Philosophical Review

Testimony: A Philosophical Study. by C. A. J. Coady

Review by: Richard Fumerton
The Philosophical Review, Vol. 104, No. 4 (Oct., 1995), pp. 618-621
Published by: Duke University Press on behalf of Philosophical Review
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 BOOK REVIEWS

tieswithradicallydifferent practices.He thusfailsto rule out the possibility

of logicallyincompatible knowledge claims being respectivelysanctioned
by alternativeevidentialpractices.He thus also failsto show whyhis com-
munityis uniquely epistemicallyprivilegedat deliveringtruthand knowl-
edge about the external world (understood realistically).Indeed, there
seems littlereason forthinkingthere is any longer a practice-independent
world.
Thirdly,Almeder's "experimentalproof" of realismis inconclusive.Our
inabilityto control consciouslythe content or course of our experiences
does not entail theirsource in a mind-independentreality.They may,after
all, originatein a part of mind both unconscious and beyond willfulcon-
trol.
Revisionisticepistemologiesface a forbiddinggauntlet of obstacles, in-
cluding idealism, relativism,and recrudescentskepticism.I am not con-
vinced Almeder avoids any of these. This notwithstanding, Blind Realism
representsa thoughtful,challenging,and coherent attemptto combine
and develop the contextualismand interpersonalismofAustinianordinary
language epistemologywith the fallibilismand progressivismof Peircean
epistemologyof science.

JAMES MAFFIE
University
ofColorado,Boulder

ThePhilosophical
Review,
Vol. 104, No. 4 (October 1995)

TESTIMONY A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY By C. A. J. CoADY. New York:

Oxford UniversityPress,Clarendon Press, 1992. Pp. x, 315.

Coady's book is probably the single most comprehensive treatmentof

philosophical questions relatingto testimonyand as such mustbe read by
anyone interestedin the topic. His epistemologicalconclusionsconcerning
testimonychallenge much of the philosophical tradition.
The book begins by remindingus just how pervasiveour reliance on
testimonyis. Despite the fact that much of what we believe seems to de-
pend on informationprovided by others, there has been relativelylittle
focus in epistemologyon the nature of the evidence that testimonypro-
vides.This can be explained, in part,bythe assumptionof manytraditional
epistemologiststhatif testimonyis a source of knowledge,it is only deriv-
ativelyso. The reductiveapproach, as Coady calls it, insiststhat we have
knowledgethroughtestimonyonly insofaras we can independentlyjustify
the reliabilityof testimonythroughsome more fundamentalsource of ra-
tional belief.A good part of Coady's concern in the firsthalf of the book
is to refutethe reductivist'sconception of testimonialevidence.

618

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 BOOK REVIEWS

Before addressingfundamentalepistemologicalquestions,Coady offers

an analysisof what testimonyis. He provides an account of both formal
legal testimonyand the more informaltestimonyof othersupon whichwe
relyin our everydaylives.With respect to both he appears to argue that
S's statementP constitutestestimonyonly if (1) S's statementis evidence,
(2) the statementis offeredas evidence by S, and (3) S has the relevant
competence, authority,or credentialsto state trulythat P (32, 42). As an
analysisof the concept of testimony,both (1) and (3) are problematic.
Even ifCoady's controversialclaims about the epistemicstatusof testimony
are true, it doesn't seem rightthat I need to recognize utterancesas evi-
dence or the speaker as a relevantauthorityin order to think that the
speaker is indeed testifying.
Aftersayingwhat he thinkstestimonyis, Coady turns to the epistemic
status of beliefs reached by reliance on testimony.His primarytargetis
Hume and the aforementionedreductiveapproach. According to Hume,
one can legitimately relyon testimonyonlyafterexperience has confirmed
that testimonyis generallyreliable. Coady correctlypoints out that the
term"experience" in thiscontextis ambiguous as betweenthe experience
of people in general and the experience of the individualattemptingto
justifyreliance on testimony. If Hume thinksthatthe individualcan justify
reliance on testimony because the communityhas generallyconfirmedthat
testimonyis reliable,he is mistaken,according to Coady,foran individual
couldn't begin to discoverwhat a community'sexperience has been with-
out relyingon the testimonyof others,withoutrelyingon the legitimacyof
thatwhich has yetto be established.But, Coady believes,an individualwill
have no chance of establishingthroughpersonal observationsany thesis
about the general reliabilityof testimony.Althoughhe presentsa number
of arguments,Coady clearlythinksthat his knock-downargumentis the
Davidsonian claim thatone could never throughobservationestablishthat
testimonyis massivelyunreliable. If one found no general correlationsbe-
tween putativeassertionsand the truthof those assertions,one would be
unable even to knowthe contentof another's assertionsor indeed thatthe
utteranceswere genuine assertionsat all. But if an individual'sexperience
cannot falsifythe hypothesisthat testimonyis generallyreliable it makes
no sense to suppose thatit could verifysuch an hypothesis.In subsequent
chapters,Coady argues that neither prudential reasoning nor analogical
reasoningwill help breathe life into the reductionist'sprogram.
I am actuallynot sure withwhat Coady ultimatelyreplaces the reduc-
tionist'sapproach to the epistemic status of testimony.At one point he
seems on the verge of claimingthatone can know a priorithat testimony
is generallyreliable (or, perhaps, prima facie credible) (96) but he quite
understandablysuggeststhat such a claim must await a more general the-
ory of a priori knowledge. In stillother passages he seems to claim only

