Jiuiittnl oj RxpcFimcnta} Psychology

1973, Vol. 100, No. 2, 387-394

REQUIRING HYPOTHESES AND THE IDENTIFICATION OF

UNIDIMENSIONAL, CONJUNCTIVE, AND
DISJUNCTIVE CONCEPTS '
ROGER L. D O M I N O W S K I 3
L'ti-iversily of Illinois, Chicago Circle

Using the selection paradigm, 120 ^S's were required to identify the relevant
attributes of cither a uaidimensional, conjunctive, or disjunctive concept,
working cither under standard conditions or with a hypothesis required after
each selection. The major result was that requiring hypotheses facilitated
solution of the conjunctive and disjunctive concepts while having no effect
on attainment of the unidimensional concept. A number of analyses were
made of the stimulus sequences selected by .S's, but in none of these was there
a difference between working conditions. Consideration was given to the
possibility that requiring hypotheses leads to more efficient use of the infor-
mation available, and the problems involved in obtaining evidence concerning
this interpretation were discussed.

In the standard selection paradigm for control over the sequence of stimuli. It is
studying concept attainment, each trial thus possible that required hypothesizing
consists of 5 selecting a stimulus from a results in 5s providing themselves with
given array and receiving information con- better, more informative stimulus sequen-
cerning its category membership (positive ces under the selection paradigm, whereas
or negative), with trials continuing until S there is no such opportunity under the
names the correct concept. Compared to reception paradigm. Byers and Davidson
performance under the standard condition, (1967) presented no analyses of the se-
Byers and Davidson (1967) found that- quences selected under their 2 conditions,
requiring 5s to hypothesize after each trial and thus this possibility remains untested.
resulted in more efficient concept attain- A second difference between the studies
ment. They suggested that requiring hy- concerns the type of concept employed.
potheses might have facilitated perfor- Byers and Davidson (1967) used a con-
mance by forcing 5s to (more regularly) junctive concept, while Karpf and Levine
consider the relevance or irrelevance of (1971) employed a simpler, unidimensional
the various stimulus attributes. concept. It has been reliably demon-
In constrast to this finding, Karpf and strated that unidimensional concepts are
Levine (1971) found no difference in per- easier to identify than conjunctive concepts
formance between a control condition and (e.g., Neisser & Weene, 1962). Thus, a
a hypothesis condition. However, there second possibility is that requiring hypo-
arc 2 salient differences between the studies theses will facilitate attainment of a con-
which might account for the difference in junctive concept, while having no effect on
results. First, Karpf and Levine used the the acquisition of unidimensional concepts.
reception paradigm, in which 5 has no This seems to be a plausible explanation.
1 If 5s under the control condition make
This research was supported by a grant from
the University of Illinois Research Board. Ap- rather efficient use of information when
preciation is expressed to Wendy Rothwell, Douglas solving for a unidimensional concept, then
M. Johnson, and Susan Zavala for their assistance a technique which, according to Byers and
in the collection and analysis of the data. The Davidson, leads to relatively efficient in-
paper was completed while the author was a re-
search fellow at the University of Aberdeen, formation utilization is not needed.
Scotland.
3
The present study was designed to pro-
Requests for reprints should be sent to Roger vide a partial examination of these issues.
IJ. Dominowski, Psychology Department, Univer-
sity of Illinois, Chicago Circle, Chicago, Illinois The selection paradigm was used, with 5s
60680. either working under standard conditions
387
388 ROGER L. DOMI\0\YSKI
or required to hypothesize after each trial.
The design included a unidimensional con-
cept and 2 bidimensional concepts, con-
junctive and inclusive disjunctive. With
a disjunctive concept, members of the
positive category do not have a common
attribute combination, in contrast to a
conjunctive concept. The study of the
effect of required hypothesizing was thus
extended to a different type of concept,
one which has regularly been found to be
more difficult than conjunctive concepts
(e.g., Haygood & Bourne, 1965; Laughlin,
1969). In addition to analyzing trials to
criterion, various analyses of the stimulus
sequences selected by Ss were performed
in an attempt to determine if requiring
hypotheses produces differences in this
regard.
