Literal Translation of Key Passages in T

Selected Passages from Thucydides
(Translated by Thomas Pangle)
1.1 [1] Thucydides an Athenian put together in writing the war of the
Peloponnesians and Athenians, how they warred against one another; and he
began to do so as soon as the war began, expecting/hoping that it would be great
and more worthy of account than things prior to it, the evidence being that they
were both at their peak for it in terms of every sort of preparation, and that he
saw that the rest of Greece was taking sides, some from the outset and others
giving thought to doing so.
[2] For this was the greatest motion that has come into being for the
Greeks and for some part of the barbarians, and, so to speak, for most of
humankind. [3] For although it was impossible, due to the length of time, to
make out clearly the things prior to these, as well as the things still earlier,
nevertheless, on the basis of the evidence that I trust, having investigated to the
greatest lengths possible, I believe that no great things came into being either as
regards wars or as regards anything else.
1.6 [4-6]
But measure in clothing and in the style nowadays, it was the Spartans who first
used, and in other respects, those Spartans who had acquired the most,
especially established a way of life equal to the many. And they were the first to
strip and to contest athletically in the nude openly, after anointing themselves
with olive oil. But in the old days even in the Olympic contest the athletes
competed wearing loincloths around their shameful parts—and it's not many
years ago that that ceased; and it is still the way among some barbarians today,
and especially those in Asia: when they have prizes for wrestling and boxing
they do this wearing loincloths. And there are many other respects in which one
might show that the old Greeks' way of life was similar to that of the barbarians
now.
1.10 [2]
For if the city of the Spartans were to become deserted, and what was left were
the temples and the foundations of the rest, I think there would be much
incredulity, after the lapse of much time, regarding the power in relation to the
fame of those at that time: and indeed they dwell in two of the five parts of the
Peloponnese, and lead the whole of it, and many allies outside; nevertheless, the
city is not compact in dwelling nor does it have expensive temples and buildings,
but it is inhabited in villages in the old fashion of Greece—and would appear
rather lacking; whereas if the Athenians were to suffer this same thing, it would
be conjectured/guessed from the apparent sight of the city that its power was
double what it is.
1.17 As many tyrants as there were in the Greek cities, managed them by looking
out only for their own affairs—as regards their own physical well being and the
aggrandizement of their own private families in security; and no deed worthy of
account was done, except for each one’s dealings with immediate neighbors.
Passages from Thucydides 2
1.18 But a time came when the tyrants of Athens and the rest of Greece, which
had been tyrannized for a long time before Athens, were mostly and finally—
except in Sicily—dissolved by the Spartans.
1.21 [1] From the evidence [pl.] that has been here stated, however, one would
not go wrong in believing that matters are such as they have been presented by
me, considering that the ancient things have been made out sufficiently on the
basis of the clearest indications—rather than trusting that they are as the poets
sing, adorning and magnifying, or that they are as they have been put together
by the speech-writers, with a view to being more attractive to the hearer, than to
being truer: being irrefutable, and most of them on account of time having
become incredible while winning their victorious way into the realm of myth.
[2] And to those who investigate, the deeds themselves will nevertheless
make it clear that this war really was greater than the old things, even if it is the
case that human beings always judge the present war that they are involved in to
be the greatest, and, once they have stopped fighting, admire rather the ancient
things.
22 [1] And with regard to as many things as were uttered in speech by
each person, either before going to war or once in it, to remember precisely what
was said was difficult for me in the cases when I heard myself, and also for those
who brought reports to me from elsewhere; but as each in my opinion would
have spoken what especially was needed [ta deonta] concerning the matters of
each occasion [the things being present always—twn aiei parontwn], thus has it
been spoken, sticking as closely as possible to the whole thought [tes sumpases
gnomes] of what was truly said.
[2] But as for the deeds that were done in the war, I have not judged it
proper to write them after having learned about them from any chance person,
nor as it was in my opinion—but instead, in accordance with what I witnessed,
and as I heard from others after undertaking as precise as possible an inquiry
about each of the matters. [3] And the discovery was toilsome, because those
present at each of the deeds did not report the same things about them, but in
accordance with the memory or the favorable thoughts those of each side had
about them.
[4] And perhaps these things will appear less pleasant in the hearing, since
there is in them nothing mythic; but it will suffice if they are judged beneficial by
as many as will wish to see with clarity the things that have come to pass and
that will be in the future, ever again such, or nearly such, in accordance with
what is human. And it is a possession for always, rather than a competitive work
to be heard at the moment, that has been composed.
1.23 [3] And earlier things that were reported by hearsay, but scantily confirmed
by events, were made not incredible—concerning earthquakes, which themselves
occurred over the greatest extent of the earth and were most strong; and eclipses
of the sun, which occurred more frequently than had been remembered from the
times before; and there were great droughts in places and as a consequence
famines; and, not least harmful, and destructive of a substantial number, the
terrible plague; for all these things occurred at the same time as this war.
[4] And the Athenians and the Peloponnesians began it, breaking the
thirty years’ peace treaty which had come into being for them after the capture of
Euboea. Now on account of what they broke it—the charges, and the issues—I
have written first, so that no one may ever have to seek from what such a war
arose among the Greeks. The truest allegation/justification/excuse [prophasis],
however—though least evident in speech—I hold to be the Athenians’ having
become great and instilling in the Spartans a fear that compelled them
necessarily into war. But the charges made manifest in speech on each side were
the following, on the basis of which they broke the treaty and began the war.
[First use of word for “justice’ in the book:]
1.25 [3] The Corinthians in accordance with justice undertook the punitive aid, in
the lawful belief that the colony belonged no less to them than to the
Corcyraeans—and at the same time, also out of hatred for the Corcyraeans,
because the latter, though being their colonists, were negligent, failing to give in
the shared festival gatherings the lawful privileges, nor assigning to the
Corinthian man the first rites at the sacrifices, as did the other colonists, but
showing contempt for the Corinthians.
[From the speech of the Corcyraeans at Athens, the first speech in the book]:
1.32 [1] “Just it is, Oh Athenians—for those who, like us, come to their neighbors
asking for help, without being able to claim any long-owed favor either on
account of having themselves done any previous great good deed or through
alliance—to demonstrate: first, if they can, that what they ask is advantageous,
or, if not, that it is at least not detrimental; and then, that they will show reliable
gratitude—and, if they establish neither of these clearly, then not to become
indignant if they fail in their plea. . . .
33 [1] If you are persuaded, there will accrue to you from our request a
noble concurrence of fortune in many respects: first because you will be coming
to the aid of victims of injustice, rather than those who are harming others; and
then, by welcoming those who are in the greatest dangers, you will in a special
degree lay up for yourselves a gratitude rooted in the testimony of everlasting
memory; and you will acquire a navy that is the biggest there is except for your
own. [2] And just consider, what could be a rarer sort of active flourishing, or
more painful to your foes, than that a power, for which you would have
estimated it worth giving much money and gratitude, should come to you, of its
own accord, giving itself to you without risk or expense—and in addition,
making you virtuous in the eyes of the many and the object of gratitude from
those you defend, along with the strength you get for yourselves. In all of time, it
has fallen to few to get all these things together, and there are few requesting an
alliance who thus come giving to those whom they ask no less security and
adornment than will accrue to themselves.
[3] As to the war, on account of which we would be useful, if one of you
doesn't think it will take place, he is wrong in judgment, and does not perceive
that the Lacedaimonians, by the fear you induce, are seeking war, and that the
Corinthians, who are powerfully influential with them and enemies of you are
getting hold of us in anticipation, with a view to handling you, so that we might
not stand together out of common enmity to them and that they may not fail to
anticipate by either harming us or strengthening themselves. . . .
35 [3] And it is terrible if they can man their ships from the treaty-signers
and in addition the rest of Greece, and not least from your subjects, while we are
excluded from the proposed alliance and from assistance from any other
quarter—and they set it down as injustice if you are persuaded by what we ask!
[4] But we shall hold you to be much more at fault if we do not persuade
you. For you will spurn us when we are in danger and are not enemies, and you
will fail to oppose these who are your enemies and are aggressors, but instead
overlook the fact that they are gathering forces from your empire: this is not
what is just—but instead, either to prevent them from hiring from your people,
or to send us, too, as much help as you are persuaded to send, or, especially,
openly to receive us and to come to our side. . . .
36 [1] And if someone is of the opinion that the things said are indeed
advantageous, but he fears lest through being persuaded by these things he
might break the treaty, let him know that this fear of his, possessed of might, will
frighten his enemies instead, while his confidence when he is weak, having failed
to accept our alliance, in the face of mighty enemies, will be less intimidating; . .
.”
[From the speech of the Corinthians at Athens] 1.42 [2] “For one especially
follows the path of interest when one least errs/does wrong, and the future war
which the Corcyraeans rely on to frighten you in urging you to act unjustly is
something that still lies in the unevident; nor is being roused up by it worth the
present, and not future, enmity that you will acquire from Corinthians—but it is
sensible/moderate for you rather to be removing the suspicion you have already
incurred, as a consequence of Megara [3] (for the last act of goodwill is the
timeliest, and even if it is lesser, is still able to dissolve greater complaint). [4]
Nor should you be moved by the fact that they offer a great naval alliance; for
not committing injustice against your equals is a more secure power than to be
roused up by what is immediately evident to take a greater share through risks. .
..
[Last words of Corinthians] 1.43 [4] "If you do these things, you will both do the
things that are most fitting and your deliberation will conclude in what is best for
you yourselves.”
[Opening words of Corinthian Heralds] 1.53 [2] “You are committing injustice,
men of Athens, in beginning war and breaking the treaty.”
[Opening words of Athenian response to Corinthian Heralds] 1.53 [4]: “We are
not beginning war, men of the Peloponnese, nor breaking the treaty, but we have
come to aid in battle these Corcyraeans who are our allies.”
[Speech of the Corinthians at Sparta] 1.69 [1] “And for these things you are to
blame, inasmuch as you first allowed them to strengthen their city after the
Persian Wars, and then later to build the long walls—and have always, up until
now, deprived of their freedom, not only those who have been enslaved by them,
but even your own allies! For it is not the one who enslaves, but rather the one
who, being able to put a stop to this, overlooks it, who truly is the doer, if indeed
the latter maintains the claim of deserving the virtue of being the liberator of
Greece. . . .
[4] For you remain quiet, alone of all the Greeks, you Spartans; you defend
yourselves against someone not by power, but by intention; and you alone
prevent the growth of your enemies, not at the start, but instead when it has
already doubled! . . .
70 [5] And when they prove stronger than their enemies, they go on the
farthest, while when they are defeated, they fall back the least. [6] Moreover they
use their bodies as if they most belonged to someone else, for the sake of the city;
while their minds they use as most their own, for doing something for the sake of
the city. . . .
70 [9] So that if someone were to sum them up by saying that they were by
nature born neither themselves ever to have rest nor to allow other humans to
have it, he would speak correctly. . . .
71 [1] Opposed by such a city, Oh Lacedaimonians, you delay and you
think that tranquility does not most suffice to those among humans who employ
their forces justly but with the judgment that if they are done injustice, they will
plainly not put up with it; but instead you proceed on an equal basis with a view
to not offending others and defending yourselves from being harmed. [2] But
this policy you would obtain with difficulty even if you lived with a neighbor
who was similar; but now, as we have just made clear, your practices are old-
fashioned compared to them. [3] And it is a necessity that, even as in art, what
arises anew prevail. And for a city dwelling in tranquility, unchanging lawful
customs are best; for those whom necessity requires to undertake much,
artfulness is also needed. That is why the affairs of the Athenians, from much
experience, have been more innovative than yours.
[Th.’s introduction of Athenians’ speech at Sparta] 1.72 [1] Now there chanced to
be an Athenian delegation that had arrived earlier in Sparta on other business,
and when they learned about the speeches, it seemed to them that they ought to
appear before the Spartans, not to make a defense in any respect against the
charges brought against their city, but to make clear that the Spartans ought not
to deliberate hastily about the whole matter, but consider it for a longer time. At
the same time, they wished to indicate how great was the power of their city, and
remind the elders of what they knew, while showing the younger ones what they
lacked experience of—since they believed that from such a speech they would
turn them more towards peace than towards war.
[Speech of Athenians at Sparta] 1.73 [1] “. . . not unreasonably do we possess

what we have acquired, and our city is deserving of repute.
[2] And why is it necessary to speak as regards the very ancient matters—
of which the witnesses are heard accounts rather than the eyes of the listeners?
But about the Persian Wars, and as much as you yourselves know about, even if
it is rather tedious always for those who bring them forward, necessity compels
us to speak; when we did the deeds, the risk was run for the sake of a benefit, of
which, from the deed, you took a share: so let us not be deprived entirely of the
repute, if it will be beneficial. . . .
74 [2] Much the most daring spirit we showed, we who, when no one
came to our aid by land, when the others before us were already enslaved,
deemed it worthy to abandon the city and to destroy our homes—not so as to
give up the common cause of the remaining allies, nor to scatter and become
useless to them, but to take the risk of going on to the ships while not getting
angry at the fact that you did not come to help us. [3] So that we assert that we
benefited you no less than happened upon this ourselves. Now you still
possessed inhabited cities and looked to enjoy them in the future, and when, on
that basis, you feared for yourselves more than for us, you then came to help
(you did not, at any rate, show up while we were still safe); and we, from a non-
existent city nevertheless surged forward—and running risks for the sake of
what existed only in a scant hope, saved you in your share while we saved
ourselves. . . .
75 [1] So then do we not deserve, Oh Spartans, on account of our spirit
and intelligent judgment at that time, not thus to lie under such excessive
resentment among the Greeks on account of our empire? . . . [3] . . . from this
very deed, we were necessarily compelled at first to advance the hegemony to
where it is—especially by fear, and then by honor, and later by benefit. [4] And it
no longer seemed safe to run the risk of easing up, when we were hated by the
many, some of whom had been reduced to subjection after revolting, and when
you were no longer in the same way friendly to us but instead there were
suspicions and differences (and the rebels went over to you). [5] And for all it is
blameless to put one’s interests on a sound footing in the midst of the greatest
dangers.
76 [1] You at any rate, Oh Lacedaimonians, exercise hegemony over cities
in the Peloponnese organizing them in your interest; and if you had at that time,
by staying hegemonic throughout, have been disliked as we are, know well that,
becoming no less painful to the allies than we are, you would have been
compelled either to exercise empire in a dominating way or else to risk
yourselves. [2] Thus we have done nothing amazing nor varying from the human
way, if, having been given empire, we accepted this and did not give it up,
defeated by the greatest things—honor and fear and benefit; nor again are we the
first so overcome, but it is established for all time that the weaker are compelled
by the stronger; moreover we believed ourselves deserving of the rule, and so
seemed to you until, through a calculation of your own interest, you have now
taken up the just discourse, which no one who has ever happened upon the
strength to acquire something has ever put forth so as to turn himself away from
getting more. [3] But deserving of praise are those who employ human nature in
such a way as to rule over others more justly than is called for by their power. [4]
And we think that if others were to take over our affairs their behavior would
prove whether or not we act with measure; and from our
decency/equity/fairness we have unreasonably accrued more infamy than
praise. [77.1] For by being bested in contractual agreements with the allies and by
having submitted controversies to judicial decisions in our own courts under the
same laws, we have gained a reputation for being litigious! [2] And none of them
considers, that those who hold empire elsewhere, because they are less
measured, than are we, towards their subjects, through this escape blame: for
those who can use force have no need of judicial procedure in addition. [3] But
those accustomed to deal with us, on equal footing, when they are bested in
anything contrary to what they think it ought to be, either by judgment or by
some exercise of power through the empire, are not grateful that they are not
deprived of even more, but instead bear the loss more grievously than if we had
from the beginning cast law aside to openly take advantage. Then they
themselves would not argue that the weaker ought not submit to the stronger.
And it is likely that human beings become angry at being done in justice rather
than being violently forced; for the former seems to be taking more than one's
share between equals, and the latter being compelled by the stronger.”
[Speech of Archidamus] 1.83 [2] "For they have no fewer allies, who bring them
money; and war is not a matter of weapons so much as money, through which
weapons are beneficial—especially for mainlanders against seafarers. . . .
84 [1] And do not be ashamed of the slowness and delay for which
especially they blame us. For if you hurry, you would be more slow in ceasing,
on account of having begun unprepared; and besides, we have inhabited in all
circumstances a city that is free and of greatest repute. And it is possible that this
is in fact prudent moderation. [2] For we alone on account of this are not
rendered hybristic by successes, while we give in to misfortune less than others;
and we are not carried away by the pleasure when others use praise to incite us
toward terrible things against our judgment, nor, if someone goads us with
accusation, are we any the more persuaded, through being vexed. [3] We have
become both good at war and good at counsel through being well-ordered: the
first, because reverent shame [aidws] partakes most of moderation, and stoutness
of soul, of shame [aischune]; good at counsel, because educated with more lack of
learning than to look down on the laws and with more moderation, by
harshness, than to fail to listen to them—and, not being too smart in useless
things, we don’t blame the preparations of enemies with noble speeches and then
go forth to deeds that don’t match, but instead we believe that the plans of
neighbors are pretty similar to ours, while fortune befalls in ways incalculable by
reason. [4] So we always prepare in deed as if facing well advised opponents.
And one ought not to take hope from their expected mistakes, but rather from
our taking secure precautions; and one ought not to believe there is much
difference between one human being and another, but rather that he is strongest
who is educated in the most necessary things.”
1.88 And the Lacedaimonians voted that the treaty had been broken and war was
needed—not so much by being persuaded by the speeches of the allies, as
because they feared the Athenians, lest they become still more powerful, seeing
that much of Greece was already under their sway. [89.1] For it was in some such
way as the following that the Athenians came into the activities in which they
grew.
1.93 [Themistocles ] believed the Piraeaus to be a noble spot on account of having

