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 Table of contents

1. Lebanon after the Civil War: Peace or the Illusion of Peace?...................................................................... 1

Bibliography...................................................................................................................................................... 15

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Document 1 of 1

Lebanon after the Civil War: Peace or the Illusion of Peace?

Author: Ghosn, Faten; Khoury, Amal

ProQuest document link

Abstract: This article investigates the effectiveness of Lebanon's post-conflict strategies by exploring the
"reconciliation" efforts that were undertaken after the war, and highlights the obstacles to such efforts. While
Lebanon signed a peace agreement in October 1989 to officially end a 15-year civil war, today it is still a
troubled country. Many have attributed Lebanon's inability to shed its conflict-prone past to its sectarian system;
however, this article traces the ongoing instability, in part, to the failure of the government to deal effectively with
the abuses of the civil war. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]

Full text: Headnote

This article investigates the effectiveness of Lebanon's post-conflict strategies by exploring the "reconciliation"
efforts that were undertaken after the war, and highlights the obstacles to such efforts. While Lebanon signed a
peace agreement in October 1989 to officially end a 15-year civil war, today it is still a troubled country. Many
have attributed Lebanon's inability to shed its conflict-prone past to its sectarian system; however, this article
traces the ongoing instability, in part, to the failure of the government to deal effectively with the abuses of the
civil war.
"There can be no justice without truth and no justice without reconciliation." Ghassan Moukheiber, Lebanese
Member of Parliament, Washington Post, January 2, 2006.
"Societies do not have the luxury of not dealing with their past. If not dealt with proactively, the past will always
haunt post-conflict societies." Paul van Zyl, Director of ICTJ, Daily Star, December 5, 2006.
Almost 20 years have passed since the end of the civil war, and Lebanon is still a distraught and scarred
country. While many attribute this solely to the political and/or social structure of the country, this article traces
the ongoing instability in part to the failure of the government to deal effectively with the past abuses of the civil
war. In fact, Lebanon today is a great example of a war-torn society in which unsolved atrocities, a hasty
amnesty law, and the lack of reconciliation have all added fuel to a latent fire that can easily ignite new rounds
of violence, while creating an environment of mistrust and hatred as past injustices are swept under the rug.1
Hence, while hasty amnesty laws might be necessary to end bloodshed, in the Lebanese case the post-war
settlement has not been sufficient to contain the renewal of violence. Lebanon has recently been the victim of
waves of assassinations, explosions, and skirmishes (most notably the assassination of Prime Minister Rafiq
Hariri in 2005 and the clashes that broke out in May 2008 between Lebanese factions), which in turn have
brought discussions and images of the civil war era back into the spotlight.
The aim of this article is to investigate the effectiveness of Lebanon's post-conflict strategies. To do so, we start
off by outlining the Lebanese conflict by focusing on the civil war and the post-war settlement (the Ta'if Accord).
We then trace some lessons from the civil war literature on settlements, with a specific focus on the
consolidation of peace in the aftermath of violence, particularly through reconciliation. We then proceed to
explore the post-conflict strategies, particularly the "reconciliation" efforts that were undertaken after the civil
war, in an attempt to explain why such efforts have failed to lead to a full resolution. We also highlight the
Lebanese view on such reconciliation attempts. We then introduce important factors that still present obstacles
to reconciliation efforts in the country and focus on the importance of dealing with those issues (namely, the
internally displaced persons (IDPs), the forcibly missing and disappeared, and the massacres that took place in
several areas and villages during the war). We conclude by proposing that the only way to achieve a positive,
stable peace - reconciliation rather than simply an absence of violence - in Lebanon is to face and discuss those
issues.

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THE LEBANESE CIVIL WAR AND THE POST-WAR SETTLEMENT
The Lebanese civil war, which lasted from 1975 to 1990, resulted in more than 144,000 killed; 184,000 injured;
13,000 kidnapped; and at least 17,000 missing. In addition, about 175 towns were partially or completely
destroyed,2 and over 750,000 Lebanese were internally displaced.3 The physical damages in the country were
estimated at $25 billion.
Although the civil war erupted in 1975, the seeds of this explosion were long embedded in Lebanon's history.
The domestic factors were directly related to the political confessional system that governed the country since
its independence, formalized through the National Pact in 1943. The National Pact, a verbal agreement
between Bshara al-Khoury (a Maronite leader) and Riyad al-Sold (a Sunni leader), asserted that Lebanon was a
sovereign, independent, and neutral country. It also recognized the diversity of the Lebanese population and
distributed governmental power on an essentially confessional system based on the 1932 census (the last
official census taken in Lebanon), which had identified the ratio of Christians to Muslims to be six to five. As a
result, all positions - legislative, executive, judicial, as well as those of the civil service - were allocated along
confessional lines, with the top three positions in the country (the ruling "Troika") distributed as follows: the
President, a Maronite Christian; the Prime Minister, a Sunni Muslim; and the President of the National
Assembly, a Shi'a Muslim. On the surface, this agreement seemed to create an equitable power-sharing
agreement that protected all the sects from one another. However,
the dictum of sectarian balance led to the emergence of a weak state, and as a consequence, the inability to
implement substantive administrative reforms. [Moreover] the prevailing political system tended to foster
corruption, nepotism, clientism, and laxity in upholding the public interest when it conflicted with private
interests.4
The National Pact failed to take into account demographic changes in the country over time and the political
system it created started to weaken as it was unable to adapt to and meet the demands of those changes. In
fact, in the pre-1975 political environment, there were several calls for more equitable sectarian political power-
sharing, particularly by the Muslim community, which believed the formula of 6:5 in favor of the Christians was
no longer reflective of the changing social reality. Despite the lack of an official census, it was believed that the
Muslim population had outgrown the Christian one by more than half. Therefore, on one hand, a significant
portion of the Lebanese population wanted to modify the distribution of power in the Lebanese political system;
on the other hand, other groups, recognizing the flaws of a sectarian power-sharing agreement, called for the
abolishment of sectarianism and the creation of a new political system based on secularism and equity. Internal
domestic tensions over the political structure, issues of power-sharing, exploitation of sectarian differences,
economic inequalities and disparities, combined with external/regional conflicts pertaining to the Israelis and
Palestinians, led to the outbreak of war on April 13, 1975, with the already weak Lebanese government unable
to prevent it.
The civil war in Lebanon raged for 15 years, fueled by both internal and external factors, and did not end until all
elements were ripe and ready for a solution. In other words, the conflict passed through a number of phases
and witnessed numerous failed attempts at mediation by many third parties, including the United Nations, the
Arab League, and the United States, to name a few, but did not come to an end except "at a specific historical
juncture when movement toward internal [agreement] coincided with favorable regional and international
developments."5 It was in the late 1980s and early 1990s that guns fell silent and attention moved to the
negotiation table, which brought together surviving members of the 1972 Lebanese Parliament in Saudi Arabia.
The Ta'if Accord, also known as the Document of National Reconciliation, was signed on October 22, 1989 in
Ta'if, Saudi Arabia and ratified by the Lebanese Parliament on November 5, 1989. The Accord further
institutionalized the sectarian division within the government by introducing some reforms to the existing political
system through a new power-sharing agreement that gave the Muslims a greater role in the political process.
The Accord ushered in Lebanon's Second Republic, where power is equally divided between the Christian and

