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    40215671 Dilthey Descriptive Psychology

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    Dilthey Descriptive Psychology

    Uploaded by

    Bailey Fensom

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    © All Rights Reserved
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    of 78
    10 fly export he nature and condone of sian tay wok ones oer fee orig oF theory ofthe human studies. provides iperiar concops and meni fr "hose concarned wih analyzing the humen conation rent phases ofthe cevelopmen oth pixoohy a ees ering a Descriptive and AnayePayehlon (1h) Diy argos tet Pe ana. Sie one i macs fad Mor iy CAB eu pt, oay Ho. "SN 60247851 @« descriptive psychology and historical understanding wilhelm dilthey DESCRIPTIVE PSYCHOLOGY HISTORICAL UNDERSTANDING by WILHELM DILTHEY transated by RICHARD M, ZANER AND KENNETH L, HEIGES with an Introduction by RUDOLF A. MAKKREEL MARTINUS NUHOFF / THE HA es otning» Design Amie Pre,” yar Ti Zaer, era appre! Win ieee scene aon Pocono bm ig Comme See. ‘enneih Hee onal appease Wt Dy ‘Ds Vrtebn eet ‘embed cermin Ga upon, ts reuzsir | V2 10 7 SIP eis wa: a Serine ‘oe bt rt ta a TABLE OF CONTENTS ‘Acenowt eset vw Isrmonuicnon ‘by Rolf A. Mabel Deseitire Frye ad the Human Ses Lived Experience, Understanding and Desert Siretr an Development in aye Lie Undersaning, R-ageriencing md Misr! Interpetaion Tnnss conceins 4 Drscurve ano AvALY i PenoLooy (194) ‘nanaated by Richard M. Zane 2 ‘Chactr I The Problem ofa Payeblogl Fountain fr the aman Stes Caper: Disinstinbeteen Expat and Descriptive (Caper 1: Decipive and Antic Payee 1 Care: Raabe Extn Pca ant Chater Vi: Posty and Conon ofthe Sotsion of the Task (Chaser Vi: The Situ f Pach Life 8 ‘Chater VII: The Developmen of Payee Lite o ‘Chap; Stay of he Dlerences of Phi Life The nia 106 “Tas Unersravina oF Ornen Pensons aso Toei Exe Lire translated by Kenseth L. Hoge 1. Expressions of Lite 1. The Elementary Forms of Underscing IIL Objective Spit and Blementary Uncertaning IV. The Higher Form of Undestnig Projecting, Re crating, Reeapeening Vi. Bese nerpeaion ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS | would ke to express my deep appreciation to Professors Frank Jakobsh and Rolf George of the University of Waterloo, whose sistance, suguesions and encobragement were invaluabe throughout the cay stages ofthe preparation of my portion of the translation, and to Galviele Hanowski for her kind arsitance in soning out the ial problems Keath L. Hass We are most gratefil to Professor Rudolf Mabkrel fo his care teading snd deta erie of he entire tet Kemeth L. Heiss Richard M. Zaner INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION Perhaps no philosopher has so flly explored the nature and conditions of historical understanding as Wilhelm Dithey. His work, conceived ‘overall as Crigue of Historical Reason and devsloped through is ‘wellknown theory ofthe human studs, provides concepts and methods sil fil for those concerned with analyzing the human contin, Despite the increasing recognition of iltheys cetibaions, relat ‘vey few of his writings have as yt appeared in Englshtasltion. tis {therefore both timely and useful to have aval er two work dan ftom diferent phases inthe development of his phitcsophy. The “Ideas Concerning. a. Descriptive and Analytic. Psychology” (1890), now translated into Engl forthe fist time, sets forth Dithey programa: tie and methodological viewpoins trough a descptive psychology. while “The Understanding of Other Perions and Ther Expresions of Lie (ea 1910) is representative of his Iter hermeseute approach 19 historical understanding. studies in volume one of his Eineiung in die Geutswittenschaften (inmoducton to the Harman Stade, poise in 18, He argued there that for the proper study of man and history we mist exchew the !metaphysial Speculation ofthe absolute eat whie a he same time voiding the sientstic reduction of positivism. The em of the human Sais, which encompasses both the humanities an he soci elences ‘must be dtinguished fom that of the natural seiences~ not because ofa metaphysical or material dieence in ther objects, uta ystems with divergent epistemological concerns. Through his writing this dive scnce is explored though the contrast between natural causal explane ton and historical understanding. And ie his effort to determine the ‘most appropriate methods for claying understanding, Dithey tured {rst to description and then to interpretation. ‘One ofthe Key claims af the Eifetung was that the eistemclony and ‘methodology ofthe human stdies mus! he established in conjunction