three natural harbors, and that if they became maritimers, it would contribute
greatly to [4] their acquisition of power (for he was the first who dared to say
that they ought to take hold of the sea) and he immediately helped to undertake
the empire/beginning [arche]. . . . [7] For he turned especially to the ships, seeing
—as it seems to me—that the approach of the king's military was easier by sea
than by land. And he believed the Piraeaus was of more benefit than the upper
city, and often advised the Athenians, that if ever a time came when they were
being violently forced on land, to go down to it and with their ships hold out
against all.
1.97 [1] And first exercising hegemonic leadership over the allies as autonomous
and deliberating in common assemblies, it was through the following ways that
they advanced, in the period intervening between this war and the Persian, by
war and by the handling of affairs—which were for them against the barbarians
and their own allies who were innovating, and against those of the
Peloponnesians who happened to be involved on each occasion. [2}And I have
written of these things, making a digression from the account, for the following
reason: that this stretch has been omitted by all those before me, who have put
together the Greek affairs prior to the Persian, or the Persian affairs themselves.
And whatever of these things Hellanicus has touched upon in his Attic Writing is
recalled briefly and imprecisely in chronology. And at the same time, this
provides a demonstration of the empire of the Athenians, in what way it was set
up. [98.1] First, then . . .
1.99 [2] And the Athenians in other respects no longer ruled in the same pleasing
way, and no longer engaged in military expeditions on an equal footing, and
with greater ease brought to heel those who rebelled. Those who were
responsible for these developments were the allies themselves. For on account of
this reluctance as regards the military, most of them, so as not to have to leave
home, arranged to make their assigned contributions in funds rather than in
ships; and so the navy of the Athenians grew from the funds that the others
contributed, and they, when they did rebel, found themselves unequipped and
inexperienced in making war.
1.118 [2] All these were the actions of the Greeks that came to pass towards one
another and the barbarians in the approximately fifty years intervening between
the withdrawal of Xerxes and the beginning of this war. In these the Athenians
made their empire more dominant and themselves advanced to great power. But
the Lacedaimonians, though perceiving this, did not prevent it, except a little,
and remained tranquil most of the time (being even before this not swift to
launch into wars, unless they were compelled by necessity, restrained to some
extent by enemies at home), until the power of the Athenians was clearly raised
up and they were laying hands on the alliance. Then they made it no longer
tolerable, but it seemed that it ought to be attacked with complete eagerness of
spirit and the strength brought down, if they could—and they undertook the
war.
1.127 [3] [Pericles] was most powerful among those of his time and, leading the
regime, opposed the Lacedaimonians in all things and would not allow yielding,
but was urging the Athenians to war.
1.140 [1] [Pericles' first speech, near beg.] "I see that the same and similar
counsels are to be given by me; and upon those who are persuaded, I make a
claim of justice: if there turn out to be reverses, to come to the aid of the decisions
made in common—or else not to share in credit for the shrewdness when matters
are put right. For it happens that the outcomes of actions take place no less
without learning than even the thinking of humans—which is why we
customarily blame Luck/Fortune for as many things as turn out contrary to
reason."
[Remarks of Thucydides about situation at Athens] 2.16 [2] They were troubled
and bore it hard to be leaving their homes and the ancestral temples which had
always belonged to them, from the political regime in accordance with the
ancient way, and to be about to change their way of life, such that for each it was
no less than a loss of his city.
2.17 [1-2] There was the so-called Pelasgian plot below the Acropolis, which was
ground forbidden by a curse to inhabit, and about which there was a prohibition
at the end of a Pythian prophetic oracle that went something like this: “better left
unworked is the Pelasgian”; and nevertheless it was settled because of the
present necessity. Now to me it seems that the prophecy turned out contrary to
what they expected. For it was not on account of the habitation contrary to law
that the misfortunes came to the city, but the necessity of the habitation on
account of the war, which the oracle did not mention, but foreknew that it would
not be for any good that the plot would ever be inhabited.
2.21 [2] But when they saw the army around Acharnae, only sixty stades from the
city, they no longer tolerated it, but, as was to be expected, they found it terrible
to see their land being ravaged before their eyes—something the younger ones
had never seen, nor the older except in the Persian war; and it was the general
opinion, and especially of the younger ones, that they should sally forth and not
look on. [3] And there were gatherings full of strife, some calling for a sally, a
few opposing this. And there were prophets reciting prophecies of all sorts,
which were listened to the degree that each person was aroused. . . . The city was
in every way aroused, and they were angry with Pericles, and did not remember
anything of what he had earlier advised, but reviled him on the grounds that,
here he was a general, and would not lead them out!—and they believed him to
be to blame for everything they were suffering.
[22.1] Pericles, however, seeing them angry about the present situation,
and not thinking prudently in the best way, and trusting that he understood
correctly regarding not going out, did not call an assembly of them nor any
conference whatsoever, lest they make a mistake when coming together in anger
rather than in sound judgment; but he guarded the city and kept it calm as much
as he was able.
2.28 In the same summer at the start of a lunar month—when alone it seems to be
possible for it to happen—the sun was eclipsed after midday and then again
filled, having taken on the shape of a crescent moon, and some stars having
appeared.
[Pericles’ Funeral Oration] 2.35 [1]: “The many [hoi polloi] of those who have
spoken on this occasion praise the one who introduced into the law this oration,
on the ground that it is noble to pronounce it in public over those from the wars
who are being buried. But to me it would have seemed sufficient, for men who
have become good through their deed, in deed as well to be given conspicuous
honors, of the public sort that you now see being carried out around the tomb
here—rather than risking belief in the virtues of many to one man’s speaking
well or worse. [2] For it is difficult to speak in a measured fashion about a matter
concerning which it is hard to convey convincingly the truth. For the listener
who shares in the knowledge and whose mind is well-disposed is likely to

believe that what is made clear is in some way deficient as regards what he
wishes and has knowledge of; while he who does not share in the experience is
likely to believe, on account of envy, that things are exaggerated if he hears of
something that is beyond his own nature. For praise spoken about others is
acceptable only so far as anything that each hears comports with what he thinks
he himself would be capable of doing; anything that goes beyond that is at once
envied and hence disbelieved. [3] But, since the ancients thus judged these things
to be noble, I too have to try, following the law, to hit as much as I can upon
what will be in accordance with the wish and opinion of each of you.
36.1 I will begin from the ancestors first. For it is just to them, and fitting, to
give this honor of memory on such an occasion. For the same people, always
dwelling in this land, through their virtue handed it over as free to their
descendants in succession down to the present.
[2] And while these deserve praise, still more do our fathers. For having
acquired, not without toil, in addition to what they received, the extent of empire
[rule] which we have, they left it to us now.
[3] But most of it we here now, yet living, and very much in the prime of
life, have increased—and have equipped the city to be most self-sufficient in
every respect as regards war and peace.
[4] As regards the deeds of war through which each of the gains was
made—whether we ourselves or our fathers put up the spirited defense against
attacking enemies either barbarian or Greek—I do not wish to speak at length,
before those who already know. But as regards the sort of preparation by which
we arrived at them, and by what sort of political regime [politeia], and from what
ways of life great things came into being, these are the matters I am going first to
make clear; and then turn to the praise of these here—believing that in the
present time it would not be unfitting for these things to be said, and that it
would be beneficial for the entire gathering, both inhabitants and strangers, to
heed them.
37 [1] For we employ a political regime that does not emulate the laws of
our neighbors, but we are ourselves a model for some, rather than imitating
others. By name it is called ‘democracy,’ on account of its being administered not
for the few but for the greater number; but while as regards private disputes,
everyone shares in equality according to the laws, in common matters, it is
according to desert, defined by the share each has in good repute, and not
rotation in turn, rather than virtue, which is preferred in honors—nor is poverty,
if someone has something good he can do for the city, a bar that hides desert.
[2] And we carry on our politics, with a view to the common, liberally,
while as regards the suspicion towards one another in daily affairs, we are not
angry at our neighbor if he does what pleases him, nor do we put on our faces
those hostile looks that cause pain even if they don’t punish. [3] Mingling in
private life without offense, we are not lawless in public matters on account of
our fear, paying heed to those in office at any time and to the laws—and
especially to as many of the latter as are established for the benefit of those done
injustice, as well as to those of the unwritten laws that bear the sanction of
generally recognized shame.
38 [1] Now we have also provided the greatest number of occasions for
relaxation of the mind/judgment [gnome] from toils—instituting by lawful
custom contests and sacrificial festivals throughout the year, and with elegant
private establishments, whose daily delight drives away what is painful. [2] On
account of the greatness of the city, there comes to it everything from the entire
earth, and we enjoy the goods of the rest of humanity no less than those
produced here.
39 [1] And we are distinguished in our military preparations from our
opponents in the following respects. We open our city to the public, and we do
not have periods when foreigners are asked to leave, when we prevent someone
from learning or observing something that if not hidden might benefit an enemy
who saw it—since we trust not to practices and deceits more than to the
stoutness of our own souls in action. And as regards educational matters, while
they pursue courage through toilsome discipline from earliest youth, we, living a
relaxed life, are no less capable of confronting equally-balanced dangers. [2] And
here is proof: the Spartans do not invade our country by themselves, but with
everyone else; while we, invading our neighbor’s territory by ourselves, fight
without difficulty on foreign soil and against those defending their own land,
and usually win. [3] And no enemy has ever chanced to encounter our whole
force assembled, because of our care for our navy and also our sending our many
expeditions on land. And when they encounter some portion of our forces, if
they win against some of us, they boast that they have routed all of us, and if
they are defeated they claim they were worsted by all of us. [4] And while we are
willing to run risks out of ease of spirit rather than laborious exercise, and with a
courage that is not a product of laws more than of ways, ours is the advantage in
that we do not weary beforehand in anticipation of future pains while we
evidently encounter them no less daringly than those who are constantly toiling.
And in these respects our city deserves admiration—as well as in other respects
besides.
40 [1] For we love the beautiful [noble] without extravagance, and we love
wisdom [we philosophize] without softness; we use wealth rather as an occasion
for deeds than as a subject for fine talk, and regard it as not shameful for
someone to admit to poverty, but rather shameful not to try to escape it through
action. [2] The same persons have care of their private affairs and of the political;
and the rest, whose attention is given over to their business, are not deficient in
judgment concerning politics. We alone consider someone who partakes in none
of these things to be, not free of ambitious involvement, but rather useless; and
we ourselves can judge, at any rate, or devise affairs correctly; and we do not
consider that it is speeches that are harmful to action, but rather the absence of
prior instruction through speech concerning the things that we have to proceed
to do. [3] For we are distinguished by the fact that among us the same men are
especially daring and calculating as regards what we undertake—while others
are bold through ignorance, and when they calculate are hesitant.
But those are justly judged to be superior in soul who know most clearly
the terrible and the pleasant things and do not, on account of this, turn away
from risks.
[4] And as regards what pertains to virtue, we are the contrary of the
many [hoi polloi]: for we acquire friends not by being done to but by doing; and it
is the doer who, through goodwill to his recipient, more reliably preserves
generosity with the consequence that it incurs obligation; but he who
reciprocates is less mindful, since he reciprocates virtue with a view not to
generosity but to obligation. [5] And we alone fearlessly benefit someone, not so
much by calculation of interest as by trust in generosity.
41 [1] Summing up, I say that the city as a whole provides the education of
Greece, and in my opinion, as regards each of us, the same man would with
especially graceful versatility adapt to the most different sorts of things in
presenting his body as self-sufficient. [2] And as proof that these are not elegant
words for the present rather than the truth in action, there is the evidence of the
power of the city, which we have acquired as a consequence of these ways of life.
[3] For this city alone of those now existing is found in the test to be superior to
reputation, and it alone leaves its enemy assailant without any complaint
concerning whom he has suffered injury from, and leaves its subject unable to
lay blame on the grounds that he is ruled by those unworthy/undeserving.
[4] With great proofs and surely not without testimony do we present this
power to be admired by those of this time and by those in time to come; and we
have no additional need for a Homer to praise us or for whoever may please
with verses his own time, while the thought underlying the deeds is damaged by
the truth, but we have compelled every sea and land to admit entry to our
daring, and we have established everywhere everlasting memorials of evil and
good deeds.
[5] It is for such a city then, that these here, deciding in well-born fashion
that it was just that they not be deprived of her, came to their end fighting—and
it is fitting that everyone of those left be willing to suffer on her behalf.
42 [1] This is why I have enlarged upon the things concerning the city: to
give the teaching that the stakes in the contest are not equal for us and for those
to whom nothing of such things similarly pertains—and at the same time to set
down with clear evidence the eulogy of those over whom I am now speaking. [2]
And the greatest parts of the latter have been said: for the virtues of these men,
and other such, adorned the attributes I hymned in the city, and there are not
many Greeks whose eulogy would appear, as it does for these, equaled by the
actual deeds.
And in my opinion the sudden end of these men here makes clear, either
by making first apparent or by finally establishing, their possession of the virtue
of a man. [3] And it is just, that for men worse in other respects their manly
goodness in the face of the enemy for the sake of the fatherland be put in the
foreground: for having effaced evil with good, they did more public benefit than
they did harm from private concerns. [4] Among these men there was not anyone
who postponed suffering what is terrible because he was softened by honoring
more the future enjoyment of wealth, or the hope incident to poverty, that it
might be yet escaped and wealth attained. Choosing as more to be desired the
inflicting of injury/punishment on their opponents, and believing this to be the
noblest of risks, they wished with that risk to inflict the injury/punishment while
relinquishing the other things, turning over to hope the yet unseen success while
deciding to trust in themselves with respect to the deed concerning what was
visible before them—in which they preferred defending themselves and
suffering, to saving themselves by giving in. They fled shame in what would be
said about them, while enduring the deed with their bodies, and through the
chance of the shortest moment, at the peak of their fame rather than their fear,
they departed.
43 [1] Thus these became such as befits the city. Those who are left behind
ought to pray that they may more safely, but resolve that they will no less boldly,
determine their thought against the enemy, considering not in rational
calculation alone the benefit (which could be elaborated, but before you who
know it as well yourselves, telling how many goods there are in defense against
enemies), but rather beholding every day the power of the city in action, and
becoming erotic lovers of it, and when to you it seems great, reflecting that men
of daring who knew what had to be done and who possessed a sense of awe in
their actions, acquired these things; and when they failed in any attempt, did not
think they ought therefore to deprive the city of their virtue, but offered it the
noblest contribution. [2] For by giving in common their bodies, they took
individually the praise which does not grow old—and the most distinguished
tomb: not so much that in which they lie, but that in which their fame is left
forever, remembered always, on every opportune occasion in speech and in
deed. [3] For of famous men the whole earth is the tomb, and their epigraph is
inscribed not only on columns in their own lands, but also in land not their own
there abides an unwritten memory in the mind of each rather than in a work.
[4] Emulating them, and judging the happy to be what is free, and what is
free to be stoutness of soul, do not be mere onlookers of enemy dangers. [5] For it
is not those who are doing badly, who lack hope for the good, who would more
justly be unsparing of their lives, but rather those for whom there is in life still
the risk of a reversal, and for whom it makes an especially big difference if they
misstep somehow. [6] For more painful to the man who possesses intelligence is
vice with softness than unperceived death that occurs in strength and
simultaneous with common hope.
44 [1] So the parents present of these men I do not bewail but rather
console. They know that they raised them subject to changing fortunes: lucky are
they who obtain what is most becoming—in the case of these here, by their
death; in your case, by your grief—and for whom life ended in a manner
commensurate with its happiness. [2] I know indeed that it is difficult to be
persuaded, when you will often be reminded by the good fortune of others
which you yourselves once enjoyed. And pain comes not from the goods one has
not experienced of which one is deprived, but when the accustomed are taken
away. [3] But one ought to endure, in the hope of other children, in the case of
those of you still of an age to make children. For in private the ones to come in
the future will be a kind of forgetfulness of the ones who do not exist for some,
and for the city a double benefit, since it will not be depopulated and will be
made more secure. For it is not possible for those who do not risk children on a
similar basis to deliberate fairly or justly. [4] As for those too old, you should
congratulate yourselves that most of your life was profitable and reflect that this
part will be short, and made light by the fame of these here. Love of honor alone
is ageless, and it is not the case, as some say, that in the uselessness of old age it
is gain that delights more, but rather being honored.
45 [1] For the children or the brothers of these here who are present, I see a
great challenge (for everyone is accustomed to praise those who are gone) and
difficulty, in being judged, even for surpassing virtue, to be not merely similar
but even close. There is envy for the living, on account of competition, but one
who is no obstacle is honored with an uncompetitive good will.
[2] If I must say something in regard to woman’s virtue, as it pertains to as