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Muslim communities. The redistribution of seats on the 50:50 formula necessitated some internal and
administrative reforms to the Lebanese political system introduced by the 1943 National Pact. Those reforms
included the shifting of some executive powers from the president to the prime minister and the cabinet, with
portfolios divided equally between Christians and Muslims. Another reform was the expansion of the National
Assembly and the division of parliamentary seats equally between Christians and Muslims, with fixed
percentages for each sect within the two major religions. The Accord also strengthened the post of the speaker
of parliament.
In addition to those reforms, the Ta'if Accord aimed at extending and strengthening governmental sovereignty
over all Lebanese territory by calling for the withdrawal of all foreign forces and the dissolution and disarmament
of the militias. When it came to implementation, however, certain political considerations stood in the way of
realizing those demands: the unilateral Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon did not take place until May 2000,
primarily due to increased internal pressures and continued tensions along the Israeli- Lebanese border. The
withdrawal of Syrian forces, which was supposed to begin two years after the signing of the Accord, did not
occur until 2005 following Prime Minister Hariri's assassination and the local and international reactions.
Furthermore, while Ta'if called for the gradual abolition of confessionalism and the establishment of universal
social and economic justice, sectarianism, 20 years after the signing of the agreement, is as strong as it has
been since the country's independence, and no signs of secularism are in sight. Many have attributed the
entrenchment of sectarianism to a lack of trust between the communities.
CIVIL WAR SETTLEMENTS: INGREDIENTS FOR SUCCESS
The report by the APSA Task Force on Political Violence and Terrorism, Group 3 maintains that the way a civil
war ends - whether through a military victory by one side or a negotiated settlement - affects whether or not a
state experiences a relapse to violence.6 The post-war stability of a country, according to the authors, is also
affected by several other factors including: the type of power-sharing agreement that is reached; the type of
conflict; the presence of a guarantor; and the establishment of a transitional justice mechanism to deal with
injustices during the war. These factors, taken together, are viewed as key determinants of maintaining peace
and achieving reconciliation after civil wars end.
In the Lebanese case, the civil war ended in a negotiated settlement between the different political leaders after
both sides failed to achieve victory. The duration of the conflict - 15 years of violence with no end in sight -
contributed to the "no victor, no vanquished" reality to which the Lebanese proudly refer. Such a reality, in turn,
necessitated the modification of the power-sharing agreement that formed the basis of the Lebanese system of
government since the country's independence. However, according to existing literature on post-war
settlements, the more extensive the forms of power-sharing incorporated into a settlement agreement, - i.e.,
security, political, territorial, and economic - the more likely the settlement will last.7 Peace is more likely to be
sustained if all parties are represented in key policy-making institutions in such a way that no side would be able
to monopolize control over institutions or subordinate the other groups. This is very important for the case of
Lebanon, as the failure of the Ta'if power-sharing agreement to ultimately address the security concerns of all
the groups was (and still is) a major obstacle to peace and stability.
An additional related factor impacting post-conflict peace consolidation is the nature of the civil war.8 Commonly
referred to as a protracted or identity-based conflict, such civil wars (as was the case in Lebanon) pit different
religious sects against one another in their struggle for basic needs, such as fair access to political institutions
and economic distribution, security, recognition, and acceptance as a group. While the postconflict settlement in
Lebanon attempted to deal with the political and economic issues, it fell short of addressing the latter concerns.
The comprehensiveness of the settlement and ensuing efforts have a great impact on post-conflict processes.
In order to reach a complete resolution, any post-conflict efforts should deal with the social, psychological, as
well as physical impacts of the civil war.
A third factor that affects the post-conflict environment is intervention by third parties9 and the presence of a

