SPL 2

1.) A.M. No.
SB-14-21-J September 23, 2014

[Formerly A.M. No. 13-10-06-SB]
RE: ALLEGATIONS MADE UNDER OATH AT THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE HEARING HELD ON
SEPTEMBER 26, 2013 AGAINST ASSOCIATE JUSTICE GREGORY S. ONG, SANDIGANBAYAN
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
The character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done.
- Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
This administrative complaint was filed by the Court En Banc after investigation into certain allegations that surfaced
during the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Hearing indicated prima facie violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct
by an Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan. The investigation was conducted motu proprio pursuant to the
Court's power of administrative supervision over members of the Judiciary. 1
Factual Antecedents
In the middle of 2013, the local media ran an expose involving billions of government funds channeled through
bogus foundations. Dubbed as the "pork barrel scam," as the money was sourced from the Priority Development
Assistance Fund allotted to members of the House of Representatives and Senate, the controversy spawned
massive protest actions all over the country. In the course of the investigation conducted by the Senate Committee
on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations (Blue Ribbon Committee), the names of certain government
officials and other individuals were mentioned by "whistle-blowers" who are former employees of the alleged
mastermind, Janet Lim-Napoles (Mrs. Napoles), wife of an ex-military officer. These personalities identified by the
whistle-blowers allegedly transacted with or attended Mrs. Napoles' parties and events, among whom is
incumbent Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong, herein respondent.
Benhur Luy (Luy), a cousin of Mrs. Napoles who had worked for several years with the Napoleses, filed illegal
detention charges against Mrs. Napoles who accused him of double-dealing. When Luy went public with his story
about Mrs. Napoles' anomalous transactions and before the warrant of arrest was issued by the court, she
reportedly tried to reach out to the other whistle-blowers for them not to testify against her but instead point to Luy
as the one receiving and distributing the money.
Marina Sula (Sula) executed a Sworn Statement before the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) on August 29,
2
2013, part of which reads:
32. In the sixteen (16) years that I worked with Ms. Napoles, I witnessed several personalities visit our
offices and join us as our special guests during our parties and other special occasions. 33. These
personalities who would either visit our office or join our events and affairs are: Senator Franklin Drilon,
Senator Jinggoy Estrada and family, Senator Bong Revilla, Lani Mercado-Revilla, Bryan Revilla, Secretary
Rene Villa, Congressman Pichay and Wife, Congressman Plaza, Congressman Ducut, DAR Director
Theresita Panlilio, Catherine Mae Canlas Santos, Pauline Labayen, Jen Corpuz (Staff of Senator Sotto),
Mayor Rene Maglanque, Atty. Dequina, Justice Gregory Ong, x x x.
34. Before the warrant of arrest was issued against Ms. Napoles, she told us that that case could take four
to five years to clear. She said, "Antayin niyo munang ma-clear pangalan ko para makakilos ako at
matulungan ko kayo". Sinabi niya na meron na siyang kausap sa Ombudsman at sa Sandiganbayan.
35. On 28 August 2013 while me and my companions were at the NBI, Janet Lim Napoles called me. She
was crying and ask[i]ng me not to turn my back on her, that we should stay together. She said "kahit
maubos lahat ng pera ko, susuportahan ko kayo. Hintay[i]n nyo kasi lalabas na ang TRO ko."
xxxx
38. Attorney Tan instructed us to implicate Benhur in case we were asked by the NBI. He said "wala naman
ipinakita sa inyong masama si Madam (Janet Lim Napoles). Siguro wala naman kayong sama ng loob kay
madam, kaya nga idiin ninyo si Benhur na siya ang nag-utos at saka sa kanya ninyo ibinibigay ang
pera." (Emphasis supplied.)
3
The following day, the social news network Rappler published an article by Aries Rufo entitled "Exclusive: Napoles
Parties with Anti-Graft Court Justice" showing a photograph of Senator Jinggoy Estrada (Senator Estrada), one of
the main public figures involved in the pork barrel scam, together with Mrs. Napoles and respondent. The reporter
had interviewed respondent who quickly denied knowing Mrs. Napoles and recalled that the photograph was
probably taken in one of the parties frequently hosted by Senator Estrada who is his longtime friend. Respondent
also supposedly admitted that given the ongoing pork barrel controversy, the picture gains a different context;
nevertheless, he insisted that he has untainted service in the judiciary, and further denied he was the one advising
Mrs. Napoles on legal strategies in connection with the Kevlar helmet cases where she was acquitted by a Division
of the Sandiganbayan of which respondent is the Chairman and the then Acting Presiding Justice. 4
On September 12, 2013, Sula executed a "Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay " wherein she gave details
5
regarding those persons named in her sworn statement, alleged to have visited their office or attended their events,
thus:
63) T: Ayon sa paragraph Nos. 32 at 33 ng iyong sinumpaang salaysay na may petsang 29 Agosto 2013, nabanggit
mo ang mga personalidad na nakikita mong bumibisita sa inyong opisina o di kaya naman sa tuwing may party o
special occacions si JANET NAPOLES ay may mga special guests kayo na kinabibilangan ng mga malalaking
pulitiko at ang iba naman ay may mga katungkulan sa gobyerno. Maari mo bang ilahad ang mga pangyayari sa mga
bawat pagkakataon na nakita mo sila sa iyong pagkaka-alala?
S : Opo, iisa-isahin ko po ang mga pangyayari sa mga pagkakataon na nakita ko po ang mga taong nabanggit ko:
xxxx
w) Justice GREGORY ONG - Isang beses ko po siyang nakitang nagpunta sa office sa 2501 Discovery Centre,
Ortigas at nakita ko po silang magkausap ni Madam JANET NAPOLES sa conference room.
xxxx 6
In her testimony before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee on September 26, 2013, Sula was asked to confirm her
statement regarding Justice Ong, thus:
THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Grace.
Isang tanong lang kay Ms. Sula.
Sinabi niyo kanina may tinawagan si Ms. Napoles at sinabi niya, "Malapit na lumabas yung TRO galing sa korte."
May kilala pa ba si Janet Lim Napoles sa ltuwes sa korte sa Sandiganbayan? MS. SULA. Hindi ko po alam.
THE CHAIRMAN. Your attention is called sa page –
MS. SULA. Sandiganbayan po, sorry. Mayroon po siyang binanggit na ano po –
THE CHAIRMAN. Nandito sa page 20.
MS. SULA. Si Mr. Ong, po, Justice Ong po.
THE CHAIRMAN. Gregory Ong.
MS. SULA Opo.

THE CHAIRMAN. Sa Sandiganbayan?
MS. SULA. Opo.
x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
7
In a letter dated September 26, 2013 addressed to Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno, respondent
meticulously explained the controversial photograph which raised questions on his integrity as a magistrate,
particularly in connection with the decision rendered by the Sandiganbayan' s Fourth Division in the Kevlar helmet
cases, which convicted some of the accused but acquitted Mrs. Napoles.
Respondent surmised that the photograph was taken during the birthday of Senator Estrada in February, either in
the year 2012 or 2013, but definitely not in 2010 or earlier. He explained that he could vaguely remember the
circumstances but it would have been rude for him to prevent any guest from posing with him and Senator Estrada
during the party. On the nature of his association with Mrs. Napoles, respondent asserted:
(4) I can categorically state, on the other hand, that I have never attended any party or social event hosted by Mrs.
Napoles or her family, either before she had a case with our court, or while she already had a pending case with our
court, or at any time afterwards. I have never, to use the term of Mr. Rufo in his article, "partied" with the Napoleses.
(Emphasis supplied.)
As to the Kevlar helmet cases, respondent said it was impossible for him to have been advising Mrs. Napoles, as
claimed by Mr. Rufo, as even the article itself noted that Mrs. Napoles' own brother, Reynald L. Lim, ( a.k.a.
Reynaldo L. Francisco), a co-accused in the case, was convicted by the Sandiganbayan. He stressed that these
cases were decided on the merits by the Sandiganbayan, acting as a collegial body and he was not even the
ponente of the decision. Respondent thus submitted himself to the discretion of the Chief Justice such that even
without being required to submit an explanation, he voluntarily did so "to defend [his] reputation as a judge and
protect the Sandiganbayan as an institution from unfair and malicious innuendos."
On October 7, 2013, Chief Justice Sereno wrote the Members of this Court, citing the testimonies of Luy and Sula
before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee "[t]hat the malversation case involving Mrs. Janet Lim-Napoles, Major
Jaime G. Napoles, Jenny Lim Napoles, Reynaldo L. Francisco and other perpetrators was 'fixed' (inayos) through
the intervention of Justice Gregory S. Ong of the Sandiganbayan", to wit:
SEN. ANGARA. Sa inyo, hindi niyo a/am kung inayos iyong kaso na iyon? Kasi napakaraming koneksiyon, 'di ba?
xxxx Sige, huwag kang matakot, Benhur.
MR. LUY. Alam ko, inayos ni Ms. Napoles iyon dahil may connect nga siya sa Sandiganbayan
SEN. ANGARA. Okay.
xxxx
THE CHAIRMAN. xxx Sinabi niyo kanina na may tinawagan si Ms. Napoles at sinabi niya "Malapit na lumabas yung
TRO galing sa korte." May kilala pa ba si Janet Lim Napoles sa huwes sa korte sa Sandiganbayan?
xxxx
MS. SULA. Si Mr. Ong po, Justice Ong po.
THE CHAIRMAN. Gregory Ong.
MS. SULA. Opo.
THE CHAIRMAN. Sa Sandiganbayan?

MS. SULA. Opo.
Xxxx 8
Chief Justice Sereno then requested the Court En Banc to conduct an investigation motu proprio under this Court's
power of administrative supervision over members of the judiciary and members of the legal profession (referring to
notaries public who were alleged to have purposely left their specimen signatures, dry seals and notarial books with
Mrs. Napoles to facilitate the incorporation of non-governmental organizations [NGOs] involved in the scam). 9
Under our Resolution dated October 17, 2013, the Court En Banc required respondent to submit his comment and
directed the NBI to furnish the Court with certified copies of the affidavit of Luy. On November 21, 2013, the Court
received respondent's Comment. Respondent categorically denied any irregularity in the Kevlar helmet cases and
10
explained the visit he had made to Mrs. Napoles as testified by Sula.
On Sula's statement, respondent points out that Sula never really had personal knowledge whether respondent is
indeed the alleged "contact" of Mrs. Napoles at the Sandiganbayan; what she supposedly "knows" was what Mrs.
Napoles merely told her. Hence, Sula's testimony on the matter is based purely on hearsay. Assuming that Mrs.
Napoles actually made the statement, respondent believes it was given in the context of massive media coverage of
the pork barrel scam exploding at the time. With the consciousness of a looming criminal prosecution before the
Office of the Ombudsman and later before the Sandiganbayan, it was only natural for Mrs. Napoles to assure Sula
and others involved in their business operation that she would not leave or abandon them and that she would do all
that she can to help them just so they would not turn their backs on her and become whistle-blowers. Thus, even if
Mrs. Napoles made misrepresentations to Sula regarding respondent as her "connection", she only had to do so in
order to convince Sula and her co-employees that the cases to be filed against them would be "fixed."
As to Sula's statement that she personally witnessed respondent at one time visiting Mrs. Napoles at her office and
having a meeting with her at the conference room, respondent said that at the birthday party of Senator Estrada
where the controversial photograph was taken, Mrs. Napoles engaged him in a casual conversation during which
the miraculous healing power of the robe or clothing of the Black Nazarene of Quiapo was mentioned. When Mrs.
Napoles told respondent that she is a close friend of the Quiapo Church's parish priest, he requested her help to
gain access to the Black Nazarene icon. Eventually, respondent, who is himself a Black Nazarene devotee and was
undergoing treatment for his prostate cancer, was given special permission and was able to drape the Black
Nazarene's robe or clothing for a brief moment over his body and also receive a fragrant ball of cotton taken or
exposed to the holy image, which article he keeps to this day and uses to wipe any ailing part of his body in order to
receive healing. Because of such favor, respondent out of courtesy went to see Mrs. Napoles and personally thank
her. Respondent stressed that that was the single occasion Sula was talking about in her supplemental affidavit
when she said she saw respondent talking with Mrs. Napoles at the conference room of their office in Discovery
Suites.
Respondent maintains that there was nothing improper or irregular for him to have personally seen Mrs. Napoles at
the time in order to thank her, considering that she no longer had any pending case with his court, and to his
knowledge, with any other division of the Sandiganbayan at the time and even until the date of the preparation of his
Comment. He thus prays that this Court duly note his Comment and accept the same as sufficient compliance with
the Court's Resolution dated October 17, 2013.
This Court upon evaluation of the factual circumstances found possible transgressions of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct committed by respondent. Accordingly, a Resolution was issued on January 21, 2014 stating that:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby resolves to have the instant administrative matter RE-DOCKETED as A.M. No.
SB-14-21-J (Re: Allegations Made Under Oath at tlze Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Hearing held on September
26, 2013 against Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong, Sandiganbayan), and ASSIGNS the same to retired Supreme
Court Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez for investigation, report and recommendation within a period of sixty (60)
days from notice hereof.
The Court further resolves to NOTE the letter dated January 7, 2014 of Atty. Joffre Gil C. Zapata, Executive Clerk of
Court III, Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, in compliance with the resolution of the Court En Banc dated December
3, 2013, transmitting the original records of Criminal Case Nos. 26768 and 26769. Atty. Zapata is INFORMED that
there is no more need to transmit to this Court the post-sentence investigation reports and other reports on the
supervisory history of the accused-probationers in Criminal Case Nos. 26768 and 26769.
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Justice
Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez, a retired Member of this Court, submitted her report with the following findings
and conclusions:
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
1. THE KEVLAR CASE
Two criminal cases were filed with the Sandiganbayan sometime in 2001 - Criminal Case No. 26768 for Falsification
of Public Documents and Criminal Case No. 26769 for Violation of Section 3(e) of the AntiGraft Law. Charged were
several members of Philippine Marine Corps and civilian employees including Ms. Janet L. Napoles (Napoles), her
mother Magdalena Francisco (now deceased), her brother Reynaldo Francisco and wife Anna Marie Dulguime, and
her (Napoles') three employees.
These cases are referred to as the Kevlar case because the issue involved is the same - the questionable purchase
of 500 Kevlar helmets by the Philippine Marine Corps in the amount of ₱3,865,310.00 from five suppliers or
companies owned by Napoles.
The prosecution alleged inter alia that the accused, acting in conspiracy, released the payment although there was
yet no delivery of the Kevlar helmets; that the suppliers are mere dummies of Napoles; and that the helmets were
made in Taiwan, not in the U.S.A.
Napoles' husband, Major Jaime Napoles, was dropped from the two Informations in an Order issued by the
Ombudsman on March 18, 2002.
Napoles' mother, brother, and sister-in-law were among those convicted for the lesser crime of Falsification of Public
Documents and sentenced to suffer the penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional to 8 years and 1 day
of prision mayor and each to pay PS,000.00. They all underwent probation.
Napoles and six members of the Philippine Marine Corps were acquitted in both cases.
The court ruled that Napoles "was not one of the dealer-payees in the transaction in question. Even if she owns the
bank account where the 14 checks were later deposited, this does not in itself translate to her conspiracy in the
crimes charged x x x."
xxxx
THE INVESTIGATION
xxxx
I. During the investigation, Benhur testified that he and Napoles are second cousins. After passing the Medical
Technology Licensure Examination in 2002, he was employed in the JLN (Janet Lim Napoles) Corporation as
Napoles' personal assistant. As such, he was in charge of disbursements of her personal funds and those of her
office. He was also in charge of government transactions of the corporation and kept records of its daily business
activities.
In the course of Benhur's employment at the JLN Corporation, Napoles mentioned to him the Kevlar case, then
pending in the Sandiganbayan, saying she has a "connect" in that court who would help her.
When asked about his testimony before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee concerning the Kevlar case, Benhur
declared that Napoles' "connect" with the Sandiganbayan is respondent, thus:
Q The question was, Mr. Witness, this is coming from Senator Angara, and I quote, "Kailan ho lumabas yung
decision ng Court sa Kevlar?" And just to refresh your memory, Mr. Witness, then Ms. Sula answered, "I think 2010.
Yun po yung lumabas po." And then going forward, Senator Angara referred to both of you this question: "Sa inyo,
hindi ninyo alam kung inayos yung kaso na iyon kasi napakaraming koneksyon, di ba? Baka alam ng ibang
whistleblowers kung nagka-ayusan sa kaso na iyon. Sige, huwag kang matakot, Benhur." Do you remember that
question being asked from you?
xxxx
A Yes po.
Q And now Mr. Witness, about this statement of yours at the Blue Ribbon Committee that Ms. Napoles has a certain
connect sa Sandiganbayan, who was this connect you were talking about, if you remember?
Witness Luy
A Si Justice Gregory Ong po.
Q How do you know that Justice Gregory Ong was the connect of Ms. Napoles at the Sandiganbayan?
A Ang sinabi po ... Si Ms. Napoles, pinsan ko po kasi we are second cousins. So kinuwento talaga sa akin ni
Madam kung ano ang mga developments sa mga cases, kung ano ang mga nangyayari. Tapos po, sinabi niya sa
akin mismo na nakakausap niya si Justice Gregory Ong at ang nagpakilala raw sa kanya po ay si Senator Jinggoy
Estrada.
Benhur further testified that even before the decision in the Kevlar case was promulgated, Napoles and respondent
were already communicating with each other (nag-uusap na po si!a). Therefore, she was sure the decision would be
in her favor:
Q Do you remember the date when the decision (in Kevlar case) was promulgated?
A Ano po, the year 2010 po ma' am.
Q And you met him (Justice Ong) in 2012?
A 2012 po, pero prior to that decision, madam, naririnig ko na po kay madam (Ms. Napoles) kasi kinukwento na po
ni madam sa akin na nag-uusap na po sila ni Justice Gregory Ong.
Q That was after the decision was promulgated?
A Bago po nailabas yung decision, ikinwento po m Ms. Napoles sa akin na nag-uusap na po sila ni Justice Gregory
Ong. Kaya kampante po si Ms. Napoles. Noong lumabas po yung decision, alam niya na po. Yung ang sabi sa akin
ni Ms. Napoles.
Going back to the hearing before the Blue Ribbon Committee, Benhur told Senator Angara that Napoles fixed the
Kevlar case because she has a "connect" in the Sandiganbayan:
"Baka alam ng ibang whistle blowers kung nagkaka-ayusan sa kaso na iyon (Kevlar case). Sige huwag kang
matakot Benhur."
Benhur Luy: "Alam ko inayos ni Ms. Napoles iyon dahil may connect nga siya sa Sandiganbayan."
On how Napoles "inayos" or fixed the Kevlar case, Benhur said that he kept a ledger of the Sandiganbayan case
wherein he listed all her expenses in the sum of P 100 million pesos. He was surprised why she would spend such
amount considering that what was involved in the Kevlar case was only ₱3.8 million. She explained that she gave
various amounts to different people during the pendency of the case which lasted up to ten years. And before the
decision in the Kevlar case was released, she also gave money to respondent but she did not mention the amount.
Thus, she knew she would be acquitted.
Q You answered Senator Angara this way which we already quoted a while ago, "Alam ko inayos ni Ms. Napoles
iyon dahil may connect nga siya sa Sandiganbayan." You stated that the connect is Justice Ong. Can you explain
before us what you mean, "Alam ko inayos ni Ms. Napoles iyon." What do you mean by that "inayos"?
A Kasi po ma' am meron kaming ledger ng Sandiganbayan case sa lahat ng nagastos ni Ms. Janet Napoles, nilista
ko po yon lahat. Kasi naririnig ko po kay Janet Napoles, parang pinsan ko po si Janet Napoles, "Paano nagkaroon
ng kaso ang ate ko? So nadiscover ko na Jang po na yun pala yung Kevlar. So, mahigit one hundred million na
nagastos po ni Ms. Napoles kasi di lang naman po si sir Justice Gregory Ong ...
xxx
Q Did you come to know to whom she gave all the money?
A Wala po siyang ... basta ang sabi niya inayos na niya si ... binaggit niya po si ... kasi si madam hindi kasi nagki-
keep kasi ako pinsan niya po kasi ako, nabanggit niya po si Justice Gregory Ong. Sinabi niya nagbigay daw po siya
ng pera kay Justice Ong pero she never mentioned kung magkano yung amount.
xxx
Q Nagbigay ng pera kay Justice Gregory Ong?
A Opo, yung ang sabi niya (referring to Ms. Napoles).
Q To you?
A Yes, madam.
Q Do you remember when she made that kind of statement?
A Bago po ano madam, bago po lumabas yung decision kaya kampante na po si Ms. Napoles bago lumabas yung
decision na acquitted siya. Alam na niya. Sa Kevlar case.
xxx
Justice Gutierrez
Continue counsel.
Witness Luy
Kasi naikwento po madam ni Ms. Napoles na almost PlOO million na ang nagastos niya. Tapos ang sabi ko nga po
sa kanya: "Madam, P 100 million na sa halagang ₱3.8 lang na PO (purchase order) sa Kevlar helmet, tapos P 100
million na ang nagastos mo?"
Q Did she tell you or explain to you to whom this P 100 million was paid? How was it spent?
A Basta ang natatandaan ko ... di ko na po matandaan ang mga dates kasi parang staggered. May ₱5 million sa
ibang tao ang kausap niya. Tapos ito naman tutulong ng ganito. lba-iba kasi madam, eh.
Q But there was no showing the money was given to Justice Ong?
A Wala po pero nabanggit lang po niya (Ms. Napoles) sa akin na nagbigay po siya kay Justice Ong, but she never
mentioned the amount.
Continuing with his testimony, Benhur declared that in 2012, respondent went twice to Napoles' office at the
Discovery Suites Center, 25 ADB Avenue, Ortigas, Pasig City. On the first visit, Napoles introduced Justice Ong to
Benhur and her other employees.
Benhur narrated what transpired during that visit. According to him, Napoles has so much money being placed at
the Armed Forces of the Philippines and Police Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (AFPSLAI) which offered 13%
interest annually. Napoles called Benhur telling him that respondent would like to avail of such interest for his BDO
check of ₱25.5 million. To arrange this, Napoles informed Benhur that she would just deposit respondent's ₱25.5
million in her personal account with Metro bank. Then she would issue to respondent in advance eleven (11)
checks, each amounting to ₱282,000.00 as monthly interest, or a total of ₱3,102,000.00 equivalent to 13% interest.
Upon Justice Ong's suggestion, the checks should be paid to cash. So, Benhur prepared the corresponding eleven
(11) checks, thus:
Q With respect to the Kevlar case, what participation did you have, if there was any?
Witness Luy
A Noon 2012 po kasi si Justice Gregory Ong po nasa unit 2501, yung office (of Ms. Napoles), so kami ni Janet
Napoles, nandito sa 2502 kasi yun po talaga ang office namin. Si Ms. Napoles po sinabi niya sa akin, Ben, kasi si
Ms. Napoles, may pera siyang madarni na pine-place niya po sa AFPSLAI at yung AFPSLAI po ay nagbibigay po sa
kanya o nagooffer ng 13% interest annually po. So, ang nangyari po <loon, sabi ni Janet Napoles, si Justice Ong ho
raw, gustong magkaroon din ng interest parang ganoon. So tutulungan niya. So ang ginawa po namin x x x. Q
Meaning to say, Justice Ong would like to deposit money?
A Opo.
Q So he could get 13% interest?
A Opo, kasi tapos madam ang nangyari po pumunta na po si Ms. Napoles sa kanyang opisina. Tinawag po niya ako
kasi pinasulat na niya sa akin ang checke. So, ang ginawa po ni Ms. Napoles, yung checke ni .. BDO check po kasi
yun. Ang sabi sa akin ni Ms. Napoles, checke daw po yun ni Justice Gregory Ong. Sa, BDO. So, di ko naman din po
nakita Madam yung nakalagay sa ...
Q So it is the check of Justice Ong, not the check of Ms. Napoles?
A Opo, ang amount po ng check madam ay ₱25.5 million ang amount noong BDO check na inissue ...
Q That belongs to Justice Ong?
A Opo. Tapos madam, so ang ginawa po namin ni Ms. Napoles, dahil po 13% interest ang ino-offer ng AFPSLAI,
sabi ni Madam ganito na lang, Ben, ipasok na lang muna natin yung check niya sa personal account ko. Ako na
lang muna for the meantime, mag-iissue ng check sa kanya para maavail ni Justice Ong yung interest. So, ang
ginawa nan1in madam, ₱25.5 million times 13% interest, tapos divided by 12, lumalabas ₱282,000.00 or
₱283,000.00 or ₱281,000.00 po madam kasi naground off kami sa ₱282,000.00. So, ang ginawa ni Madam, baga
monthly. So eleven (11) checks ang prinepare namin. Kung hindi po ako nagkakamali po, JLN Corporation check
ang ... Ako pa nga po ang nagsulat at saka bago po namin isinulat yung payee, inalam pa po namin. x x x So,
pumunta na naman si madam sa 2501 kasi nandoon si Justice Gregory Ong. Noong bumalik siya, pay to cash na
lang daw. So, makikita po sa records namin ni Ms. Napoles na pumasok ang ₱25.5 million na amount sa kanyang
account at the same time nag-issue siya ng checke na ₱282,000.00 na eleven checks. Nagstart kami madam 2012,
siguro sometime July or August or mga ganoong buwan po. Basta 11 checks, hindi nalalayo doon. So, siguro tapos
na.
Q But what actually turned out was that the money of Justice Ong was deposited at the bank but the interest was
paid in advance by Ms. Napoles, and actually the bank will pay Ms. Napoles the advanced interest she paid to
Justice Ong, is that clear? Is that the arrangement? Do you understand me?
A Kasi ang nangyari po ma'am ganito e: yung ₱25.5 million ipinasok sa personal account ni Ms. Napoles dito sa
Metrobank. Metrobank kasi po yun e.
On the second visit of respondent to Napoles' office, they just engaged in conversation. She ordered Chinese food
for him which, according to Benhur, is his (respondent's) favorite.
On cross-examination, Benhur claimed that in his affidavits executed in the NBI, he did not mention respondent's
name. However, in his reply-affidavit filed with the Sandiganbayan, he alleged that Napoles issued ₱282,000.00 (the
amount stated in each of the 11 checks) but he did not mention the name of the payee upon instruction of his
lawyer, Atty. Baligod. Nonetheless, he knew that the checks were issued to respondent.
II. Sula, also a whistle blower, testified that she was an employee of JLN Corporation. Her duties included the
formation of corporations by making use of the forms, applying for business licenses, transfer of properties,
purchase of cars, and others.
Sula corroborated Benhur's testimony that respondent visited the office of Napoles twice sometime in 2012.
Sula was asked to explain her testimony before the Blue Ribbon Committee during the hearing on September 26,
2013, quoted as follows:
The Chairman (Senator Teofisto Guingona III)
Sinabi ninyo na may tinawagan si Mrs. Napoles at sinabi niya, Malapit nang lumabas yung TRO galing sa korte.
May kilala pa ba si Janet Lim Napoles sa huwes sa korte sa Sandiganbayan?
xxx
Ms. Sula
Si Mr. Ong po. Justice Ong po.
The Chairman
Gregory Ong?
Ms. Sula
Opo.
The Chairman
Sa Sandiganbayan?
Ms. Sula
Opo.
The Chairman
Okay. With that, I will just have a closing statement before we leave the hearing.
Sula explained that the TRO mentioned by Napoles refers to the TRO to be issued by the Sandiganbayan in the
event the case involving the PIO billion PDAF scam against her is filed with that court; and that Napoles told Sula
and the other employees not to worry because she has contact with the Sandiganbayan - respondent Justice Ong,
thus:
Q Not the illegal detention case?
Witness Sula
A Hindi po, pag nakasuhan na po kami sa Sandiganbayan.
Q Okay, again?
A Sa pagkakaintindi po namin, ang sabi po ni Madam na it takes 4 to 5 years, so hihintayin niya na maacquit, sabi
niyang ganoon, ang pangalan niya para maluwag na tulungan kami. Ito po ang pagkakaintindi namin na sa
Sandiganbayan.
Q Yung PDAF?
A Opo, yung PDAF sa Sandiganbayan.
Q Pagdating ng kaso sa Sandiganbayan?
A Opo, kasi po ina-ano po niya, siya po tinitira na ni Benhur - si Madam tungkol sa PlO billion scam. So, pinag-
uusapan namin sa bahay niya sa South Garden Unit na, Madam, paano po yan, pag lahat ng kaso na iyan dadaan
sa lawmakers, dadaan yon sa Ombudsman at saka sa Sandiganbayan? Sabi niya, "Huwag kayong mag-alala.
Meron naman akong mga contact doon." Sabi niyang ganoon sa Ombudsman at sa Sandiganbayan.
Q Is that in your affidavit?
A Wala po. Pero sinabi ko po doon sa part na yon (her testimony before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee) na
meron na siyang kilala sa Ombudsman, pero hindi niya nabanggit ang pangalan. Pero sa Sandiganbayan, ang alam
namin kilala niya si Justice Ong.
Q Yun ang sagot niya kay Chairman Guingona. Di ba I read it a while ago?
A Opo, doon sa Sandiganbayan.
Sula also testified that every time Napoles talked to her and the other employees, she would say that Justice Ong
will help her in the Kevlar case. Sula's testimony is as follows:
Q x x x you told me that somebody will help in the Kevlar case?
A Opo. Sinabi po niya sa amin every time po pag nagkukwento siya, sinasabi niya na si Justice Ong ang tumulong
sa kanya para ma-clear po yung Kevlar case niya.
Sula likewise testified that Napoles told her and the other employees that she will fix (aayusin) the "PDAF case" in
the Sandiganbayan. Then they replied in jest that her acquaintance in that court is respondent. Napoles retorted,
"Ay huag na iyon kasi masyadong mataas ang talent fee."
xxxx
III. Aries Rufo, a Reporter of Rappler, testified that he cannot reveal who gave him the photograph [of respondent
beside Napoles and Senator Jinggoy Estrada] because he is shielded by law and he has to protect his source.
When asked about his comment upon seeing the picture, Rufo said:
Initially, when I saw the picture, since I knew that Justice Ong was one of the members of the division that handled
the Kevlar case, it aroused my curiosity why he was in that picture. Second, because in journalism, we also get to
practice ethical standards, I immediately sensed though that a Justice or a lawyer, that he should not be seen or be
going to a party or be in an event where respondent (Ms. Napoles) was in a case under his Division. He should not
be in a situation that would compromise the integrity of his office.
Rufo further testified that on August 27, 2013, he faxed a letter to respondent to "get his side about the photo." The
next day, he went to respondent's office and showed it to him. Respondent was shocked. He explained that it must
have been taken during one of the parties hosted by his friend Senator Jinggoy Estrada; that he did not know that
the woman in the picture is Napoles because she did not appear during the hearing of the Kevlar case; and that
such picture must have been taken in one of those instances when a guest would like to pose with celebrities or
public figures.
xxxx
Respondent, in his defense, vehemently denied the imputations hurled against him.
1. He asserted that he could not be the contact or "connect" of Napoles at the Sandiganbayan for he never
met or came to know her during the pendency of the Kevlar case;
2. Challenging Benhur's testimony that he fixed or "inayos" the Kevlar case, respondent claimed that it was
decided based on the merits by the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division as a collegial body. The two other
members of the court, Justice Jose R. Hernandez (ponente) and Justice Maria Cristina J. Cornejo, are
independent-minded jurists who could not be pressured or influenced by anybody, not even by their peers;
3. On Benhur's allegation that respondent received an amount of money from Napoles prior to the
promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case, respondent deplored the fact that Benhur was attempting to
tarnish his reputation without any proof. And that it is unthinkable for him to have received money from
Napoles considering that her mother, brother, and sister-in-law were convicted;
4. Respondent admitted he went to Napoles' office twice, sometime in March 2012, after the decision in the
Kevlar case was promulgated in 2010 and narrated what prompted him to do so, thus:
At the birthday party of Senator Jinggoy Estrada on February 17, 2012, Napoles approached him and introduced
herself. She engaged him in a casual conversation and thanked him for her acquittal in the Kevlar case.
Respondent replied she should thank her "evidence" instead, adding that had the court found enough evidence
against her, she would have been convicted. She talked about her charity works like supporting Chinese priests,
building churches and chapels in China, and sponsoring Chinese Catholic priests. He was not interested though in
what she was saying until she mentioned the name of Msgr. Ramirez, former Parish Priest of Quiapo Church.
Respondent became interested because he has been a devotee of the Holy Black Nazarene since he was a little
boy. Napoles told him that Msgr. Ramirez has with him the robe of the Holy Black Nazarene which has a healing
power if one wears it. Then respondent asked if he can have access to the robe so he can be cured of his ailment
(prostate cancer) which he keeps only to himself and to the immediate members of his family. Napoles made
arrangement with Msgr. Ramirez until respondent was able to drape the robe over his body for about one or two
minutes in Quiapo Church. He also received a fragrant ball of cotton which he keeps until now to heal any ailing part
of his body. That was a great deal for him. So out of courtesy, he visited Napoles in her office and thanked her. That
was his first visit.
Thereafter, Napoles kept on calling respondent, inviting him to her office, but he kept on declining. Then finally after
two weeks, he acceded for she might think he is "walang kwentang tao." They just engaged in a small talk for about
30 minutes and had coffee.
5. Concerning Benhur's testimony that Napoles paid respondent an advanced interest consisting of eleven (11)
checks in the amount of ₱282,000.00 each and that he issued to her his BDO check of ₱25.5 million which she
deposited in her account, he claimed that "he never issued that check as he did not intend to invest in AFPSLAI. In
fact, he does not have any money deposited there. Inasmuch as he did not issue any BDO check, it follows that
Napoles could not have given him those eleven (11) checks representing advanced interest. He further explained
that he found from the internet that in AFPSLAI, an investor can only make an initial deposit of ₱30,000.00 every
quarter or Pl20,000.00 per year. The limit or ceiling is ₱3 million with an interest of 15% or 16% per annum.
6. The whistle blower's testimony are conflicting and therefore lack credibility. While Sula testified that Napoles told
her that she did not want to approach respondent (should a case involving the pork barrel scam be filed with the
Sandiganbayan) because his talent fee is too high, however, both whistle blowers claimed that he is Napoles'
contact in the Sandiganbayan.
With respect to the Rappler Report, according to respondent, Rufo was insinuating four things: 1. That there was
irregularity in the manner the Kevlar case was decided;
2. That respondent was close to Napoles even during the pendency of the Kevlar case;
3. That respondent was attending parties of the Napoleses; and
4. That respondent was advising Napoles about legal strategies relative to the Kevlar case. Respondent "dismissed
all the above insinuations as false and without factual basis." As to the last insinuation that he advised Napoles
about legal strategies to be pursued in the Kevlar case, respondent stressed that the case was decided by a
collegial body and that he never interceded on her behalf.
EVALUATION
xxxx
It bears stressing that before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, Benhur initially testified that Napoles fixed or
"inayos" the Kevlar case because she has a contact at the Sandiganbayan, referring to respondent. Sula
corroborated Benhur's testimony.
Testifying before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is certainly an ordeal. The witnesses and everything they say
are open to the public. They are subjected to difficult questions propounded by the Senators, supposedly intelligent
and knowledgeable of the subject and issues under inquiry. And they can easily detect whether a person under
investigation is telling the truth or not. Considering this challenging and difficult setting, it is indubitably improbable
that the two whistle blowers would testify false! y against respondent.
Moreover, during the investigation of this case, Benhur and Sula testified in a candid, straightforward, and
categorical manner. Their testimonies were instantaneous, clear, unequivocal, and carried with it the ring of truth.
In fact, their answers to the undersigned's probing questions were consistent with their testimonies before the
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. During cross-examination, they did not waver or falter. The undersigned found the
two whistle blowers as credible witnesses and their story untainted with bias and contradiction, reflective of honest
and trustworthy witnesses.
The undersigned therefore finds unmeritorious respondent's claim that Benhur and Sula were lying.
. . . respondent insisted he could not have intervened in the disposition of the Kevlar case considering that Napoles'
mother, brother and sister-in-law were convicted.
Respondent must have forgotten that Napoles' natural instinct was self-preservation. Hence, she would avail of
every possible means to be exonerated. Besides, respondent's belief that the two members of his Division are
independent-minded Jurists remains to be a mere allegation.
xxxx
With the undersigned's finding that there is credence in the testimonies of Benhur and Sula, there is no need to
stretch one's imagination to arrive at the inevitable conclusion that in "fixing" Kevlar case, money could be the
consideration ... Benhur testified he kept a ledger (already shredded) of expenses amounting to P 100 million
incurred by Napoles for the Sandiganbayan during the pendency of the Kevlar case which extended up to ten years;
and that Napoles told him she gave respondent an undetermined sum of money.
Respondent maintains that the testimonies of Benhur and Sula are pure hearsay, inadmissible in evidence:
Justice Ong
Your honor, since these are all accusations against me by Luy and Sula, and according to Luy and Sula, these were
only told to them by Napoles, always their statements were ... they do not have personal knowledge, it was only told
to them by Napoles, is it possible that we subpoena Napoles so that the truth will come out? If. ..
xxxx
Justice Gutierrez
That is your prerogative.
Justice Ong
I am willing to take the risk although I know I am not an acquaintance of Napoles. Just to clear my name whether I
should be hung or I should not be hung.
xxxx
Atty. Geronilla
I don't think it would be necessary, your honor.
Justice Gutierrez (to Atty. Geronilla)
Discuss this matter with your client, file a motion, then we will see.
However, respondent and his counsel did not take any action on the undersigned's suggestion. They did not present
Napoles to rebut the testimonies of Benhur and Sula. Significantly, respondent failed to consider that his testimony
is likewise hearsay. He should have presented Msgr. Ramirez and Napoles as witnesses to support his claim
regarding their role which enabled him to wear the robe of the Holy Black Nazarene.
x x xx
Respondent's acts of allowing himself to be Napoles' contact in the Sandiganbayan, resulting in the fixing
of the Kevlar case, and of accepting money from her, constitute gross misconduct, a violation of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.
xxxx
That Benhur personally prepared the eleven (11) checks which Napoles handed to respondent led the undersigned
to conclude without hesitation that this charge is true. It is highly inconceivable that Benhur could devise or concoct
his story. He gave a detailed and lucid narration of the events, concluding that actually Napoles gave respondent
₱3, 102,000.00 as advanced interest.
According to respondent, the purpose of his first visit was to thank Napoles for making it possible for him to wear the
Holy Black Nazarene's robe. Even assuming it is true, nonetheless it is equally true that during that visit, respondent
could have transacted business with Napoles. Why should Napoles pay respondent an advanced interest of
₱3,102,000.0 with her own money if it were not a consideration for a favor?
Respondent's transgression pertains to his personal life and no direct relation to his judicial function. It is
not misconduct but plain dishonesty. His act is unquestionably disgraceful and renders him morally unfit as
a member of the Judiciary and unworthy of the privileges the law confers on him. Furthermore,
respondent's conduct supports Benhur's assertion that he received money from Napoles.
Dishonesty likewise violates Canon 2 (1 and 2) on Integrity of the same Code providing in part that judges must
ensure that their conduct is above reproach and must reaffirm the people's faith in the integrity of the Judiciary.
Indeed, respondent should not stay in his position even for a moment.
xxxx
...From respondent's end, there was nothing wrong when he visited Napoles twice in her office considering that the
visits took place long after the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case.
Contrary to respondent's submission, such acts also constitute gross misconduct in violation of Canon 4
on Propriety of the same Code. Section 1 provides that judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance
of impropriety in all of their activities .
. . . respondent's reason for his first visit was to thank Napoles for her help in making it possible for him to wear the
robe of the Holy Black Nazarene. Instead of visiting her, respondent could have extended his gratitude by simply
calling her by phone. Worse, he visited her again because she may think he is an unworthy person. This is an
extremely frail reason. He was seen by the whistle blowers and their co-workers who, without doubt, readily
confirmed that he was Napoles' contact at the Sandiganbayan and that he "fixed" the decision in the Kevlar case.
Respondent cannot be excused for his unconcern for the position he holds. Being aptly perceived as the visible
personification of law and justice, his personal behavior, not only while in the performance of official duties but also
outside the court, must be beyond reproach. A judicial office circumscribes a personal conduct and imposes a
number of inhibitions, whose faithful observance is the price one has to pay for holding an exalted position.
xxxx
On the photograph showing respondent with Senator Jinggoy Estrada and Napoles.
xxxx
This incident manifests respondent's disregard of the dictum that propriety and the appearance of propriety are
essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge. This exacting standard of decorum is demanded from
judges to promote public confidence in the integrity of the Judiciary.
In joining Senator Estrada and Napoles in a picture taking, respondent gave a ground for reproach by reason of
impropriety. It bears reiterating Canon 4 (1) on Propriety of the same Code which provides that judges shall avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.
Respondent maintained that he did not know Napoles at that time because she was not present before the
Sandiganbayan during the hearing of the Kevlar case for she must have waived her appearance. Respondent's
explanation lacks merit. That court could not have acquired jurisdiction over her if she did not appear personally for
arraignment.
Of utmost significance is the fact that this is not the first time that respondent has been charged administratively. In
"Assistant Special Prosecutor Ill Rohermina J Jamsani-Rodriguez v. Justices Gregory S. Ong, Jose R. Hernandez
and Rodolfo A. Ponferrada, Sandiganbayan,'' the Supreme Court found respondent Justice Ong guilty of violation of
PD 1606 and The Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan for nonobservance of collegiality in hearing criminal
cases in the Hall of Justice, Davao City. Instead of siting as a collegial body, the members of the Sandiganbayan
Fourth Division adopted a different procedure. The Division was divided into two. As then Chairperson of the
Division, respondent was ordered to pay a fine of ₱15,000.00 with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or
similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
xxxx
...the undersigned cannot hold back her skepticism regarding the acquittal of Napoles. The Sandiganbayan Fourth
Division, of which respondent was the Chairman, held that Napoles did not conspire with the suppliers in the
questionable purchase of the Kevlar helmets as she was not one of the "dealer-payees" in the transaction in
question and that there was no proof of an overt act on her part. How could the Fourth Division arrive at such
conclusion? The Decision itself indicates clearly that ( 1) Napoles was following up the processing of the documents;
(2) that she was in charge of the delivery of the helmets; and (3) the checks amounting to ₱3,864,310.00 as
payment for the helmets were deposited and cleared in only one bank account, Security Bank Account No. 512-000-
2200, in the name of Napoles.
Considering this glaring irregularity, it is safe to conclude that indeed respondent has a hand in the acquittal of
Napoles. All along, the whistle blowers were telling the truth.
xxxx
RECOMMENDATION
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, It is respectfully recommended, for consideration of the Honorable Court, that
respondent Justice Gregory S. Ong be found GUILTY of gross misconduct, dishonesty, and impropriety, all in
violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary and be meted the penalty of DISMISSAL
from the service WITH FORFEITURE of all retirement benefits, excluding accrued leave credits, and WITH
PREJUDICE to reemployment to any government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
xxxx
The Court's Ruling
This Court adopts the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the Investigating Justice which are well-
supported by the evidence on record.
Based on the testimonies of Luy, Sula and Rufo, the Investigating Justice formulated the charges against the
respondent, as follows:
1. Respondent acted as contact of Napoles in connection with the Kevlar case while it was pending in the
Sandiganbayan Fourth Division wherein he is the Chairman;
2. Respondent, being Napoles' contact in the Sandiganbayan, fixed the Kevlar case resulting in her
acquittal;
3. Respondent received an undetermined amount of money from Napoles prior to the promulgation of the
decision in the Kevlar case thus, she was sure ("kampante")of her acquittal; 4. Respondent visited Napoles
in her office where she handed to him eleven (ll) checks, each amounting to ₱282,000.00 or a total of
₱3,102,000.00, as advanced interest for his ₱25.5 million BDO check she deposited in her personal
account; and
5. Respondent attended Napoles' parties and was photographed with Senator Estrada and Napoles. 11
Respondent thus stands accused of gross misconduct, partiality and corruption or bribery during the pendency of
the Kevlar case, and impropriety on account of his dealing and socializing with Napoles after her acquittal in the said
case. Additionally, respondent failed to disclose in his September 26, 2013 letter to Chief Justice Sereno that he had
actually visited Napoles at her office in 2012, as he vehemently denied having partied with or attended any social
event hosted by her.
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty,
unlawful behavior, willful in character, improper or wrong behavior; while ·"gross" has been defined as "out of all
measure beyond allowance; flagrant; shameful; such conduct as is not to be excused." We agree with Justice
12
Sandoval-Gutierrez that respondent's association with Napoles during the pendency and after the
promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case resulting in her acquittal, constitutes gross misconduct
notwithstanding the absence of direct evidence of corruption or bribery in the rendition of the said
judgment.
We cannot overemphasize that in administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant
evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, is required. The standard of
substantial evidence is satisfied when there is reasonable ground to believe that respondent is responsible for the
misconduct complained of, even if such evidence might not be overwhelming or even preponderant. 13
The testimonies of Luy and Sula established that Napoles had been in contact with respondent ("nag-uusap sila")
during the pendency of the Kevlar case. As Napoles' trusted staff, they (especially Luy who is a cousin) were privy
to her daily business and personal activities. Napoles constantly updated them of developments regarding the case.
She revealed to them that she has a "connect" or "contact" in the Sandiganbayan who will help "fix" the case
involving her, her mother, brother and some employees. Having closely observed and heard Napoles being
confident that she will be acquitted even prior to the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case, they were
convinced she was indeed in contact with respondent, whose identity was earlier divulged by Napoles to Luy. Luy
categorically testified that Napoles told him she gave money to respondent but did not disclose the amount. There
was no reason for them to doubt Napoles' statement as they even keep a ledger detailing her expenses for the
"Sandiganbayan," which reached Pl 00 million. Napoles' information about her association with respondent was
confirmed when she was eventually acquitted in 2010 and when they saw respondent visit her office and given the
eleven checks issued by Napoles in 2012.
Respondent maintains that the testimonies of Luy and Sula were hearsay as they have no personal knowledge of
the matters they were testifying, which were merely told to them by Napoles. Specifically, he points to portions of
Sula's testimony indicating that Napoles had not just one but "contact persons" in Ombudsman and Sandiganbayan;
hence, it could have been other individuals, not him, who could help Napoles "fix" the Kevlar case, especially since
Napoles never really disclosed to Sula who was her (Napoles) contact at the Sandiganbayan and at one of their
conversations Napoles even supposedly said that respondent's "talent fee" was too high. Bribery is committed when
a public officer agrees to perform an act in connection with the performance of official duties in consideration of any
offer, promise, gift or present received. A judge who extorts money from a party-litigant who has a case before the
14
court commits a serious misconduct and this Court has condemned such act in the strongest possible terms.
Particularly because it has been committed by one charged with the responsibility of administering the law and
rendering justice, it quickly and surely corrodes respect for law and the courts.
15
An accusation of bribery is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove. The complainant must present a panoply of
evidence in support of such an accusation. Inasmuch as what is imputed against the respondent judge connotes a
grave misconduct, the quantum of proof required should be more than substantial. Concededly, the evidence in this
16
case is insufficient to sustain the bribery and corruption charges against the respondent. Both Luy and Sula have
not witnessed respondent actually receiving money from Napoles in exchange for her acquittal in the Kevlar case.
Napoles had confided to Luy her alleged bribe to respondent.
Notwithstanding the absence of direct evidence of any corrupt act by the respondent, we find credible evidence of
his association with Napoles after the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case. The totality of the
circumstances of such association strongly indicates respondent's corrupt inclinations that only heightened the
public's perception of anomaly in the decision-making process. By his act of going to respondent at her office on two
occasions, respondent exposed himself to the suspicion that he was partial to Napoles. That respondent was not
the ponente of the decision which was rendered by a collegial body did not forestall such suspicion of partiality, as
evident from the public disgust generated by the publication of a photograph of respondent together with Napoles
and Senator Jinggoy Estrada. Indeed, the context of the declarations under oath by Luy and Sula before the Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee, taking place at the height of the "Pork Barrel" controversy, made all the difference as
respondent himself acknowledged. Thus, even in the present administrative proceeding, their declarations are taken
in the light of the public revelations of what they know of that government corruption controversy, and how it has
tainted the image of the Judiciary.
The hearsay testimonies of Luy and Sula generated intense public interest because of their close relationship to
Napoles and their crucial participation in her transactions with government officials, dubbed by media as the "Pork
Barrel Queen." But as aptly observed by Justice SandovalGutierrez, the "challenging and difficult setting" of the
Senate hearings where they first testified, made it highly improbable that these whistle blowers would testify against
the respondent. During the investigation of this case, Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez described their manner of testifying
as "candid, straightforward and categorical." She likewise found their testimonies as "instantaneous, clear,
unequivocal, and carried with it the ring of truth," and more important, these are consistent with their previous
testimonies before the Senate; they never wavered or faltered even during cross-examination.
It is a settled rule that the findings of investigating magistrates are generally given great weight by the Court by
reason of their unmatched opportunity to see the deportment of the witnesses as they testified. The rule which
17
concedes due respect, and even finality, to the assessment of credibility of witnesses by trial judges in civil and
criminal cases applies a fortiori to administrative cases. In particular, we concur with Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez's
18
assessment on the credibility of Luy and Sula, and disagree with respondent's claim that these witnesses are simply
telling lies about his association with Napoles.
Contrary to respondent's submission, Sula in her testimony said that whenever Napoles talked about her contacts in
the Ombudsman and Sandiganbayan, they knew that insofar as the Sandiganbayan was concerned, it was
understood that she was referring to respondent even as she may have initially contacted some persons to get to
respondent, and also because they have seen him meeting with Napoles at her office. It appears that Napoles made
statements regarding the Kevlar case not just to Luy but also to the other employees of JLN Corporation. The
following are excerpts from Sula's testimony on direct examination, where she even hinted at their expected
outcome of the Kevlar case:
Atty. Benipayo
Q So, Ms. Sula, what were the statements being made by Ms. Janet Lim Napoles regarding her involvement in the
Kevlar case, or how she was trying to address the problem with the Kevlar case pending before the
Sandiganbayan?
Witness Sula
A Ang alam ko po kasi marami po siyang kinaka-usap na mga lawyers na binabayaran niya para tulungan siya kay
Gregory Ong sa Kevlar case. Tapos, sa kalaunan po, nasabi na niya sa amin na mcron na po siyang nakilala sa
Sandiganbayan na nagngangalang Justice Gregory Ong. Tapos, sabi niya, siya po ang tutulong sa amin para ma-
clear kami. Pero hindi niya sinabi na meron din pong ma ... sasagot sa kaso. Hindi po lahat, kasi po dalawa sa mga
empleyado niya, bale apat, dalawang empleyado niya, isang kapatid niya at sister-in-law ang mag-aano sa kaso
pati yung mother niya na namatay na ay sasagot din sa kaso. Siya Jang at saka yung asawa niya ang bale makli-
clear sa kaso.
Q So, she told you that two (2) employees, one (1) sister-in-law and one brother will answer for the case and Janet
Lim Napoles and her husband will be acquitted, is that right?
A Yun po ang aking pagkaka-alam kasi po, nag-petition po kasi sila eh, yung mga officemates ko. Nagkaroon ng
probation. Noong lumabas ang hatol, meron silang probation period.
xxxx
Q Which you told me that somebody will help in the Kevlar case?
A Opo. Sinabi po niya sa amin everytime po pag nagkukwento siya, sinasabi niya na si Justice Ong ang tutulong sa
kanya para ma-clear po yung Kevlar case niya.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
19
As it turned out, Napoles' husband was dropped from the two informations while her mother, brother and sister-in-
law were convicted in the lesser charge of falsification of public documents. Apparently, after her acquittal, Napoles
helped those convicted secure a probation. But as stated in our earlier resolution, the Court will no longer delve into
the merits of the Kevlar case as the investigation will focus on respondent's administrative liability.
Respondent's act of voluntarily meeting with Napoles at her office on two occasions was grossly improper and
violated Section 1, Canon 4 (Propriety) of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, which took effect on June 1, 2004.
SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.
A judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial and that fraternizing with litigants tarnishes
this appearance. Public confidence in the Judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct of judges. A
20
judge must avoid all impropriety and the appearance thereof. Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge
should freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary
citizen.
21
In Caneda v. Alaan, we held that:

22
Judges are required not only to be impartial but also to appear to be so, for appearance is an essential
manifestation of reality. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to avoid not just impropriety in their
conduct but even the mere appearance of impropriety.
They must conduct themselves in such a manner that they give no ground for reproach. [Respondent's] acts have
been less than circumspect. He should have kept himself free from any appearance of impropriety and endeavored
to distance himself from any act liable to create an impression of indecorum.
xxxx
Indeed, respondent must always bear in mind that:
"A judicial office traces a line around his official as well as personal conduct, a price one has to pay for o ccupying
an exalted position in the judiciary, beyond which he may not freely venture. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct enjoins a judge to avoid not just impropriety in the performance of judicial duties but in all his activities
whether in his public or private life. He must conduct himself in a manner that gives no ground for reproach."
(Emphasis supplied.)
On this score, our previous pronouncements have enjoined judges to avoid association or socializing with persons
who have pending cases before their court. Respondent cites the case of Abundo v. Mania, Jr. where this Court did
23
not find fault with a judge who was charged with fraternizing with his lawyer-friend. In that case, we said:
Respondent admits that he and Atty. Pajarillo became close friends in 1989 when they were both RTC judges
stationed in Naga City. Since they both resided in Camarines Norte, Atty. Pajarillo hitched rides with respondent to
Daet, Camarines Norte in the latter's car.
In his Comment, respondent claims that he leaves the door to his chambers open to lawyers or parties with official
court business, whose requests and complaints regarding their cases he listens to in full view of his staff, who are
witnesses to his transparency and honesty in conducting such dialogues. He also admits that Atty. Pajarillo has
been to his house on several occasions, but only to make emergency long-distance calls to his children in Metro
Manila. He, however, denies that he and Atty. Pajarillo were frequently seen eating and drinking together in public
places.
We agree with Justice Buzon's finding that the evidence against respondent on this point was insufficient, viz.:
"On the other hand, the admission of respondent that he attended two public functions where Atty. Pajarillo was also
present; that Atty. Pajarillo had been in his house twice or thrice and used his telephone; and that he receives
lawyers, including Atty. Pajarillo, and litigants inside his chambers, the door to which is always open so that [the]
staff could see that no under the table transactions are taking place, is not proof that he is fraternizing with Atty.
Pajarillo. A judge need not ignore a former colleague and friend whenever they meet each other or when the latter
makes requests which are not in any manner connected with cases pending in his court. Thus, Canon 30 of the
Canons of Judicial Ethics provides:
'30. Social relations
It is not necessary to the proper performance of judicial duty that judges should live in retirement or seclusion; it is
desirable that, so far as the reasonable attention to the completion of their work will permit, they continue to mingle
in social intercourse, and that they should not discontinue their interests in or appearance at meetings of members
at the bar. A judge should, however, in pending or prospective litigation before him be scrupulously careful to avoid
such action as may reasonably tend to waken the suspicion that his social or business relations or friendships
constitute an element in determining his judicial course.'"
The factual setting in Abundo v. Mania, Jr. is not similar to the present case because Napoles was not a colleague
or lawyer-friend but an accused in a former case before the Sandiganbayan's Fourth Division chaired by respondent
and which acquitted her from malversation charge. What respondent perhaps want to underscore is the caveat for
judges, in pending or prospective litigation before them, to avoid such action as may raise suspicion on their
partiality in resolving or deciding the case. Thus, he emphasized in his Memorandum that he "never knew Napoles
on a personal level while she was still on trial as an accused in Kevlar helmet case." Respondent even quoted
Sula's testimony expressing her opinion that she finds nothing wrong with respondent going to Napoles' office
because at that time, the Kevlar case had already been terminated.
We do not share the view that the rule on propriety was intended to cover only pending and prospective litigations.
Judges must, at all times, be beyond reproach and should avoid even the mere suggestion of partiality and
impropriety. Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct states that "[p ]ropriety and the appearance of propriety
24
are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge." Section 2 further provides:
SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as
burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct
themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
As we held in Sibayan-Joaquin v. Javellana 25
... Judges, indeed, should be extra prudent in associating with litigants and counsel appearing before them so as to
avoid even a mere perception of possible bias or partiality. It is not expected, of course, that judges should live in
retirement or seclusion from any social intercourse. Indeed, it may be desirable, for instance, that they continue,
time and work commitments permitting, to relate to members of the bar in worthwhile endeavors and in such fields
of interest, in general, as are in keeping with the noble aims and objectives of the legal profession. In pending or
prospective litigations before them, however, judges should be scrupulously careful to avoid anything that may tend
to awaken the suspicion that their personal, social or sundry relations could influence their objectivity, for not only
must judges possess proficiency in law but that also they must act and behave in such manner that would assure,
with great comfort, litigants and their counsel of the judges' competence, integrity and independence.
In this light, it does not matter that the case is no longer pending when improper acts were committed by the judge.
Because magistrates are under constant public scrutiny, the termination of a case will not deter public criticisms for
acts which may cast suspicion on its disposition or resolution. As what transpired in this case, respondent's
association with Napoles has unfortunately dragged the Judiciary into the "Pork Barrel" controversy which initially
involved only legislative and executive officials. Worse, Napoles' much-flaunted "contact" in the judiciary is no less
than a Justice of the Sandiganbayan, our special court tasked with hearing graft cases. We cannot, by any stretch of
indulgence and compassion, consider respondent's transgression as a simple misconduct.
During his testimony, respondent acknowledged his violation of judicial ethics and its serious repercussions, as
shown by his answers to the questions from the Investigation Justice, viz: Justice Gutierrez
What I am thinking Justice, as a Justice holding a very high position, could it not be possible for you to just go to the
Church of Quiapo and ask the priest there to help you or assist you, no longer through Ms. Napoles?
Justice Ong
You cannot do that, your honor. Ever since when I was a small boy, I never got near the image of the Mahal na
Poon. Nobody can do that, your honor.
Justice Gutierrez
No, no. What I mean is that you can just go to the priest in Quiapo and make the proper request. Why did you not do
that?
Justice Ong
I don't know, your honor.
Justice Gutierrez
Because you have been suffering from that ailment, mass or whatever, and that you are a devotee of the Black
Nazarene. You could have gone to the Office of the priest there and had that request for you to wear that robe of the
Black Nazarene?
Justice Ong
Hindi ko po alam na may ganyan, your honor. I was only told by Napoles during that conversation. Had I known that,
siguro po pwede ko pong gawin. Had I known that there is such a robe, maybe I will do that.
Justice Gutierrez
Okay. It happened already. But just to thank Ms. Napoles, I think Justice you should have been very, very careful
about your actuations. You should not have been seen in public, you know, with a woman like her who was an
accused before. You could have thanked her simply by calling her. You could have relayed to her your true feelings
that you are so grateful because of her assistance. Were it not for her, you could not have worn that Holy Robe of
the Black Nazarene. You could have simply called her instead of going to her office; instead of, you know, going to
the Church of Santuario de San Antonio in Forbes Park. And you should have been more careful not to be seen by
the public with her considering that she was a former accused in that case.
Justice Ong
I will heed to that advice, your honor.
Justice Gutierrez
Q And you admitted a while ago, during the interview conducted by Mr. Aries Rufo that. "That is a lesson for me;
that I should not have associated, you know, with a former respondent or accused in a case before me." You
admitted that? You said you learned you lesson. Was that the first time you learned that kind of lesson, Mr. Justice?
Or even before you took your oath as a member of the Judiciary, you already knew that lesson, isn't it or was that
the first time? That is why you associated yourself with Senator Jinggoy Estrada who was accused before of
plunder?
Justice Ong
Your honor, talking about ....
Justice Gutierrez
Q Do you admit you committed a lapse along that line?
Justice Ong
A Yes, your honor. You have to forgive me for that. (Emphasis supplied.)
26
In her report, Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez noted that respondent's purported reason for visiting Napoles in her office
remains uncorroborated, as Napoles and the Quiapo parish priest were not presented as witnesses despite her
suggestion to respondent and his counsel. On the other hand, Luy's testimony on what transpired in one of
respondent's meeting with Napoles at her office appears to be the more plausible and truthful version. Expectedly,
respondent denied having issued a BDO check for ₱25 .5 million as claimed by Luy, and asserted he (respondent)
did not deposit any money to AFPSLAI. Unfortunately, Luy is unable to present documentary evidence saying that,
as previously testified by him before the Senate, most of the documents in their office were shredded upon orders of
Napoles when the "Pork Barrel Scam" controversy came out.
Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez stated that the eleven checks of ₱282,000.00 supposed advance interest for
respondent's check deposit to AFPSLAI were given to respondent as consideration for the favorable ruling in the
Kevlar case. Such finding is consistent with Luy's testimony that Napoles spent a staggering PlOO million just to
1âwphi1
"fix" the said case. Under the circumstances, it is difficult to believe that respondent went to Napoles office the
second time just to have coffee. Respondent's act of again visiting Napoles at her office, after he had supposedly
merely thanked her during the first visit, tends to support Luy's claim that respondent had a financial deal with
Napoles regarding advance interest for AFPSLAI deposit. The question inevitably arises as to why would Napoles
extend such an accommodation to respondent if not as consideration for her acquittal in the Kevlar case?
Respondent's controversial photograph alone had raised adverse public opinion, with the media speculating on pay-
offs taking place in the courts.
Regrettably, the conduct of respondent gave cause for the public in general to doubt the honesty and fairness of his
participation in the Kevlar case and the integrity of our courts of justice. Before this Court, even prior to the
commencement of administrative investigation, respondent was less than candid. In his letter to the Chief Justice
where he vehemently denied having attended parties or social events hosted by Napoles, he failed to mention that
he had in fact visited Napoles at her office. Far from being a plain omission, we find that respondent deliberately did
not disclose his social calls to Napoles. It was only when Luy and Sula testified before the Senate and named him
as the "contact" of Napoles in the Sandiganbayan, that respondent mentioned of only one instance he visited
Napoles ("This is the single occasion that Sula was talking about in her supplemental affidavit x x x." ).
27
The Court finds that respondent, in not being truthful on crucial matters even before the administrative complaint
was filed against him motu proprio, is guilty of Dishonesty, a violation of Canon 3 (Integrity) of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct.
Dishonesty is a "disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty,
probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or
betray." Dishonesty, being a grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture
28
of retirement benefits except accrued leave credits, and with perpetual disqualification from reemployment in
government service. Indeed, dishonesty is a malevolent act that has no place in the Judiciary. 29
Under Section 11(A), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, a respondent found guilty of a serious charge may be
penalized as follows:
SEC. 11. Sanctions. - A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be
imposed:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including governmentowned or -
controlled corporations. Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued
leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6)
months; or
3. A fine of more than ₱20,000.00 but not exceeding ₱40,000.00. Considering that respondent is not a first
time offender and the charges of gross misconduct and dishonesty are both grave offenses showing his
unfitness to remain as a magistrate of the special graft court, we deem it proper to impose the supreme
penalty of dismissal.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong GUILTY of GROSS
MISCONDUCT, DISHONESTY and IMPROPRIETY, all in violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary, for which he is hereby DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits,
except accrued leave credits, if any, and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch, agency or instrumentality of
the government including government-owned or -controlled corporations.
This Decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
2.) A. July 19, 2016
G.R. No. 220598
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, Petitioner,
vs
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division), Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 220953
BENIGNO B. AGUAS, Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division), Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
We resolve the consolidated petitions for certiorari separately brought to assail and annul the resolutions issued on
April 6, 2015 and September 10, 2015, whereby the Sandiganbayan respectively denied their demurrer to
1 2
evidence, and their motions for reconsideration, asserting such denials to be tainted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Antecedents
On July 10, 2012, the Ombudsman charged in the Sandiganbayan former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
(GMA); Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) Budget and Accounts Officer Benigno Aguas; PCSO
General Manager and Vice Chairman Rosario C. Uriarte; PCSO Chairman of the Board of Directors Sergio 0.
Valencia; Members of the PCSO Board of Directors, namely: Manuel L. Morato, Jose R. Taruc V, Raymundo T.
Roquero, and Ma. Fatima A.S. Valdes; Commission on Audit (COA) Chairman Reynaldo A. Villar; and COA Head of
Intelligence/Confidential Fund Fraud Audit Unit Nilda B. Plaras with plunder. The case was docketed as Criminal
Case No. SB-12-CRM-O 174 and assigned to the First Division of the Sandiganbayan.
The information reads:

3
The undersigned Assistant Ombudsman and Gratl Investigation and Prosecution Officer III, Office of the
Ombudsman, hereby accuse GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ROSARIO C. URIARTE, SERGIO O. VALENCIA,
MANUEL L. MORA TO, JOSE R. TARUC V, RAYMUNDO T. ROQUERO, MA. FATIMA A.S. V ALOES, BENIGNO
B. AGUAS, REYNALDO A. VILLAR and NILDA B. PLARAS, of the crime of PLUNDER, as defined by, and
penalized under Section 2 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7080, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, committed, as follows:
That during the period from January 2008 to June 2010 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused GLORIA MA CAP A GAL-ARROYO, then
the President of the Philippines, ROSARIO C. URIARTE, then General Manager and Vice Chairman, SERGIO O.
VALENCIA, then Chairman of the Board of Directors, MANUEL L. MORA TO, JOSE R. TARUC V, RAYMUNDO T.
ROQUERO, MA. FATIMA A.S. V ALOES, then members of the Board of Directors, BENIGNO B. AGUAS, then
Budget and Accounts Manager, all of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO), REYNALDO A. VILLAR,
then Chairman, and NILDA B. PLARAS, then Head of Intelligence/Confidential Fund Fraud Audit Unit, both of the
Commission on Audit, all public officers committing the offense in relation to their respective offices and taking
undue advantage of their respective official positions, authority, relationships, connections or influence, conniving,
conspiring and confederating with one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass,
accumulate and/or acquire. Directly or indirectly, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or total value of THREE
HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE MILLION NINE HUNDRED NINETY SEVEN THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED FIFTEEN
PESOS (PHP365,997,915.00), more or less, through any or a combination or a series of overt or criminal acts, or
similar schemes or means, described as follows:
(a) diverting in several instances, funds from the operating budget of PCSO to its Confidential/Intelligence
Fund that could be accessed and withdrawn at any time with minimal restrictions, and converting, misusing,
and/or illegally conveying or transferring the proceeds drawn from said fund in the aforementioned sum, also
in several instances, to themselves, in the guise of fictitious expenditures, for their personal gain and benefit;
(b) raiding the public treasury by withdrawing and receiving, in several instances, the above-mentioned
amount from the Confidential/Intelligence Fund from PCSO's accounts, and or unlawfully transferring or
conveying the same into their possession and control through irregularly issued disbursement vouchers and
fictitious expenditures; and
(c) taking advantage of their respective official positions, authority, relationships, connections or influence, in
several instances, to unjustly enrich themselves in the aforementioned sum, at the expense of, and the
damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
By the end of October 2012, the Sandiganbayan already acquired jurisdiction over GMA, Valencia, Morato and
Aguas. Plaras, on the other hand, was able to secure a temporary restraining order (TRO) from this Court in Plaras
v. Sandiganbayan docketed as G.R. Nos. 203693-94. Insofar as Roquero is concerned,
the Sandiganbayan acquired jurisdiction as to him by the early part of 2013. Uriarte and Valdes remained at large.
Thereafter, several of the accused separately filed their respective petitions for bail. On June 6, 2013,
the Sandiganbayan granted the petitions for bail of Valencia, Morato and Roquero upon finding that the evidence of
guilt against them was not strong. In the case of petitioners GMA and Aguas, the Sandiganbayan, through the
4
resolution dated November 5, 2013, denied their petitions for bail on the ground that the evidence of guilt against
them was strong. The motions for reconsideration filed by GMA and Aguas were denied by the Sandiganbayan on
5
February 19, 2014. Accordingly, GMA assailed the denial of her petition for bail in this Court, but her challenge has
6
remained pending and unresolved todate.
Personal jurisdiction over Taruc and Villar was acquired by the Sandiganbayan in 2014. Thereafter, said accused
sought to be granted bail, and their motions were granted on different dates, specifically on March 31, 2014 and
7
May 9, 2014, respectively.

8
The case proceeded to trial, at which the State presented Atty. Aleta Tolentino as its main witness against all the
accused. The Sandiganbayan rendered the following summary of her testimony and evidence in its resolution dated
November 5, 2013 denying the petitions for bail of GMA and Aguas, to wit:
She is a certified public accountant and a lawyer. She is a member of the Philippine Institute of Certified Public
Accountants and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. She has been a CPA for 30 years and a lawyer for 20 years.
She has practiced accountancy and law. She became accounting manager of several companies. She has also
taught subjects in University of Santo Tomas, Manuel L. Quezon University, Adamson University and the Ateneo de
Manila Graduate School. She currently teaches Economics, Taxation and Land Reform.
Presently, she is a Member of the Board of Directors of the PCSO. The Board appointed her as Chairman of an
Audit Committee. The audit review proceeded when she reviewed the COA Annual Reports of the PCSO for 2006
2007 2008 and 2009 (Exhibits "D" "E" "F" and "G" respectively), and the annual financial statements contained
therein for the years 2005 to 2009. The reports were given to them by the COA. These are transmitted to the PCSO
annually after the subject year of audit.
One of her major findings was that the former management of the PCSO was commingling the charity fund, the
prize fund and the operating fund. By commingling she means that the funds were maintained in only one main
account. This violates Section 6 of Republic Act 1169 (PCSO Charter) and generally accepted accounting
principles.
The Audit Committee also found out that there was excessive disbursement of the Confidential and Intelligence
Fund (CIF). There were also excessive disbursements for advertising expenses. The internal audit department was
also merged with the budget and accounting department, which is a violation of internal audit rules.
There was excessive disbursement of the CIF because the PCSO was given only P10 million in 2002, i.e. P5 million
for the Office of the Chairman and P5 million for the Office of the General Manager. Such allocation was based on
the letters of then Chairman Lopez (Exh. "I") and then General Manager Golpeo (Exh. "J"), asking for P5 million
intelligence fund each. Both were dated February 21, 2000, and sent to then President Estrada, who approved
them. This allocation should have been the basis for the original allocation of the CIF in the PCSO, but there were
several subsequent requests made by the General Manager during the time of, and which were approved by, former
President Arroyo.
The allocation in excess of P10 million was in violation of the PCSO Charter. PCSO did not have a budget for this.
They were working on a deficit from 2004 to 2009. The charter allows only 15% of the revenue as operating fund,
which was already exceeded. The financial statements indicate that they were operating on a deficit in the years
2006 to 2009.
It is within the power of the General Manager to ask for additional funds from the President, but there should be a
budget for it. The CIF should come from the operating fund, such that, when there is no more operating fund, the
other funds cannot be used.
The funds were maintained in a commingled main account and PCSO did not have a registry of budget utilization.
The excess was not taken from the operating fund, but from the prize fund and the charity fund.
In 2005, the deficit was P916 million; in 2006, Pl,000,078,683.23. One of the causes of the deficit for 2006 was the
CIF expense of P215 million, which was in excess of the approved allocation of P10 million. The net cash provided
by operating expenses in 2006 is negative, which means that there were more expenses than what was received.
In the 2007 COA report, it was found that there was still no deposit to the prize and charity funds. The COA made a
recommendation regarding the deposits in one main account. There were also excessive disbursements of CIF
amounting to P77,478,705.
She received a copy of the PCSO corporate operating budget (COB) for the year 2008 in 2010 because she was
already a member of its Board of Directors. The 2008 approved COB has a comparative analysis of the actual
budget for 2007 (Exh. "K"). It is stated there that the budget for CTF in 2007 is only P25,480,550. But the financial
statements reflect P77 million. The budget was prepared and signed by then PCSO General Manager Rosario
Uriarte. It had accompanying Board Resolution No. 305, Series of 2008, which was approved by then Chairperson
Valencia, and board members Valdes, Morato, Domingo, and attested to by Board Secretary Atty. Ronald T. Reyes.
In the 2008 COA report, it was noted that there was still no deposit to the prize and charity funds, adverted in the
2007 COA report. There was already a recommendation by the COA to separate the deposits or funds in 2007. But
the COA noted that this was not followed. The financial statements show the Confidential and the Extra-Ordinary
Miscellaneous Expenses account is P38,293,137, which is more than the P10 million that was approved.
In the Comparative Income Statement (Exh. "K"), the 2008 Confidential/Intelligence Expense budget was approved
for P28 million. The Confidential and Extra-Ordinary Miscellaneous Expenses is the account being used for
confidential and intelligence expenses. The amount in the financial statements is over the budgeted amount of P28
million. Further, the real disbursement is more than that, based on a summary of expenditures she had asked the
treasurer to prepare.
In the Comparative Income Statement for 2009 Budget against the 2008 Actual Budget (Exh. "L"), the budget for
CIF and expenses was P60 million.
In the 2009 COA report, it was noted that there was still no deposit to the prize and charity funds, despite the
instruction or recommendation of COA. The funds were still deposited in one account. The COA observation in 2007
states that there is juggling or commingling of funds.
After she had concluded the audit review, she reported her findings to the Board of Directors in one of their
executive meetings. The Board instructed her to go in-depth in the investigation of the disbursements of CIF.
The Audit Committee also asked Aguas why there were disbursements in excess of P10 million. He explained that
there were board resolutions confirming additional CIF which were approved by former President Arroyo. Aguas
mentioned this in one of their meetings with the directors and corporate secretary. The board secretary, Atty. Ed
Araullo, gave them the records of those resolutions.
In the records that Araullo submitted to her, it appears that Uriarte would ask for additional CIF, by letter and
President Arroyo approves it by affixing her signature on that same letter-request. There were seven letters or
memoranda to then President Arroyo, with the subject "Request for Intelligence Fund."
She then asked their Treasurer, Mercy Hinayon, to give her a summary of all the disbursements from CIF from 2007
to 2010. The total of all the amounts in the summaries for three years is P365,997,915.
After receiving the summaries of the disbursed checks, she asked Hinayon to give her the checks or copies thereof.
She also asked Dorothy Robles, Budget and Accounting Manager, to give her the corresponding vouchers. Only
two original checks were given to her, as the rest were with the bank. She asked her to request certified true copies
of the checks.
They were then called to the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, which was then investigating the operation of PCSO,
including the CIF. She was invited as a resource speaker in an invitation from Chairman Teofisto Guingona III (Exh.
"DD"). Before the hearing, the Committee Chairman went to the PCSO and got some documents regarding the
subject matter being investigated. Araullo was tasked to prepare all the documents needed by the Committee.
These documents included the CIF summary of disbursements, letters of Uriarte and the approval of the former
president.
She attended whenever there were committee hearings. Among those who also attended were the incoming
members if the PCSO Board Directors and the directors. Accused Valencia and Aguas were also present in some
hearings as resources speakers. They were invited in connection with the past disbursements of PCSO related to
advertising expenses, CIF, vehicles for the bishops, and the commingling of funds.
The proceedings in the Committee were recorded and she secured a copy of the transcript of stenographic notes
from the Office of the Blue Ribbon Committee. In the proceeding on June 7, 2011 (Exh. ''EE"), Uriarte testified. The
witness was about two to three meters away from Uriarte when the latter testified, and using a microphone.
According to the witness, Uriarte testified that all the confidential intelligence projects she had proposed were
approved by President Arroyo; all the requests she gave to the President were approved and signed by the latter
personally in her (Uriarte's) presence; and all the documents pertaining to the CIF were submitted to President
Arroyo. On the other hand, Valencia and Taruc said they did not know about the projects. Statements before the
Committee are under oath.
After the Committee hearings, she then referred to the laws and regulations involved to check whether the
disbursements were in accordance with law. One of the duties and responsibilities of the audit committee was to
verify compliance with the laws.
She considered the following laws: R.A. 1169, as amended (PCSO Charter); P.D. 1445 (COA Code); LOI 1282;
COA Circular 92-385, as amended by Circular 2003-002, which provides the procedure for approval of
disbursements and liquidation of confidential intelligence funds. She made a handwritten flowchart (Exh. "II") of the
allocations/disbursements/liquidation and audit of the CIF, based on LOI 1282 and the COA Circulars. A digital
presentation of this flowchart was made available.
The first step is the provision or allotment of a budget because no CIF fund can be disbursed without the allocation.
This is provided in the second whereas clause of Circular 92-385. For GOCCs, applying Circular 2003-002, there
must be allocation or budget for the CIF and it should be specifically in the corporate operating budget or would be
taken from savings authorized by special provisions.
This was not followed in the PCSO CIF disbursement in 2008. The disbursement for that year was P86,555,060.
The CIF budget for that year was only P28 million, and there were no savings because they were on deficit. This
was also not followed for the year 2009. The CIF disbursement for that year was P139,420,875. But the CIF budget
was only P60 million, and there was also no savings, as they were in deficit. For the year 2010, the total
disbursement, as of June 2010, was P141,021,980. The budget was only P60 million.
The requirements in the disbursement of the CIF are the budget and the approval of the President. If the budget is
correct, the President will approve the disbursement or release of the CIF. In this case, the President approved the
release of the fund without a budget and savings. Also, the President approved the same in violation of LOI 1282,
because there were no detailed specific project proposals and specifications accompanying the request for
additional CIF. The requests for the year 2008, 2009 and 2010 were uniform and just enumerated the purposes, not
projects. They did not contain what was required in the LOI.
The purpose of this requirement is stated in the LOI itself. The request for allocations must contain full details and
specific purposes for which the fund will be used. A detailed presentation is made to avoid duplication of
expenditures, as what had happened in the past, because of a lack of centralized planning and organization or
intelligence fund.
There was no reason for each additional intelligence fund that was approved by then President Arroyo.
The third step is the designation of the disbursing officer. In this case, the Board of Directors designated Uriarte as
Special Disbursing Officer (SDO) for the portion of the CIF that she withdrew. For the portion withdrawn by Valencia,
there was no special disbursing officer designated on record.
The designation of Uriarte was in violation of internal control which is the responsibility of the department head, as
required by Section 3 of Circular 2003-002. When she went through copies of the checks and disbursement
vouchers submitted to her, she found out that Uriarte was both the SDO and the authorized officer to sign the
vouchers and checks. She was also the payee of the checks. All the checks withdrawn by Uriarte were paid to her
and she was also the signatory of the checks.
Aside from Uriarte, Valencia also disbursed funds in the CIF. For the funds withdrawn by Valencia, he was also the
authorized officer to sign the vouchers and checks. He was also the payee of the checks.
The confidential funds were withdrawn through cash advance. She identified the vouchers and checks pertaining to
the disbursements made by Uriarte and Valencia in 2008, 2009 and 2010.
The checks of Uriarte and Valencia had the treasurer as cosignatory. The treasurer who signed depends on when
the checks were issued
She knows the signatures of Uriarte, Valencia and Aguas because they have their signatures on the records.
Uriarte and Valencia signed the vouchers to certify to the necessity and legality of the vouchers; they also signed to
approve the same, signify they are "okay" for payment and claim the amount certified and approved as payee.
Gloria P. Araullo signed as releasing officer, giving the checks to the claimants.
Accused Aguas signed the vouchers to certify that there are adequate funds and budgetary allotment, that the
expenditures were properly certified and supported by documents, and that the previous cash advances were
liquidated and accounted for. This certification means that the cash advance voucher can be released. This is
because the COA rule on cash advance is that before any subsequent cash advance is released, the previous cash
advance must be liquidated first. This certification allowed the requesting party and payee to get the cash advance
from the voucher. Without this certification, Uriarte and Valencia could not have been able to get the cash advance.
Otherwise, it was a violation of P.D. 1445 (Government Auditing Code).
The third box in the flowchart is the designation of the SDO. Board Resolutions No. 217, Series of2009 (Exh."M"),
No. 2356, Series of 2009 (Exh."N"), and No. 029, Series of 2010 (Exh. "O"), resolved to designate Uriarte as SDO
for the CIF. These resolutions were signed and approved by Valencia, Taruc, Valdes, Uriarte, Roquero and Morato.
The witness is familiar with these persons' signature because their signatures appear on PCSO official records.
Valencia designated himself as SDO upon the recommendation of COA Auditor Plaras. There was no board
resolution for this designation. There was just a certification dated February 2, 2009 (Exh. "Z 4"). This certification
was signed by Valencia himself and designates himself as the SDO since he is personally taking care of the funds
which are to be handled with utmost confidentiality. The witness is familiar with Valencia's signature because it
appears on PCSO official documents. Under COA rules, the Board of Directors has authority to designate the SDO.
The chairman could not do this by himself.
Plaras wrote a letter dated December 15, 2008 to Valencia. It appears in the letter that to substantiate the liquidation
report, Plaras told Valencia to designate himself as SDO because there was no disbursing officer. It was the
suggestion of Plaras. Plaras is the head of the CIF Unit under then COA Chairman Villar. Liquidation vouchers and
supporting papers were submitted to them, with corresponding fidelity bond.
COA Circulars 92-385 and 2003-002 indicate that to disburse CIF, one must be a special disbursing officer or SDO.
All disbursing officers of the government must have fidelity bonds. The bond is to protect the government from and
answer for misappropriation that the disbursing officer may do. The bond amount required is the same as the
amount that may be disbursed by the officer. It is based on total accountability and not determined by the head of
the agency as a matter of discretion. The head determines the accountability which will be the basis of the bond
amount.
The Charter states that the head of the agency is the Board of Directors, headed by the Chairman. But now, under
the Governance of Government Corporation law, it is the general manager.
Plaras should have disallowed or suspended the cash advances because there was no fidelity bond and the
disbursing officer was not authorized. There was no bond put up for Valencia. The records show that the bond for
Uriarte was only for the amount of Pl.5 million. This is shown in a letter dated August 23, 2010, to COA Chairman
Villar through Plaras from Aguas (Exh. "B5"), with an attachment from the Bureau of Treasury, dated March 2, 2009.
It appears there that the bond for Uriarte for the CIF covering the period February 2009 to February 2010 was only
Pl.5 million.
Aguas submitted this fidelity bond certification, which was received on August 24, 2010, late, because under the
COA Circulars, it should have been submitted when the disbursing officer was designated. It should have been
submitted to COA because a disbursing officer cannot get cash advances if they do not have a fidelity bond.
Once an SDO is designated, the specimen signature must be submitted to COA, together with the fidelity bond and
the signatories for the cash advances.
The approval of the President pertains to the release of the budget, not its allocation. She thinks the action of the
Board was done because there was no budget. The Board's confirmation was needed because it was in excess of
the budget that was approved. They were trying to give a color of legality to them approval of the CIF in excess of
the approved corporate operating budget. The Board approval was required for the amount to be released, which
amount was approved in excess of the allotted budget for the year. The President cannot approve an additional
amount, unless there is an appropriation or a provision saying a particular savings will be used for the CIF. The
approvals here were all in excess of the approved budget.
Cash advances can be given on a per project basis for CIF. For one to get a cash advance, one must state what the
project is as to that cash advance. No subsequent cash advance should be given, until previous cash advances
have been liquidated and accounted for. If it is a continuing project, monthly liquidation reports must be given. The
difference in liquidation process between CIF and regular cash advances is that for CIF, the liquidation goes to the
Chair and not to the resident auditor of the agency or the GOCC. All of the liquidation papers should go to the COA
Chair, given on a monthly basis.
In this case, the vouchers themselves are couched generally and just say cash advance from CIF of the Chairman
or from the GM's office in accordance with her duties. There is no particular project indicated for the cash advance.
Also, the requirement that prior advances be liquidated first for subsequent advances to be given was not followed.
The witness prepared a summary of the cash advances withdrawn by the two disbursing officers covering the years
2008, 2009 and 2010 (Exh. "D5"). The basis for this summary is the record submitted to them by Aguas, which were
supposedly submitted to COA. It shows that there were subsequent cash advances, even if a prior advance has not
yet been liquidated. Valencia submitted liquidation reports to Villar, which consists of a letter, certification and
schedule of cash advances, and liquidation reports. One is dated July 24, 2008 (Exh. "G 5") and another is dated
February 13, 2009 (Exh. "H5").
When she secured Exhibit "G5", together with the attached documents, she did not find any supporting documents
despite the statement in Exhibit "G5" that the supporting details of the expenses that were incurred from the fund can
be made available, if required. Aguas, the person who processed the cash advances said he did not have the
details or suppmiing details of documents of the expenditures.
Normally, when liquidating CIF, the certification of the head of the agency is necessary. If there were vouchers or
receipts involved, then all these should be attached to the liquidation report. There should also be an
accomplishment report which should be done on a monthly basis. All of these should be enclosed in a sealed
envelope and sent to the Chairman of the COA, although the agency concerned must retain a photocopy of the
documents. The report should have a cover/transmittal letter itemizing the documents, as well as liquidation
vouchers and other supporting papers. If the liquidation voucher and the supporting papers are in order, then the
COA Chairman or his representative shall issue a credit memorandum. Supporting papers consist of receipts and
sales invoices. The head of the agency would have to certify that those were all actually incurred and are legal. In
this case, there were no supporting documents submitted with respect to Valencia's cash advances in 2008. Only
the certifications by the SDO were submitted. These certifications stated that he has the documents in his custody
and they can be made available, if and when necessary.
When she reviewed the CIF, she asked Aguas to produce the supporting documents which were indicated in
Valencia's certification and Aguas's own certification in the cash advance vouchers, where he also certified that the
documents supporting the cash advance were in their possession and that there was proper liquidation. Aguas
replied that he did not have them.
She identified the letter of Uriarte to Villar dated July 24, 2008 as well as a transmittal letter by Uriarte for August 1,
2008, a certification and schedule of cash advances and an undetailed liquidation report. Among the attachments is
Board Resolution 305, a copy of the COB for 2008, a document for the second half of 2008, a document dated April
2, 2009, and a document for liquidation of P2,295,000. She also identified another letter for P50 million, dated
February 13, 2009, attached to the transmittal letter. There is a certification attached to those two letters amounting
to P2,295,000. Also attached is the schedule of cash advances by Aguas and a liquidation report where Aguas
certified that the supporting documents are complete and proper although the supporting documents and papers are
not attached to the liquidation report, only the general statement. These documents were submitted to them by
Aguas.
She was shown the four liquidation reports (Exhibits "M5", "N5", "05" and "P5") attached to the transmittal letter and
was asked whether they were properly and legally accomplished. She replied that they were couched in general
terms and the voucher for which the cash advance was liquidated is not indicated and only the voucher number is
specified. She adds that the form of the liquidation is correct, but the details are not there and neither are the
supporting papers.
The liquidation report was dated July 24, 2008, but it was submitted only on August 1, 2008 to COA, and it
supposedly covered the cash advances of Uriarte from January to May 2008. This is stated in her summary of
liquidation that was earlier marked. There were no supporting papers stated on or attached to the liquidation report.
She identified a set of documents to liquidate the cash advances from the CIF for the second semester of 2008 by
Uriarte. The transmittal letter of Uriarte was received by the COA on April 2, 2009. Upon inquiry with Aguas, he said
that he did not have any of the supporting papers that he supposedly had according to the certification. According to
him, they are with Uriarte. Uriarte, on the other hand, said, during the Senate hearing, that she gave them to
President Arroyo.
When Plaras wrote Valencia on December 15, 2008, Aguas wrote back on behalf of Valencia, who had designated
himself as SDO. However, their designations, or in what capacity they signed the voucher are not stated. Among the
attachments is also a memorandum dated April 2, 2008 (Exhibit "P 5"), containing the signature of Arroyo, indicating
her approval to the utilization of funds. Another memorandum, dated August 13, 2008, indicating the approval of
Arroyo was also attached to the transmittal letter of Aguas on April 4, 2009. These two memoranda bear the
reasons for the cash advances, couched in general terms. The reasons were donated medicines that were sold and
authorized expenditures on endowment fund. The reasons stated in the memoranda are practically the same.
Uriarte did not submit any accomplishment reports regarding the intelligence fund. Aguas submitted an
accomplishment report, but the accomplishments were not indicated in definite fashion or with specificity.
The witness narrated, based on her Summary of Liquidation Reports in 2009, that the total cash advance made by
Uriarte was P132,760,096. Arroyo approved P90 million for release. P10 million in January 2009 and April 27, 2009,
and then P50 million in May 6, 2009.In July 2, 2009, P10 million or a total of P70 million. In October 2009, P20
million or a total of P90 million. The amount that was cash advanced by Valencia was P5,660,779. Therefore, the
total cash advances by these two officials were P138,420,875, but all of these were never liquidated in 2009. Uriarte
and Valencia only submitted a liquidation voucher and a report to COA on April I2, 2010. For the January 22, 2009
disbursements, the date of the liquidation voucher was June 30, 2009, but it was submitted to COA on April 12,
2010. Witness identified the transmittal letter for P28 million by Uriarte, dated October 19, 2009, which was received
by the COA only on April 12, 2010, with an accompanying certification from Uriarte as to some of the documents
from which the witness's Summary of Liquidation was based.
The cash advances made by Uriarte and Valencia violated par. I, Sec. 4 and Sec. 84 of P.D. I445 and par. 2, III,
COA Circular No. 92-385.
Since these cash advances were in excess of the appropriation, in effect, they were disbursed without any
appropriation. These cash advances were also made without any specific project, in violation of par. 2 of COA
Circular No. 92-385. In this case, the cash advances were not for a specific project. The vouchers only indicate the
source of the fund. The vouchers did not specify specific projects.
The total cash advances for the years 2008, 2009 and 2010 to accused Uriarte and Valencia is more than
P366,000,000. Valencia cash advanced PI 3.3 million. The rest was made by Uriarte.
The memoranda to President Arroyo stated only the problems encountered by the PCSO. These problems, as
stated in each memorandum, included donated medicines sometimes ending up in store for sale, unofficial use of
ambulances, rise of expenditures of endowment fund, lotto sweepstakes scams, fixers for programs of the PCSO,
and other fraudulent schemes. No projects were mentioned.
As regards the sixth step - the credit notice, the same was not validly issued by the COA. The credit notice is a
settlement or an action made by the COA Auditors and is given once the Chairman, in the case of CIF Fund, finds
that the liquidation report and all the supporting papers are in order. In this case, the supporting papers and the
liquidation report were not in order, hence, the credit notice should not have been issued. Further, the credit notice
has to follow a specific form. The COA Chairman or his representative can: 1) settle the cash advance when
everything is in order; 2) suspend the settlement if there are deficiencies and then ask for submission of the
deficiencies; or 3) out rightly disallow it in case said cash advances are illegal, irregular or unconscionable,
extravagant or excessive. Instead of following this form, the COA issued a document dated January 10, 2011, which
stated that there is an irregular use of the price fund and the charity fund for CIF Fund. The document bears an
annotation which says, "wait for transmittal, draft" among others. The document was not signed by Plaras, who was
the Head of the Confidential and Intelligence Fund Unit under COA Chairman Villar. Instead, she instructed her staff
to "please ask Aguas to submit the supplemental budget." This document was not delivered to PCSO General
Manager J.M. Roxas. They instead received another letter dated January 13, 2011 which was almost identical to the
first document, except it was signed by Plaras, and the finding of the irregular use of the prize fund and the charity
fund was omitted. Instead, the work "various" was substituted and then the amount of P137,5000,000. Therefore,
instead of the earlier finding of irregularity, suddenly, the COA issued a credit notice as regards the total of
P140,000,000. The credit notice also did not specify that the transaction had been audited, indicating that no audit
was made.
A letter dated May 11, 2009 from the COA and signed by Plaras, states that the credit notice is hereby issued. Thus,
it is equivalent to the credit notice, although it did not come in the required form. It merely stated that the credit
notice is issued for P29,700,000, without specifying for which vouchers and for which project the credit notice was
being given. It merely says "First Semester of 2008". In other words, it is a "global" credit notice that she issued and
it did not state that she made an audit.
Another letter, dated July 14, 2010 and signed by Plaras, supposedly covers all the cash advances in 2009, but only
up to the amount of P116,386,800. It also did not state that an audit was made.
There were no supporting papers attached to the voucher, and the certification issued is not in conformity with the
required certification by COA Circular 2003-002. The certification dated July 24, 2008 by Valencia was not in
conformity with the certification required by COA. The required form should specify the project for which the
certification was being issued, and file code of the specific project. The certification dated July 24, 2008, however,
just specified that it was to certify that the P2 million from the 2008 CIF Fund was incurred by the undersigned, in
the exercise of his functions as PCSO Chairman for the various projects, projects and activities related to the
operation of the office, and there was no specific project or program or file code of the intelligence fund, as required
by COA. Furthermore, the certification also did not contain the last paragraph as required by COA. Instead, the
following was stated in the certification: "He further certifies that the details and supporting documents and papers
on these highly confidential missions and assignments are in our custody and kept in our confidential file which can
be made available if circumstances so demand." No details or supporting documents were reviewed by the witness,
and though she personally asked Aguas, the latter said that he did not have the supporting papers, and they were
not in the official files of the PCSO. Two people should have custody of the papers, namely, The Chairman of COA
and the PCSO or its Special Disbursing Officer. The witness asked Aguas because Valencia was not there, and also
because Aguas was the one who made the certification and was in-charge of accounting. The vouchers, supposedly
certified by Aguas, as Budget and Accounting Department Manager, each time cash advances were issued, stated
that the supporting documents are complete, so the witness went to him to procure the documents.
A certification dated February 13, 2009, stating that P2,857,000 was incurred by Valencia in the exercise of his
function as PCSO Chairman, related to the operations of his office without the specific intelligence project. In the
same document, there is a certification similar to one in the earlier voucher. No details of this certification were
submitted by Aguas.
Another certification dated July 24, 2008 was presented, and it also did not specify the intelligence and confidential
project, and it did not contain any certification that the amount was disbursed legally or that no benefits was given to
any person. Similarly, the fourth paragraph of the same document states that Uriarte certified that details and
supporting papers of the cash advance that she made of P27,700,000 are "kept in their confidential" (sic). The same
were not in the PCSO official records.
The certification dated October 19, 2009 for the amount of P2,498,300, was submitted to the witness by Aguas. It
also did not conform to the COA requirements, as it also did not specify the use of the cash advance, did not contain
any certification that the cash advance was incurred for legal purposes, or that no benefits to other people were paid
out of it. Again, no supporting documents were found and none were given by Aguas. Similarly, a certification dated
February 8, 2010 for the amount of P2,394,654 was presented, and it also does not conform with the COA circular,
as it only stated that the amount was spent or incurred by Valencia for projects covering the period of July 1 to
December 31, 2009 to exercise his function as PCSO Chairman, thus no particular intelligence fund or project was
stated. As in the other certifications, though it was stated that the details were in the confidential file, it appeared that
these were not in the possession of PCSO. Another certification dated October 19, 2009 submitted by Uriarte was
examined by the witness in the course of her audit, and found that it also did not conform to the requirements, as it
only stated that the P25 million and P10 million intelligence and confidential fund dated January 29, 2009 and April
27, 2009 were used in the exercise of her function as PCSO Vice Chairman and General Manager.
All the documents were furnished by Aguas during the course of the audit of the financial transactions of PCSO.
Other documents given by Aguas include a letter by Valencia to COA Chairman Villar, which was attached to the
letter dated July 24, 2008. For the Certification issued by Valencia for P2,857,000, there was also a certification
attached dated February 13, 2009. As to Exhibit "J5", together with the certification, there was a letter but no other
documents were submitted. Similarly, as to Exhibit "M6", it was attached to a letter dated October 19, 2009 and was
submitted to the witness by Aguas. Exhibit "N6" was attached to the letter of Valencia dated February 8, 2010, the
October 19, 2009 certification was attached to the October 19, 2009 letter to Chairman Villar.
The certification dated June 29, 2010, signed by Valencia in the amount of P2,075,000, also does not conform with
the COA requirement as it only specifies that the fund was disbursed by Valencia under his office for various
programs in the exercise of his function as Chairman. Though there was a certification that the supporting papers
were kept in the office, these papers were not found in the records of the PCSO and Aguas did not have any of the
records. The certification was attached to the letter of Valencia to Villar dated June 29, 2010.
In the certification dated June 29, 2010 signed by Uriarte in the amount of P137 ,500,000, the witness also said that
the certification did not conform to the COA Circular because it only stated that the amount was disbursed from a
special intelligence fund, authorized and approved by the President under the disposition of the Office of the Vice
Chairman. Despite the statement certifying that there were documents for the audit, no documents were provided
and the same were not in the official files of PCSO . The certification was attached to a letter by Uriarte dated July 1,
2010 addressed to Villar.
In the certification dated October 19, 2009 signed by Uriarte in the amount of P2,500,000, the witness made the
same finding that it also did not conform to the COA Circular, as it did not specify the project for which the cash
advance was obtained and there were also no records in the PCSO. It was attached to the letter dated October 19,
2009.
Finally, in the certification dated February 9, 2010 signed by Uriarte in the amount of P73,993,846, the witness
likewise found that it did not conform with the requirements of the COA, as all it said was the amount was used for
the exercise of the functions of the PCSO Chairman and General Manager. The documents related to this were also
not in the PCSO records and Aguas did not submit the same. It was attached to a letter dated February 8, 2010
from Uriarte to Villar.
There are two kinds of audit on disbursements of government funds: pre-audit and post-audit. Both are defined in
COA Circular 2009-002. Pre-audit is the examination of documents supporting the transaction, before these are
paid for and recorded. The auditor determines whether: (1) the proposed expenditure was in compliance with the
appropriate law, specific statutory authority or regulations; (2) sufficient funds are available to enable payment of the
claim; (3) the proposed expenditure is not illegal, irregular, extravagant, unconscionable or unnecessary, and (4) the
transaction is approved by the proper authority and duly supported by authentic underlying evidence. On the other
hand, the post-audit requirement is the process where the COA or the auditor will have to do exactly what was done
in the pre-audit, and in addition, the auditor must supplement what she did by tracing the transaction under audit to
the books of accounts, and that the transaction is all recorded in the books of accounts. The auditor, in post-audit,
also makes the final determination of whether the transaction was not illegal, irregular, extravagant, excessive,
unconscionable or unnecessary.
In this case, no audit was conducted. In a letter dated May 11, 2009 signed by Plaras, it was stated that a credit
advice was given. However, the letter did not conform to the requirements or form of a credit notice. Such form was
in COA Circular 2003-002, and should specify the liquidation report number, the amount, check numbers, and the
action taken by the auditor. The auditor should also include a certification that these have been audited. In this
instance, no certification that the transaction was audited was given by Plaras. Other similar letters did not conform
with the COA Circular. All transactions of the government must be subject to audit in accordance with the provisions
of the Constitution. Nevertheless, the requirements for audit are the same.
The effect of the issuance of the credit notice by the COA was that the agency will take it up in the books and credit
the cash advance. This is the seventh step in the flowchart. Once there is a cash advance, the liability of the officers
who obtained the cash advance would be recorded in the books. The credit notice, when received, would indicate
that the account was settled. The agency will credit the receivable or the cash advance, and remove from the books
as a liability of the person liable for the cash advance. The effect of this was that the financial liabilities of Uriarte and
Valencia were removed from the books, but they could still be subject to criminal liability based on Sec. 10 of COA
Circular 91-368 (Government Accounting and Auditing Manuals, Vol. 1, implementing P.O. 1445), which states:
"The settlement of an account whether or not on appeal has been made within the statutory period is no bar to
criminal prosecution against persons liable." From the 2008 COA Annual Audited Financial Statements of PCSO, it
was seen that the procedure was not followed because the liability of the officers was already credited even before
the credit notice was received. In the financial statements, it was stated that the amount due from officers and
employees, which should include the cash advances obtained by Uriarte and Valencia, were not included because
the amount stated therein was P35 million, while the total vouchers of Uriarte and Valencia was P86 million.
The witness also related that she traced the records of the CIF fund (since such was no longer stated as a
receivable), and reviewed whether it was recorded as an expense in 2008. She found out that the recorded CIF fund
expense, as recorded in the corporate operating budget as actually disbursed, was only P21,102,000. As such, she
confronted her accountants and asked them "Saan tinago itong amount na to?" The personnel in the accounting
office said that the balance of the P86 million or the additional P21 million was not recorded in the operating fund
budget because they used the prize fund and charity fund as instructed by Aguas. Journal Entry Voucher No.
8121443 dated December 31, 2008, signed by Elmer Camba, Aguas (Head of the Accounting Department), and
Hutch Balleras (one of the staff in the Accounting Department), showed that this procedure was done.
The contents of the Journal Entry Voucher are as follows:
(a) Accounts and Explanation: Due to other funds. This means that the amount of P63,750,000 was credited as
confidential expense from the operating fund. The amount was then removed from the operating fund, and it was
passed on to other funds.
(b) PF Miscellaneous, Account No. 424-1-L P41,250,000 and CF Miscellaneous for 424-2-G for P22,500,000. PF
Miscellaneous means Prize Fund Miscellaneous and CF stands for Charity Fund Miscellaneous. This means that
funds used to release the cash advances to Uriarte and Valencia were from the prize fund and charity.
Attached to the Journal Entry Voucher was a document which reads "Allocation of Confidential and Intelligence
Fund Expenses", and was the basis of Camba in doing the Journal Entry Voucher. In the same document, there
was a written annotation dated 12-31-2008 which reads that the adjustment of CIF, CF and IF, beneficiary of the
fund is CF and PF and signed by Aguas.
The year 2009 was a similar case, as the witness traced the recording of the credit notice at the end of 2009, and
despite the absence of the credit notice, the Accounting Department removed from the books of PCSO the liability of
Uriarte and Valencia, corresponding to the cash advances obtained in 2009. She based this finding on the COA
Annual Audit Report on the PCSO for the year ended December 31, 2009. It was stated in the Audit Report that the
total liability due from officers and employees was only P87,747,280 and it was less than the total cash advances of
Uriarte and Valencia, which was P138 million. As a result, the witness checked the corresponding entry for the
expenses in the corporate operating budget and found out that the same was understated. The CIF expenses were
only P24,968,300, as against the actual amount per vouchers, which was P138,420,875. Upon checking with the
Accounting Department, the department showed her another Journal Entry Voucher No. 9121157, dated December
29, 2009, where the personnel removed immediately the expense and recorded it as expense for the prize fund and
charity fund by the end of December 31.
The contents of the Journal Entry Voucher, especially the notation "due from'', means the accountability of those
who had cash advance was instead credited. It was removed, and the amount was P106 million. The entry was
confidential expense for P15,958,020 and then the due to other funds was P90,428,780. The explanation for "424"
was found in the middle part, stating: "424-1-L" of miscellaneous prize fund was used in the amount of P58,502,740
and the charity fund was used in the amount of P31, 916,040. The total amount of the receivables from Uriarte and
Valencia that was removed was P106,386,800 and P90,428,780 respectively which came from the prize fund and
charity fund.
The witness reported the discrepancy because there were violations of R.A. 1169, Sec. 6, which provides for the
different funds of PCSO namely: prize fund (55% of the net receipts), charity fund (30% of the net receipts), and
operating fund (15% ). The proceeds of the lotto and sweepstakes ticket sales provide the money for these different
funds, removing first the printing cost and the net proceeds (98%) is divided among the three funds mentioned. The
prize fund is the fund set aside to be used to pay the prizes for the winnings in the lotto or sweepstakes draws,
whether they are jackpot or consolation prizes. Incentives to the lotto operators or horse owners are also drawn from
this fund, as all of the expenses connected to the winnings of the draw. On the other hand, the charity fund is
reserved for charity programs approved by the board of PCSO, and constitutes hospital and medical assistance to
individuals, or to help facilities and other charities of national character. Operating expenses are charged to the
expenses to operate, personnel services, and MOOE. One kind of fund cannot be used for another kind, as they
become a trust fund which should only be used for the purpose for which it was authorized, not even with the
approval of the board.
The amounts obtained from the charity fund and prize fund for 2008 was P63,750,000, and in 2009 P90,428,780.
The Board of Directors was given a copy of the COA Audit Reports for years 2008 and 2009. The Board of Directors
for both years was composed of: Chairman Valencia, and Board Members Morato, Roquero, Taruc and Valdez.
Uriarte was the Vice Chairman of the Board of Directors. The witness did not know whether the Board checked the
COA reports, but there was no action on their part, and neither did they question the correctness of the statements.
They also had the Audit Committee (which was composed of members of the board) at that time, and one of the
duties of the Audit Committee was to verify the balances.
The witness identified the documents referring to the confirmation by the Board of Directors of PCSO of the CIF.
Board Resolution No. 217, approved on February 18, 2009, confirms the CIF approved by the President. It did not
state which CIF they were approving. They also assigned Uriarte as the Special Disbursing Officer of the CIF, but it
did say for what year. The signatories to the same Board Resolution were Valencia, Taruc, Valdes, Uriarte, Roquero
and Morato. The same were the witness's findings for Board Resolution No. 2356 S. 2009, approved on December
9, 2009. As for Board Resolution No. 29, S. 2010, approved on January 6, 2010, the Board confirmed the fund
approved by the President for 2010, though the approval of the President was only received on August 13, 2010 as
shown in the Memorandum dated January 4. In effect, the Board was aware of the requests, and because they
ratified the cash advances, they agreed to the act of obtaining the same.
Apart from the President violating LOI 1282, the witness also observed that the President directly dealt with the
PCSO, although the President, by Executive Order No. 383 dated November 14, 2004, and Executive Order No.
455 dated August 22, 2005, transferred the direct control and supervision of the PCSO to the Department of Social
Welfare and Development (DSWD), and later to the Department of Health (DOH). A project should first be approved
by the Supervising and Controlling Secretary of the Secretary of Health; that the President had transferred her direct
control and supervision, and lost the same. The witness said her basis was administrative procedure. In this regard,
President Aquino now has transferred the control and supervision of the PCSO back to the Office of the President
through Executive Order No. 14, S. 2010, dated November 19, 2010.
Uriarte should not have gone directly to the President to ask for the latter's approval for allocation. Nonetheless, the
release of the CIF must still be approved by the President. 9
The State also presented evidence consisting in the testimonies of officers coming from different law enforcement
agencies to corroborate Tolentino's testimony to the effect that the PCSO had not requested from their respective
10
offices any intelligence operations contrary to the liquidation report submitted by Uriarte and Aguas.
To complete the evidence for the Prosecution, Atty. Anamarie Villaluz Gonzales, Office-in-Charge and Department
Manager of the Human Resources of PCSO; Flerida Africa Jimenez, Head of the Intelligence and Confidential Fund
Audit Unit of the COA; and Noel Clemente, Director of COA were presented as additional witnesses.
After the Prosecution rested its case, GMA, Aguas, Valencia, Morato, Taruc V, Roquero and Villar separately filed
their demurrers to evidence asserting that the Prosecution did not establish a case for plunder against them.
On April 6, 2015, the Sandiganbayan granted the demurrers to evidence of Morato, Roquero, Taruc and Villar, and
dismissed the charge against them. It held that said accused who were members of the PCSO Board of Directors
were not shown to have diverted any PCSO funds to themselves, or to have raided the public treasury by conveying
and transferring into their possession and control any money or funds from PCSO account; that as to Villar, there
had been no clear showing that his designation of Plaras had been tainted with any criminal design; and that the
fact that Plaras had signed "by authority" of Villar as the COA Chairman could not criminally bind him in the absence
of any showing of conspiracy.
However, the Sandiganbayan denied the demurrers of GMA, Aguas and Valencia, holding that there was sufficient
evidence showing that they had conspired to commit plunder; and that the Prosecution had sufficiently established a
case of malversation against Valencia, pertinently saying:
Demurrer to evidence is an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence which his
adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue. The
party demurring challenges the sufficiency of the whole evidence to sustain a verdict. The court then
ascertains whether there is a competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or to support a
verdict of guilt.
xxxx
Sufficient evidence for purposes of frustrating a demurrer thereto is such evidence in character, weight or amount as
will legally justify the judicial or official action demanded to accord to circumstances. To be considered sufficient
therefore, the evidence must prove (a) the commission of the crime, and (b) the precise degree of paiiicipation
therein by the accused (Gutib v. CA, 110 SCAD 743, 312 SCRA 365 [1999]).
x x x x x x x x x
A. Demurrer filed by Arroyo and Aguas:
It must be remembered that in Our November 5, 2013 Resolution, We found strong evidence of guilt against
Arroyo and Aguas, only as to the second predicate act charged in the Information, which reads:
(b) raiding the public treasury by withdrawing and receiving, in several instances, the above-mentioned amount from
the Confidential/Intelligence Fund from PCSO's accounts, and/or unlawfully transferring or conveying the same into
their possession and control through irregularly issued disbursement vouchers and fictitious expenditures.
In the November 5, 2013 Resolution, We said:
It should be noted that in both R.A. No. 7080 and the PCGG rules, the enumeration of the possible predicate acts in
the commission of plunder did not associate or require the concept of personal gain/benefit or unjust enrichment
with respect to raids on the public treasury, as a means to commit plunder. It would, therefore, appear that a "raid on
the public treasury" is consummated where all the acts necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present.
Thus a "raid on the public treasury" can be said to have been achieved thru the pillaging or looting of public coffers
either through misuse, misappropriation or conversion, without need of establishing gain or profit to the raider.
Otherwise stated, once a "raider" gets material possession of a government asset through improper means
and has free disposal of the same, the raid or pillage is completed. x x x
xxxx
Clearly, the improper acquisition and illegal use of CIF funds, which is obviously a government asset, will amount to
a raid on the public treasury, and therefore fall into the category of ill-gotten wealth.
xxxx
xxx It is not disputed that Uriarte asked for and was granted authority by Arroyo to use additional CIF funds during
the period 2008-2010. Uriarte was able [to] accumulate during that period CIF funds in the total amount of
P.352,681,646. This was through a series of withdrawals as cash advances of the CIF funds from the PCSO coffers,
as evidenced by the disbursement vouchers and checks issued and encashed by her, through her authorized
representative.
These flagrant violations of the rules on the use of CIF funds evidently characterize the series of withdrawals by
and releases to Uriarte as "raids" on the PCSO coffers, which is part of the public treasury. These were, in
every sense, "pillage," as Uriarte looted government funds and appears to have not been able to account for
it. The monies came into her possession and, admittedly, she disbursed it for purposes other than what these were
intended for, thus, amounting to "misuse" of the same. Therefore, the additional CIF funds are ill-gotten, as defined
by R.A. 7080, the PCGG rules, and Republic v. Sandiganbayan. The encashment of the checks, which named
her as the "payee," gave Uriarte material possession of the CIF funds which she disposed of at will.
As to the determination whether the threshold amount of P50million was met by the prosecution's evidence, the
Court believes this to have been established. Even if the computation is limited only to the cash advances/releases
made by accused Uriarte alone AFTER Arroyo had approved her requests and the PCSO Board approved CIF
budget and the "regular" P5million CIF budget accorded to the PCSO Chairman and Vice Chairman are NOT taken
into account, still the total cash advances through accused Uriarte's series of withdrawals will total
P189,681,646. This amount surpasses the P50million threshold.
The evidence shows that for the year 2010 alone, Uriarte asked for P150 million additional CIF funds, and Arroyo
granted such request and authorized its use. From January 8, 2010 up to June 18, 2010, Uriarte made a series of
eleven (11) cash advances in the total amount of P138,223,490. According to Uriarte's testimony before the
Senate, the main purpose for these cash advances was for the "roll-out" of the small town lottery program.
However, the accomplishment report submitted by Aguas shows that P137,500,000 was spent on non-related
PCSO activities, such as "bomb threat, kidnapping, terrorism and bilateral and security relations." All the cash
advances made by Uriarte in 2010 were made in violation of LOI 1282, and COA Circulars 2003-002 and 92-385.
These were thus improper use of the additional Cff funds amounting to raids on the PCSO coffers and were ill-
gotten because Uriarte had encashed the checks and came into possession of the monies, which she had complete
freedom to dispose of but was not able to properly account for.
These findings of the Court clearly point out the commission by Uriarte of the crime of Plunder under the
second predicate act charged in the Information. As to Arroyo's participation, the Court stated in its
November 5, 2013 Resolution that:
The evidence shows that Arroyo approved not only Uriarte's request for additional CIF funds in 2008-2010, but also
authorized the latter to use such funds. Arroyo's "OK" notation and signature on Uriartc's letter-requests
signified unqualified approval of Uriarte's request to use the additional CIF funds because the last
paragraph of Uriarte's requests uniformly ended with this phrase: "With the use of intelligence fund, PCSO
can protect its image and integrity of its operations.
The letter-request of Uriarte in 2010 was more explicit because it categorically asked for: "The approval on the use
of the fifty percent of the PR Fund as PCSO Intelligence Fund will greatly help PCSO in the disbursement of funds
to immediately address urgent issues."
Arroyo cannot, therefore, successfully argue that what she approved were only the request for the grant or
allocation of additional CIF funds, because Arroyo's "OK" notation was unqualified and, therefore, covered
also the request to use such funds, through releases of the same in favor of Uriarte. 11
The Sandiganbayan later also denied the respective Motions for Reconsideration of GMA and Aguas, observing
that:
In this case, to require proof that monies went to a plunderer's bank account or was used to acquire real or
personal properties or used for any other purpose to personally benefit the plunderer, is absurd. Suppose a
plunderer had already illegally amassed, acquired or accumulated P50 Million or more of government funds and just
decided to keep it in his vault and never used such funds for any purpose to benefit him, would that not be plunder?
Or, if immediately right after such amassing, the monies went up in flames or recovered by the police, negating any
opportunity for the person to actually benefit, would that not still be plunder? Surely, in such cases, a plunder charge
could still prosper and the argument that the fact of personal benefit should still be evidence-based must fail.
Also, accused Arroyo insists that there was no proof of the fact of amassing the ill-gotten wealth, and that the "overt
act" of approving the disbursement is not the "overt act" contemplated by law. She further stresses that there was
no proof of conspiracy between accused Arroyo and her co-accused and that the Prosecution was unable to prove
their case against accused Arroyo. What accused Arroyo forgets is that although she did not actually commit
any "overt act" of illegally amassing CIF funds, her act of approving not only the additional CIF funds but
also their releases, aided and abetted accused Uriarte's successful raids on the public treasury. Accused
Arroyo is therefore rightly charged as a coconspirator of Uriarte who accumulated the CIF funds. Moreover, the
performance of an overt act is not indispensable when a conspirator is the mastermind. 12
Considering that the Sandiganbayan denied the demurrers to evidence of GMA and Aguas, they have come to the
Court on certiorari to assail and set aside said denial, claiming that the denial was with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Issues
GMA pleads that the denial of her demurrer to evidence was in patent and flagrant violation of Republic Act
No. 7080, the law on plunder, and was consequently arbitrary and oppressive, not only in grave abuse of
discretion but rendered without jurisdiction because:
First Ground
On the basis of the above Resolutions, the Sandiganbayan has denied petitioner Arroyo's Demurrer to
Evidence and considering the reasons for doing so, would find petitioner Arroyo guilty of the offense of
plunder under Republic Act No. 7080 as charged in the Information notwithstanding the following:
a. While the gravamen, indeed corpus delicti of the offense of plunder under R.A. No. 7080, and as charged
in the Information, is that the public officer ... "amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through
a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section l(d) hereof, in the aggregate
amount or total value of at least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00)", the Sandiganbayan Resolutions
extirpate this vital element of the offense of plunder;
b. In point of fact, not a single exhibit of the 637 exhibits offered by the prosecution nor a single testimony
of the 21 witnesses of the prosecution was offered by the prosecution to prove that petitioner amassed,
accumulated or acquired even a single peso of the alleged ill-gotten wealth amounting to P365,997,915.00 or
any part of that amount alleged in the Information;
c. Implicitly confirming the above, and aggravating its error, on the basis solely of petitioner Arroyo's
authorization of the release of the Confidential/Intelligence Fund from PCSO's accounts, the Sandiganbayan
ruled that she has committed the offense of plunder under R.A. No. 7080 for the reason that her release of
CIF funds to the PCSO amount to a violation of Sec. l(d) [11 of R.A. No. 7080 which reads, as follows:
1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public
treasury;
which, "did not associate or require the concept of personal gain/benefit or un.just enrichment with respect
to raids on the public treasury", thereby disregarding the gravamen or the corpus delicti of the offense of
plunder under R.A. No. 7080.
Second Ground
Worsening the above error of the Sandiganbayan, the Resolutions, with absolutely no justification in law or
in the evidence, purportedly as the "mastermind" of a conspiracy, and without performing any overt act,
would impute to petitioner Arroyo the "series of withdrawals as cash advances of the CIF funds from the
PCSO coffers" by Uriarte as "raids on the PCSO coffers, which is part of the public treasury" and "in every
sense, 'pillage' as Uriarte looted government funds and appears to have not been able to account for it".
Parenthetically, Uriarte has not been arrested, was not arraigned and did not participate in the trial of the
case.
Third Ground
That as an obvious consequence of the above, denial of petitioner Arroyo's Demurrer To Evidence for the
reasons stated in the Sandiganbayan Resolutions, amounting no less to convicting her on the basis of a
disjointed reading of the crime of plunder as defined in R.A. No. 7080, aggravated by the extirpation in the
process of its "corpus delicti" - the amassing, accumulation or acquisition of ill-gotten wealth, hence, of a
crime that docs not exist in law and consequently a blatant deprivation of liberty without due process of
law.
Fourth Ground
The Information alleges that the ten (10) persons accused in Crim. Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174, namely:
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Rosario C. Uriarte, Sergio 0. Valencia, Manuel L. Morato, Jose R. Taruc V,
Raymundo T. Roquero, [M]a. Fatima A.S. Valdes, Benigno B. Aguas, Reynaldo A. Villar and Nilda B.
Plaras" ... all public officers committing the offense in relation to their respective offices and taking undue
advantage of their respective official positions, authority, relationships, connections or influence,
conniving, conspiring and confederating with one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
criminally amass, accumulate and/or acquire, directly or indirectly, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate
amount or total value of THREE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE MILLION NINE HUNDRED NINETY SEVEN
THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED FIFTEEN PESOS (PHP365,997,915.00), more or less, through any or a
combination or a series of overt or criminal acts, or similar schemes or means, described as follows ... " or
each of them, P36,599,791.50 which would not qualify the offense charged as "plunder" under R.A. No. 7080
against all ten (10) accused together, for which reason the Information docs not charge the offense of
plunder and, as a consequence, all proceedings thereafter held under the Information arc void. 13
On his part, Aguas contends that:
A. In light of the factual setting described above and the evidence offered and admitted, docs proof beyond
reasonable doubt exist to warrant a holding that Prosecution proved the guilt of the accused such that there
is legal reason to deny Petitioner's Demurrer'?
B. Did the Prosecution's offered evidence squarely and properly support the allegations in the Information'?
PETITIONER STRONGLY SUBMITS THAT PROSECUTION FAILED TO ESTABLISH BY PROOF BEYOND

REASONABLE DOUBT THE EXISTENCE OF THE CORE ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME OF PLUNDER. 14
On the other hand, the Prosecution insists that the petitions for certiorari should be dismissed upon the following
grounds, namely:
A. CERTIORARI IS NOT THE PROPER REMEDY FROM AN ORDER OR RESOLUTION DENYING DEMURRER
TO EVIDENCE.
B. THERE IS NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION BECAUSE THE SANDIGANBAYAN MERELY

INTERPRETED WHAT CONSTITUTES PLUNDER UNDER LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN LIGHT OF FACTS
OF THE CASE. IT DID NOT JUDICIALLY LEGISLATE A "NEW" OFFENSE.
1. ACTUAL PERSONAL GAIN, BENEFIT OR ENRICHMENT IS NOT AN ELEMENT OF PLUNDER UNDER R.A.
No. 7080.
2. EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT ARROYO, BY INDISPENSABLE COOPERATION, CONSPIRED WITH HER CO-
ACCUSED AND PARTICIPATED IN THE COMPLEX, ILLEGAL SCHEME WHICH DEFRAUDED PCSO IN
HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS OF PESOS, WHICH CONSTITUTES PLUNDER.
3. ARROYO IS NOT SIMILARLY SITUATED WITH ACCUSED PCSO BOARD MEMBERS AND CANNOT THUS
DEMAND THAT THE SANDIGANBA YAN DISMISS THE PLUNDER CASE AGAINST HER.
C. ARROYO'S BELATED, COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE INFORMATION CHARGING HER AND CO-
ACCUSED FOR PLUNDER IS HIGHLY IMPROPER, ESPECIALLY AT THIS LA TE STAGE OF THE
PROCEEDING.
1. THE FACTS CONSTITUTING THE OFFENSE ARE CLEARLY ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION.
2. ARROYO'S ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN THE PROCEEDINGS ARISING FROM OR RELATING TO SB-12-

CRM-0174 PROVES THAT SHE HAS ALWAYS KNOWN AND UNDERSTOOD THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF
THE ACCUSATIONS AGAINST HER.
D. ARROYO IS NOT ENTITLED TO A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER BECAUSE THE CRIMINAL

PROSECUTION IN SB-12-CRM-0174 CANNOT BE ENJOINED. 15
Based on the submissions of the parties, the Court synthesizes the decisive issues to be considered and resolved,
as follows:
Procedural Issue:
1. Whether or not the special civil action for certiorari is proper to assail the denial of the demurrers to evidence.
Substantive Issues:
1. Whether or not the State sufficiently established the existence of conspiracy among GMA, Aguas, and Uriarte;
2. Whether or not the State sufficiently established all the elements of the crime of plunder:
a. Was there evidence of amassing, accumulating or acquiring ill-gotten wealth in the total amount of not less than
P50,000,000.00?
b. Was the predicate act of raiding the public treasury alleged in the information proved by the Prosecution?
Ruling of the Court
The consolidated petitions for certiorari are meritorious.
I.
The Court cannot be deprived of its jurisdiction
to correct grave abuse of discretion
The Prosecution insists that the petition for certiorari of GMA was improper to challenge the denial of her demurrer
to evidence; that she also thereby failed to show that there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the Sandiganbayan in denying her demurrer to evidence; and that, on the contrary, the Sandiganbayan only
interpreted what constituted plunder under the law and jurisprudence in light of the established facts, and did not
legislate a new offense, by extensively discussing how she had connived with her co-accused to commit plunder. 16
The Court holds that it should take cognizance of the petitions for certiorari because the Sandiganbayan, as shall
shortly be demonstrated, gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The special civil action for certiorari is generally not proper to assail such an interlocutory order issued by the trial
court because of the availability of another remedy in the ordinary course of law. Moreover, Section 23, Rule 119 of
17
the Rules of Court expressly provides that "the order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to
evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before judgment." It is not an
insuperable obstacle to this action, however, that the denial of the demurrers to evidence of the petitioners was an
interlocutory order that did not terminate the proceedings, and the proper recourse of the demurring accused was to
go to trial, and that in case of their conviction they may then appeal the conviction, and assign the denial as among
the errors to be reviewed. Indeed, it is doctrinal that the situations in which the writ of certiorari may issue should
18
not be limited, because to do so –

19
x x x would be to destroy its comprehensiveness and usefulness. So wide is the discretion of the court that authority
is not wanting to show that certiorari is more discretionary than either prohibition or mandamus. In the exercise of
our superintending control over other courts, we are to be guided by all the circumstances of each
particular case 'as the ends of justice may require.' So it is that the writ will be granted where necessary to
prevent a substantial wrong or to do substantial justice. 20
The Constitution itself has imposed upon the Court and the other courts of justice the duty to correct errors of
jurisdiction as a result of capricious, arbitrary, whimsical and despotic exercise of discretion by expressly
incorporating in Section 1 of Article VIII the following provision:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established
by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
The exercise of this power to correct grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government cannot be thwarted by rules of procedure to the contrary or for
the sake of the convenience of one side. This is because the Court has the bounden constitutional duty to strike
down grave abuse of discretion whenever and wherever it is committed. Thus, notwithstanding the interlocutory
character and effect of the denial of the demurrers to evidence, the petitioners as the accused could avail
themselves of the remedy of certiorari when the denial was tainted with grave abuse of discretion. As we shall
21
soon show, the Sandiganbayan as the trial court was guilty of grave abuse of discretion when it capriciously denied
the demurrers to evidence despite the absence of competent and sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment for
plunder, and despite the absence of the factual bases to expect a guilty verdict. 22
II.
The Prosecution did not properly allege and prove
the existence of conspiracy among GMA, Aguas and Uriarte
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony, and
decide to commit it. In this jurisdiction, conspiracy is either a crime in itself or a mere means to commit a crime.
23
As a rule, conspiracy is not a crime unless the law considers it a crime, and prescribes a penalty for it. The
24
exception is exemplified in Article 115 (conspiracy and proposal to commit treason), Article 136 (conspiracy and
proposal to commit coup d'etat, rebellion or insurrection) and Article 141 (conspiracy to commit sedition) of
the Revised Penal Code. When conspiracy is a means to commit a crime, it is indispensable that the agreement to
commit the crime among all the conspirators, or their community of criminal design must be alleged and competently
shown.
We also stress that the community of design to commit an offense must be a conscious one. Conspiracy
25
transcends mere companionship, and mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to
conspiracy. Even knowledge of, or acquiescence in, or agreement to cooperate is not enough to constitute one a
party to a conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission of the crime with a view to the furtherance of
the common design and purpose. Hence, conspiracy must be established, not by conjecture, but by positive and
26
conclusive evidence.
In terms of proving its existence, conspiracy takes two forms. The first is the express form, which requires proof of
an actual agreement among all the co-conspirators to commit the crime. However, conspiracies are not always
shown to have been expressly agreed upon. Thus, we have the second form, the implied conspiracy. An implied
conspiracy exists when two or more persons are shown to have aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of
the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent, were in
fact connected and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association and a concurrence of
sentiment. Implied conspiracy is proved through the mode and manner of the commission of the offense, or from
27
the acts of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime indubitably pointing to a joint purpose,
a concert of action and a community of interest. 28
But to be considered a part of the conspiracy, each of the accused must be shown to have performed at least an
overt act in pursuance or in furtherance of the conspiracy, for without being shown to do so none of them will be
liable as a co-conspirator, and each may only be held responsible for the results of his own acts. In this connection,
the character of the overt act has been explained in People v. Lizada: 29
An overt or external act is defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention to commit a particular
crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to its complete termination following its natural
course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the spontaneous desistance of the perpetrator, will
logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. The raison d'etre for the law requiring a direct overt act
is that, in a majority of cases, the conduct of the accused consisting merely of acts of preparation has never
ceased to be equivocal; and this is necessarily so, irrespective of his declared intent. It is that quality of
being equivocal that must be lacking before the act becomes one which may be said to be a
commencement of the commission of the crime, or an overt act or before any fragment of the crime itself
has been committed, and this is so for the reason that so long as the equivocal quality remains, no one can
say with certainty what the intent of the accused is. It is necessary that the overt act should have been the
ultimate step towards the consummation of the design. It is sufficient if it was the "first or some subsequent step in a
direct movement towards the commission of the offense after the preparations are made." The act done need not
constitute the last proximate one for completion. It is necessary, however, that the attempt must have a
causal relation to the intended crime. In the words of Viada, the overt acts must have an immediate and
necessary relation to the offense. (Bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)
In her case, GMA points out that all that the State showed was her having affixed her unqualified "OK" on the
requests for the additional CIFs by Uriarte. She argues that such act was not even an overt act of plunder because it
had no immediate and necessary relation to plunder by virtue of her approval not being per se illegal or irregular.
However, the Sandiganbayan, in denying the Motions for Reconsideration of GMA and Aguas vis-a-vis the denial of
the demurrers, observed that:
xxxx accused Arroyo insists that there was no proof of the fact of amassing the ill-gotten wealth, and that the "overt
act" of approving the disbursement is not the "overt act" contemplated by Jaw. She further stresses that there was
no proof of conspiracy between accused Arroyo and her co-accused and that the Prosecution was unable to prove
their case against accused Arroyo. What accused Arroyo forgets is that although she did not actually commit any
"overt act" of illegally amassing CIF funds, her act of approving not only the additional CIF funds but also their
releases, aided and abetted accused Uriarte's successful raids on the public treasury. Accused Arroyo is therefore
rightly charged as a co-conspirator of Uriarte who accumulated the CIF funds. Moreover, the performance of an
overt act is not indispensable when a conspirator is the mastermind. 30
It is in this regard that the Sandigabayan gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of its jurisdiction.
To start with, its conclusion that GMA had been the mastermind of plunder was plainly conjectural and outrightly
unfounded considering that the information did not aver at all that she had been the mastermind; hence,
the Sandigabayan thereby acted capriciously and arbitrarily. In the second place, the treatment by
the Sandiganbayan of her handwritten unqualified "OK" as an overt act of plunder was absolutely unwarranted
considering that such act was a common legal and valid practice of signifying approval of a fund release by the
President. Indeed, pursuant to People v. Lizada, supra, an act or conduct becomes an overt act of a crime only
when it evinces a causal relation to the intended crime because the act or conduct will not be an overt act of the
crime if it does not have an immediate and necessary relation to the offense.
In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, the Court recognized two nuances of appreciating conspiracy as a means to commit
31
a crime, the wheel conspiracy and the chain conspiracy.
The wheel conspiracy occurs when there is a single person or group (the hub) dealing individually with two or more
other persons or groups (the spokes). The spoke typically interacts with the hub rather than with another spoke. In
the event that the spoke shares a common purpose to succeed, there is a single conspiracy. However, in the
instances when each spoke is unconcerned with the success of the other spokes, there are multiple conspiracies. 32
An illustration of wheel conspiracy wherein there is only one conspiracy involved was the conspiracy alleged in the
information for plunder filed against former President Estrada and his co-conspirators. Former President Estrada
was the hub while the spokes were all the other accused individuals. The rim that enclosed the spokes was the
common goal in the overall conspiracy, i.e., the amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth.
On the other hand, the American case of Kotteakos v. United States illustrates a wheel conspiracy where multiple
33
conspiracies were established instead of one single conspiracy. There, Simon Brown, the hub, assisted 31
independent individuals to obtain separate fraudulent loans from the US Government. Although all the defendants
were engaged in the same type of illegal activity, there was no common purpose or overall plan among them, and
they were not liable for involvement in a single conspiracy. Each loan was an end in itself, separate from all others,
although all were alike in having similar illegal objects. Except for Brown, the common figure, no conspirator was
interested in whether any loan except his own went through. Thus, the US Supreme Court concluded that there
existed 32 separate conspiracies involving Brown rather than one common conspiracy. 34
The chain conspiracy recognized in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan exists when there is successive communication and
cooperation in much the same way as with legitimate business operations between manufacturer and wholesaler,
then wholesaler and retailer, and then retailer and consumer. 35
This involves individuals linked together in a vertical chain to achieve a criminal objective. Illustrative of chain
36
conspiracy was that involved in United States v. Bruno, of the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. There, 88
37
defendants were indicted for a conspiracy to import, sell, and possess narcotics. This case involved several
smugglers who had brought narcotics to retailers who, in turn, had sold the narcotics to operatives in Texas and
Louisiana for distribution to addicts. The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled that what transpired was a
single chain conspiracy in which the smugglers knew that the middlemen must sell to retailers for distribution to
addicts, and the retailers knew that the middle men must purchase drugs from smugglers. As reasoned by the court,
"the conspirators at one end of the chain knew that the unlawful business would not and could not, stop with their
buyers; and those at the other end knew that it had not begun with their sellers." Each conspirator knew that "the
success of that part with which he was immediately concerned was dependent upon success of the whole." This
means, therefore, that "every member of the conspiracy was liable for every illegal transaction carried out by other
members of the conspiracy in Texas and in Louisiana." 38
Once the State proved the conspiracy as a means to commit a crime, each co-conspirator is as criminally liable as
the others, for the act of one is the act of all. A co-conspirator does not have to participate in every detail of the
execution; neither does he have to know the exact part performed by the co-conspirator in the execution of the
criminal act. Otherwise, the criminal liability of each accused is individual and independent.
39
The Prosecution insisted that a conspiracy existed among GMA, Uriarte, Valencia and the Members of the PCSO
Board of Directors, Aguas, Villar and Plaras. The Sandiganbayan agreed with the Prosecution as to the conspirators
involved, declaring that GMA, Aguas, and Uriarte had conspired and committed plunder.
A review of the records of the case compels us to reject the Sandiganbayan's declaration in light of the information
filed against the petitioners, and the foregoing exposition on the nature, forms and extent of conspiracy. On the
contrary, the Prosecution did not sufficiently allege the existence of a conspiracy among GMA, Aguas and Uriarte.
A perusal of the information suggests that what the Prosecution sought to show was an implied conspiracy to
commit plunder among all of the accused on the basis of their collective actions prior to, during and after the implied
agreement. It is notable that the Prosecution did not allege that the conspiracy among all of the accused was by
express agreement, or was a wheel conspiracy or a chain conspiracy.
This was another fatal flaw of the Prosecution.
In its present version, under which the petitioners were charged, Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7080 (Plunder Law)
states:
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties. – Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with
members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons,
amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt criminal acts as
described in Section 1 (d) hereof in the aggregate amount or total value of at least Fifty million pesos
(P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any
person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of
plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and
the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be
considered by the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes
and assets including the properties and shares of stocks derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in
favor of the State. [As Amended by Section 12, Republic Act No. 7659 (The Death Penalty Law)]
Section l(d) of Republic Act No. 7080 provides:
Section 1. Definition of terms. - As used in this Act, the term:
xxxx
d. "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business enterprise or material possession of any person within the
purview of Section two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents,
subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:
1. Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury;
2. By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any/or entity in
connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public officer
concerned;
3. By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any of its
subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities or government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
4. By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest
or participation including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;
5. By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of

decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or
6. By taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich
himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of
the Philippines.
The law on plunder requires that a particular public officer must be identified as the one who amassed,
acquired or accumulated ill-gotten wealth because it plainly states that plunder is committed by any public
officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity,
business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth in
the aggregate amount or total value of at least P50,000,000.00 through a combination or series of overt
criminal acts as described in Section l(d) hereof. Surely, the law requires in the criminal charge for plunder
against several individuals that there must be a main plunderer and her co-conspirators, who may be
members of her family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other
persons. In other words, the allegation of the wheel conspiracy or express conspiracy in the information
was appropriate because the main plunderer would then be identified in either manner. Of course, implied
conspiracy could also identify the main plunderer, but that fact must be properly alleged and duly proven
by the Prosecution.
This interpretation is supported by Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, where the Court explained the nature of the
40
conspiracy charge and the necessity for the main plunderer for whose benefit the amassment, accumulation and
acquisition was made, thus:
There is no denying the fact that the "plunder of an entire nation resulting in material damage to the national
economy" is made up of a complex and manifold network of crimes. In the crime of plunder, therefore, different
parties may be united by a common purpose. In the case at bar, the different accused and their different criminal
acts have a commonality - to help the former President amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. Sub-
paragraphs (a) to (d) in the Amended Information alleged the different participation of each accused in the
conspiracy. The gravamen of the conspiracy charge, therefore, is not that each accused agreed to receive
protection money from illegal gambling, that each misappropriated a portion of the tobacco excise tax, that each
accused ordered the GSIS and SSS to purchase shares of Belle Corporation and receive commissions from such
sale, nor that each unjustly enriched himself from commissions, gifts and kickbacks; rather, it is that each of them,
by their individual acts, agreed to participate, directly or indirectly, in the amassing, accumulation and
acquisition of ill-gotten wealth of and/or for former President Estrada. [bold underscoring supplied for
emphasis]
Here, considering that 10 persons have been accused of amassing, accumulating and/or acquiring ill-gotten
wealth aggregating P365,997,915.00, it would be improbable that the crime charged was plunder if none of
them was alleged to be the main plunderer. As such, each of the 10 accused would account for the aliquot
amount of only P36,599,791.50, or exactly 1/10 of the alleged aggregate ill-gotten wealth, which is far below the
threshold value of ill-gotten wealth required for plunder.
We are not unmindful of the holding in Estrada v. Sandiganabayan to the effect that an information alleging
41
conspiracy is sufficient if the information alleges conspiracy either: (1) with the use of the word conspire, or its
derivatives or synonyms, such as confederate, connive, collude, etc; or (2) by allegations of the basic facts
constituting the conspiracy in a manner that a person of common understanding would know what is being
conveyed, and with such precision as would enable the accused to competently enter a plea to a subsequent
indictment based on the same facts. We are not talking about the sufficiency of the information as to the allegation
of conspiracy, however, but rather the identification of the main plunderer sought to be prosecuted under R.A. No.
7080 as an element of the crime of plunder. Such identification of the main plunderer was not only necessary
because the law required such identification, but also because it was essential in safeguarding the rights of all of the
accused to be properly informed of the charges they were being made answerable for. The main purpose of
requiring the various elements of the crime charged to be set out in the information is to enable all the accused to
suitably prepare their defense because they are presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that
constituted the offense charged. 42
For sure, even the Sandiganbayan was at a loss in this respect. Despite the silence of the information on who the
main plunderer or the mastermind was, the Sandiganbayan readily condemned GMA in its resolution dated
September 10, 2015 as the mastermind despite the absence of the specific allegation in the information to that
effect. Even worse, there was no evidence that substantiated such sweeping generalization.
In fine, the Prosecution's failure to properly allege the main plunderer should be fatal to the cause of the
State against the petitioners for violating the rights of each accused to be informed of the charges against
each of them.
Nevertheless, the Prosecution insists that GMA, Uriarte and Aguas committed acts showing the existence of an
implied conspiracy among themselves, thereby making all of them the main plunderers. On this score, the
Prosecution points out that the sole overt act of GMA to become a part of the conspiracy was her approval via the
marginal note of "OK" of all the requests made by Uriarte for the use of additional intelligence fund. The Prosecution
stresses that by approving Uriaiie's requests in that manner, GMA violated the following:
a. Letter of Instruction 1282, which required requests for additional confidential and intelligence funds (CIFs) to be
accompanied with detailed, specific project proposals and specifications; and
b. COA Circular No. 92-385, which allowed the President to approve the release of additional CIFs only if there was
an existing budget to cover the request.
The insistence of the Prosecution is unwarranted. GMA's approval of Uriarte's requests for additional CIFs did not
make her part of any design to raid the public treasury as the means to amass, accumulate and acquire ill-gotten
wealth. Absent the specific allegation in the information to that effect, and competent proof thereon, GMA' s
approval of Uriarte' s requests, even if unqualified, could not make her part of any criminal conspiracy to commit
plunder or any other crime considering that her approval was not by any means irregular or illegal.
The Prosecution takes GMA to task for approving Uriarte's request despite the requests failing to provide "the full
detail [ ofJ the specific purposes for which said funds shall be spent and shall explain the circumstances giving rise
to the necessity for the expenditure and the particular aims to be accomplished." It posits that the requests were not
specific enough, contrary to what is required by LOI 1282.
LOI 1282 reads:
LETTER OF INSTRUCTION No. 1282
To: All Ministries and Offices Concerned
In recent years intelligence funds appropriated for the various ministries and certain offices have been, as reports
reaching me indicate, spent with less than full regard for secrecy and prudence. On the one hand, there have been
far too many leakages of information on expenditures of said funds; and on the other hand, where secrecy has been
observed, the President himself was often left unaware of how these funds had been utilized.
Effective immediately, all requests for the allocation or release of intelligence funds shall indicate in full detail the
specific purposes for which said funds shall be spent and shall explain the circumstances giving rise to the necessity
for the expenditure and the particular aims to be accomplished.
The requests and the detailed explanations shall be submitted to the President personally.
It is imperative that such detailed presentations be made to the President in order to avoid such duplication of
expenditures as has taken place in the past because of the lack of centralized planning and organized disposition of
intelligence funds.
Full compliance herewith is desired.

Manila, January 12, 1983.
(Sgd.) FERDINANDE. MARCOS

President of the Philippines
However, an examination of Uriarte' s several requests indicates their compliance with LOI No. 1282. The requests,
similarly worded, furnished: (a) the full details of the specific purposes for which the funds would be spent; (b) the
explanations of the circumstances giving rise to the necessity of the expenditure; and (c) the particular aims to be
accomplished.
The specific purposes and circumstances for the necessity of the expenditures were laid down as follows:
In dispensing its mandate, PCSO has been constantly encountering a number of fraudulent schemes and nefarious
activities on a continuing basis which affect the integrity of our operations, to wit:
1. Donated medicines sometimes end up in drug stores for sale even if they were labeled "Donated by PCSO- Not
for Sale";
2. Unwarranted or unofficial use of ambulances by beneficiarydonees;
3. Unauthorized expenditures of endowment fund for charity patients and organizations;
4. Lotto and sweepstakes scams victimizing innocent people of winning the jackpot and selling tampered tickets as
winning tickets;
5. Fixers for the different programs of PCSO such as Ambulance Donation Project, Endowment Fund Program and
Individual Medical Assistance Program;
6. Other fraudulent schemes and activities which put the PCSO in bad light. 43
A reading of the requests also reveals that the additional CIFs requested were to be used to protect PCSO's image
and the integrity of its operations. The Court thus cannot share the Prosecution's dismissiveness of the requests for
not being compliant with LOI No. 1282. According to its terms, LOI No. 1282 did not detail any qualification as to
how specific the requests should be made. Hence, we should not make any other pronouncement than to rule that
Uriarte's requests were compliant with LOI No. 1282.
COA Circular No. 92-385 required that additional request for CIFs would be approved only when there was available
budget. In this regard, the Prosecution suggests that there was no longer any budget when GMA approved Uriarte's
requests because the budget had earmarked intelligence funds that had already been maxed out and used. The
suggestion is not acceptable, however, considering that the funds of the PCSO were comingled into one account as
early as 2007. Consequently, although only 15% of PCSO's revenues was appropriated to an operation fund from
which the CIF could be sourced, the remaining 85% of PCSO's revenues, already co-mingled with the operating
fund, could still sustain the additional requests. In short, there was available budget from which to draw the
additional requests for CIFs.
It is notable that the COA, although frowning upon PCSO's co-mingling of funds, did not rule such co-mingling as
illegal. As such, sourcing the requested additional CIFs from one account was far from illegal.
Lastly, the Prosecution's effort to show irregularities as badges of bad faith has led it to claim that GMA had known
that Uriarte would raid the public treasury, and would misuse the amounts disbursed. This knowledge was imputed
to GMA by virtue of her power of control over PCSO.
The Prosecution seems to be relying on the doctrine of command responsibility to impute the actions of subordinate
officers to GMA as the superior officer. The reliance is misplaced, for incriminating GMA under those terms was
legally unacceptable and incomprehensible. The application of the doctrine of command responsibility is limited, and
cannot be true for all litigations. The Court ruled in Rodriguez v. Macapagal-Arroyo that command responsibility
44
pertains to the responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or
other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic conflict. The doctrine has also found
application in civil actions for human rights abuses. But this case involves neither a probe of GMA' s actions as the
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, nor of a human rights issue. As such, it is legally
improper to impute the actions of Uriarte to GMA in the absence of any conspiracy between them.
On the part of Aguas, the Sandiganbayan pronounced him to be as much a member of the implied conspiracy as
GMA was, and detailed his participation in this manner:
In all of the disbursement vouchers covering the cash advances/releases to Uriarte of the CIF funds, Aguas certified
that:
CERTIFIED: Adequate available funds/budgetary allotment in the amount of P___________ ; expenditure properly
certified; supported by documents marked (X) per checklist and back hereof; account codes proper; previous cash
advance liquidated/accounted for.
These certifications, after close scrutiny, were not true because: 1.) there were no documents which lent support to
the cash advances on a per project basis. The particulars of payment simply read: "To draw cash advance form the
CIF Fund of the Office of the Vice-Chairman and General Manager". No particular purpose or project was specified
contrary to the requirement under COA Circular 2003-002 that cash advances must be on a per project basis.
Without specifics on the project covered by each cash advance. Aguas could not certify that supporting documents
existed simply because he would not know what project was being funded by the cash advances; and 2.) There
were no previous liquidations made of prior cash advances when Aguas made the certifications. COA circular 2003-
002 required that cash advances be liquidated within one (1) month from the date the purpose of the cash advance
was accomplished. If the completion of the projects mentioned were for more than one month, a monthly progress
liquidation report was necessary. In the case of Uriarte' s cash advances certified to by Aguas, the liquidation made
was wholesale, i.e. these were done on a semi-annual basis without a monthly liquidation or at least a monthly
liquidation progress report. How then could Aguas correctly certify that previous liquidations were accounted for?
Aguas's certification also violated Sec. 89 of P.D. 1445 which states:
Limitations on cash advance. No cash advance shall be given unless for a legally authorized specific purpose. A
cash advance shall be reported on and liquidated as soon as the purpose for which it was given has been served.
No additional cash advance shall be allowed to any official or employee unless the previous cash advance given to
him is first settled or a proper accounting thereof is made.
There is a great presumption of guilt against Aguas, as his action aided and abetted Uriarte's being able to draw
these irregular CIF funds in contravention of the rules on CIF funds. Without Aguas's certification, the disbursement
vouchers could not have been processed for payment. Accordingly, the certification that there were supporting
documents and prior liquidation paved the way for Uriarte to acquire ill-gotten wealth by raiding the public coffers of
the PCSO.
By just taking cognizance of the series and number of cash advances and the staggering amounts involved, Aguas
should have been alerted that something was greatly amiss and that Uriarte was up to something. If Aguas was not
into the scheme, it would have been easy for him to refuse to sign the certification, but he did not. The conspiracy
"gravamen" is therefore present in the case of Aguas. Moreover, Aguas's attempt to cover-up Uriarte's misuse of
these CIF funds in his accomplishment report only contributed to unmasking the actual activities for which these
funds were utilized. Aguas' s accomplishment report, which was conformed to by Uriarte, made it self-evidence that
the bulk of the CIF funds in 2009 and 2010 were allegedly spend for non-PCSO related activities, e.g. bomb threats,
kidnapping, terrorism, and others.45
Thus, the Sandiganbayan concluded that Aguas became a part of the implied conspiracy when he signed the
disbursement vouchers despite the absence of certain legal requirements, and issued certain certifications to the
effect that the budgetary allotment/funds for cash advance to be withdrawn were available; that the expenditures
were supported by documents; and that the previous cash advances had been liquidated or accounted for.
We opine and declare, however, that Aguas' certifications and signatures on the disbursement vouchers were
insufficient bases to conclude that he was into any conspiracy to commit plunder or any other crime. Without GMA's
participation, he could not release any money because there was then no budget available for the additional CIFs.
Whatever irregularities he might have committed did not amount to plunder, or to any implied conspiracy to commit
plunder.
Under the circumstances, the Sandiganbayan's finding on the existence of the conspiracy to commit plunder was
unsustainable. It then becomes unavoidable for the Court to rule that because the Prosecution failed to properly
allege the elements of the crime, as well as to prove that any implied conspiracy to commit plunder or any other
crime existed among GMA, Aguas and Uriarte there was no conspiracy to commit plunder among them. As a result,
GMA and Aguas could be criminally responsible only for their own respective actions, if any.
III.
No proof of amassing, or accumulating, or acquiring
ill-gotten wealth of at least P50 Million
was adduced against GMA and Aguas
The Sandiganbayan sustained the sufficiency of the evidence to convict the petitioners for plunder on the basis that
the Prosecution established all the elements of plunder.
After a review of the records, we find and rule that the Prosecution had no case for plunder against the
petitioners.
To successfully mount a criminal prosecution for plunder, the State must allege and establish the following
elements, namely:
1. That the offender is a public officer who acts by herself or in connivance with members of her family,
relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons;
2. That the offender amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of
the following overt or criminal acts: (a) through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public
funds or raids on the public treasury; (b) by receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage,
kickback or any other form of pecuniary benefits from any person and/or entity in connection with any government
contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public officer; (c) by the illegal or fraudulent
conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or
instrumentalities of Government owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries; (d) by obtaining, receiving or
accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation including the
promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking; (e) by establishing agricultural, industrial or
commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit
particular persons or special interests; or (f) by taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship,
connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of
the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines; and,
3. That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or acquired is at
least P50,000,000.00. 46
The corpus delicti of plunder is the amassment, accumulation or acquisition of ill-gotten wealth valued at
not less than P50,000,000.00. The failure to establish the corpus delicti should lead to the dismissal of the criminal
prosecution.
As regards the element that the public officer must have amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth worth
at least P50,000,000.00, the Prosecution adduced no evidence showing that either GMA or Aguas or even Uriarte,
for that matter, had amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth of any amount. There was also no
evidence, testimonial or otherwise, presented by the Prosecution showing even the remotest possibility that the
CIFs of the PCSO had been diverted to either GMA or Aguas, or Uriarte.
The absolute lack of evidence on this material but defining and decisive aspect of the criminal prosecution was
explicitly noted in the concurring and partial dissenting opinion of Justice Rodolfo A. Ponferrada of
the Sandiganbayan, to wit:
Here the evidence of the prosecution failed to show the existence of the crime of plunder as no evidence was
presented that any of the accused, accumulated and/or acquired ill-gotten wealth. In fact, the principal witness of the
prosecution when asked, said that she does not know the existence or whereabouts of the alleged ill-gotten wealth,
to wit:
Q: Of course, you don't know where is this ill-gotten wealth are (sic) now?
A: Yes, Your Honors. We don't know whether they saved it, squandered it or what? We don't know, Your
Honor. [bold emphasis supplied]
47
After Atty. Tolentino, as the Prosecution's main witness, conceded lack of any knowledge of the amassing,
accumulating or acquiring of ill-gotten wealth of at least P50,000,000.00, nothing more remained of the criminal
prosecution for plunder. Hence, the Sandiganbayan should have granted the demurrers of GMA and Aguas, and
dismissed the criminal action against them.
IV.
The Prosecution failed to prove the
predicate act of raiding the public treasury
The Sandiganbayan observed that the Prosecution established the predicate act of raiding the public treasury, to
wit:
Secondly, the terms "unjust enrichment," "benefit," and "pecuniary benefit" are only mentioned in the predicate acts
mentioned in par. 2, 5 and 6 of Section 1 (d) of the Plunder Law. Paragraph 1 of the same section where "raids on
the public treasury" is mentioned did not mention "unjust enrichment" or "personal benefit". Lastly, the predicate act
covering "raids on the public treasury" is lumped up with the phrases misappropriation, conversion, misuse and
malversation of public funds. Thus, once public funds, as in the case of CIF funds, are illegally accumulated,
amassed or acquired. To the tune of PSO Million or more, there will be no need to establish any motive to gain, or
much more establish where the money eventually ended up. As stated in Our Resolution dated November 5, 2013:
It should be noted that in both R.A. No. 7080 and the PCGG rules, the enumeration of the possible predicate acts in
the commission of plunder did not associate or require the concept of personal gain/benefit or unjust enrichment
with respect to raids on the public treasury, as a means to commit plunder. It would, therefore, appear that a "raid on
the public treasury" is consummated where all the acts necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present.
Thus a "raid on the public treasury" can be said to have been achieved thru the pillaging or looting of public coffers
either through misuse, misappropriation or conversion, without need of establishing gain or profit to the "raider" gets
material possession of a government asset through improper means and has free disposal of the same, the raid or
pillage is completed.
xxxx
Clearly, the improper acquisition and illegal use of CIF funds, which is obviously a government asset, will amount to
a raid on the public treasury, and therefore fall into the category of ill-gotten wealth.
xxxx
x x x It is not disputed that Uriarte asked for and was granted authority by Arroyo to use additional CIF funds during
the period 2008 - 2010. Uriarte was able to accumulate during that period CIF funds in the total amount of
P352,681,646. This was through a series of withdrawals as cash advances of the CIF funds from the PCSO coffers,
as evidenced by the disbursement vouchers and checks issued and encashed by her, through her authorized
representatives.
These flagrant violations of the rules on the use of CIF funds evidently characterize the series of withdrawals by and
releases to Uriarte as "raids" on the PCSO coffers, which is part of the public treasury. These were, in every sense,
"pillage," as Uriarte looted government funds and appears to have not been able to account for it. The monies came
into her possession and, admittedly, she disbursed it for purposes other than what these were intended for, thus
amounting to "misuse" of the same. xxx
In this case, to require proof that monies went to a plunderer's bank account or was used to acquire real or personal
properties or used for any other purpose to personally benefit the plunderer, is absurd. Suppose a plunderer had
already amassed, acquired or accumulated P50 Million or more of government funds and just decide to keep it in his
vault and never used such funds for any purpose to benefit him, would that not be plunder? Or, if immediately right
after such amassing, the monies went up in flames or recovered by the police, negating any opportunity for the
purpose to actually benefit, would that not still be plunder? Surely, in such cases, a plunder charge could still
prosper and the argument that the fact of personal benefit should still be evidence-based must fail. 48
The Sandiganbayan contended that in order to prove the predicate act of raids of the public treasury, the
Prosecution need not establish that the public officer had benefited from such act; and that what was necessary was
proving that the public officer had raided the public coffers. In support of this, it referred to the records of the
deliberations of Congress to buttress its observation.
We do not share the Sandiganbayan' s contention.
The phrase raids on the public treasury is found in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080, which provides:
Section I .Definition of Terms. - x x x
xxxx
d) Ill-gotten wealth means any asset, property, business enterprise or material possession of any person within the
purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents,
1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury;
xxxx
To discern the proper import of the phrase raids on the public treasury, the key is to look at the accompanying
words: misappropriation, conversion, misuse or malversation of public funds. This process is conformable with the
maxim of statutory construction noscitur a sociis, by which the correct construction of a particular word or phrase
that is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings may be made by considering the company
of the words in which the word or phrase is found or with which it is associated. Verily, a word or phrase in a statute
is always used in association with other words or phrases, and its meaning may, therefore, be modified or restricted
by the latter.
49
To convert connotes the act of using or disposing of another's property as if it were one's own; to
misappropriate means to own, to take something for one's own benefit; misuse means "a good, substance,
50
privilege, or right used improperly, unforeseeably, or not as intended;" and malversation occurs when "any public
51
officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the
same or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other
person to take such public funds, or property, wholly or partially." The common thread that binds all the four
52
terms together is that the public officer used the property taken. Considering that raids on the public
treasury is in the company of the four other terms that require the use of the property taken, the
phrase raids on the public treasury similarly requires such use of the property taken. Accordingly,
the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in contending that the mere accumulation and gathering constituted the forbidden
act of raids on the public treasury. Pursuant to the maxim of noscitur a sociis, raids on the public treasury requires
the raider to use the property taken impliedly for his personal benefit.
The Prosecution asserts that the Senate deliberations removed personal benefit as a requirement for plunder. In not
requiring personal benefit, the Sandiganbayan quoted the following exchanges between Senator Enrile and Senator
Tañada, viz.:
Senator Emile. The word here, Mr. President, "such public officer or person who conspired or knowingly
benefited". One does not have to conspire or rescheme. The only element needed is that he "knowingly
benefited". A candidate for the Senate for instance, who received a political contribution from a plunderer, knowing
that the contributor is a plunderer and therefore, he knowingly benefited from the plunder, would he also suffer the
penalty, Mr. President, for life imprisonment?
Senator Tañada. In the committee amendments, Mr. President, we have deleted these lines 1 to 4 and part ofline 5,
on page 3. But, in a way, Mr. President, it is good that the Gentleman is bringing out these questions, I believe that
under the examples he has given, the Court will have to ...
Senator Emile. How about the wife, Mr. President, he may not agree with the plunderer to plunder the country but
because she is a dutiful wife or a faithful husband, she has to keep her or his vow of fidelity to the spouse. And, of
course, she enjoys the benefits out of the plunder. Would the Gentleman now impute to her or him the crime of
plunder simply because she or he knowingly benefited out of the fruits of the plunder and, therefore, he must suffer
or he must suffer the penalty of life imprisonment?
The President. That was stricken out already in the Committee amendment.
Senator Tañada. Yes, Mr. President. Lines l to 4 and part of line 5 were stricken out in the Committee amendment.
But, as I said, the eamples of the Minority Floor Leader are still worth spreading the Record. And, I believe that in
those examples, the Court will have just to take into consideration all the other circumstances prevailing in the case
and the evidence that will be submitted.
The President. In any event, 'knowingly benefited' has already been stricken off." 53
The exchanges between Senator Enrile and Senator Tañada reveal, therefore, that what was removed from the
coverage of the bill and the final version that eventually became the law was a person who was not the main
plunderer or a co-conspirator, but one who personally benefited from the plunderers' action. The requirement of
personal benefit on the part of the main plunderer or his co-conspirators by virtue of their plunder was not removed.
As a result, not only did the Prosecution fail to show where the money went but, more importantly, that
GMA and Aguas had personally benefited from the same. Hence, the Prosecution did not prove the
predicate act of raids on the public treasury beyond reasonable doubt.
V.
Summation
In view of the foregoing, the Court inevitably concludes that the Sandiganbayan completely ignored the failure of the
information to sufficiently charge conspiracy to commit plunder against the petitioners; and ignored the lack of
evidence establishing the corpus delicti of amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth in the total
amount of at least P50,000,000.00 through any or all of the predicate crimes. The Sandiganbayan thereby acted
capriciously, thus gravely abusing its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. To justify the issuance of the writ of certiorari, the abuse of discretion must be grave, as when the
54
power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and the abuse must
be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined, or to act at all, in contemplation of law, as to be equivalent to having acted without jurisdiction.
55
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petitions for certiorari; ANNULS and SETS ASIDE the resolutions issued in

Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174 by the Sandiganbayan on April 6, 2015 and September 10,
2015; GRANTS the petitioners' respective demurrers to evidence; DISMISSES Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-
0174 as to the petitioners GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO and BENIGNO AGUAS for insufficiency of
evidence; ORDERS the immediate release from detention of said petitioners; and MAKES no pronouncements on
costs of suit.
2.) B. April 18, 2017
G.R. No. 220598
GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE SANDIGANBAYAN, (First Division), Respondents
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN,, J.:
On July 19, 2016, the Court promulgated its decision, disposing:
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petitions for certiorari; ANNULS and SETS ASIDE the resolutions issued in

Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174 by the Sandiganbayan on April 6, 2015 and September 10,
2015; GRANTS the petitioners' respective demurrers to evidence; DISMISSES Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-
0174 as to the petitioners GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO and BENIGNO AGUAS for insufficiency of
evidence; ORDERS the immediate release from detention of said petitioners; and MAKES no pronouncements on
costs of suit.
SO ORDERED. 1
On August 3, 2016, the State, through the Office of the Ombudsman, has moved for the reconsideration of the
decision, submitting that:
I. THIS HONORABLE COURT'S GIVING DUE COURSE TO A CERTIORARI ACTION ASSAILING AN

INTERLOCUTORY ORDER DENYING DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE VIOLA TES RULE 119, SECTION 23 OF THE
RULES OF COURT, WHICH PROVIDES THAT AN ORDER DENYING THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE
SHALL NOT BE REVIEWABLE BY APPEAL OR BY CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ERRORS WHICH AMOUNT TO A VIOLATION OR
DEPRIVATION OF THE STATE'S FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
A. THE DECISION REQUIRES ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS IN THE PROSECUTION OF

PLUNDER, VIZ. IDENTIFICATION OF THE MAIN PLUNDERER AND PERSONAL BENEFIT TO
HIM/HER, BOTH OF WHICH ARE NOT PROVIDED IN THE TEXT OF REPUBLIC ACT (R.A.) NO. 7080.
B. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION WAS NOT FULLY TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT,
INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE IRREGULARITIES IN THE CONFIDENTIAL/INTELLIGENCE
FUND (CIF) DISBURSEMENT PROCESS, QUESTIONABLE PRACTICE OF CO-MINGLING OF
FUNDS AND AGUAS' REPORTS TO THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA) THAT BULK OF THE
PHP365,997,915.00 WITHDRAWN FROM THE PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE'S
(PCSO) CIF WERE DIVERTED TO THE ARROYO-HEADED OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT.
C. ARROYO AND AGUAS, BY INDISPENSABLE COOPERATION, IN CONSPIRACY WITH THEIR

COACCUSED IN SB-12-CRM-0174, COMMITTED PLUNDER VIA· A COMPLEX ILLEGAL SCHEME
WHICH DEFRAUDED PCSO IN HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS OF PESOS.
D. EVEN ASSUMING THAT THE ELEMENTS OF PLUNDER WERE NOT PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT, THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PEOPLE SHOWS, BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT, THAT ARROYO, AGUAS AND THEIR COACCUSED IN SB-12-CRM-0174 ARE
GUILTY OF MALVERSATION. 2
In contrast, the petitioners submit that the decision has effectively barred the consideration and granting of the
motion for reconsideration of the State because doing so would amount to the re-prosecution or revival of the
charge against them despite their acquittal, and would thereby violate the constitutional proscription against double
jeopardy.
Petitioner Gloria M. Macapagal-Arroyo (Arroyo) points out that the State miserably failed to prove the corpus
delicti of plunder; that the Court correctly required the identification of the main plunderer as well as personal benefit
on the part of the raider of the public treasury to enable the successful prosecution of the crime of plunder; that the
State did not prove the conspiracy that justified her inclusion in the charge; that to sustain the case for malversation
against her, in lieu of plunder, would violate her right to be informed of the accusation against her because the
information did not necessarily include the crime of malversation; and that even if the information did so, the
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy already barred the re-opening of the case for that purpose.
Petitioner Benigno B. Aguas echoes the contentions of Arroyo in urging the Com1 to deny the motion for
reconsideration.
In reply, the State avers that the prohibition against double jeopardy does not apply because it was denied its day in
court, thereby rendering the decision void; that the Court should re-examine the facts and pieces of evidence in
order to find the petitioners guilty as charged; and that the allegations of the information sufficiently included all that
was necessary to fully inform the petitioners of the accusations against them.
Ruling of the Court
The Court DENIES the motion for reconsideration for its lack of merit.
To start with, the State argues' that the consolidated petitions for certiorari were improper remedies in light of
Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court expressly prohibiting the review of the denial of their demurrer prior to
the judgment in the case either by appeal or by certiorari; that the Court has thereby limited its own power, which
should necessarily prevent the giving of due course to the petitions for certiorari, as well as the undoing of the order
denying the petitioners' demurrer to evidence; that the proper remedy under the Rules of Court was for the
petitioners to proceed to trial and to present their evidence-in-chief thereat; and that even if there had been grave
abuse of discretion attending the denial, the Court's certiorari powers should be exercised only upon the petitioners'
compliance with the stringent requirements of Rule 65, particularly with the requirement that there be no plain,
speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, which they did not establish.
Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, pertinently provides:
Section 23. Demurrer to evidence. – xxx
xxxx
The order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself shall not
be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before judgment. (n)
The argument of the State, which is really a repetition of its earlier submission, was squarely resolved in the
decision, as follows:
The Court holds that it should take cognizance of the petitions for certiorari because the Sandiganbayan, as shall
shortly be demonstrated, gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The special civil action for certiorari is generally not proper to assail such an interlocutory order issued by the trial
court because of the availability of another remedy in the ordinary course of law. Moreover, Section 23, Rule 119 of
the Rules of Court expressly provides that "the order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to
evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before judgment." It is not an
insuperable obstacle to this action, however, that the denial of the demurrers to evidence of the petitioners was an
interlocutory order that did not terminate the proceedings, and the proper recourse of the demurring accused was to
go to trial, and that in case of their conviction they may then appeal the conviction, and assign the denial as among
the errors to be reviewed. Indeed, it is doctrinal that the situations in which the writ of certiorari may issue should not
be limited, because to do so -
x x x would be to destroy its comprehensiveness and usefulness. So wide is the discretion of the com1 that authority
is not wanting to show that certiorari is more discretionary than either prohibition or mandamus. In the exercise of
oursuperintending control over other courts, we are to be guided by all the circumstances of each particular
case 'as the ends of justice may require.' So it is that the writ will be granted where necessary to prevent a
substantial wrong or to do substantial justice.
The Constitution itself has imposed upon the Court and the other courts of justice the duty to correct errors of
jurisdiction as a result of capricious, arbitrary, whimsical and despotic exercise of discretion by expressly
incorporating in Section 1 of Article VIII the following provision:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established
by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. The exercise of this power to correct grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government cannot be thwarted by rules of
procedure to the contrary or for the sake of the convenience of one side. This is because the Court has the
bounden constitutional duty to strike down grave abuse of discretion whenever and wherever it is
committed. Thus, notwithstanding the interlocutory character and effect of the denial of the demurrers to
evidence, the petitioners as the accused could avail themselves of the remedy of certiorari when the denial
was tainted with grave abuse of discretion. As we shall soon show, the Sandiganbayan as the trial court
was guilty of grave abuse of discretion when it capriciously denied the demurrers to evidence despite the
absence of competent and sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment for plunder, and despite the
absence of the factual bases to expect a guilty verdict. 3
We reiterate the foregoing resolution, and stress that the prohibition contained in Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules
of Court is not an insuperable obstacle to the review by the Court of the denial of the demurrer to evidence
through certiorari. We have had many rulings to that effect in the past. For instance, in Nicolas v.
Sandiganbayan, the Court expressly ruled that the petition for certiorari was the proper remedy to assail the denial
4
of the demurrer to evidence that was tainted with grave abuse of discretion or excess of jurisdiction, or oppressive
exercise of judicial authority.
Secondly, the State submits that its right to due process was violated because the decision imposed additional
elements for plunder that neither ' Republic Act No. 7080 nor jurisprudence had theretofore required, i.e., the
identification of the main plunderer, and personal benefit on the part of the accused committing the predicate crime
of raid on the public treasury. The State complains that it was not given the opportunity to establish such additional
elements; that the imposition of new elements fu1iher amounted to judicial legislation in violation of the doctrine of
separation of powers; that the Court nitpicked on the different infirmities of the information despite the issue
revolving only around the sufficiency of the evidence; and that it established all the elements of plunder beyond
reasonable doubt.
The State cites the plain meaning rule to highlight that the crime of plunder did not require personal benefit on the
part of the raider of the public treasury. It insists that the definition of raids on the public treasury, conformably with
the plain meaning rule, is the taking of public money through fraudulent or unlawful means, and such definition does
not require enjoyment or personal benefit on the part of plunderer or on the part of any of his co-conspirators for
them to be convicted for plunder.
The submissions of the State are unfounded.
The requirements for the identification of the main plunderer and for personal benefit in the predicate act of raids on
the public treasury have been written in R.A. No. 7080 itself as well as embedded in pertinent jurisprudence. This
we made clear in the decision, as follows:
A perusal of the information suggests that what the Prosecution sought to show was an implied conspiracy to
commit plunder among all of the accused on the basis of their collective actions prior to, during and after the implied
agreement. It is notable that the Prosecution did not allege that the conspiracy among all of the accused was by
express agreement, or was a wheel conspiracy or a chain conspiracy.
This was another fatal flaw of the Prosecution.
In its present version, under which the petitioners were charged, Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7080 (Plunder Law)
states:
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder: Penalties. - Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with
amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt criminal acts as
described in Section 1 (d) hereof in the aggregate amount or total value of at least Fifty million pesos
(₱50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any
favor of the State. [As Amended by Section 12, Republic Act No. 7659 (The Death Penalty Law)]
Section l(d) of Republic Act No. 7080 provides:
Section 1. Definition of terms. - As used in this Act, the term:
xxxx
d. "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business enterprise or material possession of any person within the
purview of Section two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents,
1. Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public
treasury;
2. By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any/or entity in
connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public officer
concerned;
3. By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or
any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities or government-owned or controlled corporations and
their subsidiaries;
4. By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of
interest or participation including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or
undertaking;
5. By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or

implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or
6. By taking undue advantage of official positi0n, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly
enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice
The law on plunder requires that a particular public officer must be identified as the one who amassed,
acquired or accumulated ill-gotten wealth because it plainly states that plunder is committed by any public
officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity,
business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth in
the aggregate amount or total value of at least ₱50,000,000.00 through a combination or series of overt
criminal acts as described in Section l(d) hereof. Surely, the law requires in the criminal charge for plunder
against several individuals that there must be a main plunderer and her co-conspirators, who may be
members of her family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordim1tes or other
persons. In other words, the allegation of the wheel conspiracy or express conspiracy in the information
was appropriate because the main plunderer would then be identified in either manner. Of course, implied
conspiracy could also identify the main plunderer, but that fact must be properly alleged and duly proven
by the Prosecution.
This interpretation is supported by Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, where the Court explained the nature of the
conspiracy charge and the necessity for the main plunderer for whose benefit the amassment, accumulation and
acquisition was made, thus:
acts have a commonality - to help the former President amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. Sub-
acquisition of ill-gotten wealth of and/or for former President Estrada. [bold underscoring supplied for
5
emphasis]
Indeed, because plunder is a crime that only a public official can commit by amassing, accumulating, or
acquiring ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or total value of at least ₱50,000,000.00, the
identification in the information of such public official as the main plunderer among the several individuals
thus charged is logically necessary under the law itself. In particular reference to Criminal Case No. SB-12-
CRM-0174, the individuals charged therein - including the petitioners - were 10 public officials; hence, it was only
proper to identify the main plunderer or plunderers among the 10 accused who herself or himself had amassed,
accumulated, or acquired ill-gotten wealth with the total value of at least ₱50,000,000.00.
The phrase raids on the public treasury as used in Section 1 (d) of R. A. No. 7080 is itself ambiguous. In order to
ascertain the objective meaning of the phrase, the act of raiding the public treasury cannot be divided into parts.
This is to differentiate the predicate act of raids on the public treasury from other offenses involving property, like
robbery, theft, or estafa. Considering that R.A. No. 7080 does not expressly define this predicate act, the Court has
necessarily resorted to statutory construction. In so doing, the Court did not adopt the State's submission that
personal benefit on the part of the accused need not be alleged and shown because doing so would have defeated
the clear intent of the law itself, which was to punish the amassing, accumulating, or acquiring of ill-gotten wealth in
6
the aggregate amount or total value of at least ₱150,000,000.00 by any combination or series of acts of
misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury.
As the decision has observed, the rules of statutory construction as well as the deliberations of Congress indicated
the intent of Congress to require personal benefit for the predicate act of raids on the public treasury, viz.:
The phrase raids on the public treasury is found in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080, which provides:
Section l .Definition of Terms. – xxx
xxxx
d) Ill-gotten wealth means any asset, prope1iy, business enterprise or material possession of any person within the
purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents,
1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury;
xxxx
To discern the proper import of the phrase raids on the public treasury, the key is to look at the
accompanying words: misappropriation, conversion, misuse or malversation of public funds. This process
is conformable with the maxim of statutory construction noscitur a sociis, by which the correct
construction of a particular word or phrase that is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various
meanings may be made by considering the company of the words in which the word or phrase is found or
with which it is associated. Verily, a word or phrase in a statute is always used in association with other
words or phrases, and its meaning may, therefore, be modified or restricted by the latter.
To convert connotes the act of using or disposing of another's property as if it were one's own; to
misappropriate means to own, to take something for one's own benefit; misuse means "a good, substance,
privilege, or right used improperly, unforcsccably, or not as intended;" and malversation occurs when "any public
officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the
same or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other
person to take such public funds, or property, wholly or partially." The common thread that binds all the four terms
together is that the public officer used the property taken. Considering that raids on the public treasury is in the
company of the four other terms that require the use of the property taken, the phrase raids on the public
treasury similarly requires such use of the property taken. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in
contending that the mere accumulation and gathering constituted the forbidden act of raids on the public
treasury. Pursuant to the maxim of noscitur a sociis, raids on the public treasury requires the raider to use the
property taken impliedly for his personal benefit.
7
The Prosecution asserts that the Senate deliberations removed personal benefit as a requirement for plunder. In not
requiring personal benefit, the Sandiganbayan quoted the following exchanges between Senator Enrile and Senator
Tafiada, viz.:
Senator Enrile. The word here, Mr. President, "such public officer or person who conspired or knowingly
benefited". One does not have to conspire or rescheme. The only element needed is that he "knowingly
benefited". A candidate for the Senate for instance, who received a political contribution from a plunderer, knowing
that the contributor is a plunderer and therefore, he knowingly benefited from the plunder, would he also suffer the
penalty, Mr. President, for life imprisonment?
Senator Tafiada. In the committee amendments, Mr. President, we have deleted these lines 1 to 4 and part of line 5,
on page 3. But, in a way, Mr. President, it is good that the Gentleman is bringing out these questions, I believe that
under the examples he has given, the Court will have to...
Senator Enrile. How about the wife, Mr. President, he may not agree with the plunderer to plunder the country but
because she is a dutiful wife or a faithful husband, she has to keep her or his vow of fidelity to the spouse. And, of
course, she enjoys the benefits out of the plunder. Would the Gentleman now impute to her or him the crime of
plunder simply because she or he knowingly benefited out of the fruits of the plunder and, therefore, he must suffer
or he must suffer the penalty of life imprisonment?
The President. That was stricken out already in the Committee amendment.
Senator Tañada. Yes, Mr. President. Lines 1 to 4 and part of line 5 were stricken out in the Committee amendment.
But, as I said, the examples of the Minority Floor Leader are still worth spreading the Record. And, I believe that in
those examples, the Court will have just to take into consideration all the other circumstances prevailing in the case
and the evidence that will be submitted.
The President. In any event, 'knowingly benefited' has already been stricken off."
The exchanges between Senator Enrile and Senator Tañada reveal, therefore, that what was removed from
the coverage of the bill and the final version that eventually became the law was a person who was not the
main plunderer or a co-conspirator, but one who personally benefited from the plunderers' action. The
requirement of personal benefit on the part of the main plunderer or his co-conspirators by virtue of their
plunder was not removed.
As a result, not only did the Prosecution fail to show where the money went but, more importantly, that GMA and
Aguas had personally benefited from the same. Hence, the Prosecution did not prove the predicate act of raids on
the public treasury beyond reasonable doubt. 8
Thirdly, the State contends that the Court did not appreciate the totality of its evidence, particularly the different
irregularities committed in the disbursement of the PCSO funds, i.e., the commingling of funds, the non-compliance
with LOI No. 1282, and the unilateral approval of the disbursements. Such totality, coupled with the fact of the
petitioners' indispensable cooperation in the pilfering of public funds, showed the existence of the conspiracy to
commit plunder among all of the accused.
The contention lacks basis.
As can be readily seen from the decision, the Court expressly granted the petitioners' respective demurrers to
evidence and dismissed the plunder case against them for insufficiency of evidence because:
x x x the Sandiganbayan as the trial court was guilty of grave abuse of discretion when it capriciously denied the
demurrers to evidence despite the absence of competent and sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment for
plunder, and despite the absence of the factual bases to expect a guilty verdict. 9
Such disposition of the Court fully took into consideration all the evidence adduced against the petitioners. We need
not rehash our review of the evidence thus adduced, for it is enough simply to stress that the Prosecution failed to
establish the corpus delicti of plunder - that any or all of the accused public officials, particularly petitioner Arroyo,
had amassed, accumulated, or acquired ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or total value of at least
₱50,000,000.00.
Fourthly, in accenting certain inadequacies of the allegations of the information, the Court did not engage in
purposeless nitpicking, and did not digress from the primary task of determining the sufficiency of the evidence
presented by the State against the petitioners. What the Court thereby intended to achieve was to highlight what
would have been relevant in the proper prosecution of plunder and thus enable itself to discern and determine
whether the evidence of guilt was sufficient or not. In fact, the Court categorically clarified that in discussing the
essential need for the identification of the main plunderer it was not harping on the sufficiency of the information, but
was only enabling itself to search for and to find the relevant proof that unequivocally showed petitioner Arroyo as
the "mastermind" - which was how the Sandiganbayan had characterized her participation - in the context of the
implied conspiracy alleged in the information. But the search came to naught, for the information contained nothing
that averred her commission of the overt act necessary to implicate her in the supposed conspiracy to commit the
crime of plunder. Indeed, the Court assiduously searched for but did not find the sufficient incriminatory evidence
against the petitioners. Hence, the Sandiganbayan capriciously and oppressively denied their demurrers to
evidence.
Fifthly, the State posits that it established at least a case for malversation against the petitioners.
Malversation is defined and punished under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, which reads thusly:
Article 217. Malversation of public funds or property; Presumption of malversation. - Any public officer who, by
reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same or shall take
or misappropriate or shall consent, through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such
public funds, or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of
such funds or property, shall suffer:
1. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved in the
misappropriation or malversation does not exceed two hundred pesos.
2. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount involved is more than two
hundred pesos but does not exceed six thousand pesos.
3. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period, if the
amount involved is more than six thousand pesos but is less than twelve thousand pesos.
4. The penalty of reclusion temporal, in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved is more
than twelve thousand pesos but is less than twenty-two thousand pesos. If the amount exceeds the latter,
the penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification and a
fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal to the total value of the property embezzled.
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable,
upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or
property to personal use. (As amended by RA 1060).
The elements of malversation are that: (a) the offender is an accountable public officer; (b) he/she is responsible for
the misappropriation of public funds or property through intent or negligence; and (c) he/she has custody of and
received such funds and property by reason of his/her office. 10
The information in Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174 avers:11
The undersigned Assistant Ombudsman and Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer III, Office of the
Ombudsman, hereby accuse GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ROSARIO C. URIARTE, SERGIO O. VALENCIA,
MANUEL L. MORATO, JOSE R. TARUC V, RAYMUNDO T. ROQUERO, MA. FATIMA AS. VALDES, BENIGNO B.
AGUAS, REYNALDO A. VILLAR and NILDA B. PLARAS, of the crime of PLUNDER, as defined by, and penalized
under Section 2 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7080, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, committed, as follows:
That during the period from January 2008 to June 2010 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, then the
President of the Philippines, ROSARIO C. URIARTE, then General Manager and Vice Chairman, SERGIO 0.
VALENCIA, then Chairman of the Board of Directors, MANUEL L. MORA TO, JOSE R. TARUC V, RAYMUNDO T.
ROQUERO, MA. FATIMA AS. VALDES, then members of the Board of Directors, BENIGNO B. AGUAS, then
Budget and Accounts Manager, all of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO), REYNALDO A. VILLAR,
then Chairman, and NILDA B. PLARAS, then Head of Intelligence/Confidential Fund Fraud Audit Unit, both of the
Commission on Audit, all public officers committing the offense in relation to their respective offices and taking
undue advantage of their respective official positions, authority, relationships, connections or influence, conniving,
conspiring and confederating with one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally 'amass,,
accumulate and/or acquire directly or indirectly, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or total value of THREE
HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE MILLION NINE HUNDRED NINETY SEVEN THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED FIFTEEN
PESOS (PHP365,997,915.00), more or less, through any or a combination or a series of overt or criminal acts, or
similar schemes or means, described as follows:
(a) diverting in several instances, funds from the operating budget of PCSO to its Confidential/Intelligence
Fund that could be accessed and withdrawn at any time with minimal restrictions, and converting, misusing,
and/or illegally conveying or transferring the proceeds drawn from said fund in the aforementioned sum, also
in several instances, to themselves, in the guise of fictitious expenditures, for their personal gain and benefit;
(b) raiding the public treasury by withdrawing and receiving, in several instances, the above-mentioned
amount from the Confidential/Intelligence Fund from PCSO's accounts, and or unlawfully transferring or
conveying the same into their possession and control through irregularly issued disbursement vouchers and
fictitious expenditures; and
(c) taking advantage of their respective official positions, authority, relationships, connections or influence, in
several instances, to unjustly enrich themselves in the aforementioned sum, at the expense of, and the
damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
In thereby averring the predicate act of malversation, the State did not sufficiently allege the aforementioned
essential elements of malversation in the information. The omission from the information of factual details
descriptive of the aforementioned elements of malversation highlighted the insufficiency of the allegations.
Consequently, the State's position is entirely unfounded.
Lastly, the petitioners insist that the consideration and granting of the motion for reconsideration of the State can
amount to a violation of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy because their acquittal under the
decision was a prior jeopardy within the context of Section 21, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution, to
wit:
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a
law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same
act.
The insistence of the petitioners is fully warranted. Indeed, the consideration and granting of the motion for
reconsideration of the State will amount to the violation of the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy.
The Court's consequential dismissal of Criminal Case No. SB-12- CRM-0174 as to the petitioners for insufficiency of
evidence amounted to their acquittal of the crime of plunder charged against them. In People v. Tan, the Court
12
shows why:
In People v. Sandiganbayan, this Com1 explained the general rule that the grant of a demurrer to evidence
operates as an acquittal and is, thus, final and unappealable, to wit:
The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is ''filed after tile prosecution had
rested its case," and when the same is granted, it calls "for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by the
prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of
the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused." Such dismissal of a criminal case by the
grant of demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would be to place the accused in double
jeopardy. The verdict being one of acquittal, the case ends there.
xxxx
The rule on double jeopardy, however, is not without exceptions. In People v. Laguio, Jr., this Court stated that the
only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion, thus:
... The only instance when double ,jeopardy will not attach is when the trial court acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to
present its case or where the trial was a sham. However, while certiorari may be availed of to correct an erroneous
acquittal, the petitioner in such an extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly
abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice. 13
The constitutional prohibition against placing a person under double jeopardy for the same offense bars not only a
new and independent prosecution but also an appeal in the same action after jeopardy had attached. As such,
14
every acquittal becomes final immediately upon promulgation and cannot be recalled for correction or amendment.

