II.

EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWLS

A. When law takes effect

NCC 2: Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided.  
This Code shall take effect one year after such publication. (1a)

EO 200, Sec. 2: Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper
of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided.

Revised Administrative Code, Secs. 18-24: SECTION 18. When Laws Take Effect.—Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation, unless it is otherwise provided.

SECTION 19. Prospectivity.—Laws shall have prospective effect unless the contrary is expressly provided.

SECTION 20. Interpretation of Laws and Administrative Issuances.—In the interpretation of a law or administrative issuance promulgated in all the
official languages, the English text shall control, unless otherwise specifically provided. In case of ambiguity, omission or mistake, the other texts
may be consulted.

SECTION 21. No Implied Revival of Repealed Law.—When a law which expressly repeals a prior law is itself repealed, the law first repealed shall not
be thereby revived unless expressly so provided.

SECTION 22. Revival of Law Impliedly Repealed.—When a law which impliedly repeals a prior law is itself repealed, the prior law shall thereby be
revived, unless the repealing law provides otherwise.

SECTION 23. Ignorance of the Law.—Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.

SECTION 24. Contents.—There shall be published in the Official Gazette all legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature; all executive and
administrative issuances of general application; decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, or other courts
of similar rank, as may be deemed by the said courts of sufficient importance to be so published; such documents or classes of documents as may
be required so to be published by law; and such documents or classes of documents as the President shall determine from time to time to have
general application or which he may authorize so to be published.

The publication of any law, resolution or other official documents in the Official Gazette shall be prima facie evidence of its authority.

Cases:
Tanada v Tuvera

The Supreme Court ruled that laws should be published. The clear object of such is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws
which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the
maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of
which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

Unless otherwise provided refers to the date of publication and not publication itself. Publication is indispensable.

Acaac v Azcuna Jr.

Having no action from SP with the said ordinance, the ordinance was presumed valid. Petitioner’s own evidence also revealed that a public hearing
was conducted prior the promulgation of said ordinance. Even if respondent failed to submit other evidences, the principle that in accordance with
the presumption of validity in favor of an ordinance, its constitutionality or legality should be upheld in the absence of any controverting evidence
that the procedure prescribed by law was not observed in its enactment.

B. Ignorance of Law

NCC 3: Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith. (2)

Kasilag v Rodriguez

Petitioner is not a lawyer and therefore not conversant with the laws. When he accepted the mortgage of the improvements, it is based on his
well-grounded belief that he is was not violating the prohibition on the alienation of land. Thus is possessing, and consenting the receipt of its
fruits, he has no knowledge that this is already in the nature of a contract of antichresis, which as a lien, was prohibited by section 116. Therefore,
petitioner's ignorance of the provisions of section 116 is excusable and may, therefore, be the basis of his good faith.

C. Retroactivity of Laws

NCC 4: Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. (3)

Art. 2252. Changes made and new provisions and rules laid down by this Code which may prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the old legislation shall have no retroactive effect.
For the determination of the applicable law in cases which are not specified elsewhere in this Code, the following articles shall be observed: (Pars. 1
and 2, Transitional Provisions).

Art. 2253. The Civil Code of 1889 and other previous laws shall govern rights originating, under said laws, from acts done or events which took
place under their regime, even though this Code may regulate them in a different manner, or may not recognize them. But if a right should be
declared for the first time in this Code, it shall be effective at once, even though the act or event which gives rise thereto may have been done or
may have occurred under prior legislation, provided said new right does not prejudice or impair any vested or acquired right, of the same origin.
(Rule 1)

Art. 2254. No vested or acquired right can arise from acts or omissions which are against the law or which infringe upon the rights of others. (n)

Art. 2255. The former laws shall regulate acts and contracts with a condition or period, which were executed or entered into before the effectivity
of this Code, even though the condition or period may still be pending at the time this body of laws goes into effect. (n)

Art. 2256. Acts and contracts under the regime of the old laws, if they are valid in accordance therewith, shall continue to be fully operative as
provided in the same, with the limitations established in these rules. But the revocation or modification of these acts and contracts after the
beginning of the effectivity of this Code, shall be subject to the provisions of this new body of laws. (Rule 2a)

Art. 2257. Provisions of this Code which attach a civil sanction or penalty or a deprivation of rights to acts or omissions which were not penalized by
the former laws, are not applicable to those who, when said laws were in force, may have executed the act or incurred in the omission forbidden or
condemned by this Code.

If the fault is also punished by the previous legislation, the less severe sanction shall be applied.

If a continuous or repeated act or omission was commenced before the beginning of the effectivity of this Code, and the same subsists or is
maintained or repeated after this body of laws has become operative, the sanction or penalty prescribed in this Code shall be applied, even though
the previous laws may not have provided any sanction or penalty therefor. (Rule 3a)

Art. 2258. Actions and rights which came into being but were not exercised before the effectivity of this Code, shall remain in full force in
conformity with the old legislation; but their exercise, duration and the procedure to enforce them shall be regulated by this Code and by the Rules
of Court. If the exercise of the right or of the action was commenced under the old laws, but is pending on the date this Code takes effect, and the
procedure was different from that established in this new body of laws, the parties concerned may choose which method or course to pursue.
(Rule 4)

Art. 2259. The capacity of a married woman to execute acts and contracts is governed by this Code, even if her marriage was celebrated under the
former laws. (n)

Art. 2260. The voluntary recognition of a natural child shall take place according to this Code, even if the child was born before the effectivity of this
body of laws. (n)

Art. 2261. The exemption prescribed in Article 302 shall also be applicable to any support, pension or gratuity already existing or granted before
this Code becomes effective. (n)

Art. 2262. Guardians of the property of minors, appointed by the courts before this Code goes into effect, shall continue to act as such,
notwithstanding the provisions of Article 320. (n)

Art. 2263. Rights to the inheritance of a person who died, with or without a will, before the effectivity of this Code, shall be governed by the Civil
Code of 1889, by other previous laws, and by the Rules of Court. The inheritance of those who, with or without a will, die after the beginning of the
effectivity of this Code, shall be adjudicated and distributed in accordance with this new body of laws and by the Rules of Court; but the
testamentary provisions shall be carried out insofar as they may be permitted by this Code. Therefore, legitimes, betterments, legacies and
bequests shall be respected; however, their amount shall be reduced if in no other manner can every compulsory heir be given his full share
according to this Code. (Rule 12a)

Art. 2264. The status and rights of natural children by legal fiction referred to in article 89 and illegitimate children mentioned in Article 287, shall
also be acquired by children born before the effectivity of this Code. (n)

Art. 2265. The right of retention of real or personal property arising after this Code becomes effective, includes those things which came into the
creditor's possession before said date. (n)

Art. 2266. The following shall have not only prospective but also retroactive effect:

(1) Article 315, whereby a descendant cannot be compelled, in a criminal case, to testify against his parents and ascendants;
(2) Articles 101 and 88, providing against collusion in cases of legal separation and annulment of marriage;
(3) Articles 283, 284, and 289, concerning the proof of illegitimate filiation;
(4) Article 838, authorizing the probate of a will on petition of the testator himself;
(5) Articles 1359 to 1369, relative to the reformation of instruments;
(6) Articles 476 to 481, regulating actions to quiet title;
(7) Articles 2029 to 2031, which are designed to promote compromise. (n)

Art. 2267. The following provisions shall apply not only to future cases but also to those pending on the date this Code becomes effective:

(1) Article 29, Relative to criminal prosecutions wherein the accused is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt;
(2) Article 33, concerning cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries. (n)
Art. 2268. Suits between members of the same family which are pending at the time this Code goes into effect shall be suspended, under such
terms as the court may determine, in order that compromise may be earnestly sought, or, in case of legal separation proceedings, for the purpose
of effecting, if possible, a reconciliation. (n)

Art. 2269. The principles upon which the preceding transitional provisions are based shall, by analogy, be applied to cases not specifically regulated
by them. (Rule 13a) 

Revised Penal Code Art. 22: Retroactive effect of penal laws. - Penal Laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a
felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws
a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.

