The Nature of Customary International Law

Author(s): Josef L. Kunz

Source: The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 47, No. 4 (Oct., 1953), pp. 662-669
Published by: American Society of International Law
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662 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

furtherrevision,but they also need modificationor elaboration to cover

captives taken in internationalpolice action. There has been some dis-
position in certain quarters in this countryto scoffat that descriptionof
what has been going on in Korea, and there is a good deal of justification
in fact,if not in law, for this cynicism. But it is noticeable that even the
scoffersdo not clearly take the position that the United States is at war
with either North Korea or China. In any event the problem urgently
calls for attentionand solution,as difficultas that may be.
PITMAN B. POTTER

THE NATURE OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW

The aseertainmentof the existenceor non-existenceof a norm of cus-

tomaryinternationallaw and, in the affirmative case, the aseertainmentof
its contents-always a prominent task of international tribunals and
Courts-has played a strong role in the jurisprudence of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice. The Court has had occasion to ascertain the
existence,' or to deny the existence,of a rule of general2 or particular3
customary international law. The fact that sometimesthe pronounce-
mentsof the Court were rather to the surprise of the doctrineand of the
practice of states,has not only broughtinto being an extensiveliterature,4
but has also directedattentiononce more to the problemof the nature of
customaryinternationallaw whichjustifiesa briefsurveyof this problem.
There are two additional reasons. While many internationallawyers
have concentratedtheir studies since 1920 nearly exclusivelyon the par-
ticular internationallaw of the League of Nations,and, now, of the United
1 Corfu Channel Case (Merits), April 9, 1949, I.C.J. Reports, 1949, p. 4; this JOURNAL,
Vol. 43 (1949), p. 558.
2 Reservations to Genocide Convention,Advisory Opinion, May 28, 1951, I.C.J. Reports,

1951, p. 15; this JOURNAL,Vol. 45 (1951), p. 579; Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case,

December 18, 1951, I.C.J. Reports, 1951, p. 116; this JOURNAL, Vol. 46 (1952), p. 348.
3 Asylum Case, November 20, 1950, I.C.J. Reports, 1950, p. 266; this JOURNAL, Vol.
45 (1951), p. 179.
4 See W. W. Cox, "Reservations to Multipartite Conventions,' Proceedings, American

Society of International Law, 1952, pp. 26-35; G. G. Fitzmaurice, "Reservations to

Multilateral Conventions," International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 2
(1953), pp. 1-26; D. H. N. Johnson,"The Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case," ibid., Vol.
1 (1952), pp. 145-180; Jens Evensen, "The Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case and Its
Legal Consequences," this JOURNAL, Vol. 46 (1952), pp. 609-630; C. H. M. Waldock,
"The Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case," British Year Book of International Law,
Vol. 28 (1951), pp. 114-171; A. E. Evans, "The Columbian-Peruvian Asylum Case,"
American Political Science Review, Vol. 46 (1952), pp. 142-157; C. Barcia Trelles,
"El derechode asilo diplom4atico,"
IBevista de DerechoInternacional,Vol. 59. (1951),
pp. 161-180, and in Bevista Espafiola de Derecho Internacional, Vol. IV (1951), pp.
59-66; P. F. Gonidee,"L'affaire du droitde'asile," Revue Generalede Droit Interna-
tional Public (3e serie), Vol. 22 (1951), pp. 547-592; J. L. F. Van Essen, in Inter-
national and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. I (1952), pp. 533-539.

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 EDITORIAL COMMENT 663

Nations,thereis a transformation of customarygeneral law going on, too.

