Ervin Sagun 20180200231

Ethics Review Digests

Code of Professional Responsibility

Canon 14
Francis et. al v. Portugal
Facts:
Information was filed against police before the Sandiganbayan for murder and frustrated
murder due to a shooting incident. However, upon filing Motion for Reconsideration and other
motions, complainants never heard from Atty. Portugal again and also moving out from his last
known address without any forwarding address. Court then issued a Resolution denying the
petition for late filing and non-payment of docket fees. Complainants also learned that the said
Resolution had attained finality and warrants of arrest had already been issued against the
accused because respondent, whose whereabouts remained unknown, did nothing to prevent
the reglementary period for seeking reconsideration from lapsing. Respondent states that it is
of vital significance that the Court notes that he was not the original counsel of the accused. He
was merely requested by the original counsel to be on hand, assist the accused, and be present
at the promulgation of the Sandiganbayan decision. Respondent claims that there was no
formal engagement undertaken by the parties. But only because of his sincere effort.
Issue:
Did Atty. Portugal violate the Code of Professional Responsibility by his sudden withdrawal and
disappearance?
Held:
Yes. As to respondent’s conduct in dealing with the accused and complainants, he definitely fell
short of the high standard of assiduousness that a counsel must perform to safeguard the rights
of his clients. Had respondent truly intended to withdraw his appearance for the accused, he as
a lawyer who is presumably steeped in court procedures and practices, should have filed the
notice of withdrawal himself instead of the accused. The rule in this jurisdiction is that a client
has the absolute right to terminate the attorney-client relation at anytime with or without
cause. The right of an attorney to withdraw or terminate the relation other than for sufficient
cause is, however, considerably restricted. Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the
principle that an attorney who undertakes to conduct an action impliedly stipulates to carry it
to its conclusion. He is not at liberty to abandon it without reasonable cause. A lawyer’s right to
withdraw from a case before its final adjudication arises only from the client’s written consent
or from a good cause. Once he agrees to take up the cause of the client, the lawyer owes
fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
After agreeing to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to both cause and client,
even if the client never paid any fee for the attorney-client relationship. Lawyering is not a
business; it is a profession in which duty of public service, not money, is the primary
consideration. Hence, even if respondent felt under-compensated in the case he undertook to
defend, his obligation embodied in the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility still remains unwavering. The zeal and the degree of fervor in handling the case
should neither diminish nor cease just because of his perceived insufficiency of remuneration.

Canon 15
Lim et. al v. Villarosa
Facts: The respondent represented Mrs. Jalandoni in a civil case. Utmost trust and confidence
was reposed on said counsel, hence delicate and confidential matters involving all the personal
circumstances of his client were entrusted to the respondent. The latter was provided with all
the necessary information relative to the property in question and likewise on legal matters
affecting the corporation (PRC) particularly involving problems which affect Hotel Alhambra.
Said counsel was privy to all transactions and affairs of the corporation/hotel. The respondent
handled the entire case and sometime presented Mrs. Jalandoni as a witness, eventually
respondent filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for Mrs. Jalandoni without any approval or
knowledge form the said client, which resulted to irreparable injury to Mrs. Jalandoni because it
suffered unexpected defeat. Thereafter, spouse’s Jalbuena was sued by PRC for estafa, and the
respondent represented the spouse’s Jalbuena before the city Prosecutor of Bacolod. In his
contention the respondent said there is a retainership agreement between them and Dennis
Jalbuena and that he cannot refuse to the said client. A case was filed against the respondent,
due to conflict of interest to his clients and for not releasing the significant documents which
belongs to Mrs. Jalandoni or PRC and which was allegedly used for the benefit or advantage of
Spouses Jalbuena in the case filed against them by PRC.
Issue: Whether there existed a conflict of interest in the cases represented and handled by
respondent Whether respondent properly withdrew his services as counsel of record in Civil
Case
Held: Yes Rule 15.03 A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent
of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. The rule on conflict of interests covers
not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided but also those in
which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Another test of the inconsistency of
interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full
discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof, and also whether he will be called
upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquires in the previous
employment. The first part of the rule refers to cases in which the opposing parties are present
clients either in the same action or in a totally unrelated case; the second part pertains to those
in which the adverse party against whom the attorney appears is his former client in a matter
which is related, directly or indirectly, to the present controversy. The rule prohibits a lawyer
from representing new clients whose interests oppose those of a former client in any manner,
whether or not they are parties in the same action or in totally unrelated cases. The cases here
directly or indirectly involved the party’s connection to PRC, even if neither PRC nor Lumot A.
Jalandoni was specifically named as party-litigant in some of the cases mentioned. An attorney
owes to his client undivided allegiance. After being retained and receiving the confidences of
the client, he cannot, without the free and intelligent consent of his client, act both for his
client and for one whose interest is averse to, or conflicting with that of his client in the same
general matter. The prohibition stands even if the adverse interest is very slight; neither is it
material that the intention and motive of the attorney may have been honest. The
representation by a lawyer of conflicting interests, in the absence of the written consent of all
parties concerned after a full disclosure of the facts, constitutes professional misconduct which
subjects the lawyer to disciplinary action. Even respondents alleged effort to settle the existing
controversy among the family members was improper because the written consent of all
concerned was still required. A lawyer who acts as such in settling a dispute cannot represent
any of the parties to it.

