PRINCIPLE OF NATURAL JUSTICE AND ITS LEGAL IMPLECATIONS NATURAL JUSTICE: CONCEPT AND MEANING: Natural Justice is en important concept in administrative law. The principles of natuel justice of fundamental rules of procedure are the preliminary basis of « good administrative set up of sny country. The concept and doctrine of Principles of Natural Justice and its applicetion in Justice delivery system is not new. It has its place since the beginning of justice delivery system, Natucal justice is an expression of English common law, which involves « procedural requirement of feimess. It is an important concept in administrative lew. In the words of Justice Ksishne Iyer Netusal justice is a pervasive fact of secular lew where a spiritual touch cnlivens legislation, legislation and adjudication to make faimess 0 creed of life, It has many colour and shades, many forms and shapes It is no doubt, a procedural requirement but it ensues a strong safeguard agninst any Judicil or administrative, order ot action, adversely ffecting the substantive rights of the individuals. Different jussts have described the principle in different ways, Some celled it as the unwritten law Gus non seriptum) or the lew of reason. It has, however not been found to be cepable of being defined, but some jurists ‘have described the principle as a great humanising principle intended to invest lew with faimess to secue justice and to prevent miscarriage of justice. With the passage of time, some principles have evolved and crystallised which are well recognized principles of natural justice Natural Justice is en important concept in administrative law. The team natural justice Sgnifies basic principles of justice, which are made eveilable to everyone litigant during tral Principles of natural justice are founded on reason and enlightened public policy. These principles aze adopted to circumstances of all ceses Such principles are applicable to ecisions of all governmental agencies, tribunals and judgments of all cousts. In the present ‘world the importance of principle of natural justice hes been ghining its strength andit is now the essence of any judicial system. Natural justice rules are not codified laws. It is not possible to define precisely and scientifically the expression ‘naturel justice’, They are "Lond Esher MR in Vionet VS Barat, (1885) 55 LIQB 39, 1‘basically common sense justice which aze built-in the conscience of humen being They are ‘based on netural ideels and values which ave wniversel in nature. ‘ Natucel justice’ and ‘legal justice’ ere substences of ‘justices’ which must be secured by both, and whenever legal justice fails to achieve this purpose, natural justice has to be called in aid of legal justice Rules of naturel justice have developed with the growth of civilization It is not the creation of Consitution or mankind It originated slong with lumen history. In order to protect himself agninst the excess of organized power, man hes always appealed to someone which is aot been created by him end such someone could only be God and His lnws, Divine law ot Natural lew, to which all temporal lews must and actions must conform. [tis of “higher lew of nature’ or ‘naturel law" which implies faimness, ceesonableness, equity and equality HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT ‘The concept of Principle of natural justice is not a new concept, Natural justice has an impressive history which has been recognized from the easiest times The Greeks had accepted the principle that ‘no man should be condemned unheard’. It was first applied in ‘Garden of Eden’ where opportunity to be heard was given to Adam and then providing him punishment, Some ofthe evidences of natural justice is also found in Roman lew Principle of naturel justice hes also been found in the Kautlya’s Arthsestra, Manususiti and different text Asisttle, before the ere of Chris, spoke of such principles calling t as universel law. Justinian in the fifth and sixth Centuies AD. called it "jurenetucelie’ ie, naturel lew. In Indie the principle is prevalent from the ancient times. We find it Invoked in Kaulllye's ‘Asthashastra, In this context, para 43 of the judgment of the Hor/ble Supreme Cout In the case of Mohinder Singh Gillv. Chief Election Commissioner”, may be usefully quoted: ‘Indeed, natal justice ts a pervasive facet of secular law where a spiritual touch enlivens legislation administration anel adjudication, to make fairness a creed of life. It has many colours and shades, many forms and shapes and, save where valid law excludes, it applies when people ave affected by acts of authority. It the bone of healthy goverrment recognized from earliest times and not a