threat to the negative face of the
addressee — even more so in inherently face threatening acts like questions. Yet,
the speaker evades this potential threat by including himself into the address. The
speaker thereby shows that any threat to the addressee’s face applies to himself as
well. This is a clear strategy invoking positive politeness to redress a face-threaten-
ing act (cf. Brown & Levinson 1987: 127–8).
5. Inclusive as an impolite first person
A rather different use of the inclusive is found in Santali, a Munda language of In-
dia. In this language, the inclusive can be used with first-person singular reference
in an impolite context:
There is a special use of the pronoun for first-person inclusive dual alaŋ: It is used
instead of first-person singular iɲ in threatening language. It does not mean two
persons, but it seems that the speaker considers himself connected with the ad-
dressee while threatening him. (Neukom 2001: 37)
What this means exactly is nicely illustrated by the example presented in (3), in
which a person is threatening an old woman. This person is referring to himself by
use of an inclusive.
(3) Santali (Munda, Austro-Asiatic, Neukom 2001: 38–9)
ma bodhi, daka dɔhɔe-me, ar ba-m dɔhɔe-khan-dɔ
mod old woman rice put-2sg.sub and neg-2sg.subj put-if-top
nãhãk’-laŋ gɛr-gitic’-gɔt’-me-a ar boge-te-laŋ
just-inc.subj bite-lie-mdf-2sg.obj-ind and good-inst-inc.subj
thәyә-me-a
kick-2sg.obj-ind
‘Old woman, put the rice down, and if you don’t put it down, I shall just bite
you that you will lie (there), and I shall give you a good kicking.’
A comparable usage of the inclusive is described by Chandrasekhar (1970) for Ma-
layalam, a Dravidian language spoken in India. The inclusive pronoun nammal in
Malayalam can be used as first person reference in the following situations (Chan-
drasekhar 1970: 246):
• in a friendly chat;
• in a spirit which implies some contempt for the listener;
• in an aggressive spirit.
The first situation — a friendly situation — might seem of a rather different matter
as the other two situations, which are more aggressive contexts. However, a friendly
situation may allow the use of an otherwise rude expression, as a sort-of conspira-
torial act, which presumes that both know better than to interpret the linguistic ex-
pression as humiliation. Interpreted this way, the various usages of the inclusive
pronoun in Malayalam can be unified as being basically an impolite way of self-
reference, possibly extended to jocular language when speaking with friends.
222 Michael Cysouw
The aggressive use of the inclusive as found in these languages can be explained
by the fact that including reference to the addressee is a violation of the addressee’s
negative face. Such a face-threatening expression can, of course, be used if it is the ob-
jective of the speaker to be rude or aggressive. Or it can be used to re-establish a dif-
ference in rank, as is the case with the (older) inclusive pronoun nam in the Dravid-
ian language Malayalam, which is used for self-reference by royalty and aristocratic
people when talking to person of lower status (Chandrasekhar 1970: 246; 1977: 88).
For Tamil — also a Dravidian language — a comparable use of the inclusive naam for
self-reference by high-status persons is observed by Brown & Levinson (1987: 201–
3). The same pronoun naam can also be used as polite address (cf. Section 2), leading
to the possible situation that both participants in the speech act refer to the same par-
ticipant with the same pronoun. Such a usage of the inclusive is also claimed for the
Vietnamese pronoun ta (Thompson 1987; Nguyen 1996; Dình-hoà 1997). Nguyen
(1996: 9) explains “that ta ‘we (incl.)’ in many instances refers to an ‘I superior’ is a
common phenomenon: think for example of the use of kingly we and nous in English
and French respectively”. The superior self-referential usage of the inclusive is com-
pared here with the well-known pluralis majestatis usage of a first-person plural pro-
noun in European languages. However, in cases like the English we, there is no for-
mal differentiation between an inclusive and an exclusive pronoun. The English we is
probably best interpreted as basically an exclusive pronoun (see Daniel, this volume),
so the pluralis majestatis in English can be analysed as pretending to include the ad-
dressee, but actually excluding the addressee, thereby expressing distance to the ad-
dressee (contrary to the analysis by Head 1978: 178; see also the next section).
The existence of an impolite usage of the inclusive indicates that the inclusive
need not have polite connotations, as discussed in the previous sections. When self-
reference is intended, but the addressee is also included by use of an inclusive form,
this threatens the negative face of the addressee. The ‘impolite’ usages of the inclu-
sive, as discussed in this section, are examples of non-redressed acts against the
negative face of the addressee.
6. Exclusive as a polite first person (negative politeness)
All examples that have been presented until now exhibit some kind of honorific use
of the inclusive. However, it is also possible for the exclusive to have polite usage.
For example, in Minangkabau, a Sundic language from Sumatra (Indonesia), the
exclusive pronoun kami is used as a form of polite self-reference: “kami . . . is also
used for polite first person reference: it softens the too strong self-assertive charac-
ter of I” (Moussay 1981: 153, my translation).5 For Malay, Donohue & Smith (1998:
71, n. 2) note that the exclusive pronoun kami can be used as a “highly stylized
use of a ‘royal’ first-person singular pronoun, in certain speech styles.” A third case
among the Austronesian languages of a polite usage of the exclusive is described for
Malagasy (Brown & Levinson 1987: 203, citing E. O. Keenan, p.c.).
The polite use of the exclusive appears to be widespread in the Munda family. In
Kharia, as in Munda in general (with a few possible exceptions), the exclusive dual
is simultaneously the honorific form. When speaking about oneself to a person de-
serving respect, the first-person dual exclusive is used (J. Peterson, p.c.). However, it
is difficult to find published accounts of this phenomenon. Osada (1992: 67) men-
tions in passing that “in the Ho language, which is closely related to Mundari, aliŋ
[dual exclusive] is used for the honorific first-person singular”.6
Among the Dravidian languages, Brown & Levinson (1987) describe the pos-
sibility of using plural forms for expressing respect in Tamil. For self reference ex-
pressing respect, the exclusive is used.
Tamil . . . provides clear cases of . . . respectful plurality deriving from the treatment
of the individual as a member of a corporate group. Nouns which refer to groups
or to group property (including group members) seldom take singular pronouns.
Thus ‘my father’ is rendered enke appaa, meaning ‘our (exclusive) father’. (Brown
& Levinson 1987: 199)
A comparable phenomenon — though apparently in the opposite diachronic di-

rection — is observed in Vietnamese. Here, the exclusive pronoun chúng tôi (with-
out an explicit polite connotation) is based on the pronoun tôi, which has respect-
ful self-reference (chúng being a plurality marker from Chinese origin, Thompson
1987: 249).7
By using an exclusive instead of a first-person singular, the speaker conceals the
self-reference and gives the impression that he is not alone responsible for the utter-
ance. In general, an exclusive can be analysed as an associative plural of the first-
person singular. An associative plural indicates a set of the form ‘X and his/her as-
sociates’ (Corbett 2000: 101). Transferred to the domain of personal pronouns, the
associative plural of ‘I’ is ‘I and my associates’. This is exactly what is normally seen
as the meaning of the exclusive. The exclusive is thus the plural of I (cf. Daniel, this
volume), and thereby can be used to conceal self-reference in face-threatening situ-
ations because the usage of plural forms instead of singular ones is as a form of
negative politeness (Brown & Levinson 1987: 198 ff.).
7. Analysis and conclusions
The possible origins of honorific reference are various and the developments often
unexpected, intricately intertwined with the social structure of the community and
the existing linguistic structures. Head’s (1978: 178) claim, that exclusive indicates
greater social distance and inclusive less social distance, does not hold against the
existing linguistic variation as summarised in Table 1 (see the appendix for a com-
plete list of all examples discussed). Note that in Table 1, many languages are counted
more than once, as they exhibit various honorific usages of clusivity (the last row of
the table shows the frequencies with these multiple occurrences removed). Tamil is
224 Michael Cysouw
Table 1. Frequencies of attested usages of honorific clusivity
Usage Attested in
No. of stocks No. of families No. of languages
Inclusive as a polite second person 5 9 17
Inclusive as a humble first person 1 3 5
Inclusive as a bonding first person 3 3 3
Inclusive as an impolite first person 2 3 4
Exclusive as a polite first person 3 5 7
Total 14 23 36
(Multiple occurrences subtracted) (8) (14) (26)
even mentioned four times. However, the frequent presence of Tamil is purely the
result of the quality of description of honorific practice in Tamil as presented by
Brown & Levinson (1987). This illustrates that more in-depth analyses will prob-
ably result in many more examples of honorific usages of clusivity. The present col-
lection probably only scratches the surface of the real possibilities.
The most commonly attested development seems to be that an inclusive pronoun
is used with a polite connotation ‑ indicating social distance. The most commonly
attested case is one in which inclusive is used for polite address (Section 2). Like-
wise, the inclusive can also be used for humble self-reference, although I have only
found this among Austronesian languages (Section 3). In both these usages, the in-
clusive functions to express (or establish) distance between speaker and addressee,
the speaker giving deference to the addressee. This usage of the inclusive for this
goal is quite remarkable, because the inclusive ‑ taken literally ‑ implies a bond be-
tween speaker and addressee. I have proposed (see Section 2) that the distancing ef-
fect can be explained by reference to the inherent asymmetry between speaker and
addressee. The speaker, simply by being speaker, has more control over the speech-
act than the addressee. Using an inclusive diminishes this inherent power-position,
in effect an abasement of the speaker.
The inclusive can also be used to establish a bond between speaker and addressee
(Section 4). This can be explained as a way to relieve embarrassment on the side of
the speaker. By including both speaker and addressee in the reference, both are de-
picted as involved in the utterance, which alleviates the responsibility for the utter-
ance from the speaker. However, including the addressee can also be interpreted as
threatening the negative face of the addressee, leading to the possibility to use the
inclusive for self-reference with an impolite connotation (Section 5). In some lan-
guages, the inclusive can be used both for such impolite self-reference and for po-
lite address (as discussed in Section 2). This can result in a communicative setting
in which the same inclusive pronoun is used to refer to one of the speech-act par-
ticipants: one participant uses the inclusive for impolite self-reference and the other
participant uses the same pronoun for polite address of that participant.
Finally, a few cases are attested in which the exclusive is used as a (negative) po-
lite kind of self-reference. This usage of the exclusive can quite straightforwardly be
analysed similarly to the commonly attested polite usage of plural forms. An exclu-
sive is a first person associative plural, which can get the meaning of a first-person
singular polite (Section 6).
The usage of clusivity for honorific functions is a typical phenomenon for South-
east Asian languages (see Table 2). However, this prominence could very well be a
result of selective descriptive practice. It is known that honorific usage of language
is particularly prominent in the structure of languages in South-east Asia in general.
This might lead to a greater sensitivity towards honorific usages of clusivity as well
and thus to more available descriptions of this phenomenon .
The question now remains whether these honorific uses observed exhaust the
possibilities of human language, or whether it is simply by chance that I did not (yet)
find any other kinds of honorific use of clusivity. First, the use of clusivity as honor-
ific third person reference has not been attested so far. I do not see any principle rea-
son why it should not be possible, for example, to use an exclusive as a third person
honorific by using positive politeness. However, I do not know of any such case.
Second, the exclusive is only attested for polite self-reference, using a form of nega-
tive politeness (see Section 6). It is highly improbably that an exclusive will be used for
other honorific usages. It will not be used for polite address, because the addressee is
not part of the referential value of the exclusive. The only possibility would be an ex-
clusive used for address with a strong kind of negative politeness, comparable to the
usage of a third person for polite address (cf. Head 1978: 167–70). However, the ex-
clusive includes (also) speaker reference, the usage of which is a face threatening act
in itself (intending ‘you’ but saying ‘I’ is a highly imposing expression).
Third, I have attested one usage of clusivity that expresses impoliteness (see Sec-
tion 5). However, given the right context, every expression can probably be used to
Table 2. Areal/genetic distribution of examples attested
Area/Stock No. of examples No. of languages

Southeast Asia/Pacific
Austronesian 21 15
Austro-Asiatic 5 4
Dravidian 5 2
West Papuan 1 1
Others
Tibeto-Burman 1 1
Mayan 1 1
Quechuan 1 1
Isolates 1 1
Total 37 27
226 Michael Cysouw
Table 3. Logical possibilities and attested usages of polite inclusive
Polite Inclusive used for Described in

First person reference with
– Positive politeness Section 4
– Negative politeness Section 3
Second person reference with
– Positive politeness (not attested)
– Negative politeness Section 2
be impolite. For example, it seems to be perfectly possible that an exclusive would

be used as an impolite address.
Finally, there are three different polite usages of clusivity attested (see Table 3).
The theoretically missing case could very well be imagined. The inclusive used for
second person reference could eventually be used as a kind of positive politeness.
Specifically strategy 7 as described by Brown & Levinson (1987: 119–220), “presup-
pose/raise/assert common ground”, argues that an inclusive should be able to func-
tion as positive polite address. By using an inclusive, both speaker and addressee are
equally involved in the situation: “one speaks as if everything were shared between
members” (Brown & Levinson 1987: 203). For example, if the speaker has a higher
status than the addressee has, then the usage of an inclusive for address would be a
strong example of positive politeness. The high status speaker lowers himself to as-
sert a common ground with the addressee. This is in fact what happens in English
(Quirk et al. 1985: 350–1) with the inclusive authorial we in serious writing (As we
saw in Chapter 3,. . .) or with the doctor’s we (How are we feeling today?). Of course,
English does not have a formal inclusive–exclusive opposition, but it still indicates
that I might be possible to find a language in which the inclusive can be used as a
kind of positively polite address.
From these theoretical possibilities, it can be inferred that there is much more
conceivable in human language than I have been able to find in existing descrip-
tive work. The real possibilities of honorific reference of clusivity are probably even
more manifold than I have been able to sketch here.
Acknowledgements
The basic work on this chapter has been conducted while I was at the Zentrum für allge-
meine Sprachwissenschft (ZAS) in Berlin. I thank Mixail Daniel, Laura Downing, Elena Fili-
monova, Frank Lichtenberk and Horst Simon and for tips and general comments on earl-
ier versions of this chapter. Further, I thank John Peterson for help with the Munda data and
Ruben van der Stoel for help with the Sulawesi data. Of course, the present content of this
chapter remains completely my own responsibility.
Notes
1. The examples presented in this article show a strong overlap with the examples discussed
by Lichtenberg (this volume). In particular, the Sections 2 and 3 in this chapter should be
compared with Lichtenberk’s Sections 2.3 and 2.2, respectively. He mentions more examples
of the kind as discussed in this chapter, though only from Austronesian languages. Both our
collections of examples had been collected separately.
2. “ikәŋ et idikkәŋ expriment généralement la notion de pluriel, (= ‘nous’). . . . Le pronom idi’,
à la première personne, signifie, semble-t-il, ‘nous’, mais il est également employé en tant que
forme de politesse, à la 2ème personne (= ‘vous’). . . . Les notions d’exclusion-inclusion ne
sont pratiquement pas exprimeés par la langue de la littérature Bugis traditionelle. Parmi les
pronoms de première personne, ikәŋ, idikkәŋ et ia’ peuvent avoir une valeur exclusive.”
3. “Als verklaring waarom men de eerste persoon meervoud voor beleefdheidspluralis ge-
bruikt, zei men ons het volgende: ‘Wanneer we een meerdere met ikita aanspreken en we
zeggen per ongeluk iets onaangenaams, dan kan hij niet zò gemakkelijk kwaad worden, om-
dat we ons zelf dan ook onder dat onaangenaams betrekken’.”
4. The following abbreviations are used in the interlinear glosses: sg - singular, pl - plural,
subj - subject, obj - object, inc - inclusive, inst - instrumental, neg - negation, mod - modal,
mdf - modifier, top - topic, ind - indicative.
5. “kami . . . est encore utilisé pour se désigner poliment à la première personne: il estompe
l’affirmation trop tranchée du je.”
6. Deeney (1975: 5) only mentions that in Ho all dual forms can be used honorifically. He
does not specify possible honorific usages of the dual exclusive.
7. Head (1978: 178) presents Auca (also known as Waorani), a yet unclassified language spo-
ken in Ecuador, as an example of this kind. However, he misinterprets the rather difficult to
interpret source. The source he used (Peeke 1973: 41) says “honorific includes dual or plural
exclusive in the first person”. Now, there appears to be a typo in this phrase. Instead of ‘ex-
clusive’ it should read ‘inclusive’ (cf. Peeke 1973: 40 for some more discussion on this topic).
From a different work by the same author (Peeke 1979: 52) it becomes clear that there is
an inclusive (apparently without any honorific connotation) that is grouped together with
some honorific forms in one paradigm because all pronouns have the same suffix, not be-
cause they are all honorific forms: ‘para conservar la simetría, se incluye [el inclusivo] en la
columna previamente dedicade al honorífico maternal (to retain the symmetry, the [inclu-
sive] is included in the column previously dedicated to mother-honorifics)’ (Peeke 1979: 52).
Appendix: Survey of examples discussed

Within the lists of the various kind of honorific usages, the languages are grouped by genetic
family relationship. Different families that belong to the same overarching stock are counted
separately (e.g. various families within Austronesian). Some languages exhibit various kinds
honorific usages of clusivity (i.e. they appear multiple times in different sections, e.g. Tamil).
Such languages are counted more than once.
Inclusive as a polite second person (see Section 2)
Attested in 9 families, 17 languages: Muna, Konjo, Bajau, Wolio, Sa’dan, Duri, Palu (all Sula
228 Michael Cysouw
wesi, Austronesian); Toba Batak, North Maluku Malay, Sulawesi Malay (all Sundic, Austro-
nesian); Tetun (Timor, Austronesian); Malagasy (Borneo, Austronesian); Hawaiian (Poly-
nesian, Austronesian); Ainu (Isolate); Limbu (Kiranti, Tibeto-Burman); Cuzco Quechua
(Quechuan); Tamil (Dravidian).
Additional evidence attested in: Makassarese, Banggai, Tukang Besi, Coastal Saluan (all Sula
wesi, Austronesian); Old Javanese (Sundic, Austronesian); Bimanese (Bima-Sumba, Austro-
nesian).
Inclusive as a humble first person (see Section 3)
Attested in 3 families, 5 languages: Sawu (Bima-Sumba, Austronesian); Toba Batak, Sulawesi
Malay (both Sundic, Austronesian); Duri, Palu (both Sulawesi, Austronesian).
Additional evidence attested in: Samoan, Tongan, Mae, Niuafo’ou, Nukuoro, Tuvaluan (all
Polynesian, Austronesian).
Inclusive as a bonding first person (Section 4)
Attested in 3 families, 3 languages: Galela (West Papuan); Tzeltal (Mayan); Tamil (Dravid-
ian).
Inclusive as an impolite first person (see Section 5)
Attested in 3 families, 4 languages: Santali (Munda, Austro-Asiatic); Vietnamese (Mon
Khmer, Austro-Asiatic); Malayalam, Tamil (both Dravidian).
Exclusive as a polite first person (see Section 6)
Attested in 5 families, 7 languages: Minangkabau, Malay (both Sundic, Austronesian); Mala
gasy (Borneo, Austronesian); Kharia, Ho (both Munda, Austro-Asiatic); Vietnamese (Mon
Khmer, Austro-Asiatic); Tamil (Dravidian).
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Chapter 8
Exclusive pronouns in
American Sign Language
Kearsy Cormier
Centre for Deaf Studies, University of Bristol
This chapter examines the distribution of inclusive/exclusive marking among spoken and
signed languages, particularly American Sign Language (ASL). Pronominal systems of
signed languages are often taken to be fully indexic — that is, signed pronouns ‘point to’ their
referents. The results of this study show distinct exclusive marking in ASL. An exclusive pro-
noun need not be indexic as other ASL pronouns are. Furthermore, results also show the
context-dependent nature of exclusion in ASL compared to spoken languages. While most
spoken languages with this distinction can include/exclude only the addressee, ASL can use
one exclusive marking to exclude any salient discourse participant. This chapter highlights
the importance of including signed languages in language typologies, to ensure accurate
generalizations about the world’s languages.
Keywords: sign language, ASL, modality, exclusive, indexic, person
1. Introduction
In the last few decades, considerable progress has been made in establishing Ameri-
can Sign Language (ASL) and other signed languages as linguistic systems compar-
able to any spoken language. However, in attempting to prove that signed languages
are indeed languages, it seems that, until recently, linguists may have overstepped
the bounds in claiming that signed languages are structured exactly the same way as
spoken languages are. Signed and spoken languages are produced in two very dif-
ferent modalities: the first in the visual/gestural modality, the second in the audi-
tory/oral modality. Surely we should expect some differences between signed and
spoken languages due to modality.
Researchers have shown that there are obvious modality effects at the phonetic/
phonological levels (Brentari 1998, Liddell & Johnson 1989, Sandler 1993). Like-
wise, other research has suggested that there are minimal modality effects at the
level of syntax (Lillo-Martin 2002; Neidle et al. 2000; Petronio 1993). Modality ef-
fects at the morphological level are not so clear. We know that signed languages
mark many of the same types of morphological categories that occur in spoken lan-
guages. For example, signed languages have rich aspectual marking and number
marking; many spoken languages mark these categories as well. But how similar are
these morphological categories across modalities?
232 Kearsy Cormier
In this chapter I focus on the distribution of one particular morphological fea-

ture — inclusive/exclusive marking — in spoken versus signed languages. This is
one feature that has not been mentioned frequently in the literature on signed lan-
guages. I present the results of a study that identifies several pronominal forms in
ASL that are used to indicate first-person plurals. The results of this study also show
a distinct exclusive form for one type of pronoun in ASL.
Section 2 is an overview of the inclusive–exclusive distinction in spoken lan-
guages, and includes information on the distribution of this feature and related
markedness patterns. Section 3 includes an overview of the ASL pronominal sys-
tem and first-person pronouns in ASL, followed by a detailed description of exclu-
sive pronouns in ASL and related markedness patterns. In Section 4, I discuss the
possibility that inclusive–exclusive distinctions may exist in other signed languages.
Section 5 includes further discussion of inclusive/exclusive marking in ASL and of
the differences between inclusive/exclusive marking in speech versus sign.
2. Inclusive/exclusive pronouns in spoken languages
Before we look more closely at inclusive/exclusive pronouns, we need to look at the

category of first-person plural, since the inclusive–exclusive distinction in spoken
languages is traditionally considered within this category.1
2.1. First-person plural pronouns in spoken languages

The first-person plural category is somewhat anomalous. The English first-person
plural pronoun ‘we’, for example, is not plural in the same sense as an English plural
noun. ‘I’ refers to the speaker, but ‘we’ does not generally mean ‘more than one
speaker’. Benveniste (1971: 202) notes: “ ‘We’ is not a multiplication of identical ob-
jects but a junction between ‘I’ and the ‘non-I’, no matter what the content of this
‘non-I’ may be.” This is not only true of English, but of other languages as well.2
Because first-person plurals indicate the speaker plus other non-specified partici-
pants, the reference of a first-person plural is often quite vague. This potential am-
biguity may be one reason why some languages encode information within the first
person other than just the inclusion of the speaker - e.g. information about whether
the addressee is included. This is generally what has happened in spoken languages
that have separate categories for inclusive and exclusive pronouns.
Languages that have an inclusive–exclusive distinction in the first person have
separate first-person plural forms that indicate whether the addressee is included
(‘we including you’) or excluded (‘we excluding you’). Many languages, such as
English, do not have this distinction. Thus, English has only one first-person plural
form: ‘we’3 which is not specified for inclusive or exclusive. In contrast, Tagalog
(Austronesian) has a first-person plural inclusive form kamí meaning ‘we including
you,’ and a first-person plural exclusive form tayo meaning ‘we excluding you.’
Exclusive pronouns in American Sign Language 233
Forchheimer (1953) surveys the person systems of 71 languages, classifying

them according to person, number, complexity of morphological marking and in-
clusive/exclusiveness. Of those 71 languages, 45 have a distinction between inclu-
sive and exclusive. This introduces the question: what determines whether or not a
language has an inclusive–exclusive distinction?
2.2. Distribution of inclusive/exclusive across spoken languages

According to Nichols (1992), there is a strong correlation between the inclusive–
exclusive opposition and geography. That is, the frequency of languages that have
the inclusive–exclusive distinction varies greatly across continents, with the great-
est frequencies in the languages of the Pacific. There is also a strong genetic cor-
relation; the inclusive–exclusive distinction tends to occur within entire language
families. Despite the strong genetic correlation, as Nichols points out, the inclusive–
exclusive distinction can be spread outside a language family within a particular
area. Therefore, the main correlation here is areal rather than genetic.
Other hierarchies arise when breaking down the inclusive–exclusive distinction
by grammatical number rather than geography. Combining the number and inclu-
sive–exclusive data from Forchheimer (1953) and Ingram (1978) results in the hier-
archical pattern shown in Table 1. Inspection of Table 1 reveals that, in general, if a
language marks the inclusive–exclusive distinction in the dual, it will also mark in-
clusive and/or exclusive in the plural (cf. Types 6, 7 and 8). Language universal 1490
from the Universals Archive (Filimonova & Plank 1996–2002; Sokolovskaya 1980)
states the same generalization.4 Likewise, if a language marks the inclusive–exclu-
sive distinction in the trial, it will also mark inclusive and/or exclusive in the plural
(cf. Types 9 and 10). Thus we may propose the following hierarchy for number in
languages with the inclusive–exclusive distinction: Plural < Dual, Trial. This same
hierarchy follows from language universals 1489 and 1490 from the Universals Ar-
chive (Filimonova & Plank 1996–2002; Sokolovskaya 1980).
2.3. Markedness
Hierarchical patterns often bring up questions regarding markedness. Which value
is more marked among spoken languages, inclusive or exclusive? Here I adopt Croft’s
(1990) notion of markedness which is based on the notion of grammatical assyme-
try across languages. Croft refers to several different criteria for markedness which
were based on the work of Greenberg (1966). One is a structural criterion for mark-
edness, in which “the marked value of a grammatical category will be expressed by
at least as many morphemes as is the unmarked value of that category” (Croft 1990:
73). Another is the distribution criterion, which states that “if the marked value oc-
curs in a certain number of distinct language types . . . then the unmarked value will
occur in at least the language types that the marked value occurs in” (Croft 1990:
83). A third is the neutralization criterion, in which neutralization of an opposition
234 Kearsy Cormier
Table 1. Distribution of the inclusive–exclusive distinction among spoken languages
Type Sg Pl Du Tr Languages
1 I we Ø Ø Indo-European: English, Latin; Sino-Tibetan:
Chinese (Pekinese); Japanese; Sumerian;
Afro-Asiatic: Shilh; Na-Dene: Tlingit
2 I we-incl Ø Ø Austronesian: Malay, Tagalog; Niger-Congo:
we-excl Ful, Nkosi; Dravidian: Tamil, Telegu; Altaic:
Ordos Mongol, Tungus; Algic: Algonquian;
Afro-Asiatic: Somali; Sino-Tibetan: Garo,
Purik, Balti, Chitkuli; Melanesian Pidgin
English (Tok Pisin)
3 I we-incl-ltd Ø Ø Mixe-Zoque: Sierra Popoluca
we-incl-gen
we-excl
4 I we we-2 Ø Indo-Iranian: Sanskrit; Na-Dene: Carrier;
Penutian: Maidu;
Eskimo-Aleut: West Greenlandic, Eskimo;
Uralic: Ostyak
5 I we we-2-incl Ø Sino-Tibetan: Lower Kanauri; Penutian:
we-2-excl Coos; Niger-Congo: Ewe
6 I we-incl we-2-incl Ø Uto-Aztecan: Southern Paiute
we-excl Siouan: Lakota, Winnebago
7 I we-incl we-2-incl Ø Sino-Tibetan: Kanauri; Austronesian:
we-excl we-2-excl Hawaiian; Uto-Aztecan: Shoshone; Penutian:
Chinook, Siuslawan, Yokuts; Iroquoian:
Mohawk; Austro-Asiatic: Mundari; Oto-
Manguean: Otomi; Australian: Dyirringan,
Kamilaroi, Saibalgal; Trans-New Guinea:
Bongu, Kunimaipa; Kiowa Tanoan: Kiowa
8 I-incl we-incl we-2-incl Ø Austronesian: Rotumana
I-excl we-excl we-2-excl
9 I we we-2-incl we-3-incl- Niger-Congo: Kele
we-incl-ltd we-2-excl gen
we-excl
10 I we-incl we-2-incl we-3-incl Austronesian: Nogogu; Australian: Worora
we-excl we-2-excl we-3-excl
Note: Referring to Churchward (1978[1940]), Forchheimer (1953) mentions one language with the inclusive–
exclusive distinction in the singular: Polynesian Rotuman (Type 8). According to Churchward (1978), the form
he calls “inclusive singular” may have an interpretation similar to a third-person indefinite, meaning some‑
thing like “someone” or “one”. Churchward also notes that this form may be used in the same context where an
English speaker would use the first-person singular. “But even in this case it carries with it an ‘inclusive’ impli‑
cation, such as ‘and so would you (or anyone else) if placed in the same position’” (Churchward 1978: 145).
Notation: incl = inclusive; excl = exclusive; Ø indicates that the language(s) in question lack the number cat‑
egory/categories denoted by the column heading.
results in the unmarked category. I will look at each of these criteria in turn.
Jacobsen (1980: 211) notes that, in Tübatulabal (Uto-Aztecan) and Yokuts (Pe-
nutian), the “inclusive formation contains fewer morphemes than does the exclu-
sive”. Also, many Australian languages have a simple form ŋali for first-person dual
inclusive and an augmented form of this pronoun for first-person dual exclusive
(Dixon & Blake 1983). Thus for these languages, the exclusive form is more mor-
phologically complex than the inclusive form; this satisfies Croft’s (1990) structural
criterion for markedness.5
Universal 1484 from the Universals Archive states that if a language has a spe-
cial form meaning ‘we-exclusive,’ then it also has a special form meaning ‘we-inclu-
sive’ (Filimonova & Plank 1996–2002). This tendency holds for the data in Table 1,
which show that languages that have either inclusive or exclusive categories (but
not both) invariably express inclusive, not exclusive (cf. Types 6 and 9). That is, no
language among Forchheimer’s (1953) 45 languages marks exclusive without also
marking inclusive. Thus the exclusive category also satisfies Croft’s crosslinguistic
distribution criterion for markedness described above.
Finally, Jacobsen (1980: 222 referring to Anderson 1975, 1977) notes that “if a
language loses this [inclusive–exclusive] distinction, it will be the inclusive form
that remains to take over the combined first-person plural reference”. Again this
supports exclusive as the marked category since this is consistent with Croft’s
(1990) neutralization criterion, i.e. neutralization of an opposition results in the
unmarked (inclusive) category. Together, these observations suggest that inclusive
is unmarked while exclusive is marked in terms of crosslinguistic distribution.6
To summarize, the distribution of the inclusive–exclusive distinction among the
world’s spoken languages is largely areal. Some number categories are more likely to
show the distinction than others — specifically, the plural category is more likely to
show the distinction than the dual or trial categories. Finally, in terms of marked-
ness, inclusive is generally crosslinguistically unmarked while exclusive is marked.
3. Inclusive/exclusive pronouns in ASL
So far we have focused on the inclusive–exclusive distinction in spoken languages.

However, in order to determine if the marking of this distinction is influenced by
language modality, it is also important to examine this distinction in signed lan-
guages. In fact, inclusive–exclusive distinctions do exist in signed languages, al-
though there is very little discussion of this in the sign literature, as was noted earlier.
In this section I will examine the pronominal system and exclusive marking in ASL.
3.1. The ASL pronominal system

A personal pronoun in ASL normally takes the form of a pointing sign (index fin-
ger extended and other fingers closed) directed toward a distinct location or loca-
236 Kearsy Cormier
Figure (1a) Figure (1b)
YOU-PL THEY
Figure 1a. YOU-PL Figure 1b. THEY
tions in space. By using a pointing sign,Figure

the (2)
signer associates the pronoun with this
distinct location; the association between signs and locations in space is referred to
as indexing. Subsequent signs that point to this previously established location are
interpreted as being coreferential. If the referent is physically present (e.g. the ad-
dressee or a non-addressed individual), the signer points to the location of that ref-
erent. In the case of self-reference (i.e. the pronoun ME7), the signer points to his/
her chest. If a referent is not physically present, the signer simply chooses a location
in neutral space for that referent.8
This same principle of indexing applies to plural pronouns that refer to address-
ees or non-addressed individuals. To refer to more than one addressee, the signer
uses a pointing sign with a sweeping motion that refers to all the addressees, as
shown in Figure 1a. Likewise, to refer to more than one non-addressed person, the
TWO-OF-US
signer uses a pointing sign with a sweeping motion that refers to all the non-ad-
dressed individuals, as in Figure 1b.
Figure (3)
3.1.1. First-person plural pronouns in ASL
Before identifying the forms of first-person plurals in ASL, it may be helpful to
look at what form they take in spoken languages. According to Forchheimer (1953),
some languages morphologically modify the first-person singular pronoun for the
plural (e.g. Chinese uo ‘I’ vs. uomen ‘we’). Other languages use an entirely separate
lexical item for the plural (e.g. Korean na ‘I’ vs. uri ‘we’). Still other languages have
what Forchheimer refers to as ‘composite plurals’, that is “pluralic forms that are
composed of two or more simple elements” (1953: 40). He cites as an example Mela-
nesian Pidgin English (Tok Pisin), which has the composite plural form jumi ‘you
plus me’.
Similar forms for indicating more than one referent exist in ASL. ASL allows all
THREE-OF-US
three types of plural formation mentioned above: lexical, morphological and com-
posite. For example, previous ASL literature (e.g., Baker-Shenk & Cokely 1981) has
identified separate lexical signs for first-person plurals, similar to the Korean ex-
ample above, such as the dual TWO-OF-US, and the number-incorporated signs
(THREE-OF-US, FOUR-OF-US, etc.). The dual form TWO-OF-US indexes

YOU-PL
the lo-
THEY
cations of two individuals (i.e. the signer and one other person); see Figure 2. The
number-incorporated pronouns (e.g. THREE-OF-US, FOUR-OF-US, and FIVE-
Figure (1a) OF-US) indicate a specific number of referents (Baker-Shenk
Figure (1b) & Cokely
Figure (2) 1981); see
Figure 3.9
ASL also has a general first-person plural form WE (and its possessive equiva-
lent OUR); see Figures 4 and 5. The citation form (dictionary form) for the sign
WE is a pointing sign that begins with contact on one side of the signer’s chest and
ends with contact on the other side of the signer’s chest. This pronoun is produced
at the center of the signer’s chest, so that the two points of contact are equidistant
from the signer’s midline (i.e. the imaginary line that runs down the center of the
body from head to toe). The signs WE and OUR do not specify the number or lo-
cations of their referents in any direct way. Meier (1990) notes that these forms are
idiosyncratic since in both signs the hand contacts the chest twice. Thus, he claims,
the form of these signs cannot be predicted based solely on what might be called a
YOU-PL TWO-OF-US
THEYis, the sweeping horizontal
“plural marker” in other signs — that movement across
the signing space (e.g. YOU vs. YOU-PL; HE/SHE/IT vs. Figure THEY). (4)The sweeping
Figure (2) Figure (3)
WE
TWO-OF-US THREE-OF-US
Figure 2. TWO-OF-US Figure 3. THREE-OF-US
Figure (4) Figure (5)
Figure (3)
WE OUR
Figure 4. WE Figure 5. OUR
THREE-OF-US
Figure (5)
Figure (6). WE-COMP
OUR
238 Kearsy Cormier

Figure (6). WE-COMP Figure (7). ALL-OF-US
Figure 6. WE-COMP Figure 7. ALL-OF-US
Figure (8).toExample
movement in these plurals could be considered of displaced
be morphemic, lexical
resulting in plural
plural forms that are morphologically derived from singulars (i.e. singular pronoun
+ sweeping movement) similar to plural formation noted for Chinese above. How-
ever, with its idiosyncratic form, it is not clear that ASL WE is in fact morphologic-
ally derived from the singular first-person pronoun ME.
In addition, there are alternate ways of expressing plurality. For instance, a signer
may point individually to each of the included referents (Baker-Shenk & Cokely
1981). I call this form WE-COMP, because it is similar to the composite forms that
Forchheimer (1953) describes (recall Melanesian Pidgin English yumi ‘you plus
me’).10 Also, reference to all members of some specific set can be expressed by the
sign ALL-OF-US, a fingerspelled loan sign (Baker-Shenk & Cokely 1981).11 This
sign can be used to mean ‘all of us’. These signs are shown in Figures 6 and 7.
All of these signs are among those that the informants in the current study pro-
duced. More thorough descriptions of the phonetic forms of these signs are given
WE -DISPLACED
below in Section 3.2.
3.1.2. Two-person system for ASL

As described above, Meier (1990) notes that the first-person
Figure plural form
(9). Variants WE is idio-
of WE-CENTRAL
syncratic and does not point to its referents in the way that other pronouns do. Al-
though the first-person singular form ME does follow the general pattern of a point
to the referent (specifically, a point to the signer’s chest), Meier also notes that this
sign does not invariably refer to the signer. In the discourse strategy known as role
shift, which can function as a method of direct quotation, a point to the self refers
to the person whose role the signer is assuming (i.e., the person being quoted), not
the signer him/herself. Thus, a point to the self does not always indicate the signer.
Meier therefore proposes a two-person system: first person and non-first person.
According to this analysis, there is no grammatical distinction between second and
third person.12
Although on the surface this may seem quite different from pronominal systems
of spoken languages, this two-person analysis for signed languages actually follows
a) WE (non-arcing) b) WE (arcing)
the claim set forth by Lyons (1968: 278) about spoken languages that “the primary
distinction [within pronominal systems] is between ‘first’ (+ego: ‘plus ego’) and ‘not
first’ (-ego: ‘minus ego’) and that the distinction of second and third is secondary.”13
Thus a two-person system alone is not enough to argue for modality differences.
3.2. Description of inclusive–exclusive pronouns in ASL

In order to determine whether any first-person plural forms in ASL have inclu-
sive or exclusive forms, I designed a study using videotaped data elicited from four
deaf informants. All informants were native signers raised in signing households.
A questionnaire was devised to elicit different forms of first-person pronouns. The
informants were asked to translate English sentences — each with a specific con-
text — into ASL. The sentences all used the English pronouns we, us, or our; since
English does not have an inclusive–exclusive distinction, the informants had to rely
on the context to determine the appropriate form of the ASL pronoun (see Appen-
dix for excerpts from questionnaire).
In the context given with each sentence, the number of referents was manipu-
lated so as to elicit the following forms: dual inclusive, dual exclusive, trial inclu-
sive, trial exclusive, plural inclusive, and plural exclusive. The inclusive contexts in-
cluded the addressee; the exclusive contexts excluded the addressee. For the dual
and trial forms, the context specified two and three referents, respectively. For the
plural forms, the context specified either ‘ten or more’ or an indefinite ‘many’ refer-
ents. Furthermore, since the physical location of discourse participants is so crucial
to how indices are set up in the signing space, a set of props was used to help the in-
formants imagine real-world discourse situations. These props were placed in front
of the participants to represent where the referents were located with respect to the
signer. The props were occasionally moved from right to left and vice-versa to see
what effect the location of the referents had on the location of the pronoun.14
Each data collection session was videotaped with an 8mm video camera. I coded
the data from each session by recording the following information for every pro-
noun produced by each participant: a gloss for the pronoun, the location of the pro-
noun (right of the signer’s midline, left of the midline, or at the midline), whether
the context was inclusive or exclusive, and the location of the props (right of the
signer’s midline, left of the midline, or at the midline). Further details were also
coded, such as the handshape of the pronoun and any nonmanual behaviors (such
as body leans and eye gaze) that may have co-occurred with the pronoun.
3.2.1. Classifying the pronouns

Results from the study revealed six different forms of the first-person plural pro-
noun in ASL, including one possessive form (see Tables 2 and 3). Of these six forms,
four of them were often produced at or near the center of the signer’s chest. Each
of these forms had a variant that could be displaced to the signer’s left or right side,
near the shoulder, as in Figure 8. I will refer to these forms as lexical plurals because
240 Kearsy Cormier
Figure (8). Example of displaced lexical plural
Figure 8. Example of displaced lexical plural WE-DISPLACED

WE -DISPLACED
Table 2. Lexical plural pronouns coded
Type of first-person plural Variants Phonetic Description

Figure (9). Variants of WE-CENTRAL
First-person plural (WE): Signer’s WE-CENTRAL Produced at or near the center
hand moves from one point on of the signer’s chest; the signer’s
chest to another, both in same midline is the axis of the arc
horizontal plane.
WE-DISPLACED Produced slightly left or slightly
right of the signer’s midline on the
chest; typically involves rotation
of the forearm
Number-incorporated first- 3/4/5-OF-US- Produced at or near the center of
person plurals (THREE/FOUR/ CENTRAL the signer’s chest
FIVE-OF-US): Signs made with 3,
3/4/5-OF-US- Produced on either the signer’s left
4 or 5 handshape (palm up) with
DISPLACED or right side
small circular motion
First-person plural possessive OUR-CENTRAL Like WE-CENTRAL, produced at
a) WE
(OUR): Signs made (non-arcing)
with bent-B b) WE
or near (arcing)
center of the signer’s chest
handshape, starting with thumb- such that signer’s midline is axis
side of hand near or contacting of arc
chest with arcing forearm rotation
OUR- Like WE-DISPLACED, produced
so that pinky-side of hand ends
DISPLACED slightly left or slightly right of
near or contacting the chest
signer’s midline
Universally quantified first- ALL-OF-US - Produced at or near center of
person plurals (ALL-OF-US): CENTRAL signer’s chest; signer’s midline is
Signs made with A‑handshape axis of arc.
moving outward, opening to L-
ALL-OF-US- Produced slightly to left or slightly
handshape Not to be confused
DISPLACED right on the signer’s midline.
with ALL, produced with flat
hand.
WE -DISPLACED

Figure (9). Variants of WE-CENTRAL
a. b.
Figure 9. Variants of WE-CENTRAL. a. WE (non-arcing) b. WE (arcing)

a) WE (non-arcing) b) WE (arcing)
they do not index (i.e. point to) the locations of individual referents; thus, these
signs are lexicalized with respect to location. The lexical plurals are described in
Table 2.
The central variant of the first-person plural pronoun WE may or may not have
a large arcing motion; if not, the signer merely touches with her index finger two
points in the same horizontal plane at the center of her chest. Baker-Shenk & Cokely
(1981) claim that the variant with large arcing motion is used when the referents are
present, while the variant without this arcing motion is used when the referents are
not present. However, some of my participants claimed there is no difference be-
tween these forms; therefore for some signers these variants may be in free varia-
tion. Figure 9 shows these two variants of WE-CENTRAL.
There were two other pronominal forms that do not seem to be lexicalized vis-à-
vis location in the way that lexical plurals are. I refer to these pronouns as ostensive
pronouns, because in general they transparently point to the location of each refer-
ent. Table 3 shows descriptions of these two forms.
WE-COMP is a sign consisting of several pointing signs that refer exhaustively
to each member of some set (cf. composite pronouns from Forchheimer 1953).
This form differs from a simple concatenation of pointing signs in that the pointing
Table 3. Ostensive plural pronouns coded
Type of first-person plural Phonetic Description

Composite first-person plural (WE-COMP): Series of Varies depending on which
pointing signs that point to each member of some set referents are being indexed
Dual (TWO-OF-US): Signs made with K handshape Varies depending on which
where arm or wrist moves between locations associated referents are being indexed
with signer and some other referent.
242 Kearsy Cormier
signs of WE-COMP are produced in quick succession, with dampened movement

(i.e. each path movement is shorter than the one before it) and sometimes with al-
ternating hands (e.g. right hand, then left, then right, etc.).
For dual forms, the sign TWO-OF-US is used. This sign is classified as an osten-
sive pronoun because the hand moves between the locations associated between
the two referents and thus clearly indexes both referents. However, unlike the point-
ing handshape of WE-COMP, the dual form has a K-handshape. To produce the
K-handshape, the index and middle fingers are extended, and the thumb contacts
near the base of the middle finger. The use of this handshape here is idiosyncratic;
one might expect either an index handshape pointing to each of the two referents,
as with WE-COMP, or possibly a 2-handshape, given the handshapes of the other
number-incorporated signs. For instance, other signs that incorporate the number
two (e.g. TWO-MONTHS) use a 2-handshape rather than a K-handshape.
In addition to the manual features of ASL signs, facial expression and body pos-
ition are also important elements of ASL; these elements are referred to collectively
in the literature as nonmanual signals (NMS). NMS are important for grammat-
ical as well as affective marking. Some of the more prevalent NMS that the signers
produced were: cheek-to-shoulder (CS), body shift, body lean and eyegaze. All of
these signals may act as grammatical markers; some may additionally indicate af-
fect. Each of these NMS and their use with exclusive pronouns are described in the
Appendix.
While these NMS and others (e.g. raised eyebrows, furrowed eyebrows, head
nods and head shakes) were used extensively by the informants in this study, none
were used reliably to mark inclusive or exclusive.15 This may be due to the fact that
these NMS are used quite frequently for other grammatical and affective reasons
(e.g. topic marking, affect for doubt, affirmative marking, and negation); they were
used in this study for these purposes.
3.2.2. Spatial displacement of pronouns

In order to determine if the displacement occurring with the lexical plural pro-
nouns was due to inclusive–exclusive marking, I examined the distribution of each
pronoun location (at the center, displaced to the right, or displaced to the left) in
terms of whether the context was inclusive (i.e. including the addressee) or exclu-
sive (i.e. excluding the addressee).
In inclusive contexts, lexical pronouns tended to be central, while in exclusive
contexts these pronouns tended to be displaced (to the right or left side). In order
to determine if these tendencies were due to a grammatical inclusive–exclusive dis-
tinction, I elicited further grammaticality judgments for each of the lexical plurals
mentioned. Participants were shown sentences like examples (1) and (2) and were
then asked if these sentences could be used in an inclusive context, an exclusive
context, or either. A summary of the results based on these grammaticality judg-
ments is shown in Table 4.
Table 4. Grammaticality judgments for lexical plurals in inclusive and exclusive contexts (√
indicates grammaticality; * indicates ungrammaticality)
Lexical Plurals Inclusive context Exclusive context

WE-CENTRAL √ √
WE-DISPLACED * √
3/4/5-OF-US-CENTRAL √ √
3/4/5-OF-US-DISPLACED * √
ALL-OF-US-CENTRAL √ √
ALL-OF-US-DISPLACED * √
OUR-CENTRAL √ √
OUR-DISPLACED * √
(1) NEXT-WEEK WE-CENTRAL GO-OUT MOVIE

‘Next week we’ll go out to see a movie.’
(2) NEXT-WEEK WE-DISPLACED GO-OUT MOVIE
‘Next week we’ll go out to see a movie.’
According to Table 4, the central forms are grammatical in inclusive and exclusive
contexts. The displaced forms are grammatical in exclusive contexts only. Since
there is no form that is grammatical for inclusive but ungrammatical for exclusive,
we cannot posit a distinct inclusive category for lexical plurals. However, the fact
that the displaced forms of the lexical plurals are grammatical in the exclusive con-
text and ungrammatical in the inclusive context shows that there is a distinct exclu-
sive category for lexical plurals.
For the ostensive plurals WE-COMP and TWO-OF-US, it seems inappropri-
ate to posit any sort of inclusive–exclusive distinction. These forms include all and
only the referents that they point to, as described in Table 5. Other referents are ‘ex-
cluded’ only in the sense that they happen to be not included.
The results so far indicate that the displaced forms are exclusive in the same sense
that spoken languages with an inclusive–exclusive distinction have exclusive forms.
Table 5. Semantic description of ostensive pronouns coded
Type of first-person plural Semantic Description

Composite plural Includes all and only referents that are pointed to. If point to self
is included, then this is a first-person plural (WE‑COMP: ‘me,
him, her, and him’).
Dual Includes both and only the two referents that are pointed to. If
point to self is included, then this is a first-person dual (TWO-
OF-US).
244 Kearsy Cormier
However, this is not exactly true. Wilbur & Patschke (1998) noted that body leans
in ASL indicate inclusive–exclusive on a broader basis. According to Wilbur &
Patschke, a lean forward indicates inclusion, while a lean backward indicates exclu-
sion.16 These leans can be used with any noun (not just first-person pronouns) to
indicate inclusion or exclusion of whatever referent is salient in the discourse. Thus
a lean forward can include the addressee, or it can include the signer or a non-ad-
dressed third participant.17
The study described in this chapter was initially designed to elicit forms that in-
cluded or excluded only the addressee, since the addressee is typically the referent
that is included or excluded in spoken languages that have an inclusive–exclusive
distinction. However, following Wilbur & Patschke’s (1998) finding that forward
and backward leans can indicate inclusion or exclusion of participants other than
just the addressee, it became clear that it was necessary to check to see if the forms
identified as exclusive could be used to include or exclude discourse participants
other than the addressee as well. Consultations with my native signer participants
about other possible meanings of the displaced pronouns revealed that these exclu-
sive forms can indeed exclude any salient referent in the discourse, not just the ad-
dressee.18 This salient referent can be someone who has not been explicitly named
in the discourse (i.e. a referent who is understood in context); furthermore, the ex-
cluded referent can be someone not present. Thus, in example (3), assuming a dis-
course situation with three present participants (i.e. the signer, X and Y as shown in
Figure 10) and also another non-present referent Z, the form THREE-OF-US-DIS-
PLACED can exclude X, Y or Z, as shown in Table 6.19 However, Table 6 also reveals
that if there is no salient referent other than the signer, X, Y, or Z, THREE-OF-US-
DISPLACED is ungrammatical, because this form must exclude someone.20
(3) NEXT-WEEK THREE-OF-US-DISPLACED GO-OUT MOVIE
‘Next week the three of us will go out to see a movie.’
Figure (10).
Based on Bird’s-eye view of discourse
the grammaticality judgmentssituation
shown forinexample
Tables (3).
4 andThe
6, location of the
a semantic de-
pronoun THREE-OF-US-DISPLACED is marked by “*”.
scription of the lexical plural variants is shown in Table 7. This table indicates that
X Y
SIGNER
Figure 10. Bird’s-eye view of discourse situation for example (3). The location of the pro-
noun THREE-OF-US-DISPLACED is marked by “*”.
Table 6. Grammaticality judgements of example (3), based on discouse situation shown in
Figure 10
Referents (with Z introduced as non-present Grammatical?

participant)
Signer + X + Y (excluding Z) √
Signer + X + Z (excluding Y) √
Signer + Y + Z (excluding X) √
Referents (no other salient referent in discourse) Grammatical?