Finally, the problem of the nature of customaryinternationallaw is still
controversial within the science of international law. The nature of cus-
tomarylaw is, of course,a general problem of law. But whereascustomary
law is today of lesser importance in the advanced municipal legal orders,
it is fundamental in international law, since all general international law
has been, up to now, customarylaw. Notwithstanding a vast literatureon
customarylaw in general5 and on customaryinternationallaw,6the words
of Jules Basdevant, that "les idees des juristessur le caracte'rede la
coutumen'ontatteintni a l'unite6 ni 1 la clarte,"are still true.
There are three principal reasons why the ideas of jurists as to the
nature of customarylaw have reached neitherunitynor clarity. The first
reasonis the use of the word "source," which,as Kelsen 8 oftenhas pointed
out, is "a figurativeand highly ambiguous expression," which leads to
confusionand should be dropped as a legal term.9 Our problemmust not
be confused either with the "evidence' 10 or with the entirelydifferent
problemof the foundationof internationallaw," whetherunderstoodin a
formal sense-as the "basie norm"-or in a material sense as the "ulti-
mate" foundation. The latter problem is by its very essence a meta-
juridical problem,a problemnot of the science,but of the philosophy,of
law.
The second reason is the untenable constructionof customas "pactum
taciturn,"a doctrineheld by the early science of internationallaw from
Grotius to Vattel, and revived by the dualistic doctrine.'2 The purely
5 See, e.g.,in German,Puchta,Das Gewohnheitsrecht (1828/37); Brie,Die Lehre vom
Gewohnheitsrecht (1899); M. Rilmelin,Die bindendeKraft des Gewohnheitsrechts
(1919); W. Henrich,"Zur Problematiledes Getwohnheitsrechts, Becueil d':Mtudes
sur les sourcesdu droiten l'honneurde Fr. Gtny(Paris, 1935), Vol. II, p. 276 et seq.
8 See Ch. Rousseau,PrincipesG6n6raux du Droit InternationalPublic (Paris, 1949),
pp. 815-862,and the large bibliographies on pp. 105-106,815. Of later writingsthere
mustbe added M. Sorensen,Les sourcesdu droit international(1946); Mateesco,La
coutumedans les cyclesjuridiquesinternationaux (1947); P. Guggenheim, Lehrbuchdes
Volkerrechts, Vol. I (1947), pp. 45-51; A. Verdross,V6lkerrecht (2nd ed., 1950), pp.
107-110; H. Kelsen, Principlesof InternationalLaw (1952), pp. 303-317.
7 "RMgles gen6ralesde la paix," Hague Academyof InternationalLaw, Becueil des
Cours,1936 (IV), p. 508.
8 E.g., op. cit. (supra, note 6), p. 303.
9 See also H. W. Briggs,The Law of Nations (2nd ed., 1952), p. 44.
10This confusionis clearlyto be seen in T. J. Lawrence,The Principlesof Interna-
tional Law (7th ed., London,1915), p. 95 et seq., and in Ellery C. Stowell,Interna-
tional Law (New York, 1931), p. 26.
"1The books by Ziccardi,La costituzionedell' ordinamento internazionale(1943),
and Sperduti,La fontesupremadell' ordinamento internazionale(1946), wrestlewith
theproblemof the "foundation," in connection withthat of custom.
12Most Italian writers;particularlystronglyby K. Strupp,tl&mentsdu Droit In-
ternationalPublic, Vol. I (Paris, 1930), p. 11, and "RBgles g6n6ralesde la paix,"
Recucildes Cours,Vol. 47 (1934, I), p. 36; Pas de normesId oi il n'y a pas de traite

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664 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

fictitiouscharacterof this construction,its open contradictionto the prac-

tice of states, the untenable consequencesto which it leads, its rejection
by the overwhelmingmajority of writers,make it superfluousto refute
this constructiononce more.
The third principal reason is the idea of seeing in custom not a pro-
cedure for creatingnorms of internationallaw, but merelythe "proof,"
"evidence," "la constatation" of a pre-existingrule of law. This is the
typical approach of the natural law doctrine.'3 It reappears in Savigny's
Historical Jurisprudence (law as the product of the mystical "Volks-
geist," law to be found, not made) and, in recent times,in L. Duguit's
sociological,and G. Scelle 's 14 biological,jurisprudence. With Duguit, law
is the product of "la solidariitesociale." For Scelle custom is the trans-
lation of a biological social necessity. The "droit objectif" is the sum
total of causal laws which determinethe appearance, permanenceand de-
velopmentof the social fact. Custom has a spontaneous and intuitive
character. Similar ideas can be found in Frangois,15 and, at some stage
of his development,in Lauterpacht.16 This untenable theory is also re-
sponsiblefor the extremelybad draftingof Article 38 (1) of the Statute
of the InternationalCourt of Justice.17 Close to this idea also is Roberto
Ago,18 for whomcustomarylaw is "spontaneous law, emergingin the con-

expliciteou tacite." But thereare, on the one hand,adherentsof thedualisticdoctrine