vith 3 new psychology based on experience. Traditional asscitionist ‘aychology as well a expeinetal pochology were modelled on the ‘ara sclences and failed to do justice to the flless and contin of faperence. The "Ideas Conceming a Descriptive and Analytic Psy~ ‘chology constites Dithey’s most thorough aempt to redefine psychology asa human study. Among those recognizing the sigificance Df this work is Huser, who eres Dithey for having convincingly ‘lemonstrated how experimental psychology with its atomistic approach ‘stored the data of psychi fe He pres Dilthey's efforts to delineate the overal stacture of conscousnert and concls that hit “wrtngs ‘contin genial preview and eran radinens of phenomenoogy. "tis ff course Dithe’s descrpive approsch to psychology that dre” user's attention and makes it importa relative othe epsterelogal problem of locating an indubable starting pont forthe selences. Dihey wrote hs “Ideas” to provide the human toies with a neutral empirical foundation. An examination of ve ofthe fmportant concepts developed in Diltey's esay~ lived expeence, acquired paycic nexus, Understanding and description ~ wil stow that his psychology was Intended to give sn iil eremation forthe human sts, not !kimatic ground fom which the others could be derive. Prychoogy would be “ist within the system of the human stiles without, however, establishing an a prior! epistemological grounding for the system of the human studies. Obviously psychology could only be the frst ofthe human studies to the exe tht it Was nonspeculave ‘Theale Plthey considered it neceseay to suspend a many Rypothe ses of traditional psychology at possible, whether they be peycho- Physical or associations. Dilthey opens his Ideas” wit an stack on train expansive and ‘constructive psychologies. Their goal is explain ll psychic processes {8 diferent coosructions or combinafons of ceria isle mental ve ein Poca aera el ed perxooverion s elements suchas representations. However, these cements cannot be welletermined, with the rest that psychalogkeal Hypotheses relating them have remained largely untestabe tis possible, according fo Dilthey. to dispense with most psysholog- cal hypotheses about the association of representation because Inner experienc is aleady interconnected. Whereas outer experience presents "sith many unconnected phenomena which cn oly be related troogh the hypotheses of the natural siences,pyehology mist consult he dala ‘of immer experience which are givens pate of eel continaum. This means tht comectednes in paychs fe does aot nex to be expaned hypothetically, but can be dcty experienced, Yet Dithey does not aopether rule out hypotheses from his sescrimive poycholoy. They af, however, prevented from assuming the ndementl ral they playin the natural sciences He clams that ts fonly necessary to appeal to hypotheses in thos itances when the Conta that exists amon psychic processes fs broken or interrupted In cases where we were not fly atentve, questions of detail may remain problematic and this requte hypotheses to clarify what might have happened. Wheress expansive psychology qua natural sence begins with hypotheses, descriptive psychology ends wit them,” The nor-ypotheticl starting point for Dilthey’s psychology lies in Erlebnis ved experience). The concep of fived experience i soni hat ict to define and therefore has often ben confuse wth hat of inner experience. Indeed Dilthey himself at times writes ai If Evlebnis were nother term for ere Exfalvag. Buti is poetics of 1857 Dilthey had already claimed thatthe concept of ved experience “contains telation ofnne and outer" (GS. VI 226). Lived experience it broader in scope and certainly does not carry the subjective conmnations 20 often | addition to the particular connections disclosed by the unolting of inner experience Diltey finds that int "someting gven as a ved experience." namely,» moe genera sense ofthe cornevtedness ofthe whole of psyehicife (See GS. V. 170), This direct sree of the overall Psychic nexus underlies the acta! “transitions fm one state to nother” (GS, V, 206. Lived experince can be seen to encompas, sch states and procenses which need never be consciously as ‘etained in iner experience (See GS, V, 207 Whats only sugested here in the “Ideas” bout the wore fundamental nature of lived experience is clearly brought out ia Dilthey's Inter writings where Erlbnis becomes one ofthe main categories of lie With tive experience discosing an original coninaum it becomes necessity to reformulate the waditonl conception of the understanding which had been primarily oriented tour diserete experience of natal