Signer + X + Y *
the exclusive forms can exclude any salient referent, not just the addressee. Any
form that is specifically marked [−SR] (i.e. any displaced form) is exclusive in that
it excludes some salient referent. All other forms are neither specifically inclusive
nor exclusive.
In this section we have seen that ASL lexical pronouns like WE can be displaced
to the signer’s right or left side; these displaced forms are exclusive forms. Further-
more, unlike spoken languages that have inclusive–exclusive marking, the excluded
Table 7. Semantic description of lexical pronouns coded ([±X]*=one or more referent of
type X, non1P=non-first person referent, SR=any salient referent)
Type of first-person Neutral/exclusive Semantic description

plural variants
First-person plural (WE) WE-CENTRAL Same semantics as English ‘we’:
[+speaker] and [+non1P]*
WE-DISPLACED [+speaker] and [−SR]* and [+non1P]*
Number-incorporated 3/4/5-OF-US- [+speaker] and [+non1P]*
first-person plurals CENTRAL
(3/4/5-OF-US)
3/4/5-OF-US- [+speaker] and [−SR]* and [+non1P]*
DISPLACED
First-person plural OUR-CENTRAL same semantics as English ‘our’:
possessive (OUR) [+speaker] and [+non1P]*
OUR-DISPLACED [+speaker] and [−SR]* and [+non1P]*
Universally quantified ALL-OF-US- All of a given set such that [+speaker]
first-person plurals (ALL- CENTRAL and [+non1P]*
OF-US)
ALL-OF-US- All of a given set such that [−SR]* and
DISPLACED [+non1P]*
246 Kearsy Cormier
Figure
ure (11). THREE-OF-US-DISPLACED (Location 1 in(12). THREE-OF-US
Figure 13) (Location 2 in Figure 13)
Figure 11. THREE-OF-US-DIS- Figure 12. THREE-OF-US (Location 2

Figure (12). THREE-OF-US Figure
1 in Fig.(13).
(Location
PLACED (Location Bird’s-eye
2 in Figure
13) 13) view
in Fig. 13) of discourse situation for Figures (11) an
Y
referent for these forms can be not only the addressee, but any referent that is sali-
ent in the discourse. X Z
3.2.3. Discussion
So far I have defined lexical plurals as plural forms that do not point to the locations
of their individual referents. Lexical plural pronouns (WE, 3/4/5-OF-US, OUR,
and ALL-OF-US) do not point to each referent. However, in a non-exclusive con-
text these forms can index the general location of the referents as a group. For ex-
ample, the number-incorporated forms can be used indexically to distinguish be-
2 1
tween a group of three on the signer’s left versus a group of three on the signer’s
13). Bird’s-eyeright,
viewasofshown
discourse
by thesituation for Figures
juxtaposition of the two(11) andof(12).
forms THREE-OF-US in Figures
11 and 12. Baker-Shenk & Cokely (1981) claim that regardless of person, the loca-
Y
tion of the referents determines the location of the pronouns, such that in Figure
SIGNER
13, the pronoun THREE-OF-US at Location 1 (shown in Figure 11) would include
X
(signer + Y + Z), and the same form at Location 2 shown in Figure 12 would include
Z
(signer + X + Y).
I agree with Baker-Shenk & Cokely (1981) that the pronoun THREE-OF-US
produced on the signer’s right or left side can indeed index a group of referents. If
articulated at Location 1 in Figure 13, for example, this pronoun refers to the signer
+ Y + Z because Y is directly in front of the signer and Z is to the signer’s right; taken
together the group is basically on the signer’s right side. My data included several
instances of lexical pronouns that were indexic of a general location in this way, as
2 1
in example (4) below. In example (4), the referents of the pronoun THREE-OF-US
(i.e. the props) were generally to the right of the signer (signer + X + Y), as shown in
Figure 14. The signer produced a pronoun that was also on her right side.
SIGNER
(4) THREE-OF-US-DISPLACED LIKE CAT
‘The three of us like cats.’
Figure (13). Bird’s-eye view of discourse situation for Figures (11) and (12).
X Z
2 1
SIGNER
Figure 13. Bird’s-eye view of discourse situation for Figures 11 and 12
However, THREE-OF-US-DISPLACED can also be exclusive, in which case it need

not refer to the location of the referents. For instance, the pronoun at Location 1 in
Figure 13 could include (signer + X + Y), in which case Z or some non-present ref-
erent must be excluded. In this situation, the pronoun is not at all indexic because
the pronoun is being produced on the signer’s right side while the referents are dir-
ectly in front of her and to her left. In this case, context would determine whether
the indexic or exclusive interpretation would be most likely.
The following example from my data illustrates exactly this point. In example
(5), the referents of the pronoun THREE-OF-US (i.e. the props) are to the sign-
er’s right (signer + Y + Z), as shown in Figure 15. A pronoun matching the location
of the referents in this instance would be on the signer’s right side (as in Figure 14).
One of the participants of this study, however, produced a pronoun not only on her
left side (represented in Figure 15 by “*”), but also with her left hand (despite the
fact that she is normally right-handed). Specifically, the participant produced the
sign THREE-OF-US-DISPLACED with her left hand, then holding her left hand in
Figure (14).the
place produced Bird’s-eye
rest ofview of discourse(FOND-OF
the sentence situation during production
CAT) with of
herexample (4).
right hand.X
and Y are referents; X represents the addressee. The location of the pronoun THREE-
OF-US-DISPLACED is marked by “*”.
X
Y
SIGNER
Figure 14. Bird’s-eye view of discourse situation during production of example (4). X and Y
are referents; X represents the addressee. The location of the pronoun THREE-OF-US-DIS-
PLACED Figure (15). Bird’s-eye
is marked by “*” view of discourse situation during production of example (5). X,
Y, and Z are referents; X represents the addressee. The location of the pronoun THREE-
X
Y
Z
*
SIGNER
Figure (15). Bird’s-eye view of discourse situation during production of example (5). X,
248 Kearsy Cormier
Y, and Z are referents; X represents the addressee. The location of the pronoun THREE-
X
Y
Z
SIGNER
Figure 15. Bird’s-eye view of discourse situation during production of example (5). X, Y,
and Z are referents; X represents the addressee. The location of the pronoun THREE-OF-
US-DISPLACED is marked by “*”
(5) Left hand: THREE-OF-US-DISPLACED………………

Right hand: FOND-OF CAT
‘The three of us (excl) love cats.’
Examples like this show that an exclusive context requires displacement of the
pronoun and that the pronoun’s location does not have to match the location of
the referents. In a context which is neither specifically inclusive or exclusive, the
pronouns WE, 3/4/5-OF-US, OUR and ALL-OF-US can either be produced in the
neutral (i.e., central) form, which is not indexic, or they may index the general lo-
cation of their referents. However, modulations for exclusive interfere with any de-
fault indexic properties that these pronouns may have, resulting in examples like
(5). The fact that it is possible to produce non-indexic forms in both neutral and ex-
clusive contexts is compelling evidence for the lexical rather than ostensive status of
these pronouns. The neutral and exclusive forms together provide evidence for the
lexical status of these pronouns, whether particular tokens are indexic or not.21
3.3. Markedness
In one set of pronouns in ASL (i.e. WE, OUR, 3/4/5-OF-US), there is a distinct form
for exclusive but no form specifically for inclusive. For another set of pronouns (i.e.
TWO-OF-US, WE-COMP) there are no forms specifically for inclusive or exclu-
sive. Thus, inclusive is never morphologically distinct from regular first-person
plurals in ASL.
Exclusive marking, however, is possible with all lexical plurals. Based on this ob-
servation, ASL does not follow the same pattern of markedness for inclusive–ex-
clusive that spoken languages do; recall from Table 1 that many spoken languages
have only inclusive in a given number category, but no spoken languages have only
exclusive in a given number category. Recall that according to Greenberg’s (1966)
crosslinguistic distribution criterion, this suggests that inclusive is the unmarked
category for spoken language.
ASL, on the other hand, does not have inclusive but has a neutral form and ex-
clusive form for lexical plurals. This exclusive form is grammatically distinct from
the neutral form but morphologically may best be thought of as a combination of
two elements: first-person plural (e.g., WE) and exclusive (displacement). Under
this analysis, exclusive marking in ASL is similar to exclusive marking in spoken
French. French has a neutral first-person plural nous ‘we’ that can be used with both
inclusive and exclusive reference, but it also has nous autres ‘we excluding you’ as a
way of specifically marking exclusivity. Thus the morphological marking of exclu-
sivity in ASL may be similar to exclusive marking found in some spoken languages,
although it is not clear how common this is crosslinguistically — ASL and French
may be somewhat exceptional in this regard. The set of referents that can be ex-
cluded (i.e. any salient referent rather than just the addressee) may be what is most
unusual about exclusivity in ASL (although see Section 5 for examples of possible
correlates to context-dependent inclusivity/exclusivity in spoken languages).22
4. Inclusive/exclusive in other signed languages
Unfortunately, not much information is available on inclusive–exclusive pronouns

in any signed language, ASL or otherwise. One problem may be that researchers of
signed languages tend to consider all personal pronouns in signed languages to be
indexic (Engberg-Pedersen 1995; Liddell 2000; Lillo-Martin & Klima 1990). For ex-
ample, Baker-Shenk & Cokely (1981: 50) claim that pronouns with an index hand-
shape (including WE) are indexic. “Pronominal reference generally involves ‘point-
ing’ to a person or persons with a particular handshape. The handshape that is used
indicates the type of reference . . . the pronouns [with an index handshape] are in-
dexic (meaning ‘we’), whereas the ones [with a closed fist handshape] are reflex-
ive/emphatic (meaning ‘ourselves’)”. Baker-Shenk & Cokely’s assumption that the
sign WE is indexic goes against the claim made here that the sign WE is not indexic.
One possible reason for this discrepancy may be their use of the term ‘indexic’. They
loosely define ‘indexic’ as “pointing to”, but my argument here is that the pronoun
WE (as discussed in Meier 1990) and the number-incorporated pronouns do not
point to their referents in the same way that some of the other pronouns do (like sin-
gular pronouns and ostensive pronouns such as TWO-OF-US). Also, the number-
incorporated signs are considered by most researchers to be indexic for the reasons
outlined above - i.e. in contexts not specified for inclusive–exclusive, the number-in-
corporated pronouns are indexic in that they index the location of the group. How-
ever, as I explained earlier, I have classified these number-incorporated pronouns as
lexical rather than indexic because in inclusive–exclusive contexts, the indexic na-
ture of these signs may be suppressed. Thus, there is no clear consensus about the in-
dexicality of pronouns in ASL; this may be one reason why the inclusive–exclusive
distinction remains largely unstudied for signed languages in general.
250 Kearsy Cormier
Through personal communication with informants contacted through the Sign

Language Linguistics listserve (SLLING-L) in 1998, reports suggest that the follow-
ing signed languages may have a distinction between inclusive and exclusive: Polish
Sign Language, Icelandic Sign Language, New Zealand Sign Language, Australian
Sign Language, German Sign Language, Japanese Sign Language, Danish Sign Lan-
guage, and Israeli Sign Language. British Sign Language also has been identified as
having distinct forms for first-person inclusive and exclusive pronouns (Deuchar
1984). However, it is not clear if these languages that were identified as having an
inclusive–exclusive distinction were identified as such based on indexic forms like
ASL TWO-OF-US, or if there are true inclusive–exclusive forms that do not rely on
indexation (like ASL WE). Much more research needs to be done in this area.23
5. Discussion: Modality effects?
The fact that ASL has exclusive forms whose meanings are context-dependent rep-
resents an interesting divergence from the typical pattern in speech. First of all, it
is rare for a spoken language to distinguish forms that include a third person from
forms that do not include a third person. Forchheimer (1953) notes that the lan-
guages Sierra Popoluca (Mixe-Zoque) and Kele (Niger-Congo) (see Table 1, types 3
and 9) distinguish between limited inclusive (ltd) and general inclusive (gen); lim-
ited includes first and second (but not third) person, and general includes first, sec-
ond, and third person.24 Essentially, the limited inclusive excludes the third person,
while the general inclusive includes the third person. Presumably this could only
occur in a language that already has an inclusive–exclusive distinction in the trad-
itional sense - i.e. including/excluding the second person (Cysouw 2003).
Also, it seems very rare in speech for a single inclusive form to be able to indicate,
for example, inclusion of second person in one context and inclusion of a third per-
son in a different context. However, these systems do exist, e.g. Gooniyandi, a lan-
guage spoken in Australia (Filimonova & Plank 1996–2002).25 Gooniyandi has a
first-person plural “unrestricted” pronoun yaadi that includes the speaker plus the
hearer plus others. This form is inclusive in the traditional sense of including sec-
ond person, but also includes at least one third-person referent as well. Furthermore,
Gooniyandi has a separate first-person plural “restricted” pronoun ngidi that in-
cludes the speaker plus either the hearer or other(s) but not both (McGregor 1990).
Similar pronouns have been identified in Yaoure (Niger-Congo) (Hopkins 1986)
and Kunimaipa (Trans-New Guinea) (Pence 1968).26 The context-dependent ex-
clusive forms in ASL seem to be more similar to these “restricted” pronouns than to
inclusive–exclusive forms which include or exclude only second person referents.
The exclusive pronouns identified here for ASL are consistent with Meier (1990),
according to which ASL has no distinct second person but instead only marks first
versus non-first person (see Section 3.1.2). The fact that these exclusive forms ex-
clude any salient referent rather than just the addressee reinforces Meier’s argument
that second person has no special grammatical status in ASL and also reinforces the
special status that first person seems to have in all languages (Bühler 1982; Lyons
1968; Meier 1990).
6. Conclusion
We have seen several differences between signed languages and spoken languages
in terms of inclusive–exclusive marking. First of all, the inclusive–exclusive dis-
tinction in spoken languages is an areal and genetic phenomenon. We do not yet
have enough data to determine if or how inclusive–exclusive marking is distrib-
uted across signed languages, but we have no reason to expect that the distribution
would be based on geography. This does seem like a feature that would be subject to
parametric variation in signed languages just as it is in speech. I leave this issue for
further research.
Another difference is in markedness relationships; inclusive is the unmarked
category in spoken languages, whereas exclusive is the unmarked category in ASL.
Perhaps the greatest difference is the context-dependent nature of exclusion in ASL.
While the majority of spoken languages are limited to including/excluding the ad-
dressee, ASL can use one exclusive marking to exclude any salient discourse partici-
pant, thus supporting the two-person system for ASL proposed by Meier (1990).
Again, research on other signed languages would help shed light on this issue. If
other signed languages have first-person plural exclusive pronouns which behave
like ASL, this would suggest that language modality itself could be a factor in deter-
mining inclusive–exclusive patterning such that the visual/gestural modality lends
itself to allowing these context-dependent exclusive forms. If other signed languages
have first-person plural exclusives which behave differently from ASL (e.g. they in-
clude/exclude particular referents rather than any referent salient in the discourse)
this would suggest that signed languages behave like spoken languages in this regard
and thus language modality does not greatly affect inclusive–exclusive patterning.
Thus we have seen that inclusive–exclusive marking can pattern quite differently
in spoken languages and ASL. One significance of these differences is that they
highlight the importance of including signed languages in language typologies and
studies of linguistic diversity. Any language typology that does not include signed
languages may be making inaccurate generalizations about the world’s languages
and about the possibilities of human languages in general.
Appendix
Notation
As mentioned in note 7, English glosses for ASL signs are given in all caps. Verbs are trans-
lated in present tense for clarity (ASL does mark aspect and can mark tense, but often tense
is not marked if it is understood in context). Also, different genders are used in some of the
252 Kearsy Cormier
English glosses to distinguish between different locations, although ASL does not grammat-
ically distinguish gender.
SIGN English gloss for an ASL sign
SIGN–SIGN nglish gloss for ASL sign requiring more than one English word for
E
interpretation
(pronoun)-COMP A composite form of a pronoun
Nonmanual signals
The following nonmanual signals were used by the signers in this study with exclusive pro-
nouns in ASL:
• Cheek-to-shoulder (CS)
The signer brings one shoulder close to his/her cheek. This indicates nearness in proximity,
either in time or space (Liddell 1980). This NMS is adverbial in nature, so that the sign CAR-
CRASH with CS would indicate that the car crash just happened. Likewise, CS can be used
with the sign FUTURE in FUTURE WEDNESDAY (lit. ‘next Wednesday’) to indicate ‘this
coming Wednesday’, a construction that is awkward in English. CS can also be used to ex-
press nearness in terms of physical location, so that the sign BEHIND with CS would mean
something like “right behind”.
Interestingly, the signers in this study used CS more often in exclusive contexts than in in-
clusive contexts. One possible reason for this use of CS may be to accentuate the cohesiveness
of those included and also to create opposition between those included (i.e. the signer and
others) and the one excluded (i.e. the addressee). Thus CS used with exclusives may have the
same effect as the English word “just”, as in “just the three of us”.
• Body lean
The signer leans to one side, without necessarily rotating the torso. This can be used for a
variety of purposes, e.g. verb agreement (Bahan 1996) or contrast. In this study, body leans
served a purpose similar to CS. That is, the signer would often lean to one side when using an
exclusive pronoun. In particular, when the signer leaned to one side, it was always the same
side on which the pronoun was produced.
Wilbur & Patschke (1998) claim that forward and backward leans (rather than leans to the
side) indicate inclusion and exclusion, respectively. However, my data showed no systematic
use of forward or backward leans.
• Body shift
The signer's torso rotates so that the shoulders noticeably change orientation. Body shift can
be used for several purposes, but it is primarily used as a grammatical marker of role shift,
where the signer assumes a role of another discourse participant. This shift is used exten-
sively with direct discourse (Engberg-Pedersen 1995).
In this study, body shift was most often used in exclusive contexts. However, the direction
of the body shift (left or right) did not always match the location of the pronoun, so it is not
clear if the body shift is further marking of inclusive or exclusive.
• Eyegaze
Eyegaze is the direction or object towards which the signer’s eyes are directed. Eyegaze in
general is difficult to determine because it can change so often and so quickly. Eyegaze in this
study varied greatly, and was further problematic due to the method of data collection. The
informants were instructed to sign to the camera as if the camera was the addressee, but the
informants more often gazed at the questionnaire or the props. A more in-depth study on
eyegaze as a marker of inclusive–exclusive would therefore be very helpful; I leave this for fu-
ture research.
Signers might not use CS or body shift or body lean, but eyegaze is always a factor in
sighted signers. Therefore, this NMS may need to be considered separately.
Sample excerpts from questionnaire
The following are actual excerpts from the questionnaire used in this study. Items in bold face
are referents who were represented by visual aids, so that informants could visualize the pos-
ition of the referents relative to each other. Informants were instructed to read each context
and then translate the sentence in italics into ASL. Question 1 was designed to elicit a plural
inclusive form, and Question 2 was designed to elicit a plural exclusive form.
1. You and ten others (including B & C & others) don’t have much in common. During a con-
versation, you realize that you are all cat lovers.
B asks you:
Do we all have anything in common?
You answer B:
Yes, we like cats.
2. Many people (including you & others) are having a discussion. Everyone except B is a cat
lover; B likes dogs.
B asks the group:
I like dogs. Do all of you prefer dogs or cats?
You answer B:
We like cats.
Acknowledgements
Special thanks to my native signer participants: A, B, G and K; without their intuitions this
study would not have been possible. Thanks to Richard P. Meier for his invaluable input in
this study. Thanks also to Tony Woodbury for very helpful comments on earlier drafts of this
chapter. Thanks also to Claude Mauk for helping me videotape the participants. Thanks es-
pecially to Gene Mirus, for his help in every aspect of the initial pilot study and for help with
designing the questionnaire and to Perry Connolly, the model for the illustrations. Finally I
would like to thank Elena Filimonova, Michael Cysouw, and two anonymous reviewers for
their extremely helpful comments on later drafts of this chapter.
Notes
1. See Daniel (this volume) for evidence that inclusive forms in particular constitute their
own person categories separate from first person.
2. According to Zwicky (1977: 731), “no language has been reported with multiple speaker
morphemes distinct from speaker plus other morphemes.” He also mentions that situations
do occasionally arise in which there are truly multiple speakers (Greek choruses, for ex-
ample). In these cases, the first-person plural form is used, but in no known language is a
distinct morpheme used for the multiple speaker reading.
254 Kearsy Cormier
3. Obviously, there is also the objective form ‘us’; however, in this chapter I will focus on
nominative forms.
4. There are counterexamples to this universal, including languages like Coos (Filimonova &
Plank 1996–2002; Sokolovskaya 1980). This explains the apparent discrepancy of the Type
5 languages which do not seem to fit this pattern.
5. However, this does not hold for all languages. Among many Dravidian languages, the
inclusive form is more morphologically complex than the exclusive form. In Kudukh, for
example, the first-person plural exclusive form is e:m/em — whereas the inclusive form is
na:m/nam (Bloch 1954). I thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing this to my attention.
6. However, these tendencies should not necessarily be considered to be universals among
spoken languages. LaPolla (this volume) notes that among Tibeto-Burman languages, “ex-
cept for in the Kiranti group, usually the exclusive is more basic (simply based on the 1sg
form plus plural marking) and historically prior to the inclusive form.” This suggests that
for this group of languages the inclusive category is more marked than the exclusive cat-
egory, which is the opposite of the pattern noted for all the other spoken languages de-
scribed here.
7. As is conventional in ASL literature, English glosses for ASL signs are given in all caps.
8. Other researchers have claimed that there are factors that determine where a locus is es-
tablished in signing space (e.g. discourse factors, semantic affinity with another referent,
conventional location, etc.). Thus, the establishment of loci is rarely arbitrary (Engberg-Ped-
ersen 1993).
9. Number incorporation for pronouns can only occur for up to five referents, and for some
signers only four (Baker-Shenk & Cokely 1981). For more than five referents, signers use
other pronouns, such as WE or WE-COMP.
10. Interestingly, while there is a composite form of WE (WE-COMP), there is no compos-
ite form of the possessive pronoun OUR (i.e. there is no OUR-COMP). Multiple tokens of
the possessive OUR are only used with the possessed noun, to indicate distribution.
11. There is a set of signs in ASL referred to as fingerspelled loan signs. These signs are based
on fingerspelled words, but have acquired lexical status in ASL because of their idiosyncratic
characteristics not typically found in normally fingerspelled words (Battison 1978).
12. Although Meier’s (1990) two-person system may currently be the most widely ac-
cepted among sign linguists, other person systems have been proposed for ASL as well.
Some have proposed a three-person system (Friedman 1975; Klima & Bellugi 1979; Pad-
den 1983), while some have proposed many distinct person values, i.e. more than 3 val-
ues (Bahan et al. 2000; Neidle et al. 2000). Still others have proposed that ASL has no
contrasts for person at all (Liddell 2000; Lillo-Martin & Klima 1990; McBurney 2002).
Many sign language researchers currently follow Meier’s view about a two-person sys-
tem in ASL, including Padden (1990), Lillo-Martin (1995), Emmorey (2002), Rathmann
& Mathur (2002), and Liddell (2003). This two-person system has been attributed to other
signed languages as well, including Danish Sign Language (Engberg-Pedersen 1993), Polish
Sign Language (Farris 1994), and Taiwan Sign Language (Farris 1998).
13. There is evidence for this primary distinction between first and non-first person in lan-
guages of Papua New Guinea, for example, where in the future potential mode there are no
person distinctions expressed (only number), and the forms that are used in that paradigm
are those of the first person (Foley 1986). I thank Michael Cysouw for bringing this to my
attention.
14. The use of props in the data elicitation means that the forms elicited apply to physically
present referents, since the informants used the props to imagine referents present in the
discourse. It is possible that signers might use other forms to indicate non-present referents;
I leave this issue for future research.
15. Out of 329 pronoun tokens produced by informants in this study, 147 (43%) included
one or more of the following nonmanual signals: body lean, body shift, raised or furrowed
eyebrows, head nod, headshake, and the discourse strategy known as cheek-to-shoulder
(CS). See Appendix for descriptions of each of these nonmanual signals.
16. According to Wilbur & Patschke’s (1998) analysis, body leans in ASL mark much more
than simply inclusive–exclusive. They claim that body leans can also mark involvement or
non-involvement of a referent and can serve different focusing functions as well. For ex-
ample, a body lean forward is often used with the sign SAME to mean ‘even’, as in this ex-
ample from Wilbur & Patschke (1998: 285): “KNOW-THAT ALL BILL SAME pt [point]
GET A ‘Everyone knows that even Bill got an A.’” A body lean backward, on the other
hand, is used with the sign ONLY-ONE, as in this example from Wilbur & Patschke (1998:
285): “RECENTLY FIND-OUT ONLY-ONE KIM GET-A ‘I just found out that only Kim
got an A.’ ”
17. Wilbur & Patschke (1998) give examples which they consider exclusive in which a) a lean
back with the pronoun TWO-OF-US excludes a third-person referent ‘him’, and b) a lean
back with the pronoun TWO-OF-THEM excludes the first-person ‘me.’ Likewise, they also
give examples which they consider inclusive in which (a) a lean forward with the pronoun
THREE-OF-US is inclusive of first-person ‘me’ and excludes no one, and b) a lean forward
with the pronoun TWO-OF-THEM is inclusive of both referents and excludes no one.
18. Since I had found no systematic use of body leans in my data, I simply asked the partici-
pants about other possible meanings of the displaced exclusive pronouns produced without
any particular use of body leans.
19. The location of THREE-OF-US-DISPLACED, shown on the signer’s ipsilateral side in
Figure 10), could alternatively be on the contralateral side, in which case, the same gram-
maticality judgements in Table 6 would hold.
20. Of course, X + Y + Z (excluding Signer) would also be ungrammatical, since these are
first-person forms.
21. See Cormier (2002) for further discussion of indexicality of plural pronouns and verbs
in ASL.
22. Thanks to Michael Cysouw for pointing this out.
23. More recently, I have identified a set of exclusive pronouns in British Sign Language,
similar to those described here for ASL (Cormier, in press).
24. As shown in Table 1, Kele does not distinguish between limited inclusive and general
inclusive within a single number category. The trial form is general inclusive (i.e. includes
first, second- and third-person referents) while the plural category (in addition to an exclu-
sive form and a common form not specifically inclusive or exclusive) has a limited inclusive
form, which includes first and second but not third-person referents.
25. I thank Elena Filimonova for brining this to my attention.
256 Kearsy Cormier
26. According to Pence (1968: 109), the pronoun reipi in Kunimaipa “is used with both in-
clusive and exclusive meanings.” However, it is unclear from the data whether this form can
be either inclusive or exclusive, or whether this form can be either inclusive or simply neu-
tral with regard to inclusive–exclusive.
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Part 2
Areal and family portraits of
Chapter 9
Inclusive–exclusive in Austronesian
An opposition of unequals*
Frantisek Lichtenberk
University of Auckland
An inclusive–exclusive distinction is the norm in Austronesian and is reconstructible for

Proto-Austronesian. It has been lost in a few languages. Of the two members of the oppos-
ition, the inclusive one enjoys a special status. In many languages it has additional functions
besides referential inclusivity. It can be used to establish in-groupness, solidarity for the pur-
poses at hand. And in a number of languages present or erstwhile inclusives function to ex-
press politeness, typically either as honorific addressee forms or as humble speaker forms.
Such developments appear to be extremely rare or non-existent with exclusives. In those few
languages that have lost the inclusive–exclusive distinction, it is normally the originally in-
clusive form that continues as the first-person non-singular pronominal.
Keywords: Austronesian, in-groupness, politeness, referential range
1. Introduction
There are upwards of 1,000 languages in the Austronesian family, and with very few
exceptions they all exhibit the inclusive category. The inclusive category can be re-
constructed for Proto-Austronesian. As a norm, the inclusive as well as the other
person-number categories are manifested in several morphosyntactic areas, such
as independent personal pronouns, possessive suffixes added to possessum nouns
or possessive classifiers to index the possessor, and various affixal or clitic elem-
ents associated with verbs which index the subject or an object. Here the term “pro-
nominals” will be used as a convenient cover term for all those morphosyntactic
categories. In the discussion that follows, it will be the independent pronouns that
will figure most prominently because it is in connection with the independent pro-
nouns that the inclusive (and exclusive) notions are most often discussed in the lan-
guage descriptions, but examples of some of the other categories will also be given.
Table 1 gives the sets of the nominative and the genitive pronominals as recon-
structed for Proto-Austronesian. The nominative forms correspond to what is usu-
ally considered to be independent personal pronouns in present-day languages.
The i- and si- forms in the nominative set are personal articles; the i and ni forms in
the genitive set are genitive prepositions. The inclusive and the exclusive forms are
in bold.
262 Frantisek Lichtenberk
Table 1. Proto-Austronesian nominative and genitive pronominals (Blust 1977)
Nominative Genitive
1sg i-aku i-ku/ni-ku
2sg i-Su, (i)kaSu (polite) i-Su/ni-Su (later also i-mu/ni-mu as polite forms)
3sg si-ia i-a/ni-a
1pl excl i-kami i-mi/ni-mi
1pl incl i-kita i-ta/ni-ta
2pl i-kamu (later also iSu) i-mu/ni-mu (later also iSu/niSu)
3pl si-iDa i-Da/ni-Da
In addition to the singular-plural distinction, many Austronesian languages also

have a dual number and some also have a trial or a paucal number. The dual, trial
and paucal forms are usually based on the corresponding plural forms.
As is the tradition in Austronesian linguistics, the Proto-Austronesian inclusive
form is treated by Blust as a first-person plural form, in opposition to the exclusive
form. In the same vein, the inclusive is treated as a first person category in the gram-
matical descriptions consulted for the present study. However, as has been argued
by a number of scholars, the inclusive is best analyzed not as a subtype of the first
person, but as a separate category; for latest discussion and further references see
Daniel (this volume). And this is the analysis (and glossing conventions) adopted
in the present study.
The inclusive category has been retained in an overwhelming majority of the
Austronesian languages but has been lost in a few. Those latter languages will also
be of interest to us. The paradigmatic status of the inclusive is not among the central
concerns of the present study; however, I will return to it briefly in later sections.
Inclusive and exclusive pronominals are relational indexicals (Hanks 1992): they
index the nature of the relation between the two types of interlocutor in a speech
situation: the speaker (typically a sole speaker) and the addressee or addressees. In
their basic use, inclusive pronominals function to express the fact that the speaker
and the addressee(s) are objectively, truth-conditionally members of one group
with respect to the situation being encoded; they are characterized by a relation
of in-groupness. In contrast, exclusives in their basic use express the fact that the
speaker on the one hand and the addressee(s) on the other are not members of the
same group with respect to the situation being encoded. Needless to say, whether a
speaker and one or more addressees are or are not in a relation of in-groupness var-
ies from situation to situation.
In sentence (1) from Toqabaqita (Solomon Islands) the dual inclusive independ-
ent pronoun and the dual inclusive future-tense subject marker jointly signify that
both the speaker and the addressee will eat:1
Inclusive–exclusive in Austronesian 263
(1) Qoo, ma si manga qeri koro koki fanga.

oh and class time this du(incl) du(incl).fut eat
‘OK, and now you and I will eat.’
On the other hand, in (2), also from Toqabaqita, the dual exclusive independent
pronoun and the dual exclusive future-tense subject marker jointly signify that only
the speaker and one other person, but not the addressee, will go:
(2) Kamareqa meki lae kau.
1du(excl) 1du(excl).fut go andat
‘The two of us will be going now.’ (Said when leaving the addressee.)
On the face of it, the inclusive–exclusive contrast appears to be a straightforward

opposition between the two categories, depending on whether the addressee is in-
cluded or not.2 However, it turns out that, in Austronesian at least, the two mem-
bers of the opposition are far from equal. The inclusive member of the pair enjoys a
special position in the following respects. First, in many languages it has additional
functions besides referential inclusivity. It can be used when, in objective, truth-
conditional terms, inclusivity does not hold. That is, even though the speaker and
the addressee are not members of the same relevant grouping, the speaker may de-
cide to present the situation as if she and the addressee were in the same group. Such
inclusion may be strictly transient, ad hoc, for the speaker’s current purposes. Inclu-
sives, or former inclusives, may be used when the intended reference is singular—to
the speaker or to the addressee—even though in their basic use their reference is ne-
cessarily non‑singular. Such semantic/pragmatic developments appear to be non-
existent or extremely rare with the exclusive forms. The sources of data consulted do
not normally mention any other functions of the exclusive forms. It will be argued
that the differences in the behaviour of inclusives and exclusives are ultimately due
to the differences in their referential ranges in their basic uses: inclusives have both
the speaker and the addressee(s) in their referential range, and so the two are in an in-
groupness relation with each other, whereas this is not the case with exclusives. The
extended uses of inclusives are to be understood in the framework of Brown & Lev-
inson’s (1987) politeness theory, in particular their notion of positive politeness.
There is another area where the inclusive and the exclusive members of the op-
position are not equal. As pointed out earlier, the inclusive category has been lost
in a few Austronesian languages. In such cases, if a member of the original inclu-
sive–exclusive opposition takes on the function of a general first-person non-sin-
gular pronominal, with the other member dropping out, it is always the inclusive
pronominal that assumes the new function, and it is always the exclusive one that
disappears. There is one language where the inclusive–exclusive opposition has
been lost and where both the inclusive and the exclusive pronominals continue, but
the two forms now express a different kind of contrast. Both of these types of de-
velopment also are motivated by the differences between the referential ranges of
inclusives and exclusives in their basic functions.
Inclusive pronominals are sometimes said to be used non‑referentially, imper-

sonally, without reference to specific individuals. However, it is not clear that such
use is unique to inclusives. There is no intrinsic reason why other pronouns, in par-
ticular other non-singular pronouns, could not be used non-referentially, as will be
discussed in the relevant place.
The structure of the chapter is as follows: in Section 2 we will consider the “in-
tegrative” function of inclusives. In Section 3 we will look at the so-called non‑ref-
erential, impersonal use of inclusives. In Section 4 our attention will be focused on
those languages where the inclusive category has been lost. In Section 5 I will dis-
cuss briefly the exclusive forms in a few languages. And in the concluding section
I will summarize the findings and offer some generalizations.
2. Integrative inclusives
2.1. Integration and politeness

In their basic use, inclusive pronominals are used when the speaker and the ad-
dressee are in an in-groupness relation to each other with respect to the situation
being encoded. They characterize the speaker and the addressee as having the same
kind of involvement in the situation, or the same kind of relation to another en-
tity involved in the situation. However, in a number of Austronesian languages the
inclusive pronominals are sometimes used even though the speaker and the ad-
dressee are not, objectively, in an in-groupness relation to each other with respect to
the relevant situation. Rather, inclusives are used as if the speaker and the addressee
were in an in-groupness relation. I will refer to such uses of inclusive pronominals
as integrative: the speaker integrates herself and the addressee into one and the
same group, even though objectively they are not members of the same group. This
is illustrated in example (3) from Toqabaqita. The speaker wants to find out whether
the addressee has areca nuts in his (the addressee’s) personal basket, but rather than
saying ‘your (sg) basket’ he says ‘our (incl.) basket:
(3) Nau kwai qasi-qaba fas-i laa waqi koro, wane nau.
1sg 1sg.fut fall-hand prec-at inside basket du(incl)3 man 1sg
‘I’ll first slip my hand into our (meaning: your) basket, my friend.’
Waqi, which are like handbags or dilly-bags, are strictly personal property, owned by
a single person. The basket is the addressee’s, but the speaker speaks of it as if it were
theirs jointly.
Such integrative use of inclusive pronominals is indexical of solidarity, in‑group-
ness, personal closeness. A sentence like the one in (3) is normally appropriate only
if the two people are close acquaintances or friends. The speaker can use the inclu-
sive pronoun because he and the addressee are close, but at the same time, by virtue
of using the inclusive pronoun he reinforces the solidarity.
Integrative use of inclusives is not uncommon in Austronesian languages, and it

is usually characterized as having a politeness function. For example, van Klinken
(1999: 112) says this about the inclusive pronoun in Fehan Tetun, spoken on Timor
(east Indonesia):
Since inclusiveness is a culturally valued characteristic, [the inclusive pronoun]
ita may be used when strictly speaking the addressee is not included. This is illus-
trated by the following example [4], where women were by their choice of pronoun
including me in the description of their way of life, even though the description
clearly did not apply to me. When questioned on such uses, speakers recognised
that this extension of the strict meaning of ita was a politeness phenomenon.
(4) Ita feto la’o ha’i. Ita iha uma karian.

pl(incl) woman walk not pl(incl) loc house work
‘We women don’t go out. We are at the house working.’ (van Klinken 1999:
112)
As the Tetun example (4) and the Toqabaqita example (3) respectively demonstrate,
integration of the speaker and the addressee may be achieved in one of two ways:
either the speaker places the addressee in his/her own sphere, or he/she places him-
self/herself in the addressee’s sphere. In (4), the addressee is an outsider, but she is
treated as if she were a member of the speaker’s group. In (3), the personal basket is
the addressee’s, but the speaker speaks of it as if it were his as well. Integrative use
of inclusives de‑emphasizes, blurs the distinction between speaker and addressee:
they are treated as members of the same group when objectively they are not. It is
this blurring of the distinction between the interlocutors that underlies the solidar-
ity function of the integrative use of inclusives. However, the two integrative strat-
egies, the addressee being included in the speaker’s sphere, and the speaker includ-
ing herself in the addressee’s sphere, are not fully equivalent, as we shall see.
In one language, Minangkabau, the inclusive personal pronoun is apparently
used with first, second and third person reference (Moussay 1981). However, be-
cause the information available does not go beyond mentioning this use, and be-
cause this is the only language in the sample for which such use of an inclusive has
been reported, it will not be further considered here (but see Section 5 for discus-
sion of Minangkabau in a different context).
Crucial to understanding the functions of the integrative use of inclusives is
Brown & Levinson’s (1987) notion of positive politeness. Positive politeness is
“approach-based” (p. 70); it attends to the addressee’s positive face, which is a per-
son’s wish to have his or her wants considered desirable by others. One way of ex-
pressing positive politeness, the one that will be of special relevance here, is for
the speaker to treat the addressee as “a member of an in-group, a friend” (ibid.),
which may minimize a potentially face-threatening act. In fact, Brown & Levinson
specifically discuss the use of inclusives as a positive politeness strategy. Although
they speak of the speaker treating the addressee as being part of her (the speak-
er’s) in‑group, as we have seen above and as will be demonstrated in more detail
later, it is also possible for the speaker to place herself in the addressee’s sphere.
Descriptions of the functions of inclusives in Austronesian languages beyond
their basic use, typically (though not without exception) mention politeness, inclu-
siveness, friendliness as factors. Thus, in an extended discussion of the use of the in-
clusive pronominals in Tuvaluan, a Polynesian language, Besnier (2000) says that
they have “important affective connotations” (p. 380) and that “[t]he idiomatic uses
of the first-person inclusive plural pronoun are indexical of the explicit emphasis
on consensus, inclusion, and togetherness that permeates many aspects of Tuval-
uan social life ….” (p. 382.) One of the examples Besnier gives is (5), which was “ad-
dressed to a Nukulaelae Islander who [had] just returned from Funafuti to Nuku-
laelae, and who [had] just told the speaker about the weather on Funafuti during
the previous week” (p. 381):
(5) Ppau eiloo mo taatou!
same indeed with pl(incl)
‘It was just the same here [lit.: with us].’ (Besnier 2000: 381)
As Besnier (ibid.) points out, “[c]learly, the pronoun cannot be given its literal mean-
ing in this utterance, since it refers to a situation in which the interlocutor could not
have taken part.”
Inclusives may be used integratively in subtle ways to express, claim or profess in-
clusiveness, solidarity, in-groupness, sharing of wants. For example, Duranti (1981)
mentions such skillful use of inclusives in Samoan speechmaking. A different ex-
ample comes from Toqabaqita. In the Toqabaqita area there is a privately owned
business (shops and vehicles) called Fanukia. The meaning of Fanukia is ‘our (incl.)
land/area/place’, from fanu ‘land, area, place’ and kia, which is an archaic form for
the plural inclusive independent pronoun.4 The business is owned privately, but its
name suggests inclusiveness, as if the rest of the community benefited from it in the
same way that its owner does.
While the focus here is on inclusives in Austronesian languages, it is worth not-
ing that the integrative use of inclusives is also found in at least one variety of Mela-
nesian Pidgin. Meyerhoff (1998) discusses its existence in Bislama, a creole spoken
in Vanuatu, although her focus on the integrative use is from the perspective of ac-
commodation theory.
We can now consider in some detail the integrative use of inclusives depending
on whether the intended referent is the speaker/speaker’s group or the addressee/
addressee’s group, starting with the former. Note that this involves differences in in-
tended reference, not a typology of languages, because in at least some of the lan-
guages the inclusives can be used either way.
One more comment is called for here. Some of the sources consulted say that the
inclusives may be used with singular reference, first person or second person. While
this is true, what is of primary relevance is the fact that the intended reference of an
inclusive may involve the speaker/speaker’s group and not the addressee/address-
ee’s group, or vice versa.
2.2. Speaker/speaker’s group as intended referent(s)

When inclusives are used integratively in this way, the speaker is referring only to
herself or to her group, but by using an inclusive pronominal treats the addressee/
addressee’s group as if they were part of her own group. An example of polite inclu-
sion of the addressee in Tetun was given in the preceding section (example 4).
By including the addressee, the speaker blurs the distinction between herself and
the addressee: she suppresses her own individuality, deemphasizes herself as being
distinct from the addressee. This is nicely illustrated by the following example from
Kéo, spoken in south-central Flores, Indonesia, and by the accompanying com-
mentary:
(6) A: Kamba ko’o sai? B: Kamba kita.
buffalo poss who? buffalo pl(incl)
A: ‘Whose water buffalo are these?’ B: ‘Our water buffalo.’ (Baird 2002)
Baird’s consultant explained this example in the following way:
Both parties know that the water buffalo do not belong to the questioner, other-
wise the questioner would not have asked such a question. However, the respond-
ent uses the inclusive form of the pronoun in order not to appear arrogant for pos-
sessing something that the questioner does not. (Baird 2002)
According to Baird (ibid.), the inclusive form is often used instead of the corres-
ponding exclusive form “so that the speaker appears community minded and gen-
erous, rather than appearing arrogant and selfish”.
In Sawu, spoken in south-eastern Indonesia, also the addressee can be integrated
with the speaker:
(7) ina dii ma, ta wәbe ri j’aa
mother pl(incl) part nonpast hit.sg erg 1sg
‘My mother, I hit her.’ (Walker 1982: 11)
Walker specifically mentions the use of the plural inclusive as a polite pronoun for
first-person singular reference but does not explain the exact nature of the polite-
ness. Note that in (7) the verb ‘hit’ has the first-person singular pronoun referring
to the agent, while the noun phrase ‘my mother’ in topic position has the inclusive
pronoun as the possessor. Walker (1982: 11) emphasizes that the intended referent
of the inclusive pronoun is the speaker himself:
The context clearly indicates that the speaker is referring to his own mother and not
that of the addressee. There is no reason to suggest that siblings are present, thus al-
lowing an ‘our’ interpretation.
The inclusive pronoun may also be used integratively in Indonesian (Wolff 1971:
137):
(8) Kita dengar di-kampung, bapak sudah punja perusahaan besar.

pl(incl) hear in-home.town father perf have business big
‘We heard back home that your father has a large firm.’
Indonesian kita can be used integratively even if the intended reference is to the
speaker alone. Macdonald & Darjowidjojo (1967: 120) characterize such use of kita
as very occasional and as “more colloquial than formal” and say it is found espe-
cially in Jakarta. On the other hand, Sneddon (1996: 163) says that this use of kita is
found in “some regional varieties” of Indonesian.
In Karo Batak, spoken in Sumatra (west Indonesia), also the inclusive pronoun
is used to express solidarity by including the addressee, as pointed out by Woollams
(1996: 111): “When discussing Karo customs with outsiders, Karo speakers typically
use the expression kita kalak Karo ‘we [incl.] Karo people’, thereby including the ad-
dressee who is not technically or even necessarily in that context regarded as a mem-
ber of the group.” As we will see in the next section, the Karo Batak inclusive pro-
noun kita can also be used by the speaker to place herself in the addressee’s sphere.
Toba Batak (spoken in Sumatra) is another language where the inclusive pro-
nominals can be used with first-person singular reference, and also with second-
person singular reference (van der Tuuk 1971, Nababan 1981). According to van
der Tuuk (1971: 218), the inclusive pronoun hita is used “in place of ho [2sg] and au
[1sg] when the speaker wishes expressly to be polite or when the kinship relation-
ship is not known”.
The inclusive pronoun can also be used with first-person singular reference in
Javanese (Horne 1963). (Javanese kita is also used with second person reference in
the language of puppet plays.)
Outside of the Indonesian area, inclusives may be used with first-person singu-
lar reference in Fijian. Schütz (1985: 252), citing personal communication from Paul
Geraghty, says that “first-person dual inclusive can be used in a deferential way, when
actually first-person singular exclusive is meant.” Similarly, Milner (1972: 53) says:
This grammatical feature [the inclusive–exclusive distinction; F. L.] which is found
in both tied and free pronouns, in verbal as well as nominal pronouns, [footnote
omitted] is used to denote certain aspects of human relations which cannot be
shown so readily in European languages. Thus, if a Fijian speaks of his house or of
some other item of personal property, he usually refers to our house using the inclu-
sive form. He thereby politely indicates that it is his own house but that the person
he is speaking to is welcome to it.
In all the languages discussed thus far, the relevant forms function as inclusive
pronominals, and in addition they can be used integratively, placing the addressee
in the speaker’s sphere. In some such cases the intended reference of the pronom-
inal is singular, solely to the speaker. A somewhat different situation obtains in at
least some Polynesian languages. These languages have a reflex of the Proto-Aus-
tronesian inclusive pronoun *kita, but the reflex is used only with singular reference,
normally first person, but in at least one language also second person. It is not used
as an inclusive pronoun; instead, there are innovative forms that fulfil that func-
tion. The innovative pronouns are based on the reflexes of *kita. In these languages,
the reflexes of Proto-Austronesian *kita and the corresponding other pronominals
also express politeness, typically with the speaker humbling herself. Tongan is one
language where such self-humbling function of the reflex of *kita is found. Church-
ward (1953: 126) lists two sets of inclusive cardinal pronouns for Tongan, each set
having three members: a “preposed” set and a “postposed” set. These occur before
and after verbs, respectively. The pronouns in the preposed set are subject-indexing
clitics; those in the postposed set are independent pronouns, which can have a var-
iety of functions. The pronouns are given in Table 2. The hyphens have been added
by me; the label “1 inclusive singular” is Churchward’s.
The dual and the plural pronouns in the postposed set are derived from the sin-
gular form by means of the dual and the plural suffix, respectively. As we will see in
Section 3, Churchward characterizes the primary function of the “singular inclusives”
as indefinite, impersonal. What is relevant here is their function of speaker reference.
They are used in this way “in the language of politeness or humility” (Churchward
1953: 127). Of te and kita in example (9) he says (ibid.) that they are “[l]ess harsh, less
seemingly egotistic” than the respective exclusive first-person singular forms:
(9) ‘Okú te mā ‘aupito kita ‘i he’enau angafaí.
pres 1sg.su be.ashamed very 1sg at their.pl conduct
‘I for my part am very ashamed of their conduct.’ (Churchward 1953: 127)
In Samoan also the reflex of the Proto-Austronesian plural inclusive pronoun *kita
is used with singular, speaker reference. Mosel & Hovdhaugen (1992: 121) call the
Samoan pronoun ‘ita and its colloquial variant ta’ita “emotional first-person sin-
gular forms” and characterize their use thus: “[they] frequently indicate self-abase-
ment, humility, or an appeal for help, but they are above all an indication of affect
showing that the speaker is emotionally involved in the situation”. Besides the emo-
tional independent pronouns ‘ita and ta’ita, there is also a preverbal first-person
singular emotional pronominal ta. ‘Ita and ta both occur in (10):
(10) Ta te alu ‘ita ia Tigilau.
1sg.em genr go 1sg.em ld T.
‘I will go to Tigilau.’ (Mosel & Hovdhaugen 1992: 121)
Like Tongan, Samoan has innovative dual and plural inclusive pronominals.
Table 2. Tongan inclusive pronominals
Preposed Postposed
1 incl sg te kita
du ta kita-ua
pl tau kita-utolu
A reflex of the Proto-Austronesian inclusive pronoun *kita is used with first-per-

son singular reference also in Tuvaluan, where, according to Besnier (2000: 388), it
“connotes feelings of helplessness, vulnerability, and self-abasement”:
(11) A kita nei koo see too te moe i poo.
cnt 1sg this inc neg fall the sleep at night
‘Poor old me cannot fall asleep at night.’ (Besnier 2000: 388)
Tuvaluan kita can also be used with second-person singular reference (Section 2.3).
When it refers to the speaker, it must be modified by the proximal demonstrative
nei. Besnier considers Tuvaluan kita to be an “affective first- and second-person
pronoun”. He does note, however, that it “has pronominal characteristics, although
it does not always function as a pronoun in the ordinary sense of the term” (p. 388).
An affective, appeal-for-sympathy/pity use of a first-person singular reflex of
the Proto-Austronesian plural inclusive pronoun is also found in Tokelauan, an-
other Polynesian language (Tokelau dictionary 1986). On the other hand, in Niuean
(also Polynesian) the reflex of Proto-Austronesian *kita functions as “the emphatic,
boastful or informal version” of the neutral first-person singular independent and
possessive pronominals (Sperlich 1997: 157). Such emphatic or boastful use of
(former) inclusive pronominals is certainly unusual, not just in Polynesian but also
elsewhere in Austronesian.
The use of the reflex of the Proto-Austronesian inclusive pronoun *kita with first-
person singular reference, but not with inclusive non-singular reference, is found
in both primary subgroups of Polynesian (Tongic and Nuclear Polynesian) and has
been reconstructed for Proto-Polynesian (Walsh & Biggs 1966).
Those Polynesian languages that use a reflex of the Proto-Austronesian inclusive
pronoun *kita with first-person singular reference (and perhaps also with second-
person singular reference) have innovative non-singular inclusive pronoun forms.
In Table 3 the relevant forms are given for the languages discussed above.
A different situation obtains in Pukapukan, another Polynesian language. Puka-
pukan does not have a reflex of Proto-Austronesian *kita, but Salisbury (2002) re-
ports that the dual form tāua is occasionally used with first-person singular refer-
ence, the addressee being included “out of politeness” (p. 201); see (12).
Table 3. Singular reflexes of the Proto-Austronesian plural inclusive pronoun and innova-
tive non-singular inclusive pronouns in some Polynesian languages
Reflex of PAN *kita as 1sg pronoun Inclusive dual Inclusive plural

Tongan kita kitaua kitautolu
Samoan ‘ita, ta’ita ‘itā’ua, tā’ua ‘itātou, tātou
Tuvaluan kita taaua taatou
Tokealauan kita tāua tātou
Niuean kita taua tautolu
(12) Ēnei nā mō talatala nā aku kia koe

here art few talk.red poss me goal.art 2sg
nō lunga o tā tāua yanga tātā mako.
poss on poss poss du(incl) work write k. o.chant
‘Here are a few words from me to you concerning how I have written the
chants [which I enclose].’ (Lit.: ‘… concerning our (incl) work of writing
chants.’) (Salisbury 2002: 201)
It appears that in the history of Pukapukan cyclical renewal has taken place. Pro-
to‑Polynesian *kita, which continued an earlier inclusive plural pronoun but which
in Proto-Polynesian was used with first-person singular reference, was lost in Puka-
pukan, and the new dual inclusive form is now used integratively with the speaker
as the intended referent.
A similar use of an innovative cognate form is found in Tikopian, also a Polyne-
sian language. The Tikopian plural inclusive pronoun tatou may be used in an inte-
grative way in place of the exclusive pronoun for politeness:
(13) Ke ka poi ki tatou paito?
part fut go to pl(incl) house
‘Are you going to our house?’ (Implying, not literally, that visitor shares
in rights to it.) (Firth 1985: 501) (The parenthetical comment is Firth’s.)
Unlike Pukapukan, Tikopian does have a reflex of Proto-Austronesian *kita. Firth
characterizes Tikopian kita as a first-person singular indefinite pronoun, equiva-
lent to English one. From the examples he gives, it appears that kita is used for indir-
ect reference to oneself, as opposed to the “regular” first-person singular pronoun.
In (14) kita and the regular first-person singular pronoun kuou co-occur.
(14) Ko kita nei, kuou.
part 1sg here 1sg
‘One here, it is I.’ (Firth 1985: 188)
(15) Kita maso-kita, kita poi tatāfau.
1sg alone-1sg 1sg go stroll.red
‘One on one’s own, one goes for a stroll.’ (Firth 1985: 188)
As we have seen, in some languages the integration of the addressee is coupled with
a humbling function with respect to the speaker: the speaker shows deference to
the addressee by humbling herself. For discussion of the humbling function in the
Austronesian languages mentioned above and in some others see Cysouw (this vol-
ume).
2.3. Addressee/addressee’s group as intended referent(s)

Inclusives can then have the speaker or the speaker’s group as their intended
referent(s). However, as we will see now, they can also have the addressee or, ap-
parently less commonly, the addressee’s group as their intended referent(s). Most
sources consulted specifically mention second-person singular, not non-singu-
lar, reference. This use of inclusives appears to be more common among Indone-
sian languages than anywhere else in the Austronesian family. Typically, though
not without exception, inclusives used in this way serve a politeness purpose. By
placing herself in the addressee’s sphere, the speaker blurs the distinction between
the addressee and herself, which may serve to mitigate potentially face‑threatening
acts. In some, but not all, languages where an inclusive is used with second person
reference it is also used with first person reference.
In Fehan Tetun, the form ita, a reflex of Proto-Austronesian *kita, functions as
an inclusive and also as a “polite pronoun for second-person singular ‘you’”, which,
according to consultants, “should be used for older people, including parents, and
for other people in high positions, such as nobles and outsiders” (van Klinken 1999:
113), although it is not common in this function.
(16) Ama Liu, ha’u k-mai k-amán ita . . .
father Liu 1sg 1sg-come 1sg-accompany.(noble) pl(incl)
‘Father Liu, I have come to accompany you . . . (Said by a noble girl to a
young nobleman.) (van Klinken 1999: 113)
In Bajo (Lesser Sunda Islands), the inclusive pronominals are also used as honorif-
ics for the second-person singular. (It is not clear from Verheijen’s (1986) brief dis-
cussion if those forms can also be used as second-person plural honorifics.)
(17) Poré ja kita lagi saloh . . .
go only pl(incl) again tomorrow
‘(Let us have patience, mother.) Just go (you) once again tomorrow . . .’
(Verheijen 1986: 19)
In Karo Batak, according to Woollams (1996), the inclusive pronominals are used to
express solidarity:
… [the inclusive pronoun] kita is normally used by a speaker to include the addressee.
This may often not be literally or factually correct, but nevertheless socially appro-
priate, in the interests of maintaning solidarity. For instance, when asking a child
if his father is at home, one would normally ask [18 further below]. (Woollams
1996: 110–11)
As we saw in the preceding section, a Karo Batak inclusive pronominal can be used
when it is the speaker who is the intended referent. But an inclusive pronominal can
also be used with the addressee as the intended referent. In the quote above Wool-
lams speaks of the speaker including the addressee, although in the present study
we think of the speaker as placing herself in the addressee’s sphere when the in-
tended referent is second person. Although Woollams specifically mentions the in-
dependent pronoun kita, the example he gives contains not kita but the inclusive
possessive suffix:
(18) I rumah kang bapa-nta?

at house part father-pl(incl).poss
‘Is (our) father at home?’ (Woollams 1996: 111)
In Muna, spoken on several islands off the south-east coast of Sulawesi, the dual in-
clusive possessive suffix may be used with second-person singular reference, while
the plural inclusive possessive suffix may be used with second-person non-singular
reference. (Only the inclusive pronominals make a dual-plural distinction; see Sec-
tion 2.4 for discussion.) Van den Berg (1989) characterizes this use of inclusive pos-
sessive suffixes in terms of politeness:
(19) lambu-nto
house-du(incl).poss
a. ‘our (two) house’
b. ‘your (sg, polite) house’ (van den Berg 1989: 85)
(20) wale-nto-omu
hut-du(incl)-pl
a. ‘our (more than two) hut’
b. ‘your (pl, polite) hut’ (van den Berg 1989: 85)
The usual pattern in Indonesian languages is for inclusives to express politeness,
deference when they are used with second person reference. A somewhat differ-
ent situation may obtain in Acehnese (spoken in Sumatra), where the inclusive pro-
noun geutanyoe (which historically consists of a reflex of Proto-Austronesian *kita
and nyoe ‘this’) can, according to Durie (1985: 121), be used patronizingly with sec-
ond person reference “most typically in statements which affirm general principles
of behaviour”:
(21) Geutanyoe ka=chik, bek ta=peuranguy
pl(incl) in-adult dont pl(incl)-act
lagee=aneuk=manyak.
way-child-infant
‘We’re grown up now; let’s not act like a child.’ (Durie 1985: 121)
As we will see in Section 3, Acehnese geutanyoe is also used non-referentially, and it
is conceivable that in (21) the second person interpretation derives purely from the
context. And while Durie does not go into detail, it is possible that whether an in-
stance of the inclusive pronoun is patronizing or not also depends on context rather
than being part of the semantics/pragmatics of the pronoun itself in the way that
the polite, deferential use of the inclusives in the other languages discussed above is.
Inclusives are used with second-person singular reference also in Toba Batak
“when the speaker wishes expressly to be polite or when the kinship relationship
is not known” (van der Tuuk 1971: 218) and in Javanese, in puppet-play language
(Horne 1963). In both languages the same inclusives can also be used with first per-
son reference (Section 2.2).
Elsewhere in Austronesian, one finds the use of a formerly inclusive pronominal

(Section 2.2) with second-person singular reference in Tuvaluan, a Polynesian lan-
guage. Tuvaluan has the form kita, which is a reflex of the Proto-Austronesian in-
clusive pronoun but does not have this function in Tuvaluan. It can be used with
second-person singular reference, as an “affective” pronoun, although it is not com-
mon in everyday language. This use connotes “feelings of affection and empathy”
(Besnier 2000: 388). Kita can also be used with first-person singular reference (Sec-
tion 2.2). In both functions, according to Besnier (ibid.), “it is stylistically marked,
in that it is mostly used in courting contexts, particularly love letters and love songs,
or when talking or singing about one’s home island”. When the referent is second
person, kita may be used by itself or in apposition to the regular second-person sin-
gular pronoun. This appositional use is illustrated in (22) with the regular second-
person singular pronoun koe:
(22) E alofa au kiaa koe kita.
nonpast feel.empathy 1sg to 2sg 2sg
‘I feel affection for dear little you.’ (Besnier 2000: 388)
We also find inclusive pronominals used with second person reference to express
intimacy in Toqabaqita. In (23) the intended referent of the dual inclusive pronoun
koro is the addressee. Here this use of the inclusive pronoun is jocular rather than
polite, jocularity being indexical of personal closeness:
(23) = (3) Nau kwai qasi-qaba fas-i laa waqi koro, wane nau.
1sg 1sg.fut fall-hand prec-at inside basket du(incl) man 1sg
‘I’ll first slip my hand into our (meaning: your) basket, my friend.’
The use of inclusives to integrate the speaker into the addressee’s sphere is also dis-
cussed by Cysouw (this volume). Referring to Blust (1977), Cysouw also mentions
three languages, Old Javanese, Coastal Saluan (Loinan) and Bimanese, where the
erstwhile inclusive has become “the regular second-person singular, without hon-
orific connotation” (Cysouw, this volume, p. 214).5
2.4. Discussion
As shown in the preceding two sections, in a number of languages pronominals
that are or used to be inclusives are used integratively with first or second person
intended reference. Let’s now consider the motivation for such use. Leaving aside
the question of grammatical number for now (we will come back to it shortly), an
inclusive pronominal in its basic function minimally refers to the two participants
in a speech situation, the speaker and the addressee, the two types of participant
either one of which may be the sole intended referent in the extended use of an in-
clusive pronominal. When an inclusive is used with first person reference, the ad-
dressee is brought into the speaker’s sphere. When an inclusive is used with second
person reference, the speaker places herself in the addressee’s sphere. Since all the
languages in which inclusives can be used in either of these two ways have “regu-
lar” first and second person pronominals, the question to ask is, “What is the mo-
tivation for, the function of, using an inclusive pronominal rather than a first or sec-
ond person pronominal?”.
Although there are individual exceptions in both types of case, the integrative
use of inclusives primarily expresses politeness, deference, either by the speaker
humbling herself or honorifically with respect to the addressee. By using an inclu-
sive pronominal when the intended referent is the speaker herself or her own group,
she suppresses, downplays her own individuality, de-emphasizes herself. She is
not a separate individual, separate from the addressee. By using an inclusive pro-
nominal when the intended referent is the addressee or the addressee’s group, the
speaker identifies herself with the addressee: the addressee’s desires, wants, and/or
involvement in a situation are the speaker’s as well. Both strategies blur, submerge
the distinction between speaker and addressee; the speaker does not present her-
self and the addressee as members of different groups. Such integrative strategies
are one type of positive politeness, as discussed by Brown & Levinson (1987). By
not mentioning herself directly (by means of the first-person pronoun), the speaker
downplays her separateness, distance from the addressee. By not mentioning the
addressee directly (by means of the second-person pronoun) and by placing herself
in the addressee’s sphere, the speaker alleviates potentially face-threatening acts.
Whatever threat there may be to the addressee’s face, the speaker presents the situ-
ation as if the threat applied equally to herself by virtue of her association with the
addressee.
In some languages, the integrative use of an inclusive pronominal involves fac-
tors other than (merely) politeness. In Toqabaqita, an inclusive pronominal can be
used to express personal closeness. And in Tuvaluan, according to Besnier (2000),
the formerly inclusive pronominals are used to express affection. Both of these are,
of course, also kinds of positive politeness in Brown & Levinson’s (1987) sense.
Inclusive pronominals can then be used with reference to the two diametrically
opposed interlocutors: the speaker and the addressee(s). This, however, is not sur-
prising, because inclusives combine both types of interlocutor in their referential
range. They share reference to the speaker with (true) first person pronominals, and
they share reference to the addressee(s) with second person pronominals. They are
partly like first person pronominals and partly like second person pronominals, but
are not fully either; rather they are a category of their own (see, for example, Green-
berg 1988; Cysouw 2003; and Daniel, this volume). Either aspect of the referen-
tial range of inclusives can be seized upon in their non-basic use: referring to the
speaker as if the addressee(s) were involved as well, or referring to the addressee as
if the speaker were involved as well.
In the history of the Polynesian languages, a reanalysis of the earlier inclusive in-
dependent pronoun has taken place. The reflexes of the inclusive plural pronoun
are no longer used in that function. Rather, they are used with singular reference,
mostly to the speaker, but in at least one language (Tuvaluan) also to the addressee.
What used to be only covert reference of the pronoun when used integratively has
become its real reference, with the integrative function disappearing as a conse-
quence. New inclusive pronouns have developed, and in at least some languages
they may now be used integratively, thus retracing some of the development of the
original inclusive pronoun. On the other hand, in some languages of Indonesia the
erstwhile inclusives have become true second-person pronouns. One can assume
that here too the originally covert reference has become the pronominals’ true refer-
ence, in these cases to the addressee(s).
The integrative use of inclusive pronominals is situation-creating (Mühlhäusler
& Harré 1990: 200). It is not determined by objective, referential criteria; by defin-
ition, the speaker and the addressee do not form a group with respect to the situ-
ation being encoded. Rather, they are used to create in‑groupness, as if the speaker
and the addressee were part of the same group with respect to that situation. This is
done for whatever purposes the speaker has in mind.
In the languages that have a dual number in addition to the plural (and possibly
also trial or paucal), it is normally the dual pronominals that are used with first or
second-person singular reference. This, of course, is well motivated because it is the
dual forms whose reference is strictly to the two participants in a speech dyad.
The personal dyad is the basic unit of linguistic interaction (see, for example,
Brown & Levinson 1987 and Mühlhäusler & Harré 1990). This is reflected in one
kind of historical development that has taken place in some Austronesian lan-
guages, whereby the Proto-Austronesian plural inclusive pronominals have become
“dual” inclusive pronominals. (For the appropriateness of the term “dual” see fur-
ther below.) This has happened in, for example, Muna. As discussed in Section 2.3,
Muna has a dual inclusive possessive suffix ‑nto. ‑Nto is a reflex of the Proto-Austro-
nesian plural inclusive possessive/genitive suffix ‑ta (Table 1, Section 1). To express
the plural number, another suffix is added to the dual one; compare (24) and (25):
(24) = (19) lambu-nto

house-du(incl).poss
a. ‘our (two) house’
b. ‘your (sg, polite) house’ (van den Berg 1989: 85)
(25) = (20) wale-nto-omu
hut-du(incl)-pl
a. ‘our (more than two) hut’
b. ‘your (pl, polite) hut’ (van den Berg 1989: 85)
It is only in the inclusive category that Muna has a dual-plural distinction. The ori-
ginal plural reference of the suffix has changed to dual, presumably because its most
frequent reference was to a personal dyad. In a language with an inclusive–exclu-
sive distinction, the inclusive category is the only one whose reference includes the
two participants in an interactional dyad, which acts as motivation for the develop-
ment of a dual number there rather than in any of the other categories.
A similar kind of development has taken place in Tagalog, where the form kita
(kata in some dialects), which is a reflex of the Proto-Austronesian plural inclu-
sive pronoun *kita, functions as a “dual” inclusive pronoun.6 In Tagalog also the
“dual” number exists only in the inclusive category (Schachter & Otanes 1972; Ra-
mos & Cena 1990). Such pronominal systems are found in other Philippine lan-
guages; see Greenberg (1988) for discussion and references. Such systems attest to
the status of the personal dyad as the basic unit of linguistic interaction. This is also
evidenced by the relatively common existence of paradigms where there is a dedi-
cated inclusive form used strictly with reference to two individuals, the speaker and
the addressee, even if the language does not have a dual-number category (Cys-
ouw 2003). As various scholars have argued (for example, Greenberg 1988; Cysouw
2003; and Daniel, this volume), even though such inclusive forms refer to two indi-
viduals, they are not duals. They are to be analyzed on a par with pronominals that
refer to single individuals, as forming a minimal-number set (as opposed to an aug-
mented number set).
Finally, it should be pointed out that while the integrative use of inclusives is typ-
ically a politeness strategy, it is, in principle at least, possible for it to be used in ways
that do not express (positive or negative) politeness. Thus, it is conceivable that a
person might say ‘We (incl) have done a good job’ and that the addressee might
rightfully object to the speaker placing herself in her (the addressee’s) sphere, be-
cause, for example, in her view the speaker was not one of those who had done a
good job. Similarly, it is conceivable that a person might say ‘We (incl.) have really
messed things up’ and that the addressee might rightfully object to being grouped
together with the speaker, because she (the addressee) does not consider herself re-
sponsible for things having been messed up. Such uses of inclusive pronominals
would still be integrative, but they would not express politeness, positive or negative.
Interestingly, none of the sources of data consulted mentions such uses of inclusive
pronominals. This may be because such uses would most likely be interpreted as be-
ing misrepresentations of facts rather than as an established strategy for social in-
teraction and thus intrinsically of less interest linguistically.
3. Impersonal, non-referential inclusives
Pronominals are used impersonally when they do not have uniquely identified
referents. Rather, their “reference” is to more or less vaguely identified sets, col-
lectivities. They have a generalizing function; see, for example, the discussions of
French on by Laberge & Sankoff (1979) and Freyne (1990). As such, they are typic-
ally, though not solely, used in encoding generic types of situation, rather than spe-
cific, individual situations.
Impersonal uses of inclusive pronominals have been reported for several Austro-
nesian languages, although sometimes it is not quite clear whether a particular in-
stance of an inclusive pronominal is impersonal or integrative, or perhaps both at
the same time. And secondly, it is not always clear whether the impersonal function
is unique to inclusives. Before addressing the latter issue, we will look at some lan-
guages in which inclusives are said to be able to be used impersonally.
In Acehnese, according to Durie (1985: 120), the inclusive pronominals are used
as “indefinite pronoun[s]”, “particularly for stating general truths about human ac-
tivity or behaviour”.
(26) meunyo ka=lheueh ta=meukawên
if in-finish pl(incl)-marry
ureueng=inöng=geutanyoe=nyan êh sa=jan=geutanyoe
person-woman-pl(incl)-that sleep one-time-pl(incl)
‘Once you are married your wife sleeps with you.’ (Said by one man to an-
other.) (Durie 1985: 120–1)
The implication is that this is not a statement about the speaker, the addressee and
their respective wives, but about (Acehnese?) men in general.
The agentless passive translation of the Acehnese sentence in (27) below cap-
tures the non-referential, impersonal use of the inclusive pronominal. The agents
are non‑salient.
(27) bruek ta=peugöt keu=aweuek
coconut.shell pl(incl)-make to-ladle
‘Coconut shells are made into ladles.’ (Durie 1985: 120)
Note that in both of the Acehnese examples, even though the inclusive pronomi-
nals are used impersonally, they can still be viewed as inclusive: the set of all men
includes, at least potentially, both the speaker and the addressee; and in the same
way, the set of people who make coconuts shells into ladles includes, at least poten-
tially, both the speaker and the addressee. At any rate, there is no indication that the
speaker and the addressee are not included in the sets.
A somewhat different example of impersonal use of an inclusive pronominal is
given by van Klinken for Fehan Tetun. It is taken from an explanation given to her
“why men are fined for premarital sex if they subsequently refuse to marry the girl”
(van Klinken 1999: 112). The speaker is an elderly man.
(28) Ita loke ta feto ne’e ti’an tó.
pl(incl) open already woman this already tag
‘We/you/one (the hypothetical man) had already taken this girl sexually
(lit.: opened this girl.)’ (van Klinken 1999: 113)
The addressee is an outsider, in fact a foreigner, and female, and so is clearly not ob-
jectively included in the intended collectivity of Tetun men. It may, however, be the
case that the inclusive pronominal fulfills both an impersonal and an integrative
function here: the addressee is included, out of politeness, as part of Tetun commu-
nity and culture, about which a generic statement is being made. (As mentioned in
Sections 2.1. and 2.3, the Tetun inclusive pronominal is also used integratively.)
Similar integrative-cum-impersonal uses of inclusive pronominals appear also

to be found in Tamambo (Vanuatu), judging by the following statement by Jauncey
(1997: 107):
The first-person plural inclusive (hinda) is often used when describing how things
are done, as for example, different socio-cultural procedures such as planting yams,
cooking island food, participating in various customs and so on. Since such a de-
scription does not include the participation of the addressee, at least not at the time
of speech, it appears to be a politeness gesture towards the speaker as being wel-
come and included in the group.
A somewhat different situation is found in Tongan. As mentioned in Section 2.2,

the Tongan reflex of what was historically a plural inclusive pronoun, Proto-Austro-
nesian *kita, has lost that meaning, with innovative plural and dual forms replacing
it. Tongan kita, as well as its preverbal counterpart te, can be used integratively with
first-person singular reference. However, Churchward (1953: 127) says that the pri-
mary, fundamental meaning of te and kita is “indefinite ‘one’ which means, in effect,
I (or me) or you or anyone else”. The example he gives is:
(29) ‘Oku ‘ikai totonu ke te tokanga pē kiate kita.