who flatlyreject this construction(e.g., Balladore Pallieri, Diritto Internazionale
Pubblico (5th ed., Milan, 1948), p. 540 et seq.); on the otherhand, this construction
is acceptedby someAnglo-American writers:Lawrence,op. cit. (supra,note10), p. 95;
JohnWestlake,InternationalLaw, Part I (Cambridge,1904), p. 14; A. S. Hershey,
The Essentials of InternationalPublic Law (1921), pp. 19-20; P. E. Corbett"The
Consentof States and Sourcesof the Law of Nations," BritishYear Book of Inter-
nationalLaw, Vol. 6 (1925), p. 25. See also S. S6f6riades,Recueildes Cours,Vol. 34
(1930, IV), pp. 205, 209-210.
13 See in more recenttimesLorimer,Law of Nations,Vol. I, p. 27 (international
customas "unconsciousinterpreter of the law of naturein international relations");
and L. Le Fur: "L'lusage pr6supposel'existenced'une rgglejuridigueobligatoire:il
la constatesimnplemnent," "Rggles g6n6ralesde la paix," Recueildes Cours,Vol. 57
(1935, IV), p. 197.
14G. Scelle, "Bggles generalesde la paix," Becueil des Cours,1939 (IV), pp. 348,
350, 358, 432-437; Pr6cis de Droit des Gens (Paris, 1932), p. 5; Droit International
Public (Paris, 1949), pp. 13-14.
15 "CBgles generalesde la paix," Recueildes Cours,Vol. 66 (1938, IV), p. 173: "La
coutumene creepas le droit,elle est un mnode de constatationdu droit: elle sanctionne
"
des principesqui s 'inposentd 'eux-mn6nes.
16 "RBgges g6n6rales de la paix," Recueil des Cours,Vol. 62 (1937, IV), p. 158:
"La coutumene cree pas le droit: elle est la pratiqueactuellequi se conformea, ce
qui est d6jA le droit"; p. 159: "La coutumeest simplement la preuvede l'existence
d'un?erggleindependante de la volont6de ceux qui la suivent."
17 "International custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law" ("La
preuved 'une pratiqueg6n6raleacceptee comme6tant
comnme
coutumeinternationale,
de droit.")
18Roberto Ago, Scienza Giuridica e Diritto Internazionale (Milan, 1950).

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 EDITORIAL COMMENT 665

science of members"; but its creationor approval by those membersis ir-

relevant: the science of law is here occupied only with the ascertainment
of the principle,not with its source.
To arrive at a legally correctunderstandingof the nature of customary
internationallaw, it is necessaryto avoid these three errors. Customary
law, like all law, is positive,man-madelaw. Law regulates its own crea-
tion. Treaty and custom are two different,independentprocedures for
creating internationallegal norms.'9 The treaty procedure leads only
to norms,of particular internationallaw: custom can lead to norms of
particular or general internationallaw: but we speak of customhere only
as a proeedurefor creatingrules of general internationallaw.
The customprocedure is, historically,a primitiveprocedure; hence its
defects: slowness and uncertaintyof ascertainment. Custom can create
new norms,or change or abolish existing norms. Some writers20 see in
customa secondaryprocedure. But it is, in fact, not only the older, but
also the hierarchicallyhigher form of creating norms of international
law.21 Custom-producedgeneral internationallaw is the basis; the cus-
tomaryprinciple of "Pacta sunt servanda" is the reason for validity of
all particular internationallaw created by the treatyprocedure.
Internationalcustomis, therefore,a procedurefor the creationof norms
of general internationallaw. It is internationallaw which lays down the
conditionsunder which the procedure of custom creates valid norms of
general internationallaw. These conditions are two: usage and opinio
juris; theyhave equal importance. This is admittedoverwhelmingly by the
writers,and provedby the practice of states and of international tribunals
and courts.22 Only Strupp, fromhis extremepactum taciturnstandpoint,
denies the necessityof usage. As to the conditionof opinio juris, Kopel-
manas 23 took a position against its necessity,and recently Guggenheim
has held that the conditionof opinio juris is superfluous. But this theory
is untenable; it would eliminate the distinction, between customaryrules
of law, on the one hand, and rules of internationalmoralityand conven-
tional internationalrules (courtoisie internationale) on the other hand,
whereas the practice of states shows that the states and courts sharply
distinguishbetween these internationalrules of differentnormativesys-
tems.
19That is whythe norm,IIPacta sun;tservanda," cannotserveas the basic normof
international law.
A Manual of InternationalLaw (1951), p. 13.
20 E.g., G. Schwarzenberger,
21 Thus CharlesCheneyHyde, International Law (2nd ed.), Vol. I (1945), p. 10;
Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, InternationalLaw, A Treatise,Vol. I (7th ed., 1948), p. 25;
Verdrossin Recueildes Cours,Vol. 30 (1929, V), p. 293; Kelsen,op. cit. (supra, note
6), p. 314.
22 The necessityof the conditionof opinio juris plays a prominent r8le in interna-
tional decisions;see The Lotus Case, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 10, Sept. 7, 1928, p. 28,
and the AsylumCase, cited above.
23 BritishYear Book of International Law, 1937, pp. 127-151.