many as will be now in widowhood, I will indicate the whole with brief advice:
great is the repute of those of you who do not become inferior to the nature that
you possess, and of she among you who has least fame among males whether for
virtue or blame.
46 [1] I have now uttered in speech, in accordance with the law, whatever
I had to say that was fitting; and in deed, those interred here have been adorned
already and in addition their children the city will raise from this time until their
maturity at public expense, thus offering a beneficial crown of reward for such
struggles to these and to those they have left behind. For where the greatest
prizes are for virtue, there will the best men participate in politics.
[2] Now, having finished lamenting in the way fitting for each, depart.”
[The Plague] 2.47 [3] And [the Spartans] were not many days in Attica when the
disease first began to come into being among the Athenians, being reported to
have struck many places earlier, both around Lemnos and in other regions,
though there was never remembered to have occurred anywhere such a plague
and destruction of humans. [4] For the doctors were inadequate at first, since
they were trying to cure in ignorance, but they themselves especially died,
inasmuch as they especially were exposed—nor was there any other human art
[that availed]. And as many as were the supplications made at the temples, or the
uses of divinations and such things, all were of no benefit, and finally, defeated
by the evil, they turned away from these things.
2.48 [3] Now concerning it, let it be said as each knows, whether doctor or
layman, from what it was likely that it came into being, and the causes of such a
change which he believes to be sufficient in power for such a transformation; I
will tell the manner of its coming into being, and such things as will allow
someone who observes, if it should ever again occur, to best foresee without
ignorance, and I will make these things clear on the basis of having myself been
ill and having observed other sufferers. . . .
2.50 [1] For the character/form (eidos) of the disease having become stronger than
rational description (logos), in other respects too it fell upon each with a
harshness greater than accords with human nature, and also in the following
respect showed itself to be especially something more than what is among the
usual things: for the birds and as many of the four-footed animals as prey on
humans, though there were many unburied bodies about, did not approach or, if
they tasted, died. [2] And here is evidence: of such birds there came to be a
manifest dearth, and they were not seen either elsewhere or around any such
[corpse]. And the dogs provided even better perceptible evidence of avoidance,
on account of their dwelling alongside. [51.1] So the disease, leaving aside many
other strange features of the way in which it happened to occur differently in
each from one to another, was such in its form (idea) as a whole.
2.51 [4]: But the most terrible feature of all in the evil was the loss of spirit/hope
(athumia) that occurred when someone would perceive that he was sickening (for
turning at once to hopelessness of judgment they gave themselves up to a much
greater degree and did not hold out), and that they became infected one from
another on account of nursing, and died like sheep. And this brought about the
greatest destruction. [5] For if they weren’t willing, on account of fear, to go to
one another, they died deserted, and many homes were emptied by the lack of
nursing care. If they did go to one another, they died—and especially those
making any claim to virtue, for out of shame they did not spare themselves but
went to their friends, when even the relatives out of weariness had ceased
mourning the departed, defeated by the great evil. [6] But still more, similarly,
those who had entirely escaped had compassion for the one dying and the one
suffering, on account of having previous knowledge and themselves being now
in confidence. For it did not lay hold of the same person twice, to the extent of
death. And these were congratulated as blessed, by the others, and themselves in
their exceeding joy at the moment had a certain inflated hope that for the rest of
time they would not ever be destructively corrupted by another disease.
2.52 [3] And the temples in which they were quartered were full of corpses,
which had died there; for the humans, violently overcome by the evil, having no
grasp of what was to come, fell into disregard of the sacred and the profane
things alike. [4] And all the laws concerning burials which they employed before
were in disorder, and they buried as each was able. And many turned to
shameless burials in their lack of facilities on account of the numbers of their own
that had already died. For getting ahead of those who had piled up pyres, they
put on their own dead and kindled the pyre; and some even threw the one they
were carrying on top of another that was burning and went away. [53.1] And
also in other respects the disease first was the source of lawlessness to a greater
degree for the city. For one more easily had the daring to do what previously he
had kept hidden so as not to act in accordance with pleasure, seeing how quick
was the change of those who were happy and suddenly died, and those who
before possessed nothing now having the formers’ property. [2] The consequence
was that they resolved to do what quickly reaped fruits and was conducive to
pleasure, considering their bodies and their property similarly to be ephemeral.
[3] And no one was eager in spirit to undergo the toil that precedes what is
reputed to be noble, believing that it was unclear if they would die before they
arrived at it; and instead, immediate pleasure from any source and what was
profitable for it was set up as both noble and expedient. [4] No fear of gods or
law of humans restrained, since on one hand they judged that being pious or not
was similar, seeing that all equally were destroyed, and, on the other hand, no
one hoped to live long enough to have to pay the penalty after judicial trial for
crimes, but a much greater sentence that had been voted against them hung over
them, and before it fell it was reasonable to enjoy life a bit.
2.54 [5] Concerning the oracle, they surmised that what was happening was in
accord with it; and the plague did begin immediately after the invasion by the
Peloponnesians; and it did not go into the Peloponnese to any extent deserving
mention, and it spread over Athens especially, and secondly other places that
had many humans. So these are the things that came about as regards the plague.
2.59 [2] They held Pericles to blame for having persuaded them to go to war and
through/on account of that having suffered the misfortunes, and they were
eager to come to terms with the Lacedaimonians; and sending certain
ambassadors to them, achieved nothing. [3] Being at a loss in their judgment on

all sides, they assailed Pericles. And he, seeing them bitter in response to the
present affairs, and doing everything just as he had expected, called an assembly
(he was still general) because he wished to embolden; and also, by drawing away
the anger of their judgment, to make it calmer and less fearful.
[From last speech of Pericles] 2.60 [2] “I consider that the city’s being as a whole
in correct condition benefits the private individuals more than when it prospers
as regards each of the citizens but falls as a collectivity. [3] For if a man is doing
nobly in his own affairs, and his fatherland is destroyed, he too will be
destroyed; but, if he has bad fortune in a city that has good fortune, he is much
more saved. [4] So: if the city can sustain private misfortunes, but each individual
is unable to sustain the city’s, how is it not the case that all should defend it, and
not act as you now are? For you are so cast down by your private misfortunes in
each home that you neglect the common preservation, and you hold to blame me
who counseled going to war and yourselves who agreed. . . .
60 [5] And yet you are angry at me, being such a man who I think is
inferior to none in knowing the things needed, and in expounding these, a friend
to the city [philopolis], and superior to money. [6] For he who knows, and does
not clearly teach, is equivalent to one who has not thought within his heart
[thumos]; and one possessing both, but of a hostile mind [dusnous] toward the
city, would not speak out as for his own [oikeios]; but even if you add this, but he
is defeated by money, all would be sold for this one thing. . . .
61 [4] But nevertheless, dwelling in a great city and reared in dispositions
of character that match it, you ought to be willing to endure the greatest
misfortunes, and not to make disappear your claim of desert—for humans with
justice equally blame him who out of softness abandons the fame that belongs to
him, and hate him who reaches out of boldness for that which does not belong—
but put aside the pain at private matters and attach yourselves to the safety of
the common.
63 [1] And the city gets from the empire a being honored, in which you all
take pride, and which it makes sense for you to assist, and not to flee the toils—
or else not to pursue the honors. Nor should you believe that the contest is about
one thing only, slavery instead of freedom; but in addition, if you are deprived of
the empire you are in danger from the hatred you incur from the empire. [2] It is
no longer possible for you to withdraw from it—if someone out of fear in the
present circumstances will through inactivity be "the good man." For you hold it
now like a tyranny—the acquisition of which seems/is opined to be unjust, but
the giving up of which is dangerous. [3] Such men, persuading others, would
very quickly destroy a city, even supposing they dwelled somewhere under their
own laws by themselves; for the inactive is not saved unless ranged with the
active, nor is it expedient in a ruling/imperial city, but in one subjected, living
safely as a slave. But do not be led aside by such citizens . . .
64 [2] But the demonic things ought to be endured as necessary and what
comes from enemies courageously; for such was previously the way of this city
and ought not now to be stopped in you. And know that it has among all
humans the greatest name on account of not giving in to misfortunes, but
expending in war the most bodies and toils, and acquiring the greatest power so
far, of which there will be, among those who come after, eternal—even if now
too we sometime give way (for by nature all things also decline)—memory left
behind, that we being Greeks ruled over the most Greeks, in the greatest wars
holding out against all and each, and dwelled in a city that was the richest in all
things and the greatest. [4] And indeed, these things the man of inaction would
blame; but he who also wishes to do something will emulate; and if someone
does not possess them, he will be envious. [5] But being hated and painful in the
present belongs indeed to all who claim to deserve to rule over others; and
whoever, in seeking the greatest things, accepts the accompanying envy,
deliberates correctly. For hatred does not endure, in the main, but the present
splendor and the reputation in time to come are left in remembrance always. [6]
And do you, knowing beforehand the beauty that is to be in the future, and the
absence of the shameful in the present, now seize both with an eager spirit . . .”
2.65 [1] Saying such things, Pericles tried to dissolve the anger of the Athenians
against himself, and to draw their judgment away from the present terrible
things. [2] As regards public matters they were persuaded by the arguments, and
did not any more send to the Lacedaimonians and were more eager in the war;
but, as regards private matters, they were pained by the sufferings—the
populace (demos) because starting with less, it was deprived even of this, and the
powerful having lost through destruction beautiful possessions in the country,
both buildings and costly furnishings—but above all because they had war
instead of peace. [3] They all indeed did not leave off their anger until they had
fined him a sum of money. [4] But then a little later, as the crowd likes to do, they
reelected him general and turned over to him all their affairs, since as regards
their own private affairs, each felt pain less intensely, and since they believed
him most worthy as regards what the whole city needed.
[5] For so long as he was preeminent in the city in peace, he led it in a
measured way and guarded it in safety, and under him it became greatest; and
when the war broke out, he evidently foresaw its power also in this.
[6] He lived two years and six months of it; and when he died, his
foresight in the war became even better known. [7] For he said that if they
remained quiet and took care of the navy and did not seek to expand the empire
in the war, nor risk the city, they would prevail. But they acted to the contrary in
all these respects, and in other matters that seemed outside the war, carrying on
politics in accordance with personal love of honor and personal gain but bad for
themselves and their allies: policies which, when they were pursued correctly,
brought more personal honor and benefit, but when they failed, brought harm to
the city in the war.
[8] And the cause was that that man, being powerful, on account of his
claim of deserving, and his judgment, and his being manifestly least bribable,
was able to check the majority in a free manner; he was not led by them rather
than himself leading them; and this on account of not speaking to please and
thus acquiring power improperly, but instead possessing power through his
recognized claim of deserving—and thus being able to speak against them even
when they were angry. [9] When, at any rate, he perceived them made bold with
untimely insolence, he spoke in such a way as to strike fear into them; and when
he saw them irrationally fearful, he put boldness back into them. Said to be a
democracy, it became in action rule by the first man.
[10] Those who came after, being more equal to one another, and striving
each to become first, turned to pleasing the people and surrendered affairs to
them. [11] From which came error in many other things, as was to be expected in
a great city holding empire, and in particular the error of the naval expedition to
Sicily—which was not so much an error of judgment concerning those against
whom they went, as it was of subsequent judgment, on the part of those who
sent it out, [failing] to support those who were managing it; instead, on account
of private slanders concerning the leadership of the multitude, they dulled affairs
in the expedition and first brought about turmoil among themselves as regards
affairs in the city. [12] But, having fallen in Sicily with the greater part of their
navy and the rest of their force, and with the city in civil strife, they nevertheless
held out for three years against their former enemies and those who joined them
from Sicily and most of their allies who had revolted; and then later against
Cyrus the son of the Persian king, who came along and provided the
Peloponnesians with money for their navy; and they did not give in until they
collapsed by falling upon one another in private quarreling. [13] Such a surplus
of means did Pericles then have, from which he foresaw that the city would quite
easily prevail in the war over the Peloponnesians.
2.86 [6] . . . the generals of the Peloponnesians [at least four in number], wishing
quickly to make the naval battle, before something more might come to help
from the Athenians, first called together the soldiers, and, seeing that the many
[hoi polloi] among them, on account of the previous, were frightened and not
eager in spirit, encouraged them and spoke something like the following:
2.87: [1] “As regards the recent naval battle, O men of the Peloponnese, if
someone among you on account of it fears the battle to come, he does not have a
just evidentiary ground for fear. [2] For its outcome was due to a lack of
preparation, as you know, and we were sailing not for a naval battle but to a
campaign. And we happened to be opposed by no small number of things due to
luck; and presumably also inexperience, on account of this being our first naval
battle, contributed to some extent. [3] So it was not on account of our vice that we
were bested, nor is it just that the judgment that has not been defeated in a battle
using all its strength, and that still has in itself something to respond with, be
blunted by the outcome of accident—but rather [it is just] to believe that humans
may fall by misfortunes, but by their judgments will always be the same as
regards their correct courage, and, with courage present, will not use the excuse
of inexperience to become bad in some respect. [9] . . . and we will not concede to
anyone an excuse for becoming bad: if someone should, then, wish it, he will be
punished with the appropriate penalty; and the good will be honored with the
prizes fitting for virtue.”
2.88 Such were the encouragements given by the leaders of the Peloponnesians.
But Phormio, both himself fearing the dread in the soldiers and perceiving that
they were gathering by themselves in fear of the number of the ships, wished by
calling them together to encourage them and also to make an exhortation
suitable to the present occasion. For previously he always told them, preparing
their judgments, that there was no number of ships so great for them that, if it
attacked, they would not be able to withstand it; and the soldiers had for long
grasped this claim of merit in themselves, that, being Athenians, they would not
give way before any mob of Peloponnesian ships. But at this time, seeing that
they were dispirited in the face of the present sight, he wished to remind them of
their boldness; and calling together the Athenians he spoke something like the
following:
"Seeing, Oh men who are soldiers, you fearing the number of the enemies,
I have called you together, not deeming it worthy to be in dread of things that
are not terrible. . . . "
[From the speech of the Mytilenian ambassadors at Olympia] 3.9 [1] “The
established lawful convention of the Greeks, Oh Lacedaimonians and allies, we
know; for those who in times of war have rebelled and abandoned an alliance are
welcomed with pleasure inasmuch as they bring benefit, but are regarded as
worse because they are believed to be traitors to their former friends. [2] And not
unjust is this judgment of worth, if those who rebel and those from whom they
separate are equal in judgment and in goodwill of mind [eunoia], and balanced in
preparation and power, and there is no fair excusing allegation for the
rebellion—which was not the case for the Athenians and us, nor will we seem to
anyone to be the worse, if in peacetime having been honored by them we
revolted in dangerous times. [10.1] For about the just and virtue we will make
our arguments first, especially since we need an alliance, knowing that there is
neither firm friendship among individuals nor community among cities for any
end, if they do not exercise toward one another what is reputed to be virtue and
if they are not similar in their ways in other respects. . . .
[4] And as long as they led on terms of equality, we followed with an
eager spirit; but when we saw them relaxing in hostility toward the Mede, and
arranging for themselves the slavery of the allies, we were no longer without
fear. . . .
[6] And, using as examples what had previously happened, we held the
Athenians to be no longer trustworthy leaders. For it was not likely that they
would subject those with whom they had, along with us, made treaties, but not
do the same to the ones remaining if ever they had the power. . . .
[11.1] And if we were all still living under our own laws, we would have
been more confident that they would do nothing new; but since they held most
subjugated, while associating with us as equals, it was likely that in the future
they would find it harder to bear a situation in which most had already yielded
while we alone still were on equal terms, especially inasmuch as they were
becoming ever more powerful while we were becoming more deserted. And it is
equally balanced fear alone that puts trust in an alliance; for the party wishing to
overstep is deterred by not being superior enough to attack. . .
[12.1] What friendship had this become, or what trustworthy freedom, in
which we welcomed one another contrary to our judgment, and they attended to
us, in time of war, out of fear, while we did the same to them in quiet times? And
what for others most makes trust firm, goodwill, was for us replaced by the bond
of fear, and we were allies held together by terror rather than friendship. And
whichever were the first to acquire a secure boldness would be first to overstep
in some way. [2] So if we seem to someone to commit injustice in revolting,
because they delayed doing terrible things to us, and we did not wait until we
knew for certain if one of those was to befall, he is not considering the matter
correctly. [3] For if we had the power to plot against them in equality, we should
also have on the same basis delayed somewhat in attacking them; but since they
could attack at any time, we also ought to be able to defend ourselves.”
[The Mytilenean affair] 3.36 [4] And on the next day there came over them a
certain regret of mind, and a reasoning that made it recognized that the
resolution was savage and gross, to destroy an entire city rather than the guilty
ones. When the Mytilenean envoys present and their Athenian sympathizers
observed this, they prevailed on the authorities to open the matter again (the
authorities were easy to persuade, because it was also obvious to them that the
majority of citizens wanted someone to make it possible for them to deliberate
again).
[From Cleon’s speech] 3.39 [1] “ . . . I declare that the Mytileneans have done you
greater injustice than any other single city. [2] For I can understand the revolt
(apostasis) of those for whom your rule/empire is impossible to bear, or of those
compelled by the enemies; but those who possess an island, with walls, and have
to fear our enemies only by sea, in which and against whom by their own naval
force of triremes they are not undefended, and who live under their own laws
and are honored among the first by us—for these to do such things, why, how is
this not plotting and insurrectionary assault (epistasis) rather than revolt
(apostasis)?!—For revolt is carried out by those who are suffering some violence.
But these sought, standing together with our worst enemies, to destroy us: this is
worse than if, being on their own, they made acquisitive war against us. [3] Their
willingness to do terrible things was not affected by the examples provided by
the way the others of their neighbors who previously attempted to rebel against
us were handled, nor did their present happiness make them hesitate. Becoming
bold as regards the future, and filled with hopes beyond their power, but less
than their wish, they initiated war, asserting the claim of might in the place of
right [justice]. At a moment when they supposed they would be victorious,
without having suffered injustice, they carried out an insurrectionary assault on
us.
[4] And it is usual for those cities to whom prosperity comes especially
easily and unexpectedly to turn to hybris. For the most part, it is safer when good
fortune comes to human beings reasonably rather than unexpectedly; and
humans more easily, as it were, stave off adversity than they preserve happiness.
[5] But you ought long ago to have honored the Mytileneans no differently than
the rest; and then they would not have thus become hybristic. For the human
being is by nature quite contemptuous of solicitude, but admiring of the
unyielding. [6] So, let them now be punished as their injustice deserves, and let
not the guilt be placed on the few, with the populace allowed to get off. For all
similarly carried out the insurrectionary assault against you, when they could
have turned to us and be now again in their city. Instead, they joined in the
revolt, considering that the risk together with the few was the surer course. . . .
40 [2]: I therefore, first then, and still now, continue to fight against your
revising your judgment expressed in what has been previously decided, against
your being led into error by the three things that are most inexpedient for
empire: pity and being pleased by speeches and equity. . . .
[4] I sum up in one word: Be persuaded by me and do the just things to