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 BOOK REVIEWS

(!) that testimonyis a fundamental source of evidence on a par withper-

ception and memory (145). He also seems to suggest,however,that one
can ultimatelyappeal to criteriaof coherence in trustingtestimony(173).
Aftersettlingto his satisfactionfundamentalepistemic questions con-
cerning the statusof testimony,Coady turns to more superficialpuzzles
and practicalproblems.He discussesat some lengththe waysin whichone
can legitimatelycome to distrustparticulartestimony, especiallytestimony
concerning extremelyunusual events.He also argues convincinglythat if
we assume the general reliabilityof testimony we need not worrytoo much
about the "disappearance of history"resultingfromthe loss of probability
throughlinks in a long chain of testimony.Coady also replies to Colling-
wood's criticismsof an historian'srelyingon testimonyand argues suc-
cessfullythat those philosopherswho deny that mathematicalknowledge
can be achieved throughtestimonyare mistaken.Focusing on a fewegre-
giouslyflawedexperiments,Coady offerswarningsagainst uncriticallyac-
ceptingpsychological"discoveries" concerningthe unreliabilityof certain
kinds of testimony.He concludes with a discussion of special problems
concerning the statusof, and criteriafor,so-called "expert" testimony.
I can't begin to do justice to the many subtle and intricatearguments
advanced in the book. As philosophers are wont to do, I will focus on
criticisms.The most strikingepistemologicalclaim in the book is the re-
jection of the idea that testimonyowes whatevercredibilityit has for an
individualto the individual'sbeing able to justifythroughhis or her own
experience its general reliability.Even if one concedes Coady's claim that
one cannot establish throughexperience that testimonyis generallyun-
reliable, it surelydoes not followthat one cannot, or need not, establish
through experience that it is generallyreliable. It may be that without
assumingthe general reliabilityof testimonyI could not formreasonable
hypothesesabout what other people mean (or even that the sounds they
emit have meaning). But for all that,the world and other people could
stillbe chaotic in a way that would preclude me fromreaching any rea-
sonable conclusions either about the existence of testimonyor, a fortiori,
about its general reliability.Even if I cannot verifythe conjunction that
there is widespread testimonyand that it is massivelyunreliable, I could
stilldiscoverthroughexperience thatI have no reason to believe thatthere
is testimonythatis generallyreliable.
If Coady's reductio of reductionismis ultimatelyunconvincing,he is
neverthelessrightin arguing that the problems of establishingthe reli-
abilityof testimonywithoutrelyingon it are monumental.I suspect many
"individualists,"however,will findhis one-paragraphtreatmentof reason-
ing to the best explanation as a solutionto the problemunsatisfying (119),
and I was puzzled thathe doesn't consider Bayesean attemptsto solve the
fundamental epistemological problem (though he does turn later to

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 BOOK REVIEWS

Bayes's Theorem as a useful device for evaluatingparticular testimony).It

also seems to me thatCoady is not alwaysas self-consciousas he mightbe
concerning his views about the relevance of an individual's "access" to
factssurroundingtestimony.For example, in explaining how one needn't
lose probabilityin a chain of testimonyprovided that the chain has a cer-
tain character,it wasn't clear whether he thinksthat an individualwho
relies on such testimonywould need to know the character of the testi-
monial chain.
Finally,I'm not sure whyCoady reallyneeds to reject individualism.If
he is rightthatthe evidence of testimonyhas the same fundamentalstatus
as the evidence of memory,or that coherence is an ultimatetest of the
reliabilityof memory,whycannot we stilltreatthe experiences of the in-
dividual as the ultimatesource of knowledge?As Coady himselfacknowl-
edges, the individual must hear and understand testimony.And is it not
coherence withinan individual'sbelief systemthatis supposed to provide
additional supportfor the idea thatone can learn fromthe words of oth-
ers? Moreover,Coady clearly thinksthat he has figuredout throughhis
transcendentalargumentsthat testimonyis a fundamentalsource of evi-
dence. These argumentswere surelydivinedin the time-honoredtradition
of individualisticphilosophical reflection.

RICHARD FUMERTON
Universityof Iowa

ThePhilosophical
Review,
Vol. 104, No. 4 (October 1995)

EVIDENCE AND INQUIRK TOWARDSRECONSTRUCTIONIN FPISTEMOL-

OGY. By SUSAN HAACK. Oxford: Blackwell,1993. Pp. x, 259.

For some time, it seemed that one had to choose between two sharply
differenttheories of epistemicjustification,foundationalismand coher-
entism.Foundationaliststypically held thatsome beliefswere certain,and,
hence, basic. Basic beliefs could impartjustificationto other, non-basic
beliefs,but needed no such support themselves.Coherentistsdenied that
thereare anybasic beliefs;on theirview,alljustifiedbeliefsrequire support
fromother beliefs.The divide between foundationalismand coherentism
has narrowed lately,'and Susan Haack attemptsto synthesizethese com-
peting accounts into a view she calls "foundherentism."
Haack develops this approach in her recent book, Evidenceand Inquiry
(see especiallychaps. 1-4 and 10). She undertakesdetailed criticismsof

'For example,we havethe "moderate"foundationalism

due to WilliamAlston,
RobertAudi,and others,and the"impure"coherentism
due to LaurenceBonjour.

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