Energy Reports 8 (2022) 114–136

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Energy Reports
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/egyr

Review article

A comprehensive review of research works based on evolutionary

game theory for sustainable energy development
∗
Gang Wang a , Yuechao Chao a , Yong Cao b , Tieliu Jiang a , , Wei Han a , Zeshao Chen c
a
School of Energy and Power Engineering, Northeast Electric Power University, Jilin 132012, Jilin, China
b
Xi’an Thermal Power Research Institute Co., Ltd., Xi’an 710054, Shaanxi, China
c
School of Engineering Science, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230027, Anhui, China

article info a b s t r a c t

Article history: The evolutionary game theory method has been widely used in the research works about different
Received 21 July 2021 kinds of energy utilization fields, especially the clean energy utilizations which can facilitate the sus-
Received in revised form 13 November 2021 tainable energy development. This paper presents a research review of the evolutionary game theory
Accepted 15 November 2021
(EGT)-based studies on different energy-related aspects, including the traditional energy utilizations,
Available online xxxx
energy saving and carbon emission reduction, new energy utilizations, new energy vehicles, electric
Keywords: power market, distributed energy systems, micro-grid, smart grid and energy storage. Typical research
Evolutionary game theory works based on the evolutionary game theory method and relevant algorithms are introduced and
EGT method summarized. To promote the sustainable developments of energy utilization technologies as well
Carbon emission reduction as the usage of evolutionary game theory method, typical existing problems and several general
Sustainable energy development
recommendations about the further EGT-based research works are also proposed. The potential
further works based on the evolutionary game theory approach may include the EGT-based studies
considering more complex initial conditions and influential factors, verifications of the applicabilities
and feasibilities of the evolutionary game theory method based on practical examples, research works
with evolutionary game models consisting of more participants, and research and development (R&D)
works of new EGT-based or hybrid algorithms.
© 2021 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).

Contents

1. Introduction....................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 115
2. Evolutionary game theory method................................................................................................................................................................................. 115
3. Review of EGT-based research works ............................................................................................................................................................................ 115
3.1. Research works on traditional energy utilizations .......................................................................................................................................... 115
3.2. Research works on energy saving and carbon emission reduction............................................................................................................... 117
3.3. Research works on new energy utilizations..................................................................................................................................................... 119
3.3.1. Solar energy .......................................................................................................................................................................................... 119
3.3.2. Wind energy ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 120
3.3.3. Nuclear and hydrogen energies.......................................................................................................................................................... 122
3.3.4. Renewable energy market................................................................................................................................................................... 122
3.4. Research works on new energy vehicles .......................................................................................................................................................... 123
3.5. Research works on energy economic analysis and evaluation ...................................................................................................................... 124
3.5.1. Electric power market ......................................................................................................................................................................... 124
3.5.2. Distributed energy system and micro-grid ....................................................................................................................................... 126
3.5.3. Smart grid ............................................................................................................................................................................................. 127
3.6. Research works on energy storage .................................................................................................................................................................... 130
4. Conclusions........................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 131
CRediT authorship contribution statement ................................................................................................................................................................... 134
Declaration of competing interest.................................................................................................................................................................................. 134
Acknowledgement ............................................................................................................................................................................................................ 134

∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: jiangtieliu@163.com (T. Jiang).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.egyr.2021.11.231
2352-4847/© 2021 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
G. Wang, Y. Chao, Y. Cao et al.
Appendix ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 134
References ......................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 134
1. Introduction
Due to the consumptions of traditional energy resource as
well as the economy development of the world, the carbon
emissions has become a serious environmental issue in recent
years (Schmalensee et al., 1998). The large emissions of green-
house gas will certainly lead to the climate warming and thus
result in a series of adverse environmental effects (Walther et al.,
2017; Haldorsen et al., 2010). A great part of carbon emissions
(i.e., the carbon dioxide emissions) (Arora et al., 2011; Garbaccio
et al., 1999) comes from the electric power generations (Dis-
alvo, 1999; Singh et al., 2012), which are based on the coal, oil
and natural gas. Therefore, new energy resources were found
and developed to provide sustainable approaches for energy
development.
New energy resources include solar energy
(Wang et al., 2021d,e,b; Kasaeian et al., 2015), nuclear energy
(Wang et al., 2022; Wang, 2017; Lenzen, 2008), geothermal en-
ergy (Lund et al., 2010; Tole, 1996), wind energy (Milborrow,
2000; Ackermann and Söder, 2000), marine renewable energy
(Knight et al., 2014), biomass energy (Yilmaz and Selim, 2013),
etc. They can achieve the carbon dioxide emission reduction
as well as provide clean productions to different degrees. By
the efforts of many researchers and technicians in recent years,
these new energy resources have been considerably developed.
But currently, there are still many technical difficulties for the
utilizations of some renewable energies, for instance, high costs,
low energy conversion efficiencies, regional limitations, climatic
limitations, etc. Hence, in order to achieve the worldwide sustain-
able energy development, more research and development (R&D)
works of new energy resources are necessary.
The evolutionary game theory (EGT) originates from the imita-
tor dynamics proposed by Abrams (2006) and Taylor and Jonker
(1978). Evolutionary stability strategy (ESS) and imitator dynam-
ics constitute the convergence process of evolutionary game to-
wards the equilibrium state and final stable state. After that, the
research emphases of EGT focused on the extension of basic con-
cept and dynamic fitting. Initially, the EGT was commonly used in
biological fields. Then with the development of the internet and
artificial intelligence (AI), the EGT has been applied in many other
fields. For instance, in the biological field (Gatenby and Vincent,
2003; Anderson and Hart, 2002) and economic sphere (Friedman,
1991; Hodgson and Huang, 2012), the EGT method is usually used
to forecast the future development trends (Madeo et al., 2020;
Su et al., 2020). For enterprises, the EGT can be used to find the
influential factors on the enterprise development as well as to
reveal the future developments of enterprises. In addition, more
other disciplines have employed the EGT method to deal with
some forecasting problems.
In recent years, due to the shortage of fossil energy sources
as well as the increasingly serious environmental problems, the
EGT method has been used by many researchers to carry out
the studies on the environmental protection, carbon emission
reduction, energy development and some other issues. Many new
development trends and ideas for the environment, energies and
enterprises have been revealed by the simulation results based
on the EGT method. But to the authors’ best knowledge, so far,
there is no EGT-based research review on the energy utilization
and development field. This paper will presents a comprehensive
review of the EGT-based studies on different aspects of energy
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Energy Reports 8 (2022) 114–136
utilizations, including the traditional energies (Section 3.1), en-
ergy saving and carbon emission reduction (Section 3.2), new en-
ergy utilizations (Section 3.3), new energy vehicles (Section 3.4),
energy economic analysis and evaluation (Section 3.5) and energy
storage (Section 3.6). Section 2 is a brief introduction of the EGT
method, and Section 4 is the summary and conclusions of this
paper.
2. Evolutionary game theory method
The difference between the EGT and traditional game theory
is that the traditional game theory is based on the complete ra-
tionality of human. But in actual economic activities, it is hard to
achieve the complete rationality of participants. Veblen was the
founder of the school of institutional economics (Smith, 1976).
He was the first one who proposed a critique of neoclassicism’s
view that the rationality encompasses complex customary ac-
tivities of human. Afterwards, Arrow proposed the concept of
limited rationality (Arrow, 1951). Simon gave the definition of
finiteness assumption for the first time (Herbert, 1950). The EGT
is a new research approach based on the traditional game theory.
Different from the traditional game theory, the EGT believes that
the human rationality is limited and the complete information
conditions are unnecessary. The EGT was first applied in the
analyses of conflicts and cooperation between animals and plants,
which were conducted by Fisher (1930) and Hamilton (1967)
and some other genetic ecologists. Currently, the EGT has been
widely used in many other fields. For instance, Hanauske et al.
(2010) utilized the EGT to analyse the influential factors of the
economic crisis, looking for how to prevent the risk of market
collapse effectively.
The EGT is a research approach, in which the rationalities
of the game participants are limited. The learning and strategy
adjustment of the game participants are the keys of the limited
rationality analysis in the EGT. As the rationalities and learning
capacities of different game participants are different, different
selective mechanisms are needed during the dynamic adjust-
ment processes of strategies. The most widely used selective
mechanism dynamic equation in EGT is the replicator dynamic
equation proposed by Taylor and Jonker. When the game par-
ticipant has slow learning speed and low rationality degree, the
replicator dynamic simulation mechanism will be suitable for the
strategy adjustment in repetitive game with random pairing of
large groups. When the small groups with fast learning speed
perform random repetitive games, the optimal response model is
generally adopted. Among the symmetric game and asymmetric
game models, the Hawk and Dove game model, Frog Singing
game model and Market Entry game model are commonly used.
The ESS is used to describe a strategy, which is when the
vast majority of individuals in the population choose a certain
strategy, the group which chooses the mutation strategy cannot
invade the group that contains the vast majority of individuals as
it includes fewer individuals. Thus, the ESS has very good stability
in the process of evolutionary game. The core idea of the EGT is
the dynamic behaviour.
3. Review of EGT-based research works
3.1. Research works on traditional energy utilizations
Currently, traditional energy consumption still occupies the
largest proportion of the whole energy consumption structure.
G. Wang, Y. Chao, Y. Cao et al. Energy Reports 8 (2022) 114–136