the Mytileneans—which are at the same time the profitable things, recognizing
that by doing otherwise you are not winning their gratitude, but you are
rendering judgment upon yourselves as unjust. For if these correctly revolted,
then you ought not to rule the empire. But if indeed you make a claim to deserve
to do this even though it is not becoming, you must punish these for your benefit
even contrary to what is equitable, or else cease from empire and live the life of
‘good men’ without any risks. [5] Judge that they deserve to receive in retaliation
the same punishment, and do not let those who escaped from the plotting avoid
suffering, but consider what it was equitable/reasonable for them to have done if
they had proved superior, especially when they were the initiators of injustice. It
is especially those who do someone an evil without an excuse who go on and
destroy, recognizing the danger to them if the enemy is left alive—for he who
has been victimized for no reason of necessity is harsher if he escapes than is an
enemy on equal terms.”
[Diodotus’s Speech] 3.42 [1] “Neither do I blame those who have proposed a
reconsidered judgment concerning the Mytilenians, nor do I praise those who
blame frequently repeated deliberations about the greatest matters; but I believe
that the two things most opposed to good counsel are haste and anger, of which
the one likes to come about together with mindlessness, while the other with lack
of education and limited judgment. [2] And whoever persists in fighting against
instructive speechmaking, concerning matters of action, is either lacking in
sharpness or is pursuing some distinct private interest of his own. He is lacking
in sharpness, if he considers it possible to explicate, by any other means, what
lies in the future and is unevident; and he is pursuing his own distinct interest, if,
wishing to persuade to something shameful, he considers that he is unable to
speak well about what is not noble, but can through slander bowl over the
opposing speakers as well as the listeners. [3] But the most dangerous are even
those who make beforehand the accusation that what is uttered is a certain
rhetorical display for the sake of money. For if they were being accused of
ignorance, then he who failed to persuade would go away with the reputation of
being rather lacking in intelligence instead of being rather unjust. But, under the
imputation of injustice, if he does persuade, he comes to be suspected of
injustice, while if he does not happen to succeed, of lack of intelligence along
with injustice. [4] And the city is not benefited in such a situation; for fear
deprives it of advisors. And the city would be most correct if such citizens were
unable to speak; for it would be least persuaded to err. [5] But the good citizen
ought not to frighten the opposing speakers, but instead show himself to speak
better on an equitable basis; and the moderate/sensible city ought not to give
additional honor to one who most gives good counsel, while not diminishing the
honor that does accrue to him, and it ought not to penalize—and ought not even
to dishonor—one who fails to meet with approving judgment. [6] For thus it
would be least the case that the one who succeeds would speak against his
judgment, aiming to gratify, so as to claim to deserve yet more honors, with the
unsuccessful, guided alike, also seeking to gratify in some way, so as to win over,
the multitude. [43.1] Of which things we do the contrary, and what is more, if
someone is suspected of speaking for the sake of gain, even if he says what is
best, out of envy on account of the unsubstantiated opinion about the gains, we
deprive the city of the evident benefit. [2] But it has been established that good
things being spoken by a candid person are no less suspect than bad things, and
the result is that both one who seeks to persuade of the most terrible things and
one speaking of better things must similarly win over the multitude by deception
and become trusted through lying: [3] and the city alone is such that it is
impossible to do good through circumspect thinking by speaking openly and not
deceiving. For he who gives something good with evident openness becomes
suspected of somehow gaining more for himself, in a way that is not evident. [4]
And as regards the greatest things and in such circumstances as these, we must
claim in speaking to have more long range foresight than you who look to the
near term—especially since we are held responsible for our advice, to you who
listen without being held responsible. [5] For if the one persuading and the one
following were similarly harmed, then you would judge in a more moderately
sensible manner. But now, when you chance to fail in anything, out of anger you
punish the single judgment of the one who persuaded, and not your own
judgments, which, being that of the many, shared the error
[44.1] But I have come neither to speak in favor of nor to accuse
concerning the Mytileneans. For if we are sensibly moderate, our contest will be
not about their injustice but about our good counsel. [2] For if I were to show
them to be very unjust, I would not for this reason bid them be killed, if it were
not advantageous; nor if there were some grounds for a forgiving understanding,
if it were not plainly good for the city. [3] But I believe that we should be
deliberating about the future rather than about the present; and as regards what
Cleon so strongly maintains—that it will be advantageous in the future, with a
view to fewer revolts, to prescribe the death penalty—I know and maintain
strongly in reply quite the contrary things concerning what will be noble in the
future. [4] I call upon you not to reject the utility of my advice for the sake of the
fine appearance of his speech—for his speech being more just, in respect to your
present anger against the Mytilenians, is probably appealing. But we are not
sitting in judicial judgment as regards them, in which case just things would be
required, but instead we are deliberating about them, to see how they will be
useful.
[45.1] Now in the cities the penalty of death is prescribed for many things,
even for offenses/errors not equal to but lesser than the present case.
Nevertheless, aroused by hope, people take the risk; and no one ever entered
upon anything terrible while convicting himself of not being able to succeed in
the plot. [2] What city ever revolted, making this attempt while opining itself to
have insufficient preparation either of its own or by alliance with others? [3] And
by nature all, in private and in public life, commit offenses/errors, and there is
no law that will prevent this, since humans have ascended through all the
penalties, to see if somehow they might suffer less injustice at the hands of
evildoers. And it is likely that in the old days the penalties laid down for the
greatest injustices were softer, but as with the passage of time they were
overstepped, most ascended to death; and this too is similarly overstepped. [4]
So either some fear greater than this must be discovered, or this at least prevents
nothing, but poverty through necessity provides the daring, and wealth through
hybris and proud thought provides the urge to get the better of others, and other
turns of fortune for humans drive to taking the risks through anger, as each is
seized by something stronger that is irresistible. [5] And omnipresent hope and
erotic love—the one leading, the other following; and the one thinking up the
plot, the other proposing the resources of fortune—will cause the greatest harm,
and as beings invisible are stronger than the visible terrors. [6] And fortune, to no
less a degree, contributes to the incitement of them. For sometimes she is present
unexpectedly and arouses someone to take risks even in rather needy
conditions—and does so no less to cities, inasmuch as the stakes are the greatest
things, freedom or rule/empire over others—and each person, when he is with
all the rest, irrationally opines himself to be greater. [7] It is simply impossible,
and a sign of much simple-mindedness when someone thinks that the strength of
law or anything else terrifying can turn away human nature when it is driven by
an eagerness of spirit to do something.
[46.1] Therefore we ought not to deliberate badly because trusting to the
death penalty as something reliable, nor should we leave to those who have
revolted no hope that they will be allowed to repent and in the shortest possible
time wipe out their offense. . . .
[4] So we should not harm ourselves rather than the offenders by being
strict judges, instead of seeing how in the future, through measured
punishments, we will be able to make use of subjected cities that are strong in
their amount of money, and will judge it worthwhile to base our guard not on
the terror of the laws but on vigilant administrative deeds. [5] Which is the
contrary of what we now do . . ..
[6] One ought not to punish severely free men who revolt, but instead
before they revolt guard them severely and anticipate them in such a way that
this does not occur to their minds; and when we master them, make it so that as
few as possible bear the guilt.”
3.49 [1] When these judgments had been uttered, almost in equal balance with
one another, the Athenians all the same were in contending division of opinion,
and the vote by show of hands was very close, but the judgment of Diodotus
prevailed.
[From the speech of the Plataeans] 3.56 [3] “For if you take as just what is in your
immediate interest, and in the Thebans’ war-interest, you would appear to be
untrue judges of what is correct, caring more for what is advantageous. [4] And
if they now seem beneficial to you, we and the other Greeks were much more so
back then when you were in greater danger. . . .
[5] And it is just to put in the scales against our present offense, if there is
any offense, our zealous spirit at that time. You will find the latter a greater, in
comparison to a smaller, and in a time when it was rare to find some virtue of the
Greek opposed to the power of Xerxes; and at that time those were praised who
did not do what was advantageous with a view to their escaping in safety, but
were willing to dare the best things with risks. [6] Among whom were we, who
then became honored among the first, but now fear that we will be destroyed for
adhering to the same—choosing the Athenians for justice rather than you for
profit. [7] And indeed one ought to manifestly conceive of the same things in the
same way, and believe the advantageous to be nothing other than always
holding firmly to a sense of gratitude to the good men among allies for their
virtue, while also indeed securing what is immediately beneficial to yourselves.”
[From the speech of the Thebans] 3.64 [4] "Who would more justly be hated by all
the Greeks than you, who displayed your 'being good men' in evil towards
them? And in regard to the qualities in which you once were 'worthy,' as you
claim, you have now shown them not to belong to you, and the things that your
nature always wishes have been put to the test of the truth: for with the
Athenians you have taken the unjust path."
3.68 [4] In pretty much everything concerning the Plateans, the Lacedaimonians
thus turned against them for the sake of the Thebans, believing that the latter
would be helpful in the war that had then just begun.
[The civil strife] 3.82 [1] To such savagery the civil strife [stasis] proceeded, and it
seemed intense, because it came to pass there first—since later the whole of
Greece, so to speak, was set in motion, the dispute in each place being between
the leaders of the populace, calling in the Athenians, and the few, the
Lacedaimonians. And in peace they would not have had an excuse nor would
they be ready to call them in; but, those being at war, made it easy for either side
that wished some innovation to call in an ally, so as to do evil to the opponents
and to strengthen themselves at the same time. [2] And there befell the cities in
connection with civil strife many harsh things, as have come into being and
always/at every time will be, so long as there is the same nature of human
beings—more intense and more tranquil [hesuchiatera] and in forms that are
diverse, depending on how stand each of the turns of fortune. For in peace and
good activities the cities and the individuals have better thoughts on account of
not being thrown into unwanted necessities. But War, taking away daily
prosperity, is a violent Teacher, and assimilates the passionate angers of the
many [hoi polloi] to their circumstances. [3] So the things of the cities were
revolutionized; and those for whom it was later, by learning of what had been
done before, carried further the extreme inventiveness of thought by ingenious
artfulness of assaults and monstrousness of vengeful punishments.
[4] And they changed, by their mode of speaking righteously/justly, the
accustomed status of names given to deeds.
For irrational daring was conventionally regarded as the
courage/manliness that loves comrades; hesitant forethought, as fair-seeming
cowardice; sensible moderation, as the cloak of lack of manliness; and mental
acuteness in regard to everything as idleness in regard to everything. And rash
sharpness was put forward as what is proper for a real man, while deliberation
in safety as the good-sounding excuse for shirking.
[5] The one who was bitter was always trusted, while the one who spoke
against him was suspected. Anyone whose plots succeeded was mentally acute,
and anyone who suspected plots was still more impressive. But he who thought
ahead so as not to have need of such things was a dissolver of alliances and one
frightened by his adversaries. To put it simply, he who anticipated with action
future evil was praised, as was he who urged this on anyone who was not
thinking of it.
[6] And kinship became less close an attachment than partisan loyalty, on
account of the latter being more ready to be daring without needing any
explanation. For these ties are not formed to provide benefits according to the
established laws, but in order to get more than others against the established
laws. And their pledges of trust amongst themselves were strengthened less by
divine law than by some partnership in law-breaking.
[7] Noble offers uttered by opponents who had the upper hand were
received with a guard up against their deeds, and not with noble generosity. To
retaliate with revenge was more valued than not to have previously suffered
some harm. And when oaths of reconciliation were ever exchanged, they were
given by each side with a view to their present lack of strength when they had no
other source of power; but he who was the first to become emboldened by a
good turn of fortune, when he saw an unguarded opportunity, took his revenge
with greater pleasure on account of violating the trust than if he had had an
excuse, and calculated both his security and the fact that by triumphing through
guile he won the prize for mental acuteness in addition. And the many are more
readily called deft being evildoers than ignorant being good, and are ashamed of
the latter, but take pride in the former.
[8] And the cause of all these things [was/is] the ruling through both
grasping for more and love of honor; and the eagerness of spirit that comes from
these things once they enter on the love of strife. For the leaders in the cities on
either side, employing a fair-seeming name—vaunting “political equality under
law of the many” and “sensibly moderate aristocracy”—claimed in speech to
serve the community while they actually made it their victory prize. In every
way contesting against one another for superiority, they dared to do the most
terrible things and sought ever greater vengeful punishments, imposing these
not within the bounds of the just and the advantageous for the city, but defining
them on either side always with a view to what gave pleasure—either with an
unjust judgment passed by vote or by acquiring superiority by force they were
ready to gratify the immediate love of victory. So that in piety neither side
lawfully believed, but they better heeded fair-appearance of speech by which
there could be carried out some envious action. And the citizens in the middle
were killed by both sides, because they did not take sides or out of envy that they
were surviving.
[83.1] Thus every form of evil disposition was established among the
Greeks on account of the civil strife; and simplicity of character [guileless good-
naturedness—euethes], which is the greater part of inbred nobility, disappeared
under ridicule, while distrustful antagonism was highly distinguished. [2] For
there was no speech strong enough nor oath fear-inspiring enough to effect
reconciliation, but all who were stronger, calculating the hopelessness of
security, looked to see how they might avoid suffering rather than had the
capacity to trust. [3] And for the most part the inferior in judgment prevailed. For
because they feared their own incapacity, as well as the mental acuteness of their
opponents, in order that they not be defeated by speeches and, on account of
their opponents’ versatility of judgment, be worsted by plots, they went daringly
into action. The others, contemptuously assuming that they would be the first to
perceive anything and that they did not need to take by action what they could
get by thought, were more destroyed, by not being enough on their guard.
3.84.1: So it was in Corcyra that most of the things were dared. And as
many things as those who are ruled with hybris rather than with moderation, by
those who provide them the opportunity for vengeful punishment, would do—
some who would judge against justice, releasing themselves from accustomed
poverty and very much desiring, through their sufferings, to have the
possessions of their neighbors; and some who would attack not with a view to
getting more, but on the basis of equality, being most carried away by
uneducated, angry passion, assaulting savagely and pitilessly. [2] Life in the city
was chaotic in this crisis, and human nature, which is even used to committing
injustice against the laws, held sway over the laws; and showed plainly its
satisfaction in being unrestrained as regards angry passion, superior to justice,
and an enemy to the eminent. For it would not have put vengeful punishment
before what is pious, and profiting before not committing injustice, except where
envying held harmful power. [3] And in their vengeful punishments of others,
humans claim they deserve to dissolve in advance and not to let stand the laws
about such things, upon which depends hope of salvation for all who might fall,
including themselves, if ever someone is in danger and in need of one or another
of them.
[The Homeric Hymn to Apollo, in its original form and as altered, apparently, by
Thucydides—original text in square brackets] 3.104 [4]
From the Hymn/Prelude [Prooimion] to Apollo

[line 146] At other times it is by Delos, Phoebus, that your spirit [thumos] is
especially delighted,
[But you by Delos, Phoebus, are especially delighted in your heart,]
There where the Ionians in trailing robes gather
With their children and wives in your concourse;
[With their children and reverent wives]
Where You, with boxing and dancing and song,
They delight by invoking, when they ordain the contest.
[next lines, omitted by Th.:]

[One would declare them immortal and never to grow old,
Whoever then encountered the Ionians assembled at that time.]
3.104 [5]
[line 165] But come, be gracious Apollo, together with Artemis,

And farewell, maidens! And me in aftertimes remember,
Whenever one of the earth-dwelling humans
Shall arrive here—another one of those who are experienced in
suffering—and asks:
“Maidens, who is the man who for you most pleasingly sings,
Coming hither; and in whom do you especially take delight?”
Now all of you answer very propitiously/anonymously/with quiet grace:
“The blind man, and he dwells on rugged Chios—”
[next line, omitted by Th.]