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guarantor. It is believed that security guarantees by third parties to protect the different groups and hold them to
their promises are important factors for peace sustainability.10 The role that third parties played in bringing
Lebanese factions to the table was important; however, the presence of Syria as a guarantor presented several
obstacles to national reconciliation in the country (which we will detail later).
Countries emerging from violent conflict are generally fragile and prone to failure; "bringing civil wars to a
conclusion and sustaining the peace thereafter requires a commitment of material resources and the willingness
to sustain the peacebuilding mission until the new institutions have time to establish their effectiveness and
legitimacy in the eyes of the population."11 Peace does not come about by merely signing a peace agreement
with extensive power-sharing elements and by assigning a guarantor. There needs to be genuine political will
and continuous efforts to make the transition from "negative peace" to "positive peace" (i.e., from the absence
of direct violence to promotion of reconciliation and stability) possible. Such efforts require a resolution of the
underlying issues that led to the civil war to begin with. This is the only way to get to a stable peace where "the
probability of war is so small it does not really enter into the calculations of any of the people involved."12
Therefore, dealing with underlying or root causes of the war necessitates some form of reconciliation. Charles
Hauss13 rightly argues that, without reconciliation, the best that states can hope for is the kind of armed
standoff that exists in Cyprus today. At worst, the fighting keeps breaking out again and again, as we have seen
in the Israeli- Palestinian conflict. Hence, it is necessary for a nation to resolve the underlying issues and
reconcile as a whole in order to eliminate the recourse to violence. The report by the APSA Task Force on
Political Violence and Terrorism, Group 4 confirms this idea by stating that societies that have reconciled were
less likely to experience future violence. 14
Many within the peace studies literature have argued that managing a conflict or even resolving the issues may
not be sufficient to maintaining peace and/or preventing future conflicts from emerging.15 Formal conflict
resolution mechanisms, such as peace agreements, usually involve the leaders who negotiate them, but not
necessarily the constituents that they represent. As a result, such outcomes may not be stable, and in many
cases they have collapsed - as in the case of Angola.16 For this reason, peace and conflict studies scholars
and practitioners have called for an approach that not only deals with the issues at the surface but works on
finding solutions to the underlying issues of a conflict and altering the relationships between adversaries. Daniel
Bar Tal and Gemma Bennink suggest that it is the process of reconciliation itself that can build stable and
lasting peace, since it goes beyond the agenda of formal conflict resolution to changing the motivations, beliefs,
and attitudes of the communities regarding the conflict, the nature of the relationship between the parties, and
the parties themselves.17 This becomes even more necessary when we are dealing with societies that have
been caught in protracted conflict that are usually characterized as "prolonged and often violent struggle by
communal groups [be they along ethnic or religious lines] for such basic needs as security, recognition and
acceptance, fair access to political institutions and economic participation."18 Too often when these conflicts
end, they have not only caused physical destruction, but have also wrecked the cultural infrastructure of
societies involved. Therefore, it is not only important to resolve the conflict and rebuild the country, but also to
restore the relationships between the communities.
This is true for Lebanon: while there has been an absence of direct violence between individuals, groups, and
the government (with the exception of the 2008 hostilities mentioned above), there has not been a successful
reconciliation process, as the root causes of the war, as well as the abuses created by the war, have not been
confronted. In fact, in a survey conducted between January and May 2009, 85% of those interviewed believed
that the Lebanese have not reconciled with one another. This belief is widely held across all sects (see Table
1).19
In order to progress from "negative peace" to "positive peace" in Lebanon, we need to think about the obstacles
to a successful process and to find mechanisms that would apply to the different issues that hinder progress
towards a sustainable peace. The process towards a reconciled post-conflict society is long, but is well worth

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the effort. In order to think of solutions to lingering problems, we need to first assess the strategies undertaken
in Lebanon at the end of the war.
RECONCILIATION EFFORTS: A "SUCCESS"?
At face value, it would seem that the Lebanese case had two important elements for sustaining peace after a
civil war. First, there was a power-sharing agreement that redistributed power equally among the different
communities, preventing a single group from being able to dominate and eliminate another. Second, a third
party, in this case Syria, was given the role of preserving the peace by maintaining its forces in Lebanon and
providing security.20 However, things are not always what they seem. That is, while "stability" did reign over
Lebanon and a civil war has not erupted, this "stability" came "at the expense of human rights, democracy, and
national reconciliation."21 Thus, for the last 18 years, the "stable peace" in Lebanon has been nothing more
than an illusion.
Farid El Khazen22 argues that the civil war ended not because of internal reconciliation or agreement between
the parties, nor with a political program that attained the approval of the majority of the Lebanese. According to
him, the military war ended but the political war continues to rage. Since the cessation of violence, the situation
has continued to worsen - especially with respect to the integration of the Lebanese from all sects and
confessions and coexistence [al-'ayish al-mushtarak]. As a matter of fact, more than a decade later
"communities still live in total separation, rejecting each other, blaming each other. It is a real time bomb."23
Several factors have contributed to keeping Lebanon in a state of "negative peace." First, while the Ta'if Accord
redistributed power in a more equitable manner, it did so in a way that reinforced confessionalism and
sectarianism in Lebanon.24 In other words, it reinforced loyalty to the sect or sectarian or political leader [za'im]
and not to the country. Sectarian identity thus becomes more important than the national one. This is why
Michael Hudson maintains that "Lebanon has been viewed by some analysts and valued by many Lebanese as
a kind of consociational confederation of sectarian communities lacking a higher national loyalty and a strong
supra-confessional state."25 Therefore, as the demographics keep changing in Lebanon, one may expect that
there will be new demands for a new power-sharing agreement based on the current reality on the ground,
since loyalty is to the sect and not the state.
While the Ta'if Accord has also been referred to as the "Document of the Lebanese National Reconciliation,"
"The Lebanese National Accord Document,"26 and "Document of National Understanding,"27 the only
reconciliation it truly aimed at was between the elites/ zuama' (plural of za'im, leader). In fact, the agreement
aimed at regulating or managing the conflict to reach a settlement that would appease the elites (elite
"reconciliation") rather than resolving the underlying issues of the conflict (national reconciliation). To many
Lebanese, "the Ta'if Accord helped to 'reconcile' warlords, not the people. Proof is that any tiny problem stirs
factional feelings."28 Whether elite "reconciliation" really took place is questionable when one looks at the
political interactions in the country for the past 20 years; rather, what Ta'if was able to bring about is a kind of
elite accommodation. So while such elite cooperation and accommodation was necessary for ending the
violence and achieving some sense of stability, it is only a short-term solution. The belief that Ta'if did not
succeed at re-distributing power equally is confirmed by survey results - all those surveyed believe that the
Sunni community came out with major political gains and felt that other communities had lost some of their
political power, irrespective of the sect of the respondent. In other words, communities differently benefited (see
Table 2) and/or lost (see Table 3) in the post-war environment.
Although the Ta'if Accord was able to put an end to the 15 years of violence in a largely divided country, it did
not offer any basis for long-term resolution of the conflict. The Ta'if Accord failed to address the root causes of
the conflict and did not advance any serious structural changes that would sustain a long-lasting stable system.
The Accord was not inclusive in the sense that it did not truly represent the Lebanese people and their
concerns; rather, it was mainly an instrument by which political leaders agreed to "coexist." By not addressing
major grievances, the Accord did not allow room for rehabilitating the relationship between the different