Santos, Sr. v. Beltran

FACTS: Respondent Elmo S. Abad was a successful examinee of the 1978 bar examinations but
was held in contempt of court for unauthorized practice of law for not taking the lawyer’s oath
and signing the roll of attorneys. Atty. Procopio S. Beltran, Jr., the complainant herein, filed a
Motion to Circularise to all Metro Manila Courts the fact that Abad is not authorised to practice,
due to respondent’s alleged continuous practice of law even after the court decision. Abad
denied the allegations of the circular.
Issue: Whether or not Abad can engage in practice of law.
Held:
No. The respondent cannot engage in the practice of law. The bar examinee who successfully
passed the bar examination cannot practice law yet and is not considered a member of the bar
until he has taken his oath and signed the roll of attorneys which are the essential requisites of
becoming a lawyer as stated in Rule 138, Secs. 17 and 19, Rules of Court. The right to practice
law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to persons of good
moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The exercise of this
privilege presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment and
even public trust, since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the
right to practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. The practice of law is a privilege
that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking
admission had practiced law without license. The actuations of respondent as shown from the
foregoing constitute a violation of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, SEC. 3. Indirect contempt to be
punished after charge and hearing, “(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and
acting as such without authority”, which should be punished more severely considering his
temerity in still continuing the practice of law despite the decision of March 28, 1983. The court
ruled that respondent be debarred from admission to the Philippine Bar until such time that the
Court finds him fit to become such a member with a fine of P2,000.00 payable within ten (10)
days from receipt of this resolution or an imprisonment of twenty (20) days in case of non-
payment thereof, with warning of drastic disciplinary action of imprisonment in case of any
further practice of law after receipt of this resolution. It is further recommended that a circular
be issued to all courts in the Philippines through the Office of the Court Administrator that
respondent Elmo S. Abad has not been admitted to the Philippine Bar, and is therefore not
authorized to practice law. So ordered.

Canon 16
Frias v. Lozada
Facts: Respondent Atty. Carmelita Bautista-Lozada seeks reconsideration of resolution finding
her guilty of violating Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility of wilfully disobeying
a final and executory decision of the Court of Appeals of suspending her from the practice of
law for two years. Atty. Carmelita Bautista-Lozada contends that, pursuant to Rule VIII of the
Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
the complaint against her was already barred by prescription. Rule VIII, Section 1 of the Rules of
Procedure of the CBD-IBP which provides: Section 1. Prescription. A complaint for disbarment,
suspension or discipline of attorneys prescribes in two years from the date of the professional
misconduct. She also asserts that her December 7, 1990 loan agreement with complainant
complied with Rule 16.04 because the interest of complainant was fully protected.

Issue: Whether or not the administrative complaint against Atty. Carmelita Bautista-Lozada a
member of bar has already prescribed.
Held: No. The Court, as early as 1967, held that the defence of prescription does not lie in
administrative proceedings against lawyers. And in the 2004 case of Heck v. Santos, we
declared that an administrative complaint against a member of the bar does not prescribe the
court also said that if they rule were otherwise, members of the bar would be emboldened to
disregard the very oath they took as lawyers, prescinding from the fact that as long as no
private complainant would immediately come.
Canon 17
Yao v. Aurelio
Facts: A complaint was filed against Atty. Aurelio by Yao before the IBP seeking for his
disbarment for alleged violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The complainant
alleged that since 1987 he retained the services of respondent as his personal lawyer; that
respondent is a stockholder and the retained counsel of Solar Farms & Livelihood Corporation
and Solar Textile Finishing Corporation of which complainant is a majority stockholder; that
complainant purchased several parcels of land using his personal funds but were registered in
the name of the corporations upon the advice of respondent; that respondent, who was also
the brother in-law of complainant's wife, had in 1999 a disagreement with the latter and
thereafter respondent demanded the return of his investment in the corporations but when
complainant refused to pay, he filed eight charges for estafa and falsification of commercial
documents against the complainant and his wife and the other officers of the corporation; that
respondent also filed a complaint against complainant for alleged non-compliance with the
reportorial requirements of the Securities and Exchange Commission with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City. Aurelio then filed cases against Yao and his wife. Yao alleged
that the series of suits filed against him and his wife constitute an abuse of the confidential
information which Aurelio obtained by virtue of his employment as counsel. Aurelio, on the
other hand, claimed that he filed those which he obtained by virtue of his being a stockholder
of Solar Textile Finishing Corporation. The investigating commissioner found that Yao
discontinued paying dividends to Aurelio which compelled the latter to file multiple criminal
and civil cases in the exercise of his rights as a stockholder. He recommended that Aurelio be
suspended from practice of law. The IBP approved and adopted the said recommendation.
Issue: Whether or not Aurelio violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Held: Yes Atty. Leonardo Aurelio is ordered suspended from the practice of law for a period of
six months. He took advantage of his being a lawyer in order to get back at Yao and in doing so,
he has inevitably utilized information he has obtained from his dealings with Yao and his
companies for his own end. It is essential to note that the relationship between an attorney and
his client is a fiduciary one.