well as considering actual conditions. The analysis results indicate

Nomenclature that the punishment on coal enterprises is closely related to the
policies of Coal Mine Safety Administration. The EGM established
Abbreviations in Ma et al. (2020) is presented in Fig. 1.
BBO Biogeography-based optimization An EGM consisting of the coal industry and government reg-
CTP Carbon trading price ulatory institution was established by Liu et al. (2015). An exam-
DES Distributed energy system ple was given to illustrate how the initial state as well as the
DPPS Distributed PV power system cost–benefit impacts the fluctuation amplitudes and stability of
ECD Energy consuming dispatch evolutionary game. The results reveal that efficient government
EELD Economic emission and load dispatch governance policies are particularly important for developing
EGT Evolutionary game theory countries. Fig. 2 illustrates a typical analysis results based on the
EMS Energy management strategy EGT method provided in Liu et al. (2015).
ES Energy storage Fang et al. (2019a) developed an EGM to evaluate the heat
sources for heat-supplying systems in urban regions (see Fig. 3).
ESS Evolutionary stability strategy
The influences of tax and subsidy policies on the evolutionary
ETES Electric thermal energy storage
process of heat-supplying systems in urban regions were studied.
EV Electric vehicle
Four different cases were investigated and the results demon-
FC Fuel cell
strate that compared with providing a subsidy policy, the taxation
HPP Hydro power plant
can promote the electric-based heat-supplying more effectively.
HPV Hydrogen powered vehicle
In addition, a dynamic combination of subsidy and tax policies
IC Investment company
can also be beneficial to facilitate the electrification processes of
IT Information technology
heat-supplying.
MGC Micro-grid configuration
By using the EGT, You et al. (2020) studied the interactions
MGSC Multi-stage green-supplying chain
among stakeholders in the internal security inspection system of
NEV New energy vehicle Chinese coal enterprises, including the coal mine owners, coal
OM Operation and maintenance mine safety supervision organizations and ordinary miners. The
OWF Off-coast wind farm evolutionary game simulation results show that due to the in-
PAR Peak-to-average ratio troduction of external supervision, the internal system of coal
PCS Pitch control system enterprise can achieve a high stability. Moreover, the penalty
PPP Public–private partnership severity should adapt to miners of different periods.
PS Power-sale Bhattacharya and Chattopadhyay (2011) proposed a hybrid
PV Photovoltaic EGT and Biogeography-based optimization (BBO) approach to
QA Quality assurance deal with the economic emission and load dispatch (EELD) prob-
R&D Research and development lem of traditional thermal power plants. The analysis results indi-
RPM Reward and punishment method cate that the hybrid approach can improve the convergence speed
RNSGA-II Revised version of Non-dominated Sort- as well as the solution quality. That provides a new potential
ing Genetic Algorithm-II method for the solution of EELD problems.
SPPP Solar PV power plant Hafezalkotob A. Mahmoudi (2017) conducted a research work
SPS Shore power system on the effects of government in the traditional thermal power
WF Wind farm plant competition. Based on the EGT method, the dependence
of production strategy of power plants on the governmental tax
policy was investigated. The evaluation results show that the tax
and environmental protection policies have obvious influences
The largest power generation in the world is based on the coal-
on the power plants. By collecting taxes appropriately, clean
fired power technology. Some problems caused by the traditional
energies can be introduced by the power plants to increase their
energy consumption have received varying degrees of attention.
By using the EGT method, many studies related to traditional competitiveness.
energy utilizations have been conducted and some of them are A problem of hydro power plants (HPPs) was studied by Chen
introduced in this section. et al. (2020). A tripartite EGM was established, which included
Yang et al. (2020a) established a tripartite evolutionary game two upstream HPPs and a downstream HPP. The benefits un-
model (EGM) comprised by supervisors, energy companies and der different cooperation strategies were studied. The simulation
whistleblowers. The simulation and analysis results show that results demonstrate that the tripartite cooperation of the three
though the initial probability of the game strategy can impact HPPs occurs only when two conditions are met simultaneously.
the convergence speed as well as the duration of the evolutionary The first condition is that the compensation paid by the down-
process, but it would not influence the final results. An obvious stream HPP is greater than the loss caused by the electricity
mutual influence exists among the probabilities of enterprise
production of the upstream HPPs. The second one is that the
management, whistleblower and supervision. Appropriate mea-
benefits of the downstream HPP should be greater than the risk.
sures should be taken by the energy regulatory authority so that
In addition to the studies introduced above, there are still
the proportion of real public reporting on energy issues can be
increased and positive improvement of energy enterprises can be some other reported EGT-based research works on traditional
promoted. energy utilizations. Due to the limited space of this article, they
Li et al. (Ma et al., 2020) carried out a long term dynamic will not be presented here. The relevant contents can be found
analysis of safety situation checking behaviour on coal enterprises in the literatures (Arroyave, 2012; Mazo et al., 2020; Zhang et al.,
by using the EGT method combined with system dynamics as 2017c).
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G. Wang, Y. Chao, Y. Cao et al.
Fig. 1. A typical EGM of safety situation checking behaviour on coal enterprises in Ma et al. (2020).
Fig. 2. Periodical fluctuations of weak supervision proportion presented in Liu
et al. (2015).
3.2. Research works on energy saving and carbon emission reduction
Unlimited greenhouse gas emissions from the human society
to the atmosphere have accelerated the temperature increase of
the earth surface. Climate warming has become a major global
concern as well as a major global challenge of the international
community. Many countries have been making great efforts to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions, especially the carbon dioxide
emissions. In recent years, with the application field expansion
of EGT, many studies on energy saving and carbon emission re-
duction based on the EGT approach have been conducted (Chong
and Sun, 2020; Pan et al., 2019; Huang et al., 2018). Some typical
research works are briefly introduced as follows.
Under the research background of improving atmospheric en-
vironment in coastal areas, Jiang et al. (2020) carried out an
EGT-based study on influences of different interference factors
on the decisions of participants. The research results reveal that
the government should adopt a dynamic punishment policy to
ensure shipping companies comply with the Emission Control
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Areas rules. The incomes of shipping companies can be improved
by the participations of non-governmental organizations and in-
dividuals.
Wang et al. (2020a) launched a study to evaluate the rela-
tionship between the carbon emission enterprise and supervision
organization by using the EGT method. Evolutionary processes
of three participants were simulated, including the central en-
vironmental protection department (CEPD), local environmental
protection department (LEPD) and carbon emission enterprise
(CEE). The game strategies for that study is shown in Fig. 4 (Wang
et al., 2020a). The evaluation results indicate that the central
environmental protection department should make rational use
of incentive mechanism for low carbon emission enterprises and
improve carbon emission tax system. The existing estimate sys-
tems of the local environmental protection department should be
reformed. Low carbon transformation and industrial upgrading of
the carbon emission enterprises should be achieved.
Zhang et al. (2019) established an EGM comprised by the
government and manufacturer under the research background
of total carbon emission control and carbon trading. The im-
pacts of government policies on the carbon trading market were
analysed under both static and dynamic carbon trading price
(CTP) conditions. The results show that the model cannot achieve
the stabilization under the static CTP condition, while under the
dynamic CTP condition, the pricing policy is an effective way to
promote the carbon emission reduction. Similar research works
can be seen in some other literatures (Wu et al., 2017; Chen et al.,
2021; Chen and Hu, 2018; Zhao and Liu, 2019).
Kang et al. (2019) carried out an evolutionary game study on
the behaviour of low carbon supply chain enterprise, low carbon
policy of government and new low carbon market. The simulation
results demonstrate that at the initial stage of low carbon tech-
nology development, only manufacturers or retailers should take
low carbon behaviours. During the mature period of low carbon
technology, low carbon behaviours should be taken only by retail-
ers. The government should not limit the carbon emission caps to
control the carbon emission reductions of enterprises, but should
control the carbon trading price. Carbon emission enterprises
should concern the sensitivities of consumers as the sensitivity
increase of consumers can reduce the carbon emissions of long
term operation.
G. Wang, Y. Chao, Y. Cao et al. Energy Reports 8 (2022) 114–136