With the acquittal being immediately final, granting the State's motion for reconsideration in this case would violate
the Constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy because it would effectively reopen the prosecution and
subject the petitioners to a second jeopardy despite their acquittal.
It is cogent to remind in this regard that the Constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy provides to the
accused three related protections, specifically: protection against a second prosecution for the same offense after
acquittal; protection against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and protection against
multiple punishments for the same offense. The rationale for the three protections is expounded in United States v.
15
Wilson: 16
The interests underlying these three protections arc quite similar. When a defendant has been once
convicted and punished for a particular crime, principles of fairness and finality require that he not be
subjected to the possibility of further punishment by being again tried or sentenced for the same
offense. Ex pa rte Lange, 18 Wall 163 (1874); In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176 (1889). When a defendant has been
acquitted of an offense, the Clause guarantees that the State shall not be permitted to make repeated
attempts to convict him,
"thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal, and compelling him to live in a continuing
state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that, even though innocent, he may be
found guilty."
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-188 (1957).
The policy of avoiding multiple trials has been regarded as so important that exceptions to the principle
have been only grudgingly allowed. Initially, a new trial was thought to be unavailable after appeal, whether
requested by the prosecution or the defendant. See United States v. Gibert, 25 F. Cas. 1287 (No. 15,204) (CCD
Mass. 1834) (Story, J.). It was not until 1896 that it was made clear that a defendant could seek a new trial
after conviction, even though the Government enjoyed no similar right. United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662.
(Bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

3.) G.R. No. 148560 November 19, 2001
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
JOHN STUART MILL, in his essay On Liberty, unleashes the full fury of his pen in defense of the rights of the
individual from the vast powers of the State and the inroads of societal pressure. But even as he draws a sacrosanct
line demarcating the limits on individuality beyond which the State cannot tread - asserting that "individual
spontaneity" must be allowed to flourish with very little regard to social interference - he veritably acknowledges that
the exercise of rights and liberties is imbued with a civic obligation, which society is justified in enforcing at all cost,
against those who would endeavor to withhold fulfillment. Thus he says -
The sole end for which mankind is warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of
any of their number, is self-protection. The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.
Parallel to individual liberty is the natural and illimitable right of the State to self-preservation. With the end of
maintaining the integrity and cohesiveness of the body politic, it behooves the State to formulate a system of laws
that would compel obeisance to its collective wisdom and inflict punishment for non-observance.
The movement from Mill's individual liberalism to unsystematic collectivism wrought changes in the social order,
carrying with it a new formulation of fundamental rights and duties more attuned to the imperatives of contemporary
socio-political ideologies. In the process, the web of rights and State impositions became tangled and obscured,
enmeshed in threads of multiple shades and colors, the skein irregular and broken. Antagonism, often outright
collision, between the law as the expression of the will of the State, and the zealous attempts by its members to
preserve their individuality and dignity, inevitably followed. It is when individual rights are pitted against State
authority that judicial conscience is put to its severest test.
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining
and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), as amended by RA 7659, wishes to impress upon us that the assailed law is
1 2
so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally
infirm. He therefore makes a stringent call for this Court to subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of constitutionality
mainly because, according to him, (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the "reasonable
doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already
punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all of which are purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights
of the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Specifically, the provisions of the Plunder Law claimed by petitioner to have transgressed constitutional boundaries
are Secs. 1, par. (d), 2 and 4 which are reproduced hereunder:
Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business, enterprise or material possession of
any person within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies,
nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or series of the following means or
similar schemes:
(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public
treasury;
(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any other form
of pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or
by reason of the office or position of the public office concerned;
(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or
any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, or government owned or controlled corporations and
their subsidiaries;
(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of
interest or participation including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or
undertaking;
(5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or

(6) By taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich
himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the
Republic of the Philippines.
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties. - Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with
amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as
described in Section 1 (d) hereof, in the aggregate amount or total value of at least fifty million pesos
(P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any
the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances as provided by the Revised Penal Code shall be
favor of the State (underscoring supplied).
Section 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to
prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to
amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a
pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy (underscoring
supplied).
On 4 April 2001 the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan eight (8) separate Informations,
docketed as: (a) Crim. Case No. 26558, for violation of RA 7080, as amended by RA 7659; (b) Crim. Cases Nos.
26559 to 26562, inclusive, for violation of Secs. 3, par. (a), 3, par. (a), 3, par. (e) and 3, par. (e), of RA 3019 (Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), respectively; (c) Crim. Case No. 26563, for violation of Sec. 7, par. (d), of RA 6713
(The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees); (d) Crim. Case No. 26564, for
Perjury (Art. 183 of The Revised Penal Code); and, (e) Crim. Case No. 26565, for Illegal Use Of An Alias (CA No.
142, as amended by RA 6085).
On 11 April 2001 petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for the remand of the case to the Ombudsman for preliminary
investigation with respect to specification "d" of the charges in the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558; and, for
reconsideration/reinvestigation of the offenses under specifications "a," "b," and "c" to give the accused an
opportunity to file counter-affidavits and other documents necessary to prove lack of probable cause. Noticeably, the
grounds raised were only lack of preliminary investigation, reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses, and
opportunity to prove lack of probable cause. The purported ambiguity of the charges and the vagueness of the law
under which they are charged were never raised in that Omnibus Motion thus indicating the explicitness and
comprehensibility of the Plunder Law.
On 25 April 2001 the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No. 26558 finding that "a
probable cause for the offense of PLUNDER exists to justify the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused."
On 25 June 2001 petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan.
On 14 June 2001 petitioner moved to quash the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558 on the ground that the facts
alleged therein did not constitute an indictable offense since the law on which it was based was unconstitutional for
vagueness, and that the Amended Information for Plunder charged more than one (1) offense. On 21 June 2001 the
Government filed its Opposition to the Motion to Quash, and five (5) days later or on 26 June 2001 petitioner
submitted his Reply to the Opposition. On 9 July 2001 the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's Motion to Quash.
As concisely delineated by this Court during the oral arguments on 18 September 2001, the issues for resolution in
the instant petition for certiorari are: (a) The Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague; (b) The Plunder Law
requires less evidence for proving the predicate crimes of plunder and therefore violates the rights of the
accused to due process; and, (c) Whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so,
whether it is within the power of Congress to so classify it.
Preliminarily, the whole gamut of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of legislation is predicated on the basic
principle that a legislative measure is presumed to be in harmony with the Constitution. Courts invariably train their
3
sights on this fundamental rule whenever a legislative act is under a constitutional attack, for it is the postulate of
constitutional adjudication. This strong predilection for constitutionality takes its bearings on the idea that it is
forbidden for one branch of the government to encroach upon the duties and powers of another. Thus it has been
said that the presumption is based on the deference the judicial branch accords to its coordinate branch - the
legislature.
If there is any reasonable basis upon which the legislation may firmly rest, the courts must assume that the
legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and has passed the law with full
knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority.
Hence in determining whether the acts of the legislature are in tune with the fundamental law, courts should proceed
with judicial restraint and act with caution and forbearance. Every intendment of the law must be adjudged by the
courts in favor of its constitutionality, invalidity being a measure of last resort. In construing therefore the provisions
of a statute, courts must first ascertain whether an interpretation is fairly possible to sidestep the question of
constitutionality.
In La Union Credit Cooperative, Inc. v. Yaranon we held that as long as there is some basis for the decision of the
4
court, the constitutionality of the challenged law will not be touched and the case will be decided on other available
grounds. Yet the force of the presumption is not sufficient to catapult a fundamentally deficient law into the safe
environs of constitutionality. Of course, where the law clearly and palpably transgresses the hallowed domain of the
organic law, it must be struck down on sight lest the positive commands of the fundamental law be unduly eroded.
Verily, the onerous task of rebutting the presumption weighs heavily on the party challenging the validity of the
statute. He must demonstrate beyond any tinge of doubt that there is indeed an infringement of the constitution, for
absent such a showing, there can be no finding of unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if well-founded, will hardly
suffice. As tersely put by Justice Malcolm, "To doubt is to sustain." And petitioner has miserably failed in the
5
instant case to discharge his burden and overcome the presumption of constitutionality of the Plunder Law.
As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters which would enable
the accused to determine the nature of his violation. Section 2 is sufficiently explicit in its description of the acts,
conduct and conditions required or forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the crime with reasonable certainty
and particularity. Thus -
1. That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance with members of his family,
relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons;
2. That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of the
following overt or criminal acts: (a) through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public
funds or raids on the public treasury; (b) by receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share,
percentage, kickback or any other form of pecuniary benefits from any person and/or entity in connection
with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public officer; (c) by the
illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any of its
subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities of Government owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries; (d) by obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any
other form of interest or participation including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise
or undertaking; (e) by establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations
and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or
(f) by taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich
himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the
Republic of the Philippines; and,
3. That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or acquired is at
least ₱50,000,000.00.
As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are subject to it what
conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. It must sufficiently guide the judge in
its application; the counsel, in defending one charged with its violation; and more importantly, the accused, in
identifying the realm of the proscribed conduct. Indeed, it can be understood with little difficulty that what the
assailed statute punishes is the act of a public officer in amassing or accumulating ill-gotten wealth of at
least ₱50,000,000.00 through a series or combination of acts enumerated in Sec. 1, par. (d), of the Plunder
Law.
In fact, the amended Information itself closely tracks the language of the law, indicating with reasonable certainty the
various elements of the offense which petitioner is alleged to have committed:
"The undersigned Ombudsman, Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB, Office of the Ombudsman, hereby accuses
former PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Joseph Ejercito Estrada, a.k.a. 'ASIONG
SALONGA' and a.k.a. 'JOSE VELARDE,' together with Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Edward Serapio,
Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe
a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and John DOES & Jane Does, of the crime of Plunder, defined and penalized under R.A. No.
7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7659, committed as follows:
That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, by himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused, WHO ARE MEMBERS
OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES
AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY,
RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass,
accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount
or TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE
HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (₱4,097,804,173.17), more or
less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE
DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR
A combination OR A series of overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS, described as follows:
(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE

AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (₱545,000,000.00), MORE
OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK
OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connection with co-
accused CHARLIE 'ATONG' ANG, Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AND
JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL
GAMBLING;
(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating, converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY,

for HIS OR THEIR PERSONAL gain and benefit, public funds in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY
MILLION PESOS (₱130,000,000.00), more or less, representing a portion of the TWO HUNDRED MILLION
PESOS (₱200,000,000.00) tobacco excise tax share allocated for the province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No.
7171, by himself and/or in connivance with co-accused Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE
a.k.a. Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES & JANE
DOES; (italic supplied).
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT, the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE 351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCKS, MORE OR LESS,
and the Social Security System (SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK, MORE OR LESS, OF THE
BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO
MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY
CENTAVOS (₱1,102,965,607.50) AND MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR MILLION SIX
HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (₱744,612,450.00),
RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN
MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS
(₱1,847,578,057.50); AND BY COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY
HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR
PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (₱189,700,000.00)
MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN
THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE;'
(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES, PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS,

OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in
the amount of MORE OR LESS THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE
HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN
CENTAVOS (₱3,233,104,173.17) AND DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE
VELARDE' AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK."
We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous - as there is obviously none - that will confuse
petitioner in his defense. Although subject to proof, these factual assertions clearly show that the elements of the
crime are easily understood and provide adequate contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts. Upon
such unequivocal assertions, petitioner is completely informed of the accusations against him as to enable him to
prepare for an intelligent defense.
Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the terms
"combination" and "series" in the key phrase "a combination or series of overt or criminal acts" found in
Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word "pattern" in Sec. 4. These omissions, according to petitioner,
render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence, violative of his
fundamental right to due process.
The rationalization seems to us to be pure sophistry. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because
general terms are used therein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them; much less do we
6
have to define every word we use. Besides, there is no positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the
legislature to define each and every word in an enactment. Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its
will, and its inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or
ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is
distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law.
Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural,
plain and ordinary acceptation and signification, unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or
7
special legal meaning to those words. The intention of the lawmakers - who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists
8
and lexicographers - to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed. Thus, Webster's New
Collegiate Dictionary contains the following commonly accepted definition of the words "combination" and "series:"
Combination - the result or product of combining; the act or process of combining. To combine is to bring into such
close relationship as to obscure individual characters.
Series - a number of things or events of the same class coming one after another in spatial and temporal
succession.
That Congress intended the words "combination" and "series" to be understood in their popular meanings is
pristinely evident from the legislative deliberations on the bill which eventually became RA 7080 or the Plunder Law:
DELIBERATIONS OF THE BICAMERAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, 7 May 1991

REP. ISIDRO: I am just intrigued again by our definition of plunder. We say THROUGH A COMBINATION OR
SERIES OF OVERT OR CRIMINAL ACTS AS MENTIONED IN SECTION ONE HEREOF. Now when we say
combination, we actually mean to say, if there are two or more means, we mean to say that number one and two or
number one and something else are included, how about a series of the same act? For example, through
misappropriation, conversion, misuse, will these be included also?
REP. GARCIA: Yeah, because we say a series.
REP. ISIDRO: Series.
REP. GARCIA: Yeah, we include series.
REP. ISIDRO: But we say we begin with a combination.
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
REP. ISIDRO: When we say combination, it seems that -
REP. GARCIA: Two.
REP. ISIDRO: Not only two but we seem to mean that two of the enumerated means not twice of one enumeration.
REP. GARCIA: No, no, not twice.
REP. ISIDRO: Not twice?
REP. GARCIA: Yes. Combination is not twice - but combination, two acts.
REP. ISIDRO: So in other words, that’s it. When we say combination, we mean, two different acts. It cannot be a
repetition of the same act.
REP. GARCIA: That be referred to series, yeah.
REP. ISIDRO: No, no. Supposing one act is repeated, so there are two.
REP. GARCIA: A series.
REP. ISIDRO: That’s not series. Its a combination. Because when we say combination or series, we seem to say
that two or more, di ba?
REP. GARCIA: Yes, this distinguishes it really from ordinary crimes. That is why, I said, that is a very good
suggestion because if it is only one act, it may fall under ordinary crime but we have here a combination or series of
overt or criminal acts. So x x x x
REP. GARCIA: Series. One after the other eh di....
SEN. TANADA: So that would fall under the term "series?"
REP. GARCIA: Series, oo.
REP. ISIDRO: Now, if it is a combination, ano, two misappropriations....
REP. GARCIA: Its not... Two misappropriations will not be combination. Series.
REP. ISIDRO: So, it is not a combination?

REP. GARCIA: Yes.
REP. ISIDRO: When you say combination, two different?
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
SEN. TANADA: Two different.
REP. ISIDRO: Two different acts.
REP. GARCIA: For example, ha...
REP. ISIDRO: Now a series, meaning, repetition...
DELIBERATIONS ON SENATE BILL NO. 733, 6 June 1989
SENATOR MACEDA: In line with our interpellations that sometimes "one" or maybe even "two" acts may already
result in such a big amount, on line 25, would the Sponsor consider deleting the words "a series of overt or," to
read, therefore: "or conspiracy COMMITTED by criminal acts such as." Remove the idea of necessitating "a series."
Anyway, the criminal acts are in the plural.
SENATOR TANADA: That would mean a combination of two or more of the acts mentioned in this.
THE PRESIDENT: Probably two or more would be....
SENATOR MACEDA: Yes, because "a series" implies several or many; two or more.
SENATOR TANADA: Accepted, Mr. President x x x x
THE PRESIDENT: If there is only one, then he has to be prosecuted under the particular crime. But when we say
"acts of plunder" there should be, at least, two or more.
SENATOR ROMULO: In other words, that is already covered by existing laws, Mr. President.
Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it is referring to at least two (2) acts falling under
different categories of enumeration provided in Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g., raids on the public treasury in Sec. 1,
par. (d), subpar. (1), and fraudulent conveyance of assets belonging to the National Government under Sec.
1, par. (d), subpar. (3).
On the other hand, to constitute a series" there must be two (2) or more overt or criminal acts falling under
the same category of enumeration found in Sec. 1, par. (d), say, misappropriation, malversation and raids
on the public treasury, all of which fall under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1). Verily, had the legislature intended
a technical or distinctive meaning for "combination" and "series," it would have taken greater pains in
specifically providing for it in the law.
As for "pattern," we agree with the observations of the Sandiganbayan that this term is sufficiently defined in Sec. 4,
9
in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2 -
x x x x under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a 'pattern' consists of at least a combination or series of overt or criminal acts
enumerated in subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d). Secondly, pursuant to Sec. 2 of the law, the pattern of overt or
criminal acts is directed towards a common purpose or goal which is to enable the public officer to amass,
accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. And thirdly, there must either be an 'overall unlawful scheme' or 'conspiracy'
to achieve said common goal. As commonly understood, the term 'overall unlawful scheme' indicates a 'general
plan of action or method' which the principal accused and public officer and others conniving with him follow to
achieve the aforesaid common goal. In the alternative, if there is no such overall scheme or where the schemes or
methods used by multiple accused vary, the overt or criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy to attain a
common goal.
Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what it
seeks to penalize. Under the circumstances, petitioner's reliance on the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is manifestly
misplaced. The doctrine has been formulated in various ways, but is most commonly stated to the effect that a
statute establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary
intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of
legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by
construction.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the
Constitution in two (2) respects - it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted
by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its
provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. But the doctrine does not apply as against
10
legislations that are merely couched in imprecise language but which nonetheless specify a standard though
defectively phrased; or to those that are apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types of activities. The
first may be "saved" by proper construction, while no challenge may be mounted as against the second whenever
directed against such activities. With more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed statute is
11
clear and free from ambiguity, as in this case.
The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a
sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice. It 12
must be stressed, however, that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the
statute to be upheld - not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility,
rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly
delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed
in its provisions, especially where, because of the nature of the act, it would be impossible to provide all the details
in advance as in all other statutes.
Moreover, we agree with, hence we adopt, the observations of Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza during the
deliberations of the Court that the allegations that the Plunder Law is vague and overbroad do not justify a facial
review of its validity -
The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so
vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application,
violates the first essential of due process of law." The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that "a
13
governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the
area of protected freedoms." 14
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible
"chilling effect" upon protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no
readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the
transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on
overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could
not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity." The possible harm to society in permitting some
15
unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be
deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their
very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from
enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the
area of free speech.
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech cases. They are inapt
for testing the validity of penal statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
"we have not recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment." In Broadrick
16
v. Oklahoma, the Court ruled that "claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes
17
which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words" and, again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all,
have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected
conduct." For this reason, it has been held that "a facial challenge to a legislative act is the most difficult challenge to
mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act
would be valid." As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is
18
vague in all its possible applications. "A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot
complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others." 19
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on
their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. They
cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the
established rule is that "one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute
on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its
application might be unconstitutional." As has been pointed out, "vagueness challenges in the First Amendment
20
context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of
due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular defendant." Consequently, there is no basis
21
for petitioner's claim that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety.
Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them down entirely on the ground that they might be
applied to parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. It constitutes a departure from
22
the case and controversy requirement of the Constitution and permits decisions to be made without concrete factual
settings and in sterile abstract contexts. But, as the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out in Younger v. Harris
23 24
[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction of these deficiencies
before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the
relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the
speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes, . . . ordinarily results in a
kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they might be decided.
For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as "manifestly strong medicine," to be
employed "sparingly and only as a last resort," and is generally disfavored. In determining the constitutionality of a
25 26
statute, therefore, its provisions which are alleged to have been violated in a case must be examined in the light of
the conduct with which the defendant is charged. 27
In light of the foregoing disquisition, it is evident that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law, so tenaciously
claimed and argued at length by petitioner, is more imagined than real. Ambiguity, where none exists, cannot be
created by dissecting parts and words in the statute to furnish support to critics who cavil at the want of scientific
precision in the law. Every provision of the law should be construed in relation and with reference to every other
part. To be sure, it will take more than nitpicking to overturn the well-entrenched presumption of constitutionality and
validity of the Plunder Law. A fortiori, petitioner cannot feign ignorance of what the Plunder Law is all about. Being
one of the Senators who voted for its passage, petitioner must be aware that the law was extensively deliberated
upon by the Senate and its appropriate committees by reason of which he even registered his affirmative vote with
full knowledge of its legal implications and sound constitutional anchorage.
The parallel case of Gallego v. Sandiganbayan must be mentioned if only to illustrate and emphasize the point that
28
courts are loathed to declare a statute void for uncertainty unless the law itself is so imperfect and deficient in its
details, and is susceptible of no reasonable construction that will support and give it effect. In that case,
petitioners Gallego and Agoncillo challenged the constitutionality of Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act for being vague. Petitioners posited, among others, that the term "unwarranted" is highly imprecise
and elastic with no common law meaning or settled definition by prior judicial or administrative precedents; that, for
its vagueness, Sec. 3, par. (e), violates due process in that it does not give fair warning or sufficient notice of what it
seeks to penalize. Petitioners further argued that the Information charged them with three (3) distinct offenses, to
wit: (a) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through manifest partiality; (b) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through
evident bad faith; and, (c) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through gross inexcusable negligence while in the
discharge of their official function and that their right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against them was violated because they were left to guess which of the three (3) offenses, if not all, they were being
charged and prosecuted.
In dismissing the petition, this Court held that Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act does not
suffer from the constitutional defect of vagueness. The phrases "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith," and "gross
and inexcusable negligence" merely describe the different modes by which the offense penalized in Sec. 3, par. (e),
of the statute may be committed, and the use of all these phrases in the same Information does not mean that the
indictment charges three (3) distinct offenses.
The word 'unwarranted' is not uncertain. It seems lacking adequate or official support; unjustified; unauthorized
(Webster, Third International Dictionary, p. 2514); or without justification or adequate reason (Philadelphia
Newspapers, Inc. v. US Dept. of Justice, C.D. Pa., 405 F. Supp. 8, 12, cited in Words and Phrases, Permanent
Edition, Vol. 43-A 1978, Cumulative Annual Pocket Part, p. 19).
The assailed provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act consider a corrupt practice and make unlawful
the act of the public officer in:
x x x or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official,
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, x x
x (Section 3 [e], Rep. Act 3019, as amended).
It is not at all difficult to comprehend that what the aforequoted penal provisions penalize is the act of a public
officer, in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions, in giving any private party benefits,
advantage or preference which is unjustified, unauthorized or without justification or adequate reason, through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
In other words, this Court found that there was nothing vague or ambiguous in the use of the term "unwarranted" in
Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which was understood in its primary and general
acceptation. Consequently, in that case, petitioners' objection thereto was held inadequate to declare the section
unconstitutional.
On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly stretched theory that Sec. 4 of the Plunder Law
circumvents the immutable obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate
acts constituting the crime of plunder when it requires only proof of a pattern of overt or criminal acts
showing unlawful scheme or conspiracy -
SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove
each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate
or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal
acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.
The running fault in this reasoning is obvious even to the simplistic mind. In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in
all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the presumption of innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights, and unless the State succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the
accused is entitled to an acquittal. The use of the "reasonable doubt" standard is indispensable to command the
29
respect and confidence of the community in the application of criminal law. It is critical that the moral force of
criminal law be not diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being
condemned. It is also important in our free society that every individual going about his ordinary affairs has
confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense without convincing a proper
factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty. This "reasonable doubt" standard has acquired such exalted stature in
the realm of constitutional law as it gives life to the Due Process Clause which protects the accused against
conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he
is charged. The following exchanges between Rep. Rodolfo Albano and Rep. Pablo Garcia on this score during the
30
deliberations in the floor of the House of Representatives are elucidating -
DELIBERATIONS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON RA 7080, 9 October 1990
MR. ALBANO: Now, Mr. Speaker, it is also elementary in our criminal law that what is alleged in the information
must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. If we will prove only one act and find him guilty of the other acts
enumerated in the information, does that not work against the right of the accused especially so if the amount
committed, say, by falsification is less than ₱100 million, but the totality of the crime committed is ₱100 million since
there is malversation, bribery, falsification of public document, coercion, theft?
MR. GARCIA: Mr. Speaker, not everything alleged in the information needs to be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
What is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is every element of the crime charged. For example, Mr.
Speaker, there is an enumeration of the things taken by the robber in the information – three pairs of pants, pieces
of jewelry. These need not be proved beyond reasonable doubt, but these will not prevent the conviction of a crime
for which he was charged just because, say, instead of 3 pairs of diamond earrings the prosecution proved two.
Now, what is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is the element of the offense.
MR. ALBANO: I am aware of that, Mr. Speaker, but considering that in the crime of plunder the totality of the
amount is very important, I feel that such a series of overt criminal acts has to be taken singly. For instance, in the
act of bribery, he was able to accumulate only ₱50,000 and in the crime of extortion, he was only able to
accumulate ₱1 million. Now, when we add the totality of the other acts as required under this bill through the
interpretation on the rule of evidence, it is just one single act, so how can we now convict him?
MR. GARCIA: With due respect, Mr. Speaker, for purposes of proving an essential element of the crime, there is a
need to prove that element beyond reasonable doubt. For example, one essential element of the crime is that the
amount involved is ₱100 million. Now, in a series of defalcations and other acts of corruption in the enumeration the
total amount would be ₱110 or ₱120 million, but there are certain acts that could not be proved, so, we will sum up
the amounts involved in those transactions which were proved. Now, if the amount involved in these transactions,
proved beyond reasonable doubt, is ₱100 million, then there is a crime of plunder (underscoring supplied).
It is thus plain from the foregoing that the legislature did not in any manner refashion the standard quantum
of proof in the crime of plunder. The burden still remains with the prosecution to prove beyond any iota of
doubt every fact or element necessary to constitute the crime.
The thesis that Sec. 4 does away with proof of each and every component of the crime suffers from a dismal
misconception of the import of that provision. What the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is
only a number of acts sufficient to form a combination or series which would constitute a pattern and
involving an amount of at least ₱50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove each and every other act alleged
in the Information to have been committed by the accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. To illustrate, supposing that the accused is
charged in an Information for plunder with having committed fifty (50) raids on the public treasury. The
prosecution need not prove all these fifty (50) raids, it being sufficient to prove by pattern at least two (2) of
the raids beyond reasonable doubt provided only that they amounted to at least ₱50,000,000.00. 31
A reading of Sec. 2 in conjunction with Sec. 4, brings us to the logical conclusion that "pattern of overt or criminal
acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy" inheres in the very acts of accumulating, acquiring or
amassing hidden wealth. Stated otherwise, such pattern arises where the prosecution is able to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the predicate acts as defined in Sec. 1, par. (d). Pattern is merely a by-product of the proof of the
predicate acts. This conclusion is consistent with reason and common sense. There would be no other explanation
for a combination or series of overt or criminal acts to stash ₱50,000,000.00 or more, than "a scheme or conspiracy
to amass, accumulate or acquire ill gotten wealth." The prosecution is therefore not required to make a deliberate
and conscious effort to prove pattern as it necessarily follows with the establishment of a series or combination of
the predicate acts.
Relative to petitioner's contentions on the purported defect of Sec. 4 is his submission that "pattern" is "a very
important element of the crime of plunder;" and that Sec. 4 is "two pronged, (as) it contains a rule of evidence and a
substantive element of the crime," such that without it the accused cannot be convicted of plunder -
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, cannot an accused be convicted under the Plunder Law without applying
Section 4 on the Rule of Evidence if there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of the commission of the acts
complained of?
ATTY. AGABIN: In that case he can be convicted of individual crimes enumerated in the Revised Penal Code, but
not plunder.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, if all the elements of the crime are proved beyond reasonable doubt without
applying Section 4, can you not have a conviction under the Plunder Law?
ATTY. AGABIN: Not a conviction for plunder, your Honor.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: Can you not disregard the application of Sec. 4 in convicting an accused charged for
violation of the Plunder Law?
ATTY. AGABIN: Well, your Honor, in the first place Section 4 lays down a substantive element of the law x x x x
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: What I said is - do we have to avail of Section 4 when there is proof beyond reasonable
doubt on the acts charged constituting plunder?
ATTY. AGABIN: Yes, your Honor, because Section 4 is two pronged, it contains a rule of evidence and it contains a
substantive element of the crime of plunder. So, there is no way by which we can avoid Section 4.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: But there is proof beyond reasonable doubt insofar as the predicate crimes charged are
concerned that you do not have to go that far by applying Section 4?
ATTY. AGABIN: Your Honor, our thinking is that Section 4 contains a very important element of the crime of plunder
and that cannot be avoided by the prosecution. 32
We do not subscribe to petitioner's stand. Primarily, all the essential elements of plunder can be culled and
understood from its definition in Sec. 2, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and "pattern" is not one of them. Moreover, the
epigraph and opening clause of Sec. 4 is clear and unequivocal:
SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder x x x x
It purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of procedure for the prosecution of a criminal case for plunder. Being
a purely procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not define or establish any substantive right in favor of the accused but
only operates in furtherance of a remedy. It is only a means to an end, an aid to substantive law. Indubitably, even
without invoking Sec. 4, a conviction for plunder may be had, for what is crucial for the prosecution is to present
sufficient evidence to engender that moral certitude exacted by the fundamental law to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, even granting for the sake of argument that Sec. 4 is flawed and vitiated
for the reasons advanced by petitioner, it may simply be severed from the rest of the provisions without necessarily
resulting in the demise of the law; after all, the existing rules on evidence can supplant Sec. 4 more than enough.
Besides, Sec. 7 of RA 7080 provides for a separability clause -
Sec. 7. Separability of Provisions. - If any provisions of this Act or the application thereof to any person or
circumstance is held invalid, the remaining provisions of this Act and the application of such provisions to other
persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby.
Implicit in the foregoing section is that to avoid the whole act from being declared invalid as a result of the nullity of
some of its provisions, assuming that to be the case although it is not really so, all the provisions thereof should
accordingly be treated independently of each other, especially if by doing so, the objectives of the statute can best
be achieved.
As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza that plunder is a malum in se which
requires proof of criminal intent. Thus, he says, in his Concurring Opinion -
x x x Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must be proven in a
prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the crime of plunder was
committed "willfully, unlawfully and criminally." It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner.
In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the requirement of mens rea and that is the reason he claims
the statute is void, petitioner cites the following remarks of Senator Tañada made during the deliberation on S.B. No.
733:
SENATOR TAÑADA . . . And the evidence that will be required to convict him would not be evidence for each and
every individual criminal act but only evidence sufficient to establish the conspiracy or scheme to commit this crime
of plunder.33
However, Senator Tañada was discussing §4 as shown by the succeeding portion of the transcript quoted by
petitioner:
SENATOR ROMULO: And, Mr. President, the Gentleman feels that it is contained in Section 4, Rule of Evidence,
which, in the Gentleman's view, would provide for a speedier and faster process of attending to this kind of cases?
SENATOR TAÑADA: Yes, Mr. President . . . 34
Senator Tañada was only saying that where the charge is conspiracy to commit plunder, the prosecution need not
prove each and every criminal act done to further the scheme or conspiracy, it being enough if it proves beyond
reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or ciminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. As far as
the acts constituting the pattern are concerned, however, the elements of the crime must be proved and the
requisite mens rea must be shown.
Indeed, §2 provides that -
Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of
considered by the court.
The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to prosecutions
under the Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element of plunder since the degree
of responsibility of the offender is determined by his criminal intent. It is true that §2 refers to "any person who
participates with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder." There is
no reason to believe, however, that it does not apply as well to the public officer as principal in the crime. As Justice
Holmes said: "We agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they omit, but there is no
canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean." 35
Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be deemed to have been resolved in the
affirmative by the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it among the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death. Other heinous crimes are punished with death as a straight penalty in R.A. No. 7659. Referring to
these groups of heinous crimes, this Court held in People v. Echegaray: 36
The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their very nature, despicable, either
because life was callously taken or the victim is treated like an animal and utterly dehumanized as to completely
disrupt the normal course of his or her growth as a human being . . . . Seen in this light, the capital crimes of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom resulting in the death of the victim or the victim is raped,
tortured, or subjected to dehumanizing acts; destructive arson resulting in death; and drug offenses involving minors
or resulting in the death of the victim in the case of other crimes; as well as murder, rape, parricide, infanticide,
kidnapping and serious illegal detention, where the victim is detained for more than three days or serious physical
injuries were inflicted on the victim or threats to kill him were made or the victim is a minor, robbery with homicide,
rape or intentional mutilation, destructive arson, and carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant of the
carnapped vehicle is killed or raped, which are penalized by reclusion perpetua to death, are clearly heinous by their
very nature.
There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in the significance and implications of the subject criminal
acts in the scheme of the larger socio-political and economic context in which the state finds itself to be struggling to
develop and provide for its poor and underprivileged masses. Reeling from decades of corrupt tyrannical rule that
bankrupted the government and impoverished the population, the Philippine Government must muster the political
will to dismantle the culture of corruption, dishonesty, greed and syndicated criminality that so deeply entrenched
itself in the structures of society and the psyche of the populace. [With the government] terribly lacking the money to
provide even the most basic services to its people, any form of misappropriation or misapplication of government
funds translates to an actual threat to the very existence of government, and in turn, the very survival of the people it
governs over. Viewed in this context, no less heinous are the effects and repercussions of crimes like qualified
bribery, destructive arson resulting in death, and drug offenses involving government officials, employees or officers,
that their perpetrators must not be allowed to cause further destruction and damage to society.
The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se.
For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se and it does not
37
matter that such acts are punished in a special law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate
crimes are mainly mala in se. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat prosecutions for plunder as though they are mere
prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an ordinance against jaywalking, without
regard to the inherent wrongness of the acts.
To clinch, petitioner likewise assails the validity of RA 7659, the amendatory law of RA 7080, on constitutional
grounds. Suffice it to say however that it is now too late in the day for him to resurrect this long dead issue, the
same having been eternally consigned by People v. Echegaray to the archives of jurisprudential history. The
38
declaration of this Court therein that RA 7659 is constitutionally valid stands as a declaration of the State, and
becomes, by necessary effect, assimilated in the Constitution now as an integral part of it.
Our nation has been racked by scandals of corruption and obscene profligacy of officials in high places which have
shaken its very foundation. The anatomy of graft and corruption has become more elaborate in the corridors of time
as unscrupulous people relentlessly contrive more and more ingenious ways to bilk the coffers of the government.
Drastic and radical measures are imperative to fight the increasingly sophisticated, extraordinarily methodical and
economically catastrophic looting of the national treasury. Such is the Plunder Law, especially designed to
disentangle those ghastly tissues of grand-scale corruption which, if left unchecked, will spread like a malignant
tumor and ultimately consume the moral and institutional fiber of our nation. The Plunder Law, indeed, is a living
testament to the will of the legislature to ultimately eradicate this scourge and thus secure society against the
avarice and other venalities in public office.
These are times that try men's souls. In the checkered history of this nation, few issues of national importance can
equal the amount of interest and passion generated by petitioner's ignominious fall from the highest office, and his
eventual prosecution and trial under a virginal statute. This continuing saga has driven a wedge of dissension
among our people that may linger for a long time. Only by responding to the clarion call for patriotism, to rise above
factionalism and prejudices, shall we emerge triumphant in the midst of ferment.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as amended by RA
7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
4.) G.R. No. 148965 February 26, 2002
JOSE "JINGGOY" E. ESTRADA, petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
A law may not be constitutionally infirm but its application to a particular party may be unconstitutional. This is the
submission of the petitioner who invokes the equal protection clause of the Constitution in his bid to be excluded
from the charge of plunder filed against him by the respondent Ombudsman.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
In November 2000, as an offshoot of the impeachment proceedings against Joseph Ejercito Estrada, then President
of the Republic of the Philippines, five criminal complaints against the former President and members of his family,
his associates, friends and conspirators were filed with the respondent Office of the Ombudsman.
On April 4, 2001, the respondent Ombudsman issued a Joint Resolution finding probable cause warranting the filing
1
with the Sandiganbayan of several criminal Informations against the former President and the other respondents
therein. One of the Informations was for the crime of plunder under Republic Act No. 7080 and among the
respondents was herein petitioner Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada, then mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila.
The Information was amended and filed on April 18, 2001. Docketed as Criminal Case No. 26558, the case was
assigned to respondent Third Division of the Sandiganbayan. The arraignment of the accused was set on July 10,
2001 and no bail for petitioner’s provisional liberty was fixed.
On April 24, 2001, petitioner filed a "Motion to Quash or Suspend" the Amended Information on the ground that the
Anti-Plunder Law, R.A. No. 7080, is unconstitutional and that it charged more than one offense. Respondent
Ombudsman opposed the motion.
On April 25, 2001, the respondent court issued a warrant of arrest for petitioner and his co-accused. On its basis,
petitioner and his co-accused were placed in custody of the law.
On April 30, 2001, petitioner filed a "Very Urgent Omnibus Motion" alleging that: (1) no probable cause exists to put
2
him on trial and hold him liable for plunder, it appearing that he was only allegedly involved in illegal gambling and
not in a "series or combination of overt or criminal acts" as required in R.A. No. 7080; and (2) he is entitled to bail as
a matter of right. Petitioner prayed that he be excluded from the Amended Information and be discharged from
custody. In the alternative, petitioner also prayed that he be allowed to post bail in an amount to be fixed by
respondent court. 3
On June 28, 2001, petitioner filed a "Motion to Resolve Mayor Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada’s Motion To Fix Bail On
Grounds That An Outgoing Mayor Loses Clout An Incumbent Has And That On Its Face, the Facts Charged In The
Information Do Not Make Out A Non-Bailable Offense As To Him." 4
On July 3, 2001, petitioner filed a "Motion to Strike Out So-Called ‘Entry of Appearance,’ To Direct Ombudsman To
Explain Why He Attributes Impropriety To The Defense And To Resolve Pending Incidents." 5
On July 9, 2001, respondent Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying petitioner’s "Motion to Quash and
Suspend" and "Very Urgent Omnibus Motion." Petitioner’s alternative prayer to post bail was set for hearing after
6
arraignment of all accused. The court held:

"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby DENIES for lack of merit the following: (1) MOTION TO
QUASH AND SUSPEND dated April 24, 2001 filed by accused Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada; (2) MOTION TO QUASH
dated June 7, 2001 filed by accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada; and (3) MOTION TO QUASH (Re: Amended
Information dated 18 April 2001) dated June 26, 2001 filed by accused Edward S. Serapio.
Considering the denial of the MOTION TO QUASH AND SUSPEND of accused Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada, his VERY
URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION, praying that he be: (1) dropped from the information for plunder for want of probable
cause and (2) discharged from custody immediately which is based on the same grounds mentioned in this
MOTION TO QUASH AND SUSPEND is hereby DENIED. Let his alternative prayer in said OMNIBUS MOTION that
he be allowed to post bail be SET for hearing together with the petition for bail of accused Edward S. Serapio
scheduled for July 10, 2001, at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon after the arraignment of all the accused." 7
The following day, July 10, 2001, petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Resolution. Respondent court denied
the motion and proceeded to arraign petitioner. Petitioner refused to make his plea prompting respondent court to
enter a plea of "not guilty" for him.
8
Hence, this petition. Petitioner claims that respondent Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in:
"1) not declaring that R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional on its face and, as applied to petitioner, and denying
him the equal protection of the laws;
2) not holding that the Plunder Law does not provide complete and sufficient standards;
3) sustaining the charge against petitioner for alleged offenses, and with alleged conspirators, with which
and with whom he is not even remotely connected - contrary to the dictum that criminal liability is personal,
not vicarious - results in the denial of substantive due process;
4) not fixing bail for petitioner for alleged involvement in jueteng in one count of the information which
amounts to cruel and unusual punishment totally in defiance of the principle of proportionality." 9
We shall resolve the arguments of petitioner in seriatim.
I.
Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to him and denies him
the equal protection of the laws. 10
The contention deserves our scant attention. The constitutionality of R.A. No. 7080, the Anti-Plunder Law, has been
settled in the case of Estrada v. Sandiganbayan. We take off from the Amended Information which charged
11
petitioner, together with former President Joseph E. Estrada, Atty. Edward Serapio, Charlie "Atong" Ang, Yolanda T.
Ricaforte and others, with the crime of plunder as follows:
"AMENDED INFORMATION
The undersigned Ombudsman Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB Office of the Ombudsman, hereby
accuses former PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, Joseph Ejercito Estrada a.k.a. "ASIONG SALONGA"
AND a.k.a "JOSE VELARDE", together with Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada, Charlie ‘Atong’ Ang, Edward Serapio,
Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane
Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and John DOES & Jane Does, of the crime of Plunder, defined and penalized under
R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7659, committed as follows:
That during the period from June, 1998 to January, 2001, in the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A PUBLIC OFFICER, BEING THEN THE
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by
himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY,
RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR
OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY,
RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally
amass, accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate
amount OR TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS [P4,097,804,173.17], more or
less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE
DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR
A combination OR A series of overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS, described as
follows:
(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE

AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00), MORE
OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK
OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connivance with co-
accused CHARLIE ‘ATONG’ ANG, Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward
Serapio, AN (sic) JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in consideration OF TOLERATION OR
PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING;
(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating, converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR

INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR PERSONAL gain and benefit, public funds in the amount of ONE
HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS [P130,000,000.00], more or less, representing a portion of
the TWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS [P200,000,000] tobacco excise tax share allocated for the
Province of Ilocor Sur under R.A. No. 7171, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in CONNIVANCE with co-accused
Charlie ‘Atong’ Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy,
and Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES;
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT, the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE 351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCK MORE OR LESS,
and the Social Security System (SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK MORE OR LESS, OF THE
BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO
MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY
CENTAVOS [P1,102,965,607.50] AND MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR MILLION SIX
HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS [P744,612,450.00],
RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN
MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS
[P1,847,578,057.50]; AND BY COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY
HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR
PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS [P189,700,000.00],
MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN
THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME "JOSE VELARDE";
(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES, PERCENTAGES,

KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND
JANE DOES, in the amount of MORE OR LESS THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE
MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND
SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS [P3,233,104,173.17] AND DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT
NAME "JOSE VELARDE" AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Manila for Quezon City, Philippines, 18 April 2001" 12
Petitioner’s contention that R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional as applied to him is principally perched on the
premise that the Amended Information charged him with only one act or one offense which cannot
constitute plunder. He then assails the denial of his right to bail.
Petitioner’s premise is patently false. A careful examination of the Amended Information will show that it is
divided into three (3) parts: (1) the first paragraph charges former President Joseph E. Estrada with the
crime of plunder together with petitioner Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada, Charlie "Atong" Ang, Edward Serapio,
Yolanda Ricaforte and others; (2) the second paragraph spells out in general terms how the accused
conspired in committing the crime of plunder; and (3) the following four sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) describe
in detail the predicate acts constitutive of the crime of plunder pursuant to items (1) to (6) of R.A. No. 7080,
and state the names of the accused who committed each act.
Pertinent to the case at bar is the predicate act alleged in sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended
Information which is of "receiving or collecting, directly or indirectly, on several instances, money in the aggregate
amount of ₱545,000,000.00 for illegal gambling in the form of gift, share, percentage, kickback or any form of
pecuniary benefit x x x." In this sub-paragraph (a), petitioner, in conspiracy with former President Estrada, is
charged with the act of receiving or collecting money from illegal gambling amounting to ₱545 million. Contrary to
petitioner’s posture, the allegation is that he received or collected money from illegal gambling "on several
instances." The phrase "on several instances" means the petitioner committed the predicate act in
series. To insist that the Amended Information charged the petitioner with the commission of only one act or offense
despite the phrase "several instances" is to indulge in a twisted, nay, "pretzel" interpretation.
It matters little that sub-paragraph (a) did not utilize the exact words "combination" or "series" as they appear in R.A.
No. 7080. For in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, we held that where these two terms are to be taken in their popular,
13
not technical, meaning, the word "series" is synonymous with the clause "on several instances." "Series" refers to a
repetition of the same predicate act in any of the items in Section 1 (d) of the law. The word "combination"
contemplates the commission of at least any two different predicate acts in any of said items. Plainly, sub-
paragraph (a) of the Amended Information charges petitioner with plunder committed by a series of the
same predicate act under Section 1 (d) (2) of the law.
Similarly misleading is petitioner’s stand that in the Ombudsman Resolution of April 4, 2001 finding probable cause
to charge him with plunder together with the other accused, he was alleged to have received only the sum of P2
million, which amount is way below the minimum of P50 million required under R.A. No. 7080. The submission is not
borne out by the April 4, 2001 Resolution of the Ombudsman, recommending the filing of charges against petitioner
and his co-accused, which in pertinent part reads:
"x x x x x x x x x
Respondent Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada, the present Mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila, appears to have also
surreptitious collection of protection money from jueteng operations in Bulacan. This is gleaned from the statements
of Gov. Singson himself and the fact that Mayor Estrada, on at least two occasions, turned over to a certain
Emma Lim, an emissary of the respondent governor, jueteng haul totalling P2 million, i.e., P1 million in January,
2000 and another P1 million in February, 2000. An alleged "listahan" of jueteng recipients listed him as one "Jingle
Bell," as affirmed by Singson [TSN 8 & Dec. 2000 SICt/17 Oct. 2000 SBRC/SCI]." 14
Hence, contrary to the representations of the petitioner, the Ombudsman made the finding that P2 million was
delivered to petitioner as "jueteng haul" on "at least two occasions." The P2 million is, therefore, not the entire
sum with which petitioner is specifically charged. This is further confirmed by the conclusion of the Ombudsman
that:
"x x x x x x x x x
It is clear that Joseph Ejercito Estrada, in confabulation with Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada, Atty. Edward Serapio and
Yolanda Ricaforte, demanded and received, as bribe money, the aggregate sum of P545 million from jueteng
collections of the operators thereof, channeled thru Gov. Luis ‘Chavit’ Singson, in exchange for protection from
arrest or interference by law enforcers; x x x."
15
To be sure, it is too late in the day for the petitioner to argue that the Ombudsman failed to establish any probable
cause against him for plunder. The respondent Sandiganbayan itself has found probable cause against the
petitioner for which reason it issued a warrant of arrest against him. Petitioner then underwent arraignment and is
now on trial. The time to assail the finding of probable cause by the Ombudsman has long passed. The issue cannot
be resurrected in this petition.
II.
Next, petitioner contends that "the plunder law does not provide sufficient and complete standards to guide
the courts in dealing with accused alleged to have contributed to the offense." Thus, he posits the following
16
questions:
"For example, in an Information for plunder which cites at least ten criminal acts, what penalty do we impose on one
who is clearly involved in only one such criminal act? Is it reclusion perpetua? Or should it be a lesser penalty?
What if another accused is shown to have participated in three of the ten specifications, what would be the penalty
imposable, compared to one who may have been involved in five or seven of the specifications? The law does not
provide the standard or specify the penalties and the courts are left to guess. In other words, the courts are called to
say what the law is rather than to apply what the lawmaker is supposed to have intended." 17
Petitioner raises these hypothetical questions for he labors hard under the impression that: (1) he is charged with
only one act or offense and (2) he has not conspired with the other accused named in sub-paragraphs (b) to (d) of
the Amended Information, ergo, the penalty imposable on him ought to be different from reclusion perpetua to
death. R.A. No. 7080, he bewails, is cloudy on the imposable penalty on an accused similarly situated as he is.
Petitioner, however, overlooks that the second paragraph of the Amended Information charges him to have
conspired with former President Estrada in committing the crime of plunder. His alleged participation consists in the
commission of the predicate acts specified in sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended Information. If these allegations are
proven, the penalty of petitioner cannot be unclear. It will be no different from that of the former President for in
conspiracy, the act of one is the act of the other. The imposable penalty is provided in Section 2 of R.A. No.
7080, viz:
"Section 2. Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with the members of his family, relatives by affinity
or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten
wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1(d) hereof in the aggregate
amount or total value of at least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall
be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the said public officer in the
commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the
imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances,
as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the court."
III.
Petitioner also faults the respondent Sandiganbayan for "sustaining the charge against petitioner for
alleged offenses and with alleged conspirators, with which and with whom he is not even remotely
connected – contrary to the dictum that criminal liability is personal, not vicarious – results in the denial of
substantive due process." 18
The Solicitor General argues, on the other hand, that petitioner is charged not only with the predicate act in sub-
paragraph (a) but also with the other predicate acts in sub-paragraphs (b), (c) & (d) because he is indicted as a
principal and as co-conspirator of the former President. This is purportedly clear from the first and second
paragraphs of the Amended Information. 19
For better focus, there is a need to examine again the allegations of the Amended Information vis-à-vis the
provisions of R.A. No. 7080.
The Amended Information, in its first two paragraphs, charges petitioner and his other co-accused with the crime of
plunder. The first paragraph names all the accused, while the second paragraph describes in general how plunder
was committed and lays down most of the elements of the crime itself. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) describe in
detail the predicate acts that constitute the crime and name in particular the co-conspirators of former
President Estrada in each predicate act. The predicate acts alleged in the said four sub-paragraphs
correspond to the items enumerated in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080. Sub-paragraph (a) alleged the predicate
act of receiving, on several instances, money from illegal gambling, in consideration of toleration or protection of
illegal gambling, and expressly names petitioner as one of those who conspired with former President Estrada in
committing the offense. This predicate act corresponds with the offense described in item [2] of the enumeration in
Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080. Sub-paragraph (b) alleged the predicate act of diverting, receiving or
misappropriating a portion of the tobacco excise tax share allocated for the province of Ilocos Sur, which act is the
offense described in item [1] in the enumeration in Section 1 (d) of the law. This sub-paragraph does not mention
petitioner but instead names other conspirators of the former President. Sub-paragraph (c) alleged two predicate
acts - that of ordering the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and the Social Security System (SSS) to
purchase shares of stock of Belle Corporation, and collecting or receiving commissions from such purchase from the
Belle Corporation which became part of the deposit in the "Jose Velarde" account at the Equitable-PCI Bank. These
two predicate acts fall under items [2] and [3] in the enumeration of R.A. No. 7080, and was allegedly committed by
the former President in connivance with John Does and Jane Does. Finally, sub-paragraph (d) alleged the predicate
act that the former President unjustly enriched himself from commissions, gifts, kickbacks, in connivance with John
Does and Jane Does, and deposited the same under his account name "Jose Velarde" at the Equitable-PCI Bank.
This act corresponds to the offense under item [6] in the enumeration of Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080.
From the foregoing allegations of the Amended Information, it is clear that all the accused named in sub-paragraphs
(a) to (d), thru their individual acts, conspired with former President Estrada to enable the latter to amass,
accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount of P4,097,804,173.17. As the Amended
Information is worded, however, it is not certain whether the accused in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) conspired with
each other to enable the former President to amass the subject ill-gotten wealth. In light of this lack of clarity,
petitioner cannot be penalized for the conspiracy entered into by the other accused with the former President as
related in the second paragraph of the Amended Information in relation to its sub-paragraphs (b) to (d). We hold that
petitioner can be held accountable only for the predicate acts he allegedly committed as related in sub-paragraph
(a) of the Amended Information which were allegedly done in conspiracy with the former President whose design
was to amass ill-gotten wealth amounting to more than P4 billion.
We hasten to add, however, that the respondent Ombudsman cannot be faulted for including the predicate
acts alleged in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) of the Amended Information in one, and not in four, separate
Informations. A study of the history of R.A. No. 7080 will show that the law was crafted to avoid the mischief
and folly of filing multiple informations. The Anti-Plunder Law was enacted in the aftermath of the Marcos
regime where charges of ill-gotten wealth were filed against former President Marcos and his alleged
cronies. Government prosecutors found no appropriate law to deal with the multitude and magnitude of the
acts allegedly committed by the former President to acquire illegal wealth. They also found that under the
20
then existing laws such as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the Revised Penal Code and other
special laws, the acts involved different transactions, different time and different personalities. Every
transaction constituted a separate crime and required a separate case and the over-all conspiracy had to be
broken down into several criminal and graft charges. The preparation of multiple Informations was a legal
nightmare but eventually, thirty-nine (39) separate and independent cases were filed against practically the
same accused before the Sandiganbayan. R.A. No. 7080 or the Anti-Plunder Law was enacted precisely to
21 22
address this procedural problem. This is pellucid in the Explanatory Note to Senate Bill No. 733, viz:
"Plunder, a term chosen from other equally apt terminologies like kleptocracy and economic treason,
punishes the use of high office for personal enrichment, committed thru a series of acts done not in the
public eye but in stealth and secrecy over a period of time, that may involve so many persons, here and
abroad, and which touch so many states and territorial units. The acts and/or omissions sought to be
penalized do not involve simple cases of malversation of public funds, bribery, extortion, theft and graft but
constitute plunder of an entire nation resulting in material damage to the national economy. The above-
described crime does not yet exist in Philippine statute books. Thus, the need to come up with a legislation as a
safeguard against the possible recurrence of the depravities of the previous regime and as a deterrent to those with
similar inclination to succumb to the corrupting influence of power."
acts have a commonality—to help the former President amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. Sub-
acquisition of ill-gotten wealth of and/or for former President Estrada.
In the American jurisdiction, the presence of several accused in multiple conspiracies commonly involves two
structures: (1) the so-called "wheel" or "circle" conspiracy, in which there is a single person or group (the "hub")
dealing individually with two or more other persons or groups (the "spokes"); and (2) the "chain" conspiracy, usually
involving the distribution of narcotics or other contraband, in which there is successive communication and
cooperation in much the same way as with legitimate business operations between manufacturer and wholesaler,
then wholesaler and retailer, and then retailer and consumer. 23
From a reading of the Amended Information, the case at bar appears similar to a "wheel" conspiracy. The hub is
former President Estrada while the spokes are all the accused, and the rim that encloses the spokes is the common
goal in the overall conspiracy, i.e., the amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth.
IV.
Some of our distinguished colleagues would dismiss the charge against the petitioner on the ground that the
allegation of conspiracy in the Amended Information is too general. The fear is even expressed that it could serve as
a net to ensnare the innocent. Their dissents appear to be inspired by American law and jurisprudence.
We should not confuse our law on conspiracy with conspiracy in American criminal law and in common
law. Under Philippine law, conspiracy should be understood on two levels. As a general rule, conspiracy is
not a crime in our jurisdiction. It is punished as a crime only when the law fixes a penalty for its commission
such as in conspiracy to commit treason, rebellion and sedition. In contrast, under American criminal law,
the agreement or conspiracy itself is the gravamen of the offense. The essence of conspiracy is the
24
combination of two or more persons, by concerted action, to accomplish a criminal or unlawful purpose, or some
purpose not in itself criminal or unlawful, by criminal or unlawful means. Its elements are: agreement to accomplish
25
an illegal objective, coupled with one or more overt acts in furtherance of the illegal purpose; and requisite intent
necessary to commit the underlying substantive offense. 26
A study of the United States Code ought to be instructive. It principally punishes two (2) crimes of
conspiracy – conspiracy to commit any offense or to defraud the United States, and conspiracy to impede or injure
27
officer. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States is penalized under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 371, as 28
follows:
"Sec. 371. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States. If two or more persons conspire either to
commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner
or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons to any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be
fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
If, however, the offense, the commission of which is the object of the conspiracy, is a misdemeanor only, the
punishment for such conspiracy shall not exceed the maximum punishment provided for such misdemeanor."
Conspiracy to impede or injure officer is penalized under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 372, viz:
"Sec. 372. Conspiracy to impede or injure officer. If two or more persons in any State, Territory, Possession, or
District conspire to prevent, by force, intimidation, or threat, any person from accepting or holding any office, trust or
place of confidence under the United States, or from discharging any duties thereof, or to induce by like means any
officer of the United States to leave the place, where his duties as an officer are required to be performed, or to
injure him in his person or property on account of his lawful discharge of the duties of his office, or while engaged in
the lawful discharge thereof, or to injure his property so as to molest, interrupt, hinder, or impede him in the
discharge of his official duties, each of such persons shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more
than six years, or both."
Section 371 of 18 U.S.C. punishes two acts: (1) conspiracy to commit any offense against the United States; and
(2) conspiracy to defraud the United States or any agency thereof. The conspiracy to "commit any offense against
the United States" refers to an act made a crime by federal laws. It refers to an act punished by
29
statute. Undoubtedly, Section 371 runs the whole gamut of U.S. Federal laws, whether criminal or
30
regulatory. These laws cover criminal offenses such as perjury, white slave traffic, racketeering, gambling, arson,
31
murder, theft, bank robbery, etc. and also include customs violations, counterfeiting of currency, copyright violations,
mail fraud, lotteries, violations of antitrust laws and laws governing interstate commerce and other areas of federal
regulation. Section 371 penalizes the conspiracy to commit any of these substantive offenses. The offense
32
of conspiracy is generally separate and distinct from the substantive offense, hence, the court rulings that
33
acquittal on the substantive count does not foreclose prosecution and conviction for related conspiracy. 34
The conspiracy to "defraud the government" refers primarily to cheating the United States out of property or money.
It also covers interference with or obstruction of its lawful governmental functions by deceit, craft or trickery, or at
least by means that are dishonest. It comprehends defrauding the United States in any manner whatever, whether
35
the fraud be declared criminal or not. 36
The basic difference in the concept of conspiracy notwithstanding, a study of the American case law
on how conspiracy should be alleged will reveal that it is not necessary for the indictment to include
particularities of time, place, circumstances or causes, in stating the manner and means of effecting the
object of the conspiracy. Such specificity of detail falls within the scope of a bill of particulars. An indictment for
37
conspiracy is sufficient where it alleges: (1) the agreement; (2) the offense-object toward which the agreement
was directed; and (3) the overt acts performed in furtherance of the agreement. To allege that the defendants
38
conspired is, at least, to state that they agreed to do the matters which are set forth as the substance of their
conspiracy. To allege a conspiracy is to allege an agreement. The gist of the crime of conspiracy is unlawful
39
agreement, and where conspiracy is charged, it is not necessary to set out the criminal object with as great
a certainty as is required in cases where such object is charged as a substantive offense. 40
In sum, therefore, there is hardly a substantial difference on how Philippine courts and American courts
deal with cases challenging Informations alleging conspiracy on the ground that they lack particularities of
time, place, circumstances or causes. In our jurisdiction, as aforestated, conspiracy can be alleged in the
Information as a mode of committing a crime or it may be alleged as constitutive of the crime itself. When
conspiracy is alleged as a crime in itself, the sufficiency of the allegations in the Information charging the
offense is governed by Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. It requires that the
information for this crime must contain the following averments:
"Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information.- A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the
accused, the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense;
and the place where the offense was committed.
When the offense was committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or
information."
The complaint or information to be sufficient must state the name of the accused, designate the offense given by
statute, state the acts or omissions constituting the offense, the name of the offended party, the approximate
date of the commission of the offense and the place where the offense was committed.
Our rulings have long settled the issue on how the acts or omissions constituting the offense should be made in
order to meet the standard of sufficiency. Thus, the offense must be designated by its name given by statute or by
reference to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it. The information must also state the acts or
41
omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. The acts or omissions
42
complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know
what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. No information for a
43
crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. Every element
44
of the offense must be stated in the information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be included therein
45
must be determined by reference to the definitions and essentials of the specified crimes. The requirement of
46
alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against
him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The presumption is that the accused has no independent
knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. 47
To reiterate, when conspiracy is charged as a crime, the act of conspiring and all the elements of said crime
must be set forth in the complaint or information. For example, the crime of "conspiracy to commit treason" is
committed when, in time of war, two or more persons come to an agreement to levy war against the Government or
to adhere to the enemies and to give them aid or comfort, and decide to commit it. The elements of this crime are:
48
(1) that the offender owes allegiance to the Government of the Philippines; (2) that there is a war in which the
Philippines is involved; (3) that the offender and other person or persons come to an agreement to: (a) levy war
against the government, or (b) adhere to the enemies, to give them aid and comfort; and (4) that the offender and
other person or persons decide to carry out the agreement. These elements must be alleged in the information.
The requirements on sufficiency of allegations are different when conspiracy is not charged as a crime in
itself but only as the mode of committing the crime as in the case at bar. There is less necessity of reciting its
particularities in the Information because conspiracy is not the gravamen of the offense charged. The
conspiracy is significant only because it changes the criminal liability of all the accused in the conspiracy and makes
them answerable as co-principals regardless of the degree of their participation in the crime. The liability of the
49
conspirators is collective and each participant will be equally responsible for the acts of others, for the act of one is
50
the act of all. In People v. Quitlong, we ruled on how conspiracy as the mode of committing the
51 52
offense should be alleged in the Information, viz:
"x x x. In embodying the essential elements of the crime charged, the information must set forth the facts and
circumstances that have a bearing on the culpability and liability of the accused so that the accused can properly
prepare for and undertake his defense. One such fact or circumstance in a complaint against two or more accused
persons is that of conspiracy. Quite unlike the omission of an ordinary recital of fact which, if not excepted from or
objected to during trial, may be corrected or supplied by competent proof, an allegation, however, of conspiracy,
or one that would impute criminal liability to an accused for the act of another or others, is indispensable in
order to hold such person, regardless of the nature and extent of his own participation, equally guilty with
the other or others in the commission of the crime. Where conspiracy exists and can rightly be appreciated, the
individual acts done to perpetrate the felony becomes of secondary importance, the act of one being imputable to all
the others (People v. Ilano, 313 SCRA 442). Verily, an accused must know from the information whether he faces a
criminal responsibility not only for his acts but also for the acts of his co-accused as well.
A conspiracy indictment need not, of course, aver all the components of conspiracy or allege all the details
thereof, like the part that each of the parties therein have performed, the evidence proving the common
design or the facts connecting all the accused with one another in the web of the conspiracy. Neither is it
necessary to describe conspiracy with the same degree of particularity required in describing a substantive
offense. It is enough that the indictment contains a statement of facts relied upon to be constitutive of the
offense in ordinary and concise language, with as much certainty as the nature of the case will admit, in a
manner that can enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended, and with such
precision that the accused may plead his acquittal or conviction to a subsequent indictment based on the
same facts. It is said, generally, that an indictment may be held sufficient "if it follows the words of the statute and
reasonably informs the accused of the character of the offense he is charged with conspiring to commit, or, following
the language of the statute, contains a sufficient statement of an overt act to effect the object of the conspiracy, or
alleges both the conspiracy and the contemplated crime in the language of the respective statutes defining them
(15A C.J.S. 842-844).
x x x x x x x x x
x x x. Conspiracy arises when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony
and decide to commit it. Conspiracy comes to life at the very instant the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to
commit the felony and forthwith to actually pursue it. Verily, the information must state that the accused have
confederated to commit the crime or that there has been a community of design, a unity of purpose or an
agreement to commit the felony among the accused. Such an allegation, in the absence of the usual usage
of the words "conspired" or "confederated" or the phrase "acting in conspiracy," must aptly appear in the
information in the form of definitive acts constituting conspiracy. In fine, the agreement to commit the
crime, the unity of purpose or the community of design among the accused must be conveyed such
as either by the use of the term "conspire" or its derivatives and synonyms or by allegations of basic facts
constituting the conspiracy. Conspiracy must be alleged, not just inferred, in the information on which
basis an accused can aptly enter his plea, a matter that is not to be confused with or likened to the
adequacy of evidence that may be required to prove it. In establishing conspiracy when properly alleged, the
evidence to support it need not necessarily be shown by direct proof but may be inferred from shown acts and
conduct of the accused.
x x x x x x x x x."
Again, following the stream of our own jurisprudence, it is enough to allege conspiracy as a mode in the
commission of an offense in either of the following manner: (1) by use of the word "conspire," or its derivatives
or synonyms, such as confederate, connive, collude, etc; or (2) by allegations of basic facts constituting the
53
conspiracy in a manner that a person of common understanding would know what is intended, and with such
precision as would enable the accused to competently enter a plea to a subsequent indictment based on the same
facts.
54
The allegation of conspiracy in the information must not be confused with the adequacy of evidence that
may be required to prove it. A conspiracy is proved by evidence of actual cooperation; of acts indicative of an
agreement, a common purpose or design, a concerted action or concurrence of sentiments to commit the felony and
actually pursue it. A statement of this evidence is not necessary in the information.
55
In the case at bar, the second paragraph of the Amended Information alleged in general terms how the
accused committed the crime of plunder. It used the words "in connivance/conspiracy with his co-accused."
Following the ruling in Quitlong, these words are sufficient to allege the conspiracy of the accused with the former
President in committing the crime of plunder.
V.
We now come to petitioner’s plea for bail. On August 14, 2002, during the pendency of the instant petition before
this Court, petitioner filed with respondent Sandiganbayan an "Urgent Second Motion for Bail for Medical Reasons."
Petitioner prayed that he be allowed to post bail due to his serious medical condition which is life-threatening to him
if he goes back to his place of detention. The motion was opposed by respondent Ombudsman to which petitioner
1âwphi1
replied.
For three days, i.e., on September 4, 20 and 27, 2001, respondent Sandiganbayan conducted hearings on the
motion for bail. Dr. Roberto V. Anastacio, a cardiologist of the Makati Medical Center, testified as sole witness for
petitioner.
On December 18, 2001, petitioner filed with the Supreme Court an "Urgent Motion for Early/Immediate Resolution of
Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada’s Petition for Bail on Medical/Humanitarian Considerations." Petitioner reiterated the motion
for bail he earlier filed with respondent Sandiganbayan. 56
On the same day, we issued a Resolution referring the motion to respondent Sandiganbayan for resolution and
requiring said court to make a report, not later than 8:30 in the morning of December 21, 2001.
On December 21, 2001, respondent court submitted its Report. Attached to the Report was its Resolution dated
December 20, 2001 denying petitioner’s motion for bail for "lack of factual basis." Basing its finding on the earlier
57
testimony of Dr. Anastacio, the Sandiganbayan found that petitioner "failed to submit sufficient evidence to convince
the court that the medical condition of the accused requires that he be confined at home and for that purpose that
he be allowed to post bail."58
The crime of plunder is punished by R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Section 12 of R.A. No. 7659, with the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death. Under our Rules, offenses punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment are non-bailable when the evidence of guilt is strong, to wit:
"Sec. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. – No
person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be
admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution."59
Section 7, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is based on Section 13, Article III of the 1987
Constitution which reads:
"Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt
is strong, shall, before conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required."
The constitutional mandate makes the grant or denial of bail in capital offenses hinge on the issue of whether or
not the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong. This requires that the trial court conduct bail hearings wherein
both the prosecution and the defense are afforded sufficient opportunity to present their respective evidence. The
burden of proof lies with the prosecution to show strong evidence of guilt. 60
This Court is not in a position to grant bail to the petitioner as the matter requires evidentiary hearing that should be
conducted by the Sandiganbayan. The hearings on which respondent court based its Resolution of December 20,
2001 involved the reception of medical evidence only and which evidence was given in September 2001, five
months ago. The records do not show that evidence on petitioner’s guilt was presented before the lower court.
Upon proper motion of the petitioner, respondent Sandiganbayan should conduct hearings to determine if the
evidence of petitioner’s guilt is strong as to warrant the granting of bail to petitioner.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is dismissed for failure to show that the respondent Sandiganbayan acted without
or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
5.) G. R. No. 148468 - January 28, 2003
ATTY. EDWARD SERAPIO, Petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE DIRECTOR-GENERAL LEANDRO MENDOZA, Respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G. R. No. 148769 - January 28, 2003
EDWARD SERAPIO, Petitioner, vs. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G. R. No. 149116 - January 28, 2003
EDWARD SERAPIO, Petitioner, vs. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION) and PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court are two petitions for certiorari filed by petitioner Edward Serapio, assailing the resolutions of the
Third Division of the Sandiganbayan denying his petition for bail, motion for a reinvestigation and motion to quash,
and a petition for habeas corpus, all in relation to Criminal Case No. 26558 for plunder wherein petitioner is one of the
accused together with former President Joseph E. Estrada, Jose "Jinggoy" P. Estrada and several others.
The records show that petitioner was a member of the Board of Trustees and the Legal Counsel of the Erap
Muslim Youth Foundation, a non-stock, non-profit foundation established in February 2000 ostensibly for the
purpose of providing educational opportunities for the poor and underprivileged but deserving Muslim youth and
students, and support to research and advance studies of young Muslim educators and scientists.
Sometime in April 2000, petitioner, as trustee of the Foundation, received on its behalf a donation in the
amount of Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200 Million) from Ilocos Sur Governor Luis "Chavit" Singson
through the latter's assistant Mrs. Yolanda Ricaforte. Petitioner received the donation and turned over the
said amount to the Foundation's treasurer who later deposited it in the Foundation's account with the
Equitable PCI Bank.
In the latter part of the year 2000, Gov. Singson publicly accused then President Joseph E. Estrada and his cohorts of
engaging in several illegal activities, including its operation on the illegal numbers game known as jueteng. This
triggered the filing with the Office of the Ombudsman of several criminal complaints against Joseph Estrada, Jinggoy
Estrada and petitioner, together with other persons. Among such complaints were: Volunteers Against Crime and
Corruption, versus Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Edward Serapio, et al., docketed as OMB Crim. Case No. 0-00-1754; Graft
Free Philippines Foundation, Inc., versus Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Edward Serapio, et al., docketed as OMB Crim. Case
No. 0-00-1755; and Leonardo De Vera, Romeo T. Capulong and Dennis B. Funa, versus Joseph Estrada, Yolanda
Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, Raul De Guzman, Danilo Reyes and Mila Reforma, docketed as OMB Crim. Case No. 0-00-
1757.
Subsequently, petitioner filed his Counter-Affidavit dated February 21, 2001. The other respondents likewise filed their
respective counter-affidavits. The Office of the Ombudsman conducted a preliminary investigation of the complaints
and on April 4, 2001, issued a joint resolution recommending, inter alia, that Joseph Estrada, petitioner and several
others be charged with the criminal offense of plunder.
On April 4, 2001, the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan several Informations against former President
Estrada, who earlier had resigned from his post as President of the Republic of the Philippines. One of these
Informations, docketed as Criminal Case No. 26558, charged Joseph Estrada with plunder. On April 18, 2001, the
Ombudsman filed an amended Information in said case charging Estrada and several co-accused, including petitioner,
with said crime. No bail was recommended for the provisional release of all the accused, including petitioner. The case
was raffled to a special division which was subsequently created by the Supreme Court. The amended Information
reads:
"That during the period from June, 1998 to January, 2001, in the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A PUBLIC OFFICER BEING THEN THE PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused, WHO ARE
MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES
AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP,
CONNECTION OR INFLUENCE, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire BY
HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount OR TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION
NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN
CENTAVOS [P4,097,804,173.17], more or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE
EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES through ANY OR A
combination OR A series of overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS, described as follows:
(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF
FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00), MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE
FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in
connivance with co-accused CHARLIE 'ATONG' ANG, Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AND
JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES in consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING;
(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating, converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR
THEIR PERSONAL gain and benefit public fund in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS
(P130,000,000.00), more or less, representing a portion of the TWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS [P200,000,000.00])
tobacco excise tax share allocated for the Province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in
CONNIVANCE with co-accused Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos
Tan or Mr. Uy, and Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES;
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT, the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE, 351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCKS, MORE OR LESS, and the Social Security System
(SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK, MORE OR LESS, OF THE BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR
LESS ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVEN
PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS [P1,102,965,607.50] AND MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR MILLION SIX
HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS [P744,612,450.00], RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL
OR MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT
THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS [P1,847,578,057.50]; AND BY COLLECTING OR RECEIVING,
DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS
OR PERCENTAGES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS [189,700,000.00] MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME
PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME "JOSE VELARDE";
(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES, PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS OR ANY FORM
OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, the amount of MORE OR LESS THREE
BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE
PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS [P3,233,104,173.17] AND DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME
"JOSE VELARDE" AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK.
CONTRARY TO LAW."1
On April 5, 2001, petitioner obtained a copy of the Ombudsman's Joint Resolution finding probable cause against him
for plunder. The next day, April 6, 2001, he filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a Motion for Reconsideration
and/or Reinvestigation.2 Petitioner likewise filed on said date, this time with the Sandiganbayan, an Urgent Omnibus
Motion: (a) To Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest and Further Proceedings; (b) To Conduct a
Determination of Probable Cause; (c) For Leave to File Accused's Motion for Reconsideration and/or Reinvestigation;
and (d) To Direct the Ombudsman to Conduct a Reinvestigation of the Charges against accused Edward Serapio.3
On April 10, 2001, the Ombudsman issued an order denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration and/or
reinvestigation on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since the amended Information charging petitioner with plunder
had already been filed with the Sandiganbayan.4
In a parallel development, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution on April 25, 2001 in Criminal Case No. 26558
finding probable cause to justify the issuance of warrants of arrest for the accused, including petitioner. Accordingly,
the Sandiganbayan issued an Order on the same date for the arrest of petitioner.5 When apprised of said order,
petitioner voluntarily surrendered at 9:45 p.m. on the same day to Philippine National Police Chief Gen. Leandro
Mendoza. Petitioner has since been detained at Camp Crame for said charge.
The Sandiganbayan set the arraignment of the accused, including petitioner, in Criminal Case No. 26558 on June 27,
2001. In the meantime, on April 27, 2001, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan an Urgent Petition for Bail which
was set for hearing on May 4, 2001.6 For his part, petitioner's co-accused Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada filed on April 20,
2001 a Very Urgent Omnibus Motion alleging that he was entitled to bail as a matter of right.
During the hearing on May 4, 2001 on petitioner's Urgent Petition for Bail, the prosecution moved for the resetting of
the arraignment of the accused earlier than the June 27, 2001 schedule. However, the Sandiganbayan denied the
motion of the prosecution and issued an order declaring that the petition for bail can and should be
heard before petitioner's arraignment on June 27, 2001 and even before the other accused in Criminal Case No.
26558 filed their respective petitions for bail. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan set the hearing for the reception of
evidence on petitioner's petition for bail on May 21 to 25, 2001.
On May 17, 2001, four days before the hearing on petitioner's petition for bail, the Ombudsman filed an urgent motion
for early arraignment of Joseph Estrada, Jinggoy Estrada and petitioner and a motion for joint bail hearings of Joseph
Estrada, Jinggoy Estrada and petitioner. The following day, petitioner filed a manifestation questioning the propriety of
including Joseph Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada in the hearing on his (petitioner's) petition for bail.
The Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution on May 18, 2001 resetting the hearings on petitioner's petition for bail to June
18 to 28, 2001 to enable the court to resolve the prosecution's pending motions as well as petitioner's motion that his
petition for bail be heard as early as possible, which motion the prosecution opposed.
On May 31, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying petitioner's April 6, 2001 Urgent Omnibus Motion.
The court ruled that the issues posed by petitioner had already been resolved in its April 25, 2001 Resolution finding
probable cause to hold petitioner and his co-accused for trial.7 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the said
May 31, 2001 Resolution.
On June 1, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution requiring the attendance of petitioner as well as all the other
accused in Criminal Case No. 26558 during the hearings on the petitions for bail under pain of waiver of cross-
examination. The Sandiganbayan, citing its inherent powers to proceed with the trial of the case in the manner it
determines best conducive to orderly proceedings and speedy termination of the case, directed the other accused to
participate in the said bail hearing considering that under Section 8, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, whatever
evidence is adduced during the bail hearing shall be considered automatically reproduced at the trial.8
However, instead of proceeding with the bail hearing set by it on June 18, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued an Order
on June 15, 2001 canceling the said bail hearing due to pending incidents yet to be resolved and reset anew the
hearing to June 26, 2001.9
On the eve of said hearing, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of
its May 31, 2001 Resolution. The bail hearing on June 26, 2001 did not again proceed because on said date
petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to quash the amended Information on the grounds that
as against him, the amended Information does not allege a combination or series of overt or criminal acts
constitutive of plunder; as against him, the amended Information does not allege a pattern of criminal acts
indicative of an overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy; the money alleged in paragraph (a) of the amended
Information to have been illegally received or collected does not constitute "ill-gotten wealth" as defined in Section
1(d) of Republic Act No. 7080; and the amended Information charges him of bribery and illegal gambling.10 By way of
riposte, the prosecution objected to the holding of bail hearing until petitioner agreed to withdraw his motion to
quash. The prosecution contended that petitioner's motion to quash the amended Information was antithetical to his
petition for bail.
The Sandiganbayan reset the arraignment of accused and the hearing on the petition for bail of petitioner in Criminal
Case No. 26558 for July 10, 2001 to enable it to resolve the pending incidents and the motion to quash of petitioner.
However, even before the Sandiganbayan could resolve the pending motions of petitioner and the prosecution,
petitioner filed with this Court on June 29, 2001 a Petition for Habeas Corpus and Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No.
148468, praying that the Court declare void the questioned orders, resolutions and actions of the Sandiganbayan on
his claim that he was thereby effectively denied of his right to due process. Petitioner likewise prayed for the issuance
of a writ of habeas corpus; that the People be declared to have waived their right to present evidence in opposition to
his petition for bail; and, premised on the failure of the People to adduce strong evidence of petitioner's guilt of
plunder, that he be granted provisional liberty on bail after due proceedings.11
Meanwhile, on June 28, 2001, Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion praying that said court
resolve his motion to fix his bail.
On July 9, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying petitioner's motion to quash the amended
Information. Petitioner, through counsel, received on said date a copy of said resolution.12 The motion to fix bail filed
by Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada was also resolved by the Sandiganbayan.
On July 10, 2001, just before his arraignment in Criminal Case No. 26558, petitioner manifested to the
Sandiganbayan that he was going to file a motion for reconsideration of the July 9, 2001 Resolution denying his
motion to quash and for the deferment of his arraignment. The Sandiganbayan, however, declared that there was no
provision in the Rules of Court or in the Sandiganbayan's rules granting the right to petitioner to file a motion for the
reconsideration of an interlocutory order issued by it and ordered petitioner to orally argue his motion for
reconsideration. When petitioner refused, the Sandiganbayan proceeded with his arraignment. Petitioner refused to
plead, impelling the court to enter a plea of not guilty for him.
On July 20, 2001, petitioner filed with the Court a Petition for Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 148769,
alleging that the Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its July 9, 2001 Resolution denying his
motion to quash, notwithstanding the fact that material inculpatory allegations of the amended
Information against him do not constitute the crime of plunder; and that he is charged, under the said
amended Information, for more than one offense. Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada likewise filed petition for certiorari with
the Court docketed as G.R. No. 148965 for the nullification of a resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying his motion to
fix bail.
On August 9, 2001, petitioner filed with the Court another Petition for Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 149116,
assailing the Sandiganbayan's Resolution dated 31 May 2001 which denied his April 6, 2001 Urgent Omnibus Motion
and its June 25, 2001 Resolution denying his motion for reconsideration of its May 31, 2001 Resolution.
Re: G.R. No. 148769
Petitioner avers that:
THE SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, IN DENYING PETITIONER SERAPIO'S MOTION TO
QUASH NOTWITHSTANDING THAT
THE FACTS ALLEGED IN THE AMENDED INFORMATION AS AGAINST PETITIONER SERAPIO DO NOT
CONSTITUTE THE CRIME OF PLUNDER.
A The Amended Information, as against petitioner Serapio, does not allege a combination or series of
overt or criminal acts constitutive of plunder.
B The Amended Information, as against petitioner Serapio, does not allege a pattern of criminal acts
indicative of an overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.
C The money described in paragraph (a) of the Amended Information and alleged to have been illegally
received or collected does not constitute 'ill-gotten wealth' as defined in Section 1(d), Republic Act No.
7080, as amended.
II
THE AMENDED INFORMATION CHARGES MORE THAN ONE OFFENSE."13
Petitioner asserts that, on the face of the amended Information, he is charged with plunder only in paragraph (a)
which reads:
"(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT
OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00), MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN
THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in
connivance with co-accused CHARLIE 'ATONG' ANG, Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AND
JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING;"14
Petitioner asserts that there is no allegation in paragraph (a) of the amended Information of a
"combination or series of overt or criminal acts" constituting plunder as described in Section 1(d) of R.A.
7080 as amended. Neither does the amended Information allege "a pattern of criminal acts." He avers
that his single act of toleration or protection of illegal gambling impelled by a single criminal resolution
does not constitute the requisite "combination or series of acts" for plunder. He further claims that the
consideration consisting of gifts, percentages or kickbacks in furtherance of said resolution turned over to and
received by former President Joseph E. Estrada "on several occasions" does not cure the defect in the amended
information. Petitioner insists that on the face of the amended Information he is charged only with bribery
or illegal gambling and not of plunder.
Petitioner argues that the P540 million which forms part of the P4,097,804,173.17 amassed by former
President Joseph E. Estrada in confabulation with his co-accused is not ill-gotten wealth as defined in
Section 1(d) of R.A. 7080.
We do not agree with petitioner. Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that:
"Sec. 6 Sufficiency of complaint or information. A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the
accused, the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where
the offense was committed.
When the offense was committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or
information."15
The acts or omissions complained or must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged and enable the court to know the proper judgment.
The Information must allege clearly and accurately the elements of the crime charged. What facts and circumstances
are necessary to be included therein must be determined by reference to the definition and elements of the specific
crimes. The purpose of the requirement of alleging all the elements of the crime in the Information is to inform an
accused of the nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare for his defense.16 Another
purpose is to enable accused, if found guilty, to plead his conviction in a subsequent prosecution for the same
offense.17 The use of derivatives or synonyms or allegations of basic facts constituting the offense charged is
sufficient.18
In this case, the amended Information specifically alleges that all the accused, including petitioner,
connived and conspired with former President Joseph E. Estrada to commit plunder "through any or a
combination or a series of overt or criminal acts or similar schemes or means." And in paragraph (a) of
the amended Information, petitioner and his co-accused are charged with receiving or collecting, directly
or indirectly, on several instances money in the aggregate amount of P545,000,000.00. In Jose "Jinggoy"
Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division), et al.,19 we held that the word "series" is synonymous with
the clause "on several instances"; it refers to a repetition of the same predicate act in any of the items in
Section 1(d) of the law. We further held that the word "combination" contemplates the commission of at
least any two different predicate acts in any of the said items. We ruled that "plainly, subparagraph (a) of
the amended information charges accused therein, including petitioner, with plunder committed by a
series of the same predicate act under Section 1(d)(2) of the law" and that:
"x x x Sub-paragraph (a) alleged the predicate act of receiving, on several instances, money from illegal gambling, in
consideration of toleration or protection of illegal gambling, and expressly names petitioner as one of those who
conspired with former President Estrada in committing the offense. This predicate act corresponds with the offense
described in item [2] of the enumeration in Section 1(d) of R.A. No. 7080. x x x."20
It is not necessary to allege in the amended Information a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of
the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy because as Section 3 of R.A. 7080 specifically provides, the
same is evidentiary and the general rule is that matters of evidence need not be alleged in the
Information.21
The Court also ruled in Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan22 that the aggregate amount of P4,097,804,173.17
inclusive of the P545 million alleged in paragraph (a) of the amended information is ill-gotten wealth as contemplated
in Section 1, paragraph 1(d) of Republic Act 7080, as amended, and that all the accused in paragraph (a) to (d) of the
amended information conspired and confederated with former President Estrada to enable the latter to amass,
accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount of P4,097,804,173.17.
Under the amended Information, all the accused, including petitioner, are charged of having conspired and
confabulated together in committing plunder. When two or more persons conspire to commit a crime, each is
responsible for all the acts of others. In contemplation of law, the act of the conspirator is the act of each of
them.23 Conspirators are one man, they breathe one breath, they speak one voice, they wield one arm and the law
says that the acts, words and declarations of each, while in the pursuit of the common design, are the acts, words and
declarations of all.24
Petitioner asserts that he is charged under the amended information of bribery and illegal gambling and others. The
Sandiganbayan, for its part, held that petitioner is not charged with the predicate acts of bribery and illegal gambling
but is charged only with one crime that of plunder:
"THE ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT THE INFORMATION CHARGES MORE THAN ONE OFFENSE
According to the accused Estradas and Edward Serapio the information charges more than one offense,
namely, bribery (Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code), malversation of public funds or property (Article
217, Revised Penal Code) and violations of Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act (RA No. 3019) and Section 7(d) of RA
6713.
This contention is patently unmeritorious. The acts alleged in the information are not charged as separate
offenses but as predicate acts of the crime of plunder.
It should be stressed that the Anti-Plunder law specifically Section 1(d) thereof does not make any express reference
to any specific provision of laws, other than R.A. No. 7080, as amended, which coincidentally may penalize as a
separate crime any of the overt or criminal acts enumerated therein. The said acts which form part of the combination
or series of act are described in their generic sense. Thus, aside from 'malversation' of public funds, the law also uses
the generic terms 'misappropriation', 'conversion' or 'misuse' of said fund. The fact that the acts involved may
likewise be penalized under other laws is incidental. The said acts are mentioned only as predicate acts of
the crime of plunder and the allegations relative thereto are not to be taken or to be understood as
allegations charging separate criminal offenses punished under the Revised Penal Code, the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act and Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees."25
This Court agrees with the Sandiganbayan. It is clear on the face of the amended Information that petitioner and his
co-accused are charged only with one crime of plunder and not with the predicate acts or crimes of plunder. It bears
stressing that the predicate acts merely constitute acts of plunder and are not crimes separate and independent of the
crime of plunder. Resultantly then, the petition is dismissed.
Re: G.R. No. 149116
Petitioner assails the May 31, 2001 Joint Resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying his April 4, 2001 Urgent Omnibus
Motion contending that:
"GROUNDS FOR THE PETITION
THE SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN SUMMARILY DENYING PETITIONER SERAPIO'S URGENT
OMNIBUS MOTION AND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (RE: RESOLUTION DATED 31 MAY
2001), NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE OMBUDSMAN HAD TOTALLY DISREGARDED EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE AND
COMMITTED GRAVE AND MANIFEST ERRORS OF LAW SERIOUSLY PREJUDICIAL TO THE RIGHTS AND INTERESTS OF
PETITIONER SERAPIO, AND THERE IS NO PROBABLE CAUSE TO SUPPORT AN INDICTMENT FOR PLUNDER AS
AGAINST PETITIONER SERAPIO."26
Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying his omnibus motion to hold
in abeyance the issuance of a warrant for his arrest as well as the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 26558; to conduct
a determination of probable cause; and to direct the Ombudsman to conduct a reinvestigation of the charges him.
Petitioner asseverates that the Ombudsman had totally disregarded exculpatory evidence and committed grave abuse
of discretion in charging him with plunder. He further argues that there exists no probable cause to support an
indictment for plunder as against him.27
Petitioner points out that the joint resolution of the Ombudsman does not even mention him in relation to the
collection and receipt of jueteng money which started in 199828 and that the Ombudsman inexplicably arrived at the
conclusion that the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation was a money laundering front organization put up by Joseph
Estrada, assisted by petitioner, even though the latter presented evidence that said Foundation is a bona fide and
legitimate private foundation.29 More importantly, he claims, said joint resolution does not indicate that he knew that
the P200 million he received for the Foundation came from jueteng.30
Petitioner insists that he cannot be charged with plunder since: (1) the P200 million he received does not constitute
"ill-gotten wealth" as defined in Section 1(d) of R.A. No. 7080;31 (2) there is no evidence linking him to the collection
and receipt of jueteng money;32 (3) there was no showing that petitioner participated in a pattern of criminal acts
indicative of an overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, or that his
act of receiving the P200 million constitutes an overt criminal act of plunder.33
Petitioner argues further that his motion for reinvestigation is premised on the absolute lack of evidence to support a
finding of probable cause for plunder as against him,34 and hence he should be spared from the inconvenience, burden
and expense of a public trial.35
Petitioner also avers that the discretion of government prosecutors is not beyond judicial scrutiny. He asserts that
while this Court does not ordinarily look into the existence of probable cause to charge a person for an offense in a
given case, it may do so in exceptional circumstances, which are present in this case: (1) to afford adequate
protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; (2) for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid
oppression; (3) when the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; and (4) where the charges are
manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance.36 Petitioner claims that he raised proper grounds for a
reinvestigation by asserting that in issuing the questioned joint resolution, the Ombudsman disregarded evidence
exculpating petitioner from the charge of plunder and committed errors of law or irregularities which have been
prejudicial to his interest.37 He also states that during the joint preliminary investigations for the various charges
against Joseph Estrada and his associates, of which the plunder charge was only one of the eight charges against
Estrada et al., he was not furnished with copies of the other complaints nor given the opportunity to refute the
evidence presented in relation to the other seven cases, even though the evidence presented therein were also used
against him, although he was only charged in the plunder case.38
The People maintain that the Sandiganbayan committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's omnibus
motion. They assert that since the Ombudsman found probable cause to charge petitioner with the crime of plunder,
the Sandiganbayan is bound to assume jurisdiction over the case and to proceed to try the same. They further argue
that "a finding of probable cause is merely preliminary and prefatory of the eventual determination of guilt or
innocence of the accused," and that petitioner still has the chance to interpose his defenses in a full blown trial where
his guilt or innocence may finally be determined.39
The People also point out that the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's
omnibus motion asking for, among others, a reinvestigation by the Ombudsman, because his motion for
reconsideration of the Ombudsman's joint resolution did not raise the grounds of either newly discovered evidence, or
errors of law or irregularities, which under Republic Act No. 6770 are the only grounds upon which a motion for
reconsideration may be filed.40
The People likewise insist that there exists probable cause to charge petitioner with plunder as a co-conspirator of
Joseph Estrada.41
This Court does not agree with petitioner.
Case law has it that the Court does not interfere with the Ombudsman's discretion in the conduct of preliminary
investigations. Thus, in Raro vs. Sandiganbayan42 , the Court ruled:
"x x x. In the performance of his task to determine probable cause, the Ombudsman's discretion is paramount. Thus,
in Camanag vs. Guerrero, this Court said:
'x x x. (S)uffice it to state that this Court has adopted a policy of non-interference in the conduct of preliminary
investigations, and leaves to the investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the exercise of
determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence as will establish 'probable cause' for filing of information against
the supposed offender."
In Cruz, Jr. vs. People,43 the Court ruled thus:
"Furthermore, the Ombudsman's findings are essentially factual in nature. Accordingly, in assailing said findings on
the contention that the Ombudsman committed a grave abuse of discretion in holding that petitioner is liable for
estafa through falsification of public documents, petitioner is clearly raising questions of fact here. His arguments are
anchored on the propriety or error in the Ombudsman's appreciation of facts. Petitioner cannot be unaware that the
Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, more so in the consideration of the extraordinary writ of certiorari where neither
question of fact nor even of law are entertained, but only questions of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion. Insofar as the third issue is concerned, we find that no grave abuse of discretion has been committed by
respondents which would warrant the granting of the writ of certiorari."
Petitioner is burdened to allege and establish that the Sandiganbayan and the Ombudsman for that matter committed
grave abuse of discretion in issuing their resolution and joint resolution, respectively. Petitioner failed to discharge his
burden. Indeed, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan and the Ombudsman
in finding probable cause against petitioner for plunder. Neither did the Sandiganbayan abuse its discretion in denying
petitioner's motion for reinvestigation of the charges against him in the amended Information. In its Resolution of
April 25, 2001, the Sandiganbayan affirmed the finding of the Ombudsman that probable cause exists against
petitioner and his co-accused for the crime of plunder, thus:
"In the light of the foregoing and considering the allegations of the Amended Information dated 18 April 2001
charging the accused with the offense of PLUNDER and examining carefully the evidence submitted in support thereof
consisting of the affidavits and sworn statements and testimonies of prosecution witnesses and several other pieces of
documentary evidence, as well as the respective counter-affidavits of accused former President Joseph Estrada dated
March 20, 2001, Jose "Jinggoy" Pimentel Estrada dated February 20, 2001, Yolanda T. Ricaforte dated January 21,
2001 and Edward S. Serapio dated February 21, 2001, the Court finds and so holds that probable cause for the
offense of PLUNDER exists to justify issuance of warrants of arrest of accused former President Joseph Ejercito
Estrada, Mayor Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada, Charlie "Atong" Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, John
Doe a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan or Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, and Jane Doe a.k.a Delia Rajas."44
Likewise, in its Resolution dated May 31, 2001 of petitioner's omnibus motion, the Sandiganbayan noted that a
preliminary investigation was fully conducted in accordance with Rule II, Administrative Order No. 7 of the Office of
the Ombudsman, pursuant to Sections 18, 23 and 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989); and
that all the basic complaints and evidence in support thereof were served upon all the accused.45 It was in light of
such findings that the Sandiganbayan held that there was no basis for the allegation that accused therein (including
petitioner) were deprived of the right to seek a reconsideration of the Ombudsman's Resolution dated April 4, 2001
finding probable cause to charge them with plunder after the conduct of preliminary investigation in connection
therewith. In addition, the Sandiganbayan pointed out that petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the
Ombudsman's resolution, but failed to show in his motion that there were newly discovered evidence, or that the
preliminary investigation was tainted by errors of law or irregularities, which are the only grounds for which a
reconsideration of the Ombudsman's resolution may be granted.46
It bears stressing that the right to a preliminary investigation is not a constitutional right, but is merely a right
conferred by statute.47 The absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the Information or
otherwise render the same defective and neither does it affect the jurisdiction of the court over the case or constitute
a ground for quashing the Information.48 If the lack of a preliminary investigation does not render the Information
invalid nor affect the jurisdiction of the court over the case, with more reason can it be said that the denial of a
motion for reinvestigation cannot invalidate the Information or oust the court of its jurisdiction over the case. Neither
can it be said that petitioner had been deprived of due process. He was afforded the opportunity to refute the charges
against him during the preliminary investigation.
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is merely to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether
there is probable cause to believe that the person accused of the crime is probably guilty thereof and should be held
for trial.49 As the Court held in Webb vs. De Leon, "[a] finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence
showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspect. Probable cause
need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable
doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt.''50
Absent any showing of arbitrariness on the part of the prosecutor or any other officer authorized to conduct
preliminary investigation, courts as a rule must defer to said officer's finding and determination of probable cause,
since the determination of the existence of probable cause is the function of the prosecutor.51 The Court agrees with
the Sandiganbayan that petitioner failed to establish that the preliminary investigation conducted by the Ombudsman
was tainted with irregularity or that its findings stated in the joint resolution dated April 4, 2001 are not supported by
the facts, and that a reinvestigation was necessary.
Certiorari will not lie to invalidate the Sandiganbayan's resolution denying petitioner's motion for reinvestigation since
there is nothing to substantiate petitioner's claim that it gravely abused its discretion in ruling that there was no need
to conduct a reinvestigation of the case.52
The ruling in Rolito Go vs. Court of Appeals53 that an accused shall not be deemed to have waived his right to ask for a
preliminary investigation after he had been arraigned over his objection and despite his insistence on the conduct of
said investigation prior to trial on the merits does not apply in the instant case because petitioner merely prayed for a
reinvestigation on the ground of a newly-discovered evidence. Irrefragably, a preliminary investigation had been
conducted by the Ombudsman prior to the filing of the amended Information, and that petitioner had participated
therein by filing his counter-affidavit. Furthermore, the Sandiganbayan had already denied his motion for
reinvestigation as well as his motion for reconsideration thereon prior to his arraignment.54 In sum then, the petition is
dismissed.
Re: G.R. No. 148468
As synthesized by the Court from the petition and the pleadings of the parties, the issues for resolution are: (1)
Whether or not petitioner should first be arraigned before hearings of his petition for bail may be conducted; (2)
Whether petitioner may file a motion to quash the amended Information during the pendency of his petition for bail;
(3) Whether a joint hearing of the petition for bail of petitioner and those of the other accused in Criminal Case No.
26558 is mandatory; (4) Whether the People waived their right to adduce evidence in opposition to the petition for
bail of petitioner and failed to adduce strong evidence of guilt of petitioner for the crime charged; and (5) Whether
petitioner was deprived of his right to due process in Criminal Case No. 26558 and should thus be released from
detention via a writ of habeas corpus.
On the first issue, petitioner contends that the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction when it deferred the hearing of his petition for bail to July 10, 2001, arraigned him on
said date and entered a plea of not guilty for him when he refused to be arraigned. He insists that the Rules on
Criminal Procedure, as amended, does not require that he be arraigned first prior to the conduct of bail hearings since
the latter can stand alone and must, of necessity, be heard immediately.55 Petitioner maintains that his arraignment
before the bail hearings are set is not necessary since he would not plead guilty to the offense charged, as is evident
in his earlier statements insisting on his innocence during the Senate investigation of the jueteng scandal and the
preliminary investigation before the Ombudsman.56 Neither would the prosecution be prejudiced even if it would
present all its evidence before his arraignment because, under the Revised Penal Code, a voluntary confession of guilt
is mitigating only if made prior to the presentation of evidence for the prosecution,57 and petitioner admitted that he
cannot repudiate the evidence or proceedings taken during the bail hearings because Rule 114, Section 8 of the
Revised Rules of Court expressly provides that evidence present during bail hearings are automatically reproduced
during the trial.58 Petitioner likewise assures the prosecution that he is willing to be arraigned prior to the posting of a
bail bond should he be granted bail.59
The People insist that arraignment is necessary before bail hearings may be commenced, because it is only upon
arraignment that the issues are joined. The People stress that it is only when an accused pleads not guilty may he file
a petition for bail and if he pleads guilty to the charge, there would be no more need for him to file said petition.
Moreover, since it is during arraignment that the accused is first informed of the precise charge against him, he must
be arraigned prior to the bail hearings to prevent him from later assailing the validity of the bail hearings on the
ground that he was not properly informed of the charge against him, especially considering that, under Section 8,
Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, evidence presented during such proceedings are considered automatically
reproduced at the trial.60 Likewise, the arraignment of accused prior to bail hearings diminishes the possibility of an
accused's flight from the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan because trial in absentia may be had only if an accused
escapes after he has been arraigned.61 The People also contend that the conduct of bail hearings prior to arraignment
would extend to an accused the undeserved privilege of being appraised of the prosecution's evidence before he
pleads guilty for purposes of penalty reduction.62
Although petitioner had already been arraigned on July 10, 2001 and a plea of not guilty had been entered by the
Sandiganbayan on his behalf, thereby rendering the issue as to whether an arraignment is necessary before the
conduct of bail hearings in petitioner's case moot, the Court takes this opportunity to discuss the controlling precepts
thereon pursuant to its symbolic function of educating the bench and bar.63
The contention of petitioner is well-taken. The arraignment of an accused is not a prerequisite to the conduct of
hearings on his petition for bail. A person is allowed to petition for bail as soon as he is deprived of his liberty by
virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender.64 An accused need not wait for his arraignment before filing a petition for
bail.
In Lavides vs. Court of Appeals,65 this Court ruled on the issue of whether an accused must first be arraigned before
he may be granted bail. Lavides involved an accused charged with violation of Section 5(b) Republic Act No. 7610
(The Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act), an offense punishable
by reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua. The accused therein assailed, inter alia, the trial
court's imposition of the condition that he should first be arraigned before he is allowed to post bail. We held therein
that "in cases where it is authorized, bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise the accused may be
precluded from filing a motion to quash."66
However, the foregoing pronouncement should not be taken to mean that the hearing on a petition for bail should at
all times precede arraignment, because the rule is that a person deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or
voluntary surrender may apply for bail as soon as he is deprived of his liberty, even before a complaint or information
is filed against him.67 The Court's pronouncement in Lavides should be understood in light of the fact that the accused
in said case filed a petition for bail as well as a motion to quash the informations filed against him. Hence, we
explained therein that to condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would be to place him in a
position where he has to choose between (1) filing a motion to quash and thus delay his release on bail because until
his motion to quash can be resolved, his arraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the filing of a motion to quash
so that he can be arraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail. This would undermine his constitutional right
not to be put on trial except upon a valid complaint or Information sufficient to charge him with a crime and his right
to bail.68
It is therefore not necessary that an accused be first arraigned before the conduct of hearings on his application for
bail. For when bail is a matter of right, an accused may apply for and be granted bail even prior to arraignment. The
ruling in Lavides also implies that an application for bail in a case involving an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death may also be heard even before an accused is arraigned. Further, if the court finds in such case that
the accused is entitled to bail because the evidence against him is not strong, he may be granted provisional liberty
even prior to arraignment; for in such a situation, bail would be "authorized" under the circumstances. In fine, the
Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in ordering the
arraignment of petitioner before proceeding with the hearing of his petition for bail.
With respect to the second issue of whether petitioner may file a motion to quash during the pendency of his petition
for bail, petitioner maintains that a motion to quash and a petition for bail are not inconsistent, and may proceed
independently of each other. While he agrees with the prosecution that a motion to quash may in some instances
result in the termination of the criminal proceedings and in the release of the accused therein, thus rendering the
petition for bail moot and academic, he opines that such is not always the case; hence, an accused in detention
cannot be forced to speculate on the outcome of a motion to quash and decide whether or not to file a petition for bail
or to withdraw one that has been filed.69 He also insists that the grant of a motion to quash does not automatically
result in the discharge of an accused from detention nor render moot an application for bail under Rule 117, Section 5
of the Revised Rules of Court.70
The Court finds that no such inconsistency exists between an application of an accused for bail and his filing of a
motion to quash. Bail is the security given for the release of a person in the custody of the law, furnished by him or a
bondsman, to guarantee his appearance before any court as required under the conditions set forth under the Rules of
Court.71 Its purpose is to obtain the provisional liberty of a person charged with an offense until his conviction while at
the same time securing his appearance at the trial.72 As stated earlier, a person may apply for bail from the moment
that he is deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender.73
On the other hand, a motion to quash an Information is the mode by which an accused assails the validity of a
criminal complaint or Information filed against him for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which are
apparent in the face of the Information.74 An accused may file a motion to quash the Information, as a general rule,
before arraignment.75
These two reliefs have objectives which are not necessarily antithetical to each other. Certainly, the right of an
accused right to seek provisional liberty when charged with an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, or when charged with an offense punishable by such penalties but after due hearing, evidence of
his guilt is found not to be strong, does not preclude his right to assail the validity of the Information charging him
with such offense. It must be conceded, however, that if a motion to quash a criminal complaint or Information on the
ground that the same does not charge any offense is granted and the case is dismissed and the accused is ordered
released, the petition for bail of an accused may become moot and academic.
We now resolve the issue of whether or not it is mandatory that the hearings on the petitions for bail of petitioner and
accused Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada in Criminal Case No. 26558 and the trial of the said case as against former President
Joseph E. Estrada be heard jointly.
Petitioner argues that the conduct of joint bail hearings would negate his right to have his petition for bail resolved in
a summary proceeding since said hearings might be converted into a full blown trial on the merits by the
prosecution.76
For their part, the People claim that joint bail hearings will save the court from having to hear the same witnesses and
the parties from presenting the same evidence where it would allow separate bail hearings for the accused who are
charged as co-conspirators in the crime of plunder.77
In issuing its June 1, 2001 Order directing all accused in Criminal Case No. 26558 to participate in the bail hearings,
the Sandiganbayan explained that the directive was made was in the interest of the speedy disposition of the case. It
stated:
" x x x The obvious fact is, if the rest of the accused other than the accused Serapio were to be excused from
participating in the hearing on the motion for bail of accused Serapio, under the pretext that the same does not
concern them and that they will participate in any hearing where evidence is presented by the prosecution only if and
when they will already have filed their petitions for bail, or should they decide not to file any, that they will participate
only during the trial proper itself, then everybody will be faced with the daunting prospects of having to go through
the process of introducing the same witness and pieces of evidence two times, three times or four times, as many
times as there are petitions for bail filed. Obviously, such procedure is not conducive to the speedy termination of a
case. Neither can such procedure be characterized as an orderly proceeding."78
There is no provision in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure or the Rules of Procedure of the Sandiganbayan
governing the hearings of two or more petitions for bail filed by different accused or that a petition for bail of an
accused be heard simultaneously with the trial of the case against the other accused. The matter of whether or not to
conduct a joint hearing of two or more petitions for bail filed by two different accused or to conduct a hearing of said
petition jointly with the trial against another accused is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Unless
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction is shown, the Court will not interfere with the
exercise by the Sandiganbayan of its discretion.
It may be underscored that in the exercise of its discretion, the Sandiganbayan must take into account not only the
convenience of the State, including the prosecution, but also that of the accused and the witnesses of both the
prosecution and the accused and the right of accused to a speedy trial. The Sandiganbayan must also consider the
complexities of the cases and of the factual and legal issues involving petitioner and the other accused. After all, if this
Court may echo the observation of the United States Supreme Court, the State has a stake, with every citizen, in his
being afforded our historic individual protections, including those surrounding criminal prosecutions. About them, this
Court dares not become careless or complacent when that fashion has become rampant over the earth.79
It must be borne in mind that in Ocampo vs. Bernabe,80 this Court held that in a petition for bail hearing, the court is
to conduct only a summary hearing, meaning such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence
of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of the hearing which is merely to determine the weight of
evidence for purposes of bail. The court does not try the merits or enter into any inquiry as to the weight that ought
to be given to the evidence against the accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further
evidence may be offered therein. It may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial
matters, avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and cross-examination of witnesses, and reducing to
a reasonable minimum the amount of corroboration particularly on details that are not essential to the purpose of the
hearing.
A joint hearing of two separate petitions for bail by two accused will of course avoid duplication of time and effort of
both the prosecution and the courts and minimizes the prejudice to the accused, especially so if both movants for bail
are charged of having conspired in the commission of the same crime and the prosecution adduces essentially the
same evident against them. However, in the cases at bar, the joinder of the hearings of the petition for bail of
petitioner with the trial of the case against former President Joseph E. Estrada is an entirely different matter. For, with
the participation of the former president in the hearing of petitioner's petition for bail, the proceeding assumes a
completely different dimension. The proceedings will no longer be summary. As against former President Joseph E.
Estrada, the proceedings will be a full-blown trial which is antithetical to the nature of a bail hearing. Moreover,
following our ruling in Jose Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, supra where we stated that Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada can only be
charged with conspiracy to commit the acts alleged in sub-paragraph (a) of the amended Information since it is not
clear from the latter if the accused in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) thereof conspired with each other to assist Joseph
Estrada to amass ill-gotten wealth, we hold that petitioner can only be charged with having conspired with the other
co-accused named in sub-paragraph (a) by "receiving or collecting, directly or indirectly, on several instances, money
x x x from illegal gambling, x x x in consideration of toleration or protection of illegal gambling.81 Thus, with respect to
petitioner, all that the prosecution needs to adduce to prove that the evidence against him for the charge of plunder is
strong are those related to the alleged receipt or collection of money from illegal gambling as described in sub-
paragraph (a) of the amended Information. With the joinder of the hearing of petitioner's petition for bail and the trial
of the former President, the latter will have the right to cross-examine intensively and extensively the witnesses for
the prosecution in opposition to the petition for bail of petitioner. If petitioner will adduce evidence in support of his
petition after the prosecution shall have concluded its evidence, the former President may insist on cross-examining
petitioner and his witnesses. The joinder of the hearing of petitioner's bail petition with the trial of former President
Joseph E. Estrada will be prejudicial to petitioner as it will unduly delay the determination of the issue of the right of
petitioner to obtain provisional liberty and seek relief from this Court if his petition is denied by the respondent court.
The indispensability of the speedy resolution of an application for bail was succinctly explained by Cooley in his
treatise Constitutional Limitations, thus:
"For, if there were any mode short of confinement which would with reasonable certainty insure the attendance of the
accused to answer the accusation, it would not be justifiable to inflict upon him that indignity, when the effect is to
subject him in a greater or lesser degree, to the punishment of a guilty person, while as yet it is not determined that
he has not committed any crime."82
While the Sandiganbayan, as the court trying Criminal Case No. 26558, is empowered "to proceed with the trial of the
case in the manner it determines best conducive to orderly proceedings and speedy termination of the case,"83 the
Court finds that it gravely abused its discretion in ordering that the petition for bail of petitioner and the trial of former
President Joseph E. Estrada be held jointly. It bears stressing that the Sandiganbayan itself acknowledged in its May
4, 2001 Order the "pre-eminent position and superiority of the rights of [petitioner] to have the matter of his
provisional liberty resolved . . . without unnecessary delay,"84 only to make a volte face and declare that after all the
hearing of petition for bail of petitioner and Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada and the trial as against former President Joseph E.
Estrada should be held simultaneously. In ordering that petitioner's petition for bail to be heard jointly with the trial of
the case against his co-accused former President Joseph E. Estrada, the Sandiganbayan in effect allowed further and
unnecessary delay in the resolution thereof to the prejudice of petitioner. In fine then, the Sandiganbayan committed
a grave abuse of its discretion in ordering a simultaneous hearing of petitioner's petition for bail with the trial of the
case against former President Joseph E. Estrada on its merits.
With respect to petitioner's allegations that the prosecution tried to delay the bail hearings by filing dilatory motions,
the People aver that it is petitioner and his co-accused who caused the delay in the trial of Criminal Case No. 26558
by their filing of numerous manifestations and pleadings with the Sandiganbayan.85 They assert that they filed the
motion for joint bail hearing and motion for earlier arraignment around the original schedule for the bail hearings
which was on May 2125, 2001.86
They argue further that bail is not a matter of right in capital offenses.87 In support thereof, they cite Article III, Sec
13 of the Constitution, which states that
"All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong,
shall before conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law.
The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive
bail shall not be required."88
The People also cited Rule 114, Secs. 7 and 4 of the Revised Rules of Court which provide:
"Sec. 7 Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. No person
charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted
to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.
Sec. 4 Bail, a matter of right, exception. All persons in custody shall be admitted to bail as a matter of right, with
sufficient sureties, or released on recognizance as prescribed by law or this Rule x x x (b) and before conviction by the
Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment."89
Irrefragably, a person charged with a capital offense is not absolutely denied the opportunity to obtain provisional
liberty on bail pending the judgment of his case. However, as to such person, bail is not a matter of right but is
discretionary upon the court.90 Had the rule been otherwise, the Rules would not have provided for an application for
bail by a person charged with a capital offense under Rule 114, Section 8 which states:
"Sec. 8 Burden of proof in bail application. At the hearing of an application for bail filed by a person who is in custody
for the commission of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, the prosecution has
the burden of showing that the evidence of guilt is strong. The evidence presented during the bail hearing shall be
considered automatically reproduced at the trial but, upon motion of either party, the court may recall any witness for
additional examination unless the latter is dead, outside the Philippines, or otherwise unable to testify."91
Under the foregoing provision, there must be a showing that the evidence of guilt against a person charged with a
capital offense is not strong for the court to grant him bail. Thus, upon an application for bail by the person charged
with a capital offense, a hearing thereon must be conducted, where the prosecution must be accorded an opportunity
to discharge its burden of proving that the evidence of guilt against an accused is strong.92 The prosecution shall be
accorded the opportunity to present all the evidence it may deem necessary for this purpose.93 When it is satisfactorily
demonstrated that the evidence of guilt is strong, it is the court's duty to deny the application for bail. However, when
the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail becomes a matter of right.94
In this case, petitioner is not entitled to bail as a matter of right at this stage of the proceedings. Petitioner's claim
that the prosecution had refused to present evidence to prove his guilt for purposes of his bail application and that the
Sandiganbayan has refused to grant a hearing thereon is not borne by the records. The prosecution did not waive,
expressly or even impliedly, its right to adduce evidence in opposition to the petition for bail of petitioner. It must be
noted that the Sandiganbayan had already scheduled the hearing dates for petitioner's application for bail but the
same were reset due to pending incidents raised in several motions filed by the parties, which incidents had to be
resolved by the court prior to the bail hearings. The bail hearing was eventually scheduled by the Sandiganbayan on
July 10, 2001 but the hearing did not push through due to the filing of this petition on June 29, 2001.
The delay in the conduct of hearings on petitioner's application for bail is therefore not imputable solely to the
Sandiganbayan or to the prosecution. Petitioner is also partly to blame therefor, as is evident from the following list of
motions filed by him and by the prosecution:
Motions filed by petitioner:
Urgent Omnibus Motion, dated April 6, 2001, for (1) leave to file motion for reconsideration/reinvestigation and
to direct ombudsman to conduct reinvestigation; (2) conduct a determination of probable cause as would suggest the
issuance of house arrest; (3) hold in abeyance the issuance of warrant of arrest and other proceedings pending
determination of probable cause;
Motion for Early Resolution, dated May 24, 2001;
Urgent Motion to Hold in Abeyance Implementation or Service of Warrant of Arrest for Immediate Grant of bail
or For Release on Recognizance, dated April 25, 2001;
Urgent Motion to allow Accused Serapio to Vote at Obando, Bulacan, dated May 11, 2001;
Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, dated May 22, 2001, praying for Resolution of May 18, 2001 be set aside and
bail hearings be set at the earliest possible time;
Urgent Motion for Immediate Release on Bail or Recognizance, dated May 27, 2001;
Motion for Reconsideration of denial of Urgent Omnibus Motion, dated June 13, 2001, praying that he be allowed
to file a Motion for Reinvestigation; and
Motion to Quash, dated June 26, 2001.95
Motions filed by the prosecution:
Motion for Earlier Arraignment, dated May 8, 2001;96
Motion for Joint Bail Hearings of Accused Joseph Estrada, Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada and Edward Serapio, dated May
8, 2001;97
Opposition to the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and Omnibus Motion to Adjust Earlier Arraignment, dated
May 25, 2001;98 and
Omnibus Motion for Examination, Testimony and Transcription in Filipino, dated June 19, 2001.99
The other accused in Criminal Case No. 26558 also contributed to the aforesaid delay by their filing of the following
motions:
Motion to Quash or Suspend, dated April 24, 2001, filed by Jinggoy Estrada, assailing the constitutionality of
R.A. No. 7080 and praying that the Amended Information be quashed;
Very Urgent Omnibus Motion, dated April 30, 2001, filed by Jinggoy Estrada, praying that he be (1)excluded
from the Amended Information for lack of probable cause; (2) released from custody; or in the alternative, (3) be
allowed to post bail;
Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Place on House Arrest, dated April 25, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada,
praying that they be placed on house arrest during the pendency of the case;
Position Paper [re: House Arrest], dated May 2, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada;
Supplemental Position Paper [re: House Arrest], dated May 2, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada;
Omnibus Motion, dated May 7, 2001, filed by Joseph Estrada, praying by reinvestigation of the case by the
Ombudsman or the outright dismissal of the case;
Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Extension, dated May 2, 2001, filed by Jinggoy Estrada, requesting for five (5) days
within which to respond to the Opposition to Motion to Quash in view of the holidays and election-related distractions;
Opposition to Urgent Motion for Earlier Arraignment, dated May 10, 2001, filed by Joseph Estrada;
Omnibus Manifestation on voting and custodial arrangement, dated May 11, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy
Estrada, praying that they be placed on house arrest;
Manifestation regarding house arrest, dated May 6, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada;
Summation regarding house arrest, dated May 23, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada;
Urgent Manifestation & Motion, dated May 6, 2001 filed by Jinggoy Estrada;
Manifestation, dated May 28, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada, praying that they be allowed to be
confined in Tanay;
Motion to charge as Accused Luis "Chavit" Singson, filed by Joseph Estrada;
Omnibus Motion, dated June 11, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada, seeking reconsideration of denial of
requests for house arrest, for detention in Tanay or Camp Crame; motion for inhibition of Justice Badoy;
Urgent Motion to Allow Accused to Clear His Desk as Mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila, dated June 28, 2001, filed
by Jinggoy Estrada;
Motion for Reconsideration, dated June 9, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada, praying that the resolution
compelling them to be present at petitioner Serapio's hearing for bail be reconsidered;
Motion to Quash, dated June 7, 2001, filed by Joseph Estrada;
Still Another Manifestation, dated June 14, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada stating that Bishop
Teodoro Bacani favors their house arrest;
Manifestation, dated June 15, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada, waiving their right to be present at the
June 18 and 21, 2001 bail hearings and reserving their right to trial with assessors;
Omnibus Motion for Instructions: 30-Day House Arrest; Production, Inspection and Copying of Documents; and
Possible Trial with Assessors, dated June 19, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada;
Urgent Motion for Additional Time to Wind Up Affairs, dated June 20, 2001, filed by Jinggoy Estrada;
Manifestation, dated June 22, 2001, filed by Jinggoy Estrada, asking for free dates for parties, claiming that
denial of bail is cruel and inhuman, reiterating request for gag order of prosecution witnesses, availing of production,
inspection and copying of documents, requesting for status of alias case; and
Compliance, dated June 25, 2001, filed by Jinggoy Estrada, requesting for permission to attend some municipal
affairs in San Juan, Metro Manila.100
Furthermore, the Court has previously ruled that even in cases where the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence in
opposition to an application for bail by an accused charged with a capital offense, the trial court is still under duty to
conduct a hearing on said application.101 The rationale for such requirement was explained in Narciso vs. Sta.
Romana-Cruz (supra), citing Basco vs. Rapatalo:102
"When the grant of bail is discretionary, the prosecution has the burden of showing that the evidence of guilt against
the accused is strong. However, the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong, being a matter of
judicial discretion, remains with the judge. This discretion by the very nature of things, may rightly be exercised only
after the evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing. Since the discretion is directed to the weight of the
evidence and since evidence cannot properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or produced before the court, it is
obvious that a proper exercise of judicial discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be submitted to the court, the
petitioner having the right of cross-examination and to introduce his own evidence in rebuttal."103
Accordingly, petitioner cannot be released from detention until the Sandiganbayan conducts a hearing of his
application for bail and resolve the same in his favor. Even then, there must first be a finding that the evidence
against petitioner is not strong before he may be granted bail.
Anent the issue of the propriety of the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus for petitioner, he contends that he is
entitled to the issuance of said writ because the State, through the prosecution's refusal to present evidence and by
the Sandiganbayan's refusal to grant a bail hearing, has failed to discharge its burden of proving that as against him,
evidence of guilt for the capital offense of plunder is strong. Petitioner contends that the prosecution launched "a
seemingly endless barrage of obstructive and dilatory moves" to prevent the conduct of bail hearings. Specifically, the
prosecution moved for petitioner's arraignment before the commencement of bail hearings and insisted on joint bail
hearings for petitioner, Joseph Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada despite the fact that it was only petitioner who asked for a
bail hearing; manifested that it would present its evidence as if it is the presentation of the evidence in chief, meaning
that the bail hearings would be concluded only after the prosecution presented its entire case upon the accused; and
argued that petitioner's motion to quash and his petition for bail are inconsistent, and therefore, petitioner should
choose to pursue only one of these two remedies.104 He further claims that the Sandiganbayan, through its questioned
orders and resolutions postponing the bail hearings effectively denied him of his right to bail and to due process of
law.105
Petitioner also maintains that the issuance by the Sandiganbayan of new orders canceling the bail hearings which it
had earlier set did not render moot and academic the petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, since said
orders have resulted in a continuing deprivation of petitioner's right to bail.106 He argues further that the fact that he
was arrested and is detained pursuant to valid process does not by itself negate the efficacy of the remedy of habeas
corpus. In support of his contention, petitioner cites Moncupa vs. Enrile,107 where the Court held that habeas
corpus extends to instances where the detention, while valid from its inception, has later become arbitrary.108
However, the People insist that habeas corpus is not proper because petitioner was arrested pursuant to the amended
information which was earlier filed in court,109 the warrant of arrest issuant pursuant thereto was valid, and petitioner
voluntarily surrendered to the authorities.110
As a general rule, the writ of habeas corpus will not issue where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty in
custody of an officer under a process issued by the court which jurisdiction to do so.111 In exceptional
circumstances, habeas corpus may be granted by the courts even when the person concerned is detained pursuant to
a valid arrest or his voluntary surrender, for this writ of liberty is recognized as "the fundamental instrument for
safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action" due to "its ability to cut through barriers of
form and procedural mazes."112 Thus, in previous cases, we issued the writ where the deprivation of liberty, while
initially valid under the law, had later become invalid,113 and even though the persons praying for its issuance were
not completely deprived of their liberty.114
The Court finds no basis for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus in favor of petitioner. The general rule
that habeas corpus does not lie where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer
under process issued by a court which had jurisdiction to issue the same115 applies, because petitioner is under
detention pursuant to the order of arrest issued by the Sandiganbayan on April 25, 2001 after the filing by the
Ombudsman of the amended information for plunder against petitioner and his co-accused. Petitioner had in fact
voluntarily surrendered himself to the authorities on April 25, 2001 upon learning that a warrant for his arrest had
been issued.
The ruling in Moncupa vs. Enrile116 that habeas corpus will lie where the deprivation of liberty which was initially valid
has become arbitrary in view of subsequent developments finds no application in the present case because the
hearing on petitioner's application for bail has yet to commence. As stated earlier, they delay in the hearing of
petitioner's petition for bail cannot be pinned solely on the Sandiganbayan or on the prosecution for that matter.
Petitioner himself is partly to be blamed. Moreover, a petition for habeas corpus is not the appropriate remedy for
asserting one's right to bail.117 It cannot be availed of where accused is entitled to bail not as a matter of right but on
the discretion of the court and the latter has not abused such discretion in refusing to grant bail,118 or has not even
exercised said discretion. The proper recourse is to file an application for bail with the court where the criminal case is
pending and to allow hearings thereon to proceed.
The issuance of a writ of habeas corpus would not only be unjustified but would also preempt the Sandiganbayan's
resolution of the pending application for bail of petitioner. The recourse of petitioner is to forthwith proceed with the
hearing on his application for bail.
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1 In G.R. No. 148769 and G.R. No. 149116, the petitions are DISMISSED. The resolutions of respondent
Sandiganbayan subject of said petitions are AFFIRMED; and
2 In G.R. No. 148468, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The resolution of respondent Sandiganbayan, Annex "L" of
the petition, ordering a joint hearing of petitioner's petition for bail and the trial of Criminal Case No. 26558 as against
former President Joseph E. Estrada is SET ASIDE; the arraignment of petitioner on July 10, 2001 is also SET ASIDE.
6.) G.R. Nos. 212761-62, July 31, 2018
SENATOR JINGGOY EJERCITO ESTRADA, Petitioner, v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, HON.

SANDIGANBAYAN, FIELD INVESTIGATION OFFICE, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN,
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, AND ATTY. LEVITO D. BALIGOD, Respondents.
G.R. NOS. 213473-74
JOHN RAYMUND DE ASIS, Petitioner, v. CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, IN HER OFFICIAL

CAPACITY AS OMBUDSMAN, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND SANDIGANBAYAN, FIFTH
DIVISION, Respondents.
G.R. NOS. 213538-39
JANET LIM NAPOLES, Petitioner, v. CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, IN HER OFFICIAL

CAPACITY AS OMBUDSMAN, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND SANDIGANBAYAN, FIFTH
DIVISION, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
The present consolidated1 petitions for certiorari2 filed by petitioners Senator Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada
(Estrada), John Raymund de Asis (De Asis), and Janet Lim Napoles (Napoles) assail the Joint
Resolution3 dated 28 March 2014 and the Joint Order4 dated 4 June 2014 of the Office of the
Ombudsman (Ombudsman) in OMB-C-C-13-0313 and OMB-C-C-13-0397 finding probable cause to
indict them, along with several others, for the crime of Plunder, defined and penalized under Section
2 of Republic Act No. (RA) 7080, as amended, and for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.
The Facts
Petitioners are charged as co-conspirators for their respective participation in the illegal pillaging of
public funds sourced from the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) of Estrada for the years
2004 to 2012. The charges are contained in two (2) complaints, namely: (1) a Complaint for
Plunder5 filed by the National Bureau of Investigation and Atty. Levito D. Baligod (NBI Complaint) on
16 September 2013, docketed as OMB-C-C-13-0313; and (2) a Complaint for Plunder and violation of
Section 3(e) of RA 30196 filed by the Field Investigation Office of the Ombudsman (FIO Complaint) on
18 November 2013, docketed as OMB-C-C-13-0397, both before the Ombudsman. Briefly stated,
petitioners were implicated for allegedly committing the following acts:
(a) Estrada, as Senator of the Republic of the Philippines, for: (1) authorizing the illegal
utilization, diversion, and disbursement of his allocated PDAF through his endorsement of
fraudulent non-governmental organizations created and controlled by Napoles' JLN
Corporation (JLN-controlled NGOs); (2) acquiring and receiving significant portions of the
diverted PDAF funds as his commission, kickbacks, or rebates in the total amount of
P183,793,750.00; and (3) giving unwarranted benefits to Napoles and the JLN-controlled
NGOs in the implementation of his PDAF-funded projects, causing undue injury to the
government in an amount of more than P278,000,000.00; 7
(b) Napoles, as the mastermind of the entire PDAF scam, for facilitating the illegal utilization,
diversion, and disbursement of Estrada's PDAF through: (1) the commencement via "business
propositions" with Estrada regarding his allocated PDAF; (2) the creation and operation of JLN-
controlled NGOs to serve as "conduits" for "ghost" PDAF-funded projects; (3) the use of spurious
receipts and liquidation documents to make it appear that the projects were implemented by her
NGOs; (4) the falsification and machinations used in securing funds from the various implementing
agencies (IAs) and in liquidating disbursements; and (5) the remittance of Estrada's PDAF for
misappropriation; and
(c) De Asis, as driver/messenger/janitor of Napoles, for assisting in the fraudulent processing and
releasing of the PDAF funds to the JLN-controlled NGOs through, among others, his designation as
President/Incorporator of a JLN-controlled NGO, namely, Kaupdanan Para sa Mangunguma
Foundation, Inc. (KPMFI) and for eventually remitting the PDAF funds to Napoles' control.
The NBI Complaint alleged that, based on the sworn statements of Benhur Luy (Luy) along with
several other JLN employees including Marina Sula (Sula) and Merlina Suñas (Suñas) (collectively,
the whistleblowers), the PDAF scheme would commence with Napoles and the legislator - in this
case, Estrada – discussing the utilization of the latter's PDAF. During this stage, the legislator and
Napoles would discuss the list of projects, description or purpose of the projects, corresponding
implementing government agency, project cost, and "commission" or "rebate" of the legislator,
ranging from 40-60% of the total project cost or the amount stated in the Special Allotment Release
Order (SARO). After the negotiations and upon instruction of Napoles, Luy would prepare the so-
called "Listing," containing the list of projects allocated by the legislator to Napoles and her NGOs,
project title or description, name of the IA under the General Appropriations Act (GAA) Menu, and the
project cost. Thereafter, Napoles would submit the "Listing" to the legislator. The legislator would
prepare a letter, which incorporated the "Listing" submitted by Napoles, addressed to the Senate
President and the Finance Committee Chairperson in the case of a Senator, or to the House Speaker
and Chairperson of the Appropriations Committee in the case of a Congressman, who would then
endorse such request to the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) for the release of the
SARO. Upon receipt by the DBM of a copy of the letter with the endorsement, the legislator would
give Napoles a copy of the letter with a "received" stamp and Napoles would give the legislator the
agreed advance legislator's commission.
Thereafter, Luy and other Napoles' employees would follow-up the release of the SARO from the
DBM, by citing the details of the legislator's letter to expedite the release of the SARO. Upon release
of the SARO, the DBM would furnish a copy of it to the legislator, who in turn, would give a copy of it
to Napoles. Upon receipt of the copy of the SARO, Napoles would order her employees to prepare the
balance of the legislator's commission, which would be delivered by Napoles to the legislator or
his/her authorized representative.
Napoles, who chose the NGO owned or controlled by her that would implement the project, would
instruct her employee to prepare a letter for the legislator to sign endorsing her NGO to the IA. The
legislator would sign the letter endorsing Napoles' NGOs to the IAs, based on the agreement with
Napoles. The IA would then prepare a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between the legislator, the
IA, and the selected NGO. Napoles' employee would secure a copy of the MOA. Thereafter, the DBM
would release the Notice of Cash Allocation (NCA) to the IA concerned, and the head of the IA would
expedite the transaction and release of the corresponding check representing the PDAF
disbursement, in exchange for a 10% share in the project cost.
The succeeding checks would be issued upon compliance with the necessary documentation, i.e.
official receipts, delivery receipts, sales invoices, inspection reports, delivery reports, certificates of
acceptance, terminal reports, and master lists of beneficiaries. Napoles' employees, upon instruction
of Napoles, would pick up the checks and deposit them to the bank accounts of the NGO concerned.
Once the funds are in the account of the JLN-controlled NGO, Napoles would call the bank to facilitate
the withdrawal of the money, and Napoles' employees would bring the proceeds to the office of JLN
Corporation for accounting. Napoles would then decide how much would be left in the office and how
much would be brought to her residence in Taguig City. Napoles and her employees would
subsequently manufacture fictitious lists of beneficiaries, inspection reports, and similar documents
that would make it appear that the PDAF-funded projects were implemented when, in fact, they were
not.
Under this modus operandi, Estrada, with the help of Napoles and De Asis, among others,
funneled his PDAF amounting to around P262,575,000.00 8 to the JLN-controlled NGOs,
specifically Masaganang Ani Para sa Magsasaka Foundation, Inc. (MAMFI) and Social Development
Program for Farmers Foundation, Inc. (SDPFFI), and in return, received "commissions" or "rebates"
amounting to P183,793,750.00, through his authorized representative, Pauline Labayen (Labayen)
and Ruby Tuason (Tuason).9
On the other hand, the FIO Complaint alleged that Estrada and Labayen, in conspiracy with
Napoles and her NGOs, committed plunder through repeated misuse of public funds as
shown by the series of SAROs issued to effect releases of funds from the PDAF allocation
of Estrada to Napoles' NGOs, and through accumulation of more than P50,000,000.00 in
the form of kickbacks.10 Estrada likewise violated Section 3(e) of RA 3019 by acting with manifest
partiality and evident bad faith in endorsing MAMFI and SDPFFI in violation of existing laws, such as
the GAA, Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9184, Government Procurement Policy Board
Resolution No. 012-2007 and Commission on Audit (COA) Circular 2007-01.
Both the NBI Complaint and the FIO Complaint cited the COA Special Audit Office Report No. 2012-
2013 (COA report) in illustrating the PDAF allotments of Estrada in 2007-2009:

SARO Number Amount (P) IA NGO
08-06025 16.490 million
09-02770 9.700 million National Agribusines MAMFI
Corporation (NABCOR)
08-01697 24.250 million[11
08-03116 18.915 million[12
09-01612 19.400 million National Livelihood
09-02769 29.100 million Development Corporation
(NLDC)
G-09-07076 30.070 million
G-09-07579 24.250 million
08-06025 19.400 million NABCOR SDPFFI
G-09-07579 24.250 million NLDC
F-09-09579 24.250 million
08-01698 22.500 million Technology Resource Center
(TRC)
TOTAL P262.575 million[13
The COA Report also made the following observations applicable to all of the PDAF disbursements of
Estrada for 2007-2009: (1) the implementation of most livelihood projects was undertaken by the
NGOs, not the IAs, in violation of existing laws; (2) the selection of NGOs and implementation of the
projects were not compliant with existing regulations; (3) the selected NGOs, their suppliers and
beneficiaries are unknown, or could not be located at their given addresses, or submitted
questionable documents, or failed to liquidate or fully document the utilization of funds; and (4)
irregularities manifested in the implementation of the livelihood projects, such as multiple attendance
of the same beneficiaries to the same or similar trainings and multiple receipt of the same or similar
kits.14
Pursuant to the Orders of the Ombudsman directing the petitioners and their co-respondents in the
complaints to submit their counter-affidavits, Estrada submitted his separate Counter-Affidavits to
the NBI Complaint on 8 January 2014, and to the FIO Complaint on 16 January 2014. De Asis failed
to submit his counter-affidavit to the NBI Complaint, while Napoles failed to submit her counter-
affidavit to both complaints. The petitioners' co-respondents filed their respective counter-affidavits
between 9 December 2013 and 14 March 2014.
In both his Counter-Affidavits,15 Estrada denied having received, directly or indirectly, any amount
from Napoles, or any person associated with her, or any NGO owned or controlled by her, and having
amassed, accumulated, or acquired ill-gotten wealth. He further denied instructing or directing any of
his staff to commit and/or participate in any irregular and unlawful transaction involving his PDAF
allocations.
Estrada claimed that he committed no intentional or willful wrongdoing in his choice of NGOs to
implement the PDAF projects, and he had no knowledge or notice of any relationship between the
NGOs that implemented the projects and Napoles. He further claimed that the "letters where (a) [he]
requested certain livelihood programs and projects to be implemented by certain [NGOs] and those
where (b) [he] authorized [his] staff to follow[-]up, supervise, sign, and act in [his] behalf to ensure
the proper and timely implementation of these projects do not show that [he] authorized the
performance of any illegal activity."16 Answering the charge against him for violation of Section 3(e)
of RA 3019, he alleged that there was no manifest partiality or evident bad faith in endorsing the
NGOs to implement the PDAF projects, since he only endorsed the NGOs accredited and selected by
the IAs, and his act of endorsement was merely recommendatory and not deemed irregular or in
violation of law.17
On 28 March 2014, the Ombudsman issued the assailed Joint Resolution finding probable cause to
charge petitioners and several other respondents in the NBI and FIO Complaints for one (1) count of
Plunder and eleven (11) counts of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.
After considering the testimonial and documentary evidence, the Ombudsman concluded that
petitioners conspired with the DBM personnel, and the heads of the IAs, specifically NABCOR, NLDC,
and TRC, in amassing ill-gotten wealth by diverting the PDAF of Estrada from its intended project
recipients to JLN-controlled NGOs, specifically MAMFI and SDPFFI. Estrada, in particular, took
advantage of his official position and amassed, accumulated, and acquired ill-gotten wealth by
receiving money from Napoles, through Tuason and Labayen, in the amount of P183,793,750.00 in
exchange for endorsing JLN-controlled NGOs to the IAs of his PDAF-funded projects. De Asis, for his
part, participated in the conspiracy by facilitating the transfer of the checks from the IAs and
depositing the same to the bank accounts of the JLN-controlled NGOs. Furthermore, the Ombudsman
found that petitioners, among others, acting in concert are manifestly partial, and in evident bad
faith in violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 in relation to Estrada's PDAF releases, coursed through
NABCOR, NLDC, TRC, MAMFI, and SDPFFI.
The motions for reconsideration were denied in the Joint Order issued by the Ombudsman on 4 June
2014.
Following the denial of the petitioners' motions for reconsideration, the Ombudsman filed several
Informations before the Sandiganbayan, charging petitioners with one (1) count of Plunder and
eleven (11) counts of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.
Thus, Estrada, De Asis, and Napoles filed their separate petitions for certiorari assailing the Joint
Resolution and Joint Order of the Ombudsman before this Court. The petition filed by Estrada is
docketed as G.R. Nos. 212761-62, the petition filed by De Asis is docketed as G.R. Nos. 213473-74,
and the petition filed by Napoles is docketed as G.R. Nos. 213538-39.
Estrada subsequently filed a Supplement to the Petition for Certiorari on 28 May 2015 and a Second
Supplement to the Petition for Certiorari on 16 March 2018 basically asserting that his indictment is
an act of political persecution and violates his constitutional right to equal protection of the laws.
The Issue
The sole issue left to be resolved in this case is whether or not the Ombudsman committed
any grave abuse of discretion in rendering the assailed Resolution and Order ultimately
finding probable cause against Estrada, De Asis, and Napoles for the charges against them.
The Ruling of the Court
We do not find merit in the petitions.
Both the Constitution18 and RA 6770,19 or The Ombudsman Act of 1989, give the Ombudsman wide
latitude to act on criminal complaints against public officials and government employees.20 As an
independent constitutional body, the Office of the Ombudsman is "beholden to no one, acts as the
champion of the people, and is the preserver of the integrity of the public service."21
This Court's consistent policy has been to maintain non-interference in the determination by the
Ombudsman of the existence of probable cause.22 Since the Ombudsman is armed with the power to
investigate, it is in a better position to assess the strengths or weaknesses of the evidence on hand
needed to make a finding of probable cause.23 As this Court is not a trier of facts, we defer to the
sound judgment of the Ombudsman.24
This policy is based not only on respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the
Constitution to the Ombudsman, but upon practicality as well.25 Otherwise, innumerable petitions
seeking dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Ombudsman will grievously hamper
the functions of the courts, in much the same way that courts will be swamped with petitions if they
had to review the exercise of discretion on the part of public prosecutors each time prosecutors
decide to file an information or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.26
Nonetheless, this Court is not precluded from reviewing the Ombudsman's action when there is a
charge of grave abuse of discretion.27 Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.28 The Ombudsman's exercise of power must
have been done in an arbitrary or despotic manner which must be so patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by law.29
Thus, for the present petition to prosper, petitioners would have to show this Court that the
Ombudsman exercised its power, to determine whether there is probable cause, in an arbitrary or
despotic manner which must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or
a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by law. On the petitioners lie the burden of
demonstrating all the facts essential to establish the right to a writ of certiorari.30
There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and judicial.31 The executive
determination of probable cause, made during preliminary investigation, is a function that properly
pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine whether probable
cause exists and to charge the person believed to have committed the crime as defined by
law.32Whether or not that function has been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor,
i.e., whether or not the prosecutor has made a correct ascertainment of the existence of
probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be
compelled to pass upon.33 The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one
made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused.34
Under Sections 1 and 3, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, probable cause is
needed to be established by the investigating officer, to determine whether there is sufficient
ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the
respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial, during preliminary
investigation. Thus, probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and
circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the
knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was
prosecuted.35 It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief.36 In determining probable cause,
the average person weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the rules
of evidence of which he or she has no technical knowledge.37
We have explained the concept of probable cause in Estrada v. Office of the Ombudsman
(Estrada)38 in this wise:
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a
crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be
based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond
reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. As well put
in Brinegar v. United States, while probable cause demands more than "bare suspicion," it
requires "less than evidence which would justify . . . conviction." A finding of probable cause
merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt.
x x x. To repeat, probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be

determined in a summary manner. Preliminary investigation is not a part of trial and it is only in a
trial where an accused can demand the full exercise of his rights, such as the right to confront and
cross-examine his accusers to establish his innocence. x x x.
xxxx
x x x. In the United States, from where we borrowed the concept of probable cause, the prevailing
definition of probable cause is this:
In dealing with probable cause, however, as the very name implies, we deal
with probabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of
everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act. The standard
of proof is accordingly correlative to what must be proved.
"The substance of all the definitions" of probable cause "is a reasonable ground for belief of
guilt." McCarthy v. De Armit, 99 Pa. St. 63, 69, quoted with approval in the Carroll opinion. 267 U.
S. at 161. And this "means less than evidence which would justify condemnation" or conviction, as
Marshall, C. J., said for the Court more than a century ago in Locke v. United States, 7 Cranch 339,
348. Since Marshall's time, at any rate, it has come to mean more than bare suspicion: Probable
cause exists where "the facts and circumstances within their [the officers'] knowledge and of which
they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of
reasonable caution in the belief that" an offense has been or is being committed. Carroll v. United
States, 267 U. S. 132, 162.
These long-prevailing standards seek to safeguard citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences
with privacy and from unfounded charges of crime. They also seek to give fair leeway for enforcing
the law in the community's protection. Because many situations which confront officers in the course
of executing their duties are more or less ambiguous, room must be allowed for some mistakes on
their part. But the mistakes must be those of reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to
their conclusions of probability. The rule of probable cause is a practical, nontechnical conception
affording the best compromise that has been found for accommodating these often opposing
interests. Requiring more would unduly hamper law enforcement. To allow less would be to leave
law-abiding citizens at the mercy of the officers' whim or caprice.39 (Emphasis supplied)
In order to arrive at probable cause, the elements of the crime charged should be present.40 In Reyes
v. Ombudsman (Reyes),41 this Court unanimously held that in determining the elements of the crime
charged for purposes of arriving at a finding of probable cause, "only facts sufficient to support
a prima facie case a against the [accused] are required, not absolute certainty ." We
explained that:
Owing to the nature of a preliminary investigation and its purpose, all of the foregoing
elements need not be definitively established for it is enough that their presence becomes
reasonably apparent. This is because probable cause - the determinative matter in a preliminary
investigation implies mere probability of guilt; thus, a finding based on more than bare suspicion but
less than evidence that would justify a conviction would suffice.
Also, it should be pointed out that a preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and
exhaustive display of the prosecution's evidence, and that the presence or absence of the
elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may be
passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits. Therefore, "the validity and merits of a
party's defense or accusation, as well as the admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are
better ventilated during trial proper than at the preliminary investigation level."
Furthermore, owing to the initiatory nature of preliminary investigations, the "technical rules of

evidence should not be applied" in the course of its proceedings, keeping in mind that "the
determination of probable cause does not depend on the validity or merits of a party's
accusation or defense or on the admissibility or veracity of testimonies presented." Thus,
in Estrada v. Ombudsman (Estrada), the Court declared that since a preliminary investigation does
not finally adjudicate the rights and obligations of parties, "probable cause can be established with
hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay."42 (Emphasis
supplied)
We reiterated the same principles in Cambe v. Office of the Ombudsman (Cambe):43
x x x [P]robable cause is determined during the context of a preliminary investigation which is

"merely an inquisitorial mode of discovering whether or not there is reasonable basis to
believe that a crime has been committed and that the person charged should be held
responsible for it." It "is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the prosecution's
evidence." Therefore, "the validity and merits of a party's defense or accusation, as well as the
admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during trial proper than at the
preliminary investigation level." Accordingly, "owing to the initiatory nature of preliminary
investigations, the technical rules of evidence should not be applied in the course of its
proceedings." In this light, and as will be elaborated upon below, this Court has ruled that
"probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for
crediting the hearsay," and that even an invocation of the rule on res inter alios acta at this stage of
the proceedings is improper.44 (Boldfacing and underscoring in the original)
In the present case, petitioners are charged with the crime of plunder and violation of Section 3(e)
RA 3019. Plunder, defined and penalized under Section 245 of RA 7080, as amended, has the
following elements: (a) that the offender is a public officer, who acts by himself or in connivance with
members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or
other persons; (b) that he amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination
or series of overt or criminal acts described in Section 1(d)46 hereof; and (c) that the aggregate
amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated, or acquired is at least Fifty
Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00). On the other hand, the elements of violation of Section 3(e)47 of RA
3019 are: (a) that the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official
functions (or a private individual acting in conspiracy with such public officers); (b) that he acted with
manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence; and (c) that his action caused undue
injury to any party, including the government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits,
advantage, or preference in the discharge of his functions.
The Ombudsman did not abuse its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding
probable cause to indict Estrada for one count of plunder and 11 counts of violation of Section 3(e) of
RA 3019.
In its Joint Resolution48 dated 28 March 2014, the Ombudsman found that probable cause exists to
indict Estrada for plunder, after finding that the elements of the crime charged are reasonably
apparent based on the evidence on record:
First, it is undisputed that Senator Estrada was a public officer at the time material to the charges.
Second, he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth.
As disclosed by the evidence, he repeatedly received sums of money from Janet Napoles

for endorsing her NGOs to implement the projects to be funded by his PDAF.
xxxx
As outlined by witnesses Luy, Sula and Suñas which Tuason similarly claimed, once a PDAF allocation
becomes available to Senator Estrada, his staff Labayen would inform Tuason of this development.
Tuason, in turn, would relay the information to either Napoles or witness Luy. Napoles or Luy would
then prepare a listing of the projects available where Luy would specifically indicate the IAs. This
listing would be sent to Labayen who would then endorse it to the DBM under her authority as
Deputy Chief-of-Staff of Senator Estrada. After the listing is released by the Office of Senator
Estrada to the DBM, Napoles would give Tuason or Labayen a down payment for delivery to Senator
Estrada. After the SARO and/or NCA is released, Napoles would give Tuason the full payment
for delivery to Senator Estrada through Labayen or by Tuason.
It bears noting that money was paid and delivered to Senator Estrada even before the SARO
and/or NCA is released. Napoles would advance Senator Estrada's down payment from her own
pocket upon the mere release by his Office of the listing of projects to the DBM, with the remainder
of the amount payable to be given after the SARO representing the legislator's PDAF allocation is
released by the DBM and a copy of the SARO forwarded to Napoles.
Significantly, after the DBM issues the SARO, Senator Estrada, through Labayen, would then write
another letter addressed to the IAs which would identify and indorse Napoles' NGOs as his
preferred NGO to undertake the PDAF-funded project, thereby effectively designating in writing the
Napoles-affiliated NGO to implement projects funded by his PDAF. Along with the other PDAF
documents, the indorsement letter of Senator Estrada is transmitted to the IA, which, in turn,
handles the preparation of the MOA concerning the project, to be entered into by the Senator's
Office, the IA and the chosen NGO.
[Dennis] Cunanan, [Deputy Director General of TRC], in his Counter-Affidavit, claimed that Senator
Estrada confirmed to him that he, indeed, chose the NGOs named in the aforementioned letters and
insisted that the choice be honored by the TRC:
17.4. . . . I remember vividly how both Senators Revilla and Estrada admonished me because
they thought that TRC was purportedly "delaying" the projects. Both Senators Revilla and
Estrada insisted that the TRC should honor their choice of NGO, which they selected to
implement the projects, since the projects were funded from their PDAF. They both asked me to
ensure that TRC would immediately act on and approve their respective projects. (emphasis, italics
and underscoring supplied)
As previously discussed, the indorsements enabled Napoles to gain access to substantial

sums of public funds. The collective acts of Senator Estrada, Napoles, et al. allowed the
illegal diversion of public funds to their own personal use.
It cannot be gainsaid that the sums of money received by Senator Estrada amount to
"kickbacks" or "commissions" from a government project within the purview of Sec. 1 (d)
(2) of RA 7080. He repeatedly received commissions, percentage or kickbacks
representing his share in the project cost allocated from his PDAF, in exchange for
his indorsement of Napole[s'] NGOs to implement his PDAF-funded projects.
Worse, the evidence indicates that he took undue advantage of his official position, authority
and influence to unjustly enrich himself at the expense, and to the damage and prejudice
of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines, within the purview of Sec. 1 (d) (6)
of RA 7080. He used and took undue advantage of his official position, authority and influence as a
Senator of the Republic of the Philippines to access his PDAF and illegally divert the allocations to the
possession and control of Napoles and her cohorts, in exchange for commissions, kickbacks,
percentages from the PDAF allocations.
Undue pressure and influence from Senator Estrada's Office, as well as his endorsement of Napoles'
NGOs, were brought to bear upon the public officers and employees of the IAs.
[Francisco] Figura, an officer from the TRC, claimed that the TRC management told him: "legislators
highly recommended certain NGOs/Foundations as conduit implementors and since PDAFs are their
discretionary funds, they have the prerogative to choose their NGO's"; and the TRC management
warned him that "if TRC would disregard it (choice of NGO), they (legislators) would feel insulted and
would simply take away their PDAF from TRC, and TRC losses (sic) the chance to earn service fees."
Figura further claimed that he tried his best to resist the pressure exerted on him and did his
best to perform his duties faithfully; [but] he and other low-ranking TRC officials had no power
to "simply disregard the wishes of Senator [Estrada],"especially on the matter of public
bidding for the PDAF projects.
Cunanan, narrates that he met Napoles sometime in 2006 or 2007, who "introduced herself as the
representative of certain legislators wo supposedly picked TRC as a conduit for PDAF-funded
projects;" at the same occasion, Napoles told him that "her principals were then Senate President
Juan Ponce Enrile, Senators Ramon "Bong" Revilla, Jr., Sen. Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada;" letters
signed by Estrada prove that he [Estrada] directly indorsed NGOs affiliated with or controlled by
Napoles to implement his PDAF projects; in the course of his duties, he "often ended up taking
and/or making telephone verifications and follow-ups and receiving legislators or their staff
members;" during one of these telephone conversations, Estrada admonished him and "insisted
that the TRC should honor their choice of the NGO....since the projects were funded from
their PDAF;" "all the liquidation documents and the completion reports of the NGO always
bore the signatures of Ms. Pauline Labayen, the duly designated representative of Sen.
Estrada;" and he occasionally met with witness Luy, who pressured him to expedite the release of
the funds by calling the offices of the legislators.
NLDC's [Gondelina] Amata also mentioned about undue pressure surrounding the designation of
NLDC as one of the Implementing Agencies for PDAF. Her fellow NLDC employee [Gregoria]
Buenaventura adds that in accordance with her functions, she "checked and verified the
endorsement letters of Senator [Estrada], which designated the NGOs that would implement his
PDAF projects and found them to be valid and authentic;" she also confirmed the
authenticity of the authorization given by Estrada to his subordinates regarding the
monitoring, supervision and implementation of PDAF projects; and her evaluation and verification
reports were accurate.
Another NLDC officer, [Alexis] Sevidal, claimed that Senator Estrada and Napoles, not NLDC
employees, were responsible for the misuse of the PDAF; Senator Estrada, through Labayen, was
responsible for "identifying the projects, determining the project costs and choosing the
NGOs" which was "manifested in the letters of Senator Estrada and Ms. Pauline
Labayen...that were sent to the NLDC;" and that he and other NLDC employees were victims of
the "political climate" and "bullied into submission by the lawmakers."
The evidence evinces that Senator Estrada used and took undue advantage of his official position,
authority and influence as a Senator to unjustly enrich himself at the expense and to the damage and
prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
The PDAF was allocated to Senator Estrada by virtue of his position, hence, he exercised control in
the selection of his priority projects and programs. He indorsed Napoles' NGOs in consideration for
the remittance of kickbacks and commissions from Napoles. These circumstances were compounded
by the fact that the PDAF-funded projects were "ghost projects" and that the rest of the PDAF
allocation went into the pockets of Napoles and her cohorts. Undeniably, Senator Estrada unjustly
enriched himself at the expense, and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the
Republic of the Philippines.
Third, the amounts earned by Senator Estrada through kickbacks and commissions amounted to
more than Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00).
Witness Luy's ledger shows, among others, that Senator Estrada received the following amounts as
and by way of kickbacks and commissions:
Year Amount received by Senator Estrada (In PhP)

2004 1,500,000.00
2005 16,170,000.00
2006 12,750,000.00
2007 16,250,000.00
2008 51,250,000.00
2009 2,200,000.00
2010 73,923,750.00
2012 9,750,000.00
Total: Php183,793,750.00
The aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or acquired by
Senator Estrada stands at Php183,793,750.00, at the very least .
The sums were received by the Senator either personally or through his Deputy Chief-Of-Staff,
Labayen, as earlier discussed.
Napoles provided those kickbacks and commissions. Witnesses Luy and Suñas, not to mention
Tuason, stated that Napoles was assisted in delivering the kickbacks and commissions by her
employees and cohorts John Raymond de Asis, Ronald John Lim and Tuason.
Senator Estrada's commission of the acts covered by Section 1 (d) (2) and Section 1 (d)
(6) of RA No. 7080 repeatedly took place over the years 2004 to 2012. This shows a
pattern – a combination or series of overt or criminal acts – directed towards a common
purpose or goal, which is to enable Senator Estrada to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-
gotten wealth.
Senator Estrada, taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or
influence as a Senator acted, in connivance with his subordinate-authorized representative Labayen,
to receive commissions and kickbacks for indorsing the Napoles NGOs to implement his PDAF-funded
project; and likewise, in connivance with Napoles, with the assistance of her employees and cohorts
Tuason, de Asis and Lim who delivered the kickbacks to him. These acts are linked by the fact that
they were plainly geared towards a common goal which was to amass, acquire and accumulate ill-
gotten wealth amounting to at least Php183,793,750.00 for Senator Estrada.49 (Emphasis in the
original)
In concluding that there is probable cause to indict Estrada for 11 counts of violation of Section 3(e)
RA 3019, the Ombudsman likewise examined the evidence on record in finding that it is reasonably
apparent that the elements of the crime are present:
First, respondents Senator Estrada, Labayen, x x x were all public officers at the time material to the
charges. Their respective roles in the processing and release of PDAF disbursements were in the
exercise of their administrative and/or official functions.
Senator Estrada himself chose, in writing, the Napoles-affiliated NGO to implement projects funded
by his PDAF. His trusted authorized staff: respondent Labayen, then prepared indorsement letters
and other communications relating to the PDAF disbursements addressed to the DBM and the IAs
(NABCOR, TRC and NLDC). This trusted staff member also participated in the preparation and
execution of MOAs with the NGOs and the IAs, inspection and acceptance reports, disbursement
reports and other PDAF documents.
xxxx
From the accounts of witnesses Luy, Sula and Suñas as well as of Tuason, Napoles made a business
proposal to Labayen regarding the Senator's PDAF, which Labayen accepted. Senator Estrada later
chose NGOs affiliated with/controlled by Napoles to implement his PDAF-funded projects.
xxxx
Second, Senator Estrada and respondent-public officers of the IAs were manifestly partial to Napoles,
her staff and the NGOs affiliated she controlled.
xxxx
That Napoles and the NGOs affiliated with/controlled by her were extended undue favor is manifest.
Senator Estrada repeatedly and directly chose the NGOs headed or controlled by Napoles and her
cohorts to implement his projects without the benefit of a public bidding, and without being
authorized by an appropriation law or ordinance.
As correctly pointed out by the FIO, the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9184 states
that an NGO may be contracted only when so authorized by an appropriation law or ordinance.
xxxx
National Budget Circular (NBC) No. 476, as amended by NBC No. 479, provides that PDAF allocations
should be directly released only to those government agencies identified in the project menu of the
pertinent General Appropriations Act (GAAs). The GAAs in effect at the time material to the charges,
however, did not authorize the direct release of funds to NGOs, let alone the direct contracting of
NGOs to implement government projects. This, however, did not appear to have impeded Estrada's
direct selection of the Napoles affiliated or controlled NGOs, and which choice was accepted in
toto by the IAs.
Even assuming arguendo that the GAAs allowed the engagement of NGOs to implement PDAF-funded
projects, such engagements remain subject to public bidding requirements. x x x.
xxxx
The aforementioned laws and rules, however, were disregarded by public respondents, Senator
Estrada having just chosen the Napoles-founded NGOs. Such blatant disregard of public bidding
requirements is highly suspect, especially in view of the ruling in Alvarez v. People.
xxxx
Notatu dignum is the extraordinary speed attendant to the examination, processing and approval by
the concerned NABCOR, NLDC and TRC officers of the PDAF releases to the Napoles-affiliated or
controlled NGOs. In most instances, the DVs were accomplished, signed and approved on the same
day. Certainly, the required, careful examination of the transaction's supporting documents could not
have taken place if the DV was processed and approved in one day.
xxxx
In addition to the presence of manifest partiality on the part of respondent public officers alluded
to, evident bad faith is present.
xxxx
That several respondent public officers unduly benefitted from the diversion of the PDAF is borne by
the records.
As earlier mentioned, Tuason claimed that she regularly remitted significant portions (around 50%)
of the diverted sums to Estrada, which portions represented Senator Estrada's "share" or
"commission" in the scheme, x x x.
xxxx
Notably, Tuason admitted having received a 5% commission for acting as liaison between Napoles
and Senator Estrada.
Witness Luy's business ledgers validate Tuason's claim that Labayen did, from time to time, receive
money from Napoles that was intended for Estrada.
xxxx
Indubitably, repeatedly receiving portions of sums of money wrongfully diverted from public coffers
constitutes evident bad faith.
Third, the assailed PDAF-related transactions caused undue injury to the Government in the
aggregate amount of PHP278,000,000.00.
Based on the 2007-2009 COA Report as well as on the independent field verification conducted by
the FIO, the projects supposedly funded by Senator Estrada's PDAF were "ghost[s]" or
inexistent. There were no livelihood kits distributed to beneficiaries. Witnesses Luy, Sula and Sufias
declared that, per directive given by Napoles, they made up lists of fictitious beneficiaries to make it
appear that the projects were implemented, albeit none took place.
Instead of using the PDAF disbursements received by them to implement the livelihood projects,
respondent De Asis as well as witnesses Luy, Sula and Suñas, all acting for Napoles, continuously
diverted these sums amounting to PHP278,000,000.00 to the pocket of Napoles.
Certainly, these repeated, illegal transfers of public funds to Napoles' control, purportedly for projects
which did not exist, and just as repeated irregular disbursements thereof, represent quantifiable,
pecuniary losses to the Government, constituting undue injury within the context of Section 3 (e) of
RA 3019.
Fourth, respondents Estrada, Labayen x x x, granted respondent Napoles unwarranted benefits.
xxxx
x x x. That they repeatedly failed to observe the requirements of R.A. No. 9184, its implementing
rules and regulations, GPPB regulations as well as national budget circulars shows that unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference were given to private respondents.
The NGOs selected by Estrada did not appear to have the capacity to implement the undertakings to
begin with. At the time material to the charges, these entities did not possess the required
accreditation to transact with the Government, let alone possess a track record in project
implementation to speak of.50
In Clave v. Office of the Ombudsman, 51 we held that in order to arrive at a finding of probable cause,
the Ombudsman only has to find enough relevant evidence to support its belief that the accused
most likely committed the crime charged. Otherwise, grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to
its ruling.
Given the ample supporting evidence it has on hand, the Ombudsman's exercise of prerogative to
charge Estrada with plunder and violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 was not whimsical, capricious,
or arbitrary, as to amount to grave abuse of discretion. Estrada's bare claim to the contrary cannot
prevail over such positive findings of the Ombudsman.
In Reyes, we unanimously ruled that the Ombudsman did not gravely abuse its discretion in finding
probable cause to indict Reyes of plunder and violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 after its
consideration that the testimonial and documentary evidence are substantial enough to reasonably
conclude that Reyes had, in all probability, participated in the PDAF scam and, hence, must stand
trial therefor. The testimonial and documentary evidence relied upon by the Ombudsman
in Reyes are: (a) the declarations of the whistleblowers Luy, Sula, and Suñas; (b) Tuason's verified
statement which corroborated the whistleblowers accounts; (c) the business ledgers prepared by
witness Luy, showing the amounts received by Senator Enrile, through Tuason and Reyes, as his
"commission" from the so-called PDAF scam; (d) the 2007-2009 COA Report documenting the results
of the special audit undertaken on PDAF disbursements - that there were serious irregularities
relating to the implementation of PDAF-funded projects, including those endorsed by Senator Enrile;
and (e) the reports on the independent field verification conducted in 2013 by the investigators of the
FIO which secured sworn statements of local government officials and purported beneficiaries of the
supposed projects which turned out to be inexistent.
We held in Reyes that: "[i]ndeed, these pieces of evidence are already sufficient to engender a well-
founded belief that the crimes charged were committed and Reyes is probably guilty thereof as it
remains apparent that: (a) Reyes, a public officer, connived with Senator Enrile and several other
persons x x x in the perpetuation of the afore-described PDAF scam, among others, in entering into
transactions involving the illegal disbursement of PDAF funds; (b) Senator Enrile and Reyes acted
with manifest partiality and/or evident bad faith by repeatedly endorsing the JLN-controlled NGOs as
beneficiaries of his PDAF without the benefit of public bidding and/or negotiated procurement in
violation of existing laws, rules, and regulations on government procurement; (c) the PDAF-funded
projects turned out to be inexistent; (d) such acts caused undue injury to the government, and at
the same time, gave unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference to the beneficiaries of the
scam; and (e) Senator Enrile, through Reyes, was able to accumulate and acquire ill-gotten wealth
amounting to at least P172,834,500.00."52
In Cambe, we likewise upheld the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause against Revilla and held
that Revilla should stand for trial for plunder and violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, considering
that after taking all the pieces of evidence together, i.e. the PDAF documents, the whistleblowers'
testimonies, Luy's business ledger, the COA and FIO reports, these pieces of evidence tend to prima
facie establish that irregularities had indeed attended the disbursement of Revilla's PDAF and that he
had a hand in such anomalous releases, being the head of office which unquestionably exercised
operational control thereof. We agreed with the Ombudsman's observation that, "[t]he PDAF was
allocated to him by virtue of his position as a Senator, and therefore he exercise[d] control in the
selection of his priority projects and programs. He indorsed [Napoles'] NGOs in consideration for the
remittance of kickbacks and commissions from Napoles. Compounded by the fact that the PDAF-
funded projects turned out to be 'ghost projects', and that the rest of the PDAF allocation went into
the pockets of Napoles and her cohorts, [there is probable cause to show that] Revilla thus unjustly
enriched himself at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the
Republic of the Philippines."53
In the present case, the Ombudsman relied upon the same testimonial and documentary
evidence relied upon by the Ombudsman in Reyes and Cambe, specifically: (a) the
testimonies of the whistleblowers Luy, Sula, and Suñas; (b) the affidavits of Tuason and
other co-respondents in the NBI and FIO Complaints; (c) the business ledgers prepared by
Luy, showing the amounts received by Estrada, through Tuason and Labayen, as his
"commission" from the so-called PDAF scam; (d) the COA Report documenting the results of the
special audit undertaken on PDAF disbursements; and (e) the reports on the independent field
verification conducted by the FIO. Aside from the said pieces of evidence, the Ombudsman pointed to
the PDAF documents, corporate papers of JLN-controlled NGOs, and admissions made by some of
Estrada's co-respondents themselves, in concluding that a person of ordinary caution and prudence
would believe, or entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that plunder and violation of Section 3(e)
of RA 3019 were indeed committed by Estrada, among the respondents named in the Joint
Resolution.
Applying our ruling in Reyes and Cambe to the present case, the Ombudsman, thus, did not abuse its
discretion in holding that the same pieces of evidence, taken together, are already sufficient to
engender a well-founded belief that the crimes charged were committed and Estrada is probably
guilty thereof, since it remains apparent that: (a) Estrada, a public officer, connived with Napoles and
several other persons in entering into transactions involving the illegal disbursement of PDAF funds;
(b) Estrada acted with manifest partiality and/or evident bad faith by repeatedly endorsing the JLN-
controlled NGOs as beneficiaries of his PDAF in violation of existing laws, rules, and regulations on
government procurement; (c) the PDAF-funded projects turned out to be inexistent; (d) such acts
caused undue injury to the government, and at the same time, gave unwarranted benefits,
advantage, or preference to the beneficiaries of the scam; and (e) Estrada, through Tuason and
Labayen, was able to accumulate and acquire ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least
P183,793,750.00.
Given that the Court previously unanimously ruled in Reyes that the following pieces of evidence: (a)
the declarations of the whistleblowers Luy, Sula, and Suñas; (b) Tuason's verified statement which
corroborated the whistleblowers' accounts; (c) the business ledgers prepared by Luy; (d) the COA
Report documenting the results of the special audit undertaken on PDAF disbursements; and (e) the
reports on the independent field verification conducted by the FIO, all taken together are already
sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that the crimes charged were committed, specifically
plunder and violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, and petitioners in Reyes and Cambe were probably
guilty thereof, we shall likewise take these into account and uphold in the present case the finding of
the Ombudsman as to the existence of probable cause against Estrada based on the said pieces of
evidence.
Besides, we held in Estrada, that "the sufficiency of the evidence put forward by the

Ombudsman against Sen. Estrada to establish its finding of probable cause in the 28 March
2014 Joint Resolution in OMB-C-C-13-0313 and OMB-C-C-13-0397 was judicially confirmed by
the Sandiganbayan, when it examined the evidence, found probable cause, and issued a
warrant of arrest against Sen. Estrada on 23 June 2014."54
In Sec. De Lima v. Reyes,55 this Court held that once the trial court finds probable cause, which
results in the issuance of a warrant of arrest, such as the Sandiganbayan in this case, with respect to
Estrada, any question on the prosecution's conduct of preliminary investigation becomes
moot.
Thus, the Ombudsman's exercise of prerogative to charge Estrada with plunder and violation of
Section 3(e) of RA 3019 was not whimsical, capricious, or arbitrary, amounting to grave abuse of
discretion.
To emphasize, a preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of
the prosecution's evidence; and the presence or absence of the elements of the crime charged
is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed upon only after a
full-blown trial on the merits.56 Moreover, the validity and merit of a party's defense or
accusation, as well as the admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated
during trial proper than at the preliminary investigation level. 57
Thus, Estrada's defense, similar to De Asis' and Napoles', which is anchored on the absence of all the
elements of the crime charged, is better ventilated during trial and not during preliminary
investigation.
Moreover, as to De Asis' arguments that there is no evidence that he knowingly took part in the acts
of plunder, and that he merely acted as driver, messenger, and janitor in good faith when he
delivered money to Napoles' house or he picked up checks and deposited the same in banks,58 we
have already ruled upon the same arguments raised by De Asis and upheld the finding of probable
cause against him in the case of Cambe:
Records show that De Asis was designated as the President/Incorporator of KPMFI which was one of
the many NGOs controlled by Napoles that was used in the embezzlement of Sen. Revilla's PDAF
allocations. Moreover, whistleblowers Luy and Suñas explicitly named De Asis as one of those who
prepared money to be given to the lawmaker. Said whistleblowers even declared that De Asis, among
others, received the checks issued by the IAs to the NGOs and deposited the same in the bank; and
that, after the money is withdrawn from the bank, he was also one of those tasked to bring the
money to Janet Napoles' house. Indeed, the foregoing prove to be well-grounded bases to believe
that, in all probability, De Asis conspired with the other co-accused to commit the crimes charged.
To refute the foregoing allegations, De Asis presented defenses which heavily centered on his
perceived want of criminal intent, as well as the alleged absence of the elements of the
crimes charged. However, such defenses are evidentiary in nature, and thus, are better
ventilated during trial and not during preliminary investigation. To stress, a preliminary
investigation is not the occasion for the fulland exhaustive display of the prosecution's
evidence; and the presence or absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in
nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed upon only after a full-blown trial on
the merits.59 (Emphasis supplied)
As to the finding of probable cause to indict Napoles for the crimes charged, and as to her argument
that the NBI and FIO Complaints are defective and insufficient in form and substance as to the
charges against her, we likewise find our ruling in Reyes applicable to this case:
Anent Janet Napole[s'] complicity in the abovementioned crimes, records similarly show that she, in
all reasonable likelihood, played an integral role in the calculated misuse of Senator Enrile's PDAF. As
exhibited in the modus operandi discussed earlier, once Janet Napoles was informed of the
availability of a PDAF allocation, either she or Luy, as the "lead employee" of the JLN Corporation,
would prepare a listing of the available projects specifically indicating the IAs. After said listing is
released by the Office of Senator Enrile to the DBM, Janet Napoles would give a down payment from
her own pockets for delivery to Senator Enrile through Reyes, with the remainder of the amount
given to the Senator after the SARO and/or NCA is released. Senator Enrile would then indorse Janet
Napole[s'] NGOs to undertake the PDAF-funded projects, which were "ghost projects" that allowed
Janet Napoles and her cohorts to pocket the PDAF allocation.
Based on the evidence in support thereof, the Court is convinced that there lies probable cause
against Janet Napoles for the charge of Plunder as it has prima facie been established that: (a) she,
in conspiracy with Senator Enrile, Reyes, and other personalities, was significantly involved in the
afore-described modus operandi to obtain Senator Enrile's PDAF, who supposedly abused his
authority as a public officer in order to do so; (b) through this modus operandi, it appears that
Senator Enrile repeatedly received ill-gotten wealth in the form of "kickbacks" in the years 2004-
2010; and (c) the total value of "kickbacks" given to Senator Enrile amounted to at least
P172,834,500.00.
In the same manner, there is probable cause against Janet Napoles for violations of Section 3 (e) of
RA 3019, as it is ostensible that: (a) she conspired with public officials, i.e., Senator Enrile and his
chief of staff, Reyes, who exercised official functions whenever they would enter into transactions
involving illegal disbursements of the PDAF; (b) Senator Enrile, among others, has shown manifest
partiality and evident bad faith by repeatedly indorsing the JLN-controlled NGOs as beneficiaries of
his PDAF-funded projects - even without the benefit of a public bidding and/or negotiated
procurement, in direct violation of existing laws, rules, and regulations on government
procurement;and (c) the "ghost" PDAF-funded projects caused undue prejudice to the government in
the amount of P345,000,000.00.
xxxx
Furthermore, there is no merit in Janet Napole[s'] assertion that the complaints are insufficient in
form and in substance for the reason that it lacked certain particularities such as the time, place, and
manner of the commission of the crimes charged. "According to Section 6, Rule 110 of the 2000
Rules of Criminal Procedure, the complaint or information is sufficient if it states the names of the
accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of
the offense; and the place where the offense was committed. The fundamental test in
determining the sufficiency of the averments in a complaint or information is, therefore,
whether the facts alleged therein, if hypotheticallv admitted, constitute the elements of
the offense." In this case, the NBI and the FIO Complaints stated that: (a) Senator Emile, Reyes,
and Janet Napoles, among others, are the ones responsible for the PDAF scam; (b) Janet Napoles, et
al. are being accused of Plunder and violations of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019; (c) they used a
certain modus operandi to perpetuate said scam, details of which were stated therein; (d) because of
the PDAF scam, the Philippine government was prejudiced and defrauded in the approximate amount
of P345,000,000.00; and (e) the PDAF scam happened sometime between the years 2004 and 2010,
specifically in Taguig City, Pasig City, Quezon City, and Pasay City. The aforesaid allegations were
essentially reproduced in the sixteen (16) Informations — one (1) for Plunder and fifteen (15) for
violation of RA 3019 — filed before the Sandiganbayan. Evidently, these factual assertions already
square with the requirements of Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure as above-
cited. Upon such averments, there is no gainsaying that Janet Napoles has been completely informed
of the accusations against her to enable her to prepare for an intelligent defense. The NBI and the
FIO Complaints are, therefore, sufficient in form and in substance.60 (Boldfacing and underscoring in
the original)
Applying our ruling in Reyes and Cambe, we likewise do not find that the Ombudsman gravely
abused its discretion in finding probable cause to indict De Asis and Napoles for the crimes charged in
the present case.
Moreover, Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.'s dissent should not have individually assessed as
inadmissible and incompetent the evidence used by the Ombudsman in finding that probable cause
exists to indict petitioners for plunder and violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.
In De Lima v. Judge Guerrero,61 penned by Justice Velasco, the Court held that the admissibility of
evidence, their evidentiary weight, probative value, and the credibility of the witness are
matters that are best left to be resolved in a full-blown trial, not during a preliminary
investigation where the technical rules of evidence are not applied nor at the stage of the
determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Thus, the better alternative
is to proceed to the conduct of trial on the merits and for the prosecution to present its evidence in
support of its allegations.
In any event, we have already ruled on the arguments raised by Justice Velasco in individually
refuting the evidence used by the Ombudsman in finding probable cause in the cases
of Reyes and Cambe.
First, there is no basis in ruling at this stage that the whistleblowers' statements, along with those of
Estrada's co-respondents, are not admissible as evidence for being hearsay and covered by the res
inter alios acta rule. We have already unanimously ruled in Reyes, and reiterated
in Cambe, that technical rules on evidence, such as hearsay evidence and the res inter alios
acta rule, should not be rigidly applied in the course of preliminary investigation
proceedings, thus:
Neither can the Napoles siblings discount the testimonies of the whistleblowers based on their
invocation of the res inter alios acta rule under Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence, which
states that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another,
unless the admission is by a conspirator under the parameters of Section 30 of the same Rule. To be
sure, the foregoing rule constitutes a technical rule on evidence which should not be rigidly applied in
the course of preliminary investigation proceedings. In Estrada, the Court sanctioned the
Ombudsman's appreciation of hearsay evidence, which would otherwise be inadmissible under
technical rules on evidence, during the preliminary investigation "as long as there is substantial basis
for crediting the hearsay." This is because "such investigation is merely preliminary, and does not
finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties." Applying the same logic, and with the similar
observation that there lies substantial basis for crediting the testimonies of the whistleblowers herein,
the objection interposed by the Napoles siblings under the evidentiary res inter alios acta rule should
falter. Ultimately, as case law edifies, "[t]he technical rules on evidence are not binding on the
fiscal who has jurisdiction and control over the conduct of a preliminary investigation," as
in this case.62 (Emphasis supplied)
To reiterate, in Estrada, where the present petitioner is the same petitioner, we held that since a
preliminary investigation does not finally adjudicate the rights and obligations of parties, "probable
cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for
crediting the hearsay."63 On the applicability of res inter alios acta rule, we further stated that: "In
OMB-C-C-13-0313 and OMB-C-C-13-0397, the admissions of Sen. Estrada's co-respondents can in no
way prejudice Sen. Estrada. Even granting Justice Velasco's argument that the 28 March 2014 Joint
Resolution in OMB-C-C-13-0313 and OMB-C-C-13-0397 mentioned the testimonies of Sen. Estrada's
co-respondents like Tuason and Cunanan, their testimonies were merely corroborative of the
testimonies of complainants' witnesses Benhur Luy, Marina Sula, and Merlina Suñas and were not
mentioned in isolation from the testimonies of complainants' witnesses."64
Second, as to Estrada's endorsement letters, which he admittedly executed, instructing the IAs to
have his PDAF-funded projects implemented by JLN-controlled NGOs, we held in Cambe that "the
PDAF documents, consisting of the written endorsements signed by Sen. Revilla himself
requesting the IAs to release his PDAF funds to the identified JLN-controlled NGOs, as well
as other documents that made possible the processing of his PDAF, x x x — directly implicate him
for the crimes charged, as they were nonetheless, all issued under the authority of his Office as
Senator of the Republic of the Philippines. In Belgica v. Ochoa (Belgica), this Court observed that 'the
defining feature of all forms of Congressional Pork Barrel would be the authority of legislators to
participate in the post-enactment phases of project implementation.' x x x. It is through this
mechanism that individual legislators, such as Sen. Revilla, were able to practically dictate the entire
expenditure of the PDAF allocated to their offices throughout the years x x x under the DBM's menu
for pork barrel allocations. '[However,] [i]t bears noting that the NGO is directly endorsed by the
legislator [and that] [n]o public bidding or negotiated procurement [took] place[,]' [in] defiance of
[GPPB] Resolution No. 012-2007."65 Similarly, Estrada's endorsement letters directly implicate him
for the crimes charged and there is no basis for his argument that his letters were merely
recommendatory.
Third, as to Luy's business ledger, Luy's admission of falsification of PDAF-related documents did not
cast serious doubt on its credibility, considering that in Cambe, we already held:
Luy's testimony therefore explicates that although the whistleblowers would sometimes forge the
legislators' signatures, such were made with the approval of Napoles based on her prior agreement
with the said legislators. It is not difficult to discern that this authorization allows for a more
expedient processing of PDAF funds since the documents required for their release need not pass
through the legislator's respective offices. It is also apparent that this grant of authority gives the
legislators room for plausible deniability: the forging of signatures may serve as a security measure
for legislators to disclaim their participation in the event of discovery. Therefore, Luy's testimony
completely makes sense as to why the legislators would agree to authorize Napoles and her staff to
forge their signatures. As such, even if it is assumed that the signatures were forged, it does
not mean that the legislators did not authorize such forgery. 66 (Emphasis supplied)
And, fourth, as to the COA Report and FIO verifications, we likewise find that these evidence buttress
the finding of probable cause against Estrada as they did against Revilla since we held in Cambe:
The findings of the COA in its SAO Report No. 2012-2013 (COA report) also buttress the finding of
probable cause against Sen. Revilla. This report presents in detail the various irregularities in the
disbursement of the PDAF allocations of several legislators in the years 2007 to 2009, such as: (a)
the IAs not actually implementing the purported projects, and instead, directly releasing the funds to
the NGOs after deducting a "management fee," which were done at the behest of the sponsoring
legislator x x x; (b) the involved NGOs did not have any track record in the implementation of
government projects, provided fictitious addresses, submitted false documents, and were selected
without any public bidding and complying with COA Circular No. 2007-001 and GPPB Resolution No.
12-2007; and (c) the suppliers who purportedly provided supplies to the NGOs denied ever dealing
with the latter. Resultantly, the COA Report concluded that the PDAF-funded projects of Sen. Revilla
were "ghost" or inexistent.
The findings in the COA report were further corroborated by the field verifications conducted by the
Field Investigation Office - Office of the Ombudsman (FIO) to determine whether or not Sen. Revilla's
PDAF was indeed utilized for its intended livelihood projects. In the course of investigation, it was
revealed that the mayors and municipal agriculturists, who had reportedly received livelihood
assistance kits/packages, purportedly procured through Sen. Revilla's PDAF, actually denied receiving
the same and worse, were not even aware of any PDAF-funded projects intended for their benefit.
Moreover, the signatures on the certificates of acceptance and delivery reports were forged, and in
fact, the supposed beneficiaries listed therein were neither residents of the place where they were
named as such; had jumbled surnames; deceased; or even downright fictitious. The foregoing led
the FIO to similarly conclude that the purported livelihood projects were "ghost" projects, and that its
proceeds amounting to P517,000,000.00 were never used for the same.67
Accordingly, as Justice Velasco's dissent put it: "x x x the Ombudsman is given wide latitude, in the
exercise of its investigatory and prosecutory powers, to prosecute offenses involving public officials
and employees, pursuant to Sec. 15 of RA No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of
1989. As such, the Ombudsman possesses the authority to determine whether probable cause exists
or not in a given set of facts and circumstances that would warrant the filing of a criminal case
against erring government employees."68 Thus, we have consistently held that we will not interfere in
the determination by the Ombudsman of the existence of probable cause, absent grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The Ombudsman is empowered to determine, in the exercise of its discretion, whether probable
cause exists, and to charge the person believed to have committed the crime as defined by
law.69 The Ombudsman's finding of probable cause does not touch on the issue of guilt or innocence
of the accused.70 All that the Ombudsman did was to weigh the evidence presented together with the
counter-allegations of the accused and determine if there was enough reason to believe that a crime
has been committed and that the accused are probably guilty thereof.71 Even Justice Velasco's
dissent stated that:
Certainly, prosecutors are given a wide latitude of discretion in determining whether an information
should be filed in court or whether the complaint shall be dismissed, and the courts must respect
the exercise of such discretion when the information filed against the person charged is
valid on its face, and that no manifest error or grave abuse of discretion can be imputed to
the public prosecutor. It is for this reason that Sen. Estrada's asseveration of political
persecution has no leg to stand on. Before such a claim may prosper, it must be proved
that the public prosecutor – the Ombudsman, in this case – employed bad faith in
prosecuting the case, or that it has employed schemes that lead to no other purpose than
to place Sen. Estrada in contempt and disrepute. I do not find such malevolent designs in
the case at bar.72 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, there is no evidence that the Ombudsman acted in capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. No manifest error or grave abuse of discretion
or bad faith can be imputed to the public prosecutor, or the Ombudsman in this case. In fine, the
Ombudsman's finding of probable cause prevails over petitioners' bare allegations of grave abuse of
discretion. Accordingly, the Court must defer to the exercise of discretion of the Ombudsman, in the
absence of actual grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petitions for lack of merit and AFFIRM the finding of probable

cause against all the petitioners.
7.)
November 7, 2017
G.R. No. 224162
JANET LIM NAPOLES, Petitioner

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), Respondent
DECISION
REYES, JR., J.:
Before this Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which sought to nullify and set aside
the Resolutions dated October 16, 2015 and March 2, 2016 of the Sandiganbayan in SB-14-CRM-0238. These
1 2
Resolutions denied Janet Lim Napoles' (Napoles) application for bail because the evidence of her guilt for the crime
of Plunder is strong.
Factual Antecedents
On September 16, 2013, the Office of the Ombudsman received the report of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI), regarding its investigation on several persons, including Napoles, former Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (Enrile)
and his former Chief of Staff, Atty. Jessica Lucila Reyes (Reyes). In its report, the NBI recommended to prosecute
Napoles, former Senator Enrile, Reyes, and several other named individuals for the crime of Plunder, defined and
penalized under Section 2 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7080, as amended, for essentially misappropriating former
Senator Enrile's Priority Development Assistant Fund (PDAF) through non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that
were selected without the required bidding procedure. This case was docketed as OMB-C-C-13-0318.
3 4
Soon after, or on November 18, 2013, the Office of the Ombudsman received a Complaint from its Field
Investigation Office (FIO), criminally charging former Senator Enrile, Reyes, Napoles, and fifty-two (52) other
individuals with violations of RA No. 7080 and Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019. Said complaint was docketed as OMB-
5
C-C-13-0396. 6
In a Joint Resolution dated March 28, 2014, the Ombudsman Special Panel of Investigators found probable cause
to indict Napoles, among others, with one (1) count of Plunder and fifteen (15) counts of violating Section 3(e) of RA
No. 3019. They likewise recommended to immediately file the necessary Informations against all the named
accused. 7
Some of the named accused, including Napoles, filed their respective motions for reconsideration. The Special
Panel of Investigators denied these motions in its Joint Order dated June 4, 2014, but dropped Ruby Chan Tuason
as a respondent, in light of her admission as a State witness and her corresponding immunity from criminal
prosecution. 8
Thus, in an Information dated June 5, 2014, Napoles, together with former Senator Enrile, Reyes, Ronald John Lim
and John Raymund De Asis, were charged with Plunder in Criminal Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238 filed with the
Sandiganbayan. The pertinent portions of the Information state:
9
In 2004 to 2010, or thereabout (sic), in the Philippines, and within this Honorable Court's jurisdiction, above-named
accused JUAN PONCE ENRILE, then a Philippine Senator, JESSICA LUCILA G. REYES, then Chief of Staff of
Senator Emile's Office, both public officers, committing the offense in relation to their respective offices, conspiring
with one another and with JANET LIM NAPOLES, RONALD JOHN LIM, and JOHN RAYMUND DE ASIS, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully, and criminally amass, accumulate, and/or acquire ill-gotten wealth amounting to at
least ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY TWO MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED THIRTY FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
PESOS (Php 172,834,500.00) through a combination or series of overt criminal acts, as follows:
a) by repeatedly receiving from NAPOLES and/or representatives LIM, DE ASIS, and others, kickbacks or
commissions under the following circumstances: before, during and/or after the project identification, NAPOLES
gave, and ENRILE and/or REYES received, a percentage of the cost of a project to be funded from ENRILE's
Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF), in consideration of ENRILE's endorsement, directly or through
REYES, to the appropriate government agencies, of NAPOLES' non-government organizations which became the
recipients and/or target implementors (sic) of ENRILE's PDAF projects, which duly-funded projects turned out to be
ghosts or fictitious, thus enabling NAPOLES to misappropriate the PDAF proceeds for her personal gain;
b) by taking undue advantage, on several occasions, of their official positions, authority, relationships, connections,
and influence to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice, of the Filipino people
and the Republic of the Philippines.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Emphasis Ours)

10
On July 7, 2014, Napoles filed her Petition for Bail, arguing that the evidence of the prosecution is insufficient to
prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. She particularly assailed the credibility of the State witnesses (otherwise
referred to as whistle blowers) as these are allegedly mere hearsay, tainted with bias, and baseless. Citing
the res inter alias acta rule, Napoles submitted that the testimonies of these whistleblowers are inadmissible against
her.11
In view of Napoles' application for bail, the Sandiganbayan conducted bail hearings. The prosecution presented the
following witnesses: (a) Carmencita N. Delantar, then Director in the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM); (b) Susan P. Garcia, an Assistant Commissioner in the Commission on Audit (COA), and the former Director
of the Special Audit Office; (c) Ryan P. Medrano, the Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer from the PIO,
Office of the Ombudsman; (d) Marina Cortez Sula, former employee of Napoles; (e) Mary Arlene Joyce Baltazar,
former bookkeeper for JLN Corporation; (t) Merlina P. Sufias, fonner employee of Napoles; (g) Benhur K. Luy,
former finance officer of Napoles; and (h) Ruby Chan Tuason, fonner Social Secretary of former President Joseph
E. Estrada.12
The prosecution likewise presented the following supposed beneficiaries of former Senator Enrile's PDAF projects,
all of whom identified their respective sworn statements before the Sandiganbayan: (a) Eldred P. Tumbocon,
Municipal Mayor of Umingan, Pangasinan; (b) Francisco 0. Collado, Jr., Municipal Agriculturist of Umingan,
Pangasinan; (c) Bartolome Ramos, Municipal Mayor of Sta. Maria, Bulacan; (d) Ricardo V. Revita, Municipal Mayor
of Rosales, Pangasinan; (e) Rodolfo A. Mendoza, Municipal Agriculturist of San Miguel, Bulacan; and (t) Imelda
Alvarado Eudenio, Municipal Agriculturist of Sta. Maria, Bulacan. The defense also stipulated that: (a) the witnesses
occupied their respective positions at the time material to the case; (b) they were unaware that their respective
municipalities were recipients of livelihood projects from former Senator Enrile's PDAF; (c) they did not receive any
agricultural package or livelihood training from former Senator Enrile, the implementing agencies of his PDAF, or
from any NGO; and (d) they did not sign or prepare any acknowledgment receipt or liquidation documents pertaining
to the transactions. 13
Furthermore, the prosecution presented another group of beneficiaries, whose testimonies were subject of the same
stipulations: (a) Shiela May Cebedo, Municipal Mayor of Bacuag, Surigao del Norte; (b) Elyzer C. Chavez, City
Mayor of Passi, Iloilo; (c) Benito D. Siadto, Municipal Mayor of Kibungan, Benguet; (d) Florencio Bentrez, Municipal
Mayor of Tuba, Benguet; and (e) Jose C. Ginez, Municipal Mayor of Sta. Maria, Pangasinan. The defense cross-
examined this group of beneficiaries. 14
After the conclusion of the prosecution's presentation of evidence, Napoles manifested that she is not presenting
any evidence for her bail application.15
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
In the first assailed Sandiganbayan Resolution dated October 16, 2015, the Petition for Bail of Napoles was denied
for lack of merit. The relevant portions of this Resolution reads:
16
It is true that none of the prosecution witnesses testified that Senator Enrile directly received the
kickbacks/commissions/rebates from accused Napoles. Based on the DDRs of Luy, accused Napoles repeatedly
gave kickbacks/commissions/rebates to Senator Emile's middlepersons. Also, prosecution witnesses Suñas and
Luy categorically testified that they were the ones who prepared the documents and money in paying the
kickbacks/commissions/rebates for Senator Enrile. These kickbacks/commissions/rebates were given by them or by
accused Napoles to Ruby Tuason and other middlepersons for Senator Enrile.
xxxx
A FINAL WORD
The Court stresses, however, that in resolving this petition for bail of accused Napoles, it is not passing judgment on
the culpability or non-culpability of Senator Enrile, Atty. Reyes, accused Napoles, Lim[,] and de Asis. Again, in a
petition for bail, the Court is only mandated to determine whether based on the pieces of evidence presented by the
prosecution, proof evident exists or the presumption of guilt is strong. As above discussed, the prosecution had
presented clear and strong evidence which leads to a well-guarded dispassionate judgment that the offense of
plunder has been committed as charged; that accused Napoles is guilty thereof, and that she will probably be
punished capitally if the law were administered at this stage of the proceedings.
WHEREFORE, accused Janet Lim Napoles's (sic) Petition for Bail dated July 7, 2014, is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. 17
On November 4, 2015, Napoles moved for the reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan's Resolution denying her
Petition for Bail. This motion was likewise deemed unmeritorious and the Sandiganbayan denied it in its Resolution
18
dated March 2, 2016, viz.:

19
WHEREFORE, accused Janet Lim Napoles's (sic) Motion for Reconsideration dated November 4, 2015
is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. 20
Napoles thus filed the present petition before this Court, alleging that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its
discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in denying her bail application. She insists in the
present petition that the prosecution was unable to discharge its burden of proving that the evidence of her
guilt is strong.21
Ruling of this Court
Preliminarily, it should be emphasized that since this is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
this Court's review is limited to whether the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in issuing its assailed Resolutions denying Napoles' application for bail. The
Court's certiorari jurisdiction covers only errors of jurisdiction on the part of the Sandiganbayan. It should be borne in
mind that not every error in the proceedings, or every erroneous conclusion of law or fact, constitutes grave abuse
of discretion. Errors in the appreciation of the parties' evidence, including the conclusions anchored on these
findings, are not correctible by the writ of certiorari.
22
In this regard, Napoles bears the burden of showing that the Sandiganbayan's denial of her bail application was
capricious, whimsical, arbitrary, or despotic, so as to amount to grave abuse of discretion. This Court is not a trier of
facts. As such, it must be established that there was a patent and gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion
of a positive duty, or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law.
23
It is within this framework that the Court reviewed the assailed Sandiganbayan Resolutions.
The prosecution bears the burden of

proving that the evidence of Napoles'
guilt for the crime of Plunder is
strong.
Despite the arrest of the accused, or his/her voluntary surrender as the case may be, the accused may be granted
provisional liberty under certain conditions. This right to bail is guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, except when the
accused is charged with a capital offense, viz.:
24
Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of
guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required. 25
While· bail may generally be granted as a matter of right prior to the conviction of the accused, those charged with
26
a capital offense is granted bail only when the evidence of guilt is not strong:
Section 7. Capital offense of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. - No
person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be
admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution. (7a) 27
The trial court is thus granted the discretion to determine whether there is strong evidence of guilt on the part of the
accused. The trial court may also deny the application for bail when the accused is a flight risk, notwithstanding the
prosecution's evidence on the guilt of the accused. 28
In exercising this discretion, the trial court should receive the parties' evidence at a hearing duly scheduled for this
purpose. The prosecution and the accused are granted reasonable opportunity to prove their respective positions:
on the part of the prosecution, that the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong, and on the part of the
defense, the opposite. The hearing is summary and limited to the determination of the weight of evidence for
29
purposes of granting or denying bail. The denial or refusal must be supported by a summary of the prosecution's
evidence. 30
In Cortes v. Catral, this Court laid down the following duties of the trial court in cases of an application for bail:
31
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application
for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the
prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling
the court to exercise its sound discretion; (Sections 7 and 8, supra).
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bailbond (Section 19,
supra) Otherwise petition should be denied. 32
Since Napoles was charged with the crime of Plunder, which carries the imposable penalty of reclusion
perpetua, she cannot be admitted to bail when the evidence of her guilt is strong. This was the burden that the
33
prosecution assumed in the subsequent hearings that followed the filing of Napoles' Petition for Bail before the
Sandiganbayan. As a trial court, the Sandiganbayan, in turn, possessed the jurisdiction to hear and weigh
the evidence of the prosecution and the defense.
At that stage of the proceedings, the bail hearings are limited to the determination of whether there is a
strong presumption of Napoles' guilt. It is merely a preliminary determination, and the Sandiganbayan may
34
deny admission to bail even when there is reasonable doubt as to the guilt of Napoles. Thus, the prosecution
can discharge its burden by proving that the evidence against Napoles shows evident proof of guilt or a great
presumption of guilt, which the Court defined in People v. Cabral as follows:
35
By judicial discretion, the law mandates the determination of whether proof is evident or the presumption of guilt is
strong. "Proof evident" or "Evident proof' in this connection has been held to mean clear, strong evidence
which leads a well-guarded dispassionate judgment to the conclusion that the offense has been committed
as charged, that accused is the guilty agent, and that he will probably be punished capitally if the law is
administered. "Presumption great" exists when the circumstances testified to are such that the inference of guilt
naturally to be drawn therefrom is strong, clear, and convincing to an unbiased judgment and excludes all
reasonable probability of any other conclusion. Even though there is a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of accused, if
on an examination of the entire record the presumption is great that accused is guilty of a capital offense, bail
should be refused. (Emphasis in the original)
36
As a lesser quantum of proof than guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the Sandiganbayan may deny the application for
bail on evidence less than that required for the conviction of Napoles. Furthermore, the Sandiganbayan "does not sit
to try the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or
against accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may be therein offered
and admitted." It should not be forgotten that the purpose of the bail hearing is to determine whether the accused is
37
entitled to provisional liberty before conviction. To require more from the prosecution, as well as from the trial court,
effectively defeats the purpose of the proceeding. 38
The Sandiganbayan did not gravely

abuse its discretion in denying
Napoles' Petition for Bail.
Applying these jurisprudential standards to the present case, it is readily apparent that the Sandiganbayan did not
gravely abuse its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Upon receiving Napoles' Petition for Bail, it
scheduled hearings to allow the parties to submit their respective pieces of evidence. The prosecution submitted
numerous testimonial and documentary evidence, endeavoring to establish evident proof of Napoles' guilt. Napoles,
on the other hand, opted not to submit any evidence on her behalf and relied instead on the supposed weakness of
the prosecution's evidence. 39
The Sandiganbayan's first assailed Resolution dated October 16, 2015 also reveals straightaway that the evidence
of the prosecution was summarized accordingly, effectively complying with the due process requirements. It even
40
extensively discussed the available evidence in relation to the elements of Plunder, which the prosecution intended
to prove point by point for purposes of demonstrating Napoles' great presumption of guilt. 41
Napoles points out in her petition, however, that the Sandiganbayan erred in finding strong evidence of her guilt for
the crime of Plunder. She challenges the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, particularly the whistleblowers
42
Luy, Suñas, Sula, and Baltazar. 43
She further claims that her bail application should have been granted because the prosecution did not present any
documentary evidence directly connecting her to the NGOs that facilitated the misappropriation of former Senator
Enrile's PDAF. In the same manner, she likewise argues that there was no direct proof of any agreement with
44
former Senator Enrile and Reyes to obtain kickbacks from the implementation of former Senator Enrile' s PDAF
projects. Napoles particularly repudiates the evidentiary value of the Summary of Rebates that Luy prepared from
45
the Daily Disbursement Reports (DD Rs) and Disbursement Vouchers (DVs) that came into in his possession while
he was an employee of Napoles. 46
At first glance, it is apparent that the arguments of Napoles before this Court are fundamentally allegations of
serious errors on the part of the Sandiganbayan in appreciating the evidence of the prosecution. This is not within
the purview of this Court's review power under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. This Court is not a trier of facts and
this proceeding is limited to the detennination of whether the Sandiganbayan patently, grossly, and arbitrarily
exercised its discretion with respect to Napoles' bail application.
In these lights, the succeeding discussion on the evidence of the prosecution against Napoles is limited only to
reviewing whether the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying the application for bail on the basis
of the evidence of the prosecution. For this purpose, it must be clearly established that the Sandiganbayan
arbitrarily ignored the alleged dearth of evidence against Napoles.
The prosecution was able to establish

with evident proof that Napoles
participated in the implied
conspiracy to misappropriate public
funds and acquire ill-gotten wealth.
The charge of Plunder against Napoles in this case alleges a conspiracy among former Senator Enrile and
Reyes, as public officers, and Napoles, Lim, and De Asis, as private individuals. On this point, this Court has
consistently ruled that the conspiracy among the accused to commit the crime of Plunder is usually an
agreement or connivance to secretly cooperate in doing the unlawful act. Even Congress, in its Explanatory
47
Note to the proposed bill criminalizing Plunder, recognized that this crime, by its very nature, is committed through a
series or combination of acts done "in stealth and secrecy over a period of time." 48
Seeing as it would be difficult to provide direct evidence establishing the conspiracy among the accused,
the Sandiganbayan may infer it "from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken together, apparently
indicate that they are merely parts of some complete whole." It was therefore unnecessary for the
49
Sandiganbayan to find direct proof of any agreement among Napoles, former Senator Enrile and Reyes. The
conspiracy may be implied from the intentional participation in the transaction that furthers the common
design and purpose. As long as the prosecution was able to prove that two or more persons aimed their
acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined
acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of
personal association and a concurrence of sentiment, the conspiracy may be inferred even if no actual
meeting among them was proven. 50
Here, .the implied conspiracy among Napoles and her co-accused was proven through various
documentary and testimonial evidence showing that they acted towards the common goal of
misappropriating the PDAF of former Senator Enrile.
When Commissioner Susan P. Garcia (Garcia) testified regarding the results of their special audit on the PDAF-
funded projects of the government, they found that Napoles and her co-accused committed Plunder through an
elaborate scheme. It began through a letter originating from the office of former Senator Enrile being sent to the
concerned implementing agency, informing the latter that the office of former Senator Enrile designated Jose
Antonio Evangelista (Evangelista) as its representative in the implementation of the PDAF-funded project.
Evangelista, who was likewise the Deputy Chief of Staff of former Senator Enrile and acting in representative
capacity, then sends another letter to the implementing agency designating a specific NGO to implement the PDAF-
funded project. Thereafter, the NGO that was endorsed by Evangelista submits a project proposal to the
implementing agency, and proceeds to enter into a memorandum of agreement (MOA) with the implementing
agency and former Senator Enrile as the parties. 51
After the signing of the MOA, the project proposal is attached to the Special Allotment Release Order (SARO),
which allows the implementing agency to incur the expenses that are stated in it. These documents are submitted
52
to the DBM for processing, and if not lacking in requirements, the DBM issues the Notice of Cash Allocation
(NCA). This authorizes the payment of the allocated amount to the implementing agency, which is done by way of
53
crediting the same to its account. After the amount is credited to its account, the implementing agency prepares the
DV s and checks payable to the identified NGO. The NGO, in turn, drafts and submits the requirements for
54
liquidation (i.e. the accomplishment report, the disbursement report, and the list of beneficiaries) after receiving the
check. However, as it turned out, the Special Audit Team found that the beneficiaries denied receiving any
55
proceeds, whether in terms of projects or equipment, from the PDAF of former Senator Enrile. 56
Commissioner Garcia and the rest of the Special Audit Team found that the release of the PDAF to the concerned
NGOs through this system violated the following: (a) DBM National Budget Circular No. 476 dated September 20,
2001, or the guidelines on the release of the PDAF, which requires national government agencies and government-
owned and controlled corporations to only implement programs that are within their functions; (b) Government
Procurement Policy Board (GPPB) Resolution No. 12-2007, which requires the selection of an NGO through public
bidding or negotiated procurement; and (c) COA Circular No. 2007- 001 dated October 25, 2007, or the guidelines
on the grant, utilization, accounting and auditing of funds released to NGOs. 57
Remarkably, the respective testimonies of Commissioner Garcia and the supposed beneficiaries of former Senator
58
Enrile's PDAF were corroborated on material points by the whistleblowers. These whistleblowers, who were former
employees of Napoles, participated in different capacities to the conspiracy.
Merlina P. Sufias (Suñas), a former employee of Napoles, testified that the office of Napoles received copies of the
SARO from the office of former Senator Enrile. Upon receipt, Napoles held meetings where they would be given
instructions to prepare an indorsement letter addressed to the implementing agency, and a project proposal
identifying the local government unit that would benefit from the PDAF-funded project. The drafts of these
documents were sent to Evangelista for review, and subsequently, the finalized versions were returned to their
office. Suñas, as the custodian of documents involving transactions with legislators, retained a copy for their file. 59
Suñas also testified that Benhur K. Luy (Luy) prepared the letters authorizing Evangelista to implement the PDAF-
funded projects on behalf of former Senator Enrile. She likewise participated in the preparation of the MOA
executed among the concerned implementing agency, former Senator Enrile, and the relevant NGO. 60
Meanwhile, Luy confirmed that Napoles asked them to prepare the documents referred to in Suñas' testimony. He
also substantiated the statement of Suñas that the office of former Senator Enrile furnished them with copies of the
PDAF requirements after its submission to the DBM. Luy was the first to receive the documents because he had to
61
verify if the entries as to the name of the NGO and the project cost were correct. 62
In their separate testimonies, both Suñas and Luy confirmed that former Senator Enrile received 40% to 50% of the
project cost. According to Luy, they referred to the share of the legislators as rebates, which he recorded in line
63
with his position as the finance officer of Napoles. The payment of the rebates was made in tranches starting in
64
2004-with the first half paid to former Senator Enrile upon the listing of the project, and the balance paid upon the
release of the SARO. Napoles, on the other hand, took 5% of the project cost as her share. The middlepersons
65 66
who received the rebates on behalf of former Senator Enrile, such as Tuason, were also given 5% of the project
67
cost.68
Another former employee of Napoles, Marina Cortez Sula (Sula), narrated that Napoles gave her instructions to
register approximately twenty (20) NGOs, including those that implemented the ghost projects funded by former
Senator Enrile's PDAf; The relevant information regarding these NGOs were listed in a red notebook that Sula kept
to assist her in the preparation of the General Information Sheets that were regularly submitted to the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC). This notebook was presented to the Sandiganbayan during the bail hearing.
69 70
Sula also stated that the NGOs were created at the instance of Napoles. According to Sula, Napoles asked her and
the other employees to come up with the names of these NGOs. Upon Napoles' approval of the name, Sula
reserved its use at the SEC. Sula also purchased forms for the articles of incorporation and by-laws of the NGOs,
which she completed under the direction of Napoles. Napoles then provided the amount necessary for the initial
deposit to open a bank account in the name of the NGO. The bank accounts were opened at either Metrobank or
Landbank because the branch managers were already familiar with Napoles, making it easy for Sula to facilitate the
process. Thereafter, Sula registered the NGOs with the SEC. 71
Sula noted that Napoles selected the incorporators and officers of the NGOs. The incorporators and officers were
usually employees of Napoles, or the relatives of these employees. Sula testified that those chosen as presidents of
the NGO were aware that their names were used because they were made to sign the incorporation documents. In
cases where the president was not an employee of Napoles, the employee who provided the name of the NGO
president was made to sign in their stead. Sula likewise admitted to forging the signatures of the incorporators, or
72
using the incorporators' names without their knowledge. 73
Suñas and Luy corroborated the testimony of Sula on the fictitious manner by which the NGOs were incorporated.
The three of them were all presidents of different NGOs, and they provided the names of their relatives as its
officers and incorporators. In exchange for agreeing to become presidents of the NGOs, both Sufi.as and Sula
74
testified that Napoles promised to provide them 1% of the project cost as their commission. 75
Similar to Suñas and Sula, Mary Arlene Joyce Baltazar (Baltazar), testified that Napoles likewise promised to give
her a commission in exchange for using her name as the president of an NGO. As the former bookkeeper of
Napoles, Baltazar further confirmed that Napoles used the names of her employees, and that of their friends and
relatives to make them appear as incorporators or officers of the concerned NGOs. Once they became president of
76
an NGO, Napoles instructed them to become voluntary members of the Social Security System (SSS) and
Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PhilHealth), because Napoles needed to terminate their
employment. Baltazar stated that this was purposely done in order to avoid any connection between Napoles and
77
the NGOs. 78
As to the manner by which Napoles obtained the amount allocated for the PDAF-funded projects, Sula narrated that
this was equally done through the employees of Napoles. Whenever the DBM disbursed the allocated amount to the
implementing agency, a check was issued to the Napoles-controlled NGO. Since Sula and the other employees
were designated as presidents of these NGOs, they were authorized to receive the check for the PDAF-funded
project from the implementing agency. 79
Napoles had access to the bank accounts of the NGOs because as Sula, Luy, and Suñas testified during the bail
hearing, they were required to sign blank withdrawal slips, which were turned over to Napoles together with the
corresponding passbook for these accounts. Thus, in the ultimate scheme of things, Napoles received the amounts
80
allocated for the PDAF-funded projects of former Senator Enrile, which she later on apportioned according to the
agreed upon share of the legislators.
With respect to the actual delivery of the PDAF-funded projects to its intended beneficiaries, Sula, Luy, Suñas, and
Baltazar admitted that they fabricated the liquidation documents. This was done by forging the receipts and the
signatures of the beneficiaries, making it appear that the project was indeed implemented. Again, this supported
81
the findings of the COA Special Audit Team and the FIO on the fictitious projects funded by the PDAF of former
82 83
Senator Enrile.
It is plain from the foregoing that Napoles and her co-accused, as well as the former employees of Napoles
who were eventually admitted as State witnesses, had a common design and objective-to divert the PDAF of
former Senator Enrile from its lawful purpose and to their own personal accounts. The individuals involved
in this case performed different criminal acts, which contributed, directly or indirectly, in the amassing,
accumulation, and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth. Consistent with the doctrine on implied
conspiracy, these actions on the part of Napoles and her co-accused are sufficient to prove the existence of
a "concurrence in sentiment," regardless of any proof that an actual agreement took place.
Arguably, there is no documentary evidence directly linking Napoles to the NGOs used as conduits for the PDAF-
funded projects of former Senator Enrile. However, her ties to the officers of the NGOs involved in this case reveal
otherwise. Napoles' participation in the conspiracy was established through testimonial evidence, not only from one
of her former employees, but from four (4) witnesses-all of whom corroborate each other on material points.
More importantly, they testified on the minute details of the scheme that only those privy to the conspiracy
would be able to provide. Notably, Napoles did not even refute their claims that they were her former employees,
relying instead on singling out inconsequential details in their testimonies.
Even the testimony of Ruby Chan Tuason, the middleperson who received the rebates of former Senator Enrile on
his behalf, confirmed that Napoles oversaw the implementation of the scheme to divert the disbursements of the
PDAF. She personally met with Napoles to negotiate the respective shares of the conspirators, and received the
amount on behalf of former Senator Enrile, which she subsequently turned over to Reyes. 84
Since the whistleblowers personally received instructions from Napoles to incorporate the NGOs, prepare the
requirements for the release of the PDAF, prepare and deliver the rebates to the middlepersons, and fabricate the
liquidation documents, they were competent witnesses on the subject of their respective testimonies. Clearly, the
85
prosecution witnesses and the documentary evidence supply interlocking pieces of information that when taken
together, provide a complete picture of the indispensability of the participation of Napoles in the scheme to
misappropriate public funds for the benefit of select individuals, by using the NGOs as conduits for the PDAF
projects of former Senator Enrile. The directions and instructions she gave to her former employees constitute a
clear evidence of her active participation, not mere acquiescence or presence, in the conspiracy.
The Sandiganbayan may rely on the

testimonies of the whistleblowers,
especially since these were
corroborated by other available
evidence.
Napoles nonetheless challenged the credibility of the whistleblowers, arguing that their testimonies should have
been received with "grave suspicion," coming as they were from "polluted source[s]." However, as this Court earlier
86
discussed, the testimonies of these prosecution witnesses were consistent, clear, and corroborative of each other.
Other testimonial and documentary evidence also substantiated the veracity of the whistleblowers' statements
during the bail hearing.
In any case, a careful perusal of the assailed Sandiganbayan Resolutions reveals that it considered the
prosecution's other testimonial and documentary evidence, and discussed it in relation to one another. Among the
documents that the Sandiganbayan considered were the letters requesting for the release of former Senator Enrile's
PDAF, the incorporation documents of the NGOs, the liquidation documents for the PDAF-funded projects, the
SAROs itself, and the DV s issued by the implementing agencies to the NGOs under the control of Napoles. 87
In other words, the Sandiganbayan did not rely solely on the testimonies of the whistleblowers. Seeing as there
were other available evidence lending credence to their testimonies, the Sandiganbayan did not gravely abuse its
discretion when it considered the testimonies of the whistleblowers in denying Napoles' bail application, despite their
participation in the conspiracy itself. The mere fact that the whistleblowers were conspirators themselves does not
automatically render their testimonies incredible and unreliable. The ruling in United States v. Remigio is instructive
88
in this regard:
The true doctrine which should govern the testimony of accomplices, or what may be variously termed principals,
confederates, or conspirators, is not in doubt. The evidence of accomplices is admissible and competent. Yet such
testimony comes from a "polluted source." Consequently, it is scrutinized with care. It is properly subject to grave
suspicion. If not corroborated, credibility is affected. Even then, however, the defendant may be convicted upon the
unsupported evidence of an accomplice. If corroborated absolutely or even to such an extent as is indicative of
trustworthiness, the testimony of the accomplice is sufficient to warrant a conviction. This is true even if the
accomplice has made previous statements inconsistent with his testimony at the trial and such inconsistencies are
satisfactorily explained.
xxxx
Where conspiracy is in issue these principles are even more certain. A conspiracy is more readily proved by the acts
of a fellow criminal than by any other method. If it is shown that the statements of the conspirator are corroborated
by other evidence, then we have convincing proof of veracity. Even if the confirmatory testimony only applies to
some particulars, we can properly infer that the witness has told the truth in other respects. (Emphasis and
89
underscoring Ours)
At this point it should be emphasized that this Court is not the proper forum to weigh the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses. It is elementary that the factual findings of the trial court, especially on the assessment or
appreciation of the testimonies of witnesses, are accorded great weight and respect. In this case, it is the
90
Sandiganbayan that had the opportunity to observe the deportment and behavior of the witnesses during the bail
hearing. It was in a better position to pass judgment on the credibility of these witnesses and the weight of their
respective testimonies. At any rate, Napoles was unable to establish any motive on the part of her former
employees, which would compel them to falsely testify against her and her co-accused.
The core issue, therefore, of whether there is strong evidence of guilt on the part of Napoles, was resolved by the
Sandiganbayan in accordance with the relevant laws, rules, and jurisprudence.
Plunder is a deplorable crime that unfairly exploits the trust that the public reposed in its officials. It is inherently
immoral not only because it involves the corruption of public funds, but also because its essence proceeds from a
rapacious intent. This Court's ruling in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan is a constant reminder of the magnitude of this
91
offense:
As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza that plunder is a malum in se which requires proof
of criminal intent. Thus, he says, in his Concurring Opinion
xxxx
Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be deemed to have been resolved in the
affirmative by the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it among the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death. Other heinous crimes are punished with death as a straight penalty in R.A. No. 7659. Referring to
these groups of heinous crimes, this Court held in People v. Echegaray:
The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their very nature, despicable, either
because life was callously taken or the victim is treated like an animal and utterly dehumanized as to completely
disrupt the normal course of his or her growth as a human being . . . . Seen in this light, the capital crimes of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom resulting in the death of the victim or the victim is raped,
tortured, or subjected to dehumanizing acts; destructive arson resulting in death; and drug offenses involving minors
or resulting in the death of the victim in the case of other crimes; as well as murder, rape, parricide, infanticide,
kidnapping and serious illegal detention, where the victim is detained for more than three days or serious physical
injuries were inflicted on the victim or threats to kill him were made or the victim is a minor, robbery with homicide,
rape or intentional mutilation, destructive arson, and can1apping where the owner, driver or occupant of the
carnapped vehicle is killed or raped, which are penalized by reclusion perpetua to death, are clearly heinous by their
very nature.
There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in the significance and implications of the subject criminal
acts in the scheme of the larger socio-political and economic context in which the state finds itself to be struggling to
develop and provide for its poor and underprivileged masses. Reeling from decades of corrupt tyrannical rule that
bankrupted the government and impoverished the population, the Philippine Government must muster the political
will to dismantle the culture of corruption, dishonesty, greed and syndicated criminality that so deeply entrenched
itself in the structures of society and the psyche of the populace. [With the government] terribly lacking the money to
provide even the most basic services to its people, any form of misappropriation or misapplication of government
funds translates to an actual threat to the very existence of government, and in turn, the very survival of the people it
governs over. Viewed in this context, no less heinous are the effects and repercussions of crimes like qualified
bribery, destructive arson resulting in death, and drug offenses involving government officials, employees or officers,
that their perpetrators must not be allowed to cause further destruction and damage to society. (Emphasis in the
92
original)
It is precisely the enormous gravity of this offense that capital punishment is imposed on those who are found guilty
of Plunder. As a necessary consequence, provisional liberty is not easily granted to those accused of this offense,
especially when the prosecution more than amply established that the evidence of guilt is strong. This is a matter of
judicial discretion on the part of the trial court, which this Court may nullify only when the exercise of this discretion
is tainted with arbitrariness and capriciousness that the trial court failed to act within the contemplation of law.
Unfortunately for Napoles, there is nothing in the records showing that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It has discharged its judicial duty in Napoles' bail application in
a manner consistent with the applicable laws and jurisprudence, and the evidence on record. Thus, all things
considered, the Court finds no reason to nullify the assailed Sandiganbayan Resolutions. The Petition for Bail of
Napoles was correctly denied.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The Resolutions dated October 16, 2015 and
March 2, 2016 of the Sandiganbayan in SB-14-CRM-0238 are AFFIRMED, there being no grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Sandiganbayan.
8.) G.R. No. 213455, August 11, 2015
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. AMPARO M.

