The Rise of Islamic State (IS): A Threat to Pakistan

Zahid Nawaz Mann

12/2/2014
 1

Abstract
The sudden rise of Islamic State (IS) in ME and declaration of Caliphate by its
leader Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi in June 2014 has surprised the world. This is a band of
barbaric trans-national terrorists—stemming from conflicts in Iraq and Syria—who
aspire to expand IS boundaries beyond the ME. The organization’s footprints have been
detected in Pakistan too, which is an ominous development due to Pakistan’s
dangerous militant landscape. Although, extremist groups in eleven Muslim states have
formally pledged their allegiance to IS, no such overt pledges have been secured with
network of extremist groups operating from Pakistan’s soil, so far. This paper reviews
background to the rise of IS and prevailing environment in ME, followed by analysis of
Pakistan’s extremism peril with focus on developments related to IS footprints and its
implications for Pakistan. Finally, recommendations are proffered to address the
menace of extremism/ terrorism in general in Pakistan, including the IS threat.
 2

The Rise of Islamic State (IS): A Threat to Pakistan

Why isn’t anybody doing anything serious about this mind-boggling peril? ….The
Arab states purport to be alarmed, but in practice their response to the
creation of the ISIS mini-petro- and terrorist-state in their midst has been a
shrug of the shoulders. If that’s unfair, it is at least undeniable they haven’t
mobilized quickly to take action.1

General

The challenge to Muslim world’s already chaotic security environment presented

by the IS has become serious and dangerous in the past few months. Abu Bakar
Baghdadi Al Qureshi Al-Hussaini’s deadly organization has made significant gains in
Iraq and Syria while it is struggling to bring maximum Kurd territories under its control as
well. The destabilization of the ME after the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 has resulted in
creation of another deadly trans-national terrorist organization in the form of IS, an off
shoot of AQI (Al-Qaeda Iraq).2 After withdrawal of the US forces from Iraq in December
2011, IS movement gained momentum and got strengthened each day due to a weak
government in Baghdad. The uprising against Hafiz al Asad’s regime in Syria (Arab
Spring) in April 2011 allowed the IS to absorb Syrian territory too from where Syrian
military was pushed back by the Free Syrian Army (FSA) rebels, having overt American
backing.

Although AQ and IS share the same strategic goal, the two differ in tactics and
execution of their ideologies. The IS enjoys defacto physical control over significant
chunk of territory which AQ lacks. While AQs major focus was against coalition among
the US and Monarchies in ME, especially in KSA, the IS has a far greater ideological
scope; revival of Islamic Caliphate. The IS presents a much sinister threat to entire
Islamic world as it will widen the exiting Shia-Sunni sectarian divide, if it manages to
spread beyond ME. This process, unfortunately, has already begun as display of IS

1
Russ Wellen, “Apathy and Denial Won’t make ISIS go Away,” FPIF, August 6, 2014.
http://fpif.org/apathy-denial-wont-make-isis-go-away/. (accessed October 21, 2014).
2
Islamic State, Jane’s World’s Insurgency and Terrorism,
https://janes.ihs.com.alumniproxy.nps.edu/CustomPages/Janes/DisplayPage.aspx?DocType=Reference
&ItemId=1320850. (Accessed October 21, 2014).
 3

flags, wall chalking, and distribution of IS pamphlet (Victory) has started to appear
outside ME, including Pakistan.3

Amid the ongoing political mayhem in Pakistan since August 2014, a more
ominous development has escaped government’s attention. The global Jihadi groups
are seeking to expand their influence, taking advantage of the Pakistan’s internal
security challenges. Both AQ and IS are now competing for support from militants in
Pakistan, raising serious security concerns in the region and for Pakistan itself. Pakistan
is already under strict scrutiny by the West, especially the US, and our archrival India,
for allegedly harboring organizations like AQ, Tehrik-e-Taliban Afghanistan (TTA) and
Haqqani network (HQN), in addition to the existence of number of domestic Islamist
organizations like Jammat ud Dawa(JUD), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and Jaish-e-
Muhammad etc.

Background

There could be four major reasons of turbulent environment in the ME: first,
bloody Israel-Palestinian conflict; second, US biased policies and its strategic economic
and security interests in the region; third, Iran with its nuclear program: and fourth, intra-
Arab differences and sectarian divisions. Regrettably, there is deterioration in all four
spheres, especially in post 9/ 11 world, resultantly the situation in ME is getting worse.
Before military invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq by the US in 2001 and 2003,
respectively, these regions were relatively stable (less Palestine and Israel); however,
today these have become infested with numerous armed extremist groups, some of
them boasting pan-Islamic ideology. The Palestine dispute has been overshadowed by
engineering threat of Islamic extremism. The IS militants, responsible for worst kind of
sectarian violence in modern history, are considered dangerous than even AQ.4

The IS, earlier known as the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), was
raised in Iraq in October 2004 when Abu Musab al-Zarqawi vowed allegiance to then
AQ leader Osama-bin-Laden (OBL) and changed the name of his group. While earlier