Fig. 3. The EGM structure studied in Fang et al. (2019a).

Fig. 4. Descriptions of the game strategies in Wang et al. (2020a).

Zhao et al. (2016) studied the impacts of carbon emission

reduction policies on enterprises by using the EGT method. Indi-
vidual and joint interventions in incentive policies were analysed.
The relevant results reveal that providing subsidies to enterprises
directly can have better effect compared with providing subsidies
to consumers. In addition, the combination of direct subsidies and
preferential taxes could facilitate the implementation of carbon
emission reduction policies more effectively. Fig. 5 presents the
typical results of sensitivity analysis of the model used in Zhao
et al. (2016).
In order to investigate the performances of low carbon tech-
nology diffusion systems, Shi et al. (2020) established a model
(see Fig. 6) and evaluated the behaviours of carbon emission
enterprises by using the EGT approach. The investigation results
reveal that the policy intervention of the government has two
effects. The first one is that the governmental subsidy, carbon
tax and penalty on the non-low carbon companies can facilitate
the diffusions of low carbon technologies. The other is that the
three policies lead to no positive effects on low carbon companies. Fig. 5. Typical results of sensitivity analysis of the model used in Zhao et al.
(2016).
Other EGT-based studies on the low carbon diffusion are reported
by (Fan and Dong, 2018; Wan and Zheng, 2019).
An EGM comprised of the government and multi-stage green-
supplying chain (MGSC) (see Fig. 7) was established by Halat and cost minimization, respectively. The policies of carbon emission
Hafezalkotob (2019). The final objectives of the government and limit, carbon tax, carbon trading and carbon offset were consid-
MGSC were considered to be the social benefit maximization and ered. The simulation results indicate that the inventory decision
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G. Wang, Y. Chao, Y. Cao et al.
Fig. 6. The model for low carbon diffusion evaluation in Shi et al. (2020).
Fig. 7. A typical MGSC presented in Halat and Hafezalkotob (2019).
can impact the carbon emission of the MGSC. In order to reduce
the carbon emission, appropriate operation adjustments of the
MGSC as well as appropriate policy changes of the government
are necessary. Another typical study on the green-supplying chain
using the EGT method was launched by Zhao et al. (2012).
Under the research background of carbon emission reduction
in the power industry of China, Cui et al. (2018) developed an
EGM consisting of the government and electric power enterprise
to study the responses of electric power enterprises when low
carbon electric power generation policies are implemented. The
analysis results show that the low carbon production cost re-
duction, profit increase of low carbon production, supervision
enhancement of electric power enterprises and supervision cost
reduction of the government are all important. Moreover, pol-
icy suggestions for the carbon emission reduction in the power
industry were provided.
In order to solve the carbon emission reduction problem in the
construction industry, Xu et al. (2019b) proposed a Stackelberg
model based on a leader–follower decision framework, which
is illustrated in Fig. 8. An integrated approach comprised by
the improved particle swarm optimization and an evolutionary
mechanism was developed to solve the complexity of the model.
The analysis results show that the methodology developed in
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Energy Reports 8 (2022) 114–136
that research work can achieve carbon emission reduction in
the construction industry of China. High carbon emission reduc-
tion efficiencies can be achieved when rigorous carbon emission
reduction policies are implemented by the government.
3.3. Research works on new energy utilizations
As mentioned above, due to the economy development and
continuous adjustment of energy structure, new energy tech-
nologies will become increasingly mature. Therefore, new energy
systems will replace traditional energy systems and occupy the
dominant position in the future energy structure (Khare et al.,
2016). In this section, the reported EGT-based research works on
new energy utilizations will be introduced according to different
energy categories, mainly including the solar, wind, nuclear and
hydrogen energies. In addition, the studies on renewable energy
market will also be mentioned.
3.3.1. Solar energy
Zhang et al. (2021) developed an EGM under the conditions of
quality assurance (QA) and sharing rewards and punishments to
investigate the evolutionary processes of the government, con-
tracting company and investment company (IC). Relationships
G. Wang, Y. Chao, Y. Cao et al.
Fig. 8. The leader–follower decision framework for carbon-economy trade-off presented in Xu et al. (2019b).
among the stakeholders of solar PV power plants (SPPPs) pre-
sented in Zhang et al. (2021) are shown in Fig. 9. The investigation
results demonstrate that the SPPP quality will not be affected
directly by the government. Under the condition of QA, the oper-
ation and maintenance (OM) improvement is the only influential
factor on the SPPP quality. For the condition of sharing rewards
and punishments, both the OM and development can impact
the SPPP quality. Furthermore, some suggestions for facilitating
the investments of the SPPP as well as the government were
provided.
Tang et al. (2021) carried out a study on the effect of subsidy
strategy on the distributed PV power system (DPPS). By using
the EGM as well as empirical analysis approach, the cooperation
between the user and government during the DPPS installing pro-
cedure was analysed. The results indicate that the local economic
development level can restrict the consequent of DPPS subsidy
policy. Meanwhile, the governmental subsidy policy is still an
effective approach to consort the relationship between the DPPS
and local economic development.
Taking the solar power as the example, Liu et al. (2016) mod-
elled the Chinese feed-in tariff policies and conducted the influ-
ence analysis of these policies on the solar energy investments
in the electric power market. Two models were used for the
simulations, which were the open-loop and closed-loop game
models. The simulation results demonstrate that the Chinese
feed-in tariff by cross control policy can effectively control the
solar energy investments as well as prevent renewable energy
power generation companies from the equilibrium deviation.
Xu et al. (2019a) and Shan and Yang (2019) conducted studies
on the photovoltaic poverty alleviation (PPA) programs of China.
Shan et al. proposed an EGM comprised by the government,
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Energy Reports 8 (2022) 114–136
PV investment company and household. The factors, which hin-
der the development of PPA programs of China, were analysed.
The pattern model of PPA studied in their work is presented in
Fig. 10. In Fig. 10, G, E and H stand for the government, PV in-
vestment company and household, respectively. DPPS represents
the distributed photovoltaic power station, VPPS is the village-
level photovoltaic power station, CGPPS stands for the centralized
ground photovoltaic power station, and PAPA represents the pho-
tovoltaic agricultural poverty alleviation. The investigation results
reveal that for the PV project, four ESSs exist. Proactive support of
the PV investment company, active participation of the household
and weak governmental supervision will be beneficial for the PPA
program advancement. The convergence speed of the ESS can be
influenced by the initial intentions of the three participants.
3.3.2. Wind energy
Gambier (2019) utilized the evolutionary multi-objective op-
timization method to adjust the controlling loops, which serve as
part of the pitch control system (PCS) of a large size wind power
generator. The FAST code was employed to carry out the simula-
tions for three different controlling loops. The results reveal that
the adjustment method can lead to acceptable behaviours for the
three different controlling loops.
González et al. (2018) proposed a novel optimization method
for neighbouring off-coast wind farms (OWFs), which was a co-
evolutionary algorithm. Fig. 11 presents the flow diagram of the
proposed method (González et al., 2018). The proposed method
aimed at finding the best layout plan of the target wind farm
(WF) with considering the disturbance brought by neighbouring
WFs. An actual example was taken to evaluate the effect of
the proposed method. Moreover, a behaviour comparison be-
tween the proposed and other relevant methods was launched
G. Wang, Y. Chao, Y. Cao et al. Energy Reports 8 (2022) 114–136

Fig. 9. Relationships among the stakeholders of SPPPs presented in Zhang et al. (2021).