pres neg be.proper subj impers pay.attention only to impers
‘It is not right that one should attend only to oneself.’ (Churchward 1953:
127)
The impersonal pronominal can be viewed as having an inclusive interpretation:

whatever the set of people referred to is, it involves, by implication, the speaker and
the addressee. What makes the Tongan impersonal pronominals different from the
ones discussed earlier is that in their inclusive sense they only function impersonally,
non-referentially, there being new inclusive, referential pronominals (Section 2.2).
Something similar appears to be the case in Rotuman, a fairly close relative of
Tongan, although not a Polynesian language. Rotuman has a pronoun of the form
‘it(a), a reflex of Proto‑Austronesian *kita, which Churchward (1940) calls a “first-
person inclusive singular” pronoun. (He uses the same designation for Tonga kita;
see Section 2.2.) According to Churchward (1940: 145), ‘it(a) “[f]undamentally,
and usually” means ‘one’, ‘oneself ’, and its possessive counterpart ‘ot means ‘one’s’.
(Like Tongan, Rotuman has innovative inclusive pronominals.) In context, the in-
tended referent may be the speaker, but “even in this case [the pronominal] carries
with it an ‘inclusive’ implication, such as ‘and so would you (or anyone else) if placed
in the same position’” (ibid.). Churchward (ibid.) provides the following example
(only the translation is given here): ‘Naturally I was overjoyed at seeing my two kid-
dies [again]’ and says that the sense ‘naturally’ is conveyed by the use of the “first-
person inclusive” forms ‘it, ‘ot and one other one. While the Rotuman forms can be
used impersonally, they do, at the same time, carry the implication of inclusivity.
While some descriptions specifically discuss an impersonal, non-referential use
of inclusive pronominals, it is not always clear that such a function is unique to the
inclusives. There is no intrinsic reason while other plural pronominals could not,
under the appropriate circumstances, be used in this way. That this may be so is ex-
emplified by Harrison’s (1976) discussion of Mokilese, a Micronesian language. Be-
sides singular, dual and plural personal pronouns, Mokilese also has “remote plural
pronouns”, which “refer to groups of people, usually large, and most of which are
probably not directly present when being discussed” (Harrison 1976: 89). The re-
mote plural pronouns are commonly used in “generic habitual sentences” (p. 90).
Thus the inclusive remote pronoun kihs “is often used to refer to all the people of
Mokil or to the whole human race” (ibid.):
(30) Kihs joh kak mine pohn jampah ma joh joau.
pl(incl).rem neg can live on earth if neg sun
‘We couldn’t live on the earth if there were no sun.’ (Harrison 1976: 90)
But then Harrison goes on to give two examples of other remote plural pronouns
used to make generic statements. Only the translations are given here, and the rele-
vant pronouns are italicized. One of the examples contains the exclusive pronoun:
‘One kind of surfing we [excl.] do is body surfing’; and the other one contains the
third-person plural pronoun: ‘The koaroa [reef herons] often gather on the sand.
When they fly away, they separate into two’s and fly off a short distance in search of
food.’ (p. 90).
It is then quite likely that in other languages for which the inclusive pronomi-
nals are said to be used impersonally, they still have their inclusive meaning. Both
the speaker and the addressee are, by implication, included in the collectivity about
which a general statement is being made. The impersonal function may also be
combined with the integrative function.
4. Loss of the inclusive category
As pointed out at the outset, the existence of the inclusive category is characteristic
of the Austronesian language family and the category is reconstructible for Proto-
Austronesian. However, there are languages without inclusives, which can, then, be
assumed to have been lost there. Although the number of such languages appears
to be quite small, a pattern is observable in the languages for which data are avail-
able. In almost all of the languages in which the inclusive–exclusive distinction has
been lost, it is the inclusive, not the exclusive, member of the original opposition
that takes on the function of the “general” first-person non-singular pronominal.
The remaining language is only partially different from the others, and is interesting
and revealing in its own way. We will consider the former languages first.
Although the data come from only a small number of languages, some of them
belong in different relatively high subgroups within Austronesian, and so the loss
of the inclusive–exclusive distinction in them can only be the result of parallel in-
dependent developments. One of the languages is Malayu Ambong, spoken in the
Table 4. Malayu Ambong personal pronouns (van Minde 1997)
1sg beta
2sg ose
3sg dia, ontua (polite), antua (deference), akang (neuter)
1pl kat’ong
2pl dorang
3pl dorang
central Moluccas, eastern Indonesia. The basic set of the Malayu Ambong pro-
nouns is given in Table 4. (Many of the pronouns have variant forms, which are not
listed here.)
According to van Minde (1997), the first-person plural pronoun kat’ong derives
historically from earlier *kita, which was a reflex of the Proto-Austronesian inclu-
sive pronoun, and orang ‘man, people’. (Orang is also found in the second- and third-
person plural pronouns, both of which have the form dorang.) The Proto-Austro-
nesian exclusive pronoun *kami does not survive in Malayu Ambong, and neither
does the inclusive–exclusive distinction. Another language is Kiribatese, spoken in
Micronesia. Kiribatese has a set of “emphatic” pronouns and a set of possessive pro-
nouns, both of which are given in Table 5.
The first-person plural possessive pronoun ara continues the Proto-Austrone-
sian inclusive genitive pronominal *ta, added to the possessive base a-. Although
there are some phonological irregularities, the emphatic pronoun ngaira almost
certainly continues, with accretion of the initial nga, the Proto-Austronesian inclu-
sive pronoun *kita. In Kiribatese also it is the exclusive pronominals that are lost.
(Kiribatese also has a set of subject-indexing pronominals, which too do not make
an inclusive–exclusive distinction.)
The inclusive–exclusive contrast has also been lost in a number of languages spo-
ken in the north New Guinea area, and in all of them it is the erstwhile inclusive
“disjunctive” pronoun that continues as the general first-person plural pronoun
(Ross 1988). The languages are Ulau-Suain, Ali, Tumleo, Sissano and Serak. These
languages form a low-level subgroup within the North New Guinea Cluster, which
Table 5. Kiribatese emphatic and possessive pronouns (Groves et al. 1985)
Independent Possessive
1sg ngngai au
2sg ngkoe am
3sg ngaia ana
1pl ngaira ara
2pl ngkamii amii
3pl ngaiia aia
suggests that the loss of the distinction took place only once, in the proto-language
ancestral to them.
Finally, Cysouw (this volume), citing van der Bergh (1953), mentions that Bang-
gai (spoken in Sulawesi) has a reflex of the Proto-Austronesian inclusive *kita that
functions as a general first-person plural pronoun.
The factor that underlies the continuance of the inclusive pronominals in the new
function of general first-person plural pronominals and the elimination of the ex-
clusive pronominals when the inclusive–exclusive distinction is lost has to do with
the difference in the referential ranges of inclusives and exclusives. The referential
range of exclusives includes the speaker and one or more non-addressees, while the
referential range of inclusives includes the speaker, the addressee(s) as well as, po-
tentially, one or more non-addressees. That is, all other things being equal, the ref-
erential range of inclusives is broader than that of exclusives. In fact, all other things
being equal, the former includes the latter. If a former exclusive pronominal should
become a general first-person plural pronominal, its referential range would have
to change to include the addressee(s) as well. On the other hand, no change in the
referential range is required when an originally inclusive pronominal becomes a
general first-person plural pronominal, because its referential range included not
only the speaker and the non-addressee(s) but, by definition, also the addressee(s).
An originally exclusive pronominal would have to undergo a change in its referen-
tial range, while an originally inclusive pronominal does not. And while it is not im-
possible for the referential range of an exclusive pronominal to change in this way,
as will be discussed presently, employing an element that does not require a change
in a novel function is better motivated than employing one that does. When the ex-
clusive pronominals of a language are lost, the inclusive–exclusive contrast is lost
as a consequence, but the referential properties of the erstwhile inclusives remain
intact.
The referential range of inclusive includes, minimally, the speaker and the
addressee(s). The fact that in the Austronesian languages just discussed the former
inclusives have become general first-person non-singular pronominals is evidence
that the speaker aspect of their referential range was dominant over the addressee
aspect. After all, reference to the addressee(s) is not a defining feature of general
first-person non-singular pronominals.
The inclusive–exclusive distinction has also been lost in Tukang Besi, spoken in
an area east of Buton Island, Southeast Sulawesi province, Indonesia. However, un-
like in the languages just discussed, in Tukang Besi both the erstwhile inclusive and
the erstwhile exclusive forms have been retained, but the inclusive–exclusive con-
trast has been reinterpreted as a number contrast. The Tukang Besi pronominals
are set out in Table 6.
Particularly relevant here are the free and the possessive forms, for which there
are Proto-Austronesian reconstructions (Table 1). Tukang Besi does not have an in-
clusive‑exclusive distinction, but it does have a plural-dual/paucal distinction, al-
though only in the first person. The plural and the dual/paucal numbers are only
Table 6. Tukang Besi pronominals (Donohue 1999)
Irrealis Realis Free forms Possessive Object Dative

subject subject object
1sg kuku- iaku -su -aku -naku
2sg ko- ‘u-/nu- iko’o -‘u -ko -nso
3sg na-/a- no-/o- ia -no -‘e -ne
1du/pa ka- ko- ikami -mami -kami -nsami
1pl ta- to- ikita -nto -kita -nggita
2pl ki- i- ikomiu -miu -komiu -ngkomiu
3pl na-/a- no-/o- amai -no -‘e (amai)
“rather loosely distinguished”, and there is “considerable overlap in usage between

the two” (Donohue 1999: 113). The plural free and possessive forms continue the
Proto‑Austronesian inclusive forms, and the dual/paucal forms continue the ex-
clusive forms. It is then possible for an originally exclusive pronominal to become
a general first-person non-singular pronominal (see the discussion above), but this
kind of development must be placed in broader context.
It is not an accident that the originally exclusive pronominals became duals/pau-
cals rather than plurals and that the originally inclusive pronominals became plu-
rals rather than duals/paucals. All other things being equal, the referential range
of inclusives is broader than that of exclusives: speaker, addressee(s) and other(s)
vs. speaker and non-addressee(s); that is, inclusives refer to more individuals than
exclusives do. Although there is no direct evidence, the loss of the inclusive–ex-
clusive contrast and the emergence of the plural-dual/paucal contrast in Tukang
Besi most likely took place more or less simultaneously. The loss of the inclusive–
exclusive contrast led the way, but before one of the terms in the opposition was
lost, it was utilized to participate in a new opposition, plural vs. dual/paucal. The
new number contrast emerged only in the first person, where there was a pre-ex-
isting pair of terms which could be employed to express it. It did not develop in the
second and the third persons, where there were no pre-existing pairs of terms. Of
the two terms in the original inclusive–exclusive opposition it was the one that, in
principle, referred to a larger number of individuals than the other that became the
plural marker, while the other one, which, in principle, referred to a smaller number
of individuals, became the dual/paucal marker. The re-interpretation of the inclu-
sive pronominal as a plural form and the re-interpretation of the exclusive pronom-
inal as a dual/paucal form is motivated, while re-interpretation of the inclusive as
dual/paucal and of the exclusive as plural would not have been.
The defining feature shared by inclusives and exclusives is reference to the
speaker. The fact that the original inclusive–exclusive contrast has been reinter-
preted as a number contrast without an inclusive–exclusive distinction is evidence
that it was the speaker aspect of the referential range of the erstwhile inclusives that
was dominant.
5. Exclusives
There is little that can be said about exclusive pronominals in Austronesian. They
do not appear to be subject to semantic/pragmatic developments to the same ex-
tent that inclusives are. In fact, I am aware of only a few languages where an exclu-
sive pronominal is used with reference other than jointly to the speaker and one
or more participants other than the addressee(s), and all of them are spoken in the
same general geographical area. One of these is Minangkabau, spoken primarily
in Sumatra. (I am grateful to Michael Cysouw (this volume) for bringing the Mi-
nangkabau data to my attention.) Minangkabau has an inclusive–exclusive distinc-
tion: the inclusive pronoun is kito, which is a reflex of the Proto-Austronesian in-
clusive pronoun *kita, and the exclusive pronoun is kami, which is a reflex of the
Proto‑Austronesian exclusive pronoun *kami (Table 1). The information on the use
of the two pronouns comes from Moussay (1981), but, unfortunately, it is sketchy.
According to Moussay, the exclusive pronoun kami can be used to refer only to the
speaker, in a polite, humble way. The use of kami in Minangkabau with speaker
reference has been confirmed by David Gil (pers. comm., March 2002), who also
says that the same is true of at least some varieties of Malay and Indonesian spo-
ken in the neighbouring Riau province. There too the relevant forms are kami. It is
not known whether these are independent developments, and so it is not possible
to make any generalizations, but it is worth pointing out the following. As we saw
earlier, inclusive pronominals can have solely the speaker or the addressee as the in-
tended referent; in its basic function an inclusive pronominal refers to both. It is not
an accident that in Minangkabau and the relevant varieties of Malay and Indone-
sian the exclusive pronoun can have the speaker, but not the addressee, as the sole
intended referent, because in its basic function an exclusive pronominal does not
have the addressee in its referential range. (Recall from Section 2.1 that the Minang-
kabau inclusive pronoun can refer to the speaker, or the addressee, or a third person.
All of these are among the possible referents of inclusives in their basic function.)
Before leaving the topic of exclusives, I want to briefly mention information
from two other languages. The first one is Taba, spoken on Makian island, off Hal-
mahera in east Indonesia. Bowden (2001) mentions two archaic first-person sin-
gular independent pronouns, joumonam, used by men, and joumapinam, used by
women. The pronouns were used “when speaking to others of higher status” (Bow-
den 2001: 189). Both pronouns are historically polymorphemic: the masculine
form joumonam comes from jou-mon-am ‘Lord-man-1pl(excl)’, and the feminine
form joumapinam comes from jou-mapin-am ‘Lord-woman-1pl(excl)’. Am func-
tions in present-day Taba as the first-person exclusive possessive particle. The two
pronouns are grammaticalizations of exclusive possessive noun phrases.
The other language is Malayu Ambong. Malayu Ambong was discussed in the
preceding section as one of the two languages in which the inclusive–exclusive con-
strast has disappeared. However, van Minde (1997: 68, n. 6) briefly mentions a “dia
lectal form” bat’ong, which “denotes the first-person plural but excluding the ad-
dressee”. According to van Minde, bat’ong comes historically from the first-person
singular pronoun beta and orang ‘man, people’. Recall that the general first-person
plural pronoun kat’ong derives historically from a reflex of the Proto-Austronesian
inclusive pronoun *kita and orang.
6. Conclusion
Several patterns have emerged from the present study, and some generalizations can
be made. When not used in their basic function, Austronesian inclusives perform
primarily an integrative function: the speaker places herself and the addressee(s)
in the same group, even though objectively they do not belong in the same group
with respect to the situation at hand. This can be done by the speaker placing her-
self in the addressee’s sphere. The speaker aligns herself with the addresee, as if the
addressee’s wants, desires were her own as well. This is a classical example of posi-
tive politeness in Brown & Levinson’s (1987) sense. This function is typically honor-
ific, deferential; it is the addressee that matters. Alternatively, the speaker may bring
the addressee(s) into her own sphere. By doing this, the speaker suppresses, de-em-
phasizes her own identity. What she does, what she is involved in, is presented as
if the addressee(s) were involved as well. By backgrounding herself, the addresee
humbles herself, thus indirectly honouring the addressee, which is another aspect
of positive politeness. Both strategies involve blurring, de-emphasizing the distinc-
tion between the speaker/speaker’s group and the addressee(s)/addressee’s group.
While in their basic use inclusives necessarily have non-singular reference, they
can be used with singular intended reference, paradoxically through their integra-
tive function: the speaker is referring to herself while including the addressee, or
the speaker is referring to the addressee while including herself. The normal ref-
erential properties of inclusives do not apply here. It is through the suspension of
those referential properties that additional, social meanings are expressed, namely
politeness (Mühlhäusler & Harré 1990).
Many Austronesian languages have not just a singular–plural distinction, but
a singular-dual-plural or even a singular–dual–trial/paucal–plural distinction. In
some languages, the dual — as the number of referents — exists only in the inclusive
category. Such languages can be said to have a minimal-augmented number con-
trast (for example, Cysouw 2003; and Daniel, this volume). This kind of develop-
ment has happened through the reinterpretation of the erstwhile plural inclusives,
with innovating forms having augmented (plural) reference. That is, the concept of
dual reference may develop in the inclusive category before it develops in any other
(exclusive, second person, third person). This, not doubt, reflects the status of the
personal dyad as the basic interactional unit. The integrative use of inclusives with
first person or second person reference is another reflection of this. In the Polyne-
sian languages further development has taken place whereby the originally covert
reference to the speaker by means of a plural inclusive pronoun has developed into
overt first-person singular reference. In contrast, in a few languages in Indonesia
what originally was probably covert reference to the addressee has developed into
overt second person reference.
Exclusives, because they foreground the distinction between the speaker and the
addressee in their basic use, are ill equipped to serve an integrative function, and so,
not surprisingly, are not used in that way. In principle, given their basic function, ex-
clusives could be used in an extended way counter-integratively, to emphasize the
speaker’s and the addressee’s distinctness or even to create dissociation between
them, treating them as if they were not in an in-group relation with respect to the
situation at hand when in fact objectively they are. However, since in human affairs
the premium is on solidarity, inclusiveness, co-operation, such an extension of ex-
clusives is much less likely than the integrative use of inclusives.
In the few languages in which the earlier inclusive–exclusive distinction has been
lost and only one of the members of the original pair continues as the general first-
person non-singular pronominal, it is always the inclusive one. This is motivated by
its original referential range, which includes all three types of participant: speaker,
addressee(s) and other(s), which is also the referential range of general first-person
non-singulars.
Daniel (this volume) argues that in languages without an inclusive–exclusive
distinction, the referential focus of a first-person plural pronoun is the speaker, not
the addressee: Speaker > Addressee. In languages with an inclusive–exclusive dis-
tinction, both the speaker and the addressee are the referential foci: Speaker = Ad-
dressee. While the latter is true in principle, it is possible in historical developments
for one member of the referential range to be treated as dominant over the other
one. In most of the Austronesian languages for which relevant data are available,
it is the speaker that was treated as dominant over the addressee in erstwhile in-
clusives. In Polynesian, the erstwhile inclusive has become a first-person singular
pronoun. And in those languages where the inclusive–exclusive contrast has been
lost and one of the members of the original opposition continues as the new gen-
eral first-person plural pronominal, it is always the inclusive one, reference to the
speaker being what unites inclusives and general first-person plural pronominals.
There is, however, at least one language where it was the hearer that was accorded
dominance in a historical development affecting the inclusive: in Banggai the erst-
while inclusive has become strictly a second person pronominal. While in their
basic use inclusives have both the speaker and the addressee as their referential foci,
it is possible for one of them to become dominant over the other. In Austronesian it
has more often been the speaker rather than the addressee.
While the examples concerning the integrative function of inclusives given here
come exclusively from Austronesian languages, such developments are not claimed
to be unique to Austronesian. The reader is referred to Cysouw (this volume) and to
Brown & Levinson (1987) for examples from outside Austronesian.
Notes
* I am grateful to Elena Filimonova and to two anonymous readers for helpful comments
on an earlier version of this chapter.
1. The glossing conventions are those of the sources, except that the inclusive forms are not
glossed as being first person, and in some cases other adjustments have been made in the
glosses for the sake of uniformity. In examples (8), (9), (13), (14), (15), (17), (18), (29) and
(30) the morphemic/lexemic glosses have been added by me. The Toqabaqita data come
from my own field notes.
2. For convenience, I will speak of singular addressees, unless there are reasons for not doing
so.
3. To highlight the fact that the pronominal in question is inclusive in its basic use, the
glosses ‘pl(incl)’ or ‘du(incl)’ will be used even if the intended reference is not inclusive and
may even be singular. However, in those languages where the etymon in question no longer
has an inclusive function, the appropriate glosses will be used depending on the reference
of the pronominal.
4. In not-too-distant past kia was used as a pronoun in women’s speech, but it is ultimately a
reflex of the Proto-Austronesian inclusive pronoun *kita (Table 1). In present-day Toqaba-
qita, kia is used both by men and by women in a few expressions.
5. I have not been able to consult original data on these languages.
6. I am grateful to Robert Blust (pers. comm., March 2002) for bringing the development
of *kita in Tagalog to my attention. Blust also mentions this kind of development in Kelabit
(spoken in Borneo), but I have not been able to consult any source of data.
Abbreviations
1 first person incl inclusive
2 second person ld locative-directional
3 third person loc locative
andat andative neg negative
art article nonpast non-past
class classifier pa paucal
cnt contrastive-absolutive part particle
dont prohibitive perf perfect
du dual pl plural
em emotional poss possessive
erg ergative prec precedentive
excl exclusive pres present
fut future red reduplication
genr general tense-aspect-mood rem remote
goal goal sg singular
impers impersonal su subject
in inchoative subj subjunctive
inc inceptive tag tag
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Chapter 10
The inclusive–exclusive distinction
in Tibeto-Burman languages
Randy J. LaPolla
La Trobe University
A survey of 170 Tibeto-Burman languages showed 69 with a distinction between inclusive

and exclusive first-person plural pronouns, 18 of which also show inclusive–exclusive in
1dual. Only the Kiranti languages and some Chin languages have inclusive–exclusive in the
person marking. Of the forms of the pronouns involved in the inclusive–exclusive oppos-
ition, usually the exclusive form is less marked and historically prior to the inclusive form,
and we find the distinction cannot be reconstructed to Proto-Tibeto-Burman or to mid level
groupings. Only the Kiranti group has marking of the distinction that can be reconstructed
to the proto level, and this is also reflected in the person-marking system.
Keywords: Tibeto-Burman, pronouns, person marking, Sino-Tibetan, comparative linguis-
tics
0. Overview
Tibeto-Burman is one of the two branches of the Sino-Tibetan stock, the other be-
ing the Sinitic languages (the Chinese dialects). The Tibeto-Burman languages are
found as far east as Hunan Province in central China, as far west as Kashmir, as far
north as Qinghai Province in China (north of Tibet), and as far south as southern
Burma. From a survey of data from 170 Tibeto-Burman languages and dialects for
which there is reliable data on pronoun systems, it is found that sixty-nine of the
languages and dialects in the database show a distinction between inclusive and ex-
clusive first-person plural pronouns. The languages that have such a distinction are
scattered throughout most of the branches of Tibeto-Burman except for the Karen
branch and certain branches in contiguous parts of Northeastern India, Northern
Burma, and Southwestern China: Bodo, Idu-Taraon, Kaman, Jinghpaw, and Tani.1
In looking at the forms of the pronouns involved in the inclusive–exclusive oppos-
ition in those languages that have it, we find that except for in the Kiranti group,
usually the exclusive form is more basic (simply based on the 1sg form plus plural
marking) and historically prior to the inclusive form, and also find that the distinc-
tion cannot be reconstructed to Proto-Tibeto-Burman or even to mid level group-
ings; the only pronouns that can be reconstructed to Proto-Tibeto-Burman are 1sg
*ŋa and 2sg *na(ŋ) (Benedict 1972).2 There are not even plural forms that recon-
struct to the earliest proto-language.3 The inclusive–exclusive distinction is then an
292 Randy J. LaPolla
innovation in each of the groups that shows it, and often within one group there are
multiple innovations. Of the languages with the inclusive–exclusive distinction in
1pl, thirty-nine also have dual marking, and of these, eighteen languages show an
inclusive–exclusive distinction in 1dl as well. Forty-one of the languages that have a
1pl inclusive–exclusive distinction also have pronominal marking on the verb, but
only the Kiranti languages and some Chin languages show an inclusive–exclusive
distinction in the person marking. Among languages with pronominal prefixes on
nouns to show possession, while some make a dual and plural distinction, only a
few show an inclusive–exclusive distinction (e.g. Belhare, Tiddim Chin, Caodeng
rGyalrong), and a number distinction is rare.
We will take a look at the forms found in those languages that exhibit the inclu-
sive–exclusive distinction group by group to see what generalizations we might be
able to draw.
1. Qiangic and rGyalrong
Within the Qiangic branch, a group of languages in western Sichuan Province and
Northern Yunnan Province of China, Daofu, Lyusu (both from Dai et al. 1991),
Prinmi (Ding 2003), and Northern Qiang (LaPolla 2003b) do not have the inclu-
sive–exclusive opposition, and in Taoping Qiang (a Southern dialect; H. Sun 1981)
the 1de and 1pe forms are based on a form of the 1sg pronoun (which derives from
the Proto-Tibeto-Burman 1sg pronoun (*ŋa)) plus the usual dual or plural marker
for that language, whereas the 1di and 1pi forms are based on an innovative form
of unknown provenience (-ŋ in the dual forms is said to derive from ɲi55 ‘two’; Liu
1987). The same is true for Guiqiong, Ersu (both from H. Sun 1985a), Tuanjie Zhaba
(Lu 1985), Namuzi, Shixing, Queyu, and Muya (all four from Dai et al. 1991) as well.
In Tangut (Gong 2003) there is a set of 1pl pronouns that makes the inclusive–ex-
clusive distinction (given below), but also an alternative form, ŋa2njiĩ2, that does
not make the distinction (i.e. can be used for inclusive or exclusive). In Queyu the
form of the dual is not based on a form of the word for ‘two’ (ɲi55), as in Guiqiong
and Muya, but seems to be a form very similar to the rGyalrong form of the dual
(see below).4 In Zatuo Zhaba (Dai et al. 1991) the inclusive–exclusive distinction is
marked in the plural by a difference in the vowel and tone of the pronoun. The dual,
which has the vowel of the inclusive plural pronoun but the tone of the exclusive
plural pronoun, plus the number ‘two’, does not make the inclusive–exclusive dis-
tinction. The forms are given in Table 1.5
It can be seen from the forms in Table 1 that the innovative forms do not rep-
resent a single innovation, but represent several independent innovations within
the Qiangic branch. The dual and plural markers also represent several innovations
within the group (but see n. 4).
The inclusive–exclusive distinction in Tibeto-Burman languages 293
Tabl e 1. Qiangic
1sg 1dl-incl. 1dl-excl. 1pl-incl. 1pl-excl.

55 13 13 13 33 31 55
Taoping Qiang ŋɑ tsuŋ -tʃ qɑŋ -tʃ tsuә -thjɑ qɑ31-thjɑ55
Namuzia ŋa55 a33-ku31 ŋa55-ku31 a33-χuo31 ŋa55-χuo31
Shixing ŋ55 ɦõ33-ts55 ŋɑ55-ts55 ɦõ33-ɹε̃55 ŋa55-ɹε̃55
Guiqiong ŋɔ35 dʐu55-ɲi33-pi53 ŋɔ35-ɲi33-pi53 dʐu55-zi55 ŋɔ33-zi55
Ersu ɑ55 jo55-dzi55 ɑ55-dzi55 jo55-r55 ɑ55-r55
Tuanjie Zhaba ŋa35 35
ɦә̃ -tse 53
ŋa35-tse53 ɦә̃35-ɲe55 ŋa35-ɲe55
Muya ŋә53 jɐ33-ni53-nә33 ŋә33-ni53-nә33 jɐ33-nә53 ŋә33-nә53
Queyu ŋa13 55
a -ndze ŋa13-(ɲa55)-ndze a55-nә ŋa13-(ɲa55)-nә
Tangut ŋa2 nja 2
– gja2-mji2 gjɨ2-mji2
Zatuo Zhaba ŋa13 ɲε55-nε33 – ɲε13 ɲe55
a All of the dual forms in Namuzi can optionally take ɳɳi 55-ku31 [two-classifier]. It seems the form
ku31 in the dual forms is the default noun classifier, or is at least homophonous with that classifier.
In rGyalrong, a group of related dialects just northwest of the Qiangic languages,

the situation is a bit different. Unlike the Qiangic languages, Cogtse rGyalrong uses
different forms for plural marking, and uses the unmarked plural form for the in-
clusive rather than the exclusive (the opposite of what we will generally see when we
look at other language groups below). In Caodeng rGyalrong (J. Sun 1998), listed
in Table 2, the inclusive forms take an extra morpheme to mark them as inclusive.
These additional suffixes are not specific to the 1di and 1pi forms; they are used for
all dual and plural forms (except the 1de and 1pe forms).
The languages in Qiangic and rGyalrong have person-marking systems (affixes
on the verb that index participants) and many also have possessive prefixes on
nouns, both of which derive from the free pronouns, and some maintain the dual
and plural marking in the person marking, but the inclusive–exclusive distinction
is not maintained (e.g. Cogtse rGyalrong (Nagano 2003) verb suffixes: 1dl-tʃh, 1pl‑j;
noun prefixes: dual (of all numbers) Ndʒә-, 1pl jә-). Caodeng rGyalrong (J. Sun
1998) also has possessive pronouns derived from the free pronouns, and with these
the distinction is maintained: 1di tsә-gjәnu, 1de tsә-gju, 1pi jә-gjәro, 1pe jә-gju.
Table 2. rGyalrong

Cogtse rGyalrong ŋa tʃhi-gyo ji-Ndʒo ji-gjo ji-ɲo ~ joa
Maerkang rGyalrong ŋa ndʒo ŋә-ndʒe jo ŋә-ɲe
Caodeng rGyalrong ɐ-gjiʔ tse-gjә-niʔ tsә-gjә jә-gjә-rɐʔ jә-gjә
a The form jo for the 1pi in rGyalrong is used only by older people (Nagano 2003). Nagano also notes
that a new form, nә-ŋa [2sg-1sg] is sometimes used for the 1dl exclusive.
2. Lolo-Burmese
Within Lolo-Burmese, a large group of languages spread throughout Southwest-

ern China, Northern Thailand, and Burma, there are two large groups, Loloish
and Burmish, and within those groups there are identifiable subgroups, Northern
and Southern Burmish, and Northern, Central, and Southern Loloish. Among the
Northern Burmish languages, Achang (Dai 1985) and Leqi (Dai et al. 1991) do not
show an inclusive–exclusive opposition (and no dual pronouns), though in Bola,
Langsu (both from Dai et al. 1991), and Zaiwa (Xu & Xu 1984) we find paired sets
of dual and plural inclusive and exclusive pronouns, as presented in Table 3. In Bola
and Langsu the exclusive pronouns are based on the 1sg pronoun plus a dual or
plural marker, while the inclusive forms involve an innovative pronoun. In Bola the
dual marker nʚ̱ k is used only for the 1dl inclusive form; 1dl exclusive, 2dl and 3dl
all take the dual marker nε̱ 55. The 1pl inclusive in Bola also does not take the usual
plural marker maʔ 31. In Langsu and Zaiwa cognates of Bola na̱ k are used for duals
in all persons, and in Langsu the same plural marker (nʚ̱ uŋ55) is used in both inclu-
sive and exclusive forms. In Zaiwa the cognate of Bola maʔ31 (the exclusive plural) is
also used for the exclusive plural (as well as second- and third-person plurals), and
the cognate of Langsu nʚ̱ uŋ55 is used for the inclusive plural.
In Southern Burmish, represented by Rangoon Burmese (Wheatley 2003), there
are many different forms for the 1sg pronoun depending on the sex and status of the
speaker, but no obligatory dual or plural marking. (There is an optional marker ‑tó
which can be used as a in-group and plural marker.)
A majority of the Loloish languages, except for Gazhuo (Dai, Liu & Fu 1987),
Bisu, Gong, Phunoi (all in Bradley 1993), and Nuosu Yi (Chen & Wu 1998) among
others, show the inclusive–exclusive opposition. See Table 4. Akha (Hansson 2003),
Nusu (Sun & Liu 1986), Xide Yi (Chen, Bian & Li 1985), and Rouruo (Sun 1985b;
Sun, Huang & Zhou 2002) show the opposition in the dual. In the Rouruo dual
forms, -pe55 is the plural marker, nε̱ 53 is the word for ‘two’, and -ia53 is the noun clas-
sifier for humans. In Xide Yi the inclusive forms are the same as the exclusive forms
except that the 2sg pronoun ni55 is added before the form. In Nasu (Gao 1958) and
Sani Yi (Ma 1951) the three relevant forms are simply different pronouns, with no
isolatable plural marker. In Akha, Nusu, Rouruo, and a Black Lahu dialect of China
described by Chang (1986) the marking of the opposition takes the form of differ-
ent base pronouns with the same dual or plural marker, again with the exclusive
Table 3. Northern Burmish

55 31 55/31 55 35
Bola ŋa nja -na̱ k ŋǎ -nε̱ ŋi̱ ŋǎ55/31-maʔ31/55
Langsu ŋɔ31 ŋj̱32-na̱k55 ŋɔ̆31-na̱ k55 ŋj̱35-na̱ uŋ55 ŋɔ̆31-na̱ uŋ55
Zaiwa ŋo51 i55-ni̱k55 ŋa55-ni̱k55 i55-nu̱ ŋ55/ŋa55-nu̱ ŋ55 ŋa55-moʔ
form being the descendent of Proto-Tibeto-Burman *ŋa. Red Lahu, Lahu Shehleh
and Yellow Lahu also have inclusive forms based on a cognate of ni31- in the Black
Lahu described by Chang 1986 (see Bradley 1979, 1993), but in the Black Lahu dia-
lect of Thailand described by Matisoff (1973, 2003) the opposition is marked by the
addition of the 2sg pronoun to the normal 1pl form, i.e. ŋà-n-hɨ [1sg-2sg-pl]. Lisu
(Mu & Duan 1983) and Lipo (Bradley 1993) also have an extension of the 1sg form
as the exclusive form, but the plural marker in the Lisu exclusive form only appears
in the 1pl exclusive form; 2pl and 3pl have -ua31. According to Bradley (1993: 182),
the inclusive form in Lisu can take the noun plural marker bu33. Bradley argues that
this is evidence of a nominal origin for the inclusive form. The inclusive pronoun
in Lipo might be related to that of Lahu. Among three different dialects of Hani (Li
& Wang 1986) we see differences in how the distinction is marked. In Haya Hani
the distinction is marked by a difference in the plural marker; in Biyue Hani and
closely related Akha6 the distinction is marked by a difference in pronoun, with the
pronoun used in the exclusive forms being the same as that for 1sg in Akha, and in
Haobai Hani the distinction is marked by a difference in both pronoun and plural
marker. Again we see a variety of plural markers used in the forms. In the Haya
Hani and Haobai Hani forms the plural marker used is the same as that used for 2pl.
Table 4. Loloish

Xide Yi ŋa33 ni55-ŋa21-ɳi55 ŋa21-ɳi55 ni55-ŋo21 ŋo21-γo44
Nasu Yi ŋu31 – – a31-sε55 ŋε55
Sani Yi ŋa33 – – a11s z55 ŋa11
Lampang Akha ŋá ~ ŋà(q) àdy-njàq ŋá-njàq àdy-màq ŋá-màq
Nusu ŋɑ35 ʔɑ-ku31 ŋɑ35-ku31 ʔɑ-dɯ31 ŋɑ35-dɯ31
Rouruo ŋu55/ŋo55 ʔa31-pe55-nε̱53-ia53 ŋo55-pe55- ʔa31-pe55 ŋo55-pe55
nε̱53-ia53
Lahu (Chang) ŋa31 31 33
ni -xɯ -nε a 31
ŋa -xɯ33-
31
ni31-xɯ33 ŋa31-xɯ33
nε31
Lahu (Matisoff) ŋà ŋà-h́-ma/ŋà-h́ -nὲ – ŋà-n-hɨ ŋà-hɨ
Lisu ŋwa33 –b – ʐo21 ŋwa33-nu21
Lipo ŋɔ33 – – ʔɑ21-ni55 ŋɔ33-vε33
Haya Hani ŋa55 – – ŋa55-du33 ŋa55-ja33
Biyue Hani ŋa55 – – a55-v̩ 33 ŋɔ31-v̩ 33
Haoni Hani ŋɔ55 – – ɔ33-tɯ33 ŋɔ33-thi55
Sangkong ŋa55/ŋa33 a55-ɲi̱31 – ho33-ɲaŋ31 a55-ɲaŋ31
Jinuo ŋɔ42 ɑ33-n̩̊ 55 – ŋu55vu33 ŋɑ55vu33
a An additional suffix, -ma33, can be added to both the dual forms.

b David Bradley (1993: 181) points out that duals can be formed in Lisu and Lipo by adding the word
for ‘two’ plus the classifier for humans after the singular or plural forms. He also reports (personal
communication, November 2002) that in the Lisu song language there is an inclusive dual marker,
a33nu21, containing the same second syllable as in the exclusive form (different from 2nd person
nu33), and argues that this suggests the distinction is likely to have arisen recently.
In Biyue Hani, Sangkong (Li 1992), and Jinuo the plural markers are the same for
both inclusive and exclusive while the pronouns differ, but the pronoun used in the
exclusive form is not exactly the same as the 1sg form.
In Rouruo (Sun, Huang & Zhou 2002: 71–2), aside from singular, dual, and plural,
there is a set of ‘collective’ pronouns, where the collective referred to is the family,
and these also show an inclusive–exclusive contrast in the first person: first person
collective inclusive ʔa31-(pe55)-iε55, first person collective exclusive ŋo55-(pe55)-iε55.
In these forms the syllable -iε55 derives from iε33, which as a noun means ‘home,
family’ and is also a noun classifier for families. The plural marker -pe55 is optional
in the dual and collective forms.
Within this one group then we see four of the five main ways of marking the dis-
tinction found in Tibeto-Burman: having the same dual/plural marker but differ-
ent pronouns, having the same pronoun but different dual/plural markers, having
completely different forms, having a form which is a coalescence of the first person
and second-person forms. The fifth type, which we will see is the main type in the
Kiranti languages (below), is adding a special marker to the dual/plural form for in-
clusive or exclusive. We can see that while a large number of the Lolo-Burmese lan-
guages have the inclusive–exclusive distinction, it cannot be reconstructed to Proto-
Lolo-Burmese. In fact Bradley (1993: 197) reconstructs only general person forms
without reference to number or inclusiveness.
The position of the Naxi language (He & Jiang 1985) has not been clearly estab-
lished, but one opinion that is widely held is that it is a link language between the
Qiangic languages and the Lolo-Burmese languages (e.g. H. Sun 2001). It may not
be a coincidence, then, that Western Naxi follows a pattern similar to that found in
both the Qiangic and the Loloish languages, that is, having different pronoun forms
with the same plural marker, though in Western Naxi the only difference between
the two pronouns is the tone.7 See Table 5. The position of Bai (Xu & Zhao 1984,
Wang 2001, Wiersma 2003) is also controversial, though I personally feel it is a Lolo-
Burmese language (like Naxi, possibly not within Loloish, but closely related). In
Xishan Bai (Wang 2001: 74) we find no dual, and no separate plural marker, simply
different forms for the inclusive and exclusive, but again, the exclusive form seems
historically prior, particularly as the exclusive form fits the pattern of the overall
paradigm (singular forms end in -ɯ, plural forms have the same initial but end in
Table 5. Naxi and Bai
1sg 1pl-incl. 1pl-excl.

31 13 55 31
Western Naxi ŋә /ŋɑ ŋә -ŋgɯ ŋә33-ŋgɯ31
Xishan Bai ŋɯ31 ɲia55 ŋɑ55
Jianchuan Bai ŋo31 jã55 ŋɑ55
Dali Bai ŋo31 ɲɑ55 ŋɑ55
Bijiang Bai ŋo̱ 42 ɲo̱ 21-ŋo̱ 21 ŋɑ55-γo55
‑a: 2sg nɯ31, 3sg pɯ31; 2pl na55, 3pl pa55), whereas the inclusive form does not. Jian-
chuan and Dali Bai (Xu & Zhao 1984: 175) follow a similar pattern, but with -o for
the singular pronouns, -ɑ for the plural pronouns, and a marked initial for the in-
clusive form, whereas Bijiang Bai (Xu & Zhao 1984: 175) has three different forms
for the relevant pronouns, with the plural used for the exclusive form being the un-
marked one (it is also used in the second- and third-person forms simply added to
the 2sg and 3sg pronouns).
The Tujia language (Tian & He 1986), which we may include with the Loloish
languages, does not show the inclusive–exclusive distinction (see Tian & He 1986:
49).8
3. Bodish
The Bodish languages, which include the Tibetan dialects, the Monpa dialects, and
the Tamangic languages, are spread throughout Western China (particularly Tibet),
Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim. Of these languages, only Lhasa Tibetan (Jin 1983, De-
Lancey 2003) and Baima (Sun 1985a), presented in Table 6, show a dual, ŋa12ɲiʔ 54
and ŋe35ɲi341 respectively (the latter transparently derived from the number ‘two’),
but neither shows the inclusive–exclusive distinction in the dual. The pronoun
used for the dual in Baima is the same form as that used in the plural exclusive form.
In Lhasa Tibetan, the inclusive is formed by adding the word raŋ14 ‘self ’ between
the 1sg pronoun and the plural marker. In Balti (Rangan 1979), Ladakhi (Koshal
1979), and nTsho sNa Monpa (Sun et al. 1980)9 the inclusive–exclusive distinction
is not marked by the pronoun, but by the form of the plural marker (‑t̪ŋ/‑tәŋ/
‑tAŋ53 vs. ‑ča/‑žә/‑rAʔ 53 respectively). Except for 2pl in Purki Balti, which has the
‑t̪ŋ form, the plural used for the exclusive form is the more general plural marker.
In Ladakhi it is also possible to add a second plural marker (-kun ~ -gun or -sәk)
to the forms. Among the Tamangic languages, Chantyal (Noonan 2003a) does not
Table 6. Bodish

12 12 14 54
Lhasa Tibetan (Central Tibetan) ŋa ŋa -raŋ -tsho ŋã12-tsho54
Baima (Eastern Tibetan) ŋa35 ʑo13-ko53 ŋe35-ko53
Balti (Western Tibetan) ŋa ŋa-t̪ aŋ ŋa-tʃa
Ladakhi (Western Tibetan) ŋә ŋә-tәŋ ŋә-ʑә
nTsho-sna (Cuona) Monpa ŋe13/ŋAi13a ŋA35-tAŋ53 ŋA35-rAʔ53
Tamang (Tamangic) ŋá jàŋ ín
Gurung (Tamangic) ŋa ŋɦjǒɦ ŋi
Nar-Phu (Tamangic) ŋæ̂/ŋɦæ̂b ŋɦî-(tɕuke) ŋɦyâŋ-(tɕuke)
a This form of the pronoun is used to emphasize agentivity, and appears with the agentive marker.
b This is an emphatic form (Noonan 2003b).
show the inclusive–exclusive distinction in the plural, but has a unique dual inclu-
sive form made up of the 1sg and 2sg pronouns (nagi < na ‘1sg’ + kâi ‘2sg’). There is
no dual exclusive form. Tamang (Mauzadon 2003), Nar-Phu (Noonan 2003b), and
Gurung (Glover 1974) all mark the distinction in the plural with different pronoun
forms (though the two forms may be historically related in Nar-Phu and possibly
Gurung).
4. Mizo-Kuki-Chin
Most languages within the Mizo-Kuki-Chin group, which is spread across both
sides of the India-Burma border, do not show the inclusive–exclusive distinction
(e.g. Mizo (Lushai), Lai, Lepcha, Thado, Anal, Chiru, Rangkhol, Kabui, Khoirao,
Hyow, Meitei, Mru, Tangkhul Naga, Lotha, Rengma, and Sema). Among those lan-
guages that show the inclusive–exclusive distinction, presented in Table 7, Cho
Chin (Jordan 1969) and Karbi (Jeyapaul 1987) follow the pattern seen above, i.e. the
exclusive form is composed of the 1sg pronoun plus the plural marker, while the in-
clusive form involves an innovative pronoun (the same plural marker is used for all
forms). Cho Chin also follows that pattern in the dual as well.10 In Tiddim (Hender-
son 1957, 1965), both of the plural pronouns differ from the singular form, though
the exclusive has the same velar initial as the 1sg form. In Sizang Chin (Stern 1963),
-te13 is the usual plural marker. Stern (1963: 236) seemed unsure of the difference
between ei55-te13/i:55 and ko:55-(te13), as he says the former are “probably inclusive
forms”, but as they are so similar to the Tiddim forms, I will assume the former are
inclusive forms. Sizang also has person marking prefixes and suffixes on the verb,
but they do not distinguish inclusiveness. In Angami (Giridhar 1980), we have
different forms for inclusive and exclusive dual and plural, though the additional
plural marker -kô can be added to both plural forms. The position of Ao (Guru-
basave 1980) as Mizo-Kuki-Chin or Bodo-Konyak-Jinghpaw is as still unresolved.
Because the 1sg pronoun (which also has a possessive prefix form ke-) seems to pat-
tern more closely with the languages discussed here, we will include it here. In Ao
Table 7. Mizo-Kuki-Chin

Cho (Hko) Chin kei niʔ-ni kei-ni miʔ-mi kei-mi
Karbi (Mikir) ne – – e-tum ~ i-tum ne-tum
Tiddim Chin kei-(maʔ) – – ei-(tε/maʔ/ma:u) kou-(tε/ma:u)
Sizang (Siyin) Chin ke:i55-(ma:) – – ei55-te13/i:55 ko:55-(te13)
Angami Naga, ɑ̄ ɑ̂vū hiê-niē ú-(kô)/wé hiē-(kô)
Kohima
Ao ní – – ase-nok o-nok
Table 8. Mikir and Chin verb affixes

Mikir (Hills-Karbi) ne- – – e- ~ i- ne-
Cho (Hko) Chin kaʔ- ni- kaʔ-ni- mi- kaʔ-mi-
Tiddim Chin (narrative) kǎ- – – i- kǎ-VERB-uʔ
Tiddim Chin (colloquial) -iŋ – – -ha-ŋ -uŋ
the two plural pronouns have the same plural marker, and the inclusive–exclusive
distinction is marked by a difference in the pronoun, which in both cases is unre-
lated to the 1sg form.
In Mikir there is a set of obligatory (hierarchical) person-marking prefixes
which is a transparent recent grammaticalization where the free pronouns became
prefixed to the verb. See Table 8. Cho Chin also has a set of verb prefixes (which
Jordan (1969: 30) says are “contracted forms” of the free pronouns). Both of these
languages maintain the inclusive–exclusive distinction. The development of ver-
bal affixes based on the free pronouns is a common sort of grammaticalization in
Tibeto-Burman (see LaPolla 1992, 1994, 2001, 2003a). In these cases the free pro-
nouns had an inclusive–exclusive distinction, and the verb prefixes maintain the
distinction. In Tiddim there are two sets of pronominal affixes, one prefixal, asso-
ciated with the narrative style, and one suffixal, associated with the colloquial style.
These two sets possibly reflect layering, that is, two different grammaticalizations of
pronominal affixes, though the same plural marker (-uʔ) appears in both sets. The
narrative set may be the newer of the two, as the forms more closely reflect the cur-
rent free pronouns, essentially being short forms of the free pronouns. The collo-
quial set seems older, as the forms have no obvious provenience (see also Peterson
2000).11 We can clearly see that the colloquial forms involve a velar nasal marking
first person, plus the usual -uʔ plural marker in the 1pl exclusive form, and a differ-
ent plural marker for the inclusive form.
In Tiddim Chin the pronominal prefixes associated with the narrative style can
also appear on nouns in both styles: 1sg kǎ-, 1pi i-, 1pe kǎ-noun-uʔ, 2sg nǎ-, 2pl nǎ-
noun-uʔ, 3sg -ǎ, 3pl ǎ-noun-uʔ.
5. Bodo-Konyak-Jinghpaw
The Bodo-Konyak-Jinghpaw languages12 are mainly spoken in northeastern In-

dia and Bangladesh, but Jinghpaw is also spoken in Northern Burma and Yunnan
Province, China. Within this group, Jinghpaw and the Bodo languages Kachari and
Kokborok do not show the inclusive–exclusive distinction, and within the Kon-
yak languages Nocte does not show the distinction, while Tangsa (Das Gupta 1980)
Table 9. Bodo-Konyak

Garo aŋ-(a) – – an-tʃiŋ tʃiŋ-(a)
Chang ŋo/kasa-ti ~ sa-ji ka-si sa-nn ka-nn
Mosang Tangsa ŋa – – nei-he ni-ʃi
Jogli Tangsa ŋa – – naŋ-taŋ ni-taŋ
Kimsing Tangsa ŋi – – na-ʃi nai-ʃi
Longcang Tangsa ŋa – – naŋ ni
Moklum Tangsa ŋa – – hi-taŋ i:
and Chang (Hutton 1987) do, as does Garo (Burling 1963, 2003b). See Table 9. In
Chang the 1sg pronoun has the form ŋo when it does not take any postposition, but
has the base form ka- when it takes a postposition, is used as a possessive prefix
on a noun, or is used in the emphatic pronoun construction: kabu (also ŋebu) 1sg
genitive, kaka 1sg ablative, kala 1sg dative, kato 1sg accusative, ka-matpan 1sg em-
phatic pronoun. This form (ka-) is also used in the exclusive forms, as opposed to sa-
(provenience unknown) used in the inclusive forms. Only Chang has dual marking,
and the forms follow the same sa-/ka- pattern as the plural forms in distinguishing
inclusive and exclusive. In the different Tangsa dialects we find a variety of patterns
with often the pronoun and the plural marker differing between inclusive and ex-
clusive forms. In general, -ʃi is the more common plural marker, although the Jogli
and Moklum dialects have -tŋ (it is unclear whether this -tŋ has any relationship
to the similar form found in some of the Bodish languages used for inclusive plu-
rals). In Moklum -tŋ is used only for the inclusive form, and in Mosang there is a
unique inclusive plural -he. No generalization seems possible about the relation-
ship between the 1sg pronoun and the plural forms, as the former are all based on
*ŋa, while the latter seem to be based on *na or *ni. These languages do not have per-
son marking on the verb.
As mentioned above, generally the Idu-Taraon and Kaman languages do not
show an inclusive–exclusive distinction, but Sun (1983) gives forms for dual (where
the word for ‘two’ is added to the 1sg pronoun), and for inclusive and exclusive plu-
rals in the Chayu dialect of southern Tibet. See Table 10. These forms differ only in
the initial consonant of the middle syllable, and Sun does not mention the origin of
this difference. The dialect of Ceta village in Lohit District of Arunachal Pradesh,
described by Pulu (1978) does not show the same forms. The Lohit dialect word
alombrō ‘many’ can be added to nouns to form plurals, and it seems a cognate of
this word is the source of the plural marking on the pronouns of the Chayu dialect
(in Chayu the form loŋ35-bɹo31 can also be added to nouns to form plurals). The in-
clusive form then may have developed from a fusion of the 1sg and 2sg (ɲo35) pro-
nouns (as in Lahu and Newar), plus the plural marker.
Table 10. Idu
1sg 1dl 1pl-incl. 1pl-excl.