CABOTAJE-TANG, HON. SAMUEL R. MARTIRES, AND HON. ALEX L. QUIROZ OF THE THIRD
DIVISION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the “petition for certiorari with prayers (a) for the Court En Banc to act on the petition;
(b) to expedite the proceedings and to set the case for oral arguments; and (c) to issue a temporary
restraining order to the respondents from holding a pre-trial and further proceedings in Criminal Case
No. SB-14-CRM-0238”1 filed by petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile (Enrile) challenging the July 11, 2014
resolutions2 of the Sandiganbayan.
I.
THE ANTECEDENTS
On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman filed an Information3 for plunder against Enrile,
Jessica Lucila Reyes, Janet Lim Napoles, Ronald John Lim, and John Raymund de Asis before the
Sandiganbayan.
The Information reads: LawlibraryofCRAlaw
xxxx
In 2004 to 2010 or thereabout, in the Philippines, and within this Honorable Court’s jurisdiction,
above-named accused JUAN PONCE ENRILE, then a Philippine Senator, JESSICA LUCILA G. REYES,
then Chief of Staff of Senator Enrile’s Office, both public officers, committing the offense in relation to
their respective offices, conspiring with one another and with JANET LIM NAPOLES, RONALD JOHN
LIM, and JOHN RAYMUND DE ASIS, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and criminally amass,
accumulate, and/or acquire ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY TWO
MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED THIRTY FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (Php172,834,500.00)
through a combination or series of overt criminal acts, as follows: LawlibraryofCRAlaw

(a) by repeatedly receiving from NAPOLES and/or her representatives LIM, DE ASIS, and others, kickbacks
or commissions under the following circumstances: before, during and/or after the project identification,
NAPOLES gave, and ENRILE and/or REYES received, a percentage of the cost of a project to be funded
from ENRILE’S Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF), in consideration of ENRILE’S
endorsement, directly or through REYES, to the appropriate government agencies, of NAPOLES’ non-
government organizations which became the recipients and/or target implementors of ENRILE’S PDAF
projects, which duly-funded projects turned out to be ghosts or fictitious, thus enabling NAPOLES to
misappropriate the PDAF proceeds for her personal gain;
(b) by taking undue advantage, on several occasions, of their official positions, authority, relationships,
connections, and influence to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice,
of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Enrile responded by filing before the Sandiganbayan (1) an urgent omnibus motion (motion to
dismiss for lack of evidence on record to establish probable cause and ad cautelam motion for
bail),4 and (2) a supplemental opposition to issuance of warrant of arrest and for dismissal of
Information,5 on June 10, 2014, and June 16, 2014, respectively. The Sandiganbayan heard both
motions on June 20, 2014.
On June 24, 2014, the prosecution filed a consolidated opposition to both motions.
On July 3, 2014, the Sandiganbayan denied Enrile’s motions and ordered the issuance of warrants of
arrest on the plunder case against the accused.6 redarclaw
On July 8, 2014, Enrile received a notice of hearing7 informing him that his arraignment would be
held before the Sandiganbayan’s Third Division on July 11, 2014.
On July 10, 2014, Enrile filed a motion for bill of particulars8 before the Sandiganbayan. On the
same date, he filed a motion for deferment of arraignment 9 since he was to undergo medical
examination at the Philippine General Hospital (PGH).
On July 11, 2014, Enrile was brought to the Sandiganbayan pursuant to the Sandiganbayan’s order
and his motion for bill of particulars was called for hearing. Atty. Estelito Mendoza (Atty. Mendoza),
Enrile’s counsel, argued the motion orally. Thereafter, Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice (PJ) Amparo
Cabotaje-Tang (Cabotaje-Tang), declared a “10-minute recess” to deliberate on the motion.
When the court session resumed, PJ Cabotaje-Tang announced the Court’s denial of Enrile’s motion
for bill of particulars essentially on the following grounds:

(1) the details that Enrile desires are “substantial reiterations” of the arguments he raised in his
supplemental opposition to the issuance of warrant of arrest and for dismissal of information; and
(2) the details sought are evidentiary in nature and are best ventilated during trial.
Atty. Mendoza asked for time to file a motion for reconsideration, stating that he would orally move
to reconsider the Sandiganbayan’s denial if he would not be given time to seek a reconsideration.
The Sandiganbayan then directed Atty. Mendoza to immediately proceed with his motion for
reconsideration.
Atty. Mendoza thus orally presented his arguments for the reconsideration of the denial of
Enrile’s motion for bill of particulars. The Sandiganbayan again declared a recess to deliberate on the
motion. After five (5) minutes, PJ Cabotaje-Tang announced the Sandiganbayan’s denial of the
motion for reconsideration.10 redarclaw
The Sandiganbayan reduced its rulings into writing on Enrile’s written and oral motions. The pertinent
portion of this ruling reads: LawlibraryofCRAlaw
xxxx
In today’s consideration of accused Juan Ponce Enrile’s Motion for Bill of Particulars, the Court heard
the parties on oral arguments in relation thereto. Thereafter, it declared a ten-minute recess to
deliberate thereon. After deliberating on the said motion as well as the arguments of the parties, the
Court resolves to DENY as it hereby DENIES the same motion for bill of particulars for the following
reasons: (1) the details desired in paragraphs 2 to 5 of the said motion are substantially reiterations
of the arguments raised by accused Enrile in his Supplemental Opposition to Issuance of Warrant of
Arrest and for Dismissal of Information dated June 16, 2014 x x x.
The Court already upheld the sufficiency of the allegations in the Information charging accused
Enrile, among other persons, with the crime of plunder in its Resolution dated July 3, 2014. It finds
no cogent reasons to reconsider the said ruling.
Moreover, the “desired details” that accused Enrile would like the prosecution to provide are
evidentiary in nature, which need not be alleged in the Information. They are best ventilated during
the trial of the case.
Counsel for accused Juan Ponce Enrile orally sought a reconsideration of the denial of his motion for
bill of particulars which was opposed by the prosecution. The Court then declared another ten-minute
recess to deliberate on the said motion for reconsideration. After deliberation thereon, the Court
likewise resolved to DENY as it hereby DENIES accused Juan Ponce Enrile’s motion for
reconsideration there being no new or substantial grounds raised to warrant the grant thereof.
ACCORDINGLY, the scheduled arraignment of accused Juan Ponce Enrile shall now proceed as
previously scheduled.
SO ORDERED.11
Atty. Mendoza subsequently moved for the deferment of Enrile’s arraignment. The Sandiganbayan
responded by directing the doctors present to determine whether he was physically fit to be
arraigned. After he was declared fit, the Sandiganbayan proceeded with Enrile’s arraignment. Enrile
entered a “no plea,” prompting the Sandiganbayan to enter a “not guilty” plea on his behalf.
II.
THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
Enrile claims in this petition that the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied his motion for bill of
particulars despite the ambiguity and insufficiency of the Information filed against him.
Enrile maintains that the denial was a serious violation of his constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Enrile further alleges that he was left to speculate on what his specific participation in the
crime of plunder had been. He posits that the Information should have stated the details of
the particular acts that allegedly constituted the imputed series or combination of overt
acts that led to the charge of plunder. Enrile essentially reiterates the “details desired” that he
sought in his motion for bill of particulars, as follows: LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Allegations of Information Details Desired

“x x x accused JUAN PONCE ENRILE, then a a. Who among the accused acquired the alleged “ill-
Philippine Senator, JESSICA LUCILA G. gotten wealth amounting to at least ONE HUNDRED
REYES, then Chief of Staff of Senator Enrile’s SEVENTY TWO MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED
Office, both public officers, committing the THIRTY FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
offense in relation to their respective offices, PESOS (Php172,834,500.00)”? One of them, two of
conspiring with one another and with JANET LIM them or all of them? Kindly specify.
NAPOLES, RONALD JOHN LIM, and JOHN
RAYMUND DE ASIS, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and criminally amass,
accumulate, and/or acquire ill-gotten wealth
amounting to at least ONE HUNDRED
SEVENTY TWO MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED
THIRTY FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
PESOS (Php172,834,500.00) through a
combination or series of overt acts, x x x.”
b. The allegation “through a combination or series of
overt criminal acts” is a conclusion of fact or of law.
What are the particular overt acts which constitute the
“combination”? What are the particular overt acts which
constitute the “series”? Who committed those acts?
x x x by repeatedly receiving from NAPOLES a. What was “repeatedly” received? If sums of money,
and/or her representatives LIM, DE ASIS, and the particular amount. If on several occasions and in
others, kickbacks or commissions under the different amounts, specify the amount on each occasion
following circumstances: before, during and/or and the corresponding date of receipt.
after the project identification, NAPOLES gave,
and ENRILE and/or REYES received, a
percentage of the cost of a project to be funded
from ENRILE’S Priority Development Assistance
Fund (PDAF), in consideration of ENRILE’S
endorsement, directly or through REYES, to the
appropriate government agencies, of NAPOLES’
non-government organizations which became the
recipients and/or target implementers of
ENRILE’S PDAF projects, which duly-funded
projects turned out to be ghosts or fictitious, thus
enabling NAPOLES to misappropriate the PDAF
proceeds for her personal gain;
b. Name the specific person(s) who delivered the amount
of Php172,834,500.00 and the specific person(s) who
received the amount; or if not in lump sum, the various
amounts totaling Php172,834,500.00. x x x Specify
particularly the person who delivered the amount,
Napoles or Lim or De Asis, and who particularly are “the
others.”
c. To whom was the money given? To Enrile or Reyes?
State the amount given on each occasion, the date when
and the place where the amount was given.
d. x x x Describe each project allegedly identified, how,
and by whom was the project identified, the nature of
each project, where it is located and the cost of each
project.
e. For each of the years 2004-2010, under what
law or official document is a portion of the “Priority
Development Assistance Fund” identified as that of a
member of Congress, in this instance, as ENRILE’s, to
be found? In what amount for each year is ENRILE’s
Priority Development Assistance Fund? When, and to
whom, did Enrile endorse the projects in favor of
“Napoles non-government organizations which became
the recipients and/or target implementers of ENRILE’s
PDAF projects?” Name Napoles non-government
organizations which became the recipients and/or target
implementers of ENRILE’s PDAF projects. Who
paid Napoles, from whom did Napoles collect the fund
for the projects which turned out to be ghosts or
fictitious? Who authorized the payments for each
project?
f. x x x what COA audits or field investigations were
conducted which validated the findings that each of
Enrile’s PDAF projects in the years 2004-2010 were
ghosts or spurious projects?
x x x by taking undue advantage, on several a. Provide the details of how Enrile took undue
occasions of their official positions, authority, advantage, on several occasions, of his official positions,
relationships, connections, and influence to authority, relationships, connections, and influence to
unjustly enrich themselves at the expense and to unjustly enrich himself at the expense and to the damage
the damage and prejudice, of the Filipino people and prejudice, of the Filipino people and the Republic of
and the Republic of the Philippines. the Philippines. Was this because
he received any money from the government? From
whom and for what reason did he receive any money or
property from the government through which he
“unjustly enriched himself”? State the details from whom
each amount was received, the place and the time.
Enrile posits that his ‘desired details’ are not evidentiary in nature; they are material facts
that should be clearly alleged in the Information so that he may be fully informed of the
charges against him and be prepared to meet the issues at the trial.
Enrile adds that the grounds raised in his motion for bill of particulars are cited in a context different
from his opposition to the issuance of a warrant of arrest. He maintains that the resolution of the
probable cause issue was interlocutory and did “not bar the submission of the same issue in
subsequent proceedings especially in the context of a different proceeding.”
Enrile thus prays that: “(a) the Court en banc act on the present petition; (b) by way of an interim
measure, the Court issue a TRO or writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the Sandiganbayan from
holding the pre-trial and subsequent proceedings against him in Criminal Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238
during the pendency of the present petition; (c) the Court expedite the proceedings and set the case
for oral arguments; and (d) at the conclusion of the proceedings, the Court annul and set aside the
Sandiganbayan’s July 11, 2014 resolution and his arraignment.”
A. The People’s Comment
In its Comment,12 the People of the Philippines13 counters that the Sandiganbayan did not exercise its
discretionary power in an arbitrary or despotic manner. Even assuming that the Sandiganbayan’s
denial of Enrile’s motion for bill of particulars was erroneous, the error did not amount to lack or
excess or jurisdiction. It further maintains that the assailed Sandiganbayan rulings were arrived at
based on the procedures prescribed under Section 2, Rule VII of the Revised Internal Rules of the
Sandiganbayan.
The People also argues that the Information already contained the ultimate facts; matters of
evidence do not need to be averred.
B. Enrile’s Reply
In his Reply, Enrile essentially claims that the right to move for a bill of particulars is “ancillary to and
in implementation” of an accused’s rights to due process, to be heard, and to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him. He maintains that the Sandiganbayan’s denial of his
motion for bill of particulars is not “a mere denial of a procedural right under the Rules of Court, but
of rights vested in an accused under the Constitution to ensure fairness in the trial of the offense
charged.” Enrile also adds that there could only be a fair trial if he could properly plead to the
Information and prepare for trial.
Enrile further argues that the People’s Comment did not dispute the relevance of the details sought in
the motion for bill of particulars. He likewise claims that the “desired details” could not be found
in the bundle of documents marked by the prosecution during the preliminary conference.
Finally, Enrile maintains that his motion for bill of particulars was not dilatory.
III.
THE COURT’S RULING
After due consideration, we resolve to partially GRANT the petition under the terms
outlined below.
A. The constitutional right of the accused to be informed
Under the Constitution, a person who stands charged of a criminal offense has the right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.14 This right has long been
established in English law, and is the same right expressly guaranteed in our 1987 Constitution. This
right requires that the offense charged be stated with clarity and with certainty to inform the accused
of the crime he is facing in sufficient detail to enable him to prepare his defense.15redarclaw
In the 1904 case of United States v. Karelsen,16 the Court explained the purpose of informing an
accused in writing of the charges against him from the perspective of his right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him: LawlibraryofCRAlaw
The object of this written accusation was – First. To furnish the accused with such a description of
the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense; and second, to avail himself of his
conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause; and third, to
inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to
support a conviction, if one should be had. (United States vs. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542.) In order that
this requirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated, not conclusions of law. Every crime is
made up of certain acts and intent; these must be set forth in the complaint with reasonable
particularity of time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant), and circumstances. In short, the
complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstances necessary to constitute
the crime charged. x x x.17 [Emphasis supplied.]
The objective, in short, is to describe the act with sufficient certainty to fully appraise the accused of
the nature of the charge against him and to avoid possible surprises that may lead to injustice.
Otherwise, the accused would be left speculating on why he has been charged at all.18 redarclaw
In People v. Hon. Mencias, et al.,19 the Court further explained that a person’s constitutional right to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him signifies that an accused should
be given the necessary data on why he is the subject of a criminal proceeding. The Court added that
the act or conduct imputed to a person must be described with sufficient particularity to enable the
accused to defend himself properly.
The general grant and recognition of a protected right emanates from Section 1, Article III of the
1987 Constitution which states that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law. The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent governmental encroachment against
the life, liberty, and property of individuals; to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the
powers of the government, unrestrained by the established principles of private rights and
distributive justice x x x; and to secure to all persons equal and impartial justice and the benefit of
the general law.20redarclaw
Separately from Section 1, Article III is the specific and direct underlying root of the right to
information in criminal proceedings – Section 14(1), Article III – which provides that “No person shall
be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.” Thus, no doubt exists that the
right to be informed of the cause of the accusation in a criminal case has deep constitutional roots
that, rather than being cavalierly disregarded, should be carefully protected.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan (2nd Division),21 the Court, in sustaining the

Sandiganbayan’s grant of the motion for bill of particulars of Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., held that “the
facile verbosity with which the legal counsel for the government flaunted the accusation of excesses
against the Marcoses in general terms must be soonest refurbished by a bill of particulars, so that
respondent can properly prepare an intelligent responsive pleading and so that trial in this case will
proceed as expeditiously as possible.”22 The Court additionally stated that: LawlibraryofCRAlaw
This Court has been liberal in giving the lower courts the widest latitude of discretion in setting aside
default orders justified under the right to due process principle. Plain justice demands and the law
requires no less that defendants must know what the complaint against them is all about.
x x x In the interest of justice, we need to dispel the impression in the individual respondents' minds
that they are being railroaded out of their rights and properties without due process of law.23
B. Procedural Sufficiency of the Information
An Information is an accusation in writing charging a person with an offense, signed by the

prosecutor and filed with the court.24 The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, in implementing the
constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, specifically require certain matters to be stated in the Information for its sufficiency. The
requirement aims to enable the accused to properly prepare for his defense since he is
presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts constituting the offense
charged.25 redarclaw
To be considered as sufficient and valid, an information must state the name of the accused; the
designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions constituting the offense; the
name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place
where the offense was committed.26 redarclaw
If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the
statute penalizing it. The acts or omissions constituting the offense and the qualifying and
aggravating circumstances alleged must be stated in ordinary and concise language; they do not
necessarily need to be in the language of the statute, and should be in terms sufficient to enable a
person of common understanding to know what offense is charged and what qualifying and
aggravating circumstances are alleged, so that the court can pronounce judgment.27 The Rules do not
require the Information to exactly allege the date and place of the commission of the offense, unless
the date and the place are material ingredients or essential elements of the offense, or are necessary
for its identification.
B.1. Ultimate facts versus Evidentiary facts
An Information only needs to state the ultimate facts constituting the offense; the evidentiary and
other details (i.e., the facts supporting the ultimate facts) can be provided during the trial.28 redarclaw
Ultimate facts is defined as “those facts which the expected evidence will support. The term does
not refer to the details of probative matter or particulars of evidence by which these material
elements are to be established.” It refers to the facts that the evidence will prove at the
trial.29
redarclaw
Ultimate facts has also been defined as the principal, determinative, and constitutive facts on whose
existence the cause of action rests;30 they are also the essential and determining facts on which the
court's conclusion rests and without which the judgment would lack support in essential
particulars.31 redarclaw
Evidentiary facts, on the other hand, are the facts necessary to establish the ultimate facts; they
are the premises that lead to the ultimate facts as conclusion.32They are facts supporting the
existence of some other alleged and unproven fact.33 redarclaw
In Bautista v. Court of Appeals,34 the Court explained these two concepts in relation to a particular
criminal case, as follows: LawlibraryofCRAlaw
The distinction between the elements of the offense and the evidence of these elements is analogous
or akin to the difference between ultimate facts and evidentiary facts in civil cases. Ultimate
facts are the essential and substantial facts which either form the basis of the primary
right and duty or which directly make up the wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant,
while evidentiary facts are those which tend to prove or establish said ultimate facts. x x
x.35 [Emphasis supplied.]
While it is fundamental that every element of the offense must be alleged in the
Information, matters of evidence – as distinguished from the facts essential to the nature
of the offense – do not need to be alleged. Whatever facts and circumstances must necessarily
be alleged are to be determined based on the definition and the essential elements of the specific
crimes.36
redarclaw
C. Arraignment
The procedural due process mandate of the Constitution requires that the accused be arraigned so
that he may be fully informed as to why he was charged and what penal offense he has to face, to
be convicted only on showing that his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt with full opportunity to
disprove the evidence against him.37 During arraignment, the accused is granted the opportunity
to fully know the precise charge that confronts him and made fully aware of possible loss
of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him.38 redarclaw
An arraignment thus ensures that an accused be fully acquainted with the nature of the crime
imputed to him in the Information and the circumstances under which it is allegedly committed.39 It
is likewise at this stage of the proceedings when the accused enters his plea,40 or enters a plea of not
guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged.41
redarclaw
A concomitant component of this stage of the proceedings is that the Information should provide the
accused with fair notice of the accusations made against him, so that he will be able to make an
intelligent plea and prepare a defense.42Moreover, the Information must provide some means
of ensuring that the crime for which the accused is brought to trial is in fact one for which
he was charged, rather than some alternative crime seized upon by the prosecution in light
of subsequently discovered evidence.43Likewise, it must indicate just what crime or crimes
an accused is being tried for, in order to avoid subsequent attempts to retry him for the
same crime or crimes.44 In other words, the Information must permit the accused to prepare his
defense, ensure that he is prosecuted only on the basis of facts presented, enable him to plead
jeopardy against a later prosecution, and inform the court of the facts alleged so that it can
determine the sufficiency of the charge.
Oftentimes, this is achieved when the Information alleges the material elements of the crime
charged. If the Information fails to comply with this basic standard, it would be quashed on the
ground that it fails to charge an offense.45Of course, an Information may be sufficient to
withstand a motion to quash, and yet insufficiently inform the accused of the specific
details of the alleged offenses. In such instances, the Rules of Court allow the accused to
move for a bill of particulars to enable him properly to plead and to prepare for trial. 46 redarclaw
C.1. Bill of Particulars
In general, a bill of particulars is the further specification of the charges or claims in an

action, which an accused may avail of by motion before arraignment, to enable him to
properly plead and prepare for trial. In civil proceedings, a bill of particulars has been defined as a
complementary procedural document consisting of an amplification or more particularized outline of a
pleading, and is in the nature of a more specific allegation of the facts recited in the pleading.47 The
purpose of a motion for bill of particulars in civil cases is to enable a party to prepare his
responsive pleading properly.
In criminal cases, a bill of particulars details items or specific conduct not recited in the Information
but nonetheless pertain to or are included in the crime charged. Its purpose is to enable an accused:
to know the theory of the government’s case;48 to prepare his defense and to avoid surprise at the
trial; to plead his acquittal or conviction in bar of another prosecution for the same offense; and to
compel the prosecution to observe certain limitations in offering evidence.49 redarclaw
In criminal proceedings, the motion for a bill of particulars is governed by Section 9 of Rule 116 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides: LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Section 9. Bill of particulars. - The accused may, before arraignment, move for a bill of particulars to
enable him properly to plead and prepare for trial. The motion shall specify the alleged defects of the
complaint or information and the details desired.
The rule requires the information to describe the offense with sufficient particularity to apprise the
accused of the crime charged with and to enable the court to pronounce judgment. The
particularity must be such that persons of ordinary intelligence may immediately know
what the Information means.50 redarclaw
The general function of a bill of particulars, whether in civil or criminal proceedings, is to guard
against surprises during trial. It is not the function of the bill to furnish the accused with the
evidence of the prosecution. Thus, the prosecutor shall not be required to include in the bill of
particulars matters of evidence relating to how the people intend to prove the elements of the
offense charged or how the people intend to prove any item of factual information included in the bill
of particulars.51
redarclaw
C.2. Origin of bill of particulars in criminal cases52 redarclaw
Even before the promulgation of the 1964 Rules of Court, when the applicable rules for criminal
procedure was still General Order No. 58,53 the Court had already recognized the need for a bill of
particulars in criminal cases. This recognition came despite the lack of any specific provision in
General Order No. 58 setting out the rules for a bill of particulars in criminal cases.
In U.S. v. Schneer,54 the issue presented was whether a bill of particulars was available in a criminal
case for estafa after the accused had already been arraigned. The Court essentially ruled that there
was no specific provision of law expressly authorizing the filing of specifications or bills of particulars
in criminal cases, and held that:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
We know of no provision either in General Orders, No. 58, or in the laws existing prior thereto which
requires the Government to furnish such a bill of particulars, and we accordingly hold that it was not
error on the part of the court below to refuse to do so.
In U.S. v. Cernias,55 however, the Court formally recognized the existence and applicability of a bill of
particulars in criminal cases. In this case, the prosecution filed an information charging Basilio
Cernias with several counts of brigandage before the Court of First Instance of Leyte. In overruling
the accused’s objection, the Court declared that the prosecution’s act of specifying certain acts done
by the conspirators in the Information “did no more than to furnish the defendant with a bill of
particulars of the facts which it intended to prove at the trial x x x.”56 redarclaw
In sum, the Court essentially held that a detailed complaint or information is not objectionable, and
that the details it contains may be properly considered as specifications or bill of particulars.57 redarclaw
In People v. Abad Santos,58 the court first recognized a bill of particulars, as a right that the accused
may ask for from the court. In this case, the prosecution charged respondent Joseph Arcache with
the crime of treason before the People’s Court. The Information filed against the accused contained,
in counts 2 and 3, the phrase “and other similar equipment.”
The counsel for the accused verbally petitioned the People’s court to order the prosecution to “make
more specific [the] phrase ‘and other similar equipment,’” which request the People’s Court granted.
The People of the Philippines filed a petition for certiorari, but the Court dismissed this petition.
In upholding the order of the People’s Court, the Court ruled that “in the absence of specific
provisions of law prohibiting the filing of specifications or bills of particulars in criminal cases, their
submission may be permitted, as they cannot prejudice any substantial rights of the accused. On the
contrary, they will serve to apprise the accused clearly of the charges filed against them, and thus
enable them to prepare intelligently whatever defense or defenses they might have.59 redarclaw
Notably, Abad Santos emphasized the importance of a bill of particulars in criminal cases, stating that
“x x x inasmuch as in criminal cases not only the liberty but even the life of the accused may be at
stake, it is always wise and proper that the accused should be fully apprised of the true charges
against them, and thus avoid all and any possible surprise, which might be detrimental to their rights
and interests; and ambiguous phrases should not, therefore, be permitted in criminal complaints or
informations; and if any such phrase has been included therein, on motion of the defense, before the
commencement of the trial, the court should order either its elimination as surplusage or the filing of
the necessary specification, which is but an amendment in mere matters of form.”60 redarclaw
In these cited cases, the Courts did not rely on the Rules of Court to provide for a bill of particulars in
criminal cases. A specific provision granting the accused the right “to move for or demand a more
definite statement or a bill of particulars” was not incorporated as a formal rule until the 1964 Rules
of Court,61under its Section 6, Rule 116. This initial provision later became Section 10 of Rule 116
under the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure 62and Section 9 of Rule 116 under the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, as amended.63 redarclaw
C.3. The Distinctive Role of a Bill of Particulars
When allegations in an Information are vague or indefinite, the remedy of the accused is not a

motion to quash, but a motion for a bill of particulars.
The purpose of a bill of particulars is to supply vague facts or allegations in the complaint or
information to enable the accused to properly plead and prepare for trial. It presupposes a valid
Information, one that presents all the elements of the crime charged, albeit under vague
terms. Notably, the specifications that a bill of particulars may supply are only formal amendments
to the complaint or Information.
In Virata v. Sandiganbayan,64 the Court expounded on the purpose of a bill of particulars as

follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
It is the office or function, as well as the object or purpose, of a bill of particulars to amplify or limit a
pleading, specify more minutely and particularly a claim or defense set up and pleaded in general
terms, give information, not contained in the pleading, to the opposite party and the court as to the
precise nature, character, scope, and extent of the cause of action or defense relied on by the
pleader, and apprise the opposite party of the case which he has to meet, to the end that the proof
at the trial may be limited to the matters specified, and in order that surprise at, and needless
preparation for, the trial may be avoided, and that the opposite party may be aided in framing his
answering pleading and preparing for trial. It has also been stated that it is the function or
purpose of a bill of particulars to define, clarify, particularize, and limit or circumscribe the
issues in the case, to expedite the trial, and assist the court. A general function or purpose
of a bill of particulars is to prevent injustice or do justice in the case when that cannot be
accomplished without the aid of such a bill. 65 redarclaw
x x x x [Emphasis ours.]
Notably, the failure of the accused to move for the specification of the details
desired deprives him of the right to object to evidence that could be introduced and
admitted under an Information of more or less general terms but which sufficiently
charges the accused with a definite crime.66 redarclaw
Although the application for the bill of particulars is one addressed to the sound discretion of the
court67 it should nonetheless exercise its discretion within the context of the facts and the
nature of the crime charged in each case and the right of the accused to be informed of the
nature and cause of accusation against him. As articulated in the case of People v.
Iannone:68
It is beyond cavil that a defendant has a basic and fundamental right to be informed of the charges
against him so that he will be able to prepare a defense. Hence the courts must exercise careful
surveillance to ensure that a defendant is not deprived of this right by an overzealous prosecutor
attempting to protect his case or his witnesses. Any effort to leave a defendant in ignorance of the
substance of the accusation until the time of trial must be firmly rebuffed. This is especially so where
the indictment itself provides a paucity of information. In such cases, the court must be vigilant in
safeguarding the defendant's rights to a bill of particulars and to effective discovery. Should the
prosecutor decide to use an indictment which, although technically sufficient, does not adequately
allow a defendant to properly prepare for trial, he may well run afoul of the defendant's right to be
informed of the accusations against him.
Thus, if the Information is lacking, a court should take a liberal attitude towards its granting69 and
order the government to file a bill of particulars elaborating on the charges. Doubts should be
resolved in favor of granting the bill70 to give full meaning to the accused’s Constitutionally
guaranteed rights.
Notably, the government cannot put the accused in the position of disclosing certain overt acts
through the Information and withholding others subsequently discovered, all of which it intends to
prove at the trial. This is the type of surprise a bill of particulars is designed to avoid.71The accused
is entitled to the observance of all the rules designated to bring about a fair verdict.
This becomes more relevant in the present case where the crime charged carries with it
the severe penalty of capital punishment and entails the commission of several predicate
criminal acts involving a great number of transactions spread over a considerable period
of time.
C.4. Motion to Quash vs. Motion for Bill of Particulars
A bill of particulars presupposes a valid Information while a motion to quash is a jurisdictional defect
on account that the facts charged in the Information does not constitute an offense.72 redarclaw
Justice Antonio T. Carpio, in his dissent, avers that the allegations in the information are not vague
because the Information needs only allege the ultimate facts constituting the offense for which the
accused stands charged, not the finer details of why and how the illegal acts alleged were committed.
In support of his position, Justice Carpio cited the cases of Miguel v. Sandiganbayan,73Go v. Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas,74 and People v. Romualdez,75 among others, to support the superfluity of the
details requested by Enrile.
Justice Carpio’s reliance on these cases is misplaced for they involve the issue of quashal of an
information on the ground that the facts charge do not constitute an offense, rather than a request
for bill of particulars. That is, these cited cases involve the critical issue of the validity of an
information, and not a request for specificity with request to an offense charged in an information.
On the other hand, the cases of People v. Sanico,76People v. Banzuela,77Pielago v. People,78People v.

Rayon, Sr.,79People v. Subesa,80People v. Anguac,81 and Los Baños v. Pedro,82 which were likewise
cited by Justice Carpio, involve the issue that an Information only need to allege the ultimate facts,
and not the specificity of the allegations contained in the information as to allow the accused to
prepare for trial and make an intelligent plea.83redarclaw
Notably, in Miguel,84 to which Justice Carpio concurred, this Court mentioned that the

proper remedy, if at all, to a supposed ambiguity in an otherwise valid Information, is
merely to move for a bill of particulars and not for the quashal of an information which
sufficiently alleges the elements of the offense charged.85 redarclaw
Clearly then, a bill of particulars does not presuppose an invalid information for it merely
fills in the details on an otherwise valid information to enable an accused to make an
intelligent plea and prepare for his defense.
I stress, however, that the issue in the present case involves abuse of discretion for denying Enrile’s
request for a bill of particulars, and not a motion to quash.
If the information does not charge an offense, then a motion to quash is in order. 86 redarclaw
But if the information charges an offense and the averments are so vague that the accused
cannot prepare to plead or prepare for trial, then a motion for a bill of particulars is the
proper remedy.87 redarclaw
Thus viewed, a motion to quash and a motion for a bill of particulars are distinct and separate
remedies, the latter presupposing an information sufficient in law to charge an offense.88 redarclaw
D. The Grave Abuse of Discretion Issue
The grant or denial of a motion for bill of particulars is discretionary on the court where the
Information is filed. As usual in matters of discretion, the ruling of the trial court will not be reversed
unless grave abuse of discretion or a manifestly erroneous order amounting to grave abuse of
discretion is shown.89 redarclaw
Grave abuse of discretion refers to the capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that amounts or
is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to
act at all in contemplation of law such as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion and hostility.90 For the extraordinary writ of certiorari to lie, there must
be capricious, arbitrary, or whimsical exercise of power.
It will be recalled that the Sandiganbayan denied Enrile’s motion for bill of particulars on two
grounds, namely: LawlibraryofCRAlaw
(1) the details sought were evidentiary in nature and are best ventilated during trial; and

(2) his desired details were reiterations of the details he sought in his supplemental opposition to the
issuance of a warrant of arrest.
We shall separately examine these grounds in determining whether the Sandiganbayan committed
grave abuse of discretion when it denied Enrile’s motion for a bill of particulars and his subsequent
motion for reconsideration.
Sandiganbayan Ground #1: LawlibraryofCRAlaw
The details sought were evidentiary in nature
D.1. The Law of Plunder
A determination of whether the details that Enrile sought were evidentiary requires an examination of
the elements of the offense he is charged with, i.e., plunder under Republic Act No. 7080.
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080, as amended, reads: LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties. — Any public officer who, by himself or in

connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through
a combination or series of overt criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof in the
aggregate amount or total value of at least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty
of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who
participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of
plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of
participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the
Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten
wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets including the properties and shares of stocks
derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State. [Emphasis supplied.]
Based on this definition, the elements of plunder are: LawlibraryofCRAlaw
(1) That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance with members of his family,
relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates, or other persons;
(2) That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of the
following overt or criminal acts:
(a) through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public
treasury;
(b) by receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickback or any other
form of pecuniary benefits from any person and/or entity in connection with any government
contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public officer concerned;
(c) by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National
Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities of government-owned or -
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries;
(d) by obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other
form of interest or participation including the promise of future employment in any business
enterprise or undertaking;
(e) by establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or
(f) by taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to
unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino
people and the Republic of the Philippines; and,
(3) That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or acquired is at
least P50,000,000.00. [Emphasis supplied.]
D.1.a. The Conspiracy Element and its Requested Details
Taking these elements into account, we hold that Enrile’s requested details on Who among the
accused acquired the alleged “ill-gotten wealth” are not proper subjects for a bill of particulars.
The allegation of the Information that the accused and Jessica Lucila G. Reyes, “conspiring with one
another and with Janet Lim Napoles, Ronald John Lim, and John Raymund de Asis x x x” expressly
charges conspiracy.
The law on plunder provides that it is committed by “a public officer who acts by himself or in
connivance with x x x.” The term “connivance” suggests an agreement or consent to commit an
unlawful act or deed with another; to connive is to cooperate or take part secretly with another.91 It
implies both knowledge and assent that may either be active or passive.92 redarclaw
Since the crime of plunder may be done in connivance or in conspiracy with other persons, and the
Information filed clearly alleged that Enrile and Jessica Lucila Reyes conspired with one another and
with Janet Lim Napoles, Ronald John Lim and John Raymund De Asis, then it is unnecessary to
specify, as an essential element of the offense, whether the ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least
P172,834,500.00 had been acquired by one, by two or by all of the accused. In the crime of
plunder, the amount of ill-gotten wealth acquired by each accused in a conspiracy is
immaterial for as long as the total amount amassed, acquired or accumulated is at least
P50 million.
We point out that conspiracy in the present case is not charged as a crime by itself but only as the
mode of committing the crime. Thus, there is no absolute necessity of reciting its particulars in the
Information because conspiracy is not the gravamen of the offense charged.
It is enough to allege conspiracy as a mode in the commission of an offense in either of the following
manner: (1) by use of the word “conspire,” or its derivatives or synonyms, such as confederate,
connive, collude; or (2) by allegations of basic facts constituting the conspiracy in a manner that a
person of common understanding would know what is intended, and with such precision as the
nature of the crime charged will admit, to enable the accused to competently enter a plea to a
subsequent indictment based on the same facts.93 redarclaw
Our ruling on this point in People v. Quitlong94 is particularly instructive:

LawlibraryofCRAlaw
A conspiracy indictment need not, of course, aver all the components of conspiracy or allege all the
details thereof, like the part that each of the parties therein have performed, the evidence proving
the common design or the facts connecting all the accused with one another in the web of the
conspiracy. Neither is it necessary to describe conspiracy with the same degree of particularity
required in describing a substantive offense. It is enough that the indictment contains a statement of
the facts relied upon to be constitutive of the offense in ordinary and concise language, with as much
certainty as the nature of the case will admit, in a manner that can enable a person of common
understanding to know what is intended, and with such precision that the accused may plead his
acquittal or conviction to a subsequent indictment based on the same facts. x x x95
D.1.b. The Requested Details of Enrile’s PDAF
We similarly rule that the petitioner is not entitled to a bill of particulars for specifics sought
under the questions –
For each of the years 2004-2010, under what law or official document is a portion of the
“Priority Development Assistance Fund” identified as that of a member of Congress, in this
instance, as ENRILE’s, to be found? In what amount for each year is ENRILE’s Priority
Development Assistance Fund?
and
x x x what COA audits or field investigations were conducted which validated the findings
that each of Enrile’s PDAF projects in the years 2004-2010 were ghosts or spurious
projects?
These matters will simply establish and support the ultimate fact that Enrile’s PDAF was used to fund
fictitious or nonexistent projects. Whether a discretionary fund (in the form of PDAF) had indeed
been made available to Enrile as a member of the Philippine Congress and in what amounts are
evidentiary matters that do not need to be reflected with particularity in the Information, and may be
passed upon at the full-blown trial on the merits of the case.
D.1.b(i) The yearly PDAF Allocations
Specifically, we believe that the exact amounts of Enrile’s yearly PDAF allocations, if any, from 2004
to 2010 need not be pleaded with specific particularity to enable him to properly plead and prepare
for his defense. In fact, Enrile may be in a better position to know these details than the prosecution
and thus cannot claim that he would be taken by surprise during trial by the omission in the
Information of his annual PDAF allocations.
Thus, whether the amounts of Enrile’s PDAF allocations have been specified or not, Enrile has been
sufficiently informed that he stands charged of endorsing Napoles’ non-government organizations to
implement spurious or fictitious projects, in exchange for a percentage of his PDAF.
D.1.b(ii) The details of the COA Audits
The details of the “COA audits or field investigations” only support the ultimate fact that the projects
implemented by Napoles’ NGOs, and funded by Enrile’s PDAF, were nonexisting or fictitious. Thus,
they are evidentiary in nature and do not need to be spelled out with particularity in the Information.
To require more details on these matters from the prosecution would amount to asking for
evidentiary information that the latter intends to present at the trial; it would be a compulsion on the
prosecution to disclose in advance of the trial the evidence it will use in proving the charges alleged
in the indictment.
D.1.c. Other Sources of Kickbacks and Commissions
We also deny Enrile’s plea for details on who “the others” were (aside from Napoles, Lim and
De Asis) from whom he allegedly received kickbacks and commissions. These other persons do not
stand charged of conspiring with Enrile and need not therefore be stated with particularly, either as
specific individuals or as John Does. The Court cannot second-guess the prosecution’s reason for not
divulging the identity of these “others” who may potentially be witnesses for the prosecution.
What the Constitution guarantees the accused is simply the right to meet and examine the
prosecution witnesses. The prosecution has the prerogative to call witnesses other than those named
in the complaint or information, subject to the defense’s right to cross-examine them.96 Making these
“others” known would in fact be equivalent to the prosecution’s premature disclosure of its evidence.
We stress, to the point of repetition, that a bill of particulars is not meant to compel the prosecution
to prematurely disclose evidentiary matters supporting its case.
D.2. The Overt Acts constituting the “Combination” or “Series” under the Plunder Law
We hold that Enrile is entitled to a bill of particulars for specifics sought under the following
questions –
What are the particular overt acts which constitute the “combination”? What are the
particular overt acts which constitute the “series”? Who committed those acts? [Emphasis
ours.]
D.2.a. Reason for Requirement for Particulars of Overt Acts
Plunder is the crime committed by public officers when they amass wealth involving at least P50
million by means of a combination or series of overt acts.97 Under these terms, it is not sufficient to
simply allege that the amount of ill-gotten wealth amassed amounted to at least P50 million; the
manner of amassing the ill-gotten wealth – whether through a combination or series of overt
acts under Section 1(d) of R.A. No. 7080 – is an important element that must be alleged.
When the Plunder Law speaks of “combination,” it refers to at least two (2) acts falling
under different categories listed in Section 1, paragraph (d) of R.A. No. 7080 [for example, raids on
the public treasury under Section 1, paragraph (d), subparagraph (1), and fraudulent conveyance of
assets belonging to the National Government under Section 1, paragraph (d), subparagraph (3)].
On the other hand, to constitute a “series” there must be two (2) or more overt or criminal acts
falling under the same category of enumeration found in Section 1, paragraph (d) [for example,
misappropriation, malversation and raids on the public treasury, all of which fall under Section 1,
paragraph (d), subparagraph (1)].98 redarclaw
With respect to paragraph (a) of the Information –

[(i.e., by repeatedly receiving from NAPOLES and/or her representatives LIM, DE ASIS, and others,
kickbacks or commissions under the following circumstances: before, during and/or after the project
identification, NAPOLES gave, and ENRILE and/or REYES received, a percentage of the cost of a
project to be funded from ENRILE’S Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF), in consideration of
ENRILE’S endorsement, directly or through REYES, to the appropriate government agencies, of
NAPOLES’ non-government organizations which became the recipients and/or target implementers of
ENRILE’S PDAF projects, which duly funded projects turned out to be ghosts or fictitious, thus
enabling NAPOLES to misappropriate the PDAF proceeds for her personal gain x x x)] –
we hold that the prosecution employed a generalized or shotgun approach in alleging the criminal
overt acts allegedly committed by Enrile. This approach rendered the allegations of the paragraph
uncertain to the point of ambiguity for purposes of enabling Enrile to respond and prepare for
his defense. These points are explained in greater detail below.
The heart of the Plunder Law lies in the phrase “combination or series of overt or criminal acts.”
Hence, even if the accumulated ill-gotten wealth amounts to at least P50 million, a person
cannot be prosecuted for the crime of plunder if this resulted from a single criminal act.
This interpretation of the Plunder Law is very clear from the congressional deliberations.99
redarclaw
Considering that without a number of overt or criminal acts, there can be no crime of plunder, the
various overt acts that constitute the “combination” and “series” the Information alleged, are
material facts that should not only be alleged, but must be stated with sufficient definiteness so that
the accused would know what he is specifically charged of and why he stands charged, so that he
could properly defend himself against the charge.
Thus, the several (i.e., at least 2) acts which are indicative of the overall scheme or
conspiracy must not be generally stated; they should be stated with enough
particularity for Enrile (and his co-accused) to be able to prepare the corresponding
refuting evidence to meet these alleged overt acts.
It is insufficient, too, to merely allege that a set of acts had been repeatedly done (although this may
constitute a series if averred with sufficient definiteness), and aver that these acts resulted in the
accumulation or acquisition of ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least P172,834,500.00, as in this
case. The Information should reflect with particularity the predicate acts that underlie the crime of
plunder, based on the enumeration in Section 1(d) of R.A. No. 7080.
A reading of the Information filed against Enrile in the present case shows that the prosecution
made little or no effort to particularize the transactions that would constitute the required
series or combination of overt acts.
In fact, it clustered under paragraph (a) of the Information its recital of the manner Enrile
and his co-accused allegedly operated, thus describing its general view of the series or
combination of overt criminal acts that constituted the crime of plunder.
Without any specification of the basic transactions where kickbacks or commissions amounting to at
least P172,834,500.00 had been allegedly received, Enrile’s preparation for trial is obviously
hampered. This defect is not cured by mere reference to the prosecution’s attachment, as Enrile
already stated in his Reply that the “desired details” could not be found in the bundle of
documents marked by the prosecution, which documents are not integral parts of the
Information. Hence, the prosecution does not discharge its burden of informing Enrile what these
overt acts were by simply pointing to these documents.
In providing the particulars of the overt acts that constitute the “combination” or “series” of
transactions constituting plunder, it stands to reason that the amounts involved, or at their ball
park figures, should be stated; these transactions are not necessarily uniform in amount, and
cannot simply collectively be described as amounting to P172,834,500.00 without hampering Enrile’s
right to respond after receiving the right information.
To stress, this final sum is not a general ball park figure but a very specific sum based on a
number of different acts and hence must have a breakdown. Providing this breakdown reinforces
the required specificity in describing the different overt acts.
Negatively stated, unless Enrile is given the particulars and is later given the chance to object to
unalleged details, he stands to be surprised at the trial at the same time that the prosecution is given
the opportunity to play fast and loose with its evidence to satisfy the more than P50 Million
requirement of law.
D.2.b. Approximate Dates of Commissions or Kickbacks
Enrile should likewise know the approximate dates, at least, of the receipt of the kickbacks and
commissions, so that he could prepare the necessary pieces of evidence, documentary or otherwise,
to disprove the allegations against him. We point out that the period covered by the indictment
extends from “2004 to 2010 or thereabout,” of which, we again stress that different overt acts
constituting of the elements of Plunder took place during this period.
Undoubtedly, the length of time involved – six years – will pose difficulties to Enrile in the
preparation of his defense and will render him susceptible to surprises. Enrile should not be left
guessing and speculating which one/s from among the numerous transactions involving his
discretionary PDAF funds from 2004 to 2010, are covered by the indictment.
D.2.c. The Projects Funded and NGOs Involved
Enrile is also entitled to particulars specifying the project that Enrile allegedly funded coupled

with the name of Napoles’ NGO (e.g., Pangkabuhayan Foundation, Inc.), to sufficiently inform
Enrile of the particular transactions referred to.100
redarclaw
Be it remembered that the core of the indictment is: LawlibraryofCRAlaw
(1) the funding of nonexisting projects using Enrile’s PDAF;
(2) Enrile’s endorsement of Napoles’ NGOs to the government agencies to implement

these projects; and
(3) Enrile’s receipt of kickbacks or commissions in exchange for his endorsement.
Under the elaborate scheme alleged to have been committed by Enrile and his co-accused,
the project identification was what started the totality of acts constituting plunder: only after a
project has been identified could Enrile have endorsed Napoles’ NGO to the appropriate government
agency that, in turn, would implement the supposed project using Enrile’s PDAF. Note that without
the project identification, no justification existed to release Enrile’s PDAF to Napoles’ allegedly bogus
NGO.
In these lights, the “identified project” and “Napoles’ NGO” are material facts that should be
clearly and definitely stated in the Information to allow Enrile to adequately prepare his defense
evidence on the specific transaction pointed to. The omission of these details will necessarily leave
Enrile guessing on what transaction/s he will have to defend against, since he may have funded other
projects with his PDAF. Specification will also allow him to object to evidence not referred to or
covered by the Information’s ultimate facts.
D.2.d. The Government Agencies Serving as Conduits
The government agencies to whom Enrile endorsed Napoles’ NGOs are also material facts that
must be specified, since they served a necessary role in the crime charged – the alleged conduits
between Enrile and Napoles’ NGOs. They were indispensable participants in the elaborate scheme
alleged to have been committed.
The particular person/s in each government agency who facilitated the transactions, need not
anymore be named in the Information, as these are already evidentiary matters. The identification of
the particular agency vis-à-vis Napoles’ NGO and the identified project, will already inform Enrile of
the transaction referred to.
In Tantuico v. Republic,101 the Republic filed a case for reconveyance, reversion, accounting,
restitution, and damages before the Sandiganbayan against former President Ferdinand Marcos,
Imelda Marcos, Benjamin Romualdez, and Francisco Tantuico, Jr. Tantuico filed a motion for bill of
particulars essentially alleging that the complaint was couched in general terms and did not have the
particulars that would inform him of the alleged factual and legal bases. The Sandiganbayan denied
his motion on the ground that the particulars sought are evidentiary in nature. Tantuico moved to
reconsider this decision, but the Sandiganbayan again denied his motion.
The Court overturned the Sandiganbayan’s ruling and directed the prosecution to prepare and file a
bill of particulars. Significantly, the Court held that the particulars prayed for, such as: names of
persons, names of corporations, dates, amounts involved, a specification of property for
identification purposes, the particular transactions involving withdrawals and
disbursements, and a statement of other material facts as would support the conclusions
and inferences in the complaint, are not evidentiary in nature. The Court explained that those
particulars are material facts that should be clearly and definitely averred in the complaint so that the
defendant may be fairly informed of the claims made against him and be prepared to meet the issues
at the trial.
To be sure, the differences between ultimate and evidentiary matters are not easy to distinguish.
While Tantuico was a civil case and did not involve the crime of plunder, the Court’s ruling
nonetheless serves as a useful guide in the determination of what matters are indispensable and
what matters may be omitted in the Information, in relation with the constitutional right of an
accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
In the present case, the particulars on the: LawlibraryofCRAlaw
(1) projects involved;
(2) Napoles’ participating NGOs; and
(3) the government agency involved in each transaction

will undoubtedly provide Enrile with sufficient data to know the specific transactions involved, and
thus enable him to prepare adequately and intelligently whatever defense or defenses he may have.
We reiterate that the purpose of a bill of particular is to clarify allegations in the Information that are
indefinite, vague, or are conclusions of law to enable the accused to properly plead and
prepare for trial, not simply to inform him of the crime of which he stands accused. Verily,
an accused cannot intelligently respond to the charge laid if the allegations are incomplete or are
unclear to him.
We are aware that in a prosecution for plunder, what is sought to be established is the commission of
the criminal acts in furtherance of the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth. In the language of Section 4 of
R.A. No. 7080, for purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it is sufficient to establish beyond
reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy to amass, accumulate, or acquire ill-gotten wealth.102 redarclaw
The term “overall unlawful scheme” indicates a general plan of action or method that the principal
accused and public officer and others conniving with him follow to achieve their common criminal
goal. In the alternative, if no overall scheme can be found or where the schemes or methods used by
the multiple accused vary, the overt or criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy to attain a
common criminal goal.103 redarclaw
Lest Section 4 be misunderstood as allowing the prosecution to allege that a set of acts has
been repeatedly done (thereby showing a ‘pattern’ of overt criminal acts), as has been done in the
present case, we point out that this section does not dispense with the requirement of stating the
essential or material facts of each component or predicate act of plunder; it merely prescribes a
rule of procedure for the prosecution of plunder.
In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,104 we construed this procedural rule to mean that [w]hat the
prosecution needed to prove beyond reasonable doubt was only the number of acts sufficient to form
a combination or series that would constitute a pattern involving an amount of at least
P50,000,000.00. There was no need to prove each and every other act alleged in the Information to
have been committed by the accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to
amass, accumulate, or acquire ill-gotten wealth.105 redarclaw
If, for example, the accused is charged in the Information of malversing public funds on twenty
different (20) occasions, the prosecution does not need to prove all 20 transactions; it suffices if a
number of these acts of malversation can be proven with moral certainty, provided only that the
series or combination of transaction would amount to at least P50,000,000.00. Nonetheless, each of
the twenty transactions should be averred with particularity, more so if the circumstances
surrounding each transaction are not the same. This is the only way that the accused can
properly prepare for his defense during trial.
D.3. Paragraph (b) of the Information
As his last requested point, Enrile wants the prosecution to provide the details of the allegation under
paragraph (b) of the Information (i.e., x x x by taking undue advantage, on several occasions, of
their official position, authority, relationships, connections, and influence to unjustly enrich
themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice, of the Filipino people and the Republic
of the Philippines) in the following manner: LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Provide the details of how Enrile took undue advantage, on several occasions, of his official positions,
authority, relationships, connections, and influence to unjustly enrich himself at the expense and to
the damage and prejudice, of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines. Was this
because he received any money from the government? From whom and for what reason did he
receive any money or property from the government through which he “unjustly enriched himself”?
State the details from whom each amount was received, the place and the time.
Our ruling on Enrile’s desired details – specifically, the particular overt act/s alleged to constitute the
“combination” and “series” charged in the Information; a breakdown of the amounts of the kickbacks
and commissions allegedly received, stating how the amount of P172,834,500.00 was arrived at; a
brief description of the ‘identified’ projects where kickbacks and commissions were received;
the approximate dates of receipt of the alleged kickbacks and commissions from the identified
projects; the name of Napoles’ non-government organizations (NGOs) which were the alleged
“recipients and/or target implementors of Enrile’s PDAF projects;” and the government agencies to
whom Enrile allegedly endorsed Napoles’ NGOs – renders it unnecessary to require the
prosecution to submit further particulars on the allegations contained under paragraph (b)
of the Information.
Simply put, the particular overt acts alleged to constitute the combination or series required by the
crime of plunder, coupled with a specification of the other non-evidentiary details stated above,
already answer the question of how Enrile took undue advantage of his position, authority,
relationships, connections and influence as Senator to unjustly enrich himself.
We also point out that the PDAF is a discretionary fund intended solely for public purposes. Since the
Information stated that Enrile, as “Philippine Senator,” committed the offense “in relation to his
office,” by “repeatedly receiving kickbacks or commissions” from Napoles and/or her representatives
through projects funded by his (Enrile’s) PDAF, then it already alleged how undue advantage had
been taken and how the Filipino people and the Republic had been prejudiced. These points are fairly
deducible from the allegations in the Information as supplemented by the required particulars.
E. The Grave Abuse of Discretion
In the light of all these considerations, we hold that the Sandiganbayan’s denial of the
petitioner’s motion for a bill of particulars, on the ground that the details sought to be
itemized or specified are all evidentiary – without any explanation supporting this
conclusion – constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
As discussed above, some of the desired details are material facts that must be alleged to enable the
petitioner to properly plead and prepare his defense. The Sandiganbayan should have diligently sifted
through each detail sought to be specified, and made the necessary determination of whether each
detail was an ultimate or evidentiary fact, particularly after Enrile stated in his Reply that the “desired
details” could not be found in the bundle of documents marked by the prosecution. We cannot insist
or speculate that he is feigning ignorance of the presence of these desired details; neither can we put
on him the burden of unearthing from these voluminous documents what the desired details are. The
remedy of a bill of particulars is precisely made available by the Rules to enable an accused to
positively respond and make an intelligent defense.
Justice Carpio’s reference to the voluminous 144-page Ombudsman’s resolution (which found
probable cause to indict the petitioner and his co-accused not only of the crime of plunder, but also
for violations of several counts of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practice Act) to justify his argument that
Enrile was already aware of the details he seeks in his motion for a bill of particulars, all the more
strengthens our conclusive position that the Information for plunder filed against Enrile was
ambiguous and glaringly insufficient to enable him to make a proper plea and to prepare for trial. We
reiterate, to the point of being repetitive, that the purpose of the bill of particulars in criminal cases is
to supply vague facts or allegations in the complaint or information to enable the accused to properly
plead and prepare for trial.
Moreover, a resolution arising from a preliminary investigation does not amount to nor does it serve
the purpose of a bill of particulars.
A bill of particulars guards against the taking of an accused by surprise by restricting the scope of
the proof;106it limits the evidence to be presented by the parties to the matters alleged in
the Information as supplemented by the bill. It is for this reason that the failure of an accused
to move for a bill of particulars deprives him of the right to object to evidence which could be lawfully
introduced and admitted under an information of more or less general terms which sufficiently
charges the defendants with a definite crime.
The record on preliminary investigation, in comparison, serves as the written account of the
inquisitorial process when the fiscal determined the existence of prima facie evidence to indict a
person for a particular crime. The record of the preliminary investigation, as a general rule, does not
even form part of the records of the case.107 These features of the record of investigation are
significantly different from the bill of particulars that serves as basis, together with the Information,
in specifying the overt acts constituting the offense that the accused pleaded to during arraignment.
Notably, plunder is a crime composed of several predicate criminal acts. To prove

plunder, the prosecution must weave a web out of the six ways of illegally amassing wealth
and show how the various acts reveal a combination or series of means or schemes that
reveal a pattern of criminality. The interrelationship of the separate acts must be shown and be
established as a scheme to accumulate ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least P50 million.
Plunder thus involves intricate predicate criminal acts and numerous transactions and schemes that
span a period of time. Naturally, in its prosecution, the State possesses an “effective flexibility” of
proving a predicate criminal act or transaction, not originally contemplated in the Information, but is
otherwise included in the broad statutory definition, in light of subsequently discovered evidence. The
unwarranted use of the flexibility is what the bill of particulars guards against.
Justice Carpio further argues that the ponencia transformed the nature of an action from
an accusation in writing charging a person with an offense to an initiatory pleading
alleging a cause of action.
We see nothing wrong with such treatment, for a motion for a bill of particulars in criminal cases is
designed to achieve the same purpose as the motion for a bill of particulars in civil cases. In fact,
certainty, to a reasonable extent, is an essential attribute of all pleadings, both civil and criminal, and
is more especially needed in the latter where conviction is followed by penal consequences.108 redarclaw
Thus, even if the Information employs the statutory words does not mean that it is unnecessary to
allege such facts in connection with the commission of the offense as will certainly put the accused
on full notice of what he is called upon to defend, and establish such a record as will effectually bar a
subsequent prosecution for that identical offense.109 redarclaw
Notably, conviction for plunder carries with it the penalty of capital punishment; for this
reason, more process is due, not less. When a person’s life interest – protected by the life,
liberty, and property language recognized in the due process clause – is at stake in the proceeding,
all measures must be taken to ensure the protection of those fundamental rights.
As we emphasized in Republic v. Sandiganbayan,110 “the administration of justice is not a matter of

guesswork. The name of the game is fair play, not foul play. We cannot allow a legal skirmish
where, from the start, one of the protagonists enters the arena with one arm tied to his back.”
Finally, we find no significance in Justice Carpio’s argument that Atty. Estelito Mendoza did not
previously find vague the Information for plunder filed against President Joseph Estrada in 2001.
Under the amended Information111 against Estrada, et al., each overt act that constituted the series
or combination and corresponding to the predicate acts under Section 1(d) had been averred with
sufficient particularity so that there was no doubt what particular transaction was referred
to.
We point out that unlike in the Information against Enrile, the following matters had been averred
with sufficient definiteness, viz: the predicate acts that constitute the crime of plunder; the
breakdown of how the alleged amount of P4,097,804,173.17, more or less, had been arrived at; the
participants involved in each transaction; and the specific sources of the illegal wealth amassed.
At any rate, that Atty. Mendoza did not previously question the indictment of President Estrada via a
motion for bill of particulars does not ipso facto mean that the present Information for plunder filed
against Enrile is not vague and ambiguous.
Sandiganbayan Ground #2: LawlibraryofCRAlaw
That Enrile’s cited grounds are reiterations of the grounds previously raised
Enrile does not deny that the arguments he raised in his supplemental opposition to issuance of a
warrant of arrest and for dismissal of information and in his motion for bill of particulars were
identical. He argues, however, that the mere reiteration of these grounds should not be a ground for
the denial of his motion for bill of particulars, since “the context in which those questions were
raised was entirely different.”
While both the motion to dismiss the Information and the motion for bill of particulars involved the
right of an accused to due process, the enumeration of the details desired in Enrile’s supplemental
opposition to issuance of a warrant of arrest and for dismissal of information and in his motion for bill
of particulars are different viewed particularly from the prism of their respective objectives.
In the former, Enrile took the position that the Information did not state a crime for which he can be
convicted; thus, the Information is void; he alleged a defect of substance. In the latter, he already
impliedly admits that the Information sufficiently alleged a crime but is unclear and lacking in details
that would allow him to properly plead and prepare his defense; he essentially alleged here a defect
of form.
Note that in the former, the purpose is to dismiss the Information for its failure to state the nature
and cause of the accusation against Enrile; while the details desired in the latter (the motion for bill
of particulars) are required to be specified in sufficient detail because the allegations in the
Information are vague, indefinite, or in the form of conclusions and will not allow Enrile to adequately
prepare his defense unless specifications are made.
That every element constituting the offense had been alleged in the Information does not
preclude the accused from requesting for more specific details of the various acts or
omissions he is alleged to have committed. The request for details is precisely the function
of a bill of particulars.
Hence, while the information may be sufficient for purposes of stating the cause and the crime an
accused is charged, the allegations may still be inadequate for purposes of enabling him to properly
plead and prepare for trial.
We likewise find no complete congruence between the grounds invoked and the details sought by
Enrile in his motion for bill of particulars, and the grounds invoked in opposing the warrant for his
arrest issued, so that the Sandiganbayan’s action in one would bar Enrile from essentially invoking
the same grounds.
The judicial determination of probable cause is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a
warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that based on
the evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused under custody in order not to
frustrate the ends of justice.112 Simply put, the judge determines whether the necessity exists to
place the accused under immediate custody to avoid frustrating the ends of justice.
On the other hand, the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure grants the accused the remedy of a bill
of particulars to better inform himself of the specifics or particulars concerning facts or matters that
had not been averred in the Information with the necessary clarity for purposes of his defense.
Its purpose is to better acquaint the accused of the specific acts and/or omissions in relation with the
crime charged, to limit the matters and the evidence that the prosecution may otherwise be allowed
to use against him under a more or less general averment, and to meet the charges head on and
timely object to evidence whose inadmissibility may otherwise be deemed waived.
Based on these considerations, the question of whether there is probable cause to issue a warrant of
arrest against an accused, is separate and distinct from the issue of whether the allegations in the
Information have been worded with sufficient definiteness to enable the accused to properly plead
and prepare his defense. While the grounds cited for each may seemingly be the same, they are
submitted for different purposes and should be appreciated from different perspectives, so that the
insufficiency of these grounds for one does not necessarily translate to insufficiency for the other.
Thus, the resolution of the issue of probable cause should not bar Enrile from seeking a more
detailed averment of the allegations in the Information.
The Sandiganbayan grossly missed these legal points and thus gravely abused its discretion: it used
wrong and completely inapplicable considerations to support its conclusion.
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing: LawlibraryofCRAlaw
a. We PARTIALLY GRANT the present petition for certiorari, and SET ASIDE the Sandiganbayan’s

resolutions dated July 11, 2014, which denied Enrile’s motion for bill of particulars and his motion for
reconsideration of this denial.
b. We DIRECT the People of the Philippines to SUBMIT, within a non-extendible period of fifteen

(15) days from finality of this Decision, with copy furnished to Enrile, a bill of particulars
containing the facts sought that we herein rule to be material and necessary. The bill of particulars
shall specifically contain the following:
LawlibraryofCRAlaw
1. The particular overt act/s alleged to constitute the “combination or series of overt
criminal acts” charged in the Information.
2. A breakdown of the amounts of the “kickbacks or commissions” allegedly received,

stating how the amount of P172,834,500.00 was arrived at.
3. A brief description of the ‘identified’ projects where kickbacks or commissions were

received.
4. The approximate dates of receipt, “in 2004 to 2010 or thereabout,” of the alleged

kickbacks and commissions from the identified projects. At the very least, the prosecution
should state the year when the kickbacks and transactions from the identified projects
were received.
5. The name of Napoles’ non-government organizations (NGOs) which were the alleged
“recipients and/or target implementors of Enrile’s PDAF projects.”
6. The government agencies to whom Enrile allegedly endorsed Napoles’ NGOs. The
particular person/s in each government agency who facilitated the transactions need not
be named as a particular.
All particulars prayed for that are not included in the above are hereby denied.
9.) [ G.R. No. 227405, September 05, 2018 ]
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, PETITIONER, VS. AMADO M. BLOR, JESUS R. BARRERA,
ANGELINA O. QUIJANO, POTENCIANO G. VICEDO, MIRAFLOR B. SOLIVEN, AND ANNIE F.
CONSTANTINO, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision dated 22 January 2016[1] and Resolution dated 18 August 2016[2] of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 138533. The case stems from a complaint against respondents for the alleged illegal procurement of six
iPad units for the Department of Agrarian Reform Provincial Office (DARPO) in Occidental Mindoro.
The Antecedent Facts
Per Special Order No. 11-2013,[3] the Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) of DARPO-Occidental Mindoro was reconstituted as follows:
respondent Jesus R. Barrera (Barrera), Chairman; respondent Angelina O. Quijano (Quijano), Vice-Chairman; and respondent
Potenciano G. Vicedo (Vicedo), Agnes A. Caliboso (Caliboso), and the concerned Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer, Members.
Further, under PARO Special Order No. 08-2012,[4] respondents Barrera and Annie R. Constantino (Constantino) would head the
Inspection and Canvass Committees, respectively. Both administrative orders were issued by respondent Amado M. Blor (Blor), Officer-
in-Charge (OlC)-Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer II (PARO).
On 17 June 2013, the Management Committee of DARPO-Occidental Mindoro held a meeting. The attendees were respondent Blor as
PARO, respondent Barrera as Chief Agrarian Reform Officer (CARO) of the Administrative and Finance Division, respondent Quijano
as CARO of the Beneficiaries Development Coordinating Division, respondent Vicedo as OIC-CARO of the Operations Division, and
Caliboso, head of the Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Unit. During the meeting, Rodrigo P. Mazo (Mazo), a procurement officer,
[5]
was summoned and instructed by respondent Blor to purchase six iPad units for the use of the PARO and CAROs. In other words,
the Chairman, Vice-Chairman and two Members of the BAC, all of whom were part of the Management Committee, happened
to be the end users of the requisition. An undated Requisition and Issue Slip (RIS)[6] was signed by respondents Barrera and Blor as
the requesting party and approving authority, respectively. Notably, the RIS specified "IPAD," with the purpose indicated as "[f]or PARO
and CARPO use."[7] Mazo created the online posting[8] at the Philippine Government Electronic Procurement System (PhilGEPS) and
drafted the Request for Quotation (RFQ).[9] The approved budget for the contract was PhP239,940, or PhP39,990 per unit. Unlike the
RIS, the RFQ did not specify "iPad," but described the article as "Tablet Computer" with the following specifications: "(1) 9.7 inch with
Retina display; (2) A6x chip with quadcore graphics; (3) 5MP iSight camera with 1080p FED video rec; (4) Facetime FID camera; (5) up
to lOhrs battery life; (6) built-in WIFI (802.11 a/b/g/n); and (7) 64-GB WIFI + Cellular."[10]
Meanwhile, respondent Constantino, Chairperson of the Canvass Committee, sent RFQs[11] to three suppliers based in SM Megamall,
Mandaluyong City, namely, Silicon Valley Computer Centre (Silicon Valley), Electroworld, and Accent Micro Products, Inc. The RFQ
was dated 18 June 2013, and signed by respondents Constantino and Blor.[12] Also, per Travel Order No. 203 S-2013 dated 18 June
2013,[13] respondent Miraflor B. Soliven (Soliven), OIC-Accountant II, and respondent Constantino were scheduled to depart on 23 June
2013 and return on 26 June 2013 "to coordinate with central project office regarding the funds of ARISP3 and canvass Ipads."[14] The
travel order was recommended by respondent Barrera and approved by respondent Blor.
On 20 June 2013, the three stores replied to respondent Blor. Apart from recommending the Apple iPad at PhP39,990 per unit,[15] the
three stores also submitted their respective quotations for the keyboard case accessory: PhP2,000 by Silicon Valley; PhP4,000 by
Electroworld; and PhP3,000 by Accent Micro Products, Inc. Incidentally, Mazo published on the same day at PhilGEPS the requisition
he earlier created, for a seven-day posting period, or until 27 June 2013.
Having submitted the lowest bid, Silicon Valley, through its owner and operator Tiny.Com Computer, Inc., was issued Land Bank of the
Philippines Check No. 127247 dated 24 June 2013 in the amount of PhP238,173.30. Respondent Blor, an authorized signatory, signed
the check. Further, three undated documents were stamped "PAID," with the date "JUN 24 2013" superimposed and the number
127247 immediately below. These undated documents included the following: (1) a purchase order signed by respondent Blor as the
authorized official and respondent Barrera as head of the requisitioning office;[16] (2) Obligation Slip No. 200-13-06-0478A signed by
respondent Barrera as the requesting party and certifying that the allotment for the six iPad units amounting to PhP251,940 was
necessary, lawful and under his direct supervision, and respondent Constantino as OIC-Budget Officer, certifying that the appropriation
was available and obligated for the indicated purpose;[17] and (3) Disbursement Voucher No. 158-06569-13 in the net amount of
PhP238,173.30 signed by respondent Soliven, certifying the availability of funds, and respondent Blor approving the payment, with the
accounting entries having been prepared by respondent Constantino as bookkeeper and approved by respondent Soliven.[18] On 28
June 2013, DARPO-Occidental Mindoro was issued Official Receipt No. 1315,[19] evidencing payment in the amount of PhP238,173.30
to Silicon Valley. Based on the Acknowledgment Receipts for Equipment,[20] the six iPad units were acquired on 24 June 2013 and
received on 1 July 2013. The recipients were respondents Blor, Barrera, Quijano, and Vicedo, and Lester P. Abeleda, Attorney III.
Meanwhile, the iPad unit given to Caliboso, BAC member and head of the Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Unit, was turned over to
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator Ariel D. Maglalang.[21]
Notably, the requisition for six tablet computers was not included in the 2013 Annual Procurement Plan (APP)[22] of DARPO-Occidental
Mindoro. However, on 14 November 2013, the 2013 APP was updated to include the requisition. The updated APP was signed by
respondent Barrera who prepared the document, respondent Soliven who certified that funds were available, and respondent Blor who
approved the updated APP.[23]
On 18 November 2013, Mazo filed with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon an Affidavit Complaint dated 2 October 2013,
[24]
charging respondents and Lester P. Abeleda with Violation of Republic Act No. (RA) 9184, or the Government Procurement Reform
Act.
The Ruling of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon
Finding substantial evidence on the illegal procurement of the iPad units, having been purchased in violation of RA 9184, the Office of
the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon held respondents administratively liable for grave misconduct. The dispositive portion of the
Decision dated 15 September 2014[25] reads:
WHEREFORE, respondents AMADO M. BLOR, Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer I, JESUS R. BARRERA, Chief Agrarian Reform
Program Officer, Administrative and Finance Division, and Chairman, Bids and Awards Committee, ANGELINA O. QUIJANO, Chief
Agrarian Reform Officer, Beneficiaries Development Coordinating Division, POTENCIANO G. VICEDO, OIC, Chief Agrarian Reform
Officer, LESTER P. ABELEDA, Legal Officer, MIRAFLOR B. SOLIVEN, OIC-Accountant II, and ANNIE CONSTANTINO, Acting Budget
Officer/Bookkeeper, all of the Department of Agrarian Reform Provincial Office (DARPO) San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, are hereby
found GUILTY of Grave Misconduct and are meted with the penalty of DISMISSAL from the service with cancellation of eligibility,
forfeiture of retirement benefits, and perpetual disqualification from holding public office, as well as in government-owned and -
controlled corporations, pursuant to the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.
SO ORDERED.[26]
On 31 October 2014, respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration. In its Order dated 14 November 2014,[27] the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon denied their motion.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals affirmed the finding of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon that the procurement of the iPad units
violated RA 9184. However, only respondents Barrera, Quijano, and Constantino were found administratively liable for being "members
of the BAC who worked actively and conceitedly to realize the acquisition of [the] iPads."[28] The dispositive portion of the Decision dated
22 January 2016[29] reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the APPEAL is found PARTLY MERITORIOUS. The assailed Decision and Order dated 15
September 2014 and 14 November 2014, respectively, are hereby MODIFIED, to the effect that only petitioners Jesus R. Barrera,
Angelina O. Quijano, and Annie [F.] Constantino are found guilty of GRAVE MISCONDUCT, and are meted the penalty of DISMISSAL
and its attendant penalties of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and perpetual disqualification for reemployment
in the government service.
On the other hand, the complaint against petitioners Amado M. Blor, Potenciano G. Vicedo, and Miraflor B. Soliven is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[30]
Upon motion by respondents Barrera, Quijano, and Constantino, the Court of Appeals reconsidered its Decision dated 22 January 2016
and appreciated their length of government service and being first-time offenders to have mitigated their liability. On the other hand, the
Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Partial Reconsideration filed by petitioner. The dispositive portion of the Resolution dated 18
August 2016[31] reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners-movants is hereby found PARTLY
MERITORIOUS.
The 22 January 2016 Decision is hereby MODIFIED, to the effect that petitioners Jesus R. Barrera, Angelina Quijano, and Annie [F.]
Constantino are hereby meted the penalty of suspension for one (1) year without pay in lieu of dismissal with its attendant penalties, for
the offense of Grave Misconduct committed through flagrant disregard of R.A. 9184.
On the other hand, the Motion for Partial Reconsideration filed by the Office of the Ombudsman is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.[32]
The Issues
In gist, petitioner and respondents raise the following two issues: first, whether the procurement of the iPad units is lawful;
and second, if in the affirmative, whether respondents are administratively liable.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition is meritorious.
The purchase of the iPad units without prior public bidding violated RA 9184.
Petitioner argues that the purchase of the six iPad units was contrary to RA 9184. Respondents contend otherwise and pass on the
blame to Lazo for failing to inform them that the requisition was posted on PhilGEPS.
Petitioner is correct. In fact, the Court of Appeals affirmed the finding of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon that
the purchase violated RA 9184. The following disquisition of the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated 22 January 2016 is instructive,
to wit:
Evaluating now the DARPO's shopping for iPads in light of the above mentioned standards, We are persuaded that the law on
procurement was not observed in the acquisition of these devices. We elaborate the reasons below.
Principally, by no means can an Apple iPad be considered an ordinary or regular office supply. Petitioners have not satisfactorily
explained why they specifically need an Apple iPad to carry out their transactions or duties. Their arguments that an iPad should be
treated as an ordinary or regular office supply borders on the absurd. They would have an iPad be classified with pens, paper clips,
bond papers, ink, and similar items and supplies normally used and consumed in a typical office in the course of its daily operations.
xxxx
Second, the acquisition of Apple iPads also contravened the "no brand name rule" in procurement, x x x.
xxxx
Thus, assuming tablets were needed, the procurement need not have been limited to Apple products. We take judicial notice that an
Apple iPad occupies the top rung on the tablet ladder and commands an expensive price. Notably, there are cheaper tablets available
on the market and which perform substantially the same functions as an Apple iPad. Consequently, had Sec. 18 been observed, the
government would have spent substantially less for each tablet.
Aside from the nature of the goods procured by shopping, We also find that the requirement for posting has not been complied with.
This has even been admitted by the petitioners. Sec. 54.2 of the RIRR elucidates on this condition, x x x.
xxxx
The defects of the procurement, however, do not stop here. A more fundamental error lay with the non-inclusion of the purchase in the
DARPO's Annual Procurement Plan ("APP"), which under the RIRR is indispensable, x x x.
xxxx
Another lapse is that no Resolution from the Bids and Awards Committee prescribed the resort to shopping. The argument that such a
Resolution is necessary only when the procurement is included in the original APP, and not in an updated one, is weak and baseless.
xxxx
Given the above observations, We are convinced that there was a deficient compliance with the law. The erroneous procedure to
facilitate the procurement as well as the extraordinary nature of the subject goods, which cannot be shopped, all point to a procurement
inconsistent with R.A. No. 9184 and its RIRR.[33]
The Court sees no reason to deviate from these findings.
Respondents Barrera, Quijano, Vicedo, and Constantino, as BAC members, are liable, and their length of service cannot
mitigate their liability.
Petitioner argues that respondents Barrera, Quijano, Vicedo, and Constantino, as officers and members of the BAC, must be held
administratively liable and dismissed from the service for the illegal procurement of the iPad units. Respondents Barrera, Quijano, and
Constantino contend otherwise and insist that the procurement was justified, and that in any event, the imposable penalty must be
mitigated by their length of service and lack of any previous offense. For his part, respondent Vicedo maintains that his administrative
liability was not proven by substantial evidence, considering that he did not sign any document relating to the procurement of the
devices.
Petitioner is correct.
Under RA 9184, the BAC shall ensure that the procuring entity abides by the standards set forth by the procurement law. In proper
cases, the BAC shall also recommend to the Head of the Procuring Entity the use of Alternative Methods of Procurement. Section 12 of
RA 9184 reads:
SECTION 12. Functions of the BAC. - The BAC shall have the following functions: advertise and/or post the invitation to bid, conduct
pre-procurement and pre-bid conferences, determine the eligibility of prospective bidders, receive bids, conduct the evaluation of bids,
undertake post-qualification proceedings, recommend award of contracts to the Head of the Procuring Entity or his duly authorized
representative: Provided, That in the event the Head of the Procuring Entity shall disapprove such recommendation, such disapproval
shall be based only on valid, reasonable and justifiable grounds to be expressed in writing, copy furnished the BAC; recommend the
imposition of sanctions in accordance with Article XXIII, and perform such other related functions as may be necessary, including the
creation of a Technical Working Group from a pool of technical, financial and/or legal experts to assist in the procurement process.
In proper cases, the BAC shall also recommend to the Head of the Procuring Entity the use of Alternative Methods of Procurement as
provided for in Article XVI hereof.
The BAC shall be responsible for ensuring that the Procuring Entity abides by the standards set forth by this Act and the IRR, and it
shall prepare a procurement monitoring report that shall be approved and submitted by the Head of the Procuring Entity to the GPPB
on a semestral basis. The contents and coverage of this report shall be provided in the IRR.
The functions of the BAC are echoed in Sections 12.1 and 12.2 of the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations (RIRR), and even
in the earlier IRR, of RA 9184.
Here, respondents Barrera, Quijano, Vicedo, and Constantino held the following positions in the BAC of DARPO-Occidental Mindoro:
respondent Barrera as Chairman, respondent Quijano as Vice-Chairman, respondent Vicedo as Member, and respondent Constantino
as part of the Technical Working Group. Further, respondents Barrera and Constantino were the heads of the Inspection and Canvass
Committees, respectively. By law, respondents Barrera, Quijano, Vicedo, and Constantino were bound, not only to know, but also to
ensure compliance by the procuring entity with the prescribed procedure on government procurement. However, they chose not to, as
found by the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon and the Court of Appeals.
Respondents Barrera, Quijano, Vicedo, and Constantino are mistaken in invoking their length of service and lack of prior disciplinary
record to mitigate their liability. In Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao v. Martel,[34] the Court explained:
Even though it affirmed the administrative guilt of the respondents for grave misconduct and gross neglect of duty, warranting the
penalty of dismissal from service, the CA downgraded their penalty to one (1) year suspension without pay. The appellate court
explained that aside from the fact that there was no proof of overpricing or damage to the government, the length of government
service of the respondents should mitigate their penalty, x x x.
xxxx
The Court disagrees.
First, the element of misappropriation is not indispensable in an administrative charge of grave misconduct. Thus, the lack of proof of
overpricing or damage to the government does not ipso facto amount to a mitigated penalty.
Second, length of service is not a magic phrase that, once invoked, will automatically be considered as a mitigating circumstance in
favor of the party invoking it. Length of service can either be a mitigating or aggravating circumstance depending on the factual milieu of
each case. Length of service, in other words, is an alternative circumstance.
In University of the Philippines v. Civil Service Commission, the length of service of the respondent therein was not considered; instead,
the Court took it against the said respondent because her length of service, among other things, helped her in the commission of the
offense. In Bondoc v. Mantala, it was asserted that jurisprudence was replete with cases declaring that a grave offense could not be
mitigated by the fact that the accused was a first-time offender or by the length of service of the accused. While in most cases, length of
service was considered in favor of the respondent, it was not considered where the offense committed was found to be serious or
grave.
Here, Martel and Guiñares had been the Provincial Accountant and the Provincial Treasurer, respectively, and both were members of
the PBAC for a number of years. With their extensive experience, it was expected that they were knowledgeable with the various laws
on the procurement process. Thus, it is truly appalling that the respondents failed to apply the basic rule that all procurement shall be
done through competitive bidding and that only in exceptional circumstances could public bidding be dispensed with. As previously
discussed, they also committed several violations during the course of the procurement which underscored the seriousness of their
transgressions.
To recall, when the procurement of iPad units was broached during the Management Committee meeting on 17 June 2013, none of
respondents Barrera, Quijano, Vicedo, and Constantino objected or raised that the purchase of the devices must undergo public
bidding. What is more, respondents Barrera, Quijano, and Vicedo happened to be the end users of the requisition. Further, respondent
Constantino sent RFQs to three stores in Manila the immediately following day, showing the lack of intent to follow the regular
procedure. A week after the Management Committee meeting and well within the seven-day posting period of the requisition at
PhilGEPS, a check dated 24 June 2013 was already issued in favor of the supplier with the lowest quotation. To the mind of the Court,
all these undisputed facts constitute substantial evidence against respondents Barrera, Quijano, Vicedo, and Constantino on their clear
intent to violate the law. Hence, their length of service in the government and lack of prior disciplinary record cannot mitigate their
liability.
Respondents Blor and Soliven facilitated the illegal procurement.
Petitioner argues that respondents Blor and Soliven must also be held administratively liable for grave misconduct for
facilitating the illegal procurement and the disbursement of public funds. On the other hand, respondents Blor and Soliven
refute their liability because they were not part of the BAC of DARPO-Occidental Mindoro.
Petitioner is correct. The Decision dated 15 September 2014 of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon reads in pertinent part:
As for respondents Blor x x x and Soliven, while they were not members of the BAC, the role played by them, in cahoots with the other
respondents who were members of the BAC, [was] indispensable to the subject transaction.
To stress, Blor was the head of the procuring entity. He approved the RIS and DV. He "gave the go signal" that prompted the
BAC to procure the iPads through shopping. He also approved the payment of the iPads despite the lack of requisite
documentation. On top of it, he is an end user. xxx. Meanwhile, respondent Soliven certified in the DV that supporting
documents are complete and proper despite the absence of a BAC Resolution approved by the head of the entity which
justifies] the use of the alternative mode of procurement, and notice of posting for seven days in the PhilGEPS, in the website
of the Procuring Entity and its electronic procurement service provider, if any, and in any conspicuous place in the premises
of the Procuring Entity.[35]
Further, respondent Blor issued Special Order No. 11-2013, enumerating the responsibilities of the BAC, and Special Order No. 8-
2012, describing the functions of the Inspection and Canvass Committees. Hence, respondent Blor cannot feign ignorance about the
rules on government procurement. Respondent Soliven also accompanied respondent Constantino, a BAC member, to Manila to
canvass iPads and their travel order was signed by respondent Blor. Most telling, respondents Blor and Soliven signed the updated
APP, inserting the requisition for the six iPad units previously not found in the original APP for 2013. Collectively, the acts of
respondents evince a community of design between the BAC officers and members, on the one hand, and the head and the accountant
of the procuring entity, on the other, to circumvent the proper procedure on government procurement.
Jurisprudence defines grave misconduct as "a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful
behavior or gross negligence by a public officer,"[36] tainted with other "elements such as corruption or willful intent to violate the law
or to disregard established rules."[37] Similarly, the purchase of the iPad units by respondents amounts to grave misconduct,
considering that the unjustifiable failure to hold public bidding is a violation of RA 9184, and their direct resort to shopping was tainted
with the intent to violate or to disregard established rules on government procurement.
To clarify, when a civil servant is disciplined, the object sought is not the punishment of the officer or employee, but the improvement of
public service and the preservation of the public's faith and confidence in the government.[38] Serious offenses, such as grave
misconduct, have always been and should remain anathema in the civil service.[39] The rationale is enshrined in Section 1, Article XI of
the Constitution - public office is a public trust.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari filed by the Office of the Ombudsman is GRANTED. The Decision dated 22 January
2016 and Resolution dated 18 August 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 138533 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision dated 15 September 2014 and Order dated 14 November 2014 of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon in OMB-L-
A-14-0017 are hereby REINSTATED.
10.) A.M. No. 12-6-18-SC
RE: CONTRACTS WITH ARTES INTERNATIONAL, INC.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
We hereby consider and resolve the issues pertaining to the matters covered by the Report of the Office of the Chief
Attorney dated June 20, 2012 (Report) on the Court's several contracts with Artes International, Inc. (Artes) that Ms.
Evelyn Toledo-Dumdum (Ms. Dumdum) entered into as the Administrator of the Court's Program Management
Office (PMO) relative to the following events and activities, namely:
1. National Forum on Liberty and Prosperity (National Forum) held on August 24-25, 2006 at the Manila Hotel;
2. Global Forum on Liberty and Prosperity (Global Forum) undertaken on October 18-20, 2006 at the Makati
Shangri-La Hotel, Makati City; and
3. Other activities relative to the retirement of Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban (Chief Justice Panganiban)
consisting of: (a) Musical Interlude at the Cultural Center of the Philippines on November 30, 2006; (b)
Commemorative Program on December 6, 2006 at the Fiesta Pavillon, Manila Hotel; (c) Retirement ceremonies on
December 6, 2006 at the Supreme Court Hall; and (d) the Celebration of the Life, Love & Achievements of Chief
Justice Panganiban Event at the Pan Pacific Hotel on December 7, 2006.
The Office of the Chief Attorney submitted the Report in compliance with the instruction of the Court's Management
Committee for the Judicial Reform Support Project (JRSP) at its April 24, 2012 meeting in Baguio City to
"summarize [the] facts on the circumstances with Artes International, Inc. (Artes)." The Report was based on the
1
files submitted by the PMO to the Management Committee in said meeting, as well as on the twin studies the OCAt
had previously conducted on the Artes matter. 2
Antecedents
On December 21, 2005, or shortly after his assumption of office, Chief Justice Panganiban announced his "judicial
philosophy of safeguarding the liberty and nurturing the prosperity of the people under the rule of law." Conformably
3
with his philosophy, the National Forum and the Global Forum were conceptualized and launched.
In planning for the National Forum and the Global Forum, Ad Hoc Committees whose memberships consisted of
officers and employees of the Court's various offices were created. It appears, however, that the PMO further
engaged an event organizer to assist the Ad Hoc Committees. Ms. Dumdum expressly confirmed so Memorandum
PMO JRPAO 09-14-2007:
2.2. To assist the Ad Hoc Committees, specifically by addressing the creative, logistical, physical and technical
requirements of the Forum, the services of an event specialists (sic), namely, Artes International, Inc. was engaged
based on the lowest responsive canvass made by this Office. Artes was the same events specialist engaged during
the conduct of the International Conference and Showcase on Judicial Reforms (ICSJR) held last November 2005. 4
The following matters were further spelled out in the certification dated November 23, 2006 issued by the PMO,
signed by Dennis Russel D. Baldago, Chief Judicial Staff Officer of the PMO and Vice-Chairperson of the Forum
Secretariat; and Dennis T. Velasco, Logistics Management Officer V of the PMO; and noted by Ms. Dumdum, as
follows:
This is in relation to the services rendered by Artes International, Inc. for the Global Forum on Liberty and Prosperity
held last October 18- 20, 2006 at the Makati Shangri-La Hotel, Philippines.
The evolving requirements for the creative, physical and technical aspects of the Global Forum were finalized only
after the conduct of the Academic and National Forum on Liberty and Prosperity last July 20 and August 24-25,
2006 respectively, barely eight (8) weeks or two (2) months to prepare for an international conference which will be
participated (sic) by Chief Justices and Judges from ninety five (95) countries, delegates from the executive and the
legislative departments of government, international development agencies, members of the diplomatic corps,
judicial institutes, leaders of the foreign academe, international bar associations, foreign business chambers and
civil society.
Thereafter, the PMO solicited three (3) canvasses, requested authorization from the Chief Justice to fund various
activities during the Global Forum, and prepared the necessary Job Order to address the abovementioned
requirements. The service provider with the lowest responsive proposal was also the same service provider during
the International Conference and Showcase on Judicial Reforms held last November 28-30, 2005 at the Makati
Shangri-La Hotel.
This is to further certify that there are limited providers for the abovementioned requirements of the Global Forum.
This Certification is issued at the request of Mrs. Adoracion Yulo, SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer, Finance Division
and Ms. Lilianne E. Ulgado, Chief Accountant, Accounting Division. 5
The services of Artes were extended to other activities related to the retirement of Chief Justice Panganiban on
December 6, 2007.
1.
The National Forum and the Global Forum
The PMO first engaged the services of Artes for the International Conference and Showcase for Judicial Refonn
(ICSJR) in 2005. Based on the records, the OCAt found that Ms. Dumdum as the Administrator of the PMO entered
into the following contracts with Artes, represented by its Executive Producer Helen R. Dabao (Ms. Dabao), and
directly took part in authorizing several disbursements, as follows:
(1) The letter-contract signed on July 18, 2006 by Ms. Dumdum and Ms. Dabao for two logo designs at the
total cost of ₱53,200.00, inclusive of VAT of ₱5,700.00. The disbursement voucher showed that the VAT
was increased to ₱9,500.00. Check No. 24690, which was eventually issued to Artes on September 25,
2006, indicated only the amount of ₱43,700.00, which was charged to the SC-JRSP WB LOAN.
(2) The quotation offer dated August 1, 2006 signed by Ms. Dabao offering the services of Artes to
undertake the video coverage of the National Forum for the total amount of ₱180,320.00, inclusive of VAT of
₱19,320.00. Ms. Dumdum affixed her signature beneath the word Conforme. The disbursement voucher for
the total amount of ₱180,320.00 was prepared and the amount was charged to the SC-JRSP WB
LOAN with the recommending approval of Ms. Dumdum.
(3) The quotation offer dated August 1, 2006 signed by Ms. Dabao offering the services of Artes for the
audio-visual presentation entitled Blueprint for Change, with 10 pieces of DVDs as deliverables, at the cost
of ₱666,261.12, inclusive of VAT amounting to P71,385.00. Ms. Dumdum affixed her signature to the
quotation offer beneath the word Conforme. Based on the disbursement voucher, the VAT was again
increased to ₱118,975.20, such that the amount of Check No. 24691 issued on September 25, 2006
payable to Artes became only ₱547,285.92, which was paid to Artes on September 27, 2006. The
disbursement voucher indicated that Ms. Dumdum recommended the expenditure to be charged to the SC-
JRSP WB LOAN.
(4) The letter-contract between Ms. Dumdum and Ms. Dabao (for Artes) entered into on August 10, 2006
for the Conference Proper of the National Forum. The letter-contract, written on the stationery of Artes,
provided:
10 August 2006
EVELYN TOLEDO-DUMDUM
Program Director
Program Management Office
6th Floor Centennial Bldg.
P. Faura Street, Ermita
Manila
Dear Ms. Dumdum,
Thank you for considering us to be able to serve your event requirements for the following:
Event Title: National Forum on August 24 & 25, 2006 "Prosperity & Liberty: Goals of Judicial Reforms"
Venue: Manila Hotel, Centennial Hall
Particulars: Conference Proper Requirements
I. Physical/Creativeffechnical Management of the National Forum at Manila Hotel on August 24 & 25,
2006.
Please be assured that Artes International, Inc. shall render the same quality work as the past ICSJR
conference if not even more efficiently and professionally. We look forward to working with you again in this
conference.
The following are areas that were discussed and agreed upon:
1. That Artes shall provide script for your guidance;
2. That your office shall provide all Emcees for the said events;
3. That you are requiring video coverage of the event; and
4. That Helen Dabao, Executive Director of Artes International, Inc. shall oversee the execution,
coordination and supervision of the conference proper on August 24 & 25, 2006; 8am to 5pm. Our
services include the following:
1. Provision of creative, production and technical staff with HELEN R. DABAO as Over-All
Director and Executive Producer; other areas of concern
2. Provision of production staff to include Technical Director, Lights Director, Writers,

Production Manager, Stage Managers, Production Assistants, technical crew and utility men;
3. Provision of lights & sound system, the screen/projector at the Centennial Hall and
Backdrop bearing the official logo. Artes shall manage all coordination & supervision of the
venue needed for the conference except booking guests and participants at the hotel.
For and in consideration of the above services ARTES INTERNATIONAL, INC. submits a package cost of
all requirements in the Conference Proper amounting to NINE HUNDRED NINETY EIGHT THOUSAND
EIGHT HUNDRED FIFTY FOUR & 78/100 PESOS (PhP998,854.78)
Please find attached the Budget Breakdown x x x of the total package cost of the project.
TERMS:
50% down payment to be paid upon signing of conforme.

50% balance to be paid upon completion of the project.
Termination of contract after signing is subject to 50% fee of the total project cost
Additional requirements shall be charged accordingly.
Quoted price is valid only until 18 August 2005.
Note: Please make cheque payable to Artes International, Inc.
We look forward to working with you. Should you have any questions and concerns, please do not hesitate
to get in touch with us.
Thank you very much for giving us the opportunity to offer our services.
Again thank you and more power to you and your office.
ARTES INTERNATIONAL, INC. SUPREME COURT OF THE PHILIPPINES
By: By:
(Sgd.) (Sgd.)
HELEN R. DABAO EVELYN TOLEDO-DUMDUM
Managing & Creative Director Program Director
The disbursement voucher shows that Ms. Dumdum recommended approval of the payment in the amount
of 1!998,854. 78 charged to the "SC-JRSP WB LOAN." 6
(5) About August 12, 2006, Ms. Dabao offered to supply 350 pieces of conference bags at ₱450.00/piece for
a total of ₱l76,400.00, inclusive of the ₱l5,900.00 VAT, and 900 pieces of ID holder at ₱95.00/piece for the
total price of ₱95,760.00, inclusive of the ₱l0,260.00 VAT. The disbursement voucher disclosed that the total
sum of ₱272,160.00 for the offered articles was charged to the SC-JRSP WB LOAN and the JRSP (WB)-
GOP Counterpart Funds in the respective amounts of ₱243,160.00 and ₱29,160.00. Artes issued a "Sales
Invoice" dated August 12, 2006 for both articles. 7
(6) The letter-contract written on the stationery of Artes and signed on August 14, 2006 by Ms. Dumdum
constituted the contract for services for the Closing Ceremonies of the National Forum held on August 24-
25, 2006. The pertinent portions of the letter-contract stated:
1. That we will provide script for your guidance;
2. That your office will provide all Emcees for the said events;
4. That Helen R. Dabao, Managing & Creative Director of Artes International, Inc. shall oversee the
execution, coordination and supervision of the said event. Our services include the following:
a. Provision of production staff to include a Technical Director, Lights Director, Writers, Production
Designer, Production Manager, Stage Managers, Production Assistants, technical crew;
b. Provision of lights and sound system for the Closing Ceremony.

all requirements in the CLOSING CEREMONY amounting to SIX HUNDRED NINETY ONE THOUSAND
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE & 04/100 (PhP691,189.04)
TERMS:
50% balance to be paid upon completion of project.
Termination of contract after signing is. subject to 50% fee of the total project cost.
Quote price is valid only until 18 August 2006.
NOTE: Please make cheque payable to Artes International, Inc. 8
The OCAt noted that the disbursement voucher for the expenditure was not among the records turned over
by the PMO.
(7) The letter-contract for the "Welcome Dinner" was signed by Dabao and Ms. Dumdum on August 15,
2006. It had similar text as the letter-contract for the "Closing Ceremony," viz.:
1. That we will provide script for your guidance;
2. That your office will provide all Emcees for the said events;
3. That you are requiring video coverage of the event;
4. That Helen R. Dabao, Managing & Creative Director of Artes International, Inc. shall oversee the
execution, coordination and supervision of the said event. Our services include the following:
a) Provision of production staff to include a Technical Director, Lights Director, Writers,

Production Designer, Production Manager, Stage Managers, Production Assistants,
technical crew and utility men;
b) Provision of lights & sound system & Backdrop
c) Provision of food for staff and production people; and
d) Artes shall manage all coordination with the venue needed for the said event.
all requirements in the WELCOME DINNER amounting to NINE HUNDRED SEVEN THOUSAND SEVEN
HUNDRED SEVENTY SIX & 41/100 PESOS (Php907,776.41)
TERMS:

Termination of contract after signing is subject to 50% fee of the total project cost.
Quoted price is valid only until 18 August 2006.
NOTE: Please make cheque payable to Artes International, Inc.
A disbursement voucher for the two letter-contracts in the total amount of ₱l,598,965.46 chargeable to the
"SC-JRSP WB LOAN" was thereafter prepared. Dumdum affixed her signature thereon to indicate her
recommendation for said disbursement. 9
(8) Through an undated Abstract of Bids, the PMO conducted a canvass for other items intended for the
National Forum, and Artes emerged as the "winning bidder" in that canvass.
The Abstract of Bids is quoted below:
SUPREME COURT
PROGRAM MANAGEMENT OFFICE
NATIONAL FORUM ON LIBERTY AND PROSPERITY
ABSTRACT OF BIDS
SOUVENIR ITEMS FOR SPEAKERS & PANELISTS; AND PENS DURING THE
NATIONAL FORUM ON LIBERTY AND PROSPERITY
Name of Bidders Price Proposal (in PHP) Compliance to Minimum REMARKS

Terms of Reference
ARTES INTERNATIONAL 35,224.00 Comply Recommended for Award
OFFICEMAN 38,640.00 Comply
CHATESU 39,480.00 Comply

MANUFACTURING
Canvassed by: Recommended by: Approved by:

(Sgd.) (Sgd.) (Sgd.)
MA. CRISTINA M. AGUILAR DENNIS RUSSEL D. BALDAGO EVELYN TOLEDO-DUMDUM
Technical Assistant Chief Judicial Staff Officer Judicial Reform Program
Administrator 10
As the winning and awarded bidder, Artes, through Ms. Dabao, entered into the "Quotation
Contract" dated August 14, 2006 and written on its stationery. Ms. Dumdum affixed her signature above her
printed name and beneath the word Conforme.
The OCAt observed that "canvass # l" was handwritten instead of the date below the
word Conforme. The "Quotation Contract" was for the supply of: (a) 25 pieces of jewelry boxes (tokens for
the panelists) for ₱l7,500.00; and (b) 450 pieces of ball pens (for the conference kits) for ₱13,950.00, at the
total contract price of ₱35,224.00, including the 12% VAT of ₱3,774.00. The copy of the corresponding
disbursement voucher for the "Quotation Contract" indicated that the expenditure was charged to JR - ( )
- Counterpart Funds. Ms. Dumdum affixed her signature on the disbursement voucher to recommend her
approval thereof.
The OCAt further observed that it was only on August 18, 2006 that Ms. Dumdum recommended the
approval of the budget of ₱7,500,000.00 for the National Forum to be charged "against the JRSP funds."
The recommendation of Ms. Dumdum was received by the Office of Chief Justice Panganiban at 10:00 a.m.
on August 22, 2006, and he affixed his signature on the same day to indicate the approval of the
recommendation. After the National Forum, preparations were made for the Global Forum.
(9) The letter-proposal for technical services and equipment rental for the Global Forum submitted on
September 16, 2006 by Ms. Dabao. Ms. Dumdum affixed her signature under the word Conforme for the
following items and corresponding costs, including the rentals:
ITEM #1-2 PROFESSIONAL CONFERENCE SYSTEM
BRAHLER DIGIMIC CONFERENCE MICROPHONES ₱370,000.00
with 40 units Microphones
BRAHLER SIMULTANEOUS INTERPRETATION 380,000.00
with Portable Interpreters' Booth+Console System for FOUR (4) LANGUAGE

__________
TRANSLATIONS
Oakage Price (sic) 750,000.00
Management Fees (17.65%) 132,375.00
Total Package Price ₱882,375.00
12% Value Added Tax 105,885.00
TOTAL PACKAGE PRICE ₱988,260.00 11
(10) On September 21, 2006, Ms. Dabao sent Ms. Dumdum a quotation letter for Conference Proper
Requirements expressing gratitude for considering Artes to serve the event, the Global Forum, on October
18-20, 2006 at the Shangri-La Makati Hotel. The pertinent portions of the quotation letter ran as follows:
I. Physical/Creative/Technical Management of the GLOBAL FORUM CONFERENCE PROPER.
1. That Artes shall provide script for your guidance
4. THAT He’en R. Dabao, Executive Director of Artes International, Inc. shall oversee the execution,
coordination and supervision of the conference proper on October 18-20; 8am to 5pm. Our services include
the following:
A.) Provision of creative, production and technical staff with HELEN R. DABAO as Over-all Director
and Executive Producer; other areas of concern such as the secretariat, logistics & security,
protocol, registration & documentation and the like are under the management of PMO.
B.) Provision of production staff to include Technical Director, Lights Director, Writers, Production
Manager, Stage Managers, Production Assistants, technical crew and stage hands;
C.) Provision of lights & sound system, the screens/projectors at the Rizal Ballroom and Backdrop
bearing the official logo and other non-technical requirements needed in the conference proper.
D.) Manage all coordination & supervision of all venue preparations needed for the conference
except booking guests and participants at the hotel.
E.) Over-all direct the proceedings of the conference according to the approved program.
the above requirements at the Conference Proper amounting to NINE HUNDRED NINETY SEVEN
THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FIFTY ONE 99/100 PESOS (PhP997,351.99).
Please find attached the Budget Breakdown (See Attachment A) of the total package cost of the project.
TERMS:
50% downpayment to be paid upon signing of conforme.
Termination of contract after signing is subject to 50% fee of the total project cost.
Note: Please make cheque payable to Artes International, Inc. (emphasis supplied.) 12
Ms. Dabao and Ms. Dumdum signed the quotation letter.
(11) The letter-contract written on the stationery of Artes for the opening ceremony and welcome lunch for
the Global Forum was signed on September 26, 2006 by Ms. Dumdum and Ms. Dabao. Its pertinent portions
said:
1. That Artes shall provide script for your guidance;
4. That Helen R. Dabao, Executive Director of Artes International, Inc. shall oversee the execution,
coordination and supervision of the OPENING CEREMONY & WELCOME LUNCH of the Global
Forum on October 18, 2006 at Makati Shangri-la Hotel.
I. Technical Requirements:
1. Additional Sound & Lights for the Entrance of Color Php25,000.00
2. Complete Lights & Sound System at Quezon

45,000.00
Ballroom
3. 10 sets 2-Way Radio (3 day conference) 30,000.00
4. 2 Sets of Spot lights (frontal for Parade) 6,000.00
5. Additional Camera w/ Camera man 15,000.00
6. Backdrop for the Quezon Ballroom 30,000.00

7. 2 sets LCD Projectors/Screens 25,000.00
8. Raw materials (mini-dvd tapes) 12,000.00
9. Gen Set 15,000.00
II. Talents:
a) 30 Cadets with Special

PhP 80,000.00
Uniforms
b) 20 pc. Marching Bands (sic) 50,000.00
c) 20 pc. Banda Kawayan 45,000.00
d) 40 pc. Bayanihan Dancers 100,000.00
e) Withholding Tax 10% 27,500.00
III. Technical/Prod./Creative Staff PhP205,000.00
IV. Other Requirements:
Food & Drinks for 110 talents and participants
Breakfast & Lunch (Php 175.00/pax) PhP 19,250.00
Misc. & Contingencies 15,000.00
TOTAL PACKAGE COST (I, II, III, IV.) PhP744,750.00
Management Fees (17.65%) 131,448.38
12% VAT 105,143.81
GRAND TOTAL OF PACKAGE COST-----PHP981,342.18 13
(12) The letter-contract printed on Artes' stationery signed on September 26, 2006 by Ms. Dabao and Ms.
Dumdum to provide creative, technical and physical management for the closing ceremony of the Global
Forum at the cost of ₱789,290.32.
The OCAt noted, however, that it was only on October 9, 2006 when Ms. Dumdum requested authority to
fund the Global Forum, as borne out by MEMORANDUM PMO JRPAO 10-09-2006, the relevant issuance,
to wit:
Your honor:
1. The estimated budget for the conduct of the Global Forum on Liberty and Prosperity on October
18-20, 2006 at the Makati Shangri-La Hotel is Twenty Million Six Hundred Thousand Pesos
(Php20,600,000.00).
2. Of this Php20.6M estimated budget, funding support will come from our various development
partners in the form of grant proceeds as follows:
Amount of Funding Support (in Development Partner

Php)
JRP-FA Funds (Grant Proceeds). This represents the cumulative unused

17,000,000.00
balance of previous years
500,000.00 ABA-Asia (new/incremental funds)
1,200,000.00 ADB (new/incremental funds)
300,000.00 CIDA (new/incremental funds)
400,000.00 TAF (new/incremental funds)
400,000.00 WB (new/incremental funds)
These new incremental funds will be administered (with the exemption of the World Bank) by our
development partners.
3. In case of the JRP-FA Funds, may we request for Your Honor's approval to disburse these funds
for the various expenditures related to the Global Forum, subject to the usual accounting and
auditing rules and regulations.
4. We are pleased to report to your Honor that possible additional new funding support may come
from AusAID, British Council, KAS and the UNDP.
5. For your Honor's kind consideration and approval, please. 14
On October 10, 2006, Chief Justice Panganiban affixed his signature to approve Ms. Dumdum's request.
On October 13, 2006, Ms. Dumdum sought the authority from Chief Justice Panganiban "to process
payment for services rendered of (sic) contractors" at the Global Forum. Her memorandum for that purpose
was as follows:
Your Honor:
1. This is in relation to our Memorandum requesting authority to fund the Global Forum on Liberty
and Prosperity on October 18-20, 2006 at the Makati Shangri-la Hotel which was approved by Your
Honor. Copy of the approved Memorandum is attached for Your Honor's reference.
2. In this connection, may we also request for Your Honor's approval for partial payment for the
following contractors of the Forum:
Makati Shangri-La Hotel Accommodation and Function Rooms 5,331,143.50
Cultural Center of the Philippines

517,158.40
Production and Artist
Goldcraft and Fashion International
Barong Tagalog for Foreign Delegate; Uniforms for Choir, Secretariat and Ushers 698,320.00
Artes International, Inc.
Physical, Creative and Technical Management 997,351.99
Global Forum AVP and Book Launching AVP 997,483.76

Simultaneous Interpretation System (SIS) 988,260.00
Audiovisual Equipment Rental and Video Coverage 997,483.76
Opening Ceremony 981,342.18
Closing Ceremony 789,290.32
Forum Collaterals (Kits, IDs, Pens, Souvenir and Shell Leis) 693,626.75
3. For Your Honor's kind consideration and approval, please. 15
Chief Justice Panganiban affixed his signature on October 16, 2006 at the lower left corner of the
memorandum to signify approval of the request for authority to process partial payments for expenses
incurred during the Global Forum.
(13) Ms. Dumdum signed a disbursement voucher around October 16, 2006 charging to the JRP(FA)-
GOP COUNTERPART FUNDS the gross amount of ₱2,875,606.01, less the sum of ₱575,121.20 as taxes,
leaving the net amount of ₱2,300,484.80 as partial payment to Artes in connection with the Global Forum.
The gross amount of ₱2,875,606.01 was broken down thusly:
* Physical, Creatives and Technical Management-------- ₱498,676.00
*Global Forum AVP and Book Launching AVP---------- 498,741.88
* Simultaneous Interpretation System (SIS) --------------- 494, 130.00
*Audiovisual Equipment Rental and Video Coverage--- 498,741.88
* Opening Ceremony------------------------------------------ 490,671.09
* Closing Ceremony ------------------------------------------- 394,645 .16
TOTAL ------------------------------------------ ₱2,875,606.01 16
Check No. 29454 for the total net amount of ₱2,300,484.81 was issued to Artes on December 5,
2006 as final payment for the production of the Global Forum. Artes received the check on the
following day.
Subsequently, the OCAt noted then Chief Accountant Lilian Ulgado's Memorandum dated February
27, 2007 addressed to the PMO Finance Division about the claim by the Makati Shangri-la Hotel for
the unpaid amount of ₱651,000.00. The pertinent portion of the Memorandum was as follows:
Per our records, the total claim of Makati Shangri-La was already paid in full per voucher 06-
11-33736. Please attach an explanation why there is still an (sic) remaining balance of ₱651,000.00.
Also, it appears that there is no basis in paying the said remaining balance of ₱651,000.00. Please
attach authority to pay the said amount and charging it to Fiscal Autonomy.
Further, in going over the supporting papers of the full payment to Makati Shangri-La per voucher
11-33736, we noted that the Court paid for the accommodation of Ms. Helen Dabao in Room Nos.
512 and 516. In the Articles of Incorporation submitted to this office, Ms. Helen Dabao is listed as
one of the incorporators of Artes International. Is Ms. Dabao a participant to the said event? Is (sic)
so, please attach copy of memo circular of those who are authorized to attend the Global
Conference showing the inclusion of Ms. Dabao in the said list. (Emphasis supplied) 17
In her responding Memorandum dated February 28, 2007, PMO Financial Management Analyst
Paula Cheryl Dumlao expressed that because the hotel accommodations for Ms. Dabao were being
questioned, the expenses therefor should be treated as a "disputed item" that could be excluded
from the bill to avoid further delays in the settlement of the obligations to Makati Shangri-La Hotel.
Thereafter, Chief Accountant Ulgado referred the matter to Judicial Staff Head Midas P. Marquez of
the Office of Chief Justice Reynato Puno to resolve whether the "remaining balance" of ₱651,000.00
for the conduct of the Global Forum could be charged to JR-FA GOP Counterpart Funds. 18
2.
Other activities relative to the retirement
of Chief Justice Panganiban
The transactions between the PMO and Artes continued even after the holding of the National Forum and Global
Forum.
In Memorandum PMO JRPAO 15-11-2006 dated November 15, 2006, Ms. Dumdum requested authority from Chief
Justice Panganiban to "fund certain activities," thusly:
Your Honor:
1. May we request authority to fund the following activities:
ACTIVITIES AMOUNT (in Php)
1. Musical Interlude at the Cultural Center of the Philippines on November 30, 551,536.00
2006
2. State of the Judiciary (Audio-Visual Production) 470,400.00
3. Leadership and Servanthood: The Labor and Legacy of Chief Justice 650,000.00
Artemio v. Panganiban (Audio-Visual Production)
TOTAL 1,671,936.00
2. Should your Honor concur, may we request that the abovementioned amount be charged to the JRP FA
(Grant Proceeds), subject to the usual accounting and auditing rules and regulations.
3. May we also request for Your Honor's approval to issue a Cash Advance in the amount of Eight Hundred
Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php850,000.00) to initially cover the cost of the abovementioned activities and other
incidental expenses to Mrs. Araceli Bayuga, Chief, Cash Division, Fiscal Management and Budget Office
(FMBO). The breakdown of the cash advance are as follows:
ACTIVITIES AMOUNT (in Php)
Musical Interlude at the Cultural Center of the Philippines on November 30, 350,000.00
2006
State of the Judiciary (Audio-Visual Production) 250,000.00
Leadership and Servanthood: The Labor and Legacy of Chief Justice Artemio 250,000.00
V. Panganiban (Audio-Visual Production)
TOTAL 850,000.00
4. For Your Honor's kind consideration and approval. 19

The OCAt reported that Associate Justice Angelina Sandoval Gutierrez, as the Chairperson of the Committee on the
Chief Justice's Valedictory, recommended the approval of the request. Chief Justice Panganiban later approved the
same and affixed his signature on the left-hand comer of the Memorandum.
Having obtained the approval, Ms. Dumdum entered into the following contracts with Artes, namely:
(1) In a letter-quotation dated November 17, 2006, Ms. Dabao offered the services of Artes for 'Retirement A
VP: Leadership and Servanthood' for the an1ount of ₱620,000.00 plus 12% VAT of ₱74,400.00 or the total
'AVP cost' of ₱694,400.00. Ms. Dumdum affixed her signature to the letter-quotation under the
word conforme. It appears that the downpayment of ₱250,000.00 was paid to Artes - this is evident from the
Sales Invoice dated December 8, 2006 collecting the 'final payment' of ₱444,400.00. For the same project,
Mindstorm Media, Inc. reportedly quoted the price of ₱l,025,155.04 while Graymatter offered their services
for ₱l,l00,000.00.
(2) Under letter-quotation dated November 22, 2006, Ms. Dabao offered the services of Artes for the
'Commemorative Program (Retirement of CJ Panganiban) on December 6, 2006 at the Fiesta Pavilion,
Manila Hotel, 6:30 PM' for the package cost of ₱997,220.22. Ms. Dumdum signed the letter-quotation for the
Court and, in Attachment I thereto, affixed her signature under the word conforme. With the total withholding
tax of ₱62,326.26 deducted from the package cost, the disbursement voucher in favor of Artes is for the net
amount of ₱934,893. 96.
(3) On November 25, 2006, Ms. Dti.hao quoted the contract price of ₱418,320.00 for the project entitled
"Celebration of the Life, Love & Achievement of Chief Justice Panganiban Event" at the Pan Pacific Hotel at
12:00 noon of December 7, 2007. Similarly, Mindstorm Media, Inc. submitted a quoted price of ₱474,374.80
inclusive of 12% VAT for the same project, while Graymatter offered ₱450,000.00 inclusive of management
fees and 12% VAT. Ms. Dumdum affixed her signature to the letter-quotation as "APJR Administrator." The
disbursement voucher prepared for the contract shows that the "technical and non-technical support"
services were rendered 'during (the) appreciation luncheon for the APJR non-development partners.' The
net contract price of ₱392,175.00, after deducting taxes of ₱26,145.00, is to be charged to 'JRSP(WB)-GOP
COUNTERPART FUNDS,' as recommended by Ms. Dumdum.
x x x x x x x x x
(4) In an undated letter-quotation, Ms. Dabao offered the services of Artes for the retirement ceremonies in
honor of Chief Justice Panganiban on December 6, 2006 at the 'Supreme Court Hall' for the price of
₱401,520.00, to which letter Ms. Dumdum affixed her signature. The disbursement voucher in favor of Artes
shows that it is to be charged to 'JRSP(WB)-GOP COUNTERPART FUNDS.' 20
On November 27, 2006, Ms. Dumdum requested from Chief Justice Panganiban authority to provide additional
funding for additional court-related activities, stating thereon in her Memorandum PMO JRPAO 27-11- 2006, as
follows:
Your Honor:
1. This is further to our Memorandum requesting authority to conduct and fund the remaining activities for
December which Your Honor approved. Copy of said Memorandum is attached for Your Honor's reference.
2. May we request additional authority to provide additional funding for the development and preparation of
the Audio-Video (sic) Presentations entitled 'Liberty and Prosperity Under the Rule of Law' and 'Leadership
and Servanthood: The Labor and Legacy of Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganibatn, Jr.' (sic) to the various
internal and external stakeholders of the APJR. The presentation of these A VPs will commence on
December 06, 2006. The total cost for the creative design, physical and technical production for the said
activities is ₱l,817,060.22.
3. Should Your Honor concur, may we request that the abovementioned amount be charged to the JRP FA
Grant Proceeds or JRSP Funds, whichever is appropriate. May we likewise request authority to disburse
and/or draw cash advance for the total amount to Mrs. Araceli Bayuga, Chief, Cash Division, Fiscal
Management and Budget Office.
4. For Your Honor's kind consideration and approval. 21
On November 28, 2006, Chief Justice Panganiban approved the request without specifying the fund source.
3.
Artes' requests for payment of unpaid contract price
Upon the conclusion of the Global Forum, the PMO forwarded to the FMBO pertinent documents relative to the
items supplied by Artes (i.e., 350 conference bags, 900 ID holders, 450 units of ball pens, and 25 jewelry boxes as
souvenirs) in order to facilitate payment to the latter.
The FMBO declined to process the payment for lack of the necessary purchase orders (POs) as required by law.
Considering that no payment could be processed without the requisite POs, the PMO requested the Property
Division of the Office of Administrative Services (OAS) to issue the POs for the supplies delivered by Artes. Being
responsible for the determination of the reasonableness of the prices of supplies, the Property Division surveyed
suppliers of the conference bags, the ID holders, and ball pens, but not the jewelry boxes which Artes claimed to
have been sourced from Cebu. Based on its survey, the Property Division concluded that the following items were
overpriced and excessive, to wit:
22 23
Qty. Unit Description Unit Price
PMO Property PMO Property

Division Division
350 pcs. Conference Bag ₱450 ₱220 ₱l57,500.00 ₱77,000.00
900 pcs. I.D. Holder 95 35 85,000.00 34,200.00
450 pcs. Ball Pens 31 13 13,950.00 5,850.00
25 pcs. Jewelry Box 700 - 11,500.00 -
In the Memorandum dated January 22, 2007 submitted to the Office of Chief Justice Puno, SC Judicial Staff Head
Felicitas D. Caunca (Ms. Caunca) of the Property Division declared that the PMO had itself conducted the
canvassing for the supplies on the ground that it had already been pressed for time; that such canvassing could
have been done through the Philippine Government Electronic Procurement System (Phil-GEPS)by the Property
Division in no time at all; that if the amounts involved were within the Property Division's authority to canvass, it
would have issued the requested POs regardless of whether the canvassing had been done by the proper bids
committee or by the Property Division itself; and that because the PMO did not observe the proper procurement
procedure, what had resulted were "advance deliveries," which were disallowed by law. 24
Ms. Caunca also clarified:
This Division believes that the price for which the PMO obtained the aforestated supplies were excessive. In this
respect, this Division finds pertinent the provision of Commission on Audit (COA) Circular No. 85- 55-A which states
that:
'Price is excessive if it is more than the 10% allowable price variance between the price paid for the item bought and
the price of the same item per canvass of the auditor. '
The matter was consulted by the undersigned with the COA Auditor assigned to the Court who expressed her
opinion that the Purchased (sic) Order may still be prepared by this Division but the amount should be based on the
quotation or canvass obtained by this Division and not that of the PMO. The COA Auditor even reminded (us on) the
prohibition on antedating the PO if only to reflect or coincide the dates when the PMO concluded their transactions
with the Artes International. Needless to state, the difference between the two (2) amounts is to be borne by the
PMO or its responsible official, as the case may be. 25
On January 23, 2007, Ms. Dabao wrote to Ms. Dumdum requesting that Artes be recognized as a "Supplier of
Services" in order to "rectify the taxes that were unwittingly withheld from Artes," which were equivalent to 15% of
the contract price. She justified her request by attaching a copy of BIR Ruling DAO75-07, which categorically stated
that Artes was subject to "2% withholding tax on income payments made by the top 10,000 private corporations and
government offices, national, or local, pursuant to section (sic) 3 (M) and (N) of Revenue No. 17-2001." 26
On January 27, 2007, Chief Accountant Ulgado inquired from the Chief of the Withholding Tax Division of the BIR
about the query of Ms. Dabao, thusly:
This refers to the BIR Ruling DA-033-2007 dated January 23, 2007 issued to Ms. Helen R. Dabao of Artes
International, Inc. The BIR ruling states that an event organizer, like Artes, is a supplier of service. Consequently,
payments made by private corporation and/or government offices are subject to the two percent (2%) withholding
tax.
The Articles of Incorporation of Artes International, x x x, states that its primary purpose is Production and
Management of Events and Entertainment.
The Court withheld the 15% withholding tax from its payment to Artes International pursuant to Sections 3 and 4 of
Revenue Regulations No. 30-2003 based on the entirety of the services rendered by said company. The creative,
physical and technical aspects of the event required the hiring of Artes International as production manager
providing management and technical services for the conduct of said event.
May we respectfully request for an opinion from your office to clarify whether or nu1 the services presented above
were covered by Section 3 (M) and (N) of RR 17-2001 or among those enumerated in Sections (sic) 3 of RR 30-
2003.
Thank you for your immediate attention.
However, Chief Accountant Ulgado received no reply from the BIR. 27
Subsequently, the FMBO requested the Office of the Chief Justice (OCJ) to refer to the OCAt the matter of "the
propriety of collecting withholding tax of 15% totaling ₱l,342,637.26 from payments" made by the PMO to Artes "for
services rendered" relative to the Global Forum. It appears that on June 6, 2007 the FMBO returned to the PMO
four disbursement vouchers issued in the name of Artes "without action," specifically: ₱376,425.00; ₱392,175.00;
₱372,225.00; and ₱934,893.00, or a total of ₱2,071,664.10, on the ground that the FMBO was still awaiting
instructions from the OCJ. 28
On August 22, 2007, the PMO, represented by Edilberto A. Davis, Dennis Russell D. Baldago and Atty. Sigrid
Promentilla; the OCJ, represented by then Assistant Court Administrator (ACA) Jose Midas P. Marquez (now the
Court Administrator); and Artes, represented by Ms. Dabao, met to "discuss the unpaid disbursement vouchers due
to Artes International Inc. (sic) for the conduct of the National and Global Forum (sic) on Liberty and Prosperity, and
the Retirement Ceremonies for Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban held last August, October and December 2007
(sic), respectively."
29
When the Memorandum of the Property Division was referred to her, Ms. Dumdum maintained through her
Memorandum dated September 14, 2007 that Artes had been an events organizer responsible for "outsourcing of
supplies and materials used in the forum"; that its services had been engaged to take charge of the details of the
Global Forum; that PMO was only involved in "overseeing that Artes took into consideration the important factors in
selecting the suppliers, such as capacity to execute the design and timely delivery of such requirements"; that "it
would be inaccurate to state that the selection of the canvassed suppliers was done by the PMO arbitrarily because
it merely proceeded from the suppliers chosen by Artes;" and that the PMO had been merely instrumental in helping
process payments to Artes by the conduct of its "ministerial duty of preparing the disbursement vouchers." 30
Anent the non-observance of procurement rules, Ms. Dumdum contended that "the procurement of supplies
and materials used in the forum need not pass through the Committee on Bids, nor follow the procurement
procedures under R.A. 9184 because those were not actual procurement of goods;" and that "[t]hose
items[,] for all intents and purposes[,] were to be treated as 'incidental' to the services provided by the
events organizer, which in this case happens to be Artes." 31
Under the circumstances, ACA Marquez, as Chief Justice Puno's Staff Head, referred the Artes matter regarding the
"supplies for the National Forum" to the OCAt for study and report.
In the meantime, on November 12, 2007, Ms. Dabao transmitted to Ms. Dumdum a letter inquiring on the status of
the following:
1. The taxes amounting to ₱l,162,850.00 withheld from the contract price of the National Forum and Global
Forum;
2. The "collaterals" amounting to ₱693,626.75 incidental to the National Forum; and
3. The payment of the remaining balance of ₱2,261,460 .22 for the Retirement Ceremonies of Chief Justice
Panganiban.
In her letter dated November 13, 2007, Ms. Dumdum acknowledged the aforementioned letter of Ms. Dabao, and
assured her that a follow-up meeting would be conducted, viz.:
x x x [A]fter the following concerns have been addressed: (a) the x x x OCA T releases its comments to the Office of
ACA Marquez regarding the taxes withheld during the conduct of the National and Global Forum (sic) on Liberty and
Prosperity in the amount of Php 1,162,850.00; (b) the PMO collaterals used during the conduct of the National
Forum on Liberty and Prosperity in the amount of Php693,626.75; and (c) the Disbursement Vouchers concerning
the remaining balance of Php2,261,460.22 for the conduct of the Retirement Ceremonies of Chief Justice
Panganiban are forwarded to the Office of ACA Marquez xx x. 32
On August 20, 2008, Ms. Dabao sent another letter requesting that Mr. Davis, who had meanwhile taken over as
Director of the PMO following the resignation of Ms. Dumdum, issued to her a "formal correspondence" on the
unpaid balances. 33
On September 23, 2008, Ms. Dabao followed up with Mr. Davis, this time threatening to expose the delay to the
media. 34
On October 6, 2008, Ms. Dabao met with ACA Marquez, Mr. Davis and Dennis Russell D. Baldago to thresh out
matters relative to the claims of Artes.
35
On May 26, 2009, Ms. Dabao wrote Chief Justice Puno to appeal for the settlement of the "aggregate overdue
accounts" totaling ,₱2,955,086.97 that Artes had been trying to collect since August 2007. 36
On March 8, 2011, Ms. Dabao wrote Court Administrator Marquez pleading for an audience to discuss the
collectibles of Artes.37
On April 28, 2011, Ms. Dabao wrote Chief Justice Renato C. Corona for help "in our three year old quest for justice,"
relevantly stating:
xxxx
We appeal to you, CJ Corona, to aid us in our three year old quest for justice. We are a small events company and
Php2.9 million is our entire rolling capital for the business. What pains us is we cannot find any reason nor could the
OCAT find any reason for the Supreme Court to hold payment for our company, Artes International, Inc. 38
On May 30, 2011, Ms. Dabao wrote Atty. Lourdes B. Lim, Department Auditor of the Commission on Audit (COA)
assigned to the Court, requesting a certification to the effect that "no audit (pre or post) has yet been conducted on
the said collectibles."
39
In her reply dated June 28, 2011, Atty. Lim responded thusly:
Please be informed that we cannot issue a certification that no audit (pre or post) since no payment has been made
yet nor disbursement voucher submitted to this Office (sic). Moreover, an Audit Observation Memorandum dated
May 9, 2007 was issued by this Office which was received in the Office of the Chief Justice on May 21, 2007 during
the time of the former Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno relative to the retirement activities in honor of the former Chief
Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, Jr. (sic) wherein no comment/reply was received by this Office.
Further, pursuant to Section 2 of P.D. 1445, The Government Auditing Code of the Philippines which provides that
'It is the declared policy of the State that all resources of the government shall be managed, expended or utilized in
accordance with law and regulations and safeguarded against loss or wastage through illegal or improper
disposition, with a view to ensuring efficiency, economy and effectiveness in the operations of government. The
responsibility to take care that such policy is faithfully adhered to rests directly with the chief or the head of the
government agency concerned.
For your appropriate action. 40
By her own Memorandum dated February 21, 2012, then JRP Administrator Geraldine Faith Econg requested Atty.
Corazon G. Ferrer-Flores, FMBO Chief, for an update on "the advice from the Office of the Chief Justice which you
have waited for." However, no action was taken thereon.
4.
The response of the PMO
Chief Justice Puno referred the Report of the OCAt to the PMO for appropriate action or comment.
Inasmuch as Ms. Dumdum had meanwhile resigned as the JRP Administrator effective February 19, 2008 and had
immediately gone on terminal leave prior thereto, it was Mr. Davis, using the title of Judicial Reform Program
Administrator, who submitted the comment dated February 18, 2008 in behalf of the PMO. 41
Mr. Davis explained therein that the estimated budget of ₱7,500,000.00 for the National Forum superseded the
approved budget of ₱6,800,000.00; and that the "latter (?) document was discarded without any intention to be used
as an official document." 42
Justifying why expenditures had been charged to the JRSP Fund even before Chief Justice Panganiban had
approved the request for authority to use such fund, Mr. Davis expounded:
The foregoing statement was nothing but obvious misrepresentation, Your Honor. Foremost, it must be considered
that the alleged expenditures cited by the OCAT are expenses which were incidental to the services of Artcs as
Events' specialist. Since Artcs procured those items in their own capacity as private contractor and in compliance
with their obligations and responsibilities as events specialist, those expenses will eventually he reimbursed by the
Supreme Court to Artes. The JRP A merely identified the funding source from which those expenses shall be
charged. Thus, those items are not subject of new contracts but are merely part of the services delivered by Artes.
Thus, it would be inaccurate to state that those expenses were incurred prior to the grant of approval by the Chief
Justice.
43
Mr. Davis cited the following provision of SC Administrative Circular No. 60-2003 to explain why the PMO had
assisted in the procurement activities, to wit:
4.3 All JRSP procurement activities shall be done through, or with the assistance of the PMO. The Project
Implementation Monitoring and Evaluation Group of the PMO (PMO-PIMEG) will manage the specific procurement
activities, and tract their baseline schedule and actual progress. The Program Director of the PMO will be
responsible for the overall monitoring of the procurement process, particularly, the notification of the lagging
activities and the responsible offices. Emphasis supplied. 44
He insisted that the PMO, being the end-user, assisted Artes as the event's specialist, thusly:
The basis of the PMO's functions as an end-user unit was further affirmed by the subsequent issuance by the GPPB
of the Generic Procurement Manuals (approved on 14 June 2008), whereby procuring entities are encouraged to
create their respective Procurement Units (an organic unit of office within the agency). These procurement units
were envisioned to perform the functions of the BAC Secretariat including the preparation of procurement
documents. Considering that "request for quotations" or "canvassing documents" as loosely used, verily fall under
the same category, then it may be properly inferred that the PMO, being the end-user unit validly conducted the
canvass. Hence the allegation of usurpation of BAC functions in violation of the Administrative Circular on
procurement as hastily alleged by OCAT was disputed. 45
Commenting on the allegation of splitting of contracts, Mr. Davis, focusing only on the production of "a 10-minute
Audio-Visual Highlights of International Conference and Showcase on Judicial Reforms (ICSJR) in DVD format and
standard casing with 700 copies," denied that there had been any splitting of contracts because such services were
distinct from those undertaken by Artes, which consisted of "translating the proceedings of the whole conference
into an Audio-Visual Documentary Video Format, with four hundred (400) copies of cover booklets." He insisted that
"Artes was engaged to focus on the substantive part of the conference and the important details which should be
accurately documented for the purpose of maintaining an official record of the events that transpired during the
conference," and, consequently, the allegation of splitting of contracts was "baseless and without merit." 46
Mr. Davis invoked the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions, and the maxim damnum
absque injuria. He manifested that "the OCAT cannot presume that PMC1 through the JRPA was in bad faith when
it entered into the questioned transactions. Absent a clear evidence of bad faith, the same shail not be applied." He
added:
Likewise, we also wish to reiterate our previous statement in Memorandum PMO JRPAO 09-14-2007 that the
PMO's involvement in the said transaction was merely to facilitate the process by overseeing that Artes took into
consideration the important factors in selecting the suppliers, particularly its capacity to execute the design and
timely delivery of such requirements. The canvass made by the PMO which reflected quotations from other
suppliers (although not generally required due to the very nature of subject items), was in fact an exercise of due
diligence because it exerted the effort to ensure that the prices charged by Artes were still within the reasonable
market price, even after including a reasonable profit margin in exchange for the additional customized design
inputted by Artes to the said items under consideration. There was nothing irregular in the conduct of the
PMO, thus it should not be penalized for doing its responsibilities efficiently to ensure that the National and Global
Forums were successfully hosted by the Court. (Emphasis supplied.) 47
Mr. Davis denied the need to secure certificates of availability of funds (CAFs) prior to the execution of the contracts
with Artes. He opined that the CAFs were required only for locally funded activities. He submitted that as long as the
requirements stated in page 145 of the Handbook on Understanding Foreign Assisted Projects of the COA "are
present, there is no reason to delay or disallow disbursement of funds."
The requirements prescribed by the Handbook on Understanding Foreign Assisted Projects adverted to are the
following:
a) Documentation.
In general, the documentation required to support disbursements depends on the type of expenditures involved. (awÞhi(
If the Bank needs full supporting documentation, two copies of contracts or purchase orders should be sent to the
Bank to review by the designated task manager before submitting the first related application. One copy of each of
the following supporting documents is normally given to the Bank with the withdrawal application:
b) Supplier's or consultant's invoice, or a summary statement of works performed signed by the supervising
engineer or other authorized official
c) Evidence of shipment (for equipment and materials purchased). This can be one of the following:
• Copy of the bill of lading
• Forwarder's certificate
d) Evidence of payment (for reimbursement). This can be one of the following:
• Receipted invoice or formal receipt
• Commercial bank’s report of payment
e) Performance security such as bank guarantee in the case of advance payments if required under the terms of the
contract, or where an unusually are (sic) advance payment is made (Emphasis supplied.)
Mr. Davis affirmed that there was nothing irregular about "facilitating the conduct of alternative method of
procurement of shopping" even though the JRP Administrator did not first seek authority to do so from the Chief
Justice. He reminded that: "The act of facilitating and approving the quotations of the items being bought by Artes
were mere exercise of the authority granted to it under Section 4.3 of Administrative Circular No. 60- 2003." He48
opined that neither the loan agreement nor the law necessitated the "formal requirements," like the CAFs for the
contracts. He reiterated that the CAFs applied only to locally funded projects; hence, the "quotation-contract" was "a
valid government contract" that could not be questioned. With respect to the authority issued by Ms. Dumdum to
49
pay amounts beyond the threshold of her authority granted under SC Administrative Circular No. 60-2003, he
posited that the observation of the OCAt thereon was a "matter of opinion" because "[t]o date, no audit observation
has been made by COA to this effect." Finally, he invoked Chief Justice's intervention "to put an end to all these
50
harassments and desperate attempts to tarnish the reputation of the undersigned." 51
It is noteworthy that in its letter of May 26, 2016, Artes, through Ms. Dabao, communicated to the Court, through the
OCJ, that it no longer wished to pursue its claim; that its claim had been the result of a misunderstanding; and that
its claim had been already settled to its complete satisfaction.52
Artes submitted simultaneously with ,its letter of May 26, 2016 the so-called Release, Waiver & Quitclaim in which it
reiterated the contents to the effect that it was waiving any and all its rights and interests in the claim; and expressly
stated that it was releasing the Court from any further liability.
53
It is possible that the Release, Waiver & Quitclaim rendered moot and academic every issue regarding Artes'
several contracts with the Court. An action is considered moot when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy
because the issues involved have become academic or dead, or when the dispute has already been resolved and,
hence, one is not entitled to judicial intervention unless the issue is likely to be raised again between the parties. As
the consequence, nothing more needs to be resolved after its determination has been overtaken by subsequent
events.54
However, the mootness principle bows to certain exceptions, such that mootness will not always deter further
proceedings upon a matter until its resolution in due time if there is a valid reason to do so. In David v. Macapagal-
Arroyo, the Court has defined four instances in which the courts can still decide an otherwise moot case, namely:
55
(a) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (b) the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount
public interest is involved; (c) when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to
guide the Bench, the Bar, and the public; and (d) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. 56
The extraordinary character of this case for involving the compliance with the law and rules on procurement as well
as the public interest thereby necessarily involved override the applicability of the mootness principle. Based on the
Report of the OCAt, liability of some form for violations of the law and rules on procurement already might have
probably attached to the public officials involved. To still proceed herein clearly responds to the Constitutional
declaration that public office is a public trust. Prudential wisdom also dictates that the Court should not immediately
brush aside the irregularities committed in relation to the services rendered by Artes if only to serve the demand for
transparency.
Ruling of the Court
The Court is not unmindful that Artes, prior to its submission of the Release, Waiver & Quitclaim, had been
consistently and assiduously pleading for the payment of the total sum of ₱4,117 ,936.98, itemized as follows:
1. The taxes withhek1 on the "contract" price of the National Forum and Global Forum amounting to ₱l,162,850.00;
2. The "collaterals" used in the National Forum amounting to ₱693,626. 76; and
3. The balance of the "contract" price of the ''Retirement Ceremonies" of CJ Panganiban amounting to
₱2,261,460.22. 57
The Court, albeit fiscally autonomous, could not simply authorize and justify the release of funds to pay Artes'
demand in view of the many questions that were raised against the contracts entered into with Artes by Ms.
Dumdum as the PMO Administrator. To decide on whether to pay or not, the Court had to be guided by the law on
the proper disbursement of public funds, whether emanating from the National Treasury or sourced from loans or
credits extended by foreign funding partners.
The WB loan agreement

and its implementation
The loan agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD), or the World Bank (WB), was signed on October 2, 2003 to fund the Judicial Reform Support
Project (JRSP) whose objective was "to assist the Borrower in developing a more effective and accessible Judiciary
that would foster public trust and confidence through the implementation of the Supreme Court's Action Program for
Judicial Reform." 58
The JRSP consisted of the following:
1. Improving Case Adjudication and Access to Justice;
2. Enhancing Institutional Integrity;
3. Strengthening the Institutional Capacity of the Judiciary; and
4. Support for the Reform of the Judicial System and Program Management Office (PMO)
Based on the foregoing, the "'Globalization Lecture Series - Forum with Chief Justice" appeared in the JRSP WB
Financial Monitoring Report CY 2006 under the second category, i.e., Enhancing Institutional Integrity.
SC Administrative Circular No. 60-2003 entitled Procurement Policy and Procedures for the Judicial Reform Support
Project was issued on November 18, 2003 "to ensure the effective implementation of the Judicial Reform Support
Project (JRSP) through the timely procurement of Goods, Works, and Services, guide the concerned Supreme
Court Offices in their respective roles in the procurement process, prescribe the allowed lead times for each
procurement activity, and monitor and resolve bottlenecks and problem areas in the procurement process." Thus,
SC Administrative Circular No. 60-2003 applied when procuring goods, works, and services in furtherance of the
implementation of the JRSP, viz.:
3. SCOPE
3.1 This Administrative Order applies to the procurement of all types of works, goods, and services in the
implementation of the JRSP,
xxx
5. LEGAL FRAMEWORK
5.1 These Guidelines are formulated in fulfillment of a major legal commitment of the Government of the
Philippines (GOP) with the World Bank (WB) and therefore, have the force and effect of a legal instrument
for compliance of all concerned with the implementation of the JRSP. The provisions of these guidelines are
basically premised and substantially based on, and in some parts or instances, literally quoted or drawn
from:
5.1.1 JRSP LOAN AGREEMENT. The Loan Agreement executed by and between the GOP and the
WB on October 2, 2003 shall govern the legal relationship between the Bank and the Supreme Court
as the Project's Implementing Agency. The terms and conditions set forth therein for the
procurement of goods, works and consulting services shall be observed in consonance with the
Bank Guidelines.
5.1.2 BANK GUIDELINES
5.1.2.1 For Works and Goods procurement, the Guidelines: Procurement under IBRD Loan
and Credits, January 1995, revised January and August 1996, September 1997 and January
1999 shall be used.
5.1.2.2 For the selection of Consultants, the Guidelines: Selection and Employment of
Consultants by World Bank Borrowers, January 1 997, revised in September 1997, January
1999 and May 2002 shall be used.
5.1.2.3 More recent provisions and amendments of Bank Guidelines may be applicable
subject to prior notice and clearance by the Bank.
5.1.3 REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9184 (An Act Providing for the Modernization, Standardization and
Regulation of the Procurement Activities of the Government and for Other Purposes) and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR).
5.2 In case of conflict, the Loan Agreement and the World Bank Guidelines take precedence over
Government Guidelines.
Under the aforequoted guidelines set in SC Administrative Circular No. 60-2003, the procurement rules for the JRSP
were not exclusively culled from the IBRD Guidelines, but also from the provisions of R.A. No 9184, which were to
be applied suppletorily. The OCAt noted that under the procurement rules the borrower, which was the Court itself,
should identify the body that would conduct the procurement activities for the borrower. For the purpose, SC
Administrative Circular No. 60-2003 adopted Article V of R.A. No. 9184 to establish the JRSP Bids and Awards
Committee (JRSP BAC) to be in charge of the conduct of the procurement activities. In light of this, and given that
the PMO Program Director was tasked with the overall monitoring of the procurement process, Ms.
Dumdum and the PMO should not have engaged in actual procurement activities, as their doing so would
mean that she and the PMO were risking not being able to perform the monitoring function properly. 59
The IBRD Guidelines defined two modes of procurement: the international competitive bidding (ICB); and the other
methods of procurement. The latter included limited international bidding (LIB); national competitive bidding (NCB);
shopping; direct contracting; etc.
60
Specifically, shopping was defined by the January 1999 IBRD Guidelines in the following manner:
Shopping (International and National)
3.5 Shopping is a procurement method based on comparing price quotations obtained from several
Suppliers, usually at least three, to assure competitive prices, and is an appropriate method for procuring
readily available off-the-shelf goods or standard specification commodities that are small in value. Requests
for quotations shall indicate the description and quantity of the goods, as well as desired delivery time and place.
Quotations may be submitted by telex or facsimile. The evaluation of quotations shall follow sound public or private
sector practices of the purchaser. The terms of the accepted offer shall be incorporated in a purchase order.
(Emphasis Supplied)
The PMO appeared to have resorted to shopping as the method of procurement in canvassing three
suppliers for the goods and supplies intended for the National Forum.
Re: Supplies for the National Forum and

the Global Forum on Liberty and Prosperity
Considering that the National Forum and the Global Forum were projects conceptualized under the aegis of the
JRSP, SC Administrative Circular No. 60-2003 governed the procurement of goods, works and services.
By resorting to national shopping, however, the PMO ignored the last sentence of the IBRD Guidelines on such
alternative method of procurement that required a purchase order (PO) in which the accepted offer should be
indicated. The PO was akin to a "contract between the parties as it requires inputs showing the requisites of a
contract of consent, object certain, and cause of obligation." Instead of the PO, the PMO used and relied on letter-
61
quotations to reflect and contain the agreements between the parties. All that Ms. Dumdum as the Program
Director had to do was to affix her signature on the letter-quotations beneath the word Conforme to indicate
conformity to the terms stated therein. This manner of contracting was yet again a clear violation of the IBRD
Guidelines and the Standard Bidding Documents, Procurement of Goods. 62
What were to be contained in the contracts was quite clearly stated in the law. In the 1999 version of the IBRD
Guidelines, the following parameters were expressly written, to wit:
Conditions of Contract
2.37 The contract documents shall clearly define the scope of work to be performed, the goods to be supplied, the
rights and obligations of the Borrower and of the supplier or contractor, and the functions and authority of the
engineer, architect, or construction manager, if one is employed by the Borrower, in the supervision and
administration of the contract. In addition to the general conditions of contract, any special conditions particular to
the specific goods or works to be procured and the location of the project shall be included. 63
Moreover, as the OCAt has correctly observed, the IBRD Guidelines mentioned of contract documents instead of
a single document. This observation is consistent with the Generic Procurement Manual (GPM) that synchronized
the provisions of R.A. No. 9184 with the procurement rules of the Asian Development Bank, Japan Bank for
International Cooperation, and the World Bank itself by requiring that contracts resulting from procurement activities
for goods should be supported not only by a contract document but by a number of documents, including the bid
documents. Yet, based on the detailed study made by the OCAt, no proper bidding procedure pursuant to the
guidelines of SC Administrative Circular No, 60-2003 was followed by the JRSP-BAC in choosing Artes as the
service provider for the National Forum and the Global Forum. Consequently, the patent nullity of the contracts with
Artes became the only legal consequence to be reached from the failure to comply with the proper procurement
procedure.
We are not also prepared to find that the PMO conducted the canvassing for the supplies for having been already
pressed for time. Such explanation was a feeble and implausible excuse in the face of the statement by Caunca of
the Property Division to the effect that the Property Division could have done the canvassing in time through the
Phil-GBPS despite time constraints. Indeed, the records revealed no immediate or compelling justification for
dispensing with the requirement of public bidding in choosing the service provider for the procurement of the goods
involved thereon. To insist that a public bidding would have unnecessarily delayed the implementation of the
program was truly unacceptable. By conducting the canvass without prior coordination with the Property Division,
Ms. Dumdum and the PMO ignored the proper procurement procedure, and unavoidably caused the making of
"advance deliveries" in contravention of the law.
The assertion by the JRP Administrator that Artes had itself conducted the canvassing of suppliers, and that the
PMO had only facilitated the process was fundamentally discredited by the documents reviewed by the OCAt. The
records disclosed that Ms. Dumdum as the JRP Administrator had approved the recommended award of contracts
to Artes as the winning bidder despite Artes having itself conducted the bidding. We advert to the points cogently
made by the OCAt thereon, viz.:
If indeed it is true that the PMO merely facilitated the process as an overseer, and Artes was the actual canvasser,
then a lot of questions are raised by the fact that Artes itself emerged the winner in the canvasses ''facilitated" by
the PMO, as evidenced by the undated Abstracts of Bids approved by the JRP Administrator. Notably, Artes
emerged the firm with the "lowest quotation" for jewelry boxes and ball pens even though the JRP Administrator
conformed to its quotation and Artes delivered the said goods days before OfficeMAN and Chateau offered their
quotations for the same goods;
Moreover, assuming that the PMO had been authorized as a special procurement body, it may not conduct
shopping without authority from the Chief Justice as head of the procuring entity. Section 48 of Republic Act No.
9184 provides that, to promote economy and efficiency, an alternative method of procurement such as shopping
may only be conducted upon prior approval by the Head of the Procuring Entity and "whenever justified by the
conditions"' provided by Republic Act No. 9184. The JRP Administrator, who does not appear to have been specially
authorized by the Chief Justice for the purpose "of approving the alternative method of procurement to competitive
bidding to be adopted, may not arrogate unto herself the responsibility of the Chief Justice to authorize the conduct
of shopping.(Italicized and bold emphases are part of the original) 64
At the very least, the resulting situation of the canvasser later emerging as the winning bidder was highly irregular
because of the plainly obvious conflict of interest.
Considering that most ·of the expenditures· whose payments were sought by Ms. Dumdum as the authorized
approving official came within the threshold allowed in SC Administrative Circular No. 06-2003 (i.e., ₱l,000,000.00
and below), the payment of contracts on the goods, works, and services procured under the JRSP would have been
presumed to have initially complied with the proper procurement procedure conducted by the JRSP-BAC. Yet, we
cannot even presume regularity simply because of several indicia of non-compliance with the proper procurement
procedure. The presumption of regularity vanished with the appearance of even just one irregularity. We agree with
the OCAt that it was doubtful if the actual canvass had been conducted in view of the abstracts of canvass,
particularly with respect to the jewelry boxes and the ball pens, being undated. The OCAt pertinently noted:
Documents show that the JRP Administrator signed the letter-quotation of Artes dated August 14, 2006. The face of
the letter-quotation does not show when she signed it. However, two days later or on August 16, 2006, Artes sent
her Sales Invoice No. 360 for the full payment of ₱35,224.00 for the said goods. On August 20, 2006, or four days
after Artes had presented Sales Invoice No. 360 to the PMO, OfficeMan and Chateau Manufacturing sent quotations
for the same goods. Could there be canvassing of all three proponents under these circumstances? In all
probability, the Abstract of Bids was prepared and included in the records only to justify the premature award of the
contract to Artes.65
It is also true that a contract that has all the essential requisites for its validity is binding between the parties
regardless of its form. But when the law requires that a contract be in some form in order that it may be valid or be
66
enforceable, or demands that a contract be proved in a certain way, the requirement of a particular form or manner
is absolute and indispensable. Once the formal requirement for the contract is absolute and indispensable, any
67
procurement contract that does not adhere to the requirement can only be deemed invalid and unenforceable. As
such, every letter-quotation signed by an unauthorized purchaser in behalf of a government agency in a manner
contrary to the loan agreement with the foreign lender and contrary to the local procurement law can only be a mere
scrap of paper that cannot by any means be accorded any validity or enforceability.
We cannot but notice that the records do not show that the PMO had secured the CAF for each of the contracts.
According to the OCAt, the CAFs were still required because the Government Auditing Code of the
Philippines, the Administrative Code of 1987, and the General Provisions of the relevant General Appropriations
68 69
Act uniformly required expenditures of appropriated funds to be supported by CAFs. We hold that the loan
70
proceeds were undoubtedly appropriated funds. In addition, R.A. No. 9184, which was definitely applicable, has
specified '"confirming the certification of availability of funds, as well as reviewing all relevant documents in relation
to their adherence to law" as parts of the assessment of the readiness of the procurement during the pre-
71
procurement conference. With the requirement for the CAFs being sine qua non in government procurement and
contracts, every contract without the corresponding CAF should be characterized as null and void. 72
The transactions consummated by Ms. Dumdum for the PMO could not be classified as regular despite the lack of a
contrary finding by the COA. Such contrary finding by the COA was not yet forthcoming because the Court had not
yet settled the claim of Artes for the balance of the aggregate contract price in view of the material violations of SC
Administrative Circular No. 60-2003 and the relevant procurement laws. Hence, there would be no disbursement of
public funds to be disallowed or no expenditure to be declared illegal.
We also clarify that the contracts with Artes did not make it to the category of ineligible as determined by the WB,
and this was due to the Court's continued refusal to settle the nearly P3 million supposedly owed to Artes. The
refusal to pay was most likely the reason why the contracts with Artes were not included in the WB's list of
ineligibles.
Re: Splitting of contracts
That Ms. Dumdum committed splitting of contracts was undeniable.
Splitting of contracts means the breaking up of contracts into smaller quantities and amounts, or dividing
contract implementation into artificial phases or subcontracts, for the purpose of making them fall below
the threshold for shopping or small value procurement, or evading or circumventing the requirement of
public bidding. Public officers and agencies are called upon by the COA to ensure that no splitting of requisitions,
73
purchase orders, vouchers, and the like, is resorted to in order to circumvent the control measures provided in the
circulars it issued and other laws and regulations. In this connection, a project funded under a single obligating
authority and implemented in several phases whether by the same or different contractors shall be deemed splitting
of contracts.
74
Under the general guidelines of the Government Procurement Policy Board (GPPB), splitting of contracts is strictly
prohibited.
COA Circular No. 76-41, dated July 30, 1976, is instructive on the matter of splitting of contracts, to wit:
Forms of Splitting:
1) Splitting of Requisitions consists in the non-consolidation of requisitions for one or more items needed at
or about the same time by the requisitioner.
2) Splitting of Purchase Orders consists in the issuance of two or more purchase orders based on two or
more requisitions for the same or at about the same time by different requisitioners; and
3) Splitting of Payments consists in making two or more payments for one or more items involving one
purchase order.
The above-enumerated forms of splitting are usually resorted to in the following cases:
1) Splitting of requisitions and purchase orders to avoid inspection of deliveries;
2) Splitting of requisitions and purchase orders to avoid action, review or approval by higher authorities; and
3) Splitting of requisitions to avoid public bidding.
The foregoing enumeration of the forms of splitting is merely illustrative and by no means exhaustive. But in
whatever form splitting has been resorted to, the idea is to do away with and circumvent control measures
promulgated by the government. It is immaterial whether or not loss or damage has been sustained by, or caused
to, the government. In a celebrated administrative case wherein a ranking official was charged with and found guilty
of splitting of purchases, the Office of the President of the Philippines was quite emphatic when it ruled that "his
liability is not contingent on proof of loss to the Government because of said violations of rules on procurement." For
this reason, except "requisitions for· supplies materials and equipment spare parts xxx acquired through emergency
purchase from reputable firms xxx:" (Section 18, Letter of Implementation No. 44, dated April 8, 1976 of the
President of the Philippines), Auditors should be on the lookout for cases of splitting in varied forms such as splitting
of requisitions and purchase orders to avoid inspection of deliveries; splitting of requisitions, purchase orders, and
payments to avoid action, review or approval by higher authorities; and splitting of requisitions to avoid public
bidding.
The Commission on Audit, therefore, cognizant of its responsibility under the Constitution to safeguard expenditures
and uses of government funds and property hereby enjoins all concerned to strictly enforce and faithfully adhere to
all laws, rules, regulations, and policies calculated to prevent or prohibit splitting in any or all forms for the protection
of the government. (Emphasis supplied)
The foregoing COA circular is addressed to all heads of departments; chiefs of bureaus and offices; managing
heads of government-owned or - controlled corporations; etc ., and proscribes the splitting of requisitions, purchase
orders, vouchers and others. The heads of the departments, bureaus or offices are expressly enjoined to observe
prudence, accountability and transparency in ensuring that no such splitting of requisitions, POs,
vouchers, etc. escape their attention or happen under their charge. With the increasing volume of transactions
involving purchases of goods, equipment, supplies and materials, there arises the need to enforce control measures
to insure that procurement is effected in a manner that is most advantageous to the Government. The control
measures protect the Government from losing millions of pesos through irregularities in the procurement process.
The following elements constitute the act of splitting of contracts or procurement project, to wit:
1. That there is a government contract or procurement project;
2. That the requisitions, purchase orders, vouchers, and the like of the project are broken up into smaller
quantities and amounts, or the implementation thereof is broken into subcontracts or artificial phases; and
3. That the splitting of the contract falls under any of the following or similar purposes, namely:
a. evading the conduct of a competitive bidding; 75
b. circumventing the control measures provided in the circulars and other laws and regulations; or 76
c. making the contract or project fall below the threshold for shopping or small value procurement. 77
Applying the foregoing elements to Artes' contracts, we find that the JRSP WB loan was used to fund both the
National Forum and the Global Forum in the respective amounts of ₱7.5 million and P20.6 million; but instead of
conducting a public bidding for the two events, Ms. Dumdum entered into several letter-contracts or quotation-
contracts with Artes for various phases of the events, each phase involving amounts that were well within her
authority to approve under SC Administrative Circular No. 60- 2003. Such letter-contracts or quotation-
contracts were aimed not only at dispensing with competitive bidding but also at avoiding the control measures set
in place under SC Administrative Circular No. 60-2003, the COA Circulars, R.A. No. 9184 and other relevant laws
and regulations on government procurement.
In its Report, the OCAt cogently opined that -
On the claim of Ms. Dumdum that Artes was an "events" organizer, this Office pointed out that the Philippine
Convention and Visitors Corporation (PCVC), a non-profit corporation that serves as the marketing arm of the
Department of Tourism, was the events organizer under a Memorandum of Agreement that Ms. Dumdum herself
signed for the Court.
The various contracts entered into with Artes for each of the two events, in light of the claim of Ms. Dumdum that
Artes was an "events organizer," only led to the conclusion that there was splitting of contracts. If it were true that
Artes was engaged as an events organizer, a lump sum contract thereon should have covered all the details of
holding the National Forum, including the needed supplies. 78
Had the PMO engaged Artes as the events organizer of the two events, Ms. Dumdum should have executed with
Artes a lump sum contract that covered all the details and incidentals of the events instead of the several letter-
contracts and quotation-contracts for each and every phase of the events. That the value of each of the letter-
contracts and quotation-contracts entered into by Ms. Dumdum was within her authority to approve (i.e., ₱l
million and below) was another strong manifestation of splitting of contracts.
Splitting of contracts is a serious transgression of the procurement rules of the Government. Section 65(4) of R.A.
No. 9184 penalizes public officers who commit "splitting of contracts which exceed procedural purchase limits and
competitive bidding" with "imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day but not more than fifteen
years."
Personal liability of Ms. Dumdum
Section 103 of the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines declares that "[e]xpenditures of government funds
or uses of government property in violation of law or regulations shall be the personal liability of the official or
employee found to be directly responsible therefor."
Considering that Artes already waived any and all claims it had against the Court pursuant to the several contracts
entered into with Ms. Dumdum, there is no more need to make the latter personally liable for the reimbursement of
any amounts that Artes was claiming.
Her release from personal liability for reimbursement notwithstanding, Ms. Dumdum should be investigated for any
administrative or criminal liability for acts done in connection with the following circumstances, namely:
a. requesting authority to fund the National Forum twice on the same day for the separate amounts of
₱7,500,000.00 and ₱6,800,000.00 without indicating whether the first request is superseded or that the latter
request was intended to be for an amount to be added to the first request;
b. entering into contracts even before the Chief Justice approved the use of funds from which the expenses
for the contracts were drawn;
c. allowing her subordinates to conduct the alternative method of procurement of shopping without her
having been duly authorized as the representative of the Chief Justice for the purpose of approving the
alternative mode of procurement;
d. prematurely awarding to Artes the contract for the jewelry boxes and ball pens before actual receipt of
offers of other proponents;
e. participating in procurement activities notwithstanding that her authority was to monitor such activities, in
violation of the rule on conflict of interest;
f. allowing the conduct of activities that violate procurement rules such as the rule prohibiting splitting of
contracts;
g. signing contracts prepared by private contracting parties as letter-quotations with no Certificate of

Availability of Funds (CAF) attached thereto and hence in violation of formal requirements prescribed by law
and the Loan Agreement; and
h. authorizing the payment of the amount of ₱l,313,435.00 (or ₱l,427,647.72 inclusive of tax), which is
beyond her threshold of authority for payments of ₱l million under Administrative Circular No. 60-2003. 79
Even if the disciplinary procedure provided in Paragraph 9.4 of Administrative Circular No. 60-2003 is no longer
applicable to Ms. Dumdum in view of her having meanwhile ceased to be connected with the Court, Paragraph 9.3
of Administrative Circular No. 60-2003 may apply, viz.:
9.3 Sanctions. Supreme Court officials, employees and private individuals who shall fail to comply with the
provisions of this Administrative Circular without just cause shall be held liable and subject to
sanctions/penalties provided under Articles XXI to XXIII of R.A. 9184 (see Annex J). [Emphasis supplied.]
In addition, the provisions of R.A. No. 3019 may be taken into consideration in order to ascertain whether or not any
act or omission committed by any party, including Ms. Dumdum, resulted in or caused undue injury to the
Government. However, it is not the Court but another office that should make the ascertainment in that regard.
No personal liability on the part of
Chief Justice Panganiban
We have found nothing in the records that established former Chief Justice Panganiban's privity to the contracts
entered into by Ms. Dumdum with Artes. Although he had approved, belatedly, the budgets for the holding of the
National Forum and the Global Forum in the respective amounts of ₱7.5 million and ₱20.6 million, his approval was
within his official authority to grant as the Chief Justice.
The documents presented for Chief Justice Panganiban's approval had undergone the presumed study and
verification by the PMO under Ms. Dumdum as well as by the committee constituted for the purpose. He must have
relied in utmost good faith on his subordinates, upon whom the primary responsibility of ensuring that all
procurement of goods and services were within the limits required by the laws and the procurement rules. Such
reliance in good faith absolved him from any personal liability in the absence of proof of any conspiracy between
them.
Conclusion
Based on the OCAt's Report dated June 20, 2012, violations of law in the disbursement of funds of the Court as well
as of funds derived from the loans extended by the World Bank appear to have been committed. The laws on
procurement as well as those on auditing and official accountability were also contravened. Although such violations
would have resulted in the nullification of the contracts for services and supplies between the Court and Artes, the
Court would have still authorized payments to Artes of any unpaid balances based on the equitable principle
of quantum meruit in order not to be guilty of being unjustly enriched. The Court would then consequently move to
seek from the concerned individuals the reimbursement of whatever amounts it would have thereby paid. That
would not happen now because Artes meanwhile expressly released the Court from any further monetary liability
upon its claim.
WHEREFORE, acting on the Report dated June 20, 2012 submitted by the Office of the Chief Attorney, the
Court RESOLVES to:
1. CONSIDER the claim of Artes International, Inc. for payment extinguished in accordance to the
unilateral Release, Waiver & Quitclaim executed and submitted by Artes International, Inc.; and
2. FURNISH a copy of this RESOLUTION to the OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN and the COMMISSION ON

AUDIT as basis for whatever further action may be warranted or necessary to be taken against MS. EVELYN
DUMDUM.
The matter subject of this case is now considered CLOSED and TERMINATED