Fig. 10. Pattern model of the PPA presented in Shan and Yang (2019).

to demonstrate the advantages of the proposed method in that
study.
Yin et al. (2020) developed a novel multi-objective predictive
control (MOPC) method based on the evolutionary optimization,
121
which aimed at the improvement of electric power generation
capacity as well as the fatigue load reduction of WFs. The FLORIS
code was utilized to provide necessary data for the MOPC method.
Under different wind speed and wind direction conditions, the
G. Wang, Y. Chao, Y. Cao et al.
Fig. 11. Flow diagram of the method proposed in González et al. (2018).
operation behaviours of the WF were investigated by using the
MOPC method. The results reveal that in contrast with other
common control approaches, the MOPC method can decrease the
thrust of the WF by approximately 13.0% when the output electric
power generation capacity is basically unchanged.
3.3.3. Nuclear and hydrogen energies
Compared with the solar and wind energy utilizations, the
published EGT-based research works on other new energy re-
sources are relatively fewer. In this section, two typical EGT-based
studies on nuclear and hydrogen energies are introduced.
Woo (2020) utilized the EGT method to simulate the global
warming as well as carry out the energy type selection. Every
energy type showed its advantages and defects. Two EGMs were
established to conduct the electricity production evaluations. Ac-
cording to the comparison results, the priority of nuclear power
will gradually increase and thus it can serve as one of the main
energy types of a country. The EGM used in Woo (2020) is
illustrated in Fig. 12.
Andreasen and Sovacool (2014) carried out a development
study on the hydrogen energy utilization of Denmark. By analysing
the stakeholder conflicts in the R&D works of hydrogen, some
conclusions were revealed. The results demonstrate that for rel-
evant stakeholders, the application of hydrogen energy may be
a conflict field. The evolutionary economic analysis indicate that
the stakeholder conflict could facilitate the developments of the
hydrogen energy technologies. Cooperation relationships exist
between the hydrogen and other low carbon energy systems.
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Energy Reports 8 (2022) 114–136
3.3.4. Renewable energy market
There are many research works on renewable energy market
conducted by using the EGT approach (Lamantia and Radi, 2015;
Safarzadeh and Rasti-Barzoki, 2019; Xu et al., 2020; Kamalinia
et al., 2014). This section presents several typical studies of them.
A tripartite EGM consisting of the government, investment
company and public was developed by Gao and Zhao (2020) to
evaluate a public–private partnership (PPP) problem (see Fig. 13).
The evaluation results reveal that when a new energy power
construction project is launched, a win–win result as well as the
highest profits could be obtained by the three participants. The
facilitating effect of the public on the project is obvious. The
governmental reparations as well as the estimated losses brought
by the investment company can impact the choices of the public.
The electric power industry supervision and power-sale (PS)
are two important influential factors for electric power market.
In order to provide a reference for the regulation optimization
of the Renewable Portfolio Standard of China, Xin (2020) es-
tablished an EGM with considering the competitive relationship
between the integrated PS enterprise and independent PS enter-
prise. The evolutionary simulation results show that the static
reward and punishment method (RPM) cannot lead to a stable
strategy but can cause fluctuations in the evolutionary processes.
On the contrary, the dynamic RPM can make the evolutionary
process stable gradually. When the Renewable Portfolio Standard
is implemented, apposite Renewable Portfolio Standard quotas
should be drawn up and the PS market scale should be consid-
ered. Fig. 14 presents the electric power market of China under
the Renewable Portfolio Standard policy (Xin, 2020). Other EGT-
based studies on the Renewable Portfolio Standard and green
certificate trading under the research background of renewable
energy power market are presented in Zhu et al. (2020), Zhang
et al. (2018) and Zou et al. (2019).
Fang et al. (2018) established an EGM comprised of the renew-
able energy power generation and transmission to investigate
the significance of the enhancement of governmental supervision.
The investigation results indicate that the evolutionary process
can reach the stable state only when the governmental supervi-
sion, fossil energy power plant obeisance and power grid sub-
sidy exist simultaneously. Apposite governmental punishment
can speed up the equilibrium of renewable energy power market.
Zhao and Liu (2015) carried out a study by using an EGM
comprised by the traditional electric power enterprise, electric
power distribution enterprise and various users. The simulation
results reveal that all participants can obtain apposite profits
when optimal game strategies are adopted. Distributed clean
energy development could lead to both economic and social
benefits.
In order to forecast the outlooks of clean energy consumption
of China, Yang et al. (2020b) developed a new hybrid algorithm
based on the EGT, which was called the EGT-ADE-LSSVM. By using
this hybrid algorithm, a comparison study was conducted by
taking an example into account. The comparison results demon-
strate that the model based on the hybrid algorithm has better
behaviour on the result forecasting than other models. According
to the model based on the hybrid algorithm, the clean energy
consumption of China can be 3.86 × 1010 kWh in 2030.
Tong et al. (2020) evaluated the transition context and niche
level practices of the district energy system by utilizing the multi-
level perspective and co-evolutionary method. The results reveal
that the operation enterprises and designers of district energy
systems take a lot of responsibilities under the supports of limited
policies and markets. For the institutional level, the pressure will
be small if the district energy system is selected to be the main
sustainability means.
G. Wang, Y. Chao, Y. Cao et al. Energy Reports 8 (2022) 114–136

Fig. 12. The modelling of evolutionary game theory used in Woo (2020).

Fig. 13. Game model of the government, investment company and public utilized in Gao and Zhao (2020).