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communities. Furthermore, Ta'if did not address the issue of structural violence: by reinstitutionalizing the
sectarian divisions in the political system (in a non-representative way), it further perpetuated inequalities and
differences. The Ta'if Accord did not effectively touch upon the basic human needs for security and equality,
which are at the core of protracted conflicts. As discussed above, this is a necessary ingredient in any power-
sharing agreement in order to sustain a stable peace.
Another element that hindered reconciliation in Lebanon was the blanket amnesty that was granted after the
war. In general, amnesty laws are necessary in order to get both sides in a civil war to put down their weapons.
However, amnesties that grant impunity for gross human rights violations without investigation are incompatible
with international law.29 On August 16, 1991, the Lebanese Parliament passed a General Amnesty Law (No.
84/91) that pardoned crimes committed during the civil war, including war crimes and crimes against humanity.
This was believed to be a necessary step to provide a clean slate for everybody and for the factional leaders to
remain in their seats.30 Moreover, it has been argued that the law provided a sense of stability as it was giving
everybody a second chance, and since there were no clear winners, putting a large number of people on trial
would have brought the country to a stand-still as there were not enough resources to carry out such
prosecutions.31 Others, however, have criticized this law, arguing "that instead of reconciling citizens with the
principles of justice and rule of law, Lebanon's authorities were always in favor of political leaders consolidating
their position as superior to the rest of the population."32
What is interesting about this law is that while it pardoned crimes committed against the Lebanese population
(civilians), it did not pardon crimes committed against political and religious leaders (i.e. against state security),
nor crimes related to fraud, bankruptcy, forgery of foreign or domestic currency and its sale, forgery of official
documents, and crimes related to the theft of antiques.33 The Human Rights Committee has criticized this law,
arguing that such a "sweeping amnesty" prevented the appropriate investigations and punishments of
perpetrators of human rights violations, and it undermined efforts to establish respect for human rights and to
consolidate democracy.34 The law prevented any official acknowledgement of the war. According to Young,35
the "problem with the amnesty law was not so much that it protected the war's criminals - in the end that is what
amnesty law[s] do - but more perniciously, that it encouraged the Lebanese to forget their crimes." El Khazen
further noted that "the idea [was] that we should forget the war, turn the page and move on. It's a scandal."36
However, the wound has not healed and the memory of the war is not erased from the minds of the people.
Therefore, issues pertaining to the war should be addressed in order for the Lebanese to come to terms with the
conflict and be able to move on with their lives.
The amnesty law directly or indirectly ended up playing a role in hindering the post-conflict process because
there was no accountability and no reason for changes in behavior. As a result of the amnesty law and the elite
"reconciliation" (or accommodation) achieved through Ta'if, militia leaders were easily able to transition
themselves into key positions in government. That is, "having become ministers, parliamentarians, and top-
ranked civil servants, they established their influence over economic matters in general and over the vast
project of national reconstruction in particular. Their control over public and private foreign aid gave them
exceptional leverage to broaden their clientele and thus to renew their legitimacy."37 For example, specialized
agencies like the Reconstruction and Development Council, the Fund of the Displaced, and the Council of the
South provided new sources of redistribution and patronage for former militia leaders.
When we asked Lebanese students about amnesty and whether they believe it was the right thing to do or if it
encouraged an atmosphere of impunity, respondents were split with 44% believing it was a good idea and 46%
believing it was a bad one. This difference depended on one's sect; while 54% of the Sunnis interviewed
believed it was a good idea to give amnesty, 64% of Shi'ites disagreed. The Druze respondents were split
evenly. The majority of the Christian sects agreed with the Shi'ites: 53% of the Maronites, 67% of the Catholics,
and 52% of the Orthodox believed that amnesty encouraged impunity (see Table 4).
Another important obstacle was the presence of the Syrian forces in Lebanon. The Syrians had no interest in