11.) G.R. No. 229256
MARIETTA MAGLAYA DE GUZMAN, Petitioner

vs.
THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN AND BESTFORMS, IN CORPORATED, Respondents
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Nature of the Case
This petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to reverse and set 1aside the April 20, 2016
Decision and January 11, 2017 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. SP No. 129712, which affirmed
1 2
the Decision of the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) in OMB-C-A-06-0427-H finding petitioner Marietta
Maglaya De Guzman (De Guzman) guilty of grave misconduct and dismissing her from government service.
Factual Antecedents
The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:
On March 30, 2006 and April 12, 2006, the National Printing Office Bids & Awards Committee (NPO-BAC)
conducted competitive public biddings for, among others, the printing of accountable forms of the Land
Transportation Office (LTO). Private respondent Bestforms, Inc. and Readyform, Inc. (RFI) secured the awards in
the said public biddings. For the March 30, 2006 bidding, Bestforms, Inc. and RFI were accordingly issued their
3
respective Notices of Award on April 17 and April 25, 2006. RFI was likewise issued a Notice of Award for the April
12, 2006 bidding.
However, prior to the issuance of a Notice of Award to Bestforms, Inc. for the April 12 bidding, the NPO discovered
that the said corporation violated NPO rules on security printing based on an inspection conducted by the NPO
Accreditation Committee and NPO-BAC at its printing facilities. In addition to the discovery of Bestforms, Inc.'s
4
violations, the LTO called the attention of the NPO regarding the substandard paperstock used by Bestforms, Inc.
for the printing of LTO Certificates of Registration. To verify this allegation, the NPO submitted samples of the
5
materials used by Bestforms, Inc. to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory. On May 17, 2006, the
PNP Crime Laboratory issued Report No. 046-06 stating that the paper sample from Bestforms, Inc. was made of
low-quality materials.
6
Consequently, the NPO issued two Show Cause Letters to Bestforms, Inc. to enable it to explain the findings of the.
7
NPO Accreditation Committee. Thereafter, the Accreditation Committee revoked Bestforms, Inc.'s accreditation as a
private security printer of NPO. Resultantly, Bestforms, Inc. was disqualified to participate in any bidding conducted
by the NPO and its ongoing printing transactions were likewise cancelled. Bestforms, Inc. did not appeal the
8
decision of the Accreditation Committee revoking its accreditation.
Resultantly, the contracts awarded to Bestforms, Inc. during the March 30, 2006 bidding were subjected to a re-
bidding through Limited Source Bidding on June 13 to 14, 2006. RFI won in these biddings and subsequently
secured two Notices of Award both dated June 16, 2006 for the contracts. Aside from these two awards, the NPO
9
similarly awarded to RFI, this time through Negotiated Procurement, the supply of LTO forms since the
contracts awarded to Bestforms, Inc. on April 17, 2006 was cancelled and considering further that RFI
submitted the same bid price as that of private respondent. 10
Subsequently, Bestforms, Inc. instituted an administrative complaint against the NPO officer-in-charge,
Felipe Evardone, and the members of the NPO-BAC before the Office of the Ombudsman, alleging that the
NPO officers and RFI knowingly and willfully conspired, colluded, and connived with each other to
manipulate the award of the printing contracts to the latter. De Guzman held the position of Sales &
Promotion Supervisor V in the NPO and simultaneously served as the Chairperson of the NPO-BAC.
Ruling of the Office of the Ombudsman
In a Dedsion issued on June 17, 2011, the Ombudsman found De Guzman and her co-respondents guilty of grave
11
misconduct and ordered them dismissed from service with forfeiture of benefits, except accrued leave credits, and
with prejudice to re-employment in the government or any subdivision, instrumentality, or agency thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations. The decretal portion of the Ombudsman's Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondents Felipe Pagaran Evardone, Marietta Maglaya De Guzman, Evelyn
Ramos Perlado, Miguel Doyungan Arcadio, Vicente Monteros Lago, Jr. and Recto Salmo Tomas, Jr., are hereby
found GUILTY of the administrative offense of GRAVE MISCONDUCT and ordered DISMISSED from the service
with forfeiture of all benefits, except accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to reemployment in the Government or
any subdivision, instrumentality or agency thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
Pursuant to Section 7, Administrative Order No. 17 of the Office of the Ombudsman and the Ombudsman
Memorandum Circular No. 01, Series of 2006, the Honorable Press Secretary is hereby directed to implement, this
Decision and to submit promptly a Compliance Report within five (5) days from receipt indicating the OMB case
number, to this Office, thru the Central Records Division, 2nd Floor, Office of the Ombudsman Building, Agham
Road, Diliman, Quezon City.
SO ORDERED. 12
The Ombudsman based its judgment on the failure of the NPO-BAC to observe the) procedures laid down in
Republic Act No. (RA) 9184, I otherwise known as the "Government Procurement Reform Act," for the Limited
Source Biddings that it conducted on June 13 and 14, 2006, and in entering into a Negotiated Procurement with
RFI.
According to the Ombudsman, the NPO-BAC failed to show that it: a) conducted a pre-procurement conference
prior to the biddings pursuant to Section 20 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations Part A (IRR-A) of RA 9184;
b) sent written invitations to the Commission on Audit (COA) and to two (2) observers to attend the biddings in
accordance with Section 13.1 of the IRR-A; c) advertised the Invitation to Apply for Eligibility to Bid (IAEB) in a
newspaper of general nationwide circulation for the period mandated by the law; d) posted the said IAEB at the
website of the Government Electronic Procurement Services (GEPS) and at a conspicuous place reserved for the
said purpose in the premises of the NPO; and e) included the mandated contents of the IAEB in the advertisement
and periods of posting, specifically, the Approved Budget for the Contract (ABC) or Ceiling Rate, required
specifications for the forms to be printed, as well as the pertinent dates that should have been provided or made
available to prospective bidders.
13
Aggrieved, De Guzman questioned the Decision of the Ombudsman via a petition for review under Rule 43 with the
CA.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On April 20, 2016, the CA rendered its Decision affirming the findings of the Office of the Ombudsman, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED. The decision of the Office of the Ombudsman
in OMB Case No. OMB-C-A-06-0427-H finding petitioner Marietta Maglaya De Guzman guilty of grave misconduct
is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. 14
Citing the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9184 that took effect on September 2, 2009 (Revised
IRR), the appellate court noted that the procedures for competitive bidding laid down in the law should likewise be
observed in Limited Source Bidding, specifically in Section 13 thereof. Echoing the Ombudsman's observation, the
CA held that the NPO-BAC failed to invite the COA or its representatives, as well as observers from a duly
recognized private group in a sector or discipline relevant to the procurement. In addition, the CA ruled that the
NPO-BAC failed to sufficiently justify why it resorted to Negotiated Procurement with RFI instead of competitive
public bidding.
De Guzman moved for reconsideration of the Decision, but the same was denied by the CA in its assailed January
11, 2017 Resolution. Hence, this petition with the following assignment of errors:
I.
Whether or not the [CA] violated the Constitution when it retroactively applied a rule that was non-existent at the
time [De Guzman] committed the acts or omissions complained of.
II.
Whether or not the [CA] seriously erred in finding that [De Guzman] and her co-respondents committed
grave misconduct when they failed to strictly observe the two-failed bidding rule in negotiated procurement
under RA 9184 for the award of the second set of LTO accountable forms.
III.
Whether or not the [CA] gravely erred in sustaining the assailed Decision of the Office of the Ombudsman finding
[De Guzman] guilty of grave misconduct.
IV.
Whether or not dismissal from service is too harsh a penalty for the purported infraction committed by [De
Guzman]. 15
In the main, De Guzman argues that the NPO-BAC complied with all the requirements of the law when it
resorted to alternative modes of procurement in the questioned procurements. In support, De Guzman cites
Memorandum Order No. 38, issued by then Executive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora on November 19, 1998, which
16
prescribes the guidelines in contracting the services of private security printers for the printing of accountable forms
with money value and other specialized accountable forms which the NPO has no capability to undertake. In
accordance with the directive of Memorandum Order No. 38, the NPO conducts annual accreditation of private
security printers to ensure the security of government forms with money value. Considering the necessity of
17
prior accreditation of private security printers, as well as the fact that government accountable forms are
not ordinary printing materials, the NPO utilizes limited-source bidding in the procurement of printing
18
services.
To De Guzman, the CA erred in holding that the NPO-BAC violated the law when it failed to comply with Sec. 49.4
of the Revised IRR respecting the sending out of direct invitations to all suppliers in the preselected list and the
compliance with the procedure for competitive bidding. She points out that these requirements were not yet in
existence when the said limited source biddings were conducted in 2006. 19
In addition, De Guzman asserts that the June 13 and 14, 2006 biddings were merely a re-bid of the March 30 and
April 12, 2006 biddings; accordingly, a pre-bid conference was no longer necessary since all information about the
projects had already been discussed with and made known to interested accredited bidders. Stated otherwise, De
20
Guzman posits that the pre-bid conference for the March 30 and April 12 biddings served as the pre-bid conference
for the June 2006 biddings. Insofar as why a re-bid was conducted instead of awarding the contract to the second
lowest bidder, De Guzman explains that the second and third bidders submitted bid offers beyond the ABC, which in
effect automatically disqualified them from being considered in a negotiated procurement according to Section 54.2
of the IRR-A. 21
Anent the allegation of noncompliance by the NPO-BAC with the requirements for negotiated procurement,
De Guzman argues that RA 9184 and the Rules clearly allow the BAC to resort to this type of procurement in
case of a take-over of a previously awarded contract, contrary to the CA's conclusion that a prior two-failed
biddings is a condition sine qua non before the BAC could resort to negotiated procurement. As proof
thereof, the NPO-BAC issued a Resolution on June 2, 2006 explaining that the resort to negotiated procurement
with RFI is based on a take-over of Bestforms, Inc.'s contract due to the revocation of the latter's accreditation.
Issue
The pertinent issue for the resolution of this Court is whether or not De Guzman is liable for grave
misconduct for the failure of the NPO-BAC to comply with the requirements under RA 9184 for limited-
source bidding and negotiated procurement.
The Court's Ruling
At the outset, De Guzman correctly points out, that it is the IRR-A, which took effect in October 2003, which is
applicable to the extant case. It was clearly erroneous for the CA to have applied the Revised IRR considering that
the questioned actions were committed in 2006.
Nevertheless, for the reasons that will be discussed below, the petition is denied for lack of merit.
Section 10, Article IV, in relation to Section 5, pars. (n) and (o), Article I, of RA 9184 mandates that all acquisition of
22
goods, consulting services, and the contracting for infrastructure projects by any branch, department, office, agency,
or instrumentality of the government, including state universities and colleges, government-owned and/or -controlled
corporations, government financial institutions, and local government units shall be done through competitive
bidding. This is in consonance with the law's policy and principle of promoting transparency in the procurement
process, implementation of procurement contracts, and competitiveness by extending equal opportunity to enable
private contracting parties who are eligible and qualified to participate in public bidding. This principle is elucidated
by this Court in Lagoc v. Malaga, thus:
[A] competitive public bidding aims to protect the public interest by giving the public the best possible advantages
thru open competition. Another self-evident purpose of public bidding is to avoid or preclude suspicion of favoritism
and anomalies in the execution of public contracts. 23
Alternative methods of procurement, however, are allowed under RA 9184 which w9uld enable dispensing with the
requirement of open, public and competitive bidding, but only in highly exceptional cases and under the conditions
24
set .forth in Article XVI thereof. These alternative modes of procurement include Limited Source Bidding and
Negotiated Procurement:
SEC. 49. Limited Source Bidding. - Limited Source Bidding may be resorted to only in any of the following
conditions:
(a) Procurement of highly specialized types of Goods and Consulting Services which are known to be obtainable
only from a limited number of sources; or
(b) Procurement of major plant components where it is deemed advantageous to limit the bidding to known eligible
bidders in order to maintain an optimum and uniform level of quality and performance of the plant as a whole.
x x xx
SEC. 53. Negotiated Procurement. - Negotiated Procurement shall be allowed only in the following instances:
(a) In cases of two failed biddings, as provided in Section 35 hereof;
(b) In case of imminent danger to life or property during a state of calamity, or when time is of the essence arising
from natural or man-made calamities or other causes where immediate action is necessary to prevent damage to or
loss of life or property, or to restore vital public services, infrastructure facilities and other public utilities;
(c) Take-over of contracts, which have been rescinded or terminated for causes provided for in the contract and
existing laws, where immediate action is necessary to prevent damage to or loss of life or property, or to restore vital
public services, infrastructure facilities and other public utilities;
(d) Where the subject contract is adjacent or contiguous to an on-going infrastructure project, as defined in the IRR:
Provided, however, That the original contract is the result of a Competitive Bidding; the subject contract to be
negotiated has similar or related scopes of work; it is within the contracting capacity of the contractor; the contractor
uses the same prices or lower unit prices as in the original contract less mobilization cost; the amount involved does
not exceed the amount of the ongoing project; and, the contractor has no negative slippage: Provided, further, That
negotiations for the procurement are commenced before the expiry of the original contract. Whenever applicable,
this principle shall also govern consultancy contracts, where the consultants have unique experience and expertise
to deliver the required service; or,
(e) Subject to the guidelines specified in the IRR, purchases of Goods from another agency of the Government,
such as the Procurement Service of the DBM, which is tasked with a centralized procurement of commonly used
Goods for the government in accordance with Letters of Instruction No. 755 and Executive Order No. 359, series of
1989. (Emphasis supplied)
Corollary thereto, the IRR-A expounds on the definition of Limited Source Bidding and Negotiated Procurement in
this wise:
Section 49. Limited Source Bidding
Limited Source Bidding, otherwise known as selective bidding, is a method of procurement of goods and consulting
services that involves direct invitation to bid by the concerned procuring entity from a set of pre-selected suppliers or
consultants with known experience and proven capability on the requirements of the particular contract. The pre-
selected suppliers or consultants shall be those appearing in a list maintained by the relevant Government authority
that has expertise in the type of procurement concerned, which list should have been submitted to, and maintained
updated with, the GPPB. The BAC of the concerned procuring entity shall directly send to the pre-selected bidders
the invitation to bid, which shall already indicate the relevant information required to enable the bidders to prepare
their bids as prescribed under the pertinent provisions of this IRR-A Limited source bidding may be employed by
concerned procuring entities under any of the following conditions:
a) Procurement of highly specialized types of goods (e.g. sophisticated defense equipment, complex air navigation
systems, coal) and consulting services where only a few suppliers or consultants are known to be available, such
that resorting to the public bidding method will not likely result in any additional suppliers or consultants participating
in the bidding; or x x x
x x xx
Section 53. Negotiated Procurement
Negotiated Procurement is a method of procurement of goods, infrastructure projects and consulting services,
whereby the procuring entity directly negotiates a contract with a technically, legally and financially capable supplier,
contractor or consultant only in the following cases: x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The requirements of a pre-bid

conference, written invitation to
observers, and posting of the IAEB
must still be followed in alternative
modes of procurement
The foregoing provisions, however, should be read in relation to other provisions of RA 9184 pertinent to the
conduct of any procurement activity. These include (1) the conduct of pre-procurement and pre-bid conferences; (2)
the presence of observers throughout the whole bidding process; and (3) publication and/or posting of the IAEB,
and other notices.
Section 13, Article V of RA 9184 and Section 13, Rule V of IRR-A underscore that written invitations should be sent
to a COA representative and to at least two (2) other observers to sit in its proceedings. It should be emphasized
that both the law and the IRR-A categorically state that these observers shall be invited to observe in all stages of
the procurement:
SEC. 13. Observers. - To enhance the transparency of the process, the BAC shall, in all stages of the procurement
process, invite, in addition to the representative of the Commission on Audit, at least two (2) observers to sit in its
proceedings, one (1) from a duly recognized private group in a sector or discipline relevant to the procurement at
hand, and the other from a non-government organization: Provided, however, That they do not have any direct or
indirect interest in the contract to be bid out. The observers should be duly registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission and should meet the criteria for observers as set forth in the IRR.
xxx
Section 13. Observers
13.1. To enhance the transparency of the process, the BAC shall, in all stages of the procurement process, invite, in
addition to the representative of the COA, at least two (2) observers to sit in its proceedings:
1. At least one (1) shall come from a duly recognized private group in a sector or discipline relevant to the
procurement at hand, for example:
xxx
b) For goods -
A specific relevant chamber-member of the Philippine Chamber of Commerce and Industry (PCCI).
2. The other observer shall come from a non-government organization (NGO).
On the other hand, Sections 20 and 22 of Article VII of RA 9184 mandate the BAC to hold a pre-procurement and
pre-bid conference on each and every procurement, without making any qualifications nor exceptions as to which
mode of procurement these requirements are applicable to:
SEC. 20. Pre-Procurement Conference. - Prior to the issuance of the Invitation to Bid, the BAC is mandated to hold
a pre-procurement conference on each and every procurement, except those contracts below a certain level or
amount specified in the IRR, in which case, the holding of the same is optional. x x x
SEC. 22. Pre-Bid Conference. - At least one pre-bid conference shall be conducted for each procurement, unless
otherwise provided in the IRR. Subject to the approval of the BAC, a pre-bid conference may also be conducted
25
upon the written request of any prospective bidder.
The pre-bid conference(s) shall be held within a reasonable period before the deadline for receipt of bids to allow
prospective bidders to adequately prepare their bids, which shall be specified in the IRR. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
As regards the publication and posting requirements, the IRR-A instructs that the advertisement or publication of the
IAEB in a newspaper of general circulation may be dispensed with for alternative modes of procurement. The Rules,
however, explicitly states that the IAEB shall still be posted at a conspicuous place in the premises of the procuring
entity concerned:
Section 21. Advertising and Contents of the Invitation to Bid x x x
21.2.4. For alternative methods of procurement as provided for in Rule XVI of this IRR-A, advertisement in a
newspaper as required in this Section may be dispensed with: Provided, however, That posting shall be made in the
website of the procuring entity concerned, if available, the G-EPS, and posted at any conspicuous place reserved
for this purpose in the premises of the procuring entity concerned, as certified by the head of the BAC Secretariat of
the procuring entity concerned, during the same period as above. (Emphasis supplied)
The NPO-BAC failed to comply with

the procedural requirements for
limited source bidding and
negotiated procurement
Contrary, to De Guzman's position, the language of the law and the IRR-A is clear such requirements must be
followed in any and all types of procurement. Not all procedures followed in competitive biddings are
dispensed with when an agency or office resorts to any of the alternative modes of procurement.
Regardless of whether the June biddings were just a re-bid of the March and April biddings, it was
incumbent upon the NPO-BAC to observe the aforestated procedural requirements for the latter biddings.
De Guzman could have easily refuted the allegations levelled against her by presenting a certification of the head of
the BAC Secretariat attesting to the fact of posting of the IAEB, or a copy of the written invitations sent to the
observers as required in Section 13.1, Rule V of the IRR-A. Yet, she opted to rebut the allegations without any
concrete proof. Her bare claim that written invitations were in fact sent by the NPO-BAC to the COA and two other
observers remains unsubstantiated. Moreover, her allegation that representatives from the COA and National
26
Printing Office Workers Association were regularly invited to attend to witness the bidding, without more, is
insufficient proof of compliance. Save from her general averments and denials, she failed to sufficiently prove that
27
all the requirements of the law for the conduct of limited source bidding and negotiated procurement were met.
The Ombudsman and the CA similarly found that none of the conditions for negotiated procurement obtained that
could have justified the resort thereto.
While De Guzman counters that the Rules allows the BAC to resort to Negotiated Procurement based on a take-
over of a previously awarded contract, her own assertion that the transaction was not purely a Negotiated
Procurement but an award to a bidder who offered the same lowest calculated bid during the same bidding held on
March 30, 2006 all the more highlights the circumvention of RA 9184 by the NPO-BAC. There is nothing in the
28
law that allows the procuring entity to directly award a contract to a participating bidder, even one who
offered the best bid, whenever there is a failure of bidding. On the contrary, the IRR-A specifically directs
that, for purposes of a negotiated procurement based on a take-over of contract, the procuring entity must
negotiate first with the second and third lowest calculated bidders, and in the event that the negotiations
fail, the procuring entity is still precluded from directly awarding the contract. It must still produce a list of
three eligible contractors to negotiate with:
Section 54. Terms and Conditions for the use of Alternative Methods
xxx
54.2. In addition to the specific terms, conditions, limitations and restrictions on the application of each of the
alternative methods specified in Sections 48 to 53 of this IRR-A, the following shall also apply: x x x
(e) For item (c) of Section 53 of the Act and this IRR-A, the contract may be negotiated starting with the second
lowest calculated bidder for the project under consideration at the bidder's original bid price. If negotiation fails, then
negotiation shall be done with the third lowest calculated bidder at his original price. If the negotiation fails again, a
short list of at least three (3) eligible contractors shall be invited to submit their bids, and negotiation shall be made
starting with the lowest bidder. Authority to negotiate contracts for projects under these exceptional cases shall. be
subject to prior approval by the heads of the procuring entities concerned, within their respective limits of approving
authority.
The records are bereft of any evidence showing compliance with the foregoing requirements. 1âwphi1
Bestforms, Inc.'s allegation that there was non-compliance with the bidding procedures partakes of a negative
allegation. Negative allegations need not be proved even if essential to one's cause of action or defense if they
constitute a denial of the existence of a document the custody of which belongs to the other party. 29
Under Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of [Court, a fact may be deemed established in cases filed before
30
administrative or quasi-judicial bodies if it is supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is defined as

such amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. It is
more than a mere scintilla of evidence. The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when there is reasonable
31
ground to believe that a person is responsible for the misconduct complained of, even if such evidence might not be
overwhelming or even preponderant. Its absence is not shown by stressing that there is contrary evidence, direct or
32
circumstantial, on record.33
Based from the above disquisition, the Court finds no reason to overturn the findings of the Ombudsman, as
affirmed by the CA, that De Guzman, along with the other members of the NPO-BAC, committed grave misconduct
when they conducted the bid process of and awarded the subject contracts without compliance with the other
requirements for limited source bidding and negotiated procurement. The lack of official documents proving
compliance with the bidding requirements constitutes the substantial evidence that sufficiently establishes De
Guzman's liability for grave misconduct.
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or
gross negligence by a public officer. The misconduct is grave if it involves additional elements such as corruption or
willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules, which must be proven by substantial evidence;
otherwise, the misconduct is only simple. Corruption, as an element of grave misconduct, consists in the act of an
official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some benefit for
himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others. In grave misconduct, the elements of
34
corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of an established rule must be evident.
35
The foregoing discourse greatly tilts the balance towards the administrative liability of the members of the NPO-BAC
for grave misconduct. De Guzman and the other members of the NPO-BAC grossly disregarded the law and were
manifestly remiss in their duties in strictly observing the directives of RA 9184, which resulted in undue benefits to
RFI. Such gross disregard of the law is so blatant and palpable that the same amounts to a willful intent to subvert
the clear policy of the law for transparency and accountability in government contracts. This merits her dismissal
from service under Section 46, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.
36
It bears reiteration that public biddings are held for the best protection of the public and to give the public the best
possible advantages by means of open competition among the bidders, and to change them without complying with
the bidding requirement would be against public policy. What are prohibited are modifications or amendments which
give the winning bidder an edge or advantage over the other bidders who took part in the bidding, or which make
the signed contract unfavorable to the government. 37
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is DENIED. The April 20, 2016 Decision and January 11, 2017 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 129712 are hereby AFFIRMED.
12.) G.R. No. 175608 June 8, 2007
DEPARTMENT of BUDGET and MANAGEMENT PROCUREMENT SERVICE (DBM-PS) and the Inter-Agency
Bids and Awards Committee (IABAC), petitioners,
vs.
KOLONWEL TRADING, respondent.
x --------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 175616 June 8, 2007
VIBAL PUBLISHING HOUSE, INC., LG & M CORPORATION and SD PUBLICATIONS, INC., petitioners,

vs.
x --------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 175659 June 8, 2007
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, petitioner,
vs.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Before the Court are these consolidated three (3) petitions for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, with a
prayer for a temporary restraining order, to nullify and set aside the Order1 dated December 4, 2006 of the Manila
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 18, in SP Civil Case No. 06-116010, a special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition thereat commenced by herein respondent Kolonwel Trading (Kolonwel for short) against the Department
of Budget and Management Procurement Service (DBM-PS), et al.
At the core of the controversy are the bidding and the eventual contract awards for the supply and delivery of some
17.5 million copies of Makabayan (social studies) textbooks and teachers manuals, a project of the Department of
Education (DepEd).
The factual antecedents:
In the middle of 2005, the DepEd requested the services of the DBM-PS to undertake the aforementioned
procurement project which is to be jointly funded by the World Bank (WB), through the Second Social Expenditure
Management Program (SEMP2) of the Philippines (RP) – International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(IBRD) Loan Agreement No. 7118-PH2 (Loan No. 7118-PH, hereinafter) dated September 12, 2002; and the Asian
Development Bank (ADB), through SEDIP Loan No. 1654-PHI. Earlier, the Executive Director of the Government
Procurement Policy Board (GPPB), in reply to a DepEd query, stated that "procurement[s] for MAKABAYAN …
textbooks where funds therefore (sic) are sourced from World Bank Loan shall be governed by the applicable
procurement guidelines of the foreign lending institution. The 2005 Call for Submission of Textbooks and Teacher’s
Manuals shall be viewed vis-à-vis relevant World Bank guidelines." 3
On October 27, 2005, the DBM-PS Inter-Agency Bids and Awards Committee (IABAC) called for a bidding for the
supply of the Makabayan textbooks and manuals, divided into three (3) lots, to wit: Lot 1 for Sibika Grades 1-3; Lot 2
for HeKaSi Grades 4-6 and Lot 3 for Araling Panlipunan Years I-IV. Of the entities, foreign and local, which
responded and procured the Bidding Documents, 4 only eleven (11) bidders submitted, either as principal or in joint
venture arrangement, proposals for the different lots. Among them were Watana Phanit Printing & Publishing Co.,
Ltd., of Thailand (Watana, for short), petitioner Vibal Publishing House, Inc., (Vibal, hereinafter), Daewoo
International Corporation of South Korea (Daewoo, for brevity) and respondent Kolonwel. Kolonwel’s tender
appeared to cover all three (3) lots.5
Following the bid and the book content/body evaluation process, the IABAC, via Resolution (Res.) No. 001-
20066 dated March 9, 2006, resolved "to recommend to the [WB] and the [ADB] failure of bids for all lots in view of
the abovementioned disqualifications, non-compliance and reservations of [DepEd]." Issues of "Conflict of interest"
with respect to Watana and Vibal, "failure in cover stock testing" for Kolonwel and DepEd’s "reservation" were
among the disqualifying reasons stated in the resolution.
On March 15, 2006, the IABAC submitted to WB for its review and information Res. No. 001-2006. Appended to the
covering letter was a document entitled "Bid Evaluation Report and Recommendation for Award of Contract."7
The following events, as recited in the assailed Manila RTC order and as borne out by the records, then transpired:
1. In a letter8 dated April 24, 2006 to the DepEd and the DBM-PS IABAC Chairman, the WB, through its
Regional Senior Economist, Ms. Rekha Menon, disagreed, for stated reasons, with the IABAC’s finding of
conflict of interest on the part of Vibal and Watana and the rejection of their bids. Ms. Menon, however,
upheld the disqualification of all the other bidders. She thus asked the IABAC to review its evaluation and to
provide the WB with the revised Bid Evaluation Report (BER), taking into account the December 31, 2006
RP-IBRD Loan closing date.
2. On May 11, 2006, the IABAC informed Kolonwel of its or its bid’s failure to post qualify and of the grounds
for the failure.9
In its reply-letter of May 18, 2006, 10 Kolonwel raised several issues and requested that its disqualification be
reconsidered and set aside. In reaction, IABAC apprised WB of Kolonwel’s concerns stated in its letter-reply.
3) Subsequently, the IABAC, agreeing with WB’s position articulated in Ms. Menon, issued Res. No. 001-
2006-A effectively recommending to WB the contract award to Vibal of Sibika 1 & 3 and HekaSi 5; to
Watana of Sibika 2 and HeKaSi 4 & 5 and to Daewoo of Sibika 3. Upon review, WB offered "no objection" to
the recommended award.11
4) The issuance of notices of award and the execution on September 12, 2006 of the corresponding
Purchaser-Supplier contracts followed.12
5. On June 23, 2006, the DBM-PS IABAC chairman informed Kolonwel of the denial of its request for
reconsideration and of the WB’s concurrence with the denial. 13 The IABAC denied, on September 8, 2006, a
second request for reconsideration of Kolonwel 14 after WB found the reasons therefor, as detailed in PS
IABAC Res. No. 001-2006-B15 dated July 18, 2006, unmeritorious, particularly on the aspect of cover stock
testing.
Such was the state of things when on, October 12, 2006, Kolonwel filed with the RTC of Manila a special civil action
for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary
injunction. Docketed as SP Civil Case No. 06-116010, and raffled to Branch 18 of the court, 16 the petition sought to
nullify IABAC Res. Nos. 001-2006 and 001-2006-A and to set aside the contract awards in favor of Vibal and
Watana. In support of its TRO application, Kolonwel alleged, among other things, that the supply-awardees were
rushing with the implementation of the void supply contracts to beat the loan closing-date deadline.
A week after, the Manila RTC scheduled - and eventually conducted - a summary hearing on the TRO application.
In an order17 of October 31, 2006, as amended in another order 18 dated November 20, 2006, the court granted a 20-
day TRO enjoining the IABAC, et al, starting November 6, 2006, from proceeding with the subject September 12,
2006 purchase- supply contracts. In the original order, the court set the preliminary conference and hearing for the
applied preliminary injunction on November 7, and 8, 2006, respectively.
In the meantime, Vibal filed an urgent motion to dismiss19 Kolonwel’s petition on several grounds, among
them want of jurisdiction and lack of cause of action, inter alia alleging that the latter had pursued judicial
relief without first complying with the protest procedure prescribed by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9184,
otherwise known as the "Government Procurement Reform Act." The DepEd later followed with its own motion
to dismiss, partly based on the same protest provision. As records show, the trial court did not conduct a hearing on
either dismissal motions, albeit it heard the parties on their opposing claims respecting the propriety of issuing a writ
of preliminary injunction.
On December 4, 2006, the Manila RTC issued its assailed Order 20 finding for Kolonwel, as petitioner a quo,
disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the court grants the petition for certiorari and prohibition. The IABAC Resolution No. 001-2006-A
dated May 30, 2006 is annulled and set aside. IABAC Resolution No. 001-2006 is declared validly and regularly
issued in the absence of a showing of grave abuse of discretion or excess of jurisdiction. All subsequent actions of
the respondents resulting from the issuance of IABAC Resolution No. 001-2006-A are consequently nullified and set
aside. This court grants a final injunction pursuant to Sec. 9 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court as amended,
restraining respondents Department of Education and Culture (sic), [DBM-PS], [IABAC], Vibal Publishing House,
Inc., LG & M Corporation and SD Publications from the commission or continuance of acts, contracts or transactions
proceeding from the issuance of IABAC Resolution No. 001-2006-A.
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis and words in brackets supplied)
Hence, these three (3) petitions which the Court, per its Resolution 21 of January 16, 2007, ordered consolidated.
Earlier, the Court issued, in G. R. No. 175616, a TRO22 enjoining the presiding judge23 of the RTC of Manila, Branch
18, from proceeding with SP Civil Case No. 06-116010 or implementing its assailed order.
Petitioners urge the annulment of the assailed RTC Order dated December 4, 2006, on jurisdictional ground,
among others. It is their parallel posture that the Manila RTC erred in assuming jurisdiction over the case despite
respondent Kolonwel’s failure to observe the protest mechanism provided under Sec. 55 in relation to Secs. 57 and
58 of R.A. No. 9184, respectively reading as follows:
Sec. 55. Protest on Decision of the BAC.- Decisions of the BAC [Bids and Awards Committee] in all stages of
procurement may be protested to the head of the procuring entity…. Decisions of the BAC may be protested by
filing a verified position paper and paying a non-refundable protest fee. The amount of the protest fee and the
periods during which the protest may be filed and resolved shall be specific in the IRR.
Sec. 57. Non-interruption of the Bidding Process. In no case shall any process taken from any decision treated in
this Article stay or delay the bidding process. Protests must first be resolved before any award is made.
Sec. 58. Report to Regular Courts; Certiorari.- Court action may be resorted to only after the
protests contemplated in this Article shall have been completed. Cases that are filed in violation of the process
specified in this article shall be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The [RTC] shall have jurisdiction over final
decisions of the head of the procuring entity. (Emphasis and words in bracket added.)
As a counterpoint, the respondent draws attention to its having twice asked, and having been twice spurned by, the
IABAC to reconsider its disqualification, obviously agreeing with the Manila RTC that the judicial window was
already opened under the exhaustion of available administrative remedies principle. In the same breath, however,
the respondent would argue, again following the RTC’s line, that it was prevented from filing a protest inasmuch as
the government had not issued the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9184 to render the
protest mechanism of the law operative for foreign-funded projects.
The Court is unable to lend concurrence to the trial court’s and respondent’s positions on the interplay of
the protest and jurisdictional issues. As may be noted, the aforequoted Section 55 of R.A. No. 9184 sets
three (3) requirements that must be met by the party desiring to protest the decision of the Bids and Awards
Committee (BAC). These are: 1) the protest must be in writing, in the form of a verified position paper; 2) the
protest must be submitted to the head of the procuring entity; and 3) the payment of a non-refundable
protest fee. The jurisdictional caveat that authorizes courts to assume or, inversely, precludes courts from
assuming, jurisdiction over suits assailing the BAC’s decisions is in turn found in the succeeding Section 58 which
provides that the courts would have jurisdiction over such suits only if the protest procedure has already been
completed.
Respondent’s letters of May 18, 200624 and June 28, 200625 in which it requested reconsideration of its
disqualification cannot plausibly be given the status of a protest in the context of the aforequoted
provisions of R.A. No. 9184. For one, neither of the letter-request was addressed to the head of the
procuring entity, in this case the DepEd Secretary or the head of the DBM Procurement Service, as required
by law. For another, the same letters were unverified. And not to be overlooked of course is the fact that the
third protest-completing requirement, i.e., payment of protest fee, was not complied with.
Given the above perspective, it cannot really be said that the respondent availed itself of the protest procedure
prescribed under Section 55 of R.A. No. 9184 before going to the RTC of Manila via a petition for certiorari. Stated a
bit differently, respondent sought judicial intervention even before duly completing the protest process. Hence, its
filing of SP Civil Case No. 06-116010 was precipitate. Or, as the law itself would put it, cases that are filed in
violation of the protest process "shall be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction."
Considering that the respondent’s petition in RTC Manila was actually filed in violation of the protest process set
forth in Section 55 of R.A. No. 9184, that court could not have lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter
of this case. In fact, Section 58, supra, of R.A. No. 9184 emphatically states that cases filed in violation of the
protest process therein provided "shall be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction."
It is to be stressed that the protest mechanism adverted to is a built-in administrative remedy embodied in the law
itself. It was not prescribed by an administrative agency tasked with implementing a statute through the medium of
interpretative circulars or bulletins. Ignoring thus this administrative remedy would be to defy the law itself.
It will not avail the respondent any to argue that the absence of an IRR to make the protest mechanism under R.A.
No. 9184 become operative for foreign-funded projects was what prevented it from complying with the protest
procedure. As the last sentence of the afore-quoted Section 55 of R.A. No. 9184 is couched, the specific office of an
IRR for foreign-funded project, vis-à-vis the matter of protest, is limited to fixing "the amount of the protest fee and
the periods during which the protest may be filed and resolved." Surely, the absence of provisions on protest fee
and reglementary period does not signify the deferment of the implementation of the protest mechanism as a
condition sine qua non to resort to judicial relief. As applied to the present case, the respondent had to file a protest
and pursue it until its completion before going to court. There was hardly any need to wait for the specific filing
period to be prescribed by the IRR because the protest, as a matter of necessity, has to be lodged before court
action.
Neither is it necessary that the amount of protest fee be prescribed first. Respondent could very well have
proceeded with its protest without paying the required protest fee, remitting the proper amount once the appropriate
IRR fixed the protest fee.
There may perhaps be room for relaxing the prescription on protest if a bona fide attempt to comply with legal
requirements had been made. But the fact alone that the respondent did not even submit a verified position paper
by way of protest argues against such plausibility. Significantly, none of the reconsideration-seeking letters of the
respondent advert to the protest procedure under Section 55 of R.A. No. 9184, even by way of noting that it was at
a loss as to the inoperativeness of such provision in the light of the absence of an IRR.
In its petition before the Manila RTC, the respondent veritably admitted to not complying with the protest
requirement, albeit with the lame excuse that it was effectively barred from complying with the required
administrative remedies of protest. Neither did the respondent then argue that it was not able to comply due to the
absence of an IRR for foreign- funded projects.
At any rate, there is, in fact a set of implementing rules and regulations, denominated as "IRR-A," issued on July 11,
2003 by the GPPB and the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee, Section 55.1 26 of which provides that prior to
a resort to protest, the aggrieved party must first file a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the BAC. It is
only after the BAC itself denies reconsideration that the protest, accompanied by a fixed protest fee, shall be filed
within the period defined in the IRR.
It may be that IRR-A specifically defines its coverage to "all fully domestically-funded procurement activities," it
being also provided that "foreign-funded procurement activities shall be the subject of a subsequent
issuance." 27 However, a similarly drawn argument involving IRR-A was set aside in Abaya v. Ebdane, 28 a case
involving Loan Agreement No. PH-P204 entered into by and between the RP and the Japan Bank for International
Cooperation (JBIC) for the implementation DPWH Contract Package No. I (CP I). Wrote the Court in Abaya:
Admittedly, IRR-A covers only fully domestically-funded procurement activities from procurement planning up to
contract implementation and that it is expressly stated that IRR-B for foreign-funded procurement activities shall be
subject of a subsequent issuance. Nonetheless, there is no reason why the policy behind Section 77 of IRR-A
cannot be applied to foreign-funded procurement projects like the CP I project. Stated differently, the policy on the
prospective or non-retroactive application of RA 9184 with respect to domestically-funded procurement projects
cannot be any different with respect to foreign-funded procurement projects …. It would be incongruous, even
absurd, to provide for the prospective application of RA 9184 with respect to domestically-funded procurement
projects and, on the other hand, as urged by the petitioners, apply RA 9184 retroactively with respect to foreign-
funded procurement projects. To be sure, the lawmakers could not have intended such an absurdity.
As in Abaya, there really should be no reason why the policy behind Section 55.l of IRR-A on the procedure for
protest cannot be applied, even analogously, to foreign-funded procurement projects, such as those in this case.
Indeed, there is no discernable justification why a different procedure should obtain with respect to foreign-funded
procurement undertakings as opposed to a locally funded project, and certainly there is no concrete foundation in
R.A. 9184 to indicate that Congress intended such a variance in the protest procedure.
The Manila RTC, in granting the petition for certiorari and prohibition, stated the observation that there was
"substantial compliance of the requirement of protest." 29 Yet, it is not even clear that respondent Kolonwel, in its
dealings with the IABAC, particularly in seeking reconsideration of its decision, was even aware of the protest
requirements. What is beyond dispute, however, is that courts are precluded by express legislative command from
entertaining protests from decisions of the BAC. What Congress contextually intended under the premises was that
not only would there be a distinct administrative grievance mechanism to be observed in assailing decisions of the
BAC, but that courts would be without jurisdiction over actions impugning decisions of the BACs, unless, in the
meantime, the protest procedure mandated under Section 55 of R.A. No. 9184 is brought to its logical completion.
It is Congress by law, not the courts by discretion, which defines the court’s jurisdiction not otherwise conferred by
the Constitution. Through the same medium, Congress also draws the parameters in the exercise of the functions of
administrative agencies. Section 55 of R.A. No. 9184 could not be any clearer when it mandates the manner of
protesting the decision of bids and awards committees. Similarly, there can be no quibbling that, under Section 58 of
the same law, courts do not have jurisdiction over decisions of the BACs unless the appropriate protest has been
made and completed. The absence of the IRR does not detract from the reality that R.A. No. 9184 requires a protest
to be filed under the form therein prescribed.
Given the above perspective, the Manila RTC had no jurisdiction over respondent Kolonwel’s petition for certiorari
and prohibition. Accordingly, it ought to have granted herein petitioners’ motion to dismiss, but it did not. Worse, the
court even added another layer to its grievous error when it granted the respondent’s basic petition for certiorari and
prohibition itself.
Compounding the Manila RTC’s error is its having proceeded with SP Civil Case No. 06-116010 even without
acquiring jurisdiction over Watana. As may be recalled, the respondent, in its petition before the RTC, impleaded
Watana as one of the defendants, the latter having been awarded by the IABAC Sibika 2 and HeKaSi 4 &5. The
records, however, show that Watana was not served with summons. The Sheriff’s Return dated October 18, 2006,
noted that summons was not served on Watana and another defendant at "No. 1281 G. Araneta Avenue cor. Ma.
Clara Street, Quezon City, on the ground that said companies were not holding office thereat according to Mr.
Marvin V. Catacutan."
There can be no dispute that Watana is an indispensable party to the respondent’s petition in SP Civil Case No. 06-
116010, Kolonwel having therein assailed and sought to nullify the contract-award made in its and Vibal’s favor.
Indispensable parties are those with such interest in the controversy that a final decree would necessarily affect their
rights so that courts cannot proceed without their presence. 30 All of them must be included in a suit for an action to
prosper or for a final determination to be had.31 Watana, to repeat, was never served with summons; neither did it
participate in the proceedings below. Plainly, then, the Manila RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over one of the
indispensable parties, the joinder of whom is compulsory. 32
With the foregoing disquisitions, the Court finds it unnecessary to even dwell on the other points raised in this
consolidated cases. In the light, however, of the Manila RTC’s holding that the WB Guidelines on Procurement
under IBRD Loans do not in any way provided superiority over local laws on the matter, 33 the Court wishes to state
the following observation:
As may be recalled, all interested bidders were put on notice that the DepEd’s procurement project was to be
funded from the proceeds of the RP-IBRD Loan No. 7118-PH,34 Section 1, Schedule 4 of which stipulates that
"Goods … shall be procured in accordance with the provisions of Section 135 of the ‘Guidelines for Procurement
under IBRD Loans.’" Accordingly, the IABAC conducted the bidding for the supply of textbooks and manuals based
on the WB Guidelines, particularly the provisions on International Competitive Bidding (ICB). Section 4 of R.A. No.
9184 expressly recognized this particular process, thus:
Sec. 4. Scope and application. - This Act shall apply to the Procurement of … Goods and Consulting Services,
regardless of source of funds, whether local or foreign by all branches and instrumentalities of government …. Any
treaty or international or executive agreement affecting the subject matter of this Act to which the Philippine
government is a signatory shall be observed. (Emphasis added.)
The question as to whether or not foreign loan agreements with international financial institutions, such as Loan No.
7118-PH, partake of an executive or international agreement within the purview of the Section 4 of R.A. No. 9184,
has been answered by the Court in the affirmative in Abaya, supra. Significantly, Abaya declared that the RP-JBIC
loan agreement was to be of governing application over the CP I project and that the JBIC Procurement Guidelines,
as stipulated in the loan agreement, shall primarily govern the procurement of goods necessary to implement the
main project.
Under the fundamental international law principle of pacta sunt servanda, 36 which is in fact embodied in the afore-
quoted Section 4 of R.A. No. 9184, the RP, as borrower, bound itself to perform in good faith its duties and
obligation under Loan No. 7118- PH. Applying this postulate in the concrete to this case, the IABAC was legally
obliged to comply with, or accord primacy to, the WB Guidelines on the conduct and implementation of the
bidding/procurement process in question.
WHEREFORE, the instant consolidated petitions are GRANTED and the assailed Order dated December 4, 2006 of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila in its SP Case No. 06-116010 is NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.
13.) G.R. Nos. 218709-10, November 14, 2018
LIBERTY B. TIONGCO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by
Liberty B. Tiongco (Tiongco) assailing the Decision2 dated 18 February 2015 and the
Resolution3 dated 18 June 2015 of the Sandiganbayan in Case Nos. SB-08-CRM-0414 and SB-08-
CRM-0415. The Sandiganbayan found Tiongco guilty of (1) Usurpation of Official Functions, or
violation of Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act
No. 3019 (R.A. 3019), otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The Facts
Tiongco is a former Vice President of the Philippine Crop Insurance Corporation (PCIC), a
government-owned and controlled corporation. Following the retirement of Benito F. Estacio, Jr.
(Estacio) as PCIC president, Lamberto R. Barbin (Barbin) assumed the post on 21 April 2006.4
Tiongco's Version
According to Tiongco, on the day Barbin assumed office, Barbin called all the officers and employees
of PCIC for a meeting. After that meeting, Barbin asked Tiongco, Nilo Mordeno (Mordeno), and Jaime
Padilla (Padilla) to stay. Barbin then asked the three to help him manage the office since he was still
new to its operations. Tiongco and Mordeno asked for authorization to help him with all the aspects
of PCIC's operations. Said authorization came on 24 April 2006 in the form of Special Order No. 06-
0085 where Tiongco was designated as Acting Senior Vice President.
On 25 April 2006, Tiongco received Estacio's Request for Clearance for her signature. Said request
already contained the signatures of the pertinent department heads, including the head of the Office
of the General Counsel, Atty. Francisco Cantre.6 Tiongco averred that she signed the clearance on the
basis of the department heads' signatures, thinking that they were the most knowledgeable of his
accountabilities and liabilities. She then forwarded the request to the Administrative Department.7
On 28 April 2006, PCIC's Board of Directors approved8 the application for Estacio's retirement in
Board Resolution No. 2006-012, which states:
RESOLVED to approve, as it hereby approves the application for retirement of Mr. BENITO F.
ESTACIO, JR. former PCIC President, effective the close of office hours of April 20, 2006 under RA
1616, subject to the submission of clearance from money and property accountabilities from the
PCIC, clearance from the GSIS, submission of statement of assets and liabilities in accordance with
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and clearance from the Office of the Ombudsman.9
On 3 May 2006, Tiongco signed the disbursement voucher and check representing Estacio's
retirement gratuity. According to her, she based her authority to sign on PCIC's Codified Approving
and Signing Authorities (CASA)10 which provides, among others, that in the absence of the president
or in urgent matters, any two Class "A" signatories may sign for the agency.11 Since she falls under a
Class "A" signatory, Tiongco, together with Acting Assistant Vice President Mordeno, signed the
disbursement voucher and check because, according to her, Barbin was "always absent." She claimed
that, as far as she knew, Barbin would only come to work early in the morning and then leave
immediately after because he was still working on his clearance from Malacañang.12
She further claimed that she informed Barbin of her actions and the latter did not voice any
objections at that time. It was only when she failed to give her assent to Barbin's "questionable acts"
that the latter turned sour on her.13
Complaints Before the Office of the Ombudsman
In a Memorandum14 dated 4 July 2006, PCIC Corporate Secretary Mario A. Encinareal (Encinareal)

informed the Board of Directors of the violations committed by Tiongco, Mordeno, Combatir, and
Padilla, specifically, "the payment of the retirement gratuity and terminal leave of [Estacio] xxx
without the knowledge and without the authority of the President, without Ombudsman Clearance
and without the required Certification that the payee/retiree has no pending criminal or
administrative case."15 The concerned officers were given 90 days to explain.
One month after, or on 8 August 2006, Encinareal filed a Complaint16 before the Office of the
Ombudsman accusing Tiongco and Mordeno of Usurpation of Official Functions, and
violation of Section 3(e) and (f) of R.A. 3019.17
On 3 April 2007, former PCIC employee Doroteo Celis III (Celis), who was terminated from the
service by Tiongco for "poor performance and fraudulent practices," also filed a complaint before the
Office of the Ombudsman against Tiongco and Mordeno for the same charges and based on the same
circumstances.18
Resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman
In its Resolution dated 15 October 2007, the Office of the Ombudsman found probable cause against
Tiongco, Mordeno, Combatir, and Padilla and recommended the filing of an Information for
Usurpation of Authority or Official Function against Tiongco and Mordeno; Falsification of Public
Documents against Combatir and Padilla; and violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 against the four
accused.19
Trial
Shortly after the filing of the Information, Tiongco filed a Motion for Reinvestigation in Case No. SB-
08-CRM-0415, praying for an opportunity to move for the reconsideration of the resolution of the
Office of the Ombudsman. The motion was denied in a Resolution dated 2 March 2009.20 Tiongco
then filed an Urgent Motion to Quash in Case No. SB-08-CRM-0414, arguing that said case violated
her right against double jeopardy because of the pendency of a purportedly identical case for
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019. Meanwhile, she also filed a Motion to Dismiss in Case No. SB-
08-CRM-0415 alleging that there is a separate pending case involving the same transaction.
The Sandiganbayan's Fifth Division denied Tiongco's Urgent Motion to Quash, while the First Division
denied her Motion to Dismiss.21 Meanwhile, Tiongco, Combatir, and Padilla voluntarily appeared
before the Sandiganbayan. Mordeno remained at large. On 19 May 2014, Padilla died, and the cases
against him were dismissed.22
On 18 January 2010, Tiongco filed a Motion to Consolidate the two cases against her, conceding that
the charges arose from the same transaction. The motion was granted and joint trial ensued before
the Sandiganbayan's Fifth Division.23
During pre-trial, the parties stipulated, among others, on the following:
1.) The identity of the accused as the same persons charged in the Information;
2.) Accused Liberty [B]. Tiongco occupied the position of Acting Senior Vice President for Regional
Management Group of the [PCIC] with the corresponding Salary Grade 27 at the time of the
commission of the crime stated in the Information;
xxxx
5.) On April 20, 2006, Benito T. Estacio retired from his position as PCIC President and he was
replaced by Lamberto R. Barbin, who assumed office on April 21, 2006.
6.) Disbursement Voucher No. 05-06-05-461 with the following particulars: the amount of One
Million Five Hundred Twenty Two Thousand and Eight Hundred Forty Nine Pesos and 48/100
(Php1,522,849.48) representing the payment of Retirement Benefits of Benito Estacio signed and
approved by Liberty Tiongco and Noel Mordeno.
(Not admitted by accused Combatir & Padilla) (Admitted by accused Tiongco with qualification that
the approval of payment of benefits was made by the Board of Directors)
7.) Landbank Edsa Greenhills Branch Check No. 0000318783 dated May 3, 2006 pay to the order of
Benito F. Estacio Jr. in the amount of Php 1,522,849.48 signed by Liberty Tiongco and Noel
Mordeno.24
During the trial, the prosecution presented Celis. Claiming to be one of PCIC's "pioneer employees"
familiar with its internal procedures, he said he took it upon himself to secure documents from the
Commission on Audit where he allegedly noticed the anomalies in Estacio's application for
retirement.25 Based on these documents, Celis pointed out that Tiongco signed Estacio's Request for
Clearance as approving authority even though she was not the head of the agency.26 Celis further
opined that Tiongco violated PCIC's Manual on Systems and Procedures in issuing the clearance
because the Certification from the Office of the Ombudsman submitted by Estacio is not the
clearance required under said Manual.27
The Sandiganbayan also heard testimony from Barbin. He claimed that he was always at the office
even when he was newly appointed. He also maintained that he never saw the documents pertaining
to Estacio's retirement and only later learned that the latter's retirement gratuity had already been
paid. He later received a Memorandum signed by Tiongco, Mordeno, Padilla, and Combatir which,
among others, informed him of the same fact. The Corporate Secretary later informed him of the
irregularity in this, which prompted him to form a committee to investigate. The result of said
investigation was referred to the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel for proper action.28
For the defense, Tiongco testified on her own behalf. She claimed that when she received Estacio's
Request for Clearance, she noticed that the concerned department heads had already signed,
including Office of the General Counsel head Atty. Cantre. While she may have seen the notation "no
pending cases except OMB-0-00-0898, 0-00-1697,"29 she still signed the request knowing that the
department heads were more knowledgeable of Estacio's pending accountability and liabilities. She
also assumed that since Atty. Cantre had signed on the request, his department had cleared Estacio
for retirement.30 She made no further inquiries and did not impose any safeguards to ensure
restitution in case Estacio would be found guilty in his pending cases. She maintained that she had
authority to sign based on the PCIC CASA. As Acting Senior Vice President, she is classified as a Class
"A" signatory. Since she knew Barbin was not around at that time because he was busy fixing his
clearance and appointment documents, she did not ask his office if he was coming in.31 She insisted
that signing was within the authority delegated to her by Barbin in Special Order No. 06-008.32 She
further pointed out that Barbin was later informed of the retirement payment to Estacio and he did
not object to the same.33
Meanwhile, Estacio also testified on the propriety of Tiongco's action. According to him, former PCIC
officials have had their retirement pay approved despite having pending cases. He also pointed out
that COA's post-audit investigation showed that it found payment of his retirement benefits in
order.34 He also supported Tiongco's claim of authority to sign his Request for Clearance, arguing that
the same was already signed by the proper heads of pertinent departments.35
The Decision of the Sandiganbayan
In its 18 February 2015 Decision, the Sandiganbayan found Tiongco guilty of Usurpation of Official
Functions and violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019:
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0414, this Court finds accused LIBERTY TIONGCO y
BACCAY GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt x x x of Usurpation of Official Functions defined and
penalized under Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code. Considering the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
and where no aggravating nor mitigating circumstance was proven, accused is imposed the
indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) MONTHS of arresto mayor in its maximum period as minimum to
TWO (2) YEARS, ELEVEN (11) MONTHS and TEN (10) DAYS of prision correccional in its medium
p[e]riod as maximum.
In Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0415, this Court finds accused LIBERTY TIONGCO y
BACCAY GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of a violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019,
otherwise known as The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and is sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of IMPRISONMENT of SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) MONTH as minimum to TEN
(10) YEARS as maximum, with perpetual disqualification to hold public office.
x x x x36
The Sandiganbayan held that all the elements of the crime of Usurpation of Official Functions were
present in this case.37First, Tiongco is concededly a public officer at the time of the commission of the
crime.
Second, the Sandiganbayan held that the specific duties for Tiongco's position, as laid down in BC-
CSC Form No. 1 (Revised 23 June 1976), do not include the authority to determine the release of
retirement benefits to a prospective retiree. Likewise, based on her own testimony, Tiongco believed
signing the Request for Clearance was merely ministerial after all the department heads had already
affixed their signature. However, the Sandiganbayan ruled that, under Ombudsman Memorandum
Circular No. 10 (OMB MC No. 10),38 said authority is not ministerial but discretionary.39 The
Sandiganbayan also ruled that discretion to release retirement benefits was not included in the
authority delegated by Barbin.40
Third, the Sandiganbayan held that it is the payment and release of Estacio's retirement gratuity that
is the essence of the crime since the authority for this exclusively pertains to the head of the agency.
In this case, Barbin was even "left in the dark" on the release of Estacio's retirement benefits.41
Fourth, the Sandiganbayan brushed aside Tiongco's argument that Section 20.4 of the PCIC CASA
granted her the power to allow the disbursement of Estacio's retirement gratuity. The Sandiganbayan
held that this provision speaks only of the absence of the president. Barbin may have been out of
the office most of the time but he was expected to come in albeit at odd hours. It was still physically
possible for Tiongco to consult with Barbin and give him the discretion on the release of Estacio's
retirement pay, the Sandiganbayan ruled.42
The Sandiganbayan further held that Tiongco cannot use good faith as a defense since she "certainly
knew at the outset that it was possible that the payment of Estacio's retirement gratuity and terminal
leave benefits may be delayed if the 'head' of the agency, being then [Barbin], would otherwise
determine that he would not release such payment."43 It also emphasized that payment of retirement
benefits did not qualify as an "urgent/quick action" that would justify overriding the need for the
PCIC president's signature given the tedious procedure the same has to go through before the same
can be approved.44
As to the charge for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, the Sandiganbayan emphasized Tiongco's
act of approving the payment and release of Estacio's retirement gratuity and terminal leave
benefits, ruling that "[considering that such act did not qualify as one of her function[s] and duties,
but is relegated only to the head of the agency, her usurpation of official functions is visibly a
showing of manifest partiality to [Estacio]."45 Likewise, "Tiongco's act caused undue injury to the
Government since no necessary safeguards for restitution were made."46
Tiongco filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the Sandiganbayan denied in its 18 June 2015
Resolution.
On 22 June 2015, or four days after the resolution denying her motion for reconsideration was
promulgated, Tiongco, filed a Manifestation and Motion47 praying for a hearing for the Sandiganbayan
to consider a letter from the Office of the Ombudsman informing Tiongco's counsel that the cases
against Estacio, namely OMB-0-00-1697 and OMB-ADM-0-00-0898, subject of the Ombudsman
certification attached to his application for retirement, were dismissed on 29 June 2007 and 30 July
2007, respectively.
The Office of the Solicitor General opposed the Motion, arguing that Tiongco is no longer allowed to
present additional evidence at that stage of the proceedings. It also pointed out that during the
hearing on the Manifestation and Motion, Tiongco's counsel manifested in open court that she was
withdrawing the Manifestation and Motion.48
In its 4 August 2015 Resolution,49 the Sandiganbayan denied Tiongco's 22 June 2015 Motion. It found
that the Ombudsman Certification was not being presented as "newly discovered evidence where she
could seek a new trial or the re-opening of the case pursuant to Section 2, Rule 121, [nor would it]
pass as one. By the exercise of due diligence alone, the dismissal of the cases before the Office of the
Ombudsman should have been discovered during the progress of the trial."50 The same was also not
mentioned in the Motion for Reconsideration. Since the document has not been formally offered in
evidence, nor made a part of the records of the case at the time they were submitted for decision,
the Sandiganbayan held that the same "is merely a scrap of paper barren of probative [value]."51
The Present Petition
Tiongco is now before the Court praying for the reversal of the decision of the Sandiganbayan, which
allegedly committed the following errors:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The Sandiganbayan erred in ruling that petitioner Tiongco usurped the functions of Lamberto Barbin,
President of PCIC in SB-08-CRM-0414. On the contrary, petitioner Tiongco was authorized under the
PCIC [CASA], signing together with Nilo Mordeno, in lieu of President Barbin.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The Sandiganbayan erred in holding that the elements of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No.
3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act were present in SB-08-CRM-0415 as:
(a) There was not a single piece of evidence that proved undue injury or damage to the
government; and
(b) Petitioner Tiongco could not have acted with manifest partiality in the release of the
retirement gratuity and terminal leave pay of Estacio considering that there was no
evidence that Estacio was favored by petitioner over other persons similarly situated.
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The Sandiganbayan misapprehended the facts of the case when it ruled that petitioner Tiongco did
not act in good faith and without criminal intent in signing the request for clearance, and in signing
the disbursement voucher and check.
FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The Sandiganbayan erred in not appreciating the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in
favor of petitioner Tiongco.52
Tiongco maintains that she was justified in signing the clearance because of Barbin's
absence and refusal to act.53 She points to Section 20.4 of the PCIC's CASA as authorizing her to
act in Barbin's absence and when the situation requires quick and urgent action, which, she claims,
was required in this case.54 She further claims that Barbin refused to sign any documents at PCIC,
leaving the task to her as Acting Senior Vice President.55 Since Barbin gave no qualification to the
delegated authority, she was within her authority to sign the clearance.56
As to her second assignment of error, Tiongco avers that there was no proof of undue injury,
damage to the government, or unwarranted benefit given to Estacio. 57 Tiongco argues that
whatever Estacio received was due and proper – as evidenced by the fact that the same was not
disallowed by COA – earned by him for his service to the PCIC. Moreover, the cases then pending at
the Office of the Ombudsman were eventually dismissed.58
Next, Tiongco claims that there is no manifest partiality in the release of Estacio's
retirement gratuity since it was not proven that he was favored over other persons
similarly situated.59 Since she was convicted of committing a violation of Section 3(e) of
R.A. 3019 through manifest partiality, it was imperative that it be proven she favored
Estacio over another person. In this case, however, there was no other person over whom Estacio
was favored. Thus, the prosecution failed to prove all the elements of the crime.60
For her third assignment of error, she argues that she should now be acquitted as she was charged
with conspiracy but none was proven. Hence, she can rely on her good faith.61 She further states that
it is impossible for her to have caused the preparation, approval, and release of retirement gratuity
alone. She points to the convoluted process of securing said gratuity, which requires the signature of
department heads and approval of the Board of Directors.
Tiongco also underscores the finding of the Sandiganbayan that there was no collusion between
Tiongco and Estacio for the latter to obtain unwarranted benefits.62 She reiterates her authority to
sign and that her duty was "merely to check and see whether all the other department heads had
signed the clearances for their respective offices."63
At the very least, Tiongco avers that she was faced with a difficult question of law (whether she had
authority to sign) and acted in good faith. But since the head of the Office of the General Counsel
signed the document, it was understandable that she believed she had such authority.64
Finally, her fourth assignment of error emphasized that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender should have been construed in her favor.65 She reiterates that since she surrendered and
posted bail, her surrender was voluntary and spontaneous and should be considered in the
computation of penalties.66
Arguments of the Office of the Special Prosecutor
Initially, the Office of the Special Prosecutor argues that the issues raised in this petition are the
same ones raised in Tiongco's Motion for Reconsideration before the Sandiganbayan, which had
thoroughly discussed and adjudicated all of these in its assailed Resolution. Likewise, respondent
avers that the issues raised are factual in nature and, therefore, beyond the ambit of a Rule 45
petition for review.67 Further, the petition should be dismissed for failure to indicate the date of
receipt of the assailed decision.68
Respondent argues that Tiongco was not authorized under the PCIC CASA to approve the request for
clearance and the subsequent release of Estacio's retirement gratuity.69 Moreover, her argument that
she signed because the same required quick action, which Barbin could not provide as he was out of
the office, was belied by her own testimony in open court.70 In her testimony, Tiongco admitted that
she did not ascertain if Barbin was] in his office or if he was reporting for work that day, and simply
assumed that he was not around.71 Meanwhile, Barbin provided evidence that he reported for work
regularly and that he did not give Tiongco "authority to act for and in his behalf."72
Next, respondent argues that Tiongco's act of approving the release of Estacio's retirement gratuity
was tainted with manifest partiality and caused injury to the government or gave unwarranted
benefit, advantage, or preference to Estacio.73 According to respondent, such partiality, bad faith,
and gross inexcusable negligence were evident in Tiongco's actions, namely, that she had to overstep
the authority designated to her in order to accommodate Estacio's retirement, that she disregarded
the condition imposed by the PCIC Board of Directors in approving Estacio's clearance, and that she
failed to institute safeguards to protect the PCIC's funds as required under OMB MC No. 10.74 Thus,
Tiongco's partiality towards Estacio resulted in unwarranted benefit, preference, or advantage to the
latter.75
Respondent then argues that neither good faith nor her voluntary surrender can be appreciated in
Tiongco's favor.76 As to her argument of good faith, respondent contends that Tiongco's claim that
she was faced with a difficult question over her authority to sign should have put her on inquiry as to
her authority and the presence of the PCIC President. Further, she herself admitted that she was
aware that OMB MC No. 10 prescribed precautionary measures for approving retirement gratuity but
she "willfully overlooked the prescription and proceeded to approve the release."77 Likewise, the
haste with which she signed the request militates against her assertion of good faith. Respondent
avers that, considering that she herself claims that she was faced with a "difficult question of law,"
good faith should have prompted her to act with caution and prudence.78
Lastly, respondent argues against appreciating "voluntary surrender" as a mitigating circumstance in

favor of Tiongco. Respondent points out that voluntary surrender can only be appreciated if it is
"alleged, invoked and proved during trial." 79 Tiongco failed to do that.
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether the Sandiganbayan correctly found Tiongco guilty of (1) Usurpation
of Official Functions and (2) violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019.
The petition has no merit and should be denied.
Usurpation of Official Functions
Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code defines Usurpation of Official Functions:
Article 177. Usurpation of authority or official functions. — Any person who shall knowingly and
falsely represent himself to be an officer, agent or representative of any department or agency of the
Philippine Government or of any foreign government, or who, under pretense of official position, shall
perform any act pertaining to any person in authority or public officer of the Philippine Government
or any foreign government, or any agency thereof, without being lawfully entitled to do so, shall
suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.
This provision actually speaks of two ways of committing the offense under Article 177. Tiongco is
charged with Usurpation of Official Functions. As established by this Court in Ruzol v.
Sandiganbayan,80 usurpation of official functions is committed when "under pretense of official
position, [a person] shall perform any act pertaining to any person in authority or public officer of the
Philippine Government or any foreign government, or any agency thereof, without being lawfully
entitled to do so."
To put simply, Usurpation of Official Functions has the following elements:
1. The offender may be a private person or public officer.

2. The offender performs any act pertaining to any person in authority or public officer of the
Philippine government, any of its agencies, or of a foreign government.
3. The offender performs the act under pretense of official function.
4. The offender performs the act without being legally entitled to do so.
First, it has been conclusively established that Tiongco was a public officer at the time of the
commission of the crime. She herself admitted such in her Counter-Affidavit81 dated 10 October
2006, where she stated that she was then "currently the Acting Senior Vice President of the [PCIC]
with a salary grade of 27."82
Second, she performed an act that rightfully pertained to the President of PCIC as head of the
agency, and not to her as Acting Senior Vice President.
Based on evidence she herself presented, Tiongco's designation as Acting Senior Vice President,
Regional Management Group, carried with it the following responsibilities:
1. Plans, organizes, directs and controls the activities and operations of the Regional
Management Group;
2. Exercises direct supervision over the operation of the Regional Offices;
3. Directs the conduct of actuarial studies and research on risk, loss rates, adequacy of
premiums, re-insurance and other pertinent information on existing coverage;
4. Directs the preparation of expansion/feasibility studies and insurance packages for new
product lines;
5. Directs the development of corporate plans and programs including marketing plans and
promotional activities in line with the priorities and policies defined by the President and Board
of Directors;
6. Prepares and submits for consideration of the Board, President, and operational plans and
programs for the Regional Offices;
7. Prepares and submits reports of corporation's operation of the Regional Offices to the
President; and
8. Performs other related functions as may be assigned by the Board/President.83
None of the functions pertain to approving the release of retirement gratuity.
While Tiongco's claim that Barbin "asked for help" in running the agency, which was the reason for
her designation as Acting Senior Vice President, she has not shown any specific assignment or
conferment of authority related to approving release of retirement benefits. Meanwhile, OMB MC No.
10 specifically states:
In the event the certification presented states that the prospective retiree has a pending case, the
responsibility of determining whether to release his retirement benefits, as well as the imposition of
necessary safeguards to ensure restitution thereof in the event retiree is found guilty, rests upon
and shall be left at the sound discretion of the head of the department, office or agency
concerned.84 (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, the assignment cannot be presumed or inferred from the general statement in number 8 of
the above-quoted list of responsibilities. It must be specifically granted in light of the explicit
mandate of OMB MC No. 10 and that conferment of authority must be clearly shown. Tiongco has not
done so.
Third, that Tiongco signed Estacio's disbursement voucher "under pretense of official function" is
clear. Tiongco argues that she believed she had the authority to sign and that her acts "are indicative
of good faith”85
The Court, in Ruzol, recognized good faith as a defense in prosecutions for usurpation of official
functions. However, the Court also ruled that:
It bears stressing at this point that in People v. Hilvano, this Court enunciated that good faith is a
defense in criminal prosecutions for usurpation of official functions. The term "good faith" is ordinarily
used to describe that state of mind denoting "honesty of intention, and freedom from knowledge
of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry; an honest intention to abstain
from taking any unconscientious advantage of another, even though technicalities of law, together
with absence of all information, notice, or benefit or belief of facts which render the transaction
unconscientious." Good faith is actually a question of intention and although something internal, it
can be ascertained by relying not on one's self-serving protestations of good faith but on evidence of
his conduct and outward acts.86 (Emphasis supplied)
Tiongco cannot claim good faith because it has been established that she had "knowledge of
circumstances which ought to put [her] upon inquiry." She admitted that she saw the notation "no
pending cases except OMB-0-00-0898 and 0-00-1697" in Estacio's request for clearance.
Tiongco also admitted that she was well aware of the provisions of OMB MC No. 10. She said she did
it because Barbin was always absent, an admission that she knew the authority was vested in the
PCIC President. She nonetheless arrogated such authority unto herself, justifying her action with
urgency of the situation bringing Section 20.4 of the PCIC CASA into effect. However, even acting
under that authority was wrong, as will be discussed later.
Next, PCIC Board Resolution No. 2006-012 states:
RESOLVED to approve, as it hereby approves the application for retirement of Mr. BENITO F.
ESTACIO, JR. former PCIC President, effective the close of office hours of April 20, 2006 under RA
1616, subject to the submission of clearance from money and property accountabilities from the
PCIC, clearance from the GSIS, submission of statement of assets and liabilities in accordance with
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and clearance from the Office of the Ombudsman.87
While OMB MC No. 10 requires only certification, the PCIC Board required a clearance from the
Office of the Ombudsman. In other words, the approval of Estacio's retirement was conditional –
"subject to" fulfillment of the requirements the Board of Directors set. Since Estacio only presented a
certification, which stated that he had two pending cases, he had not met the requirements of the
Board of Directors.
In cases of such non-fulfillment, OMB MC No. 10 gives the discretion to allow a prospective retiree to
retire and receive benefits only to the "head of the department, office or agency." Thus, in cases
where the head is absent or the agency currently has no president, the authority is granted to
whoever is designated officer-in-charge or acting as head of agency, not to the one designated
merely as Acting Senior Vice President.
Fourth, Tiongco was legally not entitled to act on the release of Estacio's retirement gratuity. As
discussed above, the authority was vested in Barbin as head of PCIC under OMB MC No. 10.
Tiongco, however, argues that she acted pursuant to PCIC's CASA, Section 20.4, which states that in
case the President is absent or an urgent matter needs his signature, "any two Class A signatories or
any Class A signatory signing with any Class B signatory may approve/sign the transaction in behalf
of the President."
As will be discussed later, the absence of Barbin was not such that he could no longer exercise his
discretionary powers. He continued to perform his functions, although he admitted that he was not
physically present at the PCIC premises at times. He, however, testified that he regularly went to the
PCIC office during that period.
Further, the release of Estacio's retirement gratuity was not an urgent matter. At that time, he was
not yet entitled to its release pending compliance with the Board's requirement of an Ombudsman
clearance.
Based on the foregoing, the undeniable conclusion is that Tiongco is guilty of the crime of Usurpation
of Official Functions.
Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019
In Rivera v. People,88 the Court discussed the two ways by which a public official violates
Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 in the performance of his functions:
x x x (1) by causing undue injury to any party, including the Government; or (2) by giving
any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference.
It is not enough that undue injury was caused or unwarranted benefits were given as
these acts must be performed through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. Proof of any of these three in connection with the prohibited acts
mentioned in Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 is enough to convict.89
The elements90 of the offense are as follows:
(1) the offender is a public officer;
(2) the act was done in the discharge of the public officer's official, administrative or
judicial functions;
(3) the act was done through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable
negligence; and
(4) the public officer caused any undue injury to any party, including the
Government, or gave any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference.
The prohibited act of either causing undue injury or giving unwarranted benefits, advantage, or
preference may be committed in three ways: through (1) manifest partiality, (2) evident bad faith, or
(3) gross inexcusable negligence.
In People v. Atienza,91 the Court defined these elements:

x x x. There is "manifest partiality" when there is a clear, notorious, or plain inclination or
predilection to favor one side or person rather than another. "Evident bad faith" connotes not only
bad judgment but also palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity
or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will. "Evident bad faith" contemplates a state
of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or ill will or for
ulterior purposes. "Gross inexcusable negligence" refers to negligence characterized by the want of
even the slightest care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not
inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with conscious indifference to consequences insofar as
other persons may be affected.
The Court finds that Tiongco acted with manifest partiality and evident bad faith in this case.
Manifest Partiality
Tiongco's partiality is clear. Her willingness to disregard the PCIC Board's directive and OMB MC No.
10 in order to grant Estacio's request speaks of such partiality. Her actions all point to facilitating
whatever course of action would be favorable to Estacio.
The Court also finds, in this case, an inclination by Tiongco to take advantage of Barbin's absence
from the premises of PCIC to accommodate Estacio, who is, not insignificantly, her former boss.
Tiongco made her own determination and characterized Estacio's request for retirement gratuity as
urgent, knowing that doing so, taken with Barbin's absence, would trigger the mechanism under
Section 20.4 of the PCIC CASA that would allow her and another Class "A" signatory (in this case,
Mordeno, who had fled and left her to suffer the consequences) to sign on the request.
Evident Bad Faith
In Antonino v. Desierto,92 the Court held that "[b]ad faith per se is not enough for one to be held
liable under the law; bad faith must be evident. Bad faith does not simply connote bad moral
judgment or negligence. There must be some dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and
conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will."
As discussed above, Tiongco's bad faith was clearly exhibited in her willful disregard for OMB MC No.
10 and for the requirements of the PCIC Board. It is clear as well that she knowingly encroached on
Barbin's authority to approve the payment of retirement gratuity to one who has pending cases
before the Ombudsman.
She herself admitted that she was faced with a difficult question of law. Yet, instead of seeking
guidance from PCIC's legal counsel or from Barbin himself, she simply decided on her own and took
her own course of action that did not conform to established rules.
Moreover, her failure to ensure restitution from Estacio in case he is found guilty in his pending cases
is clearly a breach of her sworn duty as a government official tasked with safeguarding the interest of
the service.
Undue Injury or Unwarranted Benefit, Advantage or Privilege
For violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, "what contextually is punishable is the act of causing
undue injury to any party, or giving to any private party of unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of the public officer's functions."93
The Court has clarified that "the use of the disjunctive word 'or' connotes that either act of (a)
'causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government'; [or] (b) 'giving any private party
any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference,' qualifies as a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A.
3019, as amended."94 Thus, an accused "may be charged under either mode or both, x x x. In other
words, the presence of one would suffice for conviction."95
The Court has treated undue injury in the context of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 to have "a meaning
akin to" the civil law concept of "actual damage,"96 to wit:
Undue injury in the context of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 should be equated with the
civil law concept of "actual damage." Unlike in actions for torts, undue injury in Sec. 3(e) cannot
be presumed even after a wrong or a violation of a right has been established. Its existence must be
proven as one of the elements of the crime. In fact, the causing of undue injury, or the giving of any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence constitutes the very act punished under this section. Thus, it is required that
the undue injury be specified, quantified and proven to the point of moral certainty.97
In this case, undue injury to the government was caused by the unauthorized disbursement of
P1,522,849.48 in public funds, in that, first, the person who approved said disbursement did not
have the authority to do so, and second, because the beneficiary was not yet entitled to the release
of the retirement gratuity.
As such, Estacio also enjoyed an unwarranted benefit because non-compliance with the requirements
under OMB MC No. 10 disqualified him to receive his retirement gratuity at that time. On top of that,
Estacio was given said unwarranted benefit through Tiongco's usurpation of Barbin's official functions
and the violation of OMB MC No. 10.
Estacio's former position afforded him access to the highest officials of the agency, the same ones
who were in a position to know how to work through PCIC's processes. Tiongco's overreach was
obviously targeted to expedite the process in favor of the former president.
At this point, it is also important to point out that the dismissal of the cases against Estacio is
irrelevant. The letter being presented by petitioner to this Court was not considered by the
Sandiganbayan since it was never presented at trial or at any time before the denial of her motion for
reconsideration. Tiongco submitted the same, through a Manifestation and Motion, only four days
after the resolution of her motion for reconsideration.
The Sandiganbayan ruled that the letter is a "mere scrap of paper barren of probative [value]."98 It
held that the letter was not newly discovered evidence, nor was Tiongco presenting it as such, since
it could have been easily obtained during the course of the trial, or even filed with her motion for
reconsideration. Further, it said that even if the court can concede that the same is a public
document, it was never presented in evidence and was, thus, not part of the records when the case
was submitted for decision.99
As such, this letter is being offered for its evidentiary value for the first time before this Court. This
being a petition for review under Rule 45, the Court is limited to determining questions of law and
could not consider evidence belatedly presented by Tiongco.
Moreover, it will not change the ruling of the Court since it has been already determined that the
elements of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 were proven in this case.
Voluntary surrender
Finally, Tiongco's plea to consider her voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance must be set
aside.
Tiongco is raising this issue for the first time in this petition for review. Records show that Tiongco
never raised this argument during the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan. Likewise, Tiongco
failed to file her Memorandum where she should have argued for the consideration of this mitigating
circumstance. Lastly, Tiongco could have advanced her cause when she filed her motion for
reconsideration, but lost her chance when she still failed to raise this issue then.100
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 18 February 2015 and the Resolution
dated 18 June 2015 of the Sandiganbayan in Case Nos. SB-08-CRM-0414 and SB-08-CRM-0415
are AFFIRMED.
14.) [ G.R. No. 193236, September 17, 2018 ]
FLORENCIA GARCIA-DIAZ PETITIONER, VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, RESPONDENT.
[G.R. Nos. 193248-49]
JOSE G. SOLIS, PETITIONER, VS. SANDIGANBAYAN AND THE PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Co-conspirators are liable collectively and equally for the common design of their criminal acts. When a contract that is grossly and
manifestly disadvantageous to the government is entered into, the persons involved—whether public officers or private persons—may
be charged for violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and suffer the same penalty if found guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
This resolves two (2) Petitions for Review on Certiorari filed separately by Florencia L. Garcia-Diaz[1] (Garcia-Diaz) and Jose G.
Solis[2] (Solis) assailing the Sandiganbayan March 3, 2010 Decision[3] and July 29, 2010 Resolution[4] that declared them guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Section 3(g)[5] of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Additionally, Solis was found guilty of falsification of public documents punished under Article 171, paragraph 4[6] of the Revised Penal
Code. The criminal cases were filed in connection with the execution of a Compromise Agreement involving 4,689 hectares of
land located within Fort Magsaysay Military Reservation (Fort Magsaysay), a land of the public domain, but was almost
registered under the name of Garcia-Diaz, a private person.
In 1976, Garcia-Diaz's predecessor-in-interest, Flora L. Garcia (Garcia), filed an application for registration of a 16,589.84-hectare
property located in Laur and Palayan City, Nueva Ecija before the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija. Garcia based her application
on the supposed title of her predecessor, Melecio Padilla (Padilla), as evidenced by Possessory Information Title No. 216 issued during
the Spanish regime. The property was surveyed and its technical description provided in Bureau of Lands (BL) Plan II-6752.[7] Garcia
further alleged that she had been in possession of the property for 26 years, as of the filing of her application, in addition to the
possession and enjoyment of her predecessors, which had lasted for more than 80 years.[8]
The case was docketed as Land Registration Case No. 853, LRC-Record No. N-51127.[9]
The Republic of the Philippines (the Republic) opposed Garcia's application mainly on the ground that the property sought to be
registered formed part of Fort Magsaysay per Presidential Proclamation No. 237 dated December 19, 1955.[10] The property, the
Republic claimed, formed part of the public domain and was inalienable.[11]
Despite the Republic's opposition, the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija granted Garcia's application for registration.[12] This led to
the Republic's filing of an appeal before the Court of Appeals, which was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 22217.[13]
During the pendency of the appeal, Garcia died. She was substituted by her heirs, among them being Garcia-Diaz.[14]
Meanwhile, in its February 26, 1992 Decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance and dismissed
Garcia's application for registration.[15] It cited as basis the 1975 case of Director of Lands v. Reyes,[16] which likewise involved an
application for registration of the property covered by BL Plan II-6752, the same property Garcia was seeking to register. In Director of
Lands, this Court found that no "Melecio Padilla" appeared in the list of holders of información posesoria titles in then Santos, now
Laur, Nueva Ecija.[17] The name "Melecio Padilla" appeared in the list for Peñaranda, Nueva Ecija but it only involved a land of smaller
area.[18] This Court in Director of Lands concluded that the possessory information title under the name of Padilla was unreliable; hence,
it ordered the application for registration dismissed.[19]
Garcia-Diaz's co-heirs then filed a motion for reconsideration, which was likewise denied by the Court of Appeals. They went on to file a
Petition for Review on Certiorari before this Court, entitled Flora L. Garcia v. Court of Appeals, et al. and docketed as G.R. No. 104561,
but it was likewise denied in this Court's April 8, 1992 Resolution for lack of reversible error in the challenged decision. The Motion for
Reconsideration of the April 8, 1992 Resolution was denied with finality on June 15, 1992.[20]
As for Garcia-Diaz, she did not join her co-heirs in appealing before this Court. Instead, during the pendency of her own motion for
reconsideration before the Court of Appeals, she chose to amicably settle with the Republic. Through her counsel, then Atty.
Fernando A. Santiago (Atty. Santiago), who later retired as a Court of Appeals Justice, Garcia-Diaz submitted a draft Compromise
Agreement dated May 16, 1997 to then Solicitor General Silvestre H. Bello III (Solicitor General Bello). [21]
In relation to the compromise being negotiated, representatives from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and
Armed Forces of the Philippines on the one hand; and Garcia-Diaz and then Atty. Santiago as her counsel on the other, entered into an
Agreement dated October 22, 1997.[22] Under the Compromise Agreement, the National Mapping and Resource Information Authority
(NAMRIA)[23] was authorized to conduct the final preliminary evaluation survey and to clarify the technical description of the reservation
in Proclamation No. 237, specifically, to determine which portion of the property described in BL Plan II-6752 coincided with the actual
ground location of Fort Magsaysay.[24] Salvador V. Bonnevie (Bonnevie), Executive Assistant to then NAMRIA Administrator Solis,
chaired the meeting with Virgilio I. Fabian, Jr. (Fabian), Assistant Director of NAMRIA's Remote Sensing and Resource Data Analysis
Department, serving as co-chair.[25]
Solis then issued a Travel Order dated January 29, 2018, directing Senior Remote Sensing Technologists Ireneo T. Valencia (Valencia)
and Arthur J. Viernes (Viernes) to proceed to Laur, Nueva Ecija and "relocate the tie points and corners 6 and 7 of Fort Magsaysay
Military Reservation."[26] Valencia and Viernes were to survey the area from January 30 to February 3, 1998 and were given
transportation allowance and per diems. They were likewise allowed to hire emergency laborers for the survey.[27]
As directed by Solis and with the assistance of some personnel from the City Environment and Natural Resources Office of
Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija, Valencia and Viernes proceeded to Laur and conducted the survey. In their Summary Report, they
confirmed that they were able to relocate the actual ground positions of comers 6 and 7 of Fort Magsaysay. They found that the Bureau
of Lands Location Monuments remained in the position as earlier computed and plotted in the topographic map referred to in
Presidential Proclamation No. 237. Attached to the Summary Report were the sketch map of Fort Magsaysay, and Valencia and
Viernes' Field Notes or Traverse Computations.[28]
Solis then wrote Solicitor General Ricardo P. Galvez (Solicitor General Galvez), who by then had replaced Solicitor General
Bello. In his February 12, 1998 Letter, Solis essentially stated that the actual ground location of Fort Magsaysay did not match
with the technical description as provided in Presidential Proclamation No. 237. Specifically, the team that surveyed the military
reservation, headed by Valencia and Viernes, supposedly found corner points 6 and 7 in the technical description "misleading" and that
"the [tie point] cannot be located, hence comparison with BL Plan II-6752 cannot be effected." Solis then recommended that
Presidential Proclamation No. 237 be amended accordingly. The February 12, 1998 Letter more comprehensively stated:
This refers to CA-G.R. No. 22217 (LRC Case No. 853, LRC Rec. 511-27) regarding evaluation of the technical description of
Proclamation No. 237 establishing Fort Magsaysay Military Reservation containing an approximate area of 73,000 hectares more or
less.
In an agreement signed among the parties concerned (AFP, LMB, Applicant and NAMRIA), this office was tasked and authorized to
replot and check the technical description of Proclamation No. 237 in reference to BL Plan II-6752, (Possessory Title Reg. No. 216).
Finding[s] disclose that the military reservation is not located in the topographic map sheets referred to in the technical description in
Proclamation No. 237, that the description of corner points 6 and 7 are misleading and that the [tie point] cannot be located, hence
comparison with BL Plan II-6752 cannot be effected.
The existence of the tie point of BL Plan II-6752 was verified by a team dispatched to relocate BLLM No. 1 and 2 and BBM 41 and 42 of
Laur and Barangay San Isidro. It confirmed that the plottings made by this Office is geographically and accurately located in the ground.
The technical description of the portion of BL Plan II-6752 located outside the Fort Magsaysay Military Reservation is hereto attached
as Annex "A". Points 6 and 7 of the Military Reservation were plotted in relation to BL Plan II-6752 in the survey plan attached hereto as
Annex "B".
It is the recommendation of this authority to amend Proclamation No. 237 and to complete and finalize the plotting of the Military
Reservation with corner points 6 and 7, which were located in relation to land monuments in Laur and Barangay San Isidro, N.E. in the
attached plan, as the bases for the amendments.[29]
However, it appears that three (3) drafts of the February 12, 1998 Letter were prepared. Two (2) of the drafts, both signed by
Solis, explicitly provided that "the military reservation is not located in the topographic map sheets referred to in the technical
description in Proclamation No. 237." Attached to the drafts was a survey plan, which plotted comer points 6 and 7 bounding
Fort Magsaysay and showed the technical description of a portion of the property covered by BL Plan II-6752 that was located
outside the military reservation. Thus, Solis recommended in those two (2) drafts that Presidential Proclamation No. 237 be
amended and that the plotting of the military reservation with comer points 6 and 7 be completed and finalized. The third draft
was not signed by Solis but was initialed by Fabian. It did not state that the existence of the tie point was verified by a survey team. This
draft had no attachments.[30]
The draft that reached Solicitor General Galvez was one of the two drafts declaring that the actual ground location of Fort Magsaysay
did not conform with the technical description in Presidential Proclamation No. 237. This draft was signed by Solis but did not reflect
Fabian's initials.[31]
Based on the findings stated in the February 12, 1998 Letter, the Republic, through Solicitor General Galvez, and Garcia-Diaz,
through her counsel, then Atty. Santiago, signed and jointly filed a Motion for Approval of Amicable Settlement dated May 18,
1999. In the Compromise Agreement, Garcia-Diaz agreed to withdraw her application for registration of the property covered
by BL Plan II-6752 that was within Fort Magsaysay in exchange for the Republic's withdrawal of its opposition to the
registration of the portion outside the reservation, a portion which was supposedly comprised of 4,689 hectares. Gaudencio
A. Mendoza, Assistant Executive for Legal Affairs, and Bonnevie served as witnesses.[32] The Compromise Agreement
particularly provided:
1. The First Party [Garcia-Diaz] hereby withdraws her application for registration of title for the portion of the land described in BL Plan
II-6752 which is situated within the military reservation described under Presidential Proclamation No. 237;
2. The First Party [Garcia-Diaz] undertakes to set aside and donate to the government five hundred (500) hectares for development as
housing project;
3. The Second Party [the Republic] hereby withdraws its opposition to the registration in the name of the First Party FLORENCIA
GARCIA DIAZ, Filipino, of legal age, widow, of the portion of BL Plan II[-]6752 with an area of 4,689 hectares more or less (Annex "B")
which is situated outside the Fort Magsaysay military reservation;
4. Both parties agree to submit this Compromise Agreement for approval and for judgment in accordance therewith by the Court of
Appeals.[33]
In its June 30, 1999 Resolution, the Court of Appeals granted the Motion for Approval of Amicable Settlement and rendered judgment
based on the compromise.[34]
On January 12, 2000, Solicitor General Galvez filed a Manifestation and Motion before the Court of Appeals. Thereafter, in its March 9,
2000 Resolution, the Court of Appeals motu proprio ordered and directed the Land Registration Authority to hold in abeyance the
processing and issuance of the registration decree and certificate of title covering the 4,689-hectare property until Garcia-Diaz
commented on the January 12, 2000 Manifestation and Motion filed by the Office of the Solicitor General.[35]
In the meantime, Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources Antonio Cerilles directed the new NAMRIA Administrator, Isidro S.
Fajardo, to form a team to investigate the alleged anomaly involving the Compromise Agreement.[36] The Investigating Committee then
submitted a Memorandum to the Administrator dated April 12, 2000, where they declared inaccurate the statement of then
Administrator Solis in his February 12, 1998 Letter that a portion of the property described in BL Plan II-6752 was outside the technical
description of Fort Magsaysay as provided in Presidential Proclamation No. 237.[37] The Investigating Committee based its findings,
among others, on Map SP 203, a plotting of technical description provided in Presidential Proclamation No. 237, which showed that the
entire property described in BL Plan II-6752 was within the actual ground location of Fort Magsaysay.[38]
A Motion to Set Aside Compromise Settlement dated June 5, 2001 was then filed before the Court of Appeals.[39]
In the Information dated March 17, 2004,[40] public officers Solicitor General Galvez, NAMRIA officials Solis, Fabian, Bonnevie,
Valencia, and Viernes, and private person Garcia-Diaz were charged for violating Section 3(g) [41] of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act before the Sandiganbayan. The accusatory portion of the Information in Criminal Case No. 27974 read:
That on or about May 18, 1999 or sometime prior (or) subsequent thereto, in the City of Makati, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, accused Ricardo P. Galvez, a high-ranking public officer, being then the Solicitor General, with accused Jose G.
Solis, Salvador V. Bonnevie, Virgilio I. Fabian, Jr., Ireneo T. Valencia and Arthur J. Viernes, being then the Administrator, Officer-
in-Charge, HGSD Assistant Director, Remote Sensing and Resource Data Analysis Department (RSRDAD), and Senior Remote
Sensing Technologists, respectively, of the National Mapping and Resource Information Administration (NAMRIA), while in the
performance of their official functions and committing the offense in relation to office, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
one another, together with Florencia Garcia-Diaz, a private person, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally enter
into a Compromise Agreement dated May 18, 1999 with the said Florencia Garcia-Diaz, wherein the Republic of the
Philippines, as represented by accused Solicitor General Ricardo P. Galvez, withdrew opposition to the registration in the
name of accused Florencia Garcia-Diaz a portion of BL Plan II-6752, with an area of 4,689 hectares, which contract was
grossly disadvantageous to the government, considering that the parcel of land, subject of the compromise agreement, is not
alienable or registerable as the same falls within the Fort Magsaysay Military Reservation, the probative value of purported titulo
de informacion possesoria issued in the name of Melecio Padilla, from whom the title applicant Flora Garcia and now her heiress
claimant Florencia Garcia-Diaz (herein accused), derived their claim, had been declared by the Supreme Court in the case of Director
of Lands v. Reyes, 68 SCRA 177 (1975) as seriously flawed, and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 26, 1992 in CA-
GR CV No. 22217 (Flora L. Garcia vs. Republic of the Philippines) denying the application for registration of Flora Garcia relative to the
parcels of land stated in the said agreement.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[42] (Emphasis in the original)
In another Information of the same date, Solis, Fabian, Bonnevie, Valencia, and Viernes were further charged with falsification of public
documents under Article 171, paragraph 4[43] of the Revised Penal Code. The accusatory portion of the Information in Criminal Case
No. 27975 read:
That on or about February 12, 1998 in the City of Makati, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Jose
G. Solis, Salvador V. Bonnevie, Virgilio I. Fabian, Jr., lreneo T. Valencia and Arthur J. Viernes, being then the Administrator, with
Salary Grade 27, Officer-in-Charge, HGSD, Assistant Director, Remote Sensing and Resource Data Analysis Department (RSRDAD),
and Senior Remote Sensing Technologists, respectively, of the National Mapping and Resource Information Administration (NAMRIA),
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, and committing the offense in relation to office, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously make it appear in an official letter dated February 12, 1998, addressed to the Solicitor General, which form
part of the public record, that Fort Magsaysay Military Reservation is not located in the topographic map sheets referred to in the
technical description in Proclamation No. 237 (Reserving for Military Purpose a portion of the public domain situated in the
Municipalities of Papaya, Sta. Rosa and Laur, Province of Nueva Ecija and portion of Quezon Province, Philippines), the description of
corner points 6 and 7 are misleading, the tie point cannot be located, hence comparison with BL Plan [II]-6752 cannot be effected, and
for submitting a relocation of points 6 and 7 of proclamation and the. survey plan of portion BL [Plan] II-6752 indicating that an area of
4,689 hectares is located outside the military reservation, when in truth and in fact, as the accused knew fully well and are legally bound
to disclose, that said substantial portion of Fort Magsaysay Military Reservation being claimed by one Florencia Garcia-Diaz, a private
person, is inside the Army Map Sheet (AMS) topographic map as referred to in the technical description of Proclamation [No.] 237,
thereby making untruthful statements in the narration of facts.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[44]
Garcia-Diaz filed a Motion to Dismiss/Quash[45] Information, contending that private persons cannot be charged under the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. This Motion was denied by the Sandiganbayan in its August 2, 2006 Resolution.[46]
As for Solicitor General Galvez, he died during the pendency of the case. Thus, the charge against him was dismissed.[47]
The case then proceeded to arraignment during which all the accused, except Fabian, who was and still remains at large, pleaded not
guilty to the charges.[48]
After trial, the Sandiganbayan found Garcia-Diaz and Solis guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3(g) of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. According to the Sandiganbayan, the prosecution established the following elements of the
crime: first, that the accused is a public officer; second, that he or she entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the
government; and, third, that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.[49]
With respect to the first issue, it was undisputed that accused Solis, Bonnevie, Valencia, and Viernes were public officers as they were
officials of the NAMRIA, an agency attached to the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. While it is true that Garcia-Diaz
was a private person, the Sandiganbayan nevertheless held that a private person may be held liable under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act if he or she acts in conspiracy with a public officer. It cited as basis Go v. Sandiganbayan[50] as well as the "avowed policy"
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act "to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike which may constitute
graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto."[51]
As for the second element, the Sandiganbayan found that Solicitor General Galvez, in conspiracy with Solis and Garcia-Diaz, entered
into the Compromise Agreement on behalf of the government. Garcia-Diaz was the first party in the Compromise Agreement,[52] while
Solis' statement in his February 12, 1998 Letter "completed the conspiracy and complemented the whole scheme"[53] by making it
appear that 4,689 hectares of the land covered by BL Plan II-6752 was alienable, disposable, and may be the subject of a compromise.
On the third element, the Sandiganbayan discussed how entering into the Compromise Agreement was grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government. Like the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan cited Director of Lands v. Reyes,[54] where this
Court found that Padilla's purported possessory information title, from which Garcia-Diaz ultimately derived her title to the property
described in BL Plan II-6752, was an unreliable evidence of title. In addition, the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 22217 found that
the entire property covered by BL Plan II-6752 was within Fort Magsaysay. The execution of the Compromise Agreement would have
led to the loss of 4,689 hectares in public land, to the disadvantage of the government.[55]
For the Sandiganbayan, Garcia-Diaz could not claim good faith in entering into the Compromise Agreement; It held that violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act is malum prohibitum where good faith is not a defense.[56]
The Sandiganbayan noted that the execution of the Compromise Agreement would not have been possible if not for Solis' false
representation in his February 12, 1998 Letter that 4,689 hectares of the property described in BL Plan II-6752 was located outside Fort
Magsaysay.[57] Solis could not dispute his liability, according to the Sandiganbayan, for even assuming that Fabian prepared the letter,
Solis admitted on direct examination that he had examined it and its attachments. Further, the Sandiganbayan disbelieved Solis' claim
that he only perfunctorily signed the letter because it was a product of several negotiations. Solis knew the purpose and importance of
his recommendation to Solicitor General Galvez: the Republic's withdrawal of opposition to the registration in favor of Garcia-Diaz of a
portion of Fort Magsaysay.[58]
The Sandiganbayan, however, acquitted Bonnevie, Valencia, and Viernes. It found that Bonnevie, who was then the executive
assistant of Solis, only followed the orders of his superior, Solis, when he presided over the meeting where the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and Garcia-Diaz agreed to a re-survey of Fort Magsaysay. It
ruled that Bonnevie's signing as witness to the Compromise Agreement did not prove that he had a hand in its execution.[59]
As for Valencia and Viernes, the Sandiganbayan found no evidence that they were part of the conspiracy to register in Garcia-Diaz's
name 4,689 hectares of land within Fort Magsaysay. Valencia and Viernes re-surveyed the property only in compliance with the Travel
Order issued by their superior, Solis. Further, in their Summary Report, they never represented that a portion of the property described
in BL Plan II-6752 was located outside Fort Magsaysay. All they said was that they conducted a survey and they were able to retrieve
the tie points and relocate the actual ground positions of comers 6 and 7 referred to in Presidential Proclamation No. 237.[60]
Aside from the graft charge, Solis was found guilty of falsification by a public officer punished under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the
Revised Penal Code. The Sandiganbayan found that the February 12, 1998 Letter of Solis to Solicitor General Galvez was a public
document, having been written and transmitted in Solis' official capacity.[61] Solis had a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts
narrated in the letter. Not only did he head the country's central mapping agency, he also knew that his letter would be the basis for
approval of the Compromise Agreement.[62] Lastly, the statement that 4,689 hectares of the property described in BL Plan II-6752 were
outside Fort Magsaysay described in Presidential Proclamation No. 237 was absolutely false. The contention that comers 6 and 7 were
misleading was likewise false and was contrary to Valencia and Viernes' findings in their Summary Report that they were able to
relocate comers 6 and 7 as computed and positioned based on the topographic map of the reservation. Further, superimposing BL Plan
II-6752 on the already available topographic map of Fort Magsaysay easily revealed that the whole property claimed by Garcia-Diaz
was within the military reservation.[63]
As for Bonnevie, Valencia, and Viernes, the Sandiganbayan said that "[t]here is a dearth of evidence as to [their] participation . . . in the
falsification."[64] They were, therefore, acquitted.
The dispositive portion of the Sandiganbayan March 3, 2010 Decision[65] read:
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 27974, accused Jose G. Solis and Florencia Garcia-Diaz are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of Section 3 (g) of [Republic Act No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act], and each is hereby sentenced to suffer
the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) month to ten (10) years, with perpetual disqualification from
public office.
2. In Criminal Case No. 27975, accused Solis is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of falsification, defined and penalized under
Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, and is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional medium to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor medium.
3. Accused Bonnevie, Valencia and Viernes are ACQUITTED in both cases, for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.[66]
Garcia-Diaz[67] and Solis[68] filed their respective Motions for Reconsideration. Garcia-Diaz reiterated her argument that she
could not be convicted under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act because she was a private person. She added that she
could not be faulted for entering into a compromise with the Republic considering that its alleged ownership of Fort
Magsaysay was not yet finally decided. Lastly, she pointed out that then Court of Appeals Justice Vicente V. Mendoza (Justice
Mendoza), the ponente of the Court of Appeals February 26, 1992 Decision that reversed the Decision of the land registration court on
Garcia's application for registration, was the solicitor general who represented the Republic before the land registration court. Thus, he
had no authority to render the Court of Appeals February 26, 1992 Decision.[69]
As for Solis, he maintained that the prosecution failed to prove his part in the conspiracy to execute the Compromise
Agreement. First, he was not a party to it. Second, he had never met Solicitor General Galvez, the solicitor general who
entered into the Compromise Agreement. He only dealt with Solicitor General Bello, who requested for his opinion. Lastly, there was
nothing on record to prove that he knew Garcia-Diaz so as to establish conspiracy.[70]
With respect to his conviction of falsification, Solis argued that the prosecution failed to prove the second element. He allegedly had no
legal obligation to disclose the truth in his February 12, 1998 Letter for he merely expressed an opinion there.[71]
In its July 29, 2010 Resolution,[72] the Sandiganbayan denied Garcia-Diaz's and Solis' Motions for Reconsideration. It reiterated that a
private person may be convicted under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act if he or she is found to have committed the crime in
conspiracy with a public official.[73] It added that Garcia-Diaz could not claim that the Republic's ownership of Fort Magsaysay was not
yet final given that this Court had already ruled as early as 1975 in Director of Lands v. Reyes[74] that Padilla, Garcia-Diaz's alleged
predecessor, had no title to the property covered by BL Plan II-6752 despite the existence of Possessory Information Title No. 216.
Finally, it was never proven that then Court of Appeals Justice Mendoza was the solicitor general before the land registration court that
initially granted Garcia's application for registration. Further, this issue was raised for the first time on motion for reconsideration and
this Court had ultimately upheld the Decision of the Court of Appeals in Flora L. Garcia v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 104561.
Thus, the Sandiganbayan disregarded Garcia-Diaz's arguments.[75]
Addressing the arguments of Solis involving the graft charge, the Sandiganbayan held that there can be conspiracy even if all the
conspirators do not know each other personally. What is important is that the conspirator knowingly contributed to the criminal design.
According to the Sandiganbayan, the most indispensable part of the conspiracy was the February 12, 1998 Letter issued by Solis to
then Solicitor General Galvez as this served as the technical basis to conclude that 4,689 hectares of the property described in BL Plan
II-6752 were outside the reservation described in Presidential Proclamation No. 237, and hence, alienable and disposable.[76]
The Sandiganbayan affirmed Solis' conviction of falsification of documents. He could not claim that his recommendation to amend
Presidential Proclamation No. 237 was a mere opinion to escape liability. Valencia and Viernes, the foresters who resurveyed Fort
Magsaysay, never claimed that corners 6 and 7 were "misleading" as Solis had said in his February 12, 1998 Letter. Valencia and
Viernes even said in their Summary Report that they found the actual ground positions of corners 6 and 7. As the head of the central
mapping agency of the government, Solis had the legal obligation to disclose the truth as found by foresters Valencia and Viernes, yet,
he distorted his subordinates' findings.[77]
The dispositive portion of the Sandiganbayan July 29, 2010 Resolution read:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing:
. . . 0.
2. The separate motions for reconsideration, dated March 8, 2010, and March 17, 2010, of accused Jose G. Solis and Florencia Garcia-
Diaz, respectfully, are DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[78]
Garcia-Diaz[79] and Solis[80] filed their respective Petitions for Review on Certiorari before this Court. The Office of the Special
Prosecutor, on behalf of the Sandiganbayan and the People of the Philippines, filed separate Comments[81] to which Garcia-Diaz[82] and
Solis[83] filed their respective Replies. Considering that the Petitions assail the same Sandiganbayan Decision and Resolution, the
Petitions were consolidated pursuant to this Court's November 15, 2010 Resolution.[84]
Based on the pleadings, the issues for this Court's resolution are the following:
First, whether or not a private person may be charged and convicted of violating the provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act;
Second, whether or not conspiracy exists even if the public officer is not a party to the contract or transaction that caused a
gross and manifest disadvantage to the government; and
Finally, whether or not petitioner Jose G. Solis violated a legal obligation to disclose the truth when he executed his February 12, 1998
Letter.
Petitioner Garcia-Diaz insists that she cannot be charged and convicted under Section 3(g) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act because Section 3 refers to "corrupt practices of public officers" and she is not a public officer. According to
her, a private person may be penalized under the statute only under Section 4(b) [85] of which she was not charged.[86]
For his part, petitioner Solis maintains that he cannot be charged of violation of Section 3(g) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act because he was not even a party to the Compromise Agreement. He had already resigned from his position as
NAMRIA Administrator at the time of its execution. He argues that "it is unfair that [he] be presumed to be involved in the execution and
signing of the . . . compromise agreement."[87] He maintains that his February 12, 1998 Letter was drafted by his subordinate, Fabian,
and that he merely signed it on the assumption that everything was in order. The "[a]bsence of [his participation in the] conspiracy is,
[therefore], very evident."[88]
Additionally, Solis argues that he should not have been convicted of falsification under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal
Code because the second element of the felony is allegedly absent in this case. He claims that he had no legal obligation to disclose
the truth of the narration of facts in his February 12, 1998 Letter. At best, what he said was an "inexact, inaccurate or
erroneous"[89] interpretation of the Summary Report of Remote Sensing Technologists Valencia and Viernes.[90]
Proceeding first with a procedural matter, respondent People of the Philippines argues that Garcia-Diaz's appeal should have been
dismissed outright because she solely impleaded the Sandiganbayan as respondent. It claims that this is contrary to Rule 45, Section
4[91] of the Rules of Court, which states that the lower court that rendered the assailed decision should not be impleaded as respondent
in the Petition.[92]
On the merits, respondent People of the Philippines counters that it has long been settled that a private person may be convicted under
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act if he or she acted in conspiracy with a public officer. It cites as legal bases Go v.
Sandiganbayan,[93] Meneses v. People,[94] Balmadrid v. Sandiganbayan,[95] Domingo v. Sandiganbayan,[96] Singian, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan,[91] and United States v. Ponte.[98] Considering that petitioner Garcia-Diaz was found to have conspired with Solicitor
General Galvez and petitioner Solis in entering into the Compromise Agreement that caused gross and manifest disadvantage to the
government, she was validly convicted of violating Section 3(g) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.[99]
As regards petitioner Solis, respondent People of the Philippines maintains that he was correctly convicted of violating Section 3(g) of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Petitioner Solis cannot hide behind the fact that he was not a signatory to the Compromise
Agreement because he issued the very basis for its execution: his February 12, 1998 Letter where he declared that "the military
reservation is not located in the topographic map sheets referred to in the technical description in Proclamation No. 237."[100] For
respondent People of the Philippines, it does not matter that petitioner Solis did not know personally Solicitor General Galvez or
petitioner Garcia-Diaz. All that is required is unity of purpose for there to be conspiracy. Here, the purpose is to "give the proposed
compromise settlement a semblance of propriety and legitimacy."[101]
On the falsification charge against him, respondent People of the Philippines argues that petitioner Solis cannot put the blame on
Fabian, who allegedly prepared the February 12, 1998 Letter. During his direct examination, petitioner Solis testified that he did not
name the person who allegedly prepared this Letter but that he nevertheless reviewed its contents. It did not even pass through the
usual procedure as it did not bear the signatures of the Director and Assistant Director of NAMRIA's Remote Sensing Resources Data
Analysis Department, and that of the Deputy Administrator.[102] Finally, contrary to Solis' argument, he had the legal obligation to
disclose the truth that the property described in BL Plan II-6752 was within Fort Magsaysay because of the functions of NAMRIA, of
which he was the Administrator.[103]
The Petitions for Review on Certiorari must be denied.
I
Petitioners Garcia-Diaz and Solis were convicted of violating Section 3(g) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which provides:
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
....
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same,
whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.
The elements of Section 3(g) are: first, the accused is a public officer; second, that he or she entered into a contract or
transaction on behalf of the government; and third, that the contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government.[104]
Given the above elements, petitioner Garcia-Diaz claims that she cannot be convicted under Section 3(g) because the first element is
absent. She is not a public officer but a private person.
Petitioner Garcia-Diaz's argument is not new. It is true that Section 3 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act speaks of
corrupt practices of public officers. "However, if there is an allegation of conspiracy, a private person may be held liable
together with the public officer."[105] This is consistent with the policy behind the statute, which, as provided in its first section, is "to
repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike which may constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead
thereto."[106]
The reason that private persons may be charged with public officers under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act is "to avoid
repeated and unnecessary presentation of witnesses and exhibits against conspirators in different venues, especially if the issues
involved are the same. It follows, therefore, that if a private person may be tried jointly with public officers, he or she may also be
convicted jointly with them."[107]
Thus, when an information alleges that a public officer "conspires," "confederates," "connives," or "colludes" with a private person, or
when the "allegation of basic facts constituting conspiracy [between the public officer and the private person is made] in a manner that
a person of common understanding would know what is intended,"[108] then a private person may be convicted under Section 3 of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The information against the private person will be sufficient in form and substance and, contrary to
Garcia-Diaz's argument, there is no "impossible crime"[109] against the private person.
The Information filed in Criminal Case No. 27974 provides that Solicitor General Galvez, NAMRIA Administrator Solis, Officer-in-Charge
Bonnevie, Assistant Director Fabian, and Remote Sensing Technologists Valencia and Viernes, all public officers, "conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, together with Florencia Garcia-Diaz, a private person,"[110] executed the Compromise
Agreement that declared a part of Fort Magsaysay as outside the technical description provided in Presidential Proclamation No. 237. It
obviously contains an allegation of conspiracy against petitioner Garcia-Diaz.
Having been charged and tried under a valid Information, petitioner Garcia-Diaz was validly convicted of Section 3(g) of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act. This is despite her being a private person.
II
For his part, petitioner Solis mainly contends that he was erroneously convicted because of the absence of the second and third
elements. He was not a party to the Compromise Agreement. Thus, he never entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the
government as provided in Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019. Furthermore, he points out that the registration of the 4,689 hectares
in the name of petitioner Garcia-Diaz did not push through; hence, there was no gross and manifest disadvantage to the government.
In so arguing, petitioner Solis disregards the essence of conspiracy where the act of one is the act of all.[111] A finding of conspiracy
means that all the accused are deemed to have "consented to and adopted as their own, the offense [of the other accused]."[112] Co-
conspirators are answerable collectively and equally, regardless of the degree of their participation in the crime,[113] because it is the
common scheme, purpose, or objective that is punished, not the individual acts of each of the accused.[114]
Here, the common scheme was to make it appear that part of the property described in BL Plan II-6752 is outside Fort
Magsaysay as described in Presidential Proclamation No. 237, and hence, alienable, disposable, and can be the subject of a
compromise. So while it is true that petitioner Solis was not the party who entered into the Compromise Agreement on behalf
of the government, it was his recommendation in his February 12, 1998 Letter that served as the basis for its execution. In the
words of petitioner Solis, "finding[s] disclose that the military reservation is not located in the topographic map sheets
referred to in the technical description in Proclamation No. 237."[115] Without this recommendation, there would be nothing to
compromise on in the first place. Petitioner Solis' recommendation was indispensable for the existence of the second
element.
It was also the recommendation of petitioner Solis that caused the existence of the third element. The segregation of 4,689
hectares of land of the public domain, to be registered in the name of a private person, was grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government. It is immaterial that the registration in the name of petitioner Garcia-Diaz did not push
through. Petitioner Solis remains liable because "the core element" of Section 3(g) is that the "engagement in a transaction or
contract . . . is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government." [116] Section 3(g) is unlike Section 3(e) 117 of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which requires actual injury to the government. 118 Surely, surrendering 4,689 hectares of
public domain is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.
Petitioner Solis' other arguments, i.e., that Fabian prepared his February 12, 1998 Letter and that petitioner Solis routinely affixed his
signature in it, and that he did not personally know Solicitor General Galvez and petitioner Garcia-Diaz, are factual in nature and cannot
be raised in the present Petition.[119] In any case, it was never established that Fabian or any other of petitioner Solis' subordinates
prepared his February 12, 1998 Letter. This Court agrees with the following findings of the Sandiganbayan:
To exonerate himself, accused Solis contended that he only relied on his subordinates when he signed the said February 12, 1998
letter, because it had already passed the 5 offices of the NAMRIA, as shown by the routing slip. He did not thoroughly examine the
attachments to the letter but relied on his technical people. However, the conformity to the contents of these offices to the letter, dated
February 12, 1998, could not be ascertained on the face of the routing slip. In fact, in item no. 4, Basa merely requested accused
Fabian of the Land Classification Division a briefing before the records would be forwarded to accused Solis. Nonetheless, the said
briefing did not happen, as could be gleaned from Basa's testimony that the papers directly went to accused Bonnevie. Moreover, Basa
testified, which accused Solis failed to rebut, that the February 12, 1998 letter did not pass through the usual procedure. Except for the
initial of accused Fabian under accused Solis' name, the letter did not bear the signatures of the Assistant Director and Deputy
Administrator Vinia. In fact, the letter appears to have been drafted even before the routing slip reached Basa on February 16, 1998. As
to accused Solis' testimony that he did not examine the attachments to the letter but depended on his technical people, the same is
inconsistent with his statement on direct examination. He claimed that he studied the letter the first time he saw it, because of the map
and several documents attached thereto. This simply means that he also scrutinized the attachments because these were the very
reason why he studied the letter. He was also the one who ordered the relocation survey, thus, it is impossible that he did not peruse
the survey report or the field notes. Moreover, to represent that 4,689 hectares of BL Plan II-6752 are outside the military reservation is
certainly a decision of great importance, as it would decide the fate of the compromise settlement. Accused Solis knew this, having
been told by the Office of the Solicitor General of the purpose of the relocation survey. Thus, we find it incredible that he only signified
his conformity without bothering to examine the attachments, unless, such decision had been a foregone conclusion.[120]
Therefore, petitioner Solis cannot put the blame on any of his subordinates as to the contents of his February 12, 1998 Letter.
Further, it is immaterial that petitioner Solis knew Solicitor General Galvez and petitioner Garcia-Diaz personally. Their
collective acts nevertheless show the common purpose of giving the Compromise Agreement a semblance of legitimacy.
Petitioners Garcia-Diaz and Solis remain equally liable as co-conspirators.
In sum, the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of petitioners Garcia-Diaz and Solis. They conspired to make it
appear that a 4,689-hectare portion of the property described in BL Plan II-6752 is outside the reservation described in Presidential
Proclamation No. 237. Garcia-Diaz cannot claim good faith because as early as 1975, this Court held in Director of Lands v.
Reyes[121] that the source of her supposed ownership—Possessory Information Title No. 216—does not exist. As for petitioner Solis, he
issued his February 12, 1998 Letter as basis to claim that the 4,689 hectares of land described in BL Plan II-6752 are located outside
Fort Magsaysay, knowing fully well that this statement is false. Petitioners Garcia-Diaz and Solis are liable for violation of Section 3(g)
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and the sentence of six (6) years and one (1) month to 10 years, with perpetual
disqualification from office, conforms with the penal provision of the statute[122] and with the Indeterminate Sentence Law.[123]
III
Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes the felony of falsification by a public officer, thus:
Article 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic minister. — The penalty of prisión mayor and a fine not to
exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall
falsify a document by committing any of the following acts:
1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric;

2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate;
3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other than those in fact made by them;
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
5. Altering true dates;
6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning;
7. Issuing in authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an original document when no such original exists, or
including in such copy a statement contrary to, or different from, that of the genuine original; or
8. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in a protocol, registry, or official book.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any ecclesiastical minister who shall commit any of the offenses enumerated in the preceding
paragraphs of this article, with respect to any record or document of such character that its falsification may affect the civil status of
persons.
In general, the elements of Article 171 are: first, "the offender is a public officer, employee, or notary public"; second, he or she takes
advantage of his or her official position; and third, he or she falsifies a document by committing any of the acts enumerated in Article
171.[124]
Specific to the fourth mode in Article 171, i.e., making untruthful statements in a narration of facts, the elements are: first, "the offender
makes in a [public] document untruthful statements in a narration of facts"; second, the offender "has a legal obligation to disclose the
truth of the facts narrated by him [or her]"; and, third, the facts that he or she narrated are absolutely false.[125] Further, to be convicted
under Article 171, the public officer must have taken advantage of his or her official position to commit the falsification either because
"he [or she] has the duty to make or prepare or otherwise to intervene in the preparation of a document," or because he or she has the
official custody of the falsified document.[126]
Petitioner Solis contends that the second element is absent because he had no legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts that he
narrated in his February 12, 1998 Letter to Solicitor General Galvez. At best, what he made was an inaccurate opinion on whether a
portion of the property described in BL Plan II-6752 is outside Fort Magsaysay as described m Presidential Proclamation No. 237.
At any rate, the February 12, 1998 Letter was allegedly prepared by Fabian, and that petitioner Solis signed it on the assumption that
Fabian properly performed his duty. Therefore, based on Arias v. Sandiganbayan,[127] where this Court said that "all heads of offices
have to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates,"[128] petitioner Solis contends that he should be exonerated from the
falsification charge.
Contrary to petitioner Solis' argument, he did not make a mere opinion but deliberately made an untruthful statement in his February 12,
1998 Letter. To recall, he wrote that "finding[s] disclose that the military reservation is not located in the topographic map sheets
referred to in the technical description in Proclamation No. 237,"[129] referring to the findings of Remote Sensing Technologists Valencia
and Viernes in their Summary Report. Nothing in the Summary Report, however, indicates that the property described in BL Plan II-
6752 is outside the military reservation as described in Presidential Proclamation No. 237. After re-surveying Fort Magsaysay, Valencia
and Viernes actually confirmed that they were able to relocate the actual ground positions of comers 6 and 7 of Fort Magsaysay. They
found that the Bureau of Lands Location Monuments remained in the position as earlier computed and plotted in the topographic map
referred to in Presidential Proclamation No. 237, indicating that the actual ground location of Fort Magsaysay conformed with the
technical description in Presidential Proclamation No. 237.
It is ridiculous to say that petitioner Solis had no legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts as he narrated in his February 12, 1998
Letter. On the contrary, inherent in the very nature and purpose of the document was petitioner Solis' obligation, as NAMRIA
Administrator, to disclose the truth of the facts as he narrated.[130] NAMRIA is the government agency responsible for conducting
geophysical surveys as well as managing resource information needed by both the public and private sectors.[131] Because of the
agency's special competence, petitioner Solis was requested by the Republic, through the Solicitor General, to conduct a re-survey of
Fort Magsaysay. He was informed at the outset that his agency's findings would determine whether or not the government would enter
into a compromise with petitioner Garcia-Diaz. To allow petitioner Solis to claim that he had no legal obligation to disclose the truth in
his letter will be contrary to NAMRIA's functions. It will erode the public's confidence in NAMRIA and all its issuances and research
findings.
It is true that this Court said in Arias[132] that "all heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates and on the
good faith of those who . . . enter into negotiations."[133] However, as earlier found, it was never established that a subordinate prepared
the February 12, 1998 Letter and that petitioner Solis merely signed it perfunctorily. The Sandiganbayan even found that it did not pass
the usual procedure, not being signed by an assistant director, a director, and a deputy administrator. Furthermore, petitioner Solis
testified on direct examination that he examined it and its attachments. It must be presumed that petitioner Solis prepared it, not a
subordinate. Arias, therefore, does not apply.
All told, petitioner Solis is guilty of falsification of public document. Petitioner Solis, then NAMRIA Administrator, wrote the February 12,
1998 Letter, an official correspondence to the Solicitor General, and therefore, a public document. He had the legal obligation to
disclose the truth of the facts narrated in it for he was fully aware that his findings would determine whether 4,689 hectares of the
property covered by BL Plan II-6752, claimed to be located outside Fort Magsaysay, may be the subject of a compromise. Lastly, as
established, the narration of facts was absolutely false and contrary to the findings of the foresters who re-surveyed Fort Magsaysay.
There being no modifying circumstance in this case, the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day
of prisión correccional medium as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of prisión mayor medium as maximum is in order.[134]
This Court notes that from the Office of the Solicitor General, only the late Solicitor General Galvez was charged before the
Sandiganbayan. Other officials of the Office of the Solicitor General who participated in the proceedings leading to the compromise,
specifically those who drafted the letters of Solicitor General Galvez to Administrator Solis requesting for a re-survey, were not
investigated. As such, copies of this Decision must be forwarded to the Office of the Ombudsman to determine the individuals who
should likewise be investigated for their possible liabilities.
WHEREFORE, the Petitions for Review on Certiorari are DENIED. The Sandiganbayan March 3, 2010 Decision and July 29, 2010
Resolution in Criminal Cases Nos. 27974-75 are AFFIRMED.
15.) G.R. No. 198162, June 21, 2017
CORAZON M. LACAP, Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN [FOURTH DIVISION] AND THE PEOPLE

OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
CAGUIOA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Decision1 dated February 21, 2011 (Decision) of the Sandiganbayan2 in Crim. Case No. SB 08-CRM-
0030, finding accused Corazon Mallari Lacap (Corazon) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
Section 3(f) of Republic Act No. 3019 (RA 3019), otherwise known as the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act," and imposing upon her the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) month
imprisonment as minimum to ten (10) years imprisonment as maximum, with perpetual
disqualification from public office.
The Charge Against the Accused
Corazon was indicted for violation of Section 3(f) of RA 3019, for having allegedly
neglected or refused, after due demand, and without sufficient justification, to act within a
reasonable time, on the application of complainant Fermina Santos (Fermina) for a
business permit in Masantol, Pampanga for the years 1999 and 2000 for the purpose of
discriminating against Fermina.3 The Information reads: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That during the period from February 1999 to March 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto,
in the Municipality of Masantol, Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, CORAZON M. LACAP, a high ranking public officer, being the
Municipal Mayor of Masantol, Pampanga, while in the performance of her official functions,
committing the offense in relation to duty and taking advantage thereof, motivated by one criminal
impulse, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally neglect or refuse to act, within a
reasonable time, on private complainant Fermina Santos' application for Mayor's Permit, duly filed
with the office of the accused within the above-stated periods (sic), and despite her repeated
demands or requests and complete documentary requirements supporting the same, which unlawful
act of the accused was done to spite and retaliate against said private complainant for having
previously filed a criminal complaint against the accused's husband, thereby favoring the latter's own
interest and discriminating against Fermina Santos, to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
The pertinent sub-section of RA 3019 provides: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(f) Neglecting or refusing, after due demand or request, without sufficient justification to act within a
reasonable time on any matter pending before him for the purpose of obtaining directly or
indirectly, from any person interested in the matter some pecuniary or material benefit or
advantage, or for purpose of favoring his own interest or giving undue advantage in favor
of or discriminating against any other interested party.
The Facts and Antecedent Proceedings
Corazon was arraigned on April 28, 2008 and, with the assistance of her counsel, she pleaded not
guilty to the charge against her. The pre-trial conference was terminated on July 11, 2008. Trial on
the merits then ensued.5
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution presented the following witnesses:
1. Fermina Santos, the private complainant;
2. Atty. Julita Santos Manalac Calderon (Atty. Calderon), the Graft Investigation and Prosecution
Officer III of the Office of the Ombudsman assigned at the Public Assistance Bureau Central
Office;
3. Marina Josieriza Fronda Paras, the municipal treasurer of Masantol, Pampanga;
4. Alejandro G. Santos, the husband of the complainant;
5. Tomas S. Manansala, the son-in-law of the complainant and an ambulant vendor of school
supplies in Sto. Niño, Masantol, Pampanga; and
6. Andres T. Onofre, Jr., a businessman engaged in selling school supplies in Sto. Niño, Masantol,
Pampanga.6
Fermina's testimony is summarized in the assailed Decision, viz: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
She owns the Fersan Variety: Store [located in Masantol, Pampanga and] engaged in the sale of
school supplies, furniture and accessories since 1975. x x x
She usually applies for a Mayor's Permit between February and March of every year and has been
submitting to the Office of the Mayor for the issuance of Mayor's Permit the [required] documents x x
x. If everything is complete, she will present these documents to the Office of the Treasurer in
Masantol, Pampanga for assessment and evaluation and then it will be submitted to the Office of the
Mayor for approval. From 1975 to 1998, the Mayor of Masantol has been issuing her a Mayor's Permit
x x x.
For the year 1999, she filed an Application for Mayor's Permit (Exh. A) and submitted to the Mayor's
Office the following documents in compliance with the requirements: Taxpayer's Information Sheet
(Exh. B), Social Security Systems' Clearance x x x ([Exh.] D), Community Tax Certificate x x x (Exh.
E), Health Certificate (Exh. F), Sanitary Permit x x x (Exh. G), Fire Permit x x x (Exh. H), Barangay
Certificate (Exh. I), Certificate of Registration of Business Name (Exh. J). However, accused Mayor
Corazon Lacap denied her application and she (accused) was angry at her x x x. She went back to
accused Lacap twice to ask for reconsideration but she (Lacap) was even more angry, and told them
(sic) to leave the place. Accused Lacap even said "I will not sign it, are you lucky?" x x x.
The misunderstanding started when she filed [a complaint] against Abelardo Dizon, the
compadre of Mayor Corazon Lacap x x x. Epifanio Lacap[, the husband of the accused]
called her up and asked her to withdraw the complaint against his compadre. She told
Epifanio to be fair but Epifanio shouted invectives at her. Epifanio said "kung hindi kayo
susunod sa akin, makikita nyo, mga walanghiya kayo, magsilayas kayo diyan!" x x x.
She went to the Office of Elpidian Asuncion, the Director of the Public Assistance Bureau of the
Ombudsman and she was referred to Atty. Julita Calderon.
Atty. Calderon issued a notice to accused Lacap to visit her Office. Atty. Calderon also advised her
(Santos) to go to accused Lacap, and after two days, she went to accused Lacap's office together
with her husband and a radio reporter x x x. However, accused Lacap still denied her application and
told her "[A]re you lucky? You filed a case against my husband, you filed a case against me, and
now, I will issue you a permit? Get out!" x x x.
x x x [S]he filed four complaints against the Lacap Spouses. The first was filed against Corazon Lacap
in the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of San Fernando, Pampanga when she had the Fersan Store closed
on July 3, 1998 (Exh. R); the second was a complaint against her husband, Epifanio Lacap[,] before
the Office of the Prosecutor of San Fernando, Pampanga for Serious Oral Defamation (Exh. B); third
is a complaint filed before the DILG Region 3 x x x; and the fourth is before the Office of the
Ombudsman (Exh. O). She did not violate anything but still former Mayor Epifanio Lacap ordered the
closure of her store because of the cases.
x x x [S]he is not aware of a Task Force created in 1998 to eradicate the illegal businesses within
Masantol, Pampanga.
In 1998, former Mayor Epifanio Lacap ordered the closure of her store because she filed a complaint
against him on March 17, 1998 x x x. It was Epifanio Lacap who asked her to get a permit from the
DTI which is one of the requirements for the approval of the application for Mayor's Permit. On April
1, 1998 she was issued a Mayor's Permit but she was told to get a DTI Certificate of Registration x x
x. She claimed that her documents were complete when she applied for Mayor's Permit in 1998. At
first her store was ordered closed by Epifanio Lacap and the second time it was ordered closed by
Mayor Corazon Lacap on July 3, 1998 x x x.
She also own[ed] the Pining Variety Store which operated from 1980 to 1998 until it was ordered
closed by accused Corazon Lacap x x x. She has only one x x x store in Masantol[,] Pampanga. She
alleged that every five years, the name of the store should be changed as instructed by the DTI x x
x. The name of the store before was Pining [V]ariety [S]tore and after five years x x x [i]n 1998, the
name x x x changed to x x x Fersan Variety Store that was ordered closed by Mayor Corazon Lacap x
x x.
When she presented her application (Exh. A) for approval, accused Lacap did not look at it and she
was very angry x x x.
Witness said that she has a permit in 1998 and yet they closed her store. There were two x x x
policemen and a bodyguard carrying firearms who went to her store and forcibly padlocked her store
x x x. She was not able to get her merchandise until x x x 2001 so none were (sic) sold or could be
sold because they were damaged, either eaten by molds or cockroaches x x x. It was RTC Judge
Reynaldo Raura who ordered that her store be opened.7
The assailed Decision likewise summarized the testimony of Atty. Calderon in this wise: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
She met Fermina Santos in 1998 when the latter went to her office to seek assistance regarding the
closing and padlocking of her business establishment x x x.
She wrote to x x x Mayor x x x Corazon Lacap, to ask her the reasons for the closure and padlocking
of Santos' store. Accused responded but since it was already late in the year, Santos said that she is
no longer interested in the closure and padlocking of her store x x x.
In 1999, Santos again went to her office to ask for assistance in the renewal of her business permit
in x x x Masantol, Pampanga because the City Government of Pampanga refused to accept her
application for renewal of business permit x x x.
Santos submitted to her documents including the original copy of the application which was refused.
She (Atty. Calderon) wrote to the Municipal Treasurer of Masantol, Pampanga, Criselda Diaz vda. de
Santillan to invite her for a conference and to ask why she refused to accept the documents x x x.
When Santillan appeared, she handed a letter (Exh. M) stating that Santos withdrew her application.
The letter also states that the Municipal Bookkeeper already processed the application for business
permit but when it was brought to the Office of the Mayor, she is no longer in the position to know
the result because it was not returned to her anymore x x x.
They wrote Santos to bring the application for them to make a letter forwarding all the documents to
the Municipal Mayor. In [a letter dated April 26,] 1999, she wrote again the Municipal Mayor
forwarding to her all the documents which were brought by Santos to her Office. She attached to her
letter (Exh. N) Exh. A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, K, L. At the time she wrote the letter she had in mind
that everything was complete and it is the duty of the Mayor to issue a permit x x x.
Mayor Lacap did not reply but her counsel requested for time to answer the letter dated April 26,
1999. In May, 1999, accused Lacap's counsel made a response (Exh. P) that it was Santos who
withdrew her application and thus[,] there is nothing, no application in the Office of the Mayor which
they could act on x x x.8
In turn, the gist of Marina Josieriza Paras' testimony, as reflected in the assailed Decision, is as
follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[As the Municipal Treasurer of Masantol, Pampanga], [h]er office is tasked to make the proper
implementation of the collection of taxes and fees for the issuance of Mayor's Permit.
Prior to the issuance of a Mayor's Permit, the applicant must x x x proceed to the Office of the
Treasurer to secure [an] application form. x x x.
When all the documents are presented, the applicant will proceed to the Assessment Office and will
be required to pay the assessment fees. The Municipal Treasurer will in turn issue receipt. The
applicant can now go to the Office of the Mayor for the approval and issuance of a Mayor's permit x x
x.
The same procedure applies, except that in the year 1999 [during the incumbency of Lacap] before
they can issue the Mayor's Permit, the application should be approved by the Mayor x x x.
xxxx
She knows Fermina Santos because Santos ran for Mayor in 1998. At the time when Santos filed the
application for business permit for the year 1999 Santos was already a candidate for Mayor in
Masantol, Pampanga x x x.9
Alejandro Santos, husband of Fermina, testified that: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
x x x [O]n two (2) occasions he was maligned by a certain Epifanio Lacap, the husband of accused
Corazon Lacap.
Sometime on March 11, 1998, while he was fixing the roof in their warehouse in Arabia, Masantol,
Pampanga, he was picked-up by (two) 2 policemen of the then Mayor Epifanio Lacap. He was brought
to the Mayor's house and Mayor Epifanio demanded that the case against his compadre, Abelardo
Dizon, be withdrawn. He explained to him (Epifanio) that he and Abelardo Dizon had already an
agreement and that he can no longer withdraw the case as the same is a case of double sale and is
already pending with the court x x x. The Mayor was so angry at him and told him that he does not
care even how many agreements he had with his compadre as long as he will withdraw the case
against Dizon. His wife also arrived at the Mayor's house and when the Mayor saw her, he even
shouted at her: "Ayan ang isang sakim dumarating, mga putang inang yan mga sakim! x x x Feeling
so humiliated at that time because they were berated in front of so many people, they eventually left
the place. After that incident, he and his wife filed complaints against Mayor Epifanio Lacap but he
can no longer recall what happened with those complaints.
Sometime in 1999, his wife filed an application for Mayor's permit to operate the business in the
market area under the business name Fersan Variety Store, but the same was not approved by
accused Mayor Corazon Lacap. But in 1998, they were issued a business permit because at that time
they have not yet filed a complaint against Mayor Epifanio Lacap x x x. He thought that there was
already a bad blood between their families because he refused to heed the demand of former Mayor
Epifanio Lacap to withdraw the complaint against Abelardo Dizon x x x.
It was accused Mayor Corazon Lacap who ordered the closure of their store x x x.10
Lastly, Andres T. Onofre, Jr. testified that:
He is a businessman engaged in the selling of school supplies also in Sto. Niño, Masantol, Pampanga.
From 1990 to 1999, he was not able to secure license/permit from the Municipality. What he just did
was to fill up an application form to operate a store and submit the same to the Municipality of
Masantol and then he was already issued an official receipt x x x. He already considered that as an
authority to operate his business x x x and all those years, he was never questioned by the Mayor for
operating a business without a permit x x x.11
Version of the Defense
After the prosecution rested its case, the defense presented the following two witnesses:
1. Corazon M. Lacap, the accused and elected Mayor of Masantol, Pampanga in May 1998; and
2. Belinda B. Trinidad, the former bookkeeper of Masantol, Pampanga.12
As culled from the assailed Decision, Corazon testified that: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
She knows the private complainant Santos because she is a kumare whom she considers a friend.
Complainant Santos owns a variety store which she allegedly ordered to be closed. The truth was
that she did not order the closure of the store because when she assumed her post as a Mayor,
Santos' store was already closed by her husband, the former Mayor Epifanio Lacap, way back June
23, 1997 x x x. The reason for the said closure was that x x x Santos was operating without a
Mayor's permit, DTI, SSS and that she was not issuing official receipt to their customers x x x.
xxxx
The Office of the Ombudsman, thru a certain Atty. Calderon, wrote her a letter asking her to inform
the Ombudsman of whatever action she may have taken with regard to the application of Fermina
Santos for a Mayor's Permit x x x.
x x x [I]t was her lawyer who answered the letter of Atty. Calderon. It was stated in the letters that
accused Mayor cannot possibly act on the alleged application of complainant Santos for the simple
reason that the application was not yet submitted to the Mayor's Office for appropriate action x x x.
Her basis is the certification issued by the Treasurer's Office to the effect that there is no application
that reached their office for 1999-2000 x x x.13
Belinda B. Trinidad, on the other hand, testified that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
She was the former Bookkeeper of the Municipality of Masantol, Pampanga. One of her duties was to
process the application for municipal license and to check if the requirements are complete.
Sometime in February, 2000, upon verification with their record book, there was no application for a
business permit filed by Fermina Santos x x x. As proof of that statement, she issued a Certification
to that effect x x x.
xxxx
On March 10, 2000, she again issued a Certification (Exh. 7) stating therein that there is still a
missing document that is why the Mayora did not approve the application of Santos x x x.
Way back 1999, there was no application for Municipal license filed by complainant Santos in their
office x x x.14
The Sandiganbayan Ruling
The Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision15 dated February 21, 2011 finding the prosecution's evidence
sufficient for conviction and holding Corazon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section
3(f) of RA 3019, and imposed upon her the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day
imprisonment as minimum to ten (10) years imprisonment as maximum, with perpetual
disqualification from public office.
Corazon filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the Sandiganbayan in its
Resolution16 dated August 4, 2011 for lack of merit and because there were no new matters raised
therein.
Aggrieved, Corazon filed the instant petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The Office of the
Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman, representing the People of the Philippines, filed
its Comment dated March 23, 2012.17 Corazon then filed a Manifestation with Motion to Admit
Attached Reply to Comment.18 The Office of the Special Prosecutor filed its Memorandum dated March
20, 2014.19 Corazon filed a Motion to Admit Attached Memorandum dated May 8, 2014.20
In a Resolution dated August 17, 2016,21 this case was transferred from the Third Division to the First
Division.
Issues
Corazon raised three issues in her Petition: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) whether the Sandiganbayan committed serious misapprehension of facts in having found the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of official inaction under Section 3(f) of the Anti-Graft Law;
(2) whether the accused's act of referring the letter of Atty. Calderon to her lawyer for appropriate response
constitutes a felony; and
(3) whether the Sandiganbayan wrongly assumed that the accused acted with criminal intent to
discriminate against the private complainant absent any categorical evidence therefor.22
The Court's Ruling
There is no merit in Corazon's petition.
The issues raised by Corazon in her petition essentially show that she disputes the
existence of the elements of the offense penalized under Section 3(f) of RA 3019, to
wit: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[1.] The offender is a public officer;

[2.] The said officer has neglected or has refused to act without sufficient justification after due
demand or request has been made on him;
[3.] Reasonable time has elapsed. from such demand or request without the public officer having
acted on the matter pending before him; and
[4.] Such failure to so act is for the purpose of obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any person
interested in the matter some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage in favor of an
interested party, or discriminating against another.23
The resolution of the three issues, therefore, rests upon the existence of sufficient proof to establish
the four elements enumerated above.
The first element is not disputed. As the then Municipal Mayor of Masantol, Pampanga, who assumed
office on June 30, 1998,24 Corazon was, at the time of the commission of the offense charged, a
public officer.
The second issue raised by Corazon disputes the presence of the second and third elements, while
the third issue puts in doubt the fourth element.
Corazon argues that she did not refuse to act on Fermina's application for a mayor's permit as
contained in the transmittal letter of Atty. Calderon (Exh. "N") to Corazon. Corazon deemed it wise to
refer the said letter to her retained lawyer, Atty. Andres Pangilinan (Atty. Pangilinan), because of
"other pending cases lodged by [Fermina] against [Corazon] in the Regional Trial Court of Macabebe,
Pampanga, and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Pampanga."25 Corazon adds that, as a non-lawyer,
she had to refer the matter to her lawyer for legal advice "because [to her mind] there were already
a number of cases filed by [Fermina] against her involving the same subject matter pending before
the courts and other agencies, which may render the issue thereat moot and academic."26 For
Corazon, she made a "POSITIVE AND CATEGORICAL ACT" when she referred Atty. Calderon's letter
to her lawyer, Atty. Pangilinan, "in order to appropriately respond to the same."27 Moreover, Corazon
posits that Atty. Pangilinan's response to Atty. Calderon's transmittal letter that "[Fermina] had
already withdrawn her application for business permit and, thus, there is no more application to act
upon" is proof that Corazon acted on Fermina's application for business permit.
Corazon further argues that there is no direct proof of her criminal intent to discriminate against
Fermina "established by the prosecution in this case which is why the [Sandiganbayan] merely relied
on the assumption that when [Corazon] referred the letter of [Atty. Calderon] to her lawyer, [Atty.
Pangilinan], she simply refused to issue to [Fermina] the Mayor's Permit she was asking for."28
The foregoing arguments have been squarely addressed by the Sandiganbayan which found them
without merit. The assailed Decision states: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Accused Lacap acknowledged in open court her receipt of the letter (Exh. N) sent to her by Atty.
Calderon with attachments which included Santos' application and other requirements (Exhs. A to L),
(TSN, p. 42, July 1, 2009). It is to be noted that Atty. Calderon wrote the Mayor, accused Lacap, and
forwarded to the latter all the documents. In that letter, Atty. Calderon stated: "We hope that by this
transmittal letter, action on Mrs. Santos' application will now be attended to with dispatch". Accused
Lacap did not reply, and instead, simply referred the matter to her lawyer with whom she allegedly
consulted (Ibid., p. 49). Having received the documents and necessarily aware of what those
documents are, the appreciation of and action on which being within her official competence as
Mayor, it was incumbent upon, it was expected of, accused Lacap to act promptly on the matter,
given the request that the matter be acted upon with dispatch, and considering prior incidents of
rejection of the same application allegedly due to incomplete requirements. It has been held that
"Public officials are called upon to act expeditiously on matters pending before them. For only in
acting thereon either by signifying approval or disapproval may the plaintiff continue on to the next
step of the bureaucratic process. On the other hand, official inaction brings to a standstill the
administrative process and the plaintiff is left in the darkness of uncertainty." (Jose V. Nessia vs.
Jesus M. Fermin, and Municipality of Victorias, Negros Occidental, G.R. No. 102918, March 30, 1993).
The duty of accused Lacap as the public official concerned, to act is clear and unambiguous. The
situation then obtaining did not call for any legal expertise. There was no need for accused Mayor
Lacap to refer the matter to a lawyer for consultation. The Mayor simply had to check if the
documents are complete and then act on it. It was obviously a case of refusal to act, and for which
we find no justification, as none is extant in the records.
Observably, accused Lacaps acknowledgement of receipt of the documents runs counter to her
lawyer's letter-reply to Atty. Calderon which, while acknowledging their receipt of Atty. Calderon's
letter dated April 26, 1999, nevertheless, pointed out that the Office of the Mayor could not, "at this
point in time" (obviously referring to the time of their receipt of the letter allegedly on May 7, 1999),
act on the alleged application for a business permit "for the simple reason that her application was
not yet submitted to the Honorable Mayor's Office for appropriate action". (Exh. P; Exh. 8).
Considering the inconsistency, it becomes apparent that the lawyer was either misinformed or
misled.
In the same letter, the lawyer further stated that upon their inquiry, they discovered that "the
application of Fermina Santos which was submitted to the Office of the Treasurer was withdrawn,
hence, for all intents and purposes, no more application for business license was formally pending
before the Office of the Mayor or even at the Office of the Municipal Treasurer of Masantol
Pampanga." Such alleged withdrawal of Santos' application has not been substantiated. The sources
of that information have not been disclosed and stated for verification. Defense' (sic) Exh. 6
(Certification issued by Belinda B. Trinidad, Bookkeeper, Office of the Municipal Treasurer, x x x
Masantol, Pampanga) indicates that as per records kept on file in their office, certain Ms. Fermina
Santos has no pending application for business license for the year 2000 as of this date (February 28,
2000). Likewise, the Certification dated March 10, 2000 issued by the same official (Exh. 7) indicates
that Santos' application for business license and business permit was not approved by Mayor Corazon
Lacap due to lack of SSS clearance for 2000. x x x Plainly, the certifications do not support the
alleged withdrawal of application. It should not be forgotten that the application together with all the
supporting documents were directly sent to and received by accused Lacap.
What clearly appears to have been withdrawn by Santos was her administrative charge against
accused Lacap in her (Santos') letter to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan dated April 6, 1999 (Exh. O;
Exh. 9). In the same letter, Santos stated that she has decided to cease/stop doing business in
Masantol, Pampanga, a statement which the Defense took to mean a withdrawal of Santos'
application for a business permit. We are not persuaded. Taken in its entirety, the letter directly
relates to Santos' withdrawal of her administrative charge. Her decision to stop doing business in
Masantol, Pampanga is, as appropriately pointed out by the Prosecution in its Memorandum, "an
expression of Ms. Santos' frustrations over the case she filed in said body" (citing TSN, September 1,
2008).
Notably moreover, when confronted by the Chairperson of the Fourth Division of this Court hearing
this case with the observation that the truth of the matter is that x x x accused Lacap x x x did not
give Santos the Mayor's Permit notwithstanding the documents sent to her by Atty. Calderon x x x,
accused Lacap was evasive in her response. Pushed against the wall, she sought to hide behind her
lawyer whose services clearly were not called for at that point in time. She merely came up with the
following lame response: "My Lawyer. I consulted my lawyer so he was the one who answered the
letter of Atty. Calderon" (TSN, p. 49, July 1, 2009).
Given the foregoing considerations, the conclusion is inevitable, that is, that accused Corazon's
inaction on Santos' application was willful and deliberate, and the motive behind the same cannot but
be deducible from her (Corazon's) open court admission that Santos filed cases against her, one for
Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019; another for Mandamus in the Regional Trial Court of
Macabebe, Pampanga; and an administrative case before the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in San
Fernando, Pampanga (TSN, p. 18, July 1, 2009). Prosecution's documentary Exhibits R and V show
that Santos filed administrative and criminal case against accused Corazon's husband, Epifanio Lacap
in 1998 and 1999. These documented facts bolster the conclusion as aforestated, and
correspondingly establish the fact that the deliberate refusal to act is for the purpose of
discriminating against Santos. Such discrimination is further made manifest by the testimony of
Andres T. Onofre, Jr., who is, like Santos, engaged in the sale of school supplies in Masantol,
Pampanga that from 1990 to 1999, he was not able to secure [a] license to operate his store from
the Municipality (TSN, January 7, 2009, p. 23). And all those years, he was never questioned by the
Mayor from operating a business without a permit (ibid., p. 30).
Perceptibly, the filing of this case was triggered or impelled by the personal animosity
between the principal protagonists (complainant Santos and accused Corazon) but the
latter should not be unmindful of the fact that she is a public official who is enjoined to
respond to the call of her duty with the highest degree of dedication often beyond her own
interest (A.M. No. P-97-1241, March 20, 2001, Dinna Castillo vs. Zenaida C. Buencillo). As a public
official, she must rise above personal differences, personal conflicts she may have with the public
whom she committed to serve.29
Corazon raised the same arguments in her Motion for Reconsideration dated March 7, 201130 before
the Sandiganbayan, but the Sandiganbayan stood its ground and denied the Motion for
Reconsideration.
In its Resolution31 dated August 4, 2011 (Resolution), the Sandiganbayan reasoned out: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Notably, no new matters have been raised by the accused to warrant a reconsideration of the
judgment rendered in this case. The arguments reiterated and later amplified, failed to convince.
The judgment of conviction was not based on mere assumptions simply conjured up. Accused's guilt
for the offense charged was based on and/or drawn from facts which have been established.
1. There was inaction on Santos' application for the business permit, prompting Santos
to seek the assistance of the Public Assistance Bureau of the Office of the
Ombudsman. The inaction became more perceptibly deliberate when, despite receipt
from Atty. Calderon of the Ombudsman's Public Assistance Bureau of the letter-
request for immediate action, accused Mayor still did not take action on the
application, neither on the request The only official action required of her by law as
the Municipal Mayor was to either approve or disapprove the application. She did
neither, but simply referred the letter to her lawyer even when nothing demanded referral to a
lawyer. That referral was not the official action contemplated by the law in that situation. That
referral is inaction which, however, is not the same as, nor can it be equated with,
disapproval.
2. To constitute a violation of Sec. 3(f), R.A. 3019, the inaction on the part of the public
official is not solely for the purpose of obtaining some gain, benefit or advantage for
him (accused public officer). It may also be for the purpose of discriminating against
another (Coronado vs. Sandiganbayan, 44 SCAD 21).
xxxx
Accused had the motive to discriminate against the private complainant, and this has not been
simply assumed or surmised, but drawn from facts which have been established, documented, and
even admitted by the accused (as discussed in pages 18 and 19 of the assailed Decision).32
The Court completely agrees with the findings and ruling of the Sandiganbayan.
The Constitution mandates that: "Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at
all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives."33 Thus, "[they] are called upon to
act expeditiously on matters pending before them. For only in acting thereon either by signifying
approval or disapproval may the [public] continue on to the next step of the bureaucratic process. On
the other hand, official inaction brings to a standstill the administrative process and the [public] is
left in the darkness of uncertainty."34
In an application for a mayor's permit or license to do business in a municipality or city, the

procedure is fairly standard and uncomplicated. It requires the submission of the required documents
and the payment of the assessed business taxes and fees. In case of failure to comply with the
requirements, the application deserves to be disapproved. If the application is compliant, then
approval is the action to be taken. An inaction or refusal to act is a course of action anathema to
public service with utmost responsibility and efficiency. If the deliberate refusal to act or intentional
inaction on an application for mayor's permit is motivated by personal conflicts and political
considerations, it thus becomes discriminatory, and constitutes a violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act.
The authority of the mayor to issue licenses and permits is not ministerial, it is discretionary.
In Roble Arrastre, Inc. v. Villaflor,35 the Court held:
The crux of the instant controversy is whether respondent mayor can be compelled by a writ
of mandamus to grant petitioner's application for a renewal of a business permit to operate an
arrastre service at the Municipal Port of Hilongos in Leyte.
Ostensibly, it is petitioner's contention that respondent mayor's power to issue permits as contained
in the aforesaid law [Republic Act No. (RA) 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of
1991] is ministerial; hence, mandamus lies.
xxxx
x x x [W]e make a determination of the nature of the power of respondent mayor to grant petitioner
a permit to operate an arrastre service. Central to the resolution of the case at bar is a reading of
Section 444(b)(3)(iv) of the Local Government Code of 1991, which provides, thus: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC 444. The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation.
(b) For efficient, effective d economical governance the purpose of which is the general welfare of the
municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the Municipal mayor shall:
xxxx
(3) Initiate and maximize the generation of resources and revenues, and apply the same to the
implementation of development plans, program objectives and priorities as provided for under
Section 18 of this Code, particularly those resources and revenues programmed for agro-industrial
development and country-wide growth and progress, and relative thereto, shall:
xxxx
(iv) Issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the conditions
upon which said licenses or permits had been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance. (Italics supplied.)
As Section 444(b)(3)(iv) so states, the power of the municipal mayor to issue licenses is pursuant to
Section 16 of the Local Government Code of 1991, which declares: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 16. General Welfare. - Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted,
those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its
efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general
welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and
support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety,
enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of
appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance
economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain
peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
Section 16, known as the general welfare clause, encapsulates the delegated police power to local
governments. Local government units exercise police power through their respective legislative
bodies. Evidently, the Local Government Code of 1991 is unequivocal that the municipal mayor has
the power to issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the
conditions upon which said licenses or permits had been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance. x x x
xxxx
x x x What can be deduced from [Section 444(b)(3)(iv)] is that the limits in the exercise of the
power of a municipal mayor to issue licenses, and permits and suspend or revoke the same can be
contained in a law or an ordinance. Otherwise stated, a law or an ordinance can provide the
conditions upon which the power of the municipal mayor under Section 444(b)(3)(iv) can be
exercised. x x x
xxxx
Section 444(b)(3)(iv) of the Local Government Code of 1991, whereby the power of the respondent
mayor to issue license and permits is circumscribed, is a manifestation of the delegated police power
of a municipal corporation. Necessarily, the exercise thereof cannot be deemed ministerial. x x x36
While a discretionary power or authority of Corazon, as the then Municipal Mayor of Masantol,
Pampanga, is involved in this case, its exercise must be pursuant to law and ordinance. The mayor
must act on the application for a business permit, and as correctly pointed out by the
Sandiganbayan, the action expected of the mayor was either to approve or disapprove the same.
When Corazon referred to her lawyer, Atty. Pangilinan, the transmittal letter of Atty. Calderon, to
which Fermina's application for mayor's permit and supporting documents were attached,
Corazon did not act according to law or ordinance. Indeed, she failed to cite any law or ordinance
which required her to do so. Her purported good faith belief that the cases which Fermina had filed
against her and her husband had a bearing on Fermina's application for mayor's permit is not borne
out, and actually belied, by Atty. Pangilinan's reply to Atty. Calderon's letter which made no mention
of those pending cases. Rather than being a proof of "POSITIVE AND CATEGORICAL ACT"37 as
claimed by Corazon in her Petition, the reply letter shows that Corazon merely dribbled the ball, so to
speak, and made Corazon's deliberate refusal' to act on Fermina's application for business/mayor's
permit and her motive clear and patent.
The reply letter emphasized that Fermina had no pending application and considering the non-
existence of her application, how could Corazon act on a non-existing application; and advised
Fermina to re-apply for a business permit. But the reply letter ignored Atty. Calderon's supplication:
"We hope that by this transmittal letter, action on Mrs. Santos' application will now be attended to
with dispatch."38 The reply letter even made no reference to the application of Fermina and
supporting requirements that were attached to Atty. Calderon's transmittal letter. There is no
question then, to the mind of the Court, that Corazon simply ignqred Fermina's application for
mayor's permit' and its supporting documents. There is likewise no doubt that the act of Corazon in
referring the matter to her lawyer was merely a ploy to mask her refusal to act and avoid possible
anction for her inaction.
The purported advice for Fermina to re-apply for a business permit in the face of the duly filled-up
application and supporting documents attached to Atty. Calderon's letter, as well as the express
supplication for an action with dispatch on the application unequivocally show the intentional inaction
or deliberate refusal to act on Corazon's part.
That discrimination underlied this refusal is also apparent in the reply letter, which states:
After going over your letter, it is clear that Mrs. Fennina Santos is merely using your office
to harass the Honorable Mayor of Masantol. x x x Mrs. Fermina Santos concealed vital informations
(sic) regarding her application for business license and to enlighten your office, under date of April
06, 1999, the Office of the Mayor was copy furnished of a letter addressed to the Acting Vice
Governor of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, wherein in the said letter, Fermina Santos categorically
stated she decided to cease/stop doing business in Masantol, Pampanga and several days thereafter
she withdrew her application for business license in the Municipality of Masantol, Pampanga.39
Assuming that Fermina indeed had evil motives in seeking the intervention of the Office of the
Ombudsman, Corazon, being the public officer tasked to issue municipal peqnits and licenses, was
expected to rise above personal conflicts and political rivalries and act pursuant to the applicable law
and ordinance. The actuations of Corazon vis-a-vis Fermina, being a political rival, should have been
above board and circumspect to forestall any complaint from Fermina of political vendetta. The
alleged withdrawal of Fermina's application pn April 6, 1999 clearly has no bearing on her application
for mayor's permit attached to the transmittal letter of Atty. Calderon dated April 26, 1999. Corazon
should have thus acted on Fermina's application as transmitted.
In her Petition, Corazon says:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
A perusal of her application in 1999 which was marked by the prosecution as Exhibit "A", will in tantly
reveal that it does not bear any rubber stamp marking which would show that the same was either
received officially by the Municipal Assessor's Office or the Office of the Municipal Mayor. Also, it is
the original application itself, which could only mean that, indeed, she carried with her the application
and had never filed the same.
xxxx
In fact, a deep perusal of the attachments in the application for business permit submitted by the
complainant to Atty. Calderon, it instantly reveals that the complainant has not paid the Mayor's
Permit fee in 1998 inasmuch as the Official Receipts which she presented and marked by the
prosecution as Exhs. "K" and "L" are official receipts pertaining to the year 1998. x x x40
This argument does not convince. If the defects in the application and supporting requirements
attached to Atty. Calderon's transmittal letter were so obvious, then Corazon could have easily
disapproved Fermina's application. She did not do this. Instead, Corazon referred the matter to her
personal lawyer. Rather than advance her cause, those allegations in her Petition continue to make
obvious the criminal intent to discriminate against Fermina, her political rival, which animated her
deliberate refusal to act or intentional inaction on Fermina's application for a business/mayor's
permit.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the Decision of the Sandiganbayan promulgated on February 21,

2011 in Crim. Case No. SB 08-CRM-0030 finding accused Corazon Mallari Lacap GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 3(f) of Republic Act No. 3019 otherwise known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended, and imposing upon her the penalty of imprisonment for
an indeterminate period of six (6) years and one (1) month imprisonment, as minimum, to ten (10)
years imprisonment, as maximum, with perpetual disqualification from public office.
16.) G.R. No. 186421 *
ROBERTO P. FUENTES, Petitioner
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE,J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are the Decision dated September 30, 2008 and the
1 2
Resolution dated February 16, 2009 of the Sandiganbayan in Crim. Case No. 28342, which found petitioner
3
Roberto P. Fuentes (Fuentes) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Article 3 (e) of Republic Act No. (RA)
4
3019, entitled the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act." 5
The Facts
The instant case stemmed from an Information charging Fuentes of violation of Article 3 (e) of RA 3019, the
accusatory portion of which states:
That on January 8, 2002 and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto at the Municipality of Isabel, Province of
Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused ROBERTO P.
FUENTES, a high-ranking public officer, being the Municipal Mayor of Isabel, Leyte, in such capacity and
committing the offense in relation to office, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and criminally cause undue injury to private complainant Fe N. Valenzuela by then and
there refusing for unreasonable length of time, to renew the latter's Business Permit to engage in Ship
Chandling Services in the Port of Isabel without any legal basis or reason despite the fact that Fe N.
Valenzuela has complied with all the requirements and has been operating the Ship Chandling Services in
the Port of Isabel since 1993, which act caused damage to the perishable ship provisions of Fe N.
Valenzuela for MN Ace Dragon and a denial of her right to engage in a legitimate business thereby causing
damage and prejudice to Fe N. Valenzuela.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 6
On September 15, 2006, Fuentes pleaded "not guilty" to the aforesaid charge. 7
The prosecution alleged that private complainant Fe Nepomuceno Valenzuela (Valenzuela) is the sole proprietor of
Triple A Ship Chandling and General Maritime Services (Triple A), which was operating in the Port of Isabel, Leyte
since 1993 until 2001 through the Business Permits issued by the Local Government Unit of Isabel (LGU) during the
said period. However, in 2002, Fuentes, then Mayor of Isabel, refused to sign Triple A's Business Permit,
despite: (a) Valenzuela's payment of the renewal fees; (b) all the other municipal officers of the LGU having signed
the same, thereby signifying their approval thereto; and (c) a Police Clearance certifying that Valenzuela had no
8
derogatory records in the municipality. Initially, Triple A was able to carry out its business despite the lack of the said
Business Permit by securing temporary permits with the Port Management Office as well as the Bureau of Customs
(BOC). However, Triple A's operations were shut down when the BOC issued a Cease and Desist
Order after receiving Fuentes's unnumbered Memorandum alleging that Valenzuela was involved in
9 10
smuggling and drug trading. This caused the BOC to require Valenzuela to secure a Business Permit from the
LGU in order to resume Triple A's operations. After securing the Memorandum, Valenzuela wrote to Fuentes
pleading that she be issued a Business Permit, but the latter's security refused to receive the same. Valenzuela
likewise obtained certifications and clearances from Isabel Chief of Police Martin F. Tamse
(Tamse ), Barangay Captain Dino A. Bayron, the Narcotics Group of Tacloban National Police
11 12
Commission (NAPOLCOM), the Philippine National Police (PNP) Isabel Police Station, and the Police
Regional Office 8 of the PNP similarly stating that she is of good moral character, a law-abiding citizen, and
has not been charged nor convicted of any crime as per verification from the records of the locality. Despite
the foregoing, no Business Permit was issued for Triple A, causing: (a) the spoilage of its goods bought in early
2002 for M/V Ace Dragon as it was prohibited from boarding the said goods to the vessel due to lack of Business
Permit; and (b) the suspension of its operations from 2002 to 2006. In 2007, a business permit was finally issued in
Triple A's favor. 13
In his defense, Fuentes averred that as early as 1999, 2000, and 2001, he has been hearing rumors that Valenzuela
was engaged in illegal activities such as smuggling and drug trading, but he did not act on the same. However, in
2002, he received written reports from the Prime Movers for Peace and Progress and Isabel Chief of Police Tamse
allegedly confirming the said rumors, which prompted him to hold the approval of Valenzuela's Business Permit for
Triple A, and to issue the unnumbered Memorandum addressed to port officials and the BOC. Fuentes maintained
that if he went on with the approval of such permit and the rumors turned out to be true, many will suffer and will be
victimized; on the other hand, if the rumors were false, then only one stands to suffer. Further, Fuentes presented
corroborative testimonies of other people, essentially: (a) refuting Valenzuela's claim that Triple A was unable to
resume operations due to lack of Business Permit; and (b) accusing Valenzuela of pulling out her application for
Business Permit from the Mayor's Office, which precluded Fuentes from approving the same. 14
The Sandiganbayan Ruling
In a Decision dated September 30, 2008, the Sandiganbayan found Fuentes guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
15
crime charged, and accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of
six (6) years and one (1) month, as minimum, to ten (10) years and six (6) months, as maximum, with perpetual
disqualification from public office, and ordered to pay Valenzuela the amount of ₱200,000.00 as nominal damages. 16
The Sandiganbayan found that the prosecution had established all the elements of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA
3019, considering that: (a) Fuentes was admittedly the Mayor of Isabel, Leyte at the time relevant to the
case; (b) he singled out Valenzuela's Triple A despite the fact that the rumors relative to the illegal smuggling and
drug-related activities covered all ship chandlers operating in the Port of Isabel; (c) he still refused to approve
Valenzuela's Business Permit for Triple A even though she had already secured clearances not only from the other
offices of the LGU, but from the PNP itself, exculpating her from any illegal activities; and (d) as a result of Fuentes's
acts, Valenzuela was unable to operate her ship chandling business through Triple A, thus, causing her undue
injury.
17
Aggrieved, Fuentes moved for reconsideration, which was, however, denied in a Resolution dated February 16,
18
2009; hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The primordial issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the Sandiganbayan correctly convicted
Fuentes of the crime of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is without merit.
Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 states:
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized
by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be
unlawful:
xxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted
benefit, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.
As may be gleaned above, the elements of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 are as follows: (a) that the
accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions (or a private
individual acting in conspiracy with such public officers); (b) that he acted with manifest partiality, evident
bad faith, or inexcusable negligence; and (c) that his action caused any undue injury to any party, including
the government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge
of his functions. 19
After a judicious review of the case, the Court is convinced that the Sandiganbayan correctly convicted Fuentes of
the crime charged, as will be explained hereunder.
Anent the first element, it is undisputed that Fuentes was a public officer, being the Municipal Mayor of Isabel,
Leyte at the time he committed the acts complained of.
As to the second element, it is worthy to stress that the law provides three modes of commission of the crime,
namely, through "manifest partiality", "evident bad faith", and/or "gross negligence." In Coloma, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan, the Court defined the foregoing terms as follows:
20
"Partiality" is synonymous with "bias" which "excites a disposition to see and report matters as they are
wished for rather than as they are." "Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it
imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn
duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud." "Gross negligence has been
so defined as negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where
there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but wilfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences in
so far as other persons may be affected. It is the omission of that care which even inattentive and thoughtless men
never fail to take on their own property."21 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In other words, there is "manifest partiality" when there is a clear, notorious, or plain inclination or
predilection to favor one side or person rather than another. On the other hand, "evident bad faith"
connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do
moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will. It contemplates a state of
mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive or self-interest or ill will or for ulterior
purposes. 22
In the instant case, Fuentes's acts were not only committed with manifest partiality, but also with bad faith.
As can be gleaned from the records, Fuentes himself testified that according to the rumors he heard, all five
(5) ship chandlers operating in the Port of Isabel were allegedly involved in smuggling and drug trading.
Yet, it was only Valenzuela's chandling operations through Triple A that was refused issuance of a
Business Permit, as evidenced by Business Permits issued to two (2) other chandling services operators in the
said port, namely: S.E. De Guzman Ship Chandler and General Maritime Services; and Golden Sea Kers Marine
Services. Moreover, if Fuentes truly believed that Valenzuela was indeed engaged in illegal smuggling and drug
trading, then he would not have issued Business Permits to the latter's other businesses as well. However, and as
aptly pointed out by the Sandiganbayan, Fuentes issued a Business Permit to Valenzuela's other business, Gemini
Security, which provides security services to vessels in the Port of Isabel. Under these questionable circumstances,
the Court is led to believe that Fuentes's refusal to issue a Business Permit to Valenzuela's Triple A was indeed
committed with manifest partiality against the latter, and in favor of the other ship chandling operators in the Port of
Isabel.
As regards the issue of bad faith, while it is within the municipal mayor's prerogative to suspend, revoke, or refuse to
issue Business Permits pursuant to Sections 1623 and 444 (b) (3) (iv)24 of the Local Government Code as an
incident of his power to issue the same, it must nevertheless be emphasized that: (a) the power to suspend or
revoke is premised on the violation of the conditions specified therein; and (b) the power to refuse issuance is
premised on non-compliance with the pre-requisites for said issuance. In the exercise of these powers, the mayor
must observe due process in that it must afford the applicant or licensee notice and opportunity to be heard. 25
Here, it is clear that Valenzuela had complied with all the prerequisites for the issuance of a Business
Permit for Triple A, as her application already contained the prior approval of the other concerned officials
of the LGU. In fact, Valenzuela even submitted numerous certifications issued by various law enforcement
agencies clearing her of any kind of participation from the alleged illegal smuggling and drug trading
activities in the Port of Isabel. Despite these, Fuentes still refused to issue a Business Permit for
Valenzuela's Triple A without affording her an opportunity to controvert the rumors against her. Worse, he
even issued the unnumbered Memorandum which effectively barred Triple A from conducting its ship chandling
operations without a Business Permit. Quite plainly, if Fuentes truly believed the rumors that Valenzuela was indeed
engaged in illegal activities in the Port of Isabel, then he should have already acted upon it in the years 1999, 2000,
and 2001, or when he allegedly first heard about them. However, Fuentes's belated action only in 2002 - which was
done despite the clearances issued by various law enforcement agencies exonerating Valenzuela from such
activities - speaks of evident bad faith which cannot be countenanced.
Anent the third and last element, suffice it to say that Fuentes's acts of refusing to issue a Business Permit in
Valenzuela's favor, coupled with his issuance of the unnumbered Memorandum which effectively barred Triple A
from engaging in its ship chandling operations without such Business Permit, caused some sort of undue injury on
the part of Valenzuela. Undeniably, such suspension of Triple A's ship chandling operations prevented Valenzuela
from engaging in an otherwise lawful endeavor for the year 2002. To make things worse, Valenzuela was also not
issued a Business Permit for the years 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006, as it was only in 2007 that such permit was
issued in Triple A's favor. Under prevailing case law, "[p]roof of the extent of damage is not essential, it being
sufficient that the injury suffered or the benefit received is perceived to be substantial enough and not merely
negligible."
26
In view of the foregoing, Fuentes committed a violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, and hence, must be held
criminally liable therefor.
1âwphi1
As regards the proper penalty to be imposed on Fuentes, Section 9 (a) of RA 3019 states that the prescribed
27
penalties for violation of the aforesaid crime includes, inter alia, imprisonment for a period of six (6) years and one
(1) month to fifteen (15) years, and perpetual disqualification from public office. Thus, the Sandiganbayan correctly
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of six (6) years and one (1) month,
as minimum, to ten (10) years and six (6) months, as maximum, with perpetual disqualification from public office.
Finally, the Court deems it proper to modify the award of damages in Valenzuela's favor. To recapitulate,
the Sandiganbayan awarded her ₱200,000.00 as nominal damages occasioned by Fuentes's non-issuance of a
Business Permit to Triple A. As defined under Article 2221 of the Civil Code, nominal damages are "recoverable
28
where a legal right is technically violated and must be vindicated against an invasion that has produced no actual
present loss of any kind or where there has been a breach of contract and no substantial injury or actual damages
whatsoever have been or can be shown." In this case, however, it is clear that Valenzuela suffered some sort of
29
pecuniary loss due to the suspension of Triple A's ship chandling operations, albeit the amount thereof was not
proven with certainty. Thus, the award of temperate, and not nominal, damages, is proper. The Court's
pronouncement in Evangelista v. Spouses Andolong is relevant on this matter:
30
In contrast, under Article 2224 [of the Civil Code], temperate or moderate damages may be recovered when
the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the
case, be provided with certainty. This principle was thoroughly explained in Araneta v. Bank of America [148-B
Phil. 124 (1971)], which cited the Code Commission, to wit:
The Code Commission, in explaining the concept of temperate damages under Article 2224, makes the following
comment:
In some States of the American Union, temperate damages are allowed. There are cases where from the nature of
the case, definite proof of pecuniary loss cannot be offered, although the court is convinced that there has been
such loss. For instance, injury to one's commercial credit or to the goodwill of a business firm is often hard to show
with certainty in terms of money. Should damages be denied for that reason? The judge should be empowered to
calculate moderate damages in such cases, rather than that the plaintiff should suffer, without redress from the
defendant's wrongful act.
Thus, in Tan v. OMC Carriers, Inc. [654 Phil. 443 (2011)], temperate damages were rightly awarded because
plaintiff suffered a loss, although definitive proof of its amount cannot be presented as the photographs produced as
evidence were deemed insufficient. Established in that case, however, was the fact that respondent's truck was
responsible for the damage to petitioner's property and that petitioner suffered some form of pecuniary loss.
In Canada v. All Commodities Marketing Corporation [590 Phil. 342 (2008)], temperate damages were also awarded
wherein respondent's goods did not reach the Pepsi Cola Plant at Muntinlupa City as a result of the negligence of
petitioner in conducting its trucking and hauling services, even if the amount of the pecuniary loss had not been
proven. In Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc. v. Paras [686 Phil. 736 (2012)], the respondent was likewise awarded
temperate damages in an action for breach of contract of carriage, even if his medical expenses had not been
established with certainty. In People v. Briones [398 Phil. 31 (2000)], in which the accused was found guilty of
murder, temperate damages were given even if the funeral expenses for the victim had not been sufficiently proven.
Given these findings, we are of the belief that temperate and not nominal damages should have been
awarded, considering that it has been established that respondent herein suffered a loss, even if the
amount thereof cannot be proven with certainty.
xxxx
Consequently, in computing the amount of temperate or moderate damages, it is usually left to the
discretion of the courts, but the amount must be reasonable, bearing in mind that temperate damages
should be more than nominal but less than compensatory.
Here, we are convinced that respondent sustained damages to its conveyor facility due to petitioner's negligence.
Nonetheless, for failure of respondent to establish by competent evidence the exact amount of damages it suffered,
we are constrained to award temperate damages. Considering that the lower courts have factually established that
the conveyor facility had a remaining life of only five of its estimated total life of ten years during the time of the
collision, then the replacement cost of ₱7,046,351.84 should rightly be reduced to 50% or ₱3,523,175.92. This is a
fair and reasonable valuation, having taking into account the remaining useful life of the facility. (Emphases and
31
Under these circumstances, the Court holds that the award of temperate damages in the amount of ₱300,000.00 is
proper, considering that Valenzuela's net income from the previous year, 2001, was ₱750,000.00. Further, such
amount shall earn legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum from finality of this Decision until fully paid, in light of
prevailing jurisprudence. 32
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated September 30, 2008 and the Resolution dated February
16, 2009 of the Sandiganbayan in Crim. Case No. 28342 are hereby AFFIRMED. Petitioner Roberto P. Fuentes is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, entitled the "Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act," and accordingly, sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate
period of six (6) years and one (1) month, as minimum, to ten (10) years and six (6) months, as maximum, with
perpetual disqualification from public office, and is ordered to pay private complainant Fe Nepomuceno Valenzuela
the amount of ₱300,000.00 as temperate damages, with legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum from finality of
this Decision until fully paid.
17.) G.R. No. 184092, February 22, 2017
AQUILINA B. GRANADA, CARLOS B. BAUTISTA, AND FELIPE PANCHO, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE

OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 186084
VENANCIO R. NAVA, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE JUSTICES MA. CRISTINA G. CORTEZ-

ESTRADA, ROLAND B. JURADO, AND TERESITA V. DIAZ-BALDOS, AS MEMBERS OF THE
SANDIGANBAYAN'S 5TH DIVISION, AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
G.R. No. 186272
JESUSA DELA CRUZ, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 186488
AQUILINA B. GRANADA, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 186570
SUSANA B. CABAHUG, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND

SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
The Commission on Audit is the guardian of public funds with the mandate to review and audit public
spending.1 The Court generally sustains the decisions of administrative authorities like the
Commission on Audit in recognition of the doctrine of separation of powers and their presumed
knowledge and expertise of the laws they have been tasked to uphold.2
This resolves the consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari and Petition for Certiorari, which
assail the Decision3 dated August 1, 2008 and the Resolution4 dated January 12, 2009 of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 23459, finding petitioners Venancio R. Nava (Nava), Susana B.
Cabahug (Cabahug), Aquilina B. Granada (Granada), Carlos Bautista (Bautista), Felipe Pancho
(Pancho), and Jesusa Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz) guilty of violation of Section 3(g) of Republic Act
No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.5
On November 5, 1993, Teresita C. Lagmay (Lagmay), Eden Jane R. Intencion, and Mabini S. Reyes of
the Commission on Audit, Region XI, Davao City, submitted a Joint-Affidavit6 with an attached
Special Audit Report7 to the Commission on Audit Director, Region XI, Davao City.
The Special Audit Report disclosed that the various school forms and construction
materials purchased by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, now Department
of Education, Division Office of Davao for the Elementary School Building Program were
priced above the prevailing market prices, leading to a loss of P613,755.36 due to
overpricing.8 The auditors recommended the refund of the excess amount, and the filing of a
criminal or administrative action against the public officials who participated in the transactions.9
On July 25, 1996, the Office of the Ombudsman, Mindanao, found that there was sufficient
evidence to indict several Department of Education, Culture and Sports officials for
violating Section 3(g) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019. 10 The dispositive of the Ombudsman
Resolution11 reads:
WHEREFORE, finding sufficient evidence to hold that the offense of violation of Section 3 (g) and (e)
of RA 3019 and falsification have been committed and that the hereunder list of persons are probably
guilty thereof, let the following criminal Informations be filed with the following courts, namely:
A) Violation of Section 3 (g) of RA 3019 relative to the overpricing of school supplies and forms with
the Regional Trial Court of Davao City against:
1. Division Superintendent Luceria de Leon,
2. Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) Chairman Edilberto Madria,
3. Clerk and BAC Member Stephen Acosta,
4. Clerk III and BAC Member Timoteo Fulguerinas,
5. Fiscal Clerk II Lydia Cerdinia and
6. Supply Officer Felipe Pancho
B) Violation of Section 3 (g) of RA 3019 relative to the overpricing of construction materials with the
Sandiganbayan against:
1. DECS Regional Director VENANCIO NAVA (with salary [)],
2. DECS Assistant Director SUSANA CABAHUG,
3. DECS Regional Administrative Officer AQUILINA B. GRANADA,
4. DECS Finance Officer CARLOS BAUTISTA,
5. DECS Division Superintendent LUCERIA M. DE LEON,
6. DECS Division Administrative Officer EDILBERTO MADRIA,
7. DECS Supply Officer FELIPE PANCHO, and
8. GEOMICHE, Incorporated President JESUS A DELA CRUZ.
C) Violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 relative to the full payment of undelivered desks with the
Regional Trial Court of Davao City against Division Superintendent Luceria de Leon, Edilberto
Madrias and Fernando Gaddi, Jr.;
D) Violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 relative to the non-collection of liquidated damages from
Romars with the Regional Trial Court of Davao City against Division Superintendent Luceria M.
De Leon;
E) Falsification of public document relative to the falsified Inspection Report with the Regional Trial
Court of Davao City against Administrative Officer Edilberto Madria, Clerk Stephen Acosta and
Clerk III Timoteo Fulguerinas the cases to prosecuted (sic) until their termination by the
Honorable Antonio V.A. Tan, City Prosecutor of Davao City except Violation of Section 3 (g) of
RA 3019 which will have to be prosecuted by the Honorable Leonardo P. Tamayo, Special
Prosecutor.
FINDING insufficient evidence to hold the other respondents liable for the charge, let the instant case
against them be dismissed.
SO RESOLVED.12
Petitioners Nava, Cabahug, Granada, and Dela Cruz were subsequently charged with Violation of
Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019 in an Information13 filed on July 25, 1996. The accusatory
portion of the Information reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That on or during the period comprising the calendar year 1991, in the City of Davao, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused VENANCIO NAVA, SUSANA B. CABAHUG,
AQUILINA B. GRANADA, CARLOS BAUTISTA, LUCERIA M. DE LEON, EDILBERTO MADRIA, FELIPE
PANCHO, all public officers being then the Regional Director with salary grade of 27, Assistant
Regional Director, Administrative Officer, Finance Officer, Division Superintendent, Administrative
Officer, Supply Officer, respectively, of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, Region XI,
while in the performance of their duties, committing the offense in relation to their office, taking
advantage of their official positions, conspiring, confederating with each other, and with Geomiche
Incorporated President JESUSA DELA CRUZ, to wit: 1. DECS Regional Director VENANCIO NAVA
approved the disbursement voucher, purchase order and invitation to bid and signed the checks for
payment; 2. DECS Assistant Director SUSANA CABAHUG approved the disbursement voucher and the
purchase order for and in behalf of Regional Director Nava; 3. DECS Regional Administrative Officer
AQUILINA B. GRANADA signed two different sets of purchase order with exactly the same contents
and the abstract of price quotations; 4. DECS Finance Officer CARLOS BAUTISTA signed Abstract of
Quotations as canvassing member; 5. DECS Division Superintendent LUCERIA M. DE LEON approved
the disbursement voucher, signed the checks, recommended the approval of two different sets of
purchase order, directed the preparation of the voucher and as (sic) signed the Abstract of
Quotations as Canvassing member; 6. DECS Division Administrative Officer EDILBERTO MADRIA
signed the checks and the abstract of quotations and canvass; 7. DECS Supply Officer FELIPE
PANCHO directed the preparation of the disbursement voucher; and 8. GEOMICHE, Incorporated
President JESUSA DELA CRUZ supplied the aforementioned construction materials despite knowledge
that the same were overpriced, which acts though seemingly separate and distinct yet parts
of a grand conspiratorial design to defraud the government, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully, criminally, purchase in behalf of the DECS Division Office of Davao City, form
(sic) Geomiche Incorporated represented [by] Jesusa dela Cruz[,] construction materials
at overpriced costs ranging from 6.09% to 695.45% thus enter into a contract grossly and
manifestly disadvantageous to the government for it left the DECS short-changed by a hefty
sum of P512,967.69 - the total amount of the overprice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.14
On March 3, 1997, the Sandiganbayan issued a hold departure order against petitioners and the
other accused.15
Petitioners entered separate pleas of not guilty during their respective arraignments.16
On October 13, 1999, the parties admitted the following stipulations of facts and issues during pre-
trial:17
1. That all the accused, except Cabahug and Pancho, admit their official positions as mentioned in
the Information during the time relevant to this case. However, accused dela Cruz, who is not a
public officer, admits her personal circumstances as mentioned in the information;
2. That accused Venancio Nava was not the Chairman nor a member of the Pre-Qualification Bids and
Awards Committee (PBAC) at the time relevant to this case;
....
ISSUE
1. Whether or not the transactions entered into by the accused public officials with the
accused supplier for the purchase of construction materials and supplies in the amount of
P2,072,318.25 were unreasonably overpriced, thus, causing undue injury to the
government.18
Luceria De Leon (De Leon) died before final judgment was handed down, thus, the Sandiganbayan
granted the motion to dismiss filed by her counsel.19
The prosecution presented the following witnesses: Araceli P. Geli (Geli), State Auditor for the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports Division Office, and Lagmay, State Auditor III for the
Commission on Audit.20
Geli was the state auditor stationed at Department of Education, Culture and Sports Division Office,
Davao City. Part of her duty as state auditor was to review and audit the transactions of the Division
Office.21
On March 6, 1992, Geli submitted her annual report22 to the Commission on Audit where she
disclosed the overpricing committed in the Elementary School Building Program.23 Geli recommended
the institution of the proper action against all Department of Education, Culture and Sports officials
involved in the transaction, and the restitution of the overpricing in the amount of P512,967.89.24
Geli testified that she re-canvassed the price of each item ordered by the Division Office after she
was informed that there was no public bidding undertaken prior to the purchase.25 Geli stressed that
only Director Venancio Nava, as the approving officer, signed the invitation to bid and that the
invitation to bid had no signature or even initials of the members of the Prequalification, Bids and
Awards Committee. After her re-canvass, Geli computed an excess payment of P512,967.69.26
Lagmay testified that she headed a special audit team sometime in 1992, pursuant to the August 5,
1992 Commission on Audit Assignment Order No. 92-2113 issued by Commission on Audit Regional
Office No. XI.27
The audit covered the period of January 1, 1991 to August 31, 1992, with the special audit team
examining the purchases of supplies and materials using the Maintenance and Operating Expenses
Funds and the purchase of materials for the Elementary School Building Project and grader's desks.
Lagmay testified that the special audit was prompted by Geli's findings.28
Lagmay identified the disbursement vouchers made to Geomiche Incorporated (Geomiche), a Manila-
based supplier,29 and the purchase orders that the special audit team examined during the audit. She
testified that the audited transactions required public bidding but the documents submitted to them
for audit did not show any indication that public bidding was conducted.30
The defense thereafter presented petitioners and the other accused as witnesses.
Nava was the Department of Education, Culture and Sports Regional Director for Davao City, Region
XI from March 12, 1990 to August 1, 1993. He was transferred to Department of Education, Culture
and Sports Region VIII, Eastern Visayas, and then to Region I. He was Regional Director of Region II
when he retired in 2000.31
Nava testified that then Secretary of Education Isidro Carino ordered that the construction of
elementary school buildings in Davao City should be prioritized. The Division Office and Regional
Office thus agreed to expedite the project and create a Prequalification, Bids and Awards Committee
(Committee) for its joint implementation.32
Nava admitted signing the invitations to bid but he asserted that the quotation of construction
materials were not yet indicated when he signed the invitations to bid.33 He testified that the abstract
of bids was attached to the invitations to bid sent to him and that it was signed by the members of
the Committee. The abstract of bids was also approved by De Leon, the Schools Division
Superintendent of Davao City.34
Nava likewise admitted signing the disbursement vouchers. However, he claimed that he signed them
only after De Leon certified that "the expenses [were] necessary, lawful[,] and incurred in her direct
supervision."35
Bautista testified that he worked in the Budget and Finance Division of the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports Region XII, Cotabato City as a finance officer.36
Bautista attested that in 1991, he became a member of the Committee.37 He narrated that the
Committee had to evaluate the quotations or the bids from the suppliers and then enter these bids in
the abstract of bids. The Committee would then recommend for approval the quotation from the
lowest bidder. He admitted that after he received the quotations from the suppliers, he no longer
verified the accuracy of the submitted quotations.38
Cabahug was the Department of Education, Culture and Sports Assistant Regional Director for Region
XI from April 1, 1991 to June 30, 1992. She was transferred to Cebu, Region VII for a few years
before being re-assigned to Region XI on September 8, 1994. On January 9, 1995, she was assigned
as the Regional Director of Region XI, and served in that capacity until her retirement on August 10,
2000.39
Cabahug acknowledged that in 1991, in her capacity as Assistant Regional Director, she signed eight
(8) purchase orders and one (1) disbursement voucher on behalf of Regional Director Nava, who was
then on official leave. Cabahug asserted that before she signed the purchase orders, Granada and De
Leon had already affixed their signatures on the purchase orders.40 Granada certified that the prices
of the material purchased were reasonable, while De Leon certified that the purchases were
necessary, legal, and made under her direct supervision.41 The Fiscal Clerk of the Davao City Division
then signed the disbursement voucher, certifying the availability of funds and that all the supporting
documents were in order.42
Granada testified that in 1991, she was the Department of Education, Culture and Sports Regional
Administrative Officer for Region XI. As the Regional Administrative Officer, Granada prepared
communications for the Regional Director's signature. Her other functions included acting as
Chairman of the Committee in the absence of the Assistant Regional Director. However, she said that
she was only a member, and not the chair, in the bidding conducted in 1991.43
Granada stated that in preparation for the purchase of materials for the construction of school
buildings, bidding was conducted in 1991. The invitation to bid was published in a newspaper and
copies were sent to the different construction and hardware shops in Davao City.44 Interested parties
then confirmed their intention to bid and the actual bidding was conducted in the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports Regional Office.45 However, Granada admitted that she could no longer
recall the number of suppliers who participated.46
After evaluating the bids, Granada testified that the Committee awarded the project to petitioner
Dela Cruz of Geomiche, the bidder with the lowest submitted quotations.47
Pancho testified that in 1991, he was employed as a supply officer for the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports.48
Pancho attested that he was directed by De Leon to prepare payment vouchers for the deliveries
made by Geomiche.49 He stated that he did not consider going against the directives of De Leon, who
was his superior, because he did not think that there was anything irregular with her instructions.50
Counsel for Dela Cruz manifested that he would not be presenting testimonial evidence for Dela
Cruz.51
On August 1, 2008, the Sandiganbayan ruled that the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of
petitioners. The Sandiganbayan also ruled that there was a concerted effort by the petitioners to
facilitate the release of funds and make it appear that a public bidding took place.52 The fallo of the
assailed Sandiganbayan Decision reads: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered convicting accused VENANCIO R.