Family Code Art. 256: This Code shall take effect one year after the completion of its publication in a newspaper of general circulation, as certified
by the Executive Secretary, Office of the President.

Done in the City of Manila, this 6th day of July, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty-seven.

Simon v Chan

The provisions of the Rules of Court, even if not yet in effect when Chan commenced Civil Case No. 915-00 on August 3, 2000, are nonetheless
applicable. It is axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate any right of a person who may feel adversely affected,
nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason is simply that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, or arise from, procedural
laws. Any new rules may validly be made to apply to cases pending at the time of their promulgation, considering that no party to an action has a
vested right in the rules of procedure, except that in criminal cases, the changes do not retroactively apply if they permit or require a lesser
quantum of evidence to convict than what is required at the time of the commission of the offenses, because such retroactivity would be
unconstitutional for being ex post facto under the Constitution.

Francisco v CA

SC said they cannot invoke Art. 254 in this case without impairing prior vested rights pursuant to Art. 256 in relation of the 2nd paragraph of Family
Code. The repeal of the New CIvil Code does not operate to prejudice or affect rights which have become vested or accrued while the said
provisions were in force.

Pesca v Pesca

The Court held that the “doctrine of stare decisis” ordained in Article 8 of the Civi lCode, expresses that judicial decisions applying or interpreting
the law shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. The rule follows the legal maxim – “legis interpretado legis vimobtinet” – that the
interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. The interpretation or construction placed by the courts
establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent of the law. The latter as so interpreted and construed would thus constitute.

D. Mandatory or Prohibitory Laws

NCC 5: Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their validity. (4a)

NCC 17 (3): Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have, for their object, public order, public policy and good
customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign
country. (11a)

Nerwin v PNOC

The RTC gravely abused its discretion, firstly, when it entertained the complaint of Nerwin against respondents notwithstanding that Nerwin was
thereby contravening the express provisions of Section 3 and Section 4 of RA 8975 for its seeking to enjoin the bidding out by respondents of the O-
ILAW Project; and, secondly, when it issued the TRO and the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction.

E. Waiver of Rights
NCC Article 6: Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a
third person with a right recognized by law.

NCC Article 2035: No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid:

(1) The civil status or persons;

(2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation;
(3) Any ground for legal separation;
(4) Future support;
(5) The jurisdiction of courts;
(6) Future legitime.

DMCI v CA
● Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right
○ An act of understanding that presupposes that a party has knowledge of its rights, but chooses not to assert them
○ When one lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest
○ Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot be established by a consent given under a mistake of fact

Villareal v People
● Absence should not be deemed waiver of his right to present evidence
○ Waiver of constitutional rights must be coupled with an actual intention to relinquish the right
○ Voluntary waiver; knowledgeable decision
○ Court must explain the exact nature and consequences of a waiver

F. Repeal of Laws

NCC Article 7: Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or
practice to the contrary.

1987 Constitution, Article XVIII Section 3: All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions, and other executive
issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed, or revoked.
Family Code Article 254: Titles III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, XI and XV of Book I Republic Act 386, otherwise known as the Civil Code of the Philippines, as
amended, and Articles 17, 18, 19, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 39, 40, 41 and 42 of Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as the Child and Youth
Welfare Code, as amended and all laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, rules and regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent herewith
are hereby repealed.

Family Code Article 255: If any provision of this Code is held invalid, all the other provisions not affected thereby shall remain valid.

Thornton v Thornton
 Implied repeals are not favored

o Two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must surface before the inference of implied repeal
may be drawn
o Every statute must be so interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence;
harmonize
o Legislature should be presumed to have known the existing laws on the subject and not have enacted conflicting statutes
o All doubts must be resolved against implied repeals

G. Judicial Decisions

NCC Article 8: Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.

Pesca v Pesca
 Stare decisis
o Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of the PHL
o Interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court shall have the force of law
 The interpretation or construction placed by the courts establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent of the law;
interpretation constitutes a part of the law as of the date the statute was enacted
 Only when a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have
relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance therewith

De Castro v JBC
 Stare decisis
o To adhere to precedent and not to unsettle things that are settled
 o Principle underlying the decision in one case is deemed of imperative authority, controlling the decisions of like cases in the
same court and in lower courts within the same jurisdiction, unless the decision is reversed
o Judicial decisions assume the same authority as the statute itself
o Higher courts bind the lower courts; coequal courts do not bind each other; SC does not bind itself
o Court is not controlled by precedent. SC is not obliged to follow blindly a particular decision. It must be followed only when
its reasoning and justification are relevant
o Court en banc may reverse a doctrine in jurisprudence

Republic v Remman Enterprises

 The finding of facts of the RTC which were adopted and affirmed by the CA are generally deemed conclusive and binding.

o The interpretation of a law by this Court constitutes part of that law from the date it was originally passed, since the Court’s
construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent
o Judicial doctrine is not a new law; it is merely a construction

H. Duty to Render Judgement

NCC Article 9. No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws.

NCC Article 10. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to
prevail.

REVISED PENAL CODE Article 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed but which are not covered by the law, and
in cases of excessivepenalties.— Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress and which is not punishable by
law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the
court to believe that said act should be made the subject of legislation.

In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, such statement as may be deemed proper,
without suspending the execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result in the imposition of a
clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by the offense.

People v Ritter
 Acquittal because there is no proof beyond reasonable doubt

Alonzo v Padua
  We are a court both of law and justice; apply the law with justice

I. PRESUMPTION and APPLICABILITY of CUSTOM

NCC Article 11. Customs which are contrary to law, public order or public policy shall not be countenanced.

NCC Article 12. A custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence.

1987 Constitution, Article XII Section 5: The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national development policies and programs,
shall protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their economic, social, and cultural well-being.

The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights or relations in determining the ownership and extent of
ancestral domain.

RULES OF COURT, Rule 129

Section. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. — A court may take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable to
unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions.

Sec. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. — During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its
intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon.

After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative or on request of a party, may take judicial notice of any
matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case.

Martinez v Van Buskirk

o Acts the performance of which has not proved destructive or injurious and which have, therefore, been acquiesced in by society for
so long a time that they have ripened into custom, can not be held to be of themselves unreasonable or imprudent
o The public, finding itself unprejudiced by such practice, has acquiesced for years without objection

J. Legal periods
NCC 13 When the laws speak of years, months, days or nights, it shall be understood that years are of three hundred sixty-five days each; months,
of thirty days; days, of twenty-four hours; and nights from sunset to sunrise. If months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by
the number of days which they respectively have. In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day included.

cf. Rules of Court (ROC) Rule 22 In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these Rules, or by order of the court, or by any
applicable statute, the day of the act or event from which the designated period of time begins to run is to be excluded and the date of
performance included. If the last day of the period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the court
sits, the time shall not run until the next working day.