mystic testament of judge-made lew. Indeed rom the legendary days of Adam-and of Kautllya's Avthashastra-the rue of law has had ths stamp of rahal justice, which makes it social justice. We need not go into these deeps for the present except to indicate that the roots of natural justice and its foliage ave noble cod not new- fangled Today its application must be sustained by cusrent legislation case law or other 2AIR 1978 SC 851Extant principle, not the hoary chord of legend and history. Ota jurisprudence has sanctioned its prevalence even like the Anglo-American system." In Swadeshi Cotton Mills V. Union of India®, It was observed that Natural justice is a ‘branch of public lev and is « formidable weapon which can be wielded to secuxe justice to the citizen Also in Canara Bank V. V K Awasthi‘the supreme cout observed that principles of natural justice are those rules which have been laid down by cous as being the ‘minimum protection of the sights of the individual against the exbitrary proceduse that may be adopted by a judiciel, Quesi-judicil and administrative authority while making an order sffecting those sights: These rules aze intended to prevent such authority from doing injustice PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL JUSTICE ‘The principles of natural justice aze those sules which have been laid down by the couts es ‘being minimum protection of the rights ofthe individual against the azbitrary procedure thet may be adopted by a judicial, quisi-judiciel and edministetive euhority while making en corder effecting those sights Frank Committee or the committee on Minister's Power hes leid down the following norms of naturel justice 1, Noman should be condemned usheard 2, Noman shall be judge in his own cause, 3, A paityis enitled to know the reazons for the decision, 4, Making available « copy of stetutory zeport However the traditional English law recognises two principles of naturel justice (A) NEMO JUDEXIN CAUSA SUA (Rule Against Bias) ‘The literal meaning of the Latin mexim ‘NEMO JUDEX IN CAUSA SUA is thet ‘No men shall be a judge in his own cause ie. to say, the deciding authority must be impertial and ‘without bies. It implies thet no man cen act ase judge for @ cause in which he has some Interest, may be pecuniary or otherwise. Bies means en operative prejudice, whether conscious or unconscious, in relation to a party or issue. Such operative prejudice may be the esult of a preconceived opinion or a predisposition or a predetermination to decide a case in "AIR 1981 SC 818, “air 20056SCC 321,‘© puticular manner so much so that it does not leave the mind open Pecuniary interest fords the strongest proof ageinstimpertility. The emphasis is on the objectivity in dealing ‘with and deciding a matter Justice Gsjendragadkar, has observed inthe case of M/S Builders Supply Corporation v. The Union of India and others’, “it is obvious thet pecuniary interest, howsoever smell it may be, In a subject matter of the proceedings, would wholly squalify a member from acting es a judge’. Lord Hardwick observed in one of the cases, “In a matter of so tender a nature, even the appearance of evil is tobe avoided" Yet it hes ‘been leid dawn as principle of lew that pecuniary interest would disqualify a Judge to decide the matter even though itis not proved thatthe decision was in anyway affected. This is thus ‘a matter of faith, which a common man must have, in the deciding authority. The principle is pplicable in such ceses also where the deciding authority hes some personal Interest in the satter other than pecuniary Interest This may be in the shape of some personel relationship ‘with one of the pasties or ill will ageinst any of them. In one of the cases order of punishment was held to be vitisted ar the officer who was in the position of a compleinant/eccuserhvitness, could not act a an enqhity officer or punishing authority ‘There may be a possibility, consciously or unconsciously to uphold as Enquiry Officer what he alleges agrinst the delinquent officer In one of the selections, which was held forthe post of Chief Conservator of Forest, one of the members of the Boerd was himself a candidate forthe post. The whole process of selection was held to be vitiated asthe member would be ajudge in his own cause In the case of AK Kraipak V. Union of India® a precaution was taken by a member of the selection Board to withéraw himself from the selection proceedings at the time his name was considered. This precaution taken could not ewe the defect of being a judge in his own cause sSnce he had participated m the deliberations when the names of his rival candidates were ‘being considered for selection on mesit. The