NAVA, SUSANA B. CABAHUG, AQUILINA B. GRANADA, CARLOS BAUTISTA, EDILBERTO
MADRIA, FELIPE PANCHO and JESUSA DELA CRUZ of the crime of violation of the Anti-graft and
Corrupt Practices Act particularly Section 3(g) thereof, or entering on behalf of government in a
contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same whether or not the public
officer profited or did not profit thereby.
In the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstances, applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, accused are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years, and one
(1) day as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day as maximum and to suffer perpetual
disqualification from public office. The accused are further ordered to pay, jointly and severally, the
government the amount of P512,967.69, which it suffered in view of the overpricing in the purchases
committed by them.
SO ORDERED.53 (Emphasis in the original)

On January 12, 2009, the Sandiganbayan denied54 the motions for reconsideration filed by Nava,
Cabahug, Granada, and Dela Cruz.
Nava filed a petition for certiorari,55 while Cabahug,56 Granada57 and Dela Cruz58 filed their respective

petitions for review of the Sandiganbayan Decision and Resolution.
Petitioner Nava asserts that his Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 was filed in lieu of an appeal
under Rule 45 because the latter, being only limited to questions of law, was insufficient.59 Nava
claims that the assailed Decision and Resolution "were based on a gross misapprehension of facts
arising from the fraudulent conduct of the audit[.]"60 Furthermore, he asseverates that the
Sandiganbayan findings were not supported by evidence and were in fact, even contradicted by
evidence.61
Nava posits that the Special Audit Report was baseless as it relied heavily on the personal and
unauthorized post-canvass conducted by Geli.62 Nava claims that Geli's post-canvass was full of
irregularities because it:
(i) intentionally did not detail and compare the brands to be purchased, (ii) failed to take into
consideration the level of inventory of the establishments, (iii) failed to get the name and
designations, as well as the sworn statements, of the persons who supposedly submitted the
quotations, (iv) failed to consider that the establishments did not intend to deliver the items quoted
for the price quoted, and (v) failed to consider the terms of the purchases made by the Division
Office.63
Lastly, Nava asserts that the Decision erred in applying the presumption of regularity to Geli's
canvass when Geli did not follow the established Commission on Audit procedures.64
The Office of the Special Prosecutor states that Nava erred in filing a special civil action pursuant to
Rule 65 when the proper remedy should have been an appeal under Rule 45.65 The Office of the
Special Prosecutor maintains that Nava's Petition involves questions of fact, which should not be
allowed in a petition for certiorari.66 It also posits that the Petition cannot be considered as a petition
for review, as the Court's jurisdiction in a petition for review is limited to errors of law.67
Furthermore, the Office of the Special Prosecutor argues that the Sandiganbayan did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in considering the finding of irregularities in the transaction, even if the
pre-trial was limited to the overpricing of the construction materials. The collateral matter of the
irregularities in the transaction is intimately related to the overpricing of the construction materials
purchased.68 The Office of the Special Prosecutor also argues that in the absence of bad faith or
malice, the canvass perfonned by the auditors should be given the benefit of the doubt due to the
presumption of regularity accorded to a public official.69
Finally, the Office of the Special Prosecutor asserts that the finding of conspiracy against Nava and
the other petitioners was sufficiently established.70
Petitioner Cabahug claims that she merely signed the disbursement vouchers and purchase orders
because her immediate superior, petitioner Nava, was absent and she had to act on his behalf so that
construction would not be stalled.71
Cabahug likewise claims that the prosecution failed to prove her participation in the supposed
conspiracy. Her participation was ministerial in nature since she had to sign on behalf of her
immediate supervisor in his absence. She also did not participate in the execution and consummation
of the contract, and she had no knowledge of the defects of the contract. Hence, she asserts that
conspiracy has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt against her.72
Cabahug maintains that the questioned documents "already passed [through] several layers of other
signatories before it reached her."73 She insists that she relied on the presumption of regularity in the
acts of her subordinates.74
The Office of the Special Prosecutor posits that Cabahug cannot claim good faith when she signed on
Nava's behalf because she was fully aware of the irregularities of the documents when she signed
them. The Office of the Special Prosecutor also asserts that the Arias doctrine cannot be applied to
Cabahug, and that her participation in the conspiracy was duly proven.75
Petitioner Granada claims that Geli's post-canvass should not have been considered by the
Sandiganbayan since the participants in the post-canvass were not the actual bidders in the
previously held bidding for the construction materials and supplies.76 Furthermore, Granada
maintains that Geli's canvassed prices, which were lower than Geomiche's, were not absolute proof
that there was gross disadvantage to the government.77
The Office of the Solicitor General contends that it was sufficiently proven that no public bidding was
conducted, leading to a violation of Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019.78 The Office of the Solicitor
General also contends that the Sandiganbayan did not err in finding that Granada and her other co-
accused conspired with each other.79
The Office of the Special Prosecutor states that the prosecution sufficiently proved that the
transactions entered into by the petitioners caused undue injury to the government.80 The Office of
the Special Prosecutor further states that Granada's guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt, and
that conspiracy was evident, making all the accused liable as principals.81
Petitioner Dela Cruz asserts that a strict construction of Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019
"covers only public officers who enter into a proscribed contract or transaction 'on behalf of the
government'. It does not impose any penalty upon a private party - natural or juridical - with whom
the public officer contracts."82
Dela Cruz further asserts that even if she acted as Geomiche's president, as a corporate officer, she
cannot be held personally liable for the acts of the corporation.83 She maintains that while the
Information alleged conspiracy, the assailed Decision was silent on her conspiracy with the other
petitioners.84
Dela Cruz claims that the Sandiganbayan's finding of irregularities or deficiencies are in excess of its
jurisdiction for going beyond the issue formulated in the pre-trial order.85 She also avers that the
finding of excessive amounts by the state auditors was without factual or legal basis.86
The Office of the Special Prosecutor maintains that the finding of conspiracy against Dela Cruz and
her other co-accused makes her liable for violating Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019, even if she
was not a public officer.87
We resolve the following issues:
First, whether Nava's Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 65 was the proper remedy to take;
Second, whether the presumption of regularity applies with the State Auditor's post-
canvass of similar items purchased by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports
from Geomiche; and
Finally, whether conspiracy was sufficiently proven by the prosecution.
The petitions are devoid of merit.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor claims that Nava erred in filing a special civil action pursuant to
Rule 65 when the proper remedy should have been an appeal under Rule 45.88 The Office of the
Special Prosecutor states that Nava's Petition asks for a re-examination of the evidence presented,
which is not proper in a petition for certiorari.89
The Office of the Special Prosecutor also posits that Nava's Petition cannot be considered as a
petition for review, as the Court's jurisdiction in a petition for review is limited to errors of law.90 It
then points out that the issues raised in Nava's Petition are primarily questions of fact, but "with [an]
allegation that there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction."91
Nava insists that his Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 was not a substitute for a lost appeal since
it was timely filed. Nava further insists that while the remedy of appeal under Rule 45 was available
to him, the same was insufficient as it was limited to questions of law. Nava claims that the assailed
Decision and Resolution were based on a fraudulent audit, surmises, and speculations.92
Section 1 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides the mode of appeal from judgments, final orders,
or resolutions of the Sandiganbayan: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SECTION 1. Filing of Petition with Supreme Court. - A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a
judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial
Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified
petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly
set forth.
Icdang v. Sandiganbayan, et al.93 emphasized that the proper remedy to take from a judgment of
conviction by the Sandiganbayan is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
At the outset it must be emphasized that the special civil action of certiorari is not the proper remedy
to challenge a judgment conviction rendered by the [Sandiganbayan]. Petitioner should have filed a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
Pursuant to Section 7 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Republic Act No. 8249,
decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be appealable to the Supreme Court by petition
for review on certiorari raising pure questions of law in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Section 1 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] party desiring to appeal
by certiorari from a judgment, final order or resolution of the . . . Sandiganbayan . . . whenever
authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The
petition . . . shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth." Section 2 of Rule 45
likewise provides that the petition should be filed within the fifteen-day period from notice of the
judgment or final order or resolution, or of the denial of petitioner's motion for reconsideration filed
in due time after notice of judgment.94 (Underscoring in the original, citation omitted)
The assailed Decision and Resolution convicted Nava and the other petitioners of the crime of
entering into a manifestly and grossly disadvantageous contract or transaction on behalf of the
government. Thus, the proper remedy to take is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
Nonetheless, inasmuch as Nava's Petition was filed within the 15-day period provided under Section
2 of Rule 45,95 this Court treated it as an appeal and did not dismiss it outright. While procedural
rules should be treated with utmost respect since they serve to facilitate the adjudication of cases in
support of the speedy disposition of cases mandated by the Constitution, "[a] liberal interpretation . .
. of the rules of procedure can be resorted to only in proper cases and under justifiable causes and
circumstances."96
II
The Commission on Audit is the guardian of public funds and the Constitution has vested it with the
"power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and
receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property [of] the Government, or any of its
subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations
with original charters."97
The Constitution likewise empowered the Commission on Audit with the: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
exclusive authority . . . to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and
methods required therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including
those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or
unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds and properties.98
The Commission on Audit's exercise of its general audit power is part of the checks and balances
system inherent in our form of government.99
Petitioner Nava insists that this Court's ruling in Arriola v. Commission on Audit,100 is applicable in the
case at bar.101 In Arriola, this Court ruled that in order to accord due process to the subjects of an
audit by the Commission on Audit, there should be a policy of transparency where the subjects of the
audit could access and review the documents used for the canvass.102Arriola also prompted the
Commission on Audit to issue Memorandum Order No. 97-102 dated March 31, 1997, which states:103
3.2 To firm up the findings to a reliable degree of certainty, initial findings of overpricing based on
market price indicators mentioned in pa. 2.1 above have to be supported with canvass sheet and/or
price quotations indicating:
a) the identities of the suppliers or sellers;

b) the availability of stock sufficient in quantity to meet the requirements of the procuring agency;
c) the specifications of the items which should match those involved in the finding of overpricing;
d) the purchase/contract terms and conditions which should be the same as those of the questioned
transaction.104
Unfortunately for petitioners, neither Arriola nor the Commission on Audit Memorandum Order No.
97-102 can be applied retroactively.105
The questioned transactions and the delivery of construction materials happened sometime in 1991.
Geli then conducted her post-audit, and submitted her Memorandum106 and Report on the Annual
Operations Audit107 on March 6, 1992. Thus, the requirements of canvass sheets or price quotations
listed down in the Commission on Audit's Memorandum Order No. 97-102, which was issued on
March 31, 1997, cannot be applied to Geli's 1992 audit.
More importantly, the Sandiganbayan found that the contract for the purchase of
construction materials and supplies from Geomiche for the construction of school buildings
did not undergo public bidding.108
Petitioner Nava asserts that the Sandiganbayan erred in ruling on the issue of public bidding when
the same was not included in the Information. He argues that the only charge against him and the
other petitioners in the Information was whether they entered into a grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous contract to the government, and not whether public bidding was conducted.109
While it is true that the Information only charged petitioners with entering into a gross and
manifestly disadvantageous contract to the government, the Sandiganbayan's assailed Decision
touched on the issue of lack of public bidding as a circumstantial evidence in support of the
accusation of overpricing. The finding of overpricing was never determined simply because there was
no public bidding. The absence of public bidding only underscored the irregularity of the transactions.
The various audits conducted confirmed the fact of overpricing as follows: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
To make things worse, it was also indubitably established that aside from the fact that there was no
public bidding conducted, the accused overpriced the construction supplies and materials in the
amount of P512,967.69, to the disadvantage and prejudice of the government (Exhibits "C", "C-1",
"D", "D-1", "D-2", "D-3", "D-3-a").
In the case at bar, there being no public bidding conducted, the government was deprived
of setting the standard or parameter upon which to lay the basis of what may be
considered just or reasonable prices of the purchases made from the lone supplier. In the
absence of such indispensable basis, the purchases made from Geomiche Incorporated are
considered grossly or manifestly disadvantageous to the government. Hence, the manifest
or gross disadvantage complained of is not purely speculative or that it has no basis in fact
and in law because the same have been quantified by the overpriced purchases. The
prosecution, through testimonial and documentary evidence, was able to substantiate with
concrete evidence of what it claimed to be grossly or manifestly disadvantageous to the
government.110
Petitioners fault Geli for conducting a purportedly personal and unauthorized canvass when she sent
out invitations to bid to the other suppliers of construction materials in Davao City.
We do not agree.
As an auditor of the Commission on Audit, Geli had the same mandate to audit all government
agencies and to be vigilant in safeguarding the proper use of the people's property, thus: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[Pros. Calonge]: Will you kindly state briefly the basic or regular function of your job as State Auditor 2
stationed at DECS Division Office of Davao City?
[Geli]: My duties then as State Auditor among others was to examine, settle and audit the regular
accounts and transactions of the Division office.111
....
[Atty. But what you conducted, according to you, was a private canvass, was it not?
Fernandez]:
[Geli]: Yes, that was a canvass, sir.
Q: It was an informal canvass which you undertook on your own without any order or
directive from any superior officer, is it not?
A: No, sir, because we are covered by a particular circular which is COA Circular No. 76-34
dated July 15, 1976.
Q: And what does that Circular provide?
A: It provides that in case of doubt as to the reasonableness of the price or prices of the items
purchased, the auditor shall canvass thereof.112
The Special Audit Report found that: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[d]uring the period of delivery, [Geli] made a canvass of prices of similar construction materials from
reputable suppliers/establishments in Davao City in order to determine the reasonableness of their
prices ... In the canvass conducted, the prices for each item were observed to have been
excessive ranging from 6.09% to 695.45% ... As a result, the government lost the amount
of P512,967.69[.]113
Geli testified on the methodology she used in the re-canvass as follows: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[Pros. What formula did you adopt in arriving in the conclusion that there was overpricing in this
Calonge]: transaction?
[Geli]: The procedures, Your Honor, that I undertook is to re-canvass of the price of each and every
item ordered by the Division Office since I was told that there was no public bidding
conducted, as evidenced by the documents submitted like the disbursement vouchers. First, the
invitation to bid was only signed by Director Venancio Nava as the approving officer; Second-
there were no signatures or even initials by the members of the PBAC which is the
Prequalification Bid and Award Committee; Third- There is no indication that there was
participation by the resident auditor of the DECS Regional Office or representative; and
Fourth- As confirmed by the resident auditor herself from the DECS Regional Office, she told
me that indeed there was no public bidding conducted as result of the re-canvass I made, I
compared with the price list offered by the bidders and, upon computation and the additional
of the ten (10) percent tolerable allowance granted by our Rules and Regulations, I came up
with the total overpriced of P512,967.69.
....
Q: Why did you conduct a personal canvass?
A: First, as I said, Your Honor the payment was to be made at the DECS Division Office;
Secondly- I doubted the reasonableness of the price offered by the winning bidder.114
In the absence of malice or bad faith, the canvass and audit performed by the auditors, which were
substantiated by evidence, should be upheld in recognition of their technical expertise. This finds
support in Lumayna, et al. v. Commission on Audit,115 citing Ocampo v. Commission on
Elections,116 which states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[I]t must be stressed that factual findings of administrative bodies charged with their specific field of
expertise, are afforded great weight by the courts, and in the absence of substantial showing that
such findings were made from an erroneous estimation of the evidence presented, they are
conclusive, and in the interest of stability of the governmental structure, should not be disturbed.117
Instead of finding fault, the vigilance and initiative of Geli should be commended. Our audit officers
should be expected to discharge their duties with zeal within the bounds of the law.
III
Conspiracy happens "when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission
of a felony and decide to commit it."118 Furthermore, conspiracy does not have to be established by
direct evidence since it may be inferred from the conduct of the accused taken
collectively.119 However, it is necessary that a conspirator directly or indirectly contributes to the
execution of the crime committed through the performance of an overt act.120
The Sandiganbayan found that there was a common design among the petitioners to make
it appear that bidding took place to effect the release of funds for the purchase of
overpriced construction supplies and materials, thus: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The series of acts of the accused in signing all the documents to effect the release of the
funds for the purchase of construction supplies and materials spelled nothing but
conspiracy. The signatures of all the accused appearing in the documents indicate
accused's common design in achieving their one goal to the damage and prejudice of the
government.
As indubitably proved by the prosecution, the direct interrelated participation of each of the accused
(Exhibit "N-1") were as follows[:] Venancio Nava approved the Invitation to Bids, Disbursement
Vouchers, Purchase Orders and signed the checks; Aquilina Granada signed two (2) different sets of
Purchase Orders, with the same contents and signed the Abstract of Quotation as Chairman; Susan
Cabahug approved a Disbursement Voucher and another set of Purchase Order for Director Nava;
Carlos Bautista signed the Abstract of Quotation/Canvass as a member; Luceria M. De Leon directed
the preparation of Disbursement Vouchers and approved the same, recommended the approval of
two (2) different sets of Purchase Orders, signed the Abstract of Quotation/Canvass as member and
signed the checks; Edilberto Madria signed the Abstract of Quotation/Canvass as member and signed
the checks; and Felipe Pancho directed the preparation of the Disbursement Vouchers. In these
series of interconnected acts of the public officers, accused Dela Cruz was the beneficiary.
Verily, where the acts of the accused collectively and individually demonstrate the existence of a
common design towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose, conspiracy is evident,
and all the perpetrators will be liable as principals.121
The records show that the invitations to bid122 were only signed by Nava as the approving officer
without the signature or initials of the members of the Committee, or the participation of the resident
auditor.123 Furthermore, the abstract of quotations was not signed by all the Committee members, or
the representative of the Commission on Audit, as testified by State Auditor Geli: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
AJ NAZARIO:
Why did you say that there was no public bidding?
[Geli]
:Firstly, Your Honor, I was told by the resident auditor that there was no public bidding because in the
first place all biddings conducted by the Regional office then were witnessed by the resident auditor or
any representative.
AJ NAZARIO:
You came to the conclusion that there was no public bidding because the resident auditor told you?
Witness:
Yes, Your Honor. Secondly, the documents supporting the disbursement voucher do not indicate that there
was any public bidding conducted.
AJ NAZARIO:
What was wrong with the documents?
Witness:
First, it should be the PBAC who will initiate the calling of the public bidding. Second- there was no
publication in any newspaper or general circulation. Third, there was never a posting of the invitations to
bid and then all the members of the PBAC have no participation as indicated in the Invitations to Bid as
well as the Abstract of Quotations.
AJ NAZARIO:
This Invitation to Bid, which was according to you, you were told that there was no public bidding. Under
what circumstances, how was it told to you?
Witness:
It was only verbally communicated to me. Not only by the resident auditor but also the DECS Division
office' officials and employees.
AJ NAZARIO:
How did these employees get involved, was it in the course of the performance of your functions that this
information was given to you?
Witness:
Yes, Your Honors.124
The purchase orders certified by Granada and approved by Nava, were found to be grossly
inadequate to substantiate the payments made through the disbursement vouchers approved by
Nava and Cabahug.125 The Special Audit Report126 submitted by State Auditor Lagmay reads: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The first payment to G[e]omich[e], Inc. under Voucher No. 91-05-02-SB for P1,500,000.00
(Appendix 11) was supported by purchase orders issued by the DECS Division Office (Appendix 9)
with a total amount of only P70,505.21. The second voucher amounting to P557,093.25 (Appendix
12) was supported by the DECS Regional Office purchase orders for only P71,459.25 (Appendix 10)
while the third voucher for P15,225.00 (Appendix 13) had no purchase order attached. From these
payments, it appears that the amounts indicated/appearing in the purchase orders were less than the
payments made, as tabulated hereunder:
Voucher No. Amount PO attached Diff.

91-05-02-SB P1,500,000.00 P70,505.21 P1,429,494.79
91-07-114SB 557,093.25 71,459.25 485,634.00
91-07-179SB 15,225.00 - 15,225.00
----------------- --------------- -----------------------
P2,072.318.25 P141.964.46 P1,930,353.79127
(Underscoring in the original)
Clearly, conspiracy between the accused-petitioners was duly established as their collective and
individual acts demonstrated a common design, to award the contract to Geomiche without a public
bidding. Their actions then led to the purchase of overpriced construction materials to the
disadvantage of the government.
Petitioner Dela Cruz asserts that as a private individual, she cannot be held liable under
Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019 because it only covers public officers who enter into
a contract or transaction on behalf of the government. 128
Dela Cruz is mistaken.
Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019 reads: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer
and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
....
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.
The elements of this offense are as follows: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) that the accused is a public officer; (2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of
the government; and (3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous
to the government.129
Private persons acting in conspiracy with public officers may be indicted and if found
guilty, be held liable for the pertinent offenses under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019.
This supports the "policy of the anti-graft law to repress certain acts of public officers and
private persons alike [which constitute] graft or corrupt practices act or which may lead
thereto."130
In Singian, Jr. v. Sandiganbanyan, et al.:131

For one to be successfully prosecuted under Section 3(g) of RA 3019, the following
elements must be proven: "1) the accused is a public officer; 2) the public officer entered
into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and 3) the contract or
transaction was grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government." However,
private persons may likewise be charged with violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019 if they
conspired with the public officer. Thus, "if there is an allegation of conspiracy, a private
person may be held liable together with the public officer, in consonance with the avowed
policy of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act which is to repress certain acts of public
officers and private persons alike which may constitute graft or corrupt practices or which
may lead thereto."132 (Citations omitted)
The prosecution, through testimonial and documentary evidence, sufficiently proved the connivance
between the public officers, who entered into and facilitated the grossly disadvantageous transactions
on behalf of the government with Dela Cruz's Geomiche as the beneficiary. Undoubtedly, the
collective and individual acts of petitioners showed a common design of purchasing the overpriced
construction materials from Dela Cruz to the disadvantage of the government.
When the separate juridical personality of a corporation is used "to defeat public convenience, justify
wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime, the law will regard the corporation as an association of
persons."133
The Sandiganbayan has proven beyond reasonable doubt that petitioners conspired with each other
to forego the required bidding process and to purchase grossly overpriced construction materials
from Geomiche. There is sufficient basis to pierce the corporate veil, and Dela Cruz, as Geomiche's
president, should be held equally liable as her co-conspirators.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petitions are DISMISSED.
The assailed Decision dated August 1, 2008 and Resolution dated January 12, 2009 of the
Sandiganbayan are AFFIRMED in toto.
18.) G.R. No. 173990 October 27, 2009
EDGARDO V. ESTARIJA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the SOLICITOR GENERAL, and EDWARD
RANADA, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to reverse and set aside the 25 November 2005
Decision1 and the 11 July 2006 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with modifications the Decision
and Resolution of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City, Branch 8, finding petitioner, Captain Edgardo V.
Estarija (Estarija), then Harbor Master of the Philippine Ports Authority, Davao City, guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of violating Section 3, paragraph b of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.
On 7 August 1998, an Information was filed before the RTC of Davao City against Estarija for violating Section 3,
paragraph b of Republic Act No. 3019. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
That on or about August 6, 1998, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, EDGARDO ESTARIJA, a public officer, being then the Harbor Master of the
Philippine Ports Authority at Sasa, Davao City, while in the performance of his official function as such, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously request and consequently receive the amount of FIVE THOUSAND
PESOS (₱5,000.00) from Davao Pilot Association in consideration of accused’s issuance of berthing permits.3
Upon his arraignment on 26 August 1998, Estarija, assisted by a counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the
charge.4 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
On 15 March 2000, the RTC rendered a decision convicting Estarija of the crime charged and imposing upon him a
straight penalty of seven years. The decretal portion of the RTC decision reads:
For the foregoing, this Court finds accused Capt. Edgardo Estarija GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Par. B, Sec. 3 of Republic Act 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Accordingly, he is hereby sentenced to suffer a penalty of imprisonment of SEVEN (7) YEARS. 5
Estarija filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the RTC.
On 10 August 2000, Estarija filed a notice of appeal.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of Estarija. The Court of Appeals, however, modified the
penalty to an indeterminate sentence ranging from 6 years and 1 day to 9 years, with the accessory penalty of
perpetual disqualification from public office, thus:
WHEREFORE, this Court x x x hereby AFFIRMS the finding of guilt of the accused-appellant but ORDERS the
modification of the sentence imposed upon the accused-appellant. Conformably, accused-appellant is hereby
sentenced to an Indeterminate penalty of Six (6) Years and One (1) Month to Nine (9) Years of imprisonment, with
the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from public office. 6
Hence, the instant petition.

In the main, the issue for resolution is whether or not error attended the RTC’s findings, as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, that Estarija is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3, paragraph b of Republic Act No.
3019.
Quite apart from the foregoing issue raised by Estarija, the question that comes to the fore, as made evident by the
proceedings below, is whether or not Estarija correctly filed his appeal with the Court of Appeals; or put differently,
whether the Court of Appeals had appellate jurisdiction over the RTC decision convicting Estarija of the charge.
Although not assigned as an error, said issue can be entertained by the Court, since, in a criminal proceeding, an
appeal throws the whole case open for review, and it becomes the duty of the Court to correct any error in the
appealed judgment, whether it is made the subject of an assignment of error or not. 7
Republic Act No. 8249 entitled, "An Act Further Defining the Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, Amending for the
Purpose Presidential Decree No. 1606, as Amended, Providing Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes," which
further defined the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, took effect on 23 February 1997. Paragraph 3, Section 4(c) of
Republic Act No. 8249 reads:
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary Grade ‘27’ or higher, as
prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original
jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and
municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended. 1avvphi1
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders of
regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein
provided. (Emphasis supplied.)
It is manifest from the above provision that the decisions of the Regional Trial Court -- convicting an
accused who occupies a position lower than that with salary grade 27 or those not otherwise covered by
the enumeration of certain public officers in Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606 as amended by
Republic Act No. 8249 -- are to be appealed exclusively to the Sandiganbayan.
Time and again, it has been held that the right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process, but merely a
statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law. The
party who seeks to avail himself of the same must comply with the requirements of the rules, failing in which the
right to appeal is lost.
1avvphi1
Having failed to comply with the requirements set forth in the rules, Estarija’s appeal should have been dismissed by
the Court of Appeals.
In the instant case, instead of appealing his conviction to the Sandiganbayan, Estarija erroneously filed an appeal
with the Court of Appeals, in utter disregard of paragraph 3, Section 4(c) of Republic Act No. 8249. The Court of
Appeals did not notice this conspicuous misstep, since it entertained the appeal. This fatal flaw committed by
Estarija did not toll the running of the period for him to perfect his appeal to the Sandiganbayan. Because of
Estarija’s failure to perfect his appeal to the Sandiganbayan within the period granted therefor, the Decision of the
RTC convicting him of violating Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019 has thus become final and executory.
Inasmuch as the decision of the RTC has long been final and executory, it can no longer be altered or
modified.8 Nothing is more settled in law than that when a judgment becomes final and executory, it becomes
immutable and unalterable.9 The same may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant
to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and whether or not made by the highest
court of the land. The reason is grounded on the fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice
that, at the risk of occasional error, the judgments or orders of courts must be final at some definite date fixed by
law.
The RTC imposed upon Estarija the straight penalty of seven (7) years. This is erroneous. The penalty for violation
of Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019 is imprisonment for not less than six years and one month nor more than
fifteen years, and perpetual disqualification from public office. Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, if the offense
is punished by a special law, the Court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate penalty, the maximum term
of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law, and the minimum term shall not be less than the minimum
prescribed by the same. Thus, the correct penalty should have been imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and
one (1) month, as minimum, to nine (9) years as maximum, with perpetual disqualification from public office.
However, since the decision of the RTC has long become final and executory, this Court cannot modify the same. 10
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Davao City, Branch 8, dated 15 March 2000, finding Edgardo V. Estarija GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019 is declared FINAL and EXECUTORY.
19.) G.R. No. 197613
PUBLIC ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Petitioner

vs.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN and ATTY. TERENCIA S. ERNIRIVERA, Respondents
DECISION
CAGUIOA, J.:
The Case
This is a Petition for Certiorari (Petition) filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which seeks to annul the
1
Resolution (Assailed Resolution) dated September 1, 2010 and Order (Assailed Order) dated November 30, 2010
2 3
issued by the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) in OMB: C-C- 08-0419-I.
The Assailed Resolution and Order dismissed, for lack of probable cause, the separate criminal complaints
(Criminal Complaints) filed against Atty. Terencia S. Emi-Rivera (Atty. Rivera) for violation of the following:
(i) Section 7(b)(2) and (d) of Republic Act No. (RA) 6713, which prohibits public officers from engaging in the
4 5
private practice of their profession while in the public service;
(ii) Section 3(e) of RA 3019 as amended, which prohibits public officers from causing any undue injury to any party,
6 7
including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence; and
(iii) Article 171(4) of Act No. 3815, otherwise known as the Revised Penal Code (RPC), which treats the crime of
8
falsification by a public officer.
The Facts
Atty. Rivera is a Career Service Employee who joined the government service on July 18, 1978 as Trial
Attorney II. Since then, Atty. Rivera had been promoted to several permanent positions, until she was appointed to
9
the position of Public Attorney V (PAS) for PAO Regional Office No. III by virtue of a presidential appointment dated
March 8, 2004. 10
Violation of RA 3019 (causing undue

injury and/or giving unwarranted
benefits/advantage to private parties)
and RA 6713 (engaging in private
practice)
After Atty. Rivera assumed her duties as PAS, PAO received a Letter and Affidavit dated August 13, 2004 and
August 17, 2004, respectively, both by a certain Hazel F. Magabo (Magabo ). Magabo alleged that contrary to
11
PAO's internal rules, Atty. Rivera agreed to handle the annulment case sought to be filed by her brother Isidro
Fayloga (Fayloga), and received staggered payments therefor in the total amount of Ninety-Three Thousand Pesos
(₱93,000.00). Such amount consists of money sent by Fayloga from abroad, as well as money personally
12
advanced by Magabo upon Atty. Rivera's promise that these advances would expedite Fayloga's
annulment. However, Magabo later discovered that Atty. Rivera did not file any petition on Fayloga's behalf.
13 14
To support her claims, Magabo presented copies of bank slips showing that she made several deposits in varying
amounts to Atty. Rivera's account. Magabo also presented a summary of payments showing that Atty. Rivera and
her secretary also received cash on different dates. 15
In response, Atty. Rivera averred that while she did receive the amount of Ninety-Three Thousand Pesos
(₱93,000.00) as alleged, such amount was merely entrusted to her. Atty. Rivera explained that Magabo, her
longtime friend, asked for her help in finding a private practitioner to take on Fayloga's case, and that the money she
received was meant to cover the professional fees and litigation expenses that would be incurred in this
connection. Atty. Rivera further averred that she returned the money entrusted to her as soon as it became
16
apparent that Fayloga would no longer return to the Philippines to pursue the annulment case. 17
As Atty. Rivera subsequently assumed the position of Regional Public Attorney, PAO referred the letter to the
Department of Justice (DOJ) for proper disposition. 18
Thereafter, the allegations in Magabo's Letter and Affidavit became subject of a formal administrative complaint filed
on September 28, 2005 against Atty. Rivera for Grave Misconduct and violation of Civil Service Rules and
Regulations (DOJ Proceeding). 19
After two (2) hearing dates, Magabo submitted an Affidavit of Desistance stating that she is no longer interested in
pursuing the case, as it merely resulted from a misunderstanding between her and her siblings. 20
Nevertheless, on March 27, 2007, the DOJ issued a Resolution (DOJ Resolution) finding Atty. Rivera liable for
21
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, a lesser offense treated under Section 22(t) of Rule XIV of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292. She was meted with the penalty of suspension
for a period of six (6) months and one (1) day without pay. 22
Falsification
On December 4, 2006 (during the pendency of the DOJ Proceeding), Atty. Rivera submitted a Certificate of Service
anent her attendance for November 2006, which states in part:
I, TERENCIA S. ERNI-RIVERA, do hereby certify that I reported for work and performed my duties and functions as
Regional Public Attorney for PAO, Region IV-B, for the month of November 2006. (Emphasis supplied)
23
District Public Attorney Emilio G. Aclan (DPA Aclan) submitted a subsequent Certification dated December 19, 2006
which states:
This is to certify that ATTY. TERENCIA E. RIVERA, Regional Director, Region IV-B (MIMAROPA), reported for work
in this Office from November 13, 2006 up to November 24, 2006. x x x (Emphasis in the original; underscoring
24
omitted.)
Thereafter, Deputy Chief Public Attorney Silvestre Mosing issued a Memorandum dated December 22, 2006
requiring Atty. Rivera to explain why she should not be held administratively and criminally liable for the
"discrepancies" between her Certificate of Service and the Certification issued by DPA Aclan. 25
On December 27, 2006, Atty. Rivera submitted her Comment/Explanation which states, in part:
With due respect, there is no irregularity in [my Certificate of Service], as shown hereunder:
November 1 All Saints Day
November 2 & 3 On leave
November 4 & 5 Saturday & Sunday
November 6-10 PAO-convention, Manila Hotel
November 13-24 PAO-District Office, Batangas City
November 25 & 26 Saturday & Sunday

November 27-30 On leave
I do not see any need to attach a Certificate of Appearance or approved Travel Order when I am on leave. 26
After consideration, the PAO Legal Research Division issued its Report and Recommendation dated January 5,
2007 recommending that Atty. Rivera be held administratively liable for violation of: (i) Civil Service (CSC) Omnibus
Rules on Leave; (ii) PAO Memorandum Circular No. 18, series of 2002 on reasonable office rules and regulations;
(iii) Falsification of Official Documents treated under Section 52(A)(6), Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (URACCS); and (iv) Dishonesty treated under Section 52(A)(1) of the
URACCS. The Report and Recommendation was forwarded to the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) for
27
action, Atty. Rivera being a presidential appointee. 28
Acting on the Report and Recommendation, Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita issued an Order dated June 12,
2007, placing Atty. Rivera under preventive suspension for a period not exceeding ninety (90) days. 29
Report of the PAO Designated
Resident Ombudsman
Later, on August 31, 2007, Atty. Melita S. Recto (Atty. Recto), the PAO Designated Resident Ombudsman, issued a
Report recommending that Atty. Rivera be held administratively and criminally liable for the above-detailed acts
30
committed during her incumbency as Public Attorney. In essence, the Report lent credence to the findings of the
DOJ and PAO Legal Research Division. The penultimate portion of the Report states:
RECOMMENDATION
x x x In view of the above-stated disquisitions, the undersigned most respectfully recommends that [Atty. Rivera] be
criminally charged for:
a. Violation of [Section] 7 (D) of [RA 6713]
b. Falsification of Official Document
Atty. Rivera should likewise be administratively charged for:
c. Four (4) counts of Neglect of Duty [as] defined under Section 52 A (2), Rule IV of the [URACCS] in relation to
Section 5 (B) of [RA 6713].
[d.] Simple Misconduct under Section 52 (B) (4) Rule IV of the [URACCS] in relation to violation of PAO
Memorandum Circular No. 18, Series of 2002. 31
On the basis of the findings in said Report, Atty. Recto (as PAO Designated Resident Ombudsman), together with
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), filed the Criminal Complaints against Atty. Rivera.
On September 1, 2010, the Ombudsman issued the Assailed Resolution dismissing the Criminal Complaints, thus:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the separate complaints for alleged violation of Section 7, paragraph (b ), subparagraph
(2), and paragraph (d) of [RA 6713]; Section 3, paragraph (e), of [RA 3019], as amended; and Article 171,
paragraph (4) of [the RPC], as amended; filed by [Atty. Recto] and the [NBI] against respondent [Atty. Rivera] are
hereby DISMISSED for lack of probable cause.
SO ORDERED. 32
PAO filed a Motion for Reconsideration and subsequent Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration dated
33 34
September 24, 2010 and October 26, 2010, respectively. Both motions were denied by the Ombudsman for lack of
merit in the Assailed Order dated November 30, 2010. 35
PAO received a copy of the Assailed Order on June 1, 2011. Hence, PAO filed the present Petition on July 29,
36
2011.
The Issue
The sole issue for this Court's resolution is whether the Ombudsman acted in grave abuse of discretion
when it directed the dismissal of the Criminal Complaints against Atty. Rivera for lack of probable cause.
The Court's Ruling
Time and again, this Court has consistently stressed that a petition for certiorari is a special civil action that may be
resorted to only for the limited purpose of correcting errors of jurisdiction, and not errors of judgment. In turn, errors
37
of jurisdiction proceed from grave abuse of discretion, or such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. In this Petition, such grave abuse discretion is imputed to the Ombudsman.
38
Under the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman is mandated to investigate acts or omissions of public officials or
employees which appear to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. Accordingly, the Ombudsman is vested with
39
investigatory and prosecutorial powers to fulfill its constitutional mandate. The Ombudsman's powers are plenary in
40
nature, designed to insulate it from outside pressure and influence. 41
Nevertheless, the plenary nature of the Ombudsman's powers does not place it beyond the scope of the Court's
power of review) Under its expanded jurisdiction, the Court may strike down the act of any branch or instrumentality
of the government, including the Ombudsman, on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. However, for the
42
extraordinary writ of certiorari to issue against the actions of the Ombudsman, the petitioner must show that the
latter's exercise of power had been done in an arbitrary or despotic manner. Such abuse of power must be so patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at
all in contemplation of law.43
The allegations in the Petition failed to show that the Assailed Resolution and Order had been issued in the
foregoing manner. Accordingly, the Court resolves to deny the instant Petition on this ground.
The Assailed Resolution and Order

were issued within the bounds of the
Ombudsman 's investigatory and
prosecutorial powers.
PAO asserts that the Ombudsman "overzealously exceeded its mandate by requiring more than the quantum of
evidence needed to support a finding of probable cause." PAO claims that the Ombudsman effectively demanded it
to present evidence sufficient to establish Atty. Rivera's guilt for the offenses charged, instead of merely requiring
such evidence necessary to sustain a finding of probable cause to file a criminal information against her. 44
These assertions lack basis.
Probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information, has been defined to constitute such facts as are
sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty
thereof, thus:
45
x x x [Probable cause] does not mean "actual or positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely
based on opinion and reasonable belief. Probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient
evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes
the offense charged.
x x x In determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the
calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on common sense. What is
determined is whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed,
and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. x x x (Emphasis in the original omitted;
46
emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Indeed, the determination of probable cause does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to
secure a conviction. However, there is nothing in the Assailed Resolution and Order which suggests that the
47
Ombudsman dismissed the Criminal Complaints due to PAO's failure to offer such higher quantum of evidence. The
Court quotes the relevant portions of the Assailed Resolution, thus:
After a careful evaluation of the different pleadings of the parties herein, together with the various pieces of
documentary evidence attached thereto, [the Ombudsman] finds that there is no sufficient ground to engender a
well-founded belief that the charged offenses have been committed and that public respondent is probably guilty
thereof, and should be held for trial. This is so for the evidence on record failed to establish that Atty. Rivera indeed
solicited, took, or accepted money from [Magabo] in the course of her official duties as Chief of the Legal Research
Division of the [PAO], or in connection with any operation being regulated by, or any transaction which may be
affected by the functions of her office. x x x [I]nasmuch as the purported receipt of [the money] had no connection
whatsoever to the official duties of Atty. Rivera at the [PAO] x x x no case for the supposed violation of [Section 7(d)]
of [RA 6713] and [Section 3(e)] of [RA 3019] x x x could be maintained against her. x x x
Similarly, it cannot be maintained .that [Atty. Rivera] transgressed the provisions of [Section 7(b)(2)] of [RA 6713],
considering that no satisfactory proof was even adduced to the effect that Atty. Rivera has been habitually or
customarily holding herself to the public as a lawyer. Furthermore, the Affidavit of Desistance executed by [Magabo]
x x x expressing x x x that [her administrative complaint] was merely the result of a miscommunication between her
and her siblings Edna Villoria and [Fayloga] likewise made the finding of probable cause vis-avis (sic) [Atty. Rivera]
for the abovementioned offenses difficult, considering that the [Criminal Complaints] against the latter for the
supposed violation of [RA 3019], as amended, and [RA] 6713, are evidently based on the administrative suit
previously filed by [Magabo] x xx.
Finally, the [Ombudsman] also finds no sufficient evidence to indict [Atty. Rivera] for the supposed violation of
[Article 171(4)] of [the RPC], as amended, since the latter never stated in her Cerification x x x that she rendered full
time service for the month of November 2006. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
48
Contrary to PAO's assertions, the Ombudsman did not impose a higher quantum of proof. The dismissal of the
Criminal Complaints was not prompted by PAO's failure to present evidence to establish Atty. Rivera's criminal
liability beyond reasonable doubt, but rather, on its failure to establish, by substantial evidence, that Atty. Rivera
committed the acts subject of the Criminal Complaints. Evidently, probable cause cannot exist where the acts which
constitute the offenses charged are not proven to have been committed by the respondent.
The Ombudsman did not act in grave

abuse of its discretion when it found
no probable cause to charge Atty.
Rivera with violation of RA 6713 and
RA 3019. The Court's ruling in
Ramos v. Imbang does not apply.
Anent the charge of violation of Section 7(b)(2) and (d) of RA 6713 and Section 3(e) of RA 3019, PAO maintains
that the Court's ruling in Ramos v. lmbang (Imbang) precludes the dismissal of the Criminal Complaints, as the
49
factual antecedents therein are similar to this case.50
Again, this is error.
In Imbang, the Court found respondent therein (a PAO lawyer) guilty of violating the lawyer's oath, as well as
Canons 1 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for engaging in private practice and receiving the
amount of Five Thousand Pesos (₱5,000.00) in attorney's and appearance fees. In said case, respondent led the
private complainant to believe that he had been attending hearings in connection with the case respondent filed on
the latter's behalf, only to discover later on that no such case had been filed. Thus, the respondent was disbarred
51
from the practice of law.
Thus, in lmbang, the evidence on record established that respondent received appearance fees for attending
hearings that never took place. Hence, the acts which constitute the administrative offenses charged therein were
proven to have been committed by the respondent. As stated at the outset, such is not the case here.
As correctly observed by the Ombudsman, the Criminal Complaints rest heavily on the findings of the DOJ
and PAO Legal Division. These findings, are, in turn, based on Magabo's allegations which, as she admitted
in her Affidavit of Desistance, merely arose from a family misunderstanding. In fact, in the same affidavit,
52
Magabo acknowledged that the entire amount she had entrusted to Atty. Rivera had already been returned.
The Ombudsman did not act in grave

abuse of its discretion when it found
no probable cause to charge Atty.
Rivera with Falsification under the
RPC.
Anent the charge of Falsification under the RPC, PAO insists, as it did before the Ombudsman, that Atty. Rivera
untruthfully declared that she reported for work for the entire month of November 2006, contrary to DPA Adan's
findings that she only reported for work on November 13 to 24 of the same year.
A careful reading of the certifications in question belies PAO's allegation. Notably, Atty. Rivera's Certificate of
Service states that "[she] reported for work and performed [her] duties as Regional Public Attorney x x x for the
month of November 2006." On the other hand, DPA Adan's Certification states that Atty. Rivera "reported for
53
work in [the PAO Region IV-B office] from November 13, 2006 up to November 24, 2006." Hence, while Atty.
54
Rivera's Certificate of Service attests to the performance of her duties as Regional Public Attorney for the entire
month of November, DPA Adan's Certification merely certifies the dates when Atty. Rivera physically reported to
the PAO Region IV-B office to perform said duties.
In fact, in her Comment/Explanation, Atty. Rivera was able to account for all the other days in November on which
she allegedly did not report to work. Such days were either holidays, weekends, filed leave days, or days set aside
for official business. The supposed discrepancies between said certificates are thus more apparent than real.
55
Proceeding from the foregoing, PAO's imputation of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman fails.
Consequently, the findings in the Assailed Resolution and Order must be respected, in accordance with the Court's
pronouncement in Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Desierto: 56
Case law has it that the determination of probable cause against those in public office during a preliminary
investigation is a function that belongs to the Office of the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman has the discretion to
determine whether a criminal case, given its attendant facts and circumstances, should be filed or not. It is basically
his call. He may dismiss the complaint forthwith should he find it to be insufficient in form or substance, or he may
proceed with the investigation if, in his view, the complaint is in due and proper form and substance. We have
consistently refrained from interfering with the constitutionally mandated investigatory and prosecutorial powers of
the Ombudsman. Thus, if the Ombudsman, using professional judgment, finds the case dismissible, the Court shall
respect such findings, unless the exercise of such discretionary powers is tainted by grave abuse of
discretion. (Emphasis supplied)
57
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED. The Assailed Resolution dated
September 1, 2010 and Order dated November 30, 2010 issued by the Ombudsman in OMB: C-C-08- 0419-I are
hereby AFFIRMED.
20.) G.R. No. 192685 July 31, 2013
OSCAR R. AMPIL, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, POLICARPIO L. ESPENESIN, Registrar, Register of Deeds, Pasig
City, FRANCIS SERRANO, YVONNE S. YUCHENGCO, and GEMA O. CHENG, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 199115
OSCAR R. AMPIL, Petitioner,
vs.
POLICARPIO L. ESPENESIN, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
No less than the Constitution maps out the wide grant of investigatory powers to the Ombudsman. 1 Hand in hand
with this bestowal, the Ombudsman is mandated to investigate and prosecute, for and in behalf of the people,
criminal and administrative offenses committed by government officers and employees, as well as private persons in
conspiracy with the former.2 There can be no equivocation about this power-and-duty function of the Ombudsman.
Before us are consolidated petitions separately filed by Oscar R. Ampil (Ampil): (1) one is for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court docketed as G.R. No. 192685; and (2) the other is for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court docketed as G.R. No. 199115.
Challenged in the petition for certiorari is the Resolution 3 of the Ombudsman in OMB-C-C-07-0444-J, dismissing the
criminal complaint filed by Ampil against respondents Policarpio L. Espenesin (Espenesin), Francis Serrano
(Serrano), Yvonne S. Yuchengco (Yuchengco) and Gema O. Cheng (Cheng), and the Order 4 denying Ampil’s
motion for reconsideration thereof. Ampil’s complaint charged respondents with Falsification of Public Documents
under Article 171(6) of the Revised Penal Code and violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, The
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended.
The appeal by certiorari, on the other hand, assails the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 113171,
which affirmed the Order dated 13 July 2009 of the Ombudsman in OMB-C-A-07-0474-J on the administrative
aspect of the mentioned criminal complaint for Falsification and violation of Republic Act No. 3019 against the
Registrar of Deeds, respondent Espenesin. Initially, the Ombudsman issued a Decision dated 30 April 2008, finding
Espenesin guilty of Simple Misconduct and meting on Espenesin the penalty of one (1) month suspension. On
motion for reconsideration of Ampil, the Ombudsman favored Espenesin’s arguments in his Opposition, and recalled
the one-month suspension the Ombudsman had imposed on the latter.
These consolidated cases arose from the following facts.
On 9 November 1995, ASB Realty Corporation (ASB) and Malayan Insurance Company (MICO) entered into a Joint
Project Development Agreement (JPDA) for the construction of a condominium building to be known as "The
Malayan Tower." Under the JPDA, MICO shall provide the real property located at the heart of the Ortigas Business
District, Pasig City, while ASB would construct, and shoulder the cost of construction and development of the
condominium building.
A year thereafter, on 20 November 1996, MICO and ASB entered into another contract, with MICO selling to ASB
the land it was contributing under the JPDA. Under the Contract to Sell, ownership of the land will vest on ASB only
upon full payment of the purchase price.
Sometime in 2000, ASB, as part of the ASB Group of Companies, filed a Petition for Rehabilitation with Prayer for
Suspension of Actions and Proceedings before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). As a result, the
SEC issued a sixty (60) day Suspension Order (a) suspending all actions for claims against the ASB Group of
Companies pending or still to be filed with any court, office, board, body, or tribunal; (b) enjoining the ASB Group of
Companies from disposing of their properties in any manner, except in the ordinary course of business, and from
paying their liabilities outstanding as of the date of the filing of the petition; and (c) appointing Atty. Monico V. Jacob
as interim receiver of the ASB Group of Companies. 5 Subsequently, the SEC, over the objections of creditors,
approved the Rehabilitation Plan submitted by the ASB Group of Companies, thus:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the objections to the rehabilitation plan raised by the creditors are hereby considered
unreasonable.
Accordingly, the Rehabilitation Plan submitted by petitioners is hereby APPROVED, except those pertaining to Mr.
Roxas’ advances, and the ASB-Malayan Towers. Finally, Interim Receiver Mr. Fortunato Cruz is appointed as
Rehabilitation Receiver.6 (Emphasis supplied).
Because of the obvious financial difficulties, ASB was unable to perform its obligations to MICO under the JPDA and
the Contract to Sell. Thus, on 30 April 2002, MICO and ASB executed their Third contract, a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA),7 allowing MICO to assume the entire responsibility for the development and completion of
The Malayan Tower. At the time of the execution of the MOA, ASB had already paid MICO ₱427,231,952.32 out of
the ₱640,847,928.48 purchase price of the realty. 8
The MOA specifies the entitlement of both ASB and MICO to net saleable areas of The Malayan Tower representing
their investments. It provides, in pertinent part:
Section 4. Distribution and Disposition of Units. (a) As a return of its capital investment in the Project, each party
shall be entitled to such portion of all the net saleable area of the Building that their respective contributions to the
Project bear to the actual construction cost. As of the date of the execution hereof, and on the basis of the total
costs incurred to date in relation to the Remaining Construction Costs (as defined in Section 9(a) hereof), the parties
shall respectively be entitled to the following (which entitlement shall be conditioned on, and subject to, adjustments
as provided in sub-paragraph (b) of Section 4 in the event that the actual remaining cost of construction exceeds the
Remaining Construction Cost):
(i) MICO – the net saleable area particularly described in Schedule 2 hereof.
(ii) ASB – the following net saleable area:
(A) the net saleable area which ASB had pre-sold for an aggregate purchase price of
₱640,085,267.30 as set forth in Schedule 1 (including all paid and unpaid proceeds of said
presales);
(B) the net saleable area particularly described in Schedule 3 hereof which shall be delivered
to ASB upon completion of the Project; and,
(C) provided that the actual remaining construction costs do not exceed the Remaining
Construction Cost, the net saleable area particularly described in Schedule 4 hereof which
shall be delivered to ASB upon completion of the Project and determination of its actual
construction costs. If the actual remaining construction costs exceed the Remaining
Construction Cost, sub-paragraph (b) of this Section 4 shall apply.
(b) In the event that the actual remaining construction costs exceed the Remaining Construction Cost as
represented and warranted by ASB to MICO under Section 9(a) hereof, and MICO pays for such excess, the
pro-rata sharing in the net saleable area of the Building, as provided in sub-paragraph (a) of this Section 4
shall be adjusted accordingly. In such event, MICO shall be entitled to such net saleable area in Schedule 4
that corresponds to the excess of the actual remaining cost over the Remaining Construction Cost.
(c) To ensure the viability of the Project, the parties agree on a single pricing system, which MICO shall have
the exclusive right to fix and periodically adjust based on prevailing market conditions in consultation with,
but without need of consent of, ASB, for each party’s primary sale or other disposition of its share in the net
saleable area of the Building. In accordance with the immediately preceding provision, MICO hereby adopts
the selling prices set forth in Schedule 5 hereof. Each party or its officers, employees, agents or
representatives shall not sell or otherwise dispose any share of said party in the net saleable area of the
Building below the prices fixed by MICO in accordance with this Section 4 (c). MICO shall have the exclusive
right to adopt financing and discounting schemes to enhance marketing and sales of units in the Project and
such right of MICO shall not be restricted or otherwise limited by the foregoing single pricing system
provision.
(d) Each party shall bear the profits earned and losses incurred as well as any and all taxes and other
expenses in connection with the allocation or sale of, or other transaction relating to, the units allotted to
each party.9
On 11 March 2005, Condominium Certificates of Title (CCTs) for 38 units10 and the allotted parking spaces
were issued in the name of ASB. On even date but prior to its release, another set of CCTs covering the
same subject units but with MICO as registered owner thereof, was signed by Espenesin in his capacity as
Registrar of Deeds of Pasig City. Notably, Espenesin had likewise signed the CCTs which were originally
issued in ASB’s name.
On 2 April 2006, counsel for ASB wrote Espenesin calling his attention to the supposed amendment in the CCTs
which he had originally issued in ASB’s name. 11 Counsel for ASB demanded that Espenesin effect in the second set
of CCTs, the registration of the subject units in The Malayan Tower back to ASB’s name.
On 17 May 2006, Espenesin replied and explained, thus:
The registration of the Malayan-ASB Realty transaction, from its inception up to the issuance of titles, were all
handled by respondent Atty. Francis Serrano. He therefore appeared and we have considered him the legitimate
representative of both parties (sic). His representation, we gathered, covers the interest of both MICO and ASB in as
far as the titling of the condominium units are concerned.
Sometime ago Serrano requested that condominium titles over specified units be issued in consonance with the
sharing in the joint venture MOA. Titles were correspondingly issued as per request, some in the name of MICO and
some in the name of ASB. Before its release to the parties, Atty. Serrano came back and requested that some titles
issued in the name of ASB be changed to MICO because allegedly there was error in the issuance.
Believing it was a simple error and on representation of the person we came to know and considered the
representative of both parties, we erased the name ASB Realty Corporation on those specified titles and placed
instead the name Malayan Insurance Company.
To our mind, the purpose was not to transfer ownership but merely to rectify an error committed in the issuance of
titles. And since they were well within our capacity to do, the titles not having been released yet to its owner, we did
what we believed was a simple act of rectifying a simple mistake. 12
After learning of the amendment in the CCTs issued in ASB’s name, Ampil, on 23 January 2007, wrote
respondents Yuchengco and Cheng, President and Chief Financial Officer of MICO, respectively,
introducing himself as an unsecured creditor of ASB Holdings, Inc., one of the corporations forming part of
the ASB Group of Companies.13 Ampil averred that MICO had illegally registered in its name the subject
units at The Malayan Tower which were reserved for ASB under the MOA, and actually, already registered in
ASB’s name with the Register of Deeds of Pasig City. Ampil pointed out that the "condominium units should
have benefited him and other unsecured creditors of ASB because the latter had categorically informed them
previously that the same would be contributed to the Asset Pool created under the Rehabilitation Plan of the ASB
Group of Companies." Ultimately, Ampil demanded that Yuchengco and Cheng rectify the resulting error in the
CCTs, and facilitate the registration of the subject units back to ASB’s name.
Respondents paid no heed to ASB’s and Ampil’s demands.

As previously adverted to, Ampil charged respondents with Falsification of Public Documents under Article
171(6) of the Revised Penal Code and violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 before the
Office of the Ombudsman, alleging the following:
1. Respondents, in conspiracy, erased the name of ASB, and intercalated and substituted the name of
MICO under the entry of registered owner in the questioned CCTs covering the subject units of The Malayan
Tower;
2. The alterations were done without the necessary order from the proper court, in direct violation of Section
10814 of Presidential Decree No. 1529;
3. Respondents violated Article 171(6) of the Revised Penal Code by:
3.1 Altering the CCTs which are public documents;
3.2 Effecting the alterations on genuine documents;
3.3 Changing the meaning of the CCTs with MICO now appearing as registered owner of the subject
units in Malayan Tower; and
3.4 Effectively, making the documents speak something false when ASB is the true owner of the
subject units, and not MICO.
4. Ampil, as unsecured creditor of ASB, was unjustly prejudiced by the felonious acts of respondents;
5. Respondents violated Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019:
5.1 Respondent Espenesin, as Registrar of the Pasig City Registry of Deeds, committed an
offense in connection with his official duties by allowing himself to be persuaded, induced or
influenced by respondent Serrano into altering the questioned CCTs; and
5.2 The actions of respondent Espenesin demonstrate manifest partiality, evident bad faith
and/or, at the least, gross inexcusable negligence.
6. Respondents Yuchengco and Cheng, being responsible officers of MICO, as principals by inducement
and conspirators of Espenesin and Serrano, are likewise liable for falsification of the CCTs and violation of
Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019.15
As required by the Ombudsman, respondents filed their counter-affidavits: Espenesin and Serrano filed individually,
while Yuchengco and Cheng filed jointly. Respondents’ respective counter-affidavits uniformly denied petitioner’s
charges and explicated as follows:
Respondent Espenesin countered, among others, (i) that their intention was only to cause the necessary
rectification on certain errors made on the CCTs in issue; (ii) that since the CCTs were not yet issued and released
to the parties, it is still within his authority, as part of the registration process, to make the necessary amendments or
corrections thereon; (iii) that no court order would be necessary to effect such changes, the CCTs still being within
the control of the Register of Deeds and have not yet been released to the respective owners; (iv) that the
amendments were made not for the purpose of falsifying the CCTs in issue but to make the same reflect and
declare the truth; and (v) that he merely made the corrections in accordance with the representations of respondent
Serrano who he believed to be guarding and representing both the interests of MICO and ASB.
Respondent Serrano, on the other hand, argued: (i) that the units in issue are not yet owned by ASB; (ii) that these
units were specifically segregated and reserved for MICO in order to answer for any excess in the estimated cost
that it will expend in the completion of the Malayan Tower; (iii) that ASB is only entitled to these reserved units only
after the Malayan Tower is completed and that the units are not utilized to cover for the increase in the cost
expended by MICO pursuant to Section 4(c) of the MOA; (iv) that the Malayan Tower was still incomplete at the time
when the alterations were made on the CCT, hence, the claim of ownership of ASB over the reserved units is
premature and totally baseless; (v) that prior to the fulfillment of the resolutory condition, that is, after the completion
of the Malayan Tower and there remains a balance in the Remaining Construction Cost, the units still rightfully
belongs to MICO; and (vi) that the alteration was made merely for the purpose of correcting an error.
Respondents Cheng and Yuchengco, while adopting the foregoing arguments of Espenesin and Serrano, further
averred that: (i) Ampil has no legal personality to file this suit, he being merely an unsecured creditor of ASB whose
interest was not definitively shown to have been damaged by the subject controversy; (ii) that their participation as
respondents and alleged co-conspirators of Serrano and Espenesin was not clearly shown and defined in the
complaint; (iii) the CCTs issued in the name of ASB have not yet been entered in the Registration Book at the time
when the alterations were effected, hence, the same could still be made subject of appropriate amendments; (iv)
that the CCTs in issue named in favor of ASB were mere drafts and cannot legally be considered documents within
the strict definition of the law; (v) that court order authorizing to amend a title is necessary only if the deed or
document sought to be registered has already been entered in the registration book; and (vi) that MICO is the duly
registered owner of the land on which Malayan Tower stands and ASB was merely referred to as the developer. 16
Thereafter, the Ombudsman issued the assailed Resolution in G.R. No. 192685 dismissing Ampil’s complaint. For
the Ombudsman, the resolution of whether respondents falsified the CCTs must be prefaced by a determination of
who, between MICO and ASB, is the rightful owner of the subject units. The Ombudsman held that it had no
authority to interpret the provisions of the MOA and, thus, refrained from resolving the preliminary question of
ownership. Given the foregoing, the Ombudsman was hard pressed to make a categorical finding that the CCTs
were altered to speak something false. In short, the Ombudsman did not have probable cause to indict respondents
for falsification of the CCTs because the last element of the crime, i.e., that the change made the document speak
something false, had not been established.
Significantly, the Ombudsman did not dispose of whether probable cause exists to indict respondents for violation of
Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019.
Ampil filed a Motion for Reconsideration. However, in yet another setback, the Ombudsman denied Ampil’s motion
and affirmed the dismissal of his complaint.
On the administrative litigation front and as previously narrated, the Ombudsman found Espenesin liable for Simple
Misconduct. However, on motion for reconsideration of Ampil praying for a finding of guilt against Espenesin for
Grave Misconduct and Dishonesty, the Ombudsman reconsidered its earlier resolution and recalled the one-month
suspension meted on Espenesin.
Thereafter, Ampil filed a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court before the appellate court. And as
already stated, the appellate court affirmed the Ombudsman’s resolution absolving Espenesin of not just Grave
Misconduct and Dishonesty, but also of Simple Misconduct.
Hence, this dual recourse by Ampil: first, alleging grave abuse of discretion in the Ombudsman’s failure to find
probable cause to indict respondents for Falsification of Public Documents under Article 171(6) of the Revised Penal
Code, and for their commission of corrupt practices under Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019; and
second, raising grievous error of the Court of Appeals in affirming the Ombudsman’s absolution of Espenesin from
administrative liability.
To obviate confusion, we shall dispose of the first issue, i.e., whether probable cause exists to indict respondents for
Falsification of Public Documents under Article 171(6) of the Revised Penal Code and for their commission of
corrupt practices under Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019.
Despite the Ombudsman’s categorical dismissal of his complaint, Ampil is adamant on the existence of probable
cause to bring respondents to trial for falsification of the CCTs, and for violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic
Act No. 3019. In fact, he argues that Espenesin has been held administratively liable by the Ombudsman for altering
the CCTs. At the time of the filing of G.R. No. 192685, the Ombudsman had not yet reversed its previous resolution
finding Espenesin liable for simple misconduct. He insists that the admission by respondents Espenesin and
Serrano that they altered the CCTs should foreclose all questions on all respondents’ (Espenesin’s, Serrano’s,
Yuchengco’s and Cheng’s) liability for falsification and their commission of corrupt practices, under the Revised
Penal Code and Republic Act No. 3019, respectively. In all, Ampil maintains that the Ombudsman’s absolution of
respondents is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
G.R. No. 192685 is partially impressed with merit. Accordingly, we find grave abuse of discretion in the
Ombudsman’s incomplete disposition of Ampil’s complaint.
That the Ombudsman is a constitutional officer duty bound to "investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person,
any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be
illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient"17 brooks no objection. The Ombudsman’s conduct of preliminary investigation
is both power and duty. Thus, the Ombudsman and his Deputies, are constitutionalized as protectors of the people,
who "shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the
government x x x, and shall, x x x notify the complainants of the action taken and the result thereof." 18
The raison d'être for its creation and endowment of broad investigative authority is to insulate the Office of the
Ombudsman from the long tentacles of officialdom that are able to penetrate judges’ and fiscals’ offices, and others
involved in the prosecution of erring public officials, and through the execution of official pressure and influence,
quash, delay, or dismiss investigations into malfeasances and misfeasances committed by public officers. 19
Plainly, the Ombudsman has "full discretion," based on the attendant facts and circumstances, to determine the
existence of probable cause or the lack thereof. 20 On this score, we have consistently hewed to the policy of non-
interference with the Ombudsman’s exercise of its constitutionally mandated powers. 21 The Ombudsman’s finding to
proceed or desist in the prosecution of a criminal case can only be assailed through certiorari proceedings before
this Court on the ground that such determination is tainted with grave abuse of discretion which contemplates an
abuse so grave and so patent equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 22
However, on several occasions, we have interfered with the Ombudsman’s discretion in determining probable
cause:
(a) To afford protection to the constitutional rights of the accused;
(b) When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions;
(c) When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice;
(d) When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;
(e) Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;
(f) When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
(g) Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
(h) Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;
(i) Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance. 23 (Emphasis supplied).
The fourth circumstance is present in G.R. No. 192685.
While we agree with the Ombudsman’s disquisition that there is no probable cause to indict respondents for
Falsification of Public Documents under Article 171(6) of the Revised Penal Code, we are puzzled why the
Ombudsman completely glossed over Ampil’s charge that respondents committed prohibited acts listed in Sections
3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019. Nowhere in the Resolution or in the Order denying reconsideration thereof
did the Ombudsman tackle and resolve the issue of whether respondents violated the particular provisions of
Republic Act No. 3019.
Curiously, the Ombudsman docketed Ampil’s complaint-affidavit as one "for: Falsification of Public Documents and
Violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended." 24 The Ombudsman even prefaced the
Resolution, thus: "this has reference to the complaint filed by Oscar Ampil on 17 September 2007 against
respondents, for Falsification of Public Documents and Violation of Sections 3, paragraphs (a) and (e) of Republic
Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended." 25
The Ombudsman’s silence on the component anti-graft charges is pointed up by the specific allegations in Ampil’s
complaint-affidavit that:
18. The acts of ATTY. ESPENESIN and his co-conspirators are clear violations of Section 3 paragraph (a) and/or
(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act x x x;
xxxx
19. On the basis of the evidence x x x and the admissions of the conspirators themselves, ATTY. ESPENESIN is
liable under both pars. (a) and (e) thereof or either of the two. By maliciously and feloniously altering the subject
CCT’s (sic), contrary to law and to the prejudice of ASB and Ampil, ATTY. ESPENESIN committed an offense in
connection with his official duties and he admitted having done so in conspiracy with his co-respondents. x x x
ATTY. ESPENESIN allowed himself to be persuaded, induced or influenced into committing such violation or
offense which is the substance of par. (a) of RA 3019;
20. In committing such unauthorized and unlawful alterations on the subject CCT’s (sic), ATTY. ESPENESIN
caused undue injury to ASB and to AMPIL as an unsecured creditor, who is ultimately one of the beneficiaries of
said CCT from the ASSET POOL created by the SEC, and gave MICO unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his official duties as Register of Deeds of Pasig City. Such acts were admitted by
ATTY. ESPENESIN in his letter to ASB x x x. Such acts, taken together with his admission, indubitably show ATTY.
ESPENESIN’s manifest partiality, evident bad faith and/or, at the least, his gross inexcusable negligence in doing
the same;
21. ATTY. ESPENESIN is liable under Section 3 pars. (a) and/or (e) of RA 3019, as well as under Article 171 par. 6
of the RPC. ATTY. SERRANO, YVONNE S. YUCHENGCO and (sic) GEMMA O. CHENG are also liable for
violation of the said provisions of law in conspiracy with ATTY. ESPENESIN, the latter as a principal via direct
participation, ATTY. SERRANO, as principal by inducement and YUCHENGCO and CHENG, also by inducement,
who being responsible officers of MICO ultimately benefited from said unlawful act. 26 and the pith of the Resolution
which carefully and meticulously dissected the presence of the first three definitive elements of the crime of
falsification under Article 171(6) of the Revised Penal Code:
The first three definitive elements of the crime, albeit present, are defeated by the absence of the fourth.
The respondents readily admitted that an alteration was indeed made on the CCTs in issue allegedly for the
purpose of correcting a mistake in the name of the registered owner of the condominium units involved. Said
alteration had obviously changed the tenor of the CCTs considering that ASB, the initially named owner, was
changed into MICO. The first and third elements are undeniably present.
Anent the second element, the respondents argued that the CCTs in issue were mere drafts and are not legally
considered "genuine documents" within the strict definition of the law. Albeit the contention is partially true, no proof
has been shown to prove that the CCTs issued in favor of ASB were mere drafts.
The CCTs of ASB are obviously complete. If we are to compare it with the appearance and contents of the CCTs
issued in favor of MICO, one will notice no definitive difference between the two except that one set was named in
favor of ASB and the other set, in favor of MICO. Nothing is shown that will clearly prove that the former were mere
drafts and the latter are the final copies. As far as the appearance of the CCTs of ASB is concerned, all appear to be
complete and genuine. Proof to the contrary must be shown to prove otherwise.
Delivery of the titles to the named owners is not a pre-requisite before all these CCTs can be legally categorized as
genuine documents. The fact that the same had already been signed by respondent Espenesin in his capacity as
Registrar of Deeds of Pasig City and the notations imprinted thereon appeared to have been entered on March 11,
2005 at 11:55 a.m. at the Registry Books of Pasig City, the CCTs in issue are bound to be treated as genuine
documents drafted and signed in the regular performance of duties of the officer whose signature appears thereon. 27
On the whole, the Ombudsman’s discussion was straightforward and categorical, and ultimately
established that Espenesin, at the urging of Serrano, altered the CCTs issued in ASB’s name resulting in
these CCTs ostensibly declaring MICO as registered owner of the subject units at The Malayan Tower.
Despite the admission by Espenesin that he had altered the CCTs and the Ombudsman’s findings thereon, the
Ombudsman abruptly dismissed Ampil’s complaint-affidavit, resolving only one of the charges contained therein with
nary a link regarding the other charge of violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019. Indeed, as
found by the Ombudsman, the 4th element of the crime of Falsification of Public Documents is lacking, as the actual
ownership of the subject units at The Malayan Tower has yet to be resolved. Nonetheless, this circumstance does
not detract from, much less diminish, Ampil’s charge, and the evidence pointing to the possible commission, of
offenses under Sections 3(a) and (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 reads:
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized
by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be
unlawful:
(a) Persuading, inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act constituting a violation of rules and
regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or an offense in connection with the official duties of the latter,
or allowing himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced to commit such violation or offense.
xxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of
offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
The elements of Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019 are:
(2) the offender persuades, induces, or influences another public officer to perform an act or the
offender allows himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced to commit an act;
(3) the act performed by the other public officer or committed by the offender constitutes a violation
of rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or an offense in connection with
the official duty of the latter. (Emphasis supplied).
Whereas, paragraph (e) of the same section lists the following elements:
(2) the act was done in the discharge of the public officer’s official, administrative or judicial functions;
(3) the act was done through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence; and
(4) the public officer caused any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or gave any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference.28
As Registrar of the Registry of Deeds of Pasig City, Espenesin is tasked, among others, to review deeds and other
documents for conformance with the legal requirements of registration.29 Section 10 of Presidential Decree No.
1529, Amending and Codifying the Laws Relative to Registration of Property and for Other Purposes provides:
Section 10. General functions of Registers of Deeds. – The office of the Register of Deeds constitutes a public
repository of records of instruments affecting registered or unregistered lands and chattel mortgages in the province
or city wherein such office is situated.
It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to immediately register an instrument presented for registration dealing
with real or personal property which complies with all the requisites for registration. He shall see to it that said
instrument bears the proper documentary and science stamps and that the same are properly cancelled. If the
instrument is not registerable, he shall forthwith deny registration thereof and inform the presentor of such denial in
writing, stating the ground or reason therefore, and advising him of his right to appeal by consulta in accordance
with Section 117 of the Decree.
Most importantly, a Registrar of the Registry of Deeds is charged with knowledge of Presidential Decree No. 1529,
specifically Sections 5730 and 108.31
In the instant case, the elements of the offenses under Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019,
juxtaposed against the functions of a Registrar of the Registry of Deeds establish a prima facie graft case
against Espenesin and Serrano only. Under Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019, there is a prima facie
case that Espenesin, at the urging of Serrano, allowed himself to be persuaded to alter the CCTs originally
issued in ASB’s name, against the procedure provided by law for the issuance of CCTs and registration of
property. In addition, under Section 3(e) of the same law, there is likewise a prima facie case that
Espenesin, through gross inexcusable negligence, by simply relying on the fact that all throughout the
transaction to register the subject units at The Malayan Tower he liaised with Serrano, gave MICO an
unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference in the registration of the subject units.
In Sison v. People of the Philippines, we expounded on Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019:
The third element of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 may be committed in three ways, i.e., through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. Proof of any of these three in connection with the prohibited acts
mentioned in Section 3(e) of RA 3019 is enough to convict.
Explaining what "partiality," "bad faith" and "gross negligence" mean, we held:
"Partiality" is synonymous with "bias" which "excites a disposition to see and report matters as they are wished for
rather than as they are." "Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest
purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive or
intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud." "Gross negligence has been so defined as negligence
characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not
inadvertently but willfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences in so far as other persons
may be affected. It is the omission of that care which even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to take on their
own property."
In the instant case, petitioner was grossly negligent in all the purchases that were made under his watch.
Petitioner’s admission that the canvass sheets sent out by de Jesus to the suppliers already contained his
signatures because he pre-signed these forms only proved his utter disregard of the consequences of his actions.
Petitioner also admitted that he knew the provisions of RA 7160 on personal canvass but he did not follow the law
because he was merely following the practice of his predecessors. This was an admission of a mindless disregard
for the law in a tradition of illegality. This is totally unacceptable, considering that as municipal mayor, petitioner
ought to implement the law to the letter. As local chief executive, he should have been the first to follow the law and
see to it that it was followed by his constituency. Sadly, however, he was the first to break it.
Petitioner should have complied with the requirements laid down by RA 7160 on personal canvass, no matter how
strict they may have been. Dura lex sed lex. The law is difficult but it is the law. These requirements are not empty
words but were specifically crafted to ensure transparency in the acquisition of government supplies, especially
since no public bidding is involved in personal canvass. Truly, the requirement that the canvass and awarding of
supplies be made by a collegial body assures the general public that despotic, irregular or unlawful transactions do
not occur. It also guarantees that no personal preference is given to any supplier and that the government is given
the best possible price for its procurements.
The fourth element is likewise present. While it is true that the prosecution was not able to prove any undue
injury to the government as a result of the purchases, it should be noted that there are two ways by which
Section 3(e) of RA 3019 may be violated—the first, by causing undue injury to any party, including the
government, or the second, by giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference.
Although neither mode constitutes a distinct offense, an accused may be charged under either mode or both. The
use of the disjunctive "or’ connotes that the two modes need not be present at the same time. In other words, the
presence of one would suffice for conviction.
Aside from the allegation of undue injury to the government, petitioner was also charged with having given
unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference to private suppliers. Under the second mode, damage is not
required.
The word "unwarranted" means lacking adequate or official support; unjustified; unauthorized or without justification
or adequate reason. "Advantage" means a more favorable or improved position or condition; benefit, profit or gain of
any kind; benefit from some course of action. "Preference" signifies priority or higher evaluation or desirability;
choice or estimation above another.
In order to be found guilty under the second mode, it suffices that the accused has given unjustified favor
or benefit to another, in the exercise of his official, administrative or judicial functions. Petitioner did just that.
The fact that he repeatedly failed to follow the requirements of RA 7160 on personal canvass proves that
unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference was given to the winning suppliers. These suppliers were awarded
the procurement contract without the benefit of a fair system in determining the best possible price for the
government. The private suppliers, which were all personally chosen by respondent, were able to profit from the
transactions without showing proof that their prices were the most beneficial to the government. For that, petitioner
must now face the consequences of his acts.32 (Emphasis supplied).
We stress that the Ombudsman did not find probable cause to indict respondents for falsification simply because the
Ombudsman could not categorically declare that the alteration made the CCT speak falsely as the ownership of the
subject units at The Malayan Tower had yet to be determined. However, its initial factual findings on the
administrative complaint categorically declared, thus:
x x x Espenesin justified his action by asseverating that since the CCTs were still under the possession and control
of the Register of Deeds and have not yet been distributed to the owners, amendments can still be made thereon.
It is worthy to note that the CCTs of ASB, at the time when the amendment was made, were obviously complete.
From its face, we can infer that all have attained the character of a binding public document. The signature of
Espenesin is already affixed thereon, and on its face, it was explicitly declared that the titles have already been
entered in the Registration Book of the Register of Deeds of Pasig City on March 11, 2005 at 11:55 a.m. Allegations
to the contrary must be convincingly and positively proven, otherwise, the presumption holds that the CCTs issued
in the name of ASB were regular and the contents thereon binding.
Stated in a different light, delivery of the titles to the named owners is not a pre-requisite before all these CCTs can
be legally categorized as genuine documents. The fact that the same had already been signed by x x x Espenesin
in his capacity as Register of Deeds of Pasig City and the notations imprinted thereon appeared to have been
entered on March 11, 2005 at 11:55 a.m. at the Registry Books of Pasig City, the CCTs in issue are bound to be
treated as genuine documents drafted and signed in the regular performance of duties of the officer whose
signature appears thereon. The law has made it so clear that it is the entry of the title in the Registration Book that
controls the discretion of the Register of Deeds to effect the necessary amendments and not the actual delivery of
the titles to the named owners.
This being the case, strict compliance with the mandates of Section 108 of P.D. 1529 is strictly called for. The
provision is clear that upon entry of a certificate of title (which definitely includes Condominium Certificate of Title)
attested to by the Register of Deeds, no amendment shall be effected thereon except upon lawful order of the court.
In the instant case, it became obvious that after the CCTs of ASB were entered in the Registration Book on March
11, 2005 at exactly 11:55 a.m., the notations thereon were thereafter amended by Espenesin when Atty. Serrano
purportedly informed him of the alleged error inscribed therein. The proper remedy that should have been
undertaken by Espenesin soon after he was informed of the error is to either initiate the appropriate petition himself
or to suggest to the parties to the MOA to file said petition in court for the amendment of the CCTs. An amendment
by way of a shortcut is not allowed after entry of the title in the Registration Book.
xxxx
If the Regional Trial Court sitting as a land registration court is not legally authorized to determine the respective
rights of the parties to the MOA when deciding on the petition for amendment and cancellation of title, all the more
with the Registrar of Deeds who is legally not empowered to make such determination and to cause an automatic
amendment of entries in the Registration Book on the basis of his unauthorized determination.
Espenesin’s liability is grounded on the untimely and unauthorized amendment of the CCTs in issue. This is
regardless of whether the amendment had made the CCTs speak of either a lie or the truth. What defines his
error is his inability to comply with the proper procedure set by law.33 (Emphasis supplied).
We likewise stress that the determination of probable cause does not require certainty of guilt for a crime. As the
term itself implies, probable cause is concerned merely with probability and not absolute or even moral certainty; 34 it
is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. 35 It is sufficient that based on the preliminary investigation
conducted, it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. Well-settled in
jurisprudence, as in Raro v. Sandiganbayan,36 that:
x x x Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief,
in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty
of the crime for which he was prosecuted.37
Probable cause is a reasonable ground for presuming that a matter is or may be well-founded on such state of facts
in the prosecutor's mind as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe — or entertain an
honest or strong suspicion — that it is so.38
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been
committed and there is enough reason to believe that it was committed by the accused. It need not be based on
clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. 39
A finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a
conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.
Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge. 40
A finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt.
The term does not mean "actual and positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on
opinion and reasonable belief. x x x Probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient
evidence to procure a conviction. 41 (Emphasis and italics supplied).
In this instance, Espenesin explains and categorically admits that he altered, nay corrected, 38 certificates of title
which we again reproduce for easy reference:
Sometime ago Serrano requested that condominium titles over specified units be issued in consonance with the
sharing in the joint venture MOA. Titles were correspondingly issued as per request, some in the name of MICO and
some in the name of ASB. Before its release to the parties, Atty. Serrano came back and requested that some titles
issued in the name of ASB be changed to MICO because allegedly there was error in the issuance.
Believing it was a simple error and on representation of the person we came to know and considered the
representative of both parties, we erased the name ASB Realty Corporation on those specified titles and placed
instead the name Malayan Insurance Company.
To our mind, the purpose was not to transfer ownership but merely to rectify an error committed in the issuance of
titles. And since they were well within our capacity to do, the titles not having been released yet to its owner, we did
what we believed was a simple act of rectifying a simple mistake. 42
The letter of Espenesin itself underscores the existence of a prima facie case of gross negligence:
1. Serrano transacted the registration of the units in The Malayan Tower with the Office of the Register of
Deeds, Pasig City;
2. Serrano had previously presented a joint venture agreement, the MOA, which Espenesin followed in the
initial preparation and issuance of the titles;
3. Before some CCTs initially issued in ASB’s name were released, Serrano returned and requested that
some titles issued in the name of ASB be changed to MICO because those titles were supposedly
erroneously registered to ASB; and
4. Just on Serrano’s utterance and declaration which Espenesin readily believed because he considered
Serrano the representative of both parties, and without any other documentation to base the amendment on,
Espenesin erased the name of ASB on those specified titles and replaced it with the name of MICO.
Espenesin, a Registrar of Deeds, relied on Serrano’s word alone that a supposed error has been committed. Even if
ownership of the units covered by the amended CCTs has not been categorically declared as ASB’s given the
ongoing dispute between the parties, the MOA which Espenesin had previously referred to, allocates those units to
ASB:
Section 4. Distribution and Disposition of Units. (a) As a return of its capital investment in the Project, each party
shall be entitled to such portion of all the net saleable area of the Building that their respective contributions to the
Project bear to the actual construction cost. As of the date of the execution hereof, and on the basis of the total
costs incurred to date in relation to the Remaining Construction Costs (as defined in Section 9(a) hereof), the parties
shall respectively be entitled to the following (which entitlement shall be conditioned on, and subject to, adjustments
as provided in sub-paragraph (b) of Section 4 in the event that the actual remaining cost of construction exceeds the
Remaining Construction Cost):
(i) MICO – the net saleable area particularly described in Schedule 2 hereof.
(ii) ASB – the following net saleable area:
(A) the net saleable area which ASB had pre-sold for an aggregate purchase price of ₱640,085,267.30 as
set forth in Schedule 1 (including all paid and unpaid proceeds of said pre-sales);
(B) the net saleable area particularly described in Schedule 3 hereof which shall be delivered to ASB upon
completion of the Project; and,
(C) provided that the actual remaining construction costs do not exceed the Remaining Construction Cost,
the net saleable area particularly described in Schedule 4 hereof which shall be delivered to ASB upon
completion of the Project and determination of its actual construction costs. If the actual remaining
construction costs exceed the Remaining Construction Cost, sub-paragraph (b) of this Section 4 shall
apply.43
The MOA even recognizes and specifies that:
E. ASB has pre-sold a number of condominium units in the Project to certain buyers as set forth in Schedule 1
hereof, and in order to protect the interests of these buyers and preserve the interest in the Project, the goodwill and
business reputation of Malayan, Malayan has proposed to complete the Project, and ASB has accepted such
proposal, subject to the terms and conditions contained herein, including the contribution to the Project (a) by
Malayan of the Lot and (b) by ASB of its interest as buyer under the Contract to Sell.
xxxx
Section 3. Recognition of ASB’s Investment. The parties confirm that as of the date hereof, ASB invested in the
Project an amount equivalent to its entitlement to the net saleable area of the Building under Section 4 below,
including ASB’s interest as buyer under the Contract to Sell. 44
One fact deserves emphasis. The ownership of the condominium units remains in dispute and, by necessary
inference, does not lie as well in MICO. By his baseless reliance on Serrano’s word and representation, Espenesin
allowed MICO to gain an unwarranted advantage and benefit in the titling of the 38 units in The Malayan Tower.
That a prima facie case for gross negligence amounting to violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No.
3019 exists is amply supported by the fact that Espenesin disregarded the well-established practice necessitating
submission of required documents for registration of property in the Philippines:
Documents Required for Registration of Real Property with the Register of Deeds:
1. Common Requirements
o Original copy of the Deed or Instrument (Original Copy + 2 duplicate copies)If the original copy cannot be
produced, the duplicate original or certified true copy shall be presented accompanied with a sworn affidavit
executed by the interested party why the original copy cannot be presented.
o Owner’s copy of the Certificate of Title or Co-owner’s copy if one has been issued. (Original Copy + 2
duplicate copies)
o Latest Tax Declaration if the property is an unregistered land. (Original Copy + 2 duplicate copies)
2. Specific Requirements
1. Deed of Sale/Transfer
xxxx
 For Corporation
1. Secretary’s Certificate or Board Resolution to Sell or Purchase (Original Copy + Duplicate Copy)
2. Articles of Incorporation (for transferee corporation) (1 Certified Copy of the Original)
3. Certificate of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) that the Articles of Incorporation
had been registered . (1 Certified Copy of the Original)
4. For Condominium or Condominium Certificate of Transfer, affidavit/certificate of the Condominium

Corporation that the sale/transfer does not violate the 60-40 rule.(Original Copy + 1 Duplicate Copy)
5. Subsequent transfer of CCT requires Certificate of the Condominium Management. (Original

Copy)
6. Sale by a Corporation Sole, court order is required.(Original copy of the Court Order)
Additional Requirements
xxxx
11. Condominium Projects
 Master Deed (Original Copy + 1 Duplicate Copy)

 Declaration of Restriction (Original Copy + 1 Duplicate Copy)
 Diagrammatic Floor Plan (Original Copy + 1 Duplicate Copy)
If the Condominium Certificate of Title is issued for the first time in the name of the registered owner, require
the following:
o Certificate of Registration with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (Original Copy + 1
Duplicate Copy)
o Development Permit (Original Copy + 1 Duplicate Copy)
o License to Sell (Original Copy + 1 Duplicate Copy)45
Espenesin, by his own explanation, relied on nothing more than Serrano, who he "came to know and
considered as representative of both parties," and Serrano’s interpretation of the MOA that Serrano had
brought with him.
On the whole, there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that respondents Espenesin and Serrano
committed prohibited acts listed in Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019.
As regards Yuchengco and Cheng, apart from Ampil’s general assertions that the two, as officers of MICO,
benefited from the alteration of the CCTs, there is a dearth of evidence pointing to their collective responsibility
therefor. While the fact of alteration was admitted by respondents and was affirmed in the Ombudsman’s finding of
fact, there is nothing that directly links Yuchengco and Cheng to the act.
We are aware that the calibration of evidence to assess whether a prima facie graft case exists against respondents
is a question of fact. We have consistently held that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, more so in the
consideration of the extraordinary writ of certiorari where neither questions of fact nor law are entertained, but only
questions of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. 46 In this case, however, certiorari will lie,
given that the Ombudsman made no finding at all on respondents possible liability for violation of Sections 3(a) and
(e) of Republic Act No. 3019.
We hasten to reiterate that we are only dealing herein with the preliminary investigation aspect of this case. We do
not adjudge respondents’ guilt or the lack thereof. The assertions of Espenesin and Serrano on the former’s good
faith in effecting the alteration and the pending arbitration case before the Construction Industry Arbitration
Commission involving the correct division of MICO’s and ASB’s net saleable areas in The Malayan Tower are
matters of defense which they should raise during trial of the criminal case.
As regards the administrative liability of Espenesin, the basic principle in the law of public officers is the three-fold
liability rule, which states that the wrongful acts or omissions of a public officer, Espenesin in these cases, may give
rise to civil, criminal and administrative liability. An action for each can proceed independently of the others. 47
On this point, we find that the appellate court erred when it affirmed the Ombudsman’s last ruling that Espenesin is
not administratively liable.
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or
gross negligence by a public officer.48
In Grave Misconduct, as distinguished from Simple Misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the
law or flagrant disregard of established rules, must be manifest 49 and established by substantial evidence. Grave
Misconduct necessarily includes the lesser offense of Simple Misconduct. 50 Thus, a person charged with Grave
Misconduct may be held liable for Simple Misconduct if the misconduct does not involve any of the elements to
qualify the misconduct as grave.51
In (G.R. No. 199115), the elements particular to Grave Misconduct are, by the Ombudsman’s own finding, present.
Corruption, as an element of Grave Misconduct, consists in the act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully
and wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to
duty and the rights of others.52 This has already been demonstrated as discussed above. And, there is here a
manifest disregard for established rules on land registration by a Register of Deeds himself. As he himself admits in
his letter, Espenesin erased the name of ASB on the specified CCTs because he believed that Serrano’s request for
the re-issuance thereof in MICO’s name constituted simple error.
Section 108 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 provides:
Section 108. Amendment and alteration of certificates. No erasure, alteration, or amendment shall be made upon
the registration book after the entry of a certificate of title or of a memorandum thereon and the attestation of the
same be Register of Deeds, except by order of the proper Court of First Instance. A registered owner of other
person having an interest in registered property, or, in proper cases, the Register of Deeds with the approval of the
Commissioner of Land Registration, may apply by petition to the court upon the ground that the registered interests
of any description, whether vested, contingent, expectant or inchoate appearing on the certificate, have terminated
and ceased; or that new interest not appearing upon the certificate have arisen or been created; or that an omission
or error was made in entering a certificate or any memorandum thereon, or, on any duplicate certificate; or that the
same or any person on the certificate has been changed; or that the registered owner has married, or, if registered
as married, that the marriage has been terminated and no right or interests of heirs or creditors will thereby be
affected; or that a corporation which owned registered land and has been dissolved has not convened the same
within three years after its dissolution; or upon any other reasonable ground; and the court may hear and determine
the petition after notice to all parties in interest, and may order the entry or cancellation of a new certificate, the entry
or cancellation of a memorandum upon a certificate, or grant any other relief upon such terms and conditions,
requiring security or bond if necessary, as it may consider proper; Provided, however, That this section shall not be
construed to give the court authority to reopen the judgment or decree of registration, and that nothing shall be done
or ordered by the court which shall impair the title or other interest of a purchaser holding a certificate for value and
in good faith, or his heirs and assigns, without his or their written consent. Where the owner's duplicate certificate is
not presented, a similar petition may be filed as provided in the preceding section.
The foregoing clearly speaks of a court order prior to any erasure, alteration or amendment upon a certificate of title.
In reversing its prior ruling, the Ombudsman cavalierly dismisses the fact of Espenesin already signing the CCTs
issued in ASB’s name as "only a part of the issuance process because the final step in the titling procedure is
indeed the release of the certificate of title." 53 The Ombudsman further ruled:
Considering that prior to the release of titles, Espenesin merely rectified what was represented to this office as error
in the preparation of typing or the certificates, hence, it is wrong to subject him to an administrative sanction. This is
bolstered by the fact that, at the time of release (and perhaps even up to the present time), there was no final
determination yet from the land registration court as to who has a better right to the property in
question.54 (Emphasis supplied).
This statement of the Ombudsman is virtually a declaration of Espenesin’s misconduct. It highlights Espenesin’s
awareness and knowledge that ASB and MICO are two different and separate entities, albeit having entered into a
joint venture for the building of "The Malayan Tower."
As Registrar of Deeds, Espenesin was duty bound to inquire and ascertain the reason for Serrano’s new instruction
on those specific set of CCTs and not just heed Serrano’s bidding. He heads the Office of Register of Deeds which
is constituted by law as "a public repository of records of instruments affecting registered or unregistered lands x x x
in the province or city wherein such office is situated." He should not have so easily taken Serrano’s word that the
amendment Serrano sought was to correct simple and innocuous error. Espenesin could have then easily asked, as
he is obliged to, for a contract or an authenticated writing to ascertain which units and parking slots were really
allotted for ASB and MICO. His actions would then be based on what is documented and not merely by a lame claim
of bona fides mistake.
Moreover, Espenesin was previously presented a MOA, and consulted this same MOA, in the initial preparation and
issuance of the 38 CCTs in ASB’s name. Certainly, a Registrar of Deeds who is required by law to be a member of
the legal profession,55 possesses common sense and prudence to ask for documents on which to base his
corrections. Reliance on the mere word of even the point person for the transaction, smacks of gross negligence
when all transactions with the Office of the Register of Deeds, involving as it does registration of property, ought to
be properly recorded and documented.
That the Office of the Register of Deeds requires documentation in the registration of property, whether as an
original or a subsequent registration, brooks no argument. Again, and it cannot be overlooked that, Espenesin
initially referred to a MOA albeit Serrano worked on the registration transaction for both ASB and MICO.
Subsequently, Serrano returns, bearing ostensible authority to transact even for ASB, and Espenesin fails to ask for
documentation for the correction Serrano sought to be made, and simply relies on Serrano’s word.
We are baffled by the Registrar of Deeds’ failure to require documentation which would serve as his basis for the
correction. The amendment sought by Serrano was not a mere clerical change of registered name; it was a
substantial one, changing ownership of 38 units in The Malayan Tower from one entity, ASB, to another, MICO.
Even just at Serrano’s initial request for correction of the CCTs, a red flag should have gone up for a Registrar of
Deeds. 1âwphi1
Espenesin splits hairs when he claims that it is "in the Registration Book where the prohibition to erase, alter, or
amend, without court order, applies." We disagree with Espenesin. Chapter IV on Certificate of Title of Presidential
Decree No. 1529,56 specifically Sections 40, 42 and 43 belie the claim of Espenesin:
Section 40. Entry of Original Certificate of Title. Upon receipt by the Register of Deeds of the original and duplicate
copies of the original certificate of title the same shall be entered in his record book and shall be numbered, dated,
signed and sealed by the Register of Deeds with the seal of his office. Said certificate of title shall take effect upon
the date of entry thereof. The Register of Deeds shall forthwith send notice by mail to the registered owner that his
owner's duplicate is ready for delivery to him upon payment of legal fees.
Section 42. Registration Books. The original copy of the original certificate of title shall be filed in the Registry of
Deeds. The same shall be bound in consecutive order together with similar certificates of title and shall constitute
the registration book for titled properties.
Section 43. Transfer Certificate of Title. The subsequent certificate of title that may be issued by the Register of
Deeds pursuant to any voluntary or involuntary instrument relating to the same land shall be in like form, entitled
"Transfer Certificate of Title", and likewise issued in duplicate. The certificate shall show the number of the next
previous certificate covering the same land and also the fact that it was originally registered, giving the record
number, the number of the original certificate of title, and the volume and page of the registration book in which the
latter is found.
Recording or entry of the titles, whether an original or a subsequent transfer certificate of title in the record, is
simultaneous with the signing by the Register of Deeds. The signature on the certificate by the Registrar of Deeds is
accompanied by the dating, numbering and sealing of the certificate. All these are part of a single registration
process. Where there has been a completed entry in the Record Book, as in this case where the Ombudsman found
that "the signature of Espenesin is already affixed on the CCTs, and on its face, it was explicitly declared that the
titles have already been entered in the Registration Book of the Register of Deeds of Pasig City on March 11, 2005
at 11:55 a.m.," the Register of Deeds can no longer tamper with entries, specially the very name of the titleholder.
The law says that the certificate of title shall take effect upon the date of entry thereof.
To further drive home the point, as Registrar of Deeds, Espenesin knew full well that "there is no final determination
yet from the land registration court as to who has a better right to the property in question." Espenesin’s attempt to
minimize the significance of a Registrar of Deed’s signature on a CCT only aggravates the lack of prudence in his
action. The change in the titleholder in the CCTs from ASB to MICO was an official documentation of a change of
ownership. It definitely cannot be characterized as simple error.
Grave misconduct, of which Espenesin has been charged, consists in a public officer’s deliberate violation of a rule
of law or standard of behavior. It is regarded as grave when the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the
law, or flagrant disregard of established rules are present. 57 In particular, corruption as an element of grave
misconduct consists in the official’s unlawful and wrongful use of his station or character to procure some benefit for
himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others. 58
In sum, the actions of Espenesin clearly demonstrate a disregard of well-known legal rules. 59 The penalty for Grave
Misconduct is dismissalfrom service with the accessory penalties of forfeiture of retirement benefits, cancellation of
eligibility, and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in the government service, including government-owned
or controlled corporation.60
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 192685 is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Resolution of the Ombudsman
dated 30 April 2008 in OMB-C-C-07-0444-J is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Ombudsman is hereby directed to
file the necessary Information for violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 against public
respondent Policarpio L. Espenesin and private respondent Francis Serrano.
The petition in G.R. No. 199115 is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 28 September 2011 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 113171 and the Order dated 13 July 2009 of the Ombudsman in OMB-C-A-07-0474-J are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Policarpio L. Espenesin is GUlLTY of Grave Misconduct and we, thus,
impose the penalty of DIMISSAL from service. However, due to his retirement from the service, we order forfeiture
of all his retirement pay and benefits.
21.) A.M. No. P-06-2257 March 28, 2008
[Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 01-1212-P]
ARTHUR and LEONORA STILGROVE, Complainants,

vs.
Clerk of Court ERIBERTO R. SABAS and Sheriff III ERNESTO SIMPLICIANO, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
In a Resolution1 issued on 29 November 2006, the Court resolved the administrative complaint against respondents
Eriberto Sabas, retired2 clerk of court and ex officio sheriff of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), 4th Judicial Region,
Puerto Princesa City, and Ernesto Simpliciano, now deceased, 3 former deputy sheriff of the same court, finding
Sabas guilty of grave abuse of authority and conduct unbecoming a court personnel while dismissing the complaint
against Simpliciano. Sabas’ Motion for Reconsideration 4 was partially granted in a Resolution dated 29 May 2007
thereby clarifying the penalty imposable upon him. The dispositive part of the latter resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Eriberto Sabas, former Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of the
Municipal Trial Court of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan, is found GUILTY of Grave Abuse of Authority and Conduct
Unbecoming of a Court Personnel, and accordingly FINED in an amount equivalent to his salary for six (6) months
plus the amount corresponding to fifteen (15) days of leave credits, deductible from his retirement pay.
The charges of grave abuse of authority and conduct unbecoming a court officer against Ernesto Simpliciano,
former Deputy Sheriff of the Municipal Trial Court of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan, is hereby DISMISSED for lack
of merit.
The charge of violation of Sections 3(a), 3(e) and 4(b) of Republic Act No. 3019 against Eriberto Sabas and Ernesto
Simpliciano is REFERRED to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Puerto Princesa City for
investigation, report and recommendation on respondents’ administrative liability within sixty (60) days from receipt
of the record.
SO ORDERED.
The matter is again before us on account of the completion of the investigation conducted by Perfecto E. Pe,
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Puerto Princesa City, the results of which are contained in his Report
and Recommendation5 dated 24 August 2007.
The necessary factual background is supplied by the narration of facts in the Court’s 29 November 2006 Resolution,
which we again adopt:
In 1994, Geronimo Gacot filed a detainer suit (subsequently amended into an action for recovery of possession of a
parcel of land) against Joaquin Montero and Emilio Batul with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Puerto Princesa
City. The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 1311, involved Lot No. 18553, the lot adjacent to the land occupied and
possessed by the spouses Stilgrove. During the pendency of Civil Case No. 1311, Lot No. 18553 was sold to
Cresencia de los Santos, who was able to secure Transfer Certificate of Title No. 162460 in her name. Eventually,
the MTC rendered a decision in favor of Gacot, who had, upon his death, been already substituted by his heirs,
represented by Francisca Gacot-Latube.
The decision of the MTC in Civil Case No. 1311 was affirmed on appeal by Branch 48 of the Regional Trial Court,
Puerto Princesa City, Palawan on 8 January 2001.
xxxx
A writ of execution was subsequently issued and served on the defendants in Civil Case No. 1311. Instead of
complying with the order for them to vacate the premises subject of the litigation within three (3) working days, the
defendants remained on the land and even built new structures on Lot No. 18553. Thus, Judge Heriberto M.
Pangilinan issued a Special Order for Demolition on 30 April 2001, which commanded the Ex-Officio Sheriff and/or
Deputy Sheriff:
x x x to cause the demolition of all structures including fences built or erected by defendants or any other persons
claiming rights under such defendants within the premises forming part of plaintiff’s property. The demolition shall
immediately be carried out after giving them a reasonable period of up to 10 [ten] days from receipt of this Order to
voluntarily demolish any structure they built within the premises.
On 18 May 2001, respondents Sabas, being then the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of the MTC, and
Simpliciano, then the Deputy Sheriff of the same court, with a demolition team, proceeded to execute the
demolition order. The demolition team proceeded to demolish the houses of defendants Joaquin Montero and
Emilio Batul. Upon being asked by Arthur Stilgrove, respondent Sabas confirmed that the demolition will
include a portion of Lot No. 18556 which was then occupied and possessed by the former. Arthur Stilgrove
thereafter demanded that the demolition team desist from carrying out the demolition. Notwithstanding Stilgrove’s
protestations, the demolition continued to include a fence and a portion of Stilgroves’ house which was built on Lot
No. 18556. Thereafter, on 21 May 2001, respondent Sabas executed a Return of Service.
The two respondents’ demolition of the fence and one-half of the house of the complainant spouses as well as
respondent Sabas’s shouting at complainant Arthur Stilgrove the words: "Return to (his) country, for (he) is not
welcome here!," prompted the complainants to file this administrative case against respondents. As mentioned at
the outset, another complaint was filed with the Office of the Ombudsman and docketed as OMB-1-01-0668-H (for
violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) and Section 4(b) of Republic Act No. 3019), entitled Arthur Stilgrove, et. al v.
Eriberto Sabas, et. al.
1avvphi1
In their Joint Comment dated 10 September 2001, respondents prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and raised
the defense that they demolished the fence and one-half of the house of the complainants by virtue of the Special
Order for Demolition issued by Judge Heriberto M. Pangilinan in Civil Case No. 1311. Respondents alleged that the
markers that were placed along the boundary line of Lot No. 18553 were placed at the surveyor’s own initiative
based on a relocation survey conducted by a licensed geodetic engineer. Respondents also maintained that the
Stilgroves were mere trespassers or squatters with respect to a 10-meter wide encroachment made on Lot No.
18553 by Lot No. 18556 as determined by the same relocation survey, and as such were bound by the judgment in
Civil Case No. 1311.6
The Court in its aforequoted 29 May 2007 Resolution referred the case to Judge Pe for further investigation of
respondents’ alleged violations of Section 3(a), 3(e) and 4(b) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act (hereinafter referred to as Sections 3(a), 3(e) or 4(b) for brevity). This was done because the
complaint on these grounds was not acted upon either by the investigating judge or the Office of the Court
Administrator in the previous proceedings. Hence, an investigation ensued, the results of which are now the focus of
the instant resolution.
During the initial hearing for the second investigation, complainants and respondents jointly manifested that the
evidence submitted in the preceding administrative case would be used in the evaluation of the instant case. Both
parties opted to submit their respective position papers after which, the investigation was terminated.
Complainants’ Position Paper7 accuses respondents of having violated R.A. No. 3019 for allowing
themselves to be "influenced and induced" by De Los Santos and Gacot-Latube.
Respondents’ Position Paper 8 alleges that the execution of the writ of demolition was made on the basis of the
boundary monuments indicated in the relocation survey plan. Since a portion of complainants’ property was erected
on the land forming part of the surveyed property, it was therefore included in the demolition. Respondents claim
that in order to be liable under Sections 3(a) and (e), the act of the accused must be done in bad faith, which is not
attendant in this case.
In his Report and Recommendation, the investigating judge absolved Sabas from violation of Section 3(a), finding
that there was no evidence pointing Sabas to have persuaded or induced or influenced other public officer to
perform an act constituting a violation of rules and regulation or allowed himself to be persuaded, induced or
influenced to commit such violation or offense.
As for Sabas’s liability under Section 3(e), the investigating judge exculpated him therefrom, citing Zoomzat, Inc. v.
People of the Philippines,9 and held that to be liable for the offense under this provision, the offender must be
officers and employees of offices of government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions. Since Sabas was an ex officio sheriff of the Municipal Trial Court by virtue of his being a clerk of court
whose functions do not include the granting of licenses, permits or concessions, he could not be held liable under
the aforementioned provision.
Lastly, as regards Sabas’ alleged offense under Section 4(b) which provides that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any
person knowingly to induce or cause any public official to commit any of the offenses defined in Section 3 hereof,"
the investigating judge likewise found no basis to hold Sabas liable because Sabas was actually the one who
demolished the property and did not induce nor cause any public official to commit the offense.
The Report and Recommendation contained no discussion on Simpliciano’s liability. As earlier stated, the Court
notes that respondent Simpliciano is already deceased. While it is true that respondent’s cessation from office by
death does not warrant the dismissal of the administrative case against him as long as the complaint was filed
before the respondent’s death,10 it has been the Court’s finding that, aside from Simpliciano’s mere presence at the
time of the demolition, he did not participate in the actual demolition of complainants’ fence and
house.11 Complainants failed to present sufficient evidence to prove Simpliciano’s liability for the acts complained of.
For this reason, the Court likewise clears Simpliciano of any liability for the alleged offenses involved in the second
administrative investigation subject of this Resolution.
Now, we turn to the merits of the complaint with respect to respondent Sabas.
As can be gleaned from the tenor of complainants’ position paper, respondents are charged with violation of Section
3(a) and (e) and Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 3019 for allowing themselves to be "influenced and induced" to do the
prohibited acts under said provisions.
Section 3(a) states:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers . – In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by
existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officers and are hereby declared to be
unlawful.
(a) Persuading, inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act constituting a violation of rules and
regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or an offense in connection with the official duties of the latter,
or allowing himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced to commit such violation or offense.
Sabas did not induce any public officer to perform an act violating rules and regulations. Neither was there
evidence that Sabas allowed himself to be "influenced or induced" to commit the act which became the root
cause of this administrative case. Sabas, on his own volition, committed the acts complained of.
Consequently, there is no reason to find him administratively liable under the said provision.
Section 4(b) declares as unlawful for any person to knowingly induce or cause any public official to commit any of
the offenses defined in Section 3 of the same law. As it is already the Court’s finding that there was no proof of the
alleged inducement to or by respondents, no liability can likewise arise under this provision.
Section 3(e) declares as unlawful the act of:
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government or giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of
offices of government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
As aforementioned, the investigating judge interpreted the last sentence of Section 3(e) as applying only to those
officers and employees of government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions. For this reason, Sabas was not held liable under the provision. The investigating judge cites Zoomzat,
Inc. v. People of the Philippines12 to support this position.
Admittedly, the Court made a statement in Zoomzat that for one to be held liable under Section 3(e), he must be an
officer or employee of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.13 The earlier case of Mejorada v. Sandiganbayan,14 however, squarely addressed the issue on the
proper interpretation of Section 3(e). In Mejorada, the Court explained that "the last sentence of [[Section] 3](e) is
intended to make clear the inclusion of officers and employees of [offices] or government corporations which, under
the ordinary concept of ‘public officers,’ may not come within the term," adding that "[i]t is a strained construction of
the provision to read it as applying exclusively to public officers charged with the duty of granting license or permits
or other concessions."15
Mejorada was decided by the Court en banc. Following the constitutional mandate that no doctrine or principle of
law laid down by the Court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the
Court sitting en banc,16 the case of Zoomzat cannot reverse the pronouncement in Mejorada, the former case
having been decided by a Division of the Court.
More importantly, the ultimate and undisputed anchor of the decision in Zoomzat is that the respondents cannot be
validly charged under Section 3(e) since the ordinance they enacted is void for being ultra vires, the authority to
grant franchise to operate cable television being lodged in the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) and
not with the Sangguniang Panlungsod. To quote the pertinent passages of the Court in Zoomzat:
Executive Order No. 205 clearly provides that only the NTC could grant certificates of authority to cable television
operators and issue the necessary implementing rules and regulations. Likewise, Executive Order No. 436, vests
with the NTC the regulation and supervision of cable television industry in the Philippines.
xxxx
It is undisputed that respondents were not employees of NTC. Instead, they were charged in their official capacity as
members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Gingoog City. As such, they cannot be charged with violation of
Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019 for enacting Ordinance No. 19 which granted Spacelink a franchise to operate a cable
television.
xxxx
Indeed, under the general welfare clause of the Local Government Code, the local government unit can regulate the
operation of cable television but only when it encroaches on public properties, such as the use of public streets,
rights of ways, the founding of structures, and the parceling of large regions. Beyond these parameters, its acts,
such as the grant of the franchise to Spacelink, would be ultra vires.
Plainly, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Gingoog City overstepped the bounds of its authority when it usurped the
powers of the NTC with the enactment of Ordinance No. 19. Being a void legislative act, Ordinance No. 19 did not
confer any right nor vest any privilege to Spacelink. As such, petitioner could not claim to have been prejudiced or
suffered injury thereby. Incidentally, petitioner’s claim of undue injury becomes even more baseless with the finding
that Spacelink did not commence to operate despite the grant to it of a franchise under Ordinance No. 19. 17
Thus, according to Zoomzat, when the Sangguniang Panlungsod usurped the powers of the NTC in enacting an
ordinance granting a franchise to a cable operator, it did not confer any privilege on the grantee and therefore the
complainant in the case was neither prejudiced nor did he suffer from any injury. Consequently, the Court ruled that
the withdrawal of the information against the members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod was correct.
Case law18 enumerates the elements of Section 3(e), to wit:
(1) The accused is a public officer or a private person charged in conspiracy with the former;
(2) The said public officer commits the prohibited acts during the performance of his or her official
duties or in relation to his or her public positions;
(3) That he or she causes undue injury to any party, whether the government or a private party;
(4) Such undue injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to such
parties; and
(5) That the public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence.
In Santiago v. Garchitorena,19 the Court held that there are two alternative ways whereby Section 3(e) may be
committed. These are by giving undue injury to any party including the government or by causing any
private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference. Sabas did cause undue injury to
complainants. What is to be determined still is whether Sabas acted with manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or with gross inexcusable negligence.
Manifest partiality has been characterized as "a clear, notorious or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side
rather than the other."20 Evident bad faith connotes a manifest deliberate intent on the part of the accused to do
wrong or cause damage.21 Gross inexcusable negligence has been defined as negligence characterized by the want
of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully
and intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences in so far as other persons may be affected. 22 It is the
omission of that care which even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to take on their own property. 23 In cases
involving public officials, there is gross negligence when a breach of duty is flagrant and palpable. 24
The sheriff’s duty to execute a judgment is ministerial. He need not look outside the plain meaning of the writ of
execution. And when a sheriff is faced with an ambiguous execution order, prudence and reasonableness dictate
that he seek clarification from a judge.25 However, Sabas took it upon himself to execute the order even if it
entails the destruction of a property belonging to a person not a party to the case. By doing so, the sheriff
went beyond the terms of the demolition order as it only ordered the demolition to apply only to
"defendants x x x as well as all persons claiming rights under them x x x." To reiterate our pronouncement in
the previous administrative case, it is of no moment whether Sabas executed the writ in good faith because he is
chargeable with the knowledge of what is the proper action to observe in case there are questions in the writ which
need to be clarified and to which he is bound to comply. 26
It is observed, however, that Sabas’ acts were not sufficiently proven as acts of ill will against
complainants, but are apparently due to his overzealousness in the performance of his functions, albeit
done in a discourteous manner. Sabas executed the order on the firm belief that his act was correct and in
accordance with law. From these considerations, the negligence displayed by Sabas was not of such nature
and degree as to be considered brazen, flagrant, and palpable.
Although Sabas is still liable for neglect in the performance of official duties, it is not of the kind punishable
under Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. In De la Victoria v. Mongaya,27 the Court made a similar assessment
on the degree of a respondent’s liability, which, although admittedly negligent, the negligence was not of a grave
degree warranting the severe penalty of dismissal. The Court found respondent guilty of simple neglect of duty and
imposed the penalty of suspension for one (1) month. 28 We resolve, that the same penalty is appropriate for Sabas.
However, in view of Sabas’s retirement on 17 September 2001, 29 the Court resolves to impose instead a fine
equivalent to his salary for one month, deductible from his retirement pay.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds Eriberto Sabas, former Clerk of Court and Ex Officio Sheriff of
the Municipal Trial Court of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan, GUILTY of simple neglect of duty and accordingly
imposes on him a FINE in an amount equivalent to his salary for one month, to be deducted from his retirement pay.
The charges of violation of Sections 3(a), (e) and 4(b) of Republic Act No. 3019, also known as the Anti-graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, against Ernesto Simpliciano, former Deputy Sheriff of the Municipal Trial Court of Puerto
Princesa City, Palawan, are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
22.) [ G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015 ]
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE OMBUDSMAN, PETITIONER, VS.
COURT OF APPEALS (SIXTH DIVISION) AND JEJOMAR ERWIN S. BINAY, JR.,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
"All government is a trust, every branch of government is a trust, and immemorially acknowledged so to be[.]"[1]
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition[2] filed on March 25, 2015 by petitioner Conchita Carpio Morales, in her
capacity as the Ombudsman (Ombudsman), through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), assailing: (a) the Resolution[3] dated
March 16, 2015 of public respondent the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453, which granted private respondent Jejomar
Erwin S. Binay, Jr.'s (Binay, Jr.) prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) against the implementation of the Joint
Order[4] dated March 10, 20,15 of the Ombudsman in OMB-C-A-15-0058 to 0063 (preventive suspension order) preventively
suspending him and several other public officers and employees of the City Government of Makati, for six (6) months without pay; and
(b) the Resolution[5] dated March 20, 2015 of the CA, ordering the Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for
contempt[6] in CA-G.R. SP No. 139504.
Pursuant to the Resolution[7] dated April 6, 2015, the CA issued a writ of preliminary injunction[8] (WPI) in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 which
further enjoined the implementation of the preventive suspension order, prompting the Ombudsman to file a supplemental petition[9] on
April 13, 2015.
The Facts
On July 22, 2014, a complaint/affidavit[10] was filed by Atty. Renato L. Bondal and Nicolas "Ching" Enciso VI before the Office of the
Ombudsman against Binay, Jr. and other public officers and employees of the City Government of Makati (Binay, Jr., et al), accusing
them of Plunder[11] and violation of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019,[12] otherwise known as "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," in
connection with the five (5) phases of the procurement and construction of the Makati City Hall Parking Building (Makati Parking
Building).[13]
On September 9, 2014, the Ombudsman constituted a Special Panel of Investigators[14] to conduct a fact-finding investigation, submit
an investigation report, and file the necessary complaint, if warranted (1st Special Panel).[15] Pursuant to the Ombudsman's directive, on
March 5, 2015, the 1st Special Panel filed a complaint[16] (OMB Complaint) against Binay, Jr., et al, charging them with six (6)
administrative cases[17] for Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and six
(6) criminal cases[18] for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, Malversation of Public Funds, and Falsification of Public Documents
(OMB Cases).[19]
As to Binay, Jr., the OMB Complaint alleged that he was involved in anomalous activities attending the following procurement and
construction phases of the Makati Parking Building project, committed during his previous and present terms as City Mayor of Makati:
Binay, Jr.'s First Term (2010 to 2013)[20]

(a) On September 21, 2010, Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of Award[21] for Phase III of the Makati Parking Building project to Hilmarc's
Construction Corporation (Hilmarc's), and consequently, executed the corresponding contract[22] on September 28, 2010,[23] without the
required publication and the lack of architectural design,[24] and approved the release of funds therefor in the following amounts as
follows: (1) P130,518,394.80 on December 15, 2010;[25] (2) P134,470,659.64 on January 19, 2011;[26] (3) P92,775,202.27 on February
25, 2011;[27] (4) P57,148,625.51 on March 28, 2011;[28] (5) P40,908,750.61 on May 3, 2011;[29] and (6) P106,672,761.90 on July 7, 2011;
[30]
(b) On August 11, 2011, Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of Award[31] for Phase IV of the Makati Parking Building project to Hilmarc's, and
consequently, executed the corresponding contract[32] on August 18, 2011,[33] without the required publication and the lack of
architectural design,[34] and approved the release of funds therefor in the following amounts as follows: (1) P182,325,538.97 on October
4, 2O11;[35] (2) P173,132,606.91 on October 28,2011;[36] (3) P80,408,735.20 on December 12, 2011;[37] (4) P62,878,291.81 on February
10, 2012;[38] and (5) P59,639,167.90 on October 1, 2012;[39]
(c) On September 6, 2012, Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of Award[40] for Phase V of the Makati Parking Building project to Hilmarc's, and
consequently, executed the corresponding contract[41] on September 13, 2012,[42] without the required publication and the lack of
architectural design,[43] and approved the release of the funds therefor in the amounts of P32,398,220.05[44] and P30,582,629.30[45] on
December 20, 2012; and
Binay, Jr.'s Second Term (2013 to 2016)[46]
(d) On July 3, 2013 and July 4, 2013, Binay, Jr. approved the release of funds for the remaining balance of the September 13, 2012
contract with Hilmarc's for Phase V of the Makati Parking Building project in the amount of P27,443,629.97;[47] and
(e) On July 24, 2013, Binay, Jr. approved the release of funds for the remaining balance of the contract[48] with MANA Architecture &
Interior Design Co. (MANA) for the design and architectural services covering the Makati Parking Building project in the amount of
P429,011.48.[49]
On March 6, 2015, the Ombudsman created another Special Panel of Investigators to conduct a preliminary investigation and
administrative adjudication on the OMB Cases (2nd Special Panel).[50] Thereafter, on March 9, 2015, the 2nd Special Panel issued
separate orders[51] for each of the OMB Cases, requiring Binay, Jr., et al. to file their respective counter-affidavits.[52]
Before Binay, Jr., et al.'s filing of their counter-affidavits, the Ombudsman, upon the recommendation of the 2nd Special Panel, issued
on March 10, 2015, the subject preventive suspension order, placing Binay, Jr., et al. under preventive suspension for not more than
six (6) months without pay, during the pendency of the OMB Cases.[53] The Ombudsman ruled that the requisites for the preventive
suspension of a public officer are present,[54] finding that: (a) the evidence of Binay, Jr., et al.'s guilt was strong given that (1) the losing
bidders and members of the Bids and Awards Committee of Makati City had attested to the irregularities attending the Makati Parking
Building project; (2) the documents on record negated the publication of bids; and (3) the disbursement vouchers, checks, and official
receipts showed the release of funds; and (b) (1) Binay, Jr., et al. were administratively charged with Grave Misconduct, Serious
Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service; (2) said charges, if proven to be true, warrant removal from
public service under the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS), and (3) Binay, Jr., et al.'s respective
positions give them access to public records and allow them to influence possible witnesses; hence, their continued stay in office may
prejudice the investigation relative to the OMB Cases filed against them.[55] Consequently, the Ombudsman directed the Department of
Interior and Local Government (DILG), through Secretary Manuel A. Roxas II (Secretary Roxas), to immediately implement the
preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr., et al., upon receipt of the same.[56]
On March 11, 2015, a copy of the preventive suspension order was sent to the Office of the City Mayor, and received by Maricon
Ausan, a member of Binay, Jr.'s staff.[57]
The Proceedings Before the CA
On even date,[58] Binay, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari[59] before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 139453, seeking the nullification
of the preventive suspension order, and praying for the issuance of a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin its implementation.[60] Primarily, Binay,
Jr. argued that he could not be held administratively liable for any anomalous activity attending any of the five (5) phases of the
Makati Parking Building project since: (a) Phases I and II were undertaken before he was elected Mayor of Makati in 2010; and (b)
Phases III to V transpired during his first term and that his re-election as City Mayor of Makati for a second term effectively
condoned his administrative liability therefor, if any, thus rendering the administrative cases against him moot and academic.[61] In
any event, Binay, Jr. claimed that the Ombudsman's preventive suspension order failed to show that the evidence of guilt
presented against him is strong, maintaining that he did not participate in any of the purported irregularities.[62] In support of his
prayer for injunctive relief, Binay, Jr. argued that he has a clear and unmistakable right to hold public office, having won by landslide
vote in the 2010 and 2013 elections, and that, in view of the condonation doctrine, as well as the lack of evidence to sustain the
charges against him, his suspension from office would undeservedly deprive the electorate of the services of the person they have
conscientiously chosen and voted into office.[63]
On March 16, 2015, at around 8:24 a.m., Secretary Roxas caused the implementation of the preventive suspension order through the
DILG National Capital Region - Regional Director, Renato L. Brion, CESO III (Director Brion), who posted a copy thereof on the wall of
the Makati City Hall after failing to personally serve the same on Binay, Jr. as the points of entry to the Makati City Hall were closed. At
around 9:47 a.m., Assistant City Prosecutor of Makati Billy C. Evangelista administered the oath of office on Makati City Vice Mayor
Romulo V. Peña, Jr. (Peña, Jr.) who thereupon assumed office as Acting Mayor.[64]
At noon of the same day, the CA issued a Resolution[65] (dated March 16, 2015), granting Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a TRO,
[66]
notwithstanding Pena, Jr.'s assumption of duties as Acting Mayor earlier that day.[67] Citing the case of Governor Garcia, Jr. v. CA,
[68]
the CA found that it was more prudent on its part to issue a TRO in view of the extreme urgency of the matter and seriousness of the
issues raised, considering that if it were established that the acts subject of the administrative cases against Binay, Jr. were all
committed during his prior term, then, applying the condonation doctrine, Binay, Jr.'s re-election meant that he can no longer be
administratively charged.[69] The CA then directed the Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for certiorari.[70]
On March 17, 2015, the Ombudsman manifested[71] that the TRO did not state what act was being restrained and that since the
preventive suspension order had already been served and implemented, there was no longer any act to restrain.[72]
On the same day, Binay, Jr. filed a petition for contempt,[73] docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 139504, accusing Secretary Roxas, Director
Brion, the officials of the Philippine National Police, and Pena, Jr. of deliberately refusing to obey the CA, thereby allegedly impeding,
obstructing, or degrading the administration of justice.[74] The Ombudsman and Department of Justice Secretary Leila M. De Lima were
subsequently impleaded as additional respondents upon Binay, Jr.'s filing of the amended and supplemental petition for
contempt[75] (petition for contempt) on March 19, 2015.[76] Among others, Binay, Jr. accused the Ombudsman and other respondents
therein for willfully and maliciously ignoring the TRO issued by the CA against the preventive suspension order.[77]
In a Resolution[78] dated March 20, 2015, the CA ordered the consolidation of CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 and CA-G.R. SP No. 139504,
and, without necessarily giving due course to Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt, directed the Ombudsman to file her comment
thereto.[79] The cases were set for hearing of oral arguments on March 30 and 31, 2015.[80]
The Proceedings Before the Court

Prior to the hearing of the oral arguments before the CA, or on March 25, 2015, the Ombudsman filed the present petition before this
Court, assailing the CA's March 16, 2015 Resolution, which granted Binay, Jr.'s prayer for TRO in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453, and the
March 20, 2015 Resolution directing her to file a comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt in CA-G.R. SP No. 139504.[81] The
Ombudsman claims that: (a) the CA had no jurisdiction to grant Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a TRO, citing Section 14 of RA 6770,[82] or "The
Ombudsman Act of 1989," which states that no injunctive writ could be issued to delay the Ombudsman's investigation unless there is
prima facie evidence that the subject matter thereof is outside the latter's jurisdiction;[83] and (b) the CA's directive for the Ombudsman
to comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt is illegal and improper, considering that the Ombudsman is an impeachable officer, and
therefore, cannot be subjected to contempt proceedings.[84]
In his comment[85] filed on April 6, 2015, Binay, Jr. argues that Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution specifically grants the CA
judicial power to review acts of any branch or instrumentality of government, including the Office of the Ombudsman, in case of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, which he asserts was committed in this case when said office issued the
preventive suspension order against him.[86] Binay, Jr. posits that it was incumbent upon the Ombudsman to1 have been apprised of the
condonation doctrine as this would have weighed heavily in determining whether there was strong evidence to warrant the issuance of
the preventive suspension order.[87] In this relation, Binay, Jr. maintains that the CA correctly enjoined the implementation of the
preventive suspension order given his clear and unmistakable right to public office, and that it is clear that he could not be held
administratively liable for any of the charges against him since his subsequent re-election in 2013 operated as a condonation of any
administrative offenses he may have committed during his previous term.[88] As regards the CA's order for the Ombudsman to comment
on his petition for contempt, Binay, Jr. submits that while the Ombudsman is indeed an impeachable officer and, hence, cannot be
removed from office except by way of impeachment, an action for contempt imposes the penalty of fine and imprisonment, without
necessarily resulting in removal from office. Thus, the fact that the Ombudsman is an impeachable officer should not deprive the CA of
its inherent power to punish contempt.[89]
Meanwhile, the CA issued a Resolution[90] dated April 6, 2015, after the oral arguments before it were held,[91] granting Binay, Jr.'s
prayer for a WPI, which further enjoined the implementation of the preventive suspension order. In so ruling, the CA found that Binay,
Jr. has an ostensible right to the final relief prayed for, namely, the nullification of the preventive suspension order, in view of the
condonation doctrine, citing Aguinaldo v. Santos.[92] Particularly, it found that the Ombudsman can hardly impose preventive
suspension against Binay, Jr. given that his re-election in 2013 as City Mayor of Makati condoned any administrative liability arising
from anomalous activities relative to the Makati Parking Building project from 2007 to 2013.[93] In this regard, the CA added that,
although there were acts which were apparently committed by Binay, Jr. beyond his first term — namely, the alleged payments on July
3, July 4, and July 24, 2013,[94] corresponding to the services of Hillmarc's and MANA - still, Binay, Jr. cannot be held administratively
liable therefor based on the cases of Salalima v. Guingona, Jr.,[95] and Mayor Garcia v. Mojica[96] wherein the condonation doctrine
was still applied by the Court although the payments were made after the official's re-election, reasoning that the payments were merely
effected pursuant to contracts executed before said re-election.[97] To this, the CA added that there was no concrete evidence of Binay,
Jr.'s participation for the alleged payments made on July 3, 4, and 24, 2013.[98]
In view of the CA's supervening issuance of a WPI pursuant to its April 6, 2015 Resolution, the Ombudsman filed a supplemental
petition[99] before this Court, arguing that the condonation doctrine is irrelevant to the determination of whether the evidence of guilt is
strong for purposes of issuing preventive suspension orders. The Ombudsman also maintained that a reliance on the condonation
doctrine is a matter of defense, which should have been raised by Binay, Jr. before it during the administrative proceedings, and that, at
any rate, there is no condonation because Binay, Jr. committed acts subject of the OMB Complaint after his re-election in 2013.[100]
On April 14 and 21, 2015,[101] the Court conducted hearings for the oral arguments of the parties. Thereafter, they were required to file
their respective memoranda.[102] In compliance thereto, the Ombudsman filed her Memorandum[103] on May 20, 2015, while Binay, Jr.
submitted his Memorandum the following day.[104]
Pursuant to a Resolution[105] dated June 16, 2015, the Court directed the parties to comment on each other's memoranda, and the OSG
to comment on the Ombudsman's Memorandum, all within ten (10) days from receipt of the notice.
On July 15, 2015, both parties filed their respective comments to each other's memoranda.[106] Meanwhile, on July 16, 2015, the OSG
filed its Manifestation In Lieu of Comment,[107] simply stating that it was mutually agreed upon that the Office of the Ombudsman would
file its Memorandum, consistent with its desire to state its "institutional position."[108] In her Memorandum and Comment to Binay, Jr.'s
Memorandum, the Ombudsman pleaded, among others, that this Court abandon the condonation doctrine.[109] In view of the foregoing,
the case was deemed submitted for resolution.
The Issues Before the Court
Based on the parties' respective pleadings, and as raised during the oral arguments conducted before this Court, the main issues to be
resolved in seriatim are as follows:
I. Whether or not the present petition, and not motions for reconsideration of the assailed CA issuances in CA-G.R. SP No.
139453 and CA-G.R. SP No. 139504, is the Ombudsman's plain, speedy, and adequate remedy;
II. Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction over the main petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453;
III. Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction to issue a TRO and/or WPI enjoining the implementation of a preventive
suspension order issued by the Ombudsman;
IV. Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in issuing the TRO and eventually, the WPI in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453
enjoining the implementation of the preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr. based on the condonation doctrine; and
V. Whether or not the CA's directive for the Ombudsman to ' comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt in CA- G.R. SP No.
139504 is improper and illegal.
The petition is partly meritorious.
I.
A common requirement to both a petition for certiorari and a petition for prohibition taken under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure is that the petitioner has no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Sections 1 and 2
thereof provide:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari. - When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or
in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no
appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
xxxx
Section 2. Petition for prohibition. - When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts r with certainty and praying
that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or
otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
x x x x (Emphases supplied)
Hence, as a general rule, a motion for reconsideration must first be filed with the lower court prior to resorting to the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari or prohibition since a motion for reconsideration may still be considered as a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law. The rationale for the pre-requisite is to grant an opportunity for the lower court or agency to correct any
actual or perceived error attributed to it by the re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case.[110]
Jurisprudence states that "[i]t is [the] inadequacy, [and] not the mere absence of all other legal remedies and the danger of failure of
justice without the writ, that must usually determine the propriety of certiorari [or prohibition]. A remedy is plain, speedy[,] and adequate
if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment, order, or resolution of the lower court or agency, x x
x."[111]
In this light, certain exceptions were crafted to the general rule requiring a prior motion for reconsideration before the filing of a petition
for certiorari, which exceptions also apply to a petition for prohibition.[112] These are: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the
court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by
the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the
resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject
matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where
petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest
is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack
of due process; (h) where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the
issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.[113]
In this case, it is ineluctably clear that the above-highlighted exceptions attend since, for the first time, the question on the authority of
the CA - and of this Court, for that matter - to enjoin the implementation of a preventive suspension order issued by the Office of the
Ombudsman is put to the fore. This case tests the constitutional and statutory limits of the fundamental powers of key government
institutions - namely, the Office of the Ombudsman, the Legislature, and the Judiciary - and hence, involves an issue of transcendental
public importance that demands no less than a careful but expeditious resolution. Also raised is the equally important issue on the
propriety of the continuous application of the condonation doctrine as invoked by a public officer who desires exculpation from
administrative liability. As such, the Ombudsman's direct resort to certiorari and prohibition before this Court, notwithstanding her failure
to move for the prior reconsideration of the assailed issuances in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 and CA-G.R. SP No. 139504 before the CA,
is justified.
II.
Albeit raised for the first time by the Ombudsman in her Memorandum,[114] it is nonetheless proper to resolve the issue on the CA's lack
of subject matter jurisdiction over the main petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453, in view of the well-established rule that a
court's jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. The rationale is that subject matter
jurisdiction is conferred by law, and the lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of and to render judgment on
the action.[115] Hence, it should be preliminarily determined if the CA indeed had subject matter jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP
No. 139453 petition, as the same determines the validity of all subsequent proceedings relative thereto. It is noteworthy to point out that
Binay, Jr. was given the opportunity by this Court to be heard on this issue,[116] as he, in fact, duly submitted his opposition through his
comment to the Ombudsman's Memorandum.[117] That being said, the Court perceives no reasonable objection against ruling on this
issue.
The Ombudsman's argument against the CA's lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the main petition, and her corollary prayer for its
dismissal, is based on her interpretation of Section 14, RA 6770, or the Ombudsman Act,[118] which reads in full:
Section 14. Restrictions. - No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an investigation being conducted by the
Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the jurisdiction
of the Office of the Ombudsman.
No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme
Court, on pure question of law.
The subject provision may be dissected into two (2) parts.
The first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is a prohibition against any court (except the Supreme Court[119]) from issuing a writ of
injunction to delay an investigation being conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman. Generally speaking, "[injunction is a judicial writ,
process or proceeding whereby a party is ordered to do or refrain from doing a certain act. It may be the main action or merely a
provisional remedy for and as an incident in the main action."[120] Considering the textual qualifier "to delay," which connotes a
suspension of an action while the main case remains pending, the "writ of injunction" mentioned in this paragraph could only refer to
injunctions of the provisional kind, consistent with the nature of a provisional injunctive relief.
The exception to the no injunction policy is when there is prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the
office's jurisdiction. The Office of the Ombudsman has disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the government
and its subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies, with the exception only of impeachable officers, Members of Congress, and the
Judiciary.[121] Nonetheless, the Ombudsman retains the power to investigate any serious misconduct in office allegedly committed by
officials removable by impeachment, for the purpose of filing a verified complaint for impeachment, if warranted.[122] Note that the
Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction over certain administrative cases which are within the jurisdiction of the regular courts or
administrative agencies, but has primary jurisdiction to investigate any act or omission of a public officer or employee who is under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.[123]
On the other hand, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 provides that no appeal or application for remedy may be heard
against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, with the exception of the Supreme Court on pure questions of law. This paragraph,
which the Ombudsman particularly relies on in arguing that the CA had no jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition,
as it is supposedly this Court which has the sole jurisdiction to conduct a judicial review of its decisions or findings, is vague for two (2)
reasons: (1) it is unclear what the phrase "application for remedy" or the word "findings" refers to; and (2) it does not specify what
procedural remedy is solely allowable to this Court, save that the same be taken only against a pure question of law. The task then, is
to apply the relevant principles of statutory construction to resolve the ambiguity.
"The underlying principle of all construction is that the intent of the legislature should be sought in the words employed to express it,
and that when found[,] it should be made to govern, x x x. If the words of the law seem to be of doubtful import, it may then perhaps
become necessary to look beyond them in order to ascertain what was in the legislative mind at the time the law was enacted; what the
circumstances were, under which the action was taken; what evil, if any, was meant to be redressed; x x x [a]nd where the law has
contemporaneously been put into operation, and in doing so a construction has necessarily been put upon it, this construction,
especially if followed for some considerable period, is entitled to great respect, as being very probably a true expression of the
legislative purpose, and is not lightly to be overruled, although it is not conclusive."[124]
As an aid to construction, courts may avail themselves of the actual proceedings of the legislative body in interpreting a statute of
doubtful meaning. In case of doubt as to what a provision of a statute means, the meaning put to the provision during the legislative
deliberations may be adopted,[125] albeit not controlling in the interpretation of the law.[126]
A. The Senate deliberations cited by the

Ombudsman do not pertain to the second
paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770.
The Ombudsman submits that the legislative intent behind Section 14, RA 6770, particularly on the matter of judicial review of her
office's decisions or findings, is supposedly clear from the following Senate deliberations:[127]
Senator [Edgardo J.] Angara, x x x. On page 15, Mr. President, line 14, after the phrase "petition for" delete the word "review" and in
lieu thereof, insert the word CERTIORARI. So that, review or appeal from the decision of the Ombudsman would only be taken not on a
petition for review, but on certiorari.
The President [Jovito R. Salonga]. What is the practical effect of that? Will it be more difficult to reverse the decision under
review?
Senator Angara. It has two practical effect ways, Mr. President. First is that the findings of facts of the Ombudsman would be
almost conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. Second, we would not unnecessarily clog the docket of the Supreme
Court. So, it in effect will be a very strict appeal procedure.
xxxx
Senator [Teofisto T.] Guingona, [Jr.]. Does this mean that, for example, if there are exhaustive remedies available to a respondent,
the respondent himself has the right to exhaust the administrative remedies available to him?
Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President, that is correct.
Senator Guingona. And he himself may cut the proceeding short by appealing to the Supreme Court only on certiorari?
Senator Angara. On question of law, yes.
Senator Guingona. And no other remedy is available to him?
Senator Angara. Going to the Supreme Court, Mr. President?
Senator Guingona. Yes. What I mean to say is, at what stage, for example, if he is a presidential appointee who is the respondent, if
there is f no certiorari available, is the respondent given the right to exhaust his administrative remedies first before the Ombudsman
can take the appropriate action?
Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President, because we do not intend to change the administrative law principle that before one can go to
court, he must exhaust all administrative remedies xxx available to him before he goes and seeks judicial review.
xxxx
Senator [Neptali A.] Gonzales. What is the purpose of the Committee in changing the method of appeal from one of a petition
for review to a petition for certiorari?
Senator Angara. To make it consistent, Mr. President, with the provision here in the bill to the effect that the finding of facts of
the Ombudsman is conclusive if supported by substantial evidence.
Senator Gonzales. A statement has been made by the Honorable Presiding Officer to which I concur, that in an appeal by certiorari,
the appeal is more difficult. Because in certiorari it is a matter of discretion on the part of the court, whether to give due
course to the petition or dismiss it outright. Is that not correct, Mr. President?
Senator Angara. That is absolutely correct, Mr. President
Senator Gonzales. And in a petition for certiorari, the issue is limited to whether or not the Ombudsman here has acted
without jurisdiction and has committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Is that not the
consequence, Mr. President.
Senator Angara. That is correct, Mr. President.
Senator Gonzales. And it is, therefore, in this sense that the intention of the Committee is to make it harder to have a judicial
review, but should be limited only to cases that I have enumerated.
Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President.
Senator Gonzales. I think, Mr. President, our Supreme Court has made a distinction between a petition for review and a petition for
certiorari; because before, under the 1935 Constitution appeal from any order, ruling or decision of the COMELEC shall be by means of
review. But under the Constitution it is now by certiorari and the Supreme Court said that by this change, the court exercising judicial
review will not inquire into the facts, into the evidence, because we will not go deeply by way of review into the evidence on record but
its authority will be limited to a determination of whether the administrative agency acted without, or in excess of, jurisdiction, or
committed a grave abuse of discretion. So, I assume that that is the purpose of this amendment, Mr. President.
Senator Angara. The distinguished Gentleman has stated it so well.
Senator Gonzales. I just want to put that in the Record. Senator Angara. It is very well stated, Mr. President.
xxxx
The President. It is evident that there must be some final authority to render decisions. Should it be the Ombudsman or
should it be the Supreme Court?
Senator Angara. As I understand it, under our scheme of government, Mr. President, it is and has to be the Supreme Court to make
the final determination.
The President. Then if that is so, we have to modify Section 17.

Senator Angara. That is why, Mr. President, some of our Colleagues have made a reservation to introduce an appropriate change
during the period of Individual Amendments.
xxxx
The President. All right. Is there any objection to the amendment inserting the word CERTIORARI instead of "review"? [Silence]
Hearing none, the same is approved.[128]
Upon an assiduous scrutiny of these deliberations, the Court is, however, unconvinced that the provision debated on was Section 14,
RA 6770, as the Ombudsman invokes. Note that the exchange begins with the suggestion of Senator Angara to delete the word
"review" that comes after the phrase "petition for review" and, in its stead, insert the word "certiorari" so that the "review or appeal from
the decision of the Ombudsman would not only be taken on a petition for review, but on certiorari" The ensuing exchange between
Senators Gonzales and Angara then dwells on the purpose of changing the method of review from one of a petition for review to a
petition for certiorari - that is, to make "the appeal x x x more difficult." Ultimately, the amendment to the change in wording, from
"petition for review" to "petition for certiorari" was approved.
Noticeably, these references to a "petition for review" and the proposed "petition for certiorari" are nowhere to be found in the text of
Section 14, RA 6770. In fact, it was earlier mentioned that this provision, particularly its second paragraph, does not indicate what
specific procedural remedy one should take in assailing a decision or finding of the Ombudsman; it only reveals that the remedy be
taken to this Court based on pure questions of law. More so, it was even commented upon during the oral arguments of this
case[129] that there was no debate or clarification made on the current formulation of the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 per
the available excerpts of the Senate deliberations. In any case, at least for the above-cited deliberations, the Court finds no adequate
support to sustain the Ombudsman's entreaty that the CA had no subject matter jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453
petition.
On the contrary, it actually makes greater sense to posit that these deliberations refer to another Ombudsman Act provision, namely
Section 27, RA 6770. This is because the latter textually reflects the approval of Senator Angara's suggested amendment, i.e., that the
Ombudsman's decision or finding may be assailed in a petition for certiorari to this Court (fourth paragraph), and further, his comment
on the conclusive nature of the factual findings of the Ombudsman, if supported by substantial evidence (third paragraph):
Section 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions.— (1) All provisionary orders of the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective
and executory.
A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman must be filed within five (5) days after
receipt of written notice and shall be entertained only on any of the following grounds:
(1) New evidence has been discovered which materially affects the order, directive or decision;
(2) Errors of law or irregularities have been committed prejudicial to the interest of the movant. The motion for reconsideration shall be
resolved within three (3) days from filing: Provided, That only one motion for reconsideration shall be entertained.
Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are conclusive. Any order, directive or
decision imposing the penalty of public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one (1) month's salary shall be final and
unappealable.
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to
the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive
or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The above rules may be amended or modified by the Office of the ' Ombudsman as the interest of justice may require. (Emphasis and
At first blush, it appears that Section 27, RA 6770 is equally ambiguous in stating that a "petition for certiorari" should be taken in
accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as it is well-known that under the present 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, petitions
for certiorari are governed by Rule 65 of the said Rules. However, it should be discerned that the Ombudsman Act was passed way
back in 1989[130] and, hence, before the advent of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[131] At that time, the governing 1964 Rules of
Court,[132] consistent with Section 27, RA 6770, referred to the appeal taken thereunder as a petition for certiorari, thus possibly
explaining the remedy's textual denomination, at least in the provision's final approved version:
RULE 45
Appeal from Court of Appeals to Supreme Court
SECTION 1. Filing of Petition with Supreme Court. - A party may appeal by certiorari, from a judgment of the Court of Appeals, by filing
with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari, within fifteen (15) days from notice of judgment or of the denial of his motion for
reconsideration filed in due time, and paying at the same time, to the clerk of said court the corresponding docketing fee. The petition
shall not be acted upon without proof of service of a copy thereof to the Court of Appeals. (Emphasis supplied)
B. Construing the second paragraph of

Section 14, RA 6770.
The Senate deliberations' lack of discussion on the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 notwithstanding, the other principles of
statutory construction can apply to ascertain the meaning of the provision.
To recount, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 states that "[n]o court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy
against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law." ;
As a general rule, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 bans the whole range of remedies against issuances of the
Ombudsman, by prohibiting: (a) an appeal against any decision or finding of the Ombudsman, and (b) "any application of remedy"
(subject to the exception below) against the same. To clarify, the phrase "application for remedy," being a generally worded provision,
and being separated from the term "appeal" by the disjunctive "or",[133] refers to any remedy (whether taken mainly or provisionally),
except an appeal, following the maxim generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda: general words are to be understood in a general
sense.[134] By the same principle, the word "findings," which is also separated from the word "decision" by the disjunctive "or", would
therefore refer to any finding made by the Ombudsman (whether final or provisional), except a decision.
The subject provision, however, crafts an exception to the foregoing general rule. While the specific procedural vehicle is not explicit
from its text, it is fairly deducible that the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 excepts, as the only allowable remedy against "the
decision or findings of the Ombudsman," a Rule 45 appeal, for the reason that it is the only remedy taken to the Supreme Court
on "pure questions of law," whether under the 1964 Rules of Court or the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:
Rule 45, 1964 Rules of Court
RULE 45
Appeal from Court of Appeals to Supreme Court
xxxx
Section 2. Contents of Petition. — The petition shall contain a concise statement of the matters involved, the assignment of errors made
in the court below, and the reasons relied on for the allowance of the petition, and it should be accompanied with a true copy of the
judgment sought to be reviewed, together with twelve (12) copies of the record on appeal, if any, and of the petitioner's brief as filed in
the Court of Appeals. A verified statement of the date when notice of judgment and denial of the motion for reconsideration, if any, were
received shall accompany the petition.
Only questions of law may be raised in the petition and must be distinctly set forth. If no record on appeal has been filed in the
Court of Appeals, the clerk of the Supreme Court, upon admission of the petition, shall demand from the Court of Appeals the elevation
of the whole record of the case. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Rule 45, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
RULE 45
Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment, final order or resolution of the
Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court or other courts, whenever authorized by law,
may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition may include an application for a writ of
preliminary injunction or other provisional remedies and shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. The
petitioner may seek the same provisional remedies by verified motion filed in the same action or proceeding at any time during its
pendency. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
That the remedy excepted in the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 could be a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1964
Rules of Court or the 1997 Rules of Procedure is a suggestion that defies traditional norms of procedure. It is basic procedural law that
a Rule 65 petition is based on errors of jurisdiction, and not errors of judgment to which the classifications of (a) questions of fact, (b)
questions of law, or (c) questions of mixed fact and law, relate to. In fact, there is no procedural rule, whether in the old or new Rules,
which grounds a Rule 65 petition on pure questions of law. Indeed, it is also a statutory construction principle that the lawmaking body
cannot be said to have intended the establishment of conflicting and hostile systems on the same subject. Such a result would render
legislation a useless and idle ceremony, and subject the laws to uncertainty and unintelligibility.[135] There should then be no confusion
that the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 refers to a Rule 45 appeal to this Court, and no other. In sum, the appropriate
construction of this Ombudsman Act provision is that all remedies against issuances of the Office of the Ombudsman are prohibited,
except the above-stated Rule 45 remedy to the Court on pure questions of law.
C. Validity of the second paragraph of

Section 14, RA 6770.
Of course, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770's extremely limited restriction on remedies is inappropriate since a Rule 45
appeal -which is within the sphere of the rules of procedure promulgated by this Court - can only be taken against final decisions or
orders of lower courts,[136] and not against "findings" of quasi-judicial agencies. As will be later elaborated upon, Congress cannot
interfere with matters of procedure; hence, it cannot alter the scope of a Rule 45 appeal so as to apply to interlocutory "findings" issued
by the Ombudsman. More significantly, by confining the remedy to a Rule 45 appeal, the provision takes away the remedy
of certiorari, grounded on errors of jurisdiction, in denigration of the judicial power constitutionally vested in courts. In this light, the
second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 also increased this Court's appellate jurisdiction, without a showing, however, that it gave its
consent to the same. The provision is, in fact, very similar to the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770 (as above-cited), which was
invalidated in the case of Fabian v. Desiertoni[137] (Fabian).[138]
In Fabian, the Court struck down the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770 as unconstitutional since it had the effect of increasing
the appellate jurisdiction of the Court without its advice and concurrence in violation of Section 30, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
[139]
Moreover, this provision was found to be inconsistent with Section 1, Rule 45 of the present 1997 Rules of Procedure which, as
above-intimated, applies only to a review of "judgments or final orders of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax
Appeals, the Regional Trial Court, or other courts authorized by law;" and not of quasi-judicial agencies, such as the Office of the
Ombudsman, the remedy now being a Rule 43 appeal to the Court of Appeals. In Ruivivar v. Office of the Ombudsman,[140] the
Court's ratiocinations and ruling in Fabian were recounted:
The case of Fabian v. Desierto arose from the doubt created in the application of Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 (The Ombudsman's Act)
and Section 7, Rule III of A.O. No. 7 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman) on the availability of appeal before the
Supreme Court to assail a decision or order of the Ombudsman in administrative cases. In Fabian, we invalidated Section 27 of R.A.
No. 6770 (and Section 7, Rule III of A.O. No. 7 and the other rules implementing the Act) insofar as it provided for appeal
by certiorari under Rule 45 from the decisions or orders of the Ombudsman in administrative cases. We held that Section 27
of R.A. No. 6770 had the effect, not only of increasing the appellate jurisdiction of this Court without its advice and
concurrence in violation of Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution; it was also inconsistent with Section 1, Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court which provides that a petition for review on certiorari shall apply only to a review of "judgments or final orders
of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court, or other courts authorized by
law." We pointedly said:
As a consequence of our ratiocination that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 should be struck down as unconstitutional, and in line
with the regulatory philosophy adopted in appeals from quasi-judicial agencies in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, appeals
from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the CA under the provisions of
Rule 43.[141] (Emphasis supplied)
Since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 limits the remedy against "decision or findings" of the Ombudsman to a Rule 45
appeal and thus - similar to the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770[142] - attempts to effectively increase the Supreme Court's
appellate jurisdiction without its advice and concurrence,[143] it is therefore concluded that the former provision is also unconstitutional
and perforce, invalid. Contrary to the Ombudsman's posturing,[144] Fabian should squarely apply since the above-stated Ombudsman
Act provisions are in part materia in that they "cover the same specific or particular subject matter,"[145] that is, the manner of judicial
review over issuances of the Ombudsman.
Note that since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is clearly determinative of the existence of the CA's subject matter
jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition, including all subsequent proceedings relative thereto, as the Ombudsman
herself has developed, the Court deems it proper to resolve this issue ex mero motu (on its own motion[146]). This procedure, as was
similarly adopted in Fabian, finds its bearings in settled case law:
The conventional rule, however, is that a challenge on constitutional grounds must be raised by a party to the case, neither of whom did
so in this case, but that is not an inflexible rule, as we shall explain.
Since the constitution is intended for the observance of the judiciary and other departments of the government and the judges are
sworn to support its provisions, the courts are not at liberty to overlook or disregard its commands or countenance evasions thereof.
When it is clear , that a statute transgresses the authority vested in a legislative body, it is the duty of the courts to declare that the
constitution, and not the statute, governs in a case before them for judgment.
Thus, while courts will not ordinarily pass upon constitutional questions which are not raised in the pleadings, the rule has been
recognized to admit of certain exceptions. It does not preclude a court from inquiring into its own jurisdiction or compel it to enter a
judgment that it lacks jurisdiction to enter. If a statute on which a court's jurisdiction in a proceeding depends is unconstitutional, the
court has no jurisdiction in the proceeding, and since it may determine whether or not it has jurisdiction, it necessarily follows that it may
inquire into the constitutionality of the statute.
Constitutional questions, not raised in the regular and orderly procedure in the trial are ordinarily rejected unless the
jurisdiction of the court below or that of the appellate court is involved in which case it may be raised at any time or on the
court's own motion. The Court ex mero motu may take cognizance of lack of jurisdiction at any point in the case where that fact is
developed. The court has a clearly recognized right to determine its own jurisdiction in any proceeding.[147] (Emphasis supplied)
D. Consequence of invalidity.
In this case, the Rule 65 petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 was filed by Binay, Jr. before the CA in order to nullify the
preventive suspension order issued by the Ombudsman, an interlocutory order,[148] hence, unappealable.[149]
In several cases decided after Fabian, the Court has ruled that Rule 65 petitions for certiorari against unappelable issuances[150] of the
Ombudsman should be filed before the CA, and not directly before this Court:
In Office of the Ombudsman v. Capulong[151] (March 12, 2014), wherein a preventive suspension order issued by the Office of the
Ombudsman was - similar to this case - assailed through a Rule 65 petition for certiorari filed by the public officer before the CA, the
Court held that "[t]here being a finding of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman, it was certainly imperative for the
CA to grant incidental reliefs, as sanctioned by Section 1 of Rule 65."[152]
In Dagan v. Office of the Ombudsman[153] (November 19, 2013), involving a Rule 65 petition for certiorari assailing a final and
unappealable order of the Office of the Ombudsman in an administrative case, the Court remarked that "petitioner employed the correct
mode of review in this case, i.e., a special civil action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals."[154] In this relation, it stated that while "a
special civil action for Certiorari is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, such
petition should be initially filed with the Court of Appeals in observance of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts." Further, the Court
upheld Barata v. Abalos, Jr.[155] (June 6, 2001), wherein it was ruled that the remedy against final and unappealable orders of the Office
of the Ombudsman in an administrative case was a Rule 65 petition to the CA. The same verdict was reached
in Ruivivar[156] (September 16, 2008).
Thus, with the unconstitutionality of the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, the Court, consistent with existing jurisprudence,
concludes that the CA has subject matter jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition. That being said, the Court now
examines the objections of the Ombudsman, this time against the CA's authority to issue the assailed TRO and WPI against the
implementation of the preventive suspension order, incidental to that main case.
III.
From the inception of these proceedings, the Ombudsman has been adamant that the CA has no jurisdiction to issue any provisional
injunctive writ against her office to enjoin its preventive suspension orders. As basis, she invokes the first paragraph of Section 14,
RA 6770 in conjunction with her office's independence under the 1987 Constitution. She advances the idea that "[i]n order to further
ensure [her office's] independence, [RA 6770] likewise insulated it from judicial intervention,"[157] particularly, "from injunctive reliefs
traditionally obtainable from the courts,"[158] claiming that said writs may work "just as effectively as direct harassment or political
pressure would."[159]
A. The concept of Ombudsman independence.
Section 5, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman:
Section 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman to be known as
Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy and at least one Deputy each for Luzon, Visayas[,] and Mindanao. A separate Deputy for the military
establishment may likewise be appointed. (Emphasis supplied)
In Gonzales III v. Office of the President[160] (Gonzales III), the Court traced the historical underpinnings of the Office of the
Ombudsman:
Prior to the 1973 Constitution, past presidents established several Ombudsman-like agencies to serve as the people's medium for
airing grievances and for direct redress against abuses and misconduct in the government. Ultimately, however, these agencies failed
to fully realize their objective for lack of the political independence necessary for the effective performance of their function as
government critic.
It was under the 1973 Constitution that the Office of the Ombudsman became a constitutionally-mandated office to give it political
independence and adequate powers to enforce its mandate. Pursuant to the ( 1973 Constitution, President Ferdinand Marcos enacted
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1487, as amended by PD No. 1607 and PD No. 1630, creating the Office of the Ombudsman to be known
as Tanodbayan. It was tasked principally to investigate, on complaint or motu proprio, any administrative act of any administrative
agency, including any government-owned or controlled corporation. When the Office of the Tanodbayan was reorganized in 1979, the
powers previously vested in the Special Prosecutor were transferred to the Tanodbayan himself. He was given the exclusive authority
to conduct preliminary investigation of all cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, file the corresponding information, and control the
prosecution of these cases.
With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, a new Office of the Ombudsman was created by constitutional fiat. Unlike in the 1973
Constitution, its independence was expressly and constitutionally guaranteed. Its objectives are to enforce the state policy in
Section 27, Article II and the standard of accountability in public service under Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. These
provisions read:
Section 27. The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures against graft
and corruption.
Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must, at all times, be accountable to the people, serve them with
utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.[161] (Emphasis supplied)
More significantly, Gonzales III explained the broad scope of the office's mandate, and in correlation, the impetus behind its
independence:
Under Section 12, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Office of the Ombudsman is envisioned to be the "protector of the people"
against the inept, abusive, and corrupt in the Government, to function essentially as a complaints and action bureau. This constitutional
vision of a Philippine Ombudsman practically intends to make the Ombudsman an authority to directly check and guard against the ills,
abuses and excesses , of the bureaucracy. Pursuant to Section 13 (8), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, Congress enacted RA No.
6770 to enable it to further realize the vision of the Constitution. Section 21 of RA No. 6770 provides:
Section 21. Official Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. - The Office of the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over
all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies, including Members of the
Cabinet, local government, government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may be
removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary.
As the Ombudsman is expected to be an "activist watchman," the < Court has upheld its actions, although not squarely falling under the
broad powers granted [to] it by the Constitution and by RA No. 6770, if these actions are reasonably in line with its official function and
consistent with the law and the Constitution.
The Ombudsman's broad investigative and disciplinary powers include all acts of malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance of all
public officials, including Members of the Cabinet and key Executive officers, during their tenure. To support these broad powers, the
Constitution saw it fit to insulate the Office of the Ombudsman from the pressures and influence of officialdom and partisan
politics and from fear of external reprisal by making it an "independent" office, x x x.
xxxx
Given the scope of its disciplinary authority, the Office of the Ombudsman is a very powerful government constitutional agency that is
considered "a notch above other grievance-handling investigative bodies." It has powers, both constitutional and statutory, that are
commensurate , with its daunting task of enforcing accountability of public officers.[162] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Gonzales III is the first case which grappled with the meaning of the Ombudsman's independence vis-a-vis the independence of the
other constitutional bodies. Pertinently, the Court observed:
(1) "[T]he independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman and by the Constitutional Commissions shares certain characteristics
- they do not owe their existence to any act of Congress, but are created by the Constitution itself; additionally, they all enjoy
fiscal autonomy. In general terms, the framers of the Constitution intended that these 'independent' bodies be insulated from
political pressure to the extent that the absence of 'independence' would result in the impairment of their core functions"[163];
(2) "[T]he Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the independence and flexibility needed in the
discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent constitutional
offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only [of]
the express mandate of the Constitution, but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of powers
upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system is based";[164] and
(3) "[T]he constitutional deliberations explain the Constitutional Commissions' need for independence. In the deliberations of the 1973
Constitution, the delegates amended the 1935 Constitution by providing for a constitutionally-created Civil Service Commission, instead
of one created by law, on the premise that the effectivity of this body is dependent on its freedom from the tentacles of politics.
In a similar manner, the deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the Commission on Audit highlighted the developments in the past
Constitutions geared towards insulating the Commission on Audit from political pressure."[165]
At bottom, the decisive ruling in Gonzales III, however, was that the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman, as well as that of
the foregoing independent bodies, meant freedom from control or supervision of the Executive Department:
[T]he independent constitutional commissions have been consistently intended by the framers to be independent from executive
control or supervision or any form of political influence. At least insofar as these bodies are concerned, jurisprudence is not scarce
on how the "independence" granted to these bodies prevents presidential interference.
In Brillantes, Jr. v. Yorac (G.R. No. 93867, December 18, 1990, 192 SCRA 358), we emphasized that the Constitutional Commissions,
which have been characterized under the Constitution as "independent," are not under the control of the President, even if they
discharge functions that are executive in nature. The Court declared as unconstitutional the President's act of temporarily appointing
the respondent in that case as Acting Chairman of the [Commission on Elections] "however well-meaning" it might have been.
In Bautista v. Senator Salonga (254 Phil. 156, 179 [1989]), the Court categorically stated that the tenure of the commissioners of the
independent Commission on Human Rights could not be placed under the discretionary power of the President.
xxxx
The kind of independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman certainly cannot be inferior - but is similar in degree and kind - to
the independence similarly guaranteed by the Constitution to the Constitutional Commissions since all these offices fill the political
interstices of a republican democracy that are crucial to its existence and proper functioning.[166] (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Thus, in Gonzales III, the Court declared Section 8 (2), RA 6770, which provides that "[a] Deputy or the Special Prosecutor, may be
removed from office by the President for any of the grounds provided for the removal of the Ombudsman, and after due process,"
partially unconstitutional insofar as it subjected the Deputy Ombudsman to the disciplinary authority of the President for violating the
principle of independence. Meanwhile, the validity of Section 8 (2), RA 6770 was maintained insofar as the Office of the Special
Prosecutor was concerned since said office was not considered to be constitutionally within the Office of the Ombudsman and is,
hence, not entitled to the independence the latter enjoys under the Constitution.[167]
As may be deduced from the various discourses in Gonzales III, the concept of Ombudsman's independence covers three (3) things:
First: creation by the Constitution, which means that the office cannot be abolished, nor its constitutionally specified functions and
privileges, be removed, altered, or modified by law, unless the Constitution itself allows, or an amendment thereto is made;
Second: fiscal autonomy, which means that the office "may not be obstructed from [its] freedom to use or dispose of [its] funds for
purposes germane to [its] functions;[168] hence, its budget cannot be strategically decreased by officials of the political branches of
government so as to impair said functions; and
Third: insulation from executive supervision and control, which means that those within the ranks of the office can only be
disciplined by an internal authority.
Evidently, all three aspects of independence intend to protect the Office of the Ombudsman from political harassment and
pressure, so as to free it from the "insidious tentacles of politics."[169]
That being the case, the concept of Ombudsman independence cannot be invoked as basis to insulate the Ombudsman from judicial
power constitutionally vested unto the courts. Courts are apolitical bodies, which are ordained to act as impartial tribunals and apply
even justice to all. Hence, the Ombudsman's notion that it can be exempt from an incident of judicial power - that is, a provisional writ of
injunction against a preventive suspension order - clearly strays from the concept's rationale of insulating the office from political
harassment or pressure.
B. The first paragraph of Section 14, RA

6770 in light of the powers of Congress and the
Court under the 1987 Constitution.
The Ombudsman's erroneous abstraction of her office's independence notwithstanding, it remains that the first paragraph of Section 14,
RA 6770 textually prohibits courts from extending provisional injunctive relief to delay any investigation conducted by her office. Despite
the usage of the general phrase "[n]o writ of injunction shall be issued by any court," the Ombudsman herself concedes that the
prohibition does not cover the Supreme Court.[170] As support, she cites the following Senate deliberations:
Senator [Ernesto M.] Maceda. Mr. President, I do not know if an amendment is necessary. I would just like to inquire for the
record whether below the Supreme Court, it is understood that there is no injunction policy against the Ombudsman by lower
courts. Or, is it necessary to have a special paragraph for that?
Senator Angara. Well, there is no provision here, Mr. President, that will prevent an injunction against the Ombudsman being issued.
Senator Maceda. In which case, I think that the intention, this being one of the highest constitutional bodies, is to subject this
only to certiorari to the Supreme Court. I think an injunction from the Supreme Court is, of course, in order but no lower
courts should be allowed to interfere. We had a very bad experience with even, let us say, the Forestry Code where no injunction is
supposed to be issued against the Department of Natural Resources. Injunctions are issued right and left by RTC judges all over
the country.
The President. Why do we not make an express provision to that effect?
Senator Angara. We would welcome that, Mr. President.
The President. No [writs of injunction] from the trial courts other than the Supreme Court.
Senator Maceda. I so move, Mr. President, for that amendment.
The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] Hearing none, the same is approved.[171]
Further, she acknowledges that by virtue of Sections 1 and 5 (1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, acts of the Ombudsman, including
interlocutory orders, are subject to the Supreme Court's power of judicial review As a corollary, the Supreme Court may issue ancillary
mjunctive writs or provisional remedies in the exercise of its power of judicial review over matters pertaining to ongoing investigations
by the Office of the Ombudsman. Respecting the CA, however, the Ombudsman begs to differ.[172]
With these submissions, it is therefore apt to examine the validity of the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 insofar as it prohibits all
courts, except this Court, from issuing provisional writs of injunction to enjoin an Ombudsman investigation. That the constitutionality of
this provision is the lis mota of this case has not been seriously disputed. In fact, the issue anent its constitutionality was properly raised
and presented during the course of these proceedings.[173] More importantly, its resolution is clearly necessary to the complete
disposition of this case.[174]
In the enduring words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. The Electoral Commission (Angara),[175] the "Constitution has blocked out with deft
strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative[,] and the judicial departments of the government."[176] The
constitutional demarcation of the three fundamental powers of government is more commonly known as the principle of separation of
powers. In the landmark case of Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr. (Belgica),[177] the Court held that "there is a violation of the separation of powers
principle when one branch of government unduly encroaches on the domain of another."[178] In particular, "there is a violation of the
principle when there is impermissible (a) interference with and/or (b) assumption of another department's functions."[179]
Under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, judicial power is allocated to the Supreme Court and all such lower courts:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
This Court is the only court established by the Constitution, while all other lower courts may be established by laws passed by
Congress. Thus, through the passage of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 129,[180] known as "The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,"
the Court of Appeals,[181] the Regional Trial Courts,[182] and the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts[183] were established. Later, through the passage of RA 1125,[184] and Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1486,[185] the Court of
Tax Appeals, and the Sandiganbayan were respectively established.
In addition to the authority to establish lower courts, Section 2, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution empowers Congress to define,
prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of all courts, except that it may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over
cases enumerated in Section 5[186] of the same Article:
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, ' and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not
deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof.
xxxx
Jurisdiction, as hereinabove used, more accurately pertains to jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action. In The Diocese of
Bacolod v. Commission on Elections,[187] subject matter jurisdiction was defined as "the authority 'to hear and determine cases of the
general class to which the proceedings in question belong and is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the
court and defines its powers.'"
Among others, Congress defined, prescribed, and apportioned the subject matter jurisdiction of this Court (subject to the
aforementioned constitutional limitations), the Court of Appeals, and the trial courts, through the passage of BP 129, as amended.
In this case, the basis for the CA's subject matter jurisdiction over Binay, Jr.'s main petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453
is Section 9(1), Chapter I of BP 129, as amended:
Section 9. Jurisdiction. - The Court of Appeals shall exercise:

1. Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary
writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction[.]
Note that the CA's certiorari jurisdiction, as above-stated, is not only original but also concurrent with the Regional Trial Courts (under
Section 21 (1), Chapter II of BP 129), and the Supreme Court (under Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution). In view
of the concurrence of these courts' jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts should be followed.
In People v. Cuaresma,[188] the doctrine was explained as follows:
[T]his concurrence of jurisdiction is not x x x to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained
freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is
determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the
extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary
writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of
Appeals.[189]
When a court has subject matter jurisdiction over a particular case, as conferred unto it by law, said court may then exercise its
jurisdiction acquired over that case, which is called judicial power.
Judicial power, as vested in the Supreme Court and all other courts established by law, has been defined as the "totality of powers a
court exercises when it assumes jurisdiction and hears and decides a case."[190] Under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution, it includes "the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
In Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.[191] the Court explained the expanded scope of judicial power under the 1987 Constitution:
The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power, involving the settlement of conflicting rights as
conferred by law. The second part of the authority represents a broadening of f judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review
what was before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the government.
As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the
decisions of the executive and the legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because they are tainted
with grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of "grave abuse of discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that
can expand or contract according to the disposition of the judiciary.[192]
Judicial power is never exercised in a vacuum. A court's exercise of the jurisdiction it has acquired over a particular case
conforms to the limits and parameters of the rules of procedure duly promulgated by this Court. In other words, procedure is the
framework within which judicial power is exercised. In Manila Railroad Co. v. Attorney-General,[193] the Court elucidated that "[t]he power
or authority of the court over the subject matter existed and was fixed before procedure in a given cause began. Procedure does not
alter or change that power or authority; it simply directs the manner in which it shall be fully and justly exercised. To be sure,
in certain cases, if that power is not exercised in conformity with the provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court attempting to
exercise it loses the power to exercise it legally. This does not mean that it loses jurisdiction of the subject matter."[194]
While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts is, by constitutional design, vested unto
Congress, the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts belongs exclusively to this Court. Section 5 (5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads:
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in
all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide
a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall
not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective
unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice[195] (Echegaray), the Court traced the evolution of its rule-making authority, which, under the
1935[196] and 1973 Constitutions,[197] had been priorly subjected to a power-sharing scheme with Congress.[198] As it now stands, the
1987 Constitution textually altered the old provisions by deleting the concurrent power of Congress to amend the rules, thus
solidifying in one body the Court's rule-making powers, in line with the Framers' vision of institutionalizing a "[s]tronger and more
independent judiciary."[199]
The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission would show[200] that the Framers debated on whether or not the
Court's rule-making powers should be shared with Congress. There was an initial suggestion to insert the sentence "The National
Assembly may repeal, alter, or supplement the said rules with the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court", right after the phrase
"Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged" in the enumeration of powers of the
Supreme Court. Later, Commissioner Felicitas S. Aquino proposed to delete the former sentence and, instead, after the word
"[underprivileged," place a comma (,) to be followed by "the phrase with the concurrence of the National Assembly." Eventually, a
compromise formulation was reached wherein (a) the Committee members agreed to Commissioner Aquino's proposal to delete the
phrase "the National Assembly may repeal, alter, or supplement the said rules with the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court"
and (b) in turn, Commissioner Aquino agreed to withdraw his proposal to add "the phrase with the concurrence of the National
Assembly." The changes were approved, thereby leading to the present lack of textual reference to any form of Congressional
participation in Section 5 (5), Article VIII, supra. The prevailing consideration was that "both bodies, the Supreme Court and
the Legislature, have their inherent powers."[201]
Thus, as it now stands, Congress has no authority to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure.
As pronounced in Echegaray:
The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the power to promulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also r granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of
Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate
rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive.
[202]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Under its rule-making authority, the Court has periodically passed various rules of procedure, among others, the current 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. Identifying the appropriate procedural remedies needed for the reasonable exercise of every court's judicial
power, the provisional remedies of temporary restraining orders and writs of preliminary injunction were thus provided.
A temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction both constitute temporary measures availed of during the pendency of
the action. They are, by nature, ancillary because they are mere incidents in and are dependent upon the result of the main action. It is
well-settled that the sole object of a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or
mandatory, is to preserve the status quo[203] until the merits of the case can be heard. They are usually granted when it is made to
appear that there is a substantial controversy between the parties and one of them is committing an act or threatening the immediate
commission of an act that will cause irreparable injury or destroy the status quo of the controversy before a full hearing can be had on
the merits of the case. In other words, they are preservative remedies for the protection of substantive rights or interests, and, hence,
not a cause of action in itself, but merely adjunct to a main suit.[204] In a sense, they are regulatory processes meant to prevent a case
from being mooted by the interim acts of the parties.
Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure generally governs the provisional remedies of a TRO and a WPI. A preliminary injunction
is defined under Section 1,[205] Rule 58, while Section 3[206] of the same Rule enumerates the grounds for its issuance. Meanwhile, under
Section 5[207] thereof, a TRO may be issued as a precursor to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction under certain procedural
parameters.
The power of a court to issue these provisional injunctive reliefs coincides with its inherent power to issue all auxiliary writs,
processes, and other means necessary to carry its acquired jurisdiction into effect under Section 6, Rule 135 of the Rules of
Court which reads:
Section 6. Means to carry jurisdiction into effect. - When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, f
processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer; and if the procedure to be
followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by law[208] or by these rules, any suitable process or mode of
proceeding may be adopted which appears comfortable to the spirit of the said law or rules.
In City of Manila v. Grecia-Cuerdo,[209] which is a case involving "[t]he supervisory power or jurisdiction of the [Court of Tax Appeals]
to issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction"[210] over "decisions, orders or resolutions of the RTCs in local tax cases
originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction,"[211] the Court ruled that said power
"should coexist with, and be a complement to, its appellate jurisdiction to review, by appeal, the final orders and decisions of the RTC,
in order to have complete supervision over the acts of the latter:"[212]
A grant of appellate jurisdiction implies that there is included in it the power necessary to exercise it effectively, to make all orders
that ; will preserve the subject of the action, and to give effect to the final determination of the appeal. It carries with it the power
to protect that jurisdiction and to make the decisions of the court thereunder effective. The court, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, has
authority to control all auxiliary and incidental matters necessary to the efficient and proper exercise of that jurisdiction. For this
purpose, it may, when necessary, prohibit or restrain the performance of any act which might interfere with the proper exercise of its
rightful jurisdiction in cases pending before it.[213] (Emphasis supplied)
In this light, the Court expounded on the inherent powers of a court endowed with subject matter jurisdiction:
[A] court which is endowed with a particular jurisdiction should have powers which are necessary to enable it to act effectively within
such jurisdiction. These should be regarded as powers which are inherent in its jurisdiction and the court must possess them
in order to enforce its rules of practice and to suppress any abuses of its process and to t defeat any attempted thwarting of
such process.
x x x x
Indeed, courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to be implied from a general grant of jurisdiction, in addition to
those expressly conferred on them. These inherent powers are such powers as are necessary for the ordinary and efficient
exercise of jurisdiction; or are essential to the existence, dignity and functions of the courts, as well as to the due
administration of justice; or are directly appropriate, convenient and suitable to the execution of their granted powers; and
include the power to maintain the court's jurisdiction and render it effective in behalf of the litigants. [214] (Emphases and
Broadly speaking, the inherent powers of the courts resonates the long-entrenched constitutional principle, articulated way back in the
1936 case of Angara, that "where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of
the one or the performance of the other is also conferred."[215]
In the United States, the "inherent powers doctrine refers to the principle, by which the courts deal with diverse matters over which
they are thought to have intrinsic authority like procedural [rule-making] and general judicial housekeeping. To justify the invocation or
exercise of inherent powers, a court must show that the powers are reasonably necessary to achieve the specific purpose for
which the exercise is sought. Inherent powers enable the judiciary to accomplish its constitutionally mandated functions."[216]
In Smothers v. Lewis[217] (Smothers), a case involving the constitutionality of a statute which prohibited courts from enjoining the
enforcement of a revocation order of an alcohol beverage license pending appeal,[218] the Supreme Court of Kentucky held:
[T]he Court is x x x vested with certain "inherent" powers to do that which is reasonably necessary for the administration of
justice within the scope of their jurisdiction. x x x [W]e said while considering the rule making power and the judicial power to be
one and the same that ". . . the grant of judicial power [rule making power] to the courts by the constitution carries with it, as a
necessary incident, the right to make that power effective in the administration of justice." (Emphases supplied)
Significantly, Smothers characterized a court's issuance of provisional injunctive relief as an exercise of the court's inherent power, and
to this end, stated that any attempt on the part of Congress to interfere with the same was constitutionally impermissible:
It is a result of this foregoing line of thinking that we now adopt the language framework of 28 Am.Jur.2d, Injunctions, Section 15, and
once and for all make clear that a court, once having obtained jurisdiction of a cause of action, has, as an incidental to its constitutional
grant of power, inherent power to do all things reasonably necessary to the administration of justice in the case before it. In the
exercise of this power, a court, when necessary in order to protect or preserve the subject matter of the litigation, to protect
its jurisdiction and to make its judgment effective, may grant or issue a temporary injunction in aid of or ancillary to the
principal action.
The control over this inherent judicial power, in this particular instance the injunction, is exclusively within the constitutional
realm of the courts. As such, it is not within the purview of the legislature to grant or deny the power nor is it within the
purview of the legislature to shape or fashion circumstances under which this inherently judicial power may be or may not be
granted or denied.
This Court has historically recognized constitutional limitations upon the power of the legislature to interfere with or to inhibit the
performance of constitutionally granted and inherently provided judicial functions, x x x
xxxx
We reiterate our previously adopted language, ". . . a court, once having obtained jurisdiction of a cause of action, has, as incidental to
its general jurisdiction, inherent power to do all things reasonably necessary f to the administration of justice in the case before
it. . ." This includes the inherent power to issue injunctions. (Emphases supplied)
Smothers also pointed out that the legislature's authority to provide a right to appeal in the statute does not necessarily mean that it
could control the appellate judicial proceeding:
However, the fact that the legislature statutorily provided for this appeal does not give it the right to encroach upon the constitutionally
granted powers of the judiciary. Once the administrative action has ended and the right to appeal arises the legislature is void of
any right to control a subsequent appellate judicial proceeding. The judicial rules have come into play and have preempted
the field.[219] (Emphasis supplied)
With these considerations in mind, the Court rules that when Congress passed the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 and, in so
doing, took away from the courts their power to issue a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin an investigation conducted by the Ombudsman, it
encroached upon this Court's constitutional rule-making authority. Clearly, these issuances, which are, by nature, provisional reliefs and
auxiliary writs created under the provisions of the Rules of Court, are matters of procedure which belong exclusively within the
province of this Court. Rule 58 of the Rules of Court did not create, define, and regulate a right but merely prescribed the means of
implementing an existing right[220] since it only provided for temporary reliefs to preserve the applicant's right in esse which is threatened
to be violated during the course of a pending litigation. In the case of Fabian,[221] it was stated that:
If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a
substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure.
Notably, there have been similar attempts on the part of Congress, in the exercise of its legislative power, to amend the Rules of Court,
as in the cases of: (a) In Re: Exemption of The National Power Corporation from Payment of Filing/ Docket Fees;[222] (b) Re: Petition for
Recognition of the Exemption of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) from Payment of Legal Fees; [223] and (c) Baguio
Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Cabato-Cortes[224] While these cases involved legislative enactments
exempting government owned and controlled corporations and cooperatives from paying filing fees, thus, effectively modifying Rule 141
of the Rules of Court (Rule on Legal Fees), it was, nonetheless, ruled that the prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new
rules of procedure[225] solely belongs to the Court, to the exclusion of the legislative and executive branches of government.
On this score, the Court described its authority to promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure as exclusive and "[o]ne of the
safeguards of [its] institutional independence."[226]
That Congress has been vested with the authority to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts under Section
2, Article VIII supra, as well as to create statutory courts under Section 1, Article VIII supra, does not result in an abnegation of the
Court's own power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice, and procedure under Section 5 (5), Article VIII supra. Albeit operatively
interrelated, these powers are nonetheless institutionally separate and distinct, each to be preserved under its own sphere of
authority. When Congress creates a court and delimits its jurisdiction, the procedure for which its jurisdiction is exercised is
fixed by the Court through the rules it promulgates. The first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is not a jurisdiction-vesting
provision, as the Ombudsman misconceives,[227] because it does not define, prescribe, and apportion the subject matter jurisdiction of
courts to act on certiorari cases; the certiorari jurisdiction of courts, particularly the CA, stands under the relevant sections of BP 129
which were not shown to have been repealed. Instead, through this provision, Congress interfered with a provisional remedy that
was created by this Court under its duly promulgated rules of procedure, which utility is both integral and inherent to every
court's exercise of judicial power. Without the Court's consent to the proscription, as may be manifested by an adoption of
the same as part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular issued therefor, there thus, stands to be a
violation of the separation of powers principle.
In addition, it should be pointed out that the breach of Congress in prohibiting provisional injunctions, such as in the first paragraph of
Section 14, RA 6770, does not only undermine the constitutional allocation of powers; it also practically dilutes a court's ability to
carry out its functions. This is so since a particular case can easily be mooted by supervening events if no provisional
injunctive relief is extended while the court is hearing the same. Accordingly, the court's acquired jurisdiction, through which it
exercises its judicial power, is rendered nugatory. Indeed, the force of judicial power, especially under the present Constitution, cannot
be enervated due to a court's inability to regulate what occurs during a proceeding's course. As earlier intimated, when jurisdiction over
the subject matter is accorded by law and has been acquired by a court, its exercise thereof should be undipped. To give true meaning
to the judicial power contemplated by the Framers of our Constitution, the Court's duly promulgated rules of procedure should therefore
remain unabridged, this, even by statute. Truth be told, the policy against provisional injunctive writs in whatever variant should only
subsist under rules of procedure duly promulgated by the Court given its sole prerogative over the same.
The following exchange between Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen (Justice Leonen) and the Acting Solicitor General
Florin T. Hilbay (Acting Solicitor General Hilbay) mirrors the foregoing observations:
JUSTICE LEONEN:
Okay. Now, would you know what rule covers injunction in the Rules of Court?
ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Rule 58, Your Honor.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
58, that is under the general rubric if Justice Bersamin will correct me if I will be mistaken under the rubric of what is called provisional
remedies, our resident expert because Justice Peralta is not here so Justice Bersamin for a while. So provisional remedy you have
injunction, x x x.
xxxx
JUSTICE LEONEN:
Okay, Now, we go to the Constitution. Section 5, subparagraph 5 of Article VIII of the Constitution, if you have a copy of the
Constitution, can you please read that provision? Section 5, Article VIII the Judiciary subparagraph 5, would you kindly read that
provision?
ACTING SOLICTOR GENERAL HILBAY.

"Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts..."
JUSTICE LEONEN:
Okay, we can stop with that, promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts. This is the power, the
competence, the jurisdiction of what constitutional organ?

The Supreme Court, Your Honor.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
The Supreme Court. This is different from Article VIII Sections 1 and 2 which we've already been discussed with you by my other
colleagues, is that not correct?

Correct, Your Honor.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
Okay, so in Section 2, [apportion] jurisdiction that is the power of Congress, is that not correct?

JUSTICE LEONEN:
On the other hand, the power to promulgate rules is with the Court, is that not correct?

JUSTICE LEONEN:
A TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction, would it be a separate case or is it part of litigation in an ordinary case?

It is an ancillary remedy, Your Honor.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
In fact, it originated as an equitable remedy, is that not correct?

JUSTICE LEONEN:
In order to preserve the power of a court so that at the end of litigation, it will not be rendered moot and academic, is that not
correct?

JUSTICE LEONEN:
In that view, isn't Section 14, first paragraph, unconstitutional?

No, Your Honor.
xxxx
JUSTICE LEONEN.
Can Congress say that a Court cannot prescribe Motions to Dismiss under Rule 16?

Your Honor, Congress cannot impair the power of the Court to create remedies, x x x.
JUSTICE LEONEN.
What about bill [of] particulars, can Congress say, no Court shall have the power to issue the supplemental pleading called the bill of t
particular [s]? It cannot, because that's part of procedure...

That is true.
JUSTICE LEONEN
...or for that matter, no Court shall act on a Motion to Quash, is that not correct?

Correct.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
So what's different with the writ of injunction?

Writ of injunction, Your Honor, requires the existence of jurisdiction on the part of a court that was created by Congress. In the absence
of jurisdiction... (interrupted)
JUSTICE LEONEN:
No, writ of injunction does not attach to a court. In other words, when they create a special agrarian court it has all procedures with it
but it does not attach particularly to that particular court, is that not correct?
ACTING SOLICTOR GENERAL HILBAY:

When Congress, Your Honor, creates a special court...
JUSTICE LEONEN:
Again, Counsel, what statute provides for a TRO, created the concept of a TRO? It was a Rule. A rule of procedure and the Rules of
Court, is that not correct?

Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
And a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction does not exist unless it is [an] ancillary to a particular injunction in a court, is that not
correct?

xxxx[228] (Emphasis supplied)
In Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010,[229] the Court instructed that "[i]t is through the Constitution that the fundamental
powers of government are established, limited and defined, and by which these powers are distributed among the several departments.
The Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to which all persons, including the highest
officials of the land, must defer." It would then follow that laws that do not conform to the Constitution shall be stricken down for being
unconstitutional.[230]
However, despite the ostensible breach of the separation of powers principle, the Court is not oblivious to the policy considerations
behind the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, as well as other statutory provisions of similar import. Thus, pending deliberation on
whether or not to adopt the same, the Court, under its sole prerogative and authority over all matters of procedure, deems it proper to
declare as ineffective the prohibition against courts other than the Supreme Court from issuing provisional injunctive writs to enjoin
investigations conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman, until it is adopted as part of the rules of procedure through an administrative
circular duly issued therefor.
Hence, with Congress interfering with matters of procedure (through passing the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770) without the
Court's consent thereto, it remains that the CA had the authority to issue the questioned injunctive writs enjoining the implementation of
the preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr. At the risk of belaboring the point, these issuances were merely ancillary to the
exercise of the CA's certiorari jurisdiction conferred to it under Section 9 (1), Chapter I of BP 129, as amended, and which it had already
acquired over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 case.
IV.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the issue of whether or not the CA gravely abused its jurisdiction in issuing the TRO and WPI in CA-
G.R. SP No. 139453 against the preventive suspension order is a persisting objection to the validity of said injunctive writs. For its
proper analysis, the Court first provides the context of the assailed injunctive writs.
A. Subject matter of the CA's iniunctive writs is the preventive suspension order.
By nature, a preventive suspension order is not a penalty but only a preventive measure. In Quimbo v. Acting Ombudsman
Gervacio,[231] the Court explained the distinction, stating that its purpose is to prevent the official to be suspended from using his
position and the powers and prerogatives of his office to influence potential witnesses or tamper with records which may be
vital in the prosecution of the case against him:
Jurisprudential law establishes a clear-cut distinction between suspension as preventive measure and suspension as penalty. The
distinction, by considering the purpose aspect of the suspensions, is readily cognizable as they have different ends sought to be
achieved.
Preventive suspension is merely a preventive measure, a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. The purpose of
the suspension order is to prevent the accused from using his position and the powers and prerogatives of his office to
influence potential witnesses or tamper with records which may be vital in the prosecution of the case against him. If after
such investigation, the charge is established and the person investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his suspension or removal,
then he is suspended, removed or dismissed. This is the penalty.
That preventive suspension is not a penalty is in fact explicitly provided by Section 24 of Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing
Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292) and other Pertinent Civil Service Laws.
Section. 24. Preventive suspension is not a punishment or penalty for misconduct in office but is considered to be a preventive
measure. (Emphasis supplied)
Not being a penalty, the period within which one is under preventive suspension is not considered part of the actual penalty of
suspension. So Section 25 of the same Rule XIV provides:
Section 25. The period within which a public officer or employee charged is placed under preventive suspension shall not be
considered part of the actual penalty of suspension imposed upon the employee found guilty.[232] (Emphases supplied)
The requisites for issuing a preventive suspension order are explicitly stated in Section 24, RA 6770:
Section 24. Preventive Suspension. - The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee under his
authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or
employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would
warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.
The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more than six (6)
months, without pay, except when the delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault,
negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in computing the period of
suspension herein provided. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In other words, the law sets forth two (2) conditions that must be satisfied to justify the issuance of an order of preventive suspension
pending an investigation, namely:
(1) The evidence of guilt is strong; and
(2) Either of the following circumstances co-exist with the first requirement:
(a) The charge involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty;
(b) The charge would warrant removal from the service; or
(c) The respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.[233]
B. The basis of the CA's injunctive writs is the condonation doctrine.
Examining the CA's Resolutions in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 would, however, show that the Ombudsman's non-compliance with the
requisites provided in Section 24, RA 6770 was not the basis for the issuance of the assailed injunctive writs.
The CA's March 16, 2015 Resolution which directed the issuance of the assailed TRO was based on the case of Governor Garcia, Jr.
v. CA[234] (Governor Garcia, Jr.), wherein the Court emphasized that "if it were established in the CA that the acts subject of the
administrative complaint were indeed committed during petitioner [Garcia's] prior term, then, following settled jurisprudence, he can no
longer be administratively charged."[235] Thus, the Court, contemplating the application of the condonation doctrine, among others,
cautioned, in the said case, that "it would have been more prudent for [the appellate court] to have, at the very least, on account of the
extreme urgency of the matter and the seriousness of the issues raised in the certiorari petition, issued a TRO x x x"[236] during the
pendency of the proceedings.
Similarly, the CA's April 6, 2015 Resolution which directed the issuance of the assailed WPI was based on the condonation doctrine,
citing the case of Aguinaldo v. Santos[237] The CA held that Binay, Jr. has an ostensible right to the final relief prayed for, i.e., the
nullification of the preventive suspension order, finding that the Ombudsman can hardly impose preventive suspension against Binay,
Jr. given that his re-election in 2013 as City Mayor of Makati condoned any administrative liability arising from anomalous activities
relative to the Makati Parking Building project from 2007 to 2013.[238] Moreover, the CA observed that although there were acts which
were apparently committed by Binay, Jr. beyond his first term , i.e., the alleged payments on July 3, 4, and 24, 2013,[239] corresponding
to the services of Hillmarc's and MANA - still, Binay, Jr. cannot be held administratively liable therefor based on the cases of Salalima
v. Guingona, Jr.,[240] and Mayor Garcia v. Mojica,[241] wherein the condonation dobtrine was applied by the Court although the
payments were made after the official's election, reasoning that the payments were merely effected pursuant to contracts executed
before said re-election.[242]
The Ombudsman contends that it was inappropriate for the CA to have considered the condonation doctrine since it was a matter of
defense which should have been raised and passed upon by her office during the administrative disciplinary proceedings.[243] However,
the Court agrees with the CA that it was not precluded from considering the same given that it was material to the propriety of according
provisional injunctive relief in conformity with the ruling in Governor Garcia, Jr., which was the subsisting jurisprudence at that time.
Thus, since condonation was duly raised by Binay, Jr. in his petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453,[244] the CA did not err in passing upon
the same. Note that although Binay, Jr. secondarily argued that the evidence of guilt against him was not strong in his petition in CA-
G.R. SP No. 139453,[245] it appears that the CA found that the application of the condonation doctrine was already sufficient to enjoin
the implementation of the preventive suspension order. Again, there is nothing aberrant with this since, as remarked in the same case
of Governor Garcia, Jr., if it was established that the acts subject of the administrative complaint were indeed committed during Binay,
Jr.'s prior term, then, following the condonation doctrine, he can no longer be administratively charged. In other words, with condonation
having been invoked by Binay, Jr. as an exculpatory affirmative defense at the onset, the CA deemed it unnecessary to determine if the
evidence of guilt against him was strong, at least for the purpose of issuing the subject injunctive writs.
With the preliminary objection resolved and the basis of the assailed writs herein laid down, the Court now proceeds to determine if the
CA gravely abused its discretion in applying the condonation doctrine.
C. The origin of the condonation doctrine.
Generally speaking, condonation has been defined as "[a] victim's express or implied forgiveness of an offense, [especially] by treating
the offender as if there had been no offense."[246]
The condonation doctrine - which connotes this same sense of complete extinguishment of liability as will be herein elaborated upon - is
not based on statutory law. It is a jurisprudential creation that originated from the 1959 case of Pascual v. Hon. Provincial Board of
Nueva Ecija,[247] (Pascual), which was therefore decided under the 1935 Constitution.
In Pascual, therein petitioner, Arturo Pascual, was elected Mayor of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, sometime in November 1951, and was later
re-elected to the same position in 1955. During his second term, or on October 6, 1956, the Acting Provincial Governor
filed administrative charges before the Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija against him for grave abuse of authority and usurpation of
judicial functions for acting on a criminal complaint in Criminal Case No. 3556 on December 18 and 20, 1954. In defense, Arturo
Pascual argued that he cannot be made liable for the acts charged against him since they were committed during his previous term of
office, and therefore, invalid grounds for disciplining him during his second term. The Provincial Board, as well as the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija, later decided against Arturo Pascual, and when the case reached this Court on appeal, it recognized that the
controversy posed a novel issue - that is, whether or not an elective official may be disciplined for a wrongful act committed by him
during his immediately preceding term of office.
As there was no legal precedent on the issue at that time, the Court, in Pascual, resorted to American authorities and "found that
cases on the matter are conflicting due in part, probably, to differences in statutes and constitutional provisions, and also, in part, to a
divergence of views with respect to the question of whether the subsequent election or appointment condones the prior
misconduct."[248] Without going into the variables of these conflicting views and cases, it proceeded to state that:
The weight of authorities x x x seems to incline toward the rule denying the right to remove one from office because of
misconduct during a prior term, to which we fully subscribe.[249] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The conclusion is at once problematic since this Court has now uncovered that there is really no established weight of authority in the
United States (US) favoring the doctrine of condonation, which, in the words of Pascual, theorizes that an official's re-election denies
the right to remove him from office due to a misconduct during a prior term. In fact, as pointed out during the oral arguments of this
case, at least seventeen (17) states in the US have abandoned the condonation doctrine.[250] The Ombudsman aptly cites several
rulings of various US State courts, as well as literature published on the matter, to demonstrate the fact that the doctrine is not uniformly
applied across all state jurisdictions. Indeed, the treatment is nuanced:
(1) For one, it has been widely recognized that the propriety of removing a public officer from his current term or office for misconduct
which he allegedly committed in a prior term of office is governed by the language of the statute or constitutional provision applicable to
the facts of a particular case (see In Re Removal of Member of Council Coppola).[251] As an example, a Texas statute, on the one hand,
expressly allows removal only for an act committed during a present term: "no officer shall be prosecuted or removed from office for any
act he may have committed prior to his election to office" (see State ex rel. Rowlings v. Loomis).[252] On the other hand, the Supreme
Court of Oklahoma allows removal from office for "acts of commission, omission, or neglect committed, done or omitted during a
previous or preceding term of office" (see State v. Bailey)[253] Meanwhile, in some states where the removal statute is silent or unclear,
the case's resolution was contingent upon the interpretation of the phrase "in office." On one end, the Supreme Court of Ohio strictly
construed a removal statute containing the phrase "misfeasance of malfeasance in office" and thereby declared that, in the absence of
clear legislative language making, the word "office" must be limited to the single term during which the offense charged against the
public officer occurred (see State ex rel. Stokes v. Probate Court of Cuyahoga County)[254] Similarly, the Common Pleas Court of
Allegheny County, Pennsylvania decided that the phrase "in office" in its state constitution was a time limitation with regard to the
grounds of removal, so that an officer could not be removed for misbehaviour which occurred; prior to the taking of the office
(see Commonwealth v. Rudman)[255] The opposite was construed in the Supreme Court of Louisiana which took the view that an
officer's inability to hold an office resulted from the commission of certain offenses, and at once rendered him unfit to continue in office,
adding the fact that the officer had been re-elected did not condone or purge the offense (see State ex rel. Billon v. Bourgeois).[256] Also,
in the Supreme Court of New York, Apellate Division, Fourth Department, the court construed the words "in office" to refer not to a
particular term of office but to an entire tenure; it stated that the whole purpose of the legislature in enacting the statute in question
could easily be lost sight of, and the intent of the law-making body be thwarted, if an unworthy official could not be removed during one
term for misconduct for a previous one (Newman v. Strobel).[257]
(2) For another, condonation depended on whether or not the public officer was a successor in the same office for which he has been
administratively charged. The "own-successor theory," which is recognized in numerous States as an exception to condonation
doctrine, is premised on the idea that each term of a re-elected incumbent is not taken as separate and distinct, but rather, regarded as
one continuous term of office. Thus, infractions committed in a previous term are grounds for removal because a re-elected incumbent
has no prior term to speak of[258] (see Attorney-General v. Tufts;[259] State v. Welsh;[260] Hawkins v. Common Council of Grand Rapids;
[261]
Territory v. Sanches;[262] and Tibbs v. City of Atlanta).[263]
(3) Furthermore, some State courts took into consideration the continuing nature of an offense in cases where the condonation doctrine
was invoked. In State ex rel. Douglas v. Megaarden,[264] the public officer charged with malversation of public funds was denied the
defense of condonation by the Supreme Court of Minnesota, observing that "the large sums of money illegally collected during the
previous years are still retained by him." In State ex rel. Beck v. Harvey[265] the Supreme Court of Kansas ruled that "there is no
necessity" of applying the condonation doctrine since "the misconduct continued in the present term of office[;] [thus] there was a duty
upon defendant to restore this money on demand of the county commissioners." Moreover, in State ex rel. Londerholm v. Schroeder,
[266]
the Supreme Court of Kansas held that "insofar as nondelivery and excessive prices are concerned, x x x there remains a
continuing duty on the part of the defendant to make restitution to the country x x x, this duty extends into the present term, and neglect
to discharge it constitutes misconduct."
Overall, the foregoing data clearly contravenes the preliminary conclusion in Pascual that there is a "weight of authority" in the US on
the condonation doctrine. In fact, without any cogent exegesis to show that Pascual had accounted for the numerous factors relevant to
the debate on condonation, an outright adoption of the doctrine in this jurisdiction would not have been proper.
At any rate, these US cases are only of persuasive value in the process of this Court's decision-making. "[They] are not relied upon as
precedents, but as guides of interpretation."[267] Therefore, the ultimate analysis is on whether or not the condonation doctrine, as
espoused in Pascual, and carried over in numerous cases after, can be held up against prevailing legal norms. Note that the doctrine
of stare decisis does not preclude this Court from revisiting existing doctrine. As adjudged in the case of Belgica, the stare decisis rule
should not operate when there are powerful countervailing considerations against its application.[268] In other words, stare decisis
becomes an intractable rule only when circumstances exist to preclude reversal of standing precedent.[269] As the Ombudsman correctly
points out, jurisprudence, after all, is not a rigid, atemporal abstraction; it is an organic creature that develops and devolves along with
the society within which it thrives.[270] In the words of a recent US Supreme Court Decision, "[w]hat we can decide, we can undecide."[271]
In this case, the Court agrees with the Ombudsman that since the time Pascual was decided, the legal landscape has radically shifted.
Again, Pascual was a 1959 case decided under the 1935 Constitution, which dated provisions do not reflect the experience of the
Filipino People under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Therefore, the plain difference in setting, including, of course, the sheer impact
of the condonation doctrine on public accountability, calls for Pascual's judicious re-examination.
D. Testing the Condonation Doctrine.
Pascual's ratio decidendi may be dissected into three (3) parts:
First, the penalty of removal may not be extended beyond the term in which the public officer was elected for each term is separate and
distinct:
Offenses committed, or acts done, during previous term are generally held not to furnish cause for removal and this is
especially true where the constitution provides that the penalty in proceedings for removal shall not extend beyond the removal from
office, and disqualification from holding office for the term for which the officer was elected or appointed. (67 C.J.S. p. 248,
citing Rice vs. State, 161 S.W. 2d. 401; Montgomery vs. Nowell, 40 S.W. 2d. 418; People ex rel. Bagshaw vs. Thompson, 130 P. 2d.
237; Board of Com'rs of Kingfisher County vs. Shutter, 281 P. 222; State vs. Blake, 280 P. 388; In re Fudula, 147 A. 67; State vs.
Ward, 43 S.W. 2d. 217).
The underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms x x x.[272]
Second, an elective official's re-election serves as a condonation of previous misconduct, thereby cutting the right to remove him
therefor; and
[T]hat the reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to
remove him therefor. (43 Am. Jur. p. 45, citing Atty. Gen. vs. Hasty, 184 Ala. 121, 63 So. 559, 50 L.R.A. (NS) 553.[273] (emphasis
supplied)
Third, courts may not deprive the electorate, who are assumed to have known the life and character of candidates, of their right to elect
officers:
As held in Conant vs. Grogan (1887) 6 N.Y.S.R. 322, cited in 17 A.I.R. 281, 63 So. 559, 50 LRA (NS) 553 —
The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the
people of their right to elect their officers. When the people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this
with knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty
of any. It is not for the court, by reason of such faults or misconduct to practically overrule the will of the people. [274] (Emphases
supplied)
The notable cases on condonation following Pascual are as follows:
(1) Lizares v. Hechanova[275] (May 17, 1966) - wherein the Court first applied the condonation doctrine, thereby quoting the above-
stated passages from Pascual in verbatim.
(2) Insco v. Sanchez, et al.[276] (December 18, 1967) - wherein the Court clarified that the condonation doctrine does not apply to a
criminal case. It was explained that a criminal case is different from an administrative case in that the former involves the People of the
Philippines as a community, and is a public wrong to the State at large; whereas, in the latter, only the populace of the constituency he
serves is affected. In addition, the Court noted that it is only the President who may pardon a criminal offense.
(3) Aguinaldo v. Santos[277] (Aguinaldo; August 21, 1992) - a case decided under the 1987 Constitution wherein the condonation
doctrine was applied in favor of then Cagayan Governor Rodolfo E. Aguinaldo although his re-election merely supervened the
pendency of, the proceedings.
(4) Salalima v. Guinsona, Jr.[278] (Salalima; May 22, 1996) -wherein the Court reinforced the condonation doctrine by stating that
the same is justified by "sound public policy." According to the Court, condonation prevented the elective official from being
"hounded" by administrative cases filed by his "political enemies" during a new term, for which he has to defend himself "to the
detriment of public service." Also, the Court mentioned that the administrative liability condoned by re-election covered the execution of
the contract and the incidents related therewith.[279]
(5) Mayor Garcia v. Mojica[280] (Mayor Garcia; September 10, 1999) - wherein the benefit of the doctrine was extended to then Cebu
City Mayor Alvin B. Garcia who was administratively charged for his involvement in an anomalous contract for the supply of asphalt for
Cebu City, executed only four (4) days before the upcoming elections. The Court ruled that notwithstanding the timing of the contract's
execution, the electorate is presumed to have known the petitioner's background and character, including his past misconduct; hence,
his subsequent re-election was deemed a condonation of his prior transgressions. More importantly, the Court held that the
determinative time element in applying the condonation doctrine should be the time when the contract was perfected; this meant that
as long as the contract was entered into during a prior term, acts which were done to implement the same, even if done
during a succeeding term, do not negate the application of the condonation doctrine in favor of the elective official.
(6) Salumbides, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman[281] (Salumbides, Jr.; April 23, 2010) - wherein the Court explained the doctrinal
innovations in the Salalima and Mayor Garcia rulings, to wit:
Salalima v. Guingona, Jr. and Mayor Garcia v. Hon. Mojica reinforced the doctrine. The condonation rule was applied even if the
administrative complaint was not filed before the reelection of the public official, and even if the alleged misconduct occurred
four days before the elections, respectively. Salalima did not distinguish as to the date of filing of the administrative complaint, as
long as the alleged misconduct was committed during the prior term, the precise timing or period of which Garcia did not further
distinguish, as long as the wrongdoing that gave rise to the public official's culpability was committed prior to the date of reelection.
[282]
(Emphasis supplied)
The Court, citing Civil Service Commission v. Sojor,[283] also clarified that the condonation doctrine would not apply to appointive
officials since, as to them, there is no sovereign will to disenfranchise.
(7) And finally, the above discussed case of Governor Garcia, Jr. -wherein the Court remarked that it would have been prudent for the
appellate court therein to have issued a temporary restraining order against the implementation of a preventive suspension order
issued by the Ombudsman in view of the condonation doctrine.
A thorough review of the cases post-1987, among others, Aguinaldo, Salalima, Mayor Garcia, and Governor Garcia, Jr. - all cited by
the CA to justify its March 16, 2015 and April 6, 2015 Resolutions directing the issuance of the assailed injunctive writs - would show
that the basis for condonation under the prevailing constitutional and statutory framework was never accounted for. What remains
apparent from the text of these cases is that the basis for condonation, as jurisprudential doctrine, was - and still remains - the above-
cited postulates of Pascual, which was lifted from rulings of US courts where condonation was amply supported by their own state laws.
With respect to its applicability to administrative cases, the core premise of condonation - that is, an elective official's re-election cuts qff
the right to remove him for an administrative offense committed during a prior term - was adopted hook, line, and sinker in our
jurisprudence largely because the legality of that doctrine was never tested against existing legal norms. As in the US, the propriety of
condonation is - as it should be -dependent on the legal foundation of the adjudicating jurisdiction. Hence, the Court undertakes an
examination of our current laws in order to determine if there is legal basis for the continued application of the doctrine of condonation.
The foundation of our entire legal system is the Constitution. It is the supreme law of the land;[284] thus, the unbending rule is that every
statute should be read in light of the Constitution.[285] Likewise, the Constitution is a framework of a workable government; hence, its
interpretation must take into account the complexities, realities, and politics attendant to the operation of the political branches of
government.[286]
As earlier intimated, Pascual was a decision promulgated in 1959. Therefore, it was decided within the context of the 1935 Constitution
which was silent with respect to public accountability, or of the nature of public office being a public trust. The provision in the 1935
Constitution that comes closest in dealing with public office is Section 2, Article II which states that "[t]he defense of the State is a prime
duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal military or civil
service."[287] Perhaps owing to the 1935 Constitution's silence on public accountability, and considering the dearth of jurisprudential
rulings on the matter, as well as the variance in the policy considerations, there was no glaring objection confronting the Pascual Court
in adopting the condonation doctrine that originated from select US cases existing at that time.
With the advent of the 1973 Constitution, the approach in dealing with public officers underwent a significant change. The new charter
introduced an entire article on accountability of public officers, found in Article XIII. Section 1 thereof positively recognized,
acknowledged, and declared that "[p]ublic office is a public trust." Accordingly, "[p]ublic officers and employees shall serve with
the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, and shall remain accountable to the people."
After the turbulent decades of Martial Law rule, the Filipino People have framed and adopted the 1987 Constitution, which sets forth in
the Declaration of Principles and State Policies in Article II that "[t]he State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public
service and take positive and effective measures against graft and corruption."[288] Learning how unbridled power could corrupt
public servants under the regime of a dictator, the Framers put primacy on the integrity of the public service by declaring it as a
constitutional principle and a State policy. More significantly, the 1987 Constitution strengthened and solidified what has been first
proclaimed in the 1973 Constitution by commanding public officers to be accountable to the people at all times:
Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them
with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency and act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
In Belgica, it was explained that:
[t]he aphorism forged under Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which states that "public office is a public trust," is an
overarching reminder that every instrumentality of government should exercise their official functions only in accordance with the
principles of the Constitution which embodies the parameters of the people's trust. The notion of a public trust connotes
accountability x x x.[289] (Emphasis supplied)
The same mandate is found in the Revised Administrative Code under the section of the Civil Service Commission,[290] and also, in the
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.[291]
For local elective officials like Binay, Jr., the grounds to discipline, suspend or remove an elective local official from office are
stated in Section 60 of Republic Act No. 7160,[292] otherwise known as the "Local Government Code of 1991" (LGC), which was
approved on October 10 1991, and took effect on January 1, 1992:
Section 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Action. - An elective local official may be disciplined, suspended, or removed from office on any of
the r following grounds:
(a) Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines;
(b) Culpable violation of the Constitution;
(c) Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, gross negligence, or dereliction of duty;
(d) Commission of any offense involving moral turpitude or an offense punishable by at least prision mayor;
(e) Abuse of authority;
(f) Unauthorized absence for fifteen (15) consecutive working days, except in the case of members of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
sangguniang panlunsod, sanggunian bayan, and sangguniang barangay;
(g) Application for, or acquisition of, foreign citizenship or residence or the status of an immigrant of another country; and
(h) Such other grounds as may be provided in this Code and other laws.
An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated above by order of the proper court.
Related to this provision is Section 40 (b) of the LGC which states that those removed from office as a result of an administrative
case shall be disqualified from running for any elective local position:
Section 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:
xxxx
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
In the same sense, Section 52 (a) of the RRACCS provides that the penalty of dismissal from service carries the accessory
penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding public office:
Section 52. - Administrative Disabilities Inherent in Certain Penalties. -

a. The penalty of dismissal shall carry with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, perpetual
disqualification from holding public office, and bar from taking the civil service examinations.
In contrast, Section 66 (b) of the LGC states that the penalty of suspension shall not exceed the unexpired term of the elective local
official nor constitute a bar to his candidacy for as long as he meets the qualifications required for the office. Note, however, that the
provision only pertains to the duration of the penalty and its effect on the official's candidacy. Nothing therein states that the
administrative liability therefor is extinguished by the fact of re-election:
Section 66. Form and Notice of Decision. - x x x.
xxxx
(b) The penalty of suspension shall not exceed the unexpired term of the respondent or a period of six (6) months for every
administrative offense, nor shall said penalty be a bar to the candidacy of the respondent so suspended as long as he meets the
qualifications required for the office.
Reading the 1987 Constitution together with the above-cited legal provisions now leads this Court to the conclusion that the doctrine of
condonation is actually bereft of legal bases.
To begin with, the concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary requirement of accountability to the people at all
times, as mandated under the 1987 Constitution, is plainly inconsistent with the idea that an elective local official's administrative
liability for a misconduct committed during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact that he was elected to a second term of office, or
even another elective post. Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense, and there is simply no constitutional or
statutory basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion that an official elected for a different term is fully absolved of any administrative
liability arising from an offense done during a prior term. In this jurisdiction, liability arising from administrative offenses may be
condoned bv the President in light of Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which was interpreted in Llamas v. Orbos[293] to
apply to administrative offenses:
The Constitution does not distinguish between which cases executive clemency may be exercised by the President, with the sole
exclusion of impeachment cases. By the same token, if executive clemency may be exercised only in criminal cases, it would indeed be
unnecessary to provide for the exclusion of impeachment cases from the coverage of Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution.
Following petitioner's proposed interpretation, cases of impeachment are automatically excluded inasmuch as the same do not
necessarily involve criminal offenses.
In the same vein, We do not clearly see any valid and convincing , reason why the President cannot grant executive clemency in
administrative cases. It is Our considered view that if the President can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and
forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reason can she grant executive clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly less
serious than criminal offenses.
Also, it cannot be inferred from Section 60 of the LGC that the grounds for discipline enumerated therein cannot anymore be invoked
against an elective local official to hold him administratively liable once he is re-elected to office. In fact, Section 40 (b) of the LGC
precludes condonation since in the first place, an elective local official who is meted with the penalty of removal could not be re-elected
to an elective local position due to a direct disqualification from running for such post. In similar regard, Section 52 (a) of the RRACCS
imposes a penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding public office as an accessory to the penalty of dismissal from service.
To compare, some of the cases adopted in Pascual were decided by US State jurisdictions wherein the doctrine of condonation of
administrative liability was supported by either a constitutional or statutory provision stating, in effect, that an officer cannot
be removed by a misconduct committed during a previous term,[294] or that the disqualification to hold the office does not extend
beyond the term in which the official's delinquency occurred.[295] In one case,[296] the absence of a provision against the re-election
of an officer removed - unlike Section 40 (b) of the LGC-was the justification behind condonation. In another case,[297] it was deemed
that condonation through re-election was a policy under their constitution - which adoption in this jurisdiction runs counter to our
present Constitution's requirements on public accountability. There was even one case where the doctrine of condonation was not
adjudicated upon but only invoked by a party as a ground;[298] while in another case, which was not reported in full in the official series,
the crux of the disposition was that the evidence of a prior irregularity in no way pertained to the charge at issue and therefore, was
deemed to be incompetent.[299] Hence, owing to either their variance or inapplicability, none of these cases can be used as basis for the
continued adoption of the condonation doctrine under our existing laws.
At best, Section 66 (b) of the LGC prohibits the enforcement of the penalty of suspension beyond the unexpired portion of the
elective local official's prior term, and likewise allows said official to still run for re-election This treatment is similar to People ex rel
Bagshaw v. Thompson[300] and Montgomery v. Novell[301] both cited in Pascual, wherein it was ruled that an officer cannot
be suspended for a misconduct committed during a prior term. However, as previously stated, nothing in Section 66 (b) states that the
elective local official's administrative liability is extinguished by the fact of re-election. Thus, at all events, no legal provision actually
supports the theory that the liability is condoned.
Relatedly it should be clarified that there is no truth in Pascual's postulation that the courts would be depriving the electorate of their
right to elect their officers if condonation were not to be sanctioned. In political law, election pertains to the process by which a particular
constituency chooses an individual to hold a public office. In this jurisdiction, there is, again, no legal basis to conclude that election
automatically implies condonation. Neither is there any legal basis to say that every democratic and republican state has an inherent
regime of condonation. If condonation of an elective official's administrative liability would perhaps, be allowed in this jurisdiction, then
the same should have been provided by law under our governing legal mechanisms. May it be at the time of Pascual or at present, by
no means has it been shown that such a law, whether in a constitutional or statutory provision, exists. Therefore, inferring from this
manifest absence, it cannot be said that the electorate's will has been abdicated.
Equally infirm is Pascual's proposition that the electorate, when re-electing a local official, are assumed to have done so with
knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. Suffice it
to state that no such presumption exists in any statute or procedural rule.[302] Besides, it is contrary to human experience that the
electorate would have full knowledge of a public official's misdeeds. The Ombudsman correctly points out the reality that most corrupt
acts by public officers are shrouded in secrecy, and concealed from the public. Misconduct committed by an elective official is
easily covered up, and is almost always unknown to the electorate when they cast their votes.[303] At a conceptual level,
condonation presupposes that the condoner has actual knowledge of what is to be condoned. Thus, there could be no condonation
of an act that is unknown. As observed in Walsh v. City Council of Trenton[304] decided by the New Jersey Supreme Court:
Many of the cases holding that re-election of a public official prevents his removal for acts done in a preceding term of office are
reasoned out on the theory of condonation. We cannot subscribe to that theory because condonation, implying as it does forgiveness,
connotes knowledge and in the absence of knowledge there can be no condonation. One cannot forgive something of which one has
no knowledge.
That being said, this Court simply finds no legal authority to sustain the condonation doctrine in this jurisdiction. As can be seen from
this discourse, it was a doctrine adopted from one class of US rulings way back in 1959 and thus, out of touch from - and now rendered
obsolete by - the current legal regime. In consequence, it is high time for this Court to abandon the condonation doctrine that originated
from Pascual, and affirmed in the cases following the same, such as Aguinaldo, Salalima, Mayor Garcia, and Governor Garcia,
Jr. which were all relied upon by the CA.
It should, however, be clarified that this Court's abandonment of the condonation doctrine should be prospective in application for the
reason that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal system of
the Philippines.[305] Unto this Court devolves the sole authority to interpret what the Constitution means, and all persons are bound to
follow its interpretation. As explained in De Castro v. Judicial Bar Council.[306]
Judicial decisions assume the same authority as a statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent
that they are applicable, the criteria that must control the actuations, not only of those called upon to abide by them, but also of those
duty-bound to enforce obedience to them.[307]
Hence, while the future may ultimately uncover a doctrine's error, it should be, as a general rule, recognized as "good law" prior to its
abandonment. Consequently, the people's reliance thereupon should be respected. The landmark case on this matter is People v.
Jabinal,[308] wherein it was ruled:
[W]hen a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and
should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.
Later, in Spouses Benzonan v. CA,[309] it was further elaborated:
[Pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code "judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the
legal system of the Philippines." But while our decisions form part of the law of the land, they are also subject to Article 4 of the Civil
Code which provides that "laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided." This is expressed in the familiar legal
maxim lex prospicit, non respicit, the law looks forward not backward. The rationale against retroactivity is easy to perceive. The
retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have already become vested or impairs the obligations of contract and hence,
is unconstitutional.[310]
Indeed, the lessons of history teach us that institutions can greatly benefit from hindsight and rectify its ensuing course. Thus, while it is
truly perplexing to think that a doctrine which is barren of legal anchorage was able to endure in our jurisprudence for a considerable
length of time, this Court, under a new membership, takes up the cudgels and now abandons the condonation doctrine.
E. Consequence of ruling.
As for this section of the Decision, the issue to be resolved is whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed injunctive writs.
It is well-settled that an act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a
capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.[311] It has
also been held that "grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal patently violates the Constitution, the law
or existing jurisprudence."[312]
As earlier established, records disclose that the CA's resolutions directing the issuance of the assailed injunctive writs were all hinged
on cases enunciating the condonation doctrine. To recount, the March 16, 2015 Resolution directing the issuance of the subject TRO
was based on the case of Governor Garcia, Jr., while the April 6, 2015 Resolution directing the issuance of the subject WPI was based
on the cases of Aguinaldo, Salalima, Mayor Garcia, and again, Governor Garcia, Jr. Thus, by merely following settled precedents on
the condonation doctrine, which at that time, unwittingly remained "good law," it cannot be concluded that the CA committed a grave
abuse of discretion based on its legal attribution above. Accordingly, the WPI against the Ombudsman's preventive suspension order
was correctly issued.
With this, the ensuing course of action should have been for the CA to resolve the main petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No.
139453 on the merits. However, considering that the Ombudsman, on October 9, 2015, had already found Binay, Jr. administratively
liable and imposed upon him the penalty of dismissal, which carries the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding
public office, for the present administrative charges against him, the said CA petition appears to have been mooted.[313] As initially
intimated, the preventive suspension order is only an ancillary issuance that, at its core, serves the purpose of assisting the Office of
the Ombudsman in its investigation. It therefore has no more purpose - and perforce, dissolves - upon the termination of the office's
process of investigation in the instant administrative case.
F. Exceptions to the mootness principle.
This notwithstanding, this Court deems it apt to clarify that the mootness of the issue regarding the validity of the preventive suspension
order subject of this case does not preclude any of its foregoing determinations, particularly, its abandonment of the condonation
doctrine. As explained in Belgica, '"the moot and academic principle' is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the Court
in resolving a case. The Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the
exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading
review."[314] All of these scenarios obtain in this case:
First, it would be a violation of the Court's own duty to uphold and defend the Constitution if it were not to abandon the condonation
doctrine now that its infirmities have become apparent. As extensively discussed, the continued application of the condonation doctrine
is simply impermissible under the auspices of the present Constitution which explicitly mandates that public office is a public trust and
that public officials shall be accountable to the people at all times.
Second, the condonation doctrine is a peculiar jurisprudential creation that has persisted as a defense of elective officials to escape
administrative liability. It is the first time that the legal intricacies of this doctrine have been brought to light; thus, this is a situation of
exceptional character which this Court must ultimately resolve. Further, since the doctrine has served as a perennial obstacle against
exacting public accountability from the multitude of elective local officials throughout the years, it is indubitable that paramount public
interest is involved.
Third, the issue on the validity of the condonation doctrine clearly requires the formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench,
the bar, and the public. The issue does not only involve an in-depth exegesis of administrative law principles, but also puts to the
forefront of legal discourse the potency of the accountability provisions of the 1987 Constitution. The Court owes it to the bench, the
bar, and the public to explain how this controversial doctrine came about, and now, its reasons for abandoning the same in view of its
relevance on the parameters of public office.
And fourth, the defense of condonation has been consistently invoked by elective local officials against the administrative charges filed
against them. To provide a sample size, the Ombudsman has informed the Court that "for the period of July 2013 to December 2014
alone, 85 cases from the Luzon Office and 24 cases from the Central Office were dismissed on the ground of condonation. Thus, in just
one and a half years, over a hundred cases of alleged misconduct - involving infractions such as dishonesty, oppression, gross neglect
of duty and grave misconduct - were placed beyond the reach of the Ombudsman's investigatory and prosecutorial
powers."[315] Evidently, this fortifies the finding that the case is capable of repetition and must therefore, not evade review.
In any event, the abandonment of a doctrine is wholly within the prerogative of the Court. As mentioned, it is its own jurisprudential
creation and may therefore, pursuant to its mandate to uphold and defend the Constitution, revoke it notwithstanding supervening
events that render the subject of discussion moot.
V.
With all matters pertaining to CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 passed upon, the Court now rules on the final issue on whether or not the CA's
Resolution[316] dated March 20, 2015 directing the Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt in CA-G.R. SP No.
139504 is improper and illegal.
The sole premise of the Ombudsman's contention is that, as an impeachable officer, she cannot be the subject of a charge for indirect
contempt[317] because this action is criminal in nature and the penalty therefor would result in her effective removal from office.
[318]
However, a reading of the aforesaid March 20, 2015 Resolution does not show that she has already been subjected to contempt
proceedings. This issuance, in? fact, makes it clear that notwithstanding the directive for the Ombudsman to comment, the CA has not
necessarily given due course to Binay, Jr.'s contempt petition:
Without necessarily giving due course to the Petition for Contempt respondents [Hon. Conchita Carpio Morales, in her capacity as
the Ombudsman, and the Department of Interior and Local Government] are hereby DIRECTED to file Comment on the
Petition/Amended and Supplemental Petition for Contempt (CA-G.R. SP No. 139504) within an inextendible period of three (3) days
from receipt hereof. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Thus, even if the Ombudsman accedes to the CA's directive by filing a comment, wherein she may properly raise her objections to the
contempt proceedings by virtue of her being an impeachable officer, the CA, in the exercise of its sound judicial discretion, may still opt
not to give due course to Binay, Jr.'s contempt petition and accordingly, dismiss the same. Sjmply put, absent any indication that the
contempt petition has been given due course by the CA, it would then be premature for this Court to rule on the issue. The submission
of the Ombudsman on this score is perforce denied.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Under the premises of this Decision, the Court resolves as follows:
(a) the second paragraph of Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6770 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL, while the policy against the
issuance of provisional injunctive writs by courts other than the Supreme Court to enjoin an investigation conducted by the Office of the
Ombudsman under the first paragraph of the said provision is DECLARED ineffective until the Court adopts the same as part of the
rules of procedure through an administrative circular duly issued therefor;
(b) The condonation doctrine is ABANDONED, but the abandonment is PROSPECTIVE in effect;
(c) The Court of Appeals (CA) is DIRECTED to act on respondent Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr.'s (Binay, Jr.) petition for certiorari in CA-
G.R. SP No. 139453 in light of the Office of the Ombudsman's supervening issuance of its Joint Decision dated October 9, 2015 finding
Binay, Jr. administratively liable in the six (6) administrative complamts, docketed as OMB-C-A-15-0058, OMB-C-A-15-0059, OMB-C-A-
15-0060, OMB-C-A-15-0061, OMB-C-A-15-0062, and OMB-C-A-15-0063; and
(d) After the filing of petitioner Ombudsman Conchita Carpio Morales's comment, the CA is DIRECTED to resolve Binay, Jr.'s petition
for contempt in CA-G.R. SP No. 139504 with utmost dispatch.
23.) G.R. No. L-20387 January 31, 1968
JESUS P. MORFE, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AMELITO R. MUTUC, as Executive Secretary, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Jesus P. Morfe for and his own behalf as plaintiff-appellee.

Office of the Solicitor General for defendants-appellants.
FERNANDO, J.:
Congress in 1960 enacted the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act 1 to deter public officials and employees from
committing acts of dishonesty and improve the tone of morality in public service. It was declared to be the state
policy "in line with the principle that a public office is a public trust, to repress certain acts of public officers and
private persons alike which constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto." 2 Nor was it the first
statute of its kind to deal with such a grave problem in the public service that unfortunately has afflicted the
Philippines in the post-war era. An earlier statute decrees the forfeiture in favor of the State of any property found to
have been unlawfully acquired by any public officer or employee. 3
One of the specific provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act of 1960 is that every public
officer, either within thirty (30) days after its approval or after his assumption of office "and within the
month of January of every other year thereafter", as well as upon the termination of his position, shall
prepare and file with the head of the office to which he belongs, "a true detailed and sworn statement of
assets and liabilities, including a statement of the amounts and sources of his income, the amounts of his
personal and family expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar: . . ." 4
In this declaratory relief proceeding, the periodical submission "within the month of January of every other year
thereafter" of such sworn statement of assets and liabilities after an officer or employee had once bared his financial
condition upon assumption of office was challenged for being violative of due process as an oppressive exercise of
police power and as an unlawful invasion of the constitutional right to privacy, implicit in the ban against
unreasonable search and seizure construed together with the prohibition against self-incrimination. The lower court
in the decision appealed from sustained plaintiff, then as well as now, a judge of repute of a court of first instance.
For it, such requirement of periodical submission of such sworn statement of assets and liabilities exceeds the
permissible limit of the police power and is thus offensive to the due process clause.
We do not view the matter thus and accordingly reverse the lower court.
1. The reversal could be predicated on the absence of evidence to rebut the presumption of validity. For in this
action for declaratory relief filed with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan on January 31, 1962, plaintiff, after
asserting his belief "that it was a reasonable requirement for employment that a public officer make of record his
assets and liabilities upon assumption of office and thereby make it possible thereafter to determine whether, after
assuming his position in the public service, he accumulated assets grossly disproportionate to his reported incomes,
the herein plaintiff [having] filed within the period of time fixed in the aforesaid Administrative Order No. 334 the
prescribed sworn statement of financial condition, assets, income and liabilities, . . ." 5 maintained that the provision
on the "periodical filing of sworn statement of financial condition, assets, income and liabilities after an officer or
employee had once bared his financial condition, upon assumption of office, is oppressive and unconstitutional." 6
As earlier noted, both the protection of due process and the assurance of the privacy of the individual as may be
inferred from the prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure and self-incrimination were relied upon. There
was also the allegation that the above requirement amounts to "an insult to the personal integrity and official dignity"
of public officials, premised as it is "on the unwarranted and derogatory assumption" that they are "corrupt at heart"
and unless thus restrained by this periodical submission of the statements of "their financial condition, income, and
expenses, they cannot be trusted to desist from committing the corrupt practices defined. . . ." 7 It was further
asserted that there was no need for such a provision as "the income tax law and the tax census law also require
statements which can serve to determine whether an officer or employee in this Republic has enriched himself out
of proportion to his reported income." 8
Then on February 14, 1962, came an Answer of the then Executive Secretary and the then Secretary of Justice as
defendants, where after practically admitting the facts alleged, they denied the erroneous conclusion of law and as
one of the special affirmative defenses set forth: "1. That when a government official, like plaintiff, accepts a public
position, he is deemed to have voluntarily assumed the obligation to give information about his personal affair, not
only at the time of his assumption of office but during the time he continues to discharge public trust. The private life
of an employee cannot be segregated from his public life. . . ." 9 The answer likewise denied that there was a
violation of his constitutional rights against self-incrimination as well as unreasonable search and seizure and
maintained that "the provision of law in question cannot be attacked on the ground that it impairs plaintiff's normal
and legitimate enjoyment of his life and liberty because said provision merely seeks to adopt a reasonable measure
of insuring the interest or general welfare in honest and clean public service and is therefore a legitimate exercise of
the police power." 10
On February 27, 1962, plaintiff filed a Motion for judgment on the pleadings as in his opinion all his material
allegations were admitted. Then on March 10, 1962, an order was issued giving the parties thirty days within which
to submit memoranda, but with or without them, the case was deemed submitted for decision the lower court being
of the belief that "there is no question of facts, . . . the defendants [having admitted] all the material allegations of the
complaint." 11
The decision, now on appeal, came on July 19, 1962, the lower court declaring "unconstitutional, null and void
Section 7, Republic Act No. 3019, insofar as it required periodical submittal of sworn statements of financial
conditions, assets and liabilities of an official or employee of the government after he had once submitted such a
sworn statement upon assuming office; . . . ." 12
In Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association v. The Mayor of Manila, 13 it was the holding of this Court
that in the absence of a factual foundation, the lower court deciding the matter purely "on the pleadings and the
stipulation of facts, the presumption of validity must prevail." In the present case likewise there was no factual
foundation on which the nullification of this section of the statute could be based. Hence as noted the decision of the
lower court could be reversed on that ground.
A more extended consideration is not inappropriate however, for as likewise made clear in the above Ermita-Malate
Hotel case: "What cannot be stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the
person, the standard for the validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty
curtailed affects at the most rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measure is wider."
Moreover, in the Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration in the above case, we expressly affirmed: "This
is not to discount the possibility of a situation where the nullity of a statute, executive order, or ordinance may not be
readily apparent but the threat to constitutional rights, especially those involving the freedom of the mind, present
and ominous." 14 In such an event therefore, "there should not be a rigid insistence on the requirement that evidence
be presented." Also, in the same Resolution, Professor Freund was quoted thus: "In short, when freedom of the
mind is imperiled by law, it is freedom that commands a momentum of respect; when property is imperiled, it is the
lawmakers' judgment that commands respect. This dual standard may not precisely reverse the presumption of
constitutionality in civil liberties cases, but obviously it does set up a hierarchy of values within the due process
clause. 15
2. We inquire first whether or not by virtue of the above requirement for a periodical submission of sworn statement
of assets and liabilities, there is an invasion of liberty protected by the due process clause.
Under the Anti-Graft Act of 1960, after the statement of policy, 16 and definition of terms, 17 there is an enumeration of
corrupt practices declared unlawful in addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing
law. They include persuading, inducing, or influencing another public officer to perform an act constituting a violation
of rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or an offense in connection with the official duties
of the latter, or allowing himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced to commit such violation or offense;
requesting or receiving directly or indirectly any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself, or for any
other person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the government and any other party, wherein
the public officer in his official capacity, has to intervene under the law; requesting or receiving directly or indirectly
any gift, present, or other pecuniary or material benefit, for himself or for another, from any person for whom the
public officer, in any manner or capacity, has secured or obtained, or will secure or obtain, any Government permit
or license, in consideration for the help given or to be given; accepting or having any member of his family accept
employment in a private enterprise which has pending official business with him during the pendency thereof or
within one year after its termination; causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or
judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; neglecting or
refusing, after due demand or request, without sufficient justification, to act within a reasonable time on any matter
pending before him for the purpose of obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any person interested in the matter some
pecuniary or material benefit or advantage, or for the purpose of favoring his own interest or giving undue
advantage in favor of or discriminating against any other interested party; entering, on behalf of the Government,
into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public
officer profited or will profit thereby; having directly or indirectly financial or pecuniary interest in any business,
contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity or in which he is
prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any interests; becoming interested directly or indirectly, for
personal gain, or having a material interest in any transaction or act requiring the approval of a board, panel or
group of which he is a member, and which exercises discretion in such approval, even if he votes against the same
or does not participate in such action; approving or granting knowingly any license, permit, privilege or benefit in
favor of any person not qualified for or not legally entitled to such license, permit, privilege or advantage, or of a
mere representative or dummy of one who is not so qualified or entitled and divulging valuable information of a
confidential character, acquired by his office or by him on account of his official position to unauthorized persons, or
releasing such information in advance of its authorized release date. 18
After which come the prohibition on private individuals, 19 prohibition on certain relatives, 20 and prohibition on
Members of Congress. 21 Then there is this requirement of a statement of assets and liabilities, that portion requiring
periodical submission being challenged here. 22 The other sections of the Act deal with dismissal due to unexplained
wealth, reference being made to the previous statute, 23 penalties for violation, 24 the vesting of original jurisdiction in
the Court of First Instance as the competent court, 25 the prescription of offenses, 26 the prohibition against any
resignation or retirement pending investigation, criminal or administrative or pending a prosecution, 27 suspension
and loss of benefits, 28 exception of unsolicited gifts or presents of small or insignificant value as well as recognition
of legitimate practice of one's profession or trade or occupation, 29 the separability clause, 30 and its effectivity. 31
Nothing can be clearer therefore than that the Anti-Graft Act of 1960 like the earlier statute 32 was precisely aimed at
curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in the public
service. It is intended to further promote morality in public administration. A public office must indeed be a public
trust. Nobody can cavil at its objective; the goal to be pursued commands the assent of all. The conditions then
prevailing called for norms of such character. The times demanded such a remedial device.
The statute was framed with that end in view. It is comprehensive in character, sufficiently detailed and explicit to
make clear to all and sundry what practices were prohibited and penalized. More than that, an effort was made, so
evident from even a cursory perusal thereof, to avoid evasions and plug loopholes. One such feature is the
challenged section. Thereby it becomes much more difficult by those disposed to take advantage of their positions
to commit acts of graft and corruption.
While in the attainment of such public good, no infringement of constitutional rights is permissible, there
must be a showing, clear, categorical, and undeniable, that what the Constitution condemns, the statute
allows. More specifically, since that is the only question raised, is that portion of the statute requiring
periodical submission of assets and liabilities, after an officer or employee had previously done so upon
assuming office, so infected with infirmity that it cannot be upheld as valid?
Or, in traditional terminology, is this requirement a valid exercise of the police power? In the aforesaid Ermita-
Malate Hotel decision, 33 there is a reaffirmation of its nature and scope as embracing the power to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, education, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. It has
been negatively put forth by Justice Malcolm as "that inherent and plenary power in the state which enables it to
prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society." 34
Earlier Philippine cases refer to police power as the power to promote the general welfare and public interest; 35 to
enact such laws in relation to persons and property as may promote public health, public morals, public safety and
the general welfare of each inhabitant; 36 to preserve public order and to prevent offenses against the state and to
establish for the intercourse of citizen with citizen those rules of good manners and good neighborhood calculated to
prevent conflict of rights. 37 In his work on due process, Mott 38 stated that the term police power was first used by
Chief Justice Marshall. 39
As currently in use both in Philippine and American decisions then, police power legislation usually has reference to
regulatory measures restraining either the rights to property or liberty of private individuals. It is undeniable however
that one of its earliest definitions, valid then as well as now, given by Marshall's successor, Chief Justice Taney
does not limit its scope to curtailment of rights whether of liberty or property of private individuals. Thus: "But what
are the police powers of a State? They are nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every
sovereignty to the extent of its dominions. And whether a State passes a quarantine law, or a law to punish
offenses, or to establish courts of justice, or requiring certain instruments to be recorded, or to regulate commerce
within its own limits, in every case it exercises the same power; that is to say, the power of sovereignty, the power to
govern men and things within the limits of its domain." 40 Text writers like Cooley and Burdick were of a similar
mind. 41
What is under consideration is a statute enacted under the police power of the state to promote morality in public
service necessarily limited in scope to officialdom. May a public official claiming to be adversely affected rely on the
due process clause to annul such statute or any portion thereof? The answer must be in the affirmative. If the police
power extends to regulatory action affecting persons in public or private life, then anyone with an alleged grievance
can invoke the protection of due process which permits deprivation of property or liberty as long as such
requirement is observed.
While the soundness of the assertion that a public office is a public trust and as such not amounting to property in its
usual sense cannot be denied, there can be no disputing the proposition that from the standpoint of the security of
tenure guaranteed by the Constitution the mantle of protection afforded by due process could rightfully be invoked. It
was so implicitly held in Lacson v. Romero, 42 in line with the then pertinent statutory provisions 43 that procedural due
process in the form of an investigation at which he must be given a fair hearing and an opportunity to defend himself
must be observed before a civil service officer or employee may be removed. There was a reaffirmation of the view
in even stronger language when this Court through Justice Tuason in Lacson v. Roque 44 declared that even without
express provision of law, "it is established by the great weight of authority that the power of removal or suspension
for cause can not, except by clear statutory authority, be exercised without notice and hearing." Such is likewise the
import of a statement from the then Justice, now Chief Justice, Concepcion, speaking for the Court in Meneses v.
Lacson; 45 "At any rate, the reinstatement directed in the decision appealed from does not bar such appropriate
administrative action as the behaviour of petitioners herein may warrant, upon compliance with the requirements of
due process."
To the same effect is the holding of this Court extending the mantle of the security of tenure provision to employees
of government-owned or controlled corporations entrusted with governmental functions when through Justice Padilla
in Tabora v. Montelibano, 46 it stressed: "That safeguard, guarantee, or feeling of security that they would hold their
office or employment during good behavior and would not be dismissed without justifiable cause to be determined in
an investigation, where an opportunity to be heard and defend themselves in person or by counsel is afforded them,
would bring about such a desirable condition." Reference was there made to promoting honesty and efficiency
through an assurance of stability in their employment relation. It was to be expected then that through Justice
Labrador in Unabia v. City Mayor, 47 this Court could categorically affirm: "As the removal of petitioner was made
without investigation and without cause, said removal is null and void. . . ."
It was but logical therefore to expect an explicit holding of the applicability of due process guaranty to be
forthcoming. It did in Cammayo v. Viña, 48 where the opinion of Justice Endencia for the Court contained the
following unmistakable language: "Evidently, having these facts in view, it cannot be pretended that the
constitutional provision of due process of law for the removal of the petitioner has not been complied with."
Then came this restatement of the principle from the pen of Justice J.B.L. Reyes "We are thus compelled to
conclude that the positions formerly held by appellees were not primarily confidential in nature so as to make their
terms of office co-terminal with the confidence reposed in them. The inevitable corollary is that respondents-
appellees, Leon Piñero, et al., were not subject to dismissal or removal, except for cause specified by law and within
due process. . . ." 49 In a still later decision, Abaya v. Subido, 50 this Court, through Justice Sanchez, emphasized
"that the vitality of the constitutional principle of due process cannot be allowed to weaken by sanctioning
cancellation" of an employee's eligibility or "of his dismissal from service — without hearing — upon a doubtful
assumption that he has admitted his guilt for an offense against Civil Service rules." Equally emphatic is this
observation from the same case: "A civil service employee should be heard before he is condemned. Jurisprudence
has clung to this rule with such unrelenting grasp that by now it would appear trite to make citations thereof."
If as is so clearly and unequivocally held by this Court, due process may be relied upon by public official to protect
the security of tenure which in that limited sense is analogous to property, could he not likewise avail himself of such
constitutional guarantee to strike down what he considers to be an infringement of his liberty? Both on principle,
reason and authority, the answer must be in the affirmative. Even a public official has certain rights to freedom the
government must respect. To the extent then, that there is a curtailment thereof, it could only be permissible if the
due process mandate is not disregarded.
Since under the constitutional scheme, liberty is the rule and restraint the exception, the question raised cannot just
be brushed aside. In a leading Philippine case, Rubi v. Provincial Board, 51 liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution
was defined by Justice Malcolm to include "the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary personal restraint
or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but
is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by his Creator,
subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare." In accordance with this case therefore, the
rights of the citizens to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his
livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any avocation, are all deemed embraced in the concept of liberty. This
Court in the same case, however, gave the warning that liberty as understood in democracies, is not license. Implied
in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good, the peace and order of society
and the general well-being. No one can do exactly as he pleases. Every man must renounce unbridled license. In
the words of Mabini as quoted by Justice Malcolm, "liberty is freedom to do right and never wrong; it is ever guided
by reason and the upright and honorable conscience of the individual."
The liberty to be safeguarded is, as pointed out by Chief Justice Hughes, liberty in a social organization, 52 implying
the absence of arbitrary restraint not immunity from reasonable regulations and prohibitions imposed in the interest
of the community. 53 It was Linton's view that "to belong to a society is to sacrifice some measure of individual liberty,
no matter how slight the restraints which the society consciously imposes." 54 The above statement from Linton
however, should be understood in the sense that liberty, in the interest of public health, public order or safety, of
general welfare, in other words through the proper exercise of the police power, may be regulated. The individual
thought, as Justice Cardozo pointed out, has still left a "domain of free activity that cannot be touched by
government or law at all, whether the command is specially against him or generally against him and others." 55
Is this provision for a periodical submission of sworn statement of assets and liabilities after he had filed
one upon assumption of office beyond the power of government to impose? Admittedly without the challenged
provision, a public officer would be free from such a requirement. To the extent then that there is a compulsion to act
in a certain way, his liberty is affected. It cannot be denied however that under the Constitution, such a restriction is
allowable as long as due process is observed.
The more crucial question therefore is whether there is an observance of due process. That leads us to an
inquiry into its significance. "There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It furnishes though a
standard to which governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each
appropriate case, be valid. What then is the standard of due process which must exist both as a procedural and as
substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance, or any action for that matter, from the imputation of legal
infirmity sufficient to spell its doom? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of
justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. To satisfy the due process requirement,
official action, to paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer oppression. Due
process is thus hostile to any official action marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly has it been identified as
freedom from arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play. It exacts fealty 'to those strivings for
justice' and judges the act of officialdom of whatever branch 'in the light of reason drawn from considerations of
fairness that reflect [democratic] traditions of legal and political thought.' It is not a narrow or 'technical conception
with fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances,' decisions based on such a clause requiring a 'close
and perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our society.' Questions of due process are not to be treated
narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form or phrases." 56
It would be to dwell in the realm of abstractions and to ignore the harsh and compelling realities of public service
with its ever-present temptation to heed the call of greed and avarice to condemn as arbitrary and oppressive a
requirement as that imposed on public officials and employees to file such sworn statement of assets and liabilities
every two years after having done so upon assuming office. The due process clause is not susceptible to such a
reproach. There was therefore no unconstitutional exercise of police power.
4. The due process question touching on an alleged deprivation of liberty as thus resolved goes a long way in
disposing of the objections raised by plaintiff that the provision on the periodical submission of a sworn statement of
assets and liabilities is violative of the constitutional right to privacy. There is much to be said for this view of Justice
Douglas: "Liberty in the constitutional sense must mean more than freedom from unlawful governmental restraint; it
must include privacy as well, if it is to be a repository of freedom. The right to be let alone is indeed the beginning of
all freedom." 57 As a matter of fact, this right to be let alone is, to quote from Mr. Justice Brandeis "the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men." 58
The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does not likewise compel respect for his personality as a unique
individual whose claim to privacy and interference demands respect. As Laski so very aptly stated: "Man is one
among many, obstinately refusing reduction to unity. His separateness, his isolation, are indefeasible; indeed, they
are so fundamental that they are the basis on which his civic obligations are built. He cannot abandon the
consequences of his isolation, which are, broadly speaking, that his experience is private, and the will built out of
that experience personal to himself. If he surrenders his will to others, he surrenders his personality. If his will is set
by the will of others, he ceases to be master of himself. I cannot believe that a man no longer master of himself is in
any real sense free." 59
Nonetheless, in view of the fact that there is an express recognition of privacy, specifically that of communication
and correspondence which "shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of Court or when public safety and
order" 60 may otherwise require, and implicitly in the search and seizure clause, 61 and the liberty of abode 62 the
alleged repugnancy of such statutory requirement of further periodical submission of a sworn statement of assets
and liabilities deserves to be further looked into.
In that respect the question is one of first impression, no previous decision having been rendered by this Court. It is
not so in the United States where, in the leading case of Griswold v. Connecticut, 63 Justice Douglas, speaking for
five members of the Court, stated: "Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of association contained
in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we have seen. The Third Amendment in its prohibition against
the quartering of soldiers 'in any house' in time of peace without the consent of the owner is another facet of that
privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the 'right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.' The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination
Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force him to surrender to his
detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides: 'The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." After referring to various American Supreme Court
decisions, 64 Justice Douglas continued: "These cases bear witness that the right of privacy which presses for
recognition is a legitimate one."
The Griswold case invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the use of contraceptives a criminal offense on the
ground of its amounting to an unconstitutional invasion of the right of privacy of married persons; rightfully it stressed
"a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees." 65 It has
wider implications though. The constitutional right to privacy has come into its own. 1äwphï1.ñët
So it is likewise in our jurisdiction. The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its
identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. The language of Prof. Emerson is
particularly apt: "The concept of limited government has always included the idea that governmental powers stop
short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic distinctions between
absolute and limited government. Ultimate and pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects of his life, is the
hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of limited government, safeguards a private sector, which
belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state can control. Protection of this
private sector — protection, in other words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual — has become increasingly
important as modern society has developed. All the forces of a technological age — industrialization, urbanization,
and organization — operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the
capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the difference between a democratic and a
totalitarian society." 66
Even with due recognition of such a view, it cannot be said that the challenged statutory provision calls for
disclosure of information which infringes on the right of a person to privacy. It cannot be denied that the rational
relationship such a requirement possesses with the objective of a valid statute goes very far in precluding assent to
an objection of such character. This is not to say that a public officer, by virtue of a position he holds, is bereft of
constitutional protection; it is only to emphasize that in subjecting him to such a further compulsory revelation of his
assets and liabilities, including the statement of the amounts and sources of income, the amounts of personal and
family expenses, and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year, there is no
unconstitutional intrusion into what otherwise would be a private sphere.
5. Could it be said, however, as plaintiff contends, that insofar as the challenged provision requires the periodical
filing of a sworn statement of financial condition, it would be violative of the guarantees against unreasonable search
and seizure and against self-incrimination?
His complaint cited on this point Davis v. United States. 67 In that case, petitioner Davis was convicted under an
information charging him with unlawfully having in his possession a number of gasoline ration coupons representing
so many gallons of gasoline, an offense penalized under a 1940 statute. 68 He was convicted both in the lower court
and in the Circuit Court of Appeals over the objection that there was an unlawful search which resulted in the
seizure of the coupons and that their use at the trial was in violation of Supreme Court decisions. 69 In the District
Court, there was a finding that he consented to the search and seizure. The Circuit Court of Appeals did not disturb
that finding although expressed doubt concerning it, affirming however under the view that such seized coupons
were properly introduced in evidence, the search and seizure being incidental to an arrest, and therefore reasonable
regardless of petitioner's consent.
In affirming the conviction the United States Supreme Court, through Justice Douglas emphasized that the Court
was dealing in this case "not with private papers or documents, but with gasoline ration coupons which never
became the private property of the holder but remained at all times the property of the government and subject to
inspection and recall by it." 70 He made it clear that the opinion was not to be understood as suggesting "that officers
seeking to reclaim government property may proceed lawlessly and subject to no restraints. Nor [does it] suggest
that the right to inspect under the regulations subjects a dealer to a general search of his papers for the purpose of
learning whether he has any coupons subject to inspection and seizure. The nature of the coupons is important here
merely as indicating that the officers did not exceed the permissible limits of persuasion in obtaining them." 71
True, there was a strong dissenting opinion by Justice Frankfurter in which Justice Murphy joined, critical of what it
considered "a process of devitalizing interpretation" which in this particular case gave approval "to what was done
by arresting officers" and expressing the regret that the Court might be "in danger of forgetting what the Bill of Rights
reflects experience with police excesses."
Even this opinion, however, concerned that the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure
"does not give freedom from testimonial compulsion. Subject to familiar qualifications every man is under obligation
to give testimony. But that obligation can be exacted only under judicial sanctions which are deemed precious to
Anglo-American civilization. Merely because there may be the duty to make documents available for litigation does
not mean that police officers may forcibly or fraudulently obtain them. This protection of the right to be let alone
except under responsible judicial compulsion is precisely what the Fourth Amendment meant to express and to
safeguard." 72
It would appear then that a reliance on that case for an allegation that this statutory provision offends against the
unreasonable search and seizure clause would be futile and unavailing. This is the more so in the light of the latest
decision of this Court in Stonehill v. Diokno, 73 where this Court, through Chief Justice Concepcion, after stressing
that the constitutional requirements must be strictly complied with, and that it would be "a legal heresy of the highest
order" to convict anybody of a violation of certain statutes without reference to any of its determinate provisions
delimited its scope as "one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution," safeguarding "the
sanctity, of the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence. . . ." Such is precisely the evil
sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision above quoted — to outlaw the so-called general warrants.
It thus appears clear that no violation of the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure has been shown to
exist by such requirement of further periodical submission of one's financial condition as set forth in the Anti-Graft
Act of 1960.
Nor does the contention of plaintiff gain greater plausibility, much less elicit acceptance, by his invocation of the non-
incrimination clause. According to the Constitution: "No person shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself." 74 This constitutional provision gives the accused immunity from any attempt by the prosecution to make
easier its task by coercing or intimidating him to furnish the evidence necessary to convict. He may confess, but only
if he voluntarily wills it. He may admit certain facts but only if he freely chooses to. 75 Or he could remain silent, and
the prosecution is powerless to compel him to talk. 76 Proof is not solely testimonial in character. It may be
documentary. Neither then could the accused be ordered to write, when what comes from his pen may constitute
evidence of guilt or innocence. 77 Moreover, there can be no search or seizure of his house, papers or effects for the
purpose of locating incriminatory matter. 78
In a declaratory action proceeding then, the objection based on the guaranty against self-incrimination is far from
decisive. It is well to note what Justice Tuason stated: "What the above inhibition seeks to [prevent] is compulsory
disclosure of incriminating facts." 79 Necessarily then, the protection it affords will have to await, in the language of
Justice J. B. L. Reyes, the existence of actual cases, "be they criminal, civil or administrative." 80 Prior to such a
stage, there is no pressing need to pass upon the validity of the fear sincerely voiced that there is an infringement of
the non-incrimination clause. What was said in an American State decision is of relevance. In that case, a statutory
provision requiring any person operating a motor vehicle, who knows that injury has been caused a person or
property, to stop and give his name, residence, and his license number to the injured party or to a police officer was
sustained against the contention that the information thus exacted may be used as evidence to establish his
connection with the injury and therefore compels him to incriminate himself. As was stated in the opinion: "If the law
which exacts this information is invalid, because such information, although in itself no evidence of guilt, might
possibly lead to a charge of crime against the informant, then all police regulations which involve identification may
be questioned on the same ground. We are not aware of any constitutional provision designed to protect a man's
conduct from judicial inquiry or aid him in fleeing from justice. But, even if a constitutional right be involved, it is not
necessary to invalidate the statute to secure its protection. If, in this particular case, the constitutional privilege
justified the refusal to give the information exacted by the statute, that question can be raised in the defense to the
pending prosecution. Whether it would avail, we are not called upon to decide in this proceeding." 81
6. Nor could such a provision be nullified on the allegation that it constitutes "an insult to the personal integrity and
official dignity" of public officials. On its face, it cannot thus be stigmatized. As to its being unnecessary, it is well to
remember that this Court, in the language of Justice Laurel, "does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or
expediency of legislation." 82 As expressed by Justice Tuason: "It is not the province of the courts to supervise
legislation and keep it within the bounds of propriety and common sense. That is primarily and exclusively a
legislative concern." 83 There can be no possible objection then to the observation of Justice Montemayor: "As long
as laws do not violate any Constitutional provision, the Courts merely interpret and apply them regardless of
whether or not they are wise or salutary." 84 For they, according to Justice Labrador, "are not supposed to override
legitimate policy and . . . never inquire into the wisdom of the law." 85
It is thus settled, to paraphrase Chief Justice Concepcion in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 86 that only
congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of the action taken may be the basis for declaring a statute
invalid. This is as it ought to be. The principle of separation of powers has in the main wisely allocated the
respective authority of each department and confined its jurisdiction to such a sphere. There would then be intrusion
not allowable under the Constitution if on a matter left to the discretion of a coordinate branch, the judiciary would
substitute its own. If there be adherence to the rule of law, as there ought to be, the last offender should be courts of
justice, to which rightly litigants submit their controversy precisely to maintain unimpaired the supremacy of legal
norms and prescriptions. The attack on the validity of the challenged provision likewise insofar as there may be
objections, even if valid and cogent on its wisdom cannot be sustained.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court of July 19, 1962 "declaring unconstitutional, null and void Section 7,
Republic Act No. 3019, insofar as it requires periodical submittal of sworn statements of financial conditions, assets
and liabilities of an official or employee of the government after he had once submitted such a sworn statement . . .
is reversed." Without costs.
24.) G.R. No. 192591 July 30, 2012
EFREN L. ALVAREZ, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
This resolves the motion for reconsideration of our Decision dated June 29, 2011 affirming the conviction of
petitioner for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). Petitioner sets forth
the following grounds in his motion:
THE HONORABLE COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT THE SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED MANIFEST
ERROR, VIOLATED PETITIONER'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE, AND
BLATANTLY DISREGARDED THE PRINCIPLE OF REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL
FUNCTIONS WHEN IT CONVICTED MAYOR ALVAREZ OF VIOLATING R.A. 3019 ON THE BASIS OF HIS
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF R.A. 7718 ON "SOLICITED PROPOSALS" WHEN IT
WAS CLEAR THAT THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE WAG WAG SHOPPING MALL WAS AN UNSOLICITED AND
UNCHALLENGED PROPOSAL.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER THE SERIOUS AND MANIFEST ERROR COMMITTED BY
THE SANDIGANBAYAN WHEN THE LATTER DISREGARDED MAYOR ALVAREZ’ SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE
WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF R.A. 7718.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT THE SANDIGANBAYAN DISREGARDED THE RIGHT
OF MAYOR ALVAREZ TO THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS WHEN HE ALONE AMONG THE
NUMEROUS PERSONS WHO APPROVED AND IMPLEMENTED THE UNSOLICITED PROPOSAL WAS
CHARGED, TRIED AND CONVICTED.
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT THE SANDIGANBAYAN CONVICTED PETITIONER
DESPITE THE CLEAR FACT THAT THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO ESTABLISH HIS GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT, AS SHOWN BY THE FOLLOWING CIRCUMSTANCES:
(A) THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO ESTABLISH ALLEGED GROSS INEXCUSABLE NEGLIGENCE,

EVIDENT BAD FAITH OR MANIFEST PARTIALITY OF PETITIONER
(B) THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE ALLEGED DAMAGE OR INJURY PURPORTEDLY
SUFFERED BY THE GOVERNMENT
THE HONORABLE COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER THE ESTABLISHED FACTS SHOWING THAT PETITIONER:
(A) NEVER ACTED WITH "GROSS INEXCUSABLE NEGLIGENCE" AND/OR "MANIFEST PARTIALITY";
(B) NEVER GAVE ANY "UNWARRANTED BENEFIT", "ADVANTAGE" OR "PREFERENCE" TO API.
VI
THE HONORABLE COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT PETITIONER IS AN OUTSTANDING LOCAL

EXECUTIVE WITH UNIMPEACHABLE CHARACTER AND UNQUESTIONED ACCOMPLISHMENT, PETITIONER
IS NOT THE KIND OF INDIVIDUAL WHO WOULD ENTER INTO A CONTRACT THAT WOULD PREJUDICE THE
GOVERNMENT AND HIS CONSTITUENTS. 1
Petitioner contends that bad faith, manifest partiality and gross negligence were not proven by the
respondent. He stresses that there was substantial compliance with the requirements of R.A. No. 7718, and
while it is true that petitioner may have deviated from some of the procedures outlined in the said law, the
essential purpose of the law – that a project proposal be properly evaluated and that parties other than the
opponent be given opportunity to present their proposal – was accomplished. The Sandiganbayan therefore
seriously erred when it immediately concluded that all actions of petitioner were illegal and irregular. Petitioner
maintains such actions are presumed to be regular and the burden of proving otherwise rests on the respondent.
Because all the transactions were done by him with the authority of the Sangguniang Bayan, petitioner argues that
there can be no dispute that he endeavored in good faith to comply with the requirements of R.A No. 7718.
Moreover, petitioner asserts that the non-inclusion of all the other members of the Sangguniang Bayan denied him
the equal protection of the laws.
In compliance with the directive of this Court, the Solicitor General filed his Comment asserting that petitioner
was correctly convicted of Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The Solicitor General stressed that the
findings of the Sandiganbayan and this Court that the requirements of the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) law and its
implementing rules have not been followed in the bidding and award of the contract to Australian-Professional, Inc.
(API) were based on the documents of the project which have not been questioned by petitioner. Thus, despite
petitioner’s claim of substantial compliance and API’s proposal being "complete," it is undisputed that it did not
include the required company profile of the contractor and that the publication of the invitation for comparative
proposals, as found by this Court, was defective. These findings supported by the evidence on record were shown
to have resulted in the failure to assess the actual experience and financial capacity of API to of rival proposals.
Finally, the fact that the Sangguniang Bayan members were not included in the charge does not negate the guilt of
petitioner who had the power and discretion over the implementation of the Wag-wag Shopping Mall project and not
simply to execute the resolutions passed by the Sangguniang Bayan approving the contract award to API. The facts
established in the decision of the Sandiganbayan bear great significance on petitioner’s role in the bidding and
contract award to API, which also clearly showed that petitioner as local chief executive was totally remiss in his
duties and functions.
We find no cogent reason for reversal or modification of our decision which exhaustively discussed the afore-cited
issues being raised anew by the petitioner.
Notably, petitioner’s invocation of good faith deserves scant consideration in the light of established facts,
as found by the Sandiganbayan and upheld by this Court, clearly showing that he acted with manifest
partiality and gross inexcusable negligence in awarding the BOT project to an unlicensed and financially
unqualified contractor.
It bears stressing that the offense defined under Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 may be committed even if bad faith
is not attendant. Thus, even assuming that petitioner did not act in bad faith, his negligence under the
2
circumstances was not only gross but also inexcusable. Submission of documents such as contractor’s license
3
and company profile are minimum legal requirements to enable the government to properly evaluate the
qualifications of a BOT proponent. It was unthinkable for a local government official, especially one with
several citations and awards as outstanding local executive, to have allowed API to submit a BOT proposal
and later award it the contract despite lack of a contractor’s license and proof of its financial and technical
capabilities, relying merely on a piece of information from a news item about said contractor’s ongoing mall
construction project in another municipality and verbal representations of its president.
In his testimony at the trial, petitioner admitted that after the awarding of the contract to API, the latter did not comply
with the posting of notices and submission of requirements. He simply cited the reason given by API for such non-
compliance, i.e., that the BOT law does not provide for such requirements. This clearly shows petitioner’s
indifference and utter disregard of the strict requirements of the BOT law and implementing rules, which as local
chief executive, he is mandated to follow and uphold. Petitioner’s reliance on the representations and statements of
the contractor on the compliance with legal requirements is an unacceptable excuse for his gross negligence in the
performance of his official duties. He must now face the consequences of his decisions and acts relative to the failed
project in violation of the law.
The substantial compliance rule is defined as "compliance with the essential requirements, whether of a
contract or of a statute." Contrary to petitioner’s submission, his gross negligence in approving API’s
4
proposal notwithstanding its failure to comply with the minimum legal requirements prevented the
Sangguniang Bayan from properly evaluating said proponent’s financial and technical capabilities to
undertake the BOT project. Such gross negligence was evident from the taking of shortcuts in the bidding
process by shortening the period for submission of comparative proposals, non-observance of Investment
Coordinating Committee of the National Economic Development Authority approval for the Wag-wag
Shopping Mall Project, publication in a newspaper which is not of general circulation, and accepting an
incomplete proposal from API. These forestalled a fair opportunity for other interested parties to submit
comparative proposals. Petitioner’s argument that there was substantial compliance with the law thus fails. The
essential requirements of the BOT law were not at all satisfied as in fact they were sidestepped to favor the lone
bidder, API.
Petitioner nonetheless reiterates his position that he cannot be held liable for such acts in violation of the law since
there was "substantial basis" for the Municipal Government of Muñoz to believe that API had the expertise and
capability to implement the proposed Wag-wag Shopping Mall project. He points out the time they were negotiating
with API, Australian-Professionals Realty, Inc. which is the same entity as API, was involved in two major BOT
projects (P150 million project in Lemery, Batangas and P300 million construction project in Calamba, Laguna).
We disagree.
As extensively discussed in our Decision, petitioner was grossly negligent when it glossed over API’s failure to
submit specified documents showing that it was duly licensed or accredited Filipino contractor, and has the requisite
financial capacity and technical expertise or experience, in addition to the complete proposal which includes a
feasibility study and company profile. These requirements imposed by the BOT law and implementing rules were
intended to serve as competent proof of legal qualifications and therefore constitute the "substantial basis" for
evaluating a project proposal. Petitioner’s theory would allow substitution of less reliable information as basis for the
local government unit’s determination of a contractor’s financial capability and legal qualifications in utter disregard
of what the law says and consequences prejudicial to the government, which is precisely what the law seeks to
prevent.
To reiterate, we quote from the Decision the purpose of the bidding requirements:
We have held that the Implementing Rules provide for the unyielding standards the PBAC should apply to determine
the financial capability of a bidder for pre-qualification purposes: (i) proof of the ability of the project proponent
and/or the consortium to provide a minimum amount of equity to the project and (ii) a letter testimonial from
reputable banks attesting that the project proponent and/or members of the consortium are banking with them, that
they are in good financial standing, and that they have adequate resources. The evident intent of these standards is
to protect the integrity and insure the viability of the project by seeing to it that the proponent has the financial
capability to carry it out. Unfortunately, none of these requirements was submitted by API during the pre-qualification
stage. (Emphasis supplied.)
5
Petitioner further points out that our Decision failed to consider that the Sandiganbayan disregarded his right to the
equal protection of the laws when he alone among the numerous persons who approved API’s proposal and
implemented the project was charged, tried and convicted.
It bears stressing that the manner in which the prosecution of the case is handled is within the sound discretion of
the prosecutor, and the non-inclusion of other guilty persons is irrelevant to the case against the accused. But more
6
important, petitioner failed to demonstrate a discriminatory purpose in prosecuting him alone despite the finding of
the Sandiganbayan that the Sangguniang Bayan "has conspired if not abetted all the actions of the Accused in all
his dealings with API to the damage and prejudice of the municipality" and said court’s declaration that "this is one
case where the Ombudsman should have included the entire Municipal Council of Muñoz in the information." 7
As this Court explained in Santos v. People : 8
The prosecution of one guilty person while others equally guilty are not prosecuted, however, is not, by itself, a
denial of the equal protection of the laws. Where the official action purports to be in conformity to the statutory
classification, an erroneous or mistaken performance of the statutory duty, although a violation of the statute, is not
without more a denial of the equal protection of the laws. The unlawful administration by officers of a statute fair on
its face, resulting in its unequal application to those who are entitled to be treated alike, is not a denial of equal
protection unless there is shown to be present in it an element of intentional or purposeful discrimination. This may
appear on the face of the action taken with respect to a particular class or person, or it may only be shown by
extrinsic evidence showing a discriminatory design over another not to be inferred from the action itself. But a
discriminatory purpose is not presumed, there must be a showing of "clear and intentional discrimination." Appellant
has failed to show that, in charging appellant in court, that there was a "clear and intentional discrimination" on the
part of the prosecuting officials.
The discretion of who to prosecute depends on the prosecution’s sound assessment whether the evidence before it
can justify a reasonable belief that a person has committed an offense. The presumption is that the prosecuting
officers regularly performed their duties, and this presumption can be overcome only by proof to the contrary, not by
mere speculation. Indeed, appellant has not presented any evidence to overcome this presumption. The mere
allegation that appellant, a Cebuana, was charged with the commission of a crime, while a Zamboangueña, the
guilty party in appellant’s eyes, was not, is insufficient to support a conclusion that the prosecution officers denied
appellant equal protection of the laws.1âwphi1
There is also common sense practicality in sustaining appellant’s prosecution.
While all persons accused of crime are to be treated on a basis of equality before the law, it does not follow that they
are to be protected in the commission of crime. It would be unconscionable, for instance, to excuse a defendant
guilty of murder because others have murdered with impunity. The remedy for unequal enforcement of the law in
such instances does not lie in the exoneration of the guilty at the expense of society x x x. Protection of the law will
be extended to all persons equally in the pursuit of their lawful occupations, but no person has the right to demand
protection of the law in the commission of a crime.
Likewise, if the failure of prosecutors to enforce the criminal laws as to some persons should be converted into a
defense for others charged with crime, the result would be that the trial of the district attorney for nonfeasance would
become an issue in the trial of many persons charged with heinous crimes and the enforcement of law would suffer
a complete breakdown. (Emphases supplied.)
9
Finally, the Court need not delve into the merits of petitioner’s assertion that as a local executive official well-
recognized for his achievements and public service, he is not the kind of person who would enter into a contract that
would prejudice the government. A non-sequitur, it has no bearing at all to the factual and legal issues in this case.
WHEREFORE, the present motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED with FINALITY.
No further pleadings shall be entertained in this case.
Let entry of judgment be made in due course.

25.) A.C. No. 7972, October 03, 2018
ANGELITO CABALIDA, Petitioner, v. ATTY. SOLOMON A. LOBRIDO, JR. AND ATTY. DANNY L.

PONDEVILLA, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, C.J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure of the
Resolutions issued by the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) dated
December 29, 20121 and September 27, 2014.2
The lone issue to be resolved by this Court is:
"Whether the Board of Governors of the IBP gravely erred in exonerating Respondents despite the
commission of acts violative of the Code of Professional Responsibility."3
Petitioner Angelito Cabalida (Cabalida) avers to be a high school undergraduate who was drawn into
a legal battle over property rights and in the process found himself dealing with two law practitioners
herein named respondents Atty. Solomon Lobrido, Jr. and Atty. Danny Pondevilla.
Cabalida believes that he had been wronged by both respondents-lawyers on account of which he
lost a piece of real estate property located at Rio Vista Homes, Barangay Tacoling, Bacolod City and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-227214 registered in his name.
The present case, which began as an issue involving land ownership, sales and mortgages, concludes
with a reminder to members of the Bar of the proper discharge of their duties in their practice of law.
It also covers a proper reading and interpretation of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and a review
of a decision of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP-BOG).
This is an opportune time for this Court to articulate, once again, the very essence of principled legal
practice based on our Code of Professional Responsibility and the Canons of Professional Ethics to
serve as a guide to all legal practitioners.
We proceed with the factual and procedural background of this case.
Civil Case No. 30337 for Ejectment with Damages4 was instituted before the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC) of the City of Bacolod, Negros Occidental by Cabalida against Reynaldo Salili (Salili)
and Janeph Alpiere (Alpiere). Cabalida alleged in his complaint that he is the owner of a parcel of
land, on which a residential property stands, located in Rio Vista Homes Subdivision, Barangay
Taculing, Bacolod City, registered under Transfer Certificate Title No. T-227214 in his name. Alan
Keleher (Keleher), an Australian national, gifted the property to Cabalida by virtue of their special
relationship and they lived therein until they encountered a minor misunderstanding. Cabalida
returned to his family residence in Purok Pag-asa, Barangay Estefania, Bacolod City while Keleher
continued living in the property. Keleher then hired Alpiere as his house help who would clean the
property every Saturday.
On April 4, 2005, Keleher committed suicide inside the property. Since Keleher had no family in the
Philippines, Alpiere, as his house help, was assigned by the Australian Embassy to arrange the
disposition of Keleher's body and to sell his personal properties to produce funds for the funeral
expenses. Cabalida assisted Alpiere in preparing a memorial for Keleher in Alisbo Funeral Homes.
After selling Keleher's personal properties, however, Alpiere kept the proceeds of the sale and failed
to return to the funeral homes. Thus, Cabalida bore the obligation of paying Alisbo Funeral Homes in
order to finally dispose Keleher's body.
Cabalida thereafter returned to his property to find it locked. He learned that Alpiere bolted the
property because Keleher failed to pay him his salary, refusing to open the gates to anyone until he
receives proper compensation. Cabalida requested the police and the barangay to assist him in
entering his property but they refused to get involved in the absence of a court order. Later, Cabalida
learned that Alpiere leased the property to Salili. Cabalida approached Salili and requested him to
vacate the property but Salili refused and instead dared Cabalida to institute a civil action.
Aggrieved by the situation, Cabalida filed a complaint for ejectment5 in the Office of the Lupong
Tagapamayapa of Barangay Taculing, Bacolod City on August 12, 2005, but no settlement was
reached. On August 19, 2005, Cabalida sent a demand letter6 to Alpiere and Salili, ordering them to
vacate the property and to pay the rent. Since the demand proved futile, Cabalida availed the
legal services of herein respondent Atty. Solomon Lobrido (Atty. Lobrido) for purposes of
representing him in a civil action for Ejectment against Alpiere and Salili. At the time of said
action, Atty. Lobrido was a partner in Ramos, Lapore, Pettiere and Lobrido Law Offices. On
September 23, 2005, Lobrido filed Civil Case No. 30337 for Ejectment with Damages against Alpiere
and Salili in the MTCC.
For their part, Alpiere and Salili availed the legal services of herein respondent Atty. Danny
L. Pondevilla (Atty. Pondevilla), who at the time was a partner in Basiao, Bolivar and Pondevilla
Law Office and was concurrently a City Legal Officer (CLO) of Talisay City, Negros Occidental for the
years 2004-2007. In their Answer with Counterclaim7 dated October 10, 2005, Alpiere and Salili
stated that Cabalida was merely a dummy of Keleher because the latter cannot register the property
under his name. Cabalida had also surrendered his interests over the property when he abandoned
Keleher, and turned over the title of the property and the deed of sale for a considerable amount.
Alpiere thereafter bought the property for P161,000.00, as evidenced by a deed of sale,8 and later
sold the same to Emma Pondevilla-Dequito (Pondevilla-Dequito), Pondevilla's sister, who leased the
property to Salili.
In his Reply to Counterclaim9 dated October 13, 2005, Cabalida admitted that he left a blank pre-
signed deed of sale in Keleher's possession. Keleher and Cabalida allegedly had an understanding
that Keleher could dispose the property to a buyer of their choice with or without the presence of
Cabalida. Alpiere however stole the deed of sale and falsified it by inserting his name as vendee.
Furthermore, it was impossible that Cabalida would have sold the property to Alpiere for P161,000.00
especially that weeks before the alleged sale, they were adversaries in the failed mediation with the
barangay.
Civil Case No. 30337 was then set for Preliminary Conference on February 23, 2006 but was reset to
May 17, 2006. In between those periods, the parties, with their respective lawyers, Atty. Lobrido and
Atty. Pondevilla (respondents for brevity), met for a possible amicable settlement at Atty.
Pondevilla's office. In their initial meeting, the parties agreed that the defendants would no longer
pursue the case in exchange for P150,000.00.10 Three days thereafter, Cabalida, unassisted by Atty.
Lobrido, returned to Atty. Pondevilla's office to finalize the amicable settlement. Atty. Pondevilla
conveyed to Cabalida that his clients decided to increase the amount to P250,000.00. The new terms
were embodied in a Memorandum of Agreement that was prepared by Atty. Pondevilla but it only
contained the signatures of Alpiere and Pondevilla-Dequito because Salili wanted to ponder on its
terms for two more weeks. Cabalida on the other hand signed the Memorandum of Agreement on the
belief that he can sell the property to a prospective buyer who was willing to purchase the same for
P1,300,000.00. For the time being, however, Cabalida considered mortgaging his property and thus
hired Lydia S. Gela (Gela) and Wilma Palacios (Palacios), real estate brokers, to assist him in the
mortgaging process.
Atty. Pondevilla presented the Memorandum of Agreement to the MTCC on May 17, 2006 but moved
for the resetting of the Preliminary Conference, which was granted, because Salili has not yet signed
the Memorandum of Agreement. The Preliminary Conference was moved to June 14, 2006. On said
date however, counsels for both parties requested for the provisional dismissal of Civil Case No.
30337 on the belief that the parties are close to arriving at an amicable settlement.
Cabalida again met with Atty. Pondevilla on June 17, 2006. This time, he was accompanied by his
brokers, Gela and Palacios, and by Danilo Flores (Flores), a common friend of Cabalida and Keleher.
Atty. Pond villa entered into a Trust Agreement with Cabalida and his companions as evidenced by a
document, entitled Trust Agreement, which was prepared by Atty. Pondevilla on the same day. The
Trust Agreement provides that Cabalida, Gela, Palacios and Flores received in trust P250,000.00 from
Atty. Pondevilla with the obligation to return the same upon release of the proceeds of the mortgage
over the property covered by TCT No. 277214. Upon signing the Trust Agreement, Atty. Pondevilla
released TCT No. 227214. In truth there was no money "received in trust."
Cabalida, again unassisted by Atty. Lobrido, returned to Atty. Pondevilla's office on July 2, 2006 to
finalize his amicable settlement with Salili and Alpiere. Atty. Pondevilla prepared a new Memorandum
of Agreement which contained the same terms as its earlier version but no longer listed Salili as a
party or signatory. Nonetheless, Cabalida signed the revised Memorandum of Agreement, which
provides:
WITNESSETH:
WHEREAS, [Alpiere and Pondevilla-Dequito] are the holder[s] of the land title of the property
described as TCT No. T-227218, located at Bacolod City;
WHEREAS, [Cabalida] filed an ejectment case now pending before Br. 4, of the Municipal Trial Court,
Bacolod City against [Alpiere and Pondevilla-Dequito], and [Salili];
NOW THEREFORE, the parties hereto agree to settle the case amicably by the following terms and
conditions:
1. [Alpiere and Pondevilla-Dequito] will no longer claim the lot subject of the case and will allow the
mortgage of the property by the registered owner ANGELITO CABALIDA and [Alpiere and Pondevilla
Dequito] will turnover possession of the original title.
2. That [Cabalida] will pay [Alpiere and Pondevilla-Dequito] the amount of Two Hundred Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P250,000.00) immediately upon execution of this document.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have hereunto affixed their signatures, this 2nd day of July, 2006
at Bacolod City, Philippines.
(signed) (signed)
JANEPH ALPIERE ANGELITO CABALIDA

(signed)
EMMA L. PONDEVILLA[-DEQUITO]11
On July 19, 2006, Metropol Lending Corporation (MLC) informed Cabalida that the loan has been
released in Philippine National Bank (PNB). Immediately after claiming the loan, Cabalida paid
P250,000.00 to Atty. Pondevilla for which Atty. Pondevilla issued a receipt12 cancelling the trust
agreement.
After receipt of P250,000.00 from Cabalida, Atty. Pondevilla submitted the Memorandum of
Agreement to the MTCC on August 7, 2006. Simultaneously, Atty. Pondevilla submitted his Ex-parte
Manifestation with Motion to Withdraw, with the following averments:
That it is hereby manifested that Angelito Cabalida and Janeph Alpiere already entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement to amicably settle the case dated July 2, 2006; x x x.
That it is further manifested that in case the case will be revived against the remaining defendant
Reynaldo Salili, he will be withdrawing as his counsel due to conflict of interest as he is already
formally joining the law office of the plaintiff.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed to this Honorable Court to note the manifestation to grant his
withdrawal as counsel for the defendant Reynaldo Salili.13
In its Decision14 dated August 17, 2006, the MTCC rendered a judgment in accordance with the terms
and conditions that were stipulated in the Memorandum of Agreement after finding that "the
Memorandum of Agreement is not contrary to law, morals and public policy."
On September 18, 2006, Atty. Lobrido filed an Ex-parte Motion to Withdraw15 as Cabalida's counsel
stating therein that it was upon Cabalida's request and with his conformity. Atty. Adrian Arellano
(Atty. Arellano) filed his Formal Entry of Appearance16 for Cabalida on the same date and filed a
Motion to Amend Decision praying that the order be amended to include Salili as he refused to vacate
the property. The pertinent provisions of the motion thus provides:
4. That to buy peace and to facilitate the termination of the case, Plaintiff had mortgaged his
aforementioned property in order to produce the amount which he utilized to settle this case with
[Alpiere and Pondevilla-Dequito];
5. That [Salili], a lessee of the aforestated disputed property, merely derives his right to lease the
property from the alleged right of [Pondevilla-Dequito], whose alleged right is now extinguished
because of the settlement she had entered into with the Plaintiff who has now an unquestionable
rights over the disputed property;
6. That Defendant Salili has no more leg to stand on [sic] with the settlement of this case with
defendant Alpiere and claimant [Pondevilla-Dequito];
7. Henceforth, Defendant Salili should now be ordered to vacate the premises, pay the corresponding
rentals from the time he occupied the aforementioned property up to the present, and damages at
the discretion of the Honorable Court.17
The MTCC issued an Order18 on September 25, 2006 stating that the Memorandum of Agreement did
not bind Salili because he was not one of its signatories. Hence, Civil Case No. 30337 continued only
against Salili until it was ultimately dismissed on January 24, 2008,19 when Cabalida failed to appear
on time for the Preliminary Conference.
In the meantime, Cabalida was unable to pay off his debt to MLC thus his property was foreclosed
and sold in a public auction.
On October 8, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City sent a Notice of Extrajudicial Sale of
Real Estate Mortgage20 to Cabalida, alleging as follows:
To satisfy the outstanding indebtedness of the Mortgagor ANGELITO CABALIDA of Block 81, Lot 17,
Purok Pag-asa, Brgy. Estefania, Bacolod City with the Mortgagee in the amount of SEVEN HUNDRED
FIFTY-ONE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (P751,250.00), exclusive of interest and other
charges, the Mortgagee [Metropol Lending Corp.], through this Office, pursuant to Act 3135, as
Amended, will SELL at PUBLIC AUCTION on Nov 08, 2007 at Bacolod City Hall of Justice, between the
hours of 10:00 a.m. until 11:00 a.m., whatever rights, interest and participation the Mortgagor has
in the real estate mortgaged property with all its improvements.
Cabalida now comes before the Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant, instituting
the present administrative complaint with the allegations that respondents engaged in
various unethical acts which caused the loss of his property.
Cabalida asserts in his complaint that respondents colluded to dispossess him of his
property. Atty. Pondevilla was already a member of Lobrido's law firm as early as their
initial meeting for the amicable settlement of Civil Case No. 30337. In the said meeting,
respondents convinced Cabalida that the best course of action for him was to obtain a loan
in order to come up with P250,000.00 as payment to Alpiere. This was made even after the
respondents learned that Cabalida was in communication with a prospective buyer who
was willing to purchase the property for P1,300,000.00. Atty. Pondevilla also withheld the
possession of TCT No. T-227214 from Cabalida and placed it in the custody of his office
staff until Cabalida's property was mortgaged to MLC. As for the issuance of the Trust
Agreement, Cabalida claims that he did not receive P250,000.00 in trust from Atty.
Pondevilla.
Cabalida also alleges in his complaint that the loan from the mortgage was distributed as
follows: P250,000.00 to Atty. Pondevilla, in view of the Trust Agreement, P86,000.00 to
the brokers, P50,000.00 to Atty. Lobrido, P3,000.00 to Atty. Pondevilla's office staff, and
an unspecified amount for Atty. Lobrido's appearance fee and for the filing fee.
The complaint also provides that Atty. Lobrido did not assist Cabalida when he entered into the
Memorandum of Agreement on July 2, 2006. Atty. Lobrido also made it appear that his withdrawal as
counsel was due to Cabalida's insistence when it was Atty. Lobrido himself who advised Cabalida to
look for a new counsel as his work was already over.
Thus, Cabalida claims that the unethical acts of respondents clearly violated the Code of Ethics.
Respondents took advantage of their knowledge of the law as against him who was not even a high
school graduate. He prays that their actions merit disbarment and that they be held liable for
damages equivalent to the value of the property lost.
In support of his allegations Cabalida submitted, among others, the Trust Agreement that he entered
into with Atty. Pondevilla; the receipt for the cancellation of the Trust Agreement; the Memorandum
of Agreement between Alpiere and Cabalida, and the Motions to Withdraw of respondents.
In his Comment21 filed on January 8, 2009, Atty. Lobrido alleged that Cabalida never declared that
the property costs more than P1,000,000.00. Atty. Lobrido also denies that Atty. Pondevilla joined
his law firm as early as the initial meeting for the amicable settlement of Civil Case No. 30337 and
that the main reason for their meeting was to enter into a compromise, as encouraged by the courts.
Atty. Lobrido also avers that he was not consulted nor was a privy to the Memorandum of
Agreement. He learned of the Memorandum of Agreement only after it was submitted to the MTCC,
when Cabalida complained of the excessive rates of the brokers. It was at this time that he reminded
Cabalida of his unpaid acceptance fee of P15,000.00, and not P50,000.00, which he deems fair and
reasonable. Finally, Atty. Lobrido states that Cabalida consented to his withdrawal as counsel
because it was for reasons of propriety since Atty. Pondevilla was about to join their law firm. Atty.
Lobrido has not kept track of the case thereafter.
On the other hand, Atty. Pondevilla professes in his Comment,22 filed on January 8, 2009, that the
idea of mortgaging the property came from Cabalida and his brokers. As to the circumstances
surrounding the Memorandum of Agreement, Atty. Pondevilla avers that Cabalida fully understood its
contents and that it has been notarized by another lawyer. Atty. Pondevilla also alleged that Alpiere
complied with his obligations as stated in the Memorandum of Agreement, and that the fault lies with
Cabalida and Atty. Arellano when they failed to immediately act on the decision of the MTCC. Finally,
Atty. Pondevilla claims that he joined Atty. Lobrido's law office only after he withdrew as counsel of
Alpiere and Salili.
In a Resolution23 dated February 4, 2009, the Court referred the administrative case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation or decision.
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline set the case for mandatory conference on April 17, 2009.
Flores appeared as a representative of Cabalida stating that Cabalida cannot appear because he was
looking for a lawyer who can assist him in the administrative case. Respondents however appeared in
their own behalf. In his Order24 dated April 17, 2009, Commissioner (Comm.) Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes
(Reyes) reset the mandatory conference to May 12, 2009. On the aforementioned date, only
respondents were present when the case was called for mandatory conference. Cabalida arrived, with
his legal counsel Atty. Ma. Agnes Hernando-Cabacungan (Atty. Cabacungan), but only after the
mandatory conference was again reset to June 16, 2009, as per Order25 of Comm. Reyes.
Cabalida, represented by Atty. Cabacungan, and respondents appeared on June 16, 2009. In his
Order,26 Comm. Reyes terminated the mandatory conference and stated therein that the mandatory
conference order shall be issued after it has been reviewed and corrected by the parties. Comm.
Reyes also directed the parties to file their respective verified position papers, attaching thereto
certified true copies of documentary exhibits and affidavits of witnesses. The case was then set for
clarificatory hearing on August 14, 2009.
The parties appeared in the clarificatory hearing on August 14, 2009. The Mandatory Conference
Order,27 was furnished to the parties on the same day and it contained the admissions of Cabalida
and the respondents. The admissions of respondents were limited to the following:
1. Complainant engaged the services of Atty. Solomon Lobrido sometime in September 23, 2005
for the purpose of filing a[n] Ejectment case against [Janeph] Alpiere and Reynaldo Salili
which case was filed before the Municipal Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 4.
2. That the respondent in that case which is docketed as Ejectment Civil Case No. 30337 filed a
responsive pleading, an answer and they were represented thereat by Atty. Danny Pondevilla.
3. That during the pendency of this ejectment case, Atty. Lobrido advised complainant to just
settle the case with the respondent in this case so as not to prolong the litigation during the
pre-trial stage of the case.
4. Atty. Danny Pondevilla admit on the stipulation on the Memorandum of Agreement, what was
stated in the Memorandum of Agreement. [sic]
Cabalida, on the other hand, admitted:
1. That it was [Cabalida] who hired a broker to assist him.28
In his Order29 dated August 14, 2009, Comm. Reyes stated that the parties signed the final version of
the mandatory conference order and exchanged position papers. Another clarificatory hearing was
scheduled on September 17, 2009.
All the parties were present for the clarificatory hearing on September 17, 2009. In his Order issued
on the said date, Comm. Reyes terminated the clarificatory questioning between the parties and
deemed it submitted for resolution.
Comm. Reyes rendered his Report and Recommendation30 on January 19, 2010 finding that:
The counsel of the complainant, Atty. Lobrido, advised his client to settle the case with the
respondent in the ejectment case. It would appear that the complainant negotiated directly with Atty.
Danny Pondevilla without the assistance of his counsel Atty. Lobrido, Jr. and Atty. Pondevilla came
out with a Memorandum of Agreement with the complainant, Angelito Cabalida.
The narration of Atty. Pondevilla in his answer is hereto quoted:
"During the preliminary conference of the case, the court advised to talk on the possible settlement
of the case and for the meantime have the case into the archive.
Complainant Angelito Cabalida went to the undersigned respondent's office at Talisay City because at
that time, he was holding office at Talisay City Hall being the City Legal Officer of the City and offered
to talk about the settlement of the case. The undersigned then talked to his client Janeph Alpiere
about his proposal and said that if Angelito Cabalida will pay the amount of Two Hundred Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P250,000.00) he will no longer claim over [sic] the property.
Angelito Cabalida then asked the undersigned respondent to give him time to find money because he
is trying to find [a] buyer for the lot, however, he failed to find one and instead went again to the
office of the undersigned at Talisay City together with his two brokers who offered him help [to]
mortgage his property.
A Memorandum of Agreement then was entered by my client Janeph Alpiere and let my sister signed
[sic] the Memorandum of Agreement to afford complainant Angelito Cabalida a complete security
that Janeph Alpiere as well as my sister [will] no longer claim the property because in the answer
that we filed it was said that the property was already sold to my sister.
In order to make sure that my client Janeph Alpiere will be paid the amount of Two Hundred Fifty
Thousand Pesos, the undersigned respondent then let Angelito Cabalida and the two other broker[s]
[sign] a Trust Receipt because the undersigned is thinking that Angelito Cabalida might not give any
consideration to my client after he will receive a copy of the Title and the amount of the loan. [sic]
The provision in the Memorandum of Agreement is [sic] very much simple which I would like to
quote, to wit:
1. That my client Janeph Alpiere as well as my sister will no longer claim over the property and
will turn-over possession on the Original Title.
2. That Angelito Cabalida will pay my client the amount of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P250,000.00).
That after the execution of the said Memorandum of Agreement which was notarized by a Notary
Public in their presence, [complainant] Angelito Cabalida with the two other broker[s] again went to
the office of the undersigned and asked for time to give the money as they were processing the loan
on the property. After several days, they informed the undersigned that they already have the loan
and they will have the check change to [sic] a bank and requested my secretary to get the amount
as the undersigned has his out of town hearing at that time.
After payment of the amount of consideration based on the Memorandum of Agreement, the
undersigned respondents immediately submitted it to the court and ma[d]e a proper Manifestation as
well as motion to withdraw insofar as defendant Reynaldo Salili is concerned because the
undersigned respondent will be joining the Law Office of Lapore, Lobrido, Ramos and Petierre upon
verbal negotiation with a friend Atty. Arnel Lapore. [sic]
That the undersigned respondent joined the law office of Lapore, Lobrido, Ramos and Petierre after
the settlement of my client Janeph Alpiere and complainant Angelito Cabalida.
After the filing of the Manifestation with Motion to Withdraw as counsel for Reynaldo Salili on the
ground that the undersigned will be joining the law office of the plaintiff’s counsel, the court rendered
a Decision based on the Memorandum of Agreement, the same [not being] contrary to law and public
policy.
This is the version of Atty. Pondevilla insofar as how he was able to secure the Memorandum of
Agreement with the complainant in this case. His allegations also [show] that after the Memorandum
of Agreement was finalized, he made a proper manifestation as well as motion to withdraw insofar as
Reynaldo Salili [was] concerned because he was joining the Law Offices of Lapore, Lobrido, Ramos
and Petierre.
Atty. Lobrido on the other hand confirm[ed] that a settlement was encouraged by the Court and he
told the complainant that he would explore settlement with Atty. Pondevilla.
However, in Paragraph no. 8 of Atty. Lobrido's answer, [he] admitted to [the] Court that the
respondent ha[d] no participation in the Memorandum of Agreement and that it came to his
knowledge only after it was submitted to the Court for approval.
Clearly on the part of Atty. Lobrido, he did not actively assist his client Angelito Cabalida in
negotiating with Atty. Danny Pondevilla.
After the memorandum of agreement was submitted, both lawyers withdrew as counsel. An analysis
of the memorandum of agreement entered into by Angelito Cabalida would readily show that his right
was not protected due to the following reasons:
1. Angelito Cabalida will pay the amount of Php250,000.00 but not all defendants to the
complaint signed the agreement.
2. Surprisingly, only Janeph Alpiere signed the agreement and the other party, the sister of Atty.
Pondevilla, was included as party [to] the agreement. Reynaldo Salili, one of the defendants,
was not included in the memorandum of agreement.
The memorandum of agreement submitted to the Court was designed to fail because Reynaldo Salili,
one of the defendants, was not a party and did not sign the agreement.
The complainant Angelito Cabalida filed this case for the simple reason that he felt betrayed by his
counsel Atty. Lobrido who was suppose[d] to assist him in the memorandum of agreement against
the other counsel Atty. Pondevilla who after submitting the memorandum of agreement for approval
by the Court, manifested and moved for his withdrawal as counsel for the other defendant Reynaldo
Salili.
Both respondents would want to make an impression [sic] that it is a mere coincidence that Atty.
Pondevilla joined the Law Office of Atty. Lobrido a few months after the filing of the memorandum of
agreement.
The actuation of Atty. Lobrido of not assisting his client during the negotiation violates the Code of
Professional Responsibility while the action of Atty. Pondevilla of negotiating with the party who is not
assisted by his counsel is [a] blatant violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The undersigned Commissioner would like to give both the respondents the benefit of the doubt that
there was no collusion in their actions however, individually both counsels have violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
The act of Atty. Danny L. Pondevilla of negotiating with the party who was not assisted by counsel is
a blatant violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
xxxx
Atty. Solomon A. Lobrido, Jr. failed to assist his client during the negotiation which led to the act of
his client in signing the agreement without the assistance of counsel. If his lawyer was present during
the signing, the lawyer would notice that not all the defendants in the case have signed the
agreement and that the case was not being resolved completely.
Under Canon 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence. Atty. Lobrido clearly
had the obligation to exert his best effort, [and] best judgment in the prosecution of litigation
entrusted to him. He should have exercise[d] care and diligence in the application of his knowledge
to his client's cause.
As the counsel for the complainant, Atty. Lobrido had the duty to safeguard the client's interest while
he was handling the case of complainant, Cabalida.
xxxx
In the case at bar, Atty. Lobrido failed to render the proper legal assistance to his client.
It is respectfully recommended that both respondents be meted a penalty of six (6) months
suspension for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Atty. Solomon A. Lobrido, Jr. for
failing to assist his client for violation of Canon 18 and for Atty. Danny L. Pondevilla [for] negotiating
[with] a party without assistance of counsel for violation of Canon 8.
In its Resolution No. XX-2012-660 dated December 29, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors (IBP-BOG)
reversed the findings of Comm. Reyes with the following recommendations:
Resolution No. XX-2012-660

Adm. Case No. 7972
Angelito Cabalida vs. Atty. Solomon Lobrido, Jr.
And Atty. Danny Pondevilla
RESOLVED to REVERSE as it is hereby unanimously REVERSED the Report and Recommendation of

the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as
Annex "A", and for lack of merit the case is hereby DISMISSED with Warning to be more
circumspect in their dealings and repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more
severely.31
Cabalida filed a Motion for Reconsideration32 dated April 5, 2013 with the IBP-BOG praying that a
harsher penalty of suspension or disbarment be meted out to respondents, as well as payment of
damages amounting to P1,000,000.00 as compensation for the property that he lost.
The IBP-BOG issued Resolution No. XX-2014-592 dated September 27, 2014, which maintains:
Resolution No. XXI-2014-592

Adm. Case No. 7972 Angelito
Cabalida vs. Atty. Solomon Lobrido, Jr.
And Atty. Danny Pondevilla
RESOLVED to DENY Complainant's Motion for Reconsideration, there being no cogent reason to
reverse the findings and the resolution subject of the motion, it being a mere reiteration of the
matters which had already been threshed out and taken into consideration. Thus, Resolution No. XX-
2012-660 dated December 29, 2012 is hereby AFFIRMED.33
Cabalida filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari34 on May 15, 2015, with the lone issue, to wit:
Whether the Board of Governors of the IBP gravely erred in exonerating respondents despite the
commission of acts violative of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Cabalida further discusses:
5. At the onset, it bears emphasizing that the IBP Board of Governors' reversal of the initial
recommendation by the Investigating Commissioner was never justified. Cabalida travelled all the
way from the province to secure a copy of the December 29, 2012 resolution only to be informed by
the attending staff that the initial recommendation for respondents' suspension, along with the single
page reversal of the same sans any discussion, constitutes the entire decision of the IBP. Clearly, this
is in violation of the rules governing disbarment and discipline of attorney under Rule 139-B of the
Rules of Court, Section 12(a) of which provides:
"Every case heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors upon the
record and evidence transmitted to it by the Investigator with his report. The decision of the Board
upon such review shall be in writing and shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the reasons on
which it is based. It shall be promulgated within a period not exceeding thirty (30) days from the
next meeting of the Board following the submittal of the Investigator's report."35
After a thorough review of the records, the Court adopts the findings of Comm. Reyes but
modifies the penalty to be imposed on one of the respondents.
At the outset, the records do not support Cabalida's allegation that respondents colluded to deprive
him of his property. Cabalida failed to convince that respondents were colleagues as early as the
initial meeting for the amicable settlement. While Cabalida fully recounted his encounter with
Pondevilla which led to the creation of the Trust Agreement and the Memorandum of Agreement, the
participation of Atty. Lobrido has always been narrated vaguely. Cabalida also submitted an envelope
bearing the office address of Atty. Lobrido which included Atty. Pondevilla as one of the partners. The
envelope is however dated April 13, 2009 which is almost three years after Atty. Lobrido withdrew as
Cabalida's counsel. No conflict of interest can thus be attributed to respondents during this period.
The MTCC Order36 dated May 17, 2006 however bares the participation of the respondents in the
Memorandum of Agreement. The MTCC Order provides:
When this case was called for preliminary conference, Atty. Danny Pondevilla, counsel for the
defendant appeared in court. Atty. Pondevilla showed to the Court the Amicable Settlement that he
prepared already signed by the parties except for defendant Reynaldo Salili who is asking for about
two weeks for him to sign the same.
As prayed for by Atty. Danny Pondevilla, reset for the last time the preliminary conference in this
case on June 14, 2006, at 8:30 in the morning. Atty. Pondevilla is directed to exert utmost effort to
have the Amicable Settlement ready before the next scheduled hearing.
Atty. Danny Pondevilla is notified of this Order in open court.
Furnish copy of the Order Atty. Solomon Lobrido, counsel for the plaintiff.
The Court Order shows that 1) Atty. Pondevilla prepared the Amicable Settlement, in the form of
Memorandum of Agreement; 2) Salili was the only party in Civil Case No. 30337 that has not signed
the Memorandum of Agreement; 3) Atty. Pondevilla was directed by the Court to ensure that the
Memorandum of Agreement is ready before the next hearing; and 4) Atty. Lobrido was furnished a
copy of the Order. This document supports the findings of Comm. Reyes that respondents were
remiss in their duties as lawyers and officers of the court.
It is a fundamental rule that official duty is presumed to have been performed regularly, thus it is
presumed that the aforementioned court order has been furnished accordingly to Atty. Lobrido. Atty.
Lobrido's bare denial of knowledge of the negotiations for and the submission of the Memorandum of
Agreement must fail. His failure to represent Cabalida in the negotiations for the
Memorandum of Agreement shows gross neglect and indifference to his client's cause.
Hence, there was abject failure to observe due diligence. Atty. Lobrido has therefore violated Canon
18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Canon 18.03 which provides:
Canon 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
xxxx
Canon 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
Competence is a professional obligation. A member of the legal profession owes his client entire
devotion to his genuine interest, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the
exertion of his utmost learning and ability. Public interest demands that an attorney exert his best
efforts and ability to preserve his client's cause, for the unwavering loyalty displayed to his client
likewise serves the ends of justice. Verily, the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the
corresponding duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar and to the public. A
lawyer's inability to properly discharge his duty to his client may also mean a violation of his
correlative obligations to the court, to his profession and to the general public.37
The Court fully adopts the findings of Comm. Reyes that Atty. Lobrido failed to render proper legal
assistance to his client and imposes upon him six (6) months suspension from the practice of law.
On the other hand, the MTCC Order38 also reflects that Atty. Pondevilla prepared the Memorandum of
Agreement. The uncontroverted facts of the decision of the MTCC dated September 17, 2007 further
suggests that Atty. Pondevilla actively participated in the negotiation of the Memorandum of
Agreement:
On the scheduled date, [Atty. Pondevilla] manifested that the parties have arrived at an
amicable settlement and asked for 10 days within which to submit the compromise
agreement among the parties to the case. Accordingly the hearing was set on May 17, 2006.
On the apportioned date, Atty. Pondevilla showed to the Court the Amicable Settlement
already signed by the parties, except for defendant Reynaldo Salili, who was asking for about two
weeks to sign said document. As prayed for by counsel, the preliminary conference was reset for the
last time on June 14, 2006.
On June 14, 2006, counsel for both sides agreed to have the case provisionally dismissed until after
they can finalize the amicable settlement.
On August 7, 2006, the Court was in receipt of an Ex-Parte Manifestation With Motion to withdraw as
counsel for defendant Reynaldo Salili, filed by Atty. Danny L. Pondevilla with a Memorandum of
Agreement executed among plaintiff Angelito Cabalida, defendant Janeph Alpiere and a
certain Emma Pondevilla [Dequito].
With the Memorandum of Agreement as basis, the Court rendered a Decision based on compromise
dated August 17, 2006.
The transcript of stenographic notes (TSN)39 in the hearing on June 16, 2009 further affirms Atty.
Pondevilla's undertaking in the Memorandum of Agreement:
COMM. REYES:
Can I ask you clarificatory question? (Was] this Memorandum of Agreement entered into as a result
of the trial or as a compromise agreement as a result of a filing of the case?
ATTY. PONDEVILLA:
During the pre-trial conference, Your Honor, we were advised by the judge to settle the case, Your
Honor, and in fact, I think they archive the case for the meantime. When the pre-trial conference was
conducted, Your Honor, we were advised by the Judge to settle the case and have the case
archive[d], Your Honor, [in] the meantime that we talk[ed] on the settlement, Your Honor, of the
case. And after that, Your Honor, with the agreement reached by the parties (sic), Your
Honor, I submit[ted] the Memorandum of Agreement to the court, Your Honor, as a basis
of its decision.
COMM. REYES:
I am just surprised that when our clients normally enter into a Memorandum of
Agreement/compromise we are almost sure to be assisted by counsel in the said
agreement. You just forgot...
ATTY. LOBRIDO:
This came the rapt (sic), Your Honor...
COMM. REYES:
For clarification, if you feel you can answer.
ATTY. PONDEVILLA:
Because they mutually agree[d], Your Honor, and we just put what [h]as been agreed
upon by the parties.
xxxx
COMM. REYES:
And you agreed to submit a Memorandum of Agreement signed by your client and the
other party without informing the adverse counsel?
ATTY. PONDEVILLA:
It was submitted to the court, Your Honor.
COMM. REYES:
Yes, but you submitted to the court but are you not aware that you might be in trouble for
submitting a compromise agreement wherein the adverse party was not assisted by
counsel.
ATTY. PONDEVILLA:
Because my client, Your Honor, [was] assisted by me, Your Honor.
COMM. REYES:
Yes.
ATTY. PONDEVILLA:
And my concern is my client.
COMM. REYES:
Yes, are you trying to tell me that you negotiated with other party without the assistance of counsel?
ATTY. PONDEVILLA:
I did not negotiate actually, Your Honor, it was they who came to the office, Your Honor, and I said
that my client is offering that if he is paid the amount of P250,000.00 he will give the title
to their possession, Your Honor, and the title was given to them, Your Honor. It was complied
[with].
COMM. REYES:
Yes, but they entered into a Memorandum of Agreement without the knowledge of their counsel.
Obviously, that's the implication of your position. Pañero, you came to know of the compromise
agreement only after it was submitted to the court?
ATTY. LOBRIDO:
Yes, Your Honor.
COMM. REYES:
Meaning he was signing the documents without the assistance of counsel?
ATTY. PONDEVILLA:
It was notarized by other counsel, Your Honor, and I think the notary public explain[ed]
what he is signing, Your Honor, because it was notarized by...
COMM. REYES:
So, now you are saying that it was notary public who assisted the...
ATTY. PONDEVILLA:
It will be, Your Honor. x x x.40 (Emphasis ours.)

Atty. Pondevilla's participation in the negotiation for the Memorandum of Agreement ensued when he
relayed Alpiere's terms to Cabalida. The same terms that Pondevilla relayed to Cabalida were then
faithfully stated in the Memorandum of Agreement. Thus, Pondevilla cannot dilute his role in the
creation of the Memorandum of Agreement to that of a spectator. The notary public's presence also
does not remedy the situation especially that his obligation is only towards ensuring the authenticity
and due execution of the instrument. Atty. Pondevilla knew that Atty. Lobrido was Cabalida's
counsel thus he should have, at the very least, given notice to Atty. Lobrido prior to
submission of the Memorandum of Agreement to court.
Atty. Pondevilla's actions violated Canon 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
when he negotiated with Cabalida without consulting Atty. Lobrido. Canon 8, Rule 8.02 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that:
A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment of another
lawyer; however it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and
assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.
This failure of Atty. Pondevilla, whether by design or because of oversight, is an inexcusable violation
of a canon of professional ethics and in utter disregard of a duty owing to a colleague. Atty.
Pondevilla fell short of the demands required of him as a lawyer and as a member of the Bar.41
For these infractions, the Court imposes upon Atty. Pondevilla a penalty of six months suspension
from the practice of law in line with jurisprudence. Binay-an v. Addog,42 imposed a penalty of six
months suspension on a lawyer who issued an affidavit of desistance with opposing parties but
without informing their counsel.
On another point, by his admissions, Atty. Pondevilla was engaged in the practice of law
while also employed as a City Legal Officer. This can be gathered from Atty. Pondevilla's
statement in his position paper dated July 23, 2009, to wit:
The court records will clearly show that the address of the undersigned [Pondevilla] when he
filed his Answer with Counterclaim is Basiao, Bolivar Law Office having been connected
with that Law Office at that time and also concurrently holding office at City Legal Services
Offices of Talisay City, Negros Occidental, being a City Legal Officer of the City from 2004
to 2007. In fact when he filed his motion to withdraw, counsel was using that address until he
resigned from the office.43
There is no doubt that Atty. Pondevilla acted as counsel for Alpiere and Salili in Civil Case No. 30337,
by preparing their pleadings, appearing in court in their behalf, and negotiating for them with the
opposing party. In addition, his submission of Motion to Withdraw affirms his standing as counsel of
Alpiere and Salili.
Atty. Pondevilla was also a named partner in a law office during his tenure as a City Legal
Officer, which shows his active engagement in the practice of law. The Counterclaim and
Reply to Counterclaim in Civil Case No. 30337 list his address as:
BASIAO, BOLIVAR & PONDEVILLA LAW OFFICE
By:
ATTY. DANNY L. PONDEVILLA

Counsel for the Defendant
Room 254, Plaza Mart Bldg.
Araneta Street, Bacolod City44
Furthermore, Salili's Verification45 in his Counterclaim for Civil Case No. 30337 also shows that Atty.
Pondevilla was likewise a notary public in 2005.
Atty. Pondevilla thus engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, in violation of Section
7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees, in relation to Memorandum Circular No. 17,
series of 1986, which prohibits government officials or employees from engaging in the
private practice of their profession unless: 1) they are authorized by their department
heads, and 2) that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official
functions.46
The pertinent provision of Republic Act No. 6713 provides:
Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions.—In addition to acts and omissions of public
officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following
shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and
are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. 151; Public officials and
employees during their incumbency shall not:
xxxx
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution
or law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official
functions[.]
On the other hand, Memorandum Circular No. 17,47 s. 1986, provides:
The authority to grant permission to any official or employee shall be granted by the head of the
ministry or agency in accordance with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules, which
provides:
"Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or
profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking
without a written permission from the head of Department; Provided, That this prohibition will
be absolute in the case of those officers and employees whose duties and responsibilities require that
their entire time be at the disposal of the Government: Provided, further, That if an employee is
granted permission to engage in outside activities, the time so devoted outside of office
hours should be fixed by the chief of the agency to the end that it will not impair in any
way the efficiency of the officer or employee: And provided, finally, That no permission is
necessary in the case of investments, made by an officer or employee, which do not involve any real
or apparent conflict between his private interests and public duties, or in any way influence him in
the discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part in the management of the enterprise or
become an officer or member of the board of directors", subject to any additional conditions which
the head of the office deems necessary in each particular case in the interest of the service, as
expressed in the various issuances of the Civil Service Commission.
Atty. Pondevilla's engagement in the unlawful practice of law, through disregard and
apparent ignorance of Sec. 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713, is a contravention of Canon 1,
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:
CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
law and for legal processes.
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Lawyers are servants of the law, vires legis, men of the law. Their paramount duty to society is to
obey the law and promote respect for it.48
The Court holds Atty. Pondevilla administratively liable, even in the absence of further investigation,
by reason of his admissions of facts on record. This here is an application of the principle of res ipsa
loquitur. In several instances, the Court has sanctioned lawyers for their blatant misconduct even in
the absence of a formal charge and investigation because their admissions are sufficient bases for
the determination of their administrative liabilities.49
A penalty of another six months suspension from the practice of law is further imposed on Atty.
Pondevilla, thus bringing his suspension to a period of one year. This is in congruence with Lorenzana
v. Fajardo50 and Catu v. Rellosa,51 which imposed six month suspension on respondent lawyers when
they engaged in private practice while subsequently employed in government service, in the absence
of authorization from their respective department heads.
On a final note, the Court frowns upon IBP-BOG's one paragraphed resolutions for it does not clearly
and distinctly state the facts and the reasons on which it is based, as required by Section 12(b), Rule
139-B of the Rules of Court.52 Time and again, the court consistently holds that such form does not
satisfy the procedural requirements of the Rules of Court because it makes the entire petition
vulnerable for a remand.53 The requirement, which is akin to what is required of the decisions of
courts of record, serves an important function. For aside from informing the parties the reason for
the decision to enable them to point out to the appellate court the findings with which they are not in
agreement, in case any of them decides to appeal the decision, it is also an assurance that the Board
of Governors, reached his judgment through the process of legal reasoning.54 However, considering
that the present controversy has been pending resolution for quite some time, that no further factual
determination is required, and the issues being raised may be determined on the basis of the
numerous pleadings filed together with the annexes attached thereto, we resolved to proceed and
decide the case on the basis of the extensive pleadings on record, in the interest of justice and
speedy disposition of the case.55
Perhaps this is the best time as any for this Court to remind members of the Philippine Bar the
wordings of a covenant in the Magna Carta. "To no man will we sell, to no man will we refuse, or
delay, right or justice.”56
As for the damages, the Court refuses to rule on Cabalida's claim for damages. In disciplinary
proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed
to continue as a member of the Bar. Our only concern therefore is the determination of respondent's
administrative liability. Furthermore, disciplinary proceedings against lawyers do not involve a trial of
an action, but rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Thus, this
Court cannot rule on the issue of the amount of money that should be returned to Cabalida.57
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Atty. Danny L. Pondevilla is found guilty of violation of Canon 8,
Rule 8.02 and unauthorized practice of law and is ordered SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
a period of ONE (1) YEAR effective immediately upon receipt of this decision. Atty. Solomon A.
Lobrido, Jr. is also ordered SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months for
failure to render proper legal assistance to his client. Respondents are further WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar offenses shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be FORWARDED to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to
the personal records as attorneys of Atty. Solomon A. Lobrido, Jr. and Atty. Danny L. Pondevilla.
Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the
country for their information and guidance.
26.) G.R. No. 199930, June 27, 2018
MELITA O. DEL ROSARIO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
To be resolved is whether or not the eight-year prescriptive period for the offense the
petitioner committed in violation of Republic Act No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees) should be reckoned from the filing of the
detailed sworn statement of assets, liabilities and net worth (SALN), or from the discovery
of the non-filing thereof.
It is notable that the informations filed against the petitioner alleged her violation of R.A. No.
6713 for having "fail[ed] to file her detailed sworn SALN for the year 199011991, which
the law requires to be filed on or before the 30th of April following the close of every
calendar year." Based on the allegations of the informations, the eight-year prescriptive period
under Act No. 3326 (An Act to Establish Prescription for Violations of Special Acts and Municipal
Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription shall Begin) was applicable in view of the silence of R.A.
No. 6713 on the prescriptive period for a violation thereof.
Although R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) and R.A. No 6713 both punish the
failure to file the SALN, we need to clarify that the 15-year prescriptive period explicitly provided in
Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 was not relevant. The violation of Section 71 of R.A. No. 3019 which
requires the "filing or submission of SALN, after assuming office, and within the month of January of
every other year thereafter, as well as upon the expiration of a public officers term of office, or upon
his resignation or separation from office" – was not alleged in the information.
R.A. No. 6713 – enacted in 1989 – was a much later law than R.A. No. 3019, which was
adopted on August 17, 1960. As the mandatory requirement for the filing of SALNs
currently exists, therefore, the public official or employee should file and submit the SALN
"on or before April 30, of every year" as required by R.A. No. 6713 instead of filing the
same "within the month of January of every other year" pursuant to R.A. No. 3019. Verily,
R.A. No. 6713 – by reflecting who are required to file the SALN, who are exempt from the
requirement, when should the SALN be filed, and what should be included and disclosed in the SALN
– embodies the latest legislative word on transparency and public accountability of public officers and
employees.
The Case
The petitioner seeks the review and reversal of the adverse decision promulgated on August 16,
2011,2 whereby the Sandiganbayan set aside the ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 32,
in Manila upholding the orders issued on September 18, 20093 and April 23, 20104 by the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 21, in Manila granting her motion to quash the informations
charging her with violations of Section 8 of R.A. No. 6713 for the non-filing of her SALNs for the
years 1990 and 1991.
Antecedents
On October 28, 2004, the General Investigation Bureau-A of the Office of the Ombudsman
brought a complaint charging the petitioner with the violation of Section 8 of R.A. No.
6713; dishonesty; grave misconduct; and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service for her failure to file her SALNs for the years 1990 and 1991.
On March 11, 2008, the Office of the Ombudsman criminally charged the petitioner in the MeTC with
two violations,5 the informations therefor being docketed as Criminal Case No. 444354 and Criminal
Case No. 444355, to wit:
Criminal Case No. 444354
That sometime in the year of 1991, in Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused public officer Melita O. Del Rosario, being a government
employee holding the position of Chief of Valuation and Classification Division-Office of the
Commissioner (VCD-OCOM), Bureau of Customs, Port Area, Manila, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and criminally fail to file her detailed sworn Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net worth
(SALN) for the year 1990 which the law requires to be filed on or before the thirtieth (30th) day of
April following the close of every calendar year.
Contrary to Law.6
Criminal Case No. 444355
That sometime in the year of 1992, in Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused public officer Melita O. Del Rosario, being a government
employee holding the position of Chief of Valuation and Classification Division-Office of the
Commissioner (VCD-OCOM), Bureau of Customs, Port Area, Manila, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and criminally fail to file her detailed sworn Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Networth
(SALN) for the year 1991 which the law requires to be filed on or before the thirtieth (30th) day of
April following the close of every calendar year.
Contrary to law.7
On November 19, 2008, the petitioner filed a Motion to Quash in Criminal Case No. 444354 and
Criminal Case No. 444355 on the ground of prescription of the offenses. 8
On September 18, 2009,9 the MeTC granted the Motion to Quash.
The State moved for the reconsideration of the quashal of the informations,10 but the MeTC affirmed
the quashal on April 23, 2010.11
The State appealed to the RTC praying that the quashal be annulled and set aside.12
In its decision dated October 6, 2010,13 the RTC upheld the assailed orders of the MeTC.14
Undeterred, the State elevated the decision of the RTC to the Sandiganbayan, arguing that the RTC
had erred in ruling that the eight-year prescriptive period for violation of Section 8 of R.A. No. 6713
commenced to run on the day of the commission of the violations, not from the discovery of the
offenses.15
On August 16, 2011, the Sandiganbayan promulgated its assailed decision overturning the RTC,16 and
disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 32
denying the appeal of herein petitioner in Criminal Case Nos. 10-276311-12 and entitled People of
the Philippines versus Melita O. Del Rosario, promulgated on October 6, 2010, is REVERSED. The
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21 is also ORDERED to proceed with the trial of Criminal
Case Nos. 444354-55.
SO ORDERED.17
The Sandiganbayan pointed out that "it would be difficult for the Ombudsman to know of such
omission on the part of the public official or employee on the date of filing itself;" that in Benedicto v.
Abad Santos, Jr.18 and People v. Monteiro,19 in which the employers had not registered their
employees with the Social Security System (SSS), it was ruled that the period of prescription began
from the discovery of the violations; that it would be dangerous to maintain otherwise inasmuch as
the successful concealment of the offenses during the prescriptive period would be the very means
by which the offenders would escape punishment;20 and that reckoning the prescriptive period from
the date of the commission of the offenses would defeat the purpose for which R.A. No. 6713 was
enacted, which was to temper or regulate "the harsh compelling realities of public service with its
ever-present temptation to heed the call of greed and avarice."21
Dissatisfied by the adverse outcome, the petitioner now comes to the Court to assail the adverse
decision of the Sandiganbayan.
Issue
Did the period of prescription of the offenses charged against the petitioner start to run on
the date of their discovery instead of on the date of their commission?22
Ruling of the Court
The appeal has merit.
In applying the discovery rule, the Sandiganbayan relied on the rulings handed down in the so-called
Behest Loans Cases,23 whereby the prescriptive period was reckoned from the date of discovery of
the offenses. The Sandiganbayan explained that it would be difficult for the Office of the Ombudsman
to know on the required dates of filing of the failure to file the SALNs on the part of the erring public
officials or employees; and that to suggest that the Civil Service Commission (CSC), the Office of the
Ombudsman and any other concerned agency should come up with a tracking system to ferret out
the violators of R.A. No. 6713 on the dates of the filing of the SALNs would not only be burdensome,
but highly impossible.
The Sandiganbayan erred in applying the discovery rule to the petitioner's cases.
Section 8 of R.A. No. 6713 mandates the submission of the sworn SALNs by all public
officials and employees, stating therein all the assets, liabilities, net worth and financial
and business interests of their spouses, and of their unmarried children under 18 years of
age living in their households. Paragraph (A) of Section 8 sets three deadlines for the
submission of the sworn SALNs, specifically:(a) within 30 days from the assumption of
office by the officials or employees; (b) on or before April 30 of every year thereafter; and
(c) within 30 days after the separation from the service of the officials or employees.
R.A. No. 6713 does not expressly state the prescriptive period for the violation of its
requirement for the SALNs. Hence, Act No. 3326 – the law that governs the prescriptive
periods for offenses defined and punished under special laws that do not set their own
prescriptive periods24 – is controlling. Section 1 of Act No. 3326 provides:
Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe
in accordance with the following rules: (a) after a year for offenses punished only by a fine or by
imprisonment for not more than one month, or both; (b) after four years for those punished by
imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two years; (c) after eight years for those
punished by imprisonment for two years or more, but less than six years; and (d) after
twelve years for any other offense punished by imprisonment for six years or more, except the crime
of treason, which shall prescribe after twenty years. Violations penalized by municipal ordinances
shall prescribe after two months.
The complaint charging the petitioner with the violations was filed only on October 28,
2004, or 13 years after the April 30, 1991 deadline for the submission of the SALN for
1990, and 12 years after the April 30, 1992 deadline for the submission of the SALN for
1991. With the offenses charged against the petitioner having already prescribed after
eight years in accordance with Section 1 of Act No. 3326, the informations filed against the
petitioner were validly quashed.
The relevant legal provision on the reckoning of the period of prescription is Section 2 of Act No.
3326, to wit:
Section 2. Prescription of violation penalized by special law shall begin to run from the day
of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the violation be not known at the time
from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation
and punishment.
Under Section 2, there are two modes of determining the reckoning point when
prescription of an offense runs. The first, to the effect that prescription shall "run from the
day of the commission of the violation of the law," is the general rule. We have declared in
this regard that the fact that any aggrieved person entitled to an action has no knowledge
of his right to sue or of the facts out of which his right arises does not prevent the running
of the prescriptive period.25 The second mode is an exception to the first, and is otherwise
known as the discovery rule.
Under the rulings in the Behest Loans Cases,26 the discovery rule, which is also known as the
blameless ignorance doctrine, stipulates that:
x x x the statute of limitations runs only upon discovery of the fact of the invasion of a right which
will support a cause of action. In other words, the courts would decline to apply the statute of
limitations where the plaintiff does not know or has no reasonable means of knowing the existence of
a cause of action.27
The application of the discovery rule was amply discussed in the 2014 ruling in Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) v. Carpio-Morales,28 which cited a number of rulings
involving violations of R.A. No. 3019. The Court said therein:
In the 1999 and 2011 cases of Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v.
Desierto, the Court, in said separate instances, reversed the ruling of the Ombudsman that the
prescriptive period therein began to run at the time the behest loans were transacted and instead, it
should be counted from the date of the discovery thereof.
In the 1999 case, We recognized the impossibility for the State, the aggrieved party, to have
known the violation of RA 3019 at the time the questioned transactions were made in view of the
fact that the public officials concerned connived or conspired with the "beneficiaries of the
loans." There, We agreed with the contention of the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee
that the prescriptive period should be computed from the. discovery of the commission thereof and
not from the day of such commission. x x x
Similarly, in the 2011 Desierto case, We ruled that the "blameless ignorance" doctrine applies
considering that the plaintiff therein had no reasonable means of knowing the existence of
a cause of action. In this particular instance, We pinned the running of the prescriptive period to
the completion by the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee of an exhaustive investigation on
the loans. We elucidated that the first mode under Section 2 of Act No. 3326 would not apply since
during the Marcos regime, no person would have dared to question the legality of these transactions.
Prior to the 2011 Desierto case came Our 2006 Resolution in Romualdez v. Marcelo, which involved a
violation of Section 7 of RA 3019. In resolving the issue of whether or not the offenses charged in the
said cases have already prescribed, We applied the same principle enunciated in Duque and ruled
that the prescriptive period for the offenses therein committed began to run from the discovery
thereof on the day former Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez filed the complaint with the PCGG.
This was reiterated in Disini v. Sandiganbayan where We counted the running of the prescriptive
period in said case from the date of discovery of the violation after the PCGG's exhaustive
investigation despite the highly publicized and well-known nature of the Philippine Nuclear Power
Plant Project therein involved, recognizing the fact that the discovery of the crime
necessitated the prior exhaustive investigation and completion thereof by the PCGG.
In Republic v. Cojuangco, Jr., however, We held that not all violations of RA 3019 require the
application of the second mode for computing the prescription of the offense. There, this Court held
that the second element for the second mode to apply, i.e., that the action could not have been
instituted during the prescriptive period because of martial law, is absent. This is so since
information about the questioned investment therein was not suppressed from the
discerning eye of the public nor has the Office of the Solicitor General made any allegation
to that effect. This Court likewise faulted therein petitioner for having remained dormant during the
remainder of the period of prescription despite knowing of the investment for a sufficiently long
period of time.
An evaluation of the foregoing jurisprudence on the matter reveals the following guidelines in the
determination of the reckoning point for the period of prescription of violations of RA 3019, viz.:
1. As a general rule, prescription begins to run from the date of the commission of the offense.
2. If the date of the commission of the violation is not known, it shall be counted form the date
of discovery thereof.
3. In determining whether it is the general rule or the exception that should apply in a particular
case, the availability or suppression of the information relative to the crime should first be
determined.
If the necessary information, data, or records based on which the crime could be
discovered is readily available to the public, the general rule applies. Prescription shall,
therefore, run from the date of the commission of the crime.
Otherwise, should martial law prevent the filing thereof or should information about the
violation be suppressed, possibly through connivance, then the exception applies and the
period of prescription shall be reckoned from the date of discovery thereof. (Bold
underscoring supplied for emphasis)29
Conformably with the foregoing, we cannot apply the discovery rule or the blameless ignorance
doctrine to the criminal charges against the petitioner herein.
First of all, the Sandiganbayan unjustifiably relied on the rulings in Benedicto v. Abad Santos,
Jr.30 and People v. Monteiro.31 In Benedicto v. Abad Santos, Jr., where the information was filed 10
years after the SSS discovered the violation, the Court ruled therein that the crime charged already
prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326. In People v. Monteiro, there was a finding of a successful
concealment of the offense during the period fixed for its prescription. But the facts and
circumstances obtaining therein are not on all fours with those herein simply because the petitioner
neither concealed her omissions nor conspired with others to conceal them. Also of significance is
that Section 832 of R.A. No. 6713 has stipulated the accessibility of the SALNs to the public for
copying or inspection at reasonable hours. Under the circumstances, the State had no reason not to
be presumed to know of her omissions during the eight-year period of prescription set in Act No.
3326.
The Sandiganbayan's reliance on Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee v. Desierto 33 was

misplaced. Therein, the concealment and supposed connivance and conspiracy among the concerned
public officials were emphatically mentioned as factors for applying in the reckoning of the period of
prescription the second mode instead of the general rule. The Court further noted that prior to the
ouster of President Marcos through the February 1986 EDSA Revolution, the Government as the
aggrieved party could not have known of the violations when the questioned transactions were
made; and that no person would have dared to assail the legality of the transactions at that time.
The guidelines summarized in Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Carpio-

Morales34 already settled how to determine the proper reckoning points for the period of prescription.
Whether it is the general rule or the exception that should apply in a particular case depends on the
availability or the suppression of information relative to the crime should first be ascertained. If the
information, data, or records from which the crime is based could be plainly discovered or
were readily available to the public, as in the case of the petitioner herein, the general rule
should apply, and prescription should be held to run from the commission of the crime;
otherwise, the discovery rule is applied.
Secondly, when there are reasonable means to be aware of the commission of the offense, the
discovery rule should not be applied. To prosecute an offender for an offense not prosecuted on
account of the lapses on the part of the Government and the officials responsible for the prosecution
thereof or burdened with the duty of making sure that the laws are observed would have the effect of
condoning their indolence and inaction.
We fully concur with the observations of the RTC to the effect that the offenses charged
against the petitioner were not susceptible of concealment. As such, the offenses could have
been known within the eight-year period starting from the moment of their commission. Indeed, the
Office of the Ombudsman or the CSC, the two agencies of the Government invested with the primary
responsibility of monitoring the compliance with R.A. No. 6713, should have known of her omissions
during the period of prescription.
Thirdly, the Sandiganbayan's opinion that it would be burdensome and highly impossible for the CSC,
the Office of the Ombudsman and any other concerned agency of the Government to come up with a
tracking system to ferret out the violators of R.A. No. 6713 on or about the time of the filing of the
SALNs is devoid of persuasion and merit.
The CSC and the Office of the Ombudsman both issued memorandum circulars in 1994 and 1995 to
announce guidelines or procedures relative to the filing of the SALNs pursuant to R.A. No. 6713.
Ombudsman Memorandum Circular No. 95-13 (Guidelines/Procedures on the Filing of Statements of
Assets, Liabilities and Networth and Disclosures of Business Interests and Financial Connections with
the Office of the Ombudsman Required under Section 8, Republic Act No. 6713) publicized that the
Office of the Ombudsman would create a task force that would maintain a computerized database of
all public officials and employees required to file SALNs, and that such task force would monitor full
compliance: with the law. The circular further provided that: "The administrative/personnel division
shall likewise prepare a report indicating therein the list of officials and employees who failed to
submit their respective statements of assets, liabilities and net worth and disclosures of business
interests and financial connections."
Considering that the memorandum circulars took effect prior to the commission of the violations by
the petitioner, it would be unwarranted to hold that the Office of the Ombudsman could not have
known of her omissions on the due dates themselves of the filing of the SALNs. What we need to
stress is that the prescriptive period under Act No. 3326 was long enough for the Office of the
Ombudsman and the CSC to investigate and identify the public officials and employees who did not
observe the requirement for the submission or filing of the verified SALNs – information that was
readily available to the public.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision rendered on August 16, 2011 by

the Sandiganbayan; and AFFIRMS the decision rendered on October 6, 2010 by the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 32, in Manila upholding the quashal of the informations filed in Criminal Case No. 10-
276311 and Criminal Case No. 10-276312.
27.) [ A.M. No. P-17-3659, March 20, 2018 ]
ANONYMOUS COMPLAINT AGAINST EMELIANO C. CAMAY, JR., UTILITY WORKER I,
BRANCH 61, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BOGO CITY, CEBU.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This administrative matter involves a utility worker of the Judiciary charged with various serious offenses, including immorality for living
with a woman other than his legitimate spouse and siring a child with her; bail fixing; failing to truthfully disclose his assets in his sworn
statement of assets and net worth (SALNs) filed in several years; trafficking in women; and living a lavish lifestyle.
Antecedents
By letter dated February 18, 2003, an anonymous complainant charged Emeliano C. Camay, Jr., the Utility Worker 1 of Branch
61 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Bogo City, Cebu with the aforestated offenses.[1]
The complainant alleged that Camay, a married man, had been cohabiting with a woman who was not his wife, and they had a son by
the name of Junmar; that he had been serving as the contact person of a surety company in the posting of surety bonds in the
RTC; that for every 10 bonds processed, he would receive the proceeds for the 11th bond; that he had allowed a representative of
the surety company to wait at his table, beside the desk of the clerk of court; that he was the owner of a big house, a motorcycle, and
an iPhone; that he had demanded P20,000.00 for the entertainment of the Presiding Judge Antonio D. Marigomen; and that he had a
collection of pictures of naked girls in his phone that he showed to anyone interested in engaging in sexual activity for money.[2]
In his comment dated December 10, 2013,[3] Camay denied the allegations against him. He attached a photocopy of the certificate
issued by the National Statistics Office (NSO) to the effect that he had no son by the name of Junmar Camay; [4] a photocopy of the
certificate issued by the Bogo City Assessor's Office attesting that he did not own or possess any real property located in Bogo City;
[5]
and his payslips showing his Supreme Court Savings and Loans Association (SCSLA) loan deductions (where the loan proceeds had
been used to pay for his motorcycle).[6]
The complaint was referred to Executive Judge Teresita Abarquez-Galandia of the RTC in Mandaue City for discreet investigation.[7]
In her report,[8] Judge Galandia confirmed most of the allegations in the complaint based on the verbal statements given by two
witnesses under the veil of anonymity.
The files of Camay in the Office of Administrative Services of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) showed that Camay was
married to Mary Joy Y. Santiago; that his Personal Data Sheet (PDS), BIR form No. 2305 and SALN for 2003 carried the notation of
"married/but separated in fact" regarding his civil status; that he had left blank the space for the name of his spouse in the forms for
2002; that he declared as a dependent child in his undated BIR Form No. 2305 one "Jumar Guevarra Camay," who was born on July
25, 2001; and that his PDS and SALN for various periods from 2005 to 2011 revealed a Jumar Camay, bom on July 25, 2002, as one of
his children below 18 years of age.[9]
It appeared in Camay's SALNs for 2001, 2003 and 2004 that he had a house worth between P40,000.00 and P60,000.00 in
Taytayan Hills, Bogo City but without any indication on the date of his acquisition; that in 2009, he declared his acquisition in
that year of a house and lot worth P350,000.00 in Taytayan; that in his 2011 SALN, he declared the same property to be worth
at P500,000.00; that he did not declare any real property in his SALNs for 2002, 2007 and 2008; that he also declared in his
SALN dated April 20, 2012 a motorcycle worth P45,000.00 acquired in 2002, and another one worth P68,900.00 acquired in
2012; that his SALNs showed that he did not have any other source of income like business interests or financial
connections; and that his monthly salary was his only source of income.[10]
Based on a verification with the SCSLA, Camay took several loans in 2012 totalling P8 5,000.00. His pay slips also reflected GSIS
loans, consolidated salary loan plus, enhanced salary loan, emergency loan, and policy loan, but the amounts were not substantial
enough for use in the purchase of real property.[11]
On November 9, 2015, the Court referred the complaint to Judge Galanida for a more thorough investigation.[12]
In due course, Judge Galanida interviewed two private lawyers, three public prosecutors, and three female employees of another
government agency. Of the eight informants, only Bogo City Prosecutor Ivy Tejano-Moralde executed an affidavit after the rest opted to
remain incognito to avoid reprisal from Camay.[13]
In her report and recommendation,[14] Judge Galanida described Camay as a tattooed man with an imposing aura and built, with
piercing eyes that could generate fear and intimidation in another. She recalled that during the investigation, he admitted having been
separated in fact from his wife, and that he had been living with another woman named Maria Fe G. Guevarra, with whom he had a
child named Jumar Guevarra Camay; and that he denied having an illegitimate child because the name of the child indicated in the
complaint was wrong, as the name was Jumar, not Junmar.
Judge Galanida further stated that on the matter of bail fixing, three of the informants stated that they had personally heard from Camay
about the 10+1 scheme; that an unnamed agent of Plaridel Surety and Insurance Company, who refused to be identified, confirmed
that Camay was their contact person in the RTC; that City Prosecutor Moralde declared that in cases of illegal possession of drugs
where the recommended bail was the amount of P200,000.00, Camay usually assisted the accused in obtaining the reduction of the
amounts to half in exchange for 30% of the premiums for the surety bail bond; that none of the informants actually witnessed the
solicitation of money in behalf of Judge Marigomen; that anent the allegations against Camay's lavish lifestyle, she observed his house
in Taytayan to be made of concrete with a steel perimeter fence; that a certain Climaco had donated the land to Camay's father; that
there was a warehouse-like structure thereon; and that he had only spent for the construction and renovation of the structure thereon
using funds sourced from his loans and from the remittances of his son who was working as a seafarer; and that the tax declarations
relating to the property were issued in the name of Camay and his live-in partner.[15]
Judge Galanida opined that sufficient substantial evidence established Camay's lavish lifestyle given his rank; that his basic
salary and allowances amounted to only P11,000.00 a month, but he could host lavish parties for himself and for the birthdays
of his live-in partner and their illegitimate child; and that he owned a car and motorcycle but not the iPhone, although he later
on admitted during the investigation that he had an iPhone with the clarification that his legitimate son had bought the iPhone
for him.[16]
Judge Galanida indicated that there was insufficient evidence to sufficiently prove the offense of child abuse/trafficking against Camay;
that the informants confirmed that Camay had shown them pictures of nude girls stored in his phone; and that Prosecutor Moralde
testified that Camay claimed that the girls would sell themselves out anyway, and that he was just helping them fetch a higher price.[17]
Accordingly, Judge Galanida recommended that Camay be found and held guilty of immorality, disgraceful conduct, and bail bond
fixing.[18]
In its memorandum dated January 18, 2017,[19] the OCA, agreeing with the report and recommendation of Judge Galanida,
recommended that Camay be found and declared guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct punishable under Section 46, Rule 10 of
the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS) for cohabiting with a woman who was not his wife, and
having a child with her; that he be also held to have violated Section 8, in relation to Section 11, of Republic Act No. 6713 for failing to
properly disclose his real property in several of his SALNs; and that on the matter of bail bond fixing, he be found to have facilitated or
secured bail bonds in violation of Administrative Circular No. 5, series of 1988.
Ruling of the Court
On the issue of immorality, Camay admitted to cohabiting with a woman who was not his wife and to having a child with her despite his
marriage to his wife not having been legally severed. As such, the finding of the OCA that Camay was guilty of disgraceful and immoral
conduct is upheld. In Anonymous v. Radam,[20] the Court declared that "if the father of the child born out of wedlock is himself married to
a woman other than the mother, there is a cause for administrative sanction against either the father or the mother. In such a case, the
'disgraceful and immoral conduct' consists of having extramarital relations with a married person."
Disgraceful and immoral conduct is an offense classified under the RRACCS as a grave offense punishable by suspension of six
months and one day to one year for the first offense.
We also uphold the recommendation of the OCA on Camay's surety bail fixing activities. Prosecutor Moralde attested that it was public
knowledge in the RTC that Camay was the man to approach if any party wanted to post surety bail because he could facilitate the
reduction of the recommended amounts of the bail; and that Camay transacted in behalf of the Plaridel Surety and Insurance Company,
the only surety company authorized to transact in Branch 61 of the RTC. Notwithstanding the lack of direct evidence proving his having
acquired financial gain from the bond transactions, the fact that he had assisted and facilitated the processing of the bail requirements
for parties with cases in the RTC constituted substantial evidence of such financial gain on his part. Substantial evidence is that amount
of relevant evidence that a reasonable man may accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.[21] The penalty for him is a fine of
P5,000.00, which was the penalty imposed in Concerned Citizen v. Bautista,[22] where the respondent was held guilty of violating
Administrative Circular No. 5, series of 1988 (Re: Prohibition to Work as Insurance Agent).
The charge of child abuse or trafficking is dismissed for lack of substantial evidence to support it. Although Prosecutor Moralde attested
that Camay had collected pictures of naked girls in his phone, and that he had claimed to others to have been pimping the girls
depicted therein to help them financially, the records do not show any actual or overt acts on his part that could serve as basis for
holding him administratively liable for such charge.
Finally, the finding that Camay did not consistently declare his true assets and actual net worth in his SALNs is. upheld. He
declared the house and lot located in Taytayan Hills in his SALNs for 2001, 2003, and 2004 but did not indicate the date of
acquisition of such property. He again intermittently declared the property in 2009 and 2011. He did not declare the property
in 2002, 2007, 2008 and 2010. His omissions violated the letter and spirit of Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6713, which requires
all public officials and employees to accomplish and submit a declaration of assets, liabilities, net worth and financial and
business interests, including information on real property, its improvements, acquisition costs, assessed value and current
fair market value. Section 11 of the same law provides that a violation of the requirement is penalized by fine not exceeding
the equivalent of the public official or employee's salary for six months.
Under Section 50, Rule 10 of the RRACCS, if the respondent is found guilty of two or more charges or counts, the penalty to be
imposed should be that corresponding to the most serious charge, and the other charges shall be considered as aggravating
circumstances. Although the charge of disgraceful and immoral conduct, classified as a grave offense, is the most serious charge
herein, and should be the base for determining the penalty for Camay, his dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all his retirement
benefits should be meted on him. His combined offenses have firmly demonstrated his total unfitness to continue in the service of the
Judiciary. His being guilty of such offenses has been like a cancerous tumor that slowly consumed the healthy tissues of the Judiciary,
and even destroyed its good name and reputation in the area where he served. For sure, his remaining in the service would erode the
Judiciary's institutional prestige in the eyes and estimation of the community. It is time to dismiss him in order to fully excise the tumor
before more damage could be inflicted.
A final word needs to be uttered. The Court will never tire to insist that everyone of its officials and employees comes under the strict
and immediate obligation to maintain the highest standard of conduct and decorum while serving in the Judiciary. Indeed, every person
who serves in the Judiciary should heed the following reminder issued in Office of the Court Administrator v. Juan:[23]
xxx [C]ourt employees, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, being public servants in an office dispensing justice, should always
act with a high degree of professionalism and responsibility. Their conduct must not only be characterized by propriety and decorum,
but must also be in accordance with the law and court regulations. No position demands greater moral righteousness and uprightness
from its holder than an office in the judiciary. Court employees should be models of uprightness, fairness and honesty to
maintain the people's respect and faith in the judiciary. They should avoid any act or conduct that would diminish public trust
and confidence in the courts. Indeed, those connected with dispensing justice bear a heavy burden of responsibility. (Bold
underscoring supplied for emphasis)
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and DECLARES respondent EMELIANO C. CAMAY, JR., Utility Worker 1 of Branch 61, Regional
Trial Court in Bogo City, Cebu GUILTY of DISGRACEFUL AND IMMORAL CONDUCT, VIOLATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
CIRCULAR NO. 5, SERIES OF 1988, and VIOLATION OF SECTION 8 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6713; and, ACCORDINGLY,
DISMISSES him from the service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits (excluding earned leave credits), with prejudice to his re-
employment in the Government, including in government-owned or government-controlled corporations.
The Court DIRECTS the Employees Leave Division, Office of Administrative Services, Office of the Court Administrator, to determine
the balance of his earned leave credits; and to report thereon to the Finance Division, Fiscal Management Office, Office of the Court
Administrator for purposes of computing the monetary value of his earned leave credits for release to him.
28.) A.M. No. p-17-3771
JUDGE DENNIS B. CASTILLA, Complainant

vs.
MARIA LUZ A. DUNCANO, CLERK OF COURT IV, OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT, MUNICIPAL TRIAL
COURT IN CITIES, BUTUAN, AGUSAN DEL SUR, Respondent
DECISION
TIJAM, J.:
For the Court's resolution is an administrative complaint for Conduct Unbecoming of a Court Employee, Dishonesty,
Gross Negligence, and Violation of Section 7(d) of Republic Act (RA) No. 6713, against Maria Luz A. Duncano
1
(Mrs. Duncano), Clerk of Court IV of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Butuan City, Agusan del Norte.
The Factual Antecedents
On June 22, 2011, Hon. Dennis B. Castilla (Judge Castilla), Executive· Judge of the MTCC, Butuan City, Agusan
del Norte, sent a letter-report to the Supreme Court Deputy Court Administrator, Hon. Raul BautistaVillanueva,
2
reporting alleged infractions committed by Mrs. Duncano amounting to dishonesty, deceit and neglect of duty.
In his letter-report, Judge Castilla made the following allegations:
(1) Anita Lamoste (Anita) and Anniesel Lamoste (Anniesel), the mother and sister respectively of Nathaniel
Lamoste (Nathaniel), aired their grievances to Judge Castilla concerning the actuations of Mrs. Duncano.
They relayed to Judge Castilla that on June 10, 2011, when Criminal Case No. 43863 (for Resistance
and Disobedience, Article 151 of the Revised Penal Code) against Nathaniel was still undergoing
inquest proceedings, Mrs. Duncano personally and privately but under the pretext of performing her
official duties, demanded and collected from them, the amount of PhP 7,000 for his bail bond.
Although Mrs. Duncano eventually returned the amount to the Lamostes on June 17, 2011, she first made
them beg for the return of said amount and at the same time, gave them false hopes for the release of
Nathaniel.
(2) Mrs. Duncano, then MTCC Branch Clerk of Court/Custodian, deliberately caused (probably for personal
benefit or gain); or allowed (through gross negligence) the loss or continued unavailability of a Supreme
Court EPSON Computer Printer (EPSON printer) having serial number DCAY 101692 JDF-2005-571-108.
(3) Mrs. Duncano, in her capacity as MTCC Clerk of Court, acted dishonestly, when she submitted a letter-
explanation with a job/repair receipt thereto attached, stating that the lost printer was brought to Columbia
Computer Shop in Butuan for repair when she actually knew, or should have known, that said receipt was
not for the lost printer, but was in fact that of a· computer CPU which had long been brought back to MTCC.
For failing to issue an official receipt for the money she received from Anniesel and for lying about the loss of the
EPSON printer, Judge Castilla averred that Mrs. Duncano failed to meet the high ethical standards expected of
court employees. 3
To substantiate his claims, Judge Castilla submitted, among others, the following documents: (1) Affidavit of
Recantation dated September 21, 2011 executed, signed and thumb-marked by Anita and Anniesel; and (2.)
4
Affidavit dated September 30, 2011 executed and signed by Lanie Lebios; (Mrs. Lebios) Clerk of the Warrant
5
Section of the Butuan City Police Station.
In their September 21, 2011 Affidavit, Anita and Anniesel recanted the Affidavit dated August 25, 2011, which they
6
allegedly signed. The truth of the matter was that they gave the amount of PhP7,000 to Mrs. Duncano, through Mrs.
Lebios, for Nathaniel's provisional release. Upon learning from Prosecutor Benjamin Uy (Pros. Uy) that no bail was
required, they went back to Mrs. Duncano and demanded the return of the PhP7,000. But for reasons only known to
her, Mrs. Duncano did not immediately return the amount despite the repeated demands by Anniesel. She only
returned the said amount when Pros. Uy's resolution was approved by City Prosecutor Guiritan. 7
In her affidavit, Mrs. Lebios narrated that after she handed the amount of PhP7,000 to Mrs. Duncano for the posting
of Nathaniel's cash bond, she had left. She neither talked to Mrs. Duncano nor followed-up the case. 8
In her comment, Mrs. Duncano vehemently denied the accusations leveled against her. She claimed that she did
9
not demand any amount of money from Anita or Anniesel, but merely advised them to file a Motion to Post Bail. She
said that the amount of PhP7,000 was given by the Lamostes to Mrs. Lebios and not to her directly. Nonetheless,
she claimed that she returned the PhP7,000 to Nathaniel after the trial court ordered his release without bail. She
10
further claimed that she could not have accepted money for the bailbond of Nathaniel considering that the court did
not require the posting of bail for illegal gambling, which is a simple misdemeanor. She contended that this issue
11
was bloated out of proportion by the intervention and insistence of a certain Sheriff Agileo D. Demata (Sheriff
Demata).
With respect to the EPSON printer, Mrs. Duncano averred that it was not lost, but rather, had been found within the
premises of the MTCC of Butuan City, and was declared unserviceable. She likewise averred that the EPSON
12
printer had long been returned to the Property Division of the Supreme Court. She pointed out that Sheriff Demata
twisted the facts as to the serial number of the printer in order to hold her accountable.
13
The Report and Recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
On December 19, 2012, the OCA acted on (1.) the June 22, 2011 letter-report; (2.) the September 1, 2011
Comment of Mrs. Duncano; (3.) the October 6, 2011 Reply of Judge Castilla; and (4.) the October 17, 2011
14
Rejoinder of Mrs. Duncano. Considering the serious allegations in the complaint and the counter-arguments which
15
necessitated a thorough investigation, the OCA recommended that the complaint be referred to the Executive Judge
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Butuan City, Agusan del Norte for investigation, report, recommendation within a
period of 60 days from receipt of the records.
On May 2, 2013, Deputy Court Administrator Jenny Lind R. AldecoaDelorino sent a letter to Executive Judge
16
Franciso F. Maclang (Judge Maclang) of the RTC of Butuan City, informing the latter to investigate the case
pursuant to this Court's March 20, 2013 Resolution. 17
The Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Judge
On September 16, 2013, Judge Maclang found Mrs. Duncano administratively liable for conduct unbecoming of a
court employee, and accordingly, recommended that she be meted the penalty of suspension for two months. 18
We affirm the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Judge.
It must be remembered that public office is a public trust. As this Court held in Marasigan v. Buena: 19
Public officers and employees are at all times accountable to the people; must serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency; and must lead modest lives. [R.A. No. 6713] additionally provides that every public
servant shall uphold public interest over his or her personal interest at all times. Court personnel, from the presiding
judge to the lowliest clerk, are further required to conduct themselves always beyond reproach, circumscribed with
the heavy burden of responsibility as to free them from any suspicion that may taint the good image of the judiciary.
Indeed, "(t)he nature and responsibilities of public officers enshrined in the 1987 Constitution and oft-repeated in our
case law are not mere rhetorical words. Not to be taken as idealistic sentiments but as working standards and
attainable goals that should be matched with actual deeds. " 20
With this principle in mind, We find that Mrs. Duncano has transgressed the established norm of conduct for court
employees, and, thus, is administratively guilty of the offense charged.
Substantial evidence is the quantum of proof in administrative proceedings. As thoroughly explained in Exec. Judge
Eduarte v. Ibay: 21
In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial evidence or such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Substantial evidence,
and not clear and convincing evidence or proof beyond reasonable doubt, is sufficient as basis for the imposition of
any disciplinary action upon the erring employee. The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied where the
employer, in this case the Court, has reasonable ground to believe that the employee is responsible for the
misconduct and his participation therein renders him unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by his
position. 22
The following amply established the allegations of the complainant by substantial evidence:
First, the contents of Judge Castilla's letter-report, coupled with the affidavits of Annie, Anniesel and Mrs. Lebios,
point to one conclusion, i.e., Mrs. Duncano demanded from Annie and Anniesel the amount of PhP7,000 for
Nathaniel's cash bail bond.
Specifically, in his letter-report, Judge Castilla echoed the complaint of Annie and Anniesel regarding Mrs.
Duncano's act of demanding and collecting from them the amount of PhP7,000 for Nathaniel's cash bail bond.
According to Anita and Anniesel, they stated in their affidavit that they gave PhP7,000 to Mrs. Duncano, through
Mrs. Lebios. For her part, Mrs. Lebios confirmed that she handed the said amount to Mrs. Duncano.
Against these statements, Mrs. Duncano's rebuttal was merely in the form of a denial. Although she denied that she
personally received the amount of PhP7,000, Mrs. Duncano said that the cash bail bond was returned to the
Lamostes only after the court ordered the release of Nathaniel. In fact, Anita maintained that Anniesel repeatedly
followed-up with Mrs. Duncano the release of Nathaniel and the return of the money. Anniesel even went to Mrs.
Duncano's house, but the latter simply told her to "keep on waiting" Mrs. Duncano likewise told the Lamostes
23
that "she cannot as yet release the said money considering that the resolution of [Pros. Uy] has no approval yet of
City Pros. Guiritan. " Curiously, Mrs. Duncano failed to rebut these statements. If it was true that she did not have
24
the PhP7,000 in her possession, Mrs. Duncano could have easily told the Lamostes such fact. But she did not give
any explanation at all.
Even so, it is illogical to believe that Mrs. Duncano did not receive the cash bail bond, and yet, she was the one who
returned the same. In practice, the proper procedure in the handling of cash submitted or given to the
municipal court as bail bond is for the court to formally direct the clerk of court to officially receive the cash
and to immediately deposit it with the persons with whom a cash bail bond may be deposited namely: the
collector of internal revenue, or the provincial, city or municipal treasurer . 25
Thus, being the clerk of court; Mrs. Duncano had the duty to immediately deposit with authorized
government depositories the cash bail bond she had collected, because she is not authorized to keep funds
in her custody. Unfortunately, the records are bereft of any showing that Mrs. Duncano deposited the cash bail
26
bond. Apparently, she kept the amount for herself since she admitted that she was the one who personally returned
1âwphi1
it to the Lamostes. In her desperate attempt to exonerate herself, Mrs. Duncano could only impute malicious motive
to a certain Sheriff Demata, averring that he was the one who blew this issue out of proportion.
In view of Mrs. Duncano's acts, she clearly violated the provision of Sec. 7 (d) of R.A. No. 6713, which reads,
in part:
Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and employees
now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions
of any public official and employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(d) Solicitation or acceptance of gifts. - Public officials and employees shall not solicit or accept, directly or
indirectly, any gift, gratuity, favor, entertainment, loan or anything of monetary value from any person in the
course of their official duties or in connection with any operation being regulated by, or any transaction which
may be affected by the functions of their office. [Emphasis Supplied.]
As can be gleaned from the prohibition in Sec. 7(d), it is the commission of that act as defined by the law, and not
the character or effect thereof, that determines whether or not the provision has been violated. Therefore, it is
27
immaterial whether Mrs. Duncano received the money directly from the Lamostes or indirectly through Mrs.
Lebios; and whether she returned the cash bail bond to the Lamostes. What is material is that from the
circumstances of the case, Mrs. Duncano demanded, collected and received from the Lamostes the amount
of PhP7,000 purportedly to be applied to Nathaniel's bail bond.
Second, anent the lost· EPSON printer, Mrs. Duncano was not able to account for it. What she attached in one of
her pleadings is a photo of a printer with serial number DCAV 101692 But this is not the serial number· of the
28
printer which is the subject of Judge Castilla's complaint. Instead of explaining the whereabouts of the lost printer,
Mrs. Duncano blamed Sheriff Demata again. She claimed that Sheriff Demata "twisted the fact and made an issue
as to the serial number of the computer printer . . . the insidious sheriff made it appear as DCAV 101692 when he
personally reported it to the complainant." It has been held that the conduct of court personnel, must not only be,
29
but must also be perceived to be, free from any whiff of impropriety, both with respect to their duties in the judiciary
and to their behavior outside the court. This conduct, Mrs. Duncano failed to observe.
30
Finally, Mrs. Duncano should be reminded that the position of a clerk of court is an essential and ranking officer of
our judicial system who performs delicate administrative functions vital to the prompt and proper administration of
justice. A clerk of court's office is the nucleus of activities both adjudicative and administrative, performing, among
others, the functions of keeping the records and seal, issuing processes, entering judgments and orders and giving,
upon request, certified copies from the records. 31
As aptly explained by the Court in the case of Atty. Reyes-Domingo v. Morales, as thus:
"Owing to the delicate position occupied by clerks of court in the judicial system, they are required to be persons of
competence, honesty and probity since they are specifically imbued with the mandate of safeguarding the integrity
of the court and its proceedings, to earn and preserve respect therefor, to maintain loyalty thereto and to the judge
as superior officer, to maintain the authenticity and correctness of court records and to uphold the confidence of the
public in the administration of justice."
32
WHEREFORE, based on the evidence on record, We hereby ADOPT the findings and recommendations of the

Executive Judge Francisco F. Maclang, to the effect that respondent Mrs. Maria Luz A. Duncano is declared guilty
for conduct unbecoming of a court employee and is hereby SUSPENDED for two months.
29.) G.R. No. 216871
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner

vs.
MAYOR JULIUS CESAR VERGARA, Respondent
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
For this Court’s consideration is the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court dated April
6, 2015 of petitioner Office of the Ombudsman that seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision dated May 28, 2014
1
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 125841 rendering the penalty imposed in the Decision dated
2
February 7, 2006 and Review Order dated June 29, 2012 of petitioner Office of the Ombudsman against
3
respondent Mayor Julius Cesar Vergara (Mayor Vergara) for violation of Section 5 (a) of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
6713 inapplicable due to the doctrine of condonation.
The facts follow.
A complaint was filed by Bonifacio G. Garcia, on June 21, 2005 before petitioner's Office of the Environmental
Ombudsman against respondent Mayor Julius Cesar Vergara and then Vice-Mayor Raul Mendoza (Vice-Mayor
Mendoza). Respondent Mayor Vergara was then serving as Mayor of Cabanatuan City for his third term (2004-
2007).
According to the complainant, respondent Vergara and then Vice Mayor Mendoza maintained for quite a long
time an open burning dumpsite located at the boundaries of Barangays San Isidro and Valle Cruz in
Cabanatuan City, which has long been overdue for closure and rehabilitation. He claimed that the dumpsite is
now a four-storey high mountain of mixed garbage exposing the residents of at least eighty-seven (87) barangays of
Cabanatuan City to all toxic solid wastes. He further alleged that respondent Mayor Vergara and then Vice-Mayor
Mendoza ordered and permitted the littering and dumping of the solid wastes in the said area causing immeasurable
havoc to the health of the residents of Cabanatuan and that despite the enactment of R.A. 9003, respondent Mayor
Vergara and then Vice-Mayor Mendoza allowed and permitted the collection of non-segregated and unsorted
wastes. It was also alleged that respondent Mayor Vergara and then Vice-Mayor Mendoza ignored the complaints
from local residents and the letters from the authorities of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) and from the Commissioner of the National Solid Waste Management ordering them to comply
with the provisions of the said law.
In their Joint Counter-Affidavit, both respondent Mayor Vergara and then Vice-Mayor Mendoza denied that they
4
wilfully and grossly neglected the performance of their duties pursuant to R.A. 9003. They claimed that since 1999,
they were already aware about the growing problem of garbage collection in Cabanatuan City. They also contended
that even before the enactment of RA 9003, they have already prepared a master plan for the transfer of the city
dumpsite in Barangay Valle into an agreement with Lacto Asia Pacific Corporation for the establishment of Materials
Recovery Facility at the motorpool compound of Cabanatuan City as a permanent solution to the garbage problem.
Respondent Mayor Vergara was found guilty by Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer II Ismaela B.
Boco for violation of Section 5 (a) of R.A. No. 6713, or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees which provides that:
Section 5. Duties of Public Officials and Employees. - In the performance of their duties, all public officials
and employees are under obligation to:
(a) Act promptly on letter and requests - All public officials and employees shall, within fifteen (15) working
days from receipt thereof, respond to letters, telegrams or other means of communications sent by the
public. The reply must contain the action taken on the request.
As such, petitioner imposed a penalty on respondent which reads as follows:

x x x Accordingly, he is meted the penalty of Suspension for six (6) months from the government service pursuant to
Section 10, Rule III of the Administrative Order No. 07, this Office, in relation to Section 25 of Republic Act No.
6770.
It is further recommended that both respondents, JULIUS CESAR VERGARA and RAUL P. MENDOZA be
administratively liable for NEGLECT OF DUTY for failing to implement RA 9003. Accordingly, each of them is meted
the penalty of Suspension for six (6) months from the government service pursuant to Section 10, Rule III of the
Administrative Order No. 07, this Office, in relation to Section 25 of Republic Act No. 6770. 5
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the assailed decision that meted him the
penalty of suspension for six (6) months from government service cannot be implemented or enforced as
the same runs counter to the established doctrine of condonation, since he was reelected as Mayor of
Cabanatuan City on May 10, 2010.
The petitioner, in its Review Order dated June 29, 2012, affirmed the Decision dated February 7, 2006 but modified
the penalty imposed, thus:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Decision dated 7 February 2006 is hereby AFFIRMED with modification. The

penalty imposed on respondent-movant Julius Cesar V. Vergara for failure to act promptly on letters and requests is
reduced from six-month suspension to reprimand in light of the foregoing disquisition.
SO ORDERED. 6
Aggrieved, respondent filed a petition for review with the CA.
Respondent then filed a Motion and Manifestation dated May 16, 2013, which the CA noted, alleging that his re-
election as Mayor of Cabanatuan City in the May 2010 elections eliminated the break from his service as Mayor
and, thus, qualified his case for the application of the doctrine of condonation.
The CA, on May 28, 2014, granted respondent's petition. The CA ruled that there is no reason for it to reverse the
findings of the Office of the Ombudsman, however, the appellate court held that respondent may no longer be held
administratively liable for misconduct committed during his previous term based on the doctrine of condonation,
thus:
xxxx
Contrary to the ratiocination of the Office of the Ombudsman, the application of the doctrine does not require that
the official must be reelected to the same position in the immediately succeeding election. The Supreme Court's
rulings on the matter do not distinguish the precise timing or period when the misconduct was committed, reckoned
from the date of the official's reelection, except that it must be prior to said date. Thus, when the law does not
distinguish, the courts must not distinguish.
FOR THESE REASONS, the petition is GRANTED.
SO ORDERED. 7
Petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration contending that the re-election referred to in the doctrine of
condonation refers to the immediately succeeding election. The CA, in its Resolution dated February 5, 2015,
denied the motion for reconsideration.
Hence, the present petition with the following grounds:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT RESPONDENT MAY NO LONGER BE HELD
ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE FOR MISCONDUCT COMMITTED DURING HIS PREVIOUS TERM OF OFFICE
BASED ON THE DOCTRINE OF CONDON A TION.
II.
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE DOCTRINE OF CONDON A TI ON IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR,

PETITIONER RESPECTFULLY BESEECHES THIS HONORABLE COURT TO REEXAMINE SAID DOCTRINE IN
LIGHT OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION'S MANDATE THAT PUBLIC OFFICE IS A PUBLIC TRUST. 8
According to petitioner, the term re-election, as applied in the doctrine of condonation, is used to refer to an election
immediately preceding a term of office and it is not used to refer to a subsequent re-election following the three-term
limit break considering that it is an incumbent official serving the three-term limit break who is said to be seeking re-
election. It further argues that the factual circumstances of respondent do not warrant the application of the doctrine
of condonation considering that the same doctrine is applied only to cases where the subject public officials were
elected to the same position in the immediately succeeding election. Petitioner, likewise, contends that assuming
that the doctrine of condonation is applicable in this case, such doctrine contradicts the 1987 Constitution and the
present public policy.
In his Comment dated September 23, 2015, respondent insists that he did not violate any law and that if he is
indeed guilty of violating R.A. 9003, the doctrine of condonation must be applied by virtue of his re-election.
The petition lacks merit.
Basically, this Court is presented with the single issue of whether or not respondent is entitled to the doctrine of
condonation.
In November 10, 2015, this Court, in Conchita Carpio Morales v. CA and Jejomar Binay, Jr., extensively discussed
9
the doctrine of condonation and ruled that such doctrine has no legal authority in this jurisdiction. As held in the said
the decision:
The foundation of our entire legal system is the Constitution. It is the supreme law of the land; 10 thus, the
unbending rule is that every statute should be read in light of the Constitution. Likewise, the Constitution is a
11
framework of a workable government; hence, its interpretation must take into account the complexities, realities, and
politics attendant to the operation of the political branches of government. 12
As earlier intimated, Pascual was a decision promulgated in 1959. Therefore, it was decided within the context of
the 1935 Constitution which was silent with respect to public accountability, or of the nature of public office being a
public trust. The provision in the 1935 Constitution that comes closest in dealing with public office is Section 2,
Article II which states that "[t]he defense of the State is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this duty
all citizens may be required by law torender personal military or civil service." Perhaps owing to the 1935
13
Constitution's silence on public accountability, and considering the dearth of jurisprudential rulings on the matter, as
well as the variance in the policy considerations, there was no glaring objection confronting the Pascual Court in
adopting the condonation doctrine that originated from select US cases existing at that time.
With the advent of the 1973 Constitution, the approach in dealing with public officers underwent a significant
change. The new charter introduced an entire article on accountability of public officers, found in Article XIII. Section
1 thereof positively recognized, acknowledged, and declared that "[p]ublic office is a public trust." Accordingly,
"[p]ublic officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency,
and shall remain accountable to the people."
After the turbulent decades of Martial Law rule, the Filipino People have framed and adopted the 1987 Constitution,
which sets forth in the Declaration of Principles and State Policies in Article II that "[t]he State shall maintain honesty
and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures against graft and corruption." Learning
14
how unbridled power could corrupt public servants under the regime of a dictator, the Framers put primacy on the
integrity of the public service by declaring it as a constitutional principle and a State policy. More significantly, the
1987 Constitution strengthened and solidified what has been first proclaimed in the 1973 Constitution by
commanding public officers to be accountable to the people at all times:
Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the
people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency and act with patriotism and justice,
and lead modest lives.
In Belgica, it was explained that:
[t]he aphorism forged under Section 1, A1iicle XI of the 1987 Constitution, which states that "public office is a public
trust," is an overarching reminder that every instrumentality of government should exercise their official functions
only in accordance with the principles of the Constitution which embodies the parameters of the people's trust. The
notion of a public trust connotes accountability x x x.15
The same mandate is found in the Revised Administrative Code under the section of the Civil Service
Commission, and also, in the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.
16 17
For local elective officials like Binay, Jr., the grounds to discipline, suspend or remove an elective local official from
office are stated in Section 60 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the "Local Government Code of 1991"
18
(LGC), which was approved on October 10 1991, and took effect on January 1, 1992:
Section 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Action. - An elective local official may be disciplined, suspended, or removed
from office on any of the r following grounds:
(a) Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines;
(b) Culpable violation of the Constitution;
(c) Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, gross negligence, or dereliction of duty;
(d) Commission of any offense involving moral turpitude or an offense punishable by at least prision mayor;
(e) Abuse of authority;
(t) Unauthorized absence for fifteen (15) consecutive working days, except in the case of members of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlunsod, sanggunian bayan, and sangguniang barangay;
(g) Application for, or acquisition of, foreign citizenship or residence or the status of an immigrant of another
country; and
(h) Such other grounds as may be provided in this Code and other laws.
An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated above by order of the proper court.
Related to this provision is Section 40 (b) of the LGC which states that those removed from office as a result of an
administrative case shall be disqualified from running for any elective local position:
Section 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:
xxxx
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
xxxx
In the same sense, Section 52 (a) of the RRA CCS provides that the penalty of dismissal from service carries the
accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding public office:
Section 52. - Administrative Disabilities Inherent m Certain Penalties. -
The penalty of dismissal shall carry with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, perpetual
disqualification from holding public office, and bar from taking the civil service examinations.
In contrast, Section 66 (b) of the LGC states that the penalty of suspension shall not exceed the unexpired term of
the elective local official nor constitute a bar to his candidacy for as long as he meets the qualifications required for
the office. Note, however, that the provision only pertains to the duration of the penalty and its effect on the official’s
candidacy. Nothing therein states that the administrative liability therefor is extinguished by the fact of re-election:
Section 66. Form and Notice of Decision. – x x x.
xxxx
(b) The penalty of suspension shall not exceed the unexpired term of the respondent or a period of six (6) months
for every administrative offense, nor shall said penalty be a bar to the candidacy of the respondent so suspended as
long as he meets the qualifications required for the office.
Reading the 1987 Constitution together with the above-cited legal provisions now leads this Court to the
conclusion that the doctrine of condonation is actually bereft of legal bases.
To begin with, the concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary requirement of accountability
to the people at all times, as mandated under the 1987 Constitution, is plainly inconsistent with the idea that
an elective local official’s administrative liability for a misconduct committed during a prior term can be
wiped off by the fact that he was elected to a second term of office, or even another elective post. Election
is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense, and there is simply no constitutional or statutory
basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion that an official elected for a different term is folly absolved of
any administrative liability arising from an offense done during a prior term. In this jurisdiction, liability arising
from administrative offenses may be condoned by the President in light of Section 19, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution which was interpreted in Llamas v. Orbos to apply to administrative offenses:
19
x x x The Constitution does not distinguish between which cases executive clemency may be exercised by the
President, with the sole exclusion of impeachment cases. By the same token, if executive clemency may be
exercised only in criminal cases, it would indeed be unnecessary to provide for the exclusion of impeachment cases
from the coverage of Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution. Following petitioner's proposed interpretation, cases
of impeachment are automatically excluded inasmuch as the same do not necessarily involve criminal offenses.
In the same vein, We do not clearly see any valid and convincing, reason why the President cannot grant executive
clemency in administrative cases. It is Our considered view that if the President can grant reprieves, commutations
and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reason can she grant executive
clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than criminal offenses.
Also, it cannot be inferred from Section 60 of the LGC that the grounds for discipline enumerated therein cannot
anymore be invoked against an elective local official to hold him administratively liable once he is re-elected to
office. In fact, Section 40 (b) of the LGC precludes condonation since in the first place, an elective local official who
is meted with the penalty of removal could not be re-elected to an elective local position due to a direct
disqualification from running for such post. In similar regard, Section 52 (a) of the RRACCS imposes a penalty of
perpetual disqualification from holding public office as an accessory to the penalty of dismissal from service.
To compare, some of the cases adopted in Pascual were decided by US State jurisdictions wherein the doctrine of
condonation of administrative liability was supported by either a constitutional or statutory provision stating, in effect,
that an officer cannot be removed by a misconduct committed during a previous term, or that the disqualification to
20
hold the office does not extend beyond the term inwhich the official's delinquency occurred. In one case, the
21 22
absence of a provision against the re-election of an officer removed - unlike Section 40 (b) of the LGC-was the
justification behind condonation. In another casc, it was deemed that condonation through re-election was a policy
23
under their constitution - which adoption in this jurisdiction runs counter to our present Constitution's requirements
on public accountability. There was even one case where the doctrine of condonation was not adjudicated upon but
only invoked by a party as a ground; while in another case, which was not reported in full in the official series, the
24
crux of the disposition was that the evidence of a prior irregularity in no way pertained to the charge at issue and
therefore, was deemed to be incompetent. Hence, owing to either their variance or inapplicability, none of these
25
cases can be used as basis for the continued adoption of the condonation doctrine under our existing laws.
At best, Section 66 (b) of the LGC prohibits the enforcement of the penalty of suspension beyond the unexpired
portion of the elective local official's prior term, and likewise allows said official to still run for reelection This
treatment is similar to People ex rel Bagshaw v. Thompson and Montgomery v. Novell both cited in Pascual,
26 27
wherein it was ruled that an officer cannot be suspended for a misconduct committed during a prior term. However,
as previously stated, nothing in Section 66 (b) states that the elective local official's administrative liability is
extinguished by the fact of re-election. Thus, at all events, no legal provision actually supports the theory that the
liability is condoned.
Relatedly it should be clarified that there is no truth in Pascual’s postulation that the courts would be
depriving the electorate of their right to elect their officers if condonation were not to be sanctioned. In
political law, election pertains to the process by which a particular constituency chooses an individual to
hold a public office. In this jurisdiction, there is, again, no legal basis to conclude that election
automatically implies condonation. Neither is there any legal basis to say that every democratic and
republican state has an inherent regime of condonation. If condonation of an elective official’s
administrative liability would perhaps, be allowed in this jurisdiction, then the same should have been
provided by law under our governing legal mechanisms. May it be at the time of Pascual or at present, by no
means has it been shown that such a law, whether in a constitutional or statutory provision, exists. Therefore,
inferring from this manifest absence, it cannot be said that the electorate’s will has been abdicated.
Equally infirm is Pascual’s proposition that the electorate, when reelecting a local official, are assumed to have done
so with knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had
been guilty of any. Suffice it to state that no such presumption exists in any statute or procedural rule. Besides, it is
28
contrary to human experience that the electorate would have full knowledge of a public official's misdeeds. The
Ombudsman correctly points out the reality that most corrupt acts by public officers are shrouded in secrecy, and
concealed from the public. Misconduct committed by an elective official is easily covered up, and is almost always
unknown to the electorate when they cast their votes. At a conceptual level, condonation presupposes that the
29
condoner has actual knowledge of what is to be condoned. Thus, there could be no condonation of an act that is
unknown. As observed in Walsh v. City Council of Trenton decided by the New Jersey Supreme Court:
30
Many of the cases holding that re-election of a public official prevents his removal for acts done in a preceding term
of office are reasoned out on the theory of condonation. We cannot subscribe to that theory because condonation,
1âwphi1
implying as it does forgiveness, connotes knowledge and in the absence of knowledge there can be no
condonation. One cannot forgive something of which one has no knowledge.
That being said, this Court simply finds no legal authority to sustain the condonation doctrine in this
jurisdiction. As can be seen from this discourse, it was a doctrine adopted from one class of US rulings way back
in 1959 and thus, out of touch from - and now rendered obsolete by - the current legal regime. In consequence, it is
high time for this Court to abandon the condonation doctrine that originated from Pascual, and affirmed in the cases
following the same, such as Aguinaldo, Salalima, Mayor Garcia, and Governor Garcia, Jr. which were all relied upon
by the CA.
The above ruling, however, was explicit in its pronouncement that the abandonment of the doctrine of condonation
is prospective in application, hence, the same doctrine is still applicable in cases that transpired prior to the ruling of
this Court in Carpio Morales v. CA and Jejomar Binay, Jr. Thus: 31
It should, however, be clarified that this Court's abandonment of the condonation doctrine should be prospective in
application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution, until reversed,
shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. Unto this Court devolves the sole authority to interpret what
32
the Constitution means, and all persons are bound to follow its interpretation. As explained in De Castro v. Judicial
Bar Council. 33
Judicial decisions assume the same authority as a statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily
become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria that must control the actuations, not only of those called
upon to abide by them, but also of those duty-bound to enforce obedience to them. 34
Hence, while the future may ultimately uncover a doctrine’s error, it should be, as a general rule, recognized as
"good law" prior to its abandonment. Consequently, the people’s reliance thereupon should be respected. The
landmark case on this matter is People v. Jabinal, wherein it was ruled:
35
[W]hen a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied
prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.
Later, in Spouses Benzonan v. CA, it was further elaborated:

36
[Pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code "judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall
form a part of the legal system of the Philippines." But while our decisions form part of the law of the land, they are
also subject to Article 4 of the Civil Code which provides that "laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the
contrary is provided." This is expressed in the familiar legal maxim lex prospicit, non respicit, the law looks forward
not backward. The rationale against retroactivity is easy to perceive. The retroactive application of a law usually
divests rights that have already become vested or impairs the obligations of contract and hence, is unconstitutional. 37
Indeed, the lessons of history teach us that institutions can greatly benefit from hindsight and rectify its ensuing
course. Thus, while it is truly perplexing to think that a doctrine which is barren of legal anchorage was able to
1âwphi1
endure in our jurisprudence for a considerable length of time, this Court, under a new membership, takes up the
cudgels and now abandons the condonation doctrine.
Considering that the present case was instituted prior to the abovecited ruling of this Court, the doctrine of
condonation may still be applied.
It is the contention of the petitioner that the doctrine of condonation cannot be applied in this case, since there was a
gap in the re-election of the respondent. It must be remembered that the complaint against respondent was filed on
June 21, 2005, or during the latter's third term as Mayor (2004- 2007) and was only re-elected as Mayor in 2010.
According to petitioner, for the doctrine to apply, the respondent should have been re-elected in the same position in
the immediately succeeding election.
This Court finds petitioner's contention unmeritorious.
The application of the doctrine does not require that the official must be re-elected to the same position in the
immediately succeeding election. In Giron v. Ochoa, the Court recognized that the doctrine can be applied to a
38
public officer who was elected to a different position provided that it is shown that the body politic electing
the person to another office is the same. Thus, the Court ruled:
On this issue, considering the ratio decidendi behind the doctrine, the Court agrees with the interpretation of the
administrative tribunalsbelow that the condonation doctrine applies to a public official elected to another office. The
underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms. Thus, in Carpio-Morales, the basic considerations
are the following: first, the penalty of removal may not be extended beyond the term in which the public officer was
elected for each term is separate and distinct; second, an elective official's re-election serves as a condonation of
previous misconduct, thereby cutting the right to remove him therefor; and third, courts may not deprive the
electorate, who are assumed to have known the life and character of candidates, of their right to elect officers. In
this case, it is a given fact that the body politic, who elected him to another office, was the same.
From the above ruling of this Court, it is apparent that the most important consideration in the doctrine of
condonation is the fact that the misconduct was done on a prior term and that the subject public official
was eventually re-elected by the same body politic. It is inconsequential whether the said re-election be on
another public office or on an election year that is not immediately succeeding the last, as long as the
electorate that re-elected the public official be the same. In this case, the respondent was re-elected as
mayor by the same electorate that voted for him when the violation was committed. As such, the doctrine of
condonation is applied and the CA did not err in so ruling.
WHEREFORE, Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court dated April 6, 2015 of petitioner
Office of the Ombudsman is DENIED. Consequently, the Decision dated May 28, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 125841 is AFFIRMED
30.) G.R. No. 192723, June 05, 2017
LEOVIGILDO A. DE CASTRO, Petitioner, v. FIELD INVESTIGATION OFFICE, OFFICE OF THE

OMBUDSMAN AND THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, Respondents.
DECISION
CAGUIOA, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 (Petition) filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court against
the Decision2 dated April 29, 2009 (Assailed Decision) and Resolution3 dated June 23, 2010 (Assailed
Resolution) in CA-G.R. SP No. 99752 rendered by the Second Division of the Court of Appeals (CA).
The Assailed Decision and Resolution stem from an appeal from the Decision4 dated March 26, 2007
rendered by the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) in OMB-C-A-05-0617-K, finding petitioner
Leovigildo A. De Castro (Leovigildo) guilty of Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct, and imposing upon
him the penalty of dismissal from service, cancellation of civil service eligibility, forfeiture of
retirement benefits, and perpetual disqualification from re-employment in the government service.
The administrative charges filed against Leovigildo are anchored on his alleged failure to
file truthful Statements of Assets and Liabilities (SALNs) for the years 1994, 1995 and
1996, and explain the manifest disproportion between his declared income for the years
1973 to 2004 and the value of the assets he acquired within the same period.5
The Facts
Leovigildo began working in the Bureau of Customs (BOC) on December 4, 19736 as storekeeper at
the Manila International Airport.7 Since then, Leovigildo had been assigned to occupy the following
positions:8
Year of Assignment Position

1979 Common Bonded Inspector
1980 Common Bonded Supervisor
1986 Customs Operations Assistant Chief
1989 Supervising Customs Operations Officer
1996 Chief Customs Operations Officer
Marina Rios (Marina), Leovigildo's wife, also served in government. Sometime in July 1969, Marina
began working as a clerk in the now defunct Philippine Atomic Energy Commission.9 Thereafter,
Marina rose through the ranks, until she retired as a training officer sometime in 1988.10
Based on the Certificates of Employment and Compensation which form part of the records of the
case, Leovigildo and Marina's declared income from 1974 to 2004 amounted to P10,841,412.28.11
Sometime in 2003, the Ombudsman, through its Field Investigation Office (FIO), conducted motu
proprio lifestyle checks on government officials and employees.12 Leovigildo was among those
evaluated. The findings of the FIO in respect of Leovigildo's assets and net worth are summarized as
follows:
Documents revealed that [Leovigildo] earns primarily from his salary as an employee of the [BOC].
[Leovigildo's] annual salary as of 2004 is estimated at [P]303,052.54, including allowances and
bonuses.
[Leovigildo's] [SALN] from 1994 to 2003 showed that neither he nor his spouse had financial
connections and business interests. Thus, [Leovigildo] [had] no other source of income except his
salary from employment.
[Leovigildo], in his SALN from 1997 to 2003, declared a residential house and lot in Parañaque, a
house and lot in Taal[,] Batangas, and an agricultural land in Laguna. [Leovigildo] also disclosed that
he acquired a car worth [P]625,000.00 in 2002.
Records show that there are other properties and business interests belonging to [Leovigildo] which
were not declared in his SALNs such as his investments amounting to P416,669.00 in Lemar Export
and Import Corporation, which was incorporated on 25 May 1994.
There are also properties registered under the name (sic) of [Leovigildo's] children, which should be
considered as part of his undisclosed assets, in view of the fact that during the time of the
acquisition, the children have (sic) no sources of income or means of livelihood of their own.13
The assets in the names of Leovigildo's children (Disputed Assets), which FIO alleged should be
attributed to Leovigildo, are further summarized as follows:14
Date of Age at
Asset Acquisition Cost Registered Owner
Acquisition Acquisition
Investment in Lemar Export P625,003.50 May 25, 1994 Marina Rose and Leo Marina Rose -
and Import Corporation Gerald, jointly with 18
(Lemar Corp.) Leovigildo Leo Gerald -24
450 square-meter (sq. m.) P5,708,600.0015 December 3, Leo Gerald 27
residential house and lot in 1997
Muntinlupa City
Investment in De Castro P500,000.00 February 28, Leo Gerald 28
Oral Implant Center 1998
Condominium unit in P3,984,929.75 August 28, Leo Gerald 28
Makati City 1998
Investment in Lemar P3,500,000.0016 February 2, Leo Gerald Leo Gerald -29
General Trading (Lemar 1999 Marie Aleli (Aleli) Aleli -28
Trading) Marie Antoinette Antoinette- 26
(Antoinette) Leovigildo, Jr.
Leovigildo, Jr. -24
Marina Rose Marina Rose-
23
Condominium unit in Ayala P5,676,861.64 July 8, 1999 Leovigildo, Jr. 24
Alabang, Muntinlupa City
Toyota Land Cruiser P2,800,000.00 June 19, 2000 Leo Gerald 30
Investment in Ceraco P120,000.00 December 19, Leovigildo, Jr. 26
Corporation (Ceraco) 2001
Investment in Le Mar P100,000.00 January 21, Marina Rose 27
Dental Clinic 2003
Honda CRV Wagon P701,832.00 on February 27, Marina Rose 28
installment basis 2004
Total Value P23,717,226.89
In addition to Leovigildo's alleged undisclosed assets and investments, the FIO also found that based
on Bureau of Immigration (BI) records, Leovigildo and his family had taken seventy (70) outbound
flights between 1993-2004 to several countries, including Japan, Hong Kong and South Korea. The
FIO pegged the cost of such trips at P30,000.00 each, bringing the De Castros' total estimated travel
cost to P2,100,000.00.17
Consequently, the FIO concluded that Leovigildo and Marina's assets and expenses from 1974-2004
amounted to P30,829,603.48,18 and found that this was manifestly disproportionate to their declared
income of P10,841,412.28.19
Proceedings before the Ombudsman
Subsequently, the FIO filed a Complaint20 dated October 5, 2005 before the Ombudsman, charging
Leovigildo of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service, pursuant to Section 22 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No.
29221 (Omnibus Rules).22 In the same Complaint, FIO prayed that (i) a preliminary investigation be
conducted against Leovigildo for violation of Section 8 of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 671323 and Article
183 of the Revised Penal Code;24 and (ii) forfeiture proceedings be lodged against Leovigildo, Marina,
and their children.25
On March 24, 2006, the Ombudsman issued an Order placing Leovigildo under preventive
suspension.26
In his Counter-Affidavit27 dated August 28, 2006, Leovigildo maintained that the assets which he and
Marina acquired while in government service were all reported in their respective SALNs. Leovigildo
summarized these assets accordingly:
Income from 1974 to 2004 P10,841,412.28

Less: Properties acquired (at acquisition cost):

- House and [lot], Paranaque P381,536.59
- House and lot at Taal, Batangas 135,000.00
- Agricultural land, Sta. Maria, Laguna 30,000.00
- Toyota Premio 500,000.00
- Other personal properties 530,000.00
P1,576,536.59
Expenses:

- Cash donation to Leo Gerald, 1995 P1,000,000.00
- Wedding gift to Leo Gerald and Angelica Beatriz, 1998 250,000.00
P1,250,000.00 (2,826,536.59)

Available funds for family/other expenses P8,014,875.69

Less: Cash on hand [as of] December 31, 2004 115,000.00

Actual family and other expenses P7,899,875.69 28
Based on these figures, Leovigildo averred that the net value of the assets he and Marina acquired
for the period in question amounts only to P1,576,536.59.29 Further, he also argued that FIO bloated
his net worth by using the market values of the properties declared in his SALNs as basis for their
computation, instead of using their respective acquisition costs.30
Leovigildo also insisted that his children are all professionals who possess the financial capacity to
acquire the Disputed Assets that FIO wrongfully attributed to him.31 He then proceeded to detail his
children's professional qualifications to bolster his defense:
Acquisition
Degree Sources of Income
of license
Leo Gerald Leo Gerald 1994 (i) service in various dental clinics; (ii) service in own
Dentistry, clinic at the Medical Plaza, Makati; (iii) service as
Centro Escolar professor at Our Lady of Fatima University; (iv) service as
University company dentist at Global Lighting Phils., Inc.; (v) rental
income from clinic space; and (vi) sales income from
Lemar Trading32
Leovigildo, Law, Ateneo Jr. 2000 (i) service as associate for Quasha Ancheta Pena and
Jr. de Manila Nolasco Law Office; (ii) service as Chief Legal Counsel
University of Philippine Power Distributors Investment Corporation;
(iii) service as External Legal Counsel of Seed Capital
Ventures Inc.; and (iv) service as Special Consultant for
P.A. Garcia Law Office33
Aleli Medicine, 1997 (i) service as resident trainee and medical officer at East
University of Avenue Medical Center; (ii) service as general obstetrics
Sto. Tomas and gynecology practitioner at San Jose District Hospital
and Fortmed Medical Clinic in Sta. Rosa, Laguna; and (iii)
service as gynecologic oncologist at Philippine General
Hospital34
Antoinette Medicine, 1998 Service as gastroenterologist at the Institute of Digestive
University of Diseases, St. Luke's Medical Center in Quezon City35
Sto. Tomas
Marina Rose Dentistry, Rose 1999 (i) service in various dental clinics; (ii) service in own
University of clinic in Carmona, Cavite; and (iii) service as company
the East dentist for Provident Apparel International Manufacturing
Corporation36
Finally, Leovigildo denied FIO's claims regarding his family's foreign trips, emphasizing that the
documents which serve as basis for these claims were not attached to the Complaint.37
On March 26, 2007, the Ombudsman issued a Decision finding Leovigildo guilty of the administrative
charges against him. The relevant portion of said Decision reads:
[R]espondent LEOVIGILDO DE CASTRO is hereby found GUILTY of DISHONESTY and GRAVE