RAC Sec. 31 Legal Periods. - "Year" shall be understood to be twelve calendar months; "month" of thirty days, unless it refers to a specific calendar
month in which case it shall be computed according to the number of days the specific month contains; "day," to a day of twenty-four hours; and
"night," from sunset to sunrise.

Internal Revenue v Primetown, GR 162155, August 28, 2007

In terms of the basis for determining prescriptive period, the Administrative Code shall be followed over the New Civil Code, since this is the more
recent law. The Administrative Code provides that a year shall be understood as 12 calendar months.

K. Applicability of Penal Laws

NCC 14. Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in the Philippine territory, subject to the
principles of public international law and to treaty stipulations.

L. Binding effect

NCC 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad.

cf.  FC 26 All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and
valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637 and 38. (17a)
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by Executive Order
227)

Tenchavez v. Escaño 15 SCRA 355

For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or effect to a foreign decree of absolute divorce between Filipino citizens could be a
patent violation of the declared public policy of the state, specially in view of the third paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code that prescribes the
following:
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, policy and good customs, shall not
be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

ATCI Overseas Corp vs. Echin, G.R. No. 178551, Oct. 11, 2010

Facts: Echin was hired by ATCI in behalf of its principal, Ministry of Public Health of Kuwait, as medical technologist. After a year, respondent was
terminated for not passing the probationary period despite his good performance which prompted him to file a complaint for illegal dismissal with
the NLRC.

Ruling: According to RA 8042: The obligations covenanted in the recruitment agreement entered into by and between the local agent and its
foreign principal are not coterminous with the term of such agreement, such that if either or both of the parties decide to end the agreement, the
responsibilities of such parties towards the contracted employees under the agreement do not at all end, but the same extends up to and until the
expiration of the employment contracts of the employees recruited and employed pursuant to the said recruitment agreement. Favoring the
immunity invoked by the petitioner will render the law on joint and solidary liability inutile.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. Where a
foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours. Thus, we apply Philippine
labor laws in determining the issues presented before us.

Tuna Processing Inc. v Phil. Kingford, 185582, Feb. 29, 2012

Facts: TPI won a dispute for arbitration before the International Centre for Dispute Resolution and sought to enforce the said judgement in the
Philippines despite the fact that he is not licensed to do business in the Philippines.

Ruling: TPI, although not licensed to do business in the Philippines, may seek recognition and enforcement of the foreign arbitral award in
accordance with the provisions of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004.  A foreign corporation’s capacity to sue in the Philippines is not
material insofar as the recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award is concerned.
When a party enters into  a  contract  containing  a  foreign  arbitration  clause and, as in this case,  in  fact  submits itself to arbitration, it   becomes
bound by the contract, by  the arbitration and by the result of arbitration, conceding thereby  the  capacity of the  other  party to enter into the
contract, participate in the arbitration and cause the implementation of the result.

NCC 16 Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is stipulated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever
may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.

Amos v Bellis, 20 SCRA 358

Amos Bellis a Texan by nationality and domicile. Illegitimate children claiming legitimes.
It must have been the purpose of Congress to make the 2nd paragraph of Art 16 a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and
intestate successions.  As further indication of this legislative intent Congress added a new provision, under Art 1039, which decrees that capacity
to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent.

NCC 17 The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are
executed.

When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the
solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution.

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have, for their object, public order, public policy and good customs
shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

Raytheon v Rouzie, GR 162894, February 26, 2008

Rouzie claiming nonpayment of commissions, illegal termination and breach of contract w/ foreign elements.
On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-of-laws problem where the case is filed in a Philippine court and where the court has jurisdiction over
the subject matter, the parties and the res, it may or can proceed to try the case even if the rules of conflict-of-laws or the convenience of the
parties point to a foreign forum. This is an exercise of sovereign prerogative of the country where the case is filed.

NCC 18 In matters which are governed by the Code of Commerce and special laws, their deficiency shall be supplied by the provisions of this Code.

Tamano v Ortiz, G.R. No. 126603, June 29, 1998

Facts: Petitioner was the 2nd wife of Sen. Tamano. The first was conducted in 1958 (both under civil and muslim rites) and remained subsisting
even when the 2nd was contracted. In this case, petitioner tries to dismiss the case voiding her marriage for being bigamous by arguing that the
RTC has no jurisdiction over the matter since (1) only parties to the marriage can file an action for annulment and (2) the 1st marriage was
conducted under muslim rights, so Shari’a courts should have original and exclusive jurisdiction over the matter. SC held that the RTC had
jurisdiction over the matter.
Doctrine: Shari’a courts are not vested with original and exclusive jurisdiction when it comes to marriages celebrated under both civil and Muslim
laws, since Art 13, PD 1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties were married under both Civil and Muslim rites. Consequently, the
RTCs are not divested of their general original jurisdiction under Sec. 19 (6) of BP 129 (Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980).

Llave vs Republic, GR 169766, March 30, 2011

Facts: Continuation of the previous case, but this case dealt with the substantive matter of WON the 2nd marriage was bigamous. The SC held that
it was bigamous.

Doctrine: Petitioner asserts that Sen. Tamano's prior marriage to Zorayda has been severed by way of divorce under PD 1083 (Code of Muslim
Personal Laws). However, PD 1083 cannot benefit Petitioner because Art 13(1) thereof provides that the law applies to "marriage and divorce
wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or
such code. Art 13 of PD 1083 DOES NOT provide for a situation where the parties were married BOTH in civil and Muslim rites. As such, the
provisions of the Civil Code must govern – and it does not allow divorce.

Zamoranas v. People
 If both parties [in marriage] are Muslims, there is a presumption that the Muslim Code or Muslim law is complied with. If together with it or
in addition to it, the marriage is likewise solemnized in accordance with the Civil Code of the Philippines, in a so-called combined Muslim-
Civil marriage rites whichever comes first is the validating rite and the second rite is merely ceremonial one. But, in this case, as long as both
parties are Muslims, this Muslim Code will apply. In effect, two situations will arise, in the application of this Muslim Code or Muslim law,
that is, when both parties are Muslims and when the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim
Code or Muslim law. A third situation occur[s] when the Civil Code of the Philippines will govern the marriage and divorce of the parties, if
the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with the Civil Code.

Villagracia v. Sharia
 When it became apparent that Vivencio is not a Muslim, respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court should have motu proprio dismissed the case.

III. A. CONCEPT OF A ‘PERSON’ AND ‘PERSONALITY’

NCC Article 37. Juridical Capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject in legal relations, is inherent in every natural person and is lost only through
death. Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired or maybe lost.

NCC Article 38. Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil interdiction are mere restrictions on capacity to
act, and do not exempt the incapacitated person from certain obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts or from property relations, such as
easements.
NCC Article 39. The following circumstances, among others, modify or limit capacity to act: age, insanity, imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute,
penalty, prodigality, family relations, alienage, absence, insolvency and trusteeship. The consequences of these circumstances are governed in this
Code, other codes, the Rules of Court, and in special laws. Capacity to act is not limited on account of religious belief or political opinion.