Pinto and Szczupak (2003) utilized the EGT on the analysis
of the new energy markets. They pointed that the EGT can cor-
rectly represent the agent behaviours, responses to participant
behaviours, regulation changes and many other issues in the new
energy markets. The simulation results indicate that the EGT can
solve some problems brought by traditional models as well as
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shows a satisfactory performance on the dynamic simulations of
new energy markets.
3.4. Research works on new energy vehicles
In recent years, the new energy vehicle (NEV) industry de-
velops rapidly due to the needs of carbon emission reduction.
G. Wang, Y. Chao, Y. Cao et al.
Fig. 14. Electric power market of China under the Renewable Portfolio Standard policy (Xin, 2020).
However, the development of NEVs still has a long way to go
as some key technologies for NEVs are not mature currently. The
typical EGT-based studies on NEVs are shown as follows.
Tan and Wang (2017) developed a novel navigation method
for the electric vehicle (EV) charging. By using the hierarchical
game method, the competition of different charging stations as
well as the charging station selecting strategies of electric vehi-
cles were investigated. The results demonstrate that the proposed
navigation method can improve the benefits of charging stations
effectively.
Wang et al. (2021a) established an EGM consisting of the
investment company (IC), hydrogen powered vehicle (HPV) user
and solar PV power plant (SPPP). Based on the tripartite EGM
as well as the policies and provisions of China, the evolutionary
processes and evolutionary stable strategies are simulated and
discussed. Effect estimate results of typical parameters on the
three participants show that higher solar intensity, longer annual
sunshine duration, larger subsidies, longer lifetimes of hydrogen
charging facility and PV panels will be favourable to the smooth
progress of the partnership. Reasonable hydrogen selling price
should be considered as it has incentive effect on ICs and SPPPs
but inhibition on HPV users.
A tripartite EGM was established by Encarnação et al. (2018) to
study the influential factors on the electric vehicle development.
The model included the government, enterprise and electric ve-
hicle user. Relevant simulations were conducted and the results
reveal that the public supervision as well as the public-civil
synergy is needed for ensuring the adoption of electric vehicle.
In addition, the coordination of the three participants is also a
key factor to facilitate the development of electric vehicle.
Taking China as the example, Li et al. (2019) and Hu et al.
(2020) carried out two similar studies of the influences of govern-
mental policies on promoting the development of electric vehicle
by using different network models based on the EGT. The effects
of tax and subsidy policies of NEVs in China were evaluated
(see Fig. 15). The results demonstrate that the tax and subsidy
polices on electric vehicle production, license limitation of fuel
vehicle and electric vehicle user subsidy polices all have positive
effects on facilitating the development of electric vehicle. But
the influence of the electric vehicle production subsidy is more
effective than that of the electric vehicle user subsidy.
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Energy Reports 8 (2022) 114–136
Fang et al. (2019b) analysed several influential factors of the
cooperation among the IC, electric vehicle and resident by em-
ploying the EGT approach. The solar PV power issue was also
introduced in the studied EGM (see Fig. 16). Impacts of typical
factors on the evolutionary processes of the three participants
were obtained. Some suggestions were also provided for facili-
tating the developments of electric vehicle and solar PV power.
Another study launched by Fang et al. can be seen in Fang et al.
(2020), which is also an EGT-based research work on facilitating
the construction of charging infrastructure for electric vehicles.
In order to reduce the hydrogen consumption as well as im-
prove the durability of fuel cell (FC), Sun et al. (2020a) developed
a novel energy management strategy (EMS) for hybrid FC/electric
vehicles. The min–max game model was used to estimate the
performance of the proposed EMS. The results indicate that in
contrast with other EMSs, the proposed EMS can effectively de-
crease the hydrogen consumption as well as improve the FC
durability. The min–max game model is presented in Fig. 17 (Sun
et al., 2020a).
By using the EGT method, Ji et al. (2019) carried out a research
work on facilitating the NEV development as well as decreasing
the financial pressure of the government brought by supporting
the NEV development. Behaviours of the government and NEV
production enterprise were investigated. The simulation results
reveal that the gradual abolishment of the governmental subsidy
policy is beneficial to facilitating the NEV development. More-
over, the improvements of additional profits of NEV production
enterprise, penalties for fossil vehicle manufacturers and cover-
age ratio of public charging devices all can promote the NEV
development.
3.5. Research works on energy economic analysis and evaluation
3.5.1. Electric power market
As the information technology (IT) advances, some new al-
gorithms have been well developed and thus some optimization
problems, which were previously difficult or impossible to solve,
can be dealt with currently. The application behaviours of the
EGT in the studies on electric power markets are particularly
obvious (Lee and El-Sharkawi, 2003; Liu et al., 2020; Liu and Sun,
2020; Chamorro et al., 2017).
G. Wang, Y. Chao, Y. Cao et al.
Fig. 15. New energy vehicle tax and subsidy policies of China (Li et al., 2019).
Fig. 16. The EGM studied in Fang et al. (2019b).
Ladjici et al. (2012, 2014) and Ladjici and Boudour (2011)
conducted several studies on the electric power market by utiliz-
ing the competitive co-evolutionary algorithm. Fig. 18 illustrates
the flow diagram of the competitive co-evolutionary algorithm
provided in Ladjici and Boudour (2011). In those studies, the elec-
tric power supplier strategies in the electric power market were
investigated and the optimal supplier strategy was searched. The
results show that the competitive co-evolutionary algorithm is
effective in finding the optimal supplier strategy, and the supplier
could obtain more profits by using the structural weaknesses
of electric power markets as well as the electric power grid
limitations. Another EGT-based study related to the benefit im-
provement of electric power supplier was presented by Sun et al.
(2020b) in the relevant literature.
Wang and Xiong (2010) carried out an influential factor inves-
tigation on the pricing strategy of electric power enterprises in
China by using the Hawk and Dove game model. Two participants
were considered, which were the large- and small-scale elec-
tric power companies. The results show that the electric power
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Energy Reports 8 (2022) 114–136
Fig. 17. The min–max game model used in Sun et al. (2020a).
market stability of China could be improved by the governmen-
tal decisions of relevant parameters rather than by the market
adjustment.
The electric power dispatch is always an important issue for
the electric power market. Nwulu and Xia (2015), Wu et al.
(2010), Lu et al. (2011) and Du et al. (2015) all conducted EGT-
based research works related to the electric power dispatch issue.
Among these studies, Nwulu and Xia, Wu et al. and Lu et al. all
studied the economic emission and electric power dispatch issue
by using the multi-objective differential evolutionary (MODE)
method and considered two objective functions, which were the
cost minimizations of emission and fuel. The relevant simulation
results all reveal the effectiveness as well as the advantages of the
MODE method in the analysis of electric power dispatch issue.
G. Wang, Y. Chao, Y. Cao et al.
Fig. 18. Flow diagram of the competitive co-evolutionary algorithm used in Ladjici and Boudour (2011).
The EGT-based study launched by Du et al. only focused on the
fuel cost reduction problem of electric power enterprises.
Predictions of electricity price and load are two key problems
for the electric power market under the condition of power-
supplying deregulation. Karsaz et al. (2010) developed a novel
cooperative co-evolutionary approach for the two problems. In
order to evaluate the performance of the proposed approach, the
actual electric power market data of New England and Australia
were utilized to be compared with the simulation results. The
evaluation results demonstrate that the proposed approach can
increase the prediction accuracy by 5.0∼20.0%. The approach
layout as well as some typical prediction results in Karsaz et al.
(2010) are shown in Fig. 19.
3.5.2. Distributed energy system and micro-grid
The concept of distributed energy system (DES) is proposed
relative to the traditional centralized energy supply system. The
DES is a direct user-oriented medium or small energy conversion
and utilization system. It can produce and supply energy on-site
according to the needs of users and has a variety of functions,
which can meet multiple goals. As a new generation of energy
supply mode, the DES is a powerful supplement to the centralized
energy supply system.
Micro-grid refers to a small power generation and distribution
system composed of distributed power sources, energy storage
devices, energy conversion devices, loads, monitoring and protec-
tion devices, etc. The proposal of the micro-grid aims at realizing
the flexible and efficient application of distributed electric power
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Energy Reports 8 (2022) 114–136
sources as well as solving the problem of a large number and
diverse forms of distributed electric power grid connection. The
development and extension of the micro-grid can fully promote
the large-scale integration of distributed power sources and re-
newable energy sources, and realize the highly reliable supply
of multiple forms of energy to the load. It is an effective way
to achieve the active distribution network, which makes the
traditional electric power grid transit to the smart power grid.
Therefore, the DESs and micro-grids have become an impor-
tant part of the energy network. Many EGT-based research works
on the DESs (Khan, 2016; Perera et al., 2021; Navidi et al., 2021;
Al-Agtash and Al-Fahoum, 2005; Srikantha and Kundur, 2015;
Zhang et al., 2017b; Navidi et al., 2020; Ren et al., 2020; Nagaballi
and Kale, 2020) and micro-grids (Huang et al., 2019; Jin et al.,
2020; Xu and Yan, 2020; Zeng and Chen, 2019; Aguila-Leon et al.,
2020; Lu et al., 2019; Xu et al., 2021) were carried out and some
of them will be introduced in this section.
Perera et al. (2021) conducted a study on the interactions
between different DESs by using a game-theoretic method. Three
kinds of energy system structures were analysed and compared.
The results indicate that the fully-cooperative and non-cooperati-
ve structures can decrease the cost by 30.0% and 15.0% in con-
trast with the third structure. The approach, which can reduce
the costs and maintain privacies simultaneously, was obtained.
Fig. 20 presents the fully-cooperative structure studied by Perera
et al. (2021).
G. Wang, Y. Chao, Y. Cao et al.
Fig. 19. Proposed approach and typical results in Karsaz et al. (2010): (a)
cooperative co-evolutionary approach layout, (b) electricity price prediction
results.
Focusing on the distributed electric power market, Al-Agtash
and Al-Fahoum (2005) launched a research work on the evo-
lutionary negotiation process for electric power generation and
consumption enterprises, which was carried out within the elec-
tric power agent. The purpose was to find the optimal negotiation
strategy which can satisfy the goals and benefits of the related
enterprises. The negotiation agent architecture was developed
and can be seen in Fig. 21.
Srikantha and Kundur (2015) introduced the EGT technologies
into the strategy formulation of electric power dispatch system
to deal with the problems brought by DESs based on solar or
wind energies. The simulation and analysis results reveal that
the proposed electric power dispatch strategy has high scala-
bility as well as can make intermittent DESs conduct real-time
electric power distributions under the condition which lower
computational overheads could be kept.
Under the condition of regional energy system application,
Ren et al. (2020) established an EGM consisting of the govern-
ment, energy service enterprise and consumer to search the op-
timal strategies. For the equilibrium and disequilibrium strategy
conditions, the strategy selecting performances of the partici-
pants were investigated. The results reveal that the government
prefers to improve the regional DES subsidies, and the energy
service enterprise prefers to improve the incomes by adopting
favourable energy pricing rules. The consumers would select the
energy supplied by the energy service enterprise.
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Energy Reports 8 (2022) 114–136
A Stackelberg game model based on the leader–follower de-
cision was built by Huang et al. (2019) to study the combined
optimization problem of micro-grid configuration (MGC) and en-
ergy consuming dispatch (ECD). Four different algorithms were
utilized to carry out the relevant simulations. The results demon-
strate that the game model has good performance on optimizing
the MGC and ECD simultaneously.
Jin et al. (2020) proposed a hybrid solar-gas-wind micro-grid
based on the multi-agent system. A game theory optimization
method was developed to conduct the analysis of benefit relation-
ships between the agents. The hybrid solar-gas-wind micro-grid
was utilized to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed opti-
mization method. The results indicate that when the cooperative
game mode is adopted, the investment enterprises of solar power,
gas power and wind power can have benefit increases of 19.0%,
88.0% and 6.0% compared with the non-cooperative game mode.
Fig. 22 illustrates the hybrid micro-grid as well as some typical
results presented in Jin et al. (2020).
Xu and Yan (2020) developed an EGT-based dispatch approach
to deal with the constrained dispatch problem in micro-grid.
Taking the renewable and traditional energy power enterprises as
the instance, the effectiveness of the proposed dispatch approach
was investigated. The results reveal that the EGT-based dispatch
approach can have a satisfactory accuracy. By using this dispatch
approach, the electricity supplying costs could be decreased by
2.0%.
By using a tripartite EGM, Xu et al. (2021) conducted a study
on the strategy selection of the shore power system (SPS) com-
prised by the government, harbor enterprise and liner company.
The results show that no matter what stage the three partici-
pants are in and no matter what initial strategies are adopted,
the government will choose to implement excitation polices, the
harbor enterprise tends to conduct the shore power, and the liner
company would like to alter the SPS facilities. The initial govern-
mental strategy significantly impacts the strategy evolutionary
processes of the other two participants.
3.5.3. Smart grid
The smart grid is based on an integrated, high-speed two-way
communication network. Through the applications of advanced
sensing and measurement technology, advanced equipment tech-
nology, advanced control methods and advanced decision support
system technology, it achieves the goals of reliability, safety,
economy, high efficiency, environmental friendliness and safe
use of the power grid. Its main features include the self-healing,
incentivizing and protecting users, resisting attacks, providing
the power quality that meets user needs, allowing the accesses
of various electric power generation forms, starting the electric
power market, and optimal and efficient operation of assets. The
relevant research works on smart grids based on the EGT method
have been launched by many researchers (Hwang et al., 2018;
Noor et al., 2018; Reka and Ramesh, 2016; Zhu et al., 2016; Azar
et al., 2018; Devia et al., 2021).
Hwang et al. (2018) carried out a study for the benefit im-
provements of electric power supplier and consumer in the smart
grid by using the EGM based on the Stackelberg game. Two strate-
gies were proposed, which were the best-pricing and power-
generating strategy for the electric power supplier and best
electricity-using strategy for the consumer. The relevant results
indicate that by using the two strategies, the benefits of the elec-
tric power supplier can be increased to 45.0% and the electricity
charge of the consumer can be decreased by 15.6%. In addition,
the peak-to-average ratio (PAR) can be decreased by using the
proposed algorithm. The algorithm used in Hwang et al. (2018) is
presented in Fig. 23.
Taking the smart grid into account, Reka and Ramesh (2016)
presented a demand response modelling plan based on the EGT
G. Wang, Y. Chao, Y. Cao et al. Energy Reports 8 (2022) 114–136

