Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 188921               April 18, 2012

LEO C. ROMERO and DAVID AMANDO C. ROMERO, Petitioners,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, AURORA C. ROMERO and VITTORIO C. ROMERO, Respondents.

DECISION

SERENO, J.:

This is a Petition filed under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, praying for the reversal of
the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 14 April 2009 and the subsequent Resolution dated 21
1  2 

July 2009.

The Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the Petition for Certiorari filed by petitioners which alleged
grave abuse of discretion in the Resolutions dated 14 December 2007 and 29 January 2008 issued
by Judge Maria Susana T. Baua in her capacity as presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Lingayen, Pangasinan. The said Resolutions dismissed petitioners’ complaint against private
respondents Aurora C. Romero and Vittorio C. Romero.

Petitioners allege that upon their father’s death on 18 October 1974, their mother, respondent Aurora
Romero, was appointed as legal guardian who held several real and personal properties in trust for
her children. Since that year until the present, she continues to be the administrator of the
3 

properties, businesses, and investments comprising the estate of her late husband.

Sometime in 2006, petitioners Leo and Amando discovered that several Deeds of Sale were
registered over parcels of land that are purportedly conjugal properties of their parents. These
included the following real and personal properties:

1. A parcel of land identified as Lot 3-G of Subdivision Plan Psd-67995 situated in Barrio
Pogon-lomboy, Mangatarem, Pangasinan, containing an area of one thousand square
meters under Declaration of Real Property No. 16142 and Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 290013 in the name of Vittorio C. Romero. A warehouse stands on the lot, covered by
Declaration of Real Property No. 16142.

2. A parcel of land identified as Lot 3-D of Subdivision Plan Psd-67995 situated in Barrio
Pogon-lomboy, Mangatarem, Pangasinan, containing an area of one thousand square
meters under Declaration of Real Property No. 405, and TCT No. 77223 in the name of
Spouses Dante Y. Romero and Aurora Cruz-Romero.

3. A parcel of land identified as Lot 3-E of Subdivision Plan Psd-67995 situated in Barrio
Pogon-lomboy, Mangatarem, Pangasinan, containing an area of one thousand square
meters under Declaration of
 Real Property No. 407 and TCT No. 77224 in the names of Spouses Dante Y. Romero and
Aurora Cruz-Romero.

4. A parcel of land identified as Lot 3-H of Subdivision Plan Psd-67995 situated in Barrio
Pogon-lomboy, Mangatarem, Pangasinan, containing an area of one thousand square
meters under Declaration of Real Property No. 406, and TCT No. 77225 in the name of
Spouses Dante Y. Romero and Aurora Cruz-Romero.

5. A parcel of land identified as Lot 3815-A of Subdivision Plan Psd-227224 situated in Barrio
Pogon-lomboy, Mangatarem, Pangasinan, containing an area of four hundred ninety-four
square meters under TCT No. 113514 in the name of Aurora Cruz vda. de Romero.

6. A parcel of land located in Barangay Burgos, Mangatarem, Pangasinan, containing an

area of more or less three hundred seventy-nine square meters under Declaration of Real
Property No. 16136. It is not yet registered under Act 496 or the Old Spanish Mortgage Law,
but registrable under Act 3344 as amended. The improvement thereon, a building classified
as a warehouse, is covered by Declaration of Real Property No. 16136 A.

7. A parcel of land located in Brgy. Burgos, Mangatarem, Pangasinan, containing an area of

more or less two hundred four square meters under Declaration of Real Property No. 16139.
It is not yet registered under Act 496 or Act 3344 as amended. The improvement thereon is
covered by Declaration of Real Property No. 16140.

8. A parcel of land located in Brgy. Pogon-lomboy, Mangatarem, Pangasinan, containing an

area of more or less eleven thousand six hundred forty-six square meters under Declaration
of Real Property No. 724 and TCT No. 284241 in the name of Aurora P. Cruz vda. de
Romero.

9. A parcel of land located in Brgy. Pogon-lomboy, Mangatarem, Pangasinan, containing an

area of more or less one thousand two hundred fifty-six square meters under Declaration of
Real Property No. 725 and TCT No. 284242 in the name of Aurora P. Cruz vda. de Romero. 4

Petitioners claim that sometime in August of 2005, their brother Vittorio – through fraud,
misrepresentation and duress – succeeded in registering the above-mentioned properties in his
name through of Deeds of Sale executed by their mother, Aurora. Vittorio allegedly employed force
5 

and threat upon her, and even administered drugs that rendered her weak and vulnerable. Thus,
Aurora signed the Deeds of Sale without reading or knowing their contents.

On 18 December 2006, petitioners filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale, Nullification of Title, and
Conveyance of Title (Amended) against private respondents Aurora C. Romero and Vittorio C.
6 

Romero. Respondents filed their Answer, arguing that the properties in question were acquired long
after the death of their father, Judge Dante Romero; hence, the properties cannot be considered
conjugal. They allege that the lots covered by TCT Nos. 290010, 290011, 113514, and Tax
Declaration Nos. 16136 and 11639 were paraphernal properties of Aurora which she had
mortgaged. Vittorio purportedly had to shell out substantial amounts in order to redeem them. The
lots covered by TCT Nos. 77223, 77224, and 77225 were sold by Aurora herself as attorney-in-fact
of her children on 23 November 2006, since her authority to do so had never been revoked or
modified.