MISCONDUCT and is meted the corresponding penalty of DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE and shall
carry with it the cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits and perpetual
disqualification for re-employment in the government service.38
The Ombudsman observed that while Leovigildo admits that he and his wife acquired a house and lot
in Taal, Batangas through inheritance in 1969, and subsequently purchased a 197.6 sq. m.
contiguous lot and built a house thereon in 1973 and 1988, respectively, these assets were not
reported in his 1994, 1995 and 1996 SALNs.39 Leovigildo also failed to report that his wife won
P2,000,000.00 from the sweepstakes in 1994.40
In addition, the Ombudsman found that while Leovigildo's children were all practicing professionals at
the time of the investigation, the documentary evidence on record show that the cost of the Disputed
Assets were grossly disproportionate to their respective incomes at the time of acquisition.41 Thus,
the Ombudsman concluded that Leovigildo deliberately placed the Disputed Assets in the names of
his children to exclude them from his SALNs.42 According to the Ombudsman, such deliberate
exclusion, coupled with the fact that the acquisition cost of the Disputed Assets were manifestly out
of proportion to Leovigildo and Marina's declared income, gave rise to the prima facie presumption
that these assets were unlawfully acquired.43
Leovigildo filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR) dated May 2, 2007, which the Ombudsman denied
on June 25, 2007 for lack of merit.44
Proceedings before the CA
On August 1, 2007, Leovigildo filed an appeal (Appeal) before the CA via Rule 43, ascribing both
errors of fact and law to the Ombudsman.
Leovigildo questioned the Ombudsman's authority to directly review his SALNs, arguing
that under Section 10 of R.A. 6713, it is the Commissioner of Customs who is vested with
authority to review the SALNs filed by the employees of the BOC. 45
Further, Leovigildo insisted that the Ombudsman's findings were not supported by substantial
evidence.46 While Leovigildo admitted that he failed to report his Taal assets in his 1994, 1995 and
1996 SALNs, he claimed that such failure was an honest mistake which he voluntarily rectified in his
succeeding SALNs.47 Moreover, Leovigildo argued he did not report Marina's sweepstakes winnings in
his 1994 SALN as these are not among the assets required to be reported thereunder.48
In any case, Leovigildo maintained that under BOC guidelines,49 the penalty prescribed for failure to
file or correct an erroneous SALN is only suspension for a period of one (1) month and one (1) day to
six (6) months on the first instance and dismissal from service on the second instance. Moreover,
such offense does not constitute Dishonesty or Gross Misconduct.50
On April 29, 2009, the CA rendered the Assailed Decision dismissing the Appeal. The dispositive
portion of said Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DISMISSED. Accordingly, the assailed
Decision and Order of the Ombudsman STAND.
SO ORDERED.51
The CA held that the Ombudsman possesses ample authority to review Leovigildo's SALN pursuant to
its Constitutional mandate.52
Anent Leovigildo's claim that the omissions in his 1994, 1995 and 1996 SALNs were not impelled by
any malicious intent, the CA stressed that Leovigildo's liability rests not only on the basis of such
omissions, but primarily on his failure to explain the manifest disproportion between his declared
income and the assets in his name, and in the names of his children.53 In this connection, the CA
found the Ombudsman's findings were supported by "more than [a] substantial amount" of evidence,
and thus found no reason to overturn the same.54
Aggrieved, Leovigildo filed an MR on May 22, 2009. The CA denied said MR through the Assailed
Resolution,55 which was subsequently received by Leovigildo on July 5, 2010.56
On July 19, 2010, Leovigildo filed a Motion for Extension of Time, praying for an additional period of
fifteen (15) days within which to file his petition for review on certiorari before the Court.
Finally, Leovigildo filed the present Petition on August 2, 2010.
The Issue
The sole issue for this Court's resolution is whether the CA erred in affirming the Assailed
Decision and Resolution finding Leovigildo administratively liable for Dishonesty and Grave
Misconduct.
The Court's Ruling
As a general rule, only questions of law may be raised in petitions filed under Rule 45.57 However,
there are recognized exceptions to this general rule, namely:
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of
discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the
findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went
beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and
the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts
set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked
certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion. x x x58 (Emphasis supplied)
The allegations in the Petition invoke the third, fourth, fifth and eighth exceptions above, and call on
this Court to review the findings of the Ombudsman in the Assailed Decision, which were in turn
affirmed by the CA.
The Petition is granted, in part. The Court finds that while the CA correctly ruled that Leovigildo's acts
constitute Dishonesty, it erred when it further held that such acts also constitute Grave Misconduct.
Accordingly, the Court finds sufficient basis to warrant the modification of the Assailed Decision in
this respect.
The Ombudsman possesses sufficient

authority to undertake a direct review
of Leovigildo's SALN
Leovigildo claims that he does not question the general authority of the Ombudsman to investigate
and prosecute erring public officials and employees. However, he submits that Section 10 of R.A.
6713 vests upon heads of executive departments the specific and direct authority to review their
subordinates' SALNs. Proceeding therefrom, Leovigildo alleges that the review, investigation and
corrective action taken by the Ombudsman collectively constitute a violation of R.A. 6713, an
encroachment of the authority of the Commissioner of Customs,59 and a blatant disregard of the
latter's guidelines prescribing the review and compliance procedure for the submission of SALNs
governing the employees and officials of the BOC.60 Leovigildo is mistaken.
Section 10 of R.A. 6713 provides:
Section 10. Review and Compliance Procedure. — (a) The designated Committees of both Houses of
the Congress shall establish procedures for the review of statements to determine whether said
statements have been submitted on time, are complete, and are in proper form. In the event a
determination is made that a statement is not so filed, the appropriate Committee shall so inform the
reporting individual and direct him to take the necessary corrective action.
(b) In order to carry out their responsibilities under this Act, the designated Committees of both
Houses of the Congress shall have the power, within their respective jurisdictions, to render any
opinion interpreting this Act, in writing, to persons covered by this Act, subject in each instance to
the approval by affirmative vote of the majority of the particular House concerned.
The individual to whom an opinion is rendered, and any other individual involved in a similar factual
situation, and who, after issuance of the opinion acts in good faith in accordance with it shall not be
subject to any sanction provided in this Act.
(c) The heads of other offices shall perform the duties stated in subsections (a) and (b)
hereof insofar as their respective offices are concerned, subject to the approval of the
Secretary of Justice, in the case of the Executive Department and the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, in the case of the Judicial Department. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 10 of R.A. 6713 vests upon heads of executive departments the authority to ensure
faithful compliance with the SALN requirement. However, it does not strip the Ombudsman
of its sole power to investigate and prosecute, motu proprio or upon complaint of any
person, any public official or employee for acts or omissions which appear to be illegal,
unjust, improper, or inefficient.61 The Court's ruling in Carabeo v. Sandiganbayan62 is instructive:
True, Section 10 of R.A. 6713 provides that when the head of office finds the SALN of a subordinate
incomplete or not in the proper form such head of office must call the subordinate's attention to such
omission and give him the chance to rectify the same. But this procedure is an internal office
matter. Whether or not the head of office has taken such step with respect to a particular
subordinate cannot bar the Office of the Ombudsman from investigating the latter. Its
power to investigate and prosecute erring government officials cannot be made dependent
on the prior action of another office. To hold otherwise would be to diminish its
constitutionally guarded independence.63 (Emphasis supplied)
The fact that Leovigildo had not been previously placed under a BOC sanctioned investigation does
not make the Ombudsman's acts void or premature, as the latter's power to investigate and
prosecute him on account of discrepancies in his SALNs stands independent of the power of the
Commissioner of Customs to ensure compliance with the SALN requirement within the BOC.
Leovigildo 's acts do not constitute

Grave Misconduct
Leovigildo's administrative liability primarily rests on his failure to faithfully comply with the SALN
requirement, and the acquisition of assets manifestly disproportionate to his lawful income. These
acts, while undoubtedly inimical to public service, do not constitute Grave Misconduct.
Misconduct has been defined as an intentional wrongdoing or a deliberate violation of a rule of law or
standard of behavior.64 Misconduct is grave where the elements of corruption, a clear intent to violate
the law, or a flagrant disregard of established rules are present.65 To constitute Misconduct, the act or
omission complained of must have a direct relation to the public officer's duties and affect not on]y
his character as a private individual, but also, and more importantly, the performance of his official
duties as a public servant.66
Hence, to hold Leovigildo liable for Grave Misconduct, the acts and omissions for which he was
charged must be of such character as to have had an effect on his duties as Chief Customs
Operations Officer. The Court finds that such is not the case. The Court's ruling in Gupilan-Aguilar v.
Office of the Ombudsman67 is in point:
Owning properties disproportionate to one's salary and not declaring them in the corresponding
SALNs cannot, without more, be classified as grave misconduct. Even if these allegations were
true, we cannot see our way clear how the fact of non-declarations would have a bearing
on the performance of functions by petitioner Aguilar, as Customs Chief of the
Miscellaneous Division, and by petitioner Hernandez, as Customs Operations Officer. It
is non-sequitur to assume that the omission to declare has served, in some way, to hinder the
rendition of sound public service for there is no direct relation or connection between the two.
Without a nexus between the act complained of and the discharge of duty, the charge of grave
misconduct shall necessarily fail.68 (Emphasis supplied)
Nevertheless, Leovigildo cannot be completely absolved of liability.
There exists substantial evidence on

record to hold Leovigildo liable for
Dishonesty.
To counter the charge of Dishonesty, Leovigildo argues that the Ombudsman's findings are grounded
entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures, and that the CA, in turn, failed to appreciate
important facts which, if properly considered, will justify a reversal of the Ombudsman's findings.69 In
particular, Leovigildo adopts the allegations in his Appeal and asserts that the Ombudsman (i) failed
to attach the BI records which supposedly prove that he and his family had taken seventy (70)
foreign trips while he was in government service,70 and (ii) glossed over his children's professional
qualifications, as well as other circumstances which prove that they each had the financial capacity to
legitimately acquire the Disputed Assets which were attributed to him.71
After a perusal of the Ombudsman's submissions, the Court finds that the disputed BI records which
serve as the latter's proof of the De Castros' alleged foreign trips do not form part of the records of
the case. The value the Ombudsman used to quantify the cost of these alleged trips (P30,000.00 for
each trip) was a "conservative estimate"72 which the latter appears to have arbitrarily assigned for
expediency.
Before a foreign trip taken by a public officer can be considered as proof of unexplained wealth, it
shall be first necessary to establish that the cost thereof is, in fact, manifestly disproportionate to the
latter's lawful income. Thus, in Pleyto v. PNP-Criminal Investigation and Detection Group,73 the Court
refused to consider the foreign trips alleged to have been taken by respondent therein as proof of
unexplained wealth for failure of the complainant therein to establish that the cost of these trips were
beyond the former's capacity to pay, hence:
The travel records from the BID could only establish the details on the trips taken by petitioner and
his wife, specifically, the dates of departure and arrival, the destination, and the frequency thereof.
Even these details were at times incomplete or contradictory. x x x It appears to this Court that
complete reliance was made on the travel records provided by the BID. No further effort was exerted
to complete the travel information of petitioner and his wife and clarify or reconcile confusing entries.
It is a long jump to conclude just from the BID travel records that the foreign travels taken by
petitioner and his wife were beyond their financial capacity. As this Court has already found,
petitioner had other sources of lawful income apart from his salary as a public official. His wife was
also earning substantial income from her businesses. Now the question is, whether the petitioner and
his wife could afford all their trips abroad considering their combined income.
Obviously, before this question can be answered, the cost of the trips must be initially
determined. The investigating officers of the PNP-CIDG estimated the cost of each trip to
be P100,000.00, an estimation subsequently adopted by the Office of the Ombudsman and
the Court of Appeals. This Court, though, cannot simply affirm such estimation.
x x x The investigating officers, in fixing the amount of all the foreign trips at P100,000.00
each, offered no explanation or substantiation for the same. With utter lack of basis, the
figure of P100,000.00 as cost for each foreign travel is random and arbitrary and, thus,
unacceptable to this Court. Without a reasonable estimation of the costs of the foreign
travels of petitioner and his wife, there is no way to determine whether these were within
their lawful income.74 (Emphasis supplied)
Proceeding therefrom, the Court finds that the CA erred when it considered the Ombudsman's
findings regarding the De Castros' alleged foreign trips as established facts, in the absence of
substantial evidence showing that such trips were in fact taken, and that it was reasonable to peg the
total cost of these trips at P2,100,000.00.
Nevertheless, the Court still finds that substantial evidence exists on record to hold Leovigildo guilty
of Dishonesty for having acquired assets manifestly disproportionate to his lawful income, and
concealing the same by deliberately placing them in the names of his children.
Sections 7 and 8 of R.A. 301975 spells out the SALN requirement and lays down its scope. These
provisions state:
Section 7. Statement of Assets and Liabilities. — Every public officer, within thirty days after
assuming office and, thereafter, on or before the fifteenth day of April following the close of every
calendar year, as well as upon the expiration of his term of office, or upon his resignation or
separation from office, shall prepare and file with the office of the corresponding Department Head,
or in the case of Head of Department or Chief of an independent office, with the Office of the
President, a true, detailed and sworn statement of assets and liabilities, including a statement of the
amounts and sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the
amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year: Provided, That public officers
assuming office less than two months before the end of the calendar year, may file their first
statement on or before the fifteenth day of April following the close of the said calendar year.
Section 8. Prima facie evidence of and dismissal due to unexplained wealth. — If in accordance with
the provisions of Republic Act Numbered One thousand three hundred seventy-nine, a public
official has been found to have acquired during his incumbency, whether in his name or in
the name of other persons, an amount of property and/or money manifestly out of
proportion to his salary and to his other lawful income, that fact shall be ground for
dismissal or removal. Properties in the name of the spouse and dependents of such public official
may be taken into consideration, when their acquisition through legitimate means cannot be
satisfactorily shown. Bank deposits in the name of or manifestly excessive expenditures incurred by
the public official, his spouse or any of their dependents including but not limited to activities in any
club or association or any ostentatious display of wealth including frequent travel abroad of a non-
official character by any public official when such activities entail expenses evidently out of proportion
to legitimate income, shall likewise be taken into consideration in the enforcement of this section,
notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary. The circumstances hereinabove mentioned shall
constitute valid ground for the administrative suspension of the public official concerned for an
indefinite period until the investigation of the unexplained wealth is completed. (Emphasis supplied)
While mere omission from or misdeclaration in one's SALN per se do not constitute
Dishonesty, an omission or misdeclaration qualifies as such offense when it is attended
with malicious intent to conceal the truth, 76 as Dishonesty implies a disposition to lie,
cheat, deceive, or defraud. 77
Here, Leovigildo's malicious intent to conceal the Disputed Assets is evident. Leovigildo
deliberately placed the Disputed Assets in the names of his children for the purpose of
concealing the same. While Leovigildo maintains that his children had the financial
capacity to acquire the Disputed Assets, the evidence on record clearly show otherwise. As
painstakingly explained by the CA:
Remarkably, as can be gleaned from the records, albeit at present they are all lucratively employed,
[Leovigildo's] children were able to acquire real and personal properties despite the fact
that at the time of the said properties' acquisition they had no financial capacity to do so.
[Leovigildo] failed to convince [the CA] to overturn the factual findings of the Ombudsman on this
matter which is notably supported by a more than substantial amount of evidence.
For one, LEO GERALD, his eldest son, is the registered owner of a condominium unit located in
Makati City which was acquired in 1995 through installment basis and fully paid in 1998 in the total
amount of P3,984,929.75. The terms of payment which were purportedly undertaken by LEO
GERALD in the purchase of the aforesaid unit are the following:
1. [O]n 1 September 1994, LEO GERALD paid P100,000.[00];
2. [H]e paid P447,323.96 per month for three [3] months starting October 1994 to December
1994 or a total of P1,341,971.90; P90,123.24 per month for 24 months starting January 1995
to November 1996 or a total of P2,542,957.85; and
3. [H]is last payment was on 2 December 1996 in the amount of P470,123.33.
However, [Leovigildo's] explanation relative thereto is totally unsatisfactory. As correctly observed by

the Ombudsman, it was only on 3 January 1994 when LEO GERALD was issued his license to practice
his dental profession, thus, it is highly incredible that he could have afforded to comply with the
abovementioned terms of payment. Truly, [the CA] can not come to terms with [Leovigildo's] stance
that on LEO GERALD's first year as a dentist, i.e., in 1994, the latter had earned close to P1.5 million.
xxx
xxxx
Moreover, records show that in 1994 LEO GERALD likewise made an investment with Lemar Export
and Import Corporation worth P208,334.50. Then, a year after LEO GERALD allegedly paid the last
installment for the aforementioned condominium unit, he purchased a 450 square meter property in
Muntinlupa in the amount of P3,825,000.00. Thereafter, a house was built thereon which was valued
at P1,883,600.00. [Leovigildo] argues that the lot acquisition was financed by LEO GERALD's soon-
to-be parents-in-law, while the money used in the investment was advanced by Atty. RODRIGO STA.
ANA. The construction of the house was financed by the proceeds of the sale of LEO GERALD and his
wife's Toyota Land Cruiser on 2 April 2003.
This reasoning is likewise flawed.
It bears stressing that the relationship of LEO GERALD and Atty. STA. ANA has never been
established in the instant case, thus, considering that at that time LEO GERALD was not yet
financially capable to undertake such investment, the source thereof is indeed highly suspicious. It
could only be then surmised that the source of such investment was from [Leovigildo's] pocket,
which again, is observed to be incongruent with [Leovigildo's] disposable income as appearing in his
SALNs.
Regarding the 450 square meter property in Muntinlupa City, per the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 3
December 1997, LEO GERALD paid the vendor, TAN TIONG, the full amount on even date. However,
the supposed loan, which was said to have financed the aforementioned acquisition, was undertaken
by LEO GERALD with the Spouses AVENA, his soon-to-be parents-in-law, on 18 December 1997,
which was notably 15 days after the full payment of the property. Evidently, the documents on hand
support the Ombudsman's findings that the proceeds of the alleged loan was not used by LEO
GERALD in the purchase of the 450 square meter property.
In the same vein, with respect to [Leovigildo's] claim that the money used in the construction of the
house x x x was the proceeds from the sale of LEO GERALD's Toyota Land Cruiser, it should be
stressed that the subject vehicle was acquired in cash by LEO GERALD and his wife in the year 2000
when their registered total annual net income per their Annual Income Tax Return was only
P216,825.50. x x x
xxxx
Similarly, the subject properties acquired by [Leovigildo's] other children, namely: LEOVIGILDO, Jr.,
MARIE ANTOINETTE and MARINA ROSE, were proved by substantial quantum of evidence [to have
been] purchased during the time when the said children were likewise not financially capable of
acquiring the same.
Recorded evidence disclosed that on 14 January 1999, LEOVIGILDO, Jr. purchased a condominium
unit at Richville Corporate Tower in Ayala, Alabang, for P5,676,861.64. Notably, however, on said
date, LEOVIGILDO, Jr. was only 24 years old and still a law student at that. [Leovigildo's] position
that such ownership was just held in trust by LEOVIGILDO, Jr. for his first cousin, LEONILO DE
CASTRO ATIENZA is hard to believe considering that, as admitted by [Leovigildo], no copy of
declaration of trust has been filed with the Office of the Clerk of Court of Makati City as required by
the Notarial Law. This verity casts doubt on the veracity of the supposed trust agreement.
Concomitantly, the allegation is self-serving and viewed as a tool to hide the truth that the said
condominium unit is indeed owned by [Leovigildo]. Perforce, what is clear and convincing from the
records is the fact that LEOVIGILDO, Jr. is the registered owner of the subject condominium unit.
Naturally, as between the documents and the said declaration of trust x x x the former is deserving
of more credence.
Evidence further shows that in the year 1999, MARIE ANTOINETTE, together with her husband, had a
total income of P374,083.50, but made an investment of P700,000.00 in Lemar General Trading
Corporation which was established in the same year. Evidently, this circumstance is suspicious
considering that they were not financially capable then to invest such amount.
Also, on the same year (1999), MARINA ROSE, [Leovigildo's] daughter who just passed the Dental
Board Examinations, made a P100,000.00 investment in Le Mar Dental Clinic. Again, the source of
said investment is dubious considering that MARINA ROSE could not have earned that much as she
was just in the practice of her profession in barely less than a year.
Viewed in the light of the aforementioned disquisition, and as found by the Ombudsman, [to] which
[the CA] totally subscribe[s], all the foregoing acquisitions and investments could only mean one
thing, viz: the sources thereof came from [Leovigildo] and are in fact owned by [him] but were
registered under his children's name so as to hide [their ownership]. Sadly, [Leovigildo] miserably
failed to satisfactorily establish the legitimate source of income which was used in acquiring the
subject properties.78
This Court, not being a trier of facts, accords respect to the findings of the Ombudsman where, as
here, they are supported by substantial evidence and have been affirmed by the CA. Accordingly,
these findings will no longer be disturbed.79 Consequently, since Leovigildo failed to satisfactorily
show that his children had the capacity to acquire the Disputed Assets, the Ombudsman, and
thereafter, the CA, correctly arrived at the inescapable conclusion that the same were acquired by
Leovigildo himself.
When a public officer's accumulated wealth is manifestly disproportionate to his lawful income and
such public officer fails to properly account for or explain where such wealth had been sourced, he
becomes administratively liable for Dishonesty.80 In this case, the disproportion between Leovigildo
and Marina's declared income (P10,841,412.28) and the acquisition cost of the Disputed Assets
(P23,717,226.89) is too stark to be ignored.
Under Section 52, Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
(URACCS) then in force at the time the Complaint was filed, Dishonesty was classified as a grave
offense punishable by dismissal on the first instance, which penalty inherently carries with it
cancellation of civil service eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and perpetual disqualification
from re-employment in the government service.81 This penalty had been adopted under the Revised
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service now in force. Hence, the Court finds that the
penalty imposed upon Leovigildo is proper.
Public service demands the highest level of honesty and transparency from its officers and
employees. The Constitution requires that all public officers and employees be, at all times,
accountable to the people; serve with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency; act with
patriotism and justice; and lead modest lives. Public office is a public trust; it must be treated as a
privilege rather than a right, and rest firmly upon one's sense of service rather than entitlement. In
this light, the Court deems it necessary to reiterate, as a final note, its pronouncement in Casimiro v.
Rigor:82
The constitutionalization of public accountability shows the kind of standards of public officers that
are woven into the fabric of our legal system. To reiterate, public office is a public trust, which
embodies a set of standards such as responsibility, integrity and efficiency. Unfortunately, reality
may sometimes depart from these standards, but our society has consciously embedded them in our
laws so that they may be demanded and enforced as legal principles, and the Court is mandated to
apply these principles to bridge actual reality to the norms envisioned for our public service.83
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED IN PART. The
Court of Appeals' Decision dated April 29, 2009 and Resolution dated June 23, 2010 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 99752 are MODIFIED. The charge of Grave Misconduct against petitioner Leovigildo A. De
Castro is DISMISSED. However, his conviction for Dishonesty is AFFIRMED, and accordingly, he is
meted the corresponding penalty of DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE and shall carry with it the
cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits and perpetual disqualification from re-
employment in the government service.
31.) [G.R. No. 178454, March 28 : 2011]
FILIPINA SAMSON, PETITIONER, VS. JULIA A. RESTRIVERA, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Petitioner Filipina Samson appeals the Decision[1] dated October 31, 2006 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 83422 and its Resolution[2] dated June 8, 2007, denying her motion for
reconsideration. The CA affirmed the Ombudsman in finding petitioner guilty of violating Section
4(b)[3] of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner is a government employee, being a department head of the Population

Commission with office at the Provincial Capitol, Trece Martirez City, Cavite.
Sometime in March 2001, petitioner agreed to help her friend, respondent Julia A. Restrivera, to have
the latter's land located in Carmona, Cavite, registered under the Torrens System. Petitioner said
that the expenses would reach P150,000 and accepted P50,000 from respondent to cover the initial
expenses for the titling of respondent's land. However, petitioner failed to accomplish her task
because it was found out that the land is government property. When petitioner failed to return the
P50,000, respondent sued her for estafa. Respondent also filed an administrative complaint for grave
misconduct or conduct unbecoming a public officer against petitioner before the Office of the
Ombudsman.
The Ombudsman found petitioner guilty of violating Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713 and suspended her
from office for six months without pay. The Ombudsman ruled that petitioner failed to abide by the
standard set in Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713 and deprived the government of the benefit of
committed service when she embarked on her private interest to help respondent secure a certificate
of title over the latter's land.[4]
Upon motion for reconsideration, the Ombudsman, in an Order[5] dated March 15, 2004, reduced the
penalty to three months suspension without pay. According to the Ombudsman, petitioner's
acceptance of respondent's payment created a perception that petitioner is a fixer. Her act fell short
of the standard of personal conduct required by Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713 that public officials
shall endeavor to discourage wrong perceptions of their roles as dispensers or peddlers of undue
patronage. The Ombudsman held:
x x x [petitioner] admitted x x x that she indeed received the amount of P50,000.00 from the
[respondent] and even contracted Engr. Liberato Patromo, alleged Licensed Geodetic Engineer to do
the surveys.
While it may be true that [petitioner] did not actually deal with the other government agencies for
the processing of the titles of the subject property, we believe, however, that her mere act in
accepting the money from the [respondent] with the assurance that she would work for the issuance
of the title is already enough to create a perception that she is a fixer. Section 4(b) of [R.A.] No.
6713 mandates that public officials and employees shall endeavor to discourage wrong
perception of their roles as dispenser or peddler of undue patronage.
xxxx
x x x [petitioner's] act to x x x restore the amount of [P50,000] was to avoid possible sanctions.
x x x [d]uring the conciliation proceedings held on 19 October 2002 at the barangay level, it was
agreed upon by both parties that [petitioner] be given until 28 February 2003 within which to pay the
amount of P50,000.00 including interest. If it was true that [petitioner] had available money to pay
and had been persistent in returning the amount of [P50,000.00] to the [respondent], she would
have easily given the same right at that moment (on 19 October 2002) in the presence of the
Barangay Officials.[6] x x x. (Stress in the original.)
The CA on appeal affirmed the Ombudsman's Order dated March 19, 2004. The CA ruled that
contrary to petitioner's contentions, the Ombudsman has jurisdiction even if the act complained of is
a private matter. The CA also ruled that petitioner violated the norms of conduct required of her as a
public officer when she demanded and received the amount of P50,000 on the representation that
she can secure a title to respondent's property and for failing to return the amount. The CA stressed
that Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713 requires petitioner to perform and discharge her duties with the
highest degree of excellence, professionalism, intelligence and skill, and to endeavor to discourage
wrong perceptions of her role as a dispenser and peddler of undue patronage.[7]
Hence, this petition which raises the following issues:
1. Does the Ombudsman have jurisdiction over a case involving a private dealing by a
government employee or where the act complained of is not related to the
performance of official duty?
2. Did the CA commit grave abuse of discretion in finding petitioner administratively liable
despite the dismissal of the estafa case?
3. Did the CA commit grave abuse of discretion in not imposing a lower penalty in view of
mitigating circumstances?[8]
Petitioner insists that where the act complained of is not related to the performance of
official duty, the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction. Petitioner also imputes grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the CA for holding her administratively liable. She points out that
the estafa case was dismissed upon a finding that she was not guilty of fraud or deceit, hence
misconduct cannot be attributed to her. And even assuming that she is guilty of misconduct, she is
entitled to the benefit of mitigating circumstances such as the fact that this is the first charge against
her in her long years of public service.[9]
Respondent counters that the issues raised in the instant petition are the same issues that the CA
correctly resolved.[10] She also alleges that petitioner failed to observe the mandate that
public office is a public trust when she meddled in an affair that belongs to another agency
and received an amount for undelivered work.[11]
We affirm the CA and Ombudsman that petitioner is administratively liable. We hasten to add,
however, that petitioner is guilty of conduct unbecoming a public officer.
On the first issue, we agree with the CA that the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over respondent's
complaint against petitioner although the act complained of involves a private deal between them.[12]
Section 13(1),[13] Article XI of the 1987 Constitution states that the Ombudsman can investigate on
its own or on complaint by any person any act or omission of any public official or employee when
such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, or improper. Under Section 16[14] of R.A. No.
6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman
encompasses all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance committed by any public
officer or employee during his/her tenure. Section 19[15] of R.A. No. 6770 also states that the
Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating, but not limited, to acts or omissions which are unfair
or irregular. Thus, even if the complaint concerns an act of the public official or employee which is
not service-connected, the case is within the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman. The law does not
qualify the nature of the illegal act or omission of the public official or employee that the Ombudsman
may investigate. It does not require that the act or omission be related to or be connected with or
arise from the performance of official duty. Since the law does not distinguish, neither should we.[16]
On the second issue, it is wrong for petitioner to say that since the estafa case against her was
dismissed, she cannot be found administratively liable. It is settled that administrative cases may
proceed independently of criminal proceedings, and may continue despite the dismissal of the
criminal charges.[17]
For proper consideration instead is petitioner's liability under Sec. 4(A)(b) of R.A. No.
6713.
We quote the full text of Section 4 of R.A. No. 6713:
SEC. 4. Norms of Conduct of Public Officials and Employees. - (A) Every public official and employee
shall observe the following as standards of personal conduct in the discharge and execution of
official duties:
(a) Commitment to public interest. - Public officials and employees shall always uphold the public
interest over and above personal interest. All government resources and powers of their respective
offices must be employed and used efficiently, effectively, honestly and economically, particularly to
avoid wastage in public funds and revenues.
(b) Professionalism. - Public officials and employees shall perform and discharge their duties with
the highest degree of excellence, professionalism, intelligence and skill. They shall enter public
service with utmost devotion and dedication to duty. They shall endeavor to discourage wrong
perceptions of their roles as dispensers or peddlers of undue patronage.
(c) Justness and sincerity. - Public officials and employees shall remain true to the people at all
times. They must act with justness and sincerity and shall not discriminate against anyone,
especially the poor and the underprivileged. They shall at all times respect the rights of others, and
shall refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order,
public safety and public interest. They shall not dispense or extend undue favors on account of their
office to their relatives whether by consanguinity or affinity except with respect to appointments of
such relatives to positions considered strictly confidential or as members of their personal staff whose
terms are coterminous with theirs.
(d) Political neutrality. - Public officials and employees shall provide service to everyone without
unfair discrimination and regardless of party affiliation or preference.
(e) Responsiveness to the public. - Public officials and employees shall extend prompt, courteous,
and adequate service to the public. Unless otherwise provided by law or when required by the public
interest, public officials and employees shall provide information on their policies and procedures in
clear and understandable language, ensure openness of information, public consultations and
hearings whenever appropriate, encourage suggestions, simplify and systematize policy, rules and
procedures, avoid red tape and develop an understanding and appreciation of the socioeconomic
conditions prevailing in the country, especially in the depressed rural and urban areas.
(f) Nationalism and patriotism. - Public officials and employees shall at all times be loyal to the
Republic and to the Filipino people, promote the use of locally-produced goods, resources and
technology and encourage appreciation and pride of country and people. They shall endeavor to
maintain and defend Philippine sovereignty against foreign intrusion.
(g) Commitment to democracy. - Public officials and employees shall commit themselves to the
democratic way of life and values, maintain the principle of public accountability, and manifest by
deed the supremacy of civilian authority over the military. They shall at all times uphold the
Constitution and put loyalty to country above loyalty to persons or party.
(h) Simple living. - Public officials and employees and their families shall lead modest lives
appropriate to their positions and income. They shall not indulge in extravagant or ostentatious
display of wealth in any form.
(B) The Civil Service Commission shall adopt positive measures to promote (1) observance of these
standards including the dissemination of information programs and workshops authorizing merit
increases beyond regular progression steps, to a limited number of employees recognized by their
office colleagues to be outstanding in their observance of ethical standards; and (2) continuing
research and experimentation on measures which provide positive motivation to public officials and
employees in raising the general level of observance of these standards.
Both the Ombudsman and CA found the petitioner administratively liable for violating Section 4(A)(b)
on professionalism. "Professionalism" is defined as the conduct, aims, or qualities that characterize
or mark a profession. A professional refers to a person who engages in an activity with great
competence. Indeed, to call a person a professional is to describe him as competent, efficient,
experienced, proficient or polished.[18] In the context of Section 4 (A)(b) of R.A. No. 6713, the
observance of professionalism also means upholding the integrity of public office by endeavoring "to
discourage wrong perception of their roles as dispensers or peddlers of undue patronage." Thus, a
public official or employee should avoid any appearance of impropriety affecting the integrity of
government services. However, it should be noted that Section 4(A) enumerates the standards of
personal conduct for public officers with reference to "execution of official duties."
In the case at bar, the Ombudsman concluded that petitioner failed to carry out the standard of
professionalism by devoting herself on her personal interest to the detriment of her solemn public
duty. The Ombudsman said that petitioner's act deprived the government of her committed service
because the generation of a certificate of title was not within her line of public service. In denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration, the Ombudsman said that it would have been sufficient if
petitioner just referred the respondent to the persons/officials incharge of the processing of the
documents for the issuance of a certificate of title. While it may be true that she did not actually
deal with the other government agencies for the processing of the titles of the subject property,
petitioner's act of accepting the money from respondent with the assurance that she
would work for the issuance of the title is already enough to create a perception that she
is a fixer.
On its part, the CA rejected petitioner's argument that an isolated act is insufficient to create those
"wrong perceptions" or the "impression of influence peddling." It held that the law enjoins public
officers, at all times to respect the rights of others and refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good
customs, public order, public policy, public safety and public interest. Thus, it is not the plurality of
the acts that is being punished but the commission of the act itself.
Evidently, both the Ombudsman and CA interpreted Section 4(A) of R.A. No. 6713 as broad enough
to apply even to private transactions that have no connection to the duties of one's office. We hold,
however, that petitioner may not be penalized for violation of Section 4 (A)(b) of R.A. No. 6713.
The reason though does not lie in the fact that the act complained of is not at all related to
petitioner's discharge of her duties as department head of the Population Commission.
In addition to its directive under Section 4(B), Congress authorized[19] the Civil Service Commission
(CSC) to promulgate the rules and regulations necessary to implement R.A. No. 6713. Accordingly,
the CSC issued the Rules Implementing the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees (hereafter, Implementing Rules). Rule V of the Implementing Rules provides for an
Incentive and Rewards System for public officials and employees who have demonstrated exemplary
service and conduct on the basis of their observance of the norms of conduct laid down in Section 4
of R.A. No. 6713, to wit:
RULE V. INCENTIVES AND REWARDS SYSTEM
SECTION 1. Incentives and rewards shall be granted officials and employees who have demonstrated
exemplary service and conduct on the basis of their observance of the norms of conduct laid down in
Section 4 of the Code, namely:
(a) Commitment to public interest. - x x x
(b) Professionalism. - x x x
(c) Justness and sincerity. - x x x
(d) Political neutrality. - x x x
(e) Responsiveness to the public. - x x x
(f) Nationalism and patriotism. - x x x
(g) Commitment to democracy. - x x x
(h) Simple living. - x x x
On the other hand, Rule X of the Implementing Rules enumerates grounds for administrative
disciplinary action, as follows:
RULE X. GROUNDS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

DISCIPLINARY ACTION
SECTION 1. In addition to the grounds for administrative disciplinary action prescribed under existing
laws, the acts and omissions of any official or employee, whether or not he holds office or
employment in a casual, temporary, hold-over, permanent or regular capacity, declared unlawful or
prohibited by the Code, shall constitute grounds for administrative disciplinary action, and without
prejudice to criminal and civil liabilities provided herein, such as:
(a) Directly or indirectly having financial and material interest in any transaction requiring the
approval of his office. x x x.
(b) Owning, controlling, managing or accepting employment as officer, employee, consultant,

counsel, broker, agent, trustee, or nominee in any private enterprise regulated, supervised or
licensed by his office, unless expressly allowed by law;
(c) Engaging in the private practice of his profession unless authorized by the Constitution, law or
regulation, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with his official functions;
(d) Recommending any person to any position in a private enterprise which has a regular or pending
official transaction with his office, unless such recommendation or referral is mandated by (1) law, or
(2) international agreements, commitment and obligation, or as part of the functions of his office;
xxxx
(e) Disclosing or misusing confidential or classified information officially known to him by reason of
his office and not made available to the public, to further his private interests or give undue
advantage to anyone, or to prejudice the public interest;
(f) Soliciting or accepting, directly or indirectly, any gift, gratuity, favor, entertainment, loan or
anything of monetary value which in the course of his official duties or in connection with any
operation being regulated by, or any transaction which may be affected by the functions of, his
office. x x x.
xxxx
(g) Obtaining or using any statement filed under the Code for any purpose contrary to morals or
public policy or any commercial purpose other than by news and communications media for
dissemination to the general public;
(h) Unfair discrimination in rendering public service due to party affiliation or preference;
(i) Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines and to the Filipino people;
(j) Failure to act promptly on letters and request within fifteen (15) days from receipt, except as
otherwise provided in these Rules;
(k) Failure to process documents and complete action on documents and papers within a reasonable
time from preparation thereof, except as otherwise provided in these Rules;
(l) Failure to attend to anyone who wants to avail himself of the services of the office, or to act
promptly and expeditiously on public personal transactions;
(m) Failure to file sworn statements of assets, liabilities and net worth, and disclosure of business
interests and financial connections; and
(n) Failure to resign from his position in the private business enterprise within thirty (30) days from
assumption of public office when conflict of interest arises, and/or failure to divest himself of his
shareholdings or interests in private business enterprise within sixty (60) days from such assumption
of public office when conflict of interest arises: Provided, however, that for those who are already in
the service and a conflict of interest arises, the official or employee must either resign or divest
himself of said interests within the periods herein-above provided, reckoned from the date when the
conflict of interest had arisen.
In Domingo v. Office of the Ombudsman,[20] this Court had the occasion to rule that failure
to abide by the norms of conduct under Section 4(A)(b) of R.A. No. 6713, in relation to its
implementing rules, is not a ground for disciplinary action, to wit:
The charge of violation of Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713 deserves further comment. The provision
commands that "public officials and employees shall perform and discharge their duties with the
highest degree of excellence, professionalism, intelligence and skill." Said provision merely
enunciates "professionalism as an ideal norm of conduct to be observed by public
servants, in addition to commitment to public interest, justness and sincerity, political neutrality,
responsiveness to the public, nationalism and patriotism, commitment to democracy and simple
living. Following this perspective, Rule V of the Implementing Rules of R.A. No. 6713 adopted by the
Civil Service Commission mandates the grant of incentives and rewards to officials and employees
who demonstrate exemplary service and conduct based on their observance of the norms of conduct
laid down in Section 4. In other words, under the mandated incentives and rewards system, officials
and employees who comply with the high standard set by law would be rewarded. Those who fail to
do so cannot expect the same favorable treatment. However, the Implementing Rules does not
provide that they will have to be sanctioned for failure to observe these norms of conduct.
Indeed, Rule X of the Implementing Rules affirms as grounds for administrative
disciplinary action only acts "declared unlawful or prohibited by the Code." Rule X
specifically mentions at least twenty three (23) acts or omissions as grounds for
administrative disciplinary action. Failure to abide by the norms of conduct under Section
4(b) of R.A. No. 6713 is not one of them. (Emphasis supplied.)
Consequently, the Court dismissed the charge of violation of Section 4(A)(b) of R.A. No. 6713 in that
case.
We find no compelling reason to depart from our pronouncement in Domingo. Thus, we

reverse the CA and Ombudsman that petitioner is administratively liable under Section
4(A)(b) of R.A. No. 6713. In so ruling, we do no less and no more than apply the law and its
implementing rules issued by the CSC under the authority given to it by Congress. Needless to
stress, said rules partake the nature of a statute and are binding as if written in the law itself. They
have the force and effect of law and enjoy the presumption of constitutionality and legality until they
are set aside with finality in an appropriate case by a competent court.[21]
But is petitioner nonetheless guilty of grave misconduct, which is a ground for disciplinary action
under R.A. No. 6713?
We also rule in the negative.
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly,
unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. The misconduct is grave if it involves any of
the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established
rules, which must be proved by substantial evidence. Otherwise, the misconduct is only simple.[22]
Conversely, one cannot be found guilty of misconduct in the absence of substantial evidence. In one
case, we affirmed a finding of grave misconduct because there was substantial evidence of voluntary
disregard of established rules in the procurement of supplies as well as of manifest intent to
disregard said rules.[23] We have also ruled that complicity in the transgression of a regulation of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue constitutes simple misconduct only as there was failure to establish
flagrancy in respondent's act for her to be held liable of gross misconduct.[24] On the other hand, we
have likewise dismissed a complaint for knowingly rendering an unjust order, gross ignorance of the
law, and grave misconduct, since the complainant did not even indicate the particular acts of the
judge which were allegedly violative of the Code of Judicial Conduct.[25]
In this case, respondent failed to prove (1) petitioner's violation of an established and definite rule of
action or unlawful behavior or gross negligence, and (2) any of the aggravating elements of
corruption, willful intent to violate a law or to disregard established rules on the part of petitioner. In
fact, respondent could merely point to petitioner's alleged failure to observe the mandate that public
office is a public trust when petitioner allegedly meddled in an affair that belongs to another agency
and received an amount for undelivered work.
True, public officers and employees must be guided by the principle enshrined in the Constitution
that public office is a public trust. However, respondent's allegation that petitioner meddled in an
affair that belongs to another agency is a serious but unproven accusation. Respondent did not even
say what acts of interference were done by petitioner. Neither did respondent say in which
government agency petitioner committed interference. And causing the survey of respondent's land
can hardly be considered as meddling in the affairs of another government agency by petitioner who
is connected with the Population Commission. It does not show that petitioner made an illegal deal
or any deal with any government agency. Even the Ombudsman has recognized this fact. The
survey shows only that petitioner contracted a surveyor. Respondent said nothing on the propriety or
legality of what petitioner did. The survey shows that petitioner also started to work on her task
under their agreement. Thus, respondent's allegation that petitioner received an amount for
undelivered work is not entirely correct. Rather, petitioner failed to fully accomplish her task in view
of the legal obstacle that the land is government property.
However, the foregoing does not mean that petitioner is absolved of any administrative liability.
But first, we need to modify the CA finding that petitioner demanded the amount of P50,000 from
respondent because respondent did not even say that petitioner demanded money from her.[26] We
find in the allegations and counter-allegations that respondent came to petitioner's house in BiÃ±an,
Laguna, and asked petitioner if she can help respondent secure a title to her land which she intends
to sell. Petitioner agreed to help. When respondent asked about the cost, petitioner said P150,000
and accepted P50,000 from respondent to cover the initial expenses.[27]
We agree with the common finding of the Ombudsman and the CA that, in the aftermath of the
aborted transaction, petitioner still failed to return the amount she accepted. As aptly stated by the
Ombudsman, if petitioner was persistent in returning the amount of P50,000 until the preliminary
investigation of the estafa case on September 18, 2003,[28] there would have been no need for the
parties' agreement that petitioner be given until February 28, 2003 to pay said amount including
interest. Indeed, petitioner's belated attempt to return the amount was intended to avoid possible
sanctions and impelled solely by the filing of the estafa case against her.
For reneging on her promise to return aforesaid amount, petitioner is guilty of conduct unbecoming a
public officer. In Joson v. Macapagal, we have also ruled that the respondents therein were guilty of
conduct unbecoming of government employees when they reneged on their promise to have
pertinent documents notarized and submitted to the Government Service Insurance System after the
complainant's rights over the subject property were transferred to the sister of one of the
respondents.[29] Recently, in Assistant Special Prosecutor III Rohermia J. Jamsani-Rodriguez v.
Justices Gregory S. Ong, et al., we said that unbecoming conduct means improper performance and
applies to a broader range of transgressions of rules not only of social behavior but of ethical practice
or logical procedure or prescribed method.[30]
This Court has too often declared that any act that falls short of the exacting standards for public
office shall not be countenanced.[31] The Constitution categorically declares as follows:
SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency,
act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.[32]
Petitioner should have complied with her promise to return the amount to respondent after failing to
accomplish the task she had willingly accepted. However, she waited until respondent sued her
for estafa, thus reinforcing the latter's suspicion that petitioner misappropriated her money.
Although the element of deceit was not proven in the criminal case respondent filed against the
petitioner, it is clear that by her actuations, petitioner violated basic social and ethical norms in her
private dealings. Even if unrelated to her duties as a public officer, petitioner's transgression could
erode the public's trust in government employees, moreso because she holds a high position in the
service.
As to the penalty, we reprimanded the respondents in Joson and imposed a fine in Jamsani-

Rodriguez. Under the circumstances of this case, a fine of P15,000 in lieu of the three months
suspension is proper. In imposing said fine, we have considered as a mitigating circumstance
petitioner's 37 years of public service and the fact that this is the first charge against her.[33] Section
53[34] of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service provides that
mitigating circumstances such as length of service shall be considered. And since petitioner has
earlier agreed to return the amount of P50,000 including interest, we find it proper to order her to
comply with said agreement. Eventually, the parties may even find time to rekindle their friendship.
WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the Decision dated October 31, 2006 of the Court of Appeals and its
Resolution dated June 8, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 83422, as well as the Decision dated January 6,
2004 and Order dated March 15, 2004 of the Ombudsman in OMB-L-A-03-0552-F, and ENTER a new
judgment as follows:
We find petitioner GUILTY of conduct unbecoming a public officer and impose upon her a FINE of
P15,000.00 to be paid at the Office of the Ombudsman within five (5) days from finality of this
Decision.
We also ORDER petitioner to return to respondent the amount of P50,000.00 with interest thereon at
12% per annum from March 2001 until the said amount shall have been fully paid.
32.) G.R. No. 164316 September 27, 2006
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, petitioner,

vs.
GERTRUDES MADRIAGA and ANA MARIE BERNARDO, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The Court of Appeals having declared, by Decision of May 28, 2004, that the six-month suspension meted out by
the Office of the Ombudsman to respondent Gertrudes Madriaga (Gertrudes), school principal of San Juan
Elementary School, San Juan, Metro Manila, and her co-respondent Ana Marie Bernardo (Ana Marie), a classroom
teacher who was designated as Canteen Manager of the same school, is merely recommendatory to the
Department of Education, the Office of the Ombudsman filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.
The factual antecedents of the case are as follows:
By letter-complaint1 of September 8, 2000 filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, the San Juan School Club (the
Club), through its president Teresa Nuque (Teresa), charged respondents with violation of Section 1 of Rule IV 2 and
Section 1 of Rule VI3 of the Rules Implementing Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 otherwise known as the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.
After respondents had given their side of the complaint, Graft Investigation Officer Helen M. Acuña, by Decision of
May 28, 2001, found respondents guilty of violation of Section 5(a) of R.A. No. 6713 reading:
SEC. 5. Duties of Public Officials and Employees. – In the performance of their duties, all public officials and
employees are under obligation to:
(a) Act promptly on letters and requests. – All public officials and employees shall, within fifteen (15)
working days from receipt thereof, respond to letters, telegrams or other means of communications
sent by the public. The reply must contain the action taken on the request (Emphasis supplied),
and imposed upon them the penalty of reprimand.4
By Memorandum Order dated June 28, 2001, however, Graft Investigation Officer Julita Calderon "set aside" Helen
Acuña's decision, the former finding that respondents were guilty also of conduct grossly prejudicial to the best
interest of the service, and accordingly penalizing them with six months suspension. Thus Julita Calderon's order
disposed:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises being considered and there being substantial evidence to establish the
guilt of respondent GERTRUDES MADRIAGA for violation of Section 5 (a) of RA 6713 for not promptly
responding to the letter request of the complainant for copies of the school canteen's financial
statements for the period from February to August 2000 and against respondents GERTRUDES
MADRIAGA and ANA MARIE BERNARDO for [C]onduct Grossly Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service under Section 22(t) of Rule XIV, of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of EO No.
292, the penalty of six (6) months suspension is hereby imposed as against both these respondents.
Accordingly, the Decision dated May 28, 2001 of GIO Acuña is therefore SET ASIDE.
Let a copy of this Memorandum Order of June 28, 2001 be sent to the Secretary of the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) with office address at ULTRA, Pasig City, for proper
implementation.5 (Emphasis partly supplied and partly in the original; underscoring supplied)
Respondents' motion for reconsideration and/or reinvestigation having been denied by Order 6 of July 26, 2001, they
elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via petition for certiorari. Finding the issues that called for resolution in the
petition to be
A. Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman has the authority to impose administrative
sanctions over public officials; and
B. What is the nature of the functions of the Ombudsman as envisioned by the Fundamental Law,7
the appellate court, by Decision of May 28, 2004, declared that the penalty imposed by the Office of the
Ombudsman is merely "recommendatory" to the Department of Education,8 it (Office of the Ombudsman)
having "only the power to investigate possible misconduct of a government official or employee in the performance
of his functions, and thereafter recommend to the disciplining authority the appropriate penalty to be meted out; and
that it is the disciplining authority that has the power or prerogative to impose such penalty." 9
Hence, the present petition.
The Office of the Ombudsman (hereafter petitioner) argues that the Constitution and R.A. No. 6770 (The
Ombudsman Act of 1989) have conferred on it full disciplinary authority over public officials and
employees including the power to enforce its duly-issued judgments,10 and jurisprudence has upheld such
authority; and under Section 21 of R.A. No. 6770, 11 with the exception of impeachable officials, Members of
Congress and the Judiciary, it has been given full administrative disciplinary jurisdiction over all public officials and
employees who commit any kind of malfeasance, misfeasance or non-feasance. 12
The petition is impressed with merit.
Article XI, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution13 grants petitioner administrative disciplinary power to
(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official,
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient,
[and]
xxxx
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at
fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure
compliance therewith.
Section 15(3) of R.A. No. 6770 echoes the constitutional grant to petitioner of the power to "recommend" the
imposition of penalty on erring public officials and employees and ensure compliance therewith.
SEC. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. – The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers,
functions and duties:
xxxx
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public officer or employee at fault or who
neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law, and recommend his removal, suspension,
demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith; or enforce its disciplinary
authority as provided in Section 2114 of this Act: Provided, that the refusal by an officer without just
cause to comply with an order of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute
an officer or employee who is at fault or who neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law
shall be a ground for disciplinary action against said officer;
In the recent case of Ledesma v. Court of Appeals,15 this Court, resolving in the negative the issue of whether the
recommendation of the Ombudsman for the suspension of the therein petitioner, who was found administratively
liable in connection with the extension of Temporary Resident Visas of two foreign nationals, was merely advisory
on the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation where petitioner was the Chairman of the First Division of its Board of
Special Inquiry, held:
Petitioner insists that the word "recommend" be given its literal meaning, that is, that the Ombudsman's
action is only advisory in nature rather than one having any binding effect, citing Tapiador v. Office of the
Ombudsman, . . .
xxxx
For their part, the Solicitor General and the Office of the Ombudsman argue that the
word "recommend" must be taken in conjunction with the phrase "and ensure compliance therewith." The
proper interpretation of the Court's statement in Tapiador should be that the Ombudsman has the
authority to determine the administrative liability of a public official or employee at fault, and direct
and compel the head of the office or agency concerned to implement the penalty imposed. In other
words, it merely concerns the procedural aspect of the Ombudsman's functions and not its jurisdiction.
We agree with the ratiocination of public respondents. Several reasons militate against a literal interpretation
of the subject constitutional provision. Firstly, a cursory reading of Tapiador reveals that the main point of
the case was the failure of the complainant therein to present substantial evidence to prove the charges of
the administrative case. The statement that made reference to the power of the Ombudsman is, at best,
merely an obiter dictum and, as it is unsupported by sufficient explanation, is susceptible to varying
interpretations, as what precisely is before us in this case. Hence, it cannot be cited as a doctrinal
declaration of this Court nor is it safe from judicial examination.
The provisions of RA 6770 support public respondents' theory. Section 15 is substantially the same as
Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution which provides for the powers, functions and duties of the
Ombudsman. We draw attention to subparagraph 3, to wit:
SEC. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. – The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following
powers, functions and duties:
xxxx
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public officer or employee at
fault or who neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law, and recommend his
removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith; or
enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21 of this Act: Provided, that the refusal by
an officer without just cause to comply with an order of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend,
demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer or employee who is at fault or who neglects to perform
an act or discharge a duty required by law shall be a ground for disciplinary action against said
officer; (Emphasis supplied)
We note that the proviso above qualifies the "order" "to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or
prosecute" an officer or employee – akin to the questioned issuances in the case at bar. That the
refusal, without just cause, of any officer to comply with such an order of the Ombudsman to
penalize an erring officer or employee is a ground for disciplinary action, is a strong indication that
the Ombudsman's "recommendation" is not merely advisory in nature but is actually mandatory
within the bounds of law. This should not be interpreted as usurpation by the Ombudsman of the
authority of the head of office or any officer concerned. It has long been settled that the power of the
Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute any illegal act or omission of any public official is not an
exclusive authority but a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged. By
stating therefore that the Ombudsman "recommends" the action to be taken against an erring officer
or employee, the provisions in the Constitution and in RA 6770 intended that the implementation of
the order be coursed through the proper officer, which in this case would be the head of the BID. 16
x x x x (Citations omitted; Emphasis partly in the original and partly supplied, italics in the original)
The word "recommend" in Sec. 15(3) must thus be read in conjunction with the phrases "ensure compliance
therewith" or "enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21" of R.A. No. 6770.
In fine, petitioner's authority to impose administrative penalty and enforce compliance therewith is not merely
recommendatory. It is mandatory within the bounds of the law. The implementation of the order imposing the penalty
is, however, to be coursed through the proper officer.
WHEREFORE, the challenged Court of Appeals Decision of May 28, 2004 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Let the records of the case be remanded to the office of origin, Office of the Ombudsman, for appropriate action
consistent with the ruling in this case.
33.) A.M. No. P-97-1247 May 14, 1997
(Formerly A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 95-71-P)
1
NARITA RABE, complainant,
vs.
DELSA M. FLORES, Interpreter III, RTC, Branch IV, Panabo, Davao, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
In an administrative complaint for "Conduct Unbecoming a Government Employee, Acts Prejudicial to the Interest of
the Service and Abuse of Authority" dated August 18, 1995, Complainant Narita Rabe, by counsel, charged
2
Respondent Delsa M. Flores, Interpreter III at the Regional Trial Court, Branch IV, Panabo, Davao, as
follows: 3
(Mrs.) Flores took advantage of her position as a court employee by claiming a stall at the extension
of the Public (sic) Market when she is (sic) not a member of our client's association and was never a party
to Civil Case No. 89-23. She herself knows (sic) that the stalls in the said area had already been awarded to
our client's members pursuant to the decision of the court on October 30, 1991. Worse, she took the law into
her hands when she destroyed the stall of our client and brought the materials to the police station of
Panabo, Davao.
After respondent filed her answer, the Court issued a Resolution dated January 17, 1996, absolving her of the
charge. In the same resolution, however, the Court required respondent to explain why she should no be
administratively dealt with for the following:
4
. . . a) why she obtained a certification dated June 18, 1991 issued by Atty. Victor R. Ginete, Clerk of Court,
same court, that she started performing her duties as (an) interpreter on May 16, 1991 when (1) according to
a certification dated June 17, 1991 issued by Mr. Jose B. Avenido, Municipal Treasurer, Panabo Davao, she
was employed in the office of the Municipal Assessor as Assessment Clerk I since February 1, 1990 to June
3, 1991 with her last salary being paid by said office on June 3, 1991; and (2) she took her oath of office
before Judge Mariano C. Tupas only on June 17, 1991;
b) why she did not report said business interest in her sworn statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net
Worth, Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections, and Identification of Relatives in
the Government Service for the years 1991, 1992, 1993, and 1994;
c) why she has not divested herself of her interest in said business within sixty (60) days from her
assumption into (sic) office; and
d) why she has indicated in her DTRs for August 1995 that she worked on August 15-18, 21, 23-25 and 28-
31 and fore September, 1995 that she worked for all its twenty one (21) working days when her Contract of
Lease with the Municipal Government of Panabo for the market stall in its Section 7 clearly states that she
has to personally conduct her business and be present at the stall otherwise the same would be canceled as
per its Section 13.
Respondent Flores, in a letter dated February 13, 1996, explains that, as stated in the certification of Atty. Ginete,
she assumed her job in the Regional Trial Court, Branch IV, Panabo, Davao on May 16, 1991, in compliance with
the directive from this Court for her to start working on the said date. Respondent further states that "even prior to
said date (May 16, 1991)" she already reported to the court in order to familiarize herself with the scope of her
duties.
5
Respondent Flores also admits that she had received from the municipality a salary for the period May 16 1991 —
May 31, 1991, notwithstanding her transfer to the judiciary on May 16, 1991. She submits, however, the following
justification: 6
I admit that I received my last salary in the amount of One Thousand and 80/100 (P1,000.80) Pesos from
the Local Government Unit from May 16-31, 1991 but farthest from my mind is the intent to defraud the
government. It was my desire all the time to refund the amount the moment my salary is received from the
Supreme Court, unfortunately more often than not (the salary) is received three or four months after
assumption of office.
As we all know the month of May and June is the time we enroll our children in school thus the money I got
that month from the Local Government Unit came handy in defraying registration expenses of my four
children. The passage of time coupled with some intervening events, made me oblivious of my obligation to
refund the money. However, when my attention was called on the day I received the copy of the resolution, I
took no time in refunding the same.
Respondent alleges that the certification of Municipal Treasurer Jose V. Avenido is inaccurate because it was on
January 25, 1990 that she was appointed as Assessment Clerk I. According to respondent, she took her oath on
7
June 17, 1991, simply because it was on that date that she received a copy of her oath form. 8
Respondent avers that she did not divulge any business interest in her Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities
and Financial Disclosure for the years 1991-1994 because she "was never engaged in business during said period
although I had a stall in the market."
9
Respondent further avers that her Daily Time Record indicated that she held office on August 15, 18, 21, 23 to 25
and 28, 31 and all the working days of September, 1995 "because in truth and in fact . . . (she) did hold office on
those days." This was because her contract of lease with the Municipal Government of Panabo was never
implemented as it became the subject of "Civil Case No. 95-53 — Panabo Public Market Vendors Assn. Inc. and
Pag-ibig Ng Gulayan Ass. Inc. Vs. Municipality of Panabo, et. al., for Declaration of Nullity of Mun. Ord. No. XLV,
Series of 1994."
10
The Court referred the matter to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation. In
its report, the OCA found respondent guilty of dishonesty and failure to report her business interest, and
recommended that the penalty of dismissal be imposed on her. The Court finds that the report and recommendation
of the OCA is in accord with the evidence and the law. We hold the explanation of respondent unsatisfactory.
Respondent's misconduct is evident from the records.
By her own admission, respondent had collected her salary from the Municipality of Panabo for the period
of May 16-31, 1991, when she was already working at the RTC. She knew that she was no longer entitled to a
salary from the municipal government, but she took it just the same. She returned the amount only upon
receipt of the Court Resolution dated January 17, 1996, or more than five (5) years later. We cannot
countenance the same. Respondent's conduct is plain dishonesty.
Her explanation, as observed earlier, is unsatisfactory. Her overriding need for money from the municipal
government, aggravated by the alleged delay in the processing of her initial salary from the Court, does not justify
receipt of a salary not due her. We sympathize with respondent's sad plight of being the sole breadwinner of her
family, with her husband and parents to feed and children to send to school. This, however, is not an acceptable
excuse for her misconduct. If poverty and pressing financial need could justify stealing, the government would have
been bankrupt long ago. A public servant should never expect to become wealthy in government.
But there is really more to respondent's defense of poverty. If respondents was just driven by dire pecuniary need,
respondent should have returned the salary she had obtained from the Municipal Government of Panabo as soon
as she obtained her salary from the court. However, she returned the money only after receipt of the Court's
Resolution dated January 17, 1996, saying that she forgot all about it. Forgetfulness or failure to remember is never
a rational or acceptable explanation.
In Macario Flores vs. Nonilon Caniya, Deputy Sheriff, RTC, Imus, Cavite, this Court ruled that a sheriff who failed
11
to issue an official receipt for the money entrusted to him for the purpose of satisfying a judgment debt, "had really
wanted to misappropriate the said amount." Inevitably, he was dismissed from service with forfeiture of all retirement
benefits and accrued leave credits, with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of the
government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
It is well to stress once again the constitutional declaration that a "(p)ublic office is a public trust. Public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty
and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives." 12
We have repeatedly held that although every office in the government service is a public trust, no position exacts a
greater demand for moral righteousness and uprightness from an individual than in the judiciary. Personnel in the
judiciary should conduct themselves in such a manner as to be beyond reproach and suspicion, and free from any
appearance of impropriety in their personal behavior, not only in the discharge of their official duties but also in their
everyday life. They are strictly mandated to maintain good moral character at all times and to observe
irreproachable behavior so as not to outrage public decency. 13
This Court, in JPDIO vs. Josephine Calaguas, Records Officer, OCC, MTCC, Angeles City, held: 14
The Court must reiterate that a public office is a public trust. A public servant is expected to exhibit, at all
times, the highest degree of honesty and integrity and should be made accountable to all those whom he
serves.
Respondent's malfeasance is a clear contravention of the constitutional dictum that the State shall "maintain
honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures against graft and corruption." 15
Under the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of EO No. 292 known as the "Administrative Code of 1987" and
other pertinent Civil Service Laws, the penalty for dishonesty is dismissal, even for the first offense. Accordingly,
16
for respondent's dishonesty in receiving and keeping what she was not lawfully entitled to, this Court has the duty to
impose on her the penalty prescribed by law: dismissal.
Apart from the above finding, we also note the contradiction between the certification issued by Municipal Treasurer
Jose Avenido stating that respondent had worked as an assessment clerk in his office up to June 3, 1991, and the
certification of Clerk of Court Victor Ginete stating that respondent started working as an interpreter on May 16,
1991. Although specifically asked by the Court to explain this contradiction, respondent could only state that the
certification of the treasurer is inaccurate because she assumed her position as Assessment Clerk on January 25,
1990 and not on February 1, 1990 as written in the said certification. Respondent, however, failed to explain the
gravamen of the inquiry, i.e., that she was certified to be still connected with the Municipal Government of Panabo
on June 3, 1991, notwithstanding her assumption of her post in the Regional Trial Court as early as May 16, 1991.
To the mind of the Court, respondent's inability to explain this discrepancy is consistent with her failure to
satisfactorily explain why she knowingly received and kept a salary she was not entitled to. Worse, it may be
indicative of a conscious design to hold two positions at the same time.
Aside from dishonesty, however, respondents is also guilty of failure to perform her legal obligation to
disclose her business interests. Respondent herself admitted that she "had a stall in the market." The Office
of the Court Administrator also found that she had been receiving rental payments from one Rodolfo Luay
for the use of the market stall. That respondent had a stall in the market was undoubtedly a business
interest which should have been reported in her Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities. Her failure to do
so exposes her to administrative sanction.
Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6713 provides that it is the "obligation" of an employee to submit a sworn
statement, as the "public has a right to know" the employee's assets, liabilities, net worth and financial and
business interest. Section 11 of the same law prescribes the criminal and administrative penalty for
violation of any provision thereof. Paragraph (b) of Section 11 provides that "(b) Any violation hereof
proven in a proper administrative proceeding shall sufficient cause for removal or dismissal of a public
official or employee, even if no criminal prosecution is instituted against him."
In the present case, the failure of respondent to disclose her business interest which she herself admitted is
inexcusable and is a clear violation of Republic Act No. 6713.
The respondent's claim that her contract of lease of a market stall was never implemented because it became the
subject of a civil case, fails to convince us. We agree with the finding of the OCA on respondent's guilt for this
separate offense. It is a finding, which further supports its recommendation for respondent's dismissal, to wit: 17
The case respondent is referring to was filed in 1995. This can be seen from the number of the case which
is 95-93. Earlier than the filling of the case, respondent was already collecting rentals — as early
as February 22, 1991 — from one Rodolfo Luay who was operating a business without the necessary
license.
Respondent should have, therefore, indicated in her "Sworn Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth,
Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections, and Identification of Relatives in the
Government Service" for the years 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994 and 1995 that she had a market stall in the
Public market of Panabo, Davao.
She admits that she never indicated such in her sworn statements.
As this Office had earlier stated in its Memorandum dated November 10, 1995 filed in connection with the instant
complaint:
Such non-disclosure is punishable with imprisonment not exceeding five (5) years, or a fine not exceeding
five thousand (P5,000.00) pesos, or both. But even if no criminal prosecution is instituted against the
offender, the offender can be dismissed from the service if the violation is proven. Respondent 201 file
speaks for itself.
Furthermore, respondent should have divested herself of her interest in said business within sixty (60) days
from her assumption into (sic) office. She has not. The penalty for non-disclosure of business interests and
non-divestment is the same. (Citations omitted.)
In her explanation, respondent maintains the position that she has no business interest, implicitly
contending that there is nothing to divulge or divest from. As discussed above, respondent had a business
interest. We do not find her administratively liable, however, for failure to divest herself of the said interest.
The requirement for public officers, in general, to divest themselves of business interests upon assumption
of a public office is prompted by the need to avoid conflict of interests. In the absence of any showing that
18
a business interest will result in a conflict of interest, divestment of the same is unnecessary. In the present
case, it seems a bit far-fetched to imagine that there is a conflict of interest because an Interpreter III of the
Regional Trial Court has a stall in the market. A court, generally, is not engaged in the regulation of public
market, nor does it concern itself with the activities thereof. While respondent may not be compelled to
divest herself of her business interest, she had the legal obligation of divulging it.
WHEREFORE, in conformity with the recommendations of the Office of the Court Administrator, Interpreter III Delsa
M. Flores is hereby DISMISSED from service with FORFEITURE of all retirement benefits and accrued leave credits
and with PREJUDICE to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-
owned or controlled corporations.
34.) G.R. No. 170122 October 12, 2009
CLARITA DEPAKAKIBO GARCIA, Petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 171381
CLARITA DEPAKAKIBO GARCIA, Petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
Before us are these two (2) consolidated petitions under Rule 65, each interposed by petitioner Clarita D. Garcia,
with application for injunctive relief. In the first petition for mandamus and/or certiorari, docketed as G.R. No.
170122, petitioner seeks to nullify and set aside the August 5, 2005 Order, 1 as reiterated in another Order dated
August 26, 2005, both issued by the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, which effectively denied the petitioner’s
motion to dismiss and/or to quash Civil Case No. 0193, a suit for forfeiture commenced by the Republic of the
Philippines against the petitioner and her immediate family. The second petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No.
171381, seeks to nullify and set aside the November 9, 2005 Resolution 2 of the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division,
insofar as it likewise denied the petitioner’s motion to dismiss and/or quash Civil Case No. 0196, another forfeiture
case involving the same parties but for different properties.
The Facts
To recover unlawfully acquired funds and properties in the aggregate amount of PhP 143,052,015.29 that retired
Maj. Gen. Carlos F. Garcia, his wife, herein petitioner Clarita, children Ian Carl, Juan Paulo and Timothy Mark
(collectively, the Garcias) had allegedly amassed and acquired, the Republic, through the Office of the Ombudsman
(OMB), pursuant to Republic Act No. (RA) 1379, 3 filed with the Sandiganbayan (SB) on October 29, 2004 a petition
for the forfeiture of those properties. This petition, docketed as Civil Case No. 0193, was eventually raffled to the
Fourth Division of the anti-graft court.
Civil Case No. 0193 was followed by the filing on July 5, 2005 of another forfeiture case, docketed as Civil Case No.
0196, this time to recover funds and properties amounting to PhP 202,005,980.55. Civil Case No. 0196 would
eventually be raffled also to the Fourth Division of the SB. For convenience and clarity, Civil Case No. 0193 shall
hereinafter be also referred to as Forfeiture I and Civil Case No. 0196 as Forfeiture II.
Prior to the filing of Forfeiture II, but subsequent to the filing of Forfeiture I, the OMB charged the Garcias and three
others with violation of RA 7080 (plunder) under an Information dated April 5, 2005 which placed the value of the
property and funds plundered at PhP 303,272,005.99. Docketed as Crim. Case No. 28107, the Information was
raffled off to the Second Division of the SB. The plunder charge, as the parties’ pleadings seem to indicate, covered
substantially the same properties identified in both forfeiture cases.
After the filing of Forfeiture I, the following events transpired in relation to the case:
(1) The corresponding summons were issued and all served on Gen. Garcia at his place of detention.
Per the Sheriff’s Return4 dated November 2, 2005, the summons were duly served on respondent Garcias.
Earlier, or on October 29, 2004, the SB issued a writ of attachment in favor of the Republic, an issuance
which Gen. Garcia challenged before this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 165835.
Instead of an answer, the Garcias filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of the SB’s lack of jurisdiction over
separate civil actions for forfeiture. The OMB countered with a motion to expunge and to declare the Garcias
in default. To the OMB’s motion, the Garcias interposed an opposition in which they manifested that they
have meanwhile repaired to the Court on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 165835 to nullify the writ of
attachment SB issued in which case the SB should defer action on the forfeiture case as a matter of judicial
courtesy.
(2) By Resolution5 of January 20, 2005, the SB denied the motion to dismiss; declared the same motion
as pro forma and hence without tolling effect on the period to answer. The same resolution declared the
Garcias in default.
Another resolution6 denied the Garcias’ motion for reconsideration and/or to admit answer, and set a date for
the ex-parte presentation of the Republic’s evidence.
A second motion for reconsideration was also denied on February 23, 2005, pursuant to the prohibited
pleading rule.
(3) Despite the standing default order, the Garcias moved for the transfer and consolidation of Forfeiture I
with the plunder case which were respectively pending in different divisions of the SB, contending that such
consolidation is mandatory under RA 8249. 7
On May 20, 2005, the SB 4th Division denied the motion for the reason that the forfeiture case is not the
corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the criminal case of plunder.
(4) On July 26, 2005, the Garcias filed another motion to dismiss and/or to quash Forfeiture I on, inter alia,
the following grounds: (a) the filing of the plunder case ousted the SB 4th Division of jurisdiction over the
forfeiture case; and (b) that the consolidation is imperative in order to avoid possible double jeopardy
entanglements.
By Order8 of August 5, 2005, the SB merely noted the motion in view of movants having been declared in default
which has yet to be lifted.
It is upon the foregoing factual antecedents that petitioner Clarita has interposed her first special civil action for
mandamus and/or certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 170122, raising the following issues:
I. Whether or not the [SB] 4th Division acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion x x
x in issuing its challenged order of August 5, 2005 and August 26 2005 that merely "Noted without action," hence
refused to resolve petitioner’s motion to dismiss and/or to quash by virtue of petitioner’s prior default in that:
A. For lack of proper and valid service of summons, the [SB] 4th Division could not have acquired
jurisdiction over petitioner’s, [and her children’s] x x x persons, much less make them become the true
"parties-litigants, contestants or legal adversaries" in forfeiture I. As the [SB] has not validly acquired
jurisdiction over the petitioner’s [and her children’s] x x x persons, they could not possibly be declared in
default, nor can a valid judgment by default be rendered against them.
B. Even then, mere declaration in default does not per se bar petitioner from challenging the [SB] 4th
Division’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of forfeiture I as the same can be raised anytime, even
after final judgment. In the absence of jurisdiction over the subject matter, any and all proceedings before
the [SB] are null and void.
C. Contrary to its August 26, 2005 rejection of petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the first challenged
order that the issue of jurisdiction raised therein had already been passed upon by [the SB 4th Division’s]
resolution of May 20, 2005, the records clearly show that the grounds relied upon by petitioner in her motion
to dismiss and/or to quash dated July 26, 2005 were entirely different, separate and distinct from the
grounds set forth in petitioner’s manifestation and motion [to consolidate] dated April 15, 2005 that was
denied by it per its resolution of May 20, 2005.
D. In any event, the [SB] 4th Division has been ousted of jurisdiction over the subject matter of forfeiture I
upon the filing of the main plunder case against petitioner that mandates the automatic forfeiture of the
subject properties in forfeiture cases I & II as a function or adjunct of any conviction for plunder.
E. Being incompatible, the forfeiture law (RA No. 1379 [1955]) was impliedly repealed by the plunder
law (RA No. 7080 [1991]) with automatic forfeiture mechanism.
F. Since the sought forfeiture includes properties purportedly located in the USA, any penal conviction for
forfeiture in this case cannot be enforced outside of the Philippines x x x.
G. Based on orderly procedure and sound administration of justice, it is imperative that the matter of
forfeiture be exclusively tried in the main plunder case to avoid possible double jeopardy entanglements,
and to avoid possible conflicting decisions by 2 divisions of the [SB] on the matter of forfeiture as a penal
sanction.9 (Emphasis added.)
With respect to Forfeiture II, the following events and proceedings occurred or were taken after the petition for
Forfeiture II was filed:
(1) On July 12, 2005, the SB sheriff served the corresponding summons. In his return of July 13, 2005, the
sheriff stated giving the copies of the summons to the OIC/Custodian of the PNP Detention Center
who in turn handed them to Gen. Garcia. The general signed his receipt of the summons, but as to those
pertaining to the other respondents, Gen. Garcia acknowledged receiving the same, but with the following
qualifying note: "I’m receiving the copies of Clarita, Ian Carl, Juan Paolo & Timothy – but these copies will
not guarantee it being served to the above-named (sic)."
(2) On July 26, 2005, Clarita and her children, thru special appearance of counsel, filed a motion to dismiss
and/or to quash Forfeiture II primarily for lack of jurisdiction over their persons and on the subject matter
thereof which is now covered by the plunder case.
To the above motion, the Republic filed its opposition with a motion for alternative service of
summons. The motion for alternative service would be repeated in another motion of August 25,
2005.
(3) By Joint Resolution of November 9, 2005, the SB denied both the petitioner’s motion to dismiss and/or to
quash and the Republic’s motion for alternative service of summons.
On January 24, 2006, the SB denied petitioner’s motion for partial reconsideration. 10
From the last two issuances adverted to, Clarita has come to this Court via the instant petition for certiorari,
docketed as GR No. 171381. As there submitted, the SB 4th Division acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion in issuing its Joint Resolution dated November 9, 2005 and its Resolution of January
24, 2006 denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss and/or to quash in that:
A. Based on its own finding that summons was improperly served on petitioner, the [SB] ought to have
dismissed forfeiture II for lack of jurisdiction over petitioner’s person x x x.
B. By virtue of the plunder case filed with the [SB] Second Division that mandates the automatic
forfeiture of unlawfully acquired properties upon conviction, the [SB] Fourth Division has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of forfeiture.
C. Being incompatible, the forfeiture law (RA No. 1379 [1955]) was impliedly repealed by the plunder
law (RA No. 7080 [1991]) with automatic forfeiture mechanism.
D. Based on orderly procedure and sound administration of justice, it is imperative that the matter of
forfeiture be exclusively tried in the main plunder case to avoid possible double jeopardy
entanglements and worse conflicting decisions by 2 divisions of the Sandiganbayan on the matter of
forfeiture as a penal sanction.11 (Emphasis added.)
Per Resolution of the Court dated March 13, 2006, G.R. No. 170122 and G.R. No. 171381 were consolidated.
The Court’s Ruling
The petitions are partly meritorious.
The core issue tendered in these consolidated cases ultimately boils down to the question of jurisdiction
and may thusly be couched into whether the Fourth Division of the SB has acquired jurisdiction over the person of
petitioner—and her three sons for that matter—considering that, first, vis-à-vis Civil Case Nos. 0193 (Forfeiture I)
and 0196 (Forfeiture II), summons against her have been ineffectively or improperly served and, second, that the
plunder case—Crim. Case No. 28107—has already been filed and pending with another division of the SB, i.e.,
Second Division of the SB.
Plunder Case in Crim. Case No. 28107 Did Not Absorb the Forfeiture Cases in Civil Case Nos. 0193 and 0196
Petitioner maintains that the SB 4th Division has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of Forfeitures I and II as both
cases are now covered or included in the plunder case against the Garcias. Or as petitioner puts it a bit differently,
the filing of the main plunder case (Crim. Case No. 28107), with its automatic forfeiture mechanism in the event of
conviction, ousted the SB 4th Division of its jurisdiction over the subject matter of the forfeiture cases. The inclusion
of the forfeiture cases with the plunder case is necessary, so petitioner claims, to obviate possible double jeopardy
entanglements and colliding case dispositions. Prescinding from these premises, petitioner would ascribe grave
abuse of discretion on the SB 4th Division for not granting its separate motions to dismiss the two forfeiture petitions
and/or to consolidate them with the plunder case on the foregoing ground.
Petitioner’s contention is untenable. And in response to what she suggests in some of her pleadings, let it
be stated at the outset that the SB has jurisdiction over actions for forfeiture under RA 1379, albeit the
proceeding thereunder is civil in nature. We said so in Garcia v. Sandiganbayan12 involving no less than
petitioner’s husband questioning certain orders issued in Forfeiture I case.
Petitioner’s posture respecting Forfeitures I and II being absorbed by the plunder case, thus depriving the
4th Division of the SB of jurisdiction over the civil cases, is flawed by the assumptions holding it together,
the first assumption being that the forfeiture cases are the corresponding civil action for recovery of civil
liability ex delicto. As correctly ruled by the SB 4th Division in its May 20, 2005 Resolution, 13 the civil liability for
forfeiture cases does not arise from the commission of a criminal offense, thus:
Such liability is based on a statute that safeguards the right of the State to recover unlawfully acquired
properties. The action of forfeiture arises when a "public officer or employee [acquires] during his
incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly out of proportion of his salary x x x and to his other
lawful income x x x."14 Such amount of property is then presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully
acquired.15 Thus "if the respondent [public official] is unable to show to the satisfaction of the court that he
has lawfully acquired the property in question, then the court shall declare such property forfeited in favor
of the State, and by virtue of such judgment the property aforesaid shall become property of the State.16 x x
x (Citations in the original.)
Lest it be overlooked, Executive Order No. (EO) 14, Series of 1986, albeit defining only the jurisdiction over cases
involving ill-gotten wealth of former President Marcos, his immediate family and business associates, authorizes
under its Sec. 317 the filing of forfeiture suits under RA 1379 which will proceed independently of any criminal
proceedings. The Court, in Republic v. Sandiganbayan,18 interpreted this provision as empowering the Presidential
Commission on Good Government to file independent civil actions separate from the criminal actions.
Forfeiture Cases and the Plunder Case Have Separate Causes of Action; the Former Is Civil in Nature while
the Latter Is Criminal
It bears stressing, as a second point, that a forfeiture case under RA 1379 arises out of a cause of action
separate and different from a plunder case, thus negating the notion that the crime of plunder charged in
Crim. Case No. 28107 absorbs the forfeiture cases. In a prosecution for plunder, what is sought to be
established is the commission of the criminal acts in furtherance of the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth. In
the language of Sec. 4 of RA 7080, for purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it is "sufficient to establish
beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy
[to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth]." On the other hand, all that the court needs to determine, by
preponderance of evidence, under RA 1379 is the disproportion of respondent’s properties to his legitimate
income, it being unnecessary to prove how he acquired said properties. As correctly formulated by the
Solicitor General, the forfeitable nature of the properties under the provisions of RA 1379 does not proceed from a
determination of a specific overt act committed by the respondent public officer leading to the acquisition of the
illegal wealth.19
Given the foregoing considerations, petitioner’s thesis on possible double jeopardy entanglements should a
judgment of conviction ensue in Crim. Case 28107 collapses entirely. Double jeopardy, as a criminal law concept,
refers to jeopardy of punishment for the same offense, 20 suggesting that double jeopardy presupposes two separate
criminal prosecutions. Proceedings under RA 1379 are, to repeat, civil in nature. As a necessary corollary, one who
is sued under RA 1379 may be proceeded against for a criminal offense. Thus, the filing of a case under that law is
not barred by the conviction or acquittal of the defendant in Crim. Case 28107 for plunder.
Moreover, given the variance in the nature and subject matter of the proceedings between the plunder case and the
subject forfeiture cases, petitioner’s apprehension about the likelihood of conflicting decisions of two different
divisions of the anti-graft court on the matter of forfeiture as a penal sanction is specious at best. What the SB said
in this regard merits approving citation:
On the matter of forfeiture as a penal sanction, respondents argue that the division where the plunder case is
pending may issue a decision that would collide or be in conflict with the decision by this division on the forfeiture
case. They refer to a situation where this Court’s Second Division may exonerate the respondents in the plunder
case while the Fourth Division grant the petition for forfeiture for the same properties in favor of the state or vice
versa.
Suffice it to say that the variance in the decisions of both divisions does not give rise to a conflict. After all, forfeiture
in the plunder case requires the attendance of facts and circumstances separate and distinct from that in the
forfeiture case. Between the two (2) cases, there is no causal connection in the facts sought to be established and
the issues sought to be addressed. As a result, the decision of this Court in one does not have a bearing on the
other.
There is also no conflict even if the decisions in both cases result in an order for the forfeiture of the subject
properties. The forfeiture following a conviction in the plunder case will apply only to those ill-gotten wealth not
recovered by the forfeiture case and vise (sic) versa. This is on the assumption that the information on plunder and
the petition for forfeiture cover the same set of properties. 21
RA 7080 Did Not Repeal RA 1379
Petitioner takes a different tack in her bid to prove that SB erred in not dismissing Forfeitures I and II with her
assertion that RA 7080 impliedly repealed RA 1379. We are not convinced.
Nowhere in RA 7080 can we find any provision that would indicate a repeal, expressly or impliedly, of RA
1379. RA 7080 is a penal statute which, at its most basic, aims to penalize the act of any public officer who
by himself or in connivance with members of his family amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth
in the aggregate amount of at least PhP 50 million. On the other hand, RA 1379 is not penal in nature, in that
it does not make a crime the act of a public official acquiring during his incumbency an amount of property
manifestly out of proportion of his salary and other legitimate income. RA 1379 aims to enforce the right of
the State to recover the properties which were not lawfully acquired by the officer.
It has often been said that all doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal and all efforts should be exerted
to harmonize and give effect to all laws and provisions on the same subject. To be sure, both RA 1379 and RA 7080
can very well be harmonized. The Court perceives no irreconcilable conflict between them. One can be enforced
without nullifying the other.
Sandiganbayan Did Not Acquire Jurisdiction over the Persons of Petitioner and Her Children
On the issue of lack of jurisdiction, petitioner argues that the SB did not acquire jurisdiction over her person and that
of her children due to a defective substituted service of summons. There is merit in petitioner’s contention. 1 a vv p h i 1
Sec. 7, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure clearly provides for the requirements of a valid
substituted service of summons, thus:
SEC. 7. Substituted service.—If the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the
preceding section [personal service on defendant], service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at
the defendant’s residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving
the copies at defendant’s office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.
It is basic that a court must acquire jurisdiction over a party for the latter to be bound by its decision or orders. Valid
service of summons, by whatever mode authorized by and proper under the Rules, is the means by which a court
acquires jurisdiction over a person.22
In the instant case, it is undisputed that summons for Forfeitures I and II were served personally on Maj. Gen.
Carlos Flores Garcia, who is detained at the PNP Detention Center, who acknowledged receipt thereof by affixing
his signature. It is also undisputed that substituted service of summons for both Forfeitures I and II were made on
petitioner and her children through Maj. Gen. Garcia at the PNP Detention Center. However, such substituted
services of summons were invalid for being irregular and defective.
In Manotoc v. Court of Appeals,23 we broke down the requirements to be:
(1) Impossibility of prompt personal service, i.e., the party relying on substituted service or the sheriff must
show that defendant cannot be served promptly or there is impossibility of prompt service within a
reasonable time. Reasonable time being "so much time as is necessary under the circumstances for a
reasonably prudent and diligent man to do, conveniently, what the contract or duty requires that should be
done, having a regard for the rights and possibility of loss, if any[,] to the other party." 24 Moreover, we
indicated therein that the sheriff must show several attempts for personal service of at least three (3) times
on at least two (2) different dates.
(2) Specific details in the return, i.e., the sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and
circumstances surrounding the attempted personal service.
(3) Substituted service effected on a person of suitable age and discretion residing at defendant’s house or
residence; or on a competent person in charge of defendant’s office or regular place of business.
From the foregoing requisites, it is apparent that no valid substituted service of summons was made on petitioner
and her children, as the service made through Maj. Gen. Garcia did not comply with the first two (2) requirements
mentioned above for a valid substituted service of summons. Moreover, the third requirement was also not strictly
complied with as the substituted service was made not at petitioner’s house or residence but in the PNP Detention
Center where Maj. Gen. Garcia is detained, even if the latter is of suitable age and discretion. Hence, no valid
substituted service of summons was made.
The stringent rules on valid service of summons for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
defendants, however, admits of exceptions, as when the party voluntarily submits himself to the jurisdiction of the
court by asking affirmative relief.25 In the instant case, the Republic asserts that petitioner is estopped from
questioning improper service of summons since the improvident service of summons in both forfeiture cases had
been cured by their (petitioner and her children) voluntary appearance in the forfeiture cases. The Republic points to
the various pleadings filed by petitioner and her children during the subject forfeiture hearings. We cannot subscribe
to the Republic’s views.
Special Appearance to Question a Court’s Jurisdiction Is Not Voluntary Appearance
The second sentence of Sec. 20, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure clearly provides:
Sec. 20. Voluntary appearance.—The defendant’s voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service
of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance. (Emphasis ours.)
Thus, a defendant who files a motion to dismiss, assailing the jurisdiction of the court over his person, together with
other grounds raised therein, is not deemed to have appeared voluntarily before the court. What the rule on
voluntary appearance—the first sentence of the above-quoted rule—means is that the voluntary appearance of the
defendant in court is without qualification, in which case he is deemed to have waived his defense of lack of
jurisdiction over his person due to improper service of summons.
The pleadings filed by petitioner in the subject forfeiture cases, however, do not show that she voluntarily appeared
without qualification. Petitioner filed the following pleadings in Forfeiture I: (a) motion to dismiss; (b) motion for
reconsideration and/or to admit answer; (c) second motion for reconsideration; (d) motion to consolidate forfeiture
case with plunder case; and (e) motion to dismiss and/or to quash Forfeiture I. And in Forfeiture II: (a) motion to
dismiss and/or to quash Forfeiture II; and (b) motion for partial reconsideration.
The foregoing pleadings, particularly the motions to dismiss, were filed by petitioner solely for special appearance
with the purpose of challenging the jurisdiction of the SB over her person and that of her three children.
Petitioner asserts therein that SB did not acquire jurisdiction over her person and of her three children for lack of
valid service of summons through improvident substituted service of summons in both Forfeiture I and Forfeiture II.
This stance the petitioner never abandoned when she filed her motions for reconsideration, even with a prayer to
admit their attached Answer Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam dated January 22, 2005 setting forth affirmative defenses
with a claim for damages. And the other subsequent pleadings, likewise, did not abandon her stance and defense of
lack of jurisdiction due to improper substituted services of summons in the forfeiture cases. Evidently, from the
foregoing Sec. 20, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, petitioner and her sons did not voluntarily
appear before the SB constitutive of or equivalent to service of summons.
Moreover, the leading La Naval Drug Corp. v. Court of Appeals 26 applies to the instant case. Said case elucidates
the current view in our jurisdiction that a special appearance before the court––challenging its jurisdiction over the
person through a motion to dismiss even if the movant invokes other grounds––is not tantamount to estoppel or a
waiver by the movant of his objection to jurisdiction over his person; and such is not constitutive of a voluntary
submission to the jurisdiction of the court.
Thus, it cannot be said that petitioner and her three children voluntarily appeared before the SB to cure the defective
substituted services of summons. They are, therefore, not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the SB over
their persons nor are they deemed to have waived such defense of lack of jurisdiction. Consequently, there being no
valid substituted services of summons made, the SB did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of petitioner and
her children. And perforce, the proceedings in the subject forfeiture cases, insofar as petitioner and her three
children are concerned, are null and void for lack of jurisdiction. Thus, the order declaring them in default must be
set aside and voided insofar as petitioner and her three children are concerned. For the forfeiture case to proceed
against them, it is, thus, imperative for the SB to serve anew summons or alias summons on the petitioner and her
three children in order to acquire jurisdiction over their persons.
WHEREFORE, the petitions for certiorari and mandamus are PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Sandiganbayan,
Fourth Division has not acquired jurisdiction over petitioner Clarita D. Garcia and her three children. The
proceedings in Civil Case Nos. 0193 and 0196 before the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, insofar as they
pertain to petitioner and her three children, are VOID for lack of jurisdiction over their persons. No costs.
35.) G.R. No. 213027
ESTATE OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS, Petitioner

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
IMELDA ROMUALDEZ MARCOS and IRENE MARCOS ARANETA, Petitioners,

vs.
1
RESOLUTION
SERENO, CJ.:
Before us are Petitions for Review on Certiorari assailing the Partial Summary Judgment dated 13 January 2014
2 3
and the Resolution dated 11 June 2014 rendered by the Sandiganbayan, Special Division, in Civil Case No. 0141.
4 5
In the assailed Judgment and Resolution, the pieces of jewelry, known as the Malacañang Collection, were labeled
as ill-gotten and were consequently forfeited in favor of the Republic.
THE ANTECEDENT FACTS
Civil Case No. 0141 is a forfeiture case entitled Republic of the Philippines v. Ferdinand E. Marcos, (represented by
his Estate/Heirs) and Imelda R. Marcos. It emanated from the Petition dated 17 December 1991 (1991 Petition)
6
filed by the Republic through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), represented by the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG), pursuant to Republic Act No. (R.A.) 1379 in relation to Executive Order Nos.
7
1, 2, 14 and 14-A. The 1991 Petition sought the recovery of the assets and properties pertaining to the
8 9 10 11
Marcoses, who acquired them directly or indirectly through, or as a result of, the improper or illegal use of funds or
properties owned by the government. The properties, subject of other pending forfeiture cases before the
12
Sandiganbayan, were excluded; and the properties, subject of the 1991 Petition, were specifically listed and
accordingly clustered into 18. 13
Some of the properties listed in the 1991 Petition were already adjudged as ill-gotten wealth and consequently
forfeited in favor of the government. In Republic v. Sandiganbayan (the Swiss deposits case), the Court en
14
banc in 2003 decreed that the deposits in various Swiss banks, referred to in the 1991 Petition under paragraph 9
(18), were ill-gotten wealth and forfeited in favor of the State. Likewise, in Marcos v. Republic (the Arelma case),
15 16 17
the Court's Second Division in 2012 declared that the funds, properties, and interests of Arelma were also ill-gotten
wealth and forfeited in favor of the State. 18
The present consolidated petitions emanated from the same Civil Case No. 0141, when the Republic filed a Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment dated 24 June 2009 with respect to another property listed in the 1991 Petition. By
19
way of that motion, the Republic asked the Sandiganbayan to render judgment declaring the pieces of
jewelry, known as the Malacañang Collection and specifically mentioned under paragraph 9 (6) of the 1991
Petition, as ill-gotten; and to subsequently cause this collection of jewelry to be declared forfeited in favor
of the Republic. The latter categorized the pieces of jewelry recovered from the Marcoses into three collections
20
and singled out the Malacañang Collection as the object of the motion. The estimated values thereof were
21
presented also in the motion as follows:
First, the so-called Hawaii Collection x x x mentioned in paragraph 9 (7) of the x x x forfeiture petition x x x seized
22
by the United States Customs Service and x x x turned over to the Philippine Government. Significantly, a ruling was
made by the United States (U.S.) Hawaii District Court on December 18, 1992 that the Republic of the Philippines is
entitled to the possession and control of the said collection. (Annex "A") [The Sandiganbayan] had taken judicial
23
notice of said ruling in its Resolution dated October 25, 1996.

24
Second, the Roumeliotes Collection x x x referred to as "MIA Jewelry" x x x seized from Roumeliotes at the Manila
International Airport on March 1, 1986. Although not covered by this forfeiture proceeding, respondents earlier
sought their inclusion in then pending negotiations for settlement.
Third, the Malacañang Collection x x x seized from Malacañang after February 25, 1986 and transferred to the
Central Bank on March 1, 1986. As ruled by this Honorable Court in the said resolution (Annex "B"), this collection
25
is the object of this forfeiture proceeding.
This collection is itemized in ANNEX "C'' hereof.

26
Based on the 1991 valuation of auction house Christie, Manson and Woods International, Inc., the Roumeliotes,
Malacañang and Hawaii collections were worth between US$5,3 l 3,575 (low estimate) to US$7,112,879 (high
estimate), at the time of the filing of the petition. (ANNEX "D") The value of the Malacañang collection by itself was
27
US$110,055 (low estimate) to US$153,089 (high estimate ). (citations supplied)

28
In support of the motion, the Republic cited the letter dated 25 May 2009 sent to the PCGG by Imelda Marcos,
29
through counsel, demanding "the immediate return of all her pieces of jewelry (i) taken by PCGG from Malacañang
Palace and (ii) those turned over to PCGG by the U.S. Government." The Republic argued that the letter proved
30
the claim of the Marcoses that they owned the Malacañang Collection, including the Hawaii Collection. It further 31
argued that in the 1991 Petition, they were deemed to have admitted the allegations regarding the pieces of
jewelry. The Republic said that the words or stock phrases they used in their Answer dated 18 October 1993 had
32 33
been declared by this Court in the Swiss deposits case as a "negative pregnant" and, as such, amounted to an
admission if not squarely denied. Finally, it contended that "the lawful income of the Marcoses during their
34
incumbencies as public officials was grossly disproportionate to the value of the pieces of
jewelry." Invoking the declaration of his Court in the Swiss deposits case, the Republic stated that their lawful
35 36
income amounting to USD 304,372.43 was grossly disproportionate to the value of the pieces of jewelry in
1991.37
On 3 July 2009, the Republic also filed a Request for Admission addressed to the Estate of Ferdinand Marcos,
38
Imelda Marcos, Imelda Marcos-Manotoc, and Irene Marcos Araneta. It requested the admission under oath of the
truth of the following:
1.That the set of jewelry described as the "Malacañang Collection" subject of this petition and Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment dated June 24, 2009 had been acquired during the incumbency of respondents Ferdinand E.
Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos as public officials of the Republic of the Philippines, particularly between 1966-1986.
2. That the said "Malacañang Collection'' had been acquired from abroad, particularly during respondents' travels to
Asia, Europe and the United States.
3. That the acquisition costs of the "Malacañang Collection'' more or less corresponds to the values appraised by
Christie's in 1998 as summarized in Annex F-2 of the Petition, also Annex D of the Motion for Summary Judgment
dated June 24, 2009.
4. That at the time of the recovery of the Collection in Malacañang, the pieces of jewelry were in mint condition, and
most of which has never been used by respondents. 39
The Republic also submitted a Supplement to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment dated 14 July 2009. It restated
40
that the object of the motion covered only the Malacañang Collection, as the ownership of the two other collections
had been settled by the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution dated 25 October 1996. It also attached the Affidavit of J.
41 42 43
Ermin Ernest Louie R. Miguel, director of the legal department of the PCGG, which was the custodian of the official
records pertaining to the cases filed for the recovery of the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses. The Affidavit sought to
44
prove the value of the Honolulu/PCGG Collection according to the appraisal by Christie's at US Customs in
45
Honolulu, Hawaii, on 28 and 29 September 1992; of the Roumeliotes Collection according to the appraisal by 46
Christie's at the Central Bank in Manila, Philippines, on 7 March 1988; and of the Malacañang Collection according
to the appraisal by Christie's at the Central Bank in Manila, Philippines, on 7 March 1988 and to the much higher
47
acquisition costs indicated in the Invoices transmitted by Gemsland to Imelda Marcos through Mrs. Gliceria
48
Tantoco. 49
Imelda Marcos and Irene Marcos Araneta filed their Manifestation and Preliminary Comments dated 21 July 2009. 50
They manifested therein that Imelda Marcos had indeed demanded the return of the jewelry to her through a
letter dated 25 May 2009 and that the PCGG had been unlawfully possessing the prope1iies in view of its failure to
51
initiate the proper proceeding or to issue a sequestration or freeze order. It was further manifested that Imelda
52
Marcos also wrote a letter dated 28 May 2009 to the Department of Justice (DOJ), which had administrative
53
supervision and control over the PCGG, through DOJ Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez. In turn, he sent a letter dated 4 54
June 2009 to the PCGG through Chairperson Camilo M. Sabio ordering the latter to return the jewelry if there was
no legal impediment. The PCGG, however, referred the matter to the OSG through Solicitor General Agnes VST
Devanadera in a letter dated 9 June 2009. The OSG replied to the Marcoses' letter dated 25 May 2009 by way
55 56
also of a letter dated 21 July 2009. It said that according to the OSG in its letter to the PCGG dated 19 June 2009,
57 58
the former pointed out that the fact the jewelry collection was the subject of an action for forfeiture before the
Sandiganbayan was a legal impediment to their return. 59
Imelda Marcos and Irene Marcos Araneta then stated that the Republic's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment was
filed to justify the possession by the PCGG of the pieces of jewelry, even if these were not part of the forfeiture case
- Civil Case No. 0141. They based their allegations on the pronouncements of the Sandiganbayan in its
60
Resolution dated 25 October 1996 and Order dated 19 November 2001 and on the Republic's omission of the
61 62
collection in the prayer of the 1991 Petition.

63 64
The Marcoses further stated that the Request for Admission was inconsistent with the Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment and the Supplement thereto and further reserved their right to present additional arguments or comments
on the Motion and the Supplement. 65
Imelda Marcos and Irene Marcos Araneta subsequently filed a Manifestation and Motion to Expunge dated 25 July 66
2009. They specifically stated therein that they were adopting the same arguments raised in their Comment, as 67
well as in their Motion for Reconsideration dated 5 May 2009, which was filed after the Sandiganbayan
68
Decision dated 2 April 2009 granting the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Arelma account.
69 70
In their Manifestation and Motion to Expunge, Imelda Marcos and Irene Marcos Araneta claimed that the filing of the
Request for Admission was tantamount to an abdication of the earlier position of the Republic that the case was ripe
for summary judgment. They argued that the Request for Admission entertained a possibly genuine issue as to a
71
material fact, which was needed for the grant of the motion for summary judgment. They further argued that the
72
filing of the Request for Admission was rather late, considering that it was done after the Republic had filed its
Motion for Summary Judgment in 2000 and after the case was concluded in 2004. They then requested that all
73
pleadings, motions and requests filed after the termination of the case in 2004 be expunged. Pending a resolution 74
of the motion to expunge, they simultaneously asked for additional time to answer the Request for Admission and
for permission to conduct an ocular inspection of the subject jewelry, which had been in the Republic's possession
for the past 22 years. 75
Meanwhile, Ferdinand Marcos Jr. filed a Manifestation that he was adopting the Manifestation and Motion to
76
Expunge filed by Marcos and Irene Marcos Araneta. The Republic filed its Opposition dated 24 August 2009, in
77 78
which it said that the Manifestation and Motion to Expunge of Imelda Marcos and Irene Marcos Araneta argued on
trivial matters, raised puerile arguments, and failed to refute the contention that the collection was ill-gotten and
subject to forfeiture. It further stated that the Request for Admission did not depart from the legal basis of the
79
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Instead, the request merely sought to elicit details regarding the acquisition
of the jewelry in order to expedite the resolution of the motion. The Republic therefore claimed that by operation of
80
law, the failure of the Marcoses to respond resulted in their admission of the matters contained in the request. 81
In response to the Marcoses' Manifestation and Preliminary Comments, the Republic likewise filed its Reply dated 82
24 August 2009. It insisted that while the Decision dated 2 April 2009 focused on the Arelma assets, it had
reservations regarding "other reliefs and remedies as may be just and equitable under the premises." These reliefs 83
and remedies included the prayer for the forfeiture of the Malacañang Collection as part of the ill-gotten wealth of
the Marcoses. Also, the Republic stated that the Request for Admission was not inconsistent with its Motion for
84
Partial Summary Judgment, and that the filing of the request after the motion was not prohibited by the Rules of
Court. It stressed that the Request for Admission was filed and served on 3 July 2009. It said that instead of
85 86
making an admission or a denial as a timely response to the request within 15 days or until 18 July 2009, the
Marcoses filed - and belatedly at that - a Manifestation and Motion to Expunge on 25 July 2009. Thus, the Republic 87
insisted that all the matters that were the subject of the request be deemed admitted by the Marcoses. 88
A Rejoinder dated 7 September 2009 was filed by the Marcoses who alleged that the demand could not have
89
meant that the collection was part of the case, because the jewelry collection was "trivially mentioned" in the
statement of facts of the 1991 petition; was not specifically prayed for; was not subject of the case, according to
90 91
the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution dated 25 October 1996 and Order dated 19 November 2001. They also
92 93 94
reiterated that the Request for Admission was inconsistent with the Republic's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment. 95
In a Resolution dated 2 August 2010, the Sandiganbayan denied the Marcoses' Manifestation and Preliminary
96
Comments and Manifestation and Motion to Expunge. It ruled that (1) the proceedings in this case had not been
terminated; (2) in filing their objection, respondents were not deemed to have admitted the matters in the Request
97
for Admission; and (3) the Republic's Request for Admission was not inconsistent with the Motion for Summary
98
Judgment. The Sandiganbayan further directed the Marcoses to file and serve within 15 days their sworn answer to
99
the Request for Admission, but they failed to comply with the directive.
100 101
After the submission of the parties of their respective memoranda, the Sandiganbayan issued a Partial Summary
102
Judgment dated 13 January 2014 ruling that (1) the Malacañang Collection was part and subject of the forfeiture
103
petition; (2) the Motion for Summary Judgment was proper; and (3) the forfeiture of the Malacañang Collection
104 105
was justified pursuant to R.A. 1379. 106
Motions for Reconsideration were filed by the Estate of Marcos on 29 January 2014 and by Imelda Marcos and 107
Irene Marcos Araneta on 30 January 2014. The Republic submitted its Consolidated Opposition dated 25
108 109
February 2014, while Replies were submitted by the Estate of Marcos on 12 March 2014 and by Imelda Marcos 110
and Irene Marcos Araneta on 31 March 2014. The Republic filed its Consolidated Rejoinder on 23 April 2014.
111 112
In a Resolution dated 11 June 2014, the Sandiganbayan denied the Motions for Reconsideration for being mere
113
rehashes of the arguments of the Marcoses in their Comments and Opposition to the Republic's Motion for
Summary Judgment. 114
Imelda Marcos and Irene Marcos Araneta received the Resolution denying their Motion for Reconsideration on 24
June 2014. Within the 15-day period to file a petition, they submitted to this Court a Manifestation with Entry of
115
Appearance and Motion for Extension of Time, asking that they be given until 09 August 2014 to file their
petition. Meanwhile, the Estate of Marcos filed a Motion for Extension of Time on 09 July 2014 and a
116
Manifestation on 8 August 2014, saying that its other executor in solidum was no longer filing a separate petition for
review, but was adopting that which was filed by Imelda Marcos. 117
This Court issued a Resolution on 17 November 2014 in G.R. No. 213027 granting the Motion for Extension and
118
noting the Manifestation of the Estate of Marcos that the latter was adopting the petition for review filed by Imelda
Marcos and Irene Marcos Araneta in G.R. No. 213253. This Court also issued a Resolution on 17 November 2014 119
in G.R. No. 213253 noting the Manifestation of Imelda Marcos and Irene Marcos Araneta's counsels, who were
seeking the grant of their Motion for an Extension. This Court thereafter consolidated the petitions.
120 121
THE ISSUES
The issues for this Court's resolution are as follows: (1) whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the
properties; (2) whether the Malacañang Collection can be the subject of the forfeiture case; (3) whether
forfeiture is justified under R.A. 1379; (4) whether the Sandiganbayan correctly ruled that the Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment was not inconsistent with the Request for Admission; and (5) whether the Sandiganbayan
correctly declared that the forfeiture was not a deprivation of petitioners' right to due process of law. 122
OUR RULING
We find no reversible error in the ruling of the Sandiganbayan.
The Sandiganbayan correctly acquired jurisdiction over the case. The properties are included in the 1991 Petition as
found in subparagraph (6) of paragraph (9), which reads:
9. However, the other properties which had been identified so far by both the PCGG and the Solicitor General
(excluding those involved in the aforesaid civil cases) are approximated at US$5-B and which include-
xxxx
(6) Paintings and silverware sold at public auction in the United States worth $17-M as shown by Annex "F" hereof,
aside from the jewelries, paintings and other valuable decorative arts found in Malacañang and in the United
States estimated to be about $23.9-M as listed and described in Annexes "F-1", "F-2", "F-2-a" and "F-
123 124 125
3" hereto attached as integral parts hereof; (Emphasis supplied)

126 127
The Sandiganbayan correctly noted the Annexes, which were mentioned in subparagraph 6 and made an integral
part of the 1991 Petition, itemizing and enumerating the pieces of jewelry with their estimated values. It ultimately
found that the 1991 Petition had categorically alleged that the Malacañang Collection was included in the assets,
monies and properties sought to be recovered.
With respect to the manner of making allegations in pleadings, the Rules of Court simply provides as follows:
Section 1. In general. - Every pleading shall contain in a methodical and logical form, a plain, concise and direct
statement of the ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or defense, as the case may be,
omitting the statement of mere evidentiary facts.
If a defense relied on is based on law, the pertinent provisions thereof and their applicability to him shall be
clearly and concisely stated. 128
With respect to the determination of whether an initiatory pleading sufficiently states a cause of action, this Court
has ruled in this wise:
In determining whether an initiatory pleading states a cause of action, the test is as follows: admitting the truth of the
facts alleged, can the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer? To be taken into account are
only the material allegations in the complaint; extraneous facts and circumstances or other matters aliunde are not
considered. The court may consider -- in addition to the complaint -- the appended annexes or documents, other
pleadings of the plaintiff, or admissions in the records. 129
The 1991 Petition is compliant with the requirements stated in law and jurisprudence. The sufficiency of its
allegations is thus established with respect to the pieces of jewelry. Not only were these listed in paragraph 9 (6)
130 of that petition as part of the properties subject to forfeiture but these were also itemized in the documents
annexed thereto: Annexes "F-1," "F-2," "F-2-a," and "F-3." The 1991 Petition is more than enough fulfillment
131 132 133 134
of the requirement provided under Section 3 (d) of R.A. 1379.

135
Meanwhile, the Sandiganbayan correctly held that the forfeiture was justified and that the Malacañang
Collection was subject to forfeiture. The legitimate income of the Marcoses had been pegged at USD
304,372.43. We reiterate what we have already stated initially in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, and
136 137
subsequently in Marcos v. Republic: that "whenever any public officer or employee has acquired during
138
his incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public
officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property, said
property shall be presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired." Petitioners failed to
139
satisfactorily show that the properties were lawfully acquired; hence, the prima facie presumption that they
were unlawfully acquired prevails.
The Sandiganbayan also properly ruled that there was no inconsistency or incongruity between Republic's Request
for Admission and Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Indeed, we have held that a request for admission can be
the basis for the grant of summary judgment. The request can be the basis therefor when its subject is deemed to
have been admitted by the party and is requested as a result of that party's failure to respond to the court's directive
to state what specifically happened in the case. The resort to such a request as a mode of discovery rendered all
140
the matters contained therein as matters that have been deemed admitted pursuant to Rule 26, Section 2 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. 141
On the basis of respondent Imelda Marcos' s letter dated 25 May 2009; respondents' Answer to the 1991 Petition,
which was considered to be a "negative pregnant" in Republic v. Sandiganbayan; and respondents' failure to timely
respond to petitioner's Request for Admission, the Sandiganbayan thus correctly granted the Motion for Summary
Judgment of the Republic.
A careful scrutiny of the three bases used by the Sandiganbayan in justifying the absence of a genuine issue and
eventually granting the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment leads us to no other course of action but to affirm the
ruling of the Sandiganbayan. The prima facie presumption on unlawfully acquired property indeed finds application
on the first basis. Section 2 of R.A. 13 79 provides that "[w]henever any public officer or employee has acquired
during his incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer
or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property, said property shall
be presumed primafacie to have been unlawfully acquired." And in this regard, the Sandiganbayan had taken
judicial notice of the legitimate income of the Marcoses during their incumbency as public officers for the period
1966-1986 which was pegged at USD 304,372.43. 142
With respect to the second basis - the Answer to the 1991 Petition - the denial of the Marcoses cannot be
considered a specific denial because similar to their denial in the Arelma case, in which insisted that they were not
privy to the transactions, the Marcoses gave "the same stock answer to the effect that [they] did not engage in any
illegal activities, and that all their properties were lawfully acquired." That they were not privy to the actual data in
143
the possession of the PCGG and the Solicitor General is simply a line of defense which necessarily results in their
failure to allege the lawfulness of the mode of acquiring the property. subject of forfeiture, considering the amount of
their lawful income. As in the Arelma case, the Marcoses are deemed to have admitted that the Malacanang
144
Collection itemized in the annexes were found in the palace and subsequently proven to have been owned by Mrs.
Marcos as she admitted in her letter dated 25 May 2009.
In light of the third basis, the factual antecedents of the case bear restating. The Republic filed a Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment dated 24 June 2009, after which it filed and served a Request for Admission on 3 July 2009.
Afterwards, it submitted a Supplement to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment dated 14 July 2009. On 28 July
2009, the Marcoses filed their Manifestation and Preliminary Comments. The Sandiganbayan noted the objection
they had raised in their Manifestation and Preliminary Comments. In that manner, rather than declaring that the
145
matters raised in the Request for Admission were deemed admitted, the Sandiganbayan instead ruled on the
objection raised by the Marcoses. In short, it ruled that the Request for Admission was not inconsistent with the
motion for summary judgment. The Sandiganbayan reasoned that there was no inconsistency between the two. It
146
said that a request for admission may even complement a summary judgment in that the request for admission may
be used as basis for filing a motion for summary judgment. It then denied the Manifestation and Preliminary
147
Comments and Manifestation and Motion to Expunge filed by the Marcoses relative to the Republic's Request for
Admission. Thereafter, it required the Marcoses to file and serve their sworn answer to the Request for
Admission. The Marcoses filed numerous pleadings, but none of these was made in response to the Request for
148
Admission as required by Rule 26, Section 2 of the Rules of Court until the Sandiganbayan eventually issued the
149
Partial Summary Judgment dated 13 January 2014 and the Resolution dated 11June2014.
The Sandiganbayan ruled that "a request for admission may even complement a summary judgment in that the
request for admission may be used as basis for filing a summary judgment" citing three cases as
150
follows: Concrete Aggregates Corp. v. CA, Diman v. Alumbres, and Allied Agri-Business v. CA. The first case
151 152 153
instructs that a request for admission "should set forth relevant evidentiary matters of fact, or documents described
in and exhibited with the request, whose purpose is to establish said party's cause of action or defense." 154
The second case, on the other hand, teaches the nature of modes of discovery in this wise:
Particularly as regards request for admission under Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, the law ordains that when a party
is served with a written request that he admit : (1) the genuineness of any material and relevant document described
in and exhibited with the request, or (2) the truth of any material and relevant matter of fact set forth in the request,
said party is bound within the period designated in the request, to file and serve on the party requesting the
admission a sworn statement either (10 denying specifically the matters of which an admission is requested or (2)
setting forth in details the reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit or deny those matters. If the party served
does not respond with such sworn statement, each of the matters of whichan admission is requested shall be
deemed admitted.
In this case, the Dimans' request for admission was duly served by registered mail on Jose Lacalle on February 6,
1995, and a copy thereof on his lawyers on February 4, 1995. Neither made any response whatever within the
reglementary period. Nor did either of them do so even after receiving copy of the Dimans' "MANIFESTATION WITH
MOTION TO REQUIRE PLAINTIFFS TO ANSWER REQUEST FOR ADMISSION." dated March 28, 1995. On
account thereof, in legal contemplation, the Heirs impliedly admitted all the facts listed in the request for admission.
xxxx
On the other hand, in the case of a summary judgment, issues apparently exist -- i.e., facts are asse1ied in the
complaint regarding which there is as yet no admission, disavowal or qualification; or specific denials or affirmative
defenses are in truth set out in the answer -- but the issues thus arising from the pleadings are sham, fictitious, not
genuine, as shown by admissions, depositions or admissions. (Italics supplied)
155
The third case demonstrates how failure to answer the request for admission within the period resulted in the
admission of the matters stated therein. The Court, in that case, specifically ruled:
The burden of affirmative action is on the party upon whom notice is served to avoid the admission rather than upon
the party seeking the admission. Hence, when petitioner failed to reply to a request to admit, it may not argue that
the adverse party has the burden of proving the facts sought to be admitted. Petitioners silence is an admission of
the facts stated in the request.
This Court finds that the motion for summary judgment filed by respondent CHERRY VALLEY on the ground that
there were no questions of fact in issue since the material allegations of the complaint were not disputed was
correctly granted by the trial court. It is a settled rule that summary judgment may be granted if the facts which stand
admitted by reason of a partys failure to deny statements contained in a request for admission show that no material
issue of fact exists. By its failure to answer the other partys request for admission, petitioner has admitted all the
material facts necessary for judgment against itself. 156
Petitioners claim that there has been a lack of observance of due process; that "there has been no trial or
157
hearing"; and that "petitioners were shamefully never given an opportunity to show that the questioned properties
158
may have been lawfully acquired through other means." We find the invocation of lack of observance of due
159
process at this stage of the proceedings rather belated, especially when it was never invoked before the
Sandiganbayan. Needless to say, the various pleadings petitioners have filed in this case and in other cases
involving the Marcos properties were countless occasions when they could have proven that the Malacañang
Collection had indeed been lawfully acquired as claimed. They allege that they were denied due process by not
being given any opportunity to prove their lawful acquisition of the Malacañang Collection. This allegation cannot be
given credence for being utterly baseless.
The complete records of Civil Case No. 0141 - a total of 35 volumes along with 2 envelopes containing exhibits and
1 envelope containing the transcripts of stenographic notes - have been forwarded to this Court by the
Sandiganbayan. Pertinent parts of these documents annexed to the 1991 Petition, along with the other pleadings
filed before the Sandiganbayan relative to the present petitions, have also been extensively quoted and reproduced
verbatim in this resolution. The purpose is not only to provide a clearer statement of the factual antecedents, but
also to confirm the veracity of the reference to these documents and to equally dispel any doubt regarding them.
All in all, in the absence of any compelling legal reason, there is no basis to overturn, or carve an exception to,
existing jurisprudence on the matters raised in the present case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Partial Summary Judgment dated 13 January 2014 and
Resolution dated 11 June 2014 rendered by the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case No. 0141 are AFFIRMED.
36.) G.R. No. 217120, April 18, 2016
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. THE HEIRS OF SPOUSES FLORENTINO AND

PACENCIA MOLINYAWE, REPRESENTED BY MARITES MOLINYAWE AND FRED
SANTOS, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 filed by the Republic of the Philippines (Republic) praying
that the February 20, 2015 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. SP No. 133803 be
reversed and set aside and that Civil Case No. 10-658 pending before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 57, Makati City (RTC-Branch 57), be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. .
In the CA, the appellate court denied the Republic's petition for certiorari which sought to annul the
orders, dated September 6, 20133 and November 19, 2013,4 of the RTC-Branch 57 admitting the
Amended and Supplemental Petition of the respondents, seeking the cancellation of the lis
pendens annotated at the back of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 75239, 76129 and 77577
and for quieting of title of said TCTs on the ground of prescription because the Republic failed to
execute the .final and executory decision of a co-equal court.
The Antecedents:
On May 16, 1960, criminal .cases for malversation were filed with the then Court of First Instance of
La Union (CFI-La Union) against several accused including Florentino Molinyawe (Florentino) and
docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 2996 and 2997.5
In that same year, the Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a
forfeiture case pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1379 before the then CFI-Pasig against
Florentino, his relatives, and the respondents in this case, namely: Patricia Molinyawe, Salisi
Molinyawe, Oscar Molinyawe, Vicente Miranda, Baldomera Miranda, Cresence Padilla, Leonarda
Recinto Padilla, and Vicente Leus (respondents). The forfeiture case, docketed as Civil Case No.
6379, involved several parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 75239, 76129 and 77577, and registered
in the names of the Spouses Vicente Miranda and Baldomera Miranda (Spouses Miranda), Spouses
Cresence Padilla and Leonarda Recinto Padilla (Spouses Padilla) and Vivencio Leus (Leus). The
Republic claimed that Florentino had illegally acquired the said properties as their values
were said to be grossly disproportionate to his declared income.
On November 18, 1960, the Republic caused the annotation of the forfeiture case on the back of the
titles of the subject lots.6
On September 22, 1972, the CFI-Pasig declared the sale of the subject properties to the
Spouses Miranda, Spouses Padilla and Leus null and void, and ordered that the said
properties be forfeited in favor of the Republic.
The decision was appealed to the CA but the appeal was denied by the CA in its February 13, 1974
Resolution. No further action was taken to set aside the judgment. Thus, on August 23, 1974, the CA
issued an Entry of Judgment.
The CFI-Pasig then issued a writ of execution on February 14, 1975. Although the writ was duly
served on the respondents in that case, more than thirty (30) years had passed , but still the
Republic failed to cancel TCT Nos. 75239, 76129 and 77577 and transfer them to its name. It
appeared that Florentino did not turn over to the Republic the owner's duplicate copies of the subject
TCTs.7
Meanwhile, on January 12, 1973, in Criminal Case Nos.r2996 and 2997, the CFI-La Union acquitted
Florentino of malversation.
Many years later, on July 9, 2010, the respondents, as heirs of Florentino, filed with the RTC-Branch
57, a Complaint/Petition, docketed as Civil Case No. 10-658, praying for the cancellation of the lis
pendens annotated at the back of TCT Nos. 75239, 76129 and 77577 and for quieting of title
regarding said TCTs on the ground of prescription for the non-execution of the September 22, 1972
CA decision.8
Thereafter, on October 6, 2010, the Republic caused the annotation of the September 22, 1972
decision on the back of TCT Nos. 75239, 76129 and 77577.
On December 5, 2010, the Republic filed a separate action with the RTC, Branch 138, Makati City
(RTC Branch 138), docketed as LRC Case No. M-5469, specifically a petition for annulment of
owner's duplicate copy of said TCTs and the issuance of new ones pursuant to Section 107 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 allegedly due to the respondents' refusal to surrender the
owner's duplicate copies.9
On September 12, 2011, the RTC-Branch 138 decided in favor of the Republic in LRC Case No. M-
5469 declaring the owner's duplicate copies of TCT Nos. 75239, 76129 and 77577 in possession of
the respondents as null and void. Thus, the RTC-Branch 138 cancelled the same and directed the
Register of Deeds of Makati (RD-Makati) to issue new owner's duplicate copies of said TCTs in the
name of the Republic.10
On April 12, 2012, the RD-Makati caused the cancellation and transfer of the subject TCTs as follows:
a. TCT No. 75239 in the names of the spouses Vicente Miranda and Baldomera Miranda -
cancelled and transferred to "the Republic of the Philippines with TCT No. 006-2012000526.
b. TCT No. 76129 in the names of the spouses Cresence Padilla and Leonarda Recinto Padilla -
cancelled and transferred to the Republic of the Philippines with TCT No. 006-2012000527.
c. TCT No. 77577 in the name of Vivencio Leus - cancelled and transferred to the Republic of the
Philippines with TCT No. 006- 2012000528.11
Considering that no appropriate remedy was pursued within the reglementary period, the September
12, 2011 decision in the LRC case became final and executory. In January 2012, the Republic filed a
motion for execution which was granted by the RTC-Branch 138 in its March 16, 2012 Order.12
Due to the decision in the LRC case, the respondents filed on June 10, 2013, a Motion to Admit
Amended and Supplemental Petition (attaching to it the said Amended and Supplemental
Petition), in Civil Case No. 10-658. In its September 6, 2013 Order, the RTC-Branch 57, granted the
same. The Republic moved for a reconsideration but its motion was denied in, its November 19, 2013
Order of the Court.
Consequently, the Republic filed a Rule 65 petition for certiorari before the CA seeking the annulment
of the orders, dated September 6, 2013 and November 19, 2013, issued by the RTC-Branch 57 in
Civil Case No. 10-658. It argued that the trial court had committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the September 6, 2013 and November 19, 2013
orders considering that: a] it had no jurisdiction over the original complaint/petition; b] the
amendment sought a review of a final and executory decision of a co-equal court; and c] the
amendment is a collateral attack on TCT Nos. 006-201000526, 006-201200527 and 006-201200528.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its February 20, 2015 Decision, the CA dismissed the petition. The appellate court ruled that the
RTC-Branch 57 did not act without or in excess of jurisdiction or committed grave abuse of discretion
in issuing its questioned orders. It explained that the RTC had jurisdiction over an action for quieting
of title. The CA explained that the order of the RTC to admit the respondents' amended and
supplemental petition inspite of being fully aware of the finality of the decision of a co-equal court
was not tantamount to grave abuse of discretion which would warrant the issuance of a writ
of certiorari. Further, the Court found that the RTC's judgment was not performed in a capricious or
whimsical manner because the alleged abuse of discretion was not so patent and gross. Hence, the
CA concluded that its judgment was not.exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility. In other words, the CA was saying that although the actions of the RTC-
Branch 57 could constitute imprudence, it could not be regarded as an act of grave abuse of
discretion that could justify the issuance of a writ of certiorari.
Finally, the CA opined that the decision of RTC-Branch 138 in LRA Case No. M-5469 was a "flawed
decision" reasoning as follows:
Shifting to another point, We are in awe on how LRA Case No. M-5469 was decided. There are some
observations that tinker with our curiosity. It is quite strange and mind boggling too that in LRA Case
No. M-5469, it seems apparent that the decision made therein was only based on the decision dated
September 22, 1972 pertaining to the forfeiture case without regard for taking into account the
January 23, 1975 decision in the malversation case acquitting Florentino Molinyawe. Of course, it is
understandable that no mention of the acquittal was made in petitioner's Petition for annulment of
the owner's duplicate copy of the TCTs covering the subject properties. Interestingly too, private
respondents merely opted to file a motion to dismiss, instead of filing their answer and presenting
the trial court (Branch 138) the January 23, 1975 decision. Had these been considered, a complete
turn of events could have transpired considering that such acquittal necessarily rendered the
forfeiture of the properties ineffective and invalid. By the virtue of the acquittal, the forfeiture of his
properties became ineffective. Consequently, it is but proper that his forfeited properties be given
back to him or in his absence, to his heirs. That said, the decision in LRA Case No. M-5469 is, to Us,
a flawed decision. But then, of course, this is not a matter that necessitates a discussion in the
present case mindful of the fact that this is not within the thrust of a petition for certiorari.
In certiorari, We are only limited to the determination of whether or not public respondent acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in rendering the assailed orders
and as earlier stated, no such abuse of discretion was found to be availing under the
circumstances.13 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Not in conformity with the CA decision, the Republic filed the subject petition based on the following
GROUNDS:
THE DECISION DATED FEBRUARY 20, 2015 OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS NOT IN ACCORD
WITH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE SINCE:
1) RTC-BRANCH 57 COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ADMITTING
RESPONDENTS' AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION AS IT HAS NO
JURISDICTION IN THE FIRST PLACE OVER CIVIL CASE NO. 10-658; AND
2) THE COURT OF APPEALS WENT BEYOND ITS JURISDICTION UNDER RULE 65 WHEN
IT RULED THAT THE CIVIL FORFEITURE CASE IS CONTINGENT OR DEPENDENT ON
THE CRIMINAL CASE.14
The Republic emphasizes that RTC-Branch 57 gravely abused its discretion when it admitted the
respondents' Amended and Supplemental Petition because, in the first place, it had no jurisdiction
over Civil Case No. 10-658. Citing jurisprudence, it argues that an amendment of a pleading is not
permissible when the court has no jurisdiction over the case. Moreover, by admitting the Amended
and Supplemental Petition, it was allowing the respondents to alter both the factual and legal findings
of the RTC-Branch 138 in its decision in LRC No. M-5469, which had long become final and
executory.
The Republic argues that the respondents' Complaint/Petition should have been dismissed right away
by the RTC-Branch 57 because, pursuant to Section 77 of P.D. No. 1529, they were not the proper
parties to ask for the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens. It points out that the allegations show
that the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens was but an ancillary or incident to Civil Case No.
6374. The Republic highlights that the respondents admitted that they did not have a legal or an
equitable interest in TCT Nos. 75239, 76129 and 77577; that the original complaint/petition failed to
allege any of the grounds under Section 77 of P.D. No. 1529 for the cancellation of a notice of lis
pendens; and that only the court having jurisdiction over the main action or proceeding involving the
property may order its cancellation.
More importantly, the Republic contends that the admission, of the respondents' Amended and
Supplemental Petition seeks to alter the final and executory findings of a co-equal branch. It being
the purpose, it concludes that the RTC-Branch 57 should have dismissed the petition and amended
petition pursuant to Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which allows motu
propio dismissal of cases.
Finally, the Republic stresses that the CA went beyond its jurisdiction under Rule 65 when
it stated that the civil forfeiture case was contingent or dependent on the outcome of a
criminal case.
Position of the Respondents
The respondents counter that the RTC-Branch 57 had jurisdiction over the original petition that they
had filed and that the admission of their amended and supplemental petition was in order and in
accordance with the Rules of Court. They point out that actions for quieting of title and cancellation
of lis pendens are actions which are incapable of pecuniary estimation. Hence, the respondents posit
that the RTC-Branch 57 had exclusive original jurisdiction thereof pursuant to the provisions of
Section 19 of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129, as amended.
They further argue that the amended and supplemental petition will not alter the findings of the RTC-
Branch 138 considering that they chose to amend and supplement their original petition because its
decision in LRC Case No. M-5469 rendered moot and academic their action for cancellation of lis
pendens and quieting of title. In this regard, they assert that the CA did not go beyond its jurisdiction
under Rule 65 when it briefly discussed its observation and stated that the LRC case was flawed.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Grant of extraordinary remedy of certiorari justified when grave abuse of discretion present
For the extraordinary remedy of certiorari to be justified, the petitioner must satisfactorily establish
that the court gravely abused its discretion. Grave abuse of discretion is the capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment that effectively brings the acting entity outside the exercise of its proper
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and the abuse must be so patent and
gross so as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the; duty
enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as to be equivalent to having acted without
jurisdiction.15
In the case at bar, a cursory review of the records would reveal that the RTC-Branch 57 violated
several rules of procedure and well-settled rulings. Thus, its decision was arrived at arbitrarily and
whimsically clearly constituting grave abuse of discretion.
Jurisdiction; Final and Executory judgment

Records show that when the respondents filed Civil Case No. 10-658 in July 2010 for the cancellation
of the lis pendens annotated on the back of TCT Nos. 75239, 76129 and 77577 and for quieting of
said titles before the RTC-Branch 57, there was already a decision rendered by the CFI-Pasig City in
the forfeiture case (Civil Case No. 6379) declaring null and void1 the sale of the subject properties to
the Spouses Miranda, Spouses Padilla and Leus and at the same time ordering said properties
forfeited in favor of the Republic. The September 22, 1972 decision of the CFI-Pasig, in Civil Case No.
6379 became final and executory on August 23, 1974 after the CA issued an entry of judgment.
Subsequently, in February 1975, the CFI-Pasig issued a writ of execution in Civil Case No. 6379.
The records further establish that when the respondents filed their Motion To Admit Amended and
Supplemental Petition on June 10, 2013 before the RTC-Branch 57, a decision had already been
rendered by the RTC-Branch 138 in LRC Case No. M-5469, declaring the owner's duplicate copies of
TCT Nos. 75239, 76129 and 77577 in possession of the respondents null and void, cancelling the
same and directing the RD-Makati to issue new owner's duplicate copies of said TCT's in the name of
the Republic. On April 12, 2012, in compliance with the said decision in the LRC case, the RD-Makati
caused the cancellation and transfer of the subject TCTs. Hence, TCT Nos. 75239,76129 and 77577
were all cancelled and TCT Nos. 006-2012000526, 006-2012000527 and 006-2012000528 were
issued, respectively, all in the name of the Republic.
From the above scenario, it cannot be denied that the forfeiture case involving the subject TCTs was
filed before the CFI-Pasig while the complaint/petition for cancellation of lis pendens and quieting of
title was filed before the RTC-Branch 57. There is likewise no dispute that the CFI-Pasig tried and
decided the forfeiture case. Therefore, it was the CFI-Pasig that had jurisdiction over the main action
or proceeding involving the subject TCTs, not the RTC-Branch 57. As the CFI-Pasig had jurisdiction
over the main action, said court exercised exclusive power and control over,the TCTs that were the
subjects of the respondents' complaint/petition with the RTC-Branch 57. Hence, the RTC-Branch 57
had no jurisdiction over the respondents' complaint/petition.
The Court agrees with the Republic's contention that only the court having jurisdiction over the main
action or proceeding involving the property may order the cancellation thereof. In this case, only the
CFI-Pasig (or its successor) can order the cancellation of lis pendens, not the RTC-Branch 57. The
case of J. Casim Construction Supplies, Inc. v. Registrar of Deeds of Las Pi
…….
On the CA's remark that Florentino's acquittal necessarily rendered the
forfeiture of the properties ineffective and invalid, it clearly was an obiter
dictum. Moreover, it had no substantial or procedural basis. The cases
were separate and distinct from one another. Indeed, there is no law, rule
or jurisprudence that mandates the automatic dismissal of a forfeiture
case after an acquittal in the criminal case for malversation. Illustrative of
this point is Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr. v. Republic of the Philippines,[19] where it was
ruled:
As early as Almeda v. Judge Perez, we have already delineated the difference between
criminal and civil forfeiture and classified the proceedings under R.A. 1379 as
belonging to the latter, viz.:
"Forfeiture proceedings may be either civil or criminal in nature, and may

be in rem or in personam. If they are under a statute such that if an
indictment is presented the forfeiture can be included in the criminal case,
they are criminal in nature, although they may be civil in form; and where
it must be gathered from the statute that the action is meant to be criminal
in its nature it cannot be considered as civil. If, however, the proceeding
does not involve the conviction of the wrongdoer for the offense charged
the proceeding is of a civil nature; and under statutes which specifically so
provide, where the act or omission for which the forfeiture is imposed is
not also a misdemeanor, such forfeiture may be sued for and recovered in
a civil action."
In the first place a proceeding under the Act (Rep. Act No. 1379) does not
terminate in the imposition of a penalty but merely in the forfeiture of the
properties illegally acquired in favor of the state. (Sec. 6) In the second
place the procedure outlined in the law leading to forfeiture is that
provided for in a civil action. Thus there is a petition (Sec. 3), then an answer (Sec.
4), and lastly, a hearing. The preliminary investigation which is required prior to the
filing of the petition, in accordance with Sec. 2 of the Act, is provided expressly to be
one similar to a preliminary investigation in a criminal case. If the investigation is only
similar to that in a criminal case, but the other steps in the proceedings are those for
civil proceedings, it stands to reason that the proceeding is not criminal . . . . (citations
omitted)
Forfeiture cases impose neither a personal criminal liability, nor the civil liability that
arises from the commission of a crime (ex delicto). The liability is based solely on a
statute that safeguards the right of the State to recover unlawfully acquired properties.
Executive Order No. 14 (E.O. No. 14), Defining the Jurisdiction Over Cases Involving
the Ill-gotten Wealth of Former President Ferdinand Marcos, authorizes the filing of
forfeiture suits that will proceed independently of any criminal proceedings. Section 3
of E.O. 14 empowered the PCGG to file independent civil actions separate from the
criminal actions.[20]
Besides, the CA itself recognized that it had no bearing. In fact, it wrote that it was not
within the thrust of a petition for certiorari.
The remedy of the respondents is to file the necessary motion or action before, the
court having jurisdiction over the main case, if still permitted by the rules. It is to be
remembered, however, that prescription and estoppel do not lie against the State. [21]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the February 20, 2015

Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 133803 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.
37.) G.R. No. 189434 April 25, 2012
FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR. Petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Presidential Commission on Good
Government, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 189505
IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, Petitioner,
vs.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
These two consolidated Petitions filed under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure pray for the reversal of
the 2 April 2009 Decision of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case No. 0141 entitled Republic of the Philippines v. Heirs
of Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos. The anti-graft court granted the Motion for Partial Summary
1
Judgment filed by respondent Republic of the Philippines (Republic) and declared all assets and properties of
Arelma, S.A., an entity created by the late Ferdinand E. Marcos, forfeited in favor of the government.
On 17 December 1991, the Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG),
filed a Petition for Forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan pursuant to the forfeiture law, Republic Act No. 1379
2
(R.A. 1379) in relation to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2 and 14. The petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 0141.
3 4
Respondent Republic, through the PCGG and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought the
declaration of Swiss bank accounts totaling USD 356 million (now USD 658 million), and two treasury notes
worth USD 25 million and USD 5 million, as ill-gotten wealth. The Swiss accounts, previously held by five groups of
5
foreign foundations, were deposited in escrow with the Philippine National Bank (PNB), while the treasury notes
6
were frozen by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP).
Respondent also sought the forfeiture of the assets of dummy corporations and entities established by nominees of
Marcos and his wife, Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, as well as real and personal properties manifestly
out of proportion to the spouses’ lawful income. This claim was based on evidence collated by the PCGG with
the assistance of the United States Justice Department and the Swiss Federal Police Department. The Petition for
7
Forfeiture described among others, a corporate entity by the name "Arelma, Inc.," which maintained an account and
portfolio in Merrill Lynch, New York, and which was purportedly organized for the same purpose of hiding ill-gotten
wealth.8
Before the case was set for pretrial, the Marcos children and PCGG Chairperson Magtanggol Gunigundo signed
several Compromise Agreements (a General Agreement and Supplemental Agreements) all dated 28 December
1993 for a global settlement of the Marcos assets. One of the "whereas" clauses in the General Agreement
specified that the Republic "obtained a judgment from the Swiss Federal Tribunal on December 21, 1990, that the
Three Hundred Fifty-six Million U.S. dollars (USD 356 million) belongs in principle to the Republic of the Philippines
provided certain conditionalities are met xxx." This Decision was in turn based on the finding of Zurich District
Attorney Peter Cosandey that the deposits in the name of the foundations were of illegal provenance. 9
On 18 October 1996, respondent Republic filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings
(the 1996 Motion) pertaining to the forfeiture of the USD 356 million. The Sandiganbayan denied the 1996 Motion on
the sole ground that the Marcoses had earlier moved for approval of the Compromise Agreements, and that this
latter Motion took precedence over that for summary judgment. Petitioner Imelda Marcos filed a manifestation
claiming she was not a party to the Motion for Approval of the Compromise Agreements, and that she owned 90% of
the funds while the remaining 10% belonged to the Marcos estate. 10
On 10 March 2000, the Republic filed another Motion for Summary Judgment (the 2000 Motion), based on the
grounds that: (1) the essential facts that warrant the forfeiture of the funds subject of the Petition under R.A. 1379
are admitted by respondents in their pleadings and other submissions; and (2) the respondent Marcoses’ pretrial
admission that they did not have any interest or ownership over the funds subject of the action for forfeiture
tendered no genuine issue or controversy as to any material fact.
In a 19 September 2000 Decision, the Sandiganbayan initially granted the 2000 Motion, declaring that the Swiss
deposits held in escrow at the PNB were ill-gotten wealth, and, thus, forfeited in favor of the State. In a Resolution
11
dated 31 January 2002, the Sandiganbayan reversed its earlier ruling and denied the 2000 Motion. Alleging grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the court in rendering the later Resolution, the Republic filed a Petition for
Certiorari with the Supreme Court. In G.R. No. 152154 entitled Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan (for
brevity, the "Swiss Deposits Decision"), this Court set aside the 31 January 2002 Sandiganbayan Resolution and
12
reinstated the 19 September 2000 Decision, including the declaration that the Swiss deposits are ill-gotten wealth.
On 18 November 2003, the Court denied with finality petitioner Marcoses’ Motion for Reconsideration.
On 16 July 2004, the Republic filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (2004 Motion) to declare "the funds,
properties, shares in and interests of ARELMA, wherever they may be located, as ill-gotten assets and forfeited in
favor of the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to R.A. 1379 in the same manner (that) the Honorable Supreme
Court forfeited in favor of the petitioner the funds and assets of similar ‘Marcos foundations’ such as AVERTINA,
VIBUR, AGUAMINA, MALER and PALMY." Petitioner contends that: (1) respondents are deemed to have admitted
13
the allegations of the Petition as regards Arelma; and (2) there is no dispute that the combined lawful income of
the Marcoses is grossly disproportionate to the deposits of their foundations and dummy corporations,
including Arelma. Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., Imelda Marcos, and Imee Marcos-Manotoc filed their respective
Oppositions. Irene Marcos-Araneta filed a Motion to Expunge on the ground that the proceedings in Civil Case No.
0141 had already terminated.
On 2 April 2009, the Sandiganbayan rendered the assailed Decision granting respondent’s Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment. It found that the proceedings in Civil Case No. 0141 had not yet terminated, as the Petition for
14
Forfeiture included numerous other properties, which the Sandiganbayan and Supreme Court had not yet ruled
upon. The Republic’s 1996 Motion was merely held in abeyance to await the outcome of the global settlement of the
Marcos assets. Further, this development had prompted the Republic to file the 2000 Motion, which was clearly
limited only to the Swiss accounts amounting to USD 356 million. Thus, according to the Sandiganbayan, its 19
September 2000 Decision as affirmed by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 152154, was in the nature of a separate
judgment over the Swiss accounts and did not preclude a subsequent judgment over the other properties subject of
the same Petition for Forfeiture, such as those of Arelma. The Sandiganbayan held as follows:
15
WHEREFORE, considering all the foregoing, the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment dated July 16, 2004 of
petitioner is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, Partial Summary Judgment is hereby rendered declaring the assets,
investments, securities, properties, shares, interests, and funds of Arelma, Inc., presently under management and/or
in an account at the Meryll (sic) Lynch Asset Management, New York, U.S.A., in the estimated aggregate amount of
US$3,369,975.00 as of 1983, plus all interests and all other income that accrued thereon, until the time or specific
day that all money or monies are released and/or transferred to the possession of the Republic of the Philippines,
are hereby forfeited in favor of petitioner Republic of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED. 16
On 22 October 2009, Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr. filed the instant Rule 45 Petition, questioning the said Decision. One17
week later, Imelda Marcos filed a separate Rule 45 Petition on essentially identical grounds, which was later
18
consolidated with the first Petition. The grievances of both petitioners boil down to the following issues:
1. Whether the forfeiture proceeding, Civil Case No. 0141 with the Sandiganbayan is criminal in
nature, such that summary judgment is not allowed;
2. Whether petitioner Republic complied with Section 3, subparagraphs c, d, and e of R.A. 1375;
3. Whether Civil Case No. 0141 has been terminated such that a motion for partial summary judgment may
no longer be allowed; and
4. Whether in this case there are genuine, triable issues which would preclude the application of the rule on
summary judgment.
I. Forfeiture proceedings are civil in nature
Petitioner Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. argues that R.A. 1379 is a penal law; therefore a person charged under its
provisions must be accorded all the rights granted to an accused under the Constitution and penal
laws. He asserts that the Marcoses were entitled to all the substantial rights of an accused, one of these
19
being the right "to present their evidence to a full blown trial as per Section 5 of R.A. 1379." He relies on the
20
1962 case, Cabal v. Kapunan, where the Court ruled that:

21
We are not unmindful of the doctrine laid down in Almeda vs. Perez, L-18428 (August 30, 1962) in which the theory
that, after the filing of respondents' answer to a petition for forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379, said petition may
not be amended as to substance pursuant to our rules of criminal procedure, was rejected by this Court upon the
ground that said forfeiture proceeding is civil in nature. This doctrine refers, however, to the purely procedural
aspect of said proceeding, and has no bearing on the substantial rights of the respondents therein, particularly their
constitutional right against self-incrimination.
This argument fails to convince. Petitioner conveniently neglects to quote from the preceding paragraphs of
Cabal, which clearly classified forfeiture proceedings as quasi-criminal, not criminal. And even so, Cabal
declared that forfeiture cases partake of a quasi-criminal nature only in the sense that the right against self-
incrimination is applicable to the proceedings, i.e., in which the owner of the property to be forfeited is relieved from
the compulsory production of his books and papers:
Generally speaking, informations for the forfeiture of goods that seek no judgment of fine or imprisonment against
any person are deemed to be civil proceedings in rem. Such proceedings are criminal in nature to the extent that
where the person using the res illegally is the owner or rightful possessor of it, the forfeiture proceeding is in the
nature of a punishment.
x x x x x x x x x
Proceedings for forfeitures are generally considered to be civil and in the nature of proceedings in rem. The
statute providing that no judgment or other proceedings in civil cases shall be arrested or reversed for any
defect or want of form is applicable to them. In some aspects, however, suits for penalties and forfeitures
are of quasi-criminal nature and within the reason of criminal proceedings for all the purposes of * * * that
portion of the Fifth Amendment which declares that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be
a witness against himself. The proceeding is one against the owner, as well as against the goods; for it is
his breach of the laws which has to be proved to establish the forfeiture and his property is sought to be
forfeited.
x x x x x x x x x
As already observed, the various constitutions provide that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be
a witness against himself. This prohibition against compelling a person to take the stand as a witness against
himself applies only to criminal, quasi-criminal, and penal proceedings, including a proceeding civil in form for
forfeiture of property by reason of the commission of an offense, but not a proceeding in which the penalty
recoverable is civil or remedial in nature. (Emphasis supplied.) 22
The right of the Marcoses against self-incrimination has been amply protected by the provisions of R.A. 1379, which
prohibits the criminal prosecution of individuals for or on account of any transaction, matter or thing concerning
which they are compelled -- after having claimed the privilege against self-incrimination -- to testify or produce
evidence, documentary or otherwise. Since this case’s inception in 1991, petitioners have participated in the
23
hearings, argued their case, and submitted their pleadings and other documents, never once putting at issue their
right against self-incrimination or the violation thereof. 24
More importantly, the factual context in the present case is wholly disparate from that in Cabal, which was originally
initiated as an action in personam. Manuel C. Cabal, then Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, was
charged with "graft, corrupt practices, unexplained wealth, conduct unbecoming of an officer and gentleman,
dictatorial tendencies, giving false statements of his assets and liabilities in 1958 and other equally reprehensible
acts." In contradistinction, the crux of the present case devolves solely upon the recovery of assets presumptively
25
characterized by the law as ill-gotten, and owned by the State; hence, it is an action in rem. In Republic v.
Sandiganbayan, this Court settled the rule that forfeiture proceedings are actions in rem and therefore civil
in nature. Proceedings under R.A. 1379 do not terminate in the imposition of a penalty but merely in the
26
forfeiture of the properties illegally acquired in favor of the State. 27
As early as Almeda v. Judge Perez, we have already delineated the difference between criminal and civil forfeiture
28
and classified the proceedings under R.A. 1379 as belonging to the latter, viz:
"Forfeiture proceedings may be either civil or criminal in nature, and may be in rem or in personam. If they are under
a statute such that if an indictment is presented the forfeiture can be included in the criminal case, they are criminal
in nature, although they may be civil in form; and where it must be gathered from the statute that the action is meant
to be criminal in its nature it cannot be considered as civil. If, however, the proceeding does not involve the
conviction of the wrongdoer for the offense charged the proceeding is of a civil nature; and under statutes which
specifically so provide, where the act or omission for which the forfeiture is imposed is not also a misdemeanor,
such forfeiture may be sued for and recovered in a civil action."
In the first place a proceeding under the Act (Rep. Act No. 1379) does not terminate in the imposition of a
penalty but merely in the forfeiture of the properties illegally acquired in favor of the state. (Sec. 6) In the
second place the procedure outlined in the law leading to forfeiture is that provided for in a civil action. Thus there is
a petition (Sec. 3), then an answer (Sec. 4), and lastly, a hearing. The preliminary investigation which is required
prior to the filing of the petition, in accordance with Sec. 2 of the Act, is provided expressly to be one similar to a
preliminary investigation in a criminal case. If the investigation is only similar to that in a criminal case, but the other
steps in the proceedings are those for civil proceedings, it stands to reason that the proceeding is not criminal. xxx.
(citations omitted)
Forfeiture cases impose neither a personal criminal liability, nor the civil liability that arises from the
commission of a crime (ex delicto). The liability is based solely on a statute that safeguards the right of the
State to recover unlawfully acquired properties. Executive Order No. 14 (E.O. No. 14), Defining the Jurisdiction
29
Over Cases Involving the Ill-gotten Wealth of Former President Ferdinand Marcos, authorizes the filing of forfeiture
suits that will proceed independently of any criminal proceedings. Section 3 of E.O. 14 empowered the PCGG to file
independent civil actions separate from the criminal actions. 30
Thus, petitioners cannot equate the present case with a criminal case and assail the proceedings before the
Sandiganbayan on the bare claim that they were deprived of a "full-blown trial." In affirming the Sandiganbayan and
denying petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration in the Swiss Deposits Decision, the Court held:
Section 5 of RA 1379 provides:
The court shall set a date for a hearing which may be open to the public, and during which the respondent shall be
given ample opportunity to explain, to the satisfaction of the court, how he has acquired the property in question.
And pursuant to Section 6 of the said law, if the respondent is unable to show to the satisfaction of the court that he
has lawfully acquired the property in question, then the court shall declare such property forfeited in favor of the
State.
x x x x x x x x x
A careful analysis of Section 5 of RA 1379 readily discloses that the word "hearing" does not always require
the formal introduction of evidence in a trial, only that the parties are given the occasion to participate and
explain how they acquired the property in question. If they are unable to show to the satisfaction of the
court that they lawfully acquired the property in question, then the court shall declare such property
forfeited in favor of the State. There is no provision in the law that a full blown trial ought to be conducted
before the court declares the forfeiture of the subject property. Thus, even if the forfeiture proceedings do
not reach trial, the court is not precluded from determining the nature of the acquisition of the property in
question even in a summary proceeding. 31
As forfeiture suits under R.A. 1379 are civil in nature, it follows that Rule 35 of the Rules of Court on Summary
Judgment may be applied to the present case. This is consistent with our ruling in the Swiss Deposits Decision
upholding the summary judgment rendered by the Sandiganbayan over the Swiss deposits, which are subject of the
same Petition for Forfeiture as the Arelma assets.
II. Republic complied with Section 3 (c), (d), and (e) of R.A. 1375
Petitioner Marcos, Jr. argues that there are genuine issues of fact as borne by the Pre-trial Order, Supplemental
Pre-trial Order, and the Pre-trial Briefs of the parties. He laments that the Republic was unable to meet the
necessary averments under the forfeiture law, which requires a comparison between the approximate amount of
property acquired during the incumbency of Ferdinand Marcos, and the total amount of governmental salaries and
other earnings. While the Petition contained an analysis of Ferdinand Marcos’s income from 1965 to 1986 (during
32
his incumbency), there was purportedly no mention of the latter’s income from 1940 to 1965 when he was a
practicing lawyer, congressman and senator; other earnings until the year 1985; and real properties that were
auctioned off to satisfy the estate tax assessed by the Bureau of Internal Revenue. 33
Petitioner Marcos, Jr. implores us herein to revisit and reverse our earlier ruling in the Swiss Deposits Decision and
argues that the pronouncements in that case are contrary to law and its basic tenets. The Court in that case
allegedly applied a lenient standard for the Republic, but a strict one for the Marcoses. He finds fault in the ruling
therein which was grounded on public policy and the ultimate goal of the forfeiture law, arguing that public policy is
better served if the Court gave more importance to the substantive rights of the Marcoses.
In accordance with the principle of immutability of judgments, petitioners can no longer use the present forum to
assail the ruling in the Swiss Deposits Decision, which has become final and executory. Aside from the fact that the
method employed by petitioner is improper and redundant, we also find no cogent reason to revisit the factual
findings of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case No. 0141, which this Court in the Swiss Deposits Decision found to be
thorough and convincing. In the first place, using a Rule 45 Petition to question a judgment that has already become
final is improper, especially when it seeks reconsideration of factual issues, such as the earnings of the late
President from 1940 to 1965 and the existence of real properties that petitioners claim were auctioned off to pay the
taxes. Secondly, petitioners never raised the existence of these earnings and real properties at the outset and never
mentioned these alleged other incomes by way of defense in their Answer. In their Answer, and even in their
subsequent pleadings, they merely made general denials of the allegations without stating facts admissible in
evidence at the hearing. As will be discussed later, both the Sandiganbayan and the Supreme Court found that the
Marcoses’ unsupported denials of matters patently and necessarily within their knowledge were inexcusable, and
that a trial would have served no purpose at all. 34
R.A. 1379 provides that whenever any public officer or employee has acquired during his incumbency an
amount of property manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer and to his other lawful
income, said property shall be presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired. The elements that
35
must concur for this prima facie presumption to apply are the following: (1) the offender is a public officer
or employee; (2) he must have acquired a considerable amount of money or property during his
incumbency; and (3) said amount is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or
employee and to his other lawful income and income from legitimately acquired property.
Thus, in determining whether the presumption of ill-gotten wealth should be applied, the relevant period is
incumbency, or the period in which the public officer served in that position. The amount of the public
officer’s salary and lawful income is compared against any property or amount acquired for that same
period. In the Swiss Deposits Decision, the Court ruled that petitioner Republic was able to establish the prima facie
presumption that the assets and properties acquired by the Marcoses "were manifestly and patently
disproportionate to their aggregate salaries as public officials." 36
For a petition to flourish under the forfeiture law, it must contain the following:
(a) The name and address of the respondent.

(b) The public officer or employment he holds and such other public offices or employment which he has
previously held.
(c) The approximate amount of property he has acquired during his incumbency in his past and present
offices and employments.
(d) A description of said property, or such thereof as has been identified by the Solicitor General.
(e) The total amount of his government salary and other proper earnings and incomes from legitimately
acquired property, and
(f) Such other information as may enable the court to determine whether or not the respondent has
unlawfully acquired property during his incumbency. (Emphasis supplied)
37
Petitioners claim that the Republic failed to comply with subparagraphs c, d, and e above, because the latter
allegedly never took into account the years when Ferdinand Marcos served as a war veteran with back pay, a
practicing lawyer, a trader and investor, a congressman and senator. We find this claim to be a haphazard rehash of
what has already been conclusively determined by the Sandiganbayan and the Supreme Court in the Swiss
Deposits Decision. The alleged "receivables from prior years" were without basis, because Marcos never had a
known law office nor any known clients, and neither did he file any withholding tax certificate that would prove the
existence of a supposedly profitable law practice before he became President. As discussed in the Swiss Deposits
Decision:
The Solicitor General made a very thorough presentation of its case for forfeiture:
x x x x x x x x x
4. Respondent Ferdinand E. Marcos (now deceased and represented by his Estate/Heirs) was a public officer for
several decades continuously and without interruption as Congressman, Senator, Senate President and President
of the Republic of the Philippines from December 31, 1965 up to his ouster by direct action of the people of EDSA
on February 22-25, 1986.
5. Respondent Imelda Romualdez Marcos (Imelda, for short) the former First Lady who ruled with FM (Ferdinand
Marcos) during the 14-year martial law regime, occupied the position of Minister of Human Settlements from June
1976 up to the peaceful revolution in February 22-25, 1986. She likewise served once as a member of the Interim
Batasang Pambansa during the early years of martial law from 1978 to 1984 and as Metro Manila Governor in
concurrent capacity as Minister of Human Settlements. 1âwphi1
x x x x x x x x x
11. At the outset, however, it must be pointed out that based on the Official Report of the Minister of Budget, the
total salaries of former President Marcos as President from 1966 to 1976 was ₱ 60,000 a year and from 1977 to
1985, ₱ 100,000 a year; while that of the former First Lady, Imelda R. Marcos, as Minister of Human Settlements
from June 1976 to February 22-25, 1986 was ₱ 75,000 a year. 38
The Sandiganbayan found that neither the late Ferdinand Marcos nor petitioner Imelda Marcos filed any Statement
of Assets and Liabilities, as required by law, from which their net worth could be determined. Coupled with the fact
that the Answer consisted of general denials and a standard plea of "lack of knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the truth of the allegations" – what the Court characterized as "foxy replies" and mere pretense –
fairness dictates that what must be considered as lawful income should only be the accumulated salaries of the
spouses and what are shown in the public documents they submitted, such as their Income Tax Return (ITR) and
their Balance Sheets. The amounts representing the combined salaries of the spouses were admitted by petitioner
Imelda Marcos in paragraph 10 of her Answer, and reflected in the Certification dated May 27, 1986 issued by then
Minister of Budget and Management Alberto Romulo:
Ferdinand E. Marcos, as President

1966-1976 at ₱ 60,000/year ₱ 660,000
1977-1984 at ₱ 100,000/year 800,000
1985 at ₱ 110,000/year 110,000
₱ 1,570,00
Imelda R. Marcos, as Minister
June 1976-1985 at ₱ 75,000/year ₱ 718,000
In addition to their accumulated salaries from 1966 to 1985 are the Marcos couple's combined salaries from January
to February 1986 in the amount of ₱ 30,833.33. Hence, their total accumulated salaries amounted to ₱
2,319,583.33. Converted to U.S. dollars on the basis of the corresponding peso-dollar exchange rates prevailing
during the applicable period when said salaries were received, the total amount had an equivalent value of
$304,372.43. 39
The date contained in the ITRs and Balance Sheets filed by the Marcoses are summarized in Schedules A to D
submitted as evidence by the Republic. Schedule A showed that from 1965 to 1984, the Marcoses reported Php
16,408,442.00 or USD 2,414,484.91 in total income, comprised of:
Income Source Amount Percentage

Official Salaries - ₱ 2,627,581.00 - 16.01%
Legal Practice - 11,109,836.00 - 67.71%
Farm Income - 149,700.00 - .91%
Others - 2,521,325.00 - 15.37%
Total ₱ 16,408,442.00 - 100.00%
The amount reported by the Marcos couple as their combined salaries more or less coincided with the Official
Report submitted by the Minister of Budget. Yet what appeared anomalous was the Php 11,109,836 representing
"Legal Practice," which accounted for 67% or more than three-fourths of their reported income. Out of this
anomalous amount, Php 10,649,836, or 96% thereof, represented "receivables from prior years" during the period
1967 to 1984. The Court cited the Solicitor General’s findings:
In the guise of reporting income using the cash method under Section 38 of the National Internal Revenue Code,
FM made it appear that he had an extremely profitable legal practice before he became a President (FM being
barred by law from practicing his law profession during his entire presidency) and that, incredibly, he was still
receiving payments almost 20 years after. The only problem is that in his Balance Sheet attached to his 1965 ITR
immediately preceding his ascendancy to the presidency he did not show any Receivables from client at all, much
less the ₱ 10.65-M that he decided to later recognize as income. There are no documents showing any withholding
tax certificates. Likewise, there is nothing on record that will show any known Marcos client as he has no known law
office. As previously stated, his net worth was a mere ₱ 120,000.00 in December, 1965. The joint income tax returns
of FM and Imelda cannot, therefore, conceal the skeletons of their kleptocracy. 40
In addition, the former President also reported a total of Php 2,521,325 which he referred to as "Miscellaneous
Items" and "Various Corporations" under "Other Income" for 1972-1976. Spouses Marcos did not declare any
income from any deposits that may be subject to a 5% withholding tax, nor did they file any capital gains tax returns
from 1960 to 1965. The Bureau of Internal Revenue attested that there are no records pertaining to the tax
transactions of the spouses in Baguio City, Manila, Quezon City, and Tacloban.
The Balance Sheet attached to the couple’s ITR for 1965 indicates an ending net worth of Php 120,000, which
covered the year immediately preceding their ascendancy to the presidency. As previously mentioned, the
combined salaries of the spouses for the period 1966 to 1986, or in the two decades that they stayed in power,
totaled only USD 304,372.43. In stark contrast, as shown by Schedule D, computations establish the total net worth
of the spouses for the years 1965 until 1984 in the total amount of USD 957,487.75, assuming that the income from
legal practice is real and valid. The combined salaries make up only 31.79% of the spouses’ total net worth from
41
1965 to 1984. This means petitioners are unable to account for or explain more than two-thirds of the total net worth
of the Marcos spouses from 1965 to 1984.
Thus, for the final time, we soundly reiterate that the Republic was able to establish the prima facie
presumption that the assets and properties acquired by the Marcoses were manifestly and patently
disproportionate to their aggregate salaries as public officials. The Republic presented further evidence that
they had bigger deposits beyond their lawful incomes, foremost of which were the Swiss accounts deposited in the
names of five foundations spirited away by the couple to different countries. Petitioners herein thus failed to overturn
this presumption when they merely presented vague denials and pleaded "lack of sufficient knowledge" in their
Answer.
In any case, petitioners may no longer question the findings of the Sandiganbayan affirmed by the Supreme Court in
the Swiss Deposits Decision, as these issues have long become the "law of the case" in the original Petition for
Forfeiture. As held in Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED) v. Republic: 42
Law of the case … is a term applied to an established rule that when an appellate court passes on a question and
remands the case to the lower court for further proceedings, the question there settled becomes the law of the case
upon subsequent appeal. It means that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or
decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, … so long as the facts on
which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court.
Otherwise put, the principle means that questions of law that have been previously raised and disposed of in the
proceedings shall be controlling in succeeding instances where the same legal question is raised, provided that the
facts on which the legal issue was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court.
In the case at bar, the same legal issues are being raised by petitioners. In fact, petitioner Marcos Jr. admits outright
that what he seeks is a reversal of the issues identical to those already decided by the Court in the Swiss Deposits
Decision. He may not resuscitate, via another petition for review, the same issues long laid to rest and established
43
as the law of the case.
III. Civil Case No. 0141 has not yet terminated
Petitioners next argue that the "law of the case" doctrine should be applied, not to the ruling affirming the forfeiture,
but to the grant of the summary judgment over the Swiss accounts as affirmed by the Supreme Court in the Swiss
Deposits Decision. They contend that since the Court’s Decision mentioned only the deposits under the five Swiss
foundations, then the Republic can no longer seek partial summary judgment for forfeiture over the Arelma account.
And since the said Decision has long become final and has in fact been executed, they insist that the
Sandiganbayan has lost its jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioners are under the mistaken impression that the Swiss Deposits Decision serves as the entire judgment in
Civil Case No. 0141. Just because respondent Republic succeeded in obtaining summary judgment over the Swiss
accounts does not mean it is precluded from seeking partial summary judgment over a different subject matter
covered by the same petition for forfeiture. In fact, Civil Case No. 0141 pertains to the recovery of all the assets
enumerated therein, such as (1) holding companies, agro-industrial ventures and other investments; (2)
landholdings, buildings, condominium units, mansions; (3) New York properties; (4) bills amounting to Php
27,744,535, time deposits worth Php 46.4 million, foreign currencies and jewelry seized by the United States
customs authorities in Honolulu, Hawaii; (5) USD 30 million in the custody of the Central Bank in dollar-denominated
Treasury Bills; shares of stock, private vehicles, and real estate in the United States, among others. 44
In the enumeration of properties included in the Petition, the Arelma assets were described as "Assets owned by
Arelma, Inc., a Panamanian corporation organized in Liechtenstein, for sole purpose (sic) of maintaining an account
in Merrill Lynch, New York." Paragraph 59 of the Petition for Forfeiture states:
45
59. FM and Imelda used a number of their close business associations or favorite cronies in opening bank accounts
abroad for the purpose of laundering their filthy riches. Aside from the foundations and corporations established by
their dummies/nominees to hide their ill-gotten wealth as had already been discussed, several other corporate
entities had been formed for the same purpose, to wit:
(1). ARELMA, INC – (T)his was organized for the sole purpose of maintaining an account and portfolio in
Merrill Lynch, New York.
(2). Found among Malacañang documents is a letter dated September 21, 1972 by J.L. Sunier, Senior Vice
President of SBC to Mr. Jose V. Campos, a known Marcos crony (See Annex "V-21" hereof). In the said
letter, instructions were given by Sunier to their Panama office to constitute a Panamanian company, the
name of which will be either Larema, Inc. or Arelma, Inc., or Relma, Inc. this company will have the same
set-up as Maler; the appointment of Sunier and Dr. Barbey as attorneys and appointment of selected people
in Panama as directors; the opening of direct account in the name of the new company with Merrill Lynch,
New York, giving them authority to operate the account, but excluding withdrawals of cash, securities or
pledging of portfolio; and sending of money in favor of the new company under reference AZUR in order to
cut links with the present account already opened with Merrill Lynch under an individual’s name.
(3). Also found was a letter dated November 14, 1972 and signed by Jose Y. Campos (Annex "V-21-a"
hereof). The letter was addressed to SEC, Geneva, and Sunier duly authorized by their "mutual friend"
regarding the opening of an account of Arelma, Inc. with Merrill Lynch, New York to the attention of Mr.
Saccardi, Vice-President.
(4). On May 19, 1983, J. L. Sunier wrote a letter with a reference "SAPPHIRE" and a salutation "Dear
Excellency" stating, among others, the current valuation by Merrill Lynch of the assets of Arelma, Inc.
amounting to $3,369,975 (Annex "V-21-b" hereof).
(5). Included in the documents sent by SBC, Geneva, through the Swiss Federal Department of Justice and
Police were those related to Arelma, Inc. as follows:
(a) Opening bank documents for Account No. 53.145 A.R. dated September 17, 1972, signed by Dr.
Barbey and Mr. Sunier. This was later on cancelled as a result of the change in attorneys and
authorized signatories of the company (Annexes "V-21-c" and "V-21-d" hereof).
(b) Opening bank documents for Account No. 53. 145 A.R. signed by new attorneys led by Michel
Amandruz (Annexes "V-21-e" and "V-21-f" hereof).
(c). Bank statements for Account No. 53.145 A.R. with ending balance of $26.10 as of 12-31-85
(Annex "V-21-g" and "V-21-h" hereof).
(d). An informative letter stating that Account 53. 145 A.R. was related to an account opened with
Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc., New York for Arelma, Inc. The opening of this account slowly
made Account 53. 145 A.R. an inactive account (See Annexes "V-21-I" and "V-21-j" hereof). 46
When the Marcos family fled Manila in 1986, they left behind several documents that revealed the existence of
secret bank deposits in Switzerland and other financial centers. These papers, referred to by respondent as
47
Malacañang documents, detailed how "Arelma, Inc." was established. Attached as Annex V-21 was the Letter of
48
Instruction sent to the Panamanian branch of the Sunier company to open Arelma. The latter was to have the same
set-up as Maler, one of the five Swiss foundations, subject of the 2000 Motion. Annexes "V-21-c" to "V-21-j"
pertained to documents to be used to open an account with Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc. in New York.
The Swiss Deposits Decision dealt only with the summary judgment as to the five Swiss accounts, because the
2000 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment dated 7 March 2000 specifically identified the five Swiss accounts only.
It did not include the Arelma account. There was a prayer for general reliefs in the 1996 Motion, but as has been
discussed, this prayer was dismissed by the Sandiganbayan. The dismissal was based solely on the existence of
the Compromise Agreements for a global settlement of the Marcos assets, which the Supreme Court later
invalidated. The 2000 Motion for Summary Judgment was confined only to the five accounts amounting to USD 356
million held by five Swiss foundations.
As clarified by the Solicitor General during the hearing of 24 March 2000 in the Sandiganbayan:
PJ: The Court is of the impression and the Court is willing to be corrected, that ones (sic) the plaintiff makes a claim
for summary judgment it in fact states it no longer intends to present evidence and based on this motion to render
judgment, is that correct?
SOL. BALLACILLO: Yes, your Honors.
PJ: In other words, on the basis of pre-trial, you are saying…because if we are talking of a partial claim, then there
is summary judgment, unless there is preliminary issue to the claim which is a matter of stipulation.
SOL. BALLACILLO: We submit, your Honors, that there can be partial summary judgment on this matter.
PJ: But in this instance, you are making summary judgment on the entire case?
SOL. BALLACILLO: With respect to the $365 million.
PJ: In the complaint you asked for the relief over several topics. You have $356 million, $25 million and $5 million.
Now with regards to the $365 million, you are asking for summary judgment?
SOL. BALLACILLO: Yes, your Honor.
PJ: And, therefore, you are telling us now, "that’s it, we need not have to prove."
SOL. BALLACILLO: Yes, your Honors. (Emphasis supplied.)

