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Abstract
In this paper I will discuss the concept “limit-situation”1 as it is de-
veloped in Karl Jaspers’ early writings, especially his Psychologie
der Weltanschauungen and Philosophie, and explore how this concept
could be understood in a broader way. After a discussion of the con-
cepts of “limit” and “situation” I will discuss Jaspers’ heritage from
Kant and Kierkegaard, in whose works the concepts of antinomy and
paradox are central. Antinomy is worked out in Jaspers’ thinking as
single limit-situations in which the human being understands her fini-
tude and openness. It is through these single limit-situations that her
world-view is shaped. Through a discussion of Jaspers’ communication
theory and his understanding of the mystics, I will extend the concept
of limit-situation from the single limit-situations. I will argue that the
limit-situation should be understood, not only as a concept marking
the limits of the human situation, but as a way of exploring the human
situation as limit.
Introduction
The antinomicality of existence is the limit-situation of the antinomies
(Jaspers 1970, volume II, p. 220 [1932, p 251]. Translation modified,
see footnote 1.)
we become ourselves by entering with open eyes into the limit-situa-
tions (Jaspers 1970, volume II, pp. 278–279 [1932, p. 204]. Translation
modified.)
The concept limit-situation, as well as Jaspers’ philosophy in general, has
not attracted much attention in the last decades.2 But when we today try to
understand the human being in the paradoxical situation between the own and
the different, the concept “limit-situation” can be helpful. Limit-situation is,
according to Jasper, the antinomic situation that makes up a foundational condi-
tion for human beings. This theme is relatively undeveloped in the secondary
literature, but it is a central underlying theme in existential philosophy. In this
article I will try to sort out what the concept limit-situation means and show
how the concept can be developed and used today.
During the second half of the 20th century,, philosophy of existence often
became identified with existentialism. But if existentialism was formulated by
Jean-Paul Sartre in the French philosophical tradition, the Germany concept
“philosophy of existence” (“Existenzphilosophie”) was used as to charac-
terise the work of Jaspers and Heidegger, among others 3. Both Jaspers and
Heidegger were very suspicious of the concept “existentialism”, partly because
as an “ism”, it tried to formulate a systematic teaching, but also because ex-
istentialism, to a far too high degree, stressed human autonomy and freedom,
and therefore was often characterized as strongly individualistic; alone with
her freedom and her choices the individual must fulfil herself and create an
autonomous and responsible existence. However Jaspers as well as Heidegger
accepted the term “philosophy of existence” which had a strong connection to
Kierkegaard, to whom Jaspers was one of the first to pay attention to.
Jaspers’ philosophy of existence to a great degree shares the same start-
ing-points as existentialism. Jaspers formulates one such starting-point as
‘everything is essentially real for me only through that I am myself (Jaspers
1938, p. 1, my translation). This emphasis on the existence of the self as the
beginning of all philosophy is thus a common starting-point for both Jaspers
and the existentialists. The text just quoted continues: ‘We are not only here,
but our existence is entrusted to us as place, as a body of the realisation of
2. The concept of “limit-situation” seldom occupies any central position in the secondary litera-
ture. One exception is Rodriguez de la Fuente’s doctoral thesis, which focuses to a high degree
on the concept “limit-situation”. Bollnow is another exception; he has written about Jaspers
and Heidegger and takes as his starting-point the concept of the limit-situation. Heidegger is
probably the one philosopher who, following Jaspers, has most often used the concept in his
own philosophy. The interest in Jaspers today is mostly centred around general philosophy of
existence, discussions about how different world-views can meet each other, and communica-
tion theory.
3. In Sein und Zeit, Heidegger has several references to Jaspers’ Psychologie der Weltanschau-
ungen. He also directly refers to the concept “limit-situation” in footnotes in §49, § 60, § 62
and § 68.
Jonna Bornemark 53
4. All references to this work refer to the German edition (1932), except the quotations that refer
to the English translation (1970) with the German page in brackets.
