Efren Pana vs. Heirs of Juanite, Sr.

G.R. No. 164201

December 10, 2012
Facts:

 The prosecution accused Efren Pana, his wife, Melencia and others of murder and eventually a decision was
rendered acquitting Efren of the charge for insufficiency of evidence but finding Melencia and another person guilty
as charged and was sentenced to death and ordered those found guilty to pay each of the heirs of the victims of civil
indemnity, moral damages and actual damages.
 Supreme Court affirmed RTC’s decision but modified the penalty to Reclusion Perpetua and awarded civil indemnity
and moral damages but deleted actual damages for lack of evidentiary basis and replaced it with temperate
damages and exemplary damages.
 Upon motion for execution by the heirs of the deceased, the RTC ordered the issuance of the writ resulting in the
levy of real properties registered in the names of Efren and Melecia. Subsequently, a notice of levy and a notice of
sale on execution were issued.
 Efren and his wife Melecia filed a motion to quash the writ of execution claiming that the properties levied were
conjugal assets and not paraphernal properties of Melecia.
 RTC denied the motion. The spouses moved for reconsideration but the RTC denied the same.
 Efren filed a petition for certiorari before the CA claiming that RTC abused its discretion. The CA dismissed the
petition. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: WON the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melecia can be levied and executed upon for the satisfaction
of Melecia’s civil liability in the aforesaid murder case.

Held: YES.

The SC stated that in order to determine whether the obligation of the wife arising from her criminal liability is
chargeable against the properties of the marriage, it must first identify the spouses’ property relations.

In this case, it is submitted that Efren and Melencia were married when the Civil Code was still in effect. They did not
execute a pre-nuptial agreement, hence CPG governed their property relations.

But, both RTC and CA held that since there was no prenuptial agreement between Efren and Melecia, their property
regime changed into absolute community of property when the Family code took effect. It reasoned out that Art. 256 of
the Family Code provides that the Code shall have retroactive effect in so far as it does not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. (Since none of the spouses are dead, no vested rights
have been acquired by each other over the properties of the community)

The SC stated that the lower courts erred. It stated that while it is true that the personal stakes of each spouse in their
conjugal assets are inchoate or unclear prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership of gains and, therefore, none
of them can be said to have acquired vested rights in specific assets, it is evident that Article 256 of the Family Code
does not intend to reach back and automatically convert into absolute community of property relation all conjugal
partnerships of gains that existed before 1988 excepting only those with prenuptial agreements.

The Family Code itself provides in Article 76 that marriage settlements cannot be modified except prior to marriage.

Art. 76. In order that any modification in the marriage settlements may be valid, it must be made before the
celebration of the marriage, subject to the provisions of Articles 66, 67, 128, 135 and 136.
The SC stated that the conjugal partnership of gains that governed the marriage between Efren and Melecia who
were married prior to 1988 cannot be modified except before the celebration of that marriage.

Post-marriage modification of such settlements can take place only where: (a) the absolute community or conjugal
partnership was dissolved and liquidated upon a decree of legal separation; (b) the spouses who were legally
separated reconciled and agreed to revive their former property regime; (c) judicial separation of property had been
had on the ground that a spouse abandons the other without just cause or fails to comply with his obligations to the
family; (d) there was judicial separation of property under Article 135; (e) the spouses jointly filed a petition for the
voluntary dissolution of their absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains. None of these circumstances
exists in the case of Efren and Melecia.

To automatically change the marriage settlements of couples who got married under the CC into ACP in 1988 when the
FC took effect would be to impair their acquired vested rights to such separate properties. What is clear is that Efren and
Melecia were married under the CC. The presumption, absent any evidence to the contrary, is that they were married
under the regime of CPG. Art. 119 of CC states that: “The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon
absolute or relative community of property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. In the
absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership
of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the property relations between husband and wife.”

However, the FC contains terms governing CPG that supersede the terms of the CPG under the CC. Thus, the Court must
refer to the FC in deciding WON the conjugal properties of Efren and Melecia may be held to answer for the civil
liabilities imposed on Melecia in the murder case. Art. 122 provides:

Art. 122. The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not
be charged to the conjugal properties partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family.

Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them be charged to the partnership.

However, the payment of personal debts contracted by either spouse before the marriage, that of fines and indemnities
imposed upon them, as well as the support of illegitimate children of either spouse, may be enforced against the
partnership assets after the responsibilities enumerated in the preceding Article have been covered, if the spouse who is
bound should have no exclusive property or if it should be insufficient; but at the time of the liquidation of the
partnership, such spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the purpose above-mentioned.

Since Efren does not dispute the RTC’s finding that Melecia has no exclusive property of her own, Art. 122 applies. The
civil indemnity that the decision in the murder case imposed on her may be enforced against their conjugal assets after
the responsibilities enumerated in Article 121 of the Family Code have been covered.

Contrary to Efren’s contention, Article 121 above allows payment of the criminal indemnities imposed on his wife,
Melecia, out of the partnership assets even before these are liquidated. Indeed, it states that such indemnities "may be
enforced against the partnership assets after the responsibilities enumerated in the preceding article have been
covered."[26]  No prior liquidation of those assets is required. This is not altogether unfair since Article 122 states that
"at the time of liquidation of the partnership, such [offending] spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the
purposes above-mentioned."

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS with MODIFICATION the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 77198

dated January 29, 2004 and May 14, 2004. The Regional Trial Court of Surigao City, Branch 30, shall first ascertain that, in
enforcing the writ of execution on the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melecia Pana for the satisfaction of the
indemnities imposed by final judgment on the latter accused in Criminal Cases 4232 and 4233, the responsibilities
enumerated in Article 121 of the Family Code have been covered.

Ong vs CA
GR No. L-63025
November 29, 1991

Facts:
- Petitioner’s wife, Teodora Ong conducted her own logging business. In furtherance of her business, she secured
from private respondent Francisco a loan. Unfortunately, because of mismanagement, Teodora defaulted in her
obligation.
- Francisco then filed a complaint to collect the sum legally due to him against the spouses Ong.
- The spouses were declared in default thus, the CFI rendered judgement in favour of Francisco and a motion for
execution of judgement was granted.
- The Sheriff levied a parcel of land declared in the sole name of Teodora and an auction sale was conducted
wherein Francisco was the highest bidder. A writ possession was issued in favour of Francisco.
- However, petitioner Ramon filed a motion to quash the writ of possession because he claims that the property
was conjugal (because the surname “Ong” was carried by Teodora in the tax declaration, which means that the
property was acquired during the marriage and jointly owned by them) and thus could not be held liable for
personal debts contracted by the wife and that there was no valid publication thus making the auction void.
- Lower court and CA both denied the motion filed by petitioner, thus this instant case.

Issue:
- WON the property was conjugal or paraphernal

Ruling:
- The property was paraphernal.
- The publication in the local newspaper with regard to the notice of auction was in accordance with the law.
- Further, the said property was acquired prior to their marriage.
- The mere use of the surname of the husband in the tax declaration of the subject property is not sufficient proof
that said property was acquired during the marriage and is therefore conjugal. It is undisputed that the subject
parcel was declared solely in the wife's name, but the house built thereon was declared in the name of the
spouses. Under such circumstances, the SC held that the lot in question is paraphernal, and is therefore, liable
for the personal debts of the wife.
- Maramba v Lozano: The presumption that property is conjugal refers to property acquired during the marriage.
When there is no showing as to when the property was acquired by a spouse, the fact that the title is in the
spouse’s name is an indication that the property belongs exclusively to said spouse.
- Even assuming that the property is conjugal, the same may be held liable for the debts of the wife under Art.
117 of the Civil Code because whatever profits earned by the wife would go to the conjugal partnership. It
would only be just and equitable that the obligations contracted by the wife may also be chargeable not only to
her paraphernal property but also to the conjugal property.