A married woman, twenty-one years of age or over, is qualified for all acts of civil life, except in cases specified by law.

 What is person?
 It is every physical or moral, real or juridical and legal being susceptible of rights and obligations or being subject of legal relations.
(Sanchez Roman)
 What is Personality?
 It is the aptitude to be the subject of juridical relations (Castan 8th ed. 95)
 Birth determines personality. (Art. 40)

Classes of persons and personality

A. Natural Persons (Articles 40-41)
 Human beings
B. Juridical Persons (Articles 44-47)
Kinds:
1. State and its political subdivision in rel. to Art. IX, 1987 Constitution)
2. Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose, created by law; their personality begins as
soon as they have been constituted according to law.
3. Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose to which the law grants a juridical personality,
separate and distinct from that of each shareholder, partner or member.(Art. 44)

Characteristics/Elements of civil capacity

 it is not a being, but a quality of certain beings
 it is not a physical element, but a juridical concept
 it is not an object of contract, or possession, and cannot be impaired by agreement
 it is a matter of public interest (Tolentino, 1985p.165)

Juridical capacity vs. personality

 Juridical Capacity
 The fitness to be the subject in legal relations. It is the essence of being a human. It is inherent in every natural person it is
lost only through death. (Art.37)
 Personality
  It refers to the aptitude for the holding and enjoyment of rights. It is to be the subject of rights and obligations. Basically they
are synonymous.

Juridical capacity vs. capacity to act

 Juridical Capacity
 The fitness to be the subject in legal relations. It is the essence of being a human. It is inherent in every natural person it is
lost only through death.(Art.37)
 Capacity to act
 It is the power of a person to do acts with legal effect. It can be acquired or lost. (Art.37)
 Its restriction, modifications and circumstances are found in Art. 38-39.

III. B. COMMENCEMENT AND TERMINATION OF PERSONALITY

Geluz v CA
 Recovery cannot be had for the death of an unborn child

Quimiging v Icao
 A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly
provided in Art 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The unborn child, therefore, has a right to support from its progenitors even if the
said child is only “en ventre de sa mere”

De Jesus vs. Syquia

 Upon this point we have no hesitancy in holding that the acknowledgment thus shown is sufficient. It is a universal rule of jurisprudence
that a child, upon being conceived, becomes a bearer of legal rights and capable of being dealt with as a living person.
 The problem here presented of the recognition of unborn child is really not different from that presented in the ordinary case of the
recognition of a child already born and bearing a specific name. Only the means and resources of identification are different. Even a bequest
to a living child requires oral evidence to connect the particular individual intended with the name used.

Continental Steel vs. Montano

 Death has been defined as the cessation of life. Life is not synonymous with civil personality.
 One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less than the
Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception that the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn
already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death.
  It is not a question before us whether the unborn child acquired any rights or incurred any obligations prior to his/her death that were
passed on to or assumed by the child's parents. The rights to bereavement leave and other death benefits in the instant case pertain
directly to the parents of the unborn child upon the latter's death.
 Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do not provide at all a definition of death. Moreover, while the Civil Code expressly provides that
civil personality may be extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only those who have acquired juridical personality could die

III. B. I (b) DEATH

Limjoco vs. Intestate estates of Pio Fragante

 ’Persons are of two kinds: natural and artificial. A natural person is a human being. Artificial persons include (1) a collection or succession of
natural persons forming a corporation; (2) a collection of property to which the law attributes the capacity of having rights and duties. The
latter class of artificial persons is recognized only to a limited extent in our law. Examples are the estate of a bankrupt or deceased person.’
  Introduced by the Code of Civil Procedure in the matter of estates of deceased persons: It has been the constant doctrine that it is the
estate or the mass of property, rights and assets left by the decedent, instead of the heirs directly, that becomes vested and charged with
his rights and obligations which survive after his demise. 
 the estate of a deceased person is considered a "person" is the avoidance of injustice or prejudice resulting from the impossibility of
exercising such legal rights and fulfilling such legal obligations of the decedent as survived after his death unless the fiction is indulged
 It seems reasonable that the estate of a decedent should be regarded as an artificial person. It is the creation of law for the purpose of
enabling a disposition of the assets to be properly made
 The fiction of such extension of his citizenship is grounded upon the same principle, and motivated by the same reason, as the fiction of the
extension of his personality. The fiction is made necessary to avoid the injustice of subjecting his estate, creditors and heirs, solely by reason
of his death

Valino vs. Adriano

 it is undeniable that the law simply confines the right and duty to make funeral arrangements to the members of the family to the exclusion
of one’s common law partner.
 the right and duty to make funeral arrangements will not be considered as having been waived or renounced, the right to deprive a
legitimate spouse of her legal right to bury the remains of her deceased husband should not be readily presumed to have been exercised,
except upon clear and satisfactory proof of conduct indicative of a free and voluntary intent of the deceased to that end. Should there be
any doubt as to the true intent of the deceased, the law favors the legitimate family.
 The dispositions or wishes of the deceased in relation to his funeral, must not be contrary to law. They must not violate the legal and
reglamentary provisions concerning funerals and the disposition of the remains, whether as regards the time and manner of disposition, or
the place of burial, or the ceremony to be observed.
 It is generally recognized that the corpse of an individual is outside the commerce of man. However, the law recognizes that a certain right
of possession over the corpse exists, for the purpose of a decent burial, and for the exclusion of the intrusion by third persons who have no
 legitimate interest in it. This quasi-property right, arising out of the duty of those obligated by law to bury their dead, also authorizes them
to take possession of the dead body for purposes of burial to have it remain in its final resting place, or to even transfer it to a proper place
where the memory of the dead may receive the respect of the living. This is a family right. There can be no doubt that persons having this
right may recover the corpse from third persons.

C. Restrictions on Civil Capacity

1. Presumption of Capacity

Art 37 juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is inherent in every natural person and is lost only though death.
Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and may be lost.

Catalan v Basa

 A donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously a thing or right in favor of another, who accepts it
o In order for it to be valid, it is crucial that the donor has capacity to give consent at the time of the donation
 Insanity impinges in consent freely given
o Burden of proving such incapacity rests upon the person who alleges it such that if no sufficient proof to this effect is presented,
capacity will be presumed
 Evidence presented by petitioners
o Certificate of disability for the discharge of Feliciano by the board of medical officers of the department of veteran affairs
o Proof that Feliciano was judged incompetent by the CFI and put under the guardianship of BPI
 Said evidence is insufficient to overcome the presumption that Feliciano was competent when he donated the property in question to
Mercedes
o By itself, the allegation that Feliciano suffered from schizophrenia as early as 1948 cannot prove his incompetence
 Scientific studies show that a person suffering from schizophrenia does not necessarily lose his competence to
intelligently dispose his property
 By mere allegation of the existence of schizophrenia, petitioners failed to show that a the precise moment of donation,
Feliciano had lost total control of his mental faculties
 The presumption that Feliciano remained competent to execute contracts is bolstered by the existence of other contracts
(contract of marriage)
 Competency and freedom from undue influence, shown to have existed in other acts done or contracts executed,
are presumed to continue until the contrary is shown
Deed of donation and Deed of Absolute Sale are both valid

2. Restrictions on capacity to act

Article 38. Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil interdiction are mere restrictions on capacity to act,
and do not exempt the incapacitated person from certain obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts or from property relations, such as
easements. (32a)

Article 39. The following circumstances, among others, modify or limit capacity to act: age, insanity, imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute,
penalty, prodigality, family relations, alienage, absence, insolvency and trusteeship. The consequences of these circumstances are governed in this
Code, other codes, the Rules of Court, and in special laws. Capacity to act is not limited on account of religious belief or political opinion.