Canon 18
Riesenbeck v. Abarrientos
Facts: Complainant filed a verified letter complaint with the IBP against Atty. Jaynes Abarrientos
on the ground of professional misconduct and neglect of duty averring that she engaged the
services of the respondent lawyer in a civil case she had elevated to the Court of Appeals. The
case was unfortunately decided against her so she asked the respondent to prepare a Motion
for Reconsideration. She paid him P5,000 for the motion with the understanding that if it
became necessary to file a petition for review with the Supreme Court, she will pay him another
P5,000.00 for the petition. However, it was revealed to the complainant that the motion was
denied and the period to file the petition had expired, thus she had lost all her hopes
concerning the case. The IBP found respondent to have violated Canons 17 and 18 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility and recommended to the Court that the latter be suspended for 4
months. He was likewise ordered to refund the P5,000 which the complainant paid for the
petition.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Abarrientos violated Canon 18
Ruling: Atty. Abarrientos is found liable for serious misconduct and negligence in the
performance of his duties as a lawyer. He is suspended from the practice of law for four
months, with warning that commission of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely. He was also ordered to refund the amount of P5,000 to complainant. Needless to
emphasize, a lawyer must not keep a client in the dark as to the status of and developments in
the client’s case. The lawyer is obliged to respond within a reasonable time to a client’s request
for information. A client is entitled to the fullest disclosure of the mode or manner by which
that client’s interest is defended or why certain steps are taken or omitted. A lawyer who
repeatedly fails to answer the inquiries or communications of a client violates the rules of
professional courtesy and neglects the client’s interests.

Canon 19
Mobil Oil Phili, Inc.
Facts:
Petitioner filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Rizal against the partnership La
Mallorca and its general partners, which included private respondents, for collection of a sum
of money arising from gasoline purchased on credit but not paid, for damages and attorney’s
fees.
Issue:
Whether or not public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction
Held:
Yes, respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion. The judgment was rendered in favour of
the plaintiff and against the defendants ordering the defendant La Mallorca Partnership to pay
the plaintiff. From a joint venture/partnership theory which he adopted and consistently
pursued in his complaint. Respondents shall be excluded and that only nominal attorney's fees
shall be awarded. Petitioner embraced the innominate contract theory. The defence agreed to
submit the case for decision solely on the basis of evidence adduced by plaintiff Mobil Oil but
past interest in the amount of P150.