On 14 December 2007, the RTC rendered its Resolution dismissing petitioners’ complaint, stating
thus:
xxx(T)he case under Special Proceedings No. 5185 remains pending in that no distribution of the
assets of the estate of the late Dante Y. Romero, nor a partition, has been effected among his
compulsory heirs. Thus, the contending claims of plaintiffs and defendants in this case could not be
adjudicated nor passed upon by this Court without first getting a definitive pronouncement from the
intestate court as to the share of each of the heirs of the late Dante Y. Romero in his estate.

Even the claim of defendant Aurora C. Romero that some of the properties being claimed by
plaintiffs in this case are her own, the same being paraphernal, is an issue which must be taken up
and established in the intestate proceedings. (Emphasis supplied.)
7 

The RTC denied their Motion for Reconsideration, citing Section 3, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court
which bars an heir or a devisee from maintaining an action to recover the title or possession of lands
until such lands have actually been assigned. The court ruled that "plaintiffs must first cause the
termination of Special Proceedings No. 5185 to its logical conclusion before this case could be
entertained by the Court." 8

Alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in rendering the said Resolutions,
petitioners filed for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA. On 14 April 2009, the CA rendered the
assailed judgment dismissing the Petition, ruling that the properties involved in this case are part of
the estate left to the heirs of Judge Romero, the partition of which is already subject of an intestate
proceeding filed on 6 January 1976 in the then Court of First Instance (CFI). The CA based its
9 

judgment on the findings of the RTC that the inventory of the estate of Judge Romero submitted to
the CFI included the same parties, properties, rights and interests as in the case before it.

Petitioners now come to us on a Rule 45 Petition, arguing that the probate court may rule on issues
pertaining to title over property only in a provisional capacity. They assert that the CA erred in
dismissing their appeal, just because the intestate proceeding has not yet terminated. Petitioners, as
heirs, are purportedly allowed to exercise their option of filing a separate civil action in order to
protect their interests.

Thus, the singular issue in the case at bar is whether or not petitioners in this case may file a
separate civil action for annulment of sale and reconveyance of title, despite the pendency of the
settlement proceedings for the estate of the late Judge Dante Y. Romero.

Ruling of the Court

The probate court has jurisdiction to determine the issues in the present case

Petitioners assert that the jurisdiction of the RTC sitting as a probate or intestate court relates only to
matters having to do with the settlement of the estate of deceased persons or the appointment of
executors, but does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the
proceedings. They cite Ongsingco v. Tan, Baybayan v. Aquino and several cases which state that
10  11  12 

when questions arise as to ownership of property alleged to be part of the estate of a deceased
person, but claimed by some other person to be his property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance
from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate, the intestate court has
no jurisdiction to adjudicate these questions. Petitioners conclude that the issue of ownership of the
properties enumerated in their Petition and included in the inventory submitted by respondent Aurora
Romero to the intestate court, must be determined in a separate civil action to resolve title. 13

The rulings in Ongsingco and Baybayan are wholly inapplicable, as they both arose out of facts
different from those in the case at bar. Baybayan involved a summary settlement for the estate of the
decedent, in which a parcel of land representing the share of decedent’s nephews and nieces was
already covered by a TCT under the name of a third party. To defeat the writ of partition issued by
the probate court, the third party, petitioners Baybayan et al., had to file a separate civil action for
quieting of their title and for damages. The issue before the Court then devolved upon the propriety
of the probate court’s order to amend the Complaint for quieting of title before the regular court.
More importantly, Baybayan pertained to a civil action involving third parties who were not heirs, and
not privy to the intestate proceedings in the probate court. The present action was instituted
precisely by heirs of Judge Romero, against their brother, who is also an heir, and their mother, who
is the administrator of the estate.

In Coca v. Borromeo, this Court allowed the probate court to provisionally pass upon the issue of
14 

title, precisely because the only interested parties are all heirs to the estate, subject of the
proceeding, viz:

It should be clarified that whether a particular matter should be resolved by the Court of First
Instance in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited probate jurisdiction is in reality not a
jurisdictional question. In essence, it is a procedural question involving a mode of practice "which
may be waived."

As a general rule, the question as to title to property should not be passed upon in the testate or
intestate proceeding. That question should be ventilated in a separate action. That general rule has
qualifications or exceptions justified by expediency and convenience.

Thus, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or testate proceeding the
question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to its
final determination in a separate action.

Although generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership, yet if the
interested parties are all heirs, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties
consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not
impaired, then the probate court is competent to decide the question of ownership.

We hold that the instant case may be treated as an exception to the general rule that questions of
title should be ventilated in a separate action.