A married woman, twenty-one years of age or over, is qualified for all acts of civil life, except in cases specified by law. (n)

(a) Minority
1. Age of Majority

Section 1. Article 234 of Executive Order No. 209, the Family Code of the Philippines, is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 234. Emancipation takes place by the attainment of majority. Unless otherwise provided, majority commences at the age of eighteen
years."

Section 2. Articles 235 and 237 of the same Code are hereby repealed.

Section 3. Article 236 of the same Code is also hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 236. Emancipation shall terminate parental authority over the person and property of the child who shall then be qualified and
responsible for all acts of civil life, save the exceptions established by existing laws in special cases.

"Contracting marriage shall require parental consent until the age of twenty-one.

"Nothing in this Code shall be construed to derogate from the duty or responsibility of parents and guardians for children and wards below
twenty-one years of age mentioned in the second and third paragraphs of Article 2180 of the Civil Code."

Section 4. Upon the effectivity of this Act, existing wills, bequests, donations, grants, insurance policies and similar instruments containing
references and provisions favorable to minors will not retroact to their prejudice.
2. A.M. No. 03-02-05-SC Rules on Guardianship
3. Suffrage, Sec. 1 Art. V 1987 Const.
4. Marriage, FC 5; 45 (1); cf. RA 6809

Art. 5. Any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38, may
contract marriage. (54a)

Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage:

(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen years of age or over but below twenty-one, and
the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the parents, guardian or person having substitute parental authority over the party, in
that order, unless after attaining the age of twenty-one, such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived together as husband and
wife;

5. Contracts

Article 1327. The following cannot give consent to a contract:

(1) Unemancipated minors;

(2) Insane or demented persons, and deaf-mutes who do not know how to write. (1263a)

Article 1390. The following contracts are voidable or annullable, even though there may have been no damage to the contracting parties:

(1) Those where one of the parties is incapable of giving consent to a contract;

Article 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified:

(3) Those where both parties are incapable of giving consent to a contract.

Article 1397. The action for the annulment of contracts may be instituted by all who are thereby obliged principally or subsidiarily. However,
persons who are capable cannot allege the incapacity of those with whom they contracted; nor can those who exerted intimidation, violence, or
undue influence, or employed fraud, or caused mistake base their action upon these flaws of the contract. (1302a)
Article 1399. When the defect of the contract consists in the incapacity of one of the parties, the incapacitated person is not obliged to make any
restitution except insofar as he has been benefited by the thing or price received by him. (1304)

Article 1489. All persons who are authorized in this Code to obligate themselves, may enter into a contract of sale, saving the modifications
contained in the following articles.

Where necessaries are those sold and delivered to a minor or other person without capacity to act, he must pay a reasonable price therefor.
Necessaries are those referred to in article 290. (1457a)

Article 1426. When a minor between eighteen and twenty-one years of age who has entered into a contract without the consent of the parent or
guardian, after the annulment of the contract voluntarily returns the whole thing or price received, notwithstanding the fact that he has not been
benefited thereby, there is no right to demand the thing or price thus returned.

Article 1427. When a minor between eighteen and twenty-one years of age, who has entered into a contract without the consent of the parent or
guardian, voluntarily pays a sum of money or delivers a fungible thing in fulfillment of the obligation, there shall be no right to recover the same
from the obligee who has spent or consumed it in good faith. (1160A)

Mercado v Espiritu

- The ruling of the court in this case considered the contract to be valid even if the minors presented themselves to be of legal age. They can’t
be excused from the fulfillment of their responsibilities which the contract caused.
- there was no showing that the said notarized document was attended by any violence, intimidation, fraud, or deceit.
ISIDRO BAMBALAN Y PRADO vs. GERMAN MARAMBA and GENOVEVA MUERONG

The sale of the land is void due to the following reasons:

1.) Isidro is incapacitated to enter into such contracts because he was still a minor when the alleged sale was executed; and
2.) the land wasn‘t even registered, and hence, it cannot be sold.

Art. 1390 of the NCC provides:

The following contracts are voidable or annullable even though there may have been no damage to the contracting parties:
(1) Those where one of the parties is incapable of giving consent to a contract...

Art. 38 of the NCC provides:

 Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil interdiction are mere restrictions on capacity to act
(aptitude for the exercise of rights), and do not exempt the incapacitated person from certain obligations, as when the latter arise from his
acts or from property relations, such as easements.

Art. 1397 of the NCC provides:

The action for the annulment of contracts may be instituted by all who are thereby obliged principally or subsidiarily. However, persons
who are capable cannot allege the incapacity of those with whom they contracted; nor can those who exerted intimidation, violence, or
undue influence, or employed fraud, or caused mistake base their action upon these flaws of the contract.

Suan Chian v. Alcantara

He even ratified it which made the contract binding. The circumstance that, about one month after the date of the conveyance, the appellee
informed the appellants of his minority, is of no moment, because appellee’s previous misrepresentation had already estopped him from
disavowing the contract.

DE BRAGANZA v. DE VILLA ABRILLE

 No question as to the responsibility of Rosario (the mother)

o the minority of her consigners are personal to the minors
o defense of minority will benefit her to the extent of the shares for which the minors are responsible (art 1148, OCC)
 CA decision was wrong
o Minors had no juridical duty to disclose their inability
o Minors could not be legally bound by their signatures
o Corpuz Juris Secundum:
 In order to hold infant liable, however, the FRAUD must be actual and not constructure
 mere silence when making a contract as to age does not constitute a fraud for an action of decit
o Mercado case had differing circumstances, since in that case, the minor specifically stated that he was of age
 no such statement in the case at hand (passive or constructive misrepresentation, if any at all)
 in Mercado, the minor was guilty of ACTIVE MISREPRESENTATION
 the minority which incapacitated them from contracting should likewise exempt them from the results of misrepresentation
 Respondent was wrong
 o 4 years had not completely elapsed from Oct 1947 (Rodolfo was certainly of majority age)
 Exact birthdates were not specified
 In October 1944, Rodolfo was 18; in Oct 1947, he was 21; in Oct 1951, he was 25
 Defense was interposed in June 1951 (4 months short of Oct 1951)
o there is reason to doubt the pertinency of the 4-years period fixed by OCC Art 1301
 Minority is set up only as a defense to an action, without the minors asking for any relief from the contract
 In this case, they haven’t filed an action for annulment, but merely interposed an excuse from liability
 STILL, these minors may not be entirely absolved from monetary responsibility
o OCC Art 1304: even if their written contact is unenforceable because of non-age, they shall make restitution to the extent that they
have profited by the money they received
o funds delivered to them by Villa Abrille were used for their support during the Japanese occupation
o therefore, they had profited to the extent of the value of such money
 value (accd to the Ballantine Schedule): in October 1944, P40.00 Japanese notes were equivalent to P1 of current Philippine
money
 share of these minors was 2/3 of P70K  P46666.66 (or P1166.67 in current PhP currency, plus 6% interest from March 7, 1949
when the complaint was filed)
 Minors’ promise to pay P10K in current PhP currency cannot be enforced
 Rosario shall pay 1/3 of P10K  P3333.33, plus 2% interest from Oct 1944