54 Limit-situation – Antinomies and Transcendence in Karl Jaspers’ Philosophy
the capacity to change the situation actively, but she can never be outside of
all situations. If she steps out of one situation she steps into another. Situation
is thereby a concept of facticity. It is the human situation, which the individual
tries to control through knowledge. What one knows about a situation forms it
at the same time as the knower is immersed within the situation. Knowledge
can never stand outside of the situation: on the contrary, when new knowledge
arises it changes the situation. In Psychologie der Weltanschauungen (p. 202)
Jaspers differentiates limit-situations from temporary situations, by saying
that human beings never can leave the limit-situations, in contrast to tempo-
rary situations. Limit-situation is therefore constitutive for the human being.
Even if one can leave every temporary situation, one can never leave one’s
“situatedness”, thus situatedness as such can be understood as a constitutive
limit-situation.
The concept of situation has influenced 20th-century
century philosophy to a large
degree. Philosophers understood themselves as situated and thus repudiate the
ideal perspective of an almighty god. Instead they found their knowledge within
existential limits. To Jaspers this means that the task of philosophy no longer
is to formulate universal doctrines; rather, philosophy is a unsetteling activity,
an uprooting of the situation even if this activity at the same time formulates
and orders. Jaspers further develops the concept of “situation” in Philosophie
(volume II, p. 210 ff), in a discussion about the determination and historicity
of existence as a foundational limit-situation. By historicity, Jaspers means
that human beings always exist in a certain situation with an uncertain future.
Freedom is the capacity to accept the situation and with all its hindrances and
possibilities and make it one’s own. Although the limit-situations are universal
and experienced by everyone, each individual’s personal situation interacts
with the universal limit-situations in different and unique ways. This means
that all beings are to be understood as historical phenomena. This also means
that the relationship between the individual and the universal is reshaped (even
though this to Jaspers does not mean a negation of the universal). Historicity
is universal since it means that everything is situated, but also since our way
of expressing historicity itself is historically bound.
Jaspers’ emphasis on situation shows the influence of Kierkegaardian phi-
losophy. Limit-situation concerns the specific individual as a foundational
structure. The paradoxes that the limit-situations carry are of concern not only
as an abstract mind-game but especially in factual life. Heidegger develops
this concept of the facticity of the situation further. He emphasises a concept of
situation that is partly founded on the determination of the being-in-the-world,
while at the same time this determination can only occur through openness.
Jonna Bornemark 55
thing-in-itself, that which is beyond experience but which still needs to be as-
sumed and thereby thought, or it is rather included in thinking, even though it
can never be explicit. Appearance and the thing-in-itself are not two parts of
one reality; the thing-in-itself marks instead the limitation of reason. That the
thing-in-itself can not be thought on its own, that is, be represented, does not
mean that it is not included in thought. The thing-in-itself points to that within
appearance that also points to an outside. Kant therefore means that humans
always exist on the limit (which is an argument that Jaspers emphasises even
further). This “utterly other” thereby delimits experience at the same time
as knowledge is always founded on the knower’s relationship to this radical
alterity (see Kant 1985, §57).
Jaspers is to a very large extent influenced by Kant’s understanding of the
concept “Grenze”. “Grenze” or “limit” is not only relevant to knowledge in
Jaspers’ thinking, but it is also, as we will see, an even more important concept
for understanding human finitude. This finitude signifies the impossibility for
human existence to include everything, either in knowledge or in life. The
human being is surrounded by limits. It is in connection to this that we can
understand limit-situations as an expression for the limit of the situation, as
an expression for the insight that humans exist as limited by their situation.