[All his songs will in aftertimes always be the best!”]
Demosthenes’ Speech:
4.10 [1] “Men who are sharers in this danger! In such a necessitated strait let no
one among you wish to seem clever by calculating all that is terrible surrounding
us, but rather be in good hope, without looking around, that you will come to
grips with the opponents and surmount even these things! For, whenever things
have arrived at a necessitated point as have these, they least allow calculation,
but require the swiftest embrace of risk. [2] I, however, see that most of the
beings are in our favor, if we are willing to hold our ground and are not bowled
over by their number so as to surrender the things that are stronger in our favor.
[3] For I believe that the site’s difficulty of access is in our favor. It becomes our
ally if we stand fast; but if we give way, even though it is difficult it will become
easy of access when no one is barring the way, and we’ll have a more terrible
enemy since his retreat will not be easy, even if violently compelled by us. For
they are easiest to repel when they are in the ships, but once they have
disembarked they are on equal terms. [4] And one shouldn’t fear too much their
number. For it will fight in small relays on account of the difficulty of the
approach, and it is not an army on land that can be greater on equal terms, but
instead is fighting from ships, which require the coincidence of many factors in
the sea. [5] Consequently I hold that their difficulties equalize our number; and at
the same time I call upon you—being Athenians and knowers by experience of
naval disembarkation against others, that if someone holds his ground and
doesn’t retreat on account of fear of the loud splashing and the awesome ships
bearing down, he would never be violently overcome—also now by standing
your ground and repelling them at the beachhead, to save yourselves and the
site.”
[11.1] At such encouragement from Demosthenes the Athenians were
emboldened more, and coming down took up their ranks at the water’s edge.
4.12 [3] “In this chance reversed, so that the Athenians defended from the land,
and in Spartan fashion, against the Spartans sailing up and trying to disembark
from ships against Athenians on their own land now hostile.”
4.13 [4] The Lacedaimonians chanced not to do what they had intended in
thought, to block the entrances for sailing in, but were quiet on the shore
manning their ships and making preparations, in case anyone sailed in, to fight a
naval battle in the harbor since it was not small.
4.14 [3] and the Athenians were dominating and wishing to make the most of
their present luck . . .
[Sequel to Spartan peace speech:] 4.21 [1] The Lacedaimonians said such things
believing that the Athenians, having desired a peace treaty in the time before, but
having been prevented by their opposition, when peace was offered would
gladly accept and give back the men. But the latter, having the men on the island,
believed that the treaty would be available to them whenever they wished to
make it with them, and they aimed at more. They were especially led by Cleon
the son of Cleainetos—a man who was a demagogue most persuasive with the
multitude at that time.
4.41 [3-4] the Spartans were sending to them and trying to get back Pylos and the
men. But [the Athenians] aimed at more; and though they often came, sent them
away accomplishing nothing.
4.55 [2] in matters of war, if ever, they now especially became more hesitant,
since they were engaged in a naval contest contrary to their form of preparation,
and this against Athenians, for whom not attempting was always the loss of an
expectation that they would accomplish something. [3] And at the same time
many turns of fortune against reason in a short time gave them the greatest
consternation, and they feared lest again some calamity should chance to befall
them [4] as happened on the island, and on account of it they were less daring in
the battles and thought that every move would be a mistake on account of
having lost trust in their judgment through being previously unused to faring ill.
4.58-59 And then also the other Sicilians came together at Gela, ambassadors
from all the cities, and held speeches with one another, to see if somehow they
might become reconciled. And many other judgments were expressed on both
sides, disputing and making claims, as each of them believed they were being
gotten the better of; and Hermocrates the Syracusan, son of Hermon, who
especially persuaded them to meet in common, spoke arguments to this effect:
[59.1] “Not being from the weakest city, oh Sicilians, will I make my
arguments—nor from one that is especially suffering in the war; but
demonstrating what seems to me to be the best judgment for what is common to
all Sicily.
[2] And concerning war, that it is harsh, why should someone speak at
length, giving an account of all it contains, to those who know? For no one is
necessitated by ignorance to carry it on; nor, on account of fear, if he expects to
get more, will he be turned away. It comes to pass that to some the gains appear
greater than the terrors, and others are willing to undergo the risks rather than be
immediately made inferior. [3] But as regards these very things, if it should
happen to be inopportune for either to act successfully, counsels of reconciliation
are beneficial. [4] And that is what at present would be most worthwhile for us to
be persuaded of. For each of us first went to war wishing to establish well private
interests, and now should try, through arguments with one another, to effect
reconciliation—and, if then we depart without providing to each what is equally
fair, we will go back to war.
[60.1] Yet it ought to be understood that it is not only private interests, if
we are sensibly moderate, that our meeting concerns, but the question whether,
since (as I judge) Sicily as a whole is plotted against by the Athenians, we will be
able to save it; and one ought to believe that much more compulsory agents of
reconciliation in these matters than my arguments are the Athenians, who
possess the greatest power among the Greeks, and are present with a few ships
watching for our mistakes, and, with a view to establishing their advantage, use
the conventionally lawful name of alliance to put a fair face on what is by nature
a relation of war. [2] For if we go to war, and call them in—real men who make
military expeditions even against those who do not call them in—and if we harm
ourselves with our own revenues, and pave the way for their empire, it is likely,
when they know we are worn out, that they will then come with a greater
expeditionary force to subordinate all matters here to themselves.
[61.1] Yet we ought each of us on behalf of our own place, if we are
sensibly moderate, to call in allies and assume in addition risks in order to
acquire what does not belong to us rather than to harm what we already have;
and we ought to believe that civil strife is what especially destroys cities—and
Sicily, whose inhabitants, all of us, are being plotted against, while we stand
disunited, city against city.
[2] On the basis of understanding these things, individual ought to be
reconciled to individual and city to city, in the attempt in common to save Sicily;
and let no one suppose that the Dorians among us are enemies of the Athenians,
but that the Chalcidians are safe on account of kinship with the Ionians. [3] For
the Athenians are not coming out of enmity for one of the two ethnic groups
divided by nature, but aiming at the good things in Sicily which we hold in
common. [4] They have now made this evident in the matter of the appeal of the
Chalcidian race. For to the latter, who have never given them aid in accordance
with the alliance, they have themselves zealously provided more than what is
contractually just.
[5] And it is very excusable for the Athenians to plan to get the better in
these ways; and I do not blame those wishing for empire/rule, but rather those
who are too ready to give in. For it is naturally human in every case to rule over
everyone who submits, but to defend against the aggressor.
[6] As many of us who, knowing the way matters stand, do not correctly
take precautions—and anyone who has come not judging this to be of highest
importance, to deal well with what is threatening all in common—we err. [7] But
the swiftest relief from this would be our coming to terms with one another. For
the Athenians are operating not from what is their own, but from the base given
by those who invite them in. And thus war will not issue in war, but instead
differences will without trouble issue in peace, and the unjust invited parties
who came here with fair-seeming will go away having reasonably failed.
[62.1] So as regards the Athenians, it is such an extent of good that will be
found if we deliberate well.
But as regards peace, which is agreed by everyone to be best, how could it
be that we ought not to bring it about among ourselves? Or is it your opinion
that if someone has something good, or if someone has the contrary things, that
tranquility rather than war will not cause the latter to cease for each, and the
former to be helped to be preserved throughout? [2] And that peace does not
have honors and splendors that are less risky—and also other things about which
one could go on at length, as one could go on about war? Upon looking into
these things one ought not to look down upon my arguments, but rather look
ahead each to a security for himself.
[3] And if someone thinks to achieve something stable, either by justice or
by violence, let him not suffer a harsh fall against his hope: let him understand,
that there are more now who have pursued those who are unjust, with
retributions, and others who have hoped to get the better through some power,
that have, on the one hand, fallen so far short of vindicating themselves that they
have not even been preserved, and, on the other hand, instead of gaining more,
have lost in addition what they had. [4] For retribution does not have a just right
to good fortune, simply because one has been the victim of injustice. Nor is
strength something firm, simply because it is hopeful. What dominates for the
most part is the imponderability of the future—which of all things makes itself
manifest as the most slippery, and, by the same token, the most useful. For since
we fear equally, our foresight leads us rather to come together.
[63.1] So now taking alarm on account of the fear both of this last, that is
unseen because without evidence, and of the Athenians who are present, let us
believe that these are the obstacles sufficient to have left aborted the plan that
each of us thought to carry out, and let us send away from the land the enemies
at the door, ourselves coming together preferably forever—or if not, then for as
long a time as possible quenching our private differences, let us put them off
until later.
[2] To sum up, we should know that if my advice persuades, we will each
possess a free city, on the basis of which we will, being masters of ourselves,
defend ourselves on an equal basis in virtue, against both the doer of good and
the doer of evil; but if, hearkening to others, we are not persuaded, it will not be
a matter of effecting some retribution, but rather, even if we are all too fortunate,
becoming friends to our worst enemies, and alienated by necessity from those
from whom we ought not.
[64.1] And I, as I said at the beginning, representing the greatest city, and
being more used to attacking someone than retaliating, deem it worthy out of
foresight to make concessions, and not to do ill to opponents with the result that
I am myself more harmed, nor to be so loving of victory out of stupidity as to
consider myself as much the master of the fortune that I do not rule as I am of
my own judgment—but to give way as much as is reasonable. [2] And I deem it
just that the others do the same as me, suffering this through your own agency
and not through the will of enemies. [3] For there is nothing shameful in kin
giving way to kin, whether Dorian to Dorian or Chalcidians to their kindred,
being as a whole neighbors and fellow inhabitants of one land surrounded by the
sea and called by one name, ‘Sicilians’: and we will go to war, I suppose, when
that happens, and will reconcile with one another again—by ourselves, and
using communal arguments. [4] But, if we are sensibly moderate, we will always
gather together to defend against alien ethnic groups who come against us, if
indeed we all are also put at risk if we are harmed one by one. But never again
will we invite them as allies or mediators. [5] If we do these things, we will not
deprive Sicily of two goods at present—getting rid of the Athenians and of civil
war; and in the future we will dwell in it as free, by ourselves, and less plotted
against by others.”
65.1 Hermocrates having said such things, the Sicilians were persuaded
and came to an agreement among themselves with the result that they ceased
from the war, each keeping what they had, except Morgantia going to the
Camarineans upon payment to the Syracusans of a fixed sum of silver. [2] And
the allies of the Athenians called in those who were in charge of them and said
that they would make peace and that the treaty would include them. Upon
getting their approval, they made the agreement, and after these things the ships
of the Athenians sailed away from Sicily. [3] But when the generals arrived, the
Athenians in the city punished Pythodorus and Sophocles with exile, and upon
the third, Eurymedon, levied a fine, on the grounds that when it had been
possible for them to take over Sicily they had been persuaded by bribes to leave.
Thus they employed their present good fortune to claim to deserve to have
nothing oppose them, but even to accomplish the baffling as equivalent to the
possible, whether with great or scanty means. And the cause was that the success
beyond reason in most respects sustained the strength of their hope.
4.80 [1] With the Athenians pressing hard the Peloponnesian and not least their
own land, they hoped they would most turn them away if they were to give
them pain in return by sending an army against their allies, especially since the
latter were ready to maintain it and were calling upon them to help in a revolt.
[2] And at the same time it was an excuse for them to satisfy their wish to send
out some of the Helots, lest they revolt, given the things happening with Pylos
being captured. [3] Indeed, they did this because they feared the youth and the
multitude of the Helots—for at all times most Spartan affairs have been
especially set up with a view to guarding against the Helots. They proclaimed
that as many of them as claimed to have become best for them in the wars should
be judged, as to be made free—making a test, and considering that these on
account of their spirit, each claiming to deserve to be freed first, would especially
be likely to attack them. [4] And when two thousand had been selected by
judging, these were crowned and went around to the temples as if they were
being freed; but not much later they did away with them and no one perceived in
what way each of them disappeared. [5] So at this time it was with an eager spirit
that they sent along seven hundred of them as hoplites with Brasidas, while he
drew the others from the Peloponnesus with the persuasion of pay.
4.81 [1] Brasidas himself the Spartans sent out especially because he wished
this—while the Chalcidians also were eager in spirit for this: a man reputed in
Sparta to be a doer in all respects, and who, when he went out, became most
meritorious for the Spartans. [2] For by at once presenting himself as just and
measured in regard to the cities, he caused many to revolt, and took some by the
connivance of the inhabitants, with the result that there came to be for the
Spartans, when they wanted to come to terms, which indeed they accomplished,
a giving back and a receiving of lands and a respite of war for the Peloponnesus.
Later in time in the war, after the fighting in Sicily, the virtue and the intelligence
of Brasidas, which some had perceived through experience, and others believed
in by hearing, especially instilled in the allies of the Athenians a desire for the
Spartans. [3] For since he was the first to go abroad and have the reputation of
being good in every way, he left behind a firm hope that the others were also
such.
[From Brasidas’s programmatic speech, first delivered at Acanthus]

4.86 [3] “And if someone has a private fear of someone, worrying that I may turn
the city over to some, and is accordingly lacking in eager spirit, let him above all
be trusting. [4] For I do not come to join in factional civil strife, nor do I believe
that I would be bringing a clear liberation, if I bypassed the ancestral and
enslaved the greater part to the few, or the lesser to all. [5] For that would be
harsher than alien rule, and would bring about for us Spartans, in return for our
toils, not gratitude but, instead of honor and repute, accusation. The very charges
on the basis of which we fight the Athenians we would appear to bring upon
ourselves, in more hateful fashion than one who makes no display of virtue! [6]
For to those who are worthy, gaining advantage by fair-seeming deception is
more shameful than by open force, since the latter makes its assault with the
justification of the strength which fortune bestows, the former with the plotting
of an unjust intention. [87.1] So great for us is the circumspection we undertake
in matters of the utmost importance, and you could not get firmer certainty, in
addition to the oaths, than having men for whom their deeds, when examined
closely in light of their speeches, make necessary the opinion that their interest is
as I say. . . . [87.6] Deliberate well with a view to these things, and strive to be the
first to inaugurate liberty for the Greeks, and to lay up for yourselves eternal
glory, and while conferring on the whole city the most noble name.”
4.98 [1]: The herald having said such things, the Athenians sent to the Boeotians a
herald of their own who declared that they had done no injustice to the temple
nor would they in the future voluntarily do harm. For they did not at the outset
enter it with this intention, but rather to defend themselves, from it, against those
doing injustice. [2] And that the law among the Greeks was, that whoever held
sway over each land, great or small, also owned always the temples, which they
were to tend insofar as they were able in addition to the accustomed rites. . . . [5]
And that they disturbed the water in necessity, which they had not in hubris
brought upon themselves, but in the course of defending themselves against
their opponents who previously used violence against what was theirs. [6] And
that in all likelihood there was even also on the part of the god some forgiving
understanding for what was done under the constraint of war and of something
terrifying. For altars were a refuge for those who had committed involuntary
crimes, while lawbreaking was a name for evils done not by necessity, and did
not apply to daring something on account of misfortunes.
4.116 [2] And Brasidas (for there is in Lecythus a temple of Athena, and he
happened to have proclaimed, when he was about to attack, that he would give
thirty minas in silver to the one who first scaled [the wall]) believing that the
capture had come about in some manner other than human, donated the thirty
minas to the goddess for the temple, and having torn down Lecythus and cleared
it, dedicated the whole of it as a sacred precinct.
4.120 [3] Having crossed and having called a meeting of the Scioneans, Brasidas
said what he had said in Acanthus and Torone, and in addition that they
deserved praise most of all others, who, when Pallene was cut off at the isthmus
by the Athenians holding Potideia, and they had become nothing but islanders,
had gone for freedom of their own accord and had not waited in lack of daring
for necessity to move them concerning what was evidently their own good. And
it was a sign that they would otherwise stand fast courageously before the
greatest challenges.
4.121 [1] Brasidas they received in a noble fashion in other ways, and they
publicly placed upon him a golden crown as the Liberator of Greece, while in
private they decked him with garlands and brought him offerings as to an
athlete.
[From Brasidas’s last speech: 5.9.5] “those acts of guile possess the most noble
repute by which, in deceiving the enemy one does the greatest benefit to friends.
. . .”
[7] And you, Clearidas, . . . [9] also become yourself a good man, as befits
you, being a Spartan; and you, Oh men who are allies, follow courageously, and
believe that fighting nobly in war consists of three things—being willing, and
having a sense of shame, and obeying the rulers; and on this day for you there is
in store either to become good and thus liberated and allies of the Spartans, or
servitude to the Athenians—if, in the best case, you act without dying or being
sold as chattel slaves; and the servitude will be harsher than you had before . . .”
5.16 [1] But when also in Amphipolis defeat had come to pass for the Athenians,
and Cleon and Brasidas were dead, who had from either side most opposed the
peace—the latter on account of good fortune and of being honored, from fighting
the war; the former because he believed that if there were rest, his evildoing
would become more obvious and he would be less trusted in his slandering—
then those in either city who most sought the leadership, Pleistoanax the son of
Pausanius, the king of the Spartans, and Nicias the son of Niceratus, who had
been most successful as general at that time, were much more eager in spirit:
Nicias because he wished, while he was still untouched by any suffering and
esteemed as deserving, to preserve his good fortune, and in the present to cease
from toils himself while doing the same for the citizens, while in future time to
leave behind a name as having throughout never subjected the city to disaster—
believing that this would occur if risks were not run, and to one who least gave
himself over to fortune, and that peace was without risk.
5.26 [1] These things also the same Thucydides, an Athenian, has written, in the
order as each of the things occurred, according to summers and winters, until the
time when the Spartans and their allies put a stop to the empire of the Athenians
and took the long walls and Peiraeus. And the years up until this point of the
war became in all seven and twenty. . . . [5] And I lived through the whole of it,
being of an age to perceive and to apply judgment so that I had insight into it
with a certain precision; and after my generalship in Amphipolis it befell me to
be an exile for twenty years and, becoming conversant with affairs on both sides,
including no less the Peloponnesian through the exile, I especially perceived
something of them in leisure.
5.32 [1] During about the same time in this summer the Athenians took the city of
the Scioneans by siege, slayed the adult men, sold into slavery the children and
women, and gave the land to the Plateians to dwell in; but they brought the
Delians back into Delos, being in anxiety of a religious sort [enthumoumenoi]
regarding the misfortunes in the battles, and obeying the oracle of the god in
Delphi.
5.43 [2] There were others in Athens who wished to break the treaty, including
Alcibiades the son of Kleinias, a man who in another city would have been
young in age at that time, but who was held in honor on account of the claim to
desert of his ancestors. In his opinion it was indeed also better to move rather
toward the Argives, not but that also he was opposed through a victory-loving
high-mindedness, because the Spartans had made the treaty through Nicias and
Laches, looking down on him because of his youth—and failing to hold him in
honor in accord with the ancient consulship that had once existed, which, though
it had been renounced by his grandfather, he had taken thought to renew, in
caring for their prisoners from the island. [3] Considering himself put down on
every side, he spoke out against the treaty from the first, claiming that the
Spartans were not reliable, but were making the treaty so that they could knock
out the Argives and then again go against the Athenians left by themselves—that
was their goal in making the treaty. And now, when the dispute arose, he
immediately sent privately to Argos, bidding them to come as quickly as possible
offering an alliance along with the Mantineans and Eleans, that being opportune
and himself working together with them to the utmost.
5. 75.3 And the accusation that had at that time been brought against them by the
Greeks, whether of softness on account of the disaster on the island, or of lack of
judgment and sluggishness otherwise, were wiped away by this one deed; and it
was held that they had done badly on account of fortune, while in judgment they
were still the same.
5.83 (end): And this winter ended, and the fifteenth year of the war ended.
5.84 [1] The succeeding summer Alcibiades sailed to Argos with twenty ships,
and took prisoner three hundred of the Argives who still seemed suspicious and
inclined in their minds to Sparta; these the Athenians deposited in the nearby
islands of their empire.
And the Athenians made an expedition against the island of Melos, with
thirty of their own ships, six Chian, and two Lesbian, containing twelve hundred
of their own heavy infantry accompanied by three hundred archers and twenty
mounted archers, and about fifteen hundred heavy infantry from the allies and
islanders. [2] (The Melians are Spartan colonists, and were unwilling to submit to
the Athenians, as did the other islanders. Now at first they remained at rest,
taking neither side. But then when the Athenians, to compel them, ravaged their
land, they openly went to war.) (3) So the generals Cleomedes [“Famed on
account of Persia”] son of Lycomedes [“Wolf to the Persian/Persian Wolf”] and
Teisias [“Punisher/Rewarder”] son of Teisimachus [“Punisher/Rewarder in
Battle”] led an expedition armed as described against their land; but before
committing any injustice against the land, they sent ambassadors first to make
arguments/speeches [logoi]. These the Melians would not introduce to the
popular assembly, but bid them speak concerning what they had come about
before the magistrates and the few. And the Athenian ambassadors said such
things as the following.
5.85 “Since the speeches are not going to take place before the popular
assembly, so as to prevent the many from being deceived by us, on account of
hearing in an uninterrupted speech seductive and unrefuted things all at once
(for we know that this is the thought behind our being introduced to the few),
you who preside ought to act in an even safer manner. For as regards each point
do not you, for your part either, make one speech, but instead judge by replying
immediately, whenever what is said does not seem [is not opined to be]
satisfactory. And first say if what we now are saying meets with your
acquiescence.”
86 The presiding Melians replied: “The equitableness of teaching one another