6. Criminal Liability

Atizado v People

The RTC and CA committed an error when it failed to consider the circumstance of Minority of Monreal. It cannot be doubted that Monreal was
a minor below 18 years of age when the crime was committed on April 18, 1994. Firstly, his counter-affidavit executed on June 30 1994 stated
that he was 17 years of age. Secondly, the police blotter recording his arrest mentioned that he was 17 years old at the time of his arrest on
May 18, 1994.28 Thirdly, Villafe’s affidavit dated June 29, 1994 averred that Monreal was a minor on the date of the incident.29 Fourthly, as
RTC’s minutes of hearing dated March 9, 1999 showed, Monreal was 22 years old when he testified on direct examination on March 9, 1999,31
which meant that he was not over 18 years of age when he committed the crime. And, fifthly, Mirandilla described Monreal as a teenager and
young looking at the time of the incident. Pursuant to Article 68 (2) of the RPC, when the offender is over 15 and under 18 years of age, the
penalty next lower than that prescribed by law is imposed. Based on Article 61 (2) of the RPC, reclusion temporal is the penalty next lower than
reclusion perpetua to death. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law and Article 64 of the RPC, therefore, the range of the penalty of
imprisonment imposable on Monreal was prision mayor in any of its periods, as the minimum period, to reclusion temporal in its medium
period, as the maximum period. Accordingly, his proper indeterminate penalty is from six years and one day of prision mayor, as the minimum
period, to 14 years, eight months, and one day of reclusion temporal, as the maximum period.
(b) Insanity

Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage:

(2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;

Article 1327. The following cannot give consent to a contract:

(1) Unemancipated minors;

(2) Insane or demented persons, and deaf-mutes who do not know how to write. (1263a)

Article 1328. Contracts entered into during a lucid interval are valid. Contracts agreed to in a state of drunkenness or during a hypnotic spell are
voidable. (n)

RULE 101

Proceedings for Hospitalization of Insane Persons

Section 1. Venue, Petition for commitment. — A petition for the commitment of a person to a hospital or other place for the insane may be filed
with the Court of First Instance of the province where the person alleged to be insane is found. The petition shall be filed by the Director of Health
in all cases where, in his opinion, such commitment is for the public welfare, or for the welfare of said person who, in his judgment, is insane and
such person or the one having charge of him is opposed to his being taken to a hospital or other place for the insane.

Section 2. Order for hearing. — If the petition filed is sufficient in form and substance, the court, by an order reciting the purpose of the petition,
shall fix a date for the hearing thereof, and copy of such order shall be served on the person alleged to be insane, and to the one having charge
him, or on such of his relatives residing in the province or city as the judge may deem proper. The court shall furthermore order the sheriff to
produce the alleged insane person, if possible, on the date of the hearing.

Section 3. Hearing and judgment. — Upon satisfactory proof, in open court on the date fixed in the order, that the commitment applied for is for
the public welfare or for the welfare of the insane person, and that his relatives are unable for any reason to take proper custody and care of him,
the court shall order his commitment to such hospital or other place for the insane as may be recommended by the Director of Health. The court
shall make proper provisions for the custody of property or money belonging to the insane until a guardian be properly appointed.

Section 4. Discharge of insane. — When, in the opinion of the Director of Health, the person ordered to be committed to a hospital or other place
for the insane is temporarily or permanently cured, or may be released without danger he may file the proper petition with the Court of First
Instance which ordered the commitment.
Section 5. Assistance of fiscal in the proceeding. — It shall be the duty of the provincial fiscal or in the City of Manila the fiscal of the city, to prepare
the petition for the Director of Health and represent him in court in all proceedings arising under the provisions of this rule.

US v Vaguilar

The evidence is insufficient to declare him insane. The appellant‘s conduct was consistent with the acts of an enraged criminal, not of a person with
an unsound mind at the time he committed the crimes. The fact that a person acts crazy is not conclusive that he is insane. The popular meaning of
crazy is not synonymous with the legal terms insane, non compos mentis, unsound mind, idiot or lunatic. The conduct of the appellant after he was
confined in jail, which was narrated by his co-inmate Estanislao Canaria, is consistent with the actions of a sane person (not saying a word in the
cell, crying out loud at night) who has reflected and felt remorse after the commission of the crime.
The court further held that mere mental depravity or moral insanity which results not from any disease of the mind, but from a perverted condition
of the moral system where the person is mentally sane, does not exempt one from criminal responsibility. In the absence of proof that the
defendant had lost his reason or became demented after a few moments prior to or during the perpetration of the crime, it is presumed that he
was in a normal state of mind.
Court affirmed prior judgments and imposed the same penalties.

PEOPLE vs.RAFANAN

The court rejected the insanity defense of appellant and affirmed the lower court’s decision convicting the appellant of the crime of rape.
For the defense of insanity to be sustained it is critical that there is complete loss of intelligence at the time of the commission of the crime. The
fact that appellant threatened the victim with death should she reveal she had been sexually assaulted by him, indicates, to the mind of the Court,
that the appellant was aware of the reprehensible moral quality of his assault. The law presumes every man to be sane. A person accused of a
crime has the burden of proving his affirmative allegation of insanity. In this case the appellant failed to present clear and convincing evidence
regarding his state of mind immediately before and during the sexualassault on the victim. Schizophrenia formerly called dementia praecox, is a
chronic mental disorder characterized by inability to distinguish between fantasy and reality, and often accompanied by hallucinations and
delusions. The Court elaborated on the required standards of legal insanity and established two distinguishable tests
(a) THE TEST OF COGNITION — "complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the [criminal] act,"
(b) THE TEST OF VOLITION
—
"or that there be a total deprivation freedom of the will."

Standard Oil v. Arenas, GR No. L-5921, July 25, 1911

The issue at hand concerns the question of Villanueva’s state of mind when he executed the bond with Standard Oil. From the evidence presented,
the testimonies of two physicians, his wife and the persons who witnessed him execute the bond; the Court deliberated the merits of the case. The
two physicians namely, Don Rudesino Cuervo and Don Gervasio de Ocampo, wherein Villanueva consulted Cuervo eight times during the years
1902 and 1903, and Ocampo only once, in 1908. The physicians concluded that Villanueva was capable of rational decision making. Granting that
Villanueva he was a monomaniac, it is important to prove that he was dominated by that malady when he executed the bond. To emphasize, the
Court stated that the capacity to act must be supposed to attach to a person who has not previously been declared incapable, and such capacity is
presumed to continue so long as the contrary be not proved, that is, that at the moment of his acting he was incapable, crazy, insane, or out his
mind: which, has not been proved in this case.

Decision: Based on the facts relating to the debated incapacity of Villanueva it is very evident that it cannot be concluded that, on December 15,
1908, when he subscribed the obligation now contested, he did not possess the necessary capacity to give efficient consent with respect to the
bond which he freely executed. Therefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant.

People vs. Bulagao

There was no showing from the findings of the psychologist that accused had the same mental condition at the time of the crime. Even if accused
was at such mental state at the time, psychologist testified that the accused could still discern right from wrong.