But limit also marks that there is something else: ‘The word limit implies that
there is something else, but it indicates at the same time that this other thing
is not for an existing consciousness’ (Jaspers 1970, volume II, p. 179 [1932,
p. 203], translation modified). One problem in Jaspers’ philosophy is that he
marks this radical otherness as something other, which leads to an understand-
ing of his concept of “transcendence” as a transcendent something6 (Jaspers
concept of transcendence has a close relation to Kant’s thing-in-itself). This
understanding and formulation easily leads to a misunderstanding of “limit”
as “border”. The risk consists in understanding the limit between the empirical
and the transcendent as a border between two areas, a border that can only be
seen from a bird’s-eye view. Such an understanding of limit can be found in
Jaspers’ writings when he claims, for example, that the limit-situations ‘are
like a wall we run into, a wall on which we founder’ (Jaspers 1970, volume II,
p 178 [1932, p. 203]). Nevertheless, Jaspers’ philosophy in large part strongly
emphasises that such a bird’s-eye perspective, which can observe both sides of
a border, is impossible. It is not through knowledge that the radical alterity of
6. This trait in Jaspers’ philosophy was later developed into what he called “periechontologie”,
in which the transcendent is expressed as an all-embracing something.
Jonna Bornemark 57
Antinomies as constitution
Jaspers borrowed the concept of the antinomy from Kant whose thoughts on
the “ideas” Jaspers considered so central that he included a discussion of them
in an appendix to Psychologie der Weltanschuungen. We therefore need briefly
to explore Kant’s thoughts in order to understand Jaspers’ concept of antinomy.
In Kantian philosophy, the fragmented knowledge of the senses is ordered by
the categories of understanding, and as such they differ from the ideas that are
related to the Kantian concept of reason. In contrast to sensory knowledge,
the ideas relate to things that seem to be objects for the mind, but turn out to
be something different since they can not be thought without giving arise to
antinomies. The antinomies arise since ideas relate to a totality, but a totality
that is never given. But this does not mean that the ideas are meaningless; on
the contrary, they are necessary for systematic thinking and for all systematic
58 Limit-situation – Antinomies and Transcendence in Karl Jaspers’ Philosophy
opposition to Kant, as we have seen, Jasper argues that the dialectical solu-
tions that are offered for the antinomies are only technical solutions. These
antinomies seldom create despair, since they are mostly antinomies of thinking
and not relevant for the whole existential individual. But ones relation to the
antinomies lays the foundation for the way in which one shapes a conception
of the world. The opposite pairs of the antinomies, though dependent upon
each other, are isolated and made absolute and seemingly independent when
the mind allies itself with one pole against the other. Jaspers claims that only
mystic thinking functions differently; we will come back to this claim. Because
of this dualism, all rational thinking sooner or later falls into contradictions
within the system; Jaspers calls this “failure” or “crack” (“Scheitern”). This
crack is at the same time a negative name for an opening, for ‘existence as a
whole remains unfinished. Wherever it might tend to come to a conclusion,
there are antinomies to prevent it’ (Jaspers 1970, volume II, p. 218 f., [1932, p.
250]). According to Jaspers, this openness is a necessary structure that makes
thinking possible. Without the relationship to this otherness and infinitude
thinking as a changing process would be impossible.
The antinomical structure is the final and enabling thought necessary to
thinking, but in practical life it poses a problem that needs to be solved or
actively handled. As active beings humans need to act one way or another;
this need is the final proof of human finitude. Theoretically one can always
strive towards an understanding and inclusion of all perspectives (even if this
striving always fails), but in concrete decisions one needs to make excluding
choices. The value-contraries also belong to life. Every value demands the
existence of something of less worth, and every value is thereby also a value
that excludes another. The value-contraries are, as we will see, closely con-
nected to the specific limit-situations of guilt and struggle.
Jaspers understands all art, philosophy, poetry, religion etc, as attempts to cre-
ate harmonious solutions to the antinomies – attempts that for the most part are
unconscious of the deceitfulness of their task. For individuals, the antinomies
can function as motivating forces to action and development, but they can also
lead to paralysis, frustration and cynicism. Alternatively, one can handle the
antinomies by closing one’s eyes to them and letting the opposites live side
by side (which is often called double moral standards), or, more commonly,
by taking a dogmatic position, i.e. making one side absolute and ignoring the
other and thereby becoming able to act with full force. The antinomical situa-
tion always leads to an eternal process with an infinite number of solutions.