position, however, may be different when serely officiel capacity is involved in teking a decision in any matter as distinguished from ‘having « personal Intevest. These are certein statutes which provide thet named officers may resolve the contvoversy, if any, arising bebween the organisation and the other persons, e.g, in the matters relating to nationalisation of routes, Government officers or authorities were ‘vested with the power to dispose of the objections, In such matters az above, it hes been held by the Honlble Supreme Court thet proceeding will not vitiate as It was only in official capacity thet the officer was Involved end It would not be correct to say that he was a judge SAIR 19655C 1061 “AIR 19708C 150,in his own cause being en officer of the Government, It is a kind of stetutory duty which is performed by a public officer, unless of couse bias is proved in any case. In another case Mamak Lal v. Prem Chand’, where a committee was constituted to enquire into the compleint made agsinst an Advocate, the Chairman of the Committee was one who hed ance sppenred cerier as counsel for the complainant Constitution of such a committee was held to bbe bad endit was observed, "in such cases the test is not whether in fect the bies has affected the Judgment, the test slays is ancust be whether @ litigant could reasonably apprehend that «bias attributed to a member of the Tribunel might have operated against him in the final ecision of the Tribunal" However, such objections about the constitution of committees or Tribunals consisting of members heving bias should be taken at the ealiest opportunity ‘before stst of the proceedings otherwise, normally, It would be considered as waiver to that objection Lord Denning observed in, Metropolitan Properties Ltd. v. Lunnon®,“The season is plain enough Justice must be rooted in confidence and confidence is destroyed ‘when right minded people go away thinking, the Judge was biased". But we find accusation given that the suspicion should be that of reasonable people and must not be thet of capricious end unreesonable person The principle is of great Importance, It ensues hearing cr consideration of e matter by unbiased and impartial authority. TYPES OF BIAS 1. Pecuniary Bias, Judicial approach is unenimous and decisive on the point thet any financial interest, howsoever small it may be, would vitiate administrative action The disqualification will not ‘be avoided by non-pasticipation of the biased member in the proceedings if he was present when the decision was reached Inthe age of free market economy where investment in sheres is very common there is very much chance of the bies of this type. However considered opinion is that it would serve no public interest if the deciding officer rescues himself where he has no substential ‘pecuniary interest. 2. Subject Matter Bias 7AIR 1957 SC 425 4969) 1 OB 577‘Those cases fall within this cetegory where the deciding officer is deel, otherwise, ivoWed in the subject matter of the case. Hete again the mere nvohement would not vitate the adinisratve action ulessthereisa eal ikelinood of bias In R Ve Deal Justices Ex p. Curing’, the magistrte wes not declared to try case of cruelty to an esimal on the goound thet he was « member of the royel society for the prevention of Crusty to animels as this dnt prove axed! ikelihood of bies 3. Departmental Bias Or Institutional bias ‘The problem of departmental bies is something which is inherent in the administrative process, and if not effectively checked it may negete the very concept of faimess in administrative proceeding The problem of departmental bies elso axisesin e different context ‘when the functions of @ judge and prosecutor are combined in the seme department It is not ‘uncommon to find thet the same department which initiate a matter also decides it, therefore at times departmental fraternity and loyalty militates ageinst the concept of fair hearing 4. Policy Notion Bias Bias arising out of preconceived policy notions is a delicate problem of administrative lew (On one hand, no judge as « human beingis expected to sit as a blanket sheet of paper and on. the floor, preconceived policy notions may vitiate a fer til. ‘A classic case bringing this problem to the forefront is Frankdin V. Minister of Towa and country planning" also known as Stevenage case. In this case the appellant challenged the Stevenage New Town Designation Order Act, 1946. On the ground thet no fair heering wes given because the Minister had entertained biesin his determination which was clear from his speech at Stevenage when he ssid “I want to cerry out a diving exercise in town planning and itis going to be done. Though the cout did not accept the challenge on the technical ground thatthe minister in confisming the repost wes not performing any quasi-judicial fmnction, but the problem still emains thatthe bies arising from strong policy convictions may operate as @ ‘more serious threat to fair action then any other single factor. 