METHOD
Materials. Two stimulus sets were used. One
set consisted of geometric forms varying on 6
binary dimensions: circle or square, 1 or 2 figures,
black or red, solid or open figures, left or right
side of card, and small or large. In the other
set, each stimulus was a simple cartoonlike draw-
ing of a man having the following attributes:
(smoking) cigar or pipe, (wearing) hat or beret,
(wearing) bowtie or necktie, thin or fat, beard or
moustache, and tall or short. This second stimulus
set was included solely because we were considering
their use in a subsequent experiment and wished
to determine that they yielded results comparable
to the standard geometric forms. For both stimulus
sets, stimuli were drawn on index cards and placed
in an array of 8 rows of 8 cards each, with the posi-
tion of any card randomly determined.
For each stimulus set, the order of preference
for the 6 dimensions had been previously deter-
mined by having each of 30 .S's freely categorize
the stimuli. The dimensions are listed above from
most preferred to least preferred, based on mean
ranks. For purposes of the present experiment,
the 2 highest ranking dimensions were defined as
"preferred" and the 2 lowest ranking as "not
preferred."
Design and subjects. The basic design consisted
of the factorial combination of 2 working condi-
tions (control vs. hypotheses required) with 3 con-
cept types (unidimensional, conjunctive, and dis-
junctive). The 2 stimulus sets and preferred and
nonpreferred dimensions (as solutions) were used
equally often within each fundamental condition.
The 6's were 120 introductory psychology stu-
dents who were fulfilling a course requirement.
A schedule was constructed in which the 6 basic
conditions and the relevant dimensions (preferred
or nonpreferred) alternated, until a total of 60 .V
assignments was produced, This schedule was
used first with the set of geometric forms and then
with the set of drawings of men, with 5's assigned
to conditions in order of their appearance at the
laboratory.
Procedure. Each S was seen individually. \Yith
the stimulus display in front of .S, the stimulus
attributes were described, and .V was asked to
describe an arbitrarily chosen card. A card listing
the attributes was available to S throughout the
experiment. The type of concept and the number
of attributes to be discovered were explained both
in general terms and by means of an example.
Using the example, 5 was asked to select 2 posi-
tive and 2 negative instances and to categorize
an instance selected by B (chosen to represent, if
needed, a truth table category not included in S's
selections). The instructions included 2 additional
reminders of the rule stipulating inclusion in the
positive category. It was stressed that S's task
was to discover, in as few card choices as possible,
the 2 attributes (or the single attribute, in the case
ot unidimensional concepts) that E was using as
the basis of membership in the positive category.
Trials continued until 5 identified the correct con-
cept or until 64 card choices were made.
In both the control and hypothesis-required
(HR) conditions, S was given a supply of slips
ot paper listing the stimulus attributes. In con-
trol conditions, S was told that when he was fairly
sure that he knew the solution, he should check
the (1 or 2) attributes he thought were the answer
and give the slip to E. It was emphasized that
although .S could make one guess after each selec-
tion, he should not offer a solution unless he was
fairly sure of it. In HR conditions, ,S was told
that he must complete one of the slips after each
selection. It was emphasized that the purpose of
completing the slips was to give E some idea of
how S was proceeding. Instructions included the
statement that some people preferred to make an
initial guess about the solution and test it, making
a new guess when it proved incorrect, whereas
others preferred to start with a collection of at-
tributes and try to eliminate irrelevant attributes
as they went along. It was stressed that E did
not care what method 6' used, and that what was
requested was that S, after each selection, indicate
what he was currently considering—with the ob-
vious exception that when .S thought he had iden-
tified the solution, he would check only those
(1 or 2) attributes. In both conditions, it was
indicated that E would not respond to ..S's "hy-
potheses" except to inform S that the task was
over when .S had checked the correct attributes.
Each .S worked at his own pace.
RESULTS
The measure of task difficulty for each
51 was the number of trials he required
before identifying the correct concept. It
was possible for S to identify the correct
concept before all possible alternative an-
 VRRUAUZIN'G HYPOTHESES IX CONCEPT IDKNTlFICATrON
swers had been logically eliminalccl on the
basis of the information S received from
his stimulus selections. Byers and David-
son (1967) considered the possibility that
HR 5s might be more likely than control
& to identify the solution before it was
the only logically remaining concept, and
they found that, at criterion, HR Ss had
more bits of information remaining (logo
number of concepts logically remaining)
than control Ss. In the present study,
the mean numbers of bits remaining at cri-
terion were .63 for HR and .30 for control.