Jaspers agrees with both Kant and Kierkegaard when he states that the human
being never stays within the concrete finite, but that the concrete finite always
60 Limit-situation – Antinomies and Transcendence in Karl Jaspers’ Philosophy
has both a finite and an infinite character. The concrete finite needs the infinity
of the ideas to make a structure for action possible (even if Kant emphasises the
epistemological aspect); it is thus the antinomical structure that drives humans
forward and makes action possible. Jaspers, Kant and Kierkegaard also agree
that the transcendent only has significance within the sphere of immanence,
that it is uninteresting and impossible to understand the transcendent solely
in terms of itself. The Kantian antinomies are, as we have seen, first and fore-
most antinomies of thinking, antinomies that are to be solved in a system. For
Jaspers, the antinomies signify the end of logical thinking, but to enable life to
be lived, they continually need to find temporary solutions. It is in this passage
from logical antinomies to unavoidable situations, which we continually need
to solve, that Jaspers starts to use the concept of limit-situation.
fulfilled. New life demands the death of old life at the same time as all life
is only life since it is mortal. Jaspers also points out that mortality in itself
is antinomically split, since although it is what gives attention to ones own
individuality, to human facticity and specific situation, it is at the same time
death that is common to all beings. Death only really happens to “me”; that is
ones own death signals a definite ending. Yet at the same time death always
occurs and the world keeps on going in spite of this.
2) Contingency and necessity are only mentioned as limit-situations in Psy-
chologie der Weltanschauungen (p. 239 ff). Contingency is there described as
a limit-situation in which all reality and knowledge is understood as a selection
from the infinite. The specific context might be necessary but the principle of
selection is always a contingency. The antinomy consists in the need to un-
derstand the world as necessary and coherent, at the same time as the world
shows itself as coincidental, chaotic and non-coherent and thereby impossible
to grasp from all aspects. The two sides are always limited by each other at the
same time as they are dependent upon each other. The discovery of coherence
demand something non-coherent that can be understood. The non-coherent,
can at the same time, only be thought from out of the search for coherence.
Psychologie der Weltanschauungen also treats the specific limit-situations
of struggle and guilt. But in these limit-situations a positive opposite cannot
be found to the same extent. Rather their antinomical structure opens up an
abyss in which the finitude of the self is understood. In Philosophie this abyss
is emphasized to an even greater extent at the expense of the dualistic rela-
tionship. In this book suffering is also described as a specific limit-situation
(p. 230 ff).
3) Suffering is a characterization of our finitude within life. Suffering is
often understood as something that can be avoided through, for example, the
development of medicine and science. But to avoid to understand suffering as
a necessary part of human life leads to self-deception and a failure of seeing
the existential meaning of suffering. To avoid suffering can for example mean
a refusal to allow other human beings to come close, since with proximity
comes the power to harm. To avoid this limitation in myself thereby limits
me even further. By accepting suffering, on the other hand, one can bear one’s
cross, facing suffering and accept that it belongs to “me”. Of course I try to
free myself from suffering, but I understand at the same time that it belongs to
me. I do not try to blame it or project it on someone else; instead I realize that
there is no such thing as a solution that is perfect in every respect. No matter
what choices one makes in life, a certain amount of suffering is unavoidable.
Pure happiness would be emptiness. True happiness must contain risk-taking
and rebuilding with it.