5, Preconceived Notion Bias ‘This type of bias is also known as unconscious bias. All person exercising adjudicatory powers ere humans with human prejudices, no matter some persons are more humans than. * ssi) 4574390) w'1948 AC 87others. The problem of bias arising from preconceived notions may have to be disposed of ax en inherent limitation of the administeative process It is useless to accuse a public officer of ‘bins merely because he is predisposedin favow of some policy in the public interest 6. Bias on Account of Obstinacy ‘The supreme cout hes discovered a new category of bias aiising from thoroughly ‘ueasonable obstinacy It literally means ueasonsble and unvavesing persistence, and the deciding officer would not tee “no” for an answer. This new type of bias was discoveredin a SStustion where a judge of the Calcutta High court upheld his own judgnent while sitting in appeal against his own judgnent EXCEPTION TO THE RULE AGAINST BIAS Doctrine of Necessity: ‘The doctrine of necessity is en exception to ‘Bias’. The lew permits certain things to be dane as a matter of necessity which it would otherwise not countenance on the touchutone of judicial propriety. The doctrine of necessity makes it imperative forthe authority to decide and considerations of judicial propriety must yield It can be invoked.n cases of ties where ‘There is no authority to decide the issue. If the doctrine of necessity is not allowed full play in certein unavoidable situations it would impede the course of justice itself end the efeuiting pasty would benefit from it Ifthe choice is between either to allow a biased person to act orto stifle the action altogether, the choice must fallin favour ofthe former as itis the only way to promote decision-making Where bias is epparent but the same person who is likely to be biased hes to decide, because of the statutory requirements or the exclusivencss of ‘competent authority to decide, the Coutts allow such person to decide. In Ashok Kumar Yadav vs. Haryana", the Court held that a member of the Public Service Commission could, not entirely disessociate himself from the process of selection just because a few candidates ‘were elated to im. He should disassociate himself with the selection of the persons who ere related to him, but need not disassociate with the selection of other candidates Though his presence on the selection committee could create a likelihood of bies in fevow of his relations yet, since the PSC is a constitutional authority, such a member cannot be excluded from its work end his presence in the recruitment process is mandatorily requited. The Cowt futher held thet where substitution is possible, this dectuine would not apply. Doctrine of Absolute Necessity. AIR 19875 454,‘The doctine of ‘absolute necessity’ is also taken as an exception to ‘Bias’ where it is absolutely necessary to decide « case of Bias end there is no other option left. In Election ‘Commission of India vs. Dr. Subramaniam Swamy, the SC was asked to decide whether the CEC TN Seshen who was allegedly biased in fevour of Swamy, because of the longfiiendship, could pasticipete in the giving of opinion by the EC. The opinion was to be given on the alleged disqualificetion of Jeyelelithe, the then CM of Tamil Nadu under Article 191 of the Constitution Swamy had mede a petition to the Governor alleging that Jayelalithe hhad incurred e disqualificetion under Asticle 191 read with Sec 9 of the RPA, 1951, to get lected to the legislative assembly, as atthe time of the election she was a party to @ contract ‘with the Government. Under Ast 192 of the Constitution, before gving any decision on such question of disqualification « Governor is required to obtein of the EC, and hes to act according to such opinion The Governor forwarded Swamy’s petition to the EC for its opinion Jayelalitha moved the HC of Madras under Ast 226 of the Constitution, seeking « ‘writ of probibition enjoining upon Seshan not to perticipete in giving opinion. The HC, through @ single judge Bench, held thet Seshen shouldn't give opinion in view of his prejudice ageinst Jeyalelithe, The Single Judge also held that she hed not incured eny disqualification Onappedl, the Division Bench held thet the single judge Bench had been ‘wrong in deciding the question of Jeyslelithe’s disqualification, because thet question could ‘be decided by the EC alone. The Division