3
Ismail Khan, “Zarqawi—the Link between Pakistan and Iraqi Militants, Dawn, November 23, 2014.
4
Anne Geran, “Clinton Says Islamic State Militants are Worse than Al-Qaeda,” Washington Post, October
8, 2014.
 4

known as Tanzim Qaedat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn, or AQI, the group later created
numerous front organisations, prominent among these was the Islamic State in Iraq
(ISI), which became ISIL in 2013.5 However, after falling apart with AQ in early 2014
the ISIL attained its independent identity.6 The group follows extreme branch of Sunni
(Salafi) theology with strong anti-shia sentiments. After having announced Caliphate in
June 2014—in territory under its control between Syrian governorate of Aleppo in the
west to the Iraqi province of Diyala in the east, the group renamed itself as IS.7

Map 1: Territories under IS Control in Iraq and Syria.8

The fighting strength of group is estimated between 20,000-31,000, having $2

Billion worth of assets and a capacity of generating $1-3 Million per day from the oil
resources it controls in Syrian and Iraq.9 Heavy funding is also trickling in from Gulf’s

5
Islamic State
6
Ibid.
7
Ibid..
8
Kathy Gilsinan, “The Many Ways to Map the Islamic State,” The Atlantic, August 27, 2014.
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/08/the-many-ways-to-map-the-islamic-
state/379196/. (accessed November 9, 2014).
9
Islamic State.
 5

Sunni population to IS.10 The group is known for its barbaric killings, which are often
sectarian in nature with Shias as its main victims. Since 2010, the group is exploiting
weaknesses of Iraq's nascent democratic government (Shia dominated) by initiating a
renewed campaign of sectarian violence in the country. The push towards Baghdad,
coupled with the beheadings of four Western nationals in Syria (August 2014), propelled
group's notoriety to international community, and by late September, an anti-IS
partnership led by the US began conducting air strikes against the group in both Iraq
and Syria.11

As of 1 October 2014, the following militant groups have pledged their overt
loyalty to the IS at international level:12
 Abu Mehjen al-Tae'fi Brigade, Libya.
 Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), Philippines.
 Ansar al-Tawhid fi Bilad al-Hind, India.
 Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), Philippines.
 Jaish al-Sahaba, Syria.
 Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT), Indonesia.
 Jund al-Khilafa fi Ard al-Jazaair, Algeria.
 Jund al-Khilafah in the Land offi Ard al -Kinana, Egypt.
 Liwaa Ahrar al-Sunna Baalbek,Lebanon.
 Majlis Shura al-Mujahideen fi Aknaaf Bayt al-Maqdis (or Mujahideen
Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem), Gaza Strip.
 Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT), Indonesia.

The global plan for establishing IS Caliphate is reflected in the following map:

10
Lis Sly, ISIS: Al-Qaida linked Islamists powerful enough to Capture Key Iraqi City, Dawn , June 12,
2014.
11
Islamic State.
12
Ibid.
 6

Map 2:The IS map shows both Afghanistan and Pakistan as part of the Islamic caliphate
state's Khurasan province. AQ and its affiliates believe that the movement for the
establishment of the IS of Khurasan will emerge from the region comprising of
the Kunar and Nuristan provinces of Afghanistan and Malakand region of
13
Pakistan.

Brief Review: Prevailing Environment in ME

The US, which mobilized swiftly after 9/11 against the Taliban and Al Qaeda,
doesn’t seem to be treating the threat of ISIS with the urgency it deserves.
Presumably, because ISIS has yet to threaten US soil. But, in time and if they
can consolidate their rule in those areas, international terrorism is potentially a
logical move for them. Even if it isn’t, there’s nothing to prevent their protégés
from turning to it.14

The opinion in Washington and Arab states remain divided over military action
against IS. The critiques of President Obama’s strategy against IS say that it’s “too little
and too late” (without boots on ground) whereas others say that these strikes may
provoke IS to target US interests.15 The Arab support remains symbolic and not all-out
as it is mainly led by KSA, UAE and Qatar. Egypt has refused to join this coalition
against the IS as it is mired in fixing its internal chaos and the Brotherhood. Iran, a
major player in the ME, which has helped both Syria and Iraq to confront IS before the
US jumped in, sees the US-led coalition as lacking credibility because some of its

13
Amir Rana, “What IS Means for Pakistan?” Dawn, July 3, 2014. http://www.dawn.com/news/1116799.
(accessed, November 3, 2014).
14
Apathy and Denial Won’t Make ISIS Go Away.
15
Masood Haider,” Obama Criticized for Not Committing Ground Troops Against IS,” Dawn, September
18, 2014.
 7

members had financed and armed the groups as part of their campaign to bring down
the Asad Regime in Syria.16 According to Iran’s Supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, “right
from the start, the US asked through its Ambassador in Iraq whether we could
cooperate against Daesh (IS)? I said no, because they have dirty hands.” 17 This
analysis by Iranian leader is reinforced by George Freedman, who summed up his
narration of America’s “Grand Strategy” as under:

“The US wins as long as al Qaeda loses. An Islamic world in chaos, incapable of

uniting, means the US has achieved its strategic goal. One thing the US has
indisputably done since 2001 is to create chaos in the Islamic world, generating
animosity toward America—and perhaps terrorists who will attack in the
future……. There is no question that American execution of the war in Iraq has
been clumsy, graceless and in many ways unsophisticated. But on broader, more
sophisticated level, that does not matter. So long as the Muslims are fighting
each other, the US has won its war.”18

According to Dr. Bouthainia Shaaban, advisor to President Asad, “I think

the Americans take their battles against leaders and Presidents only as a pretext
to destroy countries.” 19 Dr. Shaaban maintains that one of the objectives of
destruction in ME is to weaken the Arab armies to minimize the security
challenges to Israel (first thing Americans did after occupying Iraq was to disband
its armed forces). It is amazing to note that while Syria remains under tough
sanctions “Daesh” continues to sell its oil from the Syrian and Iraqi oil fields and
refineries in the international market, making $ 1-3 Millions per day, without any
challenge.20 As per a UN estimate, some 1,000 militants are flocking to Iraq and
Syria per month from around the world, including western countries and
Pakistan.21 The number of foreign fighters in the IS militia has jumped to 15,000,
including 2,000 westerners.22

16
Khamenei rejects anti-IS Coalition, Dawn, September 16, 2014.
17
Ibid.
18 st
George Friedman, The Next 100 Years: A forecast for the 21 Century, (GHQ, Rawalpindi, Services
Book Club, 2013). 49.
19
Robert Fisk, “Why is there such an explosion of violence across ME?” Dawn, November 1, 2014.
20
Ibid.
21
“Fighters Flocking to Iraq, Syria, in Massive Numbers, says UN,” Dawn, November 01, 2014.
22
Ibid.
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Analysis: Pakistan’s Extremism Peril

 Background
The scourge of extremism in Pakistan can be traced back to the “Afghan
Jihad” era (1979-1990) that led to disintegration of erstwhile Soviet Union in
1991. Let’s not forget that US spearheaded the global support to Jihad against
Soviet occupation in Afghanistan, Pakistan having a lead role. 23 The US
abandonment of this region immediately after the Soviet withdrawal from
Afghanistan (1990) resulted in creation of AQ and Taliban which led to
catastrophic incident like 9/11 attacks. Today there are about two hundred, all
types of state and non-state sponsored religious political parties and groups
operating in Pakistan.24 The Jihadi culture in this region is unlikely to go away
soon because of following major reasons:
 Afghanistan Imbroglio
The US occupation of Afghanistan since 2001, fiercely resisted by
Afghan Taliban and their ideological supporters from within Pakistan
(ethnic and religious overlapping), is not likely to permit lowering of
violence in this region. The “liberation insurgency,” spearheaded by TTA in
Afghanistan, is based on a mix of spirits of “Pashtun nationalism” and
strong Islamic “ideology of Jihad” against foreign occupation. Despite an
asymmetric edge over the rag-tag Afghan resistance the ISAF and NATO
have failed to help their protégé Afghan government to establish its writ
outside Kabul.

As if this wasn’t enough, India’s increasing presence and influence

in Afghanistan has put Pakistan into a nut cracker situation. The Kashmir’s
proxy war seems to have shifted to Pakistan’s western borders via
Afghanistan. Indian support to Baloch nationalists and the TTP has

23 rd
John K. Cooly, Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism, 3 ed. (London: Pluto
Press, 2002). XV.
24
Amir Rana, “What IS Means for Pakistan?” Dawn, July 3, 2014. http://www.dawn.com/news/1116799.
(accessed, November 3, 2014).
 9

received a tremendous boost through its network of almost “two dozen

consulates” in Afghanistan, thus harming Pakistan’s interests.25

 Kashmir Dispute
The Indo-Pak enduring rivalry over Kashmir is a potential nuclear
flash point and the mother cause of militancy in sub-continent. The newly
installed BJP government in India, led by Prime Minister Narinder Modi, is
validating the “two nation theory” today as his government adopts a hard
line against Pakistan and Muslims in India and Indian Occupied Kashmir
(IOK). PM Modi is a RSS (Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh) ideologue, a
Hindu extremist group that strongly believes in implementing its “Hindutva
ideology” for securing its objective of establishing a “Greater Hindustan.”26
Hindutuva, considered to be primarily anti-Islam ideology, is certainly
going to add fuel to extremist tendencies in sub-continent.
 Foreign Meddling

Due to its geo-political significance and being the only nuclear

Muslim state, Pakistan has become a victim of competing international
and regional actors’ interests in Asia. A “new great game” for access to
the energy rich Central Asian region is in play. The Caspian Sea alone
holds the world’s largest untapped fossil fuel reserves, estimated to be
between 50 to 110 billion barrels of oil and 170 to 463 trillion cubic feet of
natural gas. 27 Tensions between major powers today have pushed the
world to a new “Cold War,” according to Mikhail Gorbachev. 28 These
actors include influential Islamic states like KSA, Iran and Turkey; powerful
states like US, Russia, China and the EU; and neighboring India and
Afghanistan. Because of the strategic stability achieved due to nuclear