62 Limit-situation – Antinomies and Transcendence in Karl Jaspers’ Philosophy
4) Death and suffering are situations to which humans will always be exposed,
without any action demanded from the subject. But there are limit-situations
that start out from actions. These are, as discussed in Philosophie (p. 227 ff
and 242 ff) the limit-situations of struggle and guilt. These limit-situations are
unavoidable results from one’s own acting. Since acting can not be avoided,
neither can the limit-situations. Trying to avoid them will only recreate them
in a different form or negate ones own self. Struggle can not be avoided, since
all acting is in favour of something and in the face of some kind of resistance.
Whatever is in favour of one thing is also necessarily against something else.
Cooperation is not a solution to this, since it basically repeats the same structure
in larger numbers. The struggle becomes an existential limit-situation when it
has to be understood from the first person perspective out of which “I” real-
ize that I need to fight in favour of something even though I do not have any
absolute arguments for this something. It becomes an existential limit-situation
when I realize that the struggle needs to be carried out even though there is a
lack of foundation, when I accept that that which is important to me remains
important even though never absolute.
All action also carries existential guilt since all actions have unforeseen and
maybe unwanted consequences. Guilt is the limit-situation in which I feel
guilty for being unable to do justice to all perspectives. The human being’s
experience of her inability to perform universal acts makes her understand
herself as finite. The only other solution would be not to act at all and thereby
to negate ones own existence. A life always needs to be a specific life, to be
“my” life; guilt thus points back to the situatedness and facticity of a singular
human being. Rationality leads to attempts to defend singular acts, “my” acts,
and transforming them into universal acts, “our” acts, and thereby building a
system to explain the actions as the best possible choices in order to get away
from existential guilt.
The oppositional pairs of the limit-situations are described as a field of tension
in Psychologie der Weltanschauungen. This means that every human being
is realised through his or her position in this field of tension, that is, through
temporary solutions to the limit-situations. The impossibility of a completely
satisfying solution also carries dissatisfaction with it; all sides can not be
lived to their maximum. There is no ideal solution for all perspectives, there
are only temporary compromises and choices. Of course different persons
solve or handle the limit-situations in different ways and in different ways at
different times in life. This is what founds the differences between human be-
ings and between different world-views, the differences that Psychologie der
Weltanschauungen wants to examine.
Jonna Bornemark 63
8. Heidegger, following Jaspers, also uses the concept “Gehäuse” in Sein und Zeit, § 13, p.
60.
64 Limit-situation – Antinomies and Transcendence in Karl Jaspers’ Philosophy
9. I here follow the translation of Philosophie by E. B. Ashton, who keeps the german concept
“Existenz” untranslated.
10. These leaps should not be understood as a chronology that leads to an “enlightened” human
being; it is not a one-way development, but different attitudes between which I move.
66 Limit-situation – Antinomies and Transcendence in Karl Jaspers’ Philosophy
11. Jaspers here anticipates Levinas’s aim to prioritize the ethical. In fact neither for Levinas
or Jaspers theory of communication means a theory of dialogue. See Lichtigfeld (1996) for a
closer discussion on Levinas and Jaspers.
Jonna Bornemark 67
choices. (Whereas for the empirical I, the limit-situations mean the death of
thinking.) The existential I is in itself no steady ground. It is rather exactly
the ambiguous point at which the empirical I comes forth and, as appearance,
creates itself; the point at which the existential I, as created out of eternity,
does not create itself.
Both meanings of “I am” are closely connected with the surrounding world
and other selves. ‘The I grasps itself only in relation to everything else which
is not I – in other words, in relation to the world it is in’ (Jaspers 1970, vol-
ume II, p. 27 [1932, p. 26]). The empirical I is created in interaction with the
other and with other objects. The consciousness that is the knowing subject
needs objects, something to be directed towards, in order to be conscious at
all. Self-consciousness, in its turn, requires other self-consciousnesses since
it can not ask and answer alone. “The I” is never created independently, it
always needs others to be reflected in and to relate to. The consciousness of
the limit-situations and the finitude of the self, forces it to accept and listen
to other consciousnesses, the lack and insufficiency of the self opens it to the
other. The I always strives toward independence, but this process also requires a
“you” that also strives towards independence. Communication must take place
between two unique “selves” to save the I from falling into non-consciousness.