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666 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

The elementsof the firstcondition,"usage," are the followingones:

There mustbe a "practice," whetherof positiveacts or omissions,whether
in time of peace or war. This practice must refer to a type of situation
falling within the domain of internationalrelations. This practice must
have been continuedand repeatedwithoutinterruptionof continuity. But
internationallaw containsno rules as to how many times or for how long
a timethis practicemusthave been repeated. To require that the practice
necessarily must be "ancient,''24 has no basis in positive international
law. Thus the new and undoubtedrule of general customaryinternational
law concerningthe sovereigntyover the airspace 25 by the subjacent state
was developed-contrary to the preceding proposals of the science of
internationallaw-during the firstWorld War. It is doubtfulwhether,
as some writers26 demand, the practice must be "just" and "humane"
or must not be in violation of existing treaties or of valid international
law. For custommay change a valid treatynorm-e.g., Article XVIII of
the League of Nations Covenant-or a valid normof general international
law. As to the problemof how widely this usage must have been prac-
ticed, internationallaw demands a "general" practice, not a unanimous
one. That shows the untenabilityof the consent theory,of the pactum
taciturnconstruction. For, if it is the case of a customaryrule of general
internationallaw, created by general practice,such norm is valid for new
states and for pre-existingstates which hithertohad no opportunityof
applying it.27 The problemis, on the otherhand, of importanceas to the
coming into existenceof a new norm of customary-general international
law. Some writers say that such new norm cannot come into existence
against the resistanceof a leading state. That is why the so-called"sector
principle" of the acquisition of sovereigntyover Polar regions has cer-
tainly not become a new norm of customarygeneral internationallaw,
in consequenceof the non-acceptanceby the United States. On the other
hand, even the concurrentattitude of the leading Powers cannot create a
normof customarygeneralinternationallaw against the resistanceof other
Powers. That is why the three-milelimit of territorialwaters, upheld
by the leading maritimePowers,the United States and Great Britain, has,
in the light of non-acceptanceby other states,not become a norm of cus-
tomarygeneral internationallaw. The practice must be "general," not
universal; but a mere majorityof states is not enough. The practice must
have been applied by the overwhelmingmajority of states which hitherto
had an opportunityof applying it.
24 Thus I. Ruiz Moreno,DerechoInternacionalPublico (2nd ed.), Vol. I (1940), pp.
22-25; and D. Ant6koletz,Tratado de DerechoInternacionalPiiblico (4th ed.), Vol.
I (1949), pp. 46-47. Vattel speaks of a "long usage."
generale(Milan,
La navigazioneaerea nel dirittointernazionale
25 See MarioGiuliano,
1941).
26 Thus Ruiz Moreno; Ant6koletz, op. cit.; previouslyVattel.
27 See The Paquete Habana (1900), 175 U. S. 677.

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 EDITORIAL COMMENT 667

The usage, thus determined, mustbe coupledwith the opiniojuris.