Canon 20
Bach v. Ongkiko
Facts: Petitioner Bach engaged the services of respondent law firm Ongkiko Kalaw Manhit &
Accorda Law Offices to represent him in a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage. The
parties signed a "Fee Agreement," for the legal services to be rendered by respondent. Rule
20.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility lists the guidelines for determining the proper
amount of attorney fees, to wit: Rule 20.1 – A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors in
determining his fees. Respondent withdrew its appearance as counsel of petitioner, due to
policy differences. Respondent sent the termination billing for the services they rendered and
billed petitioner the total amount of P1,000,000.00 plus 2% interest for every month of delay in
payment, based on the provision for termination of services stated in their Fee Agreement.
Respondent filed with the RTC a Notice of Charging Lien over the properties of the spouses
Bach.
Issue: Whether or not under the concept of quantum meruit, the amount awarded by the trial
court and Court of Appeals, is excessive, unreasonable and unreasonable.
Held:
The issue in this case concerns attorney's fees in the ordinary concept. Generally, the amount
of attorney's fees due is that stipulated in the retainer agreement which is conclusive as to the
amount of the lawyer's compensation. In the absence thereof, the amount of attorney's fees is
fixed on the basis of quantum meruit, i.e., the reasonable worth of the attorney's services.
Courts may ascertain also if the attorney's fees are found to be excessive, what is reasonable
under the circumstances. In no case, however, must a lawyer be allowed to recover more than
what is reasonable, pursuant to Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
It is undisputed that respondent firm had rendered services as counsel for the petitioners. We
do not find herein a situation so intricate that demands more than a careful scrutiny of the legal
matters involved. These are simply the normal duties of a lawyer that he is bound by law to
render to his clients with utmost fidelity for which his client must not be burdened to pay an
extra price. It bears stressing that at the time respondent firm withdrew their appearance due
to policy differences with petitioner, the case was still in its initial stage.
We have identified the circumstances to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a
claim for attorney's fees as follows: (1) the amount and character of the service rendered; (2)
labour, time, and trouble involved; (3) the nature and importance of the litigation or business in
which the services were rendered; (4) the responsibility imposed; (5) the amount of money or
the value of the property affected by the controversy or involved in the employment; (6) the
skill and experience called for in the performance of the services; (7) the professional character
and social standing of the attorney; (8) the results secured; and (9) whether the fee is absolute
or contingent, it being recognized that an attorney may properly charge a much larger fee when
it is contingent than when it is not. 19
Guided by the above yardstick and so much of the pertinent data as are extant in the records of
this case and in the exercise of our sound discretion, we hold that the amount of P500,000.00 is
a reasonable and fair compensation for the legal services rendered by respondent to the
petitioner.

Bautista vs Gonzales
Facts:
Respondent Ramon A. Gonzales was charged with malpractice, deceit, gross misconduct and
violation of lawyer’s oath. Required by this Court to answer the charges against him,
respondent filed a motion for a bill of particulars asking this Court to order complainant to
amend his complaint by making his charges more definite. In a resolution the Court granted
respondent’s motion and required complainant to file an amended complaint. Complainant
submitted an amended complaint for disbarment, alleging that respondent committed acepting
a case wherein he agreed with his clients, to pay all expenses, including court fees, for a
contingent fee 50% of the value of the property in litigation and inducing complainant, who was
his former client, to enter into a contract with him for the development into a residential
subdivision of the land involved in Civil Case No. Q-15143, claiming that he acquired 50%
interest thereof as attorney’s fees from the Fortunados, while knowing fully well that the said
property was already sold at a public auction.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent committed serious misconduct involving a champertous contract.
Held:
Yes. Respondent was suspended from practice of law for six (6) months. The Court finds that
the agreement between the respondent and the Fortunados contrary to Canon 42 of the
Canons of Professional Ethics which provides that a lawyer may not properly agree with a client
to pay or bear the expenses of litigation. [See also Rule 16.04, Code of Professional
Responsibility]. Although a lawyer may in good faith, advance the expenses of litigation, the
same should be subject to reimbursement. The agreement between respondent and the
Fortunados, however, does not provide for reimbursement to respondent of litigation expenses
paid by him. An agreement whereby an attorney agrees to pay expenses of proceedings to
enforce the client’s rights is champertous. Such agreements are against public policy especially
where, as in this case, the attorney has agreed to carry on the action at his own expense in
consideration of some bargain to have part of the thing in dispute. The execution of these
contracts violates the fiduciary relationship between the lawyer and his client, for which the
former must incur administrative sanctions.