To be a “myself” one thus needs to avoid losing oneself, but neither can the
I isolate itself since it then becomes only a punctual emptiness. True human
Existenz thus demands a communicating self-consciousness, a differentiated
duality. Only with the possibility of communication – that is, only with another
with whom to communicate – can one also feel loneliness. If one does not risk
being alone, the I will lose itself in the other. This situation forms one of the
antinomies of the self: ‘I am only through others and at the same time I must
be and am an independent I’. Communication manifests the I at the same time
as it risks it, since the existence of the self not realized until it is engaged in
communication. Neither the I nor the other exist as true selves before the com-
municative encounter. ‘[N]either the I nor the other have a solid substance of
being previous to our communication. […] This is why the way we become
ourself in communication seemed like a creation out of nothing’ (Jaspers 1970,
volume II, p. 64 [1932, p. 70]). The I is thereby manifested not by its kernel,
but by its borders to the other.12 Thus there is also always the risk of arresting
communication if the I too much understands “me” and “you” as solid selves.
The self thus risks becoming solipsistic.
12. This thought has a close parallel in Diedier Anzieus The skin ego.
68 Limit-situation – Antinomies and Transcendence in Karl Jaspers’ Philosophy
Jaspers argues that this creation ex nihilo is at the same time a creation from
eternity. The process of creation takes place through an antinomical process
between oneself and another. By always separating oneself out of the stream
of experiences and thoughts, the I makes itself into an object among many, an
object that has the capacity to experience the others and the self as differenti-
ated objects among other objects. It is thus the same process that leads to the
objectification of the self as to the objectification of other things in the world.
The “I” and the “other” are both dependent upon this process. This objecti-
fication of the self is necessary for ones own freedom, for the I to be able to
see the possibilities for this “I”. Without such objectification the I couldn”t
understand or have any knowledge of itself. As self-consciousness, the I is in
the same antinomical way dependent upon other self-consciousnesses.
The limit-situation is thus foundational to the I. The empirical I arises in
a drawing of a boundary through which different objects are separated from
each other, the empirical objectified I on the one side and other objects on the
other side. The existential “I am” is this “drawing of a line”. It is the I in the
transcendent, the constant presence of ‘there is more to me still’ (Jaspers 1970,
volume II, p. 33 [1932, p. 34]. In German: ‘Ich bin noch anderes’).
The human activity that most consistently tries to reach this drawing of a line
and leave the antinomical dualism is, according to Jaspers mysticism.
13. Several contemporary commentators have noted the similarity between Jaspers’ focus on
Jonna Bornemark 69
the possibility of questioning everything and the impossibility of absolute names and medieval
negative theology. See for example Rodriguez de la Fuente (1983, p. 136) or Langley (1993,
p. 354).
70 Limit-situation – Antinomies and Transcendence in Karl Jaspers’ Philosophy
This is, to Jaspers, an always ongoing process. The relation to the infinite
is not something humans sometimes have and sometimes do not have, it is
rather an ongoing relation that humans can be more or less aware of. We can
thus understand specific limit-situations as one kind of expression of the limit-
situation as the constitutive structure of human existence. Limit-situations
can be said to formulate the human as Existenz, as the limit between the finite
and the infinite, as the place in which the infinite is formed and formulated as
something finite.
Concluding discussion
I have here given “limit-situation” a wider extension than Jaspers does. Jaspers
rarely uses the concept of limit-situation outside of his discussion of specific
limit-situations. Nevertheless, he implicitly shows how the antinomical struc-
ture, which is first formulated as the limit-situations of the human being, also
constitutes the I. The I is not primarily an existing substance that finds itself
in a present situation and then, in a second step, discovers its limits. Instead,
the I arises through a situation and through a drawing of a limit.