The practicemusthave been applied in the conviction that it is legally
binding. Whenthe practiceevenfor a long timeand withoutinterrup-
tionhas been appliedonlyin the conviction thatit is morallybindingor
conventionally binding,a normof international moralityor a normof
internationale
coutrtoisie may have come into being, but not a normof
customarygeneralinternational law. Not only must the states which
appliedthepracticehave had this conviction, but this conviction mustnot
havebeenchallengedby other states. Protests by other statesor declara-
tionsthatthey,evenif submitting to thispractice,do so onlyex gratia;
protestsagainstthe normon whichan international decisionis based,
evenin carryingout thisdecision,preventthe coming into existenceof a
new normof customary generalinternational law.
Thereis a last problemas to therelationsbetweenthosetwoconditions
of "usage" and "opinio juris," especiallyin time. We mustdistinguish
twohypotheses.A normof courtoisie internationale maybecomea norm
of customary generalinternational law: herethe "opinio juris" is later
added to the usage and no theoreticaldifficulty arises. But a difficult
problemis presented whenit is a case of theoriginalformation of a norm
of customary generalinternational law. On the one hand it is said that
usage plus opiniojuris leads to such norm;that,on the otherhand,in
orderto lead to suchnorm,thestatesmustalreadypracticethefirstcases
withtheopiniojuris. Hence,theverycomingintoexistenceof suchnorm
would presupposethat the states acted in legal error. Kelsen28 sees
thisdilemma, but it is hardlya solutionto state"that it is sufficient that
the statesconsiderthemselves boundby any normwhatever." For this
wouldnot explainwhy,then,in one case a legal rule,in anothercase a
moralor conventional one,would comeinto existence, nor would it cor-
respondto thecondition whichdemandsan opiniojuris,not"of anynorm
whatever." Verdrossresortsto the explanationthat the firstcases of
thisusagemustbe supportedby theconsciousness of helpinga "principle
oflaw whichhas notyetbecomepositivelaw" to assertitself. But thisso-
lutioncomesclose to the theoryof customas evidenceof a pre-existing
norm. Thereis here,certainly, a challenging theoretical problemwhich,
as faras thiswritercan see,has notyetfounda satisfactory solution.
The aseertainment whetherthe two conditions of the customprocedure
have beenfulfilled in a concretecase, is a taskof the competent interna-
tionalauthority, and, preliminarily, of the scienceof international law.
It is a difficulttask. Evidence can be taken fromdiplomaticcorre-
spondence,instructions and so on, municipallaws and court decisions,
treaties,negotiations, international decisions,practiceof international
organizations. But the greatest caution is alwaysnecessary. Diplomatic
correspondence and so on may carry the opinio juris,but mayalso consti-
28 GeneralTheoryof Law and State (1945), p. 114.

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668 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

tute mere expressionsof political convenienceor expediency. A national

court decision may be good evidence,but may also, in the words of the
late Professor Borchard, only be evidence of what internationallaw is
not. Treaties may, under differentcircumstances,be evidence for the
fulfillment of the two conditions,and, under othercircumstances,evidence
against it. Even similarclauses over a long timein correspondingtreaties
are not always evidence. Thus the option-of-nationality clause, although
very frequentlycontained in correspondingtreaties and in use a long
time, has not lead to a rule of customary general international law
which makes an option clause obligatory,apart from treaty.29 Repeated
violations of internationallaw may have occurred,without changing the
convictionthat they constituteviolations,but they may also have been
committedwith the opinio juris of creatingnew internationallaw. That
is, e.g., now the crucial and basic problemin the chaotic status of the laws
of war.30
It is necessaryto distinguishbetween internal laws as evidence of the
coming into existenceof a customaryrule of general internationallaw 31
and a mereparallelismof municipal statutes.82 This researchhas not only
to determinewhether a norm of customary general international law,
creatinga new or changingor abolishinga pre-existingnormhas come into
existence,but also when it has come into existence. Here is the difficult
fieldof distinguishingbetweena new customarynormwhichhas come into
existence,and mere proposals for or tendenciestoward creatingsuch new
norm. We give a few examples which will, at the same time, show how
importantthis problemis in thesetimesof transformation of general inter-
national law. Have recent international decisions3 already created a
principleof customaryinternationallaw, loweringthe degree of effectivity
of occupation of certain terrae nullius? Have recent treaty clauses al-
ready lead to a new rule of customarygeneral law concerningprivileges
and immunitiesof internationalorganizations? Hardly. Is therea norm
of general customaryinternationallaw concerningthe so-called "prin-
ciple of contiguity"?34 Has a new norm of customarygeneral interna-
tional law come into existence abolishing the privilege of jurisdictional
immunityfor state-ownedvessels engaged in normal commerce? The
29 See JosefL. Kunz, Die Volkerrechtliche Option,Vol. I (1925).
30 JosefL. Kunz, "The ChaotieStatus of the Laws of War," in this JOURNAL, Vol.
45 (1951), pp. 37-61.
31 The Scotia (U. S. SupremeCourt,1871), 14 Wallaee 170.
32 See Gieslerv. Giesler
's Heirs, Swiss Federal Court,July 11, 1935, Annual Digest
and Reportsof Publie InternationalLaw Cases 1935-1937,pp. 1-2.
83 Island of Palmas Arbitration, 1928, this JOURNAL,Vol. 22 (1928), p. 867; Judg-
mentin the Case of Eastern Greenland,P.C.I.J., April 5, 1933, Series A/B, No. 53.
On the otherhand, the ClippertonIsland Arbitration,1931 (this JOURNAL, Vol. 26
(1932), p. 390), seemsto this writernot in conformitywithgeneralinternational law.
34 Contra: Judge Max Huber in the Island of Palmas Arbitration.