Phenomena. According. to the Kantian theory of experience, we understand nature dscursively, proceeding part by pat to constrict whole. Kant's important insight tat our experience presupposes teanscendenal unity ofsei-coneioumess doesnot allow ts fo cone however. that we possess any real, inte sel/understandng. Out inner experience of the self iss phenomenal as outer experience ‘ccordingto Kant, an all psychological selAnowlege is bound by the stscurive character ofthe faulty ofVerstand understanding), Dilthey's tack on faculty psychology undermines sich 1 fixed, natural conception of Versiand. To designate @ more dynamic kind of self Understanding that can develop historically. Diltey uses the Verbal infinitive Versieen instead ofthe substantive Verstand, Insofar a the Verschen (understanding) of psychic ies based on IWed experience it ‘an be inte and proceed fom the whale tothe pas nthe ted experience, the partelar carece ppt by the tality of [ich ie an he nwa whch sande and te whol psyche ‘Blogs timed experience Te ate areal Stree a a oF Unlestindig (erties) of ouch aad ators, We exc by pel inteecta procesies but we understand though the conse the ower ofthe pete. (0. V7, ‘he Kantian understanding Verstan) qu intllectoal faculty was ely scared tothe scien explanaion of satural processes. allows ts to Felate the phesomena of mature, fut provides no insight into their undetyng realy Dithey aceepts thi limit for our knowledae of naire, but not forthe understanding Versthen) of oursives and others. Our lived experience freal~ we need no: regress behind it ind is source ‘or justification, AS a resul, the human sties possess a decisive vantage over the natural sciences, Whetets we can only “explain nature, we understand peyehie hfe” (GS, V, 142), We cannot relly Undersiand nature because isnot of our own making. Dithey aligns inset wih Vico in lain that wecan only rly know hat we have bernopuerton. 7 ourselves brought forth We thas have a kindof access to psychological Secil and historical realty ~a recognition of ourselves in others 80 16 speak — which i impossible in relaion to natue. Understanding Constitves the goal ofthe human saes inthe way that explanation ‘efnes the natural sciences ‘The fact that Dilthey i vital of “sienifc explanation” has given some the misleading impression that understanding is inratonal or Ineitive in porate sense. Whe explanation my be conceived 8 Purely intellects! proces, understanding should net be characterized ‘nuthetialy a a mere product of fein o empathy Is not reducible to am immediate sense or a projective leap. Lived experience does Provide an immediate sense ofthe whale but understanding in appealing Tova the powers of the psyche, does not ovelak the intellectual processes. nthe "1deas” the nature of understanding is aborted in terms of te methods of desxiption and analysis. While recognizing that some natural Sciences suchas Botany an zoology maybe considered more deseritive than explanatve, Dilthey asserts that deserption assumes «more “profound significance in psychology than in the nara sciences. This lim receives it juntifeaon indiredy but persuasively when we conser that according to Dltey “desrptivepsyevelogy must atthe same tne be an analytic psychology” (G5, V, 174). By establishing undamental relation between description and analy, Ditheysevers the lnk that normally exists between natural escipion snd synthesis Because description in psychology Is guided by ths sease of totality ‘binned through ved experienc, is main sk to analyze and tbe parts of the whol. This sense of oality does nt of couse exist when Wwe describe the discrete data of outer experience, Accordingly, in describing natural processes our concern ito estiblsh connections Although psyeholoBial ceseripcon may also at times connect spec arts of the paychienexs, the synthesis ot infeed, But at ost an explication of an orginally experienced sense of connectedness. The fundamental task of description in the human stds is in articulating smindeermicae nexus rater than in sythetialy cabining elements gmat Yc “A insrmuionl Sepa Bakimore Th Johns Hopkins Press Here we fad the core of Dilthey’s methodological critique of his nineteenth century peedecesso' inthe human studies Hegels dials Lica philosophy of history, Conte's grand science of sociology, and John Stuart Mis se of psychic chemistry to explain experiential novelty, are simply diferent manfstations of a pernicious synthetic approach 0 human development and chang, Instead of analyzing umn ide for its Implicit structures, these thinkers impose order on through ati

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