Here, the probate court had already received evidence on the ownership of the twelve-hectare
portion during the hearing of the motion for its exclusion from (the) inventory. The only interested
parties are the heirs who have all appeared in the intestate proceeding. (Citations omitted.)
15 

While it is true that a probate court’s determination of ownership over properties which may form part
of the estate is not final or ultimate in nature, this rule is applicable only as between the
representatives of the estate and strangers thereto. Indeed, as early as Bacquial v. Amihan, the 16 

court stated thus:

xxx The rulings of this court have always been to the effect that in the special proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of a deceased person, persons not heirs, intervening therein to protect their
interests are allowed to do so protect the same, but not for a decision on their action. In the case
of In re Estate of the deceased Paulina Vasquez Vda. de Garcia, Teresa Garcia vs. Luisa Garcia, et
al., 67 Phil., 353, this court held:

A court which takes cognizance of testate or intestate proceedings has power and jurisdiction to
determine whether or not the properties included therein or excluded therefrom belong prima facie to
the deceased, although such a determination is not final or ultimate in nature, and without prejudice
to the right of interested parties, in a proper action, to raise the question on the ownership or
existence of the right or credit.

To this same effect are rulings in various states of the United States.

* * * That the probate court is without jurisdiction to try the title to property as between the
representatives of an estate and strangers thereto is too well established by the authorities to require
argument.

There is also authority abroad that where the court is without jurisdiction to determine questions of
title, as for example, as between the estate and persons claiming adversely, its orders and
judgments relating to the sale do not render the issue of title res judicata. (Citations omitted,
17 

emphasis supplied.)

In any case, there is no merit to petitioners’ claim that the issues raised in the case at bar pertain to
title and ownership and therefore need to be ventilated in a separate civil action. The issue before
the court is not really one of title or ownership, but the determination of which particular properties
should be included in the inventory of the estate. In Civil Case No. 18757, the RTC has listed the
properties alleged by petitioners to have been conjugal properties of their parents and, therefore,
part of the estate that was illegally sold to the respondent. Some of these real properties identified
seem to be the same real properties that form part of the inventory of the estate in the intestate
proceedings. 18

Not only do petitioners assert their legal interest as compulsory heirs, they also seek to be the
owners, pro indiviso, of the said properties. To anchor their claim, they argue that the properties are
conjugal in nature and hence form part of their inheritance. For his defense, Vittorio contends that
the lots are the paraphernal properties of Aurora that she had mortgaged, and that Vittorio
subsequently redeemed.

In Bernardo v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court declared that the determination of whether a
19 

property is conjugal or paraphernal for purposes of inclusion in the inventory of the estate rests with
the probate court:

xxx (T)he jurisdiction to try controversies between heirs of a deceased person regarding the
ownership of properties alleged to belong to his estate, has been recognized to be vested in probate
courts. This is so because the purpose of an administration proceeding is the liquidation of the
estate and distribution of the residue among the heirs and legatees. Liquidation means
determination of all the assets of the estate and payment of all the debts and expenses.  Thereafter,
distribution is made of the decedent's liquidated estate among the persons entitled to succeed him.
The proceeding is in the nature of an action of partition, in which each party is required to bring into
the mass whatever community property he has in his possession. To this end, and as a necessary
corollary, the interested parties may introduce proofs relative to the ownership of the properties in
dispute. All the heirs who take part in the distribution of the decedent's estate are before the court,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, in all matters and incidents necessary to the complete
settlement of such estate, so long as no interests of third parties are affected.

In the case now before us, the matter in controversy is the question of ownership of certain of the
properties involved — whether they belong to the conjugal partnership or to the husband exclusively.
This is a matter properly within the jurisdiction of the probate court which necessarily has to liquidate
the conjugal partnership in order to determine the estate of the decedent which is to be distributed
among his heirs who are all parties to the proceedings. xxx (Emphasis supplied.)
20 
In the present case, petitioners assume that the properties subject of the allegedly illegal sale are
conjugal and constitute part of their share in the estate. To date, there has been no final inventory of
the estate or final order adjudicating the shares of the heirs. Thus, only the probate court can
competently rule on whether the properties are conjugal and form part of the estate. It is only the
probate court that can liquidate the conjugal partnership and distribute the same to the heirs, after
the debts of the estate have been paid.

Section 3, Rule 87 bars petitioners from filing the present action

Petitioners next contend that even if the probate court has the power to rule on their Complaint, the
submission of the issues in this case to the probate court is merely optional, and not mandatory
upon them. Hence, they argue, they still have the right to bring these issues in a separate civil
action, if they so choose. They argue further that Section 3, Rule 87 of the Revised Rules of Court is
not applicable to the present case.

The said provision states that:

Sec. 3. Heir may not sue until share assigned. – When an executor or administrator is appointed and
assumes the trust, no action to recover the title or possession of lands or for damages done to such
lands shall be maintained against him by an heir or devisee until there is an order of the court
assigning such lands to such heir or devisee or until the time allowed for paying debts has expired.

Petitioners believe that the above rule is subject to certain exceptions. They invoke the doctrine that
while heirs have no standing in court to sue for the recovery of property of the estate represented by
an administrator, these heirs may maintain such action if the administrator is unwilling to bring the
suit, or has allegedly participated in the act complained of.

On this contention, petitioners’ theory must again fail. There is nothing on the record that would
prove that Aurora defied the orders of the probate court or entered into sale agreements in violation
of her trust. In fact, petitioners are really accusing a co-heir, their brother Vittorio, of having acquired
certain properties which they allege to be properties of their parents.