in quiet is not blameworthy; but the present, and not merely prospective,
manifestations of war indicate something different. For we see that you come as
yourselves the judges of what is said, and that the outcome is likely to be, on the
one hand, that war will be brought upon us if we prevail by justice and, on
account of that, do not submit, and, on the other hand, slavery if we are
persuaded.”
87 [Ath.] Well, if you have met to talk on the basis of presentiments about
future things, or anything other than, on the basis of things present and that you
can see, to deliberate about preservation/safety/salvation for the city, we should
stop. But if about this last, we should talk.
88 [Mel.] It is likely and understandable that those in a situation such as this

should turn to many things in speech and opinion. But this present meeting is
indeed also about preservation/safety/salvation, and let the discussion proceed
in the way you propose, if that is agreed.
89 [Ath.] Accordingly, we for our part will not present speeches incredible in
their extent of noble words about how our empire is just, because we were the
liberators from the Persian, or that we are attacking now as victims of injustice;
and we don’t expect that you think you will persuade by saying that you can’t
fight on our side because you are colonists of the Spartans, or that you have done
us no injustice; but rather that your concern is with what things are possible of
accomplishment on the basis of what we each truly think—dealing as knowers,
with knowers, of the fact that just things, in human reasoning, are judged to be a
consequence of equal compulsion/necessity, while those who are superior do
whatever they are capable of, and the weak make way.
90 [Mel.] On which basis we at least believe it is expedient (this is necessary,

since you have thus made the agenda, speaking about the advantageous as
opposed to the just) for you not to dissolve the common good, but to grant
anyone who comes into danger at any time that what is plausible is just, and to
be given the benefit of the doubt even when he fails to persuade on the most
precise terms. This is no less for your sake, inasmuch as you would become an
example to the rest if you were to fall into the greatest retribution.
91 [Ath.] But we are not disheartened [without thumos] on account of the

end/death of our empire, even if it should cease. For it is not those who
rule/hold empire over others, as do the Spartans, it is not these who are terrible
to those over whom they are victorious (but the contest for us is not with the
Spartans), but the subjects, presumably, of those who rule/hold empire, when
they themselves prevail in attack. (2) And concerning this, let the risk be our
business. But that it is for the benefit of our empire that we are here, and that we
will now speak arguments for the salvation of your city, these things we will
make clear, since we wish to rule over you without trouble, and to save you in a
way expedient for both of us.
92 [Mel.] And how could it be expedient for us to be enslaved, as it is also for

you to rule?
93 [Ath.] Because you would submit before suffering the most terrible things,
and we would profit by not destroying you.
94 [Mel.] So then you wouldn’t accept us dwelling at rest, being friends

instead of enemies, but allied to neither side?
95 [Ath.] No, because your enmity harms us less than your friendship—
manifesting to those who are ruled a sign of weakness, while your hatred is a
sign of power.
96 [Mel.] Do your subjects really view it as reasonable that those who do not
belong to you are to be treated the same as those who are in many cases your
colonists, and some of whom have revolted?
97 [Ath.] Yes, because they consider that neither lack justice, but that the one
prevail on account of power, and that we do not attack out of fear. So even
leaving aside the extension of our empire, you make us safer by being
overthrown, especially if you—who are islanders and weaker than others—do
not prevail over the ruler of the seas.
98 [Mel.] But don’t you believe that there is security in the other course? For
it is necessary again here, even as you prevent us from straying into the just
speeches, and you try to persuade us to pay heed to your interest, for us to try to
persuade by teaching you about what is in our interest, if it coincides with yours.
For how will you avoid having to fight with everyone who does not ally
themselves with either side, when they look at what happens here and then
consider you ready to come against them? And what will you accomplish by this,
except to strengthen your present enemies, and to provoke, against their
inclination, those who would not become such?
99 [Ath.] No, because we do not believe to be so terrible for us those who

dwell in freedom on the mainland, and who will delay setting up a guard against
us, as those islanders anywhere who are not in the empire, such as yourselves,
and those who are in pain under the compulsion of the empire. For it is these
who are most likely to bring us and themselves into foreseeable danger by
turning to what is most irrational.
100 [Mel.] But then surely, if you, in order not to cease your empire, and they,
who are already enslaved, in order to get release, run so great a risk, it would be
for us, who are still free, great vileness and cowardice not to make every effort to
avoid enslavement!
101 [Ath.] No, not if you deliberate in a sensibly moderate way. For this is not
for you a contest between equals about manly goodness, to avoid incurring
shame; but instead the deliberation is about survival, about how to avoid having
to stand against those who are by far stronger.
102 [Mel.] But we know that as regards matters of war there are times when
the fortunes are more common, rather than proportionate to the difference in the
weight of each opponent; and for us submission means immediate end of hope,
but hope correctly still stands together with action.
103 [Ath.] Hope, however, as an encouragement in danger, does not destroy,

even when it harms, those who have recourse to it from a position of strength.
But for those who make a throw, betting everything (for by nature it is
expensive), it comes to be understood when they have fallen; and so long as one
has something to save, one does not yet have the knowledge. Which is something
you, who are weak and have only one throw, should not wish to undergo; nor
should you wish to become like the many, who, when it is yet possible to be
saved by human means, when evident hopes abandon them in the pressure of
circumstances, base themselves on the unevident, on divination and oracles and
all such things that bring ruin through hopes.
104 [Mel.] Difficult it is, we believe (know it well) to struggle against your
power and against Fortune, if She won’t be equal-handed. But nevertheless we
have faith that we will not be inferior in that Fortune that is from the divine,
because we are taking our stand as pious men against unjust men, and our
deficiency in power the alliance of the Spartans compensates, possessed of
compelling necessity—if not for another reason, for the sake of kinship and out
of shame they will help! So our boldness is not in every way irrational.
105 [Ath.] As regards divine favor, we do not think we will be deficient. For
we do not demand as our just right, or do, anything beyond what humans
believe about what pertains to the divine, or wish about themselves. (2) For we
hold, by opinion as regards the divine and clearly as regards the human, that
throughout everything by necessitated nature, one rules whatever one has power
over. And we neither laid down the law nor were the first to use it as laid down,
but we employ it, having accepted it as existing, and we will leave it as existing
in the future forever—knowing that you too, and the rest, if you came into the
same power as we have, would do the same. (3) And thus as regards the divine
we do not find it reasonable to fear that we will be bested.
As for the opinion about the Spartans, through which you have faith that
on account of shame they will help you, we bless you for your lack of experience
of evil, while we do not emulate your lack of prudence. (4) For the Spartans,
among themselves, and in regards to their native lawful customs, do indeed
employ virtue to the greatest degree. But as regards others, while there is much
that could be said that is relevant, in brief summary it should be made clear that
they—most manifestly of those we know—believe that the pleasant things are
the noble, and the expedient the just. And such a frame of mind is not favorable
to your present irrational notion of salvation.
106 [Mel.] But we, in accordance with this very consideration, are especially
putting our faith in what is expedient for them—that they would not wish to
abandon Melians who are their colonists, and thus make themselves distrusted
by Greeks who are well-disposed, while benefiting their enemies.
107 [Ath.] So then you do not think that on the one hand the expedient exists
together with safety, but that on the other hand the just and the noble are done
with risk?!—which the Spartans for the most part least dare.
108 [Mel.] But we hold that they will rather undertake the risks for our sake,
and will believe them less hazardous than in the case of others, inasmuch as we
lie closer to action on the Peloponnese, and are more trustworthy than others on
account of kinship of understanding.
109 [Ath.] What reveals reliability to allies is not the goodwill of those who
appeal to them, but rather if there is a great preponderance of power in relation
to the actions—which the Spartans take into consideration rather more than
others (at any rate, not trusting in their own forces, they go against their
neighbors with many allies), so that it is not likely that they will cross over to an
island while we are masters of the sea.
110 [Mel.] But they would have others they could send; and the Cretan sea is
large, making it more difficult for the dominators of it to capture than it is for
those wishing to elude them to do so safely. And if they should fail in this, they
would turn against your land and against your allies, as many as Brasidas did
not reach. And your trouble will be as much over what does not belong to you as
it will be concerning your own alliance and land.
111 [Ath.] Of these things, if something should come to pass, it would not be
to those lacking experience of them—nor to you as ignorant of the fact that
Athenians have never left off a single siege because of fear of others.
[2)[But it has sunk into our heart [thumos] that, while claiming to
deliberate about security, you have in fact not mentioned a thing, in so long a
discussion, that humans might trust in, to believe that they might be saved; but
the strongest things you have are things hoped for in the future, and what you
actually possess is too slight to enable you to prevail against the opposing forces
assembled. You manifest great irrationality in your thinking if, after dismissing
us, you still will not understand something that is more sensibly moderate than
these things.
[3[ For surely you will not have recourse to that shame which, in the
shameful—foreseeable—dangers, most destroys humans! For many, who foresee
still the things they are being carried toward, are lured on by so-called shame, by
the power of a seductive word, and are subdued by a phrase, in deed falling
voluntarily into incurable disasters, and acquiring in addition more shameful
shame, through mindlessness rather than fortune. [4[ This you, if you deliberate
well, will guard against, and will not believe it to be unbecoming to be bested by
the greatest city when it makes a measured invitation to become allies, keeping
what you have but subject to tribute; and, when you are given the choice
between war and security, do not out of love of victory choose the worse. For
those who do not give in to equals, but do nobly make way for those who are
superior, and are measured in their behavior towards those who are inferior, do
what is most correct.
[5] So consider also when we have stepped outside; and take it often to
heart [thumos] that you are deliberating about your one and only fatherland,
which will be set on good or bad fortune by this one council.
112 [1] And the Athenians left the discussions. But the Melians, after having
met among themselves, decided that they should respond pretty much as before,
and they answered as follows.
[2] “We are of the same opinion as at first, Athenians, and we will not in a
short time give up the liberty of a city that has now been inhabited for seven
hundred years; but entrusting it to the hitherto saving Fortune from the divine
and to the aiding retribution from humans, even the Spartans, we will try to save
ourselves.
[3] We propose to you that we be friends to you, but enemies to neither,
and that you depart from our land having made such treaty oaths as seem
satisfactory to both of us.”
113 The Melians thus replied. But the Athenians, quitting the conference now,
declared: “but then you alone, as you seem to us from these deliberations, judge
the things in the future to be clearer than the things seen, and the unevident you
see, by wishing, as having already come to pass; and having to the greatest
extent staked and put your faith in the Spartans, and in Fortune, and in hopes,
you will to the greatest extent fall!”
6.2 [1] It was settled in ancient time in the following way, and this was the entire
number of nations that held it.
Now the oldest that are said to have settled in any part of the land are
Cyclopes and Lastrygonians, of whom I do not have anything to say, as regards
either their race, nor from where they came, nor to where they went away. But let
it suffice what the poets have said, and as each may in some way knowingly
judge about them.
[2] After them, the Sicanoi are evidently the first to have settled, as they
themselves declare—and indeed before, on account of being born from the earth.
But as the truth will be found, they are Iberians, who were driven by the
Ligurians from the Sicanus river in Iberia. And the island was at that time called
after them “Sicania,” having been previously called “Trinacria.” And they still
dwell even now in the western parts of Sicily.
[3] But when Ilium was taken, some of the Trojans who were fleeing the
Achaeans in ships arrived in Sicily, and settling on the border of the Sicanians
were all called “Elymi,” and their polises “Eryx” and “Egesta.” And there dwelled
next to them some Phocians who, on the way back from Troy, had been driven
by storm first to Libya and then into Sicily.
[4] But the Sicels crossed over into Sicily from Italy (for they dwelled
there), fleeing the Opicians—as is likely and as is said—on rafts . . . . And Sicels
are still even now in Italy. And this land has its name from Italus, a certain king
of the Sicels: that is why it is named “Italy.” [5] Going into Sicily with a big army
they overcame the Sicanians in battle and drove them to the southern and
western parts of it, and made the island be called “Sicily” instead of “Sicania”;
and they dwelled there in possession of the best parts of the land, after they
crossed over, about three hundred years before the Greeks came into Sicily. And
still even now they hold the middle and the parts to the north of the island.
[6] And Phoenicians also settled walled-off promontories on the sea, and
neighboring islands, all around Sicily, for the sake of trade with the Sicels. But
when the many [hoi polloi] Greeks sailed in by sea, the Phoenicians left most such
places and settled together dwelling in Motya, Soloeis, and Panormus, trusting in
an alliance with the Elymi and because from there it was the shortest sail from
Sicily to Carthage.
So this was the number of the barbarians and how they settled Sicily.
6.3 [1] Of the Greeks, the first sailed from Euboean Chalcidice, with
Thucles as founder, and settled Naxos; and the altar of Apollo the Original
Leader, which is even now outside the polis, they set up—upon which, when the
observant envoys sail from Sicily, they first sacrifice. [2] The next year Archias of
the Heracleidae from Corinth settled Syracuse, having first driven the Sicels out
of the island, in which now, no longer surrounded by water, is situated the inner
city. . . .
6.6 [1] So many were the nations of Greeks and barbarians who inhabited
Sicily, being of so great a size, against which the Athenians were intent on
making an expedition—aiming, according to the truest allegation, at rule/empire
over the whole; but at the same time wishing to bring help, in a fair-seeming
way, to their own kin and to the allies they had acquired in addition. [2] But they
were especially moved by the envoys of the Egestans, who were present and
who with more eager spirits called upon them. . . . reminding the Athenians of
their alliance with the Leontines, they beseeched them to defend them by
sending ships, saying many other things but chiefly that if the Syracusans
became unpunished for their expulsion of the Leontines, and were to destroy the
remaining allies, then they would have the entire power of Sicily—presenting the
risk lest they at some time send a great army, as Dorians helping Dorians, to the
Peloponnesians who sent them out, and, together with the latter, tear down their
[the Athenians'] power; that it was sensibly moderate to oppose the Syracusans
with the remaining allies, especially since they would supply adequate money
for the war.
[From the speech of Nicias} 6.11 [6] “But it is necessary not to be elated at the
misfortunes of the opponents, but to be bold once you have mastered the
minds/thinking; and to consider that the Lacedaimonians do not have in view
anything other than how, in their shame, even now, if they are able, they might
bring us down and reestablish their present unseemly situation, inasmuch as
they most care, and for the longest time, for a reputation for virtue.”
6.15 [2] The expedition was urged with the most fervent spirit by Alcibiades son
of Cleinias, both wishing to oppose Nicias (since they were at variance in other
political matters and because the latter had made slanderous mention of him),
and especially because he desired to be general and hoped thereby to conquer
Sicily and also Carthage and at the same time to benefit his private interests
through becoming fortunate in money and in reputation. [3] For being esteemed
as deserving among the townsmen, he indulged desires beyond his means,