Article 1327. The following cannot give consent to a contract:

(2) Insane or demented persons, and deaf-mutes who do not know how to write. (1263a)

Article 807. If the testator be deaf, or a deaf-mute, he must personally read the will, if able to do so; otherwise, he shall designate two persons to
read it and communicate to him, in some practicable manner, the contents thereof. (n)

Article 820. Any person of sound mind and of the age of eighteen years or more, and not blind, deaf or dumb, and able to read and write, may be a
witness to the execution of a will mentioned in article 805 of this Code. (n)

RULE 92

Section 2. Meaning of word "incompetent." — Under this rule, the word "incompetent" includes persons suffering the penalty of civil interdiction
or who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb who are unable to read and write, those who are of unsound mind, even though they
have lucid intervals, and persons not being of unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak mind, and other similar causes, cannot, without
outside aid, take care of themselves and manage their property, becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit and exploitation.

RPC

Article 31. Effect of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification. - The penalties of perpetual or temporal special disqualification
for public office, profession or calling shall produce the following effects:
 1. The deprivation of the office, employment, profession or calling affected;

2. The disqualification for holding similar offices or employments either perpetually or during the term of the sentence according to the
extent of such disqualification.

Article 34. Civil interdiction. - Civil interdiction shall deprive the offender during the time of his sentence of the rights of parental authority, or
guardianship, either as to the person or property of any ward, of marital authority, of the right to manage his property and of the right to dispose
of such property by any act or any conveyance inter vivos.

Article 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal; Their accessory penalties. - The penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal shall
carry with them that of civil interdiction for life or during the period of the sentence as the case may be, and that of perpetual absolute
disqualification which the offender shall suffer even though pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly
remitted in the pardon.

JALOSJOS v COMELEC
Perpetual special disqualification is a ground for a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code because this accessory penalty is an
ineligibility, which means that the convict is not eligible to run for public office, contrary to the statement that Section 74 requires him to state
under oath

(f) Family Relations

Art. 150. Family relations include those:

(1) Between husband and wife;

(2) Between parents and children;

(3) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or halfblood. (217a)

Art. 151. No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest
efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the same case
must be dismissed.

This rules shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code. (222a)
Art. 87. Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the spouses during the marriage shall be void, except
moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply to persons living
together as husband and wife without a valid marriage. (133a)

Art. 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the beginning, whether relationship between the parties be legitimate or
illegitimate:

(1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and

(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood. (81a)

Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of public policy:

(1) Between collateral blood relatives whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil degree;

(2) Between step-parents and step-children;

(3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;

(4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;

(5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child;

(6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter;

(7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter;

(8) Between adopted children of the same adopter; and

(9) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that other person's spouse, or his or her own spouse. (82)

Article 1490. The husband and the wife cannot sell property to each other, except:

(1) When a separation of property was agreed upon in the marriage settlements; or

(2) When there has been a judicial separation of property under article 191. (1458a)
Article 2035. No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid:

(1) The civil status of persons;

(2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation;

(3) Any ground for legal separation;

(4) Future support;

(5) The jurisdiction of courts;

(6) Future legitime. (1814a)

Article 963. Proximity of relationship is determined by the number of generations. Each generation forms a degree. (915)

Article 964. A series of degrees forms a line, which may be either direct or collateral.

A direct line is that constituted by the series of degrees among ascendants and descendants.

A collateral line is that constituted by the series of degrees among persons who are not ascendants and descendants, but who come from a
common ancestor. (916a)

Article 965. The direct line is either descending or ascending.

The former unites the head of the family with those who descend from him.

The latter binds a person with those from whom he descends. (917)

Article 966. In the line, as many degrees are counted as there are generations or persons, excluding the progenitor.

In the direct line, ascent is made to the common ancestor. Thus, the child is one degree removed from the parent, two from the grandfather, and
three from the great-grandparent.

In the collateral line, ascent is made to the common ancestor and then descent is made to the person with whom the computation is to be made.
Thus, a person is two degrees removed from his brother, three from his uncle, who is the brother of his father, four from his first cousin, and so
forth. (918a)
Article 967. Full blood relationship is that existing between persons who have the same father and the same mother.

Half blood relationship is that existing between persons who have the same father, but not the same mother, or the same mother, but not the
same father. (920a)

(g) Alienage

Apart from the presumed notice of the COMELEC En Bane decision on the very date of its promulgation on 14 May 2013, petitioner admitted in her
petition before us that she in fact received a copy of the decision on 16 May 20 13. Indeed, the action for cancellation of petitioner's certificate of
candidacy, the decision in which is the indispensable determinant of the right of petitioner to proclamation, was correctly lodged in the COMELEC,
was completely and fully litigated in the COMELEC and was finally decided by the COMELEC. The HRET jurisdiction over the qualification of the
Member of the House of Representatives is original and exclusive, and as such, proceeds de novo unhampered by the proceedings in the COMELEC
which, as just stated has been terminated.

Legal Basis: Art. IV, Secs. 1-5, 1987 Constitution

CITIZENSHIP
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine Citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
4. Those who are naturalized in the accordance with law.

Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect
their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born
citizens.

Section 3. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law.Section 4. Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens
shall retain their citizenship, unless by their act or omission they are deemed, under the law to have renounced it.

Section 5. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law.

(h) Absence
 TITLE XIV
ABSENCE

CHAPTER 1
Provisional Measures in Case of Absence

Article 381. When a person disappears from his domicile, his whereabouts being unknown, and without leaving an agent to administer his
property, the judge, at the instance of an interested party, a relative, or a friend, may appoint a person to represent him in all that may be
necessary.

This same rule shall be observed when under similar circumstances the power conferred by the absentee has expired. (181a)

Article 382. The appointment referred to in the preceding article having been made, the judge shall take the necessary measures to safeguard the
rights and interests of the absentee and shall specify the powers, obligations and remuneration of his representative, regulating them, according to
the circumstances, by the rules concerning guardians. (182)

Article 383. In the appointment of a representative, the spouse present shall be preferred when there is no legal separation.

If the absentee left no spouse, or if the spouse present is a minor, any competent person may be appointed by the court. (183a)

CHAPTER 2
Declaration of Absence

Article 384. Two years having elapsed without any news about the absentee or since the receipt of the last news, and five years in case the
absentee has left a person in charge of the administration of his property, his absence may be declared. (184)

Article 385. The following may ask for the declaration of absence:

(1) The spouse present;

(2) The heirs instituted in a will, who may present an authentic copy of the same;
 (3) The relatives who may succeed by the law of intestacy;

(4) Those who may have over the property of the absentee some right subordinated to the condition of his death. (185)

Article 386. The judicial declaration of absence shall not take effect until six months after its publication in a newspaper of general circulation.
(186a)

CHAPTER 3 
Administration of the Property of the Absentee

Article 387. An administrator of the absentee's property shall be appointed in accordance with article 383. (187a)

Article 388. The wife who is appointed as an administratrix of the husband's property cannot alienate or encumber the husband's property, or that
of the conjugal partnership, without judicial authority. (188a)

Article 389. The administration shall cease in any of the following cases:

(1) When the absentee appears personally or by means of an agent;

(2) When the death of the absentee is proved and his testate or intestate heirs appear;

(3) When a third person appears, showing by a proper document that he has acquired the absentee's property by purchase or other title.