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helping the Lebanese reconcile, since if they did, Syria's the peace between the different factions. Syria, in
other words, had its own objectives in maintaining the status quo and supporting the "negative peace"
environment in Lebanon. 38
In sum, the Ta'if Accord prioritized order and stability over reconciliation and justice. This was complicated by
the amnesty law that brought many militia leaders into power and facilitated their program of state-sponsored
amnesia. This, in turn, has prohibited any investigations into the crimes that were committed during the war. As
a result, there is still no unified history book today. The history books taught in school conveniently end with
Lebanon gaining its independence in 1943. Since there is no unified history book about the war, for most
Lebanese, especially the younger generation, all of their information has been passed to them by their parents,
grandparents, and relatives (or other survivors) who lived through the war. As a result, the new generation,
which is either too young to remember or was not born until after the war's end, is being raised on the anger,
fear, and lack of trust that their parents and relatives still have and that have not been dealt with since the end
of the civil war. Moreover, this generation only knows what has been done to its community/ sect, but is fairly
ignorant of what its community/sect did to others. The absence of national reconciliation and common vision for
the future is apparent in the 2009 survey referenced previously. Rather than sharing the blame for the civil war,
different communities still blame each other and none of the communities accept part of the blame. As Table 5
illustrates, the two communities that are still blamed for the civil war are the Maronite and the Sunni, with the
Maronites taking most of the blame (see Table 5).
OBSTACLES TO RECONCILIATION EFFORTS
Despite the many efforts at "reconciliation" presented above, the true process has not occurred in Lebanon due
to the lack of a nationwide reconciliation strategy by the government. That is, none of the mechanisms adopted
provided truth or justice. Therefore, for a true "reconciliation" process to emerge, there needs to be a national
agenda that addresses three distinct issues pertaining to the war whose consequences are still felt in Lebanon
today. These issues are: 1) the displaced; 2) the missing/disappeared; and 3) the towns that witnessed intense
fighting. We will deal with those issues briefly, highlighting the challenges they present to moving the country
forward.
The IDP problem has been one of the most persistent consequences of the Lebanese civil war. As noted
earlier, over 750,000 people were displaced from their homes and forced to settle in different areas of the
country, where they live in dire conditions. Over 50% of the displaced were not able to meet their basic
needs.39 This displacement changed the mosaic structure of Lebanese towns where the heterogeneous
population was replaced by a more or less homogeneous one. There is no consensus on the number of
Lebanese who are still displaced around the country. This can be attributed to numerous factors, including the
lack of effective mechanisms for IDP registration and the prolonged period of displacement (more than 25
years). The majority of those displaced were not able to return to their homes due to the extensive destruction in
the villages, the lack of financing for reconstruction, feelings of insecurity, and adjustment to the new location.
The importance of the issue of internal displacement and its centrality to stability in post-war Lebanon was
highlighted by the reference to the problem in the Ta'if Accord. The only two sentences in the nine-page accord
that dealt with any issue related to the war addressed the issue of the displaced. The government was fast to
react with the creation of the Ministry of Displaced in 1992, whose aim was to help the displaced return to their
homes.
The Ministry of Displaced started off on the wrong foot; the appointment of Walid Jumblat, a former militia
leader, as the first Minister of Displaced was highly controversial since the "same war leader who had played a
role in the largest displacement (that from Mount Lebanon) was now given national responsibility for IDP
(Internally Displaced Persons) return."40 Every Minister since 1992 has been either directly appointed by
Jumblat or approved by him. Despite this, however, the Ministry did provide some economic aid to help rebuild
infrastructure and evacuate occupied homes in a number of villages (as well as in areas of displacement) in

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order to return them to their rightful owners. With the help of the UN and other NGOs, the Ministry also
sponsored youth programs and camps that focused on education and skill training. The main objective of those
programs was to bring youth from different sects together to help them rebuild their relationships as well as their
communities. Having a ministry in charge of the displaced, as well as an array of local, regional, and
international organizations working in areas of displacement to encourage return, is a great idea. However, the
lack of cooperation between the different organizations, the lack of funding, and high levels of corruption all
hindered the return of the displaced. Depending on which sources one tends to believe, the numbers of those
who have still not returned to their homes ranges from 70,000 (official Ministry of Displaced estimate) to
500,000.41
The problem of displaced persons is still pertinent 19 years after the creation of the Ministry of Displaced.
Unfortunately, several other issues have taken precedence over the return of IDPs, and as such no noticeable
efforts have been made since 2006. There are several things to keep in mind when dealing with the issue of
IDPs in Lebanon: while money, reparations, and compensations are important and should be distributed equally
among all victims of displacement, material assistance is only one aspect of what should be a more
comprehensive solution. The issues of corruption and embezzlement need to be dealt with, since millions of
dollars have already disappeared without any apparent results. A more important and sustainable approach is
reconciliation between the different communities and between residents and returnees. The importance of such
reconciliation processes was made especially clear when one returnee opened fire and killed 20 people to
avenge his parents' death more than 20 years before. It is important to keep in mind that, in these villages,
neighbors killed each other and people know the perpetrators. How can we encourage return without rebuilding
broken relationships? Reconciliation needs to be a serious undertaking - it should not be constrained to paying
the victims' families $20,000 per victim. Nor should it be merely for ceremonial purposes, where a minister visits
a village and hands a displaced family the keys to their homes. Reconciliation needs to foster a sense of
community to sustain such return.
Like the IDPs, the issue of the kidnapped/disappeared/missing persons affected every region and every sect in
the country. However, unlike the IDPs, it did not get as much attention from the government and fell under the
radar for several years before civil society efforts brought it to the spotlight. Families waiting for years for news
about the fate of their loved ones created several organizations, including the Lebanese Committee of the
Families of Detainees in Syria, Support for Lebanese in Detention and Exile (SOLIDE), and Support for
Lebanese Detained Arbitrarily (SOLIDA) to raise awareness about the issue and to demand answers from the
government. In October 1999, the Committee of the Families made three demands from the government: first,
that the government establish a commission of inquiry that would publish its findings within a year; second, that
the government establish social programs that would assist the families of the disappeared; and third, that the
government set aside a day for the memory of the disappeared and build a monument commemorating the
victims of the war.42 However, the families of the disappeared have had to watch one Lebanese government
after the other brush aside their requests and demands, mainly because some of those who ordered the
kidnappings were now in the government. The first attempt by the Lebanese government to deal with the issue
of the kidnapped/missing after the civil war was in January 2000 - ten years after the war ended. Former Prime
Minister Salim al-Hoss appointed a commission of inquiry in order to investigate the fate of individuals who
disappeared or were kidnapped between 1975 and 1990 (and hence tackle the Committee's first demand). This
commission investigated just over 2,000 cases before it announced that those individuals were probably
dead.43
This conclusion by the commission enraged the families who were looking for answers about the fate of their
loved ones - whether they were kidnapped and taken to Syria or Israel, or whether they disappeared in
Lebanese territory. They continued to push for governmental action but to no avail. The different organizations
finally came together on April 11, 2005 and have staged an open sit-in in front of the United Nations building in