25
Daniel S. Markey, No Exit From Pakistan: America’s Tortured Relationship with Pakistan, (New Delhi,
Cambridge University Press, 2013). 40.
26
Sumanta Banargee, “The Hindutva Ideology and Social Psychology,”
Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 26, No. 3 (Jan. 19, 1991), pp. 97-101.
http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/4397215?uid=2129&uid=2&uid=70&uid=4&sid=21105110393813.
(accessed November 1, 2014).
27
Lutz Kleveman, The New Great Game (New York, Atlantic Monthly Press, 2003), 3.
28
“World on Brink of Cold War, Warns Gorbachev,” Dawn, November 9, 2014.
 10

weapons in the region, proxy warfare has become more fashionable.

Therefore, promotion and exploitation of concept of Jihad, including the
one based on sectarian divisions is likely to become used by host of
actors operating in this region in pursuance of their conflicting strategic
interests.
 Writ of State

Figure 1: Comparison of Overall Incidents of Violence and Casualties in

Pakistan (2010-13)29
Among many challenges, state of Pakistan’s protracted
helplessness to control existence and functioning of numerous non-state
actors on its soil is the most serious security challenge. The in-ability of
state in formulating a comprehensive response against extremism/
terrorism, capacity building of its civilian Law Enforcement Agencies
(LEAs) and carrying out any practical political/ judicial/ legislative reforms
to confront complex security challenges has encouraged these groups to
operate with impunity. The important state pillars haven’t been able to
evolve consensus on major national security challenges, despite a dismal
security environment. Moreover, the military gains against the terrorists
remain temporary natured in the absence of simultaneous political

29
Pakistan Security Report 2013, Pakistan Institute For Peace Studies (PIPS).
 11

maneuver/ will in the areas that military won back from the terrorists (Swat
and FATA).

 Developments and Implications for Pakistan

The signals of “Daesh’s” entry into Pakistan have been detected in the
form of wall chalking in Karachi, Bahawalpur and Khanewal and distribution of
pamphlet,”Victory,” in the outskirts of Peshawar.30 The Balochistan government
also reported “growing footprint of IS” in its province, though it later retracted this
statement.31 Surprisingly, Pakistan’s Interior Minister, contrarily stated that there
is no presence of IS in Pakistan. 32 So far, no group has overtly announced
allegiance to IS but the media is booming with reports of its footprints in Pakistan.
 TTP Splinters
 Jamaat ul Ahrar (TTPJuA). Some militant groups, especially
the breakaway element of TTPJuA is jubilant over IS gains and are
ready to pave the way for IS entry in Pakistan.33 The amir of this
newly formed organization is Abdul Wali, alias Umar Khalid
Khorasani, a man with deadly credentials. According to Director US
National Intelligence, James Clapper, the Khorasan group is so
strong that it rivaled the IS threat. 34 Another analyst’s description
about Khorasani is: “No one makes Jamaat-ul-Ahrar a more
formidable force than Khorasani. He does what many Pakistani
militant leaders do—and more, including quest for steeling
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.35
 Breakaway Commanders. Six other TTP commanders have
also announced their support to IS in Pakistan. Shahidullah Shahid
stated that he along with five District Chiefs of TTP: Amir for
Orakzai Agency Saeed Khan, Kurram Agency chapter chief Daulat

30
“IS Footprints Growing In Pakistan: Report,” Dawn, November 9,2014.
31
Ibid.
32
Imran Ayub, “Nisar Rules Out IS Militants in Pakistan,” Dawn, November 12, 2014.
33
Zahid Hussain, “Competing For Jihadi Space,” Dawn, September 10, 2014.
34
“US Terms Khorasan Group as Lethal as IS,” Dawn, September 19, 2014.
35
Michael Kugelman , “Bad as Baghdadi? Pakistan’s Dangerous Man,” War on the Rocks, September
4, 2014. http://warontherocks.com/2014/09/pakistans-baghdadi/#_. (accessed October 21, 2014).
 12