pertaining to horse-raising and other expenses. This indeed was later not the
least cause of the destruction of the city of Athens. [4] For the many feared the
greatness of his lawlessness in matters of his body as regarded his manner of life,
and also of his thinking as it emerged in each one of the things he did: they
became enemies to him as one who desired tyranny, and though he was superior
in his public management of what pertained to the war, each was offended by his
private practices, and, by turning things over to others, in no long time they
brought about the downfall of the city.
[Speech of Alcibiades 6.16.1ff.]: “It is both fitting for me, rather than others, Oh
Athenians, to rule (for it is necessary to begin here, since Nicias attacked me),
and at the same time, I believe that I am deserving. For those matters on account
of which I am decried bring repute to my ancestors and to me, and benefit to the
fatherland. [2] For the Greeks believed our city to be great, even beyond its
power, on account of my magnificent display in the Olympic festival—prior to
which they hoped its power to be cast down by war: because I won the victory,
and second place, and fourth place, and I furnished everything in a manner
worthy of victory. Now by convention such things are honorable, but from the
doing, power is at the same time inferred. [3] And as regards the other ways in
which I shine in the city, in equipping choruses or anything else, by nature this is
envied by the city-dwellers, but to strangers this is manifest strength. This
“mindlessness” is not useless: when someone by private expense benefits not
himself only, but also the city; [4] nor is it unjust for me, thinking highly of
myself, not to be equal, since also, when one does badly, he does not share
equally in his misfortune with anyone; but even as when we are in misfortune
we are not saluted in the marketplace, in a similar way, one should submit to
being looked down upon by those who are prospering; or else, let him distribute
equally, and then claim to deserve similar things. [5] But I know that such, and
whoever are foremost in some splendor, are painful in their own lifetime—
especially to those who are similar, and then also to others with whom they live;
but they leave behind human beings in the future claiming to be related, even
when they are not, and in their fatherland pride in them, not as alien or errant,
but as their own and the doers of noble things. [6] These are the things that I aim
at, and it is on account of these things that I am decried as regards my private
life; but look to see if, as regards public matters, I handle them worse than
another! For I put together, without any great risk or expense to you, the most
powerful forces of the Peloponnese, and compelled the Spartans to fight, staking
everything on one day—from which experience, even though they prevailed in
battle, they still have not yet recovered firm confidence!
[17.1] These are even the ways in which my 'youth' and my seemingly
'unnatural mindlessness' dealt with the Peloponnesian power, with fitting
arguments and with a passion that persuaded by instilling faith. So do not fear it;
but while I am yet at my peak with it, and Nicias seems to be in good fortune,
use, for your benefit, each of us.”
[18.2] “We and any others who have ruled acquired the empire thus,
eagerly coming to help when called by anyone, barbarians or Greeks; since, if we
should all keep quiet, or make ethnic judgments about whom we ought to help,
we would, by adding little in additional acquisition, risk rather what we have.
For one doesn’t merely defend against a superior when he attacks, but in this
way anticipates so that he will not attack; [3] and it is not for us to exercise
stewardship over as much as we wish to rule, but it is necessary, since we are in
this position, to plot against some and not to let go of others, on account of there
being a danger that we ourselves be ruled by others if we do not ourselves rule
over others. And you cannot regard remaining quiet in the same light as do
others, unless you change your practices similarly. [4] Calculating, then, that
these things would grow more if we were to attack those people, let us make the
voyage, so that we will lay low the thoughts of the Peloponnesians, by seeming
to look down upon quiet in the present, and sailing to Sicily—and thereby we
will either, with the addition of those there, be likely to rule over all Greece, or
we will at least harm Syracuse, by which we and our allies will be benefited. . . .
[6] just as our fathers, young deliberating together at the same time with old,
raised things to their present height, so now in the same way try to advance the
city; and consider that young and old without one another can do nothing, and
similarly the inferior, the middle-level, and the very subtle when they are mixed
would be especially strong; and the city, if it should remain quiet, will like
anything else by friction against itself be worn away, and its knowledge of
everything will grow old; but by always competing it will add new experience
and be accustomed to defend itself more, not in words but in deeds. [7] And in
sum I judge that a city that is not inactive would in my opinion most quickly be
corrupted by a change to inactivity, and those humans dwell most securely who
least vary in their politics as regards their customs and laws, even if those be
inferior.”
6.19 [2] And Nicias, judging that he could no longer turn them away with the
same arguments, but that he would perhaps make them reverse their position on
account of the greatness of the preparations, if he should insist on demanding
much, came before them again and said such things as the following: . . .
6.23 [4] “. . . Which very thing I fear, and thus know that with regard to
many matters we must deliberate well, and to an even greater extent must have
good fortune, which is difficult given that we are humans—and so I wish to sail
off having handed myself over to fortune as little as possible, having made
preparations that provide safety from every reasonably likely danger. For I
consider these things to be most reliable for the city as a whole, and preservation
for us on the expedition. . . .”
6.24 [1] Now Nicias for his part said so much, believing that by the
greatness of the affairs he would either turn away the Athenians, or, if he were
compelled to make the expedition, he would thus sail away in as safe a fashion
as possible. [2] But they for their part were not drawn away from their desire to
sail by the troublesomeness of the preparation, but rather were much more
incited; and it turned out exactly the contrary for him. For he was held to have
given good advice, on the basis of which there would now be great security. [3]
And eros fell upon all similarly to sail away: upon the elder because they
supposed they would either prevail over those against whom they sailed or
would in no way fall, with such a power; upon those in their prime, out of
longing for the sight and contemplation of what was not present, and in good
hope of salvation; and upon the great mass, the army, supposing they would get
money in the present and would acquire further power from whence they would
obtain everlasting pay. [4] The result was, that on account of the excessive desire
of the majority, if there were someone who was not in agreement, he remained
quiet, since he feared that if he voted against, he would be held to be ill disposed
in his mind to the city.
6. 30: . . . [1] But the Athenians themselves and any of the allies who were present
went down to the Piraeus at dawn on the appointed day and manned the ships
for sailing off. [2] And there went down with them the rest of the city’s
population, so to speak, both the inhabitants and the strangers: the former
sending off each their own—some their comrades, some their kin, some their
sons—with hope and at the same time with lamentations, the former on the
ground that they would acquire, the latter out of a doubt if they would ever see
one another again, having in mind how long a sailing voyage they were sending
them off on. And in this key moment, as they were taking leave of one another
under the threat of danger, the awesomeness of it penetrated them more than
when they had voted to sail. Nevertheless in their present strength their
confidence revived from the sight, on account of the size of each thing they saw.
The strangers and the rest of the mob came to the spectacle as to something
noteworthy and incredible to conceive of.
[31.1] For this first naval expedition was the most expensive and the most
splendid Greek power that ever in that time had come from one city. [2] But in
number of ships and of heavy infantry, both the expedition under Pericles
against Epidaurus and the same under Hagnon against Potideia were not
inferior.. . . [3] . . . and each one was eager in spirit to the utmost that his ship
would especially excel by some decoration and by swiftness of sailing; and the
land troops were selected from the best contingents, and competed with one
another with great seriousness as regards arms and all bodily equipment. [4]
And it came about that there was a contest among themselves, in whatever post
each was assigned, and it was more like a display of power and wealth before
the other Greeks, than a preparation for war. [5] For if one were to calculate the
public outlay of the city and the private outlay of the soldiers—of the city how
much it had already spent beforehand, and what it had assigned to the generals
to have, and of the private individuals what one expended on his own body and
what the commander of a trireme on his ship, and what they were going to
spend, and in addition the funds, apart from the public pay to be received, that
each was preparing to spend on an expedition that was going to last a long time,
and everything that for barter each soldier or merchant sailed away with—many
talents would be found to be the total carried away from the city. [6] The force
was talked about abroad no less on account of astonishment at its daring, and its
splendor to behold, as on account of its overwhelming force in comparison to
those against whom it was launched, and because it represented the longest
voyage from home and embodied the greatest hopes for the future in comparison
with what at present they possessed.
[32.1] And when the ships were manned to sail, and everything had been
put aboard that they were going to take with them, silence was signaled by the
trumpet; and the lawful prayers prior to weighing anchor were offered up, not
ship by ship, but all together, led by a herald: throughout the entire army the
marines and the officers, having mixed bowls of wine, employed golden and
silver cups to pour libations. [2] The rest of the crowd joined in the prayer from
shore—citizens and anyone present who wished well to them. Having sung the
paean [the sacred song to Apollo] and having completed the rites of libation,
they weighed anchor, and, at first sailing out in a column, they then raced as far
as Aegina.
[From the speech of Hermocrates] 6.33 [4] “nor is their coming against us with a
large force without benefit, but in regard to the rest of the Siceliots it is much
better (for being stunned, they’ll be more willing to ally with us), and if then we
either prevail over them [the Athenians], or send them away having not achieved
what they aimed at (for I am not afraid that they will happen to achieve the
things they expect), it will turn out to be the most noble of deeds for us—and not
un-hoped for by me at least. . . . [5] . . . and if through lack of resources for their
supplies in a foreign land they fall, they will leave behind a name for those they
plotted against, even if they failed more on account of themselves. [6] This very
thing happened to these very Athenians: when the Persians fell in a big way
contrary to reasonable expectation, because it was Athens that they went against,
her name grew; and for such a thing to happen to us is not without hope.”
[From the speech of Athenagoras] 6.38 [2] “And I fear lest they, having tried
many times, will someday succeed. For we are bad at guarding, before we have
suffered, and, having detected, going out on the attack. [3] Now indeed it is on
account of these things that our city is rarely at rest, and that many civil wars and
contests against itself, no less than against enemies, arise—and sometimes
tyrannies and unjust dynastic oligarchies. [4] Concerning which I will try—if you
are willing to follow—to watch out that in our time no such will come to pass: by
persuading you the many [hoi polloi] and punishing the devisers of such things,
not only when they are caught in the act (for it is difficult to happen upon them)
but even concerning what they wish but are unable to do; for one must defend
oneself against the foe not only as regards the things he does, but also against his
intention, if one is not to be the first to suffer, through failure to anticipate; and as
regards the few, exposing them by refutation, and keeping up a guard, and
teaching them. For it is my opinion that thus especially will they be deterred
from evildoing. [5] And indeed, I ask what often I have asked myself: ‘What do
you want, you younger fellows? Is it to rule? That is not lawful! And the law has
denied you honorable office because you are incapable rather than because you
are capable! Or is it that you don’t want an equal lawful share with the many?
And how is it just that men who are the same should not deserve the same
things?’
[39.1] Someone will claim that democracy is neither practically intelligent
nor equal, but that those who possess property are also best at ruling in the best
way. But I assert that, in the first place, the people (demos) is the name for the
whole, while oligarchy is a name for a part; and then, that while the rich are the
best guardians of property, and the practically intelligent are the best at
deliberating, the many are the best at judging after they have listened: and these
both severally and collectively have equal shares in a similar way in democracy.
[2] But oligarchy gives a share in the risks to the many while as regards the
benefits, it not only takes more than its share but takes everything. And that is
what the powerful and the young among you eagerly desire—things that are
impossible to attain in a great city.”
6.54 [5-6] Nor was the rule in other respects oppressive to the many, but it was
maintained without arousing envious resentment. And these, tyrants, practiced
virtue and intelligence to the highest degree; and, levying an income tax of five
per cent on the Athenians, they beautifully adorned their city, and in a
distinguished fashion carried on wars and sacrificed in the temples. In other
regards the city itself employed the previously established laws, except
inasmuch that they took care that always one of their own held ruling office.
6.55 [5] Nor in my opinion would Hippias ever have easily seized the tyranny, if
Hipparchus had died while ruler, and he had on the same day established
himself. No, it was by the habitual fear instilled in the citizens, and the discipline
in the bodyguard that he got the upper hand with abundant security . . .
For they hoped that if even a few were daring, then even those who were
not before in the know, having weapons, would on the spot be willing to liberate
themselves along with them.
[From the speech of Alcibiades] 6.89 [3] “Or if someone should believe me the
worse on account of the fact that I have been on the side of the populace (demos),
let him not suppose that he is correctly offended on that ground. [4] For we were
always in the past at odds with the tyrants (and everyone who is opposed to
dynastic authority gets the name of being on the side of the populace), and for
that reason the leadership of the majority has remained ours. Besides, since the
city was democratically ruled, it was for the most part a necessity to follow along
with the given state of affairs. [5] But we did try in politics to bring more
measure into the characteristic lack of restraint. There have been, however,
others in former times and still now who have led the mob toward more evil
courses; and they were the ones who drove me out. [6] But we were the leaders
of the whole, counting it just to preserve the form in which the city
happened/chanced to be greatest and most free, and in which it had been
handed down (since what democracy is, we who are at all prudent know, and I
not the least, to such an extent that I might speak abusively of it; but there is
nothing original to be said about what is agreed to be folly/mindlessness) and it
was not in our opinion safe to transform it with you as enemies at the gates. . . .
6.92 [2] And I do not deserve to be considered worse by anyone among