While these means and their difference are
lower than those reported by Byers and
Davidson, the difference is in the same
direction and suggests a slight bias in the
trials-to-criterion measure favoring HR Ss.
Therefore, the analyses to be presented
were based on an adjusted trials-to-critc-
rion measure, determined according to the
formula used by Byers and Davidson:
Adjusted trials = Trials + (Bits Remain-
ing) (Trials/Bit), where the last term is
based on the rate at which alternative
answers were logically eliminated prior to
criterion. For the present data, the ad-
justment was slight, and the outcome of
the analysis was the same for both ad-
justed and unadjusted trials to criterion.
It might be argued that any trials-to-
criterion measure is biased in favor of HR
6s because it fails to take into account
the greater opportunity allowed HR 5s to
eliminate an incorrect answer by offering
it to E and learning that it. is wrong.
However, this argument is not supported
by analysis of Ss' hypotheses. Recall
that while control 5s used hypothesis slips
only to offer solutions, HR 5s were in-
structed to use the slips simply to indicate
what they were currently considering and
told that they could use any method they
chose. Further, all 5s were carefully in-
structed regarding the number of relevant
attributes in the correct concept (see Mil-
ler, 1971). Only if 5 checked the correct
number of attributes (1 for unidimensional,
2 for bidimensional) was it possible for
him to eliminate an incorrect answer on
the basis of E's nonresponsc (= wrong).
The mean numbers of precriterion trials
on which incorrect hypotheses of the ap-
389
propriate lorm were ofleral were 3.2 for
HR 5s and 2.4 for control 5s, a nonsignifi-
cant difference. These data indicate that,
in the present: study, HR 5s did not
obtain significantly more information about
the solution by proposing incorrect an-
swers than did control 5s. Thus, the
measure of adjusted trials to criterion can
be used to compare solution efficiency in
the HR and control conditions.
By comparing the number of precrite-
rion solution guesses to the number of
trials needed to reach criterion, some idea
can be obtained of the functional difference
between the working conditions. Overall,
control 5s required a mean of 20.2 trials
to identify the correct concept; the com-
paratively small number of precriterion
solution guesses (2.4) seems consistent
with their instructions to offer a solution
only if they were fairly sure of it. The
overall mean number of trials to criterion
for HR 5s was 13,9. Since these 5s com-
pleted a hypothesis slip after each trial
but can be considered to have made an
average of only 3.2 precriterion solution
guesses, it can be seen that most of their
hypotheses involved some number of at-
tributes other than that required for the
solution. Other investigators, although
limiting their analyses to 5s' initial hy-
potheses, have reported a tendency for the
size of 5s' hypotheses to vary from that re-
quired for solution when 5s are left free to
choose their method of finding the solution
(Bourne, 1963, 1965; Siegel, 1969). In the
present study, HR 5s completed hypothesis
slips in a variety of ways, and there was
very little indication in their hypotheses
that they followed obvious methods like one
hypothesis (possible answer) at a time or
foctising. In the absence of additional in-
formation, all that might safely be assumed
is that HR 5s were, as required, more ac-
tively involved in dealing with the informa-
tion they received than were control 5s.
The initial analysis of adjusted trials to
criterion included as orthogonal factors the
2 working conditions, 3 concept types,
2 stimulus sets, and 2 levels of preference
for relevant dimensions. The major re-
sults are depicted in Table 1. The overall
HR mean was considerably lower than the
390 ROGER L. UOMINOYVSKI
TABLE 1
ADJUSTED TRIALS TO CRITERION AS A FUNCTION OF
CONCEPTUAL RULE AND WORKING CONDITION
WorkinjI condition
Conceptual Overall
I
rule
Control
| Hypothesis
mean
; required
Unidimensiona] 9.0 i 8.7 8.8
Conjunctive 19.4 12.7 16.0
Disjunctive 32.1 20.2 26.2
Overall mean \ 20.2 13.9
control mean, F (1, 96) = 7.80, p < .01.