Canon 21
Genato v. Silapan
Facts: Respondent borrowed money from complainant which he intended to use as down
payment for the purchase of a new car. In return, respondent issued to complainant a post-
dated cheque to answer for the six months interest on the loan and mortgaged to complainant
his house and lot in Quezon City but did not surrender its title claiming that it was the subject of
reconstitution proceedings before the Quezon City Register of Deeds. With the money
borrowed from complainant, respondent purchased a new car. The document of sale of the car
was issued in complainants name and financed through City Trust Company. Then respondent
introduced to complainant a certain Emmanuel Romero who also borrowed money from
complainant. Subsequently, respondent failed to pay the amortisation on the car and the
financing firm sent demand letters to complainant. Complainant tried to encash respondents
post-dated cheque with the drawee bank but it was dishonoured as respondents account
therein was already closed. The failure of the respondent to heed complainant’s repeated
demand for payment forced the latter to file a criminal case against respondent for violation of
BP Blg. 22 and a civil case for judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Silapan violated Code of Professional Responsibility
Held: The long-established rule is that an attorney is not permitted to disclose communications
made to him in his professional character by a client, unless the latter consents. This obligation
to preserve the confidences and secrets of a client arises at the inception of their relationship.
The protection given to the client is perpetual and does not cease with the termination of the
litigation, nor is it affected by the party’s ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining another,
or by any other change of relation between them. It even survives the death of the client. It
must be stressed, however, that the privilege against disclosure of confidential communications
or information is limited only to communications which are legitimately and properly within the
scope of a lawful employment of a lawyer. It does not extend to those made in contemplation
of a crime or perpetration of a fraud. If the unlawful purpose is avowed, the communication is
not covered by the privilege as the client does not consult the lawyer professionally. It is not
within the profession of a lawyer to advise a client as to how he may commit a crime as a
lawyer is not a gun for hire. Thus, the attorney-client privilege does not attach, there being no
professional employment in the strict sense. A lawyer must conduct himself, especially in his
dealings with his clients, with integrity in a manner that is beyond reproach. His relationship
with his clients should be characterized by the highest degree of good faith and fairness. Thus,
the Court agrees with the evaluation of the IBP and finds that respondent’s allegations and
disclosures in the foreclosure case amount to a breach of fidelity sufficient to warrant the
imposition of disciplinary sanction against him. However, the recommended penalty of one (1)
year suspension of respondent from the practice of law seems to be disproportionate to his
breach of duty considering that a review of the records of this Court reveals that this is the first
administrative complaint against him. Respondent Atty. Essex L. Silapan is ordered suspended
from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months effective upon receipt of this Decision.

Metro Bank and Trust Company v. CA

Facts: Petitioner Metrobank filed a petition for review on certiorari after the Court of Appeals
ruled that petitioner should pay the certain amount based on the charging lien on the civil case
filed against them which resulted to dismissal. In the dismissed case, private respondent filed a
motion to fix its attorney’s fees, based on quantum meruit, which precipitated an exchange of
arguments between the parties. Petitioner manifested that it had fully paid private respondent,
Arturo Alafriz and Associates. Private respondent countered and attempted to arrange a
compromise with petitioner in order to avoid suit, but the negotiations were unsuccessful.
Issue: Whether or not respondent is entitled to the enforcement of its charging lien for
payment of its attorney’s fees, and private respondent is entitled to twenty-five (25%) percent
of the actual and current market values of the litigated properties on a quantum meruit basis.
Held: No. A charging lien, to be enforceable as security for the payment of attorney’s fees,
requires as a condition sine qua non a judgment for money and execution in pursuance of such
judgment secured in the main action by the attorney in favour of his client. The persons who
are entitled to or who must pay attorney’s fees have the right to be heard upon the question of
their propriety or amount. Hence, the obvious necessity of a hearing is beyond cavil. In fixing a
reasonable compensation for the services rendered by a lawyer on the basis of quantum
meruit, the determination of elements to be considered would indispensably require nothing
less than a full-blown trial.

NOTARIAL LAW
Balinon v. De Leon
Facts: A complaint was filed which includes that, notwithstanding the unlawful and immoral
purposes of an affidavit, respondent Velayo knowingly signed the same in violation of his oath
of office as attorney and notary public.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Velayo violated the Notarial law
Held: Yes. With reference with respondent Velayo, there is no question that he did nothing
except to affix his signature to the affidavit in question as a notary public. While, as contended
by his counsel, the duty of a notary public is principally to ascertain the identity of the affiant
and the voluntariness of the declaration, it is nevertheless incumbent upon him at least to
guard against having anything to do with an illegal or immoral arrangement. In the present case
respondent Velayo was somewhat negligent in just affixing his signature to the affidavit,
although his fault is mitigated by the fact the he had relied on the good faith of his co-
respondent.

Collantes v. Atty. Mabuti

Facts: Complainant alleged that respondent notarised a document entitled "Memorandum of
Agreement" in the City of Manila. Upon verification, however, he discovered that respondent
was not commissioned as a notary public in the City of Manila at time of notarisation.
Issue: Whether or not the IBP correctly found respondent liable for violation of the 2004
Notarial Rules.
Held: Yes. The Court has emphatically stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless,
routinary act. Notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public
document making it admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial
document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit, and as such, notaries public are obligated
to observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties.
In this case, the IBP found that respondent notarized the subject document, "Memorandum of
Agreement," without being commissioned as a notary public at the time of notarization. This
fact has been duly certified to by none other than the Notarial Section of the Office of the Clerk
of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Thus, by knowingly
performing notarial acts at the time when he was not authorized to do so, respondent clearly
violated the Notarial Rules and in consequence, should be held administratively liable.