We have seen, in the discussion of the specific limit-situations, how two
nuances of limit-situation appear. The dualistic structure was clearer in Psy-
chologie der Weltanschauungen, while in Philosophie, Jaspers stresses the
abyss that the limit-situation lays bare. Perhaps “Grenzsituation” could more
accurately be translated as “border-situation” in the first book and as “limit-
situation” in the second, since the first focuses on a separating border and the
second on the abyss that the self stands in front of. The same nuances come
back in the two meanings that can be found in “I am”: the “I am” is partly
the dualistic structure in which the I only appears as an opposite pole to the
objects, and partly the self-consciousness that only appears as an opposite to
other self-consciousnesses. That is, the I is an I that always needs to be related
to another. This dualistic structure also shows itself as the relation between
being and non-being, that is, being in relation to the transcendent as the non-
being. It is the transcendent in the qualification of non-being that makes this
concept necessary for Jaspers. The opposite would be an immanence in which
the other side of the border is a specific and known other, and it is here that we
see the slide between “border” and “limit”. It is this dualistic structure between
being and non-being that leads to the second meaning of “I am,” as well as
to the second nuance of limit-situation, the one that points to the abyss of the
limit-situation. “I am,” as Existenz, refers to the point in which the I and the
ideas are formulated, the ambiguous position at which the dualistic structure
is born. The I is at once one side of the border and the border. Jaspers wants to
Jonna Bornemark 71
point out that it is this second meaning of “I am” that is more foundational.
Jaspers formulates this abyss that comes forth as “the transcendent.” He
points out that ‘[t]he place of transcendence is neither this side nor that side, but
limit’ (Jaspers 1932, volume III, my translation). As we can see, transcendence
should not be understood as the other side of a border; transcendence is rather
the zero point that gives birth to the one and the other. That is, transcendence
is the primary limit that gives birth to the two sides of the border. The second
“I am” is understood and realized in the third leap, the leap in which the self
finds itself in transcendence. The I and the transcendent converge in a strange
process in which the dualistic structure reveals itself once again, with the non-
being of transcendence being doubled by the being of the I. The I is originally
situated in the transcendent.
After having discussed the conceptions of limit as border and limit as the
maximum of one’s own possibilities (the standing in front of a abyss), we have
thereby developed a third meaning of “Grenze”. This third conception can be
called “terminus”. “Terminus” means, as we have seen, limit as a fixation or a
setting of differences; that is, it refers to the limit itself, the God of the limit.
“Terminus” also refers to the demarcation of a content. That which arises from
this demarcation is concepts, or “terminology”. This continual and ongoing
establishment of a limit creates an empirical world “out of” the gap of the
transcendent. We can thus understand the limit-situation as a terminus and,
in keeping with this interpretation, we can begin to understand our situation
as limit, rather than the limit of our situation. That is, we can conceive of our
situation as a drawing of a line instead of thinking of our situation as delimited.
The I as Existenz occurs by holding opposites together without letting them
merge into each other. The I is not only one side of a limit, one side that needs
to fantasize about another side. The I is to a far greater extent simultaneously
the point of unity and separation, the terminus that produces the own and the
other. The limit should thus not be understood as an outside opposed to an
inner self; rather, the I should be understood as the limit. The inner as well
as the outer is continually open: it is always dependent, non-transparent and
changing. The radical alterity thus lives in oneself as well as in the other. It
is the point that all beings have in common at the same time as it is the point
that demands difference between everyone.
The development of the concept of the limit-situation, which I have here
sketched out, opens up a line of questions that I understand to be central to con-
temporary philosophy. Limit-situation has here been described as knowledge
producing, rather than as an object or an area for a certain kind of knowledge.
This knowledge production constitutes an important area for further and wider
72 Limit-situation – Antinomies and Transcendence in Karl Jaspers’ Philosophy
Jonna Bornemark
Södertörn University College / Uppsala universitet
jonna.bornemark@sh.se
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