Fig. 20. The fully-cooperative structure studied in Perera et al. (2021).

Fig. 21. The negotiation agent architecture diagram presented in Al-Agtash and Al-Fahoum (2005).

and established a model comprised by the utility and electric
power consumer. The algorithm can create different tax rates
for the electric power consumer to dispatch the load usage.
The verification of the proposed methodology was conducted by
analysing an example considering three residential power users,
and the results reveal that the evaluation results obtained from
using the proposed methodology were more accurate.
Focusing on the demand side management issues, Zhu et al.
(2016) conducted a study on the network smart grid by using
128
the EGT method. The research purpose was to reduce the total
costs of the smart grid, in which communities were able to choose
to use the regional power or the grid power freely. The unique
feature of the scheme proposed in that study was that a small
part of the communities will cooperate, but the other part will
choose to seek their profits.
Azar et al. (2018) presented a multi-objective electric power
matching framework. The market operator will determine the
G. Wang, Y. Chao, Y. Cao et al. Energy Reports 8 (2022) 114–136

Fig. 22. Hybrid micro-grid and typical results in Jin et al. (2020): (a) solar-gas-wind micro-grid structure, (b) capacity proportion results of three different energy
types under two game modes.

Fig. 23. The algorithm used in Hwang et al. (2018).

129
G. Wang, Y. Chao, Y. Cao et al.
Fig. 24. The flow diagram of the RNSGA-II proposed in Azar et al. (2018).
final electricity price according to the prices provided by the elec-
tric power seller and consumer. A new algorithm called RNSGA-II
was developed (see Fig. 24), which considered the targets of the
electric power seller and consumer as well as the power distri-
bution loss reduction. The analysis results demonstrate that the
RNSGA-II has better performance in contrast with other existing
evolutionary algorithms which optimize the public welfare and
computational complexity simultaneously.
Under the new smart grid framework condition, Devia et al.
(2021) carried out a study on the consumption reduction of heat-
ing system by using the distributed co-evolutionary optimization
method as well as the agent-based structure. The simulation
results reveal that the proposed strategy can reduce the costs by
23.0% as well as decrease the PAR by 25.0%.
3.6. Research works on energy storage
With the continuous popularizations of renewable energy
technologies, different kinds of energy storage (ES) techniques
have been developed and some of them have become key links
in promoting energy developments (Pardo et al., 2014; Wang
et al., 2021c, 2020b, 2019). There are big differences among the
maturities of different ES technologies. The typical EGT-based
studies on energy storage are introduced in this section.
Aiming at the wireless network using solar-based power, Tem-
bine et al. (2008) conducted a research work on the power and
multi-access control issues by using the EGT approach. Solar-
based power batteries were assumed to be utilized by mobile
devices and the non-cooperation interactions among mobile de-
vices were studied by utilizing the battery energy level model.
The payoff behaviour as well as the state transforming probability
was determined by the battery device action. The reliability of the
proposed method was revealed by the evolutionary simulation
results.
Zhang et al. (2017a) established an EGM for the operating
strategy of distributed ES system. In the proposed model, the ES
costs, market competitive level and market price were consid-
ered. The results indicate that the EGM can forecast the potential
selections of electric power consumers as well as recommend
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reasonable operating mode according to the practical market
price variations and ES element costs.
Ovalle et al. (2017) carried out an application study on multi-
population method based on the escort EGT. The study of dis-
tribution system consisting of PV power devices and a battery
ES system for electric vehicles was launched. Several cases con-
sidering different kinds of electric vehicle charging devices were
evaluated. The results demonstrate the benefits of integrating a
battery ES system regarding the undesired unbalancing effects
and strong peaks of PV production.
Many local areas of China have introduced relevant polices to
support the ES development (see Table 1). Zhang et al. (2020)
evaluated the evolutionary processes of participants in the elec-
tric power market with ES techniques. Different regional initial
conditions were considered. The EGM was comprised by three
participants, which were the government, electric power gener-
ation enterprise and electric power grid. The simulation results
reveal that the large- and medium-scale electric power gener-
ation enterprises and electric power grids in East, Central and
South China will construct ES systems without the government
supervisions. For the northeastern region of China, due to the
low on-grid electricity price, the medium- scale electric power
generation enterprises will not construct ES systems, while the
small electric power grids can obtain enough incomes by using
ES systems. For the North China, the large-scale electric power
generation enterprises and medium-scale electric power grids
will select to construct ES systems. For the West China, as the
electricity price is relatively lower, the small-scale electric power
generation enterprises and electric power grids will not construct
ES systems.
Guo et al. (2016) studied the problems in promoting the elec-
tric thermal energy storage (ETES) technique by analysing the sta-
tus of ETES popularization in China. Based on some EGMs, main
bodies and behaviours of ETES techniques were analysed and the
results reveal that different policies should be implemented for
different programs. Some recommendations for facilitating the
policies of ETES techniques were also proposed.
G. Wang, Y. Chao, Y. Cao et al. Energy Reports 8 (2022) 114–136