Virtusio v. Virtusio
Facts: Mila Virtusio (Mila) filed with a Complaint for disbarment against her husband's distant
relative, Atty. Grenalyn V. Virtusio. Atty. Virtusio convinced her to buy a house and lot. Mila
agreed for Atty. Virtusio to use her personal checks in paying the seller with Mila reimbursing
her. However, Mila began receiving letters from Stateland, demanding that she make good the
dishonoured checks that it got. When she confronted Atty. Virtusio regarding this, the latter
assured her that she would take care of the problem. But the demand letters persisted. Mila
further alleged that Atty. Virtusio declined to return to her the money the latter
misappropriated despite demand. Mila further alleged that Atty. Virtusio declined to return to
her the money the latter misappropriated despite demand.
Issue: Whether Atty. Virtuoso violated Code of Professional Responsibility.
Held: The Court cannot also countenance Atty. Virtusio s notarization of documents after her
notarial commission had expired. Although the IBP discovered this violation of the notarial law
only in the course of the proceedings and was not a subject matter of Mila s complaint, it
cannot close its eyes to the same. Besides, Atty. Virtusio had an opportunity to defend herself
against this additional charge. Her defence is that she thought that she had renewed her
commission.
Again, Atty. Virtusio’s defence is unsubstantial. She did not renew her notarial commission for
two years, 2006 and 2007, not just one. She could not have missed that fact considering that, as
she said, she had been renewing her commission yearly from 1995 to 2005.
A lawyer who notarizes a document without a proper commission violates his lawyer s oath to
obey the law. He makes it appear that he is commissioned when he is not. He thus indulges in
deliberate falsehood that the lawyer s oath forbids. This violation falls squarely under Rule 1.01
of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Canon 7 as well. A proper sanction is
authorized.
Considering, however, that based on the evidence Atty. Virtusio had notarized only two
documents without a proper notarial commission, the Court finds her suspension from notarial
practice for one year adequate.

Dinoy v. Rosal
Facts: A series of communications were then exchanged between Mr. Dinoy and the
Committee, among which was another unverified letter from Mr. Dinoy containing evidence
tending to support his charge against Atty. Rosal. Such evidence included: (a) a xerox copy of a
death certificate issued by the Parish Church of San Nicolas, Cebu City indicating that one
Cesaria Bacalla died on 10 February 1981; (b) a photograph of a headstone indicating that Jose
Gentacutan died on 2 April 1974; and (c) a xerox copy of a certification issued by the Parish
Church of San Nicolas, Cebu City indicating that the skeletal remains of Jose Gentacutan have
been interred in the Calamba Roman Catholic Cemetery, Cebu City. When the investigation was
already well under way, Mr. Dinoy submitted a "Supplementary Affidavit" dated 25 September
1993 wherein he declared that the act complained of "is illegal and unlawful and he (Atty.
Rosal) should be punished for this Act (by) disbarment from (the) practice of law."
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Rosal violated the Notarial law
Held: Yes. Notarization of a private document converts such document into a public one and
renders it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity; courts, administrative
agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgement executed by a
notary public and appended to a private document. 1 Consequently, it is the duty of the
notarial officer to demand that a document be signed in his presence by the real parties
thereto: the notarial officer must reserve "utmost care" to comply with the elementary
formalities in the performance of his duties.
In this case, respondent’s failure to observe the required standard of care was not only evident
from his inconsistent admissions as noted by Atty. Legaspi, but also from the documentary
evidence submitted by the complainant which demonstrated that two (2) of the eight (8) co-
owners of a parcel of land who executed the special power of attorney dated 8 May 1989 were
already deceased well before the time respondent notarized the document in question.
Furthermore, although the Court agrees with the IBP’s recommendation that the respondent
be administratively sanctioned for his negligence, we find the recommended penalty of six (6)
month’s suspension from the practice of law to be unduly harsh, considering that complainant
had not shown that the respondent had deliberately acknowledged and recorded a falsehood
when he notarized the document dated 8 May 1989, 3 and considering further that the present
complaint relates to the notarization of one (1) document only.