Even if we assume the property to be conjugal and thus, part of the estate, Aurora Romero’s acts as
the administrator of the estate are subject to the sole jurisdiction of the probate court. In Acebedo v.
Abesamis, the Court stated:
21 

In the case of Dillena vs. Court of Appeals, this Court made a pronouncement that it is within the
jurisdiction of the probate court to approve the sale of properties of a deceased person by his
prospective heirs before final adjudication. Hence, it is error to say that this matter should be
threshed out in a separate action.

The Court further elaborated that although the Rules of Court do not specifically state that the sale of
an immovable property belonging to an estate of a decedent, in a special proceeding, should be
made with the approval of the court, this authority is necessarily included in its capacity as a probate
court.22

Again, petitioners do not pose issues pertaining to title or ownership. They are, in effect, questioning
the validity of the sales made by the administrator, an issue that can only be properly threshed out
by the probate court. Paragraph 13 of petitioners’ Complaint alleges as follows:
13. The purported transfers and sales executed by Defendant Aurora C. Romero to and in favor of
Defendant Vittorio C. Romero are nullities since all were simulated, entered into without the intent
and volition of Defendant Aurora C. Romero, attended by force, intimidation, duress and fraud and
not supported with any valid or sufficient consideration and with the sole depraved intentions of
depriving the other compulsory heirs of the late Judge Dante Y. Romero of their rightful share in the
estate. (Emphasis omitted.)
23 

Indeed, implicit in the requirement for judicial approval of sales of property under administration is
the recognition that the probate court has the power to rescind or nullify the disposition of a property
under administration that was effected without its authority. That petitioners have the prerogative of
24 

choosing where to file their action for nullification – whether with the probate court or the regular
court – is erroneous. As held in Marcos, II v. Court of Appeals:

xxx (T)he authority of the Regional Trial Court, sitting, albeit with limited jurisdiction, as a probate
court over the estate of deceased individual, is not a trifling thing. The court's jurisdiction, once
invoked, and made effective, cannot be treated with indifference nor should it be ignored with
impunity by the very parties invoking its authority.

In testament to this, it has been held that it is within the jurisdiction of the probate court to approve
the sale of properties of a deceased person by his prospective heirs before final adjudication; to
determine who are the heirs of the decedent; the recognition of a natural child; the status of a
woman claiming to be the legal wife of the decedent; the legality of disinheritance of an heir by the
testator; and to pass upon the validity of a waiver of hereditary rights. (Citations omitted.)
25 

Thus, the validity of the sales made by Aurora, allegedly orchestrated by petitioners’ co-heir, Vittorio,
can only be determined by the probate court, because it is the probate court which is empowered to
identify the nature of the property, and that has jurisdiction over Aurora’s actions and dispositions as
administrator. In Peñaverde v. Peñaverde, the Court even adjudged the petitioners guilty of forum-
26 

shopping for filing a separate civil action despite the pendency of the said petitioners’ own case
seeking that letters of administration be granted to them. Similar to the case at bar, the petitioners in
Peñaverde also sought the annulment of titles in the name of their co-heir:

The two cases filed by petitioners are: (1) Sp. Proc. No. Q-94-19471, which seeks letters of
administration for the estate of Mariano Peñaverde; and (2) Civil Case No. Q-95-24711, which seeks
the annulment of the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Mariano Peñaverde and the
annulment of titles in his name as well as the reopening of the distribution of his estate.

Evidently, in filing Sp. Proc. No. Q-94-19471, petitioners sought to share in the estate of Mariano,
specifically the subject land previously owned in common by Mariano and his wife, Victorina.This is
also what they hoped to obtain in filing Civil Case No. Q-95-24711.

Indeed, a petition for letters of administration has for its object the ultimate distribution and partition
of a decedent's estate. This is also manifestly sought in Civil Case No. Q-95-24711, which precisely
calls for the "Reopening of Distribution of Estate" of Mariano Peñaverde. In both cases, petitioners
would have to prove their right to inherit from the estate of Mariano Peñaverde, albeit indirectly, as
heirs of Mariano's wife, Victorina.1âwphi1

Under the circumstances, petitioners are indeed guilty of forum-shopping.

x x x           x x x          x x x
In the case at bar, it cannot be denied that the parties to Sp. Proc. No. Q-94-19471 and Civil Case
No. Q-95-24711 are identical. There is also no question that the rights asserted by petitioners in both
cases are identical, i.e., the right of succession to the estate of their aunt, Victorina, wife of Mariano.
Likewise, the reliefs prayed for --- to obtain their share in the estate of Mariano --- are the same,
such relief being founded on the same facts ---their relationship to Mariano's deceased wife,
Victorina.27

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. As the properties herein are already subject of an
intestate proceeding filed on 6 January 1976, the 14 April 2009 judgment of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 104025 finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ARTURO D. BRION JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Footnotes
In CA-G.R. SP No. 104025, penned by Associate Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga, and concurred in by
1 

Associate Justices Japar B. Dimaampao, and Ramon R. Garcia, SC rollo, pp. 25-33.
CA rollo, pp. 116-117.
2 

Amended Complaint, CA rollo, p. 31.

3 

Id. at CA rollo, pp. 27-30.

4 

Id. at 31.
5 

Amended Complaint, CA rollo, pp. 26-30.

