CASE STUDY ON PEARL HARBOUR AND COVID 19

Submitted by

Team Leader
Mohammed Sulthan – 215120058

Team Members
Abijith Felix K F – 215120005
Aman Kumar – 215120015
Balya S Babu - 215120026
Farhan Khan – 215120038
Karthikeyan S – 215120048
Noel Davis - 215120067
Rishitha Parvathareddy – 215120081
S V S Gowtham Reddy – 215120089
Thamil Thalir T – 215120098

Submitted to
Dr. S. MEKALA
Associate Professor
Dept. Of Humanities and Social Sciences
National Institute of Technology
Tiruchirappalli

Date of Submission
--/11/2020
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We would like to express our sincere regards to Dr. S. Mekala for giving us the opportunity
to present our analysis on the case studies titled “Pearl Harbour and Covid 19”.We would
also like to thank her for the valuable inputs, able guidance and encouragement during our
topic selection and preparation of presentation and this report.

We would also like to thank the class representatives for their cooperation and help during
our case study presentation.

We are thankful to and fortunate enough to get constant encouragement, support and
constructive feedback in terms of questions asked by our classmates during our presentation.

With regards
Team 5
COMMUNICATION LAPSES LEADING TO THE PEARL HARBOUR DISASTER

Introduction
The Pearl Harbour Disaster occurred about 79 years ago and can be mainly attributed to a
series of communication lapses. The first lapse is the breakdown of diplomatic dialogue
between the US and Japan. The second lapse is within the Japanese political and military
establishment and the third lapse, which led the US to fail to defend itself against the
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour.

Reasons for choosing this case:

1. The events that led to this tragedy is entirely due to the breakdown of communication and
diplomatic dialogue
2. It is a significant event in history of humanity that brought in otherwise neutral US into
World War II.
3. Highlights lack of proper communication between Japanese leaders and the army and navy
and how that turned into a disaster. Many Japanese leaders were against the attack.
4. Highlights how a powerful US military failed to defend itself due to ambiguous
communication and incongruity between civil administration and military.
5. A Hollywood movie is based on this.
6. Would be an important lesson to today's diplomacy between nations like nuclear-capable
India & China, which are currently engaged in border skirmishes.

Case summary

On December 7 1941, Japan launched a surprise attack on the Pearl Harbour, using attack
planes, submarines and torpedoes. US President at that time Franklin D. Roosevelt delivered
his "Infamy Speech" to Americans, telling them that Japanese attacked despite the fact the US
was in the midst of talks for peace with Japan. The Americans were outraged. On the same
day, with the approval of congress, America entered the World War 2.

On the southern end of Oahu, Pearl Harbour, a 22,000-acre naval base was commanded by
Admiral Husband E. Kimmel of the Navy and Lt. General Walter C. Short of the Army. Both
were held and made scapegoat for failing to defend from Japanese attack.

Japan was engaged in expansionist policy like some European colonial powers, it wanted to
control East Asia. Japan invaded China and French Indochina. In response the US, Great
Britain, and Netherlands had initiated total embargo of oil and steel to Japan. Japan needed
resources therefore a plan was made to attack US Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbour and cripple
Americans so that there is enough time for Japan to seize the resource areas it needs and
fortify them to the point that retaking them will not be feasible by the Americans.

Early morning on December 7, about 350 Japanese planes attacked Pearl Harbour. About
3700 Americans including 68 civilians lost their lives.

Case Analysis

Part 1: The puzzling reason of attack by Japan

Japan invaded China in 1937. It was a part of its grand plans to occupy East Asia. It was a
time of colonialism and many countries were involved in expansionist polices for resources
and to enrich themselves. US condemned the invasion and imposed economic sanctions that
deprived Japan of oil, steel and dollars which was needed to continue its war against
China. Japan in reaction forged an Alliance with Germany and Italy in 1940, known as
Tripartite Pact, which worsened its relations with U.S. This pact became an endorsement of
Hitler by Japan.