04 November 2016 Page 8 of 15 ProQuest

downtown Beirut, demanding answers about their family members. The sitin is still strong and continuing at the
time of this writing. Their problem is greater than not knowing whether a loved one is still alive - the issues of
inheritance procedures, property transfers, and compensation also pose significant challenges.
Ghassan Moukheiber, a Lebanese Parliament Member, recently drafted a bill in the Lebanese Parliament for
establishing a truth commission (a fact-finding commission) to investigate the disappearance of over 17,000
Lebanese. Not until this proposed bill (2007) had any governmental official tried to address the Committee's
second and third requests mentioned above. In an interview with Moukheiber,44 he mentioned that the Human
Rights Committee in the Parliament worked closely with the groups mentioned above to draft the bill and
attempt to pass it in Parliament.45 He stated that he hoped that Parliament would vote to establish a Truth and
Reconciliation commission that would investigate all the kidnappings and disappeared cases, be they in
Lebanon, Syria, Israel, or even Libya. He argued that people needed facts about what happened and that
enforced disappearances are in fact a legal crime. Moukheiber is also pushing for the establishment of a war
memorial, which he believes will help the Lebanese put the civil war behind them.
Different mechanisms and strategies can be used to bring about closure for the families of the forcibly
disappeared. These include: truth commissions (i.e., some type of fact-finding commission that will be able to
investigate what happened to those that were kidnapped/missing), reparations (e.g., some type of aid to the
families), restorative justice, and non-criminal sanctions. However, lack of communication and strategies to
reach a broader audience leads to a situation in which many families who have loved ones missing are unaware
of what is being done or how they can participate in the process.
A third important issue that needs to be addressed in order for national reconciliation to take place is that of
massacres that occurred during the civil war, which is tied to the IDP problem. Although carried out on a smaller
scale than in the former Yugoslavia, sectarian cleansing did occur in several towns and areas in Lebanon.46
The different Lebanese parties and militias carried out massacres against each other's strongholds in
continuous cycles of revenge. Those confessional-based acts of violence took the lives of 200 to 1,000 civilians
each. Examples include the Black Saturday, Karantina, Kfermata, Damour, and Safra massacres to name a
few. Since Lebanon is based on a sensitive sectarian balance, it is believed that talking about what really
happened in those towns would only infuriate the different groups, making it difficult to control the eruption of
violence. But since the end of the war, these towns have witnessed little to no effort towards reconciliation with
those believed to be the perpetrators. Turning the page on these somber events in Lebanon's history requires
opening the wounds and working towards forgiveness. This issue has been the lowest on the government's
radar so far due to the possible consequences in a still unstable and divided country. No studies or interviews
have been carried out in a majority of these towns, and many questions remain unresolved: what are the
demands and expectations of victims, what are leaders who may be responsible for war crimes prepared to do,
and what sort of role can the government play?
Conclusion
Unlike interstate wars, wherein opposing sides and former enemies are separated by borders, the parties in a
civil war have to live in one territory after the cessation of violent conflict. Societies coming out of civil wars need
to move beyond managing and resolving their conflicts to reconciling and rebuilding relationships with each
other. Removing antagonistic attitudes towards one another is the only way that former enemies can learn how
to live peacefully together - a process that is neither easy nor quick.
This article has discussed some of the main post-conflict strategies to achieve reconciliation undertaken in
Lebanon since the end of the civil war. We argued that those efforts were no more than deals between political
leaders; they remained on the surface and did not deal with serious challenges on the public level. We also
maintained that Lebanon has been left in a state of "negative peace" for the past 20 years. Such a "peace" was
preferred over a more complete, "positive peace" including reconciliation, mainly due to the priority placed on
the short-term absence of war rather than longterm sustainability. As a result of the "state-sponsored

04 November 2016 Page 9 of 15 ProQuest

amnesia,"47 Lebanese society was unable to move forward and rebuild their community linkages. However,
with changes in the regional and the international environment, mainly the withdrawal of the Syrian forces from
Lebanon in 2005, the buried memories and traumas of the war have resurfaced, in addition to feelings of
injustice and anger at how things were dealt with at the end of the war. Also, the tense political climate that
exists today has only helped to re-ignite the embers of mistrust. Therefore, while recognizing that the situation
may not be "ripe" yet, Lebanon needs to be ready to deal with the past as soon as possible in order to reconcile
as a nation and move forward. Lebanon cannot afford to repeat the mistakes of 1991, since - as it is apparent
today - issues are bound to resurface if not dealt with properly. Moreover, the government will not be able to
abolish confessionalism, as is stated in the Ta'if Accord, unless it is able to build trust between the different
communities. Until then, each group is likely to favor the current confessional system as they feel some
protection for their rights as a community.
Today, however, we are witnessing a national convergence of views and thinking with regard to the need and
urgency for a reconciliation process. At present, many individuals, along with the civil society in Lebanon, have
begun to call for mechanisms to deal with the civil war and its consequences. For example, since the departure
of the Syrians from Lebanon, SOLIDE has set up a tent in the downtown district of Beirut facing the United
Nations Headquarters demanding knowledge of their loved ones.48 Similarly, Umam D&R49 sponsors a series
of workshops, lectures, and exhibitions which aim at tackling Lebanon's war-loaded memory. Participants
include human rights activists, non-governmental organizations (both local and international), victims, ex-militia
leaders, religious leaders, government representatives, lawyers, journalists, forensic experts, and academics.
One common conclusion among all the participants in a workshop observed by one of this article's authors was
the need to address past, present, and future concerns of Lebanese society. These two examples suggest that
even though the violence of the civil war effectively ended in 1990, some Lebanese "do not believe that war has
truly ended as their wounds have not been closed,"50 considering that ending a war requires other processes
besides ending the violence. The lack of national reconciliation and the absence of positive peace is still
apparent in Lebanon today, as it took months of political clashes following the collapse of Sa'd Hariri's
government on January 12, 2011 before a new cabinet passed a vote of confidence on July 7. This
disagreement has served to intensifiy the tensions among the different groups.
Footnote
1. Gunnar Theissen, "Supporting Justice, Co-existence and Reconciliation after Armed Conflict: Strategies for
Dealing with the Past," (Berghof Research Center for Conflict Management, 2004). http://www.berghof-
handbook.net/uploads/download/theissen_handbook.pdf.
2. Charles Adwan, "Corruption in Reconstruction: The Cost of National Consensus in Post War Lebanon," in
Daniel Large, ed., Corruption in Post-War Reconstruction: Confronting the Vicious Circle (Beirut: Lebanese
Transparency Association, 2005), p. 4, http://depot.gdnet.org/newkb/fulltext/ adwan.pdf.
3. Marie-Joelle Zahar, "Peace by Unconventional Means," in Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and
Elizabeth Cousens, eds., Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements (UK: Lynne Rienner,
2002), pp. 572-573.
4. Samir Makdisi and Richard Sadaka, "The Lebanese Civil War, 1975-90," in Paul Collier and Nicholas
Sambanis, eds, Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis, Vol. 2 (Washington, DC: World Bank
Publications, 2005), p. 62.
5. Hassan Krayem, "The Lebanese Civil War and the Taif Agreement," in Paul Salem, ed., Conflict Resolution in
the Arab World: Selected Essays (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1997), p. 412.
6. T. David Mason, Martha Crenshaw, Cynthia McClintock, and Barbara Walter, "How Political Violence Ends:
Paths to Conflict Deescalation and Termination," Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American
Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, August 30, 2007, http://www.
allacademic.com/meta/p228666_index.html.