Bench, however agreed with the Single Judge Bench that Seshan suffered from Bies, end therefore, should not give his opinion The Division Bench observed thet in view of the appointment of additionel two members on the EC, the EC could give opinion through members other then the CEC.On appeal, the SC confirmed that Seshen should not give opinion. The Cow, observed thet in view of the multi- member composition of the EC and its easier decision in T.N Seshan vs UOI, where it was hheld that decisions of the EC should be by majority, while giving opinion under Art 1922) of the Constitution, the CEC could get himself excused from siting on the Commission, while en opinion on a matter in which he was held to be biased was being given If the other two members differed the CEC could give opinion, end the opinion of the majority would be the opinion of the EC. In thet case, though he was biesed, he would be required to give opinion ‘under the doctrine of necessity and not only mere necessity but absolute necessity. Thus, the doctrine of bies would not be epplied. (B) AUDI ALTERAM PARTEM ( Rule of fair hearing)‘The next principle is eu lteram partem, i¢. no men should be condemned unheard or that both the sides must be heard before passing any order. A men cannot incur the loss of property or ibety for an offence by a judicial proceeding until he has «fer opportunity of ‘Answering the case aghnst him, In many stettes, provisions are made ensuring thet « notice is givento person aginst whom an order is likely to be passed before a decision Is made, but there may be instances where though en authority Is vested with the powers to pass such orders which affect the liberty or property of en individual but the statute may not contin a provision for prior hearing But what is importent to be noted is thatthe applicability of Principles of naturel justice is not dependent upon eny statutory provision The principle has to be mandetorily applied imespective ofthe fact as to whether there is any such statutory provision ot not De Smith in his Judicial Review of Administrative Action (L980), at page 161, observed, I "Where a statute authorises interference with properties or other rights and is silent on the question of heering the courts would apply rule of universe epplicetion end founded on plainest principles of matual justice." Wade in Administrative Lew (1977) at page 395 says tht principles of natural justice operate os implied mandelory requirements ‘non- observance of which invalidates the exercise of power. In the case of ,Coaper v. Sandworth Board of Works! itwas observed *. Although there is no postive word a the statute requiring thatthe perty shall be heard, yet justice of common lew would supply the omission of Legislature * In AK. Kraipalts case, the Honfble Supreme Court observed thatthe rules of natural justice operete only in areas not covered by any lew validly made, These principles thus supplement the lew of the lend In the case of Smt. Maneka Gandhiv. Union of India and another®, it has been observed thet even where there is no specific provision for showing cause, yet in & proposed action which effects the rights ofan individual it isthe duty ofthe authority to give reasonable opportunity to be heerd. This duty is sid to be implied by neture of function to be performed by the authority having power to take punitive or damaging ection ‘There are mainly hwo elements ofthis principle ie, (@NOTICE ( HEARING NOTICE ‘The tem notice originated from the letin word notitia which means being known. In its popular sense it is equivalent to information, intelligence or knowledge. In legal sense, it (1963) 14GB QS) 4 180 » AIR 1978¢ 597embraces knowledge of circumstances that ought to induce suspicion or belie, aswell as bre information of that fact Generally notice contains the flloving fects 1 Time, place end nature of beeing 2. Legal ewthosty under which eheeringis tobe held 3. Statement of specific charges which the person hes to meet HEARING It is the basic requirement of the principle of nated justice thet the opportunity of being heard must be gven Right to heming provides an individual to present his case before the court and put forward evidences in support of his case. It also includes the sight of repeesenttion and et the same time to defend his de. The application ofthe principles of rata justice vaies from case to cese depending upon the factul aspect of the matter For example in the metters relating to mejor punishment, the requirement is very sict and ful edged opporteity is emsaged under the statutory res before a person is dismissed removed o reduced in rank, but where it rates to only minor punishment, « mere explamtion submitted by the delinquent officer concemed meets the requirement of principles of nal justice. In some matters orl hewing may be necessary but in others, It ray not be necessuy, aswe find thet in one ofthe case, Union of India v. JP Mian! « matter relating to conection of date of bith it was not considered necessary to provide personal hewing, « mere representation wes held to be sufficient to conform to the application of principles of naturel justice. In Srikrishna v. State of MP!’ It has been chserved tht the principles of naturel justice are Mleribe andthe test stat the adjudieating euthority must be impartial end fur hearing must be given to the person concerned (©) REASONED DECISION “Reason is an essential requirement of the rule of lew. It provides a link between fact and decision, guard against non-epplication of mind arbitrariness, and maintains public confidence in judicial and administrative authorities. Reasons also serve a wider principle thet justice must not only be done, it must also appear to be done DOCTRINE OF POST DECISIONAL HEARING Post decisional hearing is @ hearing which takes after a provisional decision is reached Post decisional hearing takes place where it may not be feasible to hold pre decisional heating AIR 1971 SC 1093, 'S AIR 1977 SC 1691 10‘The idea of Post Decision Hearing has been developed to maintain a balance bebveen administrative efficiency and faimess to individuals"®. In Post Decisional Hearing an individual is given en opportunity to be heard after a tentative decision has been taken by the suthorities. In certain situations, it is not feasible for the authorities to heve a normal pre- decisional hearing and decisions are being teken on first instance before providing the individual to present his views, thanit would be consider reasonable if the authorities provide Post Decision Hearing as well, asset will be in compliance with the Principle of Natural Justice. In Post Decision Hearing, the prominent point is thet authorities must take only « tentative decision end not final decision without hearing the party concemned””. The fundamental objective is that when a final decision is taken than it becomes difficult for the suthorities to reverse it and the purpose of providing a feir hearing gets defeated,therefore, for ‘an accusedit turns out to be a less effective than pre decision hearing The similar proposition, was ingeminated by the Apex Cowt With the introduction of this concept, the prospect of Principle of Natural Justice has widened The Supreme Court has been emphatic and prefers for Pre Decision Hearing rather Post Decision Hearing which must be done only in extreme and unavoidable cases, It strengthens the concept of Audi Alteram Partem by providing Right to Heard at a later stage ‘The Supreme Cowt hes different views on Post Decision Hearing on whether providing opportunity to be heard at « later stage sub serves the Principle of Natural Justice or not, ot ‘can post decision hearing be an absolute substitute for pre decision hearing The concept of post decisional hearing, though jurisprudentially groundbresking, has been rather frequently discussed, so much so thet there only a handful of cases which can be cited to discuss the concept and its jurisprudence in depth and detail. An analysis of the same are as follows with, the help of case laws. CASE LAWS ‘Mankea Gandhivs. Union of India" ‘This case is « landmark judgement on this point and wes instrumental in introducing the concept of Post Decision Hearing in Indian Legel Jurisprudence. The petitioner was provided with a notice by the Regional Passport Office, Delhi to submit the passport within seven days of her receiving the notice. The decision was made by the Government of India under Section, 10()(6) of Passport Act1967 on the ground of Public Interest. The petitioner immediately ‘TP Massey, Adnsnistative La, (6* edition 2005), PMP Jam&S C Jain Prnciples of Admanastrative Law (5 edition 2007) ™ 1978SCR 621 asake the Passport Office to furnish the grounds on which her pessport is impounded upon at provided under Section 10(5), the Govesnment refused to provide the same stating in the interest of the general public they will not provide the reasons for this order. The petitioner filed a writ petition chellenging the order pessed by the Government. ‘The sxgument presented by the Attomey General reguiding the applicability of Audi alterem pprtem was rejected by the Court The coust stated thet is necessary for the authorities to comply by the principle of Natural Justice and an opportunity to be heardimust be provided to the petitioner before passing aay final order. Coust held that procedue established by section 