6 

CA rollo, p. 20.
7 
 RTC Resolution, 29 January 2008, CA rollo, p. 60.
8 

CA Decision, p. 7; CA rollo, p. 95.

9 

Petition for Review, SC rollo, pp. 9-20.

10 

97 Phil. 330 (1955).

11 

232 Phil. 191 (1987).

12 

Supra note 9, at 16.

13 

171 Phil. 246 (1978).

14 

Id. at 251-252.
15 

92 Phil 501 (1953).

16 

Id. at 503-504.
17 

CA rollo, p. 16.
18 

117 Phil. 385 (1963).

19 

Id. at 390-391.
20 

G.R. No. 102380, 18 January 1993, 217 SCRA 186.

21 

Id. at 193.
22 

Amended Complaint, CA rollo, p. 33.

23 

Spouses Lebin v. Mirasol, G.R. No. 164255, 7 September 2011.

24 

393 Phil. 253, 265(1997).

25 

397 Phil. 925 (2000).

26 

Id. at 930-932.
27 
 SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 219408, November 08, 2017 ]
DONALD FRANCIS GAFFNEY, PETITIONER, VS. GINA V. BUTLER,
RESPONDENT.

DECISION
CAGUIOA, J:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review[1] on Certiorari (Petition) under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court (Rules) filed by petitioner Donald Francis Gaffney (Donald) against respondent Gina V.
Butler (Gina), assailing the Decision[2] dated February 6, 2015 (questioned Decision) and
Resolution[3] dated July 14, 2015, both of the Court of Appeals (CA) Special Twelfth (12th)
Division, in CA-G.R. SP No. 133762.

The CA reversed and set aside the Orders (RTC Orders) dated August 15, 2013[4] and
November 25, 2013[5] (denying the corresponding Motion for Reconsideration) of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 70, in Civil Case No. 73187. Said RTC Orders
dismissed Gina's Motion to Dismiss Ad-Cautelam (Motion to Dismiss) and Donald's Motion to
Declare Defendant in Default (Motion to Declare in Default) as well as the Motion for
Reconsideration against the denial of the Motion to Dismiss subsequently filed by Gina.

The Facts

The facts, as found by the CA, are as follows:

On September 21, 2011, Donald Francis Gaffney ("private respondent") filed a Complaint
against Gina V. Butler ("petitioner") for sum of money. Private respondent alleged that sometime
between the years 2006 to 2007, petitioner and her husband Anthony Richard Butler
approached and invited private respondent to invest in ActiveFun Corporation ("ActiveFun"), an
entity engaged in the construction, operation and management of children's play and party
facilities. Petitioner was the President of ActiveFun while her husband was its Treasurer and
Chief Executive Officer.

Private respondent advanced the approximate amount of PhP12,500,000.00 representing his

initial investment in ActiveFun. However, petitioner's husband passed away sometime in
December 2009. Consequently, the proposed investment agreement did not materialize. Private
respondent then demanded the return of his investments from petitioner, who personally
undertook to repay the total amount of his investments plus accrued interest. However, despite
the lapse of a considerable period of time, petitioner was only able to pay private respondent on
October 15, 2010 an initial amount of PhP1,000,000.00, receipt of which was duly
acknowledged in writing by private respondent. Several demands through phone calls and e-
mails were made to petitioner for her to comply with her undertaking to return the investments of
private respondent but to no avail.

On July 13, 2011, a letter was sent to petitioner through registered mail demanding her to pay
private respondent and Richard McDonnell (another party who infused funds into ActiveFun)
within ten (10) days from receipt of the said letter the aggregate amount of PhP25,000,000.00
plus accrued interests. The period allowed for petitioner within which to pay lapsed without her
making any payment. Petitioner in a letter dated August 2, 2011, denied having knowledge of
the investments and having offered to buy private respondent's share in ActiveFun. Private
respondent was thus constrained to institute a legal action for the enforcement of his claim
against petitioner.

In her Answer filed on April 23, 2012, petitioner averred, among others, that she had no
knowledge of private respondent's investment in ActiveFun. She, however[,] admitted that she
paid private respondent the amount of PhP1,000,000.00 with the qualification that the same was
an undue payment, having been misled and intimidated by the latter into believing that she has
an obligation to return said investment, when no such obligation exists under the law or under a
contract. Moreover, petitioner denied the signature in the Acknowledgment Receipt as hers and
claimed that it is a forgery.

After the issues have been joined and Pre-trial was scheduled, parties were directed to have all
their documentary evidence pre-marked. Among those pre-marked by petitioner is a
handwritten note signed by private respondent acknowledging receipt of
Php1,000[,]000.00 from petitioner. Unlike the Acknowledgement Receipt attached to the
Complaint stating that PhPPhP1,000,000.00 was partial payment for monies invested in
ActiveFun, the handwritten note states that the partial payment was for money owed by
petitioner's husband.

Because no full relief can be had against the Estate/heirs of Anthony Richard Butler under the
original Complaint, private respondent filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Complaint
for the purpose of impleading the estate or the heirs[6] of the late Anthony Richard Butler
[as additional party-defendant],[7] allegedly represented by petitioner as his surviving spouse.
He alleged that petitioner required him, as a pre-condition for the payment of the balance, to
execute a separate handwritten acknowledgment of the said payment. Petitioner opposed the
motion primarily on the ground that "only natural or juridical persons may be parties in an
ordinary civil action."