Table 1
ES policy directions of local governments of China (Zhang et al., 2020).
Major policy directions Regions
Supporting the development of ES technology as the focus of the Beijing, Jilin, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Hunan, Henan, Shanghai,
electrical reform Guangdong and Xinjiang
New energy power plants + ES Hunan, Xinjiang, Beijing, Hubei, Anhui, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Yunnan,
Xizang and Qinghai
Supporting the construction The power side + ES Guangdong, Shanxi, Liaoning, Inner Mongolia, Guizhou, Qinghai
of ES projects and Xinjiang
The grid side + ES Hunan, Henan, Guangdong, Jiangsu, Gansu and Qinghai
The user side + ES Inner Mongolia, Jiangsu, Ningxia, Shanxi, Shandong, Guangdong
and Hubei
Supporting ES projects, preferentially on-grid Inner Mongolia, Henan and Hubei
Encouraging the application of ES in peak frequency modulation Shandong, Zhejiang, Henan, Jiangsu, Xinjiang and Fujian
and demand response by providing subsidies
Other incentive policies Xinjiang, Hunan, Beijing and Shandong

Table A.1
A brief summary of typical completed studies, algorithms, existing problems and further works based on the EGT for sustainable energy development.
Research fields Typical completed studies
Traditional (a) Influences of governmental safety supervision and
energy tax policies on coal mine enterprises.
utilizations
(b) Interactions among stakeholders in the internal
safety inspection systems of coal enterprises.
(c) Energy source choices of urban heat-supplying
systems.
(d) Solutions and optimizations of economic
emission and load dispatch (EELD) problems of
thermal electric power plants.
(e) Competitive relationship studies on power plants
based on traditional energy sources.
Energy saving (a) Promoting shipping enterprises to comply with
and carbon the Emission Control Areas rules by using
emission governmental punishment policies and other
reduction potential factors.
(b) Function evaluations of central and local
environmental protection department policies (e.g.,
tax policies, subsidy policies, incentive policies and
supervisions) on facilitating the carbon emission
reductions of different kinds of enterprises.
(c) Impacts of static and dynamic CTP strategies on
facilitating carbon emission reductions.
(d) Influences of governmental policies and
enterprise transformations on low carbon technology
diffusions.
(e) Problems related to the green supply chain.
(f) Low carbon and traditional technological
innovation problems of enterprises.
(g) Impacts of static and dynamic tax and subsidy
policies on carbon emission reductions.
Algorithms or models
(a) Static evolutionary
game algorithm
(b) Dynamic evolutionary
game algorithm
(c) One-population
evolutionary game
model
(a) Static evolutionary
game algorithm
(b) Dynamic evolutionary
game algorithm
(c) Hierarchical game
algorithm
(d) Evolutionary game
theory and complex
network theory
(e) Stackelberg game
algorithm
Existing problems and potential further work
prospects
(a) Complex demand functions of power plants are
suggested to be used in future EGT-based
simulations.
(b) Some practical conditions were not considered in
relevant EGT-based simulations, e.g., the collusions
between enterprises and employees, poor
management mechanisms of regulatory departments,
etc.
(c) Some EGT-based hybrid algorithms may be used
to solve some complex optimization problems in
traditional energy utilization fields.
(a) More new participants may be introduced in the
simulations based on the EGT method to make the
studied problems more close to actual situations.
(b) For most game simulations, the ideal conditions
or assumptions were adopted. Some factors were
neglected in corresponding studies, e.g., the
interactions between the consumers and industry,
information asymmetry among participants, product
quantity and quality of the production enterprise,
living standard, public purchasing capacity, etc. But
the actual situations are always relatively more
complex.
(c) Thorough studies should be conducted on how to
implement the dynamic CTP.
(d) By the comparison of different constraints, a
mechanism which can effectively limit the carbon
emissions of enterprises can be developed and then
verified in the actual production process.
(e) Studies on the optimal governmental subsidy,
reward, tax and penalty ranges for carbon emission
reductions could be launched.

(continued on next page)

Under the condition of hybrid electric power grid, Lopez et al.
(2012) proposed an evolutionary agent-based model for the elec-
tricity storage balancing. In order to minimize the costs, all ulti-
mate consumers were modelled to be agents who could select
to store or release electric power at given times. Schedules of
automated electricity store and release strategies for all time-
steps were provided for all ultimate consumers to achieve the
electricity cost minimizations.
131
4. Conclusions
In this paper, the EGT-based research works on different
energy-related aspects are introduced, including the traditional
energy utilizations, energy saving and carbon emission reduction,
new energy utilizations, new energy vehicles, electric power mar-
ket, distributed energy systems, micro-grid, smart grid and en-
ergy storage. The typical completed studies, algorithms, existing
problems and potential further works based on the EGT method
G. Wang, Y. Chao, Y. Cao et al.
Table A.1 (continued).
Research fields Typical completed studies
New energy (a) Studies on different kinds of hybrid wind and
utilizations solar power generation problems.
(b) Studies on hybrid hydro and wind power
generation.
(c) Studies on developments of nuclear power,
hydrogen technology and fuel cell technique.
(d) Studies on problems and influential factors
related to the solar PV power generation.
(e) Impacts of the RPS policies on the electric power
markets of China.
(f) Studies on the logical relationships among the
industrial policies and trade conflicts of developed
and developing countries in the energy transition
process.
(g) Impacts of the behaviours of different kinds of
participants on the renewable energy markets were
studied, including the government, different kinds of
power generation enterprises, IC, power distribution
enterprise, electric power user, etc.
NEVs (a) Studies on the solution of EV charging
infrastructure distribution problem.
(b) Impacts of governmental policies, NEV production
enterprise behaviours and NEV user behaviours on
facilitating the NEV developments.
(c) Studies on the hydrogen consumption and fuel
cell durability of hybrid fuel and electric power
vehicles.
(d) Studies on the coordinated development of EV
and solar PV power generation.
for sustainable energy development are briefly summarized and
shown in Table A.1 (see the Appendices section).
According to the review of EGT-based studies for sustainable
energy development, on the whole, the EGT method is mostly
used in two aspects, which are the prediction of energy poli-
cies, and the search and verification of the optimal solution on
the technical level. For the traditional energy utilizations, the
research works are mainly about the impacts of safety supervision
policies on the development of coal enterprises as well as on the
developments of power generation and heating in the traditional
energy industry under the national tax policy. For the field of
energy saving and carbon emission reduction, the main focuses
Energy Reports 8 (2022) 114–136
Algorithms or models Existing problems and potential further work
prospects
(a) Static evolutionary (a) More stakeholders should be considered in
game algorithm further studies. In addition, the market oligopoly
should also be considered under certain
(b) Dynamic evolutionary circumstances.
game algorithm
(b) More influential factors can be introduced in
(c) Co-evolutionary relevant studies, such as the population systems,
algorithm transportation systems and international policies,
etc.
(d) Open-loop game
algorithm (c) The games among different participants in the
monopoly market can be studied.
(e) Close-loop game
algorithm (d) Impacts of agencies (e. g., news media) can be
considered in further studies.
(f) Incomplete
information (e) In addition to solar and wind power generations,
non-cooperative game more EGT-based studies on other new energy types
algorithm should be conducted, including nuclear energy,
hydrogen energy, biomass energy, geothermal
(g) Multi-stage game energy, etc.
algorithm
(h) EGT optimized least
squares support vector
machine (LSSVM)
machine intelligence
algorithm
(a) Static evolutionary (a) Studies on the NEV diffusion problem were
game algorithm almost focused on small-world networks.
(b) Dynamic evolutionary (b) Relationships among participants in NEV diffusion
game algorithm problems were usually relatively simple.
(c) Complex network (c) Impacts of governmental policies on the NEV
evolutionary game development were not exhaustive. More detailed
algorithm issues should be considered and studied, e.g.,
dynamic subsidy policies, dynamic emission tax, etc.
(d) Hierarchical game
algorithm (d) For the NEV production enterprise and NEV
charging pile, their cooperation modes and related
(e) Indirect evolutionary supervision mechanisms should be studied in the
game algorithm future.
(e) For facilitating the NEV development,
evolutionary game processes with more participants
should be considered in further studies.
(f) Different impacts of national and local policies on
promoting the NEV development should be studied.
(g) Information asymmetry problem should be
considered in the future EGT-based studies on NEVs.
(h) More EGT-based studies related to the hydrogen
power vehicle should be conducted.
(continued on next page)
of the EGT-based studies are on the impact of low-carbon incen-
tive policies on the development of enterprises and the impact
of carbon trading prices on how companies can reduce carbon
emissions. In the field of new energy utilizations, there are many
EGT-based research works on solar energy and wind energy, but
studies on nuclear energy, hydrogen energy and other types of
new energies are much fewer, and studies on the coordinated
development of multiple energy sources are also very few. The re-
search works on the renewable energy market and the electricity
market mainly concern how to obtain more social and economic
benefits under various incentive policies as well as how to find
the path to the optimal development of the electricity market.
132
G. Wang, Y. Chao, Y. Cao et al. Energy Reports 8 (2022) 114–136