Differences among concept types were as-
sessed in terms of 2 orthogonal contrasts,
unidimensional vs. the average of the bi-
dimensional concepts (Level 1 vs. Level 2
in Xeisser and Weene's [1962] termino-
logy), and conjunctive vs. disjunctive.
The unidimensional concept was easier
than the bidimensional concepts, F (1, 96)
= 26.23, p < .001, and the disjunctive
concept was more difficult than the con-
junctive concept, /•' (1, 96) = 13.37,
f> < .001. As can be seen in Table 1, the
facilitation associated with HR was negli-
gible for the unidimensional concept, but
substantial for the bidimensional concepts,
F (1, 96) = 3.54, p < .07. This inter-
action can also be viewed by considering
the control — HR difference for each con-
cept type, using separate variance esti-
mates. The mean difference and associated
standard error for each concept type were,
respectively: unidimensional, .3, 2.46; con-
junctive, 6.7, 3 . 2 2 ; and disjunctive, 11.9,
5.7S. 3 Thus, the 95% confidence interval
for -1/controi — -I-^HR is centered near 0 for the
unidimensional concept, while 0 is excluded
for the bidimensional concepts. No other
main effects or interactions approached con-
ventional significance levels. Thus, the 2
stimulus sets appeared comparable; and
there was no evidence suggesting an effect of
preference for relevant dimensions on solu-
tion efficiency, a result in agreement with
the findings of Clayton, Merryman, and
3
The differences among standard errors reflect
the tendency for variances to increase with the
difficulty of the conceptual rule. However, a repe-
tition of the initial analysis after a square root
transformation of the original data yielded similar
outcomes.
Leonard (1969) and Downing (1969).
Stimulus set and dimensional preference
were ignored in further analyses.
Taplin (1971) found that the nature of
the first instance (positive or negative)
affected problem difficulty with bidimen-
sional concepts. In the present study, the
initial instance was selected by S, and the
percentage of 5s beginning with a positive
instance could be expected to vary with
the percentage of positive instances in the
stimulus population under different con-
cept types (simple, 50%; conjunctive,
25%; disjunctive, 75%) and did so vary.
Consequently, the data were organized into
a 2 (working conditions) X 3 (concepts)
X 2 (positive or negative first instance)
factorial design with unequal cell frequen-
cies and analyzed according to the method
of expected cell frequencies (Myers, 1966).
J n this analysis, the effects involving con-
trol vs. HR and concept types were
replicated, and one additional effect was
detected. For the conjunctive concept, a
positive initial instance was better than
a negative initial instance (13.3 vs. 17.1
trials), whereas the reverse was true for
the disjunctive concept (28.6 vs. 20.4 trials),
F (1, 107) = 5.00, p < .05,
For bidimensional concepts, stimuli can
be classified on the basis of the presence
or absence of each relevant attribute into
4 truth table types, TT, TF, FT, and FF
(Haygood & Bourne, 1965). With a con-
junctive concept, only TT instances are
positive, whereas TT, TF, and FT in-
stances are positive with a disjunctive
concept. Bourne, Fkstrand, and Mont-
gomery (1969) found that the relative fre-
quency with which the various stimulus
types were selected varied with the con-
ceptual rule. In the present study, the
4 stimulus types occurred equally often in
the stimulus population; yet, over the 2
bidimensional concepts, TT instances were
selected most frequently and FF instances
least frequently, F (3, 216) = 9.00,
p < .001 (see Table 2). More important,
differences among truth table classes varied
with the conceptual rule, F (3, 216)
= 14.96, p < .001. For the conjunctive
concept, TT instances were selected most
often and FF instances least often; while
 V E R B A L I Z I N G HYPOTHESES IN CONCEPT IDENTIFICATION
TAB Mi 2
MKAN N U M M I C R OF SELKCTTOXS FROM EACH
TRUTH TABLE CLASS PRIOR TO SOLUTION
Conceptual rule ;
Truth table i Overall
class i : , mean
i Conjunctive Disjunctive ;
TT ! 5.80 5.81 5.80
TF i 3.48 6.28 : 4.88
FT 1 3.62 4.72 ! 4.17
1-T 1.75 6.45 i 4.10
for the disjunctive concept, differences
among truth table classes were generally
smaller, and FF instances were selected
most often. These results agree nicely
with the findings of Bourne et al. (1969).