In an Order dated February 13, 2013, public respondent granted private respondent's Motion
and admitted the Amended Complaint. Petitioner did not file a motion for reconsideration of the
said order. An Alias Summons was served upon petitioner purportedly as the representative of
her late husband.

In the meantime, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss Ad-Cautelam, allegedly not as the
defendant originally named in the complaint but as the purported representative of her
late husband, arguing that the death of her husband did not ipso facto make her the
representative of his estate. More importantly, a claim against an estate of a deceased
person is governed by Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. Hence, it cannot be consolidated
with an ordinary civil action in which only natural or juridical persons may be parties
pursuant to Section 1, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. Consequently, the service of
summons intended for the estate of the late Anthony Richard Butler was improperly
served.

Private respondent on the other hand, filed a Motion to Declare Defendant in Default for failure
to file an answer within the reglementary period. x x x[8] (Emphasis supplied)
Ruling of the RTC

The RTC denied Gina's Motion to Dismiss and Donald's Motion to Declare in Default in the RTC
Order[9] dated August 15, 2013, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the movant's Motion to Dismiss Ad-Cautelam and
plaintiff's Motion to Declare Defendant in Default are hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[10]
On the Motion to Dismiss, the RTC ruled that the inclusion of the estate of the late Anthony
Richard Butler (Anthony), represented by his surviving spouse Gina, is necessary for a
complete relief on the determination or settlement of the controversy raised in the case.[11] On
the Motion to Declare in Default, the RTC observed that Gina filed an Answer to the Amended
Complaint on March 12, 2013; hence, there is no reason to declare her in default.[12]

Gina filed a Motion for Reconsideration Ad Cautelam to the denial of her Motion to Dismiss,
which the RTC denied for lack of merit in its Order[13] dated November 25, 2013. No motion for
reconsideration was filed as against the denial of the Motion to Declare in Default.

Proceedings in, and Ruling of, the CA

Gina thereafter sought relief with the CA through a Petition for Certiorari[14] under Rule 65 (CA
Petition), seeking to nullify the RTC Orders, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the RTC for
allowing the estate of Anthony to be named a defendant in the present case and for considering
Gina as legal representative of said estate when, in fact, no settlement proceedings thereon had
yet been brought.[15]

Gina prayed that the RTC Orders be reversed and set aside for having been issued with grave
abuse of discretion; and Civil Case No. 73187, insofar as it relates to the estate of Anthony, be
dismissed.[16]

The CA, in the questioned Decision dated February 6, 2015, granted Gina's CA Petition,
reversed and set aside the RTC Orders and dismissed the entire complaint, in the following
manner:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated August 15,
2012 and November 25, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 70 in Civil Case
No. 73187 are hereby SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the complaint for sum of money in Civil Case
No. 73187 is hereby ordered DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.[17]
The CA ruled that dismissal of the case against Anthony's estate is warranted under Section 1,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court which states that "only natural or juridical persons, or entities
authorized by law may be parties in a civil action."[18] The CA likewise ruled that the genuineness
and authenticity of the handwritten receipt stating that the advanced amount of P1,000,000.00 is
part payment of money owed by Anthony is undisputed.[19] This suggests that Anthony is the one
owing the money and is an indispensable party to the case.[20] Finally, the CA ruled that there is
no legal basis to consider Gina as representative of Anthony's estate since the estate has no
legal personality.[21]

Donald filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the questioned Decision, which the CA dismissed
for failing to raise any new substantial arguments, in its Resolution[22] dated July 14, 2015.

Hence, the present Petition filed by Donald, with the following prayer:
1. The questioned Decision and Resolution of the CA be set aside and the RTC Orders, denying
Gina's Motion to Dismiss be reinstated and affirmed in toto.

2. In the alternative, in the event that the estate of Anthony as represented by Gina, could not
be named as additional defendant in the present case, the questioned Decision be reconsidered
partially such that the case be dismissed only as against the estate of Anthony and that it be
remanded to the RTC for further proceedings against Gina as the sole principal defendant.[23]
Issues

Whether or not the CA committed reversible error when it:

1. set aside the RTC's ruling that the estate or heirs of Anthony, represented by his surviving
spouse Gina, could be named as additional defendant in the present case.

2. dismissed the entire complaint when dismissal of the same was not raised as an issue nor
prayed for in the petition before it.[24]
The Court's Ruling

The Petition is partly meritorious.

The deceased or his estate may not be named a defendant in the present case.

A deceased person does not have the capacity to be sued and may not be made a defendant in
a case.[25] Section 1, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court unequivocally states that "[o]nly
natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action."

Applying this legal provision, the Court, in Ventura v. Militante,[26] declared that neither a
deceased person nor his estate has capacity to be sued, explaining thus:
Parties may be either plaintiffs or defendants. The plaintiff in an action is the party complaining,
and a proper party plaintiff is essential to confer jurisdiction on the court. In order to maintain an
action in a court of justice, the plaintiff must have an actual legal existence, that is, he, she or it
must be a person in law and possessed of a legal entity as either a natural or an artificial
person, and no suit can be lawfully prosecuted save in the name of such a person.