Khan, Fateh Gul Zaman, who heads TTP in Khyber Agency, TTP’s
Peshawar amir Mufti Hassan and TTP’s Hangu chief Khalid
Mansoor, have announced support to IS but formal allegiance to
Abu Bakar Al-Baghdadi is awaited.36 Khan Said, alias Sajna, who
led the Mehsud militant force has agreed to resume talks with the
government and has indicated that he doesn’t wish to fight the
Pakistani state anymore.37 The Punjabi Taliban led by Asmatullah
Muawiya has already ended its jihad in Pakistan, announcing
reversion to “Dawaah.” This leaves Fazalullah, hiding in Kunar
(Afghanistan), virtually as TTP chief of Swat chapter with much
reduced authority and capacity.38
 Operation Zarb-e-Azab. The launching of Operation “Zarb-e-Azab” by
Pakistan’s armed forces in June 2014 in NWA—the last stronghold of
militants—has delivered great results, so far. Successful conclusion of this
military operation, as and when it culminates, is expected to not only
incapacitate the terrorists’ syndicates in FATA but by design restrict entry
of IS into Pakistan. Even if TTP splinter groups pledge allegiance to IS
overtly, intended containment of terrorists in Pakistan will discourage
Baghdadi from heading towards Pakistan. Pakistan army has pledged to
destroy the nursery upon which IS could have mushroomed in Pakistan;
without an effective TTP there is no future of IS in Pakistan.
 Amir-ul-Mominin vs Caliph. The splintering within TTP could be
attributed to launching of Operation Zarb-e-Azab in NWA, Fazalullah not
being from Mehsud tribe and the ideological disconnect between the
concepts of Amir-ul- Momin (Mullah Omar) and Caliph (Baghdadi). It is a
known fact that Mullah Omar remains unchallenged Amir-ul-Mominin of all
the extremist organizations operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan,
including AQ as OBL had pledged his allegiance to Mullah Omar back in

36
Zahir Shah Shirazi, “Six Top Commanders of TTP Announce Allegiance to Islamic State’s Baghdadi,”
Dawn, October 14, 2014.
37
Ismael Khan, “Ahrar Claim of Responsibility Appears More Credible,” Dawn, November 4, 2014.
38
Ibid.
 13

2001.39 Therefore, till the time Mullah Omar retains his position of Amir-ul-
Mominin, prospects of IS making any significant ingress into Pakistan and
Afghanistan are low but cannot be entirely ruled out.
 Triggering escalation in Sectarianism. Pakistan is already
plagued with sectarian strife; thousands of innocent lives have already
been in sectarian violence (Figure 2). In case the IS succeeds in
establishing itself in Pakistan then the existing sectarian violence is likely
to take an upward spiral. There are reports of fighters flocking to Iraq and
Syria from Pakistan to join the opposing sides there.40

The Balochistan Province is likely to act as a staging area for IS

operations into Iranian territory and beyond, just like Jindullah (suspected
of having US backing), if it succeeds in establishing itself in Pakistan. This
will surely strain already tense Iran-Pakistan relations and against
Pakistan’s national interest.

Figure 2: Trends of Sectarian Violence in Pakistan (2009-2014)41

39
Amir Mir, “A Set Back for Fazalullah, Mullah Omar and Zwahiri,” The News, October 15, 2014.
40
Tariq Khosa, “ The General’s Pledge,” Dawn, December 1, 2014.
41
Pakistan Security Report 2013.
 14

 Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ). Reportedly, the IS has established

contact with members of LeJ and Ahle Sunnat wal Jammat (ASWJ),
through its ten-member “strategic planning wing” for cooperation in
Pakistan. 42 According to another analyst, members of LeJ are fighting
alongside IS in Iraq, who believes that LeJ, which like IS is virulently anti-
Shia, helped IS set up a training camp in Iraq.43
 International Response. There is a good reason to worry—not because
Pakistan will become home to a new IS-like movement, but because
Pakistan could inadvertently help strengthen the existing IS abroad until
numerous extremist organizations continue to operate from Pakistan.
Pakistan is ranked third in Global Terrorism Index report 2014, having just
Afghanistan and Iraq above it.44 According to Fareed Zakaria, a pro-India
American journalist, “for a wannabe terrorist shopping for help,”
Pakistan—with its large selection of indigenous militant organizations—is
a veritable “Supermarket.” 45 This sinister label is certainly designed to
harm Pakistan.
The demand by IS to release Aafia Siddique in exchange of James
Foley, an American journalist before his beheading is viewed by
Pakistan’s critiques as its connection with IS. 46 The following lines from
the joint statement after the meeting between PM Modi and President
Obama in Washington lately can’t be shrugged away:

“The [US and Indian] leaders stressed the need for joint and
concerted efforts, including the dismantling of safe havens for
terrorist and criminal networks, to disrupt all financial and tactical
support for networks such as Al Qaeda, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-
Mohammad and the Haqqanis.”47

Pakistan’s dilemma is that while it could not entirely establish

state’s writ over its entire territory, especially in FATA, the countries which

42
IS Footprints Growing In Pakistan.
43
Bad as Baghdadi?
44
The General’s Pledge.
45
Bad as Baghdadi?
46
Ibid.
47
“Price of Inaction,” Dawn, October 3, 2014.
 15

consider militant organizations operating from these less-governed areas

as threat are stressing to take “joint and concerted actions, including
dismantling of alleged safe havens in Pakistan.”48 Regrettably, the same
countries do not heed to Pakistan’s legitimate demand of dismantling
terrorist safe havens in Afghanistan from where Pakistan is under constant
attack by proxy forces. However; for the first time US officials have
acknowledged that Operation “Zarb-e-Azab” is making no distinction
between different militant groups in North Waziristan Agency (NWA)
during COAS, General Raheel Sharif’s recent visit to Washington, which is
encouraging.49