35 35 31 55
Idu (Sun 1983) ŋa ŋa ka -ni ŋa -na -loŋ -(bɹo ) ŋa35-a31-loŋ35-(bɹo31)
35 31 35 31
Idu (Pulu 1978) ŋá – iɲí –
6. Western Himalayan
Within Western Himalayan, a group of languages spoken in Uttar Pradesh and

Himachal Pradesh in northwestern India, Byangsi, Johari, and Rongpo do not
show the inclusive–exclusive distinction. In Raji (Krishan 2001a) and Chau-
dangsi (Krishan 2001b) the use of an Indo-Aryan loanword meaning ‘all’, -dʑәmmәl
and ‑dʑәmma or lәiri respectively, with the 1pl form gives an inclusive sense. See
Table 11. In Darma (Krishan 2001c: 140), the same pattern is followed, though with
a native word bir-mi [all-person]. The dual marker in Raji, Chaudangsi, and Darma
(e.g. Darma ni-mi), is transparently ‘two people’. In Bunan (Grierson 1909: Vol. III.1,
469–78) and Manchad (S. R. Sharma 1996) the form of the dual and plural is the
same for inclusive and exclusive, but the pronoun differs. There is also an emphatic
form of the 1sg pronoun in Bunan, iŋgi, and from this we might suggest that at
least the Bunan forms follow the pattern seen above, that the exclusive form has the
more basic pronoun. According to D. D. Sharma (1982: 127) Pattani does not have
an inclusive–exclusive distinction, and has ɲe- as the base form for all non-singu-
lar forms (e.g. 1dl ɲe-ku, 1pl ɲe-re), but Saxena (1977: 79) gives inclusive and exclu-
sive forms, with the differences based on the pronoun used, making the pattern and
forms very similar to that found in Manchad (S. R. Sharma 1996). In Kinnauri also
(D. D. Sharma 1988) the distinction is marked in the plural by the form of the basic
pronoun, not by the plural marker, while in the dual the two forms are totally unre-
lated. Saxena (1997: 77) also gives a slightly different paradigm for Kinnauri, with
an inclusive–exclusive distinction in the dual but not in the plural, and the form
kiɕaŋ used for both 1pl and 1di (niɕi is used for 1de). In Tinani (S. R. Sharma 1996)
there is both a difference in the form of the dual and plural markers and the form
of the pronoun used for the plural. The plural form -ne is used for second-person
plural as well (third person takes -re, as in Manchad); -naŋ is used only in the 1pi
form. The 1di form also seems to have a relic of the dual marker found in Manchad
and Pattani. D. D. Sharma (1989: 145–6, cited in Saxena 1997) gives a somewhat dif-
ferent paradigm for Tinani. In the paradigm he gives, the plural inclusive and exclu-
sive differ not in the plural marker, but in the pronoun, as in Manchad and Pattani.
In these languages there is person marking on the verb, including dual and plural
marking in most languages, but no inclusive–exclusive distinction is made.13 From
the form of the plural person marking reconstructable for this group, *ɲi (Saxena
1997: 89), it would seem the exclusive forms in those languages that show a distinc-
tion in the pronouns used are the more basic and historically prior forms.
Table 11. Western Himalayan

Raji na na-dʑi ~ nhi- – na-ni-dʑәmmәl na-ni
mi
Chaudangsi dʑi ~ dʑe in-ni-mi – in-dʑәmma/in- in
lәiri
Darma dʑi ~ dʑe niŋ-ni-mi – niŋ-bir-mi niŋ
Bunan (Gahri) gji eraŋ-(njispi) hiŋ- eraŋ-ɟi/eraŋ-ʑi hiŋ-ɟi/hiŋ-ʑi
(njispi)
Manchad gje hen-gu ɲje-ku hena-re ɲje-re ~ ɲe-re
Pattani gè héŋ-gù nè-kù hénә-rè nè-rè
Lower Kinnauri gә ~ әŋ kasaŋ ni-ɕi kasaŋ-a niŋ-a
Tinani (S. R. Sharma) gje i-ɕa-g ɲji-ɕ ɲje-naŋ ɲje-ne
Tinani (D. D. Sharma) gje i-ɕa ɲi-ɕi ɲe-na e-na
7. Eastern Himalayan
The Eastern Himalayan languages (all in Nepal) include the Kiranti/Rai group
(broadly defined), Kham, Magar, and Sunwar, and Newar. Kham, Magar, and Sun-
war do not show the inclusive–exclusive distinction. The Kiranti languages do show
the distinction, as shown in Table 12, and in both the dual and the plural, generally
using the same mechanism for marking the distinction in both the dual and plural.
Within this group, only Khaling (Toba 1984), Dumi (van Driem 1993), and Hayu
(Michailovsky 1988: 124–5; 2003) follow the pattern we’ve seen in much of the rest
of the family: the forms take the same dual or plural markers (allowing for vowel
harmony) but differ in the form of the pronoun, with the exclusive pronoun being
the same as the 1sg pronoun (in Dumi). In Hayu it isn’t necessary to mark number
in first- and third-person forms in the absolutive, though dual and plural can be
marked by suffixing -nak-pu ‘two people’ and -khata respectively. Inclusive and ex-
clusive can’t be marked. But in the possessive form of the pronouns, first person
distinguishes five forms, including inclusive and exclusive forms. In the rest of the
Kiranti languages, there is a very different pattern: the pronouns are the same for in-
clusive and exclusive, but the exclusive takes a velar-initial suffix while the inclusive
is unmarked. The exclusive is then the more formally marked member of the pair.
In Thulung (Ebert 2003) and Bahing (Hodgson 1858) the exclusive marker replaces
the plural marker, but not the dual marker.14
These languages also differ from most of the rest of the family (except Cho Chin
and Karbi) in that they retain the inclusive–exclusive distinction in their person
marking systems, given in Table 13. Even Chepang, which does not show the dis-
tinction in the free pronouns (1sg ŋa, 1dl ŋi-ci ~ ni-ci, 1pl ŋi), does show the distinc-
tion in the person marking. Looking at the forms of the suffixes (below), it would
Table 12. Kiranti/Rai

Khaling uŋ i-tsi o-tsu i-k o-k
Dumi aŋ in-tsi an-tsɨ iŋ-ki aŋ-kɨ
Hayu (absolutive) gu ~ gu: gu-(nakpu) – gu-(khata) –
Hayu (possessive) ɑŋ uŋ-tshe ɑŋ-tshe ũ:-ki ɑ̃:-ki
Camling kaŋa ~ kã kai-tsi kɯ-ts-ka kai-(ni) kai-ka
Athpare aŋa an-tsi an-tsi-ga an-i an-i-ga
Bantawa ɯŋka ɯŋka-tsi ɯŋka-tsa ɯŋka-n-(tsi) ɯŋka-n-ka-
(tsi)
Thulung go gu-tsi gu-tsu-ku gu-i gu-ku
Bahing go gó-si gó-sú-kú gó-i go-ku
Phedappe Limbu aŋga an-tshi an-tshi-ge an-i an-i-ge
Belhare ŋka ŋke-tshi ŋke-ŋ-tshi-ŋ ŋke ŋke-ŋ
seem that in all but Khaling and Dumi a velar suffix marks the exclusive forms, as in
the free pronouns. Here Hayu differs from Khaling and Dumi in that it still has the
velar suffix for the exclusive plural in the person marking system. Lohorung person
marking data has been added from van Driem (1992); no data on the free pronouns
is given in that article.
Dumi, Khaling, Hayu, and Lohorung have -k in both their inclusive and exclu-
sive pronoun forms, but this -k seems to be independent of the exclusive marking
velar suffix, as in Hayu and Lohorung a second velar suffix is added to the exclusive
form. Given the data here, and the fact that the rest of the paradigm (all but the velar
suffix) matches the Dulong-Rawang person-marking paradigm and to a lesser ex-
Table 13. Kiranti/Rai person marking

Khaling (Toba 1988: 202) -ŋa: -ji -jua -ki -kaa
Dumi (van Driem 1993: 96) -tә -ti – -ki-ti -ki-ta
Hayu (Michailovsky 1974) -ŋo -tshi-k -tsho-k -ke -ko-k
Lohorung -ʔŋa -tɕi -tɕi-ga -ki -ki-ŋ-ka
Camling -uŋa -tsi -tsi-ka -i -i-(m)-ka
Kulung (Tolsma 1999) -o: -tsi -tsi-ka -ja -ja-ka
Thulung (Allen 1975) -ŋ -tsi -tsu-ku -i -ku
Bahing -ŋa -sa -su-ku -ja -ka
Limbu (van Driem 1999) -ʔe -si -si-ge a- -i-ge
Belhare -ŋa -tsi -tsi-ŋa -i -i-ŋa
Chepang -ŋa -tәjh-tse -ŋә-tse -tәjh-ʔi -ŋi ~ ŋ-se
a Khaling has a different set of suffixes for 1st person dual transitive agents, and these forms corres‑
pond more closely to the forms in the other languages: 1di -si, 1de -su.
Table 14. Newar

Dolakha Newar dʑi thi-dʑi/tɕhi-dʑi isi
Kathmandu Newar dʑi dʑhi:-(pĩ:) dʑi-pĩ:
tent the Western Himalayan paradigm (see LaPolla 2000), the likely development
of this paradigm is that the original 1pl marker was *-i, and then an exclusive-mark-
ing velar suffix developed before the split-up of the Kiranti group.
Belhare also has an inclusive–exclusive distinction in its possessive noun pre-
fixes: 1sg a-, 1di ŋketshi-, 1de ŋkeŋtshiŋ-, 1pi ŋke-, 1pe ŋkeŋ-. These forms are trans-
parently copies of the free pronouns which have become affixes on nouns, and,
except for the 1sg form, have the same forms as the free pronouns.
The ancient Tibeto-Burman language of the Kathmandu Valley, Classical Newar
(Jørgensen 1941), has a rather complicated pronominal system. There are three se-
mantically equivalent forms for 1sg (dʑe, dʑi, dʑɑ),15 exclusive plurals formed by
adding -pani to these forms, a historically later and less common exclusive plural
dʑi-mi, and a large number of inclusive plural forms which form two groups, one
group of forms which is not clearly analyzable into morphemes (dʑhɑdʑe, dʑhedʑe,
dʑhidʑi, dʑhedʑhe, dʑhidʑhi, dʑedʑhe), and one group that is clearly ‘you and I’ (tɕha-
dʑe, tɕhe-dʑe, tɕhi-dʑi, dʑe-tɕhe, dʑi-tɕhi; the 2sg pronoun is tɕhe, tɕhi, or tɕha). The
inclusive plural forms in the Dolakha dialect (Genetti 1994: 60–1, Genetti 2003)
clearly reflect this latter pattern. See Table 14. The Kathmandu dialect (Hargreaves
2003) marks the inclusive–exclusive distinction only in the aspiration of the initial
of the pronoun and the vowel length. The plural marking is also optional in the in-
clusive.
8. Dulong-Rawang
Dulong (LaPolla 2003c, personal fieldwork), Rawang (personal fieldwork), and

Anong (H. Sun 2000) are relatively closely related dialects spoken in Northwestern
Yunnan and Northern Burma. Of these three, Rawang does not mark the distinc-
tion at all.16 Dulong marks it using a form cognate to Tibetan raŋ ‘self ’ for the inclu-
sive (adding the word for ‘two’ in the dual in Dizhengdang Dulong), possibly due to
Tibetan influence. See Table 15. Anong marks the distinction in the dual and plural,
with the dual forms taking an old pronominal dual marker (< *tsi). The inclusive–
exclusive distinction is marked in the dual by a difference of pronoun, but in the
plural by a difference of plural marker.
These languages also have person marking on the verb, but the inclusive–exclu-
sive distinction is not reflected in the person marking. H. Sun (1981: 86) gives dif-
Table 15. Dulong-Rawang

Rawang ŋɑ̀ ŋɑ̀-n – ŋɯ̀ŋ-mɑʔ ŋɑ̀-mɑʔ
Kongmudang Dulong ŋɑ̀ īŋ-nε̄ – ɹɑ̄ŋ īŋ
Dizhengdang Dulong әg rә̄ŋ-ɲī әjɯ̀ŋ-ɲī ɹә̄ŋ әjɯ̀ŋ-(mɑʔ)
Anong ŋa55 ~ a31 ŋa55-iɯŋ55 a31-iɯŋ55-si31 a31-ɳi35 a31-iɯŋ55
‑io31 ‑si31
ferent forms for dual exclusive and dual inclusive for the person marking in Kong-
mudang Dulong, but this seems to be a mistake, as I have not found this distinction
in my own fieldwork on the language, and it would mean there was a distinction in
the dual not found in the plural.
9. Summary and conclusion
We have seen that the inclusive–exclusive distinction, when it is found in Tibeto-

Burman, is often an innovation within a single low level grouping, or even of sin-
gle languages within a group. Often even closely related languages or different dia-
lects of a single language differ in terms of whether or not they mark the distinction.
Only one group, the Kiranti group, has marking of the distinction that can be re-
constructed to the proto level. Kiranti is also the only group as a whole that marks
the inclusive–exclusive distinction in its person marking system (verbal suffixes)
as well.
We have also seen that there are five main ways of marking the distinction found
in Tibeto-Burman:
1. having the same dual/plural marker but different pronouns,
2. having the same pronoun but different dual/plural markers,
3. having completely different forms,
4. having a form which is a coalescence of the first person and second-person
forms,
5. adding a special marker to the dual/plural form for inclusive or exclusive.
In the case of (1) and (3), we find that of the two pronouns, generally the pronoun
used in the exclusive form is the historically prior and less marked form. In the case
of (2), generally the plural marker used in the exclusive form is the historically prior
and less marked form.
We can therefore conclude, at least in Tibeto-Burman, the inclusive form is a late
development, and generally involves a more marked form. Only in the Kiranti lan-
guages is the exclusive the more marked form.
Notes
1. The name Tani for this group (formerly known as Mirish or Abor-Miri-Dafla) is from Sun
1993a, 1993b, 2003. The group includes Adi, Apatani, Bengni, Bokar, Gallong, Hill Miri, Miji,
Mising, Nishi, and Tagin.
2. Abbreviations used: 1 first person, 2 second person, 3 third person, sg singular, dl dual, pl
plural, di dual inclusive, de dual exclusive, pi plural inclusive, pe plural exclusive.
3. The lack of third person marking and plural marking makes Proto-Tibeto-Burman (as
well as Old Chinese, which also had no plural marking) an exception to Greenberg’s (1963)
Universal 42: “All languages have pronominal categories involving at least three persons and
two numbers”.
4. In several languages of the Qiangic, Eastern Himalayan, Western Himalayan, and Dulong-
Rawang groups we find a dual marker with a dental or palatal affricate initial. If these lan-
guages are more closely related to each other than to the other branches of Tibeto-Burman,
as I have suggested (LaPolla 2000, 2003a), then we could reconstruct *tsi as a dual marker
for the pronoun paradigm in the proto-language of this group. The Queyu and rGyalrong
forms might then be similar because they are shared retentions.
5. The forms given for the pronouns will be the nominative/absolutive forms unless other-
wise marked. Forms for person marking (verbal affixes) given in the discussion below will
generally be those of the intransitive non-past forms.
6. Akha is said to be part of the Haya dialect (Li & Wang 1986), and more remote from the
Bika dialect (of which Biyue is a part), but in terms of the inclusive–exclusive opposition it
patterns more like Biyue than Haya Hani.
7. Eastern Naxi is also discussed in He & Jiang (1985), and it is claimed (p. 114) that
the Eastern dialect does not show an inclusive–exclusive distinction; it is said that ɲɑ33-
tsɯ31‑kv31 covers both meanings. It is also said that -tsɯ31-kv31 is the plural marker for the
second- and third-person forms as well. In the lexical list on p. 171, though, the forms ɲɑ33,
γo33‑tsɯ33‑kv21, and ɲɑ33-ʐa21 are given for 1sg, 1pi, and 1pe respectively for the Eastern
dialect, and the plural forms for second and third person have the plural marker -ʐa21, not
-tsɯ31‑kv31. It may be that though both sets of pronouns are called “Eastern dialect” in the
book, they represent different sub-varieties, and one of the two employs the two different
plural markers and a different pronoun base to create an inclusive–exclusive distinction.
8. On p. 207 Tian & He (1986) give inclusive and exclusive forms, but the inclusive forms
are simply the exclusive forms plus the word for ‘all’. This can be done in just about any lan-
guage.
9. Tshangla (Central Monpa, Sharchhokpa-lo; Andvik 2003) and Motuo Menba (Sun et al.
1980) do not show the inclusive–exclusive distinction.
10. I should note here that the 1pl form in Tangkhul Naga (ithum, which does not distin-
guish inclusive and exclusive; Arokianathan 1987) is cognate with one form of the inclusive
pronoun in Mikir (I would have expected the single form in those languages that don’t have
the inclusive–exclusive distinction to be cognate with the exclusive form).
11. More work needs to be done to determine if either of these sets can be reconstructed to
some deeper level of the family. Even if one or both of the sets are reconstructable, a sep-
arate question is whether the inclusive–exclusive distinction holds for the proto-level, as
some languages that have a cognate system, such as Hyow (Peterson 2000), do not have the
distinction.
12. The name of the group and its composition is from Burling (2003a), except for the place-
ment of Ao in Mizo-Kiki-Chin (based on information from Alec Coupe, personal commu-
nication, December 2002). See also Benedict (1976).
13. Though Takahashi (2001), in reporting on Pangi Kinnauri, lists a verb suffix identical
to the 2dl/2pl form as a 1dl/1pl exclusive form, e.g. dza:tʃ ‘ate (it) (1de/1pe/2dl/2pl)’ vs. dza:
ʃe: ‘ate (it) (1di/1pi)’.
14. The sources for the other data are Ebert (2003) (Camling, Athpare and Bantawa), van
Driem (1987, 1999) (Limbu), and Bickel (2003) (Belhare).
15. Jørgensen (1941) is not clear on the nature of the sounds he writes as “c”, “ch”, “j”, and “jh”.
He says they are palatals, but does not say if they are stops or affricates. As the modern lan-
guages have affricates in corresponding forms, I assume these symbols represent palatal af-
fricates, and have regularized the transcription to “tɕ”, “tɕh”, “dʑ”, and “dʑh” respectively.
16. Rawang has the same plural marker mɑʔ as the optional exclusive marker in Dizheng-
dang Dulong, but the dual and plural are all based on the 1sg pronoun: 1sg ŋà, 1dl ŋà-ní [1sg
+ ‘two’], 1pl ŋà-maʔ. We have seen plural markers in Lolo-Burmese with a form similar to
mɑʔ, and this may be one reason some scholars have suggested a close relationship among
these languages. The form is a general plural marker for animate nouns in many of the lan-
guages. There is also another form for 1pl, ŋɯ̄ŋ-mɑʔ, and this is given as 1pl inclusive in
Bradley (1993), but my informants say there is no difference between the two pronouns in
terms of inclusiveness. The difference is just that ŋɯ̄ŋ-mɑʔ is a bit more polite. I don’t know
if this reflects a loss of the distinction or some other factor.
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Chapter 11
Inclusive–exclusive distinctions in the
languages of central-western South America
Mily Crevels and Pieter Muysken
Radboud University Nijmegen
This chapter surveys the inclusive–exclusive distinctions in the pronoun and personal refer-
ence systems of 65 languages from 33 language families in central-western South America
(Bolivia, Rondonia (Brazil), Peru, Ecuador, and Colombia). Our data tentatively support the
idea of a unidirectional historical development, following the First Person Hierarchy as pro-
posed by Cysouw (2003). The incidence of the inclusive–exclusive distinction in the region
is somewhat but not extremely far above the world average, and in the majority of the cases
where there is such a distinction it seems to be a basic, i.e. morphologically underived cat-
egory. Therefore, there is no support for a global areal spread of inclusivity in the region, al-
though contact-induced change is likely in specific cases.
Keywords: South America, areal typology, person systems, historical development
1. Introduction
The analytic inclusive–exclusive distinction in person systems seems to have

been first introduced in the sixteenth century by grammarians working on mission-
ary grammars and translations in two Andean languages, Aymara and Southern Pe-
ruvian Quechua (cf. Haas 1969, Hardman-de Bautista 1972, Mannheim 1982, Ade-
laar 1993). The distinction was based on a type of ‘we’ excluding the second person
(excluyendo/exclusivo), and a ‘we’ including the second person (incluyendo/inclu-
sivo). Hymes (1972: 105–6), however, has correctly pointed out the inappropriate-
ness of the use of the term ‘inclusive’ as one applying to the first person, since it ac-
tually combines first and second persons, and, thus represents a category logically
coordinate with the distinctions of ‘first’, ‘second’, and ‘third’ person. Hymes, there-
fore, proposes the terms ‘first’, ‘second’, ‘inclusive’, and ‘third’ as four coordinate cat-
egories of person, with the term ‘fourth’ as an alternative synonym for ‘inclusive’.
Mannheim (1982: 152–3) has pointed out that the inclusive–exclusive distinction is
installed quite differently in Aymara and Quechua. While Aymara encodes the in-
clusive–exclusive split in its person system, Quechua does so in its number system.
Extending Hymes’ terminological suggestion, Mannheim suggests that Aymara
has an ‘inclusive person’, while Quechua has an ‘inclusive number’. Adelaar (1993:
211), however, states that Mannheim could only draw this conclusion, because he
314 Mily Crevels and Pieter Muysken
based it exclusively on data from the southern Quechua dialects (the Quechua IIC
subgroup according to Torero’s 1964 classification). The more conservative Que-
chua dialects, including the whole Quechua I subgroup, which is located on the
central highland of Peru, follow the Aymara model. Adelaar, furthermore, argues
that the redefinition of the inclusive–exclusive distinction in terms of a system con-
sisting of four persons offers unexpected perspectives for a cross-linguistic study
of the indigenous languages of the Americas in general. While some languages
and language families seem to show traces of a four-person system comparable to
that of Aymara, a greater number of languages and families have three-person sys-
tems complemented by a number distinction. However, in these systems, the first-
person plural is marked by a special indivisible morpheme, while combinations
of morphemes mark the second- and third-person plural. For divergent languages
like Guayabero (Guahiban, Colombia), Nahuatl (Uto-Aztecan, Mexico), Yucatec
Maya (Mayan, Mexico), and Mapuche (Araucanian, Chile) a Proto-system of four
persons can tentatively be reconstructed: first, second, third, and fourth (inclusive).
Adelaar (1993: 213) points out that the historical case of Ecuadorian Quechua is il-
lustrative for the type of evolution that the person systems of these languages have
undergone. The first-person plural inclusive suffix ‑nchik lost its inclusive meaning
and became a general first-person plural marker. This process apparently repeated
itself in different language families.
The goal of this chapter is to establish to what extent the inclusive–exclusive dis-
tinction plays a role in the languages of central-western South America (Bolivia,
Rondonia (Brazil), Peru, Ecuador, and Colombia), and, if languages make this dis-
tinction, to what extent the person systems may be reconstructed as four-person
systems, the genetic perspective. The organization of the chapter is as follows. Sec-
tion 2 takes the typological perspective and presents the general typological and
methodological approach used to survey the 65 sample languages of this chapter.
In Section 3 we will take a closer look at the specific forms found in the various
language families represented in the sample, from the genetic perspective, to study
their possible historical development. In Section 4, departing from the areal per-
spective, we will try to come to some generalizations about possible earlier areal
contact situations between languages showing the inclusive–exclusive distinction.
Finally, some concluding remarks will follow in Section 5.
2. The typological perspective
The biggest problem in typological research is the availability of relevant data. Usu-
ally sample languages are not selected at random, but on the basis of the best avail-
able data. We have not used a specific sampling method for two reasons. In the first
place our survey involves areal typology rather than an investigation of a certain
phenomenon in the languages of the world, which would call for a stratified sam-
ple. Secondly, it still is hard to get access to relevant data, even though the number
Inclusive–exclusive distinctions in the languages of central-western South America 315
of linguistic descriptions of South-American languages has been growing steadily

in the past years. For this chapter we “mucked around in grammars” in the Green-
bergian tradition, consulted language specialists, and used our own field notes. The
result is a corpus of data on the person systems of 65 languages from the central-
western South-American region from southern Colombia bordering Ecuador and
Peru to eastern Bolivia (cf. Map 1 in Appendix 1). We looked at free person mark-
ers — personal pronouns in all cases — and, if pronoun data were not available, at
bound cross-reference markers referring to the subject arguments of intransitive
(S) and the subject (A) and object (O) arguments of transitive clauses. Furthermore,
we looked at free and bound possessive markers, leaving dual forms aside, fully real-
izing that in order to reach a more complete picture of the person systems encoun-
tered in the sample languages, these need to be included in future research. It was
not always possible to obtain comparable data for all languages, as would have been
ideal. Both the exclusion of dual forms and the fact that sometimes cross-reference
markers were considered have their disadvantages. This means that our conclusions
can only be tentative.
Given that we are using a geographical region as the basis for our sample, it is ob-
vious that areal influences are a likely possibility (cf. Section 4). On the other hand,
the linguistic diversity of the sample is very high, since it represents 21 language
families and another 12 language Isolates (cf. Table 2). The person-marking types
and the First Person Hierarchy presented in Cysouw (2003: 98), represented in (1),
will serve as a parting point for the analysis of the person-marking paradigms dis-
cussed in this chapter.
(1) First Person Hierarchy
no-we > unified-we > only-incl > incl/excl > minimal/augmented
The sample does not contain any languages of the ‘no-we’ type, i.e. languages that
completely lack a separate form for non-singular first person — and second and
third person for that matter — such as the well-known Pirahã case in (2).
(2) Pirahã (Muran; Everett 1986: 280)
1 ti
2 gíxai
3 hiapióxio
According to Everett (1986: 280), there are no special plural forms for the pronouns
in (2), and, generally, first-person plural and second-person plural are expressed
periphrastically. An interesting case is formed by the Rondonian Isolate Kanoê,
which may have arisen out of a ‘no-we’ type. The non-singular person markers are
all formed by adding the plural suffix ‑te to their singular counterparts.1 Consider
the Kanoê free pronoun paradigm in (3).
(3) Kanoê (Isolate; Bacelar 2004: 141)

Singular Group2
1+2(+3) ajte
1 aj 1+3 ajte
2 mi 2+3 mite
3 oj 3+3 ojte
Those languages that only exhibit one form for non-singular first person are of
the ‘unified-we’ type, i.e. languages that do not distinguish between three different
types of ‘we’: 1+2, 1+2+3, and 1+3, or, according to Cysouw (2003: 95), languages
in which these three categories are marked by a single morpheme. Consider, for ex-
ample, the free pronoun paradigm of Awa Pit — a Barbacoan language spoken in
the border area between Colombia and Ecuador — in (4):
(4) Awa Pit (Barbacoan; Curnow 1997: 86)
Singular Group
1+2(+3) au
1 na 1+3 au
2 nu 2+3 u
3 us 3+3 uspa
The Jaqaru example in (5) shows what has been called a four-person system, in
which the only referential number distinction is made by the ‘inclusive we’ (1+2 or
1+2+3) form. Besides this form there are no other non-singular forms. The pivot
of this system seems to be the opposition between inclusion or exclusion of the ad-
dressee.
(5) Jaqaru (Aymaran; Hardman 1999: 27)
Singular Group
1+2(+3) jiwsa
1 na
2 juma
3 upa
Cysouw (2003: 147–51) labels this type of person marking as the ‘only-inclusive’
type, which usually patterns as follows: the category 1+3 (‘exclusive we’) corres-
ponds with 1, the category 2+3 corresponds with 2, and, finally, 3+3 corresponds
with 3. Cysouw’s approach would lead to the representation of the Jaqaru person
system as in Figure 1.
The ‘inclusive–exclusive’ type is exemplified by the free (emphatic) pronoun
paradigms of the Rondonian languages Wari’ and Karo in (6) and (7), respectively:
1+2
jiwsa
1+2+3
1 na 1+3
2 juma 2+3
3 upa 3+3
Figure 1. The Jaqaru ‘only-inclusive’ type
(6) Wari’ (Chapacuran; Everett & Kern 1997: 303)

Singular Group
1+2(+3) wari’
1 wata’ 1+3 warut
2 wum 2+3 wahu’
3m wiriko 3+3m wirikoko
3f wirikam 3+3f wirikakam
3n je
(7) Karo (Tupían, Tupí-Ramarama; Gabas Jr. 1999: 39)
Singular Group
1+2(+3) iʡtə
1 õn 1+3 té
2 ẽn 2+3 kaʡto
3m at 3+3 tap
3f ŋa
The Bolivian lowland Isolate Cayubaba forms an interesting case, since its para-
digm of possessive circumfixes shows possible traces of a former four person-sys-
tem. Consider (8):
(8) Cayubaba (Isolate; Key 1967: 48–9)
Singular Group
1+2(+3) o-noun-ø
1 a-noun-i 1+3 a-noun-ihi
2 apa-noun-a 2+3 apa-noun-ihi
3 a-noun-che 3+3 a-noun-iki
3imp d-noun-ø
Note that in (8) in the non-singular first, second, and third person the first or pre-
fixed part of the possessive circumfix is equal to the singular counterpart, whereas
the second or suffixed part of the circumfix is formed by the plural suffix ‑ihi/‑iki.
This might be evidence for a historical process of reanalysis of an earlier ‘only-inclu-
sive’ type.
The sample contains two candidate languages, Chayahuita and Jebero, for the
‘minimal/augmented’ type, i.e. languages that distinguish between three different
types of ‘we’: 1+2, 1+2+3, and 1+3. This distinction is exemplified by the Chaya
huita free pronoun paradigm in (9) and the Jebero subject cross-reference para-
digm in (10).
(9) Chayahuita (Cahuapanan; Hart 1988: 262)
Singular Group
1+2 kanpo’
1+2+3 kanpoa’
1 ka 1+3 kiya, këya
2 këma 2+3 kanpita
3 ina 3+3 inapita
(10) Jebero (Cahuapanan; Bendor-Samuel 1961: 76)
Singular Group
1+2 -lək
1+2+3 -ləkwaʡ
1 -lək 1+3 -liðək
2 -la 2+3 -lamaʡ
3 -li 3+3 -linaʡ
The 1+2 forms in (9) and (10) are in fact isolated dual-like forms in the respective
paradigms. Since no other dual forms appear in the paradigms, Cysouw (2003: 139–
40) classifies this kind of pronominal marking with three different types of ‘we’ as
the ‘minimal/augmented’ type. The Yagua free pronoun paradigm in (11), however,
also shows three different types of ‘we’, but unlike the Chayahuita and Jebero case,
the form nááy is in fact a dual form in a paradigm with more dual forms, and, thus,
has separate status. Therefore, in our approach, Yagua is classified as pertaining to
the ‘inclusive/exclusive’ type.
(11) Yagua (Peba-Yaguan; Payne & Payne 1990: 370)
Singular Group Restricted group
1+2(+3) vú̩ ú̩ y
1 ray 1+3 núúy nááy
2 jiy 2+3 jiréy są́ą́da
3 níí 3+3 riy naada
Of the 65 sample languages 37 (57%) have the category of inclusive–exclusive, while
the remaining 28 (43%) languages exhibit only one form for non-singular first per-
son. Of the 37 languages that make some kind of inclusive–exclusive distinction,
eight are of the ‘only-inclusive’ type, 27 of the ‘inclusive/exclusive’ type, and two
of the ‘minimal/augmented’ type. The sample contains no languages of the ‘no-we’
type. Table 1 now gives the percentages of the person-marking types encountered
Table 1. The 65-languages sample percentage-wise
No-we Unified-we Only-inclusive Inclusive/exclusive Minimal/augmented

0 = 0% 28 (43.1%) 8 (12.3%) 27 (41.5%) 2 (3.1%)
in the sample. Taking Siewierska and Bakker (this volume) as a point of reference,
we can say that the frequency of the inclusive–exclusive distinction in the languages
we sampled is slightly higher (57%) than the world-wide distribution sampled by
Siewierska and Bakker (46%).
3. The genetic perspective
Taking the language isolates into account as separate language families, it can be
said that 18 (54,5%) out of the 33 language families in the sample exhibit the inclu-
sive–exclusive distinction. In this section we will explore the question to what ex-
tent these systems are derived from other forms, or to what extent they can be re-
constructed as part of the original Proto-language.
If we look at the occurrence of the inclusive–exclusive distinction from this
purely genetic perspective, Arawakan is a family with a clear split. Arawakan gen-
erally does not exhibit the distinction (cf. Aikhenvald 1999: 88), but there are some
exceptions to be accounted for. Whereas the person systems of Southern Maipuran
(Baure, Trinitario, Iñapari, Piro) and Western Maipuran (Yanesha’), do not distin-
guish between inclusive and exclusive forms, the Pre-Andine Maipuran (Campa)
languages Ashéninca, Campa Caquinte, Machiguenga, and Nomatsiguenga do.
These four languages have a person system similar to that of Aymara (12) (cf. also
the system in Jaqaru (5)), as exemplified by the free pronoun paradigms of Ashén-
inca, Machiguenga, and Nomatsiguenga in (13) through (15), and the subject cross-
reference prefixes of Campa Caquinte in (16) — the only forms available in the
source:3
(12) Aymara (Aymaran; Hardman, Vásquez & Yapita 1988: 182)
Singular Group
1+2(+3) jiwasa
1 naya
2 juma
3 jupa
(13) Ashéninca (Arawakan; Reed & Payne 1986: 324)

Singular Group
1+2(+3) akaa
1 naaka
2 eeroka
3m irirori
3f iroori
(14) Machiguenga (Arawakan; Snell 1998: 31)
Singular Group
1+2(+3) aro(-egi)
1 naro
2 viro
3m iriro
3f iroro
(15) Nomatsiguenga (Arawakan; Shaver 1996: 34)
Singular Group
1+2(+3) eíró
1 naro
2 obiro
3m iríro
3f iroro
(16) Campa Caquinte (Arawakan; Swift 1988: 62)
Singular Group
1+2(+3) a-
1 no-
2 pi-
3m i-, iri-
3f o-
Pertaining to the ‘only-inclusive’ type, examples (12) through (15) obviously ex-
hibit a four-person system, which is exemplified by the free pronouns of the respec-
tive languages, but the same type of ‘only-inclusive’ marking is apparently pervasive
throughout the entire person system of these languages, as shown by the Caquinte
A and agentive S cross-reference markers in (16). Comparing these prefixes — and
those of the other Campa languages — with the Proto-forms given by Aikhenvald,
we can only speculate on a possible reinterpretation of the non-focused A/Sa marker
as an inclusive marker. Consider the likely forms of Proto-Arawakan A, Sa, and pos-
sessive prefixes in (17):
(17) Proto-Arawakan (Aikhenvald 1999: 88)

Singular Group
1+2(+3) wa-
1 nu- 1+3 wa-
2 (p)i- 2+3 (h)i-
3m ri-, i- 3+3 na-
3f thu, u-
imp pa-
non-foc A/Sa i-, a-
Since number distinction apparently only plays a minimal role in the core person
system of languages of the ‘only-inclusive’ type, the obvious question is how person
plurality is expressed in these languages. In the case of free person markers, plural
suffixes that are used to inflect nouns may be added, but only if the number of per-
sons or things referred to is not disambiguated by the context. In the case of bound
cross-reference markers, suffixes belonging to the verb morphology may be added
to convey a plural notion. Thus, in ambiguous contexts the Ashéninca plural suf-
fix ‑payee(ni), which is used to pluralize nouns or adjectives used as nouns, can be
added to the free person markers naaka (1+3) and aaka (1+2 or 1+2+3) to render
a plural notion of these markers. The discontinuous verbal suffix ‑aiy…ni may be
added to the verb complex to indicate a plural subject or object. Consider the ex-
amples from Reed and Payne in (18):
(18) Ashéninca (Arawakan; Reed & Payne 1986: 324–5)
a. naaka-payee ‘we:excl’
1-pl
aaka-payeeni ‘we:incl’
1+2-pl
b. no-kem-ak-e-ri
1-hear-pftv-nonfut-3m
‘I heard him.’
c. no-kem-aiy-ak-e-ri-ni
1-hear-pl-pftv-nonfut-3m-pl
‘We heard him/them.’
‘I heard them.’
Northern Maipuran Resígaro does not show the ‘only-inclusive’ type of person
marking, but makes the ‘straightforward’ inclusive–exclusive distinction:
(19) Resígaro (Arawakan; Allin 1979: 116–17)

Singular Group
1+2(+3) fú
1 n
–ó 1+3 muu
2 phú 2+3 hú
3m tsú 3+3 n
–ú
3f tsó
The remaining Arawakan languages in the sample are all of the ‘unified-we’ type.
Consider the Yanesha’ free pronoun paradigm in (20):
(20) Yanesha’ (Arawakan; Duff-Tripp 1997: 61)
Singular Group
1+2(+3) ya
1 na 1+3 ya
2 p̃a 2+3 sa
3 ña 3+3 ñet
Other sample languages that pattern according to the ‘only-inclusive’ type are
Tarma Quechua — which belongs to the Quechua I subgroup — the nearly extinct
Pacaraos Quechua dialect, and, as mentioned, Jaqaru — Aymara’s sister-language
in the Aymaran family. The Bolivian highland languages Chipaya (21) and Uru (22),
both belonging to the Uru-Chipayan family, seem to have moved from the ‘only-
inclusive’ type to the ‘inclusive/exclusive’ type. The form ‑nak(a) functions like a
(+3) plural marker, and has been added to the singular first- and third-person pro-
nouns to create plural forms. The form ‑trum/-chu(m) resembles Quechua ‑nchi as
a (+2) pluralizer. In Quechua verb morphology, (1+2) and (2+3) are marked ‑nk-
ichik and ‑nchik, respectively.
(21) Chipaya (Uru-Chipayan; Cerrón Palomino 2002: 29–30)

Singular Group
1+2(+3) utrumnak
1 wer 1+3 wernak
2 am 2+3 amtruk
3m nii 3+3m niinak
3f naa 3+3f naanak
(22) Uru (Uru-Chipayan; Muysken field notes)
Singular Group
1+2(+3) uchumi, wakpa chumi
1 wił 1+3 witnaka
2 amp 2+3 amp chuka
3 ni 3+3 ninaka
Apart from Arawakan, Quechuan is the only other language family in the sample
that is starting to show a split as far as the inclusive–exclusive distinction is con-
cerned. Huánuco Quechua and Ayacucho Quechua, classified as Quechua IIC,
seem to be moving from the ‘only-inclusive’ to the ‘inclusive/exclusive’ type. Con-
sider the free pronoun paradigms of Tarma Quechua (23), Huánuco Quechua (24),
and Ayacucho Quechua (25):
(23) Tarma Quechua (Quechuan; Adelaar 1977: 259)

Singular Group
1+2(+3) nuqanchi(k)
1 nuqa
2 qam
3 pay
(24) Huánuco Quechua (Quechuan; Weber 1989: 76)
Singular Group
1+2(+3) noqanchi(:)
1 noqa 1+3 noqaykuna
2 qam 2+3 qamkuna
3 pay 3+3 paykuna
(25) Ayacucho Quechua (Quechuan; Parker 1965: 35)
Singular Group
1+2(+3) ñuqanchik
1 ñuqa 1+3 nuqayku
2 qam 2+3 qamkuna
3 pay 3+3 paykuna
Whereas Tarma Quechua has a clear four-person system (‘only-inclusive’ type), the
Quechua I language Huánuco Quechua has -kuna nominal plural for 1+3, 2+3, and
3+3. Ayacucho Quechua seems to have developed a grammaticalized first-person
exclusive pronoun nuqayku. The non-singular second- and third-person pronouns
are still formed by adding the plural suffix ‑kuna to the singular forms. However,
both Huánuco Quechua and Ayacucho Quechua show traces of an earlier ‘only-in-
clusive’ person system. As we have seen above, the same goes for the Bolivian high-
land languages Chipaya and Uru.
From a genetic perspective it is also possible to subdivide the inclusive forms in
different languages into underived or original forms and derived forms. With ‘de-
rived’ we mean that the forms in question show evidence of a clear internal mor-
phological structure suggesting that they have been formed out of earlier building
blocks, while in the case of an ‘original’ form there is no such evidence. Thus, we
have seen in examples (5) and (12) that Aymaran has an original, underived form
for the fourth person. The same goes for Boran, as exemplified in (26) and (27).
(26) Bora (Boran; Thiesen 1996: 33)

Singular Group
1+2(+3) meé
1 oó 1+3 muúha
2 uú 2+3 ámuúha
3m diíbye 3+3 diítye
3f diílle
(27) Miraña (Boran; Seifart p.c.)
Singular Group
1+2(+3) me:múʔáj
1 ó= 1+3 múʔáj
2 ú= 2+3 ámu:ʔaj
3m di:be 3+3 di:te
3f di:dʒe
Bora and Miraña seem to have a special ‘inclusive’ morpheme me:, which appears
independently in Bora and is prefixed to the non-singular exclusive form in Mi-
raña. Other language families exhibiting an original inclusive form are Cahua-
panan — exemplified by the Chayahuita and Jebero free pronoun paradigms in (9)
and (10), respectively — Peba-Yaguan (11), and Tucanoan (28).
(28) Orejón (Tucanoan; Velie & Velie 1981: 122)
Singular Group
1+2(+3) mai (juna) jã
1 yi 1+3 yiquɨ (juna) jã
2 mɨ 2+3 mɨsa (juna) jã
3m ñi aguɨ 3+3m ĩti juna jã
3f ñio ago 3+3f ñiona jã
Tupían seems to have original forms as well. The sample contains six Tupían lan-
guages, of which four belong to the Tupí-Guaraní branch. The agreement prefixes
of three of these four languages, Guaraní-Chiriguano (30), Sirionó (31), and Yuki
(32), seem to correspond with the Proto-Tupí-Guaraní person prefixes referring to
A and agentive S arguments in independent clauses (29).
(29) Proto-Tupí-Guaraní (Jensen 1990: 130)
Singular Group
1+2(+3) ja-
1 a- 1+3 oro-
2 ere- 2+3 pe-
3 o- 3+3 o-
(30) Guaraní-Chiriguano (Tupían, Tupí-Guaraní; Dietrich 1986: 86)

Singular Group
1+2(+3) ya-/ña-
1 a- 1+3 ro-
2 re- 2+3 pe-
3 o- 3+3 o-
(31) Sirionó (Tupían, Tupí Guaraní; Priest & Priest 1967: 252)
Singular Group
1+2(+3) nãne-
1 a- 1+3 ure-
2 ere- 2+3 hẽ-
3 e- 3+3 e-
(32) Yuki (Tupían, Tupí-Guaraní; Villafañe 2004: 207)
Singular Group
1+2(+3) ya-
1 a- 1+3 ore-
2 ere- 2+3 je-
3 o-, e-, i-, u-, 3+3 o-, e-, i-, u-,
gu-/gwe/ji-/yi- gu-/gwe/ji-/yi-
Kokama, however, has been classified as a Tupí-Guaraní language, but according to
Cabral (1995) the language cannot be unambiguously classified, since its linguis-
tic subsystems do not find correlates in a single language or linguistic family.4 Thus,
the Kokama agreement markers in (33) — with the exception of the second person
(non-)singular — do not seem to derive from Proto-Tupí-Guaraní.
(33) Kokama (Tupían, Tupí-Guaraní (Mixed?); Cabral 1995: 132)
Singular Group
1+2(+3) ini-
1 ta-, *ca-5 1+3 tana-, *penu-
2 na- 2+3 epe-
3 ra-, *ya- 3+3 ra(na)-, *inu-
The inclusive forms of the Tupían sample languages all seem to be original forms.
(34) Mekens (Tupían, Tupí-Tupari; Galucio 2001: 38)
Singular Group
1+2(+3) ki-
1 o- 1+3 ose-
2 e- 2+3 eyat-
3 i-, s- 3+3 teyat-
3c se- 3c+3c se-
(35) Karo (Tupían, Tupí-Ramarama; Gabas Jr. 1999: 81)

Singular Group
1+2(+3) iʔ=
1 o= 1+3 té=
2 e= 2+3 karo=
3 to= 3+3 to=
Uru-Chipayan (21, 22), Zaparoan — exemplified by the Zaparoan free pronoun
paradigm in (36) — Cayubaba (8), Chiquitano (37), Waorani (38), and Kwaza (39)
all seem to have original forms for the inclusive markers as well.
(36) Záparo (Zaparoan; Peeke 1962: 179–81)
Singular Group
1+2(+3) pa
1 ko 1+3 kana
2 cha 2+3 kina
3 naw 3+3 na
3imp noka
(37) Chiquitano (Isolate; Galeote Tormo 1993: 128)
Singular Group
1+2(+3) axoñi
1 axɨnɨ 1+3 axɨsomɨ
2 axɨkɨ 2+3 axaño
3m axti, tyonenti 3+3m axɨma, tyonema
3f tyone 3+3f axio, tyoneio
(38) Waorani (Isolate; Peeke 1973: 128)
Singular Group
1+2(+3) bõdõ
1 botõ 1+3 bõditõ
2 bitõ 2+3 bĩditõ
3 tõbẽkã 3+3 tõbẽkã
(39) Kwaza (Isolate; van der Voort 2004: 235)
Singular Group
1+2(+3) txanã
1 si 1+3 tsitsɛ
2 xyi 2+3 xyitsɛ
3 ĩ 3+3 ĩ
Some Arawakan Campa languages have derived inclusive forms. Examples (13)
and (14) show that Ashéninca and Machiguenga seem to exhibit some kind of bare
form for the inclusive marker: Ashéninca aaka as opposed to first singular naaka,
and Machiguenga aro as opposed to first singular naro. Northern Maipuran Resí-
garo in (19), which is heavily influenced by Bora, has muu- as an innovation for the
inclusive marker. As we have seen in examples (23) through (25), the Quechuan in-
clusive forms are derived as well. Itonama has the same form for the first-person
non-singular inclusive and the second-person non-singular. Consider the Itonama
free pronoun paradigm in (40):
(40) Itonama (Isolate; Crevels field notes)
Singular Group
1+2(+3) dihni
1 osni, osni’ka 1+3 sihni
2m o’ni 2+3 dihni
2f ko’ni
3m ohni 3+3 ohnitye’ke
3f pini
As we will see in Section 4, in Mosetén the inclusive marker only occurs in the transi-
tive and intransitive cross-reference paradigms of the verb, which makes its status as
an original form quite unlikely. Movima, finally, has an interesting inclusive marker
in its transitive cross-reference paradigm — and possessive paradigm for that mat-
ter — since it is clearly derived from the combination of the first- and second-person
singular. Consider the Movima transitive cross-reference markers in (41):
(41) Movima (Isolate; Haude p.c.)
Singular Group
1+2(+3) ił=verb-n
1 ił= 1+3 ił=verb-y’li
2 -n 2+3 -nkweł
3m -’us 3+3 -’is
3f -sne
3n -’as
4. The areal perspective
In some of the languages in our sample, inclusive forms seem to have emerged
through contact with neighbouring languages. As already pointed out, the
Arawakan family shows an innovation as far as the Campa languages are concerned,
which may be due to Quechuan influence. Nevertheless, the question then remains
why a language like Yanesha’, which is very heavily influenced by Quechua, has not
adopted the inclusive–exclusive distinction.
We have already seen in the previous section that Northern Maipuran Resí-
garo (19), which is heavily influenced by Bora, has muu- as an innovation for the
i nclusive marker. This form is probably based on the dual form ‑mu‑, which is to be
found in Bora (26) and Miraña (27).
According to van der Voort (fc 2005), the Kwaza inclusive marker txana (39) may
be a loan from the Salamãi (Tupían, Tupí-Mondé) form toniʡe or tòná ‘we’ (Becker-
Donner 1955: 330–1), even more because the speakers of Salamãi were close neigh-
bours of the Kwaza. The fact that the remaining Kwaza free pronouns and those
of its neighbouring Isolates Kanoê and Aikanã do not show any resemblance to
Tupían forms, may be indicative of the borrowed status of the Kwaza inclusive–
exclusive distinction.
As alluded to above, another intriguing case is formed by Mosetén, one of the dia-
lects belonging to the small Isolated language family Mosetenan, spoken in the Bo-
livian foothills of the Andes. Whereas in this language the free pronoun tsin is used
for non-singular first-person inclusive and exclusive reference, the inclusive–exclu-
sive distinction is made in the transitive and intransitive cross-reference paradigms
of the verb. According to Sakel (2002; this volume), the inclusive marker ‑ja ap-
pears to have been brought about by language contact, since it probably is a formal
loan from another language. Consider (42), in which the free pronoun paradigm of
Mosetén is given, and (43), which gives the intransitive inflection of tsä’ï- ‘wake up’.
(42) Mosetén (Mosetenan; Sakel 2002: 8; 2004: 117)
Singular Group
1+2(+3) tsin
1 yäe 1+3 tsin
2 mi 2+3 mï’ïn
3m mi’ 3+3 mi’in
3f mo’ 3+3 mo’in
(43) Singular Group
1+2(+3) tsä’ëjä’
1m tsä’ï 1+3 tsä’ï
1f tsä’ï’ 1+3 tsä’ï’
2m tsä’ï 2+3 tsä’ï
2f tsä’ï’ 2+3 tsä’ï’
3m tsä’ï 3+3 tsä’ï (ïn)
3f tsä’ï’ 3+3 tsä’ï’ (ïn)
Similarly, the possibility cannot be excluded that the Quechua first-person inclu-
sive form emerged modelled upon the Aymaran paradigm (Adelaar p.c.). A more
detailed analysis of possible areal effects will have to wait until more is known about
the relationship of the different languages. Furthermore, we have not included most
neighbouring Brazilian languages in our survey, which makes it impossible to give
a comprehensive evaluation of possible areal effects. Nonetheless, many of the in-
clusive languages appear to be clustered together. Areas of concentration include
the following languages, which are numbered according to Map 1 in Appendix 1
(members of a single family conjointly in square brackets ):
Northern Peru and adjacent Ecuador and Colombia: [3. Bora, 4. Miraña], 10.Ya-
gua, 15. Orejón, [24. Arabela, 25. Iquito, 26. Záparo], 29. Waorani, 37. Resígaro
Central Peru: [11. Ayacucho Quechua 12. Huánuco Quechua, 13. Pacaraos Que-
chua, 14. Tarma Quechua], 2. Jaqaru, [33. Ashéninca, 34. Campa Caquinte, 35.
Machiguenga, 36. Nomatsiguenga]
Bolivian lowlands and adjacent Rondonia: [5. Moré, 6. Wari’], 9. Mosetén, [18. Karo,
19. Mekens], 27. Cayubaba, 30. Itonama, 31. Kwaza, 32. Movima
5. Conclusion
In this chapter we have tried to survey to what extent the inclusive–exclusive dis-
tinction plays a role in the languages of central-western South America (Bolivia,
Rondonia (Brazil), Peru, Ecuador, and Colombia), and, if languages make this dis-
tinction, to what extent the person systems may be reconstructed as four-person
systems. As we have seen in Table 1, of the 65 sample languages 37 (57%) have the
category of inclusive–exclusive. Of these 37 languages eight (12.3%) are of the ‘only-
inclusive’ type. Apart from these eight languages, Quechuan (Huánuco Quechua,
Ayacucho Quechua), Uru-Chipayan, and Cayubaba show clear traces of a former
‘only-inclusive’ person-marking type, which may provide further evidence for the
grammaticalization path of person-marking systems.
Table 2 gives an overview of the person-marking strategies in the linguistic fam-
ilies of central-western South America. While crosses (X) mark the occurrence of
the different person-marking types in the various language families, arrows (→)
mark probable historical changes. Contemporary stages are printed in regular font,
hypothetical previous and future stages in grey.
As becomes clear from Table 2, our results indeed suggest a unidirectional devel-
opment, in cases where change has occurred, following the person hierarchy pro-
posed by Cysouw (2003). All changes, as far as we have been able to establish, ap-
pear to go in the same direction. Cysouw’s person hierarchy is based on the two
implicational universals represented in (44), which can be combined into a hier-
archy of conditions (cf. Cysouw 2003: 96–7).
(44) a. Exclusive → Inclusive

b Split Inclusive → Exclusive
Thus, there has to be an inclusive for there to be an exclusive, and an exclusive for
there to be a split inclusive. The person-marking types resulting from the different
fulfilled conditions constitute the building blocks of Cysouw’s First Person Hiear-
chy in (1), which is repeated here.
(1) First Person Hierarchy

no-we > unified-we > only-incl > incl/excl > minimal/augmented
Table 2. Person-marking types in central-western South America
Language family No-we Unif-we Only-incl Incl/excl Min/aug

Arawakan +→ +→ →+
Aymaran +
Barbacoan +
Boran +
Cahuapanan +
Chapacuran +
Hibito-Cholonan +
Harakmbut-Katukinan +
Jabutian +
Jivaroan +
Nambikwaran +
Panoan +
Peba-Yaguan +
Quechuan +→ →+
Tacanan +
Tucanoan +
Tupian +
Uru-Chipayan +→ →+
Witotoan +
Zaparoan +
Candoshi-Shapra +
Cayubaba +→ →+
Chiquitano +
Cofán +
Waorani +
Itonama +
Kanoê +→ →+
Kwaza +
Leko +
Mosetenan +→ → →+
Movima +
Munichi +
Yurakaré +
Although tentative, the results of Table 2 seem to provide diachronic support for
Cysouw’s person hierarchy.
To return to the issue of the status of the inclusive category within the different
language families, in Table 3 the same linguistic families are represented once again,
with respect to the status of the inclusive–exclusive distinction. If a family has an in-
clusive category, can it be reconstructed as a basic category for the family, or does
it appear to be morphologically derived? To what extent is the family split with re-
spect to the feature of inclusive?
As mentioned earlier, 18 out of the 33 language families in the sample exhibit the
inclusive–exclusive distinction. In 12 out of these 18 families the fourth person cat-
egory of inclusive can be considered a basic one with some confidence, while in the
remaining six families (Arawakan, Quechuan, Chapacuran, Mosetenan, Movima,
and Itonama) it appears a distinct possibility that the category was not basic. For
some of these at least, an areal contact explanation seems plausible. In 15 families
there is no evidence of an inclusive–exclusive distinction, the incidence of the dis-
Table 3. The status of the inclusive category in the languages of central-western South
America
Language family Inclusive Underived Derived Split

Arawakan ± + +
Aymaran + +
Barbacoan
Boran + +
Cahuapanan + +
Chapacuran + +
Hibito-Cholonan
Harakmbut-Katukinan
Jabutian
Jivaroan
Nambikwaran
Panoan
Peba-Yaguan + +
Quechuan ± + +
Tacanan
Tucanoan + +
Tupian + +
Uru-Chipayan + +
Witotoan
Zaparoan + +
Candoshi-Shapra
Cayubaba + +
Chiquitano + +
Cofán
Waorani + +
Itonama + +
Kanoê
Kwaza + +
Leko
Mosetenan + +
Movima + +
Munichi
Yurakaré
tinction is somewhat but not extremely far above the world average, and in the ma-
jority of the cases where there is such a distinction it seems to be a basic category.
For these reasons a global areal account of inclusivity does not seem to be on the
right track. More detailed analysis of the precise spatial distribution of the feature
and the precise morphological features in the language families that have it is called
for to see how plausible language contact is as an explanation for its distribution.
Acknowledgements
We are very grateful to Willem Adelaar, Astrid Alexander-Bakkerus, Laércio Bacelar, Carola
Emkow, Rafael Fischer, Antoine Guillaume, Katharina Haude, Jeanette Sakel, Cristián Sal-
vatierra, Frank Seifart, Simon van de Kerke, Rik van Gijn, Hein van der Voort, and Lucrecia
Villafañe for sharing their data with us. For extensive comments on an earlier version of this
chapter, we especially thank Michael Cysouw. Furthermore we also wish to thank Elena Fili-
monova, Hein van der Voort, and an anonymous reviewer for their comments, and Willem
Doelman for his cartographic design. Needless to say, none of them is responsible for any er-
rors, infelicities, or misinterpretations in this chapter.
Abbreviations
a=transitive subject; ba=Bolivian Amazonia; bf=Bolivian foothills; bh=Bolivian highland;
bo=Bolivian Oriente; ca=Colombian Amazonia; cf= Colombian foothills; ea=Ecuadorian
Amazonia; ec= Ecuadorian coast; excl=exclusive; f=feminine; ie=inclusive/exclusive;
loc=location; imp=impersonal; incl=inclusive; loc=location; m=masculine; ma=minimal/
augmented; n=neuter; non-foc=non-focused; nonfut=non-future; nw=no-we; oi=only-
inclusive; pa=Peruvian Amazonia; pf=Peruvian foothills; pftv=perfective; ph=Peruvian
highland; pl=plural; pm=person marking; ra=Rondonian Amazonia; s=subject;
sa=intransitive subject; uw=unified-we; 1=first person; 2=second person; 3=third person;
3c=third person correferential.
Notes
1. Like many other languages in the region, Kanoê lacks nominal number. Its pronominal
system, however, does distinguish between singular and non-singular person markers by
means of the plural suffix ‑te. The fact that this suffix, which also occurs in the neighbour-
ing Isolate Aikanã (cf. van der Voort fc. 2005), resembles the Kwaza pronominal plural
marker ‑tse may point to a borrowed category of plural pronouns and, therefore, an earl-
ier ‘no-we’ type.
2. In order to establish a cross-linguistically more sensible typology, Cysouw (2003: 66) ar-
gues for a redefinition of the notion of ‘plurality’ as ‘group marking’. In doing so, the oppos-
ition singular versus plural is also redefined as singular versus non-singular. Moreover, the
dual is included in Cysouw’s (2003: 189) ‘restricted group’ categories. In this chapter we will
adhere to this new definition.
3. It is broadly assumed in the literature (cf. Haspelmath 1998: 137; Croft 2000: 157) that
grammaticalization processes underlie unilateral changes, such as the following: emphatic
personal pronoun > clitic pronoun > agreement affix. As Siewierska and Bakker (this vol-
ume) point out, such a process may involve, apart from the formal loss of independent mor-
phological status and phonological reduction, a decrease of encoded semantic distinctions
as well. Therefore, we fully realize that free pronouns may behave differently from agree-
ment markers and vice versa.
4. An extensive comparison of Kokama and Tupínambá, a Tupí-Guaraní language spoken
in the 16th and 17th centuries along the Brazilian coast, have led Cabral (1995) to the con-
clusion that, except for a great number of lexical similarities and a number of sound cor-
respondences, Kokama differs considerably from Tupínambá in its phonology, morphology
and syntax.
5. The Kokama agreement markers preceded by the * belong to female speech.
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Appendix 1: Location of the sample languages

1. Aymara Chiriguano 37. Resígaro 57. Tacana
2. Jaqaru 18. Karo 38. Baure 58. Huitoto
3. Bora 19. Mekens 39. Trinitario 59. Ocaina
4. Miraña 20. Sirionó 40. Iñapari 60. Candoshi-Shapra
5. Moré 21. Yuki 41. Piro 61. Kanoê
6. Wari’ 22. Chipaya 42. Yanesha’ 62. Cofán
7. Chayahuita 23. Uru 43. Awa Pit 63. Leko
8. Jebero 24. Arabela 44. Chachi 64. Munichi
9. Mosetén 25. Iquito 45. Cholón 65. Yurakaré
10. Yagua 26. Záparo 46. Harakmbut
11. Ayacucho 27. Cayubaba 47. Arikapu
Quechua 28. Chiquitano 48. Aguaruna
12. Huánuco 29. Waorani 49. Huambisa
Quechua 30. Itonama 50. Shuar
13. Pacaraos 31. Kwaza 51. Lakondê
Quechua 32. Movima 52. Cashinahua
14. Tarma Quechua 33. Ashéninca 53. Chácobo
15. Orejón 34. Campa Caquinte 54. Shipibo-Conibo
16. Kokama 35. Machiguenga 55. Araona
17. Guaraní- 36. Nomatsiguenga 56. Cavineña
Map
Map 1. The approximate
1. The approximate location
location of
ofthe
the65
65sample
samplelanguages
languages
Table 4. The 65 sample languages
Language Family PM LOC Source Incl

Aymara Aymaran OI PH Hardman et al. 1988 +
Jaqaru Aymaran OI PH Hardman 1999 +
Bora Boran IE PA Thiesen 1996 +
Miraña Boran IE CA Frank Seifart p.c. +
Moré Chapacuran IE BA Angenot-de Lima 2002 +
Wari’ Chapacuran IE RA Everett & Kern 1997 +
Chayahuita Cahuapanan MA PA Hart 1988 +
Jebero Cahuapanan MA PA Bendor-Samuel 1961 +
Mosetén Mosetenan IE BF Sakel 2003 +
Yagua Peba-Yaguan IE PA Payne & Payne 1990 +
Ayacucho Quechua Quechuan IE PH Parker 1965 +
Huánuco Quechua Quechuan IE PH Weber 1989 +
Pacaraos Quechua Quechuan OI PA Adelaar 1987 +
Tarma Quechua Quechuan OI PA Adelaar 1977 +
Orejón Tucanoan IE PA Velie & Velie 1981 +
Kokama Tupian IE PA Cabral 1995 +
Guaraní-Chiriguano Tupian IE BO Dietrich 1986 +
Karo Tupian IE RA Gabas Jr. 1999 +
Mekens Tupian IE RA Galucio 2001 +
Sirionó Tupian IE BA Priest & Priest 1967 +
Yuki Tupian IE BA Villafañe 2004 +
Chipaya Uru-Chipayan IE BH Cerrón-Palomino 2002 +
Uru Uru-Chipayan IE BH Muysken field notes +
Arabela Zaparoan IE PA Rich 1999 +
Iquito Zaparoan IE PA Eastman & Eastman 1963 +
Záparo Zaparoan IE EA Peeke 1962 +
Cayubaba Isolate IE BA Key 1967 +
Chiquitano Isolate IE BO Galeote Tormo 1993 +
Waorani Isolate IE EA Peeke 1973 +
Itonama Isolate IE BA Crevels field notes +
Kwaza Isolate IE RA van der Voort 2004 +
Movima Isolate IE BA Haude p.c. +
Ashéninca Arawakan OI PA Reed & Payne 1986 +
Campa Caquinte Arawakan OI PF Swift 1988 +
Machiguenga Arawakan OI PA Snell 1998 +
Nomatsiguenga Arawakan OI PF Shaver 1996 +
Resígaro Arawakan IE PA Allin 1979 +
Baure Arawakan UW BA Baptista & Wallin 1967 −
Trinitario Arawakan UW BA Cristián Salvatierra p.c. −
Iñapari Arawakan UW PA Parker 1995 −
Piro Arawakan UW PA Matteson 1965 −
Yanesha’ Arawakan UW PF Duff-Tripp 1997 −
Awa Pit Barbacoan UW CF Curnow 1997 −
Chachi Barbacoan UW EC Lindskoog & Lindskoog 1964 −
Cholón Hibito-Cholonan UW PF Alexander-Bakkerus p.c. −