Japanese leaders were against the all out war with US, but none would say so to one another
as they thought it was a sign of weakness or cowardice, since, public sentiment in Japan was
against US (Impervious Categories and Categorical Thinking)

Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro wanted to meet US President Roosevelt for a peace summit,
but a series of miscommunication prevented the summit from happening. The leaders on both
sides assumed that the other side was not willing to compromise due to portrayal of hawkish
stance by each other (Wrong Assumptions and Negative Tendencies)

Konoe asked the emperor to step in and declare that diplomacy, not war, was Japan's priority.
Emperor Hirohito asked the army and navy what they wanted to do. When no one responded,
Hirohito broke convention by saying aloud that their silence was "regrettable." He then read a
poem his grandfather had written, which was, "In all four seas all are brothers and sisters.
Then why, oh why, these rough winds and waves?" (Communication Selectivity, Semantic
noise and Emotional Outburst)

Hirohito read out the poem to indicate his desire for peace, but it was too ambiguous. Army
General Hideki Tojo and many others took it as a fatalistic acquiescence to war. If Hirohito
had stated his position clearly, or disapproved their plans, the war might have been avoided.

Japan's leaders set a deadline of December 1 for a diplomatic solution.

Japan sent an anti-war diplomat to U.S to negotiate. But the anti-war diplomat was the man
who had been pictured with Hitler, signing the Tripartite Pact. (Lack of trust - Psychological
noise and Negative Tendencies)

Japan thought that US officials were opposed to further negotiations. (Wrong Assumptions,
Inference and Negative Tendencies)

Although officially neutral, US were supplying Britain with money and arms under the “lend
lease” agreement. While occupying small islands in the pacific, Japan knew that a full-scale
invasion of south Asia would prompt war with America. It needed a mechanism to buy itself
some time. That mechanism was Pearl Harbour.

Japan planned to declare war shortly before its planes bombed the U.S. fleet at Pearl Harbour
on December 7, but there were a series of errors made by typists and translators which
prevented the Japanese embassy from giving Washington the declaration in time.
(Incongruity of Verbal message – Written noise and language difficulties - mistranslation)

For their part, US leaders had not given up on a negotiated settlement. They were stunned
when Japanese attacked. Roosevelt called the attack “a day which will live in infamy.”
The Rising Sun, wrote that "a war that need not have been fought was about to be fought
because of mutual misunderstanding, language difficulties, and mistranslations."

Part 2: U.S. failure to defend itself – Communication lapses on U.S side:

The first shots of the Battle of Pearl Harbour were actually fired by the Americans. The USS
Ward, a destroyer patrolling the waters outside of Pearl Harbour, spotted, engaged and sank a
Japanese submarine about two hours before Japanese warplanes swooped down on Pearl
Harbour. The Ward reported the incident to headquarters, but no one really listened or
believed them. (Impervious Categories and Poor Listening Skills)

An American radar station on Oahu detected the first wave of Japanese aircraft about an hour
out. But no one believed them, some thought they were seeing a group of American planes
flying in from the Mainland and others thought they were seeing a flock of birds. (Wrong
Assumptions and Impervious Categories)

A message warning of imminent war with Japan was sent from Navy officials in Washington
to Honolulu hours before the attack, but the message was not marked “urgent.” The message
went into the regular mail and was not delivered until the attack was nearly over.
(Communication Selectivity and Channel noise)