10) of Passport Act, 1967 is in conformity with the requicement of Acticle 21. The Act provides the ground on which the passport could be impounded and this provedue wes comprehensively recognized by the Cowt, Finelly the cout did not pess eny order ax ssswence was provided by the Attomey General to provide the petitioner with the opportunity to present her views within two weeks (Post Decisional Heasing) and prior tothe taking of final decision authorities will consider the views given by the petitioner. Hence first time in Indian Legl Jurisprudence the concept to Audi Alterem Pastem was evalved, ‘Swadeshi Cotton Millsvs. Union Of India” In 1978, Swadesh Cotton Mills was taken over by the Government through the Industries Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 on the ground thet the production of articles will be ckastically reduced and immediate action is required to protect it. The management was handed over to National Textile Corporstion Limited for a term of five years. The act provides the Centre Government with the power to issue orders regarding any public limited industry which is not been able to function properly. The company decided to file a writ petition in Delhi High Court ageinst the Government's order. The High Cout upheld the order of government. The appellant than filed a revision petition before Supreme Court ‘The cout reversed the decision of High Cout and held thet Section I8AA does not exclude the rule of audi alteram pastem at pre decisional stage The cowt recognized the principle of Post Decisional Hearing and held that in certain situations it is not possible to give prior notice or opportunity to be heerd in such circumstances the authorities may take the necessary decisions but it must be followed by a full remedial hearing Regarding the judicial review of the order Apex Court differed from the respondent and stated thet taking immediate ‘action is the question of fact and therefore cout can interfere if the administration is not "esi scR 2reasonable inits approsch as they form their opinion by collecting evidences. Post decisional ‘heating does not exclude the rule of pre decisional heasing wsless specificelly presesibed by the ect. Andin this ease the Govesnment bas violated the Principle of Natural Justice by not providing an opportunity tobe heard Camara Banks. VK. Awasthi”™ ‘The respondent was served with a show cause notice on 608.1992 andwas granted 15 days to reply. The respondent failed to reply and as a consequence was terminated from the service onl7.08.1992. The respondent contended thet principles of natural justice was not followed and High Cowt upholding the ssid contention ordered the bank to provide proper hearing to the respondent before the disciplinary committee. Hence, the bank filed en appeal before the ‘Supreme Cout ‘The respondent was served with a show cause notice on 608.1992 andwas granted 15 days to reply. The respondent failed to reply and as a consequence was terminated from the service onl7 08.1992. The respondent contended thet principles of natural justice was not followed and High Cowt upholding the ssid contention ordered the bank to provide proper hearing to the respondent before the disciplinary committee. Hence, the bank filed en appeal before the ‘Supreme Cout ‘The bank: provided the sespondent with personal hearing before the eppllentauthosty: The {snus concerning inthis case was-whether post decisional hearing provided by the bank to the respondent before appellant ehosty is in concsrence with Aud lteram pastem or not The Apex Court relied on Charan Lal Sahuv vs. Union of India”.Where the Cowt held thet ‘post decisional hearing can oltre the procedual deficiency of« pre-decsionl hewing! ‘Therefore, if there is any lac in the proceedings of any case, then it cen be resolved by using post decisional hearing Therefore cout allowed the appedl and held thet no violation of Painciple of Natural Justice was-witnesed and Post Decisinal Hewing in the present appeal serves the purpose of pre decisional heeing ‘The application of Post Decisonsl Hewing has act been appreciated by Courts when the setter was in relation to elections and Representation of People's Act In case ofRam [Naresh Tyagi and ors. Vs. Election Commission of India & another” end Arun Tyagivs. > 005) 68CC 321, » AIR 1990SC 1480. > AWP(C) No. 5064 of 2013, BElection Commission of India & another The Dethi High Coust ruled out the epplicetion of Post Decisional heesing The isue was regarding the deletion of voter's names ftom their tlectoral rol. Section22- C of Representation of Peoples Act provides that hearing must be provided to the voter before removing their name from the electoral