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 EDITORIAL COMMENT 669

same question could be asked with regard to the acts "jure gestionis" of
foreignstates.35 Has a normof customarygeneral internationallaw come
into existence granting to coastal states certain rights in the so-called
"contiguous zone" beyond territorialwatersI36 It is certain that, con-
traryto the opinion of some writers,the so-called "Nuremberg Principles"
have, up to now, not become principlesof customarygeneral international
law. Has a new norm of general customaryinternationallaw concerning
the "Continental Shelf," come into existence? Lauterpacht37 answered
the question in the affirmative in 1950 insofaras the Truman Declaration
is concerned. But not only are Mouton38 and the Award of Lord Asquith
of Bishopstone39of contraryopinion,but the proposals of the International
Law Commission,40 acting in its capacity for "progressive developmentof
internationallaw" and not "of its codification,"would seem to show no
more but a tendency,a trend toward the coming into existenceof a new
norm,and even that, perhaps, only by multilateraltreaty. All the more
so, certain recentextravagantunilateral declarationsconcerningthe "epi-
continentalsea," the extensionof territorialwaters,the expansion of ex-
clusive fishingrights,have not led to the coming into existenceof a new
norm of customarygeneral internationallaw 41 in the light of the strong
protestsby the United States, Great Britain and other states.
JOSEF L. KUNZ

THIE INTERNATIONAL LAW STANDARD IN RECENT STATUTES OF THE UNITED STATES

The integratingof internationallaw with municipal law involves legis-

lative judgment as well as draftsman'sskill. Through its statute law the
United States has provided numerous examples of the techniques used.
Some whichcame withinthe firstcenturyand a half of the nation's history
have been the subject of an earlier comment.' Statutoryprovisionsfrom
1941 through1952 invite special attention,partly because of the nature
of the period. Conflictand cleavage have marked these years. War and
35 See the veryinteresting
decisionand reasoningof the AustrianSupremeCourtin
the case Hans Hoffmanv. Jiri Dralle, May 10, 1950,reprintedin Osterreichische
Zeit-
8chriftfiir #ffentliches
Recht, Vol. IV (1951), pp. 90-103.
36 See Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, InternationalLaw, A Treatise (7th ed., 1948), p. 449
et seq., and Reportof the Third Session of the U.N. InternationalLaw Commission,
this JOURNAL, Supp., Vol. 45 (1951), pp. 146-147.
it"Sovereigntyover Sub-MarineAreas," BritishYear Book of InternationalLaw,
Vol. 27 (1950), pp. 376-433.
38The ContinentalShelf (The Hague, 1952).
39Reprintedin Internationaland ComparativeLaw Quarterly,Vol. I (1952), pp.
247-261; digested in this JOURNAL,Vol. 47 (1953), p. 156.
40 Loc. cit. (supra, note 36), pp. 139-144.
41 Hence, the statementby Professor Aramburit in this JOURNAL,Vol. 47 (1953),
pp. 120-123, is wholly untenable.
1 RobertR. Wilson," The InternationalLaw Standard in Statutes of the 'United
States," this JOUNtAL,
Vol. 45 (1951), pp. 732-740.

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