 Prolonged Asymmetric Conflict. Over a decade, Pakistan’s

military is engaged in a complex asymmetric conflict on its Western
borders. The roots of this conflict lie in the safe havens existing in
Afghanistan, having tacit backing of the Afghan government and foreign
forces there. This blame game will continue till the fundamental regional
disputes remain unsettled. Despite a decade of intense military operations
by Pakistani armed forces in FATA and Swat valley, a clear victory
remains a distant dream (e.g.,Wagaha border terror attack and Quetta
sectarian attacks). 50 The claim of responsibility by TTPJuA for Wagah
attack should sensitize Pakistan government as TTPJuA is all set to
announce allegiance to IS.51

Pakistan has to prepare for a long-term destabilization, till at least

2024 due to signing of BSA (Bilateral Security Agreement) between the
US and new Afghan government. Afghan soil may continue to be used by
hostile forces, right under US watch for their covert/ clandestine anti-

48
“Price of Inaction.”
49
Anwar Iqbal, “General Raheel’s Stance on Terrorists Pleases US,” Dawn, November 28, 2014.
50
Khalid Hasnain, “Carnage at Wagah—60 Killed,” Dawn, November 3, 2014. For more on Quetta
attacks read; Saleem Shahid, “Terror Again Stalks Quetta: 8 Hazaras Gunned down; 3 Killed in Bomb
Blast,” Dawn, October 24, 2014
51
Ahrar Claim of Responsibility Appears More Credible.
 16

Pakistan operations (support to BLA and fueling extremism in Pakistan), 52

unless the new Afghan government changes its stance towards Pakistan.
No wonder, if facilitating IS ingress into Pakistan is also on the menu of
these hostile intelligence agencies operating from Afghan soil.

Recommendations

The extremism/ terrorism threat in general and IS threat in particular are difficult
to be handled in isolation due to involvement of powerful actors, including some Muslim
countries. Pakistan, therefore, must make an endeavor to sensitize the OIC—though a
remote possibility because of deep sectarian, political and economic divisions—as
challenge of Islamic extremism can only be addressed jointly by Islamic countries and
not by the US, UN or any other country. Following are a few suggestions:

 Diplomatic
 Reject IS. An OIC session be requisitioned for which Pakistan
should lobby and get un-equivocal condemnation of IS and its
unanimous rejection by the Arab and non-Arab Muslim countries.
Towards that end, KSA and Iran hold the keys for any substantive
progress in diluting the menace of Islamic extremism and other
challenges to the Islamic world.
 Tapping Funding and Jihadis Flow. A major breakthrough can
only be achieved in containing Islamic extremism if the OIC
members agree to evolve stricter measures to tap funding to
extremist/ terrorist organizations and steady flow of potential
Jihadis outside their respective borders. Unless this greater
cohesion among OIC members is achieved it will be difficult to
entirely overcome the menace of extremism in Pakistan.
 Pakistan’s Image
 Pakistan suffered $ 78 Billion economic losses and lost almost
50,000 lives, including over 5200 soldiers in combating international

52
Munir Akram, “The Democracy’s Darker Dividends,” Dawn, April 27, 2014.
 17

and domestic terrorism since 2001. 53 Still, Pakistan’s tremendous

contributions go unrecognized with mantra of “do more.” Pakistan
must endeavor to bring forward the Kashmir dispute, eclipsed by
the Afghan war and its terrible fallout on Pakistan. While Pakistan’s
adversaries, particularly India, would like to project extremism in
Pakistan as a single most threat to the world/ regional peace,
Pakistan should convince the world that primary source of instability
in the region is because of unresolved Kashmir dispute.
 While Pakistan is blamed for terrorism let’s not forget that a
renowned American philosopher, Noam Chomsky, considers US as
“the leading terrorist state,” referring to the Syrian conflict and US
hubris attitude. 54 Therefore, what Pakistan needs is proactive,
dedicated and a professional diplomatic corps, duly backed by a
strong government, which can defend Pakistan internationally
against consistent allegations of terrorism hurled from Washington
and New Delhi.
 Foreign Policy. Since decades Pakistan’s foreign policy has been US
centric but not without consequences. Pakistan paid a heavy price
(Afghan refugees, drugs and arms smuggling, militancy, instability) for its
alliance with America in Afghanistan as compared to gains. The securing
of strategic partnership accords by US with India and Afghanistan, despite
Pakistan’s non-NATO ally status reflects Pakistan’s flawed relationship
with US. The much trumpeted US-Pakistan “strategic dialogue” since
2010, unfortunately, hasn’t moved beyond “talk-talk,” so far, containing
hardly anything of strategic substance. Moreover, US-India civil nuclear
cooperation and lack of any diplomatic efforts for conflict resolution
represents US biased policies in this region.