Harakmbut Harakmbut- UW PA Helberg Chávez 1984 −
Katukinan
Arikapu Jabutian UW RA van der Voort p.c. −
Aguaruna Jivaroan UW PA Fast & Larson 1974 −
Huambisa Jivaroan UW PA Jackway (ed.) 1987 −
Shuar Jivaroan UW EA Juank 1982 −
Lakondê Nambikwaran UW RA Telles 2002 −
Cashinahua Panoan UW PA Montag 1981 −
Chácobo Panoan UW BA Prost 1965 −
Shipibo-Conibo Panoan UW PA Loriot et al. 1993 −
Araona Tacanan UW BA Emkow p.c. −a
Cavineña Tacanan UW BA Guillaume 2004 −
Tacanan Tacanan UW BA Ottaviano & Ottaviano 1967 −
Huitoto Witotoan UW PA Burtch 1983 −
Ocaina Witotoan UW PA Leach 1969 −
Candoshi-Shapra Isolate UW PA Tuggy 1966 −
Kanoê Isolate UW RA Bacelar 2004 −
Cofán Isolate UW EA Fischer p.c. −
Leko Isolate UW BF van de Kerke p.c. −
Munichi Isolate UW PA Gibson 1996 −
Yurakaré Isolate UW BF van Gijn p.c. −
a Although Van Wynen & Van Wynen (1962: 200), Ottaviano & Ottaviano (1967: 197), and Pitman
(1980: 82) postulate an inclusive–exclusive distinction for Tacanan, recent fieldwork has strength‑
ened the thought that Tacanan may indeed lack such a distinction (Emkow p.c., Guillaume p.c.,
2004).
Chapter 12
Inclusive and exclusive in Turkic languages
Irina Nevskaya
Russian Academy of Sciences/Frankfurt University
The article describes Turkic language means that render inclusive and exclusive semantics.
We show that phenomena traditionally referred to as inclusive–exclusive categories in the
Turkological literature (i.e. multi-plural personal pronouns and Yakut dual pronouns)
belong to different functional fields. However, most Siberian Turkic languages and Turkmen
have developed a morphological inclusive in their imperative paradigms. Among them, we
distinguish the following two groups: (1) languages with distinct minimal and augmented
inclusives, (2) languages with a general inclusive. In addition, some Turkic languages have
developed special exclusive imperative forms. Otherwise, they use non-imperative forms in
imperative contexts to express exclusive. We also discuss how inclusive and exclusive seman-
tics is expressed in the Turkic pronominal sphere and in certain syntactic constructions.
Keywords: Turkic languages, inclusive (general, minimal, augmented), exclusive
1. Introductory notes
In grammar descriptions of different Turkic languages, there is a great confusion in

the usage of the terms inclusive–exclusive:
• A number of Turkic languages and their dialects differentiate two non-singular
imperative forms of the first person (also called hortative, exhortative, or co-
hortative in the typological literature) which some turcologists treat as inclu-
sive versus exclusive ones. We agree with Nina Dobrushina and Valentin Gous-
sev that these forms are opposed as minimal inclusive versus augmented inclusive
ones (see Dobrushina & Goussev, this volume). We deal with this issue in Section
2. We describe formal patterns of building augmented inclusive in Section 3.
• In the pronominal sphere, the opposition of plural forms of personal pronouns
with and without an additional marker of plurality is also sometimes considered
to be that of inclusive–exclusive. We will show that this phenomenon encodes
relations of different types, i.e. that multi-plural pronouns denote either a
group of persons opposed to the rest of society, or individualized plurality, other-
wise they are used for mere stylistic purposes. We will further show that Turkic
personal pronouns of the first-person plural are indifferent to the category of in-
clusive–exclusive although their meaning can be interpreted as inclusive or ex-
clusive in certain contexts. We describe these phenomena in Section 4.
342 Irina Nevskaya
• Section 5 deals with so-called dual cooperative personal pronouns in Yakut which
are also sometimes treated as inclusive–exclusive ones. We will discuss their se-
mantics and functions and the sources of their development. We will show that
they can be seen rather as a copy of the corresponding Mongolian coordinative
construction than as a distorted reflection of the category of inclusive–exclusive
pronouns found in the neighbouring Manchu-Tungusic languages.
Although Turkic languages do not have the category of inclusive–exclusive encoded
grammatically either in the verbal or in the nominal paradigm as an all-Turkic phe-
nomenon, they all have the possibility to express inclusive and exclusive semantics
by special coordinative, comitative and privative nominal phrases. See Section 6.
2. The category of inclusive–exclusive in the Turkic

imperative paradigm
The Turkic imperative paradigm shows quite a number of peculiarities in compari-

son with the paradigms of other moods, e.g. cumulative markers (Plank 1999: 282)
Table 1. Turkic non-singular imperative forms of the first person
Language 1st person “dual” 1st person “plural”

Yakut Il-ıax ıl-ıaγıŋ
‘Let us take! (you:sg and me)’ ‘Let us take! (you:pl and me)’
Dolgan al-ıaq al-ıaγıŋ
Tuvan al-aal/al-alı al-alıŋar
Tofan al-aalı al-aalıŋ/al-aalıŋar
Khakas al-aŋ al-aŋar
Altay-kiži al-aalıq/al-alıq/al-alı/al-ajlı/al-al al-aalıqtar/al-alıqtar/al-aaldar
(a dialect used as ‘Let us take! (you:sg and me)’ ‘Let us take! (you:pl and me)’
literary Altay)
Tuba (a North Altay al-aalı al-aq
variety) ‘Let us take! (you:sg and me)’ ‘Let us take! (you:pl and me)’
Kumandy (a North al-ala/al-alaq/al-alax al-alaqtar/al-alaxtır
Altay variety) ‘Let us take! (you:sg and me)’ ‘Let us take! (you:pl and me)’
Shor (with its al-aŋ/al-aq/al-aaŋ/al-aaq /al-alı al-aŋar/al-aqtar/al-aaŋar
dialects) ‘Let us take! (you:sg and me)’ /al-aaqtar
‘Let us take! (you:pl and me)’
Turkmen al-alı al-alıŋ
Inclusive and exclusive in Turkic languages 343
encoding both mood and person-number distinctions. Furthermore, some Turkic

languages (Yakut, Dolgan, Tuvan, Tofan, Khakas, Shor, Chulym, Altay and Turk-
men) differentiate two non-singular forms of the first person (see Table I).
In Turkic grammar descriptions, they are defined as exclusive and inclusive im-
perative forms of the first-person plural by some authors (Grönbech 1936; Menges
1980; Ubrjatova 1991), or as dual and plural imperative forms of the first person
by other scholars (Dyrenkova 1941: 173; Isxakov and Pal’mbax 1961: 394; Korkina
1970: 148; Baskakov (ed.) 1975: 189; Rassadin 1978: 222, etc.).
Our analysis of their use supports the opinion of Dobrushina and Goussev (Do-
brushina & Goussev, this volume) that they are opposed as minimal inclusive ver-
sus augmented inclusive ones. The forms characterised as exclusive or dual ones re-
fer to two persons — the speaker and the addressee. They are further traditionally
glossed as imperative first-person dual inclusive ones. The forms defined as inclu-
sive or plural ones refer to the speaker and two or more addressees. In glosses, we
refer to them as imperative first-person plural inclusive ones. Here are some lan-
guage examples from a number of Turkic linguistic varieties.
Yakut (Ubrjatova (ed.) 1982: 320–2): bar-ıax ‘Let us go (you:sg and me)!’ versus
bar-ıaγıŋ ‘Let us go (you:pl and me)!’.
Dolgan (Ubrjatova 1985: 179–82): bar-ıaq ‘Let us go (you:sg and me)!’ versus
bar-ıaγıŋ ‘Let us go (you:pl and me)!’.
(1) Tuvan (Isxakov, Pal’mbax 1961: 391–7)
Delegij-ni ergij už-aal!
world-acc whole fly-imp.inc.1du
‘Let us (you:sg and me) fly over the whole world!’
(2) Ogl-um, qız-ım! Meeŋ-bile ırla-ž-ıŋar!
son-poss.1sg daughter-poss.1sg I:gen-com sing-coop-imp.inc.1pl
‘My son, my daughter! Let us sing together!’
Tofan (Rassadin 1978: 222–5): al-aalı ‘Let us take! (you:sg and me)’ versus al-
aalıŋ/al-aalıŋar ‘Let us take (you:pl and me)!’.
Khakas (Baskakov 1975: 89–190): sad-aŋ ‘Let us sell (you:sg and me)!’; sad-aŋar
‘Let us sell (you:pl and me)!’ Further examples:
(3) Če, amdı, aγarın daa pol-za, par-aŋ!
well:prtcl now slowly although:prtcl be-cond go-imp.inc.1du
‘And now, slow as it may be, let us go (you and me)!’
(4) Am gorod kĭzĭ-zĭn is kör-eŋer!
now city person-poss.3sg.acc listen try-imp.inc.1pl
‘Let us listen to a man from the town now (you:pl and me)!’
Altay language varieties:1
Tuba: kör-ööli ‘Let us see (you:sg and me)!’ versus kör-öök ‘Let us see (you:pl and
me)!’ (Baskakov 1966: 84). Further examples:
344 Irina Nevskaya
(5) D’e, marγ-ıž-ıp ij-ek!

well:prtcl contest-coop-conv send:aux-imp.inc.1pl
‘Well, let us (you:pl and me) contest!’
(6) bar-aq!
go-imp.inc.1pl
‘Let us (you:pl and me) go!’
(7) tart-ıž-alı, küre-ž-eli!
fight-coop-imp.inc.1du fight-coop-imp.inc.1du
‘Let us fight (you:sg and me)!’
(8) köžö öl-ök! /öl-öli!
together die-imp.inc.1pl /die-imp.inc.1du
‘Let us die (you:pl and me)/Let us die!’ (you:sg and me)
Apparently, not all linguistic varieties spoken in Altay make this distinction, al-
though they possess the corresponding forms of the imperative. Thus, the Kuu (or
Chalkan) variety of Altay has, apparently, lost this opposition (or has never devel-
oped it): the respective forms are used synonymously as general inclusive ones. See
Kuu (Chalkan) examples (Baskakov 1985: 76–8):
(9) par-aq! / par-aqtar! / par-aqtır!
go-imp.1pl / go-imp.inc.1pl / go-imp.inc.1pl
‘Let us go (you:sg and me or you:pl and me)!’
(10) Bir qatap küzek eez-in-e ajt-t-ı:
once cat master-poss.3sg-dat say-pst-3sg
Qaat al-ara bar-aqtır! de-d-i.
wife take-inf go-imp.inc.1pl say-pst-3sg
‘Once the cat told his master, “Let us find you a wife!”’
With two participants, we would expect the minimal inclusive imperative form
here in other Altay varieties. However, the form of the imperative of the first-per-
son plural is used referring only to the speaker and the addressee.
The authors do not always mention the scope of reference of each imperative
form. Thus, Baskakov distinguishes five forms of the first-person plural in Ku-
mandy (a Northern Altay dialect) without characterizing them further: al-ala/
al‑alaq/al‑alax/al-alaqtar/al-alaxtır ‘let us take!’ (Baskakov 1972: 117). The ex-
amples, however, give us a hint.
(11) Kumandy (Baskakov 1972: 117)
Aq qas par-aq! ti-j,
white goose go-imp.inc.1du say-prs
qara qas‑ kel-ek! ti-j.
black goose come-imp.inc.1du say-prs
‘The white goose says, ‘Let us go!’ The black goose says, ‘Let us come!’
This is a riddle, its answer is ‘spring’. It describes changeable spring weather in the
form of a dialogue of two participants — a white goose and a black one. The imper-
ative form -aq/‑ek is used here to refer to two participants. Respectively, we can de-
fine it as the first person minimal inclusive imperative form.
(12) Üč qarındaš ajt-qan: Če, par-aqtar!
three brother say-pst well:prtcl go-imp.inc.1pl
‘The three brothers said, ‘OK! Let us go!’
In example (12), with three participants, augmented inclusive imperative is used.
Turkmen is the only Turkic language outside Siberia that makes the distinction
of the minimal and augmented inclusive forms of the imperative (Baskakov (ed.)
1970: 299; Clark 1998: 269–70): the minimal inclusive form is ‑a:lı/‑ä:li, the aug-
mented inclusive form is ‑a:lı:ŋ/‑ä:li:ŋ: göðlä:li ‘Let’s (two) look at (something)’,
göðlä:li:ŋ ‘Let’s (all) look at (something)’.
The fact that the discussed forms are really inclusive ones and not just first-per-
son plural forms indifferent to the category of inclusive or exclusive can be proved
by their incompatibility with exclusive contexts. They cannot be used in situations
when the guests are leaving while the host is staying; the speaker has to use other
ways to express his appeal to the other guests to leave while applying to the host:
(13) Shor (personal fieldwork)
a. Če, par-ar-ıs!
prtcl go-fut-1pl
‘OK! We are leaving (but not you)! (Lit.: we will go)’
b. Če, par-gaj-bıs!
prtcl go-perm-1pl
‘OK! We are leaving (but not you)! (Lit.: We agree to leave)’
c. *Če,
par-aqtar!
prtcl go-imp.inc.1pl
‘OK! Let us go (but not you)!’
To express exclusivity, Shor uses future or permissive tense forms of the first-per-
son plural that can contextually express imperative meanings and are indifferent to
the category of inclusive–exclusive (see examples 13a, b; see also Mixajlova (1997)
about the imperative use of non-imperative mood forms in Shor). The Shor imper-
ative form of the first person augmented inclusive would be ungrammatical in this
case (13c). It can be used only in the situation when the speaker is addressing both
the host and the other guests proposing that they all should leave together with him.
The permissive/optative forms are also used by other Siberian Turkic languages to
express causation both in inclusive and in exclusive contexts while they are indiffer-
ent to the category of inclusive–exclusive. Some Yakut grammar descriptions even
include these forms into the imperative paradigm (e.g. Ubrjatova (ed.) 1982: 324).
Khakas, on the contrary, has developed an exclusive imperative form of the first-
person plural -i:bĭs/-i:bıs as Dobrushina and Goussev show (Dobrushina & Gous-
346 Irina Nevskaya
sev, this volume). We will gloss it as first-person plural exclusive imperative. This
imperative form has already been mentioned in Khakas grammar descriptions:
Baskakov (ed.) (1975: 189), Patačakova (1977: 79), and Anderson (1998: 31), but the
authors did not define it as an exclusive form, although the examples in Patačakova
(1977), sparse as they are, illustrate its exclusive semantics:
(14) Khakas (Patačakova 1977: 79)
a. Al-i:bıs!
take-imp.exc.1pl
‘We will take ([this], not you)!’
b. Id-i:bĭs!
do-imp.exc.1pl
‘We will do ([this], not you; let us do this)!’
The fact that Siberian Turkic languages have developed a morphological inclu-
sive category is especially remarkable since Western Turkic languages do not en-
code this distinction morphologically. They have only one first-person plural im-
perative form which seems to have a general plural semantics and to be indifferent
to inclusive–exclusive semantics. It can, apparently, be used in both inclusive and
exclusive contexts:
(15) Turkish (M. Erdal, p.c.)
Gid-elim!
go-imp.1pl
‘Let us go (you:sg or you:pl and me)!’
This invitation to a cooperative action can be understood only inclusively. But if we
introduce a pronominal subject that is normally unnecessary since the person is ex-
pressed on the verb, this sentence will have an exclusive interpretation:
(16) Turkish (M. Erdal, p.c.)
Biz gid-elim!
we go-imp.1pl
‘We are leaving (but not you)!’
It should be noted that it is not always possible to judge about the use of an impera-
tive form in exclusive contexts since such contexts are normally very rare. Impera-
tive prefers inclusive because of its semantics: while the imperative main function is
causation, the addressee is the main participant of the action (Dobrushina & Gous-
sev, this volume). Therefore, inclusive semantics is a better candidate to get encoded
morphologically. However, this does not explain why inclusive got encoded mor-
phologically only in Siberian Turkic.
Apparently, the Turkic languages developed this category rather recently: it is
present neither in Old Turkic,2 nor in the majority of modern Turkic languages. We
suppose that the formation of this category in Siberian Turkic languages had been
fostered by contacts with other Siberian languages. As a matter of fact, the oppos-
ition of several non-singular forms is also found in other Altaic languages, Mon-
golic and Manchu-Tungusic in the first place. Thus, in Manchu-Tungusic languages,
the category of inclusive–exclusive is represented by personal verb forms and by
a special set of inclusive–exclusive pronouns. Turkic has developed a similar cat-
egory in the imperative paradigm, i.e. the category of minimal and augmented in-
clusive forms of the first person. On the other hand, it is also plausible that Siberian
Turkic could have preserved this category due to these contacts in case it used to be
an all-Turkic category originally.
Thus, among Siberian Turkic languages with a morphological inclusive, we dis-
tinguish at least two groups: 1) languages with distinct minimal and augmented
inclusives (the majority of the discussed languages), 2) languages with a general
inclusive (Chalkan). To express exclusive semantics, these languages either use non-
imperative forms in the imperative contexts or special exclusive forms (Khakas).
3. Formal patterns of building augmented inclusive
As Table 1 shows, there is a great variety of inclusive imperative forms of the first
person in Siberian Turkic (see also Nasilov et al. 2001).
On the one hand, this variety can be explained by the dialectal structure of these
languages. They are mostly young literary languages (like Altay, Khakas, Tuvan, Shor,
etc.), very rich in dialectal and sub-dialectal spoken vernaculars preserving differ-
ent stages of the development of the imperative forms (among others). The dialectal
forms are widely used by the native speakers, and they penetrate the written variety.
Let us examine the Shor inclusive forms of the imperative of the first person.
In literary Shor, there are two inclusive forms of the first person: the minimal
inclusive form ‑Aŋ (‑AAŋ)3 and the augmented inclusive one, whose marker con-
sists of the minimal inclusive affix plus the plural marker ‑LAr: ‑AŋnAr (‑Aŋ + ‑LAr)
or ‑AAŋnAr (‑AAŋ + ‑LAr): par-aaŋ ‘Let us go’: two persons, the addressee and the
speaker, are meant; par-aaŋ-nar ‘Let us go’: all the participants of a speech situ-
ation are meant. In the Upper-Mras and Upper-Kondum varieties of Shor, the min-
imal inclusive affix ends in ‑Q (Mixajlova 1997: 11), as in Altay, Chulym and Tuvan,
whereas the augmented inclusive marker is also composed of the minimal inclusive
affix plus the marker of plurality: ‑AAqtAr < ‑AAq + ‑LAr ~ ‑AqtAr < ‑Aq + ‑LAr.
In the Shor materials written down by W. Radloff in the nineteenth century
(1866), one can find a more ancient minimal inclusive imperative of the first per-
son ‑AlI which has now disappeared. We suppose that the marker of the first-per-
son plural ‑Q, used in possessive and finite paradigms in many Turkic languages,
was added to the minimal inclusive form ‑AlI to produce the augmented inclusive
forms *‑AlIq > ‑AAQ > ‑AQ. Later, as the former minimal inclusive affix ‑AlI got
out of use, these were reanalysed as the minimal inclusive ones, and the need arose
to reestablish this opposition by adding the plural marker ‑LAr to produce new
augmented inclusive forms.
348 Irina Nevskaya
The Shor literary forms ‑AAŋ ~ ‑Aŋ (the minimal inclusive one) and ‑AŋnAr (‑Aŋ
+ ‑LAr) ~ ‑AAŋnAr (‑AAŋ + ‑LAr) (the augmented inclusive one) could have de-
veloped similarly from the minimal inclusive affix ‑AlI. The marker of the second
person ‑(X)ŋ was added to the minimal inclusive form to produce augmented in-
clusive forms: ‑AlI + ŋ > ‑AlIŋ > ‑AAŋ > ‑Aŋ. After the affix ‑AlI got obsolete the
plural marker was added to produce new augmented inclusive forms.
Altay-Sayan Turkic language data of the nineteenth century give evidence of
quite a number of inclusive imperative forms of the first person: ‑AlI, ‑AlIQ, ‑AAQ-
tAr, ‑AlIŋ, ‑AAŋnAr, ‑AldAr, (anon. 1869: 64–5). In Shor alone, one can find all the
stages of the development of the first-person inclusive markers from ‑AlI to ‑AlIQ
and then to ‑AAQ/‑AAQtAr, as well as from ‑AlI to ‑AAŋ/‑AAŋnAr. These data
seem to confirm Schönig’s hypothesis that the Proto-Turkic affix of the first-person
plural could be ‑AlI (1987: 213).
On the other hand, this variety of Turkic imperative forms (see Table 1) exists
due to the fact that there are two formal patterns of building augmented inclusive in
Turkic, distinguished by Schönig (1987: 211–12).
The first pattern called additive is used by Yakut, Tofa, Tuvan, and Turkmen. In
their augmented inclusive formants, the minimal inclusive marker is followed by
the suffix of the second-person plural (i.e. we+you), compare Yakut ‑IAx (minimal
inclusive) and ‑IAG+Iŋ (augmented inclusive; ‑Iŋ is the imperative marker of the
second person), Tofa ‑AAlI (minimal) vs ‑AAlI+ŋ (augmented).
The Altay-Sayan Turkic languages (Khakas, Shor, and Altay language varieties)
along with Chulym show a multiplicative pattern of the development of Turkic
inclusive forms: the minimal inclusive affix is followed by the plural marker (i.e.
we+we).
As we have shown on the example of the Shor inclusive imperative forms of the
first person, this pattern is an innovation; the need to reestablish the opposition of
minimal versus augmented inclusive imperative forms arose due to the fact that the
ancient affix ‑AlI was slowly getting out of use in these languages. And vice versa,
the Turkic languages with the additive pattern preserve a more ancient stage of the
development of Turkic inclusive markers.
4. The category of inclusive–exclusive among Turkic personal pronouns
In Turkish, there are no unique pronominal forms that distinguish inclusive ver-
sus exclusive person forms (Kornfilt 1997: 298). This is also true for all Turkic lan-
guages. A very special pronominal set exists in Yakut (see Section 5). However, in
Turkic, there are several pronominal candidates that could, in principle, differenti-
ate exclusive and inclusive meanings and are interpreted as inclusive versus exclu-
sive pronouns by some Turcologists.
Grönbech was, apparently, the first among Turcologists to use the terms in-
clusive–exclusive to describe Turkic phenomena. He considered Turkic personal
ronouns with an additional marker of plurality (e.g. Turkish bizler from biz ‘we’
p
plus the plural marker ‑lAr and sizler from siz ‘you:pl’) to be inclusive pronouns,
while biz and siz were defined as exclusive ones (Grönbech 1936: 81).4 We will re-
fer to such forms as multi-plural pronouns. Later, Ubrjatova also argued that Tur-
kic pronouns of the biz+ler type function as inclusive ones (1991: 7–9). Such pro-
nouns have been found in Altay, Tuvan, Karakalpak, Kirghiz, Kazakh, etc. (Isxakov
1956: 208).
Our observation is that such multi-plural forms are found in the spoken variety
of practically all Turkic languages. However, it is quite rare that grammar books
mention such forms. Here are some examples on how Turcologists treat this phe-
nomenon.
Baskakov (ed.) (1970: 180–1) states that Turkmen bizler is the same as biz, or it de-
notes a separate group of people or a people community; sizler is the same as siz, or it
is a separate group of people, or it is a polite form. The grammar also mentions that
such forms belong to the spoken variety, but are met in the literary language as well.
Isxakov & Pal’mbax (1961: 216) say that in spoken Tuvan, the personal pronouns
can contain two or even three plural affixes: bister (bis ‘we’ + ‑LAr ‑ the plural affix) //
bisterler (bis ‘we’ + ‑LAr + ‑LAr). They further remind that the ‑s in bis is also an an-
cient plural affix. Analogously, there exist several Tuvan pronouns of the second-
and third-person plural: silerler (siler ‘you:pl’ from siz ‘you:pl’ + ‑LAr + ‑LAr), olar-
lar (olar ‘they’ from ol ‘he/she/it’ + ‑LAr + ‑LAr).
In Turkish (Kornfilt 1997: 286–7), the second-person plural form siz can be used
as a form of politeness for the second-person singular as well as plural. Due to this
fact, the number distinction gets neutralized. Furthermore, the first-person plural
form biz can be used colloquially for the first-person singular.5 According to her
opinion, in order to make the number distinction clear, it is possible colloquially
to suffix the first- and second-person plural pronouns with the regular plural suf-
fix ‑lAr: biz-ler, siz-ler. Thus, she explains the existence of the forms bizler and sizler
in Turkish as a result of the neutralization of the number distinction in the pronom-
inal sphere.
This factor should, certainly, be taken into consideration. However, we also ob-
serve some semantic differentiation between biz and siz on the one hand and bizler
and sizler on the other hand in Turkish, as well as between the corresponding forms
of plural personal pronouns in other Turkic languages. The difference between
them is not easy to grasp. Our informants mostly confirm that such personal pro-
nouns exist in their native languages, but they have difficulties in explaining their
difference with the “normal” ones.
According to Johanson (1998: 51), in nominal phrases with the plural marker,
plural affixes mostly signal individual plurality, e.g. Turkish elmalar ‘[single] apples’,
while the singular has a broad, partly number-indifferent range of use, which also
includes collective or generic reference.
According to our data, the multi-plural personal pronouns are often used to de-
note an isolated group of people who want to oppose themselves to the others, but
350 Irina Nevskaya
sometimes they are used as synonyms to the “normal” ones. In Altay, this phenom-
enon has been described by Tybykova (1991: 110) who defines such pronouns as
collective ones expressing irony and despise: bister ‘we and the like’, slerler ‘you and
the like’. Here are some Altay examples.6
(17) Altay (A. Ozonova, p.c.)
Bis-ter bastıra-zı-naŋ bijik e-mej,
we-pl other-poss3-abl high be-neg.conv
tegin iš-ti ne ed-eten-is!
simple work-acc why do-part.oblig-1pl
‘Aren’t we higher than all the others?! Why should we do such simple work!’
(18) Bis-ter tüŋej.le oŋdo-r emes,
we-pl anyway understand-fut neg.prtcl
ne d’art-arγa albadan-atan?
why explain-inf try-part.oblig
‘We will not understand (a thing) anyway, why should one try to explain?!’
The speaker wants to oppose the group of people referred to by bister to the others.
Such statements can sound very ironically. They often appear in the context of a
rhetoric question. This also concerns the multi-plural pronouns of the second and
third persons.
(19) Olor-lor üredülü, bičikči de,

they-pl well-educated learned prtcl
bis-tij ulus-la ne d’aqšılaž-atan?
we-comp people-com why greet.each.other-part.oblig
‘They are well-educated, learned people, why should they exchange greet-
ings with people like us?!’
These data support the point of view expressed in Baskakov (ed.) (1970: 180–1) that
multi-plural pronouns denote a separate group of people opposed to the rest of so-
ciety. However, they can be used just for stylistic purposes since personal pronouns
without an additional plural marker can also denote a separate group of people.
As for the category of inclusive–exclusive, Turkic personal pronouns seem to be
indifferent to it, opposite to the Turkic imperative paradigm. Since they are neu-
tral in this connection, Turkic pronouns can be interpreted as inclusive or exclu-
sive ones in certain contexts: Turkish biz can be used with reference to the speaker
and the addressee, with reference to the speaker and a third person, with reference
to the speakers, with reference to the speaker, the addressee and third persons, etc.,
the most important factor is that the speaker should include herself/himself in the
referred group, i.e. it displays properties of “we in non-inclusive languages” (see
Daniel, this volume).
One interesting feature of Turkic plural personal pronouns should be mentioned
in this connection. In Turkish, constructions of the type ‘we (and) the priest’ can
occur with the meaning ‘I and the priest’ (Kornfilt 1997: 286–7). That is, such con-
structions are systematically ambiguous:
(20) (Biz) Ahmet-le dün sinema-ya git-ti-k.7
(we) Ahmet-com yesterday cinema-dir go-pst-1pl
a. ‘Yesterday we went to the movies with Ahmet.’
b. ‘Yesterday Ahmet and I went to the movies.’
The interpretation a assigns the general plural meaning to the pronoun biz ‘we’; it
can be interpreted both exclusively and inclusively: “we (but not you) and Ahmet”
referring to the speakers and a third person, but not to the listener — the exclusive
interpretation, “we (including you) and Ahmet” — the inclusive one. The interpret-
ation b means that the pronoun biz is used in the only exclusive function: “I and
Ahmet” referring to the speaker and a third person expressed in both cases by a sep-
arate nominal phrase. The inclusive interpretation is impossible in this case.
The phenomenon also occurs with pairs of pronouns. The listener/listeners can,
thus, also be explicitly included into the scope of reference of ‘we’:
(21) (Biz) sen-in-le bu akşam sinema-ya gid-ecek-ti-k.
(we) you:sg-gen-com this evening movies-dir go-fut-pst-1pl
a. ‘We are going to the movies together with you this evening.’
b. ‘I am going to the movies together with you this evening.’
The same constructions are also possible for the second and for the third-person
plural pronouns. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to assign an inclusive or an exclu-
sive meaning to Turkic plural personal pronouns as their paradigmatic semantics.
As we have already said, they are neutral in this respect. Moreover, the only exclu-
sive use of the plural personal pronouns is limited to the construction with comita-
tive affixes (or postposition). Other constructions (e.g. the general coordinator ve in
Turkish or a coordinative conjunction la in Altay) cannot be used in this function.
There are two more points which I would like to make in this context. Firstly, it
is remarkable that the construction “we and the priest” does not have an exclusive
interpretation with the imperative forms in the Turkic languages that have mor-
phological inclusives. Compare the following Altay examples. In (22) and (23), non-
imperative verb forms are used: the indicative form of the past tense (22) and the
form of the permissive mood (23). The only exclusive interpretation of the pronoun
bis ‘we’ is possible. In (24) and (25), imperative verb forms are used, and the only
exclusive interpretation of this pronoun is blocked: we explain this by the fact that
the non-singular imperative forms of the first person are inclusive ones. In order to
exclude the addressee in the imperative, one has to choose the construction “I and
Pete [without you]”, see (26), or use a non-imperative form (see 13a and 13b).
(22) Bis Petja-la kino-go bar-ıp d’ür-d-is.
we Pete-com movies-dat go-conv go:aux-pst-1pl
a. ‘We went to the cinema together with Pete.’
b. ‘I went to the cinema together with Pete.’
352 Irina Nevskaya
(23) Bis Petja-la kino-go bar-γaj-ıs.

we Pete-com movies-dat go-perm-1pl
a. ‘OK! We will go to the cinema together with Pete.’
b. ‘OK! I will go to the cinema together with Pete.’
(24) Petja-la kino-go bar-aq!
Pete-com movies-dat go-imp.inc.1du
‘Let us (the speaker and the adressee) go to the cinema together with Pete.’
(25) Petja-la kino-go bar-aqtar!
Pete-com movies-dat go-imp.inc.1pl
‘Let us (the speaker and the addressees) go to the cinema together with
Pete.’
(26) Petja-la kino-go bar-ajın!
Pete-com movies-dat go-imp.1sg
‘Let me go to the cinema together with Pete.’
Secondly, it is not always easy to distinguish the comitative construction from
the coordinative one, especially in the languages like Altay where originally the
same element has developed both comitative and coordinative functions. It is the
postposition birlen/birle/bile/ble/le/be meaning ‘with, together with’ which has got
contracted in different ways in Turkic languages (e.g. la/le in Altay and ba/be/pa/
pe/ma/me in Shor; we use further la/le to refer to this element). In Siberian Turkic
and in Chuvash, it has got synharmonical variants and can already be considered
the marker of the comitative-instrumental case and/or a general coordinator. In Al-
tay, this element has also developed into a general coordinator and can join together
not only nominal groups, but also verbal predicates. It is written separately in this
case as distinct from the comitative affix.
In the case of the comitative construction, the element la/le stands after the sub-
ordinate noun which follows the grammatical subject of the sentence: Altay bis Ah-
met-le … [we Ahmet-com] ‘We/I with Ahmet …’. The pronoun we can have an only
exclusive interpretation here, similarly to example (20). The pronoun bis ‘we’ alone
is the topic of the sentence where this construction appears.
In the case of the coordinative construction, la/le stands after the first coordina-
tive subject: Altay bis le Ahmet… [we and Ahmet] ‘We and Ahmet…’. Both ‘we’ and
‘Ahmet’ belong to the topic. The only exclusive interpretation is not possible here.
The parameters of the person marking on the verb in a coordinative construc-
tion are also remarkable. They can be described in the following way. There is a
certain person hierarchy (well-established cross-linguistically, though not univer-
sal) with the first person having the highest rank, then the second person follows,
and the third person has the lowest rank. The person marking on the verb chooses
the person of the coordinative subject of the highest rank in the plural number. If
one of the coordinative subjects is the first person the verb gets the marking of the
first-person plural, no matter whether it is expressed by the first-person singular or
plural pronoun, and no matter which of the coordinative subjects is joined by the
coordinative conjunction; else, if one of the coordinative subjects is the second per-
son (singular or plural) the verb gets the marking of the second-person plural (Ty-
bykova 1991: 111–12 has described these rules for Altay):
(27) Bıjıl men le D’eleči süt plan-ın
this.year I and Djelechi milk plan-poss3.acc
ažıra büdür-erge mold’on-d-ıbıs.
over fulfil-inf promise-pst-1pl
‘I and Djelechi have promised to produce more milk this year than it was
planned.’
5. Yakut dual collective pronouns
Yakut has specific forms of the first- and second-person plural pronouns, i.e. bihigi
‘we’ and ähigi ‘you:pl’ which apparently go back to the combinations of the all-Turkic
pronouns ‘we’ and ‘you:pl’ with the numeral ikki ‘two’ (Böhtlingk 1851: 264). These
forms presumably used to serve as dual ones, but later have developed plural se-
mantics. However, the opposition of dual and plural forms has been renewed and, at
present, Yakut has so-called dual-collective (dvojstvenno-sobiratel’nye) pronouns bi-
hikki ‘the two of us’ and ähikki ‘the two of you’: bihigi + ikki and ähigi +ikki (Ubrjatova
(ed.) 1982: 188–90) interpreted as exclusive ones by Grönbech (1936: 81).
The pronoun bihikki denotes cooperative agents and refers to the speaker plus
another person (the addressee or a third person) expressed by a separate nominal
phrase whose head noun is in the nominative, i.e. this pronoun means ‘I together
with somebody else’:
(28) kini bihikki biirge
he/she we.together together
‘I together with him/her’
(29) Oxonoos bihikki biir nähiliäk-tääx džom-mut.
Afanasij we.together one village-with people-1pl
‘I and Afanasij are from one village.’
In these contexts, the pronoun bihikki has exclusive meaning indeed. But it can also
have inclusive semantics as in (30):
(30) Än bihikki-tääγär bil-äl-lär-ä buoluo.
you:sg we.together-comp know-aor-pl-poss3 maybe
‘They might know more than we do (i.e. more than I and you together).’
The pronoun ähikki denotes cooperative agents as well, but it refers to the addressee
plus another person, i.e. this pronoun means ‘you:sg together with somebody else’
and has dual semantics:
354 Irina Nevskaya
(31) Tüül-ääx ihin Zaxar Ivanovič ähikki äppiättii-git.

fur-dat for Zakhar Ivanovich you.together responsible-2pl
‘You and Zakhar Ivanovich are responsible for the furs.’
The phrase “a dual-cooperative pronoun + a cooperative agent” occupies one syn-
tactic place in the sentence structure and can be any nominal member of the sen-
tence: a subject (29) and (31), a circumstantial modifier (30), etc. In case this phrase
is the subject of the sentence, the person marking on the verb follows the general
rules for coordinative subjects (see 29, 31).
6. Expression of inclusive and exclusive semantics in Turkic languages
Although Turkic languages have neither special inclusive and exclusive verb forms
(except for the first-person inclusive imperative forms of a number of Turkic lan-
guages) nor special inclusive and exclusive pronouns they can distinguish between
inclusive and exclusive semantics by other language means. Thus, in Turkish, “the
comitative -y=la and the privative ‑sIz are used to express inclusive and exclusive se-
mantics”, according to Kornfilt who was, probably, the first to connect these language
means with the expression of inclusive–exclusive in Turkic languages (1997: 298):
(32) (biz) sen-in-le opera-ya git-ti-k.
(we) you:sg-gen-com opera-dir go-pst-1pl
‘We went to the opera together with you (you:sg).’
(33) (biz) opera-ya sen-siz git-ti-k.
(we) opera-dir you:sg-priv go-pst-1pl
‘We went to the opera without you (you:sg).’
(34) (biz) siz-in-le opera-ya git-ti-k.
(we) you:pl-gen-com opera-dir go-pst-1pl
‘We went to the opera together with you (you:pl).’
(35) (biz) opera-ya siz-siz git-ti-k.
(we) opera-dir you:pl-priv go-pst-1pl
‘We went to the opera without you (you:pl).’
The same constructions are also used for inclusion and exclusion of the third person
in the first or second person.
(36) (biz) onlar-la opera-ya git-ti-k.
(we) they-com opera-dir go-pst-1pl
‘We went to the opera together with them.’
(37) (biz) opera-ya onlar-sız git-ti-k.
(we) opera-dir they-priv go-pst-1pl
‘We went to the opera without them.’
(38) (siz) onlar-la opera-ya git-ti-niz.

(you:pl) they-com opera-dir go-pst-1pl
‘You went to the opera together with them.’
(39) (siz) opera-ya onlar-sız git-ti-niz.
(you:pl) opera-dir they-priv go-pst-1pl
‘You went to the opera without them.’
In case a Turkic language has lost the privative affix at some stage, other language
means are used to express the exclusive meaning, i.e. in Shor, the negative particle
čoq is used for this purpose: sen čoq ‘without you’.
7. Conclusion
Thus, in the imperative paradigm of some Turkic languages and dialects we differ-
entiate two non-singular forms of the first person, i.e. minimal inclusive (tradition-
ally denoted as exclusive or dual) and augmented inclusive (traditional inclusive or
plural) which means that the semantics of inclusive got grammaticalized in Turkic.
Among Turkic languages with a morphological inclusive, we distinguish at least
two groups: (1) languages with distinct minimal and augmented inclusives (the ma-
jority of the discussed languages), (2) languages with a general inclusive (Chalkan).
To express exclusive semantics, these languages either use non-imperative forms in
the imperative contexts (most of them) or specialized exclusive forms (Khakas).
In the pronominal sphere, plural and multi-plural forms are not opposed as in-
clusive versus exclusive ones: multi-plural forms tend to denote either an isolated
group of people opposed to the rest of society, or an individual plurality, otherwise
they are used for mere stylistic purposes while plural forms denote unmarked plur-
ality.
The Turkic personal pronoun of the first-person plural is neutral in respect to
the category of inclusive–exclusive and can be defined as “we in non-inclusive lan-
guages”.
Finally, the so-called cooperative personal pronouns in Yakut do not have inclu-
sive versus exclusive functions, but express duality.
All Turkic languages can express exclusive and inclusive semantics, as any lan-
guage can, but they do this by coordinative, comitative and privative language means.
The very fact that Siberian Turkic languages have developed inclusive forms in
the imperative and dual forms in the pronominal sphere (Yakut) is very remark-
able. On the one hand, this can be seen as an attempt to copy the category of in-
clusive–exclusive found in the neighbouring Manchu-Tungusic languages with
Turkic means. On the other hand, this influence could also have come from Mon-
golic, since it happened in practically all Siberian Turkic languages including those
that did not have prominent Manchu-Tungusic contacts. But we cannot exclude a
possibility that these features could also be remnants of an original category.
356 Irina Nevskaya
Abbreviations
abl ablative inc inclusive
acc accusative inf infinitive
aor aorist loc locative
aux auxiliary neg negation
com comitative oblig obligation
comp comparative part participle
cond conditional perm permissive
conv converb pl plural
coop cooperative poss possessive
dat dative prf perfect
dir directive priv privative
du dual prs present
exc exclusive prtcl particle
fut future pst past
gen genitive sg singular
imp imperative
Notes
1. Language varieties spoken in Northern Altay (Tuba, Chalkan, and Kumandy) used to be
treated as dialects of the Altay language, but they are separate languages. The fact has re-
cently been recognized also officially.
2. A rather late copy of the Old Turkic text Qutadgu Bilig has some ‑(A)lI and ‑(A)lIŋ forms
with minimal inclusive semantics beside the common ‑(A)lIm. However, this manuscript
has also further Middle Turkic features. Thus, we can say that we do not have any evidence
of Turkic inclusive forms before the Middle Turkic period (Erdal 2004: 236).
3. Turkic affixes may have up to 16 morphonological variants. Therefore, we use an archi-
morphemic representation of Turkic formants which is a tradition in Turcology: A denotes
a after stems with back vowels and e after stems with front vowels. I denotes ı in words with
back vowels and i in words with front vowels. Q denotes q in words with back vowels and k
otherwise. The values of L are specified by the morphonological rules of the respective Tur-
kic language. Thus, for Shor, L denotes n after nasals, t after voiceless consonants and other-
wise l. In some Turkic varieties L also denotes d after r, l, j (also in the Kondum dialect of
Shor). Vowels in brackets () appear only after stems ending in consonants. Morphonology
of genetically identical affixes may vary considerably between different Turkic languages
or even between a literary language and its dialects. We present major varieties of an affix
using a slash /.
4. Grönbech also defined Yakut compound pronouns en bihikki ‘you and we’ and kini bi-
hikki ‘he and we’ (combinations of personal pronouns en ‘you’ and kini ‘he/she’ with bihigi
‘we’ +ikki ‘two’) as inclusive pronouns and the corresponding pronoun bihigi ‘we’ (bihigi,
in its turn, goes back to the all-Turkic pronoun bis ‘we’ plus ikki ‘two’) as an exclusive one
(Grönbech 1936: 81) (see Section 5 for more details).
5. Marcel Erdal has expressed the opinion that this is possible only in very limited contexts,
so that the default meaning of biz is ‘we’ (personal communication).
6. I express my gratitude to Dr. Ajana Ozonova (Institute of Philology, Siberian Division of
the Russian Academy, Novosibirsk) who supplied me with the Altay examples and helped
to evaluate them.
7. According to Marcel Erdal (personal communication), the subject position does not ex-
ist in a Turkic sentence since the agent is expressed on the verb. Therefore, the pronoun biz
should not be mentioned even in brackets in examples (20) and (21). However, he has also
stated that the pronoun can appear in order to express contrast (we and not you). In my
opinion, this means that the position of the subject does exist in this construction.
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Moskva: Nauka.
Chapter 13
Development of an inclusive–exclusive
distinction
A possible loan scenario in Mosetenan
Jeanette Sakel
University of Manchester
The Mosetenan languages (unclassified) Mosetén and Chimane are spoken in the transition
between the foothills of the Bolivian Andes and the Amazon basin. They make a distinc-
tion between a first-person plural inclusive and exclusive in the verbal cross-reference end-
ings, though not in personal pronouns. The cross-reference markers for first-person plural
inclusive subjects are furthermore not conform to the rest of the paradigm, and can be ana-
lyzed as recent developments. I argue that the idiosyncrasies of the first-person plural inclu-
sive marking appeared due to the introduction of an inclusive–exclusive distinction through
borrowing, even though the direct source of the marker and category remain unclear.
Keywords: inclusive–exclusive, borrowing, Amazon, Mosetenan
1. Introduction1
This is a study on the development of an inclusive–exclusive distinction through

loan, which is one of the many scenarios in which an inclusive–exclusive distinc-
tion can arise. I mainly draw on data from the language family Mosetenan from
Lowland Bolivia.
There are two major types of contact-induced change: (1) the mere loan of a pat-
tern, using morphemes that already exist in the target language, and (2) the trans-
fer of a morpheme from the source language. Different terms have been used in the
literature to describe these types of changes, e.g. Aikhenvald (2002: 4) calls the first
one ‘indirect diffusion’ and the second one direct ‘diffusion’, Heath (1984: 367) ba-
sically describes (1) as ‘structural convergence’ and (2) as ‘direct transfer’. I will use
the terms ‘transfer of pattern’ for (1) and ‘borrowing of material’ for (2).
The inclusive–exclusive distinction arising through language contact has been
documented in a number of languages. For example, in the Kupwar linguistic
area (Gumperz & Wilson 1971) an inclusive distinction seems to have been intro-
duced into the pronominal systems of Kupwar Urdu and probably also Kupwar
Kannada through borrowing of the first plural inclusive marker from the neigh-
boring language Marathi. Likewise, an inclusive–exclusive distinction appears to
360 Jeanette Sakel
have developed in some Arawakan languages.2 Such a distinction is atypical in

Arawakan (Aikhenvald 1999), but some of these languages mark for a first-person
plural inclusive, re-interpreting morphemes already apparent in the language to
cover inclusive meanings (i.e. a mere loan of the structure without borrowing the
morpheme): Bare and Tariana use impersonal forms with first-person plural inclu-
sive meanings and Terêna and Campa use the original first-person singular for first
singular and first plural exclusive, while the original first-person plural form has an
inclusive meaning.
According to Thomason & Kaufman (1988: 67), moderate to heavy structural
borrowings can occur in intense contact situations. As opposed to lexical and syn-
tactic loans, morphological loans are not very common. They usually appear when
two languages — one usually superior to the other — are in close contact over a
long period and at least part of the group is perfectly bilingual. In another scen-
ario, speakers of a language X have learnt a language Y, incorporating one of X’s
marked features into Y. Usually, languages that are typologically similar more easily
take structural loans from other languages, though Thomason & Kaufman (1988:
53) also list a number of cases of structural borrowing between typologically dis-
tant languages. An example of this is the introduction of an inclusive–exclusive dis-
tinction in Kupwar Urdu, due to contact with the typologically distant language
Marathi, mentioned above. This introduction furthermore complicates the system,
which is uncommon, since, according to Thomason & Kaufman, structural loans
usually lead to a simplification of the system.
The introduction of an inclusive–exclusive distinction through loan appears in
the language family Mosetenan from Lowland Bolivia (cf. Sakel 2004). This small
unclassified3 Amazonian language family consists of two closely related languages:
Mosetén and Chimane. Mosetén has two major dialects, which are referred to by
the names of the central villages: Mosetén of Covendo and Mosetén of Santa Ana,
both spoken in the foothills of the Bolivian Andes, on the Upper Beni river, while
the Chimanes live in the adjacent Amazonian lowland region around the city of San
Borja.4 The system of inclusive marking in Mosetenan is typologically very interest-
ing: personal pronouns have no separate forms for inclusive or exclusive first-per-
son plural, while there is an elaborate system of inclusive–exclusive marking in the
verbal cross-reference forms. Furthermore, these inclusive markers differ radically
from the other forms in the paradigm. I argue that this special status of the inclu-
sive first-person plural has to do with its introduction into Mosetén through loan.
The source language, however, is still unknown, even if there are a number of indi-
cations of what it is.
This chapter is structured as follows: after defining the first-person plural inclu-
sive, I give an overview over the inclusive forms in Mosetenan. Then, I analyse of the
introduction of inclusive marking in Mosetenan by looking at the sources of the
separate forms of inclusive marking.
The development of an inclusive–exclusive distinction in Mosetenan 361
2. The definition of first-person plural inclusive
The distinction between first-person plural inclusive and first-person plural exclu-
sive has traditionally been described in terms of the inclusion or exclusion of the
addressee. When the addressee is included in the ‘we’, one usually talks about a first-
person plural inclusive, while when excluded it is a first-person plural exclusive.5
Cysouw (2003) comes up with a finer categorization. He distinguishes five main
patterns of first-person plural marking: ‘unified-we’, ‘no-we’, ‘only-inclusive’, ‘inclu-
sive–exclusive’, ‘minimal/augmented’ as well as a number of rare types. In simple
terms, ‘unified-we’ means that there is a single form for all types of ‘we’. ‘No-we’ ex-
presses that there is no special marking for ‘we’ — Cysouw gives the English inflec-
tional marking as an example, where all the plural forms are identical. ‘Only-in-
clusive’ means that the first-person plural exclusive is not marked,6 while there is
special marking for the first-person plural inclusive, consisting of speaker (hence
1) and addressee (hence 2) and variably other persons (hence 3), i.e. 1+2 or 1+2+3.
The ‘inclusive–exclusive’ type has special marking for both first-person plural in-
clusive and first-person plural exclusive. Finally, the type ‘minimal/augmented’ dis-
tinguishes three different forms for ‘we’, namely 1+2 (commonly called inclusive
dual, or what Cysouw calls ‘minimal inclusive’), 1+2+3 (this he calls augmented in-
clusive) and 1+3 (exclusive).
Inclusive marking can appear on different types of elements, such as personal
pronouns, possessive pronouns and verbal cross-reference forms. Siewierska &
Bakker (this volume), distinguish between free and bound forms. They found dif-
ferences in the encoding of inclusivity in these forms in about a quarter of the lan-
guages of their sample. In the vast majority of languages, free forms were more elab-
orately marked for inclusivity — following a hierarchy — than bound elements.
Only in a few languages (such as Chepang, Tibetan), the bound forms had more
elaborate marking than the free ones. Siewierska & Bakker (ibid.) explain this de-
velopment in that most bound markers originate from free markers, having devel-
oped through grammaticalization. In this way, they became semantically bleached.
Thus, many free forms have more elaborate marking than the (bleached) bound
forms. Siewierska & Bakker (ibid.) explain the reverse, i.e. the bound forms being
more elaborately marked for the inclusive than the free forms, by free forms be-
ing able to can undergo semantic bleaching after the grammaticalization of bound
forms. Furthermore, the current free forms could be an innovation that appeared
after the grammaticalization of the bound forms, which can be the reason for a for-
mal distinction between free and bound markers.
Mosetenan has three different strategies for marking the first-person plural.
These show in the following structures: personal pronouns (unified-we pattern),
intransitive verbs (only-inclusive) and transitive verbs (mixed pattern: only-in-
clusive with third person object forms and inclusive–exclusive pattern with first-
and second-person object forms). In this way, the bound (cross-reference) forms
in Mosetenan are more elaborate in marking for the inclusive than the free forms
362 Jeanette Sakel
Table 1. The personal pronouns in Mosetenan
Mosetenan form
1SG yäe
2SG mi
3SG M mi’
3SG F mö’
1P (I, EX) tsin
2P mï’ ïn
3P M mi’in
3P F mö’in
(personal pronouns). The development of this rather infrequent type of marking

in Mosetenan can be explained by the loan of inclusive marking, rather than by
bleaching in grammaticalization, as discussed by Siewierska & Bakker (ibid.). In
order to understand the way in which such a loan can have appeared, let us first look
at the different types of first-person plural marking in Mosetenan.
3. The first-person plural of personal pronouns in Mosetenan
Personal pronouns in Mosetenan do not distinguish between a first-person plural

inclusive or exclusive. I.e. in terms of Cysouw (2003), these pronouns can be de-
scribed as a type of ‘unified-we’. The pronominal form tsin ‘we’ is used for both first-
person plural inclusive and first-person plural exclusive, shown in Table 1.
Likewise the possessive pronouns, which are built up by personal pronouns and
another marker, do not have an inclusive–exclusive distinction.
3.1. The first-person plural in the intransitive inflection of Mosetenan

As opposed to the free pronouns, there is an inclusive–exclusive distinction in the
verbal cross-reference paradigms. The majority of intransitive cross-reference
forms in Mosetenan differentiate between masculine and feminine subjects only.
They show no marking for person or number.7 The only exceptions to this are the
forms of the first-person plural inclusive subject, -ja’ and ‑n’. These markers do not
have separate gender forms and mark exclusively for person and number, i.e. first-
person plural inclusive. The inflection of the intransitive verb tsä’ï- ‘wake up’ is
shown in Table 2.
The first-person plural inclusive can be expressed by two forms: ‑ja’ 8 and ‑n’.
While ‑ja’ is used by all speakers of Mosetén and Chimane, the form ‑n’ only appears
in the dialect of a minority of families in Covendo. The marker ‑n’ is not used in Chi-
mane (Wayne Gill, p.c.), or Mosetén of Santa Ana. The families from Covendo who
Table 2. Intransitive inflection: example tsä’ï- ‘wake up’
Verbal forms
1 M SG tsä’ï-Ø
1 F SG tsä’ï-’
2 M SG tsä’ï-Ø
3 M SG tsä’ï-Ø
1P I M tsä’ë-jä’ / tsä’ë-n’
1PIF tsä’ë-jä’ / tsä’ë-n’
1P EX M tsä’ï-Ø
1P EX F tsä’ï-’
2MP tsä’ï-Ø
2FP tsä’ï-’
3MP tsä’ï-Ø (ïn)
3FP tsä’ï-’ (ïn)
use both ‑ja’ (1) and ‑n’ (2) apply them alternatively without differences in meaning,
but they usually prefer ‑n’:
(1) Tsin nöi’-yä-khñe-n’.
1p tired-vy-strong-1pi.s
‘We are very tired.’ ele/at
(2) Tsin nöi’-yä-khñe-ja’.
1p tired-vy-strong-1pi.s
‘We are very tired.’ ele/at
In the definition of Cysouw (2003), the intransitive inflection in Mosetenan applies
an ‘only-inclusive’: the first-person plural inclusive is marked, while there is no spe-
cial marker for the first-person plural exclusive, which is rather treated in the same
way as all the remaining persons in the paradigm.
3.2. The first-person plural in the transitive inflection of Mosetenan

The transitive inflection paradigm has reference to two participants: subject and
(primary) object. These forms agree with a subset of gender, number and person
of subject and object, leading to a great variation in the organization of the forms
in the cross-reference paradigm. Still, the forms of the first-person plural inclusive
subject differ substantially from the other forms, in the same way as in the intransi-
tive inflection. Table 3 shows the isolated cross-reference forms of the transitive
paradigm in Mosetén of Covendo (cf. Sakel 2004). The slightly different forms in
the other variants of Mosetenan will be discussed below.9
364 Jeanette Sakel
Table 3. The transitive inflectional paradigm in Mosetén of Covendo
S O 1SG 2SG 3SG M 3SG F 1P EX 1P I 2P 3P

1SG M -ti -ye -te -’ -ti -ti -yak -ksi
1SG F -ti’ -ye -te -’ -ti’ -ti’ -yak -ksi’
2SG M -ti’ -ti -te -’ -tikha’ -ti -ti -ksi
2SG F -ti’ -ti’ -te -’ -tikha’ -ti’ -ti’ -ksi’
3SG M -n -n -te -’ -n -sin’ -nak -ksi
3SG F -n -n -te -’ -n -sin’ -nak -ksi’
1Pmex -ti -yak -te -’ -ti -ti -yak -ksi
1Pfex -ti’ -yak -te -’ -ti’ -ti’ -yak -ksi’
1P M I -tikha’ -tikha’ -ti -ti’ -tikha’ -tikha’ -tikha’ -kseja’/ ‑ksen’
1P F I -tikha’ -tikha’ -ti -ti’ -tikha’ -tikha’ -tikha’ -kseja’/-ksen’
2P M -tikha’ -ti -te -’ -tikha’ -ti -ti -ksi
2P F -tikha’ -ti’ -te -’ -tikha’ -ti’ -ti’ -ksi’
3P M -n -n -te -’ -n -sin’ -nak -ksi
3P F -n -n -te -’ -n -sin’ -nak -ksi’
First-person plural inclusive subjects with third-person singular objects are

marked by ‑ti-. When the object is masculine, -ti- appears without further marking
(3). When the object is feminine, a glottal stop follows the ‑ti- (4).
(3) Pa’-ki-ti-ra’ tyäkä’-dyërä’ ij-a-ti.
beat-an-1pi. s.m.o-ir em-mo kill-vi-1pi.s-m.o
‘We will beat it (the tapir, m) and thus kill it.’ ste/vc
(4) Dyoshkha’ khao’-jo-n’ tya’kaj-yi-ti-’!
go.hor flee-vj-1pi.s behind-vy-1pi.s-f.o
‘Let us go, flee, leave her behind.’ ste/vj
The cross-reference forms of first-person plural inclusive subjects and third-per-
son singular objects differ radically from the other forms in the paradigm, since all
other forms with third-person singular objects look the same way (-’ with a femi-
nine object and ‑te with a masculine object, cf. Table 3).
The forms for a first-person plural inclusive subject with a plural object are not
based on ‑ti-, but appear with the intransitive forms ‑ja’ and ‑n’ 10 in combination
with the marker ‑ksi-11 ‘third-person plural object’.
(5) Mö’-dyera’ cuarto tya-kse-ja’ paj-ki mö’-khan
3f.sg-mo room.e give-3p.o-1pi.s so-co 3f.sg-in
khosh-i-’-in.
sleep.vi-f.s-p
‘We could give them (f) this room, so that they (f) can sleep in it.’ sele/jh
In the same way as with singular objects, inclusive subjects with plural objects be-
have differently from the other third person object forms in the cross-reference
paradigm (cf. Table 3). Differently from the singular object forms, these plural
forms appear with the markers ‑ja’ and ‑n’, which also mark the inclusive in the in-
transitive paradigm. As in the intransitive, there is no distinction for the gender of
the subject. The explanation for this lies in the intransitive nature of the third-per-
son plural object marker ‑ksi-, which probably diachronically derives from a deriv-
ational affix appearing with intransitive verbs, downplaying the plurality or mere
existence of the object. Being formally intransitive, the subject agreement pattern
of this marker resembles that of the intransitive inflection, i.e. there is gender agree-
ment with all subjects apart from the first-person plural inclusive subjects, which
appear with special marking by ‑ja’ or ‑n’.12
The other inclusive subject forms in the paradigm (cf. Table 3) are reflexive forms
that appear when the subject is partially or properly included in the object or vice
versa. The reflexive marker used for first-person plural inclusive subjects ‑tikha’ is
different from all other reflexive markers ‑ti (m) and ‑ti’ (f). While the latter mark
for the gender of the subject, -tikha’ has no gender agreement forms. The reflexive
paradigm also closely resembles the paradigm of intransitive marking. Apart from
there appearing a ‑ti- in the reflexive form, all persons are marked for gender except
for the inclusive form, which appears with extra marking. In the intransitive inflec-
tion, the markers are–ja’ or ‑n’. In the reflexive, the marker is -kha’. Compare the in-
transitive inflection of tsä’i- ‘wake up’ with the reflexive inflection of jishyi-ti- ‘comb
oneself ’ in Table 4.
As has been shown until now, all inclusive subject forms differ substantially from
the other forms in the paradigms. The first-person plural inclusive object forms,
Table 4. Intransitive and reflexive paradigms
Intransitive verb ‘wake up’ Reflexive verb ‘comb oneself ’

1 M SG tsä’ï-Ø jishyi-ti-Ø
1 F SG tsä’ï-’ jishyi-ti-’
1P I M tsä’ë-jä’ / tsä’ë-n’ jishyi-ti-kha’
1PIF tsä’ë-jä’ / tsä’ë-n’ jishyi-ti-kha’
1P EX M tsä’ï-Ø jishyi-ti-Ø
1P EX F tsä’ï-’ jishyi-ti-’
2MP tsä’ï-Ø jishyi-ti-Ø
2FP tsä’ï-’ jishyi-ti-’
3MP tsä’ï-Ø (ïn) jishyi-ti-Ø (in)
3FP tsä’ï-’ (ïn) jishyi-ti-’ (in)
366 Jeanette Sakel
Table 5. (Transitive) inclusive subject forms in Mosetén of Santa Ana and Chimane
S O 1SG 2SG 3SG M 3SG F 1P EX 1P I 2P 3P