The rule is no different as regards party defendants. It is incumbent upon a plaintiff, when he
institutes a judicial proceeding, to name the proper party defendant to his cause of action.[19] In a
suit or proceeding in personam of an adversary character, the court can acquire no jurisdiction
for the purpose of trial or judgment until a party defendant who actually or legally exists and is
legally capable of being sued, is brought before it. It has even been held that the question of the
legal personality of a party defendant is a question of substance going to the jurisdiction of the
court and not one of procedure.

xxxx

Neither a dead person nor his estate may be a party plaintiff in a court action. A
deceased person does not have such legal entity as is necessary to bring action so
much so that a motion to substitute cannot lie and should be denied by the court. An
action begun by a decedent's estate cannot be said to have been begun by a legal person,
since an estate is not a legal entity; such an action is a nullity and a motion to amend the party
plaintiff will not likewise lie, there being nothing before the court to amend. Considering that
capacity to be sued is a correlative of the capacity to sue, to the same extent, a decedent
does not have the capacity to be sued and may not be named a party defendant in a
court action.[27] (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
Hence, there can be no doubt that a deceased person or his estate may not be impleaded as
defendant in a civil action as they lack legal personality. Thus, when Anthony died, his legal
personality ceased and he could no longer be impleaded as respondent in the present ordinary
civil suit for collection.[28] As such, the complaint against him should be dismissed on the ground
that the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action or for failure to state a cause of
action pursuant to Section 1(g), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, because a complaint cannot
possibly state a cause of action against one who cannot be a party to a civil action.[29]

Moreover, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the person or estate of Anthony. Summons
is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him and service thereof
is the means by which the court acquires jurisdiction over his person.[30] In the present case, no
valid service of summons upon the deceased Anthony was or could have been made, precisely
because he was already dead even before the complaint against him and his wife was filed in
court. In several occasions, the Court has held that the trial court fails to acquire jurisdiction over
a defendant who was already dead at the time the complaint was filed against him.[31]

In Ventura, the factual milieu of which is similar to the present case, the original complaint
named the "estate of Carlos Ngo as represented by surviving spouse Ms. Sulpicia Ventura."
The Court held that as the deceased was dead at the time the complaint was filed and no
special proceeding to settle his estate had been filed in court, the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over either the deceased or his estate.[32] In the case at bench, the Alias Summons
served upon Gina purportedly as the representative of her late husband[33] was thus invalid.

In sum, impleading the deceased Anthony or his estate in the present petition was improper.
The action against him must be dismissed and the same may just be filed as a claim against his
estate in a proper proceeding.[34] The CA thus did not err in reversing the trial court.

The CA cannot validly dismiss the complaint against Gina in the instant action.

Petitioner alleges that the dismissal of the entire case by the CA has no basis in fact or in law
because the same was not raised as an issue or prayed for in both the Motion to Dismiss in the
trial court and in the CA Petition.

The Court agrees.

The present action sprung when the original complaint was amended by Donald to implead the
estate of Anthony as additional defendant. Thereafter, the Motion to Dismiss was filed by
Gina, with the sole prayer that the Amended Complaint, "insofar as the claim against the Estate
of the Late Anthony Butler is concerned," be dismissed.[35]

When the aforementioned motion was denied, Gina's CA Petition, from which the questioned
Decision issued, raised only the following issues:
WHETHER OR NOT AN ESTATE OF A DECEASED PERSON IS A JURIDICAL ENTITY THAT
COULD BE NAMED DEFENDANT IN AN ORDINARY CIVIL ACTION;

WHETHER OR NOT A SURVIVING SPOUSE IS IPSO FACTO THE LEGAL

REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED SPOUSE[36]
By way of relief, the petition prayed only that the RTC Orders be set aside and the case be
dismissed "insofar as it relates to the Estate of Anthony Richard Butler."[37]

It is settled that courts cannot grant a relief not prayed for in the pleadings or in excess of what
is being sought by the party.[38] Due process considerations justify this requirement.[39] It is
improper to enter an order which exceeds the scope of relief sought by the pleadings, absent
notice which affords the opposing party an opportunity to be heard with respect to the proposed
relief.[40]
In the present case, clearly, no issue on, or prayer for, the dismissal of the entire case was
made in the Motion to Dismiss before the RTC and the corresponding CA Petition. The sole
issue presented was, and is, confined to the propriety of the complaint being maintained as
against Anthony (or his estate) who was impleaded as an additional defendant by virtue of
the Amended Complaint.