53
Ismail Khan, “Pakistan Most Terror Hit Nation,” Dawn, February 23, 2014.
54
Noam Chomsky, “The Leading Terrorist State,” Truthout-Op-ed, November 3, 2014. http://www.truth-
out.org/opinion/item/27201-the-leading-terrorist-state. (accessed November 6, 2014).
 18

Therefore, a time has come for Pakistan to consider according

Preference to regional alliances against reliance on overseas alliances.
Pakistan must strengthen its strategic partnership with China and improve
its ties with India, Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan, CARs, and Russia to end its
reliance on US. A major breakthrough in Pakistan-Russia relations has
taken place whereby Russia has agreed for defence cooperation with
Pakistan.55

 Countering Extremist Narrative. Pakistan must demonstrate that it is

combating terrorism for its own survival and not on American dictation
(major antidote against extremist narrative). To counter the extremists
propaganda of Pakistan fighting America’s war in Afghanistan, first step
required is to review the US aid program—the primary cause of Pakistan’s
subservience to US policies and a rallying call for terrorist recruitment. The
others could be ending/ regulating US drone strikes, minimizing the
strength of foreign intelligence agents and restricting their freedom of
action inside Pakistan, reducing and closely monitoring activities of
International NGO’s and foreign security agencies in Pakistan.
 Containing Religious Extremism. Pakistan has to shun its
maliciously painted image of a militant Supermarket by taking calculated
and concrete long-term measures:
 Madrassah Culture. There is a dire need to regulate the
existing Madarassah culture in a way that by a specific time period
(say five years on) these are nationalized. As per Ministry of Interior
estimates in 2011 there were about 20,000 Madrassahs with over
three million students in Pakistan.56 While majority of these may be
doing some public service but a significant number is breeding
57
extremism and terrorism in Pakistan Under the given
circumstances these are fiercely independent and unaccountable.

55
Baqir Sajjad Syed, “ Pakistan-Russia Sign Landmark Defence Cooperation Agreement,” Dawn,
November 21, 2014.
56
Ali K. Chisti, “The Madrassah Menace!” The Friday Times, January 21-27, 2011. Vol XXII, No. 49.
57
Murtaza Haider, “ Fundos by Default not by Design, Dawn, May 14, 2014.
 19

The government must legislate to end any foreign funding to

Madrassahs via influential Islamic states as recipient groups are
then bound to follow the agendas of donors in Pakistan. Pakistan
has become a proxy battle field of Shia-Sunni sectarian strife,
sponsored from abroad.
 Hate Speech. The government must implement existing rules
to curb hate speech from every source/ platform as it incites
violence in society. The government must also ensure that terrorist/
extremist organsations like TTP and LeJ are denied any coverage
in Pakistan’s private electronic and print media houses. Regretfully,
some media sections and influential religious figures have helped
these banned organizations in spreading their evil ideologies.
 Education. From the figure below it is clear that between 30-60%
children of ages 5-9 are deprived schools in Pakistan:

Figure. 3. Percentage of Children at Ages 5-9 Not in School,

1990-2006. 58
A significant number i.e between 1-2 % of these left outs find
their way to Madrassahs. Pakistan must declare education
emergency and ensure mandatory education for every child to end
reliance on Madrassahs by a vast down trodden population. This is
58
Naushin Mehmood, “The Demographic Dividend: Effects of Population Change on School Education in
Pakistan,” Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, Islamabad, PIDE Working paper, 2011:68. 4.
http://www.pide.org.pk/pdf/Working%20Paper/WorkingPaper-68.pdf. (accessed November, 10, 2014).
 20

an achievable goal, provided the government accords it a top

priority. It is worth noting that less than 2% of GDP has been
reserved for education in Pakistan for the year 2014-15, which is far
less an amount. 59 The only way to save Pakistan’s youth from
getting radicalized is ensuring a uniform education system for every
segment of society.
 Re-integration/ de-radicalisation Programs. The government
should seriously consider a comprehensive package for re-
integration and de-radicalisations programs for misguided extremist
groups in Pakistan. For this purpose special funds must be
allocated so that guns/ explosives could be replaced with pens/
books and better employment opportunities for this estranged lot’s
reversion to mainstream life.
 Stripping Religious Titles. It is strange that known terrorist like
Fazalullah, TTP chieftain, is still addressed in media as “maulana and
maulvi.” In a Muslim society religious titles have great symbolism, which is
being grossly misused by extremists. Therefore, the government must
ensure, by act of law, that leadership cadres and members of banned
outfits in Pakistan are proclaimed as “terrorists” so that they lose their fake
religious identities among masses. Moreover, government must act fast
against banned organizations functioning, without any prejudices, and
against those religious leaders who provoke religious violence (e.g., Syed
Munnawar Hassan, ex Amir of Jamaat-e-Islami).
 Death Penalty. Now that the government has passed Protection of
Pakistan Act, after much delay, it’s high time that the weird moratorium on
death penalty be lifted (up to 8,000 death penalty cases pending since
2008). 60 There is a need to form special courts, having special powers
(including legal provision for concealing identity of judges and witnesses)

59
Pakistan Economic Survey 2013-14 Report, Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan.
http://finance.gov.pk/survey_1314.html. (accessed November 10,2014).
60
Humaima Malik, “Death Penalty to Remain Suspended in Pakistan,” Pakistan Tribune, October 4,
2013.
 21

and resources to dispose sectarian and terrorism related cases quickly.