Differences among truth table classes were
not related to either working condition or
type of initial instance (positive or
negative).
Several additional analyses of stimulus
selections were conducted in an attempt
to determine if any such indexes were
related to the various conditions, particu-
larly HR vs. control. One way of evalu-
ating stimulus sequences is in terms of the
trial by which information necessary and
sufficient (NASI) for solution has been
experienced. For this measure, the means
for the 3 concepts were: uniclimensional,
4.2; conjunctive, 7.5; and disjunctive, 13.0.
The uniclimensional mean was lower than
the bidimensional means, F (1, 107) =
43.51, p < .001, and the conjunctive mean
was lower than the disjunctive mean, F (1,
107) = 17.44, p < .001. The pattern of dif-
ferences among the concepts in terms of
NASI point was analogous to that ob-
tained with trials to criterion. However,
it should be noted that if NASI point is
substracted from trials to criterion for
each concept, substantial differences in
"unnecessary" trials exist among the con-
cepts. Neither of the contrasts, HR vs.
control and positive vs. negative initial
instance, was related to NASI point.
For each S, the percentage of positive
instances selected (excluding the initial
instance) was calculated. In Table 3, it
can be seen that there was a main effect
of type of initial instance, F (1, 107)
= 7.50, p < .01, but also that this effect
391
varied with the type of concept. A greater
percentage of positive instances was se-
lected following an initial positive instance
for the bidimensional concepts, but the
type of initial instance was irrelevant for
the unidimensional concept, F (1, 107)
= 4.60, p < .05. The obvious overall dif-
ferences among the concepts are themselves
of no importance since the percentage of
positive instances in the stimulus popula-
tion varied with the concept. However,
it can be noted that of the 6 means in
Table 3, all but that for the disjunctive -
positive initial instance group are reliably
different from the percentage of positive
instances in the stimulus population.
Each 5's sequence of choices was ex-
amined to determine the mean number of
attributes changed from one choice to the
next. For all 5s, the mean number of
attribute changes was 2.60, significantly
lower than the value of 3.0 expected by
chance, I (107) = 7.35, p <; .001. How-
ever, there were no differences among the
experimental conditions in terms of this
measure. A more interesting analysis con-
cerned 5s' choices during the initial stage
of the task, on the assumption that any
differences among conditions would be
most likely to appear during this stage.
For each S, the number of attributes that
were changed following a positive instance
and following a negative instance was cal-
culated, using the first 10 trials (or less,
if criterion was reached prior to Trial 10).
For all 5s, the mean number of attribute
changes following a positive instance (2,33)
was less than the mean following negative
instances (2.91), I (107) = 5.85, p < .001.
This difference was not related to the
experimental conditions.
Finally, a type of focusing analysis was
performed. A choice counted toward fo-
TABLE 3
PERCENTAGE OF POSITIVE INSTANCES CHOSEN
Initial instance
Positive Negative
66.3
Uniclimensional 67.1
Conjunctive 49.0 35.6
Disjunctive 76.5 66.9
392 ROGKR L. DOMI.\'0\YSK[

cusing if it met either of 2 criteria: («) the Focusing scores for the disjunctive con-
chosen instance belonged to the same cate- cept were lower than those for the con-
gory as the focus instance; or (b) the junctive concept, F (1, 107) = 16.25,
chosen instance belonged to the opposite p < .001 (Table 4). This result is con-
category of the focus instance, but dif- sistent with the report by Conant and
fered from the focus on only one dimen- Trabasso (1964) that 5s solving for a con-
sion, whose relevance was u n k n o w n (see junctive concept adopt a positive focus
Byers, 1967). The second criterion means sooner than 5s solving for a disjunctive
that if S selected a negative instance concept adopt a negative focus (as noted
which differed on 2 dimensions from a posi- above, it does not establish that any 5
tive focus, the choice was counted toward was in fact focusing).