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7. Caroline Hartzell, and Matthew Hoddie, "Institutionalizing Peace: Power Sharing and Post-Civil War Conflict
Management," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 47, No. 2 (2003), pp. 318-332.
8. Nicholas Sambanis, "International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis," American Political
Science Review, Vol. 94, No. 4 (2000), pp. 779-801.
9. Patrick M. Regan, Civil Wars and Foreign Powers: Outside Intervention in Intrastate Conflict (Ann Arbor, MI:
University of Michigan Press, 2002).
10. Barbara Walter, Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2002).
11. Mason, et. al., "How Political Violence Ends: Paths to Conflict Deescalation and Termination," p. 15.
12. Kenneth Boulding, Stable Peace (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1978), p. 13.
13. Charles (Chip) Hauss, "Reconciliation," in Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess, eds., Beyond Intractability
(Boulder, CO: Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado, 2003), http://www.
beyondintractability.org/essay/reconciliation/.
14. Robert Bates, Fen Hampson, Margaret Levi, and Marc Ross, "Consolidating Peace and Mitigating Conflict
in the Aftermath of Violence." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science
Association, Chicago, IL, August, 30, 2007, p. 11, http://www.allacademic. com/meta/p228671_index.html.
15. See John Paul Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies (Washington, DC:
United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997); Neil Kritz, "Where We Are and How We Got Here: An Overview
of Developments in the Search for Justice and Reconciliation," in Alice H. Henkin, ed., The Legacy of Abuse:
Confronting the Past, Facing the Future (Washington, DC: The Aspen Institute, 2002).
16. Daniel Bar Tal and Gemma Bennink, "The Nature of Reconciliation as an Outcome and as a Process," in
Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, ed., From Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

17. Bar Tal and Bennink, "The Nature of Reconciliation as an Outcome and as a Process," p. 12.
18. Oliver Ramsbotham, "The Analysis of Protracted Social Conflict: A Tribute to Edward Azar," Review of
International Studies, Vol. 31, No. 1 (2005), p. 113.
19. The survey was administered in Lebanon in coordination with Dr. Simon Haddad. The survey was
conducted between January and May 2009 at major universities around Lebanon: Lebanese American
University, Notre Dame University, American University of Beirut, and University Saint- Joseph. One thousand
Lebanese men and women between the ages of 18 and 27 were contacted. The results are based on the
answers of 614 who responded.
20. On May 20, 1991, Lebanon and Syria signed the "Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination."
The result of the agreement was to put Lebanon under the Syrian sphere of influence both politically and
economically. As a result, Lebanon was unable to make any domestic or foreign policy decision without the tacit
approval of Syria.
20. Zahar, "Peace by Unconventional Means," p. 567.
21. Farid El Khazen, "Al-'Ayish Al-Mushtarak Bayn Al-Amis wa Al-Youm: Aawamal Jam'eh wa Inkisam"
["Coexistence between Yesterday and Today: Factors that Unite and Divide"], Al-Nahar, December 21, 2001.
Dr. El-Khazen has been a member of Parliament since 2005 and faculty in the Political Science Department at
the American University of Beirut.
22. Nayla Razzouk, "Thirteen Years After End of War in Lebanon," Middle East Online, 2004,
http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=8526=8526&format=0. Quote from Amal Makarem, Head of the
Memory for the Future Committee, an NGO working for reconciliation in Lebanon.
23. The Ta'if did acknowledge the need to abolish political sectarianisms, but no steps have been taken so far.
24. Michael Hudson, "From Consociationalism to the Public Sphere: Recent Evidence From Lebanon," in
Leonard Binder, ed., Ethnic Conflict and International Politics in the Middle East (Gainesville, FL: University