you if, seeming at one time to be a dear friend of my city, I now, together with
the worst enemies to she who is mine, am on the attack in full command of
myself; nor does my speech deserve to be suspected as animated by the exile’s
spirited zeal. [3] For I am an exile from the wickedness of those who drove me
out, and not from your benefit—if you will be persuaded by me. And the greater
enemies are not those who, like you, harm their enemies, but those who compel
their friends to become enemies. [4] And as for dear friendship to the city, it does
not obtain insofar as I am done injustice, but insofar as I participated in the city’s
political life with security. Nor do I consider that I am now going against a
fatherland that still exists, but much rather that I am re-acquiring one that at
present does not exist. And that man is correctly a dear friend of the city who,
instead of failing to attack when he has been unjustly deprived of his own,
attempts to recover it using every means on account of his desire. [5] Thus I
claim to deserve that you, Oh Spartans, use me without anxiety, in danger and in
every hardship . . .”
7.18 [2] But strength especially came upon the Spartans because they believed
that since the Athenians had a double war, against them and the Sicilians, they
would be easily overthrown; and because they held that it was they themselves
who had previously broken the treaty: for in the previous war the violation of
law had been more theirs, because the Thebans invaded Plataea in time of treaty,
and, although it was stated in the previous agreement that weapons were not to
be taken up if they were willing to give judicial satisfaction, they had failed to
heed the Athenians’ invitation to a judicial resolution. And on account of this
they believed that they had quite reasonably experienced bad fortune, and they
so took to heart [thumos] the disaster at Pylos and any other that had occurred. . .
. [3] so now the Spartans, believing that the violation of law which had
previously been their guilt, had now been turned around and fell on the
Athenians, were eager in spirit [thumos] for the war. . . .
[From paraphrase of speech of Nicias 7.48]: [3] For he knew well that the
Athenians, when they had not voted to withdraw, would not accept these things
from them. For the vote would not be taken by men concerning themselves, and
seeing affairs, as they were doing, and forming their judgment without hearing
harsh criticism from others, but it would be in a situation where they would hear
someone slandering with speech to good effect, and on this basis persuading
them. [4] And he declared that even many or the majority of the soldiers who
were present, now clamoring about the terrible conditions they are in, when they
got back there would clamor to just the contrary effect—that the generals led
them away betrayed for money. Therefore he, for his part at any rate, knowing
the natures of the Athenians, did not want to die under a disgraceful indictment
and unjustly rather than at the hand of the enemies, if he had to, taking the risk
of suffering this private end.
7.50 [4] And when, being prepared, they were on the point of sailing away, the
moon was eclipsed; for it happened/chanced to be full. And the Athenians, most
of them, bade the generals hold off, having taken it to heart [thumos]; and Nicias
(for he was somewhat too inclined to being divinely inspired [or: communicating
with gods—see 2.75.1 and 8.1.1] and such) declared that there could not even be
deliberation about moving before—as the soothsayers prescribed—they had
stayed thrice nine days. And on account of this there came about for the
Athenians, as they delayed, the stay.
7.55 [1] Victory for the Syracusans now having become splendidly evident also at
sea (for before they feared the fleet that had come with Demosthenes), the
Athenians were in total despondency [lit., loss of thumos] and their
disappointment in rational calculation great, and much greater still their regret at
the expedition. [2] For these cities alone were at the time they went against them
of the same character, being democratically governed like themselves, and strong
in ships and horses and size, so that they were not able either to introduce
discord among them by some change in the regime, by which they might bring
them over, or to gain the upper hand by much in equipment; but having failed in
most respects, and previously before these events having been at a loss, when
now they were bested even at sea, which they had not thought, they were so to a
much greater degree.
7.56 [2] – 57 [1] The Syracusans . . . were no longer making efforts simply to save
themselves, . . . but they believed—what was in fact the case—that affairs were in
the present circumstances much superior for them, and that if they would be able
to defeat the Athenians and their allies on both land and sea, the victory in the
contest would be noble for them among the Greeks; for the rest of the Greeks
would be at once either given their freedom or liberated from fear; . . . and they
themselves, being opined to be the causes, would be much admired by the rest of
human beings and by those to come in the future. . . .
For so many were the numbers on each side who made war at Syracuse
against Sicily and on behalf of Sicily—coming to help acquire the land and
helping to save it: taking their stand not so much in accordance with justice in
any way or with ethnic kinship with one another, but on account of the fortune
of each, in accordance with advantage or by compulsion of necessity. [several
pages of the catalogue of 53 peoples follows]
7.59 [1-2] . . . So many were the allied forces that gathered on each side; and at
this time all were present for both, and no more came for either.
And the Syracusans reasonably believed that it would be a noble outcome
of the contest for them . . .
7.61 (Speech of Nicias, opening): “Men who are soldiers of the Athenians and
also of the rest of the allies, the impending contest will be in common similarly
for all about survival and the fatherland of each, no less than it will be so for the
enemies. . . .
63 [3] . . . and take to heart how much the pleasure deserves to be
preserved of being admired throughout Greece, which is enjoyed by you who
have for some time held yourself by convention to be Athenians, though you are
not, on account of your knowledge of our dialect and by your imitation of our
ways; and you have shared in the benefit of our empire no less, as regards being
intimidating to the subjects—and as regards not being done injustice you have
shared much more. [4] Consequently, since you alone shared, in a free way, with
us in the empire you ought justly not to betray it . . ..”
7.70 [7] And there was much urging and shouting from either side to the
boatswains, concerning their art and the present longing for victory—the
Athenians shouting, to force by violence a way to sail out, and about the safe
return to the fatherland, how now if ever they must with an eager spirit seize it;
the Syracusans and allies, that it would be noble to prevent them from fleeing,
and that victory would exalt the fatherland belonging to each. . . .
71 [1] The armies on the land, so long as the sea battle remained equally
balanced, underwent much conflict and tension in judgment, the locals longing
for a victory that would increase their nobility, while the invaders feared lest
they would fare even worse than at present. [2] For with everything depending
on the ships, the Athenians’ fear was like nothing else . . . if some should see
their own side prevailing anywhere, they were emboldened and turned to calling
upon the gods not to deprive them of salvation; but those seeing any defeat
indulged in lamentation with outcries, and by the sight of what was being done
and the judgment on it were more cast down in servitude than those in the
action.
72 [1] The naval battle having thus been so intense, with many ships and
human beings destroyed on either side, the Syracusans and the allies prevailed,
and took up the wrecks and the corpses and, sailing away to the city, set up a
trophy. [2] But the Athenians, on account of the greatness of their present evils,
did not even think to ask for permission to take up their corpses or wrecks, but
deliberated on departing immediately in the night.
7.75 [3] For since the corpses remained unentombed, whenever someone saw one
of his comrades lying there, he was plunged into pain together with fear; and the
yet living who were to be left behind because they were wounded and weak
were much more painful than the dead, and more wretched than those who had
been destroyed; . . . [4] as their tent-mates departed, these clung to them and
followed as long as they were able, until the strength and the body failed, when,
not without a few appeals to the gods and lamentations, they fell behind: so that
the entire army was filled with tears and was so much at a loss as to be hardly
able to get away . . .. [7] For this was the greatest reversal that ever came to pass
for a Greek army: having come to enslave others, they now were instead
departing in fear lest that very thing happen to themselves, and instead of the
prayers and paeans with which they sailed out, were departing with the
contrary, imprecations of ill omen . . .”
[From the speech of Nicias—the last oration in the whole work—7.77.1-4]: “Still
even in the present circumstances, Oh Athenians and allies, we ought to have
hope: for some have before been saved even from more terrible circumstances
than such as these; nor ought you to blame yourselves too much, either for the
misfortunes or for the present sufferings, that are contrary to what is deserved. I
too, though I am superior to none of you in strength (but you see surely what
condition I am in on account of the illness), nor surely am opined to be inferior to
none in good fortune as regards private life and the rest, nevertheless am caught
in the same danger as are the meanest. And indeed I have spent my life in many
lawful duties to the gods and in many acts of justice, that are not provocative of
jealousy, to humans. In return for these, hope is commensurably bold as regards
the future, and the misfortunes are not fearsome as deserved. And probably they
will abate. For fortune has sufficiently favored the enemy, and if in making this
expedition we aroused the jealousy of one of the gods, we have now suffered
such retribution as expiates. For surely some others before, having attacked
others, and done what is all too human, have suffered what is endurable. And it
is now reasonable for us to hope that we will have gentler treatment from the
gods (for we are now more deserving of pity than of jealousy) . . .. [7] . . . and the
others of you will happen upon what you desire, presumably, to see; while the
Athenians will raise up again the great power of the city, even though now
fallen; for it is men who are the city, and not walls or ships empty of men.”
7.79 [3] There happened to occur some claps of thunder and rain, such as is usual
as the year turns to autumn, from which the Athenians became still more
hopeless [without thumos], believing that these things too were for their
destruction.
[Thucydides’ eulogy of Nicias] 7.86 [5] And he died for such a reason, or very
near to such; being the least deserving of all the Greeks of my time of coming to
this extent of misfortune, on account of his complete practice of conventional
virtue.
8.1 [1] When they knew, they were harsh with those of the orators who had joined in
being eager in spirit for the naval expedition—as if they themselves had not voted
it!—and they were in a rage at the deliverers of oracles and the prophets, and
whoever used divine revelation to arouse their hopes that they would take Sicily. [2]
And all things on every side pained them, and fear and indeed the greatest
consternation surrounded them at what had come to pass. For being deprived,
simultaneously each in private and the city, of many hoplites and cavalry and of a
youth such as they saw no longer to pertain to them, they were weighed down; and,
at the same time, not seeing sufficient ships in the docks, nor money in the common
treasury, nor crews for the ships, they were for the present without hope of being
saved, but they believed that their enemies would sail immediately from Sicily with
their fleet to the Peiraeus, especially as they had so prevailed, and their enemies
before them would now become doubly equipped in all ways and set upon them in
strength on land and sea, and that their own allies would revolt and join with them.
[3] Nevertheless, it seemed to them that in their circumstances they ought not
to give in, but to prepare even a fleet, obtaining wood and money wherever they
could, and securing matters with the allies, especially Euboea, and to moderate in an
economical way expenses somewhat as regards the affairs of the city, and to elect a
certain magistracy of elder men, who would take preliminary counsel about present
affairs as was timely. And as is the way dear to the populace, they were ready, in
light of the immediate fear surrounding them, to set in good order everything.
8.8 [1] So Calligeitus and Timagoras, on behalf of Pharnabazus, did not share in the
expedition to Chios, nor did they give the money, twenty-five talents, that they came
with for the expedition, but made it their intention to sail with another force later by
themselves. [2] But Agis, when he saw the Spartans eager to go first to Chios, did
not himself judge otherwise; but when the allies assembled at Corinth, they
deliberated, and it was decided, first, to sail to Chios having as commander
Chalcideus, who was preparing the five ships in Laconia; and then, to go to Lesbos,
having as commander Alcamenes, whom Agis had intended to appoint; and finally,
to reach the Hellespont (there Clearchus son of Ramphias had already been
appointed commander), but [3] first to cross the isthmus [of Corinth] with half the
ships . . . [9.1] But the Corinthians, although the others urged them to sail, were not
eager in spirit to sail with them before the festival of the Isthmian games, which
were held at that time, had been celebrated. And Agis was ready to agree that they
should not break the Isthmian Truce, while he made the expedition his own private
affair. [2] The Corinthians, however, would not agree, and delay ensued, and the
Athenians perceived better what the Chians were about . . ..
8.18 [1] (From the Treaty): “On the following terms an alliance with the King and
Tissaphernes has been made by the Spartans and their allies:
1. Whatever land and polises the King [of Persia] holds, or the forefathers
of the King held, are to belong to the King . . .
8.24 [3] And after this the Chians for their part no longer sallied forth, and the
[Athenians] ravaged the land, which was beautifully stocked and had suffered
nothing from the time of the Persian wars until this time. [4] For the Chians alone, of
those whom I have directly observed—together with the Spartans—were at the
same time happy and moderate; and the more their city advanced for them towards
greatness, in the same proportion the more securely they brought order to
themselves. [5] And not even in the case of this revolt, if they seem in this to have
acted contrary to what was more safe, did they dare to do it before they were about
to run the risk with numerous and good allies, and having perceived that the
Athenians did not even themselves deny that after the Sicilian disaster affairs were
for them certainly in a bad way. And if they fell to an extent into what is humanly
unexpected in life, they shared the mistake in judgment with many who were of the
same opinion, that the affairs of the Athenians would swiftly be overthrown.
8.27 [5] And he seemed/was reputed, not in the present instance more than later,
nor in this alone, but in as many other matters as Phrynichus took a stand in, not
to be without intelligence.
8.40 [2] For the slaves of the Chians are many, and have come to be the most in any
city except Sparta, and at the same time, on account of their number, are punished
harshly for their injustices; and when the Athenian army seemed firmly established
with its wall, at once many attempted to desert to them—and, having knowledge of
the land, these did the greatest evil.
8.43 [3] And Lichas especially looked into what had been done, and declared that
neither of the treaties, neither that of Chalcideus nor that of Therimenes, had been
framed in a noble fashion, but that it was a terrible thing if whatever land the King
and his ancestors had ruled before, they should claim now to rule over—for that
implied that the islands would again be enslaved, as well as Thessaly, and Locri,
and everything as far Boeotia, and, instead of liberty, the Spartans would be setting
up a Persian empire over the Greeks! [4] He urged therefore that they make better
treaties, or that at any rate they would not abide by these, nor did they need any
supplies on these terms. But Tissaphernes, for his part, left without accomplishing
anything and complaining in anger at these things.
8.45 [4] And when the cities begged for money, he [Alcibiades] drove them away,
retorting himself on behalf of Tissaphernes that the Chians were shameless, since
while being the richest of the Greeks they nevertheless claimed to deserve to be
saved by outside hired help, and to have others risk their bodies and property for
the sake of their liberty. [5] And he declared that the other cities were committing
injustice, if, having paid tribute to Athens before they revolted, they were not
willing now to contribute as much or more on their own behalves.
8.47 [1] Alcibiades gave this advice both to the King and to Tissaphernes, when
he was with them, believing it to be the best, and at the same time, caring for the
restoration of himself to his fatherland—knowing, that if he did not destroy it, it
would be possible for him at some time through persuasion to come back. And
he believed that he would be especially persuasive in this way: if Tissaphernes
was evidently on good terms with him. Which is indeed what came to pass.
[2] For when the soldiers of Athens at Samos perceived that he had strong
influence with Tissaphernes, with Alcibiades on the one hand sending messages
to the most powerful among them so that they would speak of him to the best of
the persons, to the effect that he wished to come back and to make Tissaphernes
their friend, on the basis of oligarchy and not on the basis of that wickedness and
democracy that had cast him out, and, on the other hand, more on their own
initiative, the trierarchs and the most powerful of the Athenians at Samos were
bent on dissolving the democracy.
48 [1] This was set in motion earlier in the army camp, and from there
later in the city. When certain ones crossed over from Samos to Alcibiades and
had a conference with him, and he held out to them that he would make first
Tissaphernes, and then also the King, a friend, if there were not a democracy (for
thus the King would put more trust in them), the powerful/capable among the
citizens, who especially were burdened, had many hopes for themselves, that
they would turn affairs over to themselves and prevail against the enemies.
[2] And going to Samos they brought together into a sworn conspiracy the
suitable ones among the humans, and said openly before the many that the King
would be their friend and provide money if Alcibiades came back and they
ceased being under a democracy. [3] And the mob, even if they were somewhat
irritated at what was being done at present, kept quiet on account of the
likelihood of the hope of pay from the King. But those who were putting together
the oligarchy, when they had made the majority their partner, once again among
themselves and the majority of their political clique considered what had been
communicated from Alcibiades.
[4] And to the rest it appeared easy to effect and trustworthy, but to
Phrynichus, who was still general, none of it was pleasing. Rather, he said that
Alcibiades seemed to him (which was indeed the case) to be no more wanting an
oligarchy than a democracy, but to be considering nothing else except by what
way he might, by changing the city from its present ordering, come back after
being called by his associates; and that what ought to be looked after by them
was how they might most avoid civil strife.
8.53 [1] And the envoys sent with Peisander from Samos, having arrived at
Athens, made speeches to the populace summarizing many things, but especially
to the effect that it would be possible for them, if they recalled Alcibiades and no
longer carried on the democracy in the same way, to have the King as an ally and
to prevail over the Spartans. [2] Many others spoke in opposition, as regards the
democracy; and the enemies of Alcibiades shouted out that it would be a terrible
thing if he who had violently defied the laws should come back; while the
Eumolpidean order of priests and the Cerycean order of priests bore witness
against him in regard to the Mystery rites, on account of which he had been
banished, and prohibited his being brought back in the name of the divine. And
Peisander came forward, and in the face of much speech in opposition and
abuse, took each one of the opponents aside and asked what hope he had of
salvation for the city, when Peloponnesian ships no fewer than their own
confronted them at sea, together with a larger number of allied cities, with the
King and Tissaphernes supplying them with money, which they themselves no
longer had, if someone did not persuade the King to change his stand to their
side. [3] And when, being asked, they had nothing to say, then he plainly said to
them that “This will not come to pass for us, if we do not carry on politics in a
more moderate fashion and if we do not put the offices into the hands of a few,
in order that the King trust us more; and if we do not at present cease
deliberating more about the political regime than about salvation (for later it will
be possible for us to change, if something does not please) and if we do not bring
back Alcibiades, who alone of those existing now has the power to effect this.”
55 [1] And the populace at first, when they heard, took harshly the
business about the oligarchy; but when they had been plainly taught by
Peisander that there was no other salvation, fearing and at the same time hoping
later they would make a change, they gave in.
[Thucydides’ estimation of the best regime in Athens during his lifetime] 8.97: . .
. they called an assembly . . . in which they put to an end the regime of the four
hundred and elected the five thousand, to whom they handed over affairs. All
were to belong to the five thousand who could supply their own heavy armor
and weapons; and no one was to receive money for holding office, under penalty
of being made accursed. Numerous other assemblies were later held, in which
they voted for supervisors of the law and other matters pertaining to this
constitutional regime. And to no small extent, for the first time, in my lifetime at
least, the Athenians were evidently well-governed. For a measured mixture as
regards the few and the many came into being, and this was what first raised the
city up from the bad affairs that had come to pass. And they voted to recall
Alcibiades and others with him; and, sending to that man and to the army in
Samos, they bid them to take hold of affairs.

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Selected Passages from Thucydides

(Translated by Thomas Pangle)

[First use of word for “justice’ in the book:]

[Speech of Athenians at Sparta] 1.73 [1] “. . . not unreasonably do we possess

1.93 [Themistocles ] believed the Piraeaus to be a noble spot on account of having

who shares in the knowledge and whose mind is well-disposed is likely to

[2] If I must say something in regard to woman’s virtue, as it pertains to as

ambassadors to them, achieved nothing. [3] Being at a loss in their judgment on

[4] I sum up in one word: Be persuaded by me and do the just things to

From the Hymn/Prelude [Prooimion] to Apollo

[next lines, omitted by Th.:]

[line 165] But come, be gracious Apollo, together with Artemis,

[next line, omitted by Th.]

[From Brasidas’s programmatic speech, first delivered at Acanthus]

86 The presiding Melians replied: “The equitableness of teaching one another

88 [Mel.] It is likely and understandable that those in a situation such as this

90 [Mel.] On which basis we at least believe it is expedient (this is necessary,

91 [Ath.] But we are not disheartened [without thumos] on account of the

92 [Mel.] And how could it be expedient for us to be enslaved, as it is also for

94 [Mel.] So then you wouldn’t accept us dwelling at rest, being friends

99 [Ath.] No, because we do not believe to be so terrible for us those who

103 [Ath.] Hope, however, as an encouragement in danger, does not destroy,

as deserving among the townsmen, he indulged desires beyond his means,

6.92 [2] And I do not deserve to be considered worse by anyone among

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