1P I M -tikha’ -tikha’ -ja -ja’ -tikha’ -tikha’ -tikha’ -kseja’
1P I F -tikha’ -tikha’ -ja -ja’ -tikha’ -tikha’ -tikha’ -kseja’
however, appear to be rather conform with the paradigm. The form marking a third
person subject and an inclusive object ‑sin’ is, for example, comparable to the form
‑nak marking a second-person plural object with a third person subject. In the same
way, the first-person plural inclusive reflexive object forms do not stick out of the
paradigm, appearing with the forms ‑ti (m) or ‑ti’ (f), depending on the gender of
the subject. There is no special reflexive marking by ‑tikha’ or the like, as with inclu-
sive subjects.
The other variants of Mosetenan, i.e. Mosetén of Santa Ana and Chimane, have
slightly different first-person plural inclusive subject forms in combination with
third-person singular objects. All the other forms in the cross-reference paradigm
are the same. Table 5 shows the forms of the inclusive subjects in Mosetén of Santa
Ana and Chimane.
In Mosetén of Santa Ana (Sakel 2004) and Chimane (Gill 1999), the form ‑ja- is
used to mark all first-person plural inclusive subjects in the transitive and in the in-
transitive paradigm. With third-person singular objects, there is gender agreement
with the object (6) and (7).13 The other forms of the cross-reference paradigm, in-
cluding the forms of third-person plural objects and inclusive subjects (8), as well
as inclusive object forms (9), are the same as in Mosetén of Covendo (cf. Table 3).
(6) Chimane (Gill 1999: 23, 43, 64):14
Tsun ñïbe’-je-ja-’ mö’ phen.
we give-vm-1pi.s-3f.o 3f woman
‘We gave (something) to the woman.’
(7) Tsun ñïbe’je-ja-Ø mu’ muntyi’.
we give-vm-1pi.s-3m.o 3m man
‘We gave (something) to the man.’
(8) Tsun jeya-kse-ja’.
1P say-3p.o-1pi.s
‘We say (something) to them (m or f).’
(9) Jadak mu’ ma’-je-’ toj-ji-sin’.
seem 3m want-vm-3f.o shoot-vm-1pi.o
‘It seems he wants to shoot us (m or f).’
4. The introduction of inclusive marking in Mosetenan
Having looked at the forms of the first-person plural inclusive in the cross-refer-
ence paradigm, it has become clear that the first-person plural inclusive has a spe-
cial status in the grammar of Mosetenan: 1. there is no free pronoun for the inclu-
sive, 2. all first-person plural inclusive subject markers deviate from the paradigm,
such as by appearing with a different kind of gender agreement system or with a
longer or unexpected form. By viewing the inclusive as a loan in Mosetenan, we can
explain its different status from the other elements in the language.
A loan scenario that involves the borrowing of a morpheme could partly ex-
plain a number of idiosyncrasies in the inclusive marking in Mosetenan: only ver-
bal markers for the inclusive have been borrowed, while no pronominal inclu-
sive form was borrowed. The reason for this is unclear until we know more about
how this loan scenario has taken place. From the synchronic point of view, how-
ever, we know a bit about the source language(s): the paradigmatically exceptional
lack of gender agreement with the subject could be explained by the morpheme
marking the first-person plural inclusive in Mosetenan being borrowed from a lan-
guage that does not mark for the gender of the subject [Aymara, Quechua, Takana
and Tupí-Guaraní have no gender or classifier system (apart from the Tupí-Guar-
aní languages Parintintín and Kayabí — Jensen 1999:148). Arawakan languages, on
the other hand, have classifier and gender systems.]. Apart from that, the source
language has probably nominative–accusative marking in the cross-reference para-
digm, since the special inclusive forms only appear with subjects, and not objects
[of the languages with no gender marking, Quechua and Aymara have nominative–
accusative alignment]. Mosetenan, on the other hand, has a number of (minor)
ergative traits in the cross-reference endings (especially in those of third person
objects, partly resembling the marking of third person subjects in the intransitive
paradigm, compare Table 2 and 3) and it is rather strange that such special inclusive
marking occurs with subjects only. Furthermore, there may not be very prominent
forms for personal pronouns in the source language(s) due to the fact that no pro-
nominal form was borrowed into Mosetenan [both Quechua and Aymara are pro-
drop languages]. Still, another reason for this can be that all Mosetenan varieties
apply pro-drop. Borrowing a pronominal inclusive marker can thus have been une-
conomic, since the inclusive is obligatorily marked on the verb already.
Let us now look at the different inclusive markers one by one and explain their
source, as well as the way they were introduced into Mosetenan:
4.1. ‑ja’
The form ‑ja’ is a first-person plural inclusive subject marker in all variants of Mo-
setenan. It is the only marker for the inclusive in Mosetén of Santa Ana and Chi-
mane. Analyzing this form as a loan from another language would explain why ‑ja’
368 Jeanette Sakel
odds out from the homogeneous cross-reference system of intransitive verbs by

marking for subject person instead of subject gender.
A number of surrounding languages have marking for first-person plural in-
clusive. Furthermore, some have morphemes that resemble ‑ja’ with a related (1st
plural) meaning.15 The inclusive–exclusive distinction in Mosetenan can have de-
veloped through contact with one of these languages (cf. also Crevels & Muysken,
this volume for other languages with similar distinctions in South America). For my
investigation of this matter, I primarily look at the languages that are presently spo-
ken in direct vicinity of Mosetenan. Due to the distribution of languages and lan-
guage families in South America, it can also be the case that the language that was
the source of the first-person plural inclusive–exclusive distinction in Mosetenan
is spoken in a very different area today, if it hasn’t vanished at all. My findings are
summarized in Table 6.
There are various forms ‑ja’ with similar meanings as in Mosetenan. The best can-
didate for this out of the languages discussed here is Aymara. However, ‑ja’ marks
an exclusive possessor in Aymara, rather than the inclusive first-person plural. Fur-
thermore, the marking by ‑ja’ appears with a pronominal form instead of in the
cross-reference paradigm, as in Mosetenan. Still, a closer analysis of the elements
in both languages could reveal a connection between the forms in Aymara and Mo-
setenan. Similarly, some other morphemes in surrounding languages remind of the
form and partly meaning of ‑ja’ in Mosetenan. Thus, a general first-person plural
marker *ha- has been re-constructed for Proto-Arawakan. This marker is used as a
first-person plural inclusive marker in some languages of this family, although these
are not spoken in the vicinity of Mosetenan. Furthermore, Yurakare has an optional
subject marker ‑ja that appears on pronouns. A similar form also exists in Bolivian
Guaraní, marking agentive nominalizations and factuals. Some of the resembling
morphemes in surrounding languages are prefixes, while the form found in Mo-
setenan is a suffix. In this case, a relationship with ‑ja- in Mosetenan is not excluded,
since this can be explained by the development of prefixes and suffixes through free
pronominal forms. In one language the marker is suffixed and prefixed in the other.
Like this, some languages prefix a person marker to agree with the subject, while
the same marker is suffixed when agreeing with the object. Along the same lines,
the fact that ‑ja- in some languages expresses a general first-person plural does not
mean that this language cannot be a possible source for ‑ja’ in Mosetenan. Accord-
ing to Greenberg (1998), first-person plural inclusive markers can turn into gen-
eral first-person plural markers. Thus, after the borrowing of ‑ja’ to Mosetenan, the
inclusive marker in the source language could have turned into a general first-per-
son plural marker. A reversed development is also imaginable: a general first-per-
son plural marker could have been re-interpreted as a first-person plural inclusive
marker, which then was borrowed into Mosetenan.
Even if this overview does not present us with a clear source for ‑ja’, the evidence
that forms with similar meanings occur in surrounding languages strengthen the
claim that ‑ja’ is a loan in Mosetenan. Moreover, the language-internal evidence
supports this, because ‑ja’ deviates largely from the Mosetenan paradigm(s). Fur-
thermore, there is no other morpheme ‑ja- in Mosetenan that could have been re-
interpreted language-internally.
Table 6. The existence of a form [ha], the existence of a 1st person plural inclusive, etc. in
the languages (language families) surrounding Mosetenan a
[ha] or [ha] meaning 1P I exists form of 1P I

similar
form exists
Yurakare ‑ja [ha] optional subject no no
(unclassified) marker on
pronoun
Aymara -ja [ha] 1P exclusive cross-reference pronoun: jiwasa
(Aymaran) possessive and pronoun poss.pron.: -sa
marking cross-ref:b
(the inclusive -ctanc
form is ‑sa) (1P incl→3)
-cistuv-
(3→1P incl)
Bolivian Quechua no no cross-reference cross-ref./part of
(Quechuan) and pronoun pronoun: ‑nchis
Leko (unclassified) no no no no
c
Mojo proto- 1P (general) atypical: Asheninca:
(Arawakan) Arawakan: [parallel to cross-reference cross-ref.:
*ha- other form: and pronoun a-/Ø- -ai
*w(V)-] pronoun: aaka
Takana (Takanan) no no pronominal -da (inclusive)
suffix -a (exclusive)
(Bolivian) Guaraní -ja [ha] agentive cross-reference prefixes: ya- /
(Tupí-Guaraní) nominalization and pronoun transitive form in
and factual some languages
*ti-(ti-, či-, si-) d
a
My data are from the following sources: Yurakare: Rik van Gijn (p.c.); Aymara: Hardman (2001);
Bolivian Quechua: Pieter Muysken (p.c.), van de Kerke (1996); Leko: Simon van de Kerke (p.c. , 2000)
Arawakan: Aikhenvald (1999); Takana, Cavineña, Araona, Ese Ejja: Antoine Guillaume (p.c.) & Van
Wynen & Van Wynen (1962); (Bolivian) Guaraní: Jensen (1998) & Willem Adelaar (p.c.) & Wolf
Dietrich (p.c.).
b
I only give the forms in the present tense.
c
The first-person plural inclusive is only found in Campa, Terêna, Asheninca and Palikur.
d
In some Tupí-Guaraní variants, a marker *ti- appears in the transitive paradigm to express first-
person plural inclusive. This reminds of the marking of transitive forms by -ti- in Mosetén of
Covendo. Still, this similarity seems to be due to chance: -ti- can be explained as a language-internal
invention in both Mosetén and Tupí-Guaraní (Jensen 1998, 1999).
370 Jeanette Sakel
4.2. ‑ti-
In Mosetén of Covendo, the first-person plural inclusive is marked by ‑ti- in the
transitive paradigm with third-person singular objects, while in the other variants
of Mosetenan the marker ‑ja- (discussed above) is used. The form ‑ti- in Mosetén of
Covendo is homophonous with other markers in the cross-reference endings in all
variants of Mosetenan, namely a second-person singular acting on a first-person sin-
gular (2→1) and the reflexive marker16 (for other studies of such homophonies, cf.
Cysouw, this volume). In Mosetén of Covendo, ‑ti- seems to be a re-interpretation of
the reflexive marker to cover the meaning of inclusive. There are also few other lan-
guages, in which a reflexive can be likely to have developed into a first-person plural
inclusive marker.17 I have the hypothesis, that all markers (i.e. reflexive, 2→1 and in-
clusive) are related, probably having developed from the reflexive form into a 2→1
and a first-person plural inclusive marker. The development of a homophony be-
tween the markers for a first person acting on a second person (1→2) or 2→1 with a
first-person plural marker has been discussed for a number of languages.
According to Greenberg (1987, 1998), the marker for the first-person plural in-
clusive is in some languages related to bipersonal markers of a first person in asso-
ciation with a second person. He bases his findings on examples from the language
families Carib and Algic. Greenberg describes the development of these connec-
tions in that first-person plural inclusive forms first develop into general first-per-
son plural markers and later extend to singular environments of first and second
person. In Mosetén of Covendo, a formal connection exists between first-person
plural inclusive and 2→1. However, Mosetén of Covendo differs from Carib and Al-
gic languages in that in these languages, the ‘first-person exclusive plural […] is the
odd man out in the whole system’ (Greenberg 1998: 426), whereas in Mosetenan
the first-person plural inclusive differs substantially from the rest of the paradigm.
Thus, a different explanation or path of development may lay behind the Mosetenan
forms. There is furthermore evidence in Mosetén of Covendo that the first-person
plural inclusive marker is a reinterpretation from the 2→1 marker (or the reflexive).
Somewhat closer to my findings in Mosetén of Covendo are a number of
Arawakan languages, some of which have developed a first-person plural inclusive
(Aikhenvald 1999). In Campa and Terêna, the original first-person singular has ex-
tended its meaning to first singular and first plural exclusive, while the original first-
person plural form has developed a first-person plural inclusive meaning. Thus, the
first-person plural exclusive has the same form as the first-person singular, whereas
the newly arisen first-person plural inclusive has a separate form. Still, this pattern is
different from my findings in Mosetén of Covendo, where the transitive marker for a
first-person plural inclusive subject resembles the form for second person acting on
first person, while the first-person plural exclusive form is marked in another way.18
Another analysis of first-person plural inclusive markers resembling markers for
first and second person acting on another is provided by Heath (1991, 1998). He
finds that in languages with verbal marking of person, bipersonal markers of first
and second person are often opaque. This is the case in otherwise structurally very
different types of paradigms. His explanation is that this has to do with a strategy
to avoid direct reference to discourse participants. One way to make these mark-
ers opaque is by applying first-person plural inclusive morphology in situations of
1→2 or 2→1. This is, for example, the case in Ngandi (a North Australian Gunwing-
guan language). For languages in the Americas, Heath mentions the use of a first-
person plural inclusive marker for 2→1 person for Zoque of Francisco León (Mixe-
Zoque). In the same way, Surinam (Carib) uses the marker for first-person plural
inclusive in the intransitive inflection for both 1→2 and 2→1 in transitive contexts.
Furthermore, Southern Sierra Miwok (Penutian) uses first-person plural inclusive
morphology in the imperative form of second person acting on first person. Again,
my argument for Mosetén of Covendo is that the marker for 2→1 has developed
into an inclusive marker rather than the other way around. Apart from this, Heath’s
skewing analysis can explain a number of other structures found in combination
with first- and second-person marking in Mosetén of Covendo (to be discussed
below).
I now turn to the analysis of the re-interpretation of the morpheme for the reflex-
ive or 2→1 into an inclusive marker. Table 7 shows the distribution of the markers
‑ti, -ti’, and ‑tikha’ in the transitive and reflexive cross-reference paradigms of Mo-
setén of Covendo.19
One of the most apparent differences between the forms discussed here is that
there are no gender distinctions in 2→1, as opposed to the other forms. This is prob-
ably the case because none of the other first- or second-person object markers in
the transitive cross-reference paradigm have different gender forms. We can as-
sume that the 2→1 forms probably have appeared due to re-interpretation of the re-
flexive forms and gender agreement has vanished in 2→1 due to analogy with simi-
lar forms in the paradigm.
Comparing the forms and functions of the markers in Table 7, we can see that
these have a number of traits in common: ‑ti and ‑ti’ are used when the participants
are not marked for clear number (apart from the forms with first-person plural in-
clusive subjects, cf. Table 4). Thus, ‑ti- is used in all cases of non-marked plurality
or inclusiveness. The form -tikha’, on the other hand, is used with first and second
Table 7. The distribution of the markers –ti, -ti’, and –tikha’
-ti -ti’ -tikha’

1st plural incl. S/A masculine A feminine A reflexive (1st I)
2→1 – A and P = singulara A and/or P = plural
reflexive masculine Sb feminine Sc 1st I (reflexive)
a
The feminine is the unmarked gender in Mosetenan (cf. Sakel 2002 and Sakel 2004), therefore this
marker ‑ti- is followed by a (feminine) glottal stop.
b
In all persons apart from the first-person plural inclusive.
c
In all persons apart from the first-person plural inclusive.
372 Jeanette Sakel
persons when at least one of the elements is plural. In the case of the reflexive in-
clusive subjects forms, ‘we inclusive’ is always considered to be plural. More prob-
lematic are the reflexive inclusive object forms, which are marked by ‑ti- instead of
‑tikha’ and thus in my definition are never marked for plurality. Concluding, we can
broadly say that the difference between ‑ti- and ‑tikha’ has to do with number re-
lations, more precisely the difference between the only-inclusive intransitive para-
digm and the inclusive–exclusive transitive paradigm, where plurality is marked in
different ways in Mosetenan.
Let us now look at how a re-interpretation of a reflexive or 2→1 marker into a
first-person plural inclusive marker can have come about: the reflexives are marked
by ‑ti‑ and form an intransitive paradigm (cf. Table 4). When the first-person plural
inclusive was introduced into Mosetenan, there was a need to extend inclusive
subject forms with the marker ‑ja’ in the same way as in the intransitive paradigm.
The forms for the reflexive first-person plural inclusive were marked by ‑ja’ as well,
forming -tija’ or ‑tikha’. In analogy to the simple reflexive forms, ‑ti‑ was used to
mark the simple inclusive subject forms in Mosetén of Covendo. Thus, there was
the extended inclusive and reflexive form ‑tija’ or ‑tikha’ and the ‘simple’ inclu-
sive or reflexive form ‑ti-. This development was probably favored by the fact, that
the homophonous ‑ti- marked another combination of a first and a second person,
namely 2→1.
Having explained the possible way of re-interpretation of ‑ti- as an inclusive
marker in Mosetén of Covendo, it is still unclear why ‑tikha’ appears as a 2→1
plural marker and a reflexive inclusive marker in all variants of Mosetenan. Heath
(1991) mentions number marking in Ngandi as one strategy to make person-mark-
ing opaque: ‘in Ngandi, in all 1↔2 combinations, the object marker is formally
plural regardless of objective (real-world) number. Furthermore, if the object is ob-
jectively plural, the subject-marker takes plural form even if objectively singular.’
(Heath 1991: 84).20 This leads to the structures shown in Tables 8 and 9. Mosetenan
has a similar structure in these forms, shown in Tables 10 and 11.
Table 8. First person acting on second Table 9. Second person acting on first per-
person in Ngandi (Heath 1991) son in Ngandi (Heath 1991)
2nd SG O 2nd P O 1st SG O 1st P O

1st SG S ñu-nu- ña-na- 2nd SG S ŋa-na- gur-a-
1st P S ña-na- ña-na- 2nd P S gur-a- gur-a-
Table 10. First person acting on second Table 11. Second person acting on first
person in Mosetenan person (exclusive) in Mosetenan
2nd SG O 2nd P O 1st SG O 1st P EX O

1st SG S -ye -yak 2nd SG S -ti’ -tikha’
1st P S -yak -yak 2nd P S -tikha’ -tikha’
Table 12. Reconstructed forms of 2→1, be-

fore introduction of 1st person plural inclu-
sive marker ‑ja’
1st SG O 1st P EX O
2nd SG S -ti’ *-tik
2nd P S *-tik *-tik
As in Ngandi, plural marking in Mosetenan is also used as one strategy of prag-

matic skewing. The internal morphological build-up of the Mosetenan forms, how-
ever, is not entirely clear. The clearest morpheme is ‑k-, which expresses the plural
of a second person object.21 Now looking more closely at the form ‑tikha’, we can
divide it into the elements ‑ti- ‘reflexive, etc.’, -k- ‘second-person plural object’ and
‑ja’ ‘first-person plural inclusive’. However, ‑tikha’ does not express these meanings
in all its occurrences. Rather, the built-up of ‑tikha’ has to be explained by an exten-
sion of the form and later analogy: parallel to ‑ye (1→2 singular) and ‑yak (1→2
plural) (cf. Table 10), ‑ti’ (2→1 singular) was marked by ‑k- when at least one elem-
ent was plural.22 In this way, we can reconstruct the forms for 2→1 (before the in-
troduction of the first-person plural inclusive marker ‑ja’) as shown in Table 12.
When -ja’ as a first-person plural inclusive marker was borrowed into Mosetenan,
several changes occurred. The marker ‑ja’ was introduced into the reflexive para-
digm, parallel to the changes in the general intransitive paradigm. In this way, the ‘no-
we’ pattern in the intransitive/reflexive inflection was turned into an ‘only-inclusive’
pattern, with no plural marking apart from a separate form for the inclusive (in terms
of Cysouw 2003). In the reflexive, the introduction of ‑ja’ was not as straightforward
as with the general intransitive forms, however. Rather than forming ‑tija’ out of the
reflexive and the first-person plural inclusive marker, the plurality of the inclusive
was acknowledged, in analogy to the plural form *-tik in 2→1 (cf. Table 12). Thus,
the reflexive -ti- was first marked by the plural form ‑k- before the inclusive marker
‑ja’ was added, resulting in the form ‑tikha’.23 Due to the close connection between
these forms, the inclusive reflexive ‑tikha’ became the ground for an analogy with the
2→1 plural form, turning ‑tik into ‑tikha’. From the view of the speakers of Mosetén,
this can be explained by confusion of two structures expressing similar meanings:
‘something that has to do with first- and second-person participants, at the same time
involving plurality’.24 These changes due to analogy must also have been supported
by the speakers due to another reason, namely favoring semantic skewing of first-
and second-person markers, as discussed by Heath (1991, 1998).
4.3. ‑n’
The marker ‑n’ is used only by a minority of families speaking Mosetén of Covendo.
It is homophonous with the marker for the general participle in Mosetenan and has
374 Jeanette Sakel
the same morphophonemics. Probably, the participle has grammaticalized into a

first-person plural inclusive marker due to overlapping semantics:
(10) Jädyäk-yë-ki-’ katyi’ yoj-ye-n’-dyera’ anik nä’-ë-n’
noise-vy-dk-f.s eh r-vy-1pi.s-mo em get.born-vi-1pi.s
ye-ki-’ katyi’ wa-ti-’ käedäej.
say-dk-f.s eh cry-vt-f.s baby
‘Suddenly there was a noise, like we say when we are born, so it is said that
the baby cried.’ or ‘Suddenly there was a noise, like it sounds when being
born, so it is said that the baby cried.’ te/vfj
There are two possible translations of this sentence, depending on whether the
marker ‑n’ functions as a verbal participle or a marker for the first-person plural in-
clusive subject. The path of development seems to be clear: since ‑n’ is used as an in-
clusive marker only by a small subset of speakers of one variant of Mosetén of Cov-
endo, this marker is primarily a general subject or participial marker, which then
has extended to covering inclusive meanings.
There is also evidence from other languages in which a general subject marker
is homophonous with a first-person plural inclusive marker. According to Jensen
(1998), in the language Wayampi (Tupí-Guaraní), the marker for the inclusive can
be used with generic meaning comparable to ‘one’ in ‘one does it this way’. Rodrigues
(1990) also mentions a similar structure in the related language Tupínambá (extinct,
Tupí-Guaraní), where the inclusive marker is used with third persons that are out of
focus, as well as in impersonal constructions. In the same way, in the Arawakan lan-
guages Bare and Tariana from Brazil (Aikhenvald 1999), impersonal forms were re-
interpreted with first-person plural inclusive meanings.
4.4. -sin’ and other object forms

All first-person plural inclusive subject forms deviate from the other forms in the
cross-reference paradigms and can be explained either by being a loan or having
arisen through re-interpretation of another morpheme in the language. The inclu-
sive object forms, on the other hand, appear to be rather conform with the para-
digms they appear in. Furthermore, it is unclear how these forms have developed.
Siewierska & Bakker (this volume) find that object forms are not as frequently
marked for first-person plural inclusive as subject forms. This is true for the re-
flexive object forms (i.e. the forms in which the object is partially included in the
subject or vice versa) in Mosetenan, which are not marked for the inclusive, as op-
posed to the reflexive inclusive subject forms. The marker ‑sin’ ‘third person sub-
ject acting on first-person plural inclusive object’, on the other hand, has a separate
inclusive form. Still, this marker does not stick out in the way the subject forms do.
Since the exclusive object form ‑n is homophonous with the first-person singular
object form, one possibly analysis of the development of the inclusive object marker
‑sin’ is the re-interpretation from a general first-person plural marker. Thus, ‑n was
the marker for first-person singular objects, while ‑sin’ appeared with first-person
plural objects. When the distinction between inclusive and exclusive appeared in
Mosetenan, the singular object marker was extended to the exclusive forms, while
the former first-person plural object marker turned into a separate inclusive marker.
This is parallel to the development of inclusive marking in other languages, such as
the Arawakan languages Campa and Terêna (Aikhenvald 1999).25
5. Conclusion
When I started this investigation, I was wondering why there are different strategies
for ‘we’ marking in Mosetenan. Furthermore, I was surprised by the fact that many
inclusive markers deviate from the general pattern in the cross-reference para-
digms. When I looked closer at the details, it turned out that these idiosyncrasies
appeared due to the introduction of an inclusive–exclusive distinction through bor-
rowing. The morpheme ‑ja’ was borrowed from another language into Mosetenan.
The other forms used to mark the inclusive (-sin’, -ti-, and -n’) are (later) re-inter-
pretation of language-internal morphemes, leading to homophonies between dif-
ferent categories in Mosetenan. In the personal pronouns, no inclusive–exclusive
distinction appeared, probably for economical reasons, since pronouns are usually
dropped.
Even if I did not find the direct source for ‑ja’, much evidence points at such a
loan-scenario:
1. The marker ‑ja’ does not appear elsewhere in Mosetenan (neither as bound mor-
pheme nor as lexical item).
2. A number of surrounding languages have similar markers with comparable
meanings, even if none of these languages seem (at the surface) to be the direct
source.
3. ‑ja’ is very different from the cross-reference markers in Mosetenan: while gen-
der agreement is an important element in the Mosetenan verb, ‑ja’ does not mark
for gender. I assume that the source language probably has no gender distinc-
tions.
4. Only (intransitive and transitive) subjects are marked by ‑ja’ whereas Mosetenan
has generally neutral alignment, with a number of ergative traits in the cross-
reference paradigms. The source language, on the other hand, has probably nom-
inative–accusative alignment.
In order to find out more about this loan scenario, we first need to know more about
the languages currently spoken in South America. For many of these languages,
there are no accessible materials. Materials older than 200 years only exist for few
languages,26 which means that we often have to rely on an analysis of the synchroni-
cal facts in order to learn something about the diachronical development.27
376 Jeanette Sakel
Abbreviations
→ acting on ir modal marker: irrealis
1 first person m masculine
2 second person mo modal marker: certainty
3 third person o object (primary)
an antipassive p plural
apb applicative marker r relative clause marker
co ‘but’ contrastive marker s subject (intransitive)
dk associated motion marker s/a intransitive/transitive subject
e Spanish loan sele spoken text example
eh hearsay evidential sg singular
ele elicitation example ste spoken text example
em emphasis marker tr transitive
ex exclusive vi verbal stem marker ‑i-
f feminine vj verbal stem marker ‑jo-
hor hortative vm verbal marker
i inclusive vt verbal stem marker ‑tyi-
in inessive vy verbal stem marker ‑yi-
Notes
1. I want to thank Elena Filimonova, D. N. S Bhat and two anonymous reviewers for com-
ments on this chapter. Furthermore, I want to thank my Mosetén informants. In the present
chapter, I use data from: AT (Adrian Topepe), JH (Juan Huasna), VC (Victoriano Chairique)
and vj (Victorina Cualico Josesito).
2. Still, the possibility exists that this development has happened due to language-internal
developments.
3. Mosetenan is still considered to be unclassified, even if some attempts have been made to
related this small language family to other families in South America (cf. Swadesh 1963, Sua-
rez 1973). The results of these attempts are not entirely convincing — and therefore I con-
sider Mosetenan to be unclassified (Sakel 2004) before further evidence is brought up.
4. The variety Mosetén of Santa Ana is linguistically and geographically located between
Chimane and Mosetén of Covendo. All three variants are intelligible to tolerant speakers.
5. The first-person plural inclusive is often referred to as 4th person in descriptions of South
American languages (e.g. Hardman 2001: 5). Since the notion of 4th person is used for
other structures as well, such as for one type of switch-reference marking in Inuit languages
(Payne 1979, Fortescue 1984), I use the generally accepted term first-person plural inclu-
sive for this structure.
6. Usually the first-person singular marker is used in this case.
7. Apart from a general plural marking by in that usually appears somewhere in the clause
with third-person plural forms (cf. Sakel 2004)
8. This marker is written -ha’ after a consonant stem.
9. In the table, the gray background marks reflexive forms that appear when the subject
element is properly or partially included in the object element or vice versa. These forms
will be discussed later.
10. Keep in mind that ‑n’ is exclusively used by a minority of families in Covendo .
11. The final vowel regularly changes to /e/ in this environment.
12. The historical source of this suffix as an intransitively used derivational marker (prob-
ably an antipassive marker downplaying the object) can also be seen when ‑ksi- appears in
combination with other derivational suffixes, which often follow ‑ksi-: the applicative suffix
‑bi- ‘do an action (to something) against the owner’s will’ appears between the ‘cross-refer-
ence markers’ ‑ksi‑ and ‑ja’.
(i) Jeb-a-kse-bi-ja’.
eat(tr)-vi-3p.o-apb-1pi.s
‘We are eating them against their will.’ ele/jh
13. In ditransitive verbs, only two elements are marked in the verbal cross-reference end-
ing: these are usually the agent and the beneficiary element, while the patient remains un-
expressed.
14. In order to give the reader easier access to these examples, I present the Chimane data
in the writing system proposed by Grinevald (1996). This orthography is very similar to the
one used for the two Mosetén variants in this chapter.
15. As one anonymous reviewer points out, -ha’/-ja’ could also have been derived from a
noun with a meaning such as ‘people’, ‘man’, or ‘group’, which seem to occur in a number of
Andean and pre-Andine languages (such as Aymara haqi, Cholón hayu ‘man’, etc.). There is
no such noun in Mosetenan, which means that nontheless -ha’/-ja’ is borrowed.
16. For a broader introduction to the functions of the reflexive in Mosetenan cf. Sakel 2004.
17. D. N. S Bhat (p.c.) points out that Marathi (Indo-Aryan) uses the same word (apAN) as
reflexive pronoun and the first-person plural inclusive pronoun.
18. One could argue for Mosetén that in the intransitive inflection, the forms of the first-per-
son singular and first-person plural exclusive are similar, while the form of the first-person
plural inclusive differs from them. However, ‑ja’ is so substantially different from the rest of
the paradigm, that a change of this form from a general first-person plural marker into an
inclusive marker is rather unlikely.
19. The elements in small caps refer to the same form.
20. Heath isolates the following Ngandi morphemes: ŋa ‘1st singular’, ña- (r-), ñu- ‘1st plural
exclusive’, gur- (or gu-e-) ‘1st plural exclusive’(special allomorph), -nu- ‘2nd singular’ and -
na‑, -a- ‘2nd plural’.
21. This is supported by the marker for a third person acting on a second-person plural: ‑nak.
With a singular second person object it is ‑n, i.e. the -(a)k- element expresses plurality of a
second person object.
22. The vowel change from e>a that appears in ‑ye > -yak but not in ‑ti’ > tik is regular in Mo-
setén and affects all vowels but -i- in certain forms, when followed a marker beginning in ‑k
(Sakel 2004: 46–7). The marker ‑ksi (3rd plural object) causes this vowel shift in verbs such
as ye- ‘say, transitive’ but not in ti- ‘bring’. Thus, when the marker ‑ksi is added to these verbs,
the forms become ya-ksi ‘he says to them’ and ti-ksi ‘he brings (something) to them’ — par-
allel to the cross-reference forms ‑yak and ‑tik.
23. The form ‑ja’ is written ‑ha’, since it follows another consonant, according to the orthog-
raphy of Mosetén of Covendo.
378 Jeanette Sakel
24. In this way, the first-person plural inclusive marker ‑ja’ was extended to first-person
plural exclusive objects, namely 2→1 plural forms.
25. Another possibility, suggested by an anonymous reviewer, is that ‑sin’ is related to the
pronoun tsin ‘we, inclusive and exclusive’.
26. The oldest material available for Mosetén is Herrero (1834), which is a collection of old
prayers.
27. Furthermore, a closer investigation of other structures that can be borrowed into Mo-
setenan may give more hints towards (a) possible source language(s).
References
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(eds), 65–106.
Aikhenvald, A. Y. 2002. Language contact in Amazonia. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Press.
Dixon, R. M. W. & Aikhenvald, A. Y. (eds). 1999. The Amazonian languages. Cambridge:
Fortescue, M. 1984. West Greenlandic. London: Croom Helm.
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Tribes Mission.
Greenberg, J. H. 1987. Language in the Americas. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
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jamins.
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Hardman, M. J. 2001. Aymara. München: Lincom.
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Andrés Herrero Misionero Apostólico y traducidas en español palabra para la mejor in-
teligencia de los demás misioneros que de nuevo vayan a catequizar en aquella nación.
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Studies of switch-reference, 65–88. Los Angeles: UCLA [Papers in Syntax 8].
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tico de Verano and Ministerio de Educación.
Chapter 14
The inclusive and exclusive in Shuswap
A background investigation1
Jan P. van Eijk
First Nations University of Canada
Shuwap stands alone among the Salish languages in that it makes a distinction between in-
clusive and exclusive in the first-person plural. In this chapter we investigate the possible ori-
gins of this distinction, i.e., whether it goes back to Proto-Salish or results from either a spon-
taneous development within Shuswap or from diffusion from a non-Salish language. The
available information on the history of Shuswap and its contacts with other languages sug-
gests strongly that the distinction originated within Shuswap, and was not inherited from
Proto-Salish or diffused from a non-Salish source.
Keywords: inclusive, exclusive, first-person plural, Salish, Shuswap, Proto-Salish, spontan-
eous development, diffusion
1. Introduction
On p. 81 of his introduction to the Handbook of American Indian Languages, Boas

(1911) makes the intriguing remark that “. . . we find in one of the Salish dialects
of the Interior the occurrence of an exclusive and inclusive form of the pronoun,
which is absent in all the other dialects of the same stock”.2 The “dialect” that Boas
refers to is Shuswap, but aside from this positive identification, and the fact that we
now class the Salish “dialects” as languages (which do distinguish dialects), Boas
is correct in that Shuswap is the only Salish language that makes the exclusive–in-
clusive distinction. We now have information on the personal paradigms in all the
Salish languages, be it of differing quality and attention to detail, and for no other
language has this distinction been attested.3 Shuswap itself is the subject of an out-
standing study by Kuipers, to which we turn our attention below.
In this chapter we will investigate the origin of the inclusive–exclusive distinc-
tion in Shuswap. After a survey of the formal expression of the inclusive and exclu-
sive (in Section 2) we turn our attention in Section 3 to the three possible explan-
ations for the occurrence of this distinction. We thus investigate whether it is an
inherited feature of Proto-Salish, or a spontaneous development within Shuswap,
or the result of diffusion from another (non-Salish) language in the area. In Sec-
tion 4 we discuss the possible mechanisms of the development of this distinction,
while in Section 5 we offer some conclusions.
382 Jan P. van Eijk
2. The Shuswap facts
The details of Shuswap personal pronominal inflection are set out in exemplary
fashion in Kuipers (1974: 43–8). We extract the following paradigms from Kuipers’s
discussion: (1) the possessive paradigm, based on citxw ‘house;’ (2) the intransitive
verbal paradigm, based on cut ‘to intend,’ and (3) the transitive active and passive
paradigms, based on pic’ ‘to squeeze.’ (In what follows we replace Kuipers’s raised o
with the raised w in order to indicate labialization. We also use the plus-symbol, ra-
ther than Kuipers’s hyphen, to link the article γ to the noun. The forms for the third
person make no gender or number distinctions, so that ‘his,’ ‘he’ and ‘him’ trans-
late as ‘her,’ ‘their,’ etc. as well. Note that the forms that make reference to the first-
person singular possessor, subject or object show so-called consonant reduplica-
tion, i.e., repetition of the consonant before the stressed vowel, once more after the
stressed vowel. This type of reduplication, which signals the diminutive but is used
in these cases as a sign of modesty and humility, is characteristic of some but not
all Shuswap dialects.)4 Note that the exclusive forms are based on the third-person
forms (with the addition of an element kwəxw ). This is why the exclusive forms are
aligned beside the third-person forms in the following paradigms.
γ+n-cictxw ‘my house’ γ+citxw-kt ‘our (incl) house’
γ+’-citxw ‘your house’ γ+citxw-mp ‘your (pl.) house’
γ+citxw-s ‘his house’ γ+cítxw-s kwəxw = kwəxw γ+cítxw-s ‘our (excl.)
house’
cuct-kn ‘I intend’ cut-kt ‘we (incl.) intend’
cut-k ‘you intend’ cut-kp ‘you (pl.) intend’
cut ‘he intends’5 cút kwəxw ‘we (excl.) intend’6
pípc’-n ‘I squeeze him’7 píc’-nt-m ‘we (incl.) squeeze him’
píc’-n-x ‘you squeeze him’ píc’-nt-p ‘you (pl.) squeeze him’
píc’-nt-m ‘he squeezes him’ píc’-nt-m kwəxw ‘we (excl.) squeeze him’
píc’-n-cm-s ‘he squeezes me’ píc’-nt-l-s ‘he squeezes us (incl.)’
píc’-n-c-s ‘he squeezes you’ píc’-nt-lm-s ‘he squeezes you (pl.)’
píc’-n-s ‘he squeezes him’ píc’-n-s kwəxw ‘he squeezes us (excl.)’
pípc’-n-cl-m ‘I am squeezed’ píc’-nt-l-t ‘we (incl) are squeezed’
píc’-n-c-t ‘you are squeezed’ píc’-nt-lm-t ‘you (pl.) are squeezed’
píc’-nt-m ‘he is squeezed’ píc’-nt-m kwəxw ‘we (excl.) are squeezed’
Note that ‘he squeezes him’ translates both as píc’-n-s and as píc’-nt-m. The former
form is used when the subject (agent) is in focus, while the second form is used
when the object (patient) is in focus. (We typically would have píc’-n-s in a story
where, for example, Fox is going about, sees Coyote, and then, for whatever rea-
son, squeezes Coyote. But we would have píc’-nt-m in a story where we first men-
The inclusive and exclusive in Shuswap 383
tion Coyote and then the fact that he was seen and squeezed by Fox.) The form píc’-
nt-m is in fact the third person passive form, while it is also used as the ‘we (incl.)
act on him’ form, as is shown in the paradigms above. (This is part of a pattern also
found in some other Interior Salish languages, in which transitive forms with a first-
person plural subject are identical to passive forms. See, for example, van Eijk 1997:
237–8 on Lillooet.)8 Since the passive third-person form in Shuswap underlies both
the inclusive and exclusive ‘we act on him’ forms, the transitive paradigm with ‘him’
as object also presents the only case within the Shuswap macro-paradigm in which
the inclusive and exclusive forms are related to each other.
3. Possible explanations
As is mentioned above, there are three possible explanations for the origin of the in-
clusive–exclusive distinction in Shuswap. In the first place, it might go back to Proto-
Salish (with loss of this opposition in the other Salish languages). In the second
place, it may result from a spontaneous development within Shuswap, and in the
third place it may result from diffusion from a non-Salish language in the area.
We can dismiss the first possibility right away. We now have comparative-his-
torical studies of the Salish pronominal system by Hoard (1971),9 Newman (1977,
1979a, b, 1980) and Davis (2000), and none of these studies reconstructs the inclu-
sive–exclusive distinction for Proto-Salish. (Newman 1979a, for example, recon-
structs the transitive and intransitive first-person subject markers as *-at and *kət
respectively, with no distinction for inclusive vs. exclusive in either case.)10
The second possibility is in itself feasible. There are numerous examples of lan-
guages creating new personal pronominal distinctions out of existing material. We
may think of the creation of the second-person plural forms you all, youse or yins
(this last one apparently a contraction of you ones) in a number of English dialects.
Another example would be the creation of two or even three levels of formality in
the second-person markers, as in French tu vs. vous, Dutch jij vs. u vs. gij, or Ger-
man du vs. Sie vs. Du. Of particular interest to our discussion is French on, which
patterns as a generic first-person marker (singular or plural) in what appears to be
a more colloquial register than je or nous. (An example of a first-person singular
reading would be on se défend as answer to comment ça va?, and we would have a
first-person plural inclusive reading in vite, on est pressés, spoken by a lover to his or
her beloved when insisting on a last kiss before the train rolls away.)11
Creation of an inclusive–exclusive distinction is also made likely by the fact that
this distinction is attested for a large number of languages, of many different fam-
ilies. The reason for this wide distribution is its usefulness, as it disambiguates po-
tentially confusing situations, and it is easy to see why a language would create this
distinction where it is not historically present. As for the possible formal history of
the rise of this distinction in Shuswap see the last paragraph of Section 4.
384 Jan P. van Eijk
Before we accept the rise of the inclusive–exclusive distinction in Shuswap as

a spontaneous development, we should first investigate whether or not this dis-
tinction was borrowed from a neighbouring non-Salish language. We discuss this
possibility in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 below.
3.1. Possible diffusion from non-Salish

The northwest Native American language area (encompassing both the Northwest
Coast and the Plateau) has always been a hotbed of mutual borrowing and diffusion.
For example, Boas (1911: 36, 81) mentions the existence of “true” (i.e., sex-based)
gender in Chinook (as spoken along the Columbia River) and in Coast Salish lan-
guages of Washington and British Columbia, but not in the Interior Salish languages.
(Silverstein 1974: 69, 99 provides evidence that Salish was the donor here, in spite
of the fact that this category does not occur in Interior Salish.) Mithun (1999: 132–
3) discusses the presence of a demonstrative pronominal system in Blackfoot that
is more developed than that of other Algonquian languages. As Mithun observes,
“[T]he features distinguished by Blackfoot are strikingly similar to those found in
languages of the Wakashan, Salishan, and Chimakuan families on the Northwest
coast”. Other recent studies (such as Thompson & Kinkade 1990, Kinkade, Elmen-
dorf, Rigsby & Aoki 1998, and Beck 2000) investigate the northwest language area
in great detail, with particular attention to the diffusion of a number of linguistic
features. (I also refer the interested reader to these studies for information on mi-
grations, trade routes and bilingualism, factors that play an important part in lin-
guistic diffusion. Finally, Kinkade has drawn my attention to the—admittedly re-
mote—possiblity of early explorers, such as Alexander MacKenzie passing through
the Shuswap area in 1793, playing a role here. These explorers usually employed lo-
cal guides and carriers who may have taken their languages beyond their traditional
boundaries.)
The spread of the inclusive–exclusive distinction across a number of language
families in the northwest language area is tabulated in Table 8 (item 13) of Thomp-
son & Kinkade (1990: 49), and in Table 10 (item 9) of Kinkade et al. (1998: 66).12
It is also the subject of a superb study by William Jacobsen (1980), with a very lu-
cid discussion of Shuswap on p. 220. In this passage, Jacobsen repeats a sugges-
tion made earlier (Jacobsen 1979: 767–8), viz., that the inclusive–exclusive dis-
tinction was possibly diffused from Kwakiutl (Kwakwala) at a time when Shuswap
and Kwakwala were presumably still contiguous. They are now separated by (Atha-
baskan) Chilcotin, a language that does not make the inclusive–exclusive distinc-
tion. (And Chilcotin would not likely have made this distinction at any point in its
history, since it is not a feature of Athabaskan grammatical structure—Leslie Saxon,
p.c.) The Kwakwala markers for the inclusive (-ənts) and exclusive (-ənu’xw), which
are attached to the first person (singular) marker -ən(tł), do not show any relevant
resemblance to the Shuswap inclusive or exclusive markers. However, as Jacobsen
(1980: 220) correctly observes, “it is the category that may have diffused here, not at
all the morphological pattern expressing it”. (See Mithun 1999: 72 for an essentially
identical statement.)13
On the other hand, before we accept Jacobsen’s suggestion that Kwakwala is the
source of the Shuswap inclusive–exclusive distinction, we must first consider the
historic background of the Chilcotin presence in the area. Although various maps
(including those in Czaykowska-Higgins & Kinkade 1998: 2, Kroeber 1999: xxxi and
Thompson 1979: 694) do show Chilcotin coming down in a sharp wedge separating
Shuswap from the coast (and Kwakwala), we should not automatically accept this
as proof that the Chilcotin were invaders here, splitting two previously contiguous
groups. Teit (1909: 466) argues strongly against the intrusion theory and posits that,
although the Shuswap did occupy land west of the Fraser River, according to oral
traditions their territory did not extend further west from there on. In other words,
these traditions do not support the theory of old contacts between the Shuswap and
coastal peoples, including the Kwakiutl. (The Chilcotin presence in the area is rela-
tively recent—see Kinkade 1990: 206—and this then could support the hypothesis
of earlier contacts between the Kwakiutl and the Shuswap, except that the Chilcotin
apparently moved into an area occupied by neither the Kwakiutl nor the Shuswap.
On p. 462 of his book, Teit does mention Chilcotin encroachments upon Shuswap
territories but describes these as recent—i.e., more recent than the general Chilco-
tin presence—and marks them as such on the map on p. 450.)
Even if other pieces of evidence would point at Kwakwala as the source of the in-
clusive–exclusive distinction in Shuswap, we must still consider other possible can-
didates.
Shuswap borders on Kutenai (Ktunaxa), a language isolate, over part of its eastern
boundary. Newman (1979a: 218–19) mentions Kutenai as the source of certain pro-
nominal innovations in Okanagan and Kalispel-Spokane (see also Section 4, third
last paragraph). He also mentions in a footnote (with reference to Gibson 1973) that
“many of the Shuswap men were fluent in Kutenai.” However, since Kutenai appar-
ently lacks an inclusive–exclusive distinction (see Garvin 1948), it must be excused
as a possible source for this distinction in Shuswap.
There was also a rather short-lived Iroquoian presence among the Shuswap, due
to a group of Iroquois that had followed the white furtraders as servants, free trap-
pers and hunters, and had settled in the eastern Shuswap region perhaps as early as
1816 (Teit 1909: 468). The Iroquois maintained their presence in Tete Jaune Creek
(in the northeastern part of Shuswap territory), but they seem to have entirely dis-
solved as a separate group even before Teit’s time (Teit 1909: 451). Although an in-
clusive–exclusive distinction is, to use Jacobsen’s term, “well installed” in the gram-
mar of the Iroquoian languages (see Mithun 1999: 70 for Mohawk examples),
Iroquoian cannot be considered the source of this distinction in Shuswap. First of
all, the Iroquois presence among the Shuswap is too recent and too short-lived to
be a likely source. Secondly, in spite of a certain amount of intermarriage (Teit 1909:
455), the relations between the Shuswap and Iroquois were probably too hostile
to permit the kind of social intercourse that would foster linguistic diffusion. (Ac-
386 Jan P. van Eijk
cording to the Shuswap, as quoted in Teit (1909: 472), the Iroquois were “inclined
to be cruel; inclined to thieving, especially to stealing girls”. Teit (1909: 468) also re-
counts the abduction and murder of a Shuswap girl by the Iroquois.)14 Finally, Teit
(1909: 468) observes about the Iroquois that “[T]heir language was not understood”
(i.e. by the Shuswap), and while some of the Iroquois spoke Shuswap (p. 468), the
Shuswap apparently did not speak the language of the Iroquois.15
There are two more language families in the area that may have been the source
of the inclusive–exclusive distinction in Shuswap. One is Siouan, of which Stoney
(incorrectly identified as Athabaskan in Teit 1909: 451) touches a small part of the
eastern Shuswap border. Siouan does make a distinction between inclusive and ex-
clusive, but with a twist in that it opposes a dual inclusive (“you and me”) to a plural
that does not distinguish between inclusive and exclusive (see Mithun 1999: 70 and
Rood & Taylor 1996: 465 for Lakhota, and Schudel 1997: 48–9 for Nakoda, both rel-
atives of Stoney).16 The somewhat peculiar structure of the Siouan inclusive–exclu-
sive distinction makes it an unlikely candidate for the Shuswap pattern. Also, the
contacts between the Shuswap and the Stoney were certainly too peripheral to al-
low the Stoney language to exert its influence throughout Shuswap country. Teit
(1909: 467) mentions the migration of a small group of eastern Shuswap (the Kin-
baskets) into the territory of the Stoney, with whom they formed an alliance. Teit
mentions this migration as having taken place about 65 years before he recorded it,
and over time the contacts between the migrated Shuswap and their kinfolk had be-
come very infrequent. The other family is Algonquian, which is discussed in Sec-
tion 3.2.
3.2. Algonquian
The most promising candidate for the origin of the Shuswap inclusive/exclusive
seems to be Algonquian, represented in its westernmost extension by Cree and
Blackfoot. Contacts between the Shuswap and the Blackfoot seem to have been
sparse. Teit (1909: 472) observes, “[T]he Blackfeet were not well known, but noted
as a tall people, very numerous, warlike, and buffalo-hunters. Otherwise they were
supposed to resemble the southern Okanagan”. Contacts with the Cree were cer-
tainly much more extensive. Teit (1909: 450) assigns a large portion of the eastern
Shuswap border to an area that abuts Cree territory, and on pp. 454–5 he mentions
“a great deal” of mixture between the Shuswap of that area and the Cree (and the
Iroquois, for that matter). He also mentions what was apparently widespread Cree-
Shuswap bilingualism among the Shuswap whom he had met.
The distinction between the inclusive and exclusive first-person plural is hard-
wired into Algonquian grammar and can be reconstructed for Proto-Algonquian.
Aubin (1975) reconstructs Proto-Algonquian ‘we inclusive’ as *ki:lawena:n(aw)
(p. 65), and ‘we exclusive’ as *ni:la:na and *ni:lawena:n (p. 113). The fact that the in-
clusive–exclusive distinction is firmly embedded in Algonquian grammar, and the
fact that the contacts between at least the eastern Shuswap and the Cree were strong
and generally friendly (see Teit 1909: 472), would in themselves be arguments for
considering Algonquian, and in particular Cree, as a source for the Shuswap pattern.
However, the Cree are apparently relative newcomers to the area (Mandelbaum
1979: 40–6 gives 1820–8 as the period in which they completed their occupation
of the western Plains), and this would argue against a spread of the inclusive–ex-
clusive distinction throughout the Shuswap area. On the other hand, as Sarah Tho-
mason has pointed out to me, the shallow time-depth itself is not a problem, since
borrowing can take place within a very short period. However, the spread of this
feature within a short time throughout what by 1820 would already be a very large
area would be a problem. In other words, time is not a problem here, but space is.
There is also a third view of this matter. In a recent study, Byram & Lewis (2001)
argue for an older Cree presence on the western Plains than Mandelbaum allows.
This would make diffusion of the inclusive–exclusive distinction from Cree into
Shuswap more likely. Following Snow (1959), the same authors also argue that the
word ‘ooligan’ (‘eulachon,’ ‘oolachan,’ etc.), i.e., the name for the ‘candle-fish’ that
was prized as a trade item throughout the Northwest Coast area, may have been de-
rived from the Proto-Algonquian term for ‘dish, bowl’ (given as *ola:kani in Aubin
1975: 119). They even suggest a Cree origin for ‘Oregon,’ based on a Western Cree
dialect that has replaced Proto-Algonquian *l with r. ‘Oregon’ could then result
from the pronunciation with r of ‘ooligan’ (i.e., the name of the fish), eventually be-
coming the name of the state. I venture no assessment of these etymologies, but I
refer the interested reader directly to Byram & Lewis for details, including the role
played by Chinook Jargon in this process. (There is a limited but clearly attesta-
ble Cree presence in Chinook Jargon, e.g., totoosh ‘[woman’s] breast,’ or mitass ‘leg-
gings’ [Shorey Book Store 1973]. The standard Cree spellings, tohtôs and mitâs, are
given in Wolvengrey 2001.)
Another possibility would be that the contacts between the Shuswap and the
Algonquian peoples are much more ancient than even Byram & Lewis allow. Al-
though Siebert (1967) reconstructs the Algonquian homeland as situated around
the eastern Great Lakes (see also the summary of Siebert’s article in Arlotto 1972:
237–41), this does not prevent us from postulating an even older homeland in a
much dimmer past. If this homeland were situated in a western area bordering on
the Shuswap homeland, it would account for possible diffusion of the exclusive vs.
inclusive into Shuswap. Moreover, it would account for the presence of Wiyot and
Yurok (related to Algonquian within so-called Algic) in California. (Wiyot and
Yurok are often collectively labelled Ritwan, although Berman 1982: 412 mentions
that “. . .one might expect that Wiyot and Yurok form a genetic subgroup, but the
evidence presented so far is inconclusive”.) The movement of one branch of Algic
southward into California and another one eastward to the Great Lakes would be
more plausible than a long trek of the Proto-Wiyot and Yurok across western North
America. Berman (1982: 419) even suggests that the Wiyot and Yurok may have fol-
lowed a southward path that was to be used several thousand years later by Atha-
baskan invaders into California.
388 Jan P. van Eijk
Berman’s argument for a northwestern Algic homeland is based on the similar-

ity between the vowel systems of Proto-Algonquian-Ritwan and Salish, as noted
on p. 412 of his study and continued on p. 419 with “[I]f this was the result of lan-
guage contact rather than coincidence, it would place the Proto-Algonquian-Rit-
wan homeland near the Proto-Salish homeland. This was probably in the north-
west, to the north of the Ritwan languages and to the west of the Proto-Algonquian
homeland, which was in the vicinity of the Great Lakes (Siebert 1967)”.
Denny (1989: 86–90) also argues for a closer proximity between the Salish and
Algonquian (or better, Algic) homelands than would be allowed by Siebert’s recon-
struction. Denny’s arguments are mainly based on a number of morphological sim-
ilarities between both language families, but on p. 88 he adds that “[S]ince archaeol-
ogists believe the Wiyot and Yurok migrated fairly recently to the Pacific Coast from
the Columbian Plateau, it is likely that the ancestor language of Algonquian and
Ritwan (sometimes called Algic) was spoken in that region”.)
On p. 90 of his article, Denny even argues for the possibility of a Proto-Algon-
quian-Salish family, which he then tentatively situates on the Columbian Plateau
about 7000 BC (± 1000 years). This possibility must definitely be held in abeyance,
although the morphological evidence brought in by Denny is tantalizing.
If the inclusive–exclusive distinction was borrowed into Shuswap from (Proto-)
Algic, we would expect the Shuswap area at that time to have been small. If it would
have been large, the occurrence of this distinction throughout the area would
have been problematic, since certain other features, such as diminutive reduplica-
tion associated with the first-person singular, are limited to certain dialects only
(Kuipers 1974: 39). Indeed, Kinkade (1990) argues persuasively for an intrusion
of Interior Salish from a coastal homeland and expansion thereafter. This supports
the possibility of a relatively small Proto-Shuswap homeland that could have ab-
sorbed the inclusive–exclusive distinction from an Algic neighbour before expand-
ing. (If the Interior would have been the Salish homeland, there would have been a
greater chance of Shuswap expansion before contacts with Algic, in which case we
would have to account for the somewhat problematic spread of the borrowed fea-
ture throughout the Shuswap area.)
There is a particularly interesting parallel between Salish and Algonquian in
that for both language families we can reconstruct two numerals for ‘one’, which
show at least a superficial similarity. Goddard (1979: 106–7) gives both *nekwetw-
and *pe:šekw- for Proto-Algonquian, while Kuipers (1970: 61 and 1998: 304) gives
*nak’ (*nək’-u’) and *pala’ for Proto-Salish. Note the mutual resemblance between
the first members of each pair, and the resemblance between the second members.
(Kuipers 1970: 61 already notes the resemblance between *nək’-u’ and *n-ekot-wi,
the form of *nekwetw- that is given in Bloomfield 1946: 116, although Bloomfield
omits the hyphens that occur in the form listed by Kuipers. Bloomfield also pro-
vides details on the distribution between the two forms for ‘one’ in Algonquian.) It
is quite possible that at an early stage, when Salish and Algonquian were presuma-
bly still contiguous, some Salish languages borrowed the Algonquian numeral for
‘one’ and used it to replace their own, while some Algonquian languages borrowed
the Salish numeral.17
Finally, Pentland (p.c.) informs me that there is some evidence that Pre-Proto-
Algonquian may have had glottalized consonants, which might have been the result
of diffusion from Salish. (Pentland did present this hypothesis at an annual meeting
of the Linguistic Association of America, probably in 1983, and repeated his find-
ings two years later at one of the Algonquian conferences. However, so far his in-
triguing hypothesis remains unpublished.)
4. Mechanism and semantics
If we assume that the inclusive–exclusive distinction was diffused into Shuswap