The CA regarded the estate of Anthony as an indispensable party[41] on the basis of the
handwritten receipt, executed by Donald, of the P1,000,000.00 amount from Gina "as part
payment of the money owed by the late Anthony Richard Butler to Don Gaffney."[42] The CA
ruled that the note's genuineness and authenticity were undisputed;[43] hence, Anthony's estate
was ultimately answerable for Donald's claims.[44]

These findings of the CA lack basis. It is clear from the pleadings that Donald actually disputes
the genuineness of the handwritten receipt insofar as the same shows the debt to be that of
Anthony's. Donald claims that he was merely forced to execute said handwritten receipt as it
was made a pre-condition for payment by Gina.[45] In fact, Donald submitted in
evidence[46] another acknowledgment receipt[47] which allegedly reflects his due acknowledgment
of the initial payment.[48] To be sure, it would be illogical for Donald to admit the genuineness of
the handwritten receipt precisely because his main contention is that Gina personally undertook
to pay the entire debt,[49] explaining why he named her as the principal party defendant herein.
[50]
 He only impleaded the estate of Anthony to obtain a complete relief should the same be
necessary.[51]

Moreover, courts cannot grant a relief without first ascertaining the evidence presented in
support thereof. Due process considerations require that judgments must conform to and be
supported by the pleadings.[52] The issue of the authenticity of the handwritten receipts, and
ultimately, which party is liable for the debt, was never brought up to the CA - as indeed, these
are the very issues that the trial court is meant to address and resolve. Determination of the
same requires an examination of the evidence of the parties in a full-blown trial on the merits.
Dismissal of the entire complaint, including the action against the main defendant Gina, is thus
utterly premature and erroneous.

All told, the complaint against the estate of Anthony, which was impleaded as co-defendant,
should be dismissed. Any cause of action arising from the herein alleged debt against the estate
of Anthony may be brought as a claim against said estate in the proper settlement proceedings.
However, the complaint against the original defendant Gina should remain with the RTC for trial
on the merits.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is hereby PARTIALLY

GRANTED. The Decision dated February 6, 2015 and the Resolution dated July 14, 2015 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 133762 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION such that
the Amended Complaint is REINSTATED insofar as Gina V. Butler is concerned.

The RTC is hereby ordered to proceed, expeditiously and without delay, in resolving Civil Case
No. 73187 against Gina V. Butler.

SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Chairperson), Peralta, and Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.
Perlas-Bernabe, J., on official leave.
[1]
 Rollo, pp. 3-157 (including Annexes).

 Id. at 27-35. Penned by Associate Justice Fiorito S. Macalino, with Associate Justices Elihu A. Ybañez and Zenaida
[2]

T. Galapate-Laguilles concurring.
[3]
 Id. at 37-38.
[4]
 Id. at 48-49. Penned by Presiding Judge Louis P. Acosta. The date of the Order also appears as August 15, 2012
in some parts of the records.
[5]
 Id. at 50.

 It appears from the title and body of the Amended Complaint dated October 1, 2012 that only the estate of the
[6]

deceased Anthony Richard Butler is impleaded as additional defendant. See rollo, pp. 89-97.
[7]
 Rollo, p. 89.
[8]
 Id. at 28-30.
[9]
 Id. at 48-49.
[10]
 Id. at 49.
[11]
 Id.
[12]
 Id.
[13]
 Id. at 50.
[14]
 Id. at 126-135.
[15]
 See id. at 126-127, 129-132.
[16]
 Id. at 132.
[17]
 Id. at 34.
[18]
 Id. at 31.
[19]
 Id. at 32.
[20]
 See id. at 33.
[21]
 Id.
[22]
 Id. at 37 38.
[23]
 Id. at 20.
[24]
 Id. at 8.
[25]
 Ventura v. Militante, 374 Phil. 562, 573 (1999), cited in Spouses Berot v. Siapno, 738 Phil. 673, 682 (2014).
[26]
 Id.
[27]
 Id. at 571-573.
[28]
 See Spouses Berot v. Siapno, supra note 25, at 682.
[29]
 Boston Equity Resources, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 711 Phil. 451, 475-476 (2013), citing Riano, Civil Procedure
(The Bar Lecture Series), Volume 1, 2011 Edition, p. 229.
[30]
 Romualdez-Licaros v. Licaros, 449 Phil. 824, 833 (2003).

 See Boston Equity Resources, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 29, at 476; Ventura v. Militante, supra note 25,
[31]

at 573.
[32]
 Ventura v. Militante, id. at 572, 573.
[33]
 Rollo, p. 30.
[34]
 See Boston Equity Resources, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 29, at 474, citing Sarsaba v. Vda. de Te, 611
Phil. 794, 811 (2009).
[35]
 Rollo, p. 52.
[36]
 Id. at 129.
[37]
 Id. at 132.
[38]
 Diona v. Balangue, 701 Phil. 19, 31 (2013).
[39]
 Development Bank of the Philippines v. Teston, 569 Phil. 137, 144 (2008).
[40]
 Id.
[41]
 Rollo, p. 33.
[42]
 Id. at 88.
[43]
 Id. at 32.
[44]
 Id. at 33.
[45]
 Id. at 91.
[46]
 Annex "C" of the Complaint, id. at 68.
[47]
 The acknowledgment receipt provides:

Receipt Acknowledgement

I, Donald Gaffney, hereby acknowledge the receipt of 1 million pesos, which represents the first installment in
payment of 12.5 million pesos, plus accrued interest, due me for monies invested in Active Fun Corporation over the
past three years.
 
(Signed) (Signed)
Active Fun Corporation Mr. Donald Gaffney
Ms. Gina Butler 10/15/10
Date
[48]
 See Amended Complaint, p. 3; rollo, p. 91.
[49]
 Id.
[50]
 Id. at 173.
[51]
 Id.
[52]
 Diona v. Balangue, supra note 38, at 31.