04 November 2016 Page 11 of 15 ProQuest

Press of Florida, 1999), p. 98.
25. Hudson, "From Consociationalism to the Public Sphere," p. 102.
26. Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC), "Lebanon: Displaced Return Amidst Growing Political
Tension," IDMC (2006), p. 2, www.internal-displacement.org.
27. Razzouk, "Thirteen Years After End of War in Lebanon."
28. Theissen, "Supporting Justice, Co-existence and Reconciliation after Armed Conflict," pp. 4-5.
29. Sune Haugbolle, "Public and Private Memory of the Lebanese Civil War," Comparative Studies of South
Asia, Africa and the Middle East, Vol. 25, No. 1 (2005), p. 193; Oren Barak, "'Don't Mention the War:' The
Politics of Rememberance and Forgetfulness in Postwar Lebanon," The Middle East Journal, Vol. 61, No. 1
(Winter 2007), pp. 49-70.
30. Haugbolle, "Public and Private Memory of the Lebanese Civil War," p. 193.
31. Quote from Nizar Saghieh a Lebanese lawyer and advocate for reconciliation efforts in Lebanon in Raed El
Rafei, "Lebanon's Post-conflict Strategies Debated." Daily Star, December 5, 2006.
32. Amnesty International, "Lebanon: Human Rights Developments and Violations," Report (1997), p. 7,
http://www.peacewomen.org/resources/Lebanon/aihr97.pdf.
33. Amnesty International, "Lebanon: Human Rights Developments and Violations," p. 7.
34. Michael Young, "The Sneer of Memory: Lebanon's Disappeared and Postwar Culture," Middle East Report,
No. 217 (2000), p. 45.
35. Lee Hockstader, "Lebanon's Forgotten Civil War," Washington Post Foreign Service, December 2, 1999.
36. Elizabeth Picard, "The Political Economy of Civil War in Lebanon," in Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis,
eds., War, Institutions, and Social Change in the Middle East (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press,
2000), pp. 318-319.
38. With the defeat of the Syrian forces in 1973 and their inability to reclaim the Golan Heights, which Israel had
occupied in the 1967 War, Lebanon gained strategic importance in the power struggle between these two
regional powers. In 1976, Syria quickly intervened in the Lebanese civil war in order to prevent the leftist groups
and Palestinian guerrillas from defeating the Lebanese Front, which was comprised mainly of Maronite Christian
groups, as it was worried that Israel would use this as an excuse to invade Lebanon. Moreover, with Egypt
breaking away from the Arab stance on Israel and signing a peace treaty in 1979, Syria was forced to tighten its
grip on Lebanon as it worried that Lebanon would be forced into an agreement with Israel. Nonetheless,
Lebanon was pushed to sign an agreement in May 1983. However, Syria made sure to derail this agreement.
Hence, after the civil war ended in Lebanon and with southern Lebanon and the Golan Heights still occupied
Israel, Syria hoped to continue its fight with Israel through Lebanon.
39. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), "Displaced Project: Resource Mobilization Fact Sheet
2002, Lebanon," http://www.undp.org.lb/programme/propoor/regionaldevelopment/
displaced/resourcemobilization.html.
40. Georges Assaf and Rana El-Fil, "Resolving the Issue of War Displacement in Lebanon," Forced Migration
Review, Vol. 7 (2000), p. 32.
41. Are Knudsen, "Precarious Peacebuilding: Post-War Lebanon, 1990-2005," CMI Working Paper (2005), p.
16.
42. Young, "The Sneer of Memory," p. 44.
43. Young, "The Sneer of Memory," p. 42.
44. Interview with Ghassan Moukheiber by author Faten Ghosn, Beirut, July 27, 2007.
45. This bill has not been brought up in Parliament by the time of this writing.
46. Zahar, "Peace by Unconventional Means," p. 592.
47. Young, "The Sneer of Memory," p. 42.
48. This is an all-volunteer organization which champions the cases of Lebanese victims of enforced

04 November 2016 Page 12 of 15 ProQuest

disappearance, arbitrary detention, and exile. It is mainly made up of families and relatives of the victims.
Interview by author Faten Ghosn with Ghazi Aad, Director of SOLIDE, Beirut, July 16, 2008, http://www.solide-
lb.org/.
49. This is a non-profit Lebanese association that concentrates on themes of active memory by focusing on
Lebanon's violent past, http://www.umam-dr.org/index.asp.
50. Interview with Wadad Halawani, head of the Committee of the Families of the Missing, by author Faten
Ghosn, Beirut, July 10, 2008.
AuthorAffiliation
Faten Ghosn is Assistant Professor in the School of Government and Public Policy at the University of Arizona.
Her recent publications include "Getting to the Table and Getting to Yes: An Analysis of International
Negotiations," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 54 (2010), pp. 1055-1072; "Influence of Domestic Politics on
the Decision to Negotiate," International Negotiation, Vol. 16, No. 1 (2011), pp. 69-85; and "Israel and Lebanon:
A Precarious Relationship," in Hassan Barari, ed., The Middle East - Peace by Piece: The Quest for a Solution
to the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Currently both authors are working on a book manuscript on reconciliation efforts in
Lebanon.
Amal I. Khoury is Assistant Professor in the Peace and Conflict Studies Department at Guilford College. Her
publications include, Unity in Diversity: Interfaith Dialogue in the Middle East, with Mohammed Abu Nimer and
Emily Welty (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, June 2007); "Water Scarcity in the Middle
East: Balancing Conflict, Development, and Survival in Turkey, Syria and Iraq," Journal of Peacebuilding and
Development, Vol. 3, No. 1 (2006); and "The Muslim World Reacts to September 11," in Nancy Matuszak, ed.,
History Behind the Headlines: The Origins of Conflicts Worldwide.

Subject: Politics; Civil war; Censuses; Prime ministers; Assassinations & assassination attempts; Society;
Violence; Agreements; Political leadership; Political activism; Massacres; War;

Publication title: The Middle East Journal

Volume: 65

Issue: 3

Pages: 381-397

Number of pages: 17

Publication year: 2011

Publication date: Summer 2011

Publisher: Middle East Institute

Place of publication: Washington

Country of publication: United States

Publication subject: Asian Studies, Political Science--International Relations

ISSN: 00263141

CODEN: MIEJAX

Source type: Scholarly Journals

Language of publication: English

Document type: Feature

04 November 2016 Page 13 of 15 ProQuest

Document feature: Tables References

ProQuest document ID: 882854460

Document URL: http://search.proquest.com/docview/882854460?accountid=28281

Copyright: Copyright Middle East Institute Summer 2011

Last updated: 2012-06-29

Database: ProQuest Central

04 November 2016 Page 14 of 15 ProQuest

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Citation style: APA 6th - American Psychological Association, 6th Edition

Ghosn, F., & Khoury, A. (2011). Lebanon after the civil war: Peace or the illusion of peace? The Middle East
Journal, 65(3), 381-397. Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/882854460?accountid=28281

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