from a non-Salish source, this would still leave us with two possibilities. Either the
formal marker for the exclusive (kwəxw, either in this form or an older form) was
borrowed as such, or it was merely the semantic distinction that was borrowed, with
reanalysis of an existing Shuswap morpheme in order to express the new category.
The former solution is highly unlikely, since to the best of my knowledge none of the
possible candidate languages has a marker for the exclusive that formally resem-
bles Shuswap kwəxw or can be reconstructed in a form that resembles it. Looking at
Algonquian, the most promising candidate so far as the donor of the inclusive–ex-
clusive distinction, and taking Cree as a representative of this family, we find that in
this language a pluralizing suffix that combines with a first person prefix indicates
the exclusive, while a non-third pluralizing suffix that combines with a second per-
son prefix indicates the inclusive. As an example we give the full possessive inflec-
tion of the inanimate noun môhkomân ‘knife.’18 (Prefixes and suffixes are marked in
boldface, to set them apart from the stem.)
nimôhkomân ‘my knife’ nimôhkomâninân ‘our (excl.) knife’
kimôhkomâninaw ‘our (incl.) knife’
kimôhkomân ‘your knife’ kimôhkomâniwâw ‘your (pl.) knife’
omôhkomân ‘his knife’ omôhkomâniwâw ‘their knife’
omôhkomâniyiw ‘the other person’s = omôhkomâniyiw ‘the other persons’
knife’ knife’
The intransitive and transitive verbal paradigms of Cree do not contain any mor-
pheme either that could have been the etymological source of Shuswap kwəxw.
We are thus left with the possibility that Shuswap merely borrowed the inclusive–
exclusive distinction as a semantic opposition (and used its own morphological
material to formally create the distinction). As we have seen in Section 3.1, Jacob-
sen correctly points out this possiblity, and he uses it in support of his hypothesis
that Kwakwala may have been the donor of the Shuswap pattern. This leaves two
things to be explained: what is the original form and function of kwəxw, and how can
we explain the synchronic structure of the exclusive in semantic terms?
390 Jan P. van Eijk
As for the first issue, kwəxw shows a striking resemblance to kəxw or kaxw, the
form that has been reconstructed for the second singular intransitive subject
marker in Proto-Salish (Newman 1979a, Davis 2000). However, kəxw has become -k
in Shuswap (see the paradigms in Section 2), and the neogrammarian postulate of
regularity in sound shifts would require kəxw to have become -k also where it marks
the exclusive. It is quite possible, however, that kəxw as the exclusive marker retained
full word stress at a time when kəxw as the second singular marker was losing the
stress to the verbal stem with which it was associated. (Thus, the differences in stress-
treatment could be explained formally in terms of different syntactic positions.)
This would allow kəxw as the second singular marker to be reduced to -k, while kəxw
as the exclusive marker would subsequently be demoted to (unstressed) particle
status but suffer less phonetic attrition. (The attrition would be limited to spreading
of the labialization through the ə to k, preceded by reduction of a to ə if one follows
Davis 2000 and posits kaxw as the proto-form.)
From a semantic point of view one may wonder how a form that combines third
person markings with a second-person marker (if kwəxw is indeed derived from the
second singular marker) could express the first-person plural exclusive, rather than
the second-person plural. (The latter would be the natural semantic function of
a form that combines reference to ‘he’ and ‘you.’) Perhaps the solution lies in the
fact that personal pronominal systems are notoriously casual about their frames of
reference and may undergo various shifts here. One may think of the pedantic or
ironic ‘we’ used as a second-person form (teacher to pupil: ‘have we forgotten our
books again today?’, or French alors on ne dit plus bonjours aux amis! ‘don’t we say
hello to our friends any more?’). Similarly, there is the use of a third-person form
to refer to the addressee (the polite address forms in many European languages).19
With these patterns in mind, a shift in reference from second to first person in the
case of *kəxw is not in itself impossible. Of course, if this were the case, Shuswap
would employ an obvious and logical method of marking the first-person plural ex-
clusive, by using a combination of a third person with a first person.
There may be some comparative Salish support for the proposed shift in refer-
ence from second to first person in *kəxw. Kroeber and Mattina bring to my atten-
tion that Okanagan and Kalispel-Spokane have a first-person singular intransitive
marker that is basically of the shape kwu- and arose in competition with the reflexes
of Proto-Salish *kən. Newman (1979a: 218–19) suggests Kutenai as the origin of
kwu-, but this seems unlikely. There is a remote possibility that kwu- results from a
contraction of *kəxw, with a shift in reference from second to first person. (We have
such contractions in a number of Interior Salish languages, but not always with a
shift in reference from second to first person, see Newman for details.) It is possible
then that in Shuswap we have a shift in reference from second to first person, with a
minor shift in form (*kəxw > kwəxw).
It is also possible that kwəxw goes back to a (hitherto unidentified) Pre-Shuswap
or Proto-Salish element with a meaning different from that of second person, pos-
sibly an element with a nominal meaning. Michael Cysouw (p.c.) brings to my at-
tention that this is apparently the situation in Carib, where the combination of the
third person with an element amna indicates the first-person plural exclusive. The
etymology of amna is obscure, but experts on Carib (Cysouw refers to Spike Gildea
and Sergio Meira) assume that it is nominal in origin. In general, as far as the formal
expression of the first-person plural exclusive vs. inclusive is concerned, the pos-
sibilities are almost boundless (see the catalogue in Jacobsen 1980).
Finally, it should be noted that, since the origin of kwəxw seems solidly Salish, the
putative formal and semantic histories of this form that are discussed in the preced-
ing paragraphs could also be taken as supporting an internal Shuswap development,
rather than the result of semantic diffusion.
5. Conclusions
In this article I have tried to trace the origin of the inclusive–exclusive distinction in
Shuswap. Of the three possible origins of this distinction (inheritance from Proto-
Salish, spontaneous development within Shuswap, or diffusion from a non-Salish
source) the first possibility can be safely dismissed. Of the remaining two, we can
dismiss neither the spontaneous development nor the diffusion from an outside
source.
We would have a convincing case for diffusion if we could etymologically trace
the Shuswap exclusive marker to a neighbouring non-Salish form with a compati-
ble form and meaning. Although we do not have such an etymological proof, we can
still entertain the possibility of a non-Salish source. In that case, it would be the cat-
egory itself that was diffused, but not the formal markers of the distinction. Of the
various language families that Shuswap has been in contact with and that make the
inclusive–exclusive distinction, Algonquian seems to be the most likely candidate as
a donor. Iroquoian and Siouan are most probably to be dismissed, due to the ephem-
eral nature of the contacts between these families and Shuswap. The candidacy of
Kwakwala, mentioned as a possible donor by Jacobsen (1979, 1980), is also problem-
atic, due to the fact that any areal contact between this language and Shuswap cannot
be proven at this point, and Shuswap oral history actually argues against it.20
In the absence of clear formal evidence that the distinction was borrowed from
a non-Salish source, and considering how useful and widespread this distinction is
(see Section 3 above), it seems most likely that it was created spontaneously within
Shuswap.
Notes
1. I wish to express my gratitude to Arok Wolvengrey and David Pentland for giving me their
Algonquianist insights during the preparation of this article, and for leading me to Denny
(1989). Thanks are also due to Sarah Thomason, Mercedes Hinkson and Paul Kroeber, for
their comments after my presentation of the original version of this article at the 7th Work-
392 Jan P. van Eijk
shop on Structure and Constituency in the Languages of the Americas (WSCLA), Univer-
sity of Alberta, Edmonton, March 22–4, 2002. I am also very grateful to Dale Kinkade, Aert
Kuipers, Tony Mattina, Thom Hess, William Jacobsen Jr., and Michael Cysouw, to whom
I sent copies of this article after the workshop and who graciously shared their profound
knowledge of Amerindian languages (of various families) with me. The responsibility for
this article remains my own. A different version of this article has appeared in the Proceed-
ings of the 7th WSCLA (van Eijk 2002).
A brief history of the terms ‘inclusive’ and ‘exclusive’ (with many references to Native
American languages) is given in Haas (1969a).
2. This page appears as page 68 in the reprint in Holder (1966).
3. For a survey of Salish grammars (and other Salish linguistic studies) up to 1995 see Czay
kowska-Higgins & Kinkade (1998). Salish grammars that have appeared since 1995 are
Davis & Saunders (1997) on Bella Coola, and van Eijk (1997) on Lillooet.
Van Eijk (1997: 157) mentions the presence of what appears to be an inclusive vs. exclu-
sive distinction in an adhortative paradigm in Lillooet. Being limited to only one stem, the
distinction is entirely marginal in Lillooet, in contrast to Shuswap.
4. In function this type of reduplication is similar to, for example, Italian mia moglie vs. la
sua signora and comparable humility-devices, as quoted in Bloomfield (1933: 402).
5. The third-person forms may be accompanied by an optional particle -əkwe, which we omit
here. It seems to be a quotative or reportative, discussed in detail by Kuipers on p. 74.
6. Kuipers does not mention the possibility of kwəxw preceding the main stem, as he does
for the possessive paradigm.
7. The basic structure of the transitive forms is as follows: Root-Transitivizer-Object-Subject.
The transitivizer in these forms is -nt, as in píc’-nt-lm-s ‘he squeezes you (pl.),’ with -lm for
‘you (pl.) object’ and -s ‘he.’ The object-suffix for the third person is zero, and in such forms
the suffix following the transitivizer marks the subject. The transitivizer -nt drops the t in a
number of forms, and in the relation ‘I-him’ it contracts with the -n that marks the first sin-
gular subject, hence pípc’-n.
8. For an insightful discussion of the double function of the passive in Shuswap see also
Jacobsen (1980: 220). One may also argue that the Salish passive is not really a passive, but
rather an ‘indefinite actor’ paradigm. This is the venue taken by Thompson & Thompson
(1992: 58), as quoted in van Eijk (1997: 264), with further references to the literature there.
Newman (1985), on the other hand, argues against the ‘indefinite actor’ (or ‘indefinite sub-
ject’) interpretation of the Salish passive. See also note 10.
9. Hoard’s study should be read with great caution, since the author had to work with incom-
plete and in some cases unreliable material. Nevertheless, Hoard should be saluted for his
pioneering effort. (Kinkade also brings to my attention that Newman’s reconstructions have
to be reassessed in the light of recent research and because of data that were not yet avail-
able to Newman when he conducted his studies.)
10. Newman (1979a: 212) adds that the k in *kət is a separate morpheme that occurs also in
combination with other personal markers, or, in his words, “Intransitive subjects are con-
structed by adding PS *k- Intr to the reduced form of transitive pronouns; this does not ap-
ply to the third singular, which is zero rather than the expected **k-əs.”
Note that in the Shuswap passive paradigm both the passive (or ‘indefinite actor’) marker
-m and the reflex of the first-person plural transitive marker *at appear. Newman (1985: 522)
spots this problem and defuses it immediately by observing that “[T]hroughout the his-
tory of Salish, pronominal forms have spread from one paradigm to another, their ancestral
functions becoming blurred or lost”. (See also n. 19 in this connection.)
11. Thanks are due to Patrick Douaud (Faculty of Education, University of Regina), Rose-
Marie Déchaine (University of British Columbia) and Aert Kuipers for providing me with
their insights on the semantics and pragmatics of the use of on. Historically, on comes from
Latin homo and appeared as an indefinite pronoun during the transition from Vulgar Latin
to Old French, i.e., between 500 and 1000. Its widespread usage in French may have been
influenced by Germanic Man, which was introduced into Gaul by the Franks. The informa-
tion on the historical background of this distinction is due to Douaud, while Kuipers draws
my attention to a treatment of this topic in the Larousse étymologique to which I refer the in-
terested reader for further details.
12. This last table erroneously lists the inclusive–exclusive distinction as occurring in
Kutenai.
13. The borrowing of personal pronouns is in itself possible, in spite of the fact that such
markers are often considered part of the “core vocabulary” and as such supposed to be
highly resistant to borrowing. However, as Dixon (1997: 20) makes clear, “any lexeme may
be borrowed (and may over time diffuse over a considerable area)”. (In other words, one may
question whether “core” vocabularies really exist. See also note 17 for examples of borrow-
ing of numerals across linguistic family lines.) Arlotto (1972: 188) mentions the borrowing
of plural pronouns into English from Old Norse, and de Vries (1973: 259–60) mentions the
borrowing of the reflexive pronoun zich from German into Dutch.
14. Somewhat incongruously, the Iroquois are also described on p. 472 as “quiet, not aggres-
sive or revengeful”.
15. Teit does not mention what language or languages were spoken by the Iroquois, i.e.,
whether it was Mohawk, Oneida, Seneca, or any of the other extant Iroquoian languages.
16. For a thorough study of the linguistic relations within northern Siouan see Parks & De-
Mallie (1992).
17. Kuipers informs me that he no longer considers *pala’ to be Proto-Salish, due to the fact
that it is historically limited to a number of Central Salish languages, so that its presence in
Lillooet and Thompson results from internal Salish borrowing. Accordingly, it is listed un-
der “Central Salish Roots” in Kuipers (2002: 217).
In addition to the two Salish forms given here, Bella Coola has s-maw, probably a bor-
rowing from Wakashan (Nater 1977: 14), while Upper Chehalis has ’o .c’s (diminutive of less
frequent ’uc’s), besides nač’- and nač’-aw- (both of which are used only in bound forms),
Kinkade (1991: 14–15). Kinkade also has directed my attention to two other non-cognate
forms for ‘one’ in Salish, viz., Pentlatch łt’áli, and the form that underlies Twana dáqas, Co-
lumbian naqs and Colville naqs.
There is considerable borrowing of numerals involving Salish and neighbouring languages,
as is attested by Bella Coola s-maw mentioned above. Kinkade also brings to my attention
that the form for ‘six’ is shared by Chinook and most of the Tsamosan and Central Salish
languages, although the direction of borrowing is not entirely clear. We also have intriguing
similarities between the Salish and Kutenai numerals for ‘one’ through ‘four,’ as discussed
in Kuipers (1970: 68), with reference to Haas (1965) (erroneously listed as Haas 1955 in
Kuipers’s article). An example of Amerindian numeral borrowing that does not involve Sal-
ish is the Cherokee (Iroquoian) word for ‘seven’ from Muskogean Creek (Haas 1969b: 81).
394 Jan P. van Eijk
18. Details of Cree pronominal inflection are given in Ahenakew (1987) and Okimâsis &
Ratt (1999). Cree speakers may also add a suffix ‑im to the stem when that is marked with
possessive affixes. The suffix ‑im stresses ownership (often translatable as ‘[my, your, his]
own’) and as such it is more often used with third person owners (non-participants in the
speech event) and it is obligatory in combination with those nouns that signal entities not
normally owned in traditional Cree culture. Thus we may have omôhkomânim besides
omôhkomân, and we would definitely have nisîsîpim ‘my duck (sîsîp),’ since ducks roamed
freely and were not kept on duck farms, where they would be someone’s property. (The word
sîsîp is also an example of an animate noun, the inflection of which has special complications
due to the obligatory obviative in the case of a third person possessor.)
19. A clear example of how a personal pronominal marker can shift its frame of reference de-
pending on context is provided by the Lillooet object marker -tumuł. The basic meaning of
this suffix is ‘us’, as in cun-tumúł-as ‘he (-as) tells (cun) us.’ However, in combination with the
first-person singular subject suffix -kan, the suffix -tumuł marks the second-person plural
object, as in cun-tumúł-kan ‘I tell you folks’. An extensive catalogue of overlaps between first
and second persons in Native American languages is given in Heath (1998).
20. If any Salish languages should have borrowed the inclusive–exclusive distinction from
Kwakwala, it should have been Bella Coola and Comox, which have been exposed to influ-
ence from Kwakwala (or its close relative Heiltsuk) over a long time. Examples of linguistic
diffusion from Kwakwala into Comox include the simplification of word-initial consonant
clusters to single consonants (Thompson 1979: 732) and the borrowing of lexical items, such
as waχac’i ‘pipe’ from Heiltsuk (Jacobsen 1979a: 773). For examples of Northern Wakashan
influence on Bella Coola, see Nater (1977). However, neither Bella Coola nor Comox make
the inclusive–exclusive distinction.
As for the inclusive–exclusive distinction within Wakashan, Jacobsen (1979: 767) notes
that it is made only in Northern Wakashan (“Kwakiutlan”). (The southern branch encom-
passes Nootka, Ditidaht and Makah.) Jacobsen (1997: 574 [n. 8, referring to p. 571]) argues
against Haas’s suggestion that this distinction can be reconstructed for Proto-Wakashan,
and that it had been lost in Southern Wakashan. Instead, Jacobsen adduces evidence that this
distinction developed only in Northern Wakashan. (Jacobsen also disagrees with a more un-
likely suggestion made by Morris Swadesh about Pre-Nootka.)
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Cree Editing Council].
Chapter 15
Clusivity cross-linguistically
Common trends and possible patterns1
Elena Filimonova
University of Konstanz
This concluding chapter summarizes the results of the volume as well as the observations of
the earlier typological literature, particularly emphasizing cross-linguistically valid general-
izations implicating the distinction of inclusive and exclusive. It also points out typologically
rare patterns of clusivity.
Keywords: clusivity, cross-linguistic generalizations, counter-examples
1. Introduction
The aim of this concluding chapter is to provide an overview of the phenomenon of

clusivity, summarizing the findings of preceding chapters as well as the generaliza-
tions on this topic extracted from earlier typological literature.
The primary goal of each typological study is to describe the range of cross-lin-
guistic variation for the phenomenon in question and to outline the limits of this
variation, emphasizing not only the regularities but also the anomalies (or ‘non-
such’2) of the studied topic. In our case, this would indicate the (im)possible con-
stellations of grammatical and semantic features characterizing the opposition of
inclusive–exclusive as well as its distribution. I intentionally avoid calling these lan-
guage rules ‘universals’, in order not to be drawn into the discussion about the pur-
posefulness and statistical plausibility of the listed claims and instead prefer the
neutral terms ‘generalization’ (hence G) or ‘tendency’. In what follows, I will present
a list of significant tendencies that usually hold true in the languages where the clu-
sivity is claimed to exist. Quoting the generalizations I standardize (if possible) the
corresponding original texts in an IF . . . THEN fashion — a procedure also carried
out in The Universals Archive, a searchable collection of universals available online
at http://ling.uni-konstanz.de/pages/proj/sprachbau.htm — also avoiding some-
times very complex metalanguages used by the authors in their specific contribu-
tions. This makes the cited tendencies uniform and, hopefully, easier to process.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the main findings
about the structure of pronominal paradigms with inclusive–exclusive contrast.
They mainly concern the status of inclusive and exclusive counterparts inside the
400 Elena Filimonova
opposition, the relation between the opposition and the number contrast, possible
restrictions on clusivity forms to be homonym to the other members of the para-
digm. Section 3 considers the main conclusions about the clusivity opposition in
free vs. bound pronouns, followed by results about the contrast in imperative para-
digms (section 4). Section 5 sums up the findings on additional functions of inclu-
sive–exclusive forms. Section 6 summarizes the contributions on the origin of the
opposition and its historical stability. Section 7 offers a summary of the atypical
uses of the terms inclusive and exclusive attested in the preceding chapters and lin-
guistic literature in general. Section 8 discusses possible typological correlates of
the opposition. Finally, section 9 rounds off the chapter.
2. Clusivity in the pronominal paradigm
2.1. General
In a pronominal paradigm, the inclusive–exclusive contrast has often been consid-
ered as an additional two-way distinction within a first-person plural category. Such
an alignment might indeed suit some languages but it is far from being universal.
In the last half century there were a number of contributions arguing against this
presumption and introducing other arrangements of the contrast in the paradigm.
Particularly in this volume, there are a few chapters presenting different classifica-
tions of the systems with an inclusive–exclusive distinction. Thus, surveying South
American languages, Crevels & Muysken pay special attention to the so-called four
person systems where inclusive is coordinate with first, second and third person cat-
egories. In his theoretically oriented chapter, Daniel convincingly argues for the in-
clusive always being a separate person rather than a subcategory of the first person.
A fresh look at the typology of clusivity systems is presented by Bickel & Nichols.
They propose a classification based on the structural geometry of pronominal para-
digm considering in particular whether the roots or stems of inclusive and exclusive
forms are shared by any other person or number and whether there are any gaps in
the paradigm at the intersection of clusivity and person/number categories. Siew-
ierska & Bakker introduce a further elaboration of the first person complex sug-
gested by Cysouw (2003) adding two further patterns — occasionally attested also
by Cysouw and earlier by Greenberg (1988) but more numerous in Sieweierska &
Bakker’s sample. All these findings clearly highlight the clusivity contrast as an in-
triguing and by no means trivial distinction in the pronominal paradigm. Notwith-
standing its typological diversity there are quite a few features that commonly occur.
2.2. Two poles of opposition

In this section, I consider the internal structure of the distinction with a particu-
lar focus on the status of inclusive and exclusive counterparts. Traditionally the dis-
Clusivity cross-linguistically 401
tinction between inclusive and exclusive forms is treated as an opposition, whereby

the set of participants referring to the speaker and including the addressee(s) is said
to contrast the set excluding the latter. At first glance, such a definition presupposes
an equipotential existence of both parts of the dichotomy, i.e. if in a language an op-
position of inclusive and exclusive is registered, there are two pronominal forms,
one with an inclusive meaning and another with an exclusive one; so that the pres-
ence of one form would imply the presence of another, and vice versa.
However, this claim is true for the majority of languages, but not all of them.
There are languages where only the inclusive gets a dedicated morphological form,
like for example in Aymara (Aymaran). In (1) you can see the four basic pronominal
forms and the corresponding referential sets (adapted from Hardman-de-Bautista,
Vásquez & Yapita Moya 1974: 209). The exclusive meaning ‘speaker and others’ is
associated with the ‘I’ form, while an inclusive group of speaker and addressee gets
a dedicated encoding. The forms are unspecified for number but can optionally
take a plural marker ‑naka.
(1) naya/na {S}, {S + N +… + N}3
jiwasa {S + A}, {S + A+ …+ N …}
juma {A}, {A + A…+ A}, {A + N +…+ N}
jupa {N}, {N + N +…+ N}
Structurally the Aymara inclusive has nothing to do with the first person and would
better be recognized as a separate (fourth) person (more on the topic in Filimonova
2002). Crevels & Muysken (this volume) give further examples from central–west-
ern South America where pronominal systems can be analyzed likewise as four per-
son systems. In their areal sample of 65 languages, 12.3 % reveal this pattern. In the
world-wide perspective, according to Siewierska & Bakker (this volume), this type
of systems is registered less often: in 2.3% of 394 sampled languages within free per-
sonal pronouns and in up to 5% within bound markers.
These data allow us to suggest that whenever there is a dedicated form4 for an ex-
clusive, there is a dedicated form for an inclusive as well, but not the reverse.
G1 Excl ⇒ Incl
This particular claim was also stated earlier by Sokolovskaya:5
IF there is a special form with the meaning ‘speaker + non-participant(s)’ (i.e. “we
exclusive”) THEN there is a special form with the meaning ‘speaker + addressee(s)’
and/or ‘speaker + addressee(s) + non-participant(s)’ (i.e. “we inclusive”). (Sokolov
skaya 1980: 95, U 43) [UA #1484; cf. also Cysouw 2003: 96–7].6
A logical inference from this generalization would be to question whether inclu-

sive and exclusive present a straightforward opposition referring to each other as a
plus/minus of a single grammatical category. This particular problem is faced in the
chapter by Lichtenberk who claims that inclusive–exclusive is an opposition of un-
equals. Of the two members of the opposition, inclusive seems to possess a special
status. He supports his claim with the data documenting two findings. Firstly, he
registers significantly more additional functions besides clusivity proper of the in-
clusive than of the exclusive. Secondly, he finds the usual survival of the inclusive
form while the opposition falls (see also Section 6).
The study of clusivity counterparts in terms of markedness was carried out by La-
Polla (this volume). He treats markedness as overt coding, not as a cluster of corre-
lating properties (as a classical notion of markedness in the way of the Prague lin-
guistic school would suggest). According to this approach, the unmarked category
is more simply marked (or not marked at all) and the marked item gets a special
morphological marking. LaPolla presents a detailed morphological survey of inclu-
sive–exclusive contrast in Tibeto-Burman languages and finds out that in this lan-
guage family it is pre-eminently the inclusive that appears to be more marked, often
signaled by a separate marker attached to the exclusive form. This tendency is, how-
ever, violated by Kiranti languages where the exclusive is the more marked form.
The Kiranti group is the only one where the clusivity contrast can be reconstructed
to the proto level. In the other groups this contrast is a later development intro-
duced by diffusion through the neighbouring languages or innovated within a sin-
gle language or low level groupings. The rise of any opposition involves a reanalysis
of morphemes already existing in a language and for some reason it was a general
plural form that in this particular case was reanalysed as an exclusive, whereas the
inclusive became encoded by a special marker.
At the moment we do not have the data as to whether this grammaticalization
path is common within other language families as well. In Jacobsen’s (1980) brief
survey, there are examples of both derivational paths: inclusive based on exclusive
(like in Washo (Hokan)) and exclusive based on inclusive forms (e.g. Wiradyuri
(Pama-Nyungan), Tzeltal (Mayan), Tübatulabal (Uto-Aztecan)). All these findings
suggest that the generalizations about morphological structure based on syn-
chronic patterns only should be treated with great caution. For instance, the mor-
phological models of inclusive and exclusive forms can differ considerably in inher-
ited and innovated oppositions.
2.3. Clusivity and number

Referentially inclusive and exclusive are non-singular forms. Their sets of referents
typically include two or more persons: a Speaker and somebody else (Addresse(s)
and/or Non-locutor(s)). Apparently because of this feature the inclusive–exclu-
sive distinction has long been considered to be the opposition within the (first
person) plural. In some languages, however, the ordering of pronominal para-
digm in accordance with this traditional view appears to be non-economical and
hardly convincing. A more satisfactory solution for such languages is to align a
‘thou and I’ form together with the singular pronominal forms thus yielding a set
of participants with “minimal” membership, as opposed to the “augmented” one.
In this subsection, however, I confine my attention to the languages distinguish-
ing number in a traditional, i.e. singular vs. non-singular sense. The question is:
are there any rules predicting the distribution of the opposition in the languages
with more than two numbers? If a language distinguishes singular, dual and plural,
for example, do we know whether inclusive and exclusive are present in both non-
singular numbers?
In The Universals Archive the following claim can be found:
G2 IF there is an opposition inclusive vs. exclusive in dual, THEN usually there
is such opposition in plural. (Sokolovskaya 1980: 98, U 49) [UA #1490]
Sokolovskaya mentions two counter-examples having inclusive–exclusive oppos-
ition in dual but not in plural: Coos (Kusan) illustrated in (2) and Lhota (Baric,
Sino-Tibetan).
(2) Coos (Frachtenberg 1922: 395)
Sg Du Pl
1Incl îsnE’xkan łînnE’xkan
1Excl nE’xkan xwînnE’xkan
2 e’xkan îce’xkan cîne’xkan
3 xä’kä ûxxä’kä îłxä’kä
The same pattern is found in Nomad (Trans-New Guinea) (Voorhove 1975: 392,
Franklin 1973; credited to Wolfgang Schellinger) and Wik-Munkan (Pama-Nyun-
gan) (Godfrey 1964: 76). Siewierska & Bakker (this volume) cite Tanimbili (Oce-
anic) subject prefixes as distinguishing the inclusive–exclusive contrast in dual but
not in plural.7
Sokolovskaya suggests a similar statement for trial:
G3 IF there is an opposition inclusive vs. exclusive in trial, THEN there is
such an opposition in dual and plural. (Sokolovskaya 1980: 98, U 48) [UA
#1489]
The statements G2 and G3 consider the clusivity contrast within the non-singu-
lar numbers. It is possible, however, to tackle the problem from the opposite angle
and to look for the number distinctions within the inclusive and exclusive forms.
Moravcsik and Greenberg follow the latter path in their generalizations:
G4 IF a dual and a plural are distinguished in the first-person exclusive form
of a pronoun, THEN they are also distinguished in the inclusive. (Moravc-
sik 1978: 352) [UA #578]
Greenberg formulated the same generalization for dual only:
G4′ IF there is a first-person exclusive dual, THEN there is also a first-person
inclusive dual. (Greenberg 1988: 2, 1993: 17) [UA #1876]
Greenberg (1988: 2) mentions Savo (East Papuan) having dual with first-person ex-
clusive but not with first-person inclusive. Ngankikurrungkurr (Daly, Australian)
(Hoddinott & Kofod 1988: 94; credited to Michael Cysouw) and Yagua (Peba-Ya-
guan) in (3) reveal the same pattern.8
(3) Yagua (Payne & Payne 1990: 370)
Sg Du Pl
1Incl vú̜ ú̜ y
1Excl ray nááy núúy
2 jiy sá̜ á̜ da jiryéy
3 níí naada riy
In other words, generalizations G2–G4′ suggest that if a language has more than
one non-singular number, the clusivity opposition is most likely to be found in a
number value that occupies a higher position in the number hierarchy: (singular) >
plural > dual > trial (Corbett 2000: 38). And of the two forms, inclusive and exclu-
sive, if one of them has a number contrast, it is almost always the inclusive, not the
exclusive. This might be due to the main principle of the opposition (mentioned in
G1) that classifies inclusive as a primary member of the distinction.
2.4. Clusivity and the structure of pronominal paradigm

2.4.1. Clusivity forms unter sich
As we know, the clusivity opposition is generally about in- or ex-cluding the Ad-
dressee into/from the group of the Speaker. In this definition, however, nothing is
said about the situation where all three persons (S, A, and N) are involved. A sep-
arate form that refers to the full set of persons as opposed to the other two cases:
S+As (limited inclusive) and S+Ns (exclusive) is conceivable. Cross-linguistically,
however, such a distinction between three different ‘we’ forms is unattested. Boas
was possibly the first one to point this out:
A true first-person plural is impossible, because there can never be more than one
self. This logical laxity is avoided by many languages, in which a sharp distinction
is made between the two combinations self and person or persons spoken to, or
self and person or persons spoken of. I do not know of any language expressing in a
separate form the combination of the three persons, probably because this idea read-
ily coalesces with the idea of self and persons spoken to. (Boas 1911: 39–40; my em-
phasis, EF)
In other words, he believed that this particular meaning referring to all three per-
sons (or super-inclusive) is generally covered by the so-called limited inclusive
form:
G5 IF some form denotes ‘speaker+addressee(s)’, THEN it must also denote
‘speaker + addressee(s) + non-participant(s)’. (Boas 1911: 39–40; Soko
lovskaya 1980: 93, U 22) [UA #1464]
An essential point here is that both Boas and Sokolovskaya were definitely think-
ing of the inclusive of more than minor (i.e. dual) number,9 i.e. they were concerned
with the case in which the form denotes a speaker joined by more than one ad-
dressee (cf. Boas is speaking about persons spoken to, not person in the singular).
Otherwise, all languages distinguishing between dual and plural inclusive and with
minimal/augmented opposition would violate this truth. Furthermore, we know
for sure that both of them were aware of a lot of languages with a dual inclusive as
opposed to the plural one. The fact that G5 was intentionally suggested for plural
inclusive is demonstrated once more by the following two examples.
Reviewing the grammar of Gooniyandi by McGregor, Testelec (1995: 582)
mentions that it would be at odds with Sokolvskaya’s statement in G5. Gooniya-
ndi (Bunuban, Australian) distinguishes between two forms that in traditional
terms can be described as the following: ngidi is used to refer to 1DuIncl, 1DuExcl,
and 1PlExcl, and yaadi refers to 1PlIncl (cf. (4)). If we try to apply G5 to all inclu-
sives, including dual ones (as probably Testelec did), ngidi turns out to be a coun-
ter-example. If we, however, exclude dual inclusives from the implicans, Gooniya-
ndi remains completely in line with this claim: yaadi encompasses S+As as well as
S+A(s)+N(s) meanings.
(4) Gooniyandi free pronouns arranged according to traditional categories
(McGregor 1996: 159):
Sg Du Pl
1Excl nganyi ngidi (yoorroo) ngidi (yarndi)
1Incl ngidi (yoorroo) yaadi (yarndi)
2 nginyji gidi (yoorroo) gidi (yarndi)
3 niyi bidi (yoorroo) bidi (yarndi)
Further, one can think of one another type of languages violating G5. It would
unite the reference to S+A(s)+N(s) and S+N(s) and oppose them to S+As. Cys-
ouw (2003) and Siewierska & Bakker (this volume) bring a couple of languages that
(using their terms) have one form to refer to 1+2+3 and 1+3 and another to refer
to 1+2 — what at first glance indeed looks like a possible candidate for the combin-
ation mentioned above. However, the metalanguage they use is not sensitive to the
number of persons involved. In reality, the form they encode as 1+2 is a dual inclu-
sive. In these languages, an inclusive of more than dual number and a super-inclu-
sive are covered by another — and what is important — single form. So these lan-
guages present no problems for G5 either.
This particular feature of the inclusive form to not differentiate S+A+A and
S+A+N sets of participants is coherent with another property of pronominal sys-
tems — carefully studied by Simon (this volume) — to not distinguish between dif-
ferent sets of hearers: multiple addressees A+A+A… and addressee plus non-locu-
tors A+N+N… (see also Section 7.2). Both these facts are stipulated by the inherent
singular status of the addressee, first claimed by Benveniste (1966) and later much
discussed by Greenberg (1989) and McGregor (1989, especially 1996). The singu-
larity of the addressee here does not refer to the scenario of the real world com-
munication between humans but describes pronominal systems and “how they are
organized in human languages” (McGregor 1996: 167). Here the main argument is
“that pronominal system constructs one of the addressees as the addressee, the other
as an other, added as an augmented to the former” (McGregor 1996: 168, n.7). And
this very feature excludes then the possibility to distinguish morphologically be-
tween limited and super-inclusive, as well as between two forms in the second-per-
son plural.
Sokolovskaya makes also the reverse claim to G5:10
G5′ In an overwhelming majority of languages, IF some form denotes ‘speaker
+ addressee(s) + non-participant(s)’, THEN it denotes also ‘speaker +
addressee(s)’. (Sokolovskaya 1980: 94, U 36) [UA #1477]
2.4.2. Clusivity vs. other pronominal forms

Looking further for any regularities or restrictions in the paradigmatic structure of
pronominal systems with an inclusive–exclusive distinction let’s consider the pos-
sibility of certain pronominal forms becoming homophonous. In paradigms with a
clusivity distinction, the shape merger of the forms happens by no means arbitrarily.
Thus according to Cysouw (2002: 51), in these paradigms we would never find hom-
ophonous singular forms (“no singular homophony”, in his terms):
G6 IF there is an inclusive–exclusive contrast THEN there is no singular hom-
ophony in the pronominal paradigm.
He also registers a tendency to have three times less vertical homophony in the
paradigms with the inclusive–exclusive opposition, i.e. cases with fused marking of
first-person plural with second- and/or third-person plural) than in the paradigms
without this contrast:
G7 IF there is an inclusive–exclusive contrast THEN there is less vertical
homophony in the pronominal paradigm.
Suggesting G6 and G7, Cysouw surveyed the paradigms of both free and bound
pronouns. Sokolovskaya, having focused her study on free pronouns only, came to
more specific results. Thus regarding the possibility of clusivity forms being hom-
ophonous with any other pronominal form she states:
G8 In an overwhelming majority of languages, IF some form denotes
‘speaker+addressee(s)’ and/or ‘speaker+non-participant(s)’, THEN it can-
not include among its meanings the following:
(a) ‘speaker’;
(b) ‘addressee’ in singular;
(c) ‘addressee’ in non-singular
(d) ‘addressee(s) + non-participant(s)’. (Sokolovskaya 1980: 93, U 25)
[UA #1467]
Sokolovskaya was aware of only three languages violating the claim in G8(a): Kawi
(Old Javanese), Javanese (Sundic, West Malayo-Polynesian), and Nimboran (Trans-
New Guinea). Meanwhile it became obvious that this statement is violated by far
more languages. In the first place, these are languages with four person pronominal
systems where the meanings ‘speaker’ and ‘speaker + non-participant(s)’ appear to
be associated with a single form (recall Aymara in (1); for further examples from the
South American stock see Crevels & Muysken (this volume)). In Cysouw’s collection
of syncretism cases (this volume), there are numerous examples within the bound
pronouns as well. All this evidence clearly negates the generalization in G8(a).
The cases (b)–(d) in G8 consider the homophony between clusivity forms and
the second person: (b) in singular and (c) and (d) in plural. Among the independ-
ent pronouns the syncretism between inclusive vs. exclusive and 2Sg appears to be
extremely rare. Sokolovskaya, referring to d’Ans (1968), mentions Haitian (Creole,
French-based) as the only counter-example. The syncretism between independent
clusivity and 2Pl forms occurs in a few other cases, but also very infrequently. This
might be due to the rarely registered {Addressee>Speaker} hierarchy that accord-
ing to Daniel (this volume) is responsible for inclusive being syncretic with the sec-
ond-person plurals. In a group including both the addressee and the speaker, the
{Addressee>Speaker} hierarchy focuses on the addressee and therefore requires the
second-person pronoun to be used in referring to this group.
Sokolovskaya cites Haitian, Navaho (Athabaskan) (referring to Sapir & Hoijer
1967), and Marathi (Indic, Indo-European) (see below) as being at odds with her
generalization. Sanuma (Yanomam) — its description was published years later af-
ter Sokolovskaya’s chapter (Borgman 1990) — is another famous example. Cysouw
(Cysouw on syncretisms, this volume) also mentions Itonama (isolate; also dis-
cussed by Crevels & Muysken, this volume) as having homophonous inclusive and
2Pl forms, and Nehan (West Oceanic) as having homophonous exclusive and 2Pl
forms. Within the bound pronominal forms, however, these types of syncretism ap-
pear to be much more numerous (Cysouw on syncretisms, this volume).
The next observation considers syncretism between clusivity and third-person
forms:
G9 IF some form denotes ‘speaker+addressee(s)’ and/or ‘speaker+non-
participant(s)’, THEN it cannot denote ‘non-participant’. (Sokolovskaya
1980: 93, U 24) [UA #1466]
For independent personal pronouns this claim appears to be almost absolute, with
just a few counter-examples known. Sokolovskaya, following the description by
Katenina (1963),11 mentions Marathi where an inclusive pronoun a:pan is used
in polite address to ‘addressee’ and ‘non-participant’. Cysouw (Cysouw on syncre-
tisms, this volume) also mentions Tupínambá (Tupí) having syncretic exclusive and
third person independent pronouns. The Tupínambá case, however, significantly
differs from Marathi. In contrast to Marathi, where there are separate second- and
third-person forms and the inclusive form additionally functions for referring to
addressee and non-participant, in Tupínambá, inclusive and third-person forms
appear to be homonym, i.e. sharing the same shape. I would therefore prefer to
clearly differentiate between additional meanings of clusivity forms (see Section 5)

and paradigmatic syncretism. In doing this only Tupínambá can be regarded as a
violation of G9.
As for the syncretism between clusivity and third person within the bound pro-
nominal forms, Cysouw mentions quite a number of cases from different language
families exhibiting exactly this pattern.
3. Clusivity in free vs. bound pronominal forms
It has long been assumed that in a single language any grammatical distinction
would have the same appearance in all instances where it comes to light. Thus for
example, it has been claimed that if there is any opposition in number for nouns,
there is the same number opposition for pronouns. This might be true (with a few
exceptions) for singular/plural number distinction, but it does not hold for ‘mi-
nor’ numbers like dual, paucal and others, which tend to be limited to nouns (Plank
1989; Corbett 1996; UA #255). This means that having studied the phenomenon in
one manifestation only, it is impossible to make any conclusions about the others.
Theoretically the clusivity distinction may equally occur in independent and
bound personal pronouns. The latter may be verbal agreement and nominal pos-
sessive markers. Siewierska & Bakker (this volume) carefully studied the inclu-
sive–exclusive opposition in all three instances in the sample of 394 languages, con-
centrating especially on the languages that have the contrast within both free and
bound pronouns. They present unique calculations of the frequency of the clusivity
distinction within all types of pronominal markers, particularly differentiating be-
tween intransitive subject and transitive agent and patient markers. Free personal
pronouns distinguish the opposition most commonly of all pronominal markers
(42% of languages in their sample with clusivity opposition), whereas the patient
markers are the least likely to code the contrast (34%). Their survey, however, did
not reveal any significant tendencies as to the occurrence of the opposition, its pat-
tern and how it is encoded within independent pronominal forms as compared to
the bound ones. I would also add that any generalization about clusivity opposition
that is explicitly done on the basis of either free or bound pronouns only, cannot
be transferred to the opposition as a whole. G8 and G9 above visibly illustrate this
point: within the independent personal pronouns, clusivity and second- vs. third-
person forms are almost never homophonous, whereas these types of homophony
do occur — and not occasionally — within the bound pronouns.
4. Clusivity in the imperative paradigm
All studies of the inclusive–exclusive contrast that explicitly consider personal ver-
bal markers are typically limited to the indicative paradigm. Extending the analysis
beyond the indicative mood, i.e. considering in particular the imperative paradigm,
might give interesting deeper insights into the studied matter. The typology of im-
perative constructions has once been the topic of a collective volume by the Len-
ingrad typological school (Xrakovskij (ed.) 1992). The clusivity distinction, how-
ever, was not focused on there. Dobrushina & Goussev (this volume) did specific
research as to clusivity contrast in the imperative paradigm and came to the follow-
ing conclusion:
G10 IF there is no inclusive–exclusive opposition in the imperative THEN it
will not be present elsewhere in the language either, e.g. in independent
personal pronouns or indicative verbal markers.
It might be useful to know that the Leningrad team came to the similar conclu-
sion regarding the person/number distinction. They argue that although there are
languages like Nivkh (isolate), Klamath (Klamath-Modoc (=Lutuamian)), Lezgian
(East Caucasian), Mongolian (Altaic), Japanese (Japanese-Ryukyuan) where per-
son/number are distinguished in the imperative but not in the indicative, there are
no languages that would have person/number distinction in the indicative but not
in the imperative (Xrakovskij & Volodin 1986: 87, also cited in Birjulin & Xrako-
vskij 1992: 31; UA # 676).
Interestingly, in languages with clusivity distinction in the imperative paradigm,
its pattern is often different from inclusive–exclusive correlate in the indicative or
within the free pronominal forms.12 Moreover, the way this particular pattern gets
encoded can differ as well. Thus as Dobrushina & Goussev found out, in the imper-
ative, the minimal/augmented opposition does not necessarily presuppose a dedi-
cated exclusive form. In their collection, there are just a few languages that possess
a dedicated exclusive form in the imperative. Moreover, in some languages, none of
the existing imperative forms can be used in exclusive contexts. According to Cys-
ouw (2003: 97), however, who based his conclusion on the survey of free personal
pronouns and personal verb markers in the indicative, the exclusive appears to be
an implicatum of the minimal/augmented distinction. This difference in minimal/
augmented pattern in the indicative vs. imperative paradigm is due to the fact that
the imperative “prefers inclusive semantics” (Dobrushina & Goussev, this vol-
ume). An Addressee is a prototypical causee of any imperative construction or he/
she is supposed to cause somebody else to do something (like in third person im-
peratives). It is therefore extremely difficult to get a reading of the imperative which
does not involve the Adressee, so that morphologically dedicated exclusive impera-
tives rarely occur.
All in all, taking the data in Sections 3 and 4 into consideration, it would be rea-
sonable to conclude that in all its manifestations, clusivity — being motivated by a
similar semantic distinction — morphosyntactically follows, at least in part, quite
different patterns. Even within the verb markers, any ad hoc generalization being
based on indicative or non-indicative forms only, may reveal itself as unsound.
5. Additional functions of inclusive and exclusive forms
5.1. Inclusive used in I and You contexts

In interpersonal communication, personal pronouns appear to be among the most
commonly used lexical items. Moreover, in languages, especially with well-devel-
oped stylistic differentiation, personal pronouns (free and bound ones) are often
used not in their primary sense, but with a certain conceptual displacement. Such
transformations generally concern the usage of first- and second-person forms with
a different, non-proper reference, as well as referring to the speech act participants
with lexical items other than pronouns of the first- and second-person singular. The
former can be exemplified, for instance, by editorial we or royal we, also known as
‘pluralis majestatis’, when the plural pronoun is used to refer to oneself.
The reference to SAPs not by first- and second-person pronouns occurs fre-
quently in non-standard language, like speaking to a patient or a baby, when I and
You forms appear to be replaced by a noun or a we-form. Similar substitutions also
occur in the adult-adult speech. Cf. examples from Wills (1977: 274–5):
(5) The president is not a criminal (spoken by a president)
(6) Let’s quiet down, so I can start the meeting (where us refers to the
addressee’s group excluding the speaker)
Likewise, in languages with a clusivity distinction, inclusive and exclusive forms
can have additional functions besides clusivity proper. In this volume, this issue is
explicitly studied in chapters by Cysouw and Lichtenberk. Cysouw presents a de-
tailed study of clusivity forms used with deferential and humble connotations in
different language families. Lichtenberk surveys the inclusive–exclusive contrast in
Austronesian languages and pays particular attention to possible additional func-
tions of clusivity forms in general. Regarding the honorific usages, he observes that
inclusive forms are often used instead of first- and second-person pronouns motiv-
ated by integrative strategies of politeness and personal closeness. In the first case,
using inclusive, the speaker refers to him/herself, while in the latter case, he/she
considers the addressee to be a member of his/her group. Interestingly, according
to Lichtenberk, the exclusives are rarely used in any other functions, i.e. with the
reference other than genuine exclusivity.
As for the inclusives, in languages where they are used as an addressing form, in-
clusive definitely has some cultural and social connotation. Head (1978: 194, UA
#658) suggested that
G11 In languages in which categories of proximity, inclusiveness and defin-
iteness are employed to convey social meaning, non-proximate, exclu-
sive, and indefinite or impersonal usually indicate greater respect or social
distance than do the opposing ones; inanimate and non-human typically
indicate less respect than do their counterparts, when used with social
meaning.
He illustrated his claim with only two examples: the usage of 1ExDu or 1ExPl in
self-reference as honorific in Auca (unclassified language of Ecuador) and ‘plura-
lis majestatis’ in European languages whereby plural is supposed to be exclusive.
Though Head admits that his conclusion is not universal and he is aware of lan-
guages where inclusive is used in polite address, a detailed survey by Cysouw re-
veals that it was very uncautious and precipitate to generalize on such a poor basis.
In Cysouw’s and Lichtenberk’s chapters, the reader may find numerous examples
where inclusive encodes greater respect and social distance.
What do in fact occur rarely are clusivity forms used in reference to the non-par-
ticipant. Above (Section 2.4.2) I mentioned Marathi, where inclusive form is used
to denote respect referring to the non-locutor. Up to date it seems to be the only ex-
ample known. Cysouw (Cysouw on honorific uses, this volume) registers no fur-
ther instances either. Therefore I would tentatively suggest the next generalization:
G12 If clusivity forms have any other additional meanings, they are almost
never used in reference to third person.
5.2. Inclusive used in impersonal contexts

Another frequent non-direct function of inclusive is its impersonal usage. In some
languages, third-person pronouns are used with indefinite or generalized reference,
e.g. man in German, one, they in English. Being used in statements of general truth
and having no definite referent, these forms actually refer to the group comprising all
three persons S, A, and N. The same referential set has an extended inclusive. This fea-
ture enables its usage in the same contexts in languages with an inclusive–exclusive
distinction. However, this acquired non-referential function of the inclusive does
not bleach out its proper referential meaning. Lichtenberk (this volume) states that if
an inclusive pronoun is used impersonally, it still has its prior inclusive meaning.
6. The rise and fall of the opposition
The clusivity opposition is one that can easily be innovated either by borrowing or
by spontaneous internal development within a language/family. There are various
sources documenting the spread of the contrast by diffusion (e.g. Jacobsen (1980)
for native western North American languages, Èdel’man (1980: 27) and Masica
(2001: 252–4) for Indo-Aryan languages, Ross (1988) for Oceanic languages, and
others). A few chapters in this volume contribute to the problem of the origin of the
opposition in a particular language/language family.
Bickel & Nichols (this volume) consider independent innovations of the oppos-
ition to be uncommon. Accounting for the patterns in geographical distribution of
inclusive–exclusive contrast they argue generally for the diffusion scenario. Among
others, they discuss, for instance, diffusion of the opposition into the Caucasian
area. According to their observations, this intrusion might have happened inde-
pendently into three language families: pre-Svan in the southwest, Proto-Nakh in
the southeast, and Proto-Daghestanian in the east.
The ancient Himalayas likewise appear to be another area innovating the oppos-
ition. In particular, for Tibeto-Burman languages (LaPolla, this volume) the inclu-
sive–exclusive distinction cannot be reconstructed for a proto language, i.e. in the
language groups and single languages where the contrast is attested it appears to be
an innovation. LaPolla, however, is not seeking the possible donors of the contrast
(there should be multiple independent developments in various branches, similar
to the process which happened in the Caucasus), concentrating mainly on the mor-
phological pattern of the opposition.
Crevels & Muysken (this volume) are also interested in the morphological struc-
ture of clusivity forms in central-western South American languages. They classify
the forms into (morphologically) underived vs. derived ones and conclude whether
the inclusive category is basic for the family or it is a later innovation.
Sakel and van Eijk (both this volume) describe possible scenarios of how and
why this contrast could have developed in Mosetenan, an unclassified language
family from Lowland Bolivia, and Shuswap, an isolated member of the Salish fam-
ily. Though in none of the studies a donor language could be clearly suggested, Sakel
argues for a loan-hypothesis, whereby an opposition itself and the marker could
diffuse into Mosetén from a language that does not exist any longer. Van Eijk, on
the contrary, is more inclined to a spontaneous development of this distinction in
Shuswap, though not fully dismissing the possible origin from a non-Salish source,
most likely Algonquian.
Diachronically an inclusive–exclusive opposition appears to be quite stable, its
retention being favoured by areal consistency (Nichols 1992). Bickel & Nichols
(this volume) add that language isolation and contact only to close sisters favour
the inheritance of the opposition even more strongly. The high retention rate, how-
ever, does not exclude the possibility of the contrast still getting lost or being re-
duced. Investigating Austronesian languages Lichtenberk (this volume) found out
that in almost all languages, if an opposition disappears, it is an inclusive, not an ex-
clusive member of the original opposition that continues as the general first-person
non-singular. He also refers to Ross (1988) for a similar development path in the
languages of northern New Guinea. The same tendency is mentioned for Uto-Az-
tecan by Anderson (1975, 1977) as referred to by Jacobsen (1980: 222). The data on
South Mande presented in Vydrin (2005) seem to corroborate this tendency as well.
These data suggest the next cross-linguistic generalization:
G13 Whenever an inclusive–exclusive contrast disappears from a language, it
is almost always an inclusive, not an exclusive, form that remains to take
over the combined first-person plural reference.
Lichtenberk provides an extensive discussion of this developmental path em-
phasizing that it is mainly predetermined by the overwhelming referential status
of the inclusive. The general inclusive (i.e. not a limited one) referring to S, A and N
encompasses, so to say, the group referred to by exclusive: S+N. This means that by
the fall of the clusivity opposition the semantics of the inclusive form needs less re-
analysis than would be required if the exclusive were retained.
There are, however, a few languages that go against this tendency. In some North
Caucasian languages, it was an exclusive *ži form that superseded the inclusive form,
e.g. in Lak, Ubykh, some Lezgic languages and Dargi dialects. In the other North
Caucasian languages, like Nakh and Tzesic, the merging of the contrast occurred in
line with the tendency mentioned in G13 (Nikolaev & Starostin 1994: 1089).
7. Some special cases of clusivity
7.1. What can get included and excluded?

The clusivity distinction came into general linguistic use — and is actually tradi-
tionally perceived — as a dichotomy of two referential sets: including vs. excluding
the addressee into/from the group of the speaker. Occasionally, however, the terms
“inclusive” and “exclusive” appear to be used in quite different contexts. In this sec-
tion, I try to summarize these uncommon usages.
First, I would like the reader to recall Gooniyandi in (4). There the form ngidi can
refer to the group of the speaker plus either the addressee or non-participant(s). In
traditional terms, this form covers the meanings of 1DuIncl, 1DuExcl, and 1PlExcl.
The yaadi form corresponds to traditional 1PlIncl. In terms of S, A, and N these forms
have the following referential sets: ngidi can refer to S+A, S+N, S+N+. . .+N and
yaadi to S+A+A, S+A+N, S+A+N+…+N, S+A+…+A+N, S+A+…+A+N+. . .+N.
In his final analysis of Gooniyandi system, McGregor (1996) suggests that the dif-
ference between the two forms is the membership of the addressees in the group of
the speaker, with stress on a plurality of addressees, which he understands as “the
addressee and one or more others” (1996: 165).13 He puts it this way:
What is different from the traditional or classical inclusive–exclusive system lies
in the nature to the thing that is included or excluded: in the traditional system it
is the hearer or addressee; in the Bunuban system it is the hearers, an augmented
group of addressee. In the traditional inclusive–exclusive system you-singular
is the “pivot”; in the Bunuban system it is you-non-singular, or you-augmented:
gidi. (McGregor 1996: 166).
According to this approach, ngidi turns out to be an exclusive and yaadi an inclusive
form, with the essential proviso that Bunuban clusivity is about multiple addressees.
Another special case of clusivity is documented in American Sign Language
(ASL). As Cormier (this volume) claims, the ASL-exclusive form is characterized as
having an extended meaning: the referent excluded from the group of the signer is
not necessarily the addressee but can be “any referent [i.e. also Non-participant, EF]
that is salient in the discourse”.
If we forget for a while McGregor’s elegant analysis of Gooniyandi system and

try to think of other possible interpretations of ngidi and yaadi forms, we might
end in defining ngidi as an inclusive that includes either the addressee or non-
participant(s). From this perspective ASL-exclusive might look similar in excluding
either an addressee or non-participant.
At any rate, whatever the analysis of ASL or Gooniyandi-type systems one per-
sonally prefers, it is obvious that both systems are different from the traditional clu-
sivity opposition. However, the wish to see the pertinent systems related to other
pronominal systems seem to pre-define the choice of inclusive–exclusive terms in
their analyses, though with a special caveat.
7.2. Clusivity in the second person

Another case concerning the uncommon usage of “clusivity” terms is typically re-
ferred to as ‘second-person inclusive–exclusive’, where the inclusive form would re-
fer to a set comprising addressee(s) and non-participant(s) and the exclusive would
refer to addressees only. Simon (this volume) presents a thorough study of this phe-
nomenon carefully checking all the languages where two forms in the second-per-
son plural have been allegedly documented. He argues that none of these languages
has an inclusive–exclusive contrast in the second person and the pertinent “reports
have most probably been misguided”. He argues, however, that this opposition is
uniquely marked in the verbal inflection and free pronouns of Bavarian German,
though interwoven with the category of respect.14
Simon reasons that an inclusive–exclusive distinction in the second person
does not exist universally, thus supporting the fact claimed independently (though
purely theoretically and without extensive language surveys) by a number of schol-
ars (for references see Simon, this volume). Here it is cited from Sokolovskaya:
G14 In no language is there a special form to denote ‘addressee’ in non-singular.