Table A.1 (continued).

Research fields Typical completed studies Algorithms or models Existing problems and potential further work
prospects
Energy (a) Effects of the orderly coordination during the (a) Static evolutionary (a) More influential factors should be considered in
economic electric power generation industry transformation game algorithm future studies, e.g., the real-time electric power limit,
analysis and process of China. electric power availability, fault tolerance, operation
evaluation (b) Dynamic evolutionary safety, volatilities of new energy power generations,
(b) Influential factor analysis of electricity pricing game algorithm load demand errors of electricity consumers, etc.
policies of electric power enterprises.
(c) Competitive (b) More studies on hybrid micro-grids or smart
(c) Studies on the optimal strategy of searching co-evolutionary grids which include new energy power generation
electric power suppliers in deregulated electric algorithm systems can be conducted.
power market.
(d) Evolutionary game
(d) Impacts of the information asymmetry on the theory algorithm (EGA)
electric power market. based on a hybrid
particle swarm
(e) Predictions of electricity price and load of electric optimization and
power markets. improved firefly
algorithm (HPSOIFA)
(f) Studies on the profit improvement or cost
reduction of electric power suppliers. (e) Hawk and Dove
game model
(g) Studies on the economic emission and electric
power dispatch issue. (f) Multi-periods
bounded rational
(h) Studies on the interactions among different kinds evolutionary game
of DESs. algorithm

(i) Studies on the evolutionary negotiation processes (g) Combined DEED

between the electricity production enterprise and (dynamic economic
electric power consumption enterprise in the emission dispatch) and
distributed electric power market. game theoretic demand
response model
(j) Electric power dispatch problem study of the
distributed electric power market. (h) Co–Co adaptive
algorithm
(k) Studies on the optimal configuration of
distributed electric power generation. (i) Game theory based
mini-max algorithm
(l) Impacts of governmental policies, energy service
enterprise behaviours and energy user behaviours on (j) Stackelberg game
the DESs. algorithm

(m) Joint optimization of micro-grid configuration (k) Evolutionary game

and energy consumption dispatch. theory with real options

(n) Capacity allocation optimization of the hybrid

multi-energy micro-grid.

(o) Studies on the electric power dispatch of the

micro-grid.

(p) Influences of the governmental policies on the

micro-grid.

(q) Studies on energy strategies of smart grids,

including the electricity pricing strategy of the
electricity production enterprise, the electricity
consumption strategy of the electric power consumer
(i.e., the managements of demand sides), etc.

(r) Studies on the energy dispatch of smart grids.

ES technologies (a) Simulations of the state control or energy (a) Static evolutionary (a) In addition to batteries used in solar PV power
management of solar-power batteries and EV game algorithm systems and EVs, studies on more kinds of energy
batteries. storage technologies or systems may be necessary,
(b) Dynamic evolutionary e.g., pumped storage, hydrogen production, heat
(b) Studies on the distributed energy storage game algorithm storage systems used in concentrated solar power
operation strategy in electric power markets. plants, compressed air energy storage, flywheel
(c) Multi-state energy storage, etc.
(c) Studies on effects of the governmental policies non-cooperative
and electricity price on the energy storage system evolutionary game
construction and promotion. algorithm

(d) Studies on the electricity storage balancing in the (d) Escort evolutionary
hybrid electric power grid. game algorithm

133
G. Wang, Y. Chao, Y. Cao et al.
Moreover, there are certain prediction studies on the future de-
velopments of distributed energy systems. The developments of
smart grid systems and how smart grids can obtain more profits
have also been studied. Many EGT-based research works on the
developments of new energy vehicles and related industries focus
on the impact evaluations of different incentive policies. Various
degrees of EGT-based studies have also been carried out on some
typical issues involved in energy storage technologies, such as the
regional energy storage construction plan selection and how to
promote the development of electric-heating storage technology.
As mentioned above, there are many different EGMs and the
EGT method has a wide application field. Therefore, there are
still a great many research works related to sustainable energy
development can be launched by using the EGT method in the fu-
ture. Based on the study review carried out in this paper, several
general recommendations about the further EGT-based research
works are provided. Firstly, more complex initial conditions and
influential factors should be used for the studies based on the
EGT method to make the studied problems more close to actual
conditions. In that way, the results presented by the EGT-based
studies will also be more meaningful and referable. Secondly,
if it is possible, more practical examples should be tested to
verify the applicabilities and feasibilities of the EGT method as
well as of other EGT-related algorithms. Thirdly, theoretically,
the EGMs consisting of more participants (e.g., four participants)
may have a wider application field in different issues related to
energy utilizations as there are usually multiple participants in
actual commercial relationships related to energies. Finally, the
R&D works of new EGT-based or hybrid algorithms may also be
necessary so that the computing speeds and accuracies can be im-
proved when the EGT approach is utilized to solve energy-related
problems.
This paper may be meaningful for the further R&D works
based on the EGT method and can be applied as a reference for
conducting policy and strategy formulations of different kinds of
energy utilization technologies in the future.
CRediT authorship contribution statement
Gang Wang: Writing – original draft. Yuechao Chao: Writing
– review & editing. Yong Cao: Writing – review & editing. Tieliu
Jiang: Writing – review & editing. Wei Han: Writing – review &
editing. Zeshao Chen: Writing – review & editing.
Declaration of competing interest
The authors declare that they have no known competing finan-
cial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared
to influence the work reported in this paper.
Acknowledgement
The authors appreciate the support of the Natural Science
Foundation of Jilin Province of China (Grant No. 20210101081JC).
Appendix
See Table A.1.
134
Energy Reports 8 (2022) 114–136
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