Quiao v. Quiao
G.R. No. 183622
July 4, 2012
FACTS: Brigido Quiao (petitioner) and Rita Quiao (respondent) contracted marriage in 1977. They had no separate
properties prior to their marriage. During the course of said marriage, they produced four children. In 2000, Rita filed a
complaint against Brigido for legal separation for cohabiting with another woman. Subsequently, the RTC rendered a
decision in 2005 declaring the legal separation of the parties pursuant to Article 55. Save for one child (already of legal
age), the three minor children remains in the custody of Rita, who is the innocent spouse.

The properties accrued by the spouses shall be divided equally between them subject to the respective legitimes of their
children; however, Brigido’s share of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership shall be forfeited in favor of their
children in accordance to par. 9 of Article 129 of the FC.

A few months thereafter, Rita filed a motion for execution, which was granted by the trial court. By 2006, Brigido paid
Rita with regards to the earlier decision; the writ was partially executed.

9 months later, Brigido filed a motion for clarification asking the RTC to define “Net Profits Earned.” In answer, the court
held that the phrase denotes “the remainder of the properties of the parties after deducting the separate properties of
each of the spouses and debts.”

Upon a motion for reconsideration by petitioner, it initially set aside its previous decision and stated that NET PROFIT
EARNED shall be computed in accordance with par. 4 of Article 102 of the FC. However, the respondents filed an MR and
the RTC later reverted to its original Order, setting aside the last ruling.

Hence, petitioner filed a petition review.

ISSUE: Whether or not the regime of conjugal partnership of gains governs the couple’s property relations.

HELD:

After 270 days have lapsed, P filed his Motion for Clarification on the definition of the net profits earned. From the
foregoing, P had clearly slept on his right to question the RTC’s order because it was already final and executory.

Yes. From the record, we can deduce that the petitioner and the respondent tied the marital knot on January 6, 1977.
Since at the time of the exchange of marital vows, the operative law was the Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No.
386) and since they did not agree on a marriage settlement, the property relations between the petitioner and the
respondent is the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains.

Article 119 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or relative community of
property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. In the absence of marriage
settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as
established in this Code, shall govern the property relations between husband and wife.

Thus, from the foregoing facts and law, it is clear that what governs the property relations of the petitioner and of the
respondent is conjugal partnership of gains. And under this property relation, "the husband and the wife place in a
common fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from their work or industry." The husband and
wife also own in common all the property of the conjugal partnership of gains.

The petitioner is saying that since the property relations between the spouses is governed by the regime of Conjugal
Partnership of Gains under the Civil Code, the petitioner acquired vested rights over half of the properties of the
Conjugal Partnership of Gains, pursuant to Article 143 of the Civil Code, which provides: “All property of the conjugal
partnership of gains is owned in common by the husband and wife.”
While one may not be deprived of his “vested right,” he may lose the same if there is due process and such deprivation
is founded in law and jurisprudence.

In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due process. First, he was well-aware that the respondent
prayed in her complaint that all of the conjugal properties be awarded to her. In fact, in his Answer, the petitioner
prayed that the trial court divide the community assets between the petitioner and the respondent as circumstances
and evidence warrant after the accounting and inventory of all the community properties of the parties. Second,  when
the decision for legal separation was promulgated, the petitioner never questioned the trial court’s ruling forfeiting what
the trial court termed as “net profits,” pursuant to Article 129(7) of the Family Code. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim
being deprived of his right to due process.

3. When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the husband and the wife become joint owners of all the
properties of the marriage. Whatever property each spouse brings into the marriage, and those acquired during the
marriage (except those excluded under Article 92 of the Family Code) form the common mass of the couple’s properties.
And when the couple’s marriage or community is dissolved, that common mass is divided between the spouses, or their
respective heirs, equally or in the proportion the parties have established, irrespective of the value each one may have
originally owned.

In this case, assuming arguendo that Art 102 is applicable, since it has been established that the spouses have no
separate properties, what will be divided equally between them is simply the “net profits.” And since the legal
separation½share decision of Brigido states that the in the net profits shall be awarded to the children, Brigido will still
be left with nothing.