focusing if one of the 2 differences had Focusing scores were higher following
been shown to be irrelevant by an earlier an initial positive instance for the uni-
stimulus selection. For each S, the per- dimensional concept, whereas the type of
centage of focusing choices was calculated initial instance made no difference with
for the 6 trials (or less, if criterion was bidimensional concept, F (1, 107) = 6.70,
reached earlier) following the first oppor- p < .01. This interaction must be care-
tunity to focus. Thus, focusing was mea- fully inspected. Only for the unidimen-
sured from Trial 1 for the unidimensional sional concept did the type of initial in-
concept (for either a positive or negative stance determine the type of instance from
initial instance), from the first positive which focusing was measured ; for the bi-
instance for conjunctive groups, and from dimensional concepts, it affected only the
the first negative instance for disjunctive trial on which the first focus instance was
groups (see Bruner, Goodnow, & Austin, encountered. The data therefore indicate
1956). In the conjunctive - negative ini- that a delay of a few trials in encountering
tial instance groups, the first positive in- a focus instance did not affect focusing
stance was encountered, on the average, scores (bidimensional), but that focusing
on Trial 4, while the average trial of the scores based on a positive instance of a
first negative instance was Trial 5 for unidimensional concept were higher than
the disjunctive - positive initial instance those based on a negative instance. It
groups. In presenting this analysis, no should be noted that while type of initial
claim is made that a high focusing score instance affected focusing score for the
indicates that S was in fact following a unidimensional concept, it did not affect
focusing strategy. It has been convinc- trials to criterion.
ingly argued that one cannot distinguish Several additional comments seem in
focusing from several other strategies on order. An estimate of "chance" focusing
the basis of card choices alone (Taplin & scorcs was obtained by assuming that the
Jeeves, 1972). Rather, the focusing score pool of possible stimulus selections con-
is viewed simply as one of a number of sisted of 63 equally likely alternatives after
possible indexes of the potential usefulness 5 encountered the focus instance, 62
of 5s' choices. equally likely alternatives after the first
choice, 51 after the second, and so on for
6 choices. The probability of a focusing
TABLE 4
choice at any step was equal to the pro-
PKKCKXTAGK OF "FOCUSING CHOICES" FOLLOWING portion of the remaining stimulus popula-
FIRST POSSIBLE Focus INSTAXCI;
tion which either belonged to the same
I inslanc category as the focus instance or which
Coiicfinual Ovt all
rule ; im- tn belonged to the opposite category- but
: Po.si live [ Negative j
differed from the focus on only one dimen-
Unidimensional ] 68 .5 ; 37 5 53 0 sion (note that this is more stringent than
Conjunctive 52 .3 i 53 2 52 8
Disjunctive 28 .8 i 24 2 , 26 5 the second criterion which was applied
to 5s' actual choices). This procedure
 V K R B A I . I Z I N G HYPOTHESES IX CONCEPT I D E N T I F I C A T I O N
results in expected focusing scores of
51% for the unidimensional concept and
27% for the bidimensional concepts. In
Table 4, it can be seen that only the
means for the 2 conjunctive groups and
the unidimensional - positive initial in-
stance group were noticeably above these
chance figures. The earlier caution con-
cerning the interpretation of focusing
scores is emphasized by an examination
of data from the unidimensional and
conjunctive HR-positive initial instance
groups; these groups had high mean fo-
cusing scores, and Ss' initial hypothe-
ses are known. According to Brunei' et al.
(1956), a focuser will begin with an all-
encompassing hypothesis (all attributes of
the first positive instance in these cases)
as well as making "focusing" choices. In
these 2 groups, 14 5s had high focusing
scores (>50%), but only 4 of these 5s
also gave an all-encompassing first hy-
pothesis. If the reported hypotheses are
assumed to be valid, these data indicate
that a high focusing score (based on
choices) can be achieved by 5s who are
not focusing. Finally, as was the case
with the other analyses of 5s' choices,
focusing score was not related to working
conditions (HR vs. control).