Astonishingly, no worthwhile terrorist or sectarian killer, so far, has been
legally penalized by Pakistan’s courts. The Parliament must carry out
necessary legislation at the earliest as deterrence and retribution are the
most effective tools against extremist tendencies in a society, especially in
a country like Pakistan.
 Reforming Civil LEAs. The present government formed National
Counter Terror Authority Pakistan (NACTA) and has formulated a
comprehensive National Internal Security Policy (NISP) in 2014, which are
commendable steps. However; in order to implement the NISP and
making NACTA effective and meaningful, revolutionary measures must be
taken for carrying out structural reforms in Pakistan’s Civil LEAs and
Paramilitary Forces (FC and Rangers) to make them professional, viable
and independent organizations, free of political influences. This aspect
must top government’s agenda, even at the cost of slashing mega
development projects. Pakistan’s armed forces are responsible to defend
external frontiers, regrettably, due to murky state of affairs in the civil
LEAs, Pakistan army is out stretched to defend internal frontiers too. The
military must be relieved against growing external threats, especially from
the eastern borders, thus making Pakistan’s defence impregnable.
 National Security Policy and Counter-Terrorism (CT) Strategy
 Now that the government has announced NISP and raised NACTA
it is high time to formulate and announce Pakistan’s National
Security Policy (should have preceded NISP) and a comprehensive
CT strategy after consultations and inputs from the armed forces
and intelligence agencies.
 As Pakistan is likely to confront a long war, therefore, feasibility of
raising a new force under Joint Special Services Group (JSSG) by
combining some SSG assets of PN, PAF and Pakistan Army
should be considered, taking lead from the concept of US Joint
Special Operations Command (JSOC). This force must be
 22

adequately equipped with its dedicated aviation and air assets for
rapid CT and sting type Special Operations in Pakistan’s troubled
areas and beyond, based on actionable intelligence and
technological edge. Such a force shall prove to be an effective
force multiplier in Unconventional Warfare that confronts Pakistan.
 Addressing Faltering Economy and Political Culture
 The most urgent areas requiring attention are Pakistan’s faltering
economy and its political culture—two significant elements of
Pakistan’s national power. Weaknesses in these areas will
definitely facilitate opening avenues for extremist organizations like
IS to creep-in alongside existing conglomerate of militant groups.
The political muscle has to be equally strong as the military one for
sustainable results while combating terrorism. Therefore, the civil-
military relations must be cemented by evolving consensus on
major policy matters for the sake of Pakistan’s national security and
economic revival.
 Importantly, Pakistan must focus on FATA, PATAs, FRs, GB
regions and Category B areas in Balochistan to bring these into
main stream political sphere and under Pakistan’s Constitution.
The lack of required progress in these critical political reforms has
already cost Pakistan dearly, which is the main reason of existence
of extremist/ terrorists’ sanctuaries and almost absence of state’s
writ in these areas.

Conclusion

The IS threat has to be taken seriously and can’t be wished away, especially due
to the existing militant landscape in Pakistan. Being pro-active, Pakistan must consider
a worst case scenario: development of some understanding or alliance between TTP,
LeJ, ASWJ or any other extremist groups with the IS, whose footprints have already
been detected. If Pakistan missed the warning signs today it may not be long before IS
 23

becomes “mother of all militant problems in the country.” 61 Pakistan Army must,
therefore, succeed on culmination of Operation “Zarb-e-Azab” so that there is no space
left for TTP or IS effectiveness in Pakistan, regardless.

The sooner Pakistan’s authorities realise this danger the better as our
adversaries can use this as a pretext to act against Pakistan on allegations of existence
of terrorist safe havens (WMD case against Saddam Hussain). The killing of OBL on
May 2, 2011 in a controversial Abbottabad raid by US Navy SEALs has already set a
dangerous precedence for Pakistan. In case IS also succeeds penetrating Pakistan it
would be a nightmare scenario. The important state pillars must shun their petty
differences to evolve unified and a comprehensive response to a range of complex
security challenges to Pakistan’s national security or else it may become victim of its
blunders and successful strategies of its adversaries.

Pakistan must not let foreign hands, through their enablers within, to destroy its
inner fabric, which is only possible if Pakistan carries out the much needed political,
economic, judicial and diplomatic reforms on a war footing. The writ of state has to be
established for making it really painful for any terrorist or extremist group to operate on
Pakistan’s soil and deny any opportunity to its adversaries; who are flexing their
muscles for “joint actions” on its soil. Although Pakistan’s adversaries would like to
project terrorism and extremism issues as their major concerns but Pakistan’s foreign
office and its diplomatic corps must not allow that to happen. With BJP led Indian
government cozying up to US, Pakistan will come under increasing pressure on
terrorism. Pakistan must plead its case with the international community by keeping
alive the regional disputes—to put the context of persisting regional instability in correct
perspective—for attaining any meaningful and lasting peace in this region and beyond.

61
“The IS Threat,” Dawn, November 10, 2014.
 24

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