DISBARMENT
Rural Bank v. Pilla
Facts: Rural Bank of Silay. Inc. filed the Court the complaint for disbarment against Atty. Ernesto
H. Pilla alleging deceit and gross misconduct on the part of the latter. Respondent in presenting
to the complainant Bank a forged and falsified Power of Attorney for the purpose of obtaining a
loan is a betrayal of his oath as a lawyer to do falsehood to no man and by his conduct herein
has forfeited his right to continue further in the practice of law.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Pilla violated the Code of Professional Responsibility
Held: s correctly pointed out by the trial court in Civil Case No. 1-C, since respondent actually
benefited from the falsified document, he is presumed to have a hand in the falsification of the
same. Respondent miserably failed to rebut this presumption with his barefaced denial that he
had no knowledge of the forgery. The Court cannot give credence to respondent’s negative
assertion that he did not know that the special power of attorney issued in his favour was
falsified. As a lawyer, respondent knows or ought to know that parties to a public document
must personally appear before the notary public to attest that the same is their own free act
and deed. In utter disregard of this requirement, respondent caused the special power of
attorney to be notarized without the parties appearing before the notary public. Thereafter,
respondent presented the same to complainant rural bank in order to obtain a loan therefrom.
It is thus apparent that respondent had a hand in the falsification of the document especially
considering that it was he who chiefly benefited from it. Indeed, "the settled rule is that in the
absence of satisfactory explanation, one found in possession of and who used a forged
document is the forger and therefore guilty of falsification." Further, "if a person had in his
possession a falsified document and he made use of it (uttered it), taking advantage of it and
profiting thereby, the clear presumption is that he is the material author of the falsification."
Respondent’s acts clearly fall short of the standards set by the Code of Professional
Responsibility, particularly Rule 1.01 thereof, which provides that" [a] lawyer shall not engage
in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." The fact that the conduct pertained to
respondent’s private dealings with complainant rural bank is of no moment. A lawyer may be
suspended or disbarred for ANY misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long
as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.
Possession of good moral character is not only a good condition precedent to the practice of
law, but a continuing qualification for all members of the bar.

Judicial Ethics

Panganiban v. Judge Guerero

Facts: Elnora S. Panganiban avers that respondent Judge Francisco Ma. Guerrero castigated her
in his chambers in front of several persons relative to the release of the cash bond in a criminal
case. At that time, respondent was also the pairing judge of the same regional trial court. It
appears that respondent thought that the bond posted had been accepted without the
requisite undertaking. When complainant tried to explain the matter, respondent suddenly lost
his temper and snapped at her. A couple of days later, complainant was summoned by
respondent to his chambers and again flared up and, then and there, repeatedly demanded
that complainant resign, prompting the latter to flee from respondent’s office. A few other
similar occurrences occurred afterwards.
On the other hand, respondent judge denied the averments. He, however, admitted having
criticized her by calling her attention to her shortcomings with an altogether pleasant
disposition. The Court resolved to refer complainant’s grievances against respondent to the
Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation. A fine in the
amount of P1,000.00 was imposed on the respondent judge.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent Judge was properly apprehended.
Held: Yes, a judge’s official conduct should be free from and be untainted by the appearance of
impropriety, and his or her personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance
of judicial duties, but also in his or her everyday life, should be beyond reproach. Respondent
judge has not been exactly scrupulous in exemplifying such high ideals, as earlier narrated. One
improvident act committed in an unguarded moment could have been understandable, but not
a regrettable series thereof.
It need only be said that public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or
improper conduct of judges. What is worse in the case of respondent judge is that the hapless
recipient of his deplorable behavior was a subordinate fellow worker in government and a lady
to boot. Certainly, nothing could be more demoralizing to an employee than an insensitive and
unkind colleague who is her superior at that.
Had respondent acted with kindness and consideration, it would most certainly have elicited
not only praise but, more importantly, respect for him from complainant herself, a distinction
that he would doubtless have left behind for fond remembrance by those who worked with him
and as a hallmark of his service in the judiciary. That this is not to be is the more unfortunate
although unwritten sanction in the instant administrative proceeding.

Dacera v. Judge Teodoro Dizon

Facts: Leopoldo G. Dacera, Jr. was the complainant in a prosecution for Qualified Theft filed
with Branch 37 of the RTC of General Santos City where Judge Teodoro Dizon was presiding.
The prosecutor later filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that Leopoldo G. Dacera, Jr. had
executed and signed an Affidavit of Desistance from pursuing the prosecution. Leopoldo G.
Dacera, Jr., however, opposed the Motion to Dismiss, alleging that Judge Teodoro Dizon had
unduly influenced him to sign the Affidavit of Desistance and that he had not been fully
apprised of the consequences of his actions in doing so. The Supreme Court then assigned an
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals to investigate into the matter.
Issue: Whether or not Judge Teodoro Dizon was guilty of unduly influencing Leopoldo G. Dacesa
to sign the Affidavit of Desistance.
Held: No, the investigation did not find any conclusive evidence that Judge Dizon was personally
biased in favor of either party in the disposition of the case in question.
As held in the case of Capuno vs. Jaramillo, judges have been cautioned to avoid in-chamber
sessions without the other party and his counsel present, and to observe prudence at all times
in their conduct to the end that they not only act impartially and with propriety, but are also
perceived to be impartial and proper.
In the present case, there indeed is no clear proof of malice, corrupt motives or improper
considerations which attended the acts of the respondent. A judge should avoid impropriety
and the appearance of impropriety in all his activities. Public confidence in the judiciary is
eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct of judges. They must be the embodiment of
competence, integrity and independence. A judge's conduct must be above reproach. It is clear
that respondent judge transgressed Canon 2, Rules 2.00 and 2.01 of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics.
The complaint filed by Leopoldo G. Dacera Jr. against Judge Teodoro A. Dizon, Jr., was dismissed
for lack of merit. But respondent Judge is admonished to refrain from making calls to any
parties-litigant and/or counsel with cases pending in his sala and sternly warned that a
repetition of the same will be dealt with more severely.