DISCUSSION
The present results replicate earlier findings
regarding the relative difficulty of unidimen-
sional, conjunctive, and disjunctive concepts
(e.g., Haygood & Bourne, 1965; Neisser &
Weene, 1962), as well as Taplin's (1971)
finding that the type of initial instance has
different effects on the difficulty of conjunctive
and disjunctive concepts. These results can
be understood in part on the basis of 5s'selec-
tion tendencies. Differences among the con-
cepts were obtained in terms of NASI point,
indicating that, with the sequences selected, a
perfect information processor would find the
concepts ordered in terms of difficulty as 5s
did. However, concept differences in terms of
NASI point were considerably smaller than
differences in trials to criterion; thus, differ-
ences in information available provide only a
partial account of the observed differences in
concept difficult) 7 .
393
With a unidimensional concept, most choices
will make available a reasonable amount of
information (Miller, 1971). For example,
consider a choice which differs on 3 dimen-
sions from the prior instance. If the new
instance is in the same category, then the 3
changed dimensions are irrelevant; while if
the category changes, the solution is included
in the changed set. With bidimensional con-
cepts, however, choices must he more carefully
made in order to make a reasonable amount
of information available. With a conjunctive
solution, a succession of positive instances is
very informative, and a category change useful,
only if one dimension changes between stimuli
(e.g., Dominowski, 1969; Miller, 1971). With
disjunctive concepts, the same rule applies to
category changes; but it is now negative
instances which are most informative, and a
succession of positive instances is unlikely to
lead to the solution (Chlebck & Dominowski,
1970). In the present study, 5s tended to
make fewer changes in selecting a new in-
stance following a positive instance than in
selecting after a negative instance. This ten-
dency is appropriate to the solution of a con-
junctive concept, although ideally the ten-
dency should be even stronger; but this
behavior tends to yield very little information
when solving for a disjunctive concept. With
the bidimensional concepts, 5s beginning with
a positive instance tended to choose a greater
percentage of positive instances, which should
be advantageous with a conjunctive solution
but disadvantageous with a disjunctive solu-
tion; the trials-to-criterion data are consistent
with this expectation.
The major interest in the present study
concerns the difference between working con-
ditions. Requiring hypotheses after each trial
facilitated performance with the bidimensional
concepts while having no effect with the uni-
dimensional concept. The data are thus con-
sistent with the view that Byers and Davidson
(1967) obtained different results from Karpf
and Levine (1971) because of the difference
in concepts used in the 2 studies. Further-
more, there was no indication of a difference
between HR and control conditions in any
of the analyses of the stimulus sequences
chosen by 5s in the present study. By de-
fault, the results increase the plausibility of
the notion that the facilitation produced by
required hypothesizing resulted from improved
processing of the information received rather
than from greater efficiency in making infor-
mation available.
394 ROGER
A l t h o u g h no data arc presently available
which demonstrate directly that MR 5s do
process information more efficiently, this in-
terpretation has been advocated. Bycrs and
Davidson (1967) proposed that HR 5s more
regularly consider the relevance or irrelevance
of stimulus attributes. Williams (1971), al-
though making no direct comparison of HR
and control conditions, suggested that HR 5s
are more consistent in f o r m u l a t i n g and chang-
ing hypotheses. The question remains as to
how to obtain the needed information regard-
ing 5s' processing of information. The only
uncontaminating method would seem to be
some form of posttask interview, a method
which has systematically been avoided by most
researchers but which seems worth trying, as
others have suggested (Denny, 1969; Taplin
& Jeeves, 1972). An alternative method, that
of interrogating 5s during the task, can present
a dilemma to the researcher. The problem is
t h a t i n t e r r u p t i n g the task to ask 5, for example,
w h a t he learned f r o m a particular trial opera-
tionally destroys the "control" condition. It
is conceivable that any of a number of inter-
ruptive techniques, like requiring hypothesiz-
ing or asking 5 what he learned from a trial,
might alter the manner in which i n f o r m a t i o n
is processed. Should this be the case, the evi-
dence obtained through an interruptive tech-
nique could not be generalized to the control
condition. It is possible that researchers
might have to decide if they wish to study
conceptual behavior under the simpler control
condition, using indirect methods, or whether
it would be more profitable to adopt a con-
siderably modified task in order to gain more
direct information about, the behavior involved.
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