33. Avera vs. Garcia, 42 Phil.

145 (marginal signatures) – GUEVARRA

DOCTRINE: MARGINAL SIGNATURES; USE OF RIGHT MARGIN

A will otherwise properly executed in accordance with the requirements of existing law is not
rendered invalid by the fact that the paginal signatures of the testator and attesting witnesses
appear in the right margin instead of the left.

The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith
and fraud, to avoid substitution of will and testaments and to guarantee their truth and authenticity.
Therefore the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial
ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the
law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation already
given assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more
requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the testator's last will, must be
disregarded.

FACTS:

Eutiquia Avera filed a petition for the probate of the will of one Esteban Garcia, contest was made by
Marino Garcia and Juan Rodriguez, the latter in the capacity of guardian for the minors Jose Garcia
and Cesar Garcia. Upon the date appointed for the hearing, the proponent of the will introduced one
of the three attesting witnesses who testified that the will was executed with all necessary external
formalities, and that the testator was at the time in full possession of disposing faculties. Upon the
latter point the witness was corroborated by the person who wrote the will at the request of the
testator. Two of the attesting witnesses were not introduced, nor was their absence accounted for
by the proponent of the will.

When the proponent rested, the attorney for the opposition introduced a single witness whose
testimony tended to show in a vague and indecisive manner that at the time the will was made the
testator was so debilitated as to be unable to comprehend what he was about.

After the cause had been submitted for determination upon the proof thus presented, the trial judge
found that the testator at the time of the making of the will was of sound mind and disposing
memory and that the will had been properly executed. He accordingly admitted the will to probate.

ISSUES:

Whether the will in question is rendered invalid by reason of the fact that the signature of the
testator and of the three attesting witnesses are written on the right margin of each page of the
will instead of the left margin.

RULING: NO. The will remains valid.

The instrument now before us contains the necessary signatures on every page, and the only point
of deviation from the requirement of the statute is that these signatures appear in the right margin
instead of the left. By the mode of signing adopted every page and provision of the will is
authenticated and guarded from possible alteration in exactly the same degree that it would have
been protected by being signed in the left margin; and the resources of casuistry could be exhausted
without discovering the slightest difference between the consequences of affixing the signatures in
one margin or the other.

The controlling considerations on the point now before us were well stated  In Re will of Abangan (40
Phil., 476, 479), where the court, speaking through Mr. Justice Avanceña, in a case where the
signatures were placed at the bottom of the page and not in the margin, said:

The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against
bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of will and testaments and to guarantee their truth
and authenticity. Therefore the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as
to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the
fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to
make a will. So when an interpretation already given assures such ends, any other
interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely
unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the testator's last will, must be disregarded.

In the case before us, where ingenuity could not suggest any possible prejudice to any person, as
attendant upon the actual deviation from the letter of the law, such deviation must be considered
too trivial to invalidate the instrument.

34. Icasiano vs. Icasiano, L-18979, June 30, 1964 (liberality rule on signatures on every page) –
GUEVARRA

DOCTRINE: LIBERALITY RULE; SIGNATURES ON EVERY PAGE

The inadvertent failure of an attesting witness to affix his signature to one page of a testament, due
to the simultaneous lifting of two pages in the course of signing, is not per se sufficient to justify
denial of probate. The law should not be strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix
on account of the inadvertence of a single witness over whose conduct she has no control of. Where
the purpose of the law is to guarantee the identity of the testament and its component pages, and
there is no intentional or deliberate deviation existed.

FACTS:

Celso Icasiano filed a petition for the probate of the alleged will of Villacorte and for his appointment
as executor thereof to which Natividad and Enrique, children of Icasiano filed their opposition. They
petitioned individually that they should be the special administrator. The probate court admitted the
will and it’s duplicate as the true last will of Villacorte and appointed Celso Icasiano as the executor.
The oppositors Natividad Icasiano and Enrique Icasiano appealed directly to the Supreme Court, the
amount involved being over P200,000 in the year 1959 on the ground that the same is contrary to
law and evidence. Records showed that the original will does not contain the signature of one of the
attesting witnesses, Atty. Natividad on page three out of the five pages, but the duplicate copy
attached is signed by the attesting witness. Witness Natividad admits that he may have lifted two
pages instead of one when he signed the same. The oppositors also contended that the signatures of
the testatrix in the duplicate are not genuine nor were they written or affixed on the same occasion
as the original and that they were executed through mistake and with undue influence and pressure
because the testatrix was deceived into adopting as her last will and testament the wishes of those
who will stand to benefit from the provisions of the will.

ISSUES:

Whether the failure of one of the subscribing witnesses to affix his signature to a page is sufficient to
deny probate of the will.

RULING: NO.

The failure to sign was entirely through pure oversight or mere inadvertence. Since the duplicated
bore the required signatures, this proves that the omission was not intentional. Even if the original is
in existence, a duplicate may still be admitted to probate since the original is deemed to be
defective, then in law, there is no other will but the duly signed carbon duplicate and the same can
be probated.

The law should not be strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on account of the
inadvertence of a single witness over whose conduct she has no control of. Where the purpose of
the law is to guarantee the identity of the testament and its component pages, and there is no
intentional or deliberate deviation existed.

This would not be the first time that this Court departs from a strict and literal application of the
statutory requirements, where the purposes of the law are otherwise satisfied. Thus, despite the
literal tenor of the law, this Court has held that a testament, with the only page signed at its foot by
testator and witnesses, but not in the left margin, could nevertheless be probated (Abangan vs.
Abangan, 41 Phil. 476); and that despite the requirement for the correlative lettering of the pages of
a will, the failure to mark the first page either by letters or numbers is not a fatal defect (Lopez vs.
Liboro, 81 Phil. 429). These precedents exemplify the Court's policy to require satisfaction of the
legal requirements in order to guard against fraud and bad faith but without undue or
unnecessary curtailment of the testamentary privilege.