Bafuan Mamiscal v. Clerk of Court Macalinog S. Abdullah, Sharia’h Circuit Court, Marawi CIty
Facts: A complaint was filed by Baguan M. Mamiscal against respondent Macalinog S. Abdullah
who was the Clerk of Court of the Shari'a Circuit Court in Marawi City, for partiality, violation of
due process, dishonesty, and conduct unbecoming of a court employee. Mamiscal averred that
when he and his wife had a heated argument, he decided to divorce his wife by repudiating her
(talaq). The repudiation was embodied in an agreement (kapasadan) signed by Mamiscal and
Adelaidah.
When Adelaidah left their conjugal dwelling in Iligan City and went back to her family's home in
Marinaut, Marawi City, Mamiscal had a change of heart and decided to make peace with his
wife. For the purpose, he sent their common relatives to see Adelaidah and make peace with
her on his behalf. However, Adelaidah filed the Certificate of Divorce (COD) with the office of
Abdullah for registration. Although unsigned, the certificate, purportedly executed by
Mamiscal, certified that he had pronounced talaq in the presence of two (2) witnesses and in
accordance with Islamic Law for the purpose of effecting divorce from Adelaidah. A notation on
the certificate stated that it was being filed together with the kapasadan. Abdullah, in the
exercise of his duty as both Clerk of Court and Circuit Civil Registrar, issued the invitation
notifying the couple and their representatives to appear before the Shari'a Circuit Court to
constitute the Agama Arbitration Council (AAC) that would explore the possibility of reconciling
the spouses. Later, Abdullah issued the Certificate of Registration of Divorce (CRD) finalizing the
divorce between Mamiscal and Adelaidah.
Mamiscal sought the revocation of the CRD, questioning the validity of the kapasadan on which
the CRD was based. He contended that the kapasadan was invalid considering that he did not
prepare the same. Moreover, there were no witnesses to its execution. He claimed that he only
signed the kapasadan because of Adelaidah's threats.
Mamiscal averred the following:
1. Under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, a divorce under talaq could only be filed and
registered by the male spouse
2. Abdullah "fabricated and twisted the facts" when he declared that only Mamiscal and
his representative appeared when the AAC was convened
3. Abdullah violated the Shari'a rules of procedure when he initially refused to receive
Mamiscal's motion for reconsideration when it was first filed
Abdullah countered that although he had the authority to process the registration of the
divorce as court registrar, he could not be held responsible for the contents of the COD and the
kapasadan because his functions were only ministerial.

Issue: Whether or not Abdullah should be held administratively liable for his actions in
connection with the registration of the divorce between Mamiscal and Adelaidah.

Held: No, the civil registrar is the person charged by law for the recording of vital events and
other documents affecting the civil status of persons.
To ensure the proper registration of all facets of the civil life of Muslim Filipinos throughout the
country, Article 81 of the Muslim Code must be referred to. Thus, it becomes apparent that the
Clerk of Court of the Shari'a Circuit Court enjoys the privilege of wearing two hats: first, as Clerk
of Court of the Shari'a Circuit Court, and second, as Circuit Registrar within his territorial
jurisdiction. Although the Constitution vests the Court with the power of administrative
supervision over all courts and its personnel, this power must be taken with due regard to other
prevailing laws such as Article 185 of the Muslim Code, Section 2 and 18 of the Commonwealth
Act (C.A.) No. 3753.
The Court does not have jurisdiction to impose the proper disciplinary action against civil
registrars. While he is undoubtedly a member of the Judiciary as Clerk of Court of the Shari'a
Circuit Court, a review of the subject complaint reveals that Mamiscal seeks to hold Abdullah
liable for registering the divorce and issuing the CRD pursuant to his duties as Circuit Registrar
of Muslim divorces. Hence, the administrative matter against Macalinog S. Abdullah, Clerk of
Court II, Shari'a Circuit Court, Marawi City, for partiality, violation of due process, dishonesty,
and conduct unbecoming a court employee is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.