(Sokolovskaya 1980: 91, U 11) [UA #1453] (see also Section 2.4.1, above);
IF some form denotes ‘addressee’ in the non-singular THEN it also de-
notes ‘addressee(s)+non-participant(s)’. (Sokolovskaya 1980: 91, U 12)
[UA #1454].
Nevskaya (this volume) makes a further interesting addition to the topic. She
documents turcological tradition in using the terms inclusive–exclusive. In first-
and second-person plural, many Turkic languages have two free pronominal forms
where both pairs are constructed according to the same model: ± -lAr. Some schol-
ars consider the distinction between the two forms in one person as being of the
inclusive–exclusive type. Curiously enough, none of the scholars who extend the
clusivity interpretation also to the second person seem to be aware of the oddity of
this phenomenon. Nevskaya also surveys other analyses of the opposition and con-
cludes that this contrast has nothing to do with clusivity. The plural pronominal
forms with a ‑lAr affix (multi-plural in her terms) “denote either a group of persons
opposed to the rest of society, or individualized plurality, otherwise they are used
for mere stylistic purposes”. The forms without -lAr seem to be neutral to such a dif-
ferentiation.
Yet another interpretation of the clusivity contrast in the second person (also
mentioned by Simon, this volume) is applied for instance by Harley & Ritter (2002:
504–5) and Bhat (2004: 101). They refer to the morphological analysis of pronom-
inal forms in languages where the form referring to Speaker and Addressee is de-
rived from a second person morpheme. They call this form ‘second-person inclusive’
indicating that the pivot of clusivity opposition is the Speaker (not the Addressee as
is traditionally assumed for the inclusive–exclusive contrast and not the Non-par-
ticipant as in the approach advocated by Simon for the clusivity in the second per-
son). Accordingly, this ‘inclusive’ form contrasts the second-person form exclud-
ing the Speaker from its reference group. This is the form traditionally labeled as
second-person non-singular. Compare two analyses of Ojibwa personal pronouns
with different pivots of clusivity distinction in Table 1 (adapted from Harley & Rit-
ter 2002 and Bhat 2004). (I refer the reader to Simon’s chapter (this volume) for a
detailed discussion of Algonquian pronominal morphology.)
Table 1. Two analyses of Ojibwa pronominal forms
SPEAKER is the pivot of the Ojibwa pronominal ADDRESSEE is the pivot of the
clusivity opposition forms clusivity opposition
1 person niin 1 person
2 person kiin 2 person
3 person wiin 3 person
1 person plural (inclusive)a niinawint 1 person plural exclusive
2 person plural inclusive kiinawint 1 person plural inclusive
2 person plural exclusive kiinawaa 2 person plural
3 person plural (exclusive) wiinawaa 3 person plural
a The clusivity specification given in brackets for the 1st and 3rd person plural is used by Bhat only.
Harley & Ritter refer to these forms as to just 1st and 3rd person plural respectively.
8. Clusivity and its (non-)correlates
An inclusive–exclusive contrast appears to be one of the central features character-

izing the pronominal system in a particular language. Though uncommon within
the “European” languages, this opposition occurs frequently in the other parts of
the world (e.g. Siewierska & Bakker (this volume) register this opposition in 46% of
their sample, Bickel & Nichols (this volume) in about 40% of the languages). This
fact poses a question as to why some languages have this opposition, while others
lack it. What is the difference among them? Are there any linguistic features that ap-
pear to be favourable or unfavourable for the presence of this opposition?
In her extensive and comprehensive study, Nichols (1992) rejects any correla-
tions between significant typological factors and the inclusive–exclusive distinction.
There she argues against Klimov (1977) who saw this opposition to be characteris-
tic of languages in their active-stative stage. Nichols, however, found his correlation
“artifactual”. She claims that “…most of the stative-active languages come from the
New World and Pacific, where inclusive–exclusive oppositions are relatively fre-
quent in languages of all alignment types” (1992: 123).
Still other results regarding possible correlates of the inclusive–exclusive distinc-
tion were obtained by Plank (2003) and Filimonova (1997, 1999). Plank suggests
“a good statistical correlation” (2003: 258), based on three samples of Forchheimer
(1953) as adapted in Ingram (1978) (69 languages), Perkins (1980) (50 languages)
and 205 languages from the Dual Database (University of Konstanz):
G15 IF only pronouns have a dual THEN they will very likely also have inclu-
sive–exclusive (valid in 71.6 % of languages15);
IF only nouns have a dual THEN personal pronouns are very likely to lack
inclusive–exclusive (valid in 90.9 % of languages).
If, however, dual is used in both nouns and pronouns, no significant correlation can
be drawn. Here Plank makes a significant caveat to the claims by Wundt (1904) and
Schmidt (1926) who saw the coincidence of the inclusive–exclusive distinction and
dual as irrespective of the nominal vs. pronominal domain of a dual (Plank 2003:
254–5).
In the same vein as Plank, though on a considerably smaller basis, Watkins
(1969: 46–8) suggested a similar dependency between the nominal dual and clu-
sivity contrast. He hypothesized the inclusive–exclusive distinction for Proto-Indo-
European. In the first step, being motivated by the fact that dual is absent in the
Hittite, Italic and Celtic verbs, he assumed that an Indo-European (IE) verb did
not possess a well-developed category of dual. Further, he mentioned that the so-
called dual endings in the other languages are clearly derived from the plural end-
ings. He argued then that three basic IE forms in first- and second-person dual
and plural: *-u̯ e, *‑me, *-te and the corresponding personal pronouns *u̯ e-, *ne-
(me‑), *i̯ū̆- had originally functioned as first-person inclusive, exclusive and sec-
ond-person plural forms. They received a new semantic distribution in different
languages later, after the fall of the inclusive–exclusive distinction and the develop-
ment of dual (which began first with nouns).
Another implication involving the inclusive–exclusive dichotomy was suggested
by Filimonova (1997, 1999). There I analyse languages from different families char-
acterized for {Addressee > Speaker} person hierarchy (e.g. Algonquian, Siouan,
Aymaran, Wik-Munkan, and others) and find that all of them also have an inclu-
sive–exclusive contrast.
G16 IF in the reference hierarchy an Addressee is ranked higher than the

Speaker THEN there is a category of inclusive.
I claim that this correlation between the addressee’s salience and the clusivity op-
position is semantically motivated. The prominent status of the second person — be-
ing typically marked morphosyntactically — appears to be additionally accentuated
via the dichotomy in question. Every time there is a possibility for an addressee (who
is the most salient person in these cultures) to be involved or not in the situation, this
is clearly signaled by using an appropriate pronominal form. This implication is again
unidirectional. The reverse does not hold. Daniel (this volume) elaborating the argu-
ment of Plank (1985) even claims that the mere presence of the inclusive category
may be explained as an effect of the person (locutive in his terms) hierarchy, other
than {Speaker > Addressee}, i.e. {Addressee > Speaker} or {Addressee = Speaker}.
What is particularly interesting about these generalizations (G16, G17) is that
clusivity contrast always appears as an implicatum, never as an implicans. These
generalizations give us a clue as to where one can expect the presence of the oppos-
ition, however, there seems to be no parameter that would necessarily follow from
this distinction. Generalizations G6 and G7 (Section 2.4.2) set certain restrictions
on the structure of the pronominal paradigm, but they do not involve any signifi-
cant typological parameter.
A possible corollary for the clusivity contrast was mentioned, however, in discus-
sion at the workshop ‘Truths about pronouns and how true they are’, held in Konstanz
in December 2000. The clusivity opposition generally tends not to intersect with gen-
der distinction, i.e. if there is clusivity contrast, there is no gender marking in the first
and second person. There is, however, no convincing explanation of why this might
happen (but see the recent discussion in Cysouw 2002: 58–9 and Siewierska 2004:
110–12). The observation about the non-cooccurrence of clusivity and gender con-
trast within the same person represents a strong cross-linguistic tendency. It is, how-
ever, not absolute. For instance, some Khoisan languages violate this statement hav-
ing inclusive–exclusive distinction and gender contrast in the first and second person
in all non-singular numbers, i.e. dual and plural. Touo (East Papuan), as reported by
Lynch (1998: 167–8),16 distinguishes masculine and feminine forms for inclusive and
exclusive in dual and trial,17 but has no gender differentiation in clusivity forms in
plural. Cysouw (2003) and Siewierska (2004) mention a few other problematic cases,
namely, Vanimo (Sko), the Australian languages Ndjébbana, Nunggubuyu and Kalaw
Kalaw Ya, a Chadic language (Kera) and an isolate Itonama. Such patterns need to be
accounted for and definitely more research is required in this respect.18
In sum, the clusivity opposition — albeit one of the key features of the pronom-
inal system — has little influence on shaping the language structure and sets no lim-
its on linguistic variation.
9. Conclusion
In this chapter, I have tried to summarize the main findings and cross-linguistically
valid generalizations about the inclusive–exclusive opposition. I hope that I have
not misread any conclusions, nor enhanced them with additional meanings. The
aim of this summary was not to initiate a search for languages that corroborate or
violate the mentioned generalizations. Rather, a list of such generalizations helps to
realize that clusivity is not just an additional distinction within a pronominal para-
digm but a well-organized category in its own right. It may have different appear-
ances in various languages; however, this variation is clearly motivated and follows
predetermined tendencies. The rare counter-examples make the common trends
even more obvious.
In brief, the most essential facts about clusivity can be summarized as follows.
First, of the two members of the opposition, the inclusive reveals itself as the pri-
mary one. In a pronominal paradigm, the presence of the exclusive implies the
presence of the inclusive, but not vice versa (G1); similarly, if there is a number con-
trast, it will almost always appear in the inclusive, but not necessarily in the exclu-
sive (G4, G4′). When the opposition is neutralized, with a few exceptions, it is an
inclusive, not an exclusive, form that supersedes and takes over the combined first-
person plural reference (G13).
Second, an important feature that predetermines the structure of pronominal
paradigm is the inherent singularity of the addressee. Because of this feature, pro-
nominal systems do not differentiate between limited inclusive and super-inclusive
groups of participants on the one hand (G5) and different sets of hearers (address-
ees only vs. addressees and non-participants) on the other (G15). These sets are
generally covered by a single form, correspondingly.
Third, clusivity has a considerable impact on the morphology of the pronom-
inal systems. For instance, paradigms with clusivity opposition tend not to have
homophonous singular forms (G6) and in contrast to paradigms without clusiv-
ity are less prone to have a shape merger of the first-person plural and second- and/
or third-person plural forms (G7). Also, homophony between clusivity forms and
other personal forms appears much more frequently within the bound pronouns
than within the free ones.
Fourth, there are no corollaries for clusivity features between free vs. bound
forms (Siewierska & Bakker, this volume). However, there is a rule regulating the
presence of the inclusive–exclusive distinction in imperatives: clusivity cannot be
absent in imperatives but present elsewhere, e.g. in independent personal pronouns
or indicative verbal markers (G10).
Further, clusivity has variously been claimed to have or to lack typological signif-
icance, failing to correlate or correlating with other features. Concerning the latter
it has been observed that clusivity is very likely to be absent if a dual is found within
the nouns only. If, however, only pronouns have a dual, then they are very likely to
have a clusivity distinction, as well (G16). The clusivity contrast also seems to cor-
relate with {Addressee > Speaker} and {Addressee = Speaker} reference hierarchies
(G17 and Daniel (this volume)). Finally, clusivity allegedly tends not to intersect
with a gender contrast in first and second person. The empirical validity of this de-
pendency and its functional motivations remain to be investigated.
Notes
1. I am grateful to Michael Cysouw and especially to Misha Daniel for their comments on
the earlier versions of the chapter. Naturally, remaining errors are my own.
2. The term is borrowed from the lexicon developed by Frans Plank for “Das grammatische
Raritätenkabinett” available under http://ling.uni-konstanz.de:591/universals/introrara.
html.
3. From here on I will use the following abbreviations: S for Speaker, A for Addressee, N for
Non-locutor, or Non-participant of the speech act.
4. An interesting situation is found in Urubu-Kaapor (Tupí). In this language, there are no
special pronominal forms distinguishing exclusive and inclusive. The exclusive form, and
therefore the distinction, has been lost. However, there is a periphrastic way of expressing
the idea of exclusive, namely, when the numeral follows a first-person plural pronoun it gives
an exclusive meaning to that pronoun (Kakumasu 1986: 374, 380). Urubu-Kaapor has then
an explicit way — though not a special form — to express the exclusive, not the inclusive.
5. A considerable part of the generalizations cited in this chapter were suggested by Nata-
lia K. Sokolovskaya (1980) in a study on semantics of personal pronouns — a paper well ac-
knowledged in Russian-reading circles but unfortunately almost unknown to western aca-
demics. In this contribution done on the basis of systems of independent personal pronouns
in 400 languages distributed world wide, Sokolovskaya formulated 50 semantic universals
that should hold true in pronominal systems of different languages. To describe pronom-
inal systems in terms relevant for all languages Sokolovskaya elaborated a special meta-lan-
guage, the System for the Description of Semantics [Russian: Sistema opisanija semantiki
(SOS)]. Quoting her generalizations, however, I transferred them into ordinary language.
The only thing the reader should keep in mind is that she differentiates between seven basic
meanings (meta-persons in her terms) that can be encoded in the pronominal systems:
‘speaker’, ‘addressee’, ‘non-participant’, ‘speaker + addressee(s)’, ‘speaker + non-participant(s)’,
‘addressee(s) + non-participant(s)’, and ‘speaker + addressee(s) + non-participant(s)’.
6. In square brackets, I give the running number of the entry from The Universals Archive,
hence UA.
7. Guató (Macro-Ge) (Pimentel Palácio 1986) is possibly another language that has clusivity
distinction in Dual but not in Plural (credited to Wolfgang Schellinger).
8. Tübatulabal (Uto-Aztecan) could be a further candidate to violate this generalization. At
least according to the grammatical description of Voegelin (1935), it has a dual with first-
person exclusive, but not with first-person inclusive. The accompanying collection of texts,
however, tells a different story (caveat credited to Michael Cysouw).
9. This amendment is not applicable to the languages having only a plural inclusive, with-
out a dual inclusive.
10. Interestingly, Sokolovskaya registers Kele (NW Bantu, Niger-Congo) as a counter-
example to this statement. Kele has three different ‘we’ forms: dedicated inclusive and exclu-
sive forms and a neutral form that can refer to either set of referents including the speaker,
i.e. an inclusive–exclusive opposition is optional there. On the one hand, this neutral form
referring to super-inclusive set of participants can also denote limited inclusive — which
is exactly what is suggested by G5′. Why then does she treat Kele as a violation? Unfortu-
nately, we are unable to reconstruct her logic here with any surety. Probably, Sokolovskaya
was thinking of the fact that in a dedicated inclusive context, a special inclusive form will be
used, not a neutral one. And this would split both the meanings, S+A(s) and S+A(s)+N(s),
between two separate forms.
I am aware of the fact that not everybody would agree with this motivation. In any case,
Kele’s pattern is not unique. A similar tripartite opposition is also registered in Lele (Chadic,
Afro-Asiatic) (U. Wiesemann, p.c), Dan (Mande) (mentioned in Cysouw 2003), Koh (Ad-
amawa) (mentioned in Siewierska & Bakker, this volume), Miriwoong (Miriwungic, Djera-
gan) (McGregor 2004), and possibly some other languages.
11. The sources are equivocal in this respect. Bernsten & Nimbkar (1975) for example regis-
ter the honorific use of a:pan as referring to the second person only.
12. Recall that the possible change of the inclusive–exclusive pattern in different paradigms
within a single language is also stressed in Siewierska & Bakker’s chapter.
13. There are other analyses of Gooniyandi-type system, e.g. McGregor (1989), Rumsey
(1996), Roberts (1996). In this volume, this particular analysis is critisized by Cysouw (Cy-
souw on syncretisms).
14. In the interim I have found another candidate to distinguish between two different ad-
dressee groups. Though it might well be another case that will be discounted after a closer
look, I have decided to mention it here to complete our knowledge up to date. For the Borč-
Khinov dialect (spoken in the settlements Borč, Khinov, and Šin) of Rutul (Lezgic, North-
East Caucasian), Ibragimov (1978: 258–9) documents two forms in 2Pl labeling them as in-
clusive and exclusive: vuqInär < vɨ-qIun-är ‘2Pl-Kinship.Pl-Pl’ (inclusive) and vɨI (exclusive).
These forms correspond to the 1Pl forms: yän-ur < yi‑ur ‘1Sg-Pl’ (inclusive) and yuqInär <
yi-qIun-är (exclusive). Ibragimov emphasizes that Borč-Khinov is the only dialect preserv-
ing the archaic pronominal system. The other dialects have some morphological traces of
the former clusivity distinction, but none of them has preserved the semantic contrast. Un-
fortunately Ibragimov gives no examples differentiating the two forms and the subsequent
descriptions of Rutul (e.g Alexeev 1994; Makhmudova 2001) bring no further insights to
the problem. I would therefore explicitly warn the reader to quote Borč-Khinov as a counter-
example, since no additional information has so far been gained about these data, either cor-
roborating or dismissing them.
At this point it would be worth mentioning that for some colleagues (e.g. Gulyga 1979)
Ibragimov’s data on Borč-Khinov pronouns appeared to be a piece of synchronic evidence
in reconstructing two forms — ‘second person limited’ and ‘second person neutral’ — for
Proto-Daghestanian pronominal system as a whole. This opinion is, however, not shared by
Nikolaev & Starostin (1994).
15. Plank, however, tends to count languages with minimal/augmented system as having
dual, as Michael Cysouw pointed out to me. Some scholars have misgivings in agreeing to
this approach. So if one excludes the minimal/augmented cases from Plank’s sample, the
percentage of languages where this implication is valid is reduced leaving fewer chances to
be considered a good statistical correlation.
16. Actually, Lynch refers to Touo as Baniata. However, as Michael Dunn pointed out to me,
Touo is a more appropriate name for this language. Touo is the native ethnonym, whereas
Baniata is just the name of the first village where the first anthropologist worked.
17. According to Michael Dunn (p.c.), the so-called ‘trial’ does not really mean “three”. The
current hypothesis is that it refers to a known, bounded number of entities, whereas the so-
called ‘plural’ refers to unknown, unbounded number. The ‘trial’ is thus obligatory with any
numeral. Hopefully, the ongoing field research will clarify the situation.
18. Thai (Daic, Austroasiatic) could be another candidate for distinguishing between in-
clusive and exclusive sets of participants and having masculine and feminine pronominal
forms to refer to the speaker. In Thai, however, many of the lexical items functioning as per-
sonal pronouns are of nominal origin and cannot therefore be considered real pronouns.
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Author index
Abbi, A. 68 Dai Qingxia 292, 293

Adelaar, W. F. H. 313, 314 Daniel, M. 11, 18, 38, 39, 83, 144, 275, 286, 350,
Aikhenvald, A. Y. 319, 359, 360, 370, 374, 375, 407, 417
377 Daniel, M. & Moravcsik, E. 10, 11, 38
Andersen, S. R. 170 Das Gupta, K. 299
Anderson, G. 65 DeLancey, S. 297
Austerlitz, R. 56 Diffloth, G. 65
Dirr, A. 122
Baker-Shenk, C. & Cokely, D. 236–7, 238, 241, Dumézil, G. 123
246, 249, 254 Duranti, A. 266
Barulin, A. 11, 38
Baskakov, N. A. 343, 344, 345, 346, 349, 350 Ebert, K. 302
Beffa, M.-L. & Hamayon, R. 130 Elšík, V. xii, 141
Benveniste, E. 8, 232, 432
Bhat, D. N. S. 130, 415 Filimonova, E. 32, 33, 44, 45, 233, 416
Bickel, B. & Nichols, J. 49, 55, 56, 175, 415 Filimonova, E. & Plank, F. 233, 235
Bloomfield, L. 24, 143 Forchheimer, P. 5, 69, 233, 234, 236, 250
Blust, R. A. 61, 262, 274
Boas, F. 381, 384, 404 Genetti, C. E. 304
Borgman, D. N. 126 Georgian Academy of Science 123
Bradley, D. 294, 295, 296, 307 Gill, W. 362, 366
Bresnan, J. 158 Giridhar, P. P. 130, 298
Bresnan, J. & Mchombo, S. A. 151 Givón, T. 151, 170
Brown, P. & Levinson, S. C. 135, 214, 224, 226ff, Glover, W. W. 298
263, 265, 275 Gong Hwang-cherng 292
Bubenik, V. 143 Greenberg, J. H. 14, 15, 76, 94, 114, 115, 135, 155,
Burling, R. 300 233, 248, 275, 277, 306, 368, 370, 405
Bybee, J., Perkins, R. & Pagliuca, W. 179 Grierson, Sir G. A. 301
Grönbech, K. 343, 348
Chafe, W. L. 99 Güldemann, T. 85, 164
Chang Hongen 294, 295 Gumperz, J. & Wilson, R. 359
Charpentier, J.-M. 124, 143 Gurubasave Gowda, K. S. 298
Chen Kang & Wu Da 294
Chen Shilin, Bian Shiming & Li Xiuqing 294 Haas, M. R. ix, 313
Chirikba, V. A. 122, 124 Hagège, C. 124, 143
Chung, S. & Timberlake, A. 179 Hakulinen, L. 205
Clark, L. 345 Hanks, W. F. 262
Comrie, B. 115, 116, 117, 118 Hansson, I.-L. 294
Comrie, B. & Smith, N. 113 Hardmann-de-Bautista, M. ix, 313, 376
Corbett, G. G. 8, 10, 40, 141, 170, 175, 404 Harley H. & Ritter, E. 114, 117, 118, 125–6, 128,
Crevels, M. & Muysken, P. 368, 401 141, 143, 146, 415
Croft, W. 233 Harris, A. C. 64, 69
Crowley, T. 119, 120, 121, 141, 142, 143 He Jiren & Jiang Zhuyi 306
Crowley, T. & Dixon, R. M. W. 68 Head, B. F. 213, 223, 225, 410
Cysouw, M. 10, 11, 22, 27, 34, 41, 50, 52, 69, 115, Heath, J. 359, 370, 372, 373, 377, 394
129, 144, 146, 152, 155, 157, 159, 175, 189, Henderson, E. J. A. 114
194, 208, 214, 250, 255, 271, 274, 275, 277, Henderson, T. S. T. 298
286, 315, 361, 362, 363, 370, 373, 406–7, Hewitt, B. G. 116, 122, 124, 142, 143
410–11, 420 Hewson, J. 73, 81, 144
426 Author index
Hoard, J. E. 383, 392 Noyer, R. 73, 81, 114, 117
Hodgson, B. H. 302
Hollenbach, B. E. 17, 33 Palmer, F. R. 179, 181
Hutton, J. H. 300 Parker, G. J. 118, 120, 141, 142
Hymes, D. 313 Paton, W. F. 119
Pawley, A. K. & Ross, M. D. 61
Ingram, D. 115, 117, 233 Pentland, D. 389
Isxakov, F. G. & Pal’mbax, A. A. 343, 349 Peterson D. A. 299, 307
Ivanov, V. Vs. ix Plank, F. ix, 4, 17, 20, 21, 33, 34, 36, 45, 74, 81,
115–16, 117, 118, 126, 143, 342, 416, 419
Jacobsen, W. H., Jr. 56, 65, 77, 164, 235, 384, 385, Plank, F. & Schellinger, W. 76
391, 394, 402, 412 Podlesskaya, V. 184
Jakobson, R. O. 56, 135, 139 Pulu, J. 300
Jensen, C. 89, 367, 374, 377
Jespersen, O. 8, 39 Rangan, K. 297
Jeyapaul, V. Y. 298 Ray, S. H. 119
Jin Peng 297 Rodrigues, A. 89, 100, 374
Johanson, L. 349 Ross, M. D. 61, 281, 411, 412
Jordan, Father M. M. E. P. 298, 299
Jørgensen, H. 304 Sakel, J. 164, 366, 376, 377
Saxena, A. 301
Kibrik, A. E. 32, 209 Scheuringer, H. 145
Klimov, G. A. 122, 416 Schmidt, P. W. ix, 416
Kornfilt, J. 348, 349 Schönig, C. 348
Koshal, S. 297 Sharma, D. D. 301
Krishan, S. 301 Sharma, S. R. 301
Siewierska, A. 151, 152, 417
LaPolla, R. J. 254, 299, 306, 402 Siewierska, A. & Bakker, D. 361, 362, 374, 401,
Lehmann, Ch. 151, 169, 170, 172 408, 417
Li Yongsui 296 Silverstein, M. 117, 384
Li Yongsui & Wang Ersong 295 Simon, H. J. 39, 140, 145, 146, 405, 414
Lichtenberk, F. 401, 410, 412 Sokolovskaya, N. K. 114, 233, 401, 403, 404,
Lomtatidze, K. 122, 123 406–7, 414, 419
Lyons, J. 115, 141, 239, 251 Soulié, M. G. 130
Spriggs, M. J. T. 61
Ma Xueliang 294 Steever, S. B. 64, 65
Malchukov, A. 182 Stern, T. 298
Mannheim, M. 313 Suarez, J. A. 376
Matisoff, J. A. 295 Sukala, H. & Karjalainen, M. 205
McGregor, W. B. 14, 100, 114, 146, 405–6, 413 Sun, J. T.-S. 294, 297, 300
McKay, G. 52, 69, 159 Sun Hongkai 292, 296, 304
Meier, R. P. 237, 238, 249, 250, 251, 254 Sun Hongkai, Huang Chenglong & Zhou
Merkle, L. 145 Maocao 296
Michailovsky, B. 302 Swadesh, M. 376, 394
Mithun, M. 23, 384
Mixajlova, N. I. 345 Takahashi, Y. 307
Moravcsik, E. 11, 18, 38, 170 Testelec, Y. 405
Mostaert, A. 130 Thomason, S. & Kaufman, T. 360
Mu Yuzhang & Duan Liang 295 Tian Desheng & He Tianzhen 296, 306
Mühlhäusler, P. & Harré, R. 276, 285 Toba, S. 302
Torero, A. 314
Nagano Yasuhiko 292 Tryon, D. T. 119, 120, 142, 143
Newman, S. 392 Tybykova, A. T. 350
Nichols, J. ix, 55–6, 62, 64, 65–6, 77, 122, 164, 175,
233, 411, 412, 416 Ubrjatova, E. I. 343, 345, 349, 353
Nichols, J. & Bickel, B. 56
Noonan, M. 297, 298 van Driem, G. 302
Author index 427
van der Auwera, J. & Ammann, A. 179 Wiesemann, U. 128
van der Voort, H. 328 Wilbur, R. B. & Patschke, C. 244, 255
von Eckert, R. 122 Wundt, W. 416
Walsh, D. S. & Biggs, B. 270 Xrakovskij, V. S. 180, 209, 409
Wang Feng 296 Xrakovskij, V. S. & Volodin, A. P. 409
Wasow, T. 117 Xu Xijian & Zhao Yansum 296
Watkins, C. 416
Wheatley, J. 293 Zimmerschied, S. 132
Wiersma, G. 296 Zwicky, A. M. 17, 20, 21, 33, 42–4, 73, 81, 114, 253
Language index
Terms for groups and families of languages are Bagirmi 205, 206
given in italic. Bagvalal 204
Bahing 302, 303
Abaza 122, 123, 143 Bai 296–7
Abkhaz 115–16, 121–4, 137, 142, 143 Baima 297
Acehnese 82, 273, 278 Bajau 215
Achang 294 Bajo 272
Acoma 157 Bakairí 90
Adamawa 155, 164 Balkar 183, 190, 191, 204
Adzera 165 Balti 61, 234, 297
Afrikaans 142 Bamana 183
Aghul 188, 191, 192–3 Bamileke 129
Ainu 216 Banggai 215–16, 282
Akawaio 90 Bantawa 303
Akha 61, 294, 295, 306 Bantoid 197
Aleut 22 Barasano 20
Algic 370, 387, 388 Bardi 95, 102
Algonquian 22–4, 28, 42, 43–4, 73, 78, 81, 85, 87, Bare 360, 374
91, 125, 136, 143, 234, 384, 386–9, 391, 416 Batak Karo 268, 272–3
Ali 281 Batak Toba 216, 218, 268, 273
Altay 196, 342–3, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351–3 Bavarian 39, 116, 117, 132–5, 137, 139, 140, 145,
Amanab 80 146, 414
Ambong, Malayu 280–1, 284 Belhare 51, 61, 292, 303, 304
Ambrym, South-East 115, 118–21, 136, 141 Bella Coola 394
Amercian Sign Language 231–56, 413 Bimanese 216, 274
Anal 298 Binandere 77, 91
Andamanese, Great 68 Bislama 266
Angami 298 Bisu 294
Anong 304 Blackfoot 81, 384, 386
Ao 298 Bodish 291, 297
Apalai 102 Bodo-Konyak-Jinghpaw 299
Arabela 329 Bola 294
Arawakan 79, 319–22, 326–7, 330, 331, 360, 367, Bora 324, 328
370, 374, 375 Boran 323–4, 330, 331
Arekuna 90 Border 67, 80
Ashéninca 79, 320, 321, 327 British Sign Language 250
Assiniboine 94 Buang, Central 86
Atchin 88 Buduma 91
Athabaskan 32, 85, 384, 407 Bugis 215–16, 220
Athpare 89, 303 Buma 86, 88
Atlantic 82 Bunan 301
Auca 227, 411, see also Waorani Bunuba 93, 156
Australian Sign Language 250 Burarra 87, 95
Austro-Asiatic 64, 65, 67, 221 Buriat 204
Austronesian 61, 67, 80, 82, 85, 156, 165, 166, 214– Burmese 294
16, 218–19, 222–3, 232, 234, 261–87, 412 Byangsi 301
Awa Pit 194, 199–200, 203, 316
Aymara 7, 32–3, 45, 79, 313, 319, 367, 368–9, 401 Caddoan 67, 78
Aymaran 79, 316, 319, 323, 330, 331, 369, 401, Cahuapanan 318, 324, 330, 331
416 Camling 89, 303
Language index 429
Campa 79, 319, 320, 360 Dogon 192, 200, 202, 203
Campa 360, 370, 375 Dolgan 342–3
Campa Caquinte 320 Dravidian 64–5, 188, 217, 221–3, 234, 254
Canela-Kraho 80 Dulong 304, 307
Cantonese 11 Dulong-Rawang 303, 304, 306
Caodeng rGyalrong 292 Dumi 7, 89, 302
Caquinte 79 Duri 216, 218
Carib 6, 67, 90, 102, 170, 370, 371, 391 Dutch 121, 142, 143, 171, 383, 393
Cariyona 90
Caucasian, North 413 English 18, 23, 28, 73, 75, 92, 115, 121, 140, 153,
Caucasian, North-East 50, 64, 69–70, 188, 204, 179, 180, 189, 195, 201, 222, 226, 232, 234,
205, 420 239, 271, 361, 383, 393
Caucasian, North-West 200 Ersu 292
Cayubaba 317, 326, 329, 330, 331 Eskimo-Aleut 85, 185, 203, 234
Chayahuita 318 Even 41, 181–2, 191
Chadic 91, 93, 164, 188, 417 Éwé 199, 234
Chalkan (Kuu) 344, 347, 355, 356
Chang 300 Fijian 203, 268
Chantyal 297 Finnish 205
Chapacuran 330, 331 Finno-Ugric 187, 204, 205
Chaudangsi 301 Fox 23
Chechen 50 French and its varieties 69, 121, 187, 222, 249,
Chepang 162, 168, 302, 361 277, 383, 390, 393
Chibchan 96 Fula 127, 128, 136
Chilcotin 384–5
Chimakuan 384 Galela 220
Chimane 360, 362, 366, 367 Garawa 50
Chin 175, 292 Garo 6, 234, 300
Chin, Cho 298, 302 Gazhuo 294
Chin, Sizang 298 Gé, Macro-Gé 67, 80, 96
Chinantec, Lealao 5 German and its varieties 121, 135, 142, 145, 146,
Chinese, Mandarin 8–9, 223, 234, 236, 238 179, 383, 393
Chinook 384 German Sign Language 250
Chipaya 79 Ghomala’ 116, 128–9, 131, 136, 139, 146
Chiquitano 326, 330, 331 Goilalan 77, 91, 94
Chiru 298 Gong 294
Chitkuli 234 Gooniyandi 7, 93, 250, 405, 413
Chocho 79 Guaraní 168
Chol 42 Guaraní, Bolivian 368–9
Chrau 80 Guaraní-Chiriguano 325
Chulym 343, 347, 348 Guató 96, 419
Chuvash 189, 191, 197–8, 209 Guayabero 314
Circassian 122, 201 Gugu-Yalanji 102
Comox 394 Guhu-Samane 102
Coos 102, 167, 254, 403 Guiqiong 61, 292
Cree 78, 81, 386–7, 389, 394 Gumawana 170
Cree, Plains 5, 23 Gunwingguan 371
Gur 153
Dagbani 153 Gurung 298
Dan 93, 420
Danish Sign Language 250, 254 Haitian 407
Daofu 292 Hani 295
Darma 301 Hatam 89, 91, 96, 163
Daur 162 Hawaiian 216
Dawanese 85 Hayu 302
Dekwana 90 Hdi 188
Diola-Fogny 82, 91, 101 Hebrew 193, 197–8
430 Language index
Heiltsuk 394 Kayabí 367

Himalayan, Eastern 302, 306 Kazakh 349
Himalayan, Western 301, 306 Kelabit 287
Hixkaryana 90 Kele 234, 250, 255, 419
Ho 223 Kéo 267
Hocak, see Winnebago Kera 417
Huave 79, 89 Khakas 182–3, 184–5, 191, 194, 196, 203, 342–3,
Hungarian 187, 191, 209 345–6, 347, 348, 355
Hunzib 205 Khaling 302
Hyow 298, 307 Khalkha 130, 144
Kham 302
Icelandic Sign Language 250 Kharia 223
Idu 301 Khoe 84, 101
Idu-Taraon 291, 300 Khoekhoe, see Nama
Imonda 7, 80 Khoekhoe 164
Inanwatan 82, 87 Khoirao 298
Indo-Aryan 411 Khoisan 5, 6, 25–7, 84–5, 125, 164, 417
Indo-European ix, 56, 67, 234, 407, 416 Kinnauri 301, 307
Indonesian 203, 267 Kiowa 42, 82, 91, 168, 234
Ioway-Oto 94 Kipeá Kiriri 51
Iquito 329 Kiranti 7, 82, 89, 175, 217, 254, 302, 402
Iroquoian 85, 234, 385–6, 391, 393 Kiranti/Rai 302–3
Israeli Sign Language 250 Kirghiz 349
Italian and its dialects 121, 392 Kiribatese 281
Itonama 82, 87, 327, 330, 331, 407, 417 Kisar 85
Klamath 409
Japanese 187, 191, 204, 234, 409 Kobon 202
Japanese Sign Language 250 Koh 155, 164, 420
Jaqaru 79, 316–17, 322 Koiali, Mountain 165
Jarawa 68 Kokama 325
Javanese 268, 406 Kokborok 299
Javanese, Old 216, 274, 406 Kola 86
Jebero 318 Konjo 30, 215
Jiarong 102 Korafe 77, 91, 102
Jinghpaw 291 Korean 236
Jinuo 296 Koromfe 22
Johari 301 Kudukh 254
Kuikúro 90
Kabardian 200–1, 203 Kulung 7, 82, 90
Kabui 298 Kumandy 342, 344, 356
Kachari 299 Kunimaipa 94, 96, 250, 256
Kalaw Kawaw Ya 417 Kutenai (Ktunaxa) 385, 390, 393
Kalispel-Spokane 91, 385, 390 Kwa 199
Kaman 291, 300 Kwakiutl (Kwakwala) 384, 385, 391, 394
Kannada 188, 191 Kwamera 80, 88
Kannada, Kupwar 359 Kwaza 168, 326, 328, 330, 331
Kanoê 316, 330, 331
Kanuri 197 Ladakhi 297
Kapau 156 Lahu 6, 294, 295
Kapón 90 Lai 298
Karakalpak 349 Lak 413
Karbi 298, 302 Lak(h)ota 94, 234, 386
Karen 291 Lamalera 85
Kariña 90 Langsu 294
Karo 317, 326 Lavukavele 82
Kartvelian 64, 69–70, 80 Leko 330, 331, 369
Kashuyana 90 Lele 164, 419
Language index 431
Lenakel 80, 88 Mindari 22

Lepcha 298 Miraña 324, 328
Leqi 294 Miriwoong 420
Lezgian 8–9, 409 Mixe-Zoque 67, 79, 234, 250, 371
Lezgic 188, 413 Mixtec, Chalcatongo 154
Lhota 403 Mixtecan 78–9
Lillooet 383, 392, 393, 394 Mizo (Lushai) 298
Limbu 6, 7, 188, 217, 303 Mizo-Kuki-Chin 298
Lipo 295 Mojo 369
Lisu 295 Mokilese
Lohorung 303 Mongolian 130–1, 409
Lolo-Burmese 294, 307 Mongolian, Ordos 116, 130, 137, 234
Lonwolwol 141 Mongolic 64, 67, 162, 342, 347, 355
Looma, Northern 93 Mon-Khmer 65, 80
Lotha 298 Monpa 297
Luo 199, 203 Moré 329
Luvale 197 Mosetén 327–8, 360, 362, 363–6, 367, 370, 371–2,
Lyusu 292 373–4
Mosetenan 328, 330, 331, 359–8, 412
Maba 183 Movima 327, 330, 331
Machiguenga 320 Mru 298
Macushi 6, 7, 170 Muna 83, 89, 215, 273, 276
Mae 219 Munda 221, 223
Magar 302 Mundani 129
Maká 80 Muya 292
Makah 200, 203
Makassarese 215 Na-Dene 234
Makushi 90 Naga, Mao 130, 131–2, 137, 144
Malagasy 216, 222 Naga, Tangkhul 298, 307
Malay 222, 234 Nahuatl 314
Malay, Sulawesi 216 Nakh 64, 413
Malayalam 221 Nakh-Daghestanian, see Caucasian, North-East
Mandan 78 Nakoda 386
Mande 93, 183 Nalik 88
Mande, South 412 Nama 5, 6, 25–7, 84–5, 101, 125, 164
Mangarayi 159 Namizi 292
Manhad 301 Nanai 186
Mapuche 314 Nar-Phu 298
Maranao 52 Navaho 32, 407
Maranungku 164, 166 Naxi 296, 306
Marathi 359, 407, 411 Ndjébanna 87, 95, 417
Margi 59 Negidal 188–9
Marind 11 Nehan 86, 87, 407
Mataco-Guaicuruan 80 New Zealand Sign Language 250
Maya, Yucatec 314 Newar 302, 304
Mayan 42, 219 Nganasan 189–90, 191
Maybrat 41–2, 83–4 Ngandi 371–2
Mbay 157 Ngankikurrungkurr 403
Meitei 298 Ngiti 80
Mekens 325 Niger-Congo 164, 183, 197, 199, 234, 250
Mekeo 86 Nilo-Saharan 50, 80, 93, 154, 157, 183, 199, 205,
Melanesian 158 206
Menba 306 Nilotic 199
Menomini 78, 81 Nimboran 80, 406
Micronesian 86, 280, 281 Niuafo’ou 219
Mikir 306 Niue(an) 41, 270
Minangkabau 222, 265, 284 Nivkh 409
432 Language index
Nocte 299 Quechuan 79, 83, 313–14, 322–3, 327, 329, 330, 331
Nogugu 234 Queye 292, 306
Nomad 403 Quiang 292
Nomatsiguenga 79, 320
Nukuoro 219 Raji 301
Nunggubuyu 417 Rangkhol 298
Nusu 294, 295 Rawang 304, 307
Nyulnyul 80, 95–6, 167 Rembarrnga 52
Nyulnyulan 80, 95, 167 Rengma 298
Resígaro 322, 327
Oceanic 86, 88, 159, 160, 170, 203, 403, 407, 411 rGyalrong 293, 306
Ojibwa 5, 32, 116, 126, 136 Ritwan 387–8
Ojibwa, Eastern 22, 78, 415 Rongpo 301
Ojibwe, Southwestern 78, 125 Roti 85
Okanagan 91, 385, 390 Rotuman 234, 279
Onge 68 Rouruo 294, 296
Orejón 324 Russian 8–9, 28, 183–4, 188, 193–4, 195, 198,
Orokaiva 77, 91 201, 209
Oto-Manguean 5, 24–5, 79, 153, 234 Rutul 420
Otomi 5, 6, 24–5, 27, 29, 234
Sa’dan 215
Paama 119, 141 Saharan 197
Palu 216, 218 Salamãi 328
Panare 90 Salish 85, 90, 381–94
Papuan 82, 156, 159, 165, 254 Salish, Coast 384
Papuan, East 78, 82, 403, 417 Salish, Interior 388, 390
Papuan, West 67, 83, 89, 91, 163, 220 Saluan, Coastal 216, 274
Passamaquoddy 5, 23 Samo 102
Passamaquoddy-Maliseet 78, 81 Samoan 219, 266, 268
Pattani 301 Samoyedic 189
Pawnee 78 Sangkong 296
Peba-Yaguan 160, 324, 330, 331, 404 Santali 221
Pech 96 Sanuma 29, 81, 87, 126–7, 128, 407
Pemón 90 Sar 93
Phunoi 294 Savo 403
Pirahã 153, 315 Savosavo 82
Pitjantjatjara 5, 6 Sawu 218, 267
Polish Sign Language 250, 254 Sema 298
Polynesian 266, 268, 270–1, 274, 286 Sentinel Island, language of 68
Ponapean 160 Serak 281
Popolocan 79 Shixing 292
Port-Sandwich 116, 124–5, 131, 137 Shor 196, 203, 342–3, 345, 347–8, 355
Potawatomi 23, 42, 143 Shuswap 90, 102, 381–94, 412
Prinmi 292 Sierra Miwok, Southern 371
Printintín 367 Sierra Popoluca 52, 79, 234, 250
Pukapukan 270–1 Sika 85
Puragi 101 Siouan 78, 88, 95, 234, 386, 391, 393, 416
Purik 234 Sirionó 325
Sissano 281
Qiangic 292, 306 Sixing 61
Quechua 367, 369 Sko 417
Quechua, Ayacucho 323 Slave 32
Quechua, Cuzco 217 So 50, 154
Quechua, Huallaga 79 Sobei 86
Quechua, Huánuco 323 Sopvomā 144
Quechua, Tarma 79, 322–3 Spanish 121, 186–7, 191
Quechua, Pacaraos 322 Stoney 386
Language index 433
Sudanic, Central 205, 206 Tupían 89, 324–6, 330, 331, 407, 419
Sunwar 302 Tupí-Guaraní 367, 369
Surinam 371 Tupínambá 89, 374, 407
Svan 64, 69, 80, 412 Turkic 182, 184–5, 190, 194, 196, 341–57, 414
Turkic, Siberian 346–7
Taba 282, 284 Turkic, West 346
Tagalog 232, 234, 277 Turkish 346, 348–9, 350–1, 354–5
Taiwan Sign Language 254 Turkmen 196, 203, 342–3, 345, 348, 349
Takana 367, 369 Tuvalu(an) 219, 266, 270, 274, 275
Tamambo 279 Tuvan 196, 202, 203, 342–3, 347, 348, 349
Tamang 298 Txikão 90
Tamil 217, 220, 222, 223–4, 234 Tzeltal 219–20, 402
Tangkic 67
Tangsa 299 Ubykh 122, 413
Tangut 292 Udihe 86
Tani 291 Udmurt 204
Tanimbili 159, 403 Ulau-Suain 281
Tanna 80, 88 Ulithian 86
Tanoan 42, 82, 168, 234 Uma 156
Tariana 360, 374 Ura 88
Tasmanian 68 Urdu, Kupwar 359
Telugu 234 Uru 79
Terêna 360, 370, 375 Urubu-Kaapor 419
Tetun 216 Uru-Chipayan 322, 326, 329, 330, 331
Tetun, Fehan 265, 272, 278 Chipaya 322
Thado 298 Uru 322
Thai 421 Uto-Aztecan 234, 235, 402, 412, 419
Thulung 302, 303 !Ui-Taa 85, 164
Tibetan 297
Tibeto-Burman 6–7, 61, 64, 65, 82, 89, 90, 162, Vanimo 417
175, 189, 217, 234, 254, 291–307, 402, 412 Veddas, language of the 68
Tiddim 292, 298 Vietnamese 222, 223
Tikopian 271
Timor 85, 87, 265 Wai Wai 90
Tinani 301 Waimiri-Atroari 90
Tiriyó (Trio) 90, 102 Wakashan 200, 384, 393, 394
Tiwa, Southern 82, 91 Waorani 326, see also Auca
Tiwi 68, 80, 82, 87, 95, 163 Warembori 203
Tofan 342–3, 348 Wari’ 315
Tokelau 270 Warrwa 80, 95
Tok-Pisin 6, 83, 89, 236, 238 Washo 402
Tongan 219, 269, 279 Wayampi 374
Toqabaqita 262, 264, 265, 274, 275 Wayana 90
Touo 417 Weri 15, 41, 94
Trans-New Guinea 202, 234, 250, 403, 406 West Greenlandic 185–6, 191, 234
Trukese 86 Whitesands 80, 88
Trumai 165 Wichita 78
Tshangla 306 Wik-Munkan 403, 416
Tuaripi 102 Winnebago 52, 78, 101, 234
Tuba 342–3, 356 Wiradyuri 402
Tübatulabal 235, 402, 419 Wiyot 387
Tucanoan 324, 330, 331 Woleaian 158
Tujia 297 Wolio 215
Tukang Besi 216, 282–3
Tumak 93 Yabem 86
Tumleo 281 Yagua 160, 318, 404
Tungusic 64, 86, 181, 188, 342, 347, 355 Yakut 196, 203, 342–3, 348, 353–4, 355, 356
434 Language index
Yanesha’ 320 Yuchi 5

Yanomam 29, 81, 126, 407 Yuki 324–5
Yaouré 93, 250 Yupik 203
Yapese 166 Yurakare 330, 331, 369
Yava 159 Yurok 387
Yi, Nasu 294, 295
Yi, Nuosu 294 Zaiwa 61, 294
Yi, Sani 294, 295 Záparo 326
Yi, Xide 294 Zaparoan 326, 330, 331
Yokuts 116, 125, 127, 128, 136, 234, Zhaba 292
235 Zoque 371
Subject index
1st person hierarchy see hierarchy, first person deference 271, 273, 275, 281, 410 (see also
2nd person 22–32, 41–2, 45, 73–5, 81–7, 99, respect)
113–46, 188, 190, 194, 195, 196–202, deliberative questions 182
414 derived/underived clusivity forms 323, 331, 412
development of the opposition 61, 63–5, 292, 300,
accusative alignment 367, 375 304, 305, 329–05, 346–7, 355, 358–7, 412
additive plurals 8, 38 development, spontaneous 381–94, 411
addressee 179, 180–1, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, dialect 132
188, 191, 192, 195 dialect mixture 120
addressees, number of 180, 182, 192, 203, 206, diffusion 55, 64, 65, 359–7, 381–94, 411, 412
413 disambiguation 76
addressee, singularity of the 405, 418 doctor’s we 31, 226, 410
affective 266, 270, 274 donor language see source language
affix 152, 158, 169, 171, 172 Dual Database 416
agreement dual nominal vs pronominal 416, 418
ambiguous 170, 171, 172 dual/plural 159–60, 202–3, 292–305, 343, 353,
multiple verb 56 403, 405
pronominal 170, 171, 172 dual-collective pronouns 353
syntactic 170, 171, 172 dyad 276, 277
verb affixes 53 (see also cross-reference
markers) enclave 56–8, 60, 62–5
ambiguity 76 ergative alignment 62, 367, 375
Americas, settlement of 55, 56, 57 Eurasian area 49, 56–7, 65
Ancient Sunda area 55–6, 57, 60, 61, 62, 68 Eurasian steppe zone 57, 62
areal typology 50, 55–7, 62, 327–9, 331, 367–75, exclusive as a dedicated form 235, 243, 248–9,
384–9 401, 403, 409
Assiniboine-type 94, 175 exclusive imperative 180, 181–9, 345
associative plurals 11, 131, 141, 223 exclusive reference 186–91, 351, 353, 355, 413
Australia 49, 53, 55–6, 58, 60, 63, 66, 68 extended pronouns 121
authorial (=editorial) we 226, 410
Autotyp database 49, 69 free personal pronouns 53, 55, 151–75, 348, 361,
362, 367, 368, 408, 418
bipartite stems 56
body leans 243, 252, 255 gender 362, 363, 364–6, 367, 368, 371, 375, 384,
borrowing of material 65, 164, 359–60, 362, 417, 418
367, 368, 389 (see also diffusion, transfer of genealogical stability 65–8
pattern) general inclusive see super-inclusive
bound pronominal forms 53, 151–75, 179–209, glaciation 55
361, 408, 418 (see also cross-reference grammaticalisation/grammaticalize 139, 140,
markers) 151, 163, 166, 169, 174, 299, 329, 332, 355,
361, 362, 374
Caucasus 53, 56, 58, 62–5 Das grammatische Raritätenkabinett 116, 130,
causative 200, 201 419
causee 195, 409
choric we 9–10, 139, 253 hierarchy
Circum-Pacific area 55–60 first person 155, 157, 315, 329
clitic 75, 84, 86, 91, 152, 158, 169, 171, 172 locutive 4, 17–22, 32, 34, 42 (see also person
comitative 351, 352, 354 and reference hierarchies 30–1, 32 42–3,
coordinative 351, 352 350, 405, 414–5, 416)
cross-reference markers 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, of morphosyntactic persons 34, 42 (see also
366, 367, 368–9, 370–1, 374–5 (see also personal hierarchy 18)
bound pronominal forms) number 233, 404
436 Subject index
Himalayas 56, 58, 62–5 Pacific Rim 55–6, 57

homophony 74–5, 367–75, 406–7, 418 (see also parallel path hypothesis 172
syncretism) ‘ pluralis majestatis’ 222, 410, 411
honorific 31, 213–27, 272, 274, 275, 410–11 politeness 31, 121, 132, 135, 137, 140, 145, 213–
hybrid inclusives 23, 27 27, 263, 264–6, 267, 269, 271, 273, 275, 277,
279, 349, 410
imperative 179–209, 341, 343, 408 negative 214, 217, 218–19
impersonal inclusives 277–80, 411 positive 214, 219–21, 265, 275
indexic pronouns 235–6, 249 population movement 55, 56, 62, 65
indexicals 262, 264, 266, 274 possession, obligatory marking of 56
integration/integrative 264–77, 278, 279, possessive inflection 53, 389
285 possessive pronouns 361, 362, 369
intention 182, 183 pragmatics 129
privative 354
lexical plurals 239–41, 242–8
limited inclusive 250, 255, 404, 406 referential range 181, 183, 184, 195, 263, 275,
linguistic geography 57–60 282–3, 284, 286
loan see diffusion reflexive 365–6, 370, 371, 372–3, 379
loss of the opposition 165, 169–71, 235, 280–3, representative plurals 11, 39
412–13 request for permission 182, 183
respect 132, 144, 214, 216, 217, 223, 411 (see also
markedness deference)
as a cluster of properties 233–5, 248–9, 254 role deixis 20, 34, 115, 126, 137, 144
morphological 51, 254, 301, 302, 305, 402 royal (=kingly) we see ‘pluralis majestatis’
merger 76
minimal/augmented 14, 51–3, 59, 61, 63, 68, 69, signed languages 231, 249–50
92–7, 153, 155, 157, 158, 161, 163, 166, 192, solidarity 264, 266, 268, 272, 286
194, 196–203, 277, 285, 343, 344–5, 347, 348, source language 64, 65, 359, 360, 367, 368, 375,
402, 405, 409, 420 384, 389, 412
modality differences 231, 250 spatial displacement of pronouns 242–8
morphological feature 118 super-inclusive 250, 404, 406
morphological reanalysis 120 syncretism 73–104 (see also homophony)
morpho-phonological form 169 synthesis, verbal 56, 62
morphosyntactic features 117, 126
multi-plural pronouns 341, 349, 350, 355 transfer of pattern 65, 359–60, 389–91 (see also
diffusion; borrowing of material)
Neolitic 56 two-person system 238–9, 254
neutral alignment 375 type shift 60–1, 329–30
New Guinea 56, 58, 61, 62–3, 66
nonmanual signals 239, 242, 252 unidirectional development 329, 332
number 50–2, 62, 69, 402–4 unit-augmented 51, 94
number hierarchy see hierarchy, number Universal Grammar 117, 139
number, neutralization of 349 The Universals Archive 116, 233, 235, 399–408,
410, 414
ostensive pronouns 241–2, 243
[±other] 115, 126, 134, 137, 141, 144 weak pronoun 152, 158, 169, 171, 172
In the series Typological Studies in Language the following titles have been published thus far or
are scheduled for publication:
65 TSUNODA, Tasaku and Taro KAGEYAMA (eds.): Voice and Grammatical Relations. In honor of Masayoshi
Shibatani. xviii, 366 pp. + index. Expected March 2006
64 VOELTZ, F. K. Erhard (ed.): Studies in African Linguistic Typology. xiv, 417 pp. + index. Expected February
2006
63 FILIMONOVA, Elena (ed.): Clusivity. Typology and case studies of the inclusive–exclusive distinction. 2005.
xii, 436 pp.
62 COUPER-KUHLEN, Elizabeth and Cecilia E. FORD (eds.): Sound Patterns in Interaction. Cross-linguistic
studies from conversation. 2004. viii, 406 pp.
61 BHASKARARAO, Peri and Karumuri Venkata SUBBARAO (eds.): Non-nominative Subjects. Volume 2. 2004.
xii, 319 pp.
60 BHASKARARAO, Peri and Karumuri Venkata SUBBARAO (eds.): Non-nominative Subjects. Volume 1. 2004.
xii, 325 pp.
59 FISCHER, Olga, Muriel NORDE and Harry PERRIDON (eds.): Up and down the Cline – The Nature of
Grammaticalization. 2004. viii, 406 pp.
58 HASPELMATH, Martin (ed.): Coordinating Constructions. 2004. xcv, 578 pp.
57 MATTISSEN, Johanna: Dependent-Head Synthesis in Nivkh. A contribution to a typology of polysynthesis.
2003. x, 350 pp.
56 SHAY, Erin and Uwe SEIBERT (eds.): Motion, Direction and Location in Languages. In honor of Zygmunt
Frajzyngier. 2003. xvi, 305 pp.
55 FRAJZYNGIER, Zygmunt and Erin SHAY: Explaining Language Structure through Systems Interaction. 2003.
xviii, 309 pp.
54 AIKHENVALD, Alexandra Y. and R.M.W. DIXON (eds.): Studies in Evidentiality. 2003. xiv, 349 pp.
53 GIVÓN, T. and Bertram F. MALLE (eds.): The Evolution of Language out of Pre-language. 2002. x, 394 pp.
52 GÜLDEMANN, Tom and Manfred von RONCADOR (eds.): Reported Discourse. A meeting ground for
different linguistic domains. 2002. xii, 425 pp.
51 NEWMAN, John (ed.): The Linguistics of Sitting, Standing and Lying. 2002. xii, 409 pp.
50 FEIGENBAUM, Susanne and Dennis KURZON (eds.): Prepositions in their Syntactic, Semantic and
Pragmatic Context. 2002. vi, 304 pp.
49 WISCHER, Ilse and Gabriele DIEWALD (eds.): New Reflections on Grammaticalization. 2002. xiv, 437 pp.
48 SHIBATANI, Masayoshi (ed.): The Grammar of Causation and Interpersonal Manipulation. 2002. xviii, 551 pp.
47 BARON, Irène, Michael HERSLUND and Finn SØRENSEN (eds.): Dimensions of Possession. 2001. vi, 337 pp.
46 AIKHENVALD, Alexandra Y., R.M.W. DIXON and Masayuki ONISHI (eds.): Non-canonical Marking of
Subjects and Objects. 2001. xii, 364 pp.
45 BYBEE, Joan and Paul J. HOPPER (eds.): Frequency and the Emergence of Linguistic Structure. 2001.
vii, 492 pp.
44 VOELTZ, F. K. Erhard and Christa KILIAN-HATZ (eds.): Ideophones. 2001. x, 436 pp.
43 GILDEA, Spike (ed.): Reconstructing Grammar. Comparative Linguistics and Grammaticalization. 2000.
xiv, 269 pp.
42 DIESSEL, Holger: Demonstratives. Form, function and grammaticalization. 1999. xii, 205 pp.
41 FRAJZYNGIER, Zygmunt and Traci S. CURL (eds.): Reciprocals. Forms and functions. Volume 2. 2000.
xii, 201 pp.
40 FRAJZYNGIER, Zygmunt and Traci S. CURL (eds.): Reflexives. Forms and functions. Volume 1. 2000.
xiv, 286 pp.
39 PAYNE, Doris L. and Immanuel BARSHI (eds.): External Possession. 1999. ix, 573 pp.
38 SIEWIERSKA, Anna and Jae Jung SONG (eds.): Case, Typology and Grammar. In honor of Barry J. Blake.
1998. 395 pp.
37 GIACALONE-RAMAT, Anna and Paul J. HOPPER (eds.): The Limits of Grammaticalization. 1998. vi, 307 pp.
36 NEWMAN, John (ed.): The Linguistics of Giving. 1998. xv, 373 pp.
35 GIVÓN, T. (ed.): Grammatical Relations. A functionalist perspective. 1997. viii, 350 pp.
34 GIVÓN, T. (ed.): Conversation. Cognitive, communicative and social perspectives. 1997. viii, 302 pp.
33 FOX, Barbara A. (ed.): Studies in Anaphora. 1996. xii, 518 pp.
32 BYBEE, Joan and Suzanne FLEISCHMAN (eds.): Modality in Grammar and Discourse. 1995. viii, 575 pp.
31 GERNSBACHER, Morton Ann and T. GIVÓN (eds.): Coherence in Spontaneous Text. 1995. x, 267 pp.
30 DOWNING, Pamela A. and Michael NOONAN (eds.): Word Order in Discourse. 1995. x, 595 pp.
29 KAHREL, Peter and René van den BERG (eds.): Typological Studies in Negation. 1994. x, 385 pp.
28 GIVÓN, T. (ed.): Voice and Inversion. 1994. viii, 402 pp.
27 FOX, Barbara A. and Paul J. HOPPER (eds.): Voice: Form and Function. 1994. xiii, 377 pp.
26 LORD, Carol: Historical Change in Serial Verb Constructions. 1993. x, 273 pp.
25 SVOROU, Soteria: The Grammar of Space. 1994. xiv, 290 pp.
24 PERKINS, Revere D.: Deixis, Grammar, and Culture. 1992. x, 245 pp.
23 KEMMER, Suzanne: The Middle Voice. 1993. xii, 300 pp.
22 PAYNE, Doris L. (ed.): Pragmatics of Word Order Flexibility. 1992. viii, 320 pp.
21 DOWNING, Pamela A., Susan D. LIMA and Michael NOONAN (eds.): The Linguistics of Literacy. 1992.
xx, 334 pp.
20 CROFT, William, Suzanne KEMMER and Keith DENNING (eds.): Studies in Typology and Diachrony. Papers
presented to Joseph H. Greenberg on his 75th birthday. 1990. xxxiv, 243 pp.
19:2 TRAUGOTT, Elizabeth Closs and Bernd HEINE (eds.): Approaches to Grammaticalization. Volume 2: Types
of grammatical markers. 1991. xii, 558 pp.
19:1 TRAUGOTT, Elizabeth Closs and Bernd HEINE (eds.): Approaches to Grammaticalization. Volume 1:
Theoretical and methodological issues. 1991. xii, 360 pp.
18 HAIMAN, John and Sandra A. THOMPSON (eds.): Clause Combining in Grammar and Discourse. 1988.
xiii, 428 pp.
17 HAMMOND, Michael, Edith A. MORAVCSIK and Jessica WIRTH (eds.): Studies in Syntactic Typology. 1988.
xiv, 380 pp.
16 SHIBATANI, Masayoshi (ed.): Passive and Voice. 1988. x, 706 pp.
15 AUSTIN, Peter (ed.): Complex Sentence Constructions in Australian Languages. 1988. vii, 289 pp.
14 HINDS, John, Shoichi IWASAKI and Senko K. MAYNARD (eds.): Perspectives on Topicalization. The case of
Japanese WA. 1987. xi, 307 pp.
13 Never published.
12 NEDJALKOV, Vladimir P. (ed.): Typology of Resultative Constructions. Translated from the original Russian
edition (1983). Translation edited by Bernard Comrie. 1988. xx, 573 pp.
11 TOMLIN, Russell S.: Coherence and Grounding in Discourse. Outcome of a Symposium, Eugene, Oregon, June
1984. 1987. viii, 512 pp.
10 RANSOM, Evelyn N.: Complementation: its Meaning and Forms. 1986. xii, 226 pp.
9 BYBEE, Joan: Morphology. A Study of the Relation between Meaning and Form. 1985. xii, 235 pp.
8 SLOBIN, Dan I. and Karl ZIMMER (eds.): Studies in Turkish Linguistics. 1986. vi, 294 pp.
7 CRAIG, Colette G. (ed.): Noun Classes and Categorization. Proceedings of a symposium on categorization and
noun classification, Eugene, Oregon, October 1983. 1986. vii, 481 pp.
6 HAIMAN, John (ed.): Iconicity in Syntax. Proceedings of a symposium on iconicity in syntax, Stanford, June
24–26, 1983. 1985. vi, 402 pp.
5 RUTHERFORD, William E. (ed.): Language Universals and Second Language Acquisition. 1984. ix, 264 pp.
4 CHISHOLM, William, Louis T. MILIC and John A.C. GREPPIN (eds.): Interrogativity. A colloquium on the
grammar, typology and pragmatics of questions in seven diverse languages, Cleveland, Ohio, October 5th 1981-
May 3rd 1982. 1984. v, 302 pp.
3 GIVÓN, T.: Topic Continuity in Discourse. A quantitative cross-language study. 1983. vi, 492 pp.
2 HAIMAN, John and Pamela MUNRO (eds.): Switch Reference and Universal Grammar. Proceedings of a
symposium on switch reference and universal grammar, Winnipeg, May 1981. 1983. xv, 337 pp.
1 HOPPER, Paul J. (ed.): Tense-Aspect. Between semantics & pragmatics. 1982. x, 350 pp.

Clusivity Typology and Case Studies of Inclusive-Exclusive Distinction by Elena Filimonova

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Clusivity

Typological Studies in Language (TSL)

General Editor Michael Noonan

Volumes in this series will be functionally and typologically oriented, covering

John Benjamins Publishing Company

of American National Standard for Information Sciences – Permanence

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Clusivity : Typology and case studies of the inclusive–exclusive distinction /

© 2005 – John Benjamins B.V.

11. Inclusive–exclusive distinctions in the languages of central-western

Before we proceed to the substantial part of this volume, a note on terminology

by a pronominal workshop. The discussions we had there were unusually stimulat-

The inclusive is traditionally explained as an elaboration of the meaning of the first-

2. Morphological evidence

(traditional exclusive) pronoun would be in a regular morphological connection.

Table 1. Inclusives derived from the first person

Macushi a. ‘you.sg and I’ ← ‘I’ (collective suffix)

3. Definition of the pronominal number

Number in personal pronouns is not identical to number in nominals. Number in

Is ‘we’ a plural of ‘I’?

Table 2. Morphological coding of number in personal pronouns

(1) Assumption: ‘we’ is a plural of ‘I’; ‘you.pl’ is a plural of ‘you.sg’.

Relation between pronominal and nominal plurality

First Second Proper Kin Common Non-human

Representative ‘we’ ‘you.pl’ associative, associative, associative, (associative?)

4. Definition of the category of person

Table 4. Weri personal pronouns (adapted from Greenberg 1988: 5)

Minimal ~ augmented system Viewed traditionally

1 ne ten‑ip ten 1 Excl ne tenip ten

5. Person-asymmetry paradox and related problems

Table 5. Reference structure of plural pronouns in non-inclusive languages (traditional

‘I’ (= ‘the speaker’) ‘we’ (= ‘a group which includes the speaker’)

6. Locutive hierarchies22

Table 7. Hierarchical person assignment rules

a. Non-inclusive languages. b. Inclusive languages

den. Person as assigned by means of hierarchical rules, although not contradict-

{Speaker > Addressee > Non-Locutor}

Table 8. Person-assignment rules (for non-inclusive languages)

Locutive hierarchies (Plank) Personal hierarchies (Zwicky)

SpeakerBoth Addressee Speaker Both Addressee Speaker Both

7. {Addressee > Speaker}

North America: pronominal prefixes in Algonquian

South America: pronominal suffixes in Otomi

South Africa: pronominal stems in Nama

A note on hybrid inclusives

English Algonquian Algonquian

you and us k‑i·nu‑wi k‑i·nu‑wi

Addressee Speaker Addressee Speaker Addressee Speaker

Back to South America: independent pronouns in Sanuma

Table 12. Sanuma personal pronouns: two approaches

Sulawesi. Inclusive shift?

Table 13. Konjo personal marking (Friberg 1996: 138)

Ergative proclitics Absolutive enclitics Free pronouns Possessive

Table 14. Politeness shift in Konjo

Informal speech Polite speech

A glimpse of other hierarchies

8. Previous studies of locutive hierarchies

A model to which my analysis is particularly close, even identical up to a certain

{Speaker > Addressee} > {Speaker = Addressee} >> {Addressee > Speaker}

Figure 3. Cross-linguistic frequency of locutive hierarchies

9. A note on the tradition

No Non-first person

Figure 4. Inclusives, traditional view

No Non-second person

11. Inclusive–exclusive distinctions in the languages of central-western

4.2. Areal linguistic geography: different kinds of inclusive–exclusive