In these cases the administrator shall cease in the performance of his office, and the property shall be at the disposal of those who may have a right
thereto. (190)

CHAPTER 4
Presumption of Death

Article 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes,
except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the
age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened. (n)

Article 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the estate among the heirs:

(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing, who has not been heard of for four years since the
loss of the vessel or aeroplane;

(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for four years;

(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence has not been known for four years. (n)

Article 392. If the absentee appears, or without appearing his existence is proved, he shall recover his property in the condition in which it may be
found, and the price of any property that may have been alienated or the property acquired therewith; but he cannot claim either fruits or rents.
(194)

CHAPTER 5 
Effect of Absence Upon the Contingent Rights of the Absentee

Article 393. Whoever claims a right pertaining to a person whose existence is not recognized must prove that he was living at the time his existence
was necessary in order to acquire said right. (195)

Article 394. Without prejudice to the provision of the preceding article, upon the opening of a succession to which an absentee is called, his share
shall accrue to his coheirs, unless he has heirs, assigns, or a representative. They shall all, as the case may be, make an inventory of the property.
(196a)

Article 395. The provisions of the preceding article are understood to be without prejudice to the action of petition for inheritance or other rights
which are vested in the absentee, his representatives or successors in interest. These rights shall not be extinguished save by lapse of time fixed for
prescription. In the record that is made in the Registry of the real estate which accrues to the coheirs, the circumstance of its being subject to the
provisions of this article shall be stated. (197)

Article 396. Those who may have entered upon the inheritance shall appropriate the fruits received in good faith so long as the absentee does not
appear, or while his representatives or successors in interest do not bring the proper actions. (198)
Family Code

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the
subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of
Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding
as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent
spouse. (83a)

(i) Insolvency and Trusteeship

Article 1381. The following contracts are rescissible:

(1) Those which are entered into by guardians whenever the wards whom they represent suffer lesion by more than one-fourth of the value
of the things which are the object thereof;

(2) Those agreed upon in representation of absentees, if the latter suffer the lesion stated in the preceding number;

(3) Those undertaken in fraud of creditors when the latter cannot in any other manner collect the claims due them;

(4) Those which refer to things under litigation if they have been entered into by the defendant without the knowledge and approval of the
litigants or of competent judicial authority;

(5) All other contracts specially declared by law to be subject to rescission. (1291a)

Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial auction, either in person or through the mediation of
another:

(1) The guardian, the property of the person or persons who may be under his guardianship;

(2) Agents, the property whose administration or sale may have been intrusted to them, unless the consent of the principal has been given;

(3) Executors and administrators, the property of the estate under administration;
 (4) Public officers and employees, the property of the State or of any subdivision thereof, or of any government-owned or controlled
corporation, or institution, the administration of which has been intrusted to them; this provision shall apply to judges and government
experts who, in any manner whatsoever, take part in the sale;

(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other officers and employees connected with the
administration of justice, the property and rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or
territory they exercise their respective functions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers,
with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession;

(6) Any others specially disqualified by law. (1459a)

Article 2236. The debtor is liable with all his property, present and future, for the fulfillment of his obligations, subject to the exemptions provided
by law. (1911a)

UMALE v ASB

The intention of corporate rehabilitation is “to effect a feasible and viable rehabilitation by preserving a floundering business as a going concern,
because the assets of a business are often more valuable when so maintained than they would be when liquidated.” This concept of preserving the
corporation’s business as a going concern while it is undergoing rehabilitation is called debtor-in-possession or debtor-in-place. This means that the
debtor corporation (the corporation undergoing rehabilitation), through its Board of Directors and corporate officers, remains in control of its business
and properties, subject only to the monitoring of the appointed rehabilitation receiver. There is nothing in the concept of corporate rehabilitation that
would ipso facto deprive the Board of Directors and corporate officers of a debtor corporation, such as ASB Realty, of control such that it can no longer
enforce its right to recover its property from an errant lessee.

Error raised by the petitioners involve factual findings the review of which is not within the purview of the Court’s functions under Rule 45, particularly
when there is adequate evidentiary support on record.

While petitioners assail the authenticity of the written lease contract by pointing out the inconsistency in the name of the lessor in two separate pages,
they fail to account for Umale’s actions which are consistent with the terms of the contract. SC is of the same mind as the appellate court that it is simply
inconceivable that a businessman, such as petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest, would enter into commercial transactions with and pay substantial rentals
to a corporation nary a single documentation. 

Petitioners lost sight of the restriction provided in Article 1675 of the Civil Code. It states that a lessee that commits any of the grounds for ejectment
cited in Article 1673, including non-payment of lease rentals and devoting the leased premises to uses other than those stipulated, cannot avail of the
periods established in Article 1687. Petitioners have not paid, much less offered to pay, the rent for 14 months and even had the temerity to disregard
the pay-and-vacate notice served on them.  An extension will only benefit the wrongdoer and punish the long-suffering property owner.
(j) Gender

Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and
men.

Article 403. Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding article, a daughter above twenty-one but below twenty-three years of age cannot
leave the parental home without the consent of the father or mother in whose company she lives, except to become a wife, or when she exercises
a profession or calling, or when the father or mother has contracted a subsequent marriage. (321a)

Section 4. Spouses as parties. — Husband and wife shall sue or be sued jointly, except as provided by law. (4a)

D. Domicile and Residence of Persons

1. Juridical Persons

Article 51. When the law creating or recognizing them, or any other provision does not fix the domicile of juridical persons, the same shall be
understood to be the place where their legal representation is established or where they exercise their principal functions. (41a)

2. Natural Persons

Article 50. For the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is the place of their habitual
residence. (40a)

Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. (109a)

Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide.

Article 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife from living with the husband if he should live
abroad unless in the service of the Republic. (58a)

Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds:

(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner;

(2) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or political affiliation;
 (3) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or
connivance in such corruption or inducement;

(4) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six years, even if pardoned;

(5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;

(6) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent;

(7) Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in the Philippines or abroad;

(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;

(9) Attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner; or

(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one year.

For purposes of this Article, the term "child" shall include a child by nature or by adoption. (9a)

Art. 101. If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or her obligations to the family, the aggrieved spouse may
petition the court for receivership, for judicial separation of property or for authority to be the sole administrator of the absolute community,
subject to such precautionary conditions as the court may impose.

The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph refer to marital, parental or property relations.

A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when her or she has left the conjugal dwelling without intention of returning. The spouse who
has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of three months or has failed within the same period to give any information as to his or her
whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed to have no intention of returning to the conjugal dwelling. (178a)

Art. 149. The family, being the foundation of the nation, is a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects. Consequently, family
relations are governed by law and no custom, practice or agreement destructive of the family shall be recognized or given effect. (216a, 218a)

Art. 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an unmarried head of a family, is the dwelling house where they
and their family reside, and the land on which it is situated. (223a)
Art. 101. If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or her obligations to the family, the aggrieved spouse may
petition the court for receivership, for judicial separation of property or for authority to be the sole administrator of the absolute community,
subject to such precautionary conditions as the court may impose.

The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph refer to marital, parental or property relations.

A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when her or she has left the conjugal dwelling without intention of returning. The spouse who
has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of three months or has failed within the same period to give any information as to his or her
whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed to have no intention of returning to the conjugal dwelling. (178a)

JALOSJOS v COMELEC
Perpetual special disqualification is a ground for a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code because this accessory penalty is an
ineligibility, which means that the convict is not eligible to run for public office, contrary to the statement that Section 74 requires him to state
under oath.