roll. The Election Commission without providing hearing deleted $41 names from the electoral rll, Petitioners challenged before the High Court, Election Commission contended thet they are willing to provide post decisional hearing but the Court rejecting their argument held that in such ratters post Decisional Hearing does not serve as subsite of Pre Decisional Hearing endif the legislation clearly provides for hearing before deletion of names, then providing heering after the decision is taken to remove the names does not serve the purpose and hence, Election Commission was ordered to reinstate their names in the Electoral Roll. These cases ae a proof that post decisional hearing as a process is here to stay Primarily, because it is dine in cases of extreme and grave importance which have huge beering on the legality of the thing or act concemed So, they serve as good and reesonable method to pass and carry out orders 50 thet the matter doem't worsen, a5 well ag respecting the gency of the stuation ‘Also, post decisional hearings well within the boundaries of Natural Justice, andvwe can say that it challenges the boundaries of natura justice to the point on fathering it but never crosses those boundaries. Therefore itis away to enlarge and broaden the scope of Natural Justice on cest to case basis, this, accrediting the legal jurisprudence with some very practical and sound processes Conclusion The mein objective behind the reconclition between the inclusion end exclusion of protection of Principles of Nature Justice is to harmoniously consrue indvigual’s naturel rights of being heard and fir procedure aswell asthe public interes, Langer public interest is to be loved to overide the individual's interest where the justice demands After the iscussion of the principles of naturel justice it may be concluded thatthe Courts both in India and England in relation to administrative proceedings crested vaious exception to the requirement of Neturel Justice Principles and procedue thee off However, these exceptions ae all circumstantial and not conclusive, every exception to be adjudged admissible or otherwise onlyafter looking into the facts and circumstances of each case.The exceptions to the principles of natura justice in UK and Indie mainly relate to administrative proceedings ‘The Couts in both these counties especialy in India crested various exceptions to the SLPAWe 20011. ryrequirement of naturel justice principles and procedwes taking into sccout various cixcumstences like time, place, and the apprehended danger and so on prevailing at the time of decisionmaking It must be noted that ell these exceptions are circumstantial and not conclusive, They do not apply in the same manner to situations which aze not alike. They are not rigid but flexible. These rules can be adopted and modified by statutes and statutory rules sso by the Constitution ofthe Tribunal which has to decide « particular matter and the rules ‘by which such tribunal is govemned Every action of the authorities to be segarded as an. exception must be scrutinised by the Courts depending upon the prevailing ciscumstances ‘The cases where natural justice principles have been excluded by implication suggest thet the Couts have accepted the doctrine even though the legislature has not adopted express words to that effect but those cases appear to depend so heavily on their pesticuler cizcumstances that they do not yield a clear general principle, There are arguable and also explicable instences where the cousts have concluded that natural justice was not necessary. In order to invoke the exceptions the decision of the authorities must be based on bonafide Intention and the Courts while adjudiceting the post decision dispute must find the ection of the concemed authorities to be fir and just and every such exceptions to be adjudged admissible or otherwise only after looking into the facts and cizoumstances of exch ease, The sain objective behind the reconciliation between the inclusion and exclusion of protection of Principles of Natural Justice isto harmoniously construe individual's natural rights of being heard and fair procedure as well as the public interest Larger public interest is to be allowed to ovetside the individual's interest where the justice demands, Thus, exclusion of naturljustice should not be readily made unless itis iwesistible, since the Cousts act on the ‘presumption thatthe legislature intends to observe the principles of natucal justice and those Principles do not supplant but supplement the law of the land Therefore, all satutoryprovisions must be read, intespreted and applied so as to be consistent with the principles of Natural justice as