On the other hand, when a couple enters into a regime of conjugal partnership of gains under Article142 of the Civil
Code, “the husband and the wife place in common fund the fruits of their separate property and income from their work
or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits
obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.” From the foregoing provision, each of the couple has
his and her own property and debts. The law does not intend to effect a mixture or merger of those debts or properties
between the spouses. Rather, it establishes a complete separation of capitals.

In the instant case, since it was already established by the trial court that the spouses have no separate properties, there
is nothing to return to any of them. The listed properties above are considered part of the conjugal partnership. Thus,
ordinarily, what remains in the above-listed properties should be divided equally between the spouses and/or their
respective heirs. However, since the trial court found the petitioner the guilty party, his share from the net profits of the
conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. Again,
lest we be confused, like in the absolute community regime, nothing will be returned to the guilty party in the conjugal
partnership regime, because there is no separate property which may be accounted for in the guilty party’s favor.

Sales vs. Sales

GR No. 174803 | Julky 13, 2009 | J. Quisumbing
FACTS:
 Marywin Albano Sales filed for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership and separation of properties against her
husband, Mayor Reynolan T. Sales
 Reynolan filed for the declaration of the nullity of the their marriage
 Consolidated and tried jointly
 Jan 4, 2004 – RTC declared marriage void due to mutual psychological incapacity, and directed them to liquidate,
partition, and distribute their common property (FC 147) within 60 days from receipt of decision, and comply with
FC 50, 51,and 52 as may be applicable
 June 16, 2003 – After the decision became final, Marywin filed for execution and a manifestation listing her assets
with Reynolan for partition
 Reynolan opposed motion

- RTC already ordered the distribution of their common properties without specifying what these were

 - Marywin has no share in the properties she identified because these were the fruits solely of his industry
- Not a co-ownership because they did not live together as husband and wife
- Marywin appropriated rentals of his properties and disposed one of them without his consent
- PRAYED for deferral of the resolution of the motion for execution issues he raised should be resolved first
 Sept 3, 2003 – RTC set the case for hearing on Sept 25, 2003 and ordered the reception of evidence on claims
 Nov 24, 2003 – Marywin filed a reiterative motion for execution to implement the decision and to order partition
of common properties
 Copy was furnished to Reynolan’s counsel
 Nov 28, 2003 – Reiterative motion heard in the absence of Reynolan and his counsel; RTC issued an order approving
the proposed project of partition; clerk of court ordered to execute deeds of conveyance to distribute 8 townhouse
units
 Dec 16, 2003 – Reynolan moved to reconsider RTC’s Order, prayed for its reversal, and reinstatement of Sept 25,
2003 Order (reception of evidence before partition)
- Grant of Marywin’s motion pre-empted issues he raised
 Marywin opposed Reynolan’s motion
 - Issues of alleged fraudulent sale and non-accounting of rentals were already waived by Reynolan when he failed to
set them up as compulsory counterclaims in the case
- Court ordered liquidation and distribution; already a resolved issue
 April 12, 2004 – RTC denied Reynolan’s MR\
 July 26, 2006 – CA ruled in favor of Nolan; remanded case to lower court for reception of evidence

ISSUE Whether or not CA erred when it entertained respondent’s appeal from an order granting the issuance of a writ of
execution

HELD NO.
1) There were matters of genuine concern that had to be addressed prior to the dissolution of the property relations of
the parties as a result of the declaration of nullity of their marriage. Allegations regarding the collection of rentals
without proper accounting, sale of common properties without the husband’s consent and misappropriation of the
proceeds thereof, are factual issues which have to be addressed in order to determine with certainty the fair and
reasonable division and distribution of properties due to each party.

2) The extent of properties due to respondent is not yet discernible without further presentation of evidence on the
incidental matters he had previously raised before the RTC. Since the RTC resolved these matters
in itsOrders dated November 28, 2003 and April 12, 2004, disregarding its previous order calling for the reception
of evidence, said orders became final orders as it finally disposes of the issues concerning the partition of the parties’
common properties.
As such, it may be appealed by the aggrieved party to the Court of Appeals via ordinary appeal.

DISPOSITION

CA decision AFFIRMED

Remanded to RTC for reception of evidence