Army and Navy leaders assumed that Japanese attack will be in the form of Sabotage. This
assumption was fatal and caused General Short (the commander of Army’s Hawaiian
Department) to catastrophically misinterpret message sent by War Department in
Washington:
The message was:
“Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the
barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue.
Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities
cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt
act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action
that might jeopardize your defence. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to
undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary, but these
measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm civil population or disclose
intent. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.”
Believing that the message from war department was a warning against sabotage, General
Short, immediately upon receiving that message, ordered the Hawaiian Department
contingencies to prevent sabotage, It was through these contingencies that Short effectively
disabled his pursuit planes and thus deactivated his primary base defence.
However, a important feature of their warning—a feature that probably contributed to Short's
misreading—is the omission of specific terms like air raid, air attack, hostile planes. Instead,
the message had variety of abstract terms that can apply equally well to sabotage or air
attack such as future action, hostile action, hostilities, overt act, defence, hostile Japanese
action, and, again, hostilities.
COMMUNICATION BARRIERS THAT LED TO PEARL HARBOUR

The administration and military both were guilty of staggering lack of coordination between
Washington and Oahu. The main barriers that led to Pearl Harbour were:-
1) Japanese messages were decoded by the army and navy on alternate days and all too often
one service failed to properly communicate their new intelligence to the other.
2) In January 1941 Ambassador Grewmin Tokyo passed a message that Japan was planning
an attack. It was disregarded because America wrongly assumed that it was impossible for
Japan to shift the theatre of war from East Asia to American west coast.
3) American pacific fleet commander Husband Kimmel, knowing that the situation was
getting worse did not begin air patrol in the area assuming that there will be no attack.
4) Americans had placed their pacific fleet in Pearl Harbour thinking that the water was
shallow for any torpedo attack.
5) Japanese aircraft were spotted by American radar on the day of the attack, but they were
assumed to be B17 bombers due in from the mainland.
6) On December 7, General Short scheduled practice operation of search radar north of Oahu
from 4 AM to 7 AM only, with a single inexperienced officer manning the Combat
Information Centre. The same officer wrongly assumed the Japanese aircraft as friendlies on
the day of attack.
7) General Short misinterpreted the message from War Department due to its use of abstract
terms instead of outright warning. He assumed that Japan would not entail a military attack of
Hawaiian Islands but would try to sabotage the base.
8) None of the officers on the base disagreed with General Short and everyone thought there
a no possibility of any attack on Pearl Harbour.
9) Admiral Kimmel was confident that Short’s aircraft would provide a formidable defence
against an air attack, not realizing that Short’s measures to prevent sabotage of his aircraft
had resulted in his aircraft requiring hours to be readied for combat.
The failure of each to employ his resources effectively and to keep his counterpart informed
concerning steps which fundamentally affected the safety and operations of the other service
proved to be a major factor in the success of Japan’s daring air attack.

Conclusion:

Communication is not just conveying message through words but also comprises the
important aspects like the right time, the selection of words, the Medium, etc. A minor
change in the way of communication may lead to a major error. The Pearl Harbor incident is
one such example. If the communication had been proper, the tragedy could have been
avoided. The errors that flowed throughout the incident paved a new path for another major
tragedy at 'Hiroshima' and 'Nagasaki'.

The US leadership ignored hundreds of warnings that could have saved them from such a
humiliating attack. Had they correctly inferred the messages coming from Japan or mainland
US, those 2600 lives would have been saved. There were many military leaders who made
mistakes by wrongly assuming and inferring most of the information they got by decoding
the messages coming from Japanese. There was also some ambiguity in the information that
was being sent from the naval intelligence to the US pacific fleet stationed at Pearl Harbour.
The commander of the US forces was also assuming things on his own and was preparing his
forces for something that would be done after the attack. No steps were taken for the proper
defence of Pearl Harbour. US made a mistake of thinking that the attack would come from
the Atlantic and not the Pacific.
The Japanese also made a mistake of thinking that by attacking the Pearl Harbour they can
destroy the US forces and it will take them (US) time to respond and till then Japan would
easily complete its objective of occupying most of the East Asia but in reality they just
increased the power of axis block which eventually ended in the surrender of Japan.
As in the most tragic historical events, communication breakdown played a vital role in the
attack on Pearl Harbour. As communicators, we have an obligation to examine our own
communication processes to make sure we don't have any, in the words of Franklin
Roosevelt, "A day which will live in infamy."