49
The Court’s discussion clearly did not include the Arelma account. The dispositive portion of the Swiss Deposits
Decision states:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated January 31,
2002 is SET ASIDE. The Swiss deposits which were transferred to and are now deposited in escrow at the
Philippine National Bank in the estimated aggregate amount of US$658,175,373.60 as of January 31, 2002, plus
interest, are hereby forfeited in favor of petitioner Republic of the Philippines.
50
Thus, the other properties, which were subjects of the Petition for Forfeiture, but were not included in the 2000
Motion, can still be subjects of a subsequent motion for summary judgment. To rule otherwise would run counter to
this Court’s long established policy on asset recovery which, in turn, is anchored on considerations of national
survival.
E.O. 14, Series of 1986, and Section 1(d) of Proclamation No. 3 declared the national policy after the Marcos
51 52
regime. The government aimed to implement the reforms mandated by the people: protecting their basic rights,
adopting a provisional constitution, and providing for an orderly transition to a government under a new constitution.
The said Proclamation further states that "The President shall give priority to measures to achieve the mandate of
the people to recover ill-gotten properties amassed by the leaders and supporters of the previous regime and
protect the interest of the people through orders of sequestration or freezing of assets or accounts." One of the
"whereas" clauses of E.O. 14 entrusts the PCGG with the "just and expeditious recovery of such ill-gotten wealth in
order that the funds, assets and other properties may be used to hasten national economic recovery." These
clauses are anchored on the overriding considerations of national interest and national survival, always with due
regard to the requirements of fairness and due process.
With the myriad of properties and interconnected accounts used to hide these assets that are in danger of
dissipation, it would be highly unreasonable to require the government to ascertain their exact locations and recover
them simultaneously, just so there would be one comprehensive judgment covering the different subject matters.
In any case, the Sandiganbayan rightly characterized their ruling on the 2004 Motion as a separate judgment, which
is allowed by the Rules of Court under Section 5 of Rule 36:
Separate judgments.—When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, the court, at any stage, upon a
determination of the issues material to a particular claim and all counterclaims arising out of the transaction or
occurrence which is the subject matter of the claim, may render a separate judgment disposing of such claim. The
judgment shall terminate the action with respect to the claim so disposed of and the action shall proceed as to the
remaining claims. In case a separate judgment is rendered, the court by order may stay its enforcement until the
rendition of a subsequent judgment or judgments and may prescribe such conditions as may be necessary to
secure the benefit thereof to the party in whose favor the judgment is rendered. 53
Rule 35 on summary judgments, admits of a situation in which a case is not fully adjudicated on motion, and 54
judgment is not rendered upon all of the reliefs sought. In Philippine Business Bank v. Chua, we had occasion to
55
rule that a careful reading of its Section 4 reveals that a partial summary judgment was never intended to be
considered a "final judgment," as it does not "[put] an end to an action at law by declaring that the plaintiff either has
or has not entitled himself to recover the remedy he sues for." In this case, there was never any final or complete
adjudication of Civil Case No. 0141, as the Sandiganbayan’s partial summary judgment in the Swiss Deposits
Decision made no mention of the Arelma account.
Section 4 of Rule 35 pertains to a situation in which separate judgments were necessary because some facts
existed without controversy, while others were controverted. However, there is nothing in this provision or in the
Rules that prohibits a subsequent separate judgment after a partial summary judgment on an entirely different
subject matter had earlier been rendered. There is no legal basis for petitioners’ contention that a judgment over the
Swiss accounts bars a motion for summary judgment over the Arelma account.
Thus, the Swiss Deposits Decision has finally and thoroughly disposed of the forfeiture case only as to the five
Swiss accounts. Respondent’s 2004 Motion is in the nature of a separate judgment, which is authorized under
Section 5 of Rule 36. More importantly respondent has brought to our attention the reasons why a motion for
summary judgment over the Arelma account was prompted only at this stage. In Republic of the Philippines v.
Pimentel, a case filed by human rights victims in the United States decided by the US Supreme Court only in 2008,
56
the antecedents of the Arelma account were described as follows:
In 1972, Ferdinand Marcos, then President of the Republic, incorporated Arelma, S.A. (Arelma), under Panamanian
law. Around the same time, Arelma opened a brokerage account with Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc.
(Merrill Lynch) in New York, in which it deposited $2 million. As of the year 2000, the account had grown to
approximately $35 million.
Alleged crimes and misfeasance by Marcos during his presidency became the subject of worldwide attention and
protest. A class action by and on behalf of some 9,539 of his human rights victims was filed against Marcos and his
estate, among others. The class action was tried in the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii and
resulted in a nearly $2 billion judgment for the class. See Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767 (C.A.9 1996) . We
refer to that litigation as the Pimentel case and to its class members as the Pimentel class. In a related action, the
Estate of Roger Roxas and Golden Budha [sic] Corporation (the Roxas claimants) claim a right to execute against
the assets to satisfy their own judgment against Marcos' widow, Imelda Marcos. See Roxas v. Marcos, 89 Hawaii
91, 113-115, 969 P.2d 1209, 1231-1233 (1998) .
The Pimentel class claims a right to enforce its judgment by attaching the Arelma assets held by Merrill Lynch. The
Republic and the Commission claim a right to the assets under a 1955 Philippine law providing that property derived
from the misuse of public office is forfeited to the Republic from the moment of misappropriation. See An Act
Declaring Forfeiture in Favor of the State Any Property Found To Have Been Unlawfully Acquired by Any Public
Officer or Employee and Providing for the Proceedings Therefor, Rep. Act No. 1379, 51:9 O.G. 4457 (June 18,
1955).
After Marcos fled the Philippines in 1986, the Commission was created to recover any property he wrongfully took.
Almost immediately the Commission asked the Swiss Government for assistance in recovering assets-including
shares in Arelma-that Marcos had moved to Switzerland. In compliance the Swiss Government froze certain assets
and, in 1990, that freeze was upheld by the Swiss Federal Supreme Court. In 1991, the Commission asked the
Sandiganbayan, a Philippine court of special jurisdiction over corruption cases, to declare forfeited to the Republic
any property Marcos had obtained through misuse of his office. That litigation is still pending in the Sandiganbayan.
(Citations omitted.)
The pursuit of the Arelma account encountered several hindrances, as it was subject to not one, but two claims of
human rights victims in foreign courts: the Pimentel class and the Roxas claimants. The government and the PCGG
were able to obtain a Stay Order at the appellate level, but the trial court judge vacated the stay and awarded the
Arelma assets to the Pimentel class of human rights victims.
As early as 1986, the PCGG had already sought assistance from the Swiss government to recover the Arelma
assets; however, it was only in 2000 that the Swiss authorities turned over two Stock Certificates, which were assets
of Arelma. The transfer by Switzerland of the Stock Certificates to the Republic was made under the same
conditions as the bank deposits of the five Swiss foundations. 57
Meanwhile, the Pimentel case was tried as a class action before Judge Manuel Real of the United States District
Court for the Central District of California. Judge Real was sitting by designation in the District of Hawaii after the
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated the various human rights Complaints against Marcos in that
court. Judge Real directed Merrill Lynch to file an action for interpleader in the District of Hawaii, where he presided
58
over the matter, and where the Republic and the PCGG were named as defendants. In Pimentel, the Court further
narrates how Judge Real ruled that the pending litigation in Philippine courts could not determine entitlement to the
Arelma assets:
After being named as defendants in the interpleader action, the Republic and the Commission asserted sovereign
immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. § 1604 . They moved to dismiss
pursuant to Rule 19(b) , based on the premise that the action could not proceed without them… Judge Real initially
rejected the request by the Republic and the Commission to dismiss the interpleader action. They appealed, and the
Court of Appeals reversed. It held the Republic and the Commission are entitled to sovereign immunity and that
under Rule 19(a) they are required parties (or "necessary" parties under the old terminology). See In re Republic of
the Philippines, 309 F.3d 1143, 1149-1152 (C.A.9 2002) . The Court of Appeals entered a stay pending the outcome
of the litigation in the Sandiganbayan over the Marcos assets.
After concluding that the pending litigation in the Sandiganbayan could not determine entitlement to the Arelma
assets, Judge Real vacated the stay, allowed the action to proceed, and awarded the assets to the Pimentel class.
A week later, in the case initiated before the Sandiganbayan in 1991, the Republic asked that court to declare the
Arelma assets forfeited, arguing the matter was ripe for decision. The Sandiganbayan has not yet ruled. In the
interpleader case the Republic, the Commission, Arelma, and PNB appealed the District Court's judgment in favor of
the Pimentel claimants. This time the Court of Appeals affirmed. Dismissal of the interpleader suit, it held, was not
warranted under Rule 19(b) because, though the Republic and the Commission were required ("necessary") parties
under Rule 19(a) , their claim had so little likelihood of success on the merits that the interpleader action could
proceed without them. One of the reasons the court gave was that any action commenced by the Republic and the
Commission to recover the assets would be barred by New York's 6-year statute of limitations for claims involving
the misappropriation of public property. (Citations omitted)
59
The American Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and remanded the
case with instructions to order the District Court to dismiss the interpleader action. The former held that the District
Court and the Court of Appeals failed to give full effect to sovereign immunity when they held that the action could
proceed without the Republic and the Commission:
Comity and dignity interests take concrete form in this case. The claims of the Republic and the Commission arise
from events of historical and political significance for the Republic and its people. The Republic and the Commission
have a unique interest in resolving the ownership of or claims to the Arelma assets and in determining if, and how,
the assets should be used to compensate those persons who suffered grievous injury under Marcos. There is a
comity interest in allowing a foreign state to use its own courts for a dispute if it has a right to do so. The dignity of a
foreign state is not enhanced if other nations bypass its courts without right or good cause. Then, too, there is the
more specific affront that could result to the Republic and the Commission if property they claim is seized by the
decree of a foreign court.60
Thus it was only in 2008 that the Republic was finally able to obtain a favorable judgment from the American
Supreme Court with regard to the different claims against the Arelma assets. Petitioners never intervened or lifted a
finger in any of the litigation proceedings involving the enforcement of judgment against the Arelma assets abroad.
We find merit in respondent’s observation that petitioner Imelda Marcos’s participation in the proceedings in the
Philippines, particularly her invocation of her right against undue deprivation of property, is inconsistent with her and
Ferdinand Marcos, Jr.’s insistence that the properties in question do not belong to them, and that they are mere
beneficiaries.61
Indeed, it is clear that the Arelma assets are in danger of dissipation. Even as the United States Supreme Court
gave weight to the likely prejudice to be suffered by the Republic when it dismissed the interpleader in Pimentel, it
also considered that the "balance of equities may change in due course. One relevant change may occur if it
appears that the Sandiganbayan cannot or will not issue its ruling within a reasonable period of time. If the
Sandiganbayan rules that the Republic and the Commission have no right to the assets, their claims in some later
interpleader suit would be less substantial than they are now." 62
IV. Petitioners’ sham denials justify the application of summary judgment
As already settled in the Swiss Deposits Decision and reiterated in the discussion above as the law of the case, the
lawful income of the Marcoses is only USD 304,372.43. As discussed in paragraph 9 of the Petition for Forfeiture,
Annex V-21-b states that Arelma’s assets as of 19 May 1983 were worth USD 3,369,975.00. The entirety of the
63
lawful income of the Marcoses represents only 9% of the entire assets of Arelma, which petitioners remain unable to
explain.
In their Answer to the Petition for Forfeiture, petitioners employ the same tactic, consisting of general denials based
on a purported lack of knowledge regarding the whereabouts of the Arelma assets. Paragraph 32 of the said
pleading states:
Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 59 of the Petition insofar as it alleges that the Marcoses used their
cronies and engaged in laundering their filthy riches for being false and conclusory of the truth being that the
Marcoses did not engage in any such illegal acts and that all the properties they acquired were lawfully acquired;
and specifically DENY the rest for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the
allegation since Respondents are not privy to the alleged transactions. 64
This particular denial mimics petitioners’ similar denials of the allegations in the forfeiture Petition pertaining to the
Swiss accounts and is practically identical to paragraphs 7 to 37 of the Answer. The Swiss Deposits Decision has
characterized these as "sham" denials:
17. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 18 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents cannot remember with
exactitude the contents of the alleged ITRs.
exactitude the contents of the alleged ITRs and that they are not privy to the activities of the BIR.
22. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 23 insofar as it alleges that Respondents clandestinely
stashed the country's wealth in Switzerland and hid the same under layers and layers of foundation and
corporate entities for being false, the truth being that Respondents aforesaid properties were lawfully
acquired.
23. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29 and 30 of the Petition for lack of
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents were
not privy to the transactions regarding the alleged Azio-Verso-Vibur Foundation accounts, except that as to
Respondent Imelda R. Marcos she specifically remembers that the funds involved were lawfully acquired.
24. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36,37, 38, 39, 40, and 41 of the Petition
for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations since
Respondents are not privy to the transactions and as to such transaction they were privy to they cannot
remember with exactitude the same having occurred a long time ago, except that as to Respondent Imelda
R. Marcos she specifically remembers that the funds involved were lawfully acquired.
25. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 42, 43, 44, 45, and 46, of the Petition for lack of knowledge
or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations since Respondents were not privy to
the transactions and as to such transaction they were privy to they cannot remember with exactitude the
same having occurred a long time ago, except that as to Respondent Imelda R. Marcos she specifically
remembers that the funds involved were lawfully acquired.
26. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 49, 50, 51 and 52, of the Petition for lack of knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations since Respondents were not privy to
Upon careful perusal of the foregoing, the Court finds that respondent Mrs. Marcos and the Marcos children
indubitably failed to tender genuine issues in their answer to the petition for forfeiture. A genuine issue is an issue of
fact which calls for the presentation of evidence as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious and contrived, set
up in bad faith or patently lacking in substance so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial. Respondents'
defenses of "lack of knowledge for lack of privity" or "(inability to) recall because it happened a long time ago" or, on
the part of Mrs. Marcos, that "the funds were lawfully acquired" are fully insufficient to tender genuine issues.
Respondent Marcoses' defenses were a sham and evidently calibrated to compound and confuse the
issues. (Emphasis supplied.)
65
In the case at bar, petitioners give the same stock answer to the effect that the Marcoses did not engage in any
illegal activities, and that all their properties were lawfully acquired. They fail to state with particularity the ultimate
facts surrounding the alleged lawfulness of the mode of acquiring the funds in Arelma (which totaled USD
3,369,975.00 back in 1983), considering that the entirety of their lawful income amounted only to USD 304,372.43,
or only 9% of the entire Arelma fund. Then, as now, they employ what the Court in G.R. No. 152154 characterized
as a "negative pregnant," not just in denying the criminal provenance of the Arelma funds, but in the matter of
ownership of the said funds. As discussed by the Court in the first Republic case, cited by the Sandiganbayan:
Evidently, this particular denial had the earmark of what is called in the law on pleadings as a negative pregnant,
that is, a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not
squarely denied. It was in effect an admission of the averments it was directed at. Stated otherwise, a negative
pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with it an affirmation or at least an implication of some kind
favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts alleged in the
pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation as so
qualified or modified are literally denied, it has been held that the qualifying circumstances alone are denied while
the fact itself is admitted.
66
Due to the insufficiency of petitioners’ denial of paragraph 59 which in effect denies only the qualifying
circumstances, and by virtue of the Court’s ruling in the Swiss Deposits Decision, petitioners are deemed to have
admitted the factual antecedents and the establishment of Arelma. In paragraph 32 of their Answer, they only deny
the first few sentences of paragraph 59, while conveniently neglecting to address subparagraphs 1 to 5 and the
opening bank documents described in 5 (a) to (d) of the Petition for Forfeiture. Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Petition
discusses the establishment of a Panamanian company to be named either "Larema, Inc. or Arelma, Inc., or Relma,
Inc.;" the appointment of several people as directors; and the opening of a direct account with Merrill Lynch.
Paragraphs 3 to 5 also of the Petition for Forfeiture detail correspondences between a "J.L. Sunier" and a letter
addressed to Malacañang with the salutation "Dear Excellency."
Regarding the averment of petitioners that they lack knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the above
allegations in the Petition for Forfeiture, the Court’s discussion in the Swiss Deposits Decision bears reiterating:
Here, despite the serious and specific allegations against them, the Marcoses responded by simply saying that they
had no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of such allegations. Such a general, self-
serving claim of ignorance of the facts alleged in the petition for forfeiture was insufficient to raise an issue.
Respondent Marcoses should have positively stated how it was that they were supposedly ignorant of the facts
alleged.67
Petitioners cannot escape the fact that there is manifest disparity between the amount of the Arelma funds and the
lawful income of the Marcoses as shown in the ITRs filed by spouses Marcos. The Swiss Deposits Decision found
that the genuineness of the said ITRs and balance sheets of the Marcos spouses have already been admitted by
petitioners themselves:
Not only that. Respondents’ answer also technically admitted the genuineness and due execution of the Income Tax
Returns (ITRs) and the balance sheets of the late Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos attached to the
petition for forfeiture, as well as the veracity of the contents thereof.
The answer again premised its denials of said ITRs and balance sheets on the ground of lack of knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the contents thereof. Petitioner correctly points out that
respondents' denial was not really grounded on lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief but was
based on lack of recollection. By reviewing their own records, respondent Marcoses could have easily determined
the genuineness and due execution of the ITRs and the balance sheets. They also had the means and opportunity
of verifying the same from the records of the BIR and the Office of the President. They did not.
When matters regarding which respondents claim to have no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief are
plainly and necessarily within their knowledge, their alleged ignorance or lack of information will not be considered a
specific denial. An unexplained denial of information within the control of the pleader, or is readily accessible to him,
is evasive and is insufficient to constitute an effective denial. (Footnotes omitted.)
68
We find that petitioners have again attempted to delay the goal of asset recovery by their evasiveness and the
expedient profession of ignorance. It is well-established that a profession of ignorance about a fact that is
necessarily within the pleader’s knowledge or means of knowing is as ineffective as no denial at all. On a similar
vein, there is a failure by petitioners to properly tender an issue, which as correctly ruled by the Sandiganbayan,
justifies the Republic’s resort to summary judgment.
Summary judgment may be allowed where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and where the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. In Yuchengco v. Sandiganbayan, the Court has previously
69
discussed the importance of summary judgment in weeding out sham claims or defenses at an early stage of the
litigation in order to avoid the expense and loss of time involved in a trial, viz:
Even if the pleadings appear, on their face, to raise issues, summary judgment may still ensue as a matter of law if
the affidavits, depositions and admissions show that such issues are not genuine. The presence or absence of a
genuine issue as to any material fact determines, at bottom, the propriety of summary judgment. A "genuine issue",
as differentiated from a fictitious or contrived one, is an issue of fact that requires the presentation of evidence. To
the party who moves for summary judgment rests the onus of demonstrating clearly the absence of any genuine
issue of fact, or that the issue posed in the complaint is patently unsubstantial so as not to constitute a genuine
issue for trial.
70
Even if in the Answer itself there appears to be a tender of issues requiring trial, yet when the relevant affidavits,
depositions, or admissions demonstrate that those issues are not genuine but sham or fictitious, the Court is justified
in dispensing with the trial and rendering summary judgment for plaintiff. 71
Summary judgment, or accelerated judgment as it is sometimes known, may also call for a hearing so that both the
movant and the adverse party may justify their positions. However, the hearing contemplated (with 10-day notice) is
for the purpose of determining whether the issues are genuine or not, not to receive evidence of the issues set up in
the pleadings. In Carcon Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that a hearing is not de
72
riguer. The matter may be resolved, and usually is, on the basis of affidavits, depositions, and admissions. This
does not mean that the hearing is superfluous; only that the court is empowered to determine its necessity.
It is the law itself that determines when a summary judgment is proper. Under the rules, summary judgment is
appropriate when there are no genuine issues of fact that call for the presentation of evidence in a full-blown
trial. Even if on their face the pleadings appear to raise issues, when the affidavits, depositions and admissions
1âwphi1
show that such issues are not genuine, then summary judgment as prescribed by the rules must ensue as a matter
of law. What is crucial to a determination, therefore, is the presence or absence of a genuine issue as to any
material fact. When the facts as pleaded appear uncontested or undisputed, then summary judgment is called for. 73
Guided by the principles above indicated, we hold that under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar,
summary judgment is proper. The Sandiganbayan did not commit a reversible error in granting the corresponding
2004 Motion for Summary Judgment filed by respondent. The latter is well within its right to avail itself of summary
judgment and obtain immediate relief, considering the insufficient denials and pleas of ignorance made by
petitioners on matters that are supposedly within their knowledge.
These denials and pleas constitute admissions of material allegations under paragraph 59 of the Petition for
Forfeiture – a tact they have employed repeatedly in Civil Case No. 0141. As discussed, the purpose of summary
judgment is precisely to avoid long drawn litigations and useless delays. We also affirm the Sandiganbayan’s
74
findings that the moving party, the Republic, is now entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 2 April 2009 of the Sandiganbayan is
AFFIRMED. All assets, properties, and funds belonging to Arelma, S.A., with an estimated aggregate amount of
USD 3,369,975 as of 1983, plus all interests and all other income that accrued thereon, until the time or specific day
that all money or monies are released and/or transferred to the possession of the Republic of the Philippines, are
hereby forfeited in favor of Respondent Republic of the Philippines.
37.) B. G.R. No. 189434, March 12, 2014
FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED

BY THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, RESPONDENT.
[G.R. NO. 189505]
IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, C.J.:
On 25 April 2012, this Court rendered a Decision affirming the 2 April 2009 Decision of
the Sandiganbayan and declaring all the assets of Arelma, S.A., an entity created by the late
Ferdinand E. Marcos, forfeited in favor of the Republic of the Philippines. The anti-graft court found
that the totality of assets and properties acquired by the Marcos spouses was manifestly and grossly
disproportionate to their aggregate salaries as public officials, and that petitioners were unable to
overturn the prima facie presumption of ill-gotten wealth, pursuant to Section 2 of Republic Act No.
(RA) 1379.
Petitioners seek reconsideration of the denial of their petition, reiterating the following arguments: chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
1. That the Sandiganbayan erred in granting the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment because
a) the Republic had earlier stated that it will file a separate forfeiture action regarding the
assets of Arelma and b) Civil Case No. 0141 had already terminated; and
2. That the Sandiganbayan does not possess territorial jurisdiction over the res or the
Arelma proceeds, which are held by Merrill Lynch in the United States.
We agree with the view of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in its Opposition filed on 16
August 2012, that the first issue has already been raised and exhaustively discussed in our 25 April
2012 Decision. In fact, the discussion on the first issue is merely a restatement of petitioners’ original
assertions that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction to render summary judgment over the assets
of Arelma. According to petitioners, the judgment in Civil Case No. 0141 applied only to the Swiss
deposits subject of our Decision in G.R. No. 152154, which were also listed in the Petition for
Forfeiture.
It is clear from our 25 April 2012 Decision that this is a distorted reading of the facts. The said
Petition for Forfeiture described among others, a corporate entity by the name “Arelma, Inc.,” which
maintained an account and portfolio in Merrill Lynch, New York, and which was purportedly organized
for the purpose of hiding ill-gotten wealth.1 The Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 152154 affirmed
the partial summary judgment only over the Swiss deposits which the Sandiganbayan declared as
forfeited in favor of the State.
This cannot be construed as a bar to a subsequent judgment over numerous other assets and
properties expressly sought to be forfeited in Civil Case No. 0141. Respondent Republic’s success in
obtaining summary judgment over the Swiss accounts does not mean its preclusion from seeking
partial summary judgment over a different subject matter covered by the same petition for
forfeiture. In fact, Civil Case No. 0141 pertains to the recovery of all the assets enumerated therein,
such as (1) holding companies, agro-industrial ventures and other investments; (2) landholdings,
buildings, condominium units, mansions; (3) New York properties; (4) bills amounting to Php
27,744,535, time deposits worth Php 46.4 million, foreign currencies and jewelry seized by the
United States customs authorities in Honolulu, Hawaii; (5) USD 30 million in the custody of the
Central Bank in dollar-denominated Treasury Bills; shares of stock, private vehicles, and real estate
in the United States, among others.2 crallawlibrary
The Swiss Deposits Decision, G.R. No. 152154, dealt only with the summary judgment as to the five
Swiss accounts, because the 2000 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment dated 7 March 2000
specifically identified the five Swiss accounts. It did not include the Arelma account. To subscribe to
the view of petitioners is to forever bar the State from recovering the assets listed above, including
the properties it had specifically identified in its petition for forfeiture. As we have discussed in our
Decision, the ruling of the Sandiganbayan is rightly characterized as a separate judgment, and
allowed by the Rules of Court under Section 5 of Rule 36: chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Separate judgments.—When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, the court, at
any stage, upon a determination of the issues material to a particular claim and all counterclaims
arising out of the transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of the claim, may render a
separate judgment disposing of such claim. The judgment shall terminate the action with respect to
the claim so disposed of and the action shall proceed as to the remaining claims. In case a separate
judgment is rendered, the court by order may stay its enforcement until the rendition of a
subsequent judgment or judgments and may prescribe such conditions as may be necessary to
secure the benefit thereof to the party in whose favor the judgment is rendered.
Petitioners further insist that “Civil Case No. 0141 does not involve the Arelma account because the
respondent unequivocally reserved its right to file a separate forfeiture petition concerning it.”
However, petitioners failed to prove that such a reservation was made, and never even substantiated
how such reservation could operate to deprive the State of its right to file for separate judgment.
There is nothing in Republic Act 13793 or in the Rules which prohibits the graft court from taking
cognizance of the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment only because of statements allegedly made
by one party. This Court cannot countenance the view advanced by petitioners defeating the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over violations of R.A. Nos. 3019 and 1379,4 where the laws
themselves do not provide for such limitations.
Petitioner Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. acknowledges that “the subject matter of the case (i.e. the
power/authority to determine whether an asset may be forfeited under R.A. 1379) is within the
(Sandiganbayan’s) jurisdiction.”5 However, he objects to the graft court’s purported lack of territorial
jurisdiction on the theory that forfeiture is an action in rem. He argues that the Sandiganbayan must
first acquire territorial jurisdiction over the Arelma proceeds before the judgment may be enforced.
At the outset, this theory fails to make a distinction between the issuance of a judgment, and its
execution. It is basic that the execution of a Court’s judgment is merely a ministerial phase of
adjudication.6 The authority of the Sandiganbayan to rule on the character of these assets as ill-
gotten cannot be conflated with petitioner’s concerns as to how the ruling may be effectively
enforced.
More importantly, petitioner should be reminded of his earlier insistence that R.A. 1379 is
penal, therefore petitions for forfeiture filed under this law are actions in personam, not
in rem.7 We reiterate our observations in the Swiss Deposits case: “Petitioner Republic has
the right to a speedy disposition of this case. It would readily be apparent to a reasonable
mind that respondent Marcoses have been deliberately resorting to every procedural
device to delay the resolution hereof…The people and the State are entitled to favorable
judgment, free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays x x x.”8 crallawlibrary
In any case, we find that the Sandiganbayan did not err in granting the Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment, despite the fact that the Arelma account and proceeds are held
abroad. To rule otherwise contravenes the intent of the forfeiture law, and indirectly
privileges violators who are able to hide public assets abroad: beyond the reach of the
courts and their recovery by the State. Forfeiture proceedings, as we have already
discussed exhaustively in our Decision, are actions considered to be in the nature of
proceedings in rem or quasi in rem, such that: chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (a) by the seizure of the property under legal process,
whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law; or (b) as a result of the institution of legal
proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized and made effective. In the
latter condition, the property, though at all times within the potential power of the court,
may not be in the actual custody of said court. 9
The concept of potential jurisdiction over the res, advanced by respondent, is not at all new. As early
as Perkins v. Dizon, deciding a suit against a non-resident, the Court held: “In order that the court
may exercise power over the res, it is not necessary that the court should take actual custody of the
property, potential custody thereof being sufficient. There is potential custody when, from the nature
of the action brought, the power of the court over the property is impliedly recognized by law.”10crallawlibrary
Finally, we take note of the Decision rendered by the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme
Court on 26 June 2012. In Swezey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., the foreign court
agreed with the dismissal of the turnover proceeding against the Arelma assets initiated by alleged
victims of human rights abuses during the Marcos regime. It reasoned that the Republic was a
necessary party, but could not be subject to joinder in light of its assertion of sovereign immunity: chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(The Republic’s) national interests would be severely prejudiced by a turnover proceeding because it
has asserted a claim of ownership regarding the Arelma assets that rests on several bases: the
Philippine forfeiture law that predated the tenure of President Marcos; evidence demonstrating that
Marcos looted public coffers to amass a personal fortune worth billions of dollars; findings by the
Philippine Supreme Court and Swiss Federal Supreme Court that Marcos stole related assets from the
Republic; and, perhaps most critically, the recent determination by the Philippine Supreme Court that
Marcos pilfered the money that was deposited in the Arelma brokerage account. Consequently,
allowing the federal court judgment against the estate of Marcos to be executed on property that
may rightfully belong to the citizens of the Philippines could irreparably undermine the Republic’s
claim to the Arelma assets.
xxxx
The Republic’s declaration of sovereign immunity in this case is entitled to recognition

because it has a significant interest in allowing its courts to adjudicate the dispute over
property that may have been stolen from its public treasury and transferred to New York
through no fault of the Republic. The high courts of the United States, the Philippines and
Switzerland have clearly explained in decisions related to this case that wresting control
over these matters from the Philippine judicial system would disrupt international comity
and reciprocal diplomatic self-interests.11
These statements made by the foreign court, based on principles of comity and reciprocity, are
highlighted if only to assuage petitioner’s concerns on the effective enforcement of the Decision and
this Resolution.
WHEREFORE, the Motions for Reconsideration of the Decision dated 25 April 2012 filed by
petitioners Imelda Romualdez-Marcos and Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr. are
hereby DENIED with FINALITY.
38.) G.R. No. 176944 March 6, 2013
RET. LT. GEN. JACINTO C. LIGOT, ERLINDA Y. LIGOT, PAULO Y. LIGOT, RIZA Y. LIGOT, and MIGUEL Y.
LIGOT, Petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
In this petition for certiorari,1 retired Lieutenant General (Lt. Gen.) Jacinto C. Ligot, Erlinda Y. Ligot (Mrs. Ligot),
Paulo Y. Ligot, Riza Y. Ligot, and Miguel Y. Ligot (petitioners) claim that the Court of Appeals (CA) acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it issued its January 12, 2007 resolution 2 in CA
G.R. SP No. 90238. This assailed resolution affirmed in toto the CA’s earlier January 4, 2006 resolution 3 extending
the freeze order issued against the Ligot’s properties for an indefinite period of time.
BACKGROUND FACTS
On June 27, 2005, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), represented by the Anti-Money Laundering Council
(AMLC), filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Application for the issuance of a freeze order with the CA against certain monetary
instruments and properties of the petitioners, pursuant to Section 104 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9160, as amended
(otherwise known as the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001). This application was based on the February 1, 2005
letter of the Office of the Ombudsman to the AMLC, recommending that the latter conduct an investigation on Lt.
Gen. Ligot and his family for possible violation of RA No. 9160. 5
In support of this recommendation, the Ombudsman attached the Complaint 6 it filed against the Ligots for perjury
under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code, and for violations of Section 8 7 of RA No. 67138 and RA No. 3019
(Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).
The Ombudsman’s Complaint
a. Lt. Gen. Ligot and immediate family
The Ombudsman’s complaint alleges that Lt. Gen. Ligot served in the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) for 33
years and 2 months, from April 1, 1966 as a cadet until his retirement on August 17, 2004. 9 He and Mrs. Ligot have
four children, namely: Paulo Y. Ligot, Riza Y. Ligot,
George Y. Ligot and Miguel Y. Ligot, who have all reached the age of majority at the time of the filing of the
complaint.10
Lt. Gen. Ligot declared in his Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN) that as of December 31, 2003,
he had assets in the total amount of Three Million Eight Hundred Forty-Eight Thousand and Three Pesos
(₱3,848,003.00).11 In contrast, his declared assets in his 1982 SALN amounted to only One Hundred Five Thousand
Pesos (₱105,000.00).12
Aside from these declared assets, the Ombudsman’s investigation revealed that Lt. Gen. Ligot and his family had
other properties and bank accounts, not declared in his SALN, amounting to at least Fifty Four Million One
Thousand Two Hundred Seventeen Pesos (₱54,001,217.00). These undeclared assets consisted of the following:
Undeclared Assets Amount
Jacinto Ligot’s undeclared assets P 41,185,583.5313
Jacinto Ligot’s children’s assets 1,744,035.6014

Tuition fees and travel expenses P 2,308,047.8715
Edgardo Yambao’s assets relative to the real P 8,763,550.0016

properties
Total P 54,001,217.00
Bearing in mind that Lt. Gen. Ligot’s main source of income was his salary as an officer of the AFP, 17 and given his
wife and children’s lack of any other substantial sources of income, 18 the Ombudsman declared the assets
registered in Lt. Gen. Ligot’s name, as well as those in his wife’s and children’s names, to be illegally obtained and
unexplained wealth, pursuant to the provisions of RA No. 1379 (An Act Declaring Forfeiture in Favor of the State
Any Property Found to Have Been Unlawfully Acquired by Any Public Officer or Employee and Providing for the
Proceedings Therefor).
b. Edgardo Tecson Yambao
The Ombudsman’s investigation also looked into Mrs. Ligot’s younger brother, Edgardo Tecson Yambao. The
records of the Social Security System (SSS) revealed that Yambao had been employed in the private sector from
1977 to 1994. Based on his contributions to the SSS, Yambao did not have a substantial salary during his
employment. While Yambao had an investment with Mabelline Foods, Inc., the Ombudsman noted that this
company only had a net income of ₱5,062.96 in 2002 and ₱693.67 in 2003. 19 Moreover, the certification from the
Bureau of Internal Revenue stated that Yambao had no record of any annual Individual Income
Tax Return filed for the calendar year 1999 up to the date of the investigation.
Despite Yambao’s lack of substantial income, the records show that he has real properties and vehicles registered
in his name, amounting to Eight Million Seven Hundred Sixty Three Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos
(₱8,763,550.00), which he acquired from 1993 onwards. The Office of the Ombudsman further observed that in the
documents it examined, Yambao declared three of the Ligots’ addresses as his own.
From these circumstances, the Ombudsman concluded that Yambao acted as a dummy and/or nominee of the Ligot
spouses, and all the properties registered in Yambao’s name actually belong to the Ligot family.
Urgent Ex-Parte Freeze Order Application
As a result of the Ombudsman’s complaint, the Compliance and Investigation staff (CIS) of the AMLC conducted a
financial investigation, which revealed the existence of the Ligots’ various bank accounts with several financial
institutions.20 On April 5, 2005, the Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law Enforcement Officers issued a
resolution holding that probable cause exists that Lt. Gen. Ligot violated Section 8, in relation to Section 11, of RA
No. 6713, as well as Article 18321 of the Revised Penal Code.
On May 25, 2005, the AMLC issued Resolution No. 52, Series of 2005, directing the Executive Director of the AMLC
Secretariat to file an application for a freeze order against the properties of Lt. Gen. Ligot and the members of his
family with the CA.22 Subsequently, on June 27, 2005, the Republic filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Application with the
appellate court for the issuance of a Freeze Order against the properties of the Ligots and Yambao.
The appellate court granted the application in its July 5, 2005 resolution, ruling that probable cause existed that an
unlawful activity and/or money laundering offense had been committed by Lt. Gen. Ligot and his family, including
Yambao, and that the properties sought to be frozen are related to the unlawful activity or money laundering
offense. Accordingly, the CA issued a freeze order against the Ligots’ and Yambao’s various bank accounts, web
accounts and vehicles, valid for a period of 20 days from the date of issuance.
On July 26, 2005, the Republic filed an Urgent Motion for Extension of Effectivity of Freeze Order, arguing that if the
bank accounts, web accounts and vehicles were not continuously frozen, they could be placed beyond the reach of
law enforcement authorities and the government’s efforts to recover the proceeds of the Ligots’ unlawful activities
would be frustrated. In support of its motion, it informed the CA that the Ombudsman was presently investigating the
following cases involving the Ligots:
Case Number Complainant(s) Nature
OMB-P-C-05- 0523 Wilfredo Garrido Plunder
OMB-P-C-05- 0003 AGIO Gina Villamor, et al. Perjury
OMB-P-C-05- 0184 Field Investigation Office Violation of RA No. 3019, Section

3(b); Perjury under Article 183,
Revised Penal Code in relation to
Section 11 of RA No. 6713;
Forfeiture Proceedings in Relation
to RA No. 1379
OMB-P-C-05-0352 David Odilao Malicious Mischief; Violation of

Section 20, RA No. 7856
Finding merit in the Republic’s arguments, the CA granted the motion in its September 20, 2005 resolution,
extending the freeze order until after all the appropriate proceedings and/or investigations have been terminated.
On September 28, 2005, the Ligots filed a motion to lift the extended freeze order, principally arguing that there was
no evidence to support the extension of the freeze order. They further argued that the extension not only deprived
them of their property without due process; it also punished them before their guilt could be proven. The appellate
court subsequently denied this motion in its January 4, 2006 resolution.
Meanwhile, on November 15, 2005, the "Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture, Asset Preservation, and
Freezing of Monetary Instrument, Property, or Proceeds Representing, Involving, or Relating to an Unlawful Activity
or Money Laundering Offense under Republic Act No. 9160, as Amended" 23 (Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases) took
effect. Under this rule, a freeze order could be extended for a maximum period of six months.
On January 31, 2006, the Ligots filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA’s January 4, 2006 resolution, insisting
that the freeze order should be lifted considering: (a) no predicate crime has been proven to support the freeze
order’s issuance; (b) the freeze order expired six months after it was issued on July 5, 2005; and (c) the freeze
order is provisional in character and not intended to supplant a case for money laundering. When the CA denied this
motion in its resolution dated January 12, 2007, the Ligots filed the present petition.
THE PETITIONERS’ ARGUMENTS
Lt. Gen. Ligot argues that the appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it extended the freeze order issued against him and his family even though no
predicate crime had been duly proven or established to support the allegation of money laundering. He also
maintains that the freeze order issued against them ceased to be effective in view of the 6-month extension limit of
freeze orders provided under the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases. The CA, in extending the freeze order, not only
unduly deprived him and his family of their property, in violation of due process, but also penalized them before they
had been convicted of the crimes they stand accused of.
THE REPUBLIC’S ARGUMENTS
In opposition, the Republic claims that the CA can issue a freeze order upon a determination that probable cause
exists, showing that the monetary instruments or properties subject of the freeze order are related to the unlawful
activity enumerated in RA No. 9160. Contrary to the petitioners’ claims, it is not necessary that a formal criminal
charge must have been previously filed against them before the freeze order can be issued.
The Republic further claims that the CA’s September 20, 2005 resolution, granting the Republic’s motion to extend
the effectivity of the freeze order, had already become final and executory, and could no longer be challenged. The
Republic notes that the Ligots erred when they filed what is effectively a second motion for reconsideration in
response to the CA’s January 4, 2006 resolution, instead of filing a petition for review on certiorari via Rule 45 with
this Court. Under these circumstances, the assailed January 4, 2006 resolution granting the freeze order had
already attained finality when the Ligots filed the present petition before this Court.
THE COURT’S RULING
We find merit in the petition.
I. Procedural aspect
a. Certiorari not proper remedy to assail freeze order; exception
Section 57 of the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases explicitly provides the remedy available in cases involving freeze
orders issued by the CA:
Section 57. Appeal. - Any party aggrieved by the decision or ruling of the court may appeal to the Supreme Court by
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The appeal shall not stay the enforcement of the
subject decision or final order unless the Supreme Court directs otherwise. [italics supplied]
From this provision, it is apparent that the petitioners should have filed a petition for review on certiorari, and not a
petition for certiorari, to assail the CA resolution which extended the effectivity period of the freeze order over their
properties.
Even assuming that a petition for certiorari is available to the petitioners, a review of their petition shows that the
issues they raise (i.e., existence of probable cause to support the freeze order; the applicability of the 6-month limit
to the extension of freeze orders embodied in the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture) pertain to errors of
judgment allegedly committed by the CA, which fall outside the Court’s limited jurisdiction when resolving certiorari
petitions. As held in People v. Court of Appeals: 24
In a petition for certiorari, the jurisdiction of the court is narrow in scope. It is limited to resolving only errors of
jurisdiction. It is not to stray at will and resolve questions or issues beyond its competence such as errors of
judgment. Errors of judgment of the trial court are to be resolved by the appellate court in the appeal by and of error
or via a petition for review on certiorari in this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Certiorari will issue only to
correct errors of jurisdiction. It is not a remedy to correct errors of judgment. An error of judgment is one in which the
court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is reversible only by an appeal. Error of
jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction and which
error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Certiorari will not be issued to cure errors by the trial
court in its appreciation of the evidence of the parties, and its conclusions anchored on the said findings and its
conclusions of law. As long as the court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its
discretion will amount to nothing more than mere errors of judgment, correctible by an appeal or a petition for review
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.25 (citations omitted; italics supplied)
Clearly, the Ligots should have filed a petition for review on certiorari, and not what is effectively a second motion for
reconsideration (nor an original action of certiorari after this second motion was denied), within fifteen days from
receipt of the CA’s January 4, 2006 resolution. To recall, this resolution denied the petitioners’ motion to lift the
extended freeze order which is effectively a motion for reconsideration of the CA ruling extending the freeze order
indefinitely.26
However, considering the issue of due process squarely brought before us in the face of an apparent conflict
between Section 10 of RA No. 9160, as amended, and Section 53(b) of the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases, this Court
finds it imperative to relax the application of the rules of procedure and resolve this case on the merits in the interest
of justice.27
b. Applicability of 6-month extension period under the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases
Without challenging the validity of the fixed 6-month extension period, the Republic nonetheless asserts that the
Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases does not apply to the present case because the CA had already resolved the issues
regarding the extension of the freeze order before the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases came into effect.
This reasoning fails to convince us.
Notably, the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases came into effect on December 15, 2005. Section 59 provides that it shall
"apply to all pending civil forfeiture cases or petitions for freeze order" at the time of its effectivity.
A review of the record reveals that after the CA issued its September 20, 2005 resolution extending the freeze order,
the Ligots filed a motion to lift the extended freeze order on September 28, 2005. Significantly, the CA only acted
upon this motion on January 4, 2006, when it issued a resolution denying it.
While denominated as a Motion to Lift Extended Freeze Order, this motion was actually a motion for
reconsideration, as it sought the reversal of the assailed CA resolution. Since the Ligots’ motion for reconsideration
was still pending resolution at the time the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases came into effect on December 15, 2005,
the Rule unquestionably applies to the present case.
c. Subsequent events
During the pendency of this case, the Republic manifested that on September 26, 2011, it filed a Petition for
Civil Forfeiture with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. On September 28, 2011, the RTC, Branch 22,
Manila, issued a Provisional Asset Preservation Order and on October 5, 2011, after due hearing, it issued an Asset
Preservation Order.
On the other hand, the petitioners manifested that as of October 29, 2012, the only case filed in connection with the
frozen bank accounts is Civil Case No. 0197, for forfeiture of unlawfully acquired properties under RA No. 1379
(entitled "Republic of the Philippines v. Lt. Gen. Jacinto Ligot, et. al."), pending before the Sandiganbayan.
These subsequent developments and their dates are significant in our consideration of the present case, particularly
the procedural aspect. Under Section 56 of the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases which provides that after the post-
issuance hearing on whether to modify, lift or extend the freeze order, the CA shall remand the case and transmit
the records to the RTC for consolidation with the pending civil forfeiture proceeding. This provision gives the
impression that the filing of the appropriate cases in courts in 2011 and 2012 rendered this case moot and
academic.
A case is considered moot and academic when it "ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. Generally, courts decline
jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of mootness." 28 However, the moot and academic principle is not
an iron-clad rule and is subject to four settled exceptions, 29 two of which are present in this case, namely: when the
constitutional issue raised requires the formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the
public, and when the case is capable of repetition, yet evading review.
The apparent conflict presented by the limiting provision of the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases, on one hand, and the
very broad judicial discretion under RA No. 9160, as amended, on the other hand, and the uncertainty it casts on an
individual’s guaranteed right to due process indubitably call for the Court’s exercise of its discretion to decide the
case, otherwise moot and academic, under those two exceptions, for the future guidance of those affected and
involved in the implementation of RA No. 9160, as amended.
Additionally, we would be giving premium to the government’s failure to file an appropriate case until only after six
years (despite the clear provision of the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases) were we to dismiss the petition because of
the filing of the forfeiture case during the pendency of the case before the Court. The sheer length of time and the
constitutional violation involved, as will be discussed below, strongly dissuade us from dismissing the petition on the
basis of the "moot and academic" principle. The Court should not allow the seeds of future violations to sprout by
hiding under this principle even when directly confronted with the glaring issue of the respondent’s violation of the
petitioners’ due process right30 - an issue that the respondent itself chooses to ignore.
We shall discuss the substantive relevance of the subsequent developments and their dates at length below.
II. Substantive aspect

a. Probable cause exists to support the issuance of a freeze order
The legal basis for the issuance of a freeze order is Section 10 of RA No. 9160, as amended by RA No. 9194, which
states:
Section 10. Freezing of Monetary Instrument or Property. – The Court of Appeals, upon application ex parte by the
AMLC and after determination that probable cause exists that any monetary instrument or property is in any way
related to an unlawful activity as defined in Section
3(i) hereof, may issue a freeze order which shall be effective immediately. The freeze order shall be for a period of
twenty (20) days unless extended by the court. [italics supplied]
The Ligots claim that the CA erred in extending the effectivity period of the freeze order against them, given that
they have not yet been convicted of committing any of the offenses enumerated under RA No. 9160 that would
support the AMLC’s accusation of money-laundering activity.
We do not see any merit in this claim. The Ligots’ argument is founded on a flawed understanding of probable
cause in the context of a civil forfeiture proceeding31 or freeze order application.32
Based on Section 10 quoted above, there are only two requisites for the issuance of a freeze order: (1) the
application ex parte by the AMLC and (2) the determination of probable cause by the CA.33 The probable
cause required for the issuance of a freeze order differs from the probable cause required for the institution
of a criminal action, and the latter was not an issue before the CA nor is it an issue before us in this case.
As defined in the law, the probable cause required for the issuance of a freeze order refers to "such facts
and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet, prudent or cautious man to believe that an
unlawful activity and/or a money laundering offense is about to be, is being or has been committed and that
the account or any monetary instrument or property subject thereof sought to be frozen is in any way
related to said unlawful activity and/or money laundering offense."34
In other words, in resolving the issue of whether probable cause exists, the CA’s statutorily-guided determination’s
focus is not on the probable commission of an unlawful activity (or money laundering) that the Office of the
Ombudsman has already determined to exist, but on whether the bank accounts, assets, or other monetary
instruments sought to be frozen are in any way related to any of the illegal activities enumerated under RA No.
9160, as amended.35 Otherwise stated, probable cause refers to the sufficiency of the relation between an unlawful
activity and the property or monetary instrument which is the focal point of Section 10 of RA No. 9160, as amended.
To differentiate this from any criminal case that may thereafter be instituted against the same respondent, the Rule
in Civil Forfeiture Cases expressly provides –
SEC. 28. Precedence of proceedings. - Any criminal case relating to an unlawful activity shall be given precedence
over the prosecution of any offense or violation under Republic Act No. 9160, as amended, without prejudice to the
filing of a separate petition for civil forfeiture or the issuance of an asset preservation order or a freeze order. Such
civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution. [italics supplied; emphases ours]
Section 10 of RA No. 9160 (allowing the extension of the freeze order) and Section 28 (allowing a separate petition
for the issuance of a freeze order to proceed independently) of the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases are only consistent
with the very purpose of the freeze order, which specifically is to give the government the necessary time to prepare
its case and to file the appropriate charges without having to worry about the possible dissipation of the assets that
are in any way related to the suspected illegal activity. Thus, contrary to the Ligots’ claim, a freeze order is not
dependent on a separate criminal charge, much less does it depend on a conviction.
That a freeze order can be issued upon the AMLC’s ex parte application further emphasizes the law’s consideration
of how critical time is in these proceedings. As we previously noted in Republic v. Eugenio, Jr., 36 "to make such
freeze order anteceded by a judicial proceeding with notice to the account holder would allow for or lead to the
dissipation of such funds even before the order could be issued."
It should be noted that the existence of an unlawful activity that would justify the issuance and the extension of the
freeze order has likewise been established in this case.
From the ex parte application and the Ombudsman’s complaint, we glean that Lt. Gen. Ligot himself admitted that
his income came from his salary as an officer of the AFP. Yet, the Ombudsman’s investigation revealed that the
bank accounts, investments and properties in the name of Lt. Gen. Ligot and his family amount to more than Fifty-
Four Million Pesos (₱54,000,000.00). Since these assets are grossly disproportionate to Lt. Gen. Ligot’s income, as
well as the lack of any evidence that the Ligots have other sources of income, the CA properly found that probable
cause exists that these funds have been illegally acquired. On the other hand, the AMLC’s verified allegations in its
ex parte application, based on the complaint filed by the Ombudsman against Ligot and his family for violations of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, clearly sustain the CA’s finding that probable cause exists that the
monetary instruments subject of the freeze order are related to, or are the product of, an unlawful activity.
b. A freeze order, however, cannot be issued for an indefinite period
Assuming that the freeze order is substantively in legal order, the Ligots now assert that its effectiveness ceased
after January 25, 2006 (or six months after July 25, 2005 when the original freeze order first expired), pursuant to
Section 53(b) of the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases (A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC). This section states:
Section 53. Freeze order. –
xxxx
(b) Extension. – On motion of the petitioner filed before the expiration of twenty days from issuance of a freeze
order, the court may for good cause extend its effectivity for a period not exceeding six months. [italics supplied;
emphasis ours]
We find merit in this claim.
A freeze order is an extraordinary and interim relief 37 issued by the CA to prevent the dissipation, removal, or
disposal of properties that are suspected to be the proceeds of, or related to, unlawful activities as defined in
Section 3(i) of RA No. 9160, as amended.38 The primary objective of a freeze order is to temporarily preserve
monetary instruments or property that are in any way related to an unlawful activity or money laundering, by
preventing the owner from utilizing them during the duration of the freeze order. 39 The relief is pre-emptive in
character, meant to prevent the owner from disposing his property and thwarting the State’s effort in building its
case and eventually filing civil forfeiture proceedings and/or prosecuting the owner.
Our examination of the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001, as amended, from the point of view of the freeze order
that it authorizes, shows that the law is silent on the maximum period of time that the freeze order can be extended
by the CA. The final sentence of Section 10 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001 provides, "the freeze order
shall be for a period of twenty (20) days unless extended by the court." In contrast, Section 55 of the Rule in Civil
Forfeiture Cases qualifies the grant of extension "for a period not exceeding six months" "for good cause" shown.
We observe on this point that nothing in the law grants the owner of the "frozen" property any substantive right to
demand that the freeze order be lifted, except by implication, i.e., if he can show that no probable cause exists or if
the 20-day period has already lapsed without any extension being requested from and granted by the CA. Notably,
the Senate deliberations on RA No. 9160 even suggest the intent on the part of our legislators to make the freeze
order effective until the termination of the case, when necessary.40
The silence of the law, however, does not in any way affect the Court’s own power under the Constitution to
"promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights xxx and procedure in all
courts."41 Pursuant to this power, the Court issued A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC, limiting the effectivity of an extended
freeze order to six months – to otherwise leave the grant of the extension to the sole discretion of the CA, which
may extend a freeze order indefinitely or to an unreasonable amount of time – carries serious implications on an
individual’s substantive right to due process.42 This right demands that no person be denied his right to property or
be subjected to any governmental action that amounts to a denial. 43 The right to due process, under these terms,
requires a limitation or at least an inquiry on whether sufficient justification for the governmental action. 44
In this case, the law has left to the CA the authority to resolve the issue of extending the freeze order it issued.
Without doubt, the CA followed the law to the letter, but it did so by avoiding the fundamental law’s command under
its Section 1, Article III. This command, the Court – under its constitutional rule-making power – sought to implement
through Section 53(b) of the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases which the CA erroneously assumed does not apply.
The Ligots’ case perfectly illustrates the inequity that would result from giving the CA the power to extend freeze
orders without limitations. As narrated above, the CA, via its September 20, 2005 resolution, extended the freeze
order over the Ligots’ various bank accounts and personal properties "until after all the appropriate proceedings
and/or investigations being conducted are terminated." 45 By its very terms, the CA resolution effectively bars the
Ligots from using any of the property covered by the freeze order until after an eventual civil forfeiture proceeding is
concluded in their favor and after they shall have been adjudged not guilty of the crimes they are suspected of
committing. These periods of extension are way beyond the intent and purposes of a freeze order which is intended
solely as an interim relief; the civil and criminal trial courts can very well handle the disposition of properties related
to a forfeiture case or to a crime charged and need not rely on the interim relief that the appellate court issued as a
guarantee against loss of property while the government is preparing its full case. The term of the CA’s extension,
too, borders on inflicting a punishment to the Ligots, in violation of their constitutionally protected right to be
presumed innocent, because the unreasonable denial of their property comes before final conviction.
In more concrete terms, the freeze order over the Ligots’ properties has been in effect since 2005, while the civil
forfeiture case – per the Republic’s manifestation – was filed only in 2011 and the forfeiture case under RA No.
1379 – per the petitioners’ manifestation – was filed only in 2012. This means that the Ligots have not been able to
access the properties subject of the freeze order for six years or so simply on the basis of the existence of probable
cause to issue a freeze order, which was intended mainly as an interim preemptive remedy.
As correctly noted by the petitioners, a freeze order is meant to have a temporary effect; it was never intended to
supplant or replace the actual forfeiture cases where the provisional remedy - which means, the remedy is an
adjunct of or an incident to the main action – of asking for the issuance of an asset preservation order from the court
where the petition is filed is precisely available. For emphasis, a freeze order is both a preservatory and preemptive
remedy.
To stress, the evils caused by the law’s silence on the freeze order’s period of effectivity 46 compelled this Court to
issue the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases. Specifically, the Court fixed the maximum allowable extension on the freeze
order’s effectivity at six months. In doing so, the Court sought to balance the State’s interest in going after suspected
money launderers with an individual’s constitutionally-protected right not to be deprived of his property without due
process of law, as well as to be presumed innocent until proven guilty.
To our mind, the six-month extension period is ordinarily sufficient for the government to act against the suspected
money launderer and to file the appropriate forfeiture case against him, and is a reasonable period as well that
recognizes the property owner’s right to due process. In this case, the period of inaction of six years, under the
circumstances, already far exceeded what is reasonable.
We are not unmindful that the State itself is entitled to due process. As a due process concern, we do not say that
1âwphi1
the six-month period is an inflexible rule that would result in the automatic lifting of the freeze order upon its
expiration in all instances. An inflexible rule may lend itself to abuse - to the prejudice of the State’s legitimate
interests - where the property owner would simply file numerous suits, questioning the freeze order during the six-
month extension period, to prevent the timely filing of a money laundering or civil forfeiture case within this period.
With the limited resources that our government prosecutors and investigators have at their disposal, the end-result
of an inflexible rule is not difficult to see.
We observe, too, that the factual complexities and intricacies of the case and other matters that may be beyond the
government’s prosecutory agencies’ control may contribute to their inability to file the corresponding civil forfeiture
case before the lapse of six months. Given these considerations, it is only proper to strike a balance between the
individual’s right to due process and the government’s interest in curbing criminality, particularly money laundering
and the predicate crimes underlying it.
Thus, as a rule, the effectivity of a freeze order may be extended by the CA for a period not exceeding six
months. Before or upon the lapse of this period, ideally, the Republic should have already filed a case for
civil forfeiture against the property owner with the proper courts and accordingly secure an asset
preservation order or it should have filed the necessary information. 47 Otherwise, the property owner should
already be able to fully enjoy his property without any legal process affecting it. However, should it become
completely necessary for the Republic to further extend the duration of the freeze order, it should file the necessary
motion before the expiration of the six-month period and explain the reason or reasons for its failure to file an
appropriate case and justify the period of extension sought. The freeze order should remain effective prior to the
resolution by the CA, which is hereby directed to resolve this kind of motion for extension with reasonable dispatch.
In the present case, we note that the Republic has not offered any explanation why it took six years (from
the time it secured a freeze order) before a civil forfeiture case was filed in court, despite the clear tenor of
the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases allowing the extension of a freeze order for only a period of six months. All
the Republic could proffer is its temporal argument on the inapplicability of the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases; in
effect, it glossed over the squarely-raised issue of due process. Under these circumstances, we cannot but conclude
that the continued extension of the freeze order beyond the six-month period violated the Ligot’s right to due
process; thus, the CA decision should be reversed.
We clarify that our conclusion applies only to the CA ruling and does not affect the proceedings and whatever order
or resolution the RTC may have issued in the presently pending civil cases for forfeiture. We make this clarification
to ensure that we can now fully conclude and terminate this CA aspect of the case.
As our last point, we commend the fervor of the CA in assisting the State’s efforts to prosecute corrupt public
officials. We remind the appellate court though that the government’s anti-corruption drive cannot be done at the
expense of cherished fundamental rights enshrined in our Constitution. So long as we continue to be guided by the
Constitution and the rule of law, the Court cannot allow the justification of governmental action on the basis of the
noblest objectives alone. As so oft-repeated, the end does not justify the means. Of primordial importance is that the
means employed must be in keeping with the Constitution. Mere expediency will certainly not excuse constitutional
shortcuts.48
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petition and LIFT the freeze order issued by the Court of
Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 90238. This lifting is without prejudice to, and shall not affect, the preservation orders
that the lower courts have ordered on the same properties in the cases pending before them. Pursuant to Section
56 of A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC, the Court of Appeals is hereby ordered to remand the case and to transmit the records
to the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 22, where the civil forfeiture proceeding is pending, for consolidation
therewith as may be appropriate.
39.) G.R. No. 90529 August 16, 1991
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION) and MACARIO ASISTIO, JR., respondents.
Rodolfo U. Jimenez Law Office for private respondent.
REGALADO, J.:
With the renascence of democratic space and the culmination in court of a preponderant number of ill-gotten wealth
cases, this Court is tasked again with another novel issue involving the determination of whether it is the Office of
the Ombudsman or the Office of the Solicitor General which has the authority to file a petition for forfeiture of
unlawfully acquired wealth as provided for in Republic Act No. 1379. 1
The Republic, through the Solicitor General, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari seeking to annul and set
aside the resolution of respondent Sandiganbayan, promulgated on October 10, 1989, dismissing the petition for
2
forfeiture filed by the Republic against respondent Macario Asistio, Jr., for the reason that "it is the Ombudsman —
not the Office of the Solicitor — General that has the authority to file the petition."
The facts, as summarized in the memorandum of the Republic, are as follows:
1. In a Joint Letter-Complaint to the Ombudsman dated January 8,1989 (Annex "A", Petition), Messrs. Arnel
Blancaflor and Rodolfo Santos, residents of Kalookan City, charged respondent Macario Asistio, Jr., who is
the incumbent Mayor of Kalookan City, with having violated the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A.
3019), specifically Section 8 thereof.
2. In said Joint Sworn Letter-Complaint, they alleged that during his incumbency as Kalookan City Mayor in
1981, 1982 and 1983, respondent Asistio acquired wealth in the amounts of P2,142,637.50, P11,463,734.40
and P3,658,351.00, respectively, or a total of P17,264,722.90, which he deposited in his personal account,
CA-4670-00136-3, in the Republic Planters Bank, Sangandaan Branch, Kalookan City.
3. In support of their allegations, they attached the original copies of the bank deposits and receipts which
indicated the various sums deposited within the three-year period and which had been machine validated
from January 5, 1981 thru December 20, 1983 (Annexes "A-l" to "A-370", Petition).
4. However, in his Sworn Statements of Assets and Liabilities for the period ending December 31,1982
(Annex "B", Petition) and December 31, 1984 (Annex "C", Petition), said respondent had a total income of
only P234,128.68 and P255,324.02, respectively; and as against its total assets (real and personal
properties) of P2,859,327.94 as of December 31, 1982, he had loans payable in the amount of
P2,425,575.60, and against total assets of P5,143,260.98 as of December 31, 1984, he had loans payable
in the amount of P2,660,094.74.
5. The Preliminary Investigation was conducted by Special Prosecution Officer Margarito P. Gervacio, Jr.,
before whom authenticated xerox copies of the original ledger cards of CA-4670- 00136-3 in the name of
respondent Macario Asistio, Jr. were produced and presented by the officer-in-charge of the Republic
Planters Bank, Sangandaan Branch, Kalookan City.
6. Finding that the total combined family income of respondent Asistio for the years 1981, 1982, 1983 and
1984, amounting only to P489,452.70, is manifestly out of proportion to the totality of his bank deposits in
the total amount of P14,184,337.16 for the same four-year period, the Ombudsman, therefore, finds that a
violation of Republic Act 1379 and/or Section 8 of Republic Act 3019 has been committed and that Asistio is
'probably guilty thereof (Annex "D", Petition).
7. Thus, on March 31, 1989, the Ombudsman, the Honorable Conrado M. Vasquez, indorsed the above
case to the Solicitor General for appropriate action, based on the provision of Section 2, Republic Act 1379.
Said indorsement reads, in part:
Pursuant to the provision of Sec. 2, Republic Act 1379, the appropriate preliminary investigation had
been conducted in the premises by this Office and there is reasonable ground to believe that the
provision of Sec. 8, Republic Act 3019 has been violated probably by respondent Macario Asistio, Jr.
A Resolution on the matter was issued by this Office, copies of which form part of the record. 3
On April 28, 1989, the Solicitor General, pursuant to the aforesaid recommendation of the Ombudsman, filed a
Petition for Forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan.
4
A Motion to Dismiss was filed by respondent Asistio, through counsel, on the ground that:
5
1. The Sandigan bayan has no jurisdiction over the case;
2. Sections 2, 6, 8 and 9 of R.A.1379, if not the entire statute, invalid for being unconstitutional; and
3. The petition states no cause of action.
In an Opposition to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss, the Solicitor General averred that:

6
1. The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case;
2. Respondent's attack on the constitutionality of R.A. 1379 is bereft of any basis
3. Ironically, while respondent attacks the constitutionality of R.A. 1379, he relies on the very same law to
support his argument that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over this forfeiture case grounded on Sec.
2 of R.A. 1379; respondent is therefore estopped from assailing the validity of R.A. 1379;
4. The petition has more than sufficient cause of action; and
5. The motion to dismiss is dilatory and frivolous, hence outrightly dismissible.
In dismissing the petition for forfeiture and in ruling that it is the Ombudsman who has the authority to file the same
before the court, the Sandiganbayan held that:
Other statutory provisions pertinent to the incident at bar read:
The Office of the Tanodbayan shall have the exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigation
of all cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan; to file information therefor and to direct and control
the prosecution of the said cases. (Sec. .77, PD 1630.)
The provisions of the Decree notwithstanding, the Office of the Tanodbayan shall continue to have
the exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigation, file the necessary information, and direct
and control the prosecution of all cases enumerated in Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606,
whether such cases be within the exclusive original/appellate jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan or
the appropriate courts in accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1630. (Sec. 3,
PD 1861, attending PD 1606.)
Since violations of Republic Act 1379 are cognizable exclusively by the Sandiganbayan pursuant to Section
4 of PD 1606, abrogating thereby the jurisdiction over forfeiture cases theretofore vested in the Regional
Trial Court of the city or province where the public officer or employee complained of resides or holds office
under Section 2 of Republic Act 1379, the other provision of said section 2 insofar as it lodged in the City or
Provincial Fiscal the power to conduct the previous inquiry/preliminary investigation must be deemed
similarly modified by PD 1630, Section 17, and PD 1861, Section 3 abovequoted, in the sense that such
authority of the City or Provincial Fiscal has been transferred to the Office of the Tanodbayan (now
Ombudsman). Considering, further, that PDs 1630 and 1861, Sections 17 and 3, respectively, also provide
that the Office of the Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) shall also have the exclusive authority to file the necessary
information and direct and control the prosecution of all cases falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, it is the Ombudsman-not the Office of the Solicitor General-that has the authority to file the
petition in this case.
x x x x x x x x x
UPON THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED but without
prejudice to the refiling of another petition by the Ombudsman. (Underscoring in the original text .) 7
In effect, the dismissal of the petition for forfeiture by the Sandiganbayan is premised on the supposition that since
violations of Republic Act No. 1379 now fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, and considering
further that the exclusive authority to file the necessary informations and to direct and control the prosecution of all
cases falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is vested in the Office of the Tanodbayan (now
Ombudsman), it follows that it is the Ombudsman, and not the Solicitor General, who has the authority to file the
petition for forfeiture.
It is the submission of the Solicitor General that his authority to file the petition for forfeiture under Republic Act No.
1379 should be retained, notwithstanding the amendments introduced by Presidential Decrees Nos. 1630 and 1861
vesting in the Tanodbayan (now Ombudsman) the exclusive authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of all
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan (specifically those enumerated in Section 4 of Presidential Decree No.
1606, as last amended by Presidential Decree No. 1861), to file the informations therefor and to direct and control
the prosecution of said cases.
Several reasons are advanced by the Solicitor General for his aforesaid postulation, viz:
1. The exclusive authority vested in the Tanodbayan by Section 17 of Presidential Decree No. 1630 and
Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1861 is confined only to the filing of the information and directing and
controlling the prosecution of the cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, but does not include the authority
to file a petition for forfeiture. An information, as defined under Section 4, Rule 110, of the Rules of Court, is
different from a petition, in that an information necessarily refers to a criminal proceeding while a petition
does not.
2. It is the intention of the legislature to delineate forfeiture proceedings under Republic Act No. 1379 from
the rest of the violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as may be implied from a reading of Section 9 of
Republic Act No. 3019 (penalties for violations of Sections 3, 4, 5, and 6 thereof), which does not include
Section 8 (forfeiture judgments) of the same law within the punishments usually associated with criminal
proceedings, such as imprisonment and/or perpetual disqualification from public office.
3. The provision of Republic Act No. 1379 authorizing the Solicitor General to file the petition for forfeiture
being a special and specific provision, should prevail over Presidential Decrees Nos. 1630 and 1861 which
contain general provisions involving violations not only of Republic Act No. 1379 but also of Republic Act No.
3019.
We find for the petitioner.
Before the creation of the Sandiganbayan, it was the Solicitor General who was authorized to initiate forfeiture
proceedings before the then court of first instance of the city or province where the public officer or employee
resides or holds office, pursuant to Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1379 which reads:
8
See. 2. Filing of petition.—Whenever any public officer or employee has acquired during his incumbency an
amount of property which is manifestly out of proportion to s salary as such public officer or employee and to
his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property, said property shall be
presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired. The Solicitor General, upon complaint by any
taxpayer to the city or provincial fiscal who shall conduct a previous inquiry similar to preliminary
investigations in criminal cases and shall certify to the Solicitor General that there is reasonable ground to
believe that there has been committed a violation of this Act and the respondent is probably guilty thereof,
shall file, in the name and on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, in the Court of First Instance of the
city or province where said public officer or employee resides or holds office, a petition for a writ
commanding said officer or employee to show cause why the property aforesaid, or any part thereof, should
not be declared property of the State: ... .
Thereafter, Presidential Decree No. 1486 was promulgated on June 11, 1978 providing for the creation of the
Sandiganbayan and vesting it, under Section 4 thereof, with original and exclusive jurisdiction to try and decide,
among others:
(a) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act and Republic Act No. 1379;
(b) Crimes committed by public officers or employees, including those employed in government-owned or
controlled corporations, embraced in Title VII of the Revised Penal Code;
(c) Other crimes or offenses committed by public officers or employees including those employed in
government-owned or controlled corporations in relation to their office; Provided, that in case private
individuals are accused as principals, accomplices or accessories in the commission of the crimes
hereinabove mentioned, they shall be tried jointly with the public officers or employees concerned.
x x x x x x x x x
(d) Civil suits brought in connection with the aforementioned crimes for restitution or reparation of damages,
recovery of the instruments and effects of the crimes, or forfeiture proceedings provided for under Republic
Act No. 1379;
(e) Civil actions brought under Articles 32 and 34 of the Civil Code.
x x x x x x x x x
Subsequently, Presidential Decree No. 1606 was issued on December 10, 1978 expressly repealing Presidential
Decree No. 1486 and revising in the process the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by removing therefrom the civil
cases stated in Section 4(d) and (e) of Presidential Decree No. 1486 which included forfeiture proceedings provided
for under Republic Act No. 1379.
Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over the
offenses enumerated in Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606 to embrace all such offenses irrespective of the
imposable penalty, but Presidential Decree No. 1606 was subsequently amended, first by Presidential Decree No.
1860 and eventually by Presidential Decree No. 1861, establishing the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan:
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction.—The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:
(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code;
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office, including
those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed with other
crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correcional or imprisonment for six (6)
years, or a fine of P6,000.00: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph
where the penalty prescribed by law does not exceed prision correcional or imprisonment for six (6) years or
a fine of P6,000.00 shall be tried by the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial
Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court.
(b) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction:
(1) On appeal, from the final judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in cases originally
decided by them in their respective territorial jurisdiction.
(2) By petition for review, from the final judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts, in the
exercise of their appellate jurisdiction over cases originally decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, in their respective jurisdiction.
On the foregoing considerations, there is no issue that jurisdiction over violations of Republic Acts Nos. 3019 and
1379 now rests with the Sandiganbayan. Concomitant with this transfer of jurisdiction, however, is the question of
whether such transfer necessarily involves a transfer of the authority to file a petition for forfeiture from the Solicitor
General to the Ombudsman. The Sandiganbayan holds in the affirmative; the Solicitor General opines otherwise.
The resolution of the main substantive issue posed in the present petition renders imperative a review of the powers
of the present Special Prosecutor (formerly called the Tanodbayan) and of the Ombudsman (who is now the
Tanodbayan).
Presidential Decree No. 1487, which was enacted on June 11, 1978 at the same time that Presidential Decree No.
1486 was passed, is the primary law creating the Office of the Ombudsman, then known as the Tanodbayan. The
powers of the then Tanodbayan were as follows:
SEC. 10. Powers.—The Tanodbayan shall have the following powers:
(a) He may investigate, on complaint, any administrative act of any administrative agency including any
government-owned or controlled corporation;
x x x x x x x x x
SEC. 17. Prosecution of public personnel.—If the Tanodbayan has reason to believe that any public official,
employee or other person has acted in a manner resulting in a failure of justice, he shall file and prosecute
the corresponding criminal, civil, or administrative case before the Sandiganbayan or the proper court or
body.
It is important to note that when the Tanodbayan was created, it initially had no authority to prosecute cases falling
within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as provided for under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1486
hereinbefore mentioned. It was the Chief Special Prosecutor who was vested with such authority pursuant to
Section 12 of said decree, thus:
SEC. 12. Office of the Chief Special Prosecutor.—The provisions of any law or rule to the contrary
notwithstanding, the direction and control of the prosecution of cases mentioned in Section 4 thereof, shall
be exercised by a Chief Special Prosecutor ... .
The Chief Special Prosecutor ... shall have exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigations of all
complaints filed with the Sandiganbayan, to file informations and conduct the prosecution of all cases ... .
A perusal of Sections 4(d) and 12 of Presidential Decree No. 1486, in conjunction with Section 2 of Republic Act No.
1379, readily reveals that Presidential Decree No. 1486 had impliedly repealed Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1379
by transferring both the jurisdiction of the former courts of first instance over and the authority of the Solicitor
General to file a petition for forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379 to the Sandiganbayan and the then Chief Special
Prosecutor, respectively.
Then, Presidential Decree No. 1607 was enacted on December 10, 1978, amending the power of the former
Tanodbayan to investigate administrative complaints and providing for the creation of the Office of the Chief Special
Prosecutor whose powers were substantially retained by the later law, in this wise:

(a) He may investigate, on complaint by any person or on his own motion or initiative, any administrative act
whether amounting to any criminal offense or not of any administrative agency including any government-
owned or controlled corporation;
x x x x x x x x x
SEC. 17. Office of the Chief Special Prosecutor.—
x x x x x x x x x
The Chief Special Prosecutor, ... shall have the exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigation of all
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan; to file informations therefor and to direct and control the
prosecution of d cases therein; ... .
x x x x x x x x x
SEC. 19. Prosecution of Public Personnel or Other Person.—If the Tanodbayan has reason to believe that
any public official, employee, or other person has acted in a manner warranting criminal or disciplinary
action or proceedings, he shall cause him to be investigated by the Office of the Chief Special Prosecutor
who shall file and prosecute the corresponding criminal or administrative case before the Sandiganbayan or
the proper court or before the proper administrative agency. ...
The scope of the then Tanodbayan's authority was broadened on July 18, 1979 by a subsequent law, Presidential
Decree No. 1630, to include, aside from the power to investigate any administrative act whether amounting to any
criminal offense or not of any administrative agency, the following powers: to file the necessary information or
complaint with the Sandiganbayan or any proper court or administrative agency and prosecute the same if, after
preliminary investigation, he finds a prima facie case; and to file and prosecute civil and administrative cases
involving graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by public officers and employees, including
those in government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office. The exclusive authority to conduct
9
preliminary investigation of all cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, to file informations therefor and to direct
and control the prosecution of said cases was also specifically restored by said decree to the Tanodbayan. In10
addition, the power to conduct the necessary investigation and to file and prosecute the corresponding criminal and
administrative cases before the Sandiganbayan or the proper court or before the proper administrative agency
against any public personnel who has acted in a manner warranting criminal or disciplinary action or proceedings
was likewise transferred from the Chief Special Prosecutor to the Tanodbayan. 11
Thereafter, when Presidential Decree No. 1606 was amended by Presidential Decrees Nos. 1860 and 1861 on
January 14, 1983 and March 23, 1983, respectively, both amendatory decrees contained a virtually identical Section
3 granting him the same authority, to wit:
SEC. 3. The provisions of this decree notwithstanding, the Office of the Tanodbayan shall continue to have
the exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigation, file the necessary information, and direct and
control the prosecution of all cases enumerated in Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, whether such
cases be within the exclusive original/appellate jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts in
accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1630.
With the ratification of the present Constitution, the existing Tanodbayan became known as the Office of the Special
Prosecutor which continued to exercise its powers except those conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman to be
known as the Tanodbayan created under the said Constitution. The Office of the Ombudsman, and the Office of
12
the Special Prosecutor were officially and respectively created under Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as
the Ombudsman Act of 1989, and Executive Order No. 244.
At present, the powers of the Ombudsman, as defined by Republic Act No. 6770 corollary to Section 13, Article XI of
the 1987 Constitution, include, inter alia, the authority to: (1) investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by
any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory
agency of Government, the investigation of such cases; and (2) investigate and initiate the proper action for the
13
recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth amassed after February 25, 1986 and the prosecution of the parties
involved there.14
It follows that these powers vested in the Ombudsman by the Constitution and the law have been removed from the
erstwhile Tanodbayan (now called the Special Prosecutor) and may no longer be exercised by the latter. The
powers of the previous Tanodbayan is now limited, under the supervision and control and upon the authority of the
Ombudsman, to the following: (1) to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan; (2) to enter into plea bargaining agreements; and (3) to perform such other duties
assigned to it by the Ombudsman. 15
In Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., the powers of the former Tanodbayan were explained as follows:
16
Under the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman (as distinguished from the incumbent Tanodbayan) is
charged with the duty to:
Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official,
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient. (See. 13, par. 1)
The Constitution likewise provides that:
The existing Tanodbayan shall hereafter be known as the Office of the Special Prosecutor. It shall
continue to function and exercise its powers as now or hereafter may be provided by law, except
those conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman created under this Constitution. (Art. XI, Section 7)
Now then, inasmuch as the aforementioned duty is given to the Ombudsman, the incumbent Tanodbayan
(called Special Prosecutor under the 1987 Constitution and who is supposed to retain powers and duties
NOT GIVEN to the Ombudsman) is clearly without authority to conduct preliminary investigations and to
direct the filing of criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan, except upon orders of the Ombudsman . This right
to do so was lost effective February 2, 1987. From that time, he has been divested of such authority.
Under the present Constitution, the Special Prosecutor (Raul Gonzales) is a mere subordinate of the
Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) and can investigate and prosecute cases only upon the latter's authority or
orders. The Special Prosecutor cannot initiate the prosecution of cases but can only conduct the same if
instructed to do so by the Ombudsman. Even his original power to issue subpoena, which he still claims
under Section 10(d) of PD 1630, is now deemed transferred to the Ombudsman, who may however, retain it
in the Special Prosecutor in connection with the cases he is ordered to investigate.
In the light of the foregoing pronouncements, there is no doubt that the power of the present Special Prosecutor to
conduct preliminary investigation and to prosecute is subject to the following limitations: (a) it extends only to
criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan; and (b) the same may be exercised only by authority of
the Ombudsman.
The rule is settled that forfeiture proceedings are actions in rem and therefore, civil in nature. Parenthetically,
17
considering the limited authority of the present Special Prosecutor, he is not allowed to file and prosecute forfeiture
cases provided for under Republic Act No. 1379 even if the same falls within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
On the premise that the incumbent Special Prosecutor cannot file the petition, is the Ombudsman empowered to
initiate and prosecute the same?
A perusal of the law originally creating the Office of the Ombudsman then (to be known as the Tanodbayan), and
the amendatory laws issued subsequent thereto will show that, at its inception, the Office of the Ombudsman was
already vested with the power to investigate and prosecute civil and criminal cases before the Sandiganbayan and
even the regular courts. In resume Presidential Decree No. 1487 provided:
SEC. 17. Prosecution of public personnel.—If the Tanodbayan has reason to believe that any public official,
employee, or other person has acted in a manner resulting in a failure of justice, he shall file and prosecute
the corresponding criminal, civil, or administrative case before the Sandiganbayan or the proper court of
body.
and Presidential Decree No. 1630, on its part, had this more detailed provision:
x x x x x x x x x
(e) If after preliminary investigation he finds a prima facie case, he may file the necessary information or
complaint with the Sandiganbayan or any proper court or administrative agency and prosecute the same;
(f) He may file and prosecute civil and administrative cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such
other offenses committed by public officers and employees, including those in government-owned or
controlled corporations, in relation to their office.
Presidential Decree No. 1630 was the existing law governing the then Tanodbayan when Republic Act No. 6770
was enacted providing for the functional and structural organization of the present Office of the Ombudsman. This
later law retained in the Ombudsman the power of the former Tanodbayan to investigate and prosecute on its own
or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such
act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. In addition, the Ombudsman is now vested with
primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. It would appear, therefore, that, as declared by
respondent Sandiganbayan, it is the Ombudsman who should file the petition for forfeiture involved in this case.
Nonetheless, while we do not discount the authority of the Ombudsman, we believe and so hold that the exercise of
his correlative powers to both investigate and initiate the proper action for the recovery of ill-gotten and/or
unexplained wealth is restricted only to cases for the recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth which were
amassed after February 25, 1986. Prior to said date, the Ombudsman is without authority to initiate such forfeiture
18
proceedings. We, however, uphold his authority to investigate cases for the forfeiture or recovery of such ill-gotten
and/or unexplained wealth amassed even before the aforementioned date, pursuant to his general investigatory
power under Section 15(l) of Republic Act No. 6770.
In the case at bar, the alleged unexplained wealth of respondent Macario Asistio, Jr. was supposed to have been
acquired from 1981 to 1983. Verily, the Ombudsman, like the Special Prosecutor, is without authority to initiate and
file the petition for forfeiture against respondent Asistio.
It is our considered opinion, therefore, that in cases of unlawfully acquired wealth amassed before February 25,
1986, as is the situation obtaining in the case at bar, it is the Solicitor General who should file the petition for
forfeiture. The reason is manifestly supplied by an analysis of the interplay of antecedent legislation.
It will be recalled that when Presidential Decree No. 1486 was issued on June 11, 19781 it vested in the
Sandiganbayan jurisdiction over forfeiture proceedings provided for under Republic Act No. 1379, Section 12 of the
same decree gave the Chief Special Prosecutor the authority to prosecute forfeiture cases. This should be taken as
merely an implied repeal by Presidential Decree No. 1486 of the jurisdiction of the former courts of first instance and
the authority of the Solicitor General to file a petition for forfeiture under Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1379 by
transferring said jurisdiction and authority to the Sandiganbayan and the Chief Special Prosecutor, respectively.
However, on December 10, 1978, Presidential Decree No. 1606 was enacted expressly repealing Presidential
Decree No. 1486. Issued on the same date was Presidential Decree No. 1607 which declared the official creation
1âwphi1
of the Office of the Chief Special Prosecutor, with Section 17 thereof providing for its exclusive authority to conduct
preliminary investigation of all cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, file informations therefor, and direct and
control the prosecution of said cases therein. Still and all, it now bears stressing that, under the state of the law at
that juncture, the authority of the Chief Special Prosecutor no longer included the right to file actions for forfeiture
under Republic Act No. 1379, nor was such authority vested in any other office or agency.
It is a respected rule of statutory construction that "where a law which repeals a prior law, not expressly but by
implication, is itself repealed, ... the repeal of the repealing law revives the prior law, unless the language of the
repealing statute provides otherwise. Hence, the repeal of Presidential Decree No. 1486 necessarily revived the
19
authority of the Solicitor General to file a petition for forfeiture under Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1379, but not the
jurisdiction of the quondam courts of first instance over the case nor the authority of the provincial or city fiscals to
conduct the preliminary investigation therefor, since said powers at that time remained in the Sandiganbayan and
the Chief Special Prosecutor. That such was the intendment of the law can be irresistibly deduced from a reading of
Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606 retaining in the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction over violations of Republic Act
No. 1379, and of Section 17 of Presidential Decree No. 1607 which vested in the Chief Special Prosecutor the right
to conduct a preliminary investigation and to file only informations for cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the authority thereafter restored to the then Tanodbayan to file informations
for cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan does not include the filing of a petition for forfeiture. As earlier
mentioned, an information is an accusation in writing charging a person with an offense and requires a criminal
proceeding; a petition for forfeiture involves a civil action in rem. The Solicitor General was, therefore, acting within
the scope of his authority when he filed the petition for forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan. Besides, such authority
of the Solicitor General is not an entirely new concept if we are to consider that under Executive Order No. 14, the
Solicitor General is empowered to assist in the filing and prosecution of cases for a violation thereof, including
forfeiture proceedings under Republic Act No. 1379 in connection with Executive Orders Nos. 1 and 2.
WHEREFORE, the resolution of respondent Sandiganbayan promulgated on October 10, 1989 is hereby ANNULED
and SET ASIDE, and the petition for forfeiture filed by the Solicitor General is hereby ordered REINSTATED.
40.) G.R. No. L-19052 December 29, 1962
MANUEL F. CABAL, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RUPERTO KAPUNAN, JR., and THE CITY FISCAL OF MANILA, respondents.
Francisco Carreon for petitioner.

Assistant City Fiscal Manuel T. Reyes for respondent City of Manila.
CONCEPCION, J.:
This is an original petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, to restrain the Hon. Ruperto
Kapunan, Jr., as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, from further proceeding in Criminal Case No. 60111
of said court, and to set aside an order of said respondent, as well as the whole proceedings in said criminal case. .
On or about August 1961, Col. Jose C. Maristela of the Philippine Army filed with the Secretary of Nation Defense a
letter-complaint charging petitioner Manuel Cabal, then Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, with
"graft, corrupt practices, unexplained wealth, conduct unbecoming of an officer and gentleman dictatorial
tendencies, giving false statements of his as sets and liabilities in 1958 and other equally reprehensible acts". On
September 6, 1961, the President of the Philippines created a committee of five (5) members, consisting of former
Justice Marceliana R. Montemayor, as Chairman, former Justices Buenaventura Ocampo and Sotero Cabahug, and
Generals Basilio J. Valdez and Guillermo B. Francisco, to investigate the charge of unexplained wealth contained in
said letter-complaint and submit its report and recommendations as soon as possible. At the beginning of the
investigation, on September 15, 1961, the Committee, upon request of complainant Col. Maristela, or considered
petitioner herein to take the witness stand and be sworn to as witness for Maristela, in support of his aforementioned
charge of unexplained wealth. Thereupon, petitioner objected, personally and through counsel, to said request of
Col. Maristela and to the aforementioned order of the Committee, invoking his constitutional right against self-
incrimination. The Committee insisted that petitioner take the witness stand and be sworn to, subject to his right to
refuse to answer such questions as may be incriminatory. This notwithstanding, petitioner respectfully refused to be
sworn to as a witness to take the witness stand. Hence, in a communication dated September 18, 1961, the
Committee referred the matter to respondent City Fiscal of Manila, for such action as he may deem proper. On
September 28, 1961, the City Fiscal filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a "charge" reading as follows:
The undersigned hereby charges Manuel F. Cabal with contempt under section 580 of the Revised
Administrative Code in relation to sections I and 7, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, committed as follows:
That on or about September 15, 1961, in the investigation conducted at the U.P. Little Theater:,
Padre Faura, Manila, by the Presidential Committee, which was created by the President of the
Republic of the Philippines in accordance with law to investigate the charges of alleged acquisition
by respondent of unexplained wealth and composed of Justice Marceliano Montemayor, as
Chairman, and Justices Buenaventura Ocampo and Sotero Cabahug and Generals Basilio Valdez
and Guillermo Francisco, as members, with the power, among others, to compel the attendance of
witnesses and take their testimony under oath, respondent who was personally present at the time
before the Committee in compliance with a subpoena duly issued to him, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and contumaciously, without any justifiable cause or reason refusal and fail and still
refuses and fails to obey the lawful order of the Committee to take the witness stand, be sworn and
testify as witness in said investigation, in utter disregard of the lawful authority of the Committee and
thereby obstructing and degrading the proceedings before said body.
Wherefore, it is respectfully prayed that respondent be summarily adjudged guilty of contempt of the
Presidential Committee and accordingly disciplined as in contempt of court imprisonment until such time as
he shall obey the subject order of said committee.
This charge, docketed as Criminal Case No. 60111 of said court, was assigned to Branch XVIII thereof, presided
over by respondent Judge. On October 2, 1961, the latter issued an order requiring petitioner to show cause and/or
answer the charge filed against him within ten (10) days. Soon thereafter, or on October 4, 1961, petitioner filed with
respondent Judge a motion to quash the charge and/or order to show cause, upon the ground: (1) that the City
Fiscal has neither authority nor personality to file said char and the same is null and void, for, if criminal, the charge
has been filed without a preliminary investigation, and, civil, the City Fiscal may not file it, his authority in respect of
civil cases being limited to representing the City of Manila; (2) that the facts charged constitute no offense for
section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code, upon which the charge is based, violates due process, in that it is
vague and uncertain as regards the offense therein defined and the fine imposable therefor and that it fail to specify
whether said offense shall be treated also contempt of an inferior court or of a superior court (3) that more than one
offense is charged, for the contempt imputed to petitioner is sought to be punished as contempt of an inferior court,
as contempt of a superior court an as contempt under section 7 of Rule 64 of the Rules Court; (4) that the
Committee had no power to order an require petitioner to take the witness stand and be sworn to, upon the request
of Col. Maristela, as witness for the latter, inasmuch as said order violates petitioner's constitutional right against
self-incrimination.
By resolution dated October 14, 1961. respondent Judge denied said motion to quash. Thereupon, or on October
20, 1961, petitioner began the present action for the purpose adverted to above, alleging that, unless restrained by
this court, respondent Judge may summarily punish him for contempt, and that such action would not be
appealable.
In their answer, respondents herein allege, inter alia, that the investigation being conducted by the Committee
above referred to is administrative, not criminal, in nature; that the legal provision relied upon by petitioner in relation
to preliminary investigations (Section '08-C, Republic Act No. 409, as amended by Republic Act No. 1201) is
inapplicable to contempt proceedings; that, under section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code. contempt against
an administrative officer is to be dealt with as contempt of a superior court; that petitioner herein is charged with only
one offense; and that, tinder the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination, petitioner herein may refuse, not
to take the witness stand, but to answer incriminatory questions.
At the outset, it is not disputed that the accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only to answer incriminatory
questions, but, also, to take the witness stand (3 Wharton's Criminal Evidence, pp. 1959-1960; 98 C.J.S., p. 264).
Hence, the issue before us boils down to whether or not the proceedings before the aforementioned Committee is
civil or criminal in character.
In this connection, it should be noted that, although said Committee was created to investigate the administrative
charge of unexplained wealth, there seems to be no question that Col. Maristela does not seek the removal of
petitioner herein as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. As a matter of fact he no longer holds such
office. It seems, likewise conceded that the purpose of the charge against petitioner is to apply the provisions of
Republic Act No. 1379, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft Law, which authorizes the forfeiture to the
State of property of a public officer or employee which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public
officer or employee and his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property. Such for
forfeiture has been held, however, to partake of the nature of a penalty.
In a strict signification, a forfeiture is a divestiture property without compensation, in consequence of a

default an offense, and the term is used in such a sense in this article. A forfeiture, as thus defined, is
imposed by way of punishment not by the mere convention of the parties, but by the lawmaking power, to
insure a prescribed course of conduct. It is a method deemed necessary by the legislature to restrain
the commission of an offense and to aid in the prevention of such a offense. The effect of such a forfeiture is
to transfer the title to the specific thing from the owner to the sovereign power (23 Am. Jur. 599) (Emphasis
ours.)
In Black's Law Dictionary a "forfeiture" is defined to be "the incurring of a liability to pay a definite sum of
money as the consequence of violating the provisions of some statute or refusal to comply with some
requirement of law." It may be said to be a penalty imposed for misconduct or breach of duty. (Com. vs.
French, 114 S.W. 255.)
As a consequence, proceedings for forfeiture of proper are deemed criminal or penal, and, hence, the exemption of
defendants in criminal case from the obligation to be witnesses against themselves are applicable thereto.
Generally speaking, informations for the forfeiture of goods that seek no judgment of fine or imprisonment
against any person are deemed to be civil proceedings in rem. Such proceedings are criminal in nature to
the extent that where the person using the res illegally is the owner or rightful possessor of it, the forfeiture
proceeding is in the nature of a punishment. They have been held to be so far in the nature criminal
proceedings that a general verdict on several count in an information is upheld if one count is
good. According to the authorities such proceedings, where the owner of the property appears, are so far
considered as quasi-criminal proceeding as to relieve the owner from being a witness against himself and to
prevent the compulsory production of his books and papers. ... (23 Am. Jur. 612; emphasis ours.)
Although the contrary view formerly obtained, the late decisions are to the effect that suits for forfeitures
incurred by the commission of offenses against the law are so far of quasi-criminal nature as to be within the
reason of criminal proceedings for all purposes of ... that portion of the Fifth Amendment which declares that
no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. .... It has frequently been
held upon constitutional grounds under the various State Constitution, that a witness or party called as
witness cannot be made to testify against himself as to matters which would subject his property to
forfeiture. At early common law no person could be compelled to testify against himself or to answer any
question which would have had a tendency to expose his property to a forfeiture or to form a link in a chain
of evidence for that purpose, as well as to incriminate him. Under this common-law doctrine of protection
against compulsory disclosures which would tend to subject the witness to forfeiture, such protection was
claimed and availed of in some early American cases without placing the basis of the protection upon
constitutional grounds. (23 Am. Jur., 616; emphasis ours.)
Proceedings for forfeitures are generally considered to be civil and in the nature of proceedings in rem. The
statute providing that no judgment or other proceedings in civil cases shall be arrested or reversed for any
defect or want of form is applicable to them. In some aspects, however, suits for penalties and forfeitures
are of quasi-criminal nature and within the reason of criminal proceedings for all the purposes of ... that
portion of the Fifth Amendment which declares, that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be
a witness against himself. The proceeding is one against the owner, as well as against the goods; for it is his
breach of the laws which has to be proved to establish the forfeiture and his property is sought to be
forfeited. (15 Am. Jur., Sec. 104, p. 368; emphasis ours.) lawphil.net
The rule protecting a person from being compelled to furnish evidence which would incriminate him
exists not only when he is liable criminally to prosecution and punishment, but also when his answer would
tend to expose him to a ... forfeiture .... (58 Am. Jur., See. 43, p. 48; emphasis ours.)
As already observed, the various constitutions provide that no person shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself. This prohibition against compelling a person to take the stand as a
witness against himself applied only to criminal, quasi-criminal, and penal proceedings, including a
proceeding civil in form for forfeiture of property by reason of the commission of an offense, but not a
proceeding in which the penalty recoverable is civil or remedial in nature, .... (58 Am. Jur., Sec. 44, p. 49:
emphasis ours.)
The privilege of a witness not to incriminate himself is not infringed by merely asking the witness a question
which he refuses to answer. The privilege is simply an option of refusal, and not a prohibition of inquiry. A
question is not improper merely because the answer may tend to incriminate but, where a witness exercises
his constitutional right not to answer, a question by counsel as to whether the reason for refusing to answer
is because the answer may tend to incriminate the witness is improper.
The possibility that the examination of the witness will be pursued to the extent of requiring self-incrimination
will not justify the refusal to answer questions. However, where the position of the witness is virtually that of
an accused on trial, it would appear that he may invoke the privilege in support of a blanket refusal to
answer any and all questions. (C.J.S., p. 252; emphasis ours.)
A person may not be compelled to testify in an action against him for a penalty or to answer any question as
a witness which would subject him to a penalty or forfeiture, where the penalty or forfeiture is imposed as a
vindication of the public justice of the state.
In general, both at common law and under a constitution provision against compulsory self-incrimination, a
person may not be compelled to answer any question as a witness which would subject him to a penalty
or forfeiture, or testify in action against him for a penalty.
The privilege applies where the penalty or forfeiture recoverable, or is imposed in vindication of the public
justice the state as a statutory fine or penalty, or a fine or penalty for violation of a municipal ordinance, even
though the action or proceeding for its enforcement is not brought in a criminal court but is prosecuted
through the modes of procedure applicable to ordinary civil remedy. (98 C. J. S., pp. 275-6.)
Thus, in Boyd vs. U.S. (116 U.S. 616, 29 L. ed. 746), it was held that the information, in a proceeding to declaration
a forfeiture of certain property because of the evasion of a certain revenue law, "though technically a civil
proceeding is in substance and effect a criminal one", and that suits for penalties and forfeitures are within the
reason criminal proceedings for the purposes of that portion the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the U.S.
which declares that no person shall be compelled in a criminal case to be a witness against himself. Similarly, a
proceeding for the removal of an officer was held, in Thurston vs. Clark (107 Cal. 285, 40 pp. 435, 437), to be in
substance criminal, for said portion of the Fifth Amendment applies "to all cases in which the action prosecution is
not to establish, recover or redress private and civil rights, but to try and punish persons charged with the
commission of public offenses" and "a criminal case is a action, suit or cause instituted to punish an infraction the
criminal laws, and, with this object in view, it matters not in what form a statute may clothe it; it is still a criminal case
...". This view was, in effect confirmed in Lees vs. U.S. (37 L. ed. 1150-1151). Hence, the Lawyer Reports
Annotated (Vol. 29, p. 8), after an extensive examination of pertinent cases, concludes that said constitutional
provision applies whenever the proceeding is not "purely remedial", or intended "as a redress for
a private grievance", but primarily to punish "a violation of duty or a public wrong and to deter others from offending
in likewise manner. ...".
We are unmindful of the doctrine laid down in Almeda vs. Perez, L-18428 (August 30, 1962) in which the theory that,
after the filing of respondents' answer to a petition for forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379, said petition may not
be amended as to substance pursuant to our rules of criminal procedure, was rejected by this Court upon the
ground that said forfeiture proceeding in civil in nature. This doctrine refers, however, to the
purely procedural aspect of said proceeding, and has no bearing the substantial rights of the respondents therein,
particularly their constitutional right against self-incrimination.
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is granted and respondent Judge hereby enjoined permanently from proceeding
further in Criminal Case No. 60111 of the Court of First Instance of Manila. It is so ordered.
41.) G.R. No. 152154 July 15, 2003
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION), FERDINAND E. MARCOS (REPRESENTED BY
HIS ESTATE/HEIRS: IMELDA R. MARCOS, MARIA IMELDA [IMEE] MARCOS-MANOTOC, FERDINAND R.
MARCOS, JR. AND IRENE MARCOS-ARANETA) AND IMELDA ROMUALDEZ MARCOS, respondents.
CORONA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to (1) set aside the Resolution dated
January 31, 2002 issued by the Special First Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case No. 0141 entitled Republic
of the Philippines vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, et. al., and (2) reinstate its earlier decision dated September 19, 2000
which forfeited in favor of petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic) the amount held in escrow in the
Philippine National Bank (PNB) in the aggregate amount of US$658,175,373.60 as of January 31, 2002.
BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
On December 17, 1991, petitioner Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG),
represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a petition for forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan,
docketed as Civil Case No. 0141 entitled Republic of the Philippines vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, represented by his
Estate/Heirs and Imelda R. Marcos, pursuant to RA 13791 in relation to Executive Order Nos. 1,2 2,3 144 and 14-A.5
In said case, petitioner sought the declaration of the aggregate amount of US$356 million (now estimated to be
more than US$658 million inclusive of interest) deposited in escrow in the PNB, as ill-gotten wealth. The funds were
previously held by the following five account groups, using various foreign foundations in certain Swiss banks:
(1) Azio-Verso-Vibur Foundation accounts;
(2) Xandy-Wintrop: Charis-Scolari-Valamo-Spinus- Avertina Foundation accounts;
(3) Trinidad-Rayby-Palmy Foundation accounts;
(4) Rosalys-Aguamina Foundation accounts and
(5) Maler Foundation accounts.
In addition, the petition sought the forfeiture of US$25 million and US$5 million in treasury notes which exceeded
the Marcos couple's salaries, other lawful income as well as income from legitimately acquired property. The
treasury notes are frozen at the Central Bank of the Philippines, now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, by virtue of the
freeze order issued by the PCGG.
On October 18, 1993, respondents Imelda R. Marcos, Maria Imelda M. Manotoc, Irene M. Araneta and Ferdinand R.
Marcos, Jr. filed their answer.
Before the case was set for pre-trial, a General Agreement and the Supplemental Agreements 6 dated December 28,
1993 were executed by the Marcos children and then PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo for a global
settlement of the assets of the Marcos family. Subsequently, respondent Marcos children filed a motion dated
December 7, 1995 for the approval of said agreements and for the enforcement thereof.
The General Agreement/Supplemental Agreements sought to identify, collate, cause the inventory of and distribute
all assets presumed to be owned by the Marcos family under the conditions contained therein. The aforementioned
General Agreement specified in one of its premises or "whereas clauses" the fact that petitioner "obtained a
judgment from the Swiss Federal Tribunal on December 21, 1990, that the Three Hundred Fifty-six Million U.S.
dollars (US$356 million) belongs in principle to the Republic of the Philippines provided certain conditionalities are
met x x x." The said decision of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court affirmed the decision of Zurich District Attorney
Peter Consandey, granting petitioner's request for legal assistance. 7 Consandey declared the various deposits in the
name of the enumerated foundations to be of illegal provenance and ordered that they be frozen to await the final
verdict in favor of the parties entitled to restitution.
Hearings were conducted by the Sandiganbayan on the motion to approve the General/Supplemental Agreements.
Respondent Ferdinand, Jr. was presented as witness for the purpose of establishing the partial implementation of
said agreements.
On October 18, 1996, petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings.
Respondent Mrs. Marcos filed her opposition thereto which was later adopted by respondents Mrs. Manotoc, Mrs.
Araneta and Ferdinand, Jr.
In its resolution dated November 20, 1997, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's motion for summary judgment
and/or judgment on the pleadings on the ground that the motion to approve the compromise agreement "(took)
precedence over the motion for summary judgment."
Respondent Mrs. Marcos filed a manifestation on May 26, 1998 claiming she was not a party to the motion for
approval of the Compromise Agreement and that she owned 90% of the funds with the remaining 10% belonging to
the Marcos estate.
Meanwhile, on August 10, 1995, petitioner filed with the District Attorney in Zurich, Switzerland, an additional
request for the immediate transfer of the deposits to an escrow account in the PNB. The request was granted. On
appeal by the Marcoses, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court, in a decision dated December 10, 1997, upheld the
ruling of the District Attorney of Zurich granting the request for the transfer of the funds. In 1998, the funds were
remitted to the Philippines in escrow. Subsequently, respondent Marcos children moved that the funds be placed
in custodia legis because the deposit in escrow in the PNB was allegedly in danger of dissipation by petitioner. The
Sandiganbayan, in its resolution dated September 8, 1998, granted the motion.
After the pre-trial and the issuance of the pre-trial order and supplemental pre-trial order dated October 28, 1999
and January 21, 2000, respectively, the case was set for trial. After several resettings, petitioner, on March 10,
2000, filed another motion for summary judgment pertaining to the forfeiture of the US$356 million, based on the
following grounds:
THE ESSENTIAL FACTS WHICH WARRANT THE FORFEITURE OF THE FUNDS SUBJECT OF THE
PETITION UNDER R.A. NO. 1379 ARE ADMITTED BY RESPONDENTS IN THEIR PLEADINGS AND
OTHER SUBMISSIONS MADE IN THE COURSE OF THE PROCEEDING.
II
RESPONDENTS' ADMISSION MADE DURING THE PRE-TRIAL THAT THEY DO NOT HAVE ANY
INTEREST OR OWNERSHIP OVER THE FUNDS SUBJECT OF THE ACTION FOR FORFEITURE
TENDERS NO GENUINE ISSUE OR CONTROVERSY AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT IN THE PRESENT
ACTION, THUS WARRANTING THE RENDITION OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 8
Petitioner contended that, after the pre-trial conference, certain facts were established, warranting a summary
judgment on the funds sought to be forfeited.
Respondent Mrs. Marcos filed her opposition to the petitioner's motion for summary judgment, which opposition was
later adopted by her co-respondents Mrs. Manotoc, Mrs. Araneta and Ferdinand, Jr.
On March 24, 2000, a hearing on the motion for summary judgment was conducted.
In a decision9 dated September 19, 2000, the Sandiganbayan granted petitioner's motion for summary judgment:
CONCLUSION
There is no issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence.
The Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted.
The Swiss deposits which were transmitted to and now held in escrow at the PNB are deemed unlawfully
acquired as ill-gotten wealth.
DISPOSITION
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the Republic of the Philippines and against the
respondents, declaring the Swiss deposits which were transferred to and now deposited in escrow at the
Philippine National Bank in the total aggregate value equivalent to US$627,608,544.95 as of August 31,
2000 together with the increments thereof forfeited in favor of the State. 10
Respondent Mrs. Marcos filed a motion for reconsideration dated September 26, 2000. Likewise, Mrs. Manotoc and
Ferdinand, Jr. filed their own motion for reconsideration dated October 5, 2000. Mrs. Araneta filed a manifestation
dated October 4, 2000 adopting the motion for reconsideration of Mrs. Marcos, Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr.
Subsequently, petitioner filed its opposition thereto.
In a resolution11 dated January 31, 2002, the Sandiganbayan reversed its September 19, 2000 decision, thus
denying petitioner's motion for summary judgment:
CONCLUSION
In sum, the evidence offered for summary judgment of the case did not prove that the money in the Swiss
Banks belonged to the Marcos spouses because no legal proof exists in the record as to the ownership by
the Marcoses of the funds in escrow from the Swiss Banks.
The basis for the forfeiture in favor of the government cannot be deemed to have been established and our
judgment thereon, perforce, must also have been without basis.
WHEREFORE, the decision of this Court dated September 19, 2000 is reconsidered and set aside, and this
case is now being set for further proceedings.12
Hence, the instant petition. In filing the same, petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan, in reversing its September
19, 2000 decision, committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction considering that
--
PETITIONER WAS ABLE TO PROVE ITS CASE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUISITES OF
SECTIONS 2 AND 3 OF R.A. NO. 1379:
A. PRIVATE RESPONDENTS CATEGORICALLY ADMITTED NOT ONLY THE PERSONAL

CIRCUMSTANCES OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS AND IMELDA R. MARCOS AS PUBLIC
OFFICIALS BUT ALSO THE EXTENT OF THEIR SALARIES AS SUCH PUBLIC OFFICIALS, WHO
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, WERE PROHIBITED FROM ENGAGING IN THE MANAGEMENT
OF FOUNDATIONS.
B. PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ALSO ADMITTED THE EXISTENCE OF THE SWISS DEPOSITS

AND THEIR OWNERSHIP THEREOF:
1. ADMISSIONS IN PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' ANSWER;

2. ADMISSION IN THE GENERAL / SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENTS THEY SIGNED AND
SOUGHT TO IMPLEMENT;
3. ADMISSION IN A MANIFESTATION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT IMELDA R. MARCOS

AND IN THE MOTION TO PLACE THE RES IN CUSTODIA LEGIS; AND
4. ADMISSION IN THE UNDERTAKING TO PAY THE HUMAN RIGHTS VICTIMS.
C. PETITIONER HAS PROVED THE EXTENT OF THE LEGITIMATE INCOME OF FERDINAND E.

MARCOS AND IMELDA R. MARCOS AS PUBLIC OFFICIALS.
D. PETITIONER HAS ESTABLISHED A PRIMA FACIE PRESUMPTION OF UNLAWFULLY

ACQUIRED WEALTH.
II
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS PROPER SINCE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVE NOT RAISED ANY
GENUINE ISSUE OF FACT CONSIDERING THAT:
A. PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' DEFENSE THAT SWISS DEPOSITS WERE LAWFULLY

ACQUIRED DOES NOT ONLY FAIL TO TENDER AN ISSUE BUT IS CLEARLY A SHAM; AND
B. IN SUBSEQUENTLY DISCLAIMING OWNERSHIP OF THE SWISS DEPOSITS, PRIVATE

RESPONDENTS ABANDONED THEIR SHAM DEFENSE OF LEGITIMATE ACQUISITION, AND
THIS FURTHER JUSTIFIED THE RENDITION OF A SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
III
THE FOREIGN FOUNDATIONS NEED NOT BE IMPLEADED.
IV
THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUSTICE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN

REVERSING HIMSELF ON THE GROUND THAT ORIGINAL COPIES OF THE AUTHENTICATED SWISS
DECISIONS AND THEIR "AUTHENTICATED TRANSLATIONS" HAVE NOT BEEN SUBMITTED TO THE
COURT, WHEN EARLIER THE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS QUOTED EXTENSIVELY A PORTION OF THE
TRANSLATION OF ONE OF THESE SWISS DECISIONS IN HIS "PONENCIA" DATED JULY 29, 1999
WHEN IT DENIED THE MOTION TO RELEASE ONE HUNDRED FIFTY MILLION US DOLLARS
($150,000,000.00) TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS VICTIMS.
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ARE DEEMED TO HAVE WAIVED THEIR OBJECTION TO THE

AUTHENTICITY OF THE SWISS FEDERAL SUPREME COURT DECISIONS.13
Petitioner, in the main, asserts that nowhere in the respondents' motions for reconsideration and supplemental
motion for reconsideration were the authenticity, accuracy and admissibility of the Swiss decisions ever challenged.
Otherwise stated, it was incorrect for the Sandiganbayan to use the issue of lack of authenticated translations of the
decisions of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court as the basis for reversing itself because respondents themselves
never raised this issue in their motions for reconsideration and supplemental motion for reconsideration.
Furthermore, this particular issue relating to the translation of the Swiss court decisions could not be resurrected
anymore because said decisions had been previously utilized by the Sandiganbayan itself in resolving a "decisive
issue" before it.
Petitioner faults the Sandiganbayan for questioning the non-production of the authenticated translations of the Swiss
Federal Supreme Court decisions as this was a marginal and technical matter that did not diminish by any measure
the conclusiveness and strength of what had been proven and admitted before the Sandiganbayan, that is, that the
funds deposited by the Marcoses constituted ill-gotten wealth and thus belonged to the Filipino people.
In compliance with the order of this Court, Mrs. Marcos filed her comment to the petition on May 22, 2002. After
several motions for extension which were all granted, the comment of Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr. and the
separate comment of Mrs. Araneta were filed on May 27, 2002.
Mrs. Marcos asserts that the petition should be denied on the following grounds:
A.
PETITIONER HAS A PLAIN, SPEEDY, AND ADEQUATE REMEDY AT THE SANDIGANBAYAN.
B.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN SETTING THE CASE FOR FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS.14
Mrs. Marcos contends that petitioner has a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law in view
of the resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated January 31, 2000 directing petitioner to submit the authenticated
translations of the Swiss decisions. Instead of availing of said remedy, petitioner now elevates the matter to this
Court. According to Mrs. Marcos, a petition for certiorari which does not comply with the requirements of the rules
may be dismissed. Since petitioner has a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, that is, to proceed to trial and submit
authenticated translations of the Swiss decisions, its petition before this Court must be dismissed. Corollarily, the
Sandiganbayan's ruling to set the case for further proceedings cannot and should not be considered a capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment.
Likewise, Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr., in their comment, prayed for the dismissal of the petition on the grounds
that:
(A)
BY THE TIME PETITIONER FILED ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON 10 MARCH 2000, IT
WAS ALREADY BARRED FROM DOING SO.
(1) The Motion for Summary Judgment was based on private respondents' Answer and other documents
that had long been in the records of the case. Thus, by the time the Motion was filed on 10 March 2000,
estoppel by laches had already set in against petitioner.
(2) By its positive acts and express admissions prior to filing the Motion for Summary Judgment on 10 March
1990, petitioner had legally bound itself to go to trial on the basis of existing issues. Thus, it clearly waived
whatever right it had to move for summary judgment.
(B)
EVEN ASSUMING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT LEGALLY BARRED FROM FILING THE MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, THE SANDIGANBAYAN IS CORRECT IN RULING THAT PETITIONER HAS
NOT YET ESTABLISHED A PRIMA FACIE CASE FOR THE FORFEITURE OF THE SWISS FUNDS.
(1) Republic Act No. 1379, the applicable law, is a penal statute. As such, its provisions, particularly the
essential elements stated in section 3 thereof, are mandatory in nature. These should be strictly construed
against petitioner and liberally in favor of private respondents.
(2) Petitioner has failed to establish the third and fourth essential elements in Section 3 of R.A. 1379 with
respect to the identification, ownership, and approximate amount of the property which the Marcos couple
allegedly "acquired during their incumbency".
(a) Petitioner has failed to prove that the Marcos couple "acquired" or own the Swiss funds.
(b) Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the fact of acquisition has been proven, petitioner
has categorically admitted that it has no evidence showing how much of the Swiss funds was
acquired "during the incumbency" of the Marcos couple from 31 December 1965 to 25 February
1986.
(3) In contravention of the essential element stated in Section 3 (e) of R.A. 1379, petitioner has failed
to establish the other proper earnings and income from legitimately acquired property of the Marcos
couple over and above their government salaries.
(4) Since petitioner failed to prove the three essential elements provided in paragraphs (c) 15 (d),16 and (e)17 of
Section 3, R.A. 1379, the inescapable conclusion is that the prima facie presumption of unlawful acquisition
of the Swiss funds has not yet attached. There can, therefore, be no premature forfeiture of the funds.
(C)
IT WAS ONLY BY ARBITRARILY ISOLATING AND THEN TAKING CERTAIN STATEMENTS MADE BY
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS OUT OF CONTEXT THAT PETITIONER WAS ABLE TO TREAT THESE AS
"JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS" SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE AND THEREAFTER A
CONCLUSIVE CASE TO JUSTIFY THE FORFEITURE OF THE SWISS FUNDS.
(1) Under Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the General and Supplemental Agreements, as well as
the other written and testimonial statements submitted in relation thereto, are expressly barred from being
admissible in evidence against private respondents.
(2) Had petitioner bothered to weigh the alleged admissions together with the other statements on record,
there would be a demonstrable showing that no such "judicial admissions" were made by private
respondents.
(D)
SINCE PETITIONER HAS NOT (YET) PROVEN ALL THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS TO ESTABLISH A
PRIMA FACIE CASE FOR FORFEITURE, AND PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVE NOT MADE ANY
JUDICIAL ADMISSION THAT WOULD HAVE FREED IT FROM ITS BURDEN OF PROOF, THE
SANDIGANBAYAN DID NOT COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT. CERTIORARI, THEREFORE, DOES NOT LIE, ESPECIALLY AS THIS COURT IS
NOT A TRIER OF FACTS.18
For her part, Mrs. Araneta, in her comment to the petition, claims that obviously petitioner is unable to comply with a
very plain requirement of respondent Sandiganbayan. The instant petition is allegedly an attempt to elevate to this
Court matters, issues and incidents which should be properly threshed out at the Sandiganbayan. To respondent
Mrs. Araneta, all other matters, save that pertaining to the authentication of the translated Swiss Court decisions,
are irrelevant and impertinent as far as this Court is concerned. Respondent Mrs. Araneta manifests that she is as
eager as respondent Sandiganbayan or any interested person to have the Swiss Court decisions officially translated
in our known language. She says the authenticated official English version of the Swiss Court decisions should be
presented. This should stop all speculations on what indeed is contained therein. Thus, respondent Mrs. Araneta
prays that the petition be denied for lack of merit and for raising matters which, in elaborated fashion, are
impertinent and improper before this Court.
PROPRIETY OF PETITIONER'S ACTION FOR CERTIORARI
But before this Court discusses the more relevant issues, the question regarding the propriety of petitioner
Republic's action for certiorari under Rule 6519 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the Sandiganbayan
Resolution dated January 21, 2002 should be threshed out.
At the outset, we would like to stress that we are treating this case as an exception to the general rule governing
petitions for certiorari. Normally, decisions of the Sandiganbayan are brought before this Court under Rule 45, not
Rule 65.20 But where the case is undeniably ingrained with immense public interest, public policy and deep historical
repercussions, certiorari is allowed notwithstanding the existence and availability of the remedy of appeal. 21
One of the foremost concerns of the Aquino Government in February 1986 was the recovery of the unexplained or
ill-gotten wealth reputedly amassed by former President and Mrs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, their relatives, friends and
business associates. Thus, the very first Executive Order (EO) issued by then President Corazon Aquino upon her
assumption to office after the ouster of the Marcoses was EO No. 1, issued on February 28, 1986. It created the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) and charged it with the task of assisting the President in the
"recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family,
relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or
sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them during his administration, directly
or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using their powers, authority, influence,
connections or relationship." The urgency of this undertaking was tersely described by this Court in Republic vs.
Lobregat22:
surely x x x an enterprise "of great pith and moment"; it was attended by "great expectations"; it was initiated
not only out of considerations of simple justice but also out of sheer necessity - the national coffers were
empty, or nearly so.
In all the alleged ill-gotten wealth cases filed by the PCGG, this Court has seen fit to set aside technicalities
and formalities that merely serve to delay or impede judicious resolution. This Court prefers to have such
cases resolved on the merits at the Sandiganbayan. But substantial justice to the Filipino people and to all
parties concerned, not mere legalisms or perfection of form, should now be relentlessly and firmly pursued.
Almost two decades have passed since the government initiated its search for and reversion of such ill-
gotten wealth. The definitive resolution of such cases on the merits is thus long overdue. If there is proof of
illegal acquisition, accumulation, misappropriation, fraud or illicit conduct, let it be brought out now. Let the
ownership of these funds and other assets be finally determined and resolved with dispatch, free from all the
delaying technicalities and annoying procedural sidetracks.23
We thus take cognizance of this case and settle with finality all the issues therein.
ISSUES BEFORE THIS COURT
The crucial issues which this Court must resolve are: (1) whether or not respondents raised any genuine issue of
fact which would either justify or negate summary judgment; and (2) whether or not petitioner Republic was able to
prove its case for forfeiture in accordance with Sections 2 and 3 of RA 1379.
(1) THE PROPRIETY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
We hold that respondent Marcoses failed to raise any genuine issue of fact in their pleadings. Thus, on motion of
petitioner Republic, summary judgment should take place as a matter of right.
In the early case of Auman vs. Estenzo24, summary judgment was described as a judgment which a court may
render before trial but after both parties have pleaded. It is ordered by the court upon application by one party,
supported by affidavits, depositions or other documents, with notice upon the adverse party who may in turn file an
opposition supported also by affidavits, depositions or other documents. This is after the court summarily hears both
parties with their respective proofs and finds that there is no genuine issue between them. Summary judgment is
sanctioned in this jurisdiction by Section 1, Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:
SECTION 1. Summary judgment for claimant.- A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after the pleading in answer thereto has been
served, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his favor upon
all or any part thereof.25
Summary judgment is proper when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact in the action. 26 The
theory of summary judgment is that, although an answer may on its face appear to tender issues requiring trial, if it
is demonstrated by affidavits, depositions or admissions that those issues are not genuine but sham or fictitious, the
Court is justified in dispensing with the trial and rendering summary judgment for petitioner Republic.
The Solicitor General made a very thorough presentation of its case for forfeiture:
xxx
4. Respondent Ferdinand E. Marcos (now deceased and represented by his Estate/Heirs) was a public
officer for several decades continuously and without interruption as Congressman, Senator, Senate
President and President of the Republic of the Philippines from December 31, 1965 up to his ouster by
direct action of the people of EDSA on February 22-25, 1986.
5. Respondent Imelda Romualdez Marcos (Imelda, for short) the former First Lady who ruled with FM during
the 14-year martial law regime, occupied the position of Minister of Human Settlements from June 1976 up
to the peaceful revolution in February 22-25, 1986. She likewise served once as a member of the Interim
Batasang Pambansa during the early years of martial law from 1978 to 1984 and as Metro Manila Governor
in concurrent capacity as Minister of Human Settlements. x x x
xxx xxx xxx
11. At the outset, however, it must be pointed out that based on the Official Report of the Minister of Budget,
the total salaries of former President Marcos as President form 1966 to 1976 was P60,000 a year and from
1977 to 1985, P100,000 a year; while that of the former First Lady, Imelda R. Marcos, as Minister of Human
Settlements from June 1976 to February 22-25, 1986 was P75,000 a year xxx.
ANALYSIS OF RESPONDENTS LEGITIMATE INCOME
xxx
12. Based on available documents, the ITRs of the Marcoses for the years 1965-1975 were filed under Tax
Identification No. 1365-055-1. For the years 1976 until 1984, the returns were filed under Tax Identification
No. M 6221-J 1117-A-9.
13. The data contained in the ITRs and Balance Sheet filed by the "Marcoses are summarized and attached
to the reports in the following schedules:
Schedule A:
Schedule of Income (Annex "T" hereof);
Schedule B:
Schedule of Income Tax Paid (Annex "T-1" hereof);
Schedule C:
Schedule of Net Disposable Income (Annex "T-2" hereof);
Schedule D:
Schedule of Networth Analysis (Annex "T-3" hereof).

14. As summarized in Schedule A (Annex "T" hereof), the Marcoses reported P16,408,442.00 or
US$2,414,484.91 in total income over a period of 20 years from 1965 to 1984. The sources of income are as
follows:
Official - P 2,627,581.00 - 16.01%

Salaries
Legal Practice - 11,109,836.00 - 67.71%
Farm Income - 149,700.00 - .91%
Others - 2,521,325.00 - 15.37%
Total P16,408,442.00 - 100.00%
15. FM's official salary pertains to his compensation as Senate President in 1965 in the amount of
P15,935.00 and P1,420,000.00 as President of the Philippines during the period 1966 until 1984. On the
other hand, Imelda reported salaries and allowances only for the years 1979 to 1984 in the amount of
P1,191,646.00. The records indicate that the reported income came from her salary from the Ministry of
Human Settlements and allowances from Food Terminal, Inc., National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation, National Food Authority Council, Light Rail Transit Authority and Home Development Mutual
Fund.
16. Of the P11,109,836.00 in reported income from legal practice, the amount of P10,649,836.00 or 96%
represents "receivables from prior years" during the period 1967 up to 1984.
17. In the guise of reporting income using the cash method under Section 38 of the National Internal
Revenue Code, FM made it appear that he had an extremely profitable legal practice before he became a
President (FM being barred by law from practicing his law profession during his entire presidency) and that,
incredibly, he was still receiving payments almost 20 years after. The only problem is that in his Balance
Sheet attached to his 1965 ITR immediately preceeding his ascendancy to the presidency he did not show
any Receivables from client at all, much less the P10,65-M that he decided to later recognize as income.
There are no documents showing any withholding tax certificates. Likewise, there is nothing on record that
will show any known Marcos client as he has no known law office. As previously stated, his networth was a
mere P120,000.00 in December, 1965. The joint income tax returns of FM and Imelda cannot, therefore,
conceal the skeletons of their kleptocracy.
18. FM reported a total of P2,521,325.00 as Other Income for the years 1972 up to 1976 which he referred
to in his return as "Miscellaneous Items" and "Various Corporations." There is no indication of any payor of
the dividends or earnings.
19. Spouses Ferdinand and Imelda did not declare any income from any deposits and placements which are
subject to a 5% withholding tax. The Bureau of Internal Revenue attested that after a diligent search of
pertinent records on file with the Records Division, they did not find any records involving the tax
transactions of spouses Ferdinand and Imelda in Revenue Region No. 1, Baguio City, Revenue Region
No.4A, Manila, Revenue Region No. 4B1, Quezon City and Revenue No. 8, Tacloban, Leyte. Likewise, the
Office of the Revenue Collector of Batac. Further, BIR attested that no records were found on any filing of
capital gains tax return involving spouses FM and Imelda covering the years 1960 to 1965.
20. In Schedule B, the taxable reported income over the twenty-year period was P14,463,595.00 which
represents 88% of the gross income. The Marcoses paid income taxes totaling P8,233,296.00 or
US$1,220,667.59. The business expenses in the amount of P861,748.00 represent expenses incurred for
subscription, postage, stationeries and contributions while the other deductions in the amount of
P567,097.00 represents interest charges, medicare fees, taxes and licenses. The total deductions in the
amount of P1,994,845.00 represents 12% of the total gross income.
21. In Schedule C, the net cumulative disposable income amounts to P6,756,301.00 or US$980,709.77.
This is the amount that represents that portion of the Marcoses income that is free for consumption, savings
and investments. The amount is arrived at by adding back to the net income after tax the personal and
additional exemptions for the years 1965-1984, as well as the tax-exempt salary of the President for the
years 1966 until 1972.
22. Finally, the networth analysis in Schedule D, represents the total accumulated networth of spouses,
Ferdinand and Imelda. Respondent's Balance Sheet attached to their 1965 ITR, covering the year
immediately preceding their ascendancy to the presidency, indicates an ending networth of P120,000.00
which FM declared as Library and Miscellaneous assets. In computing for the networth, the income
approach was utilized. Under this approach, the beginning capital is increased or decreased, as the case
may be, depending upon the income earned or loss incurred. Computations establish the total networth of
spouses Ferdinand and Imelda, for the years 1965 until 1984 in the total amount of US$957,487.75,
assuming the income from legal practice is real and valid x x x.
G. THE SECRET MARCOS DEPOSITS IN SWISS BANKS
23. The following presentation very clearly and overwhelmingly show in detail how both respondents
clandestinely stashed away the country's wealth to Switzerland and hid the same under layers upon layers
of foundations and other corporate entities to prevent its detection. Through their dummies/nominees, fronts
or agents who formed those foundations or corporate entities, they opened and maintained numerous bank
accounts. But due to the difficulty if not the impossibility of detecting and documenting all those secret
accounts as well as the enormity of the deposits therein hidden, the following presentation is confined to five
identified accounts groups, with balances amounting to about $356-M with a reservation for the filing of a
supplemental or separate forfeiture complaint should the need arise.
H. THE AZIO-VERSO-VIBUR FOUNDATION ACCOUNTS
24. On June 11, 1971, Ferdinand Marcos issued a written order to Dr. Theo Bertheau, legal counsel of
Schweizeresche Kreditanstalt or SKA, also known as Swiss Credit Bank, for him to establish the AZIO
Foundation. On the same date, Marcos executed a power of attorney in favor of Roberto S. Benedicto
empowering him to transact business in behalf of the said foundation. Pursuant to the said Marcos mandate,
AZIO Foundation was formed on June 21, 1971 in Vaduz. Walter Fessler and Ernst Scheller, also of SKA
Legal Service, and Dr. Helmuth Merling from Schaan were designated as members of the Board of Trustees
of the said foundation. Ferdinand Marcos was named first beneficiary and the Marcos Foundation, Inc. was
second beneficiary. On November 12, 1971, FM again issued another written order naming Austrahil PTY
Ltd. In Sydney, Australia, as the foundation's first and sole beneficiary. This was recorded on December 14,
1971.
25. In an undated instrument, Marcos changed the first and sole beneficiary to CHARIS FOUNDATION. This
change was recorded on December 4, 1972.
26. On August 29, 1978, the AZIO FOUNDATION was renamed to VERSO FOUNDATION. The Board of
Trustees remained the same. On March 11, 1981, Marcos issued a written directive to liquidated VERSO
FOUNDATION and to transfer all its assets to account of FIDES TRUST COMPANY at Bank Hofman in
Zurich under the account "Reference OSER." The Board of Trustees decided to dissolve the foundation on
June 25, 1981.
27. In an apparent maneuver to bury further the secret deposits beneath the thick layers of corporate
entities, FM effected the establishment of VIBUR FOUNDATION on May 13, 1981 in Vaduz. Atty. Ivo Beck
and Limag Management, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Fides Trust, were designated as members of the
Board of Trustees. The account was officially opened with SKA on September 10, 1981. The beneficial
owner was not made known to the bank since Fides Trust Company acted as fiduciary. However,
comparison of the listing of the securities in the safe deposit register of the VERSO FOUNDATION as of
February 27, 1981 with that of VIBUR FOUNDATION as of December 31, 1981 readily reveals that exactly
the same securities were listed.
28. Under the foregoing circumstances, it is certain that the VIBUR FOUNDATION is the beneficial
successor of VERSO FOUNDATION.
29. On March 18, 1986, the Marcos-designated Board of Trustees decided to liquidate VIBUR
FOUNDATION. A notice of such liquidation was sent to the Office of the Public Register on March 21, 1986.
However, the bank accounts and respective balances of the said VIBUR FOUNDATION remained with SKA.
Apparently, the liquidation was an attempt by the Marcoses to transfer the foundation's funds to another
account or bank but this was prevented by the timely freeze order issued by the Swiss authorities. One of
the latest documents obtained by the PCGG from the Swiss authorities is a declaration signed by Dr. Ivo
Beck (the trustee) stating that the beneficial owner of VIBUR FOUNDATION is Ferdinand E. Marcos.
Another document signed by G. Raber of SKA shows that VIBUR FOUNDATION is owned by the "Marcos
Familie"
30. As of December 31, 1989, the balance of the bank accounts of VIBUR FOUNDATION with SKA, Zurich,
under the General Account No. 469857 totaled $3,597,544.00
I. XANDY-WINTROP: CHARIS-SCOLARI-
VALAMO-SPINUS-AVERTINA FOUNDATION ACCOUNTS
31. This is the most intricate and complicated account group. As the Flow Chart hereof shows, two (2)
groups under the foundation organized by Marcos dummies/nominees for FM's benefit, eventually joined
together and became one (1) account group under the AVERTINA FOUNDATION for the benefit of both FM
and Imelda. This is the biggest group from where the $50-M investment fund of the Marcoses was drawn
when they bought the Central Bank's dollar-denominated treasury notes with high-yielding interests.
32. On March 20, 1968, after his second year in the presidency, Marcos opened bank accounts with SKA
using an alias or pseudonym WILLIAM SAUNDERS, apparently to hide his true identity. The next day,
March 21, 1968, his First Lady, Mrs. Imelda Marcos also opened her own bank accounts with the same bank
using an American-sounding alias, JANE RYAN. Found among the voluminous documents in Malacañang
shortly after they fled to Hawaii in haste that fateful night of February 25, 1986, were accomplished forms for
"Declaration/Specimen Signatures" submitted by the Marcos couple. Under the caption "signature(s)"
Ferdinand and Imelda signed their real names as well as their respective aliases underneath. These
accounts were actively operated and maintained by the Marcoses for about two (2) years until their closure
sometime in February, 1970 and the balances transferred to XANDY FOUNDATION.
33. The XANDY FOUNDATION was established on March 3, 1970 in Vaduz. C.W. Fessler, C. Souviron and
E. Scheller were named as members of the Board of Trustees.
34. FM and Imelda issued the written mandate to establish the foundation to Markus Geel of SKA on March
3, 1970. In the handwritten Regulations signed by the Marcos couple as well as in the type-written
Regulations signed by Markus Geel both dated February 13, 1970, the Marcos spouses were named the
first beneficiaries, the surviving spouse as the second beneficiary and the Marcos children – Imee,
Ferdinand, Jr. (Bongbong) and Irene – as equal third beneficiaries.
35. The XANDY FOUNDATION was renamed WINTROP FOUNDATION on August 29, 1978. The Board of
Trustees remained the same at the outset. However, on March 27, 1980, Souviron was replaced by Dr.
Peter Ritter. On March 10. 1981, Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos issued a written order to the Board of
Wintrop to liquidate the foundation and transfer all its assets to Bank Hofmann in Zurich in favor of FIDES
TRUST COMPANY. Later, WINTROP FOUNDATION was dissolved.
36. The AVERTINA FOUNDATION was established on May 13, 1981 in Vaduz with Atty. Ivo Beck and
Limag Management, a wholly-owned subsidiary of FIDES TRUST CO., as members of the Board of
Trustees. Two (2) account categories, namely: CAR and NES, were opened on September 10, 1981. The
beneficial owner of AVERTINA was not made known to the bank since the FIDES TRUST CO. acted as
fiduciary. However, the securities listed in the safe deposit register of WINTROP FOUNDATION Category R
as of December 31, 1980 were the same as those listed in the register of AVERTINA FOUNDATION
Category CAR as of December 31, 1981. Likewise, the securities listed in the safe deposit register of
WINTROP FOUNDATION Category S as of December 31, 1980 were the same as those listed in the
register of Avertina Category NES as of December 31, 1981.Under the circumstances, it is certain that the
beneficial successor of WINTROP FOUNDATION is AVERTINA FOUNDATION. The balance of Category
CAR as of December 31, 1989 amounted to US$231,366,894.00 while that of Category NES as of 12-31-83
was US$8,647,190.00. Latest documents received from Swiss authorities included a declaration signed by
IVO Beck stating that the beneficial owners of AVERTINA FOUNDATION are FM and Imelda. Another
document signed by G. Raber of SKA indicates that Avertina Foundation is owned by the "Marcos Families."
37. The other groups of foundations that eventually joined AVERTINA were also established by FM through
his dummies, which started with the CHARIS FOUNDATION.
38. The CHARIS FOUNDATION was established in VADUZ on December 27, 1971. Walter Fessler and
Ernst Scheller of SKA and Dr. Peter Ritter were named as directors. Dr. Theo Bertheau, SKA legal counsel,
acted as founding director in behalf of FM by virtue of the mandate and agreement dated November 12,
1971. FM himself was named the first beneficiary and Xandy Foundation as second beneficiary in
accordance with the handwritten instructions of FM on November 12, 1971 and the Regulations. FM gave a
power of attorney to Roberto S. Benedicto on February 15, 1972 to act in his behalf with regard to Charis
Foundation.
39. On December 13, 1974, Charis Foundation was renamed Scolari Foundation but the directors remained
the same. On March 11, 1981 FM ordered in writing that the Valamo Foundation be liquidated and all its
assets be transferred to Bank Hofmann, AG in favor of Fides Trust Company under the account "Reference
OMAL". The Board of Directors decided on the immediate dissolution of Valamo Foundation on June 25,
1981.
40 The SPINUS FOUNDATION was established on May 13, 1981 in Vaduz with Atty. Ivo Beck and Limag
Management, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Fides Trust Co., as members of the Foundation's Board of
Directors. The account was officially opened with SKA on September 10, 1981. The beneficial owner of the
foundation was not made known to the bank since Fides Trust Co. acted as fiduciary. However, the list of
securities in the safe deposit register of Valamo Foundation as of December 31, 1980 are practically the
same with those listed in the safe deposit register of Spinus Foundation as of December 31, 1981. Under
the circumstances, it is certain that the Spinus Foundation is the beneficial successor of the Valamo
Foundation.
41. On September 6, 1982, there was a written instruction from Spinus Foundation to SKA to close its Swiss
Franc account and transfer the balance to Avertina Foundation. In July/August, 1982, several transfers from
the foundation's German marks and US dollar accounts were made to Avertina Category CAR totaling DM
29.5-M and $58-M, respectively. Moreover, a comparison of the list of securities of the Spinus Foundation as
of February 3, 1982 with the safe deposit slips of the Avertina Foundation Category CAR as of August 19,
1982 shows that all the securities of Spinus were transferred to Avertina.
J. TRINIDAD-RAYBY-PALMY FOUNDATION ACCOUNTS
42. The Trinidad Foundation was organized on August 26, 1970 in Vaduz with C.W. Fessler and E. Scheller
of SKA and Dr. Otto Tondury as the foundation's directors. Imelda issued a written mandate to establish the
foundation to Markus Geel on August 26, 1970. The regulations as well as the agreement, both dated
August 28, 1970 were likewise signed by Imelda. Imelda was named the first beneficiary and her children
Imelda (Imee), Ferdinand, Jr. (Bongbong) and, Irene were named as equal second beneficiaries.
43. Rayby Foundation was established on June 22, 1973 in Vaduz with Fessler, Scheller and Ritter as
members of the board of directors. Imelda issued a written mandate to Dr. Theo Bertheau to establish the
foundation with a note that the foundation's capitalization as well as the cost of establishing it be debited
against the account of Trinidad Foundation. Imelda was named the first and only beneficiary of Rayby
foundation. According to written information from SKA dated November 28, 1988, Imelda apparently had the
intention in 1973 to transfer part of the assets of Trinidad Foundation to another foundation, thus the
establishment of Rayby Foundation. However, transfer of assets never took place. On March 10, 1981,
Imelda issued a written order to transfer all the assets of Rayby Foundation to Trinidad Foundation and to
subsequently liquidate Rayby. On the same date, she issued a written order to the board of Trinidad to
dissolve the foundation and transfer all its assets to Bank Hofmann in favor of Fides Trust Co. Under the
account "Reference Dido," Rayby was dissolved on April 6, 1981 and Trinidad was liquidated on August 3,
1981.
44. The PALMY FOUNDATION was established on May 13, 1981 in Vaduz with Dr. Ivo Beck and Limag
Management, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Fides Trust Co, as members of the Foundation's Board of
Directors. The account was officially opened with the SKA on September 10, 1981. The beneficial owner
was not made known to the bank since Fides Trust Co. acted as fiduciary. However, when one compares
the listing of securities in the safe deposit register of Trinidad Foundation as of December 31,1980 with that
of the Palmy Foundation as of December 31, 1980, one can clearly see that practically the same securities
were listed. Under the circumstances, it is certain that the Palmy Foundation is the beneficial successor of
the Trinidad Foundation.
45. As of December 31, 1989, the ending balance of the bank accounts of Palmy Foundation under General
Account No. 391528 is $17,214,432.00.
46. Latest documents received from Swiss Authorities included a declaration signed by Dr. Ivo Beck stating
that the beneficial owner of Palmy Foundation is Imelda. Another document signed by Raber shows that the
said Palmy Foundation is owned by "Marcos Familie".
K. ROSALYS-AGUAMINA FOUNDATION ACCOUNTS
47. Rosalys Foundation was established in 1971 with FM as the beneficiary. Its Articles of Incorporation was
executed on September 24, 1971 and its By-Laws on October 3, 1971. This foundation maintained several
accounts with Swiss Bank Corporation (SBC) under the general account 51960 where most of the bribe
monies from Japanese suppliers were hidden.
48. On December 19, 1985, Rosalys Foundation was liquidated and all its assets were transferred to
Aguamina Corporation's (Panama) Account No. 53300 with SBC. The ownership by Aguamina Corporation
of Account No. 53300 is evidenced by an opening account documents from the bank. J. Christinaz and R.L.
Rossier, First Vice-President and Senior Vice President, respectively, of SBC, Geneva issued a declaration
dated September 3, 1991 stating that the by-laws dated October 3, 1971 governing Rosalys Foundation was
the same by-law applied to Aguamina Corporation Account No. 53300. They further confirmed that no
change of beneficial owner was involved while transferring the assets of Rosalys to Aguamina. Hence, FM
remains the beneficiary of Aguamina Corporation Account No. 53300.
As of August 30, 1991, the ending balance of Account No. 53300 amounted to $80,566,483.00.
L. MALER FOUNDATION ACCOUNTS
49. Maler was first created as an establishment. A statement of its rules and regulations was found among
Malacañang documents. It stated, among others, that 50% of the Company's assets will be for sole and full
right disposal of FM and Imelda during their lifetime, which the remaining 50% will be divided in equal parts
among their children. Another Malacañang document dated October 19,1968 and signed by Ferdinand and
Imelda pertains to the appointment of Dr. Andre Barbey and Jean Louis Sunier as attorneys of the company
and as administrator and manager of all assets held by the company. The Marcos couple, also mentioned in
the said document that they bought the Maler Establishment from SBC, Geneva. On the same date, FM and
Imelda issued a letter addressed to Maler Establishment, stating that all instructions to be transmitted with
regard to Maler will be signed with the word "JOHN LEWIS". This word will have the same value as the
couple's own personal signature. The letter was signed by FM and Imelda in their signatures and as John
Lewis.
50. Maler Establishment opened and maintained bank accounts with SBC, Geneva. The opening bank
documents were signed by Dr. Barbey and Mr. Sunnier as authorized signatories.
51. On November 17, 1981, it became necessary to transform Maler Establishment into a foundation.
Likewise, the attorneys were changed to Michael Amaudruz, et. al. However, administration of the assets
was left to SBC. The articles of incorporation of Maler Foundation registered on November 17, 1981 appear
to be the same articles applied to Maler Establishment. On February 28, 1984, Maler Foundation cancelled
the power of attorney for the management of its assets in favor of SBC and transferred such power to
Sustrust Investment Co., S.A.
52. As of June 6, 1991, the ending balance of Maler Foundation's Account Nos. 254,508 BT and 98,929 NY
amount SF 9,083,567 and SG 16,195,258, respectively, for a total of SF 25,278,825.00. GM only until
December 31, 1980. This account was opened by Maler when it was still an establishment which was
subsequently transformed into a foundation.
53. All the five (5) group accounts in the over-all flow chart have a total balance of about Three Hundred
Fifty Six Million Dollars ($356,000,000.00) as shown by Annex "R-5" hereto attached as integral part hereof.
x x x x x x.27
Respondents Imelda R. Marcos, Maria Imelda M. Manotoc, Irene M. Araneta and Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., in their
answer, stated the following:
xxx xxx xxx
4. Respondents ADMIT paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Petition.
5. Respondents specifically deny paragraph 5 of the Petition in so far as it states that summons and other
court processes may be served on Respondent Imelda R. Marcos at the stated address the truth of the
matter being that Respondent Imelda R. Marcos may be served with summons and other processes at No.
10-B Bel Air Condominium 5022 P. Burgos Street, Makati, Metro Manila, and ADMIT the rest.
xxx xxx xxx
10. Respondents ADMIT paragraph 11 of the Petition.
11. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 12 of the Petition for lack of knowledge sufficient to form a
belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents were not privy to the transactions and that they
cannot remember exactly the truth as to the matters alleged.
exactitude the contents of the alleged ITRs and Balance Sheet.
16. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 17 of the Petition insofar as it attributes willful duplicity on the
part of the late President Marcos, for being false, the same being pure conclusions based on pure
assumption and not allegations of fact; and specifically DENY the rest for lack of knowledge or information
exactitude the contents of the alleged ITRs or the attachments thereto.
exactitude the contents of the alleged ITRs and that they are not privy to the activities of the BIR.
stashed the country's wealth in Switzerland and hid the same under layers and layers of foundation and
corporate entities for being false, the truth being that Respondents aforesaid properties were lawfully
acquired.
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents were
not privy to the transactions regarding the alleged Azio-Verso-Vibur Foundation accounts, except that as to
Respondent Imelda R. Marcos she specifically remembers that the funds involved were lawfully acquired.
24. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36,37, 38, 39, 40, and 41 of the Petition
for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations since
Respondents are not privy to the transactions and as to such transaction they were privy to they cannot
remember with exactitude the same having occurred a long time ago, except that as to Respondent Imelda
R. Marcos she specifically remembers that the funds involved were lawfully acquired.
25. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 42, 43, 44, 45, and 46, of the Petition for lack of knowledge
or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations since Respondents were not privy to
26. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 49, 50, 51 and 52, of the Petition for lack of knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations since Respondents were not privy to
Upon careful perusal of the foregoing, the Court finds that respondent Mrs. Marcos and the Marcos children
indubitably failed to tender genuine issues in their answer to the petition for forfeiture. A genuine issue is an issue of
fact which calls for the presentation of evidence as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious and contrived, set
up in bad faith or patently lacking in substance so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial. Respondents'
defenses of "lack of knowledge for lack of privity" or "(inability to) recall because it happened a long time ago" or, on
the part of Mrs. Marcos, that "the funds were lawfully acquired" are fully insufficient to tender genuine issues.
Respondent Marcoses' defenses were a sham and evidently calibrated to compound and confuse the issues.
The following pleadings filed by respondent Marcoses are replete with indications of a spurious defense:
(a) Respondents' Answer dated October 18, 1993;

(b) Pre-trial Brief dated October 4, 1999 of Mrs. Marcos, Supplemental Pre-trial Brief dated October 19,
1999 of Ferdinand, Jr. and Mrs. Imee Marcos-Manotoc adopting the pre-trial brief of Mrs. Marcos, and
Manifestation dated October 19, 1999 of Irene Marcos-Araneta adopting the pre-trial briefs of her co-
respondents;
(c) Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment dated March 21, 2000, filed by Mrs. Marcos which the other
respondents (Marcos children) adopted;
(d) Demurrer to Evidence dated May 2, 2000 filed by Mrs. Marcos and adopted by the Marcos children;
(e) Motion for Reconsideration dated September 26, 2000 filed by Mrs. Marcos; Motion for Reconsideration
dated October 5, 2000 jointly filed by Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr., and Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration dated October 9, 2000 likewise jointly filed by Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr.;
(f) Memorandum dated December 12, 2000 of Mrs. Marcos and Memorandum dated December 17, 2000 of
the Marcos children;
(g) Manifestation dated May 26, 1998; and
(h) General/Supplemental Agreement dated December 23, 1993.
An examination of the foregoing pleadings is in order.
• Respondents' Answer dated October 18, 1993.
In their answer, respondents failed to specifically deny each and every allegation contained in the petition for
forfeiture in the manner required by the rules. All they gave were stock answers like "they have no sufficient
knowledge" or "they could not recall because it happened a long time ago," and, as to Mrs. Marcos, "the funds were
lawfully acquired," without stating the basis of such assertions.
Section 10, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, provides:
A defendant must specify each material allegation of fact the truth of which he does not admit and,
whenever practicable, shall set forth the substance of the matters upon which he relies to support his denial.
Where a defendant desires to deny only a part of an averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true and
material and shall deny the remainder. Where a defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the truth of a material averment made in the complaint, he shall so state, and this shall
have the effect of a denial.28
The purpose of requiring respondents to make a specific denial is to make them disclose facts which will disprove
the allegations of petitioner at the trial, together with the matters they rely upon in support of such denial. Our
jurisdiction adheres to this rule to avoid and prevent unnecessary expenses and waste of time by compelling both
parties to lay their cards on the table, thus reducing the controversy to its true terms. As explained in Alonso vs.
Villamor,29
A litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one, more deeply schooled and skilled in the subtle art of
movement and position, entraps and destroys the other. It is rather a contest in which each contending party
fully and fairly lays before the court the facts in issue and then, brushing aside as wholly trivial and
indecisive all imperfections of form and technicalities of procedure, asks that justice be done upon the
merits. Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapier's thrust.
On the part of Mrs. Marcos, she claimed that the funds were lawfully acquired. However, she failed to particularly
state the ultimate facts surrounding the lawful manner or mode of acquisition of the subject funds. Simply put, she
merely stated in her answer with the other respondents that the funds were "lawfully acquired" without detailing how
exactly these funds were supposedly acquired legally by them. Even in this case before us, her assertion that the
funds were lawfully acquired remains bare and unaccompanied by any factual support which can prove, by the
presentation of evidence at a hearing, that indeed the funds were acquired legitimately by the Marcos family.
Respondents' denials in their answer at the Sandiganbayan were based on their alleged lack of knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations of the petition.
It is true that one of the modes of specific denial under the rules is a denial through a statement that the defendant
is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the material averment in the
complaint. The question, however, is whether the kind of denial in respondents' answer qualifies as the specific
denial called for by the rules. We do not think so. In Morales vs. Court of Appeals, 30 this Court ruled that if an
allegation directly and specifically charges a party with having done, performed or committed a particular act which
the latter did not in fact do, perform or commit, a categorical and express denial must be made.
Here, despite the serious and specific allegations against them, the Marcoses responded by simply saying that they
had no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of such allegations. Such a general, self-
serving claim of ignorance of the facts alleged in the petition for forfeiture was insufficient to raise an issue.
Respondent Marcoses should have positively stated how it was that they were supposedly ignorant of the facts
alleged.31
To elucidate, the allegation of petitioner Republic in paragraph 23 of the petition for forfeiture stated:
23. The following presentation very clearly and overwhelmingly show in detail how both respondents
clandestinely stashed away the country's wealth to Switzerland and hid the same under layers upon layers
of foundations and other corporate entities to prevent its detection. Through their dummies/nominees, fronts
or agents who formed those foundations or corporate entities, they opened and maintained numerous bank
accounts. But due to the difficulty if not the impossibility of detecting and documenting all those secret
accounts as well as the enormity of the deposits therein hidden, the following presentation is confined to five
identified accounts groups, with balances amounting to about $356-M with a reservation for the filing of a
supplemental or separate forfeiture complaint should the need arise. 32
Respondents' lame denial of the aforesaid allegation was:
stashed the country's wealth in Switzerland and hid the same under layers and layers of foundations and
corporate entities for being false, the truth being that Respondents' aforesaid properties were lawfully
acquired.33
Evidently, this particular denial had the earmark of what is called in the law on pleadings as a negative pregnant,
that is, a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not
squarely denied. It was in effect an admission of the averments it was directed at. 34 Stated otherwise, a negative
pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with it an affirmation or at least an implication of some kind
favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts alleged in the
pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation as so
qualified or modified are literally denied, has been held that the qualifying circumstances alone are denied while the
fact itself is admitted.35
In the instant case, the material allegations in paragraph 23 of the said petition were not specifically denied by
respondents in paragraph 22 of their answer. The denial contained in paragraph 22 of the answer was focused on
the averment in paragraph 23 of the petition for forfeiture that "Respondents clandestinely stashed the country's
wealth in Switzerland and hid the same under layers and layers of foundations and corporate entities." Paragraph
22 of the respondents' answer was thus a denial pregnant with admissions of the following substantial facts:
(1) the Swiss bank deposits existed and
(2) that the estimated sum thereof was US$356 million as of December, 1990.
Therefore, the allegations in the petition for forfeiture on the existence of the Swiss bank deposits in the sum of
about US$356 million, not having been specifically denied by respondents in their answer, were deemed admitted
by them pursuant to Section 11, Rule 8 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure:
Material averment in the complaint, xxx shall be deemed admitted when not specifically denied. xxx. 36
By the same token, the following unsupported denials of respondents in their answer were pregnant with admissions
of the substantial facts alleged in the Republic's petition for forfeiture:
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since respondents were
not privy to the transactions regarding the alleged Azio-Verso-Vibur Foundation accounts, except that, as to
respondent Imelda R. Marcos, she specifically remembers that the funds involved were lawfully acquired.
24. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41 of the Petition for
lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations since
respondents were not privy to the transactions and as to such transactions they were privy to, they cannot
remember with exactitude the same having occurred a long time ago, except as to respondent Imelda R.
Marcos, she specifically remembers that the funds involved were lawfully acquired.
25. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 42, 43, 45, and 46 of the petition for lack of knowledge or
information sufficient to from a belief as to the truth of the allegations since respondents were not privy to the
transactions and as to such transaction they were privy to, they cannot remember with exactitude, the same
having occurred a long time ago, except that as to respondent Imelda R. Marcos, she specifically
26. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 49, 50, 51 and 52 of the petition for lack of knowledge and
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations since respondents were not privy to the
transactions and as to such transaction they were privy to they cannot remember with exactitude the same
having occurred a long time ago, except that as to respondent Imelda R. Marcos, she specifically
The matters referred to in paragraphs 23 to 26 of the respondents' answer pertained to the creation of five groups of
accounts as well as their respective ending balances and attached documents alleged in paragraphs 24 to 52 of the
Republic's petition for forfeiture. Respondent Imelda R. Marcos never specifically denied the existence of the Swiss
funds. Her claim that "the funds involved were lawfully acquired" was an acknowledgment on her part of the
existence of said deposits. This only reinforced her earlier admission of the allegation in paragraph 23 of the petition
for forfeiture regarding the existence of the US$356 million Swiss bank deposits.
The allegations in paragraphs 4737 and 4838 of the petition for forfeiture referring to the creation and amount of the
deposits of the Rosalys-Aguamina Foundation as well as the averment in paragraph 52-a 39 of the said petition with
respect to the sum of the Swiss bank deposits estimated to be US$356 million were again not specifically denied by
respondents in their answer. The respondents did not at all respond to the issues raised in these paragraphs and
the existence, nature and amount of the Swiss funds were therefore deemed admitted by them. As held in Galofa
vs. Nee Bon Sing,40 if a defendant's denial is a negative pregnant, it is equivalent to an admission.
Moreover, respondents' denial of the allegations in the petition for forfeiture "for lack of knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations since respondents were not privy to the transactions" was
just a pretense. Mrs. Marcos' privity to the transactions was in fact evident from her signatures on some of the vital
documents41 attached to the petition for forfeiture which Mrs. Marcos failed to specifically deny as required by the
rules.42
It is worthy to note that the pertinent documents attached to the petition for forfeiture were even signed personally
by respondent Mrs. Marcos and her late husband, Ferdinand E. Marcos, indicating that said documents were within
their knowledge. As correctly pointed out by Sandiganbayan Justice Francisco Villaruz, Jr. in his dissenting opinion:
The pattern of: 1) creating foundations, 2) use of pseudonyms and dummies, 3) approving regulations of the
Foundations for the distribution of capital and income of the Foundations to the First and Second beneficiary
(who are no other than FM and his family), 4) opening of bank accounts for the Foundations, 5) changing the
names of the Foundations, 6) transferring funds and assets of the Foundations to other Foundations or
Fides Trust, 7) liquidation of the Foundations as substantiated by the Annexes U to U-168, Petition [for
forfeiture] strongly indicate that FM and/or Imelda were the real owners of the assets deposited in the Swiss
banks, using the Foundations as dummies.43
How could respondents therefore claim lack of sufficient knowledge or information regarding the existence of the
Swiss bank deposits and the creation of five groups of accounts when Mrs. Marcos and her late husband personally
masterminded and participated in the formation and control of said foundations? This is a fact respondent Marcoses
were never able to explain.
Not only that. Respondents' answer also technically admitted the genuineness and due execution of the Income Tax
Returns (ITRs) and the balance sheets of the late Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos attached to the
petition for forfeiture, as well as the veracity of the contents thereof.
The answer again premised its denials of said ITRs and balance sheets on the ground of lack of knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the contents thereof. Petitioner correctly points out that
respondents' denial was not really grounded on lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief but was
based on lack of recollection. By reviewing their own records, respondent Marcoses could have easily determined
the genuineness and due execution of the ITRs and the balance sheets. They also had the means and opportunity
of verifying the same from the records of the BIR and the Office of the President. They did not.
When matters regarding which respondents claim to have no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief are
plainly and necessarily within their knowledge, their alleged ignorance or lack of information will not be considered a
specific denial.44 An unexplained denial of information within the control of the pleader, or is readily accessible to
him, is evasive and is insufficient to constitute an effective denial. 45
The form of denial adopted by respondents must be availed of with sincerity and in good faith, and certainly not for
the purpose of confusing the adverse party as to what allegations of the petition are really being challenged; nor
should it be made for the purpose of delay.46 In the instant case, the Marcoses did not only present unsubstantiated
assertions but in truth attempted to mislead and deceive this Court by presenting an obviously contrived defense.
Simply put, a profession of ignorance about a fact which is patently and necessarily within the pleader's knowledge
or means of knowing is as ineffective as no denial at all.47 Respondents' ineffective denial thus failed to properly
tender an issue and the averments contained in the petition for forfeiture were deemed judicially admitted by them.
As held in J.P. Juan & Sons, Inc. vs. Lianga Industries, Inc.:
Its "specific denial" of the material allegation of the petition without setting forth the substance of the matters
relied upon to support its general denial, when such matters were plainly within its knowledge and it could
not logically pretend ignorance as to the same, therefore, failed to properly tender on issue. 48
Thus, the general denial of the Marcos children of the allegations in the petition for forfeiture "for lack of knowledge
or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations since they were not privy to the
transactions" cannot rightfully be accepted as a defense because they are the legal heirs and successors-in-interest
of Ferdinand E. Marcos and are therefore bound by the acts of their father vis-a-vis the Swiss funds.
• PRE-TRIAL BRIEF DATED OCTOBER 18, 1993
The pre-trial brief of Mrs. Marcos was adopted by the three Marcos children. In said brief, Mrs. Marcos stressed that
the funds involved were lawfully acquired. But, as in their answer, they failed to state and substantiate how these
funds were acquired lawfully. They failed to present and attach even a single document that would show and prove
the truth of their allegations. Section 6, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
The parties shall file with the court and serve on the adverse party, x x x their respective pre-trial briefs which shall
contain, among others:
xxx
(d) the documents or exhibits to be presented, stating the purpose thereof;

xxx
(f) the number and names of the witnesses, and the substance of their respective testimonies. 49
It is unquestionably within the court's power to require the parties to submit their pre-trial briefs and to state the
number of witnesses intended to be called to the stand, and a brief summary of the evidence each of them is
expected to give as well as to disclose the number of documents to be submitted with a description of the nature of
each. The tenor and character of the testimony of the witnesses and of the documents to be deduced at the trial
thus made known, in addition to the particular issues of fact and law, it becomes apparent if genuine issues are
being put forward necessitating the holding of a trial. Likewise, the parties are obliged not only to make a formal
identification and specification of the issues and their proofs, and to put these matters in writing and submit them to
the court within the specified period for the prompt disposition of the action. 50
The pre-trial brief of Mrs. Marcos, as subsequently adopted by respondent Marcos children, merely stated:
xxx
WITNESSES
4.1 Respondent Imelda will present herself as a witness and reserves the right to present additional
witnesses as may be necessary in the course of the trial.
xxx
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
5.1 Respondent Imelda reserves the right to present and introduce in evidence documents as may be
necessary in the course of the trial.
Mrs. Marcos did not enumerate and describe the documents constituting her evidence. Neither the names of
witnesses nor the nature of their testimony was stated. What alone appeared certain was the testimony of Mrs.
Marcos only who in fact had previously claimed ignorance and lack of knowledge. And even then, the substance of
her testimony, as required by the rules, was not made known either. Such cunning tactics of respondents are totally
unacceptable to this Court. We hold that, since no genuine issue was raised, the case became ripe for summary
judgment.
• OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

DATED MARCH 21, 2000
The opposition filed by Mrs. Marcos to the motion for summary judgment dated March 21, 2000 of petitioner
Republic was merely adopted by the Marcos children as their own opposition to the said motion. However, it was
again not accompanied by affidavits, depositions or admissions as required by Section 3, Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules
on Civil Procedure:
x x x The adverse party may serve opposing affidavits, depositions, or admissions at least three (3) days
before hearing. After hearing, the judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, supporting
affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file, show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 51
The absence of opposing affidavits, depositions and admissions to contradict the sworn declarations in the
Republic's motion only demonstrated that the averments of such opposition were not genuine and therefore
unworthy of belief.
• Demurrer to Evidence dated May 2, 2000;52

Motions for Reconsideration;53 and Memoranda
of Mrs. Marcos and the Marcos children 54
All these pleadings again contained no allegations of facts showing their lawful acquisition of the funds. Once more,
respondents merely made general denials without alleging facts which would have been admissible in evidence at
the hearing, thereby failing to raise genuine issues of fact.
Mrs. Marcos insists in her memorandum dated October 21, 2002 that, during the pre-trial, her counsel stated that his
client was just a beneficiary of the funds, contrary to petitioner Republic's allegation that Mrs. Marcos disclaimed
ownership of or interest in the funds.
This is yet another indication that respondents presented a fictitious defense because, during the pre-trial, Mrs.
Marcos and the Marcos children denied ownership of or interest in the Swiss funds:
PJ Garchitorena:
Make of record that as far as Imelda Marcos is concerned through the statement of Atty. Armando
M. Marcelo that the US$360 million more or less subject matter of the instant lawsuit as allegedly
obtained from the various Swiss Foundations do not belong to the estate of Marcos or to Imelda
Marcos herself. That's your statement of facts?
Atty. MARCELO:
Yes, Your Honor.
PJ Garchitorena:
That's it. Okay. Counsel for Manotoc and Manotoc, Jr. What is your point here? Does the estate of
Marcos own anything of the $360 million subject of this case.
Atty. TECSON:
We joined the Manifestation of Counsel.
PJ Garchitorena:
You do not own anything?
Atty. TECSON:
Yes, Your Honor.
PJ Garchitorena:
Counsel for Irene Araneta?
Atty. SISON:
I join the position taken by my other compañeros here, Your Honor.
xxx
Atty. SISON:
Irene Araneta as heir do (sic) not own any of the amount, Your Honor. 55
We are convinced that the strategy of respondent Marcoses was to confuse petitioner Republic as to what facts they
would prove or what issues they intended to pose for the court's resolution. There is no doubt in our mind that they
were leading petitioner Republic, and now this Court, to perplexity, if not trying to drag this forfeiture case to eternity.
• Manifestation dated May 26, 1998 filed by MRS.
Marcos; General/Supplemental Compromise
Agreement dated December 28, 1993
These pleadings of respondent Marcoses presented nothing but feigned defenses. In their earlier pleadings,
respondents alleged either that they had no knowledge of the existence of the Swiss deposits or that they could no
longer remember anything as it happened a long time ago. As to Mrs. Marcos, she remembered that it was lawfully
acquired.
In her Manifestation dated May 26, 1998, Mrs. Marcos stated that:
COMES NOW undersigned counsel for respondent Imelda R. Marcos, and before this Honorable Court,
most respectfully manifests:
That respondent Imelda R, Marcos owns 90% of the subject matter of the above-entitled case, being the
sole beneficiary of the dollar deposits in the name of the various foundations alleged in the case;
That in fact only 10% of the subject matter in the above-entitled case belongs to the estate of the late
President Ferdinand E. Marcos.
In the Compromise/Supplemental Agreements, respondent Marcoses sought to implement the agreed distribution of
the Marcos assets, including the Swiss deposits. This was, to us, an unequivocal admission of ownership by the
Marcoses of the said deposits.
But, as already pointed out, during the pre-trial conference, respondent Marcoses denied knowledge as well as
ownership of the Swiss funds.
Anyway we look at it, respondent Marcoses have put forth no real defense. The "facts" pleaded by respondents,
while ostensibly raising important questions or issues of fact, in reality comprised mere verbiage that was evidently
wanting in substance and constituted no genuine issues for trial.
We therefore rule that, under the circumstances, summary judgment is proper.
In fact, it is the law itself which determines when summary judgment is called for. Under the rules, summary
judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of fact requiring the presentation of evidence in a full-
blown trial. Even if on their face the pleadings appear to raise issue, if the affidavits, depositions and admissions
show that such issues are not genuine, then summary judgment as prescribed by the rules must ensue as a matter
of law.56
In sum, mere denials, if unaccompanied by any fact which will be admissible in evidence at a hearing, are not
sufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and will not defeat a motion for summary judgment. 57 A summary judgment
is one granted upon motion of a party for an expeditious settlement of the case, it appearing from the pleadings,
depositions, admissions and affidavits that there are no important questions or issues of fact posed and, therefore,
the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A motion for summary judgment is premised on the
assumption that the issues presented need not be tried either because these are patently devoid of substance or
that there is no genuine issue as to any pertinent fact. It is a method sanctioned by the Rules of Court for the prompt
disposition of a civil action where there exists no serious controversy. 58 Summary judgment is a procedural device
for the prompt disposition of actions in which the pleadings raise only a legal issue, not a genuine issue as to any
material fact. The theory of summary judgment is that, although an answer may on its face appear to tender issues
requiring trial, if it is established by affidavits, depositions or admissions that those issues are not genuine but
fictitious, the Court is justified in dispensing with the trial and rendering summary judgment for petitioner. 59
In the various annexes to the petition for forfeiture, petitioner Republic attached sworn statements of witnesses who
had personal knowledge of the Marcoses' participation in the illegal acquisition of funds deposited in the Swiss
accounts under the names of five groups or foundations. These sworn statements substantiated the ill-gotten nature
of the Swiss bank deposits. In their answer and other subsequent pleadings, however, the Marcoses merely made
general denials of the allegations against them without stating facts admissible in evidence at the hearing, thereby
failing to raise any genuine issues of fact.
Under these circumstances, a trial would have served no purpose at all and would have been totally unnecessary,
thus justifying a summary judgment on the petition for forfeiture. There were no opposing affidavits to contradict the
sworn declarations of the witnesses of petitioner Republic, leading to the inescapable conclusion that the matters
raised in the Marcoses' answer were false.
Time and again, this Court has encountered cases like this which are either only half-heartedly defended or, if the
semblance of a defense is interposed at all, it is only to delay disposition and gain time. It is certainly not in the
interest of justice to allow respondent Marcoses to avail of the appellate remedies accorded by the Rules of Court to
litigants in good faith, to the prejudice of the Republic and ultimately of the Filipino people. From the beginning, a
candid demonstration of respondents' good faith should have been made to the court below. Without the deceptive
reasoning and argumentation, this protracted litigation could have ended a long time ago.
Since 1991, when the petition for forfeiture was first filed, up to the present, all respondents have offered are foxy
responses like "lack of sufficient knowledge or lack of privity" or "they cannot recall because it happened a long time
ago" or, as to Mrs. Marcos, "the funds were lawfully acquired." But, whenever it suits them, they also claim
ownership of 90% of the funds and allege that only 10% belongs to the Marcos estate. It has been an incredible
charade from beginning to end.
In the hope of convincing this Court to rule otherwise, respondents Maria Imelda Marcos-Manotoc and Ferdinand R.
Marcos Jr. contend that "by its positive acts and express admissions prior to filing the motion for summary judgment
on March 10, 2000, petitioner Republic had bound itself to go to trial on the basis of existing issues. Thus, it had
legally waived whatever right it had to move for summary judgment." 60
We do not think so. The alleged positive acts and express admissions of the petitioner did not preclude it from filing
a motion for summary judgment.
Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Rule 35
Summary Judgment
Section 1. Summary judgment for claimant. - A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after the pleading in answer thereto has
been served, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his
favor upon all or any part thereof.
Section 2. Summary judgment for defending party. - A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-
claim is asserted or a declaratory relief is sought may, at any time, move with supporting affidavits,
depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof. (Emphasis
ours)61
Under the rule, the plaintiff can move for summary judgment "at any time after the pleading in answer thereto (i.e., in
answer to the claim, counterclaim or cross-claim) has been served." No fixed reglementary period is provided by the
Rules. How else does one construe the phrase "any time after the answer has been served?"
This issue is actually one of first impression. No local jurisprudence or authoritative work has touched upon this
matter. This being so, an examination of foreign laws and jurisprudence, particularly those of the United States
where many of our laws and rules were copied, is in order.
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim
or cross-claim may move for summary judgment at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the commencement
of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, and that a party against whom
a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim is asserted may move for summary judgment at any time.
However, some rules, particularly Rule 113 of the Rules of Civil Practice of New York, specifically provide that a
motion for summary judgment may not be made until issues have been joined, that is, only after an answer has
been served.62 Under said rule, after issues have been joined, the motion for summary judgment may be made at
any stage of the litigation.63 No fixed prescriptive period is provided.
Like Rule 113 of the Rules of Civil Practice of New York, our rules also provide that a motion for summary judgment
may not be made until issues have been joined, meaning, the plaintiff has to wait for the answer before he can
move for summary judgment.64 And like the New York rules, ours do not provide for a fixed reglementary period
within which to move for summary judgment.
This being so, the New York Supreme Court's interpretation of Rule 113 of the Rules of Civil Practice can be applied
by analogy to the interpretation of Section 1, Rule 35, of our 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Under the New York rule, after the issues have been joined, the motion for summary judgment may be made at any
stage of the litigation. And what exactly does the phrase "at any stage of the litigation" mean? In Ecker vs.
Muzysh,65 the New York Supreme Court ruled:
"PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff introduced her evidence and the defendants rested on the case made by the plaintiff. The case was
submitted. Owing to the serious illness of the trial justice, a decision was not rendered within sixty days after
the final adjournment of the term at which the case was tried. With the approval of the trial justice, the
plaintiff moved for a new trial under Section 442 of the Civil Practice Act. The plaintiff also moved for
summary judgment under Rule 113 of the Rules of Civil Practice. The motion was opposed mainly on the
ground that, by proceeding to trial, the plaintiff had waived her right to summary judgment and that
the answer and the opposing affidavits raised triable issues. The amount due and unpaid under the contract
is not in dispute. The Special Term granted both motions and the defendants have appealed.
The Special Term properly held that the answer and the opposing affidavits raised no triable issue. Rule
113 of the Rules of Civil Practice and the Civil Practice Act prescribe no limitation as to the time
when a motion for summary judgment must be made. The object of Rule 113 is to empower the court
to summarily determine whether or not a bona fide issue exists between the parties, and there is no
limitation on the power of the court to make such a determination at any stage of the litigation."
(emphasis ours)
On the basis of the aforequoted disquisition, "any stage of the litigation" means that "even if the plaintiff has
proceeded to trial, this does not preclude him from thereafter moving for summary judgment." 66
In the case at bar, petitioner moved for summary judgment after pre-trial and before its scheduled date for
presentation of evidence. Respondent Marcoses argue that, by agreeing to proceed to trial during the pre-trial
conference, petitioner "waived" its right to summary judgment.
This argument must fail in the light of the New York Supreme Court ruling which we apply by analogy to this case.
In Ecker,67 the defendant opposed the motion for summary judgment on a ground similar to that raised by the
Marcoses, that is, "that plaintiff had waived her right to summary judgment" by her act of proceeding to trial. If, as
correctly ruled by the New York court, plaintiff was allowed to move for summary judgment even after trial and
submission of the case for resolution, more so should we permit it in the present case where petitioner moved for
summary judgment before trial.
Therefore, the phrase "anytime after the pleading in answer thereto has been served" in Section 1, Rule 35 of our
Rules of Civil Procedure means "at any stage of the litigation." Whenever it becomes evident at any stage of the
litigation that no triable issue exists, or that the defenses raised by the defendant(s) are sham or frivolous, plaintiff
may move for summary judgment. A contrary interpretation would go against the very objective of the Rule on
Summary Judgment which is to "weed out sham claims or defenses thereby avoiding the expense and loss of time
involved in a trial."68
In cases with political undertones like the one at bar, adverse parties will often do almost anything to delay the
proceedings in the hope that a future administration sympathetic to them might be able to influence the outcome of
the case in their favor. This is rank injustice we cannot tolerate.
The law looks with disfavor on long, protracted and expensive litigation and encourages the speedy and prompt
disposition of cases. That is why the law and the rules provide for a number of devices to ensure the speedy
disposition of cases. Summary judgment is one of them.
Faithful therefore to the spirit of the law on summary judgment which seeks to avoid unnecessary expense and loss
of time in a trial, we hereby rule that petitioner Republic could validly move for summary judgment any time after the
respondents' answer was filed or, for that matter, at any subsequent stage of the litigation. The fact that petitioner
agreed to proceed to trial did not in any way prevent it from moving for summary judgment, as indeed no genuine
issue of fact was ever validly raised by respondent Marcoses.
This interpretation conforms with the guiding principle enshrined in Section 6, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure that the "[r]ules should be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy
and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding." 69
Respondents further allege that the motion for summary judgment was based on respondents' answer and other
documents that had long been in the records of the case. Thus, by the time the motion was filed on March 10, 2000,
estoppel by laches had already set in against petitioner.
We disagree. Estoppel by laches is the failure or neglect for an unreasonable or unexplained length of time to do
that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, warranting a presumption that the
person has abandoned his right or declined to assert it. 70 In effect, therefore, the principle of laches is one of
estoppel because "it prevents people who have slept on their rights from prejudicing the rights of third parties who
have placed reliance on the inaction of the original parties and their successors-in-interest". 71
A careful examination of the records, however, reveals that petitioner was in fact never remiss in pursuing its case
against respondent Marcoses through every remedy available to it, including the motion for summary judgment.
Petitioner Republic initially filed its motion for summary judgment on October 18, 1996. The motion was denied
because of the pending compromise agreement between the Marcoses and petitioner. But during the pre-trial
conference, the Marcoses denied ownership of the Swiss funds, prompting petitioner to file another motion for
summary judgment now under consideration by this Court. It was the subsequent events that transpired after the
answer was filed, therefore, which prevented petitioner from filing the questioned motion. It was definitely not
because of neglect or inaction that petitioner filed the (second) motion for summary judgment years after
respondents' answer to the petition for forfeiture.
In invoking the doctrine of estoppel by laches, respondents must show not only unjustified inaction but also that
some unfair injury to them might result unless the action is barred. 72
This, respondents failed to bear out. In fact, during the pre-trial conference, the Marcoses disclaimed ownership of
the Swiss deposits. Not being the owners, as they claimed, respondents did not have any vested right or interest
which could be adversely affected by petitioner's alleged inaction.
But even assuming for the sake of argument that laches had already set in, the doctrine of estoppel or laches does
not apply when the government sues as a sovereign or asserts governmental rights. 73 Nor can estoppel validate an
act that contravenes law or public policy.74
As a final point, it must be emphasized that laches is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the
inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted. 75 Equity demands that petitioner
Republic should not be barred from pursuing the people's case against the Marcoses.
(2) The Propriety of Forfeiture

The matter of summary judgment having been thus settled, the issue of whether or not petitioner Republic was able
to prove its case for forfeiture in accordance with the requisites of Sections 2 and 3 of RA 1379 now takes center
stage.
The law raises the prima facie presumption that a property is unlawfully acquired, hence subject to forfeiture, if its
amount or value is manifestly disproportionate to the official salary and other lawful income of the public officer who
owns it. Hence, Sections 2 and 6 of RA 137976 provide:
x x x x x x
Section 2. Filing of petition. – Whenever any public officer or employee has acquired during his incumbency
an amount or property which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee
and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property, said property shall be
presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired.
x x x x x x
Sec. 6. Judgment – If the respondent is unable to show to the satisfaction of the court that he has lawfully
acquired the property in question, then the court shall declare such property in question, forfeited in favor of
the State, and by virtue of such judgment the property aforesaid shall become the property of the
State. Provided, That no judgment shall be rendered within six months before any general election or within
three months before any special election. The Court may, in addition, refer this case to the corresponding
Executive Department for administrative or criminal action, or both.
From the above-quoted provisions of the law, the following facts must be established in order that forfeiture or
seizure of the Swiss deposits may be effected:
(1) ownership by the public officer of money or property acquired during his incumbency, whether it be in his
name or otherwise, and
(2) the extent to which the amount of that money or property exceeds, i. e., is grossly disproportionate to, the
legitimate income of the public officer.
That spouses Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos were public officials during the time material to the instant case was
never in dispute. Paragraph 4 of respondent Marcoses' answer categorically admitted the allegations in paragraph 4
of the petition for forfeiture as to the personal circumstances of Ferdinand E. Marcos as a public official who served
without interruption as Congressman, Senator, Senate President and President of the Republic of the Philippines
from December 1, 1965 to February 25, 1986.77 Likewise, respondents admitted in their answer the contents of
paragraph 5 of the petition as to the personal circumstances of Imelda R. Marcos who once served as a member of
the Interim Batasang Pambansa from 1978 to 1984 and as Metro Manila Governor, concurrently Minister of Human
Settlements, from June 1976 to February 1986.78
Respondent Mrs. Marcos also admitted in paragraph 10 of her answer the allegations of paragraph 11 of the petition
for forfeiture which referred to the accumulated salaries of respondents Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R.
Marcos.79 The combined accumulated salaries of the Marcos couple were reflected in the Certification dated May 27,
1986 issued by then Minister of Budget and Management Alberto Romulo. 80 The Certification showed that, from
1966 to 1985, Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos had accumulated salaries in the amount of P1,570,000
and P718,750, respectively, or a total of P2,288,750:
Ferdinand E. Marcos, as President
1966-1976 at P60,000/year P660,000

1977-1984 at 800,000
P100,000/year
1985 at 110,000
P110,000/year
P1,570,00
Imelda R. Marcos, as Minister
June 1976-1985 at P75,000/year P718,000
In addition to their accumulated salaries from 1966 to 1985 are the Marcos couple's combined salaries from January
to February 1986 in the amount of P30,833.33. Hence, their total accumulated salaries amounted to P2,319,583.33.
Converted to U.S. dollars on the basis of the corresponding peso-dollar exchange rates prevailing during the
applicable period when said salaries were received, the total amount had an equivalent value of $304,372.43.
The dollar equivalent was arrived at by using the official annual rates of exchange of the Philippine peso and the US
dollar from 1965 to 1985 as well as the official monthly rates of exchange in January and February 1986 issued by
the Center for Statistical Information of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas.
Prescinding from the aforesaid admissions, Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides that:
Section 4. – Judicial admissions – An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the
proceedings in the same case does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing
that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. 81
It is settled that judicial admissions may be made: (a) in the pleadings filed by the parties; (b) in the course of the
trial either by verbal or written manifestations or stipulations; or (c) in other stages of judicial proceedings, as in the
pre-trial of the case.82 Thus, facts pleaded in the petition and answer, as in the case at bar, are deemed admissions
of petitioner and respondents, respectively, who are not permitted to contradict them or subsequently take a position
contrary to or inconsistent with such admissions.83
The sum of $304,372.43 should be held as the only known lawful income of respondents since they did not file any
Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SAL), as required by law, from which their net worth could be determined.
Besides, under the 1935 Constitution, Ferdinand E. Marcos as President could not receive "any other emolument
from the Government or any of its subdivisions and instrumentalities". 84 Likewise, under the 1973 Constitution,
Ferdinand E. Marcos as President could "not receive during his tenure any other emolument from the Government
or any other source."85 In fact, his management of businesses, like the administration of foundations to accumulate
funds, was expressly prohibited under the 1973 Constitution:
Article VII, Sec. 4(2) – The President and the Vice-President shall not, during their tenure, hold any other
office except when otherwise provided in this Constitution, nor may they practice any profession, participate
directly or indirectly in the management of any business, or be financially interested directly or indirectly in
any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government or any other
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government owned or controlled corporation.
Article VII, Sec. 11 – No Member of the National Assembly shall appear as counsel before any court inferior
to a court with appellate jurisdiction, x x x. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in
any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof including any government owned or controlled corporation during his term
of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the government for his pecuniary benefit.
Article IX, Sec. 7 – The Prime Minister and Members of the Cabinet shall be subject to the provision of
Section 11, Article VIII hereof and may not appear as counsel before any court or administrative body, or
manage any business, or practice any profession, and shall also be subject to such other disqualification as
may be provided by law.
Their only known lawful income of $304,372.43 can therefore legally and fairly serve as basis for determining the
existence of a prima facie case of forfeiture of the Swiss funds.
Respondents argue that petitioner was not able to establish a prima facie case for the forfeiture of the Swiss funds
since it failed to prove the essential elements under Section 3, paragraphs (c), (d) and (e) of RA 1379. As the Act is
a penal statute, its provisions are mandatory and should thus be construed strictly against the petitioner and liberally
in favor of respondent Marcoses.
We hold that it was not for petitioner to establish the Marcoses' other lawful income or income from legitimately
acquired property for the presumption to apply because, as between petitioner and respondents, the latter were in a
better position to know if there were such other sources of lawful income. And if indeed there was such other lawful
income, respondents should have specifically stated the same in their answer. Insofar as petitioner Republic was
concerned, it was enough to specify the known lawful income of respondents.
Section 9 of the PCGG Rules and Regulations provides that, in determining prima facie evidence of ill-gotten wealth,
the value of the accumulated assets, properties and other material possessions of those covered by Executive
Order Nos. 1 and 2 must be out of proportion to the known lawful income of such persons. The respondent Marcos
couple did not file any Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SAL) from which their net worth could be determined.
Their failure to file their SAL was in itself a violation of law and to allow them to successfully assail the Republic for
not presenting their SAL would reward them for their violation of the law.
Further, contrary to the claim of respondents, the admissions made by them in their various pleadings and
documents were valid. It is of record that respondents judicially admitted that the money deposited with the Swiss
banks belonged to them.
We agree with petitioner that respondent Marcoses made judicial admissions of their ownership of the subject Swiss
bank deposits in their answer, the General/Supplemental Agreements, Mrs. Marcos' Manifestation and Constancia
dated May 5, 1999, and the Undertaking dated February 10, 1999. We take note of the fact that the Associate
Justices of the Sandiganbayan were unanimous in holding that respondents had made judicial admissions of their
ownership of the Swiss funds.
In their answer, aside from admitting the existence of the subject funds, respondents likewise
admitted ownership thereof. Paragraph 22 of respondents' answer stated:
22. Respondents specifically DENY PARAGRAPH 23 insofar as it alleges that respondents clandestinely
stashed the country's wealth in Switzerland and hid the same under layers and layers of foundations and
corporate entities for being false, the truth being that respondents' aforesaid properties were lawfully
acquired. (emphasis supplied)
By qualifying their acquisition of the Swiss bank deposits as lawful, respondents unwittingly admitted their ownership
thereof.
Respondent Mrs. Marcos also admitted ownership of the Swiss bank deposits by failing to deny under oath the
genuineness and due execution of certain actionable documents bearing her signature attached to the petition. As
discussed earlier, Section 11, Rule 886 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that material averments in the
complaint shall be deemed admitted when not specifically denied.
The General87 and Supplemental88 Agreements executed by petitioner and respondents on December 28, 1993
further bolstered the claim of petitioner Republic that its case for forfeiture was proven in accordance with the
requisites of Sections 2 and 3 of RA 1379. The whereas clause in the General Agreement declared that:
WHEREAS, the FIRST PARTY has obtained a judgment from the Swiss Federal Tribunal on December 21,
1990, that the $356 million belongs in principle to the Republic of the Philippines provided certain
conditionalities are met, but even after 7 years, the FIRST PARTY has not been able to procure a final
judgment of conviction against the PRIVATE PARTY.
While the Supplemental Agreement warranted, inter alia, that:
In consideration of the foregoing, the parties hereby agree that the PRIVATE PARTY shall be entitled to the
equivalent of 25% of the amount that may be eventually withdrawn from said $356 million Swiss deposits.
The stipulations set forth in the General and Supplemental Agreements undeniably indicated the manifest intent of
respondents to enter into a compromise with petitioner. Corollarily, respondents' willingness to agree to an amicable
settlement with the Republic only affirmed their ownership of the Swiss deposits for the simple reason that no
person would acquiesce to any concession over such huge dollar deposits if he did not in fact own them.
Respondents make much capital of the pronouncement by this Court that the General and Supplemental
Agreements were null and void.89 They insist that nothing in those agreements could thus be admitted in evidence
against them because they stood on the same ground as an accepted offer which, under Section 27, Rule 130 90 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that "in civil cases, an offer of compromise is not an admission of any
liability and is not admissible in evidence against the offeror."
We find no merit in this contention. The declaration of nullity of said agreements was premised on the following
constitutional and statutory infirmities: (1) the grant of criminal immunity to the Marcos heirs was against the law; (2)
the PCGG's commitment to exempt from all forms of taxes the properties to be retained by the Marcos heirs was
against the Constitution; and (3) the government's undertaking to cause the dismissal of all cases filed against the
Marcoses pending before the Sandiganbayan and other courts encroached on the powers of the judiciary. The
reasons relied upon by the Court never in the least bit even touched on the veracity and truthfulness of respondents'
admission with respect to their ownership of the Swiss funds. Besides, having made certain admissions in those
agreements, respondents cannot now deny that they voluntarily admitted owning the subject Swiss funds,
notwithstanding the fact that the agreements themselves were later declared null and void.
The following observation of Sandiganbayan Justice Catalino Castañeda, Jr. in the decision dated September 19,
2000 could not have been better said:
x x x The declaration of nullity of the two agreements rendered the same without legal effects but it did not
detract from the admissions of the respondents contained therein. Otherwise stated, the admissions made in
said agreements, as quoted above, remain binding on the respondents. 91
A written statement is nonetheless competent as an admission even if it is contained in a document which is not
itself effective for the purpose for which it is made, either by reason of illegality, or incompetency of a party thereto,
or by reason of not being signed, executed or delivered. Accordingly, contracts have been held as competent
evidence of admissions, although they may be unenforceable. 92
The testimony of respondent Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. during the hearing on the motion for the approval of the
Compromise Agreement on April 29, 1998 also lent credence to the allegations of petitioner Republic that
respondents admitted ownership of the Swiss bank accounts. We quote the salient portions of Ferdinand Jr.'s formal
declarations in open court:
ATTY. FERNANDO:
Mr. Marcos, did you ever have any meetings with PCGG Chairman Magtanggol C. Gunigundo?
F. MARCOS, JR.:
Yes. I have had very many meetings in fact with Chairman.
ATTY. FERNANDO:
Would you recall when the first meeting occurred?
PJ GARCHITORENA:
In connection with what?
ATTY. FERNANDO:
In connection with the ongoing talks to compromise the various cases initiated by PCGG against
your family?
F. MARCOS, JR.:
The nature of our meetings was solely concerned with negotiations towards achieving some kind of
agreement between the Philippine government and the Marcos family. The discussions that led up to
the compromise agreement were initiated by our then counsel Atty. Simeon Mesina x x x. 93
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. FERNANDO:
What was your reaction when Atty. Mesina informed you of this possibility?
F. MARCOS, JR.:
My reaction to all of these approaches is that I am always open, we are always open, we are very
much always in search of resolution to the problem of the family and any approach that has been
made us, we have entertained. And so my reaction was the same as what I have always … why
not? Maybe this is the one that will finally put an end to this problem. 94
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. FERNANDO:
Basically, what were the true amounts of the assets in the bank?
PJ GARCHITORENA:
So, we are talking about liquid assets here? Just Cash?
F. MARCOS, JR.:
Well, basically, any assets. Anything that was under the Marcos name in any of the banks in
Switzerland which may necessarily be not cash.95
xxx xxx xxx
PJ GARCHITORENA:
x x x What did you do in other words, after being apprised of this contract in connection herewith?
F. MARCOS, JR.:
I assumed that we are beginning to implement the agreement because this was forwarded through
the Philippine government lawyers through our lawyers and then, subsequently, to me. I was a little
surprised because we hadn't really discussed the details of the transfer of the funds, what the bank
accounts, what the mechanism would be. But nevertheless, I was happy to see that as far as the
PCGG is concerned, that the agreement was perfected and that we were beginning to implement it
and that was a source of satisfaction to me because I thought that finally it will be the end. 96
Ferdinand Jr.'s pronouncements, taken in context and in their entirety, were a confirmation of respondents'
recognition of their ownership of the Swiss bank deposits. Admissions of a party in his testimony are receivable
against him. If a party, as a witness, deliberately concedes a fact, such concession has the force of a judicial
admission.97 It is apparent from Ferdinand Jr.'s testimony that the Marcos family agreed to negotiate with the
Philippine government in the hope of finally putting an end to the problems besetting the Marcos family regarding
the Swiss accounts. This was doubtlessly an acknowledgment of ownership on their part. The rule is that the
testimony on the witness stand partakes of the nature of a formal judicial admission when a party testifies clearly
and unequivocally to a fact which is peculiarly within his own knowledge. 98
In her Manifestation99 dated May 26, 1998, respondent Imelda Marcos furthermore revealed the following:
That respondent Imelda R. Marcos owns 90% of the subject matter of the above-entitled case, being the
sole beneficiary of the dollar deposits in the name of the various foundations alleged in the case;
That in fact only 10% of the subject matter in the above-entitled case belongs to the estate of the late
President Ferdinand E. Marcos;
xxx xxx xxx
Respondents' ownership of the Swiss bank accounts as borne out by Mrs. Marcos' manifestation is as bright as
sunlight. And her claim that she is merely a beneficiary of the Swiss deposits is belied by her own signatures on the
appended copies of the documents substantiating her ownership of the funds in the name of the foundations. As
already mentioned, she failed to specifically deny under oath the authenticity of such documents, especially those
involving "William Saunders" and "Jane Ryan" which actually referred to Ferdinand Marcos and Imelda Marcos,
respectively. That failure of Imelda Marcos to specifically deny the existence, much less the genuineness and due
execution, of the instruments bearing her signature, was tantamount to a judicial admission of the genuineness and
due execution of said instruments, in accordance with Section 8, Rule 8100 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Likewise, in her Constancia101 dated May 6, 1999, Imelda Marcos prayed for the approval of the Compromise
Agreement and the subsequent release and transfer of the $150 million to the rightful owner. She further made the
following manifestations:
xxx xxx xxx
2. The Republic's cause of action over the full amount is its forfeiture in favor of the government if found to
be ill-gotten. On the other hand, the Marcoses defend that it is a legitimate asset. Therefore, both parties
have an inchoate right of ownership over the account. If it turns out that the account is of lawful origin, the
Republic may yield to the Marcoses. Conversely, the Marcoses must yield to the Republic. (underscoring
supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
3. Consistent with the foregoing, and the Marcoses having committed themselves to helping the less
fortunate, in the interest of peace, reconciliation and unity, defendant MADAM IMELDA ROMUALDEZ
MARCOS, in firm abidance thereby, hereby affirms her agreement with the Republic for the release and
transfer of the US Dollar 150 million for proper disposition, without prejudice to the final outcome of the
litigation respecting the ownership of the remainder.
Again, the above statements were indicative of Imelda's admission of the Marcoses' ownership of the Swiss
deposits as in fact "the Marcoses defend that it (Swiss deposits) is a legitimate (Marcos) asset."
On the other hand, respondents Maria Imelda Marcos-Manotoc, Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. and Maria Irene Marcos-
Araneta filed a motion102 on May 4, 1998 asking the Sandiganbayan to place the res (Swiss deposits) in custodia
legis:
7. Indeed, the prevailing situation is fraught with danger! Unless the aforesaid Swiss deposits are placed in
custodia legis or within the Court's protective mantle, its dissipation or misappropriation by the petitioner
looms as a distinct possibility.
Such display of deep, personal interest can only come from someone who believes that he has a marked and
intimate right over the considerable dollar deposits. Truly, by filing said motion, the Marcos children revealed their
ownership of the said deposits.
Lastly, the Undertaking103 entered into by the PCGG, the PNB and the Marcos foundations on February 10, 1999,
confirmed the Marcoses' ownership of the Swiss bank deposits. The subject Undertaking brought to light their
readiness to pay the human rights victims out of the funds held in escrow in the PNB. It stated:
WHEREAS, the Republic of the Philippines sympathizes with the plight of the human rights victims-plaintiffs
in the aforementioned litigation through the Second Party, desires to assist in the satisfaction of the
judgment awards of said human rights victims-plaintiffs, by releasing, assigning and or waiving US$150
million of the funds held in escrow under the Escrow Agreements dated August 14, 1995, although the
Republic is not obligated to do so under final judgments of the Swiss courts dated December 10 and 19,
1997, and January 8, 1998;
WHEREAS, the Third Party is likewise willing to release, assign and/or waive all its rights and interests over
said US$150 million to the aforementioned human rights victims-plaintiffs.
All told, the foregoing disquisition negates the claim of respondents that "petitioner failed to prove that they acquired
or own the Swiss funds" and that "it was only by arbitrarily isolating and taking certain statements made by private
respondents out of context that petitioner was able to treat these as judicial admissions." The Court is fully aware of
the relevance, materiality and implications of every pleading and document submitted in this case. This Court
carefully scrutinized the proofs presented by the parties. We analyzed, assessed and weighed them to ascertain if
each piece of evidence rightfully qualified as an admission. Owing to the far-reaching historical and political
implications of this case, we considered and examined, individually and totally, the evidence of the parties, even if it
might have bordered on factual adjudication which, by authority of the rules and jurisprudence, is not usually done
by this Court. There is no doubt in our mind that respondent Marcoses admitted ownership of the Swiss bank
deposits.
We have always adhered to the familiar doctrine that an admission made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by
the party making such admission and becomes conclusive on him, and that all proofs submitted by him contrary
thereto or inconsistent therewith should be ignored, whether an objection is interposed by the adverse party or
not.104 This doctrine is embodied in Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 4. Judicial admissions. ─ An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the
proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing
that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. 105
In the absence of a compelling reason to the contrary, respondents' judicial admission of ownership of the Swiss
deposits is definitely binding on them.
The individual and separate admissions of each respondent bind all of them pursuant to Sections 29 and 31, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 29. Admission by co-partner or agent. ─ The act or declaration of a partner or agent of the party within
the scope of his authority and during the existence of the partnership or agency, may be given in evidence
against such party after the partnership or agency is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
The same rule applies to the act or declaration of a joint owner, joint debtor, or other person jointly interested
with the party.106
SEC. 31. Admission by privies. ─ Where one derives title to property from another, the act, declaration, or
omission of the latter, while holding the title, in relation to the property, is evidence against the former. 107
The declarations of a person are admissible against a party whenever a "privity of estate" exists between the
declarant and the party, the term "privity of estate" generally denoting a succession in rights. 108 Consequently, an
admission of one in privity with a party to the record is competent. 109 Without doubt, privity exists among the
respondents in this case. And where several co-parties to the record are jointly interested in the subject matter of
the controversy, the admission of one is competent against all. 110
Respondents insist that the Sandiganbayan is correct in ruling that petitioner Republic has failed to establish
a prima facie case for the forfeiture of the Swiss deposits.
We disagree. The sudden turn-around of the Sandiganbayan was really strange, to say the least, as its findings and
conclusions were not borne out by the voluminous records of this case.
Section 2 of RA 1379 explicitly states that "whenever any public officer or employee has acquired during his
incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or
employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property, said property shall be
presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired. x x x"
The elements which must concur for this prima facie presumption to apply are:
(1) the offender is a public officer or employee;
(2) he must have acquired a considerable amount of money or property during his incumbency; and
(3) said amount is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his
other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property.
It is undisputed that spouses Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos were former public officers. Hence, the first element is
clearly extant.
The second element deals with the amount of money or property acquired by the public officer during his
incumbency. The Marcos couple indubitably acquired and owned properties during their term of office. In fact, the
five groups of Swiss accounts were admittedly owned by them. There is proof of the existence and ownership of
these assets and properties and it suffices to comply with the second element.
The third requirement is met if it can be shown that such assets, money or property is manifestly out of proportion to
the public officer's salary and his other lawful income. It is the proof of this third element that is crucial in determining
whether a prima facie presumption has been established in this case.
Petitioner Republic presented not only a schedule indicating the lawful income of the Marcos spouses during their
incumbency but also evidence that they had huge deposits beyond such lawful income in Swiss banks under the
names of five different foundations. We believe petitioner was able to establish the prima facie presumption that the
assets and properties acquired by the Marcoses were manifestly and patently disproportionate to their aggregate
salaries as public officials. Otherwise stated, petitioner presented enough evidence to convince us that the
Marcoses had dollar deposits amounting to US $356 million representing the balance of the Swiss accounts of the
five foundations, an amount way, way beyond their aggregate legitimate income of only US$304,372.43 during their
incumbency as government officials.
Considering, therefore, that the total amount of the Swiss deposits was considerably out of proportion to the known
lawful income of the Marcoses, the presumption that said dollar deposits were unlawfully acquired was duly
established. It was sufficient for the petition for forfeiture to state the approximate amount of money and property
acquired by the respondents, and their total government salaries. Section 9 of the PCGG Rules and Regulations
states:
Prima Facie Evidence. – Any accumulation of assets, properties, and other material possessions of those
persons covered by Executive Orders No. 1 and No. 2, whose value is out of proportion to their known lawful
income is prima facie deemed ill-gotten wealth.
Indeed, the burden of proof was on the respondents to dispute this presumption and show by clear and convincing
evidence that the Swiss deposits were lawfully acquired and that they had other legitimate sources of income. A
presumption is prima facie proof of the fact presumed and, unless the fact thus prima facie established by legal
presumption is disproved, it must stand as proved.111
Respondent Mrs. Marcos argues that the foreign foundations should have been impleaded as they were
indispensable parties without whom no complete determination of the issues could be made. She asserts that the
failure of petitioner Republic to implead the foundations rendered the judgment void as the joinder of indispensable
parties was a sine qua non exercise of judicial power. Furthermore, the non-inclusion of the foreign foundations
violated the conditions prescribed by the Swiss government regarding the deposit of the funds in escrow, deprived
them of their day in court and denied them their rights under the Swiss constitution and international law. 112
The Court finds that petitioner Republic did not err in not impleading the foreign foundations. Section 7, Rule 3 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, 113 taken from Rule 19b of the American Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides for
the compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. Generally, an indispensable party must be impleaded for the
complete determination of the suit. However, failure to join an indispensable party does not divest the court of
jurisdiction since the rule regarding indispensable parties is founded on equitable considerations and is not
jurisdictional. Thus, the court is not divested of its power to render a decision even in the absence of indispensable
parties, though such judgment is not binding on the non-joined party.114
An indispensable party115 has been defined as one:
[who] must have a direct interest in the litigation; and if this interest is such that it cannot be separated from
that of the parties to the suit, if the court cannot render justice between the parties in his absence, if the
decree will have an injurious effect upon his interest, or if the final determination of the controversy in his
absence will be inconsistent with equity and good conscience.
There are two essential tests of an indispensable party: (1) can relief be afforded the plaintiff without the presence of
the other party? and (2) can the case be decided on its merits without prejudicing the rights of the other party?
116
There is, however, no fixed formula for determining who is an indispensable party; this can only be determined in
the context and by the facts of the particular suit or litigation.
In the present case, there was an admission by respondent Imelda Marcos in her May 26, 1998 Manifestation
before the Sandiganbayan that she was the sole beneficiary of 90% of the subject matter in controversy with the
remaining 10% belonging to the estate of Ferdinand Marcos.117 Viewed against this admission, the foreign
foundations were not indispensable parties. Their non-participation in the proceedings did not prevent the court from
deciding the case on its merits and according full relief to petitioner Republic. The judgment ordering the return of
the $356 million was neither inimical to the foundations' interests nor inconsistent with equity and good conscience.
The admission of respondent Imelda Marcos only confirmed what was already generally known: that the foundations
were established precisely to hide the money stolen by the Marcos spouses from petitioner Republic. It negated
whatever illusion there was, if any, that the foreign foundations owned even a nominal part of the assets in question.
The rulings of the Swiss court that the foundations, as formal owners, must be given an opportunity to participate in
the proceedings hinged on the assumption that they owned a nominal share of the assets. 118 But this was already
refuted by no less than Mrs. Marcos herself. Thus, she cannot now argue that the ruling of the Sandiganbayan
violated the conditions set by the Swiss court. The directive given by the Swiss court for the foundations to
participate in the proceedings was for the purpose of protecting whatever nominal interest they might have had in
the assets as formal owners. But inasmuch as their ownership was subsequently repudiated by Imelda Marcos, they
could no longer be considered as indispensable parties and their participation in the proceedings became
unnecessary.
In Republic vs. Sandiganbayan,119 this Court ruled that impleading the firms which are the res of the action was
unnecessary:
"And as to corporations organized with ill-gotten wealth, but are not themselves guilty of misappropriation,
fraud or other illicit conduct – in other words, the companies themselves are not the object or thing involved
in the action, the res thereof – there is no need to implead them either. Indeed, their impleading is not proper
on the strength alone of their having been formed with ill-gotten funds, absent any other particular
wrongdoing on their part…
Such showing of having been formed with, or having received ill-gotten funds, however strong or convincing,
does not, without more, warrant identifying the corporations in question with the person who formed or made
use of them to give the color or appearance of lawful, innocent acquisition to illegally amassed wealth – at
the least, not so as place on the Government the onus of impleading the former with the latter in actions to
recover such wealth. Distinguished in terms of juridical personality and legal culpability from their erring
members or stockholders, said corporations are not themselves guilty of the sins of the latter, of the
embezzlement, asportation, etc., that gave rise to the Government's cause of action for recovery; their
creation or organization was merely the result of their members' (or stockholders') manipulations and
maneuvers to conceal the illegal origins of the assets or monies invested therein. In this light, they are
simply the res in the actions for the recovery of illegally acquired wealth, and there is, in principle, no cause
of action against them and no ground to implead them as defendants in said actions."
Just like the corporations in the aforementioned case, the foreign foundations here were set up to conceal the
illegally acquired funds of the Marcos spouses. Thus, they were simply the res in the action for recovery of ill-gotten
wealth and did not have to be impleaded for lack of cause of action or ground to implead them.
Assuming arguendo, however, that the foundations were indispensable parties, the failure of petitioner to implead
them was a curable error, as held in the previously cited case of Republic vs. Sandiganbayan:120
"Even in those cases where it might reasonably be argued that the failure of the Government to implead the
sequestered corporations as defendants is indeed a procedural abberation, as where said firms were
allegedly used, and actively cooperated with the defendants, as instruments or conduits for conversion of
public funds and property or illicit or fraudulent obtention of favored government contracts, etc., slight
reflection would nevertheless lead to the conclusion that the defect is not fatal, but one correctible under
applicable adjective rules – e.g., Section 10, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court [specifying the remedy of
amendment during trial to authorize or to conform to the evidence]; Section 1, Rule 20 [governing
amendments before trial], in relation to the rule respecting omission of so-called necessary or indispensable
parties, set out in Section 11, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. It is relevant in this context to advert to the old
familiar doctrines that the omission to implead such parties "is a mere technical defect which can be cured at
any stage of the proceedings even after judgment"; and that, particularly in the case of indispensable
parties, since their presence and participation is essential to the very life of the action, for without them no
judgment may be rendered, amendments of the complaint in order to implead them should be freely allowed,
even on appeal, in fact even after rendition of judgment by this Court, where it appears that the complaint
otherwise indicates their identity and character as such indispensable parties." 121
Although there are decided cases wherein the non-joinder of indispensable parties in fact led to the dismissal of the
suit or the annulment of judgment, such cases do not jibe with the matter at hand. The better view is that non-joinder
is not a ground to dismiss the suit or annul the judgment. The rule on joinder of indispensable parties is founded on
equity. And the spirit of the law is reflected in Section 11, Rule 3 122 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It prohibits
the dismissal of a suit on the ground of non-joinder or misjoinder of parties and allows the amendment of the
complaint at any stage of the proceedings, through motion or on order of the court on its own initiative. 123
Likewise, jurisprudence on the Federal Rules of Procedure, from which our Section 7, Rule 3 124 on indispensable
parties was copied, allows the joinder of indispensable parties even after judgment has been entered if such is
needed to afford the moving party full relief.125 Mere delay in filing the joinder motion does not necessarily result in
the waiver of the right as long as the delay is excusable. 126 Thus, respondent Mrs. Marcos cannot correctly argue
that the judgment rendered by the Sandiganbayan was void due to the non-joinder of the foreign foundations. The
court had jurisdiction to render judgment which, even in the absence of indispensable parties, was binding on all the
parties before it though not on the absent party.127 If she really felt that she could not be granted full relief due to the
absence of the foreign foundations, she should have moved for their inclusion, which was allowable at any stage of
the proceedings. She never did. Instead she assailed the judgment rendered.
In the face of undeniable circumstances and the avalanche of documentary evidence against them, respondent
Marcoses failed to justify the lawful nature of their acquisition of the said assets. Hence, the Swiss deposits should
be considered ill-gotten wealth and forfeited in favor of the State in accordance with Section 6 of RA 1379:
SEC. 6. Judgment.─ If the respondent is unable to show to the satisfaction of the court that he has lawfully
acquired the property in question, then the court shall declare such property forfeited in favor of the State,
and by virtue of such judgment the property aforesaid shall become property of the State x x x.
THE FAILURE TO PRESENT AUTHENTICATED TRANSLATIONS OF THE SWISS DECISIONS
Finally, petitioner Republic contends that the Honorable Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena
committed grave abuse of discretion in reversing himself on the ground that the original copies of the authenticated
Swiss decisions and their authenticated translations were not submitted to the court a quo. Earlier PJ Garchitorena
had quoted extensively from the unofficial translation of one of these Swiss decisions in his ponencia dated July 29,
1999 when he denied the motion to release US$150 Million to the human rights victims.
While we are in reality perplexed by such an incomprehensible change of heart, there might nevertheless not be any
real need to belabor the issue. The presentation of the authenticated translations of the original copies of the Swiss
decision was not de rigueur for the public respondent to make findings of fact and reach its conclusions. In short, the
Sandiganbayan's decision was not dependent on the determination of the Swiss courts. For that matter, neither is
this Court's.
The release of the Swiss funds held in escrow in the PNB is dependent solely on the decision of this jurisdiction that
said funds belong to the petitioner Republic. What is important is our own assessment of the sufficiency of the
evidence to rule in favor of either petitioner Republic or respondent Marcoses. In this instance, despite the absence
of the authenticated translations of the Swiss decisions, the evidence on hand tilts convincingly in favor of petitioner
Republic.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated January 31,
2002 is SET ASIDE. The Swiss deposits which were transferred to and are now deposited in escrow at the
Philippine National Bank in the estimated aggregate amount of US$658,175,373.60 as of January 31, 2002, plus
interest, are hereby forfeited in favor of petitioner Republic of the Philippines.
42.) G.R. No. 174431 August 6, 2012
The Heirs of JOLLY R. BUGARIN, namely MA. AILEEN H. BUGARIN, MA. LINDA B. ABIOG and MA.
ANNETTE B. SUMULONG, Petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
REYES,*
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 seeks to annul and set aside the April 3, 2006 Resolution of the
1
Sandiganbayan which ordered the forfeiture of some of the properties of the. late NBI Director, Jolly R.
Bugarin (Bugarin); pursuant to the January 30, 2002 Decision of this Court in Republic of the Philippines v.
Sandiganbayan, and its August 30, 2006 Resolution which denied the motion for reconsideration.
2
This petition, filed by the heirs of Bugarin (petitioners) prays that the Sandiganbayan be compelled to conduct
hearings "for the purpose of properly determining the properties of the late Jolly R. Bugarin that should be forfeited
in favor of the respondent, Republic of the Philippines."3
The Facts:
The late Bugarin was the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) when the late Ferdinand E. Marcos
was still the president of the country from 1965-1986. After the latter’s downfall in 1986, the new administration,
through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), filed a petition for forfeiture of properties under
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1379 against him with the Sandiganbayan. The latter dismissed the petition for insufficiency
of evidence in its August 13, 1991 Decision.
After the Sandiganbayan denied its motion for reconsideration, the PCGG sought a review of the dismissal before
the Court on December 18, 1991. Sitting En Banc, the Court found manifest errors and misapprehension of facts
leading it "to pore over the evidence extant from the records," including Bugarin’s very own summary of his property
acquisitions. Thereafter, the Court found Bugarin to have amassed wealth totaling ₱2,170,163.00 from 1968 to 1980
against his total income for the period 1967 to 1980 totaling only ₱766,548.00. With this, the Court held that
Bugarin’s properties, which were visibly out of proportion to his lawful income from 1968 to 1980, should be forfeited
in favor of the government. The fallo of the January 30, 2002 Decision of this Court in the Republic case, reads:
4 5
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Sandiganbayan is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petition is
GRANTED , and the properties of respondent JOLLY BUGARIN acquired from 1968 to 1980 which were
disproportionate to his lawful income during the said period are ordered forfeited in favor of petitioner Republic of
the Philippines. Let this case be REMANDED to the Sandiganbayan for proper determination of properties to be
forfeited in petitioner’s favor.
6
Bugarin moved for a reconsideration and while his motion was pending, he passed away in September 2002. With
this development, his heirs, the petitioners herein, moved to have the case dismissed. The Court denied both
Bugarin’s Motion for Reconsideration and petitioners’ Motion to Dismiss. Petitioners sought reconsideration but the
same was likewise denied. Still, they filed their Motion for Leave to File a Second Motion for Reconsideration and its
Admission with the attached Second Motion for Reconsideration, but it was likewise denied on July 27, 2004 for
being a prohibited pleading while the attached motion was merely noted without action. On June 25, 2004, the
7
January 30, 2002 Decision of the Court became final and executory and was entered in the Entry of Judgment. 8
With the case back at the Sandiganbayan, hearing was set for January 12, 2005 to determine which properties of
the late Bugarin would be forfeited in favor of the government. On the said date, only the counsels of the PCGG
appeared. Upon motion, the Sandiganbayan gave the PCGG thirty (30) days within which to submit "a list of
properties more or less equivalent to the amount of ₱1,403,615.00 and still remaining in the name of defendant
Bugarin." 9
Pursuant to this order, the PCGG filed its Partial Compliance, dated March 3, 2005, and Amended Partial
Compliance, dated April 4, 2005. The latter contained a list of properties and investments found by the Court in
the Republic case to have been acquired by Bugarin from 1968 to 1980 at ₱1,697,333.00. The PCCG, in a
manifestation, informed the Sandiganbayan of its earnest efforts in verifying the status of Bugarin’s other business
investments not included in their Amended Partial Compliance but only one replied to inform them that Bugarin was
"not a stockholder of nor has he any investment in this company." Thus, in the same manifestation, the PCGG
prayed that its latest compliance be considered sufficient conformity to the Sandiganbayan’s Order of January 12,
2005. No comment was filed by petitioners.
10
In the hearing of May 5, 2005, petitioners moved to cancel the hearings on the ground that they had filed a motion
for leave to file a motion to dismiss. The Sandiganbayan, thus, reset the hearing to August 29 and 30, 2005 and
gave the PCGG time to comment on the motion and petitioners corresponding time to reply.
On May 10, 2005, instead of a copy of their motion for leave to file motion to dismiss, petitioners served upon PCGG
their Manifestation and Ad Cautelam Motion to Dismiss dated May 5, 2005, to which PCGG filed a
comment/opposition. On August 8, 2005, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners’ Motion for Leave to File Motion to
Dismiss, on the ground that the case sought to be dismissed had already been decided by the Court and which
decision has, in fact, attained finality on June 25, 2004. As a result, the Manifestation and Ad Cautelam Motion to
Dismiss subsequently filed by petitioners was ordered stricken off the record by the Sandiganbayan on September
1, 2005. 11
Two days prior to the next hearing date on September 29, 2005, petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the
denial of the motion for leave of court. With this development, the hearing on the motion was set for September 30,
2005, while the hearing to determine the properties for forfeiture was reset to a later date. On March 21, 2006,
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was eventually denied and the hearing to determine the properties for
forfeiture was held. The Sandiganbayan ruled,
12
At the hearing this afternoon, only Attys. Crisostomo A Quizon and Joshua Gilbert F. Paraiso, counsels for the heirs
of Jolly Bugarin, appeared. There was no appearance for the plaintiff (respondent Republic of the Philippines).
WHEREFORE, let this case be considered submitted for resolution and the Court shall determine which properties
shall be forfeited in favor of the plaintiff, pursuant to the decision of the Supreme Court dated January 30, 2002.
SO ORDERED. 13
Petitioners moved for the reconsideration of this order arguing that the Sandiganbayan could not determine the
properties to be forfeited on its own, and further prayed that the parties be allowed to present evidence to determine
what properties of Bugarin would be subject to forfeiture.14
Finally, on April 3, 2006, the Sandiganbayan issued its assailed Resolution ordering the forfeiture of certain
properties of Bugarin. Thus,
WHEREFORE, this Court RESOLVES to:
1. ORDER the forfeiture of the properties listed in page 3 hereof;
2. ORDER the immediate issuance of a Writ of Execution pertinent to the Honorable Supreme Court’s Decision,
dated January 30, 2002, and the instant Resolution;
3. ORDER the concerned Register of Deeds to effect the immediate transfer of the titles of the forfeited real
properties of Bugarin and/or his transferees in favor of the Republic of the Philippines; and,
4. ORDER the Corporate Secretary of Makati Sports Club and of Manila Polo Club to effect the transfer of forfeited
shares of Bugarin and/ or his transferees in favor of the Republic of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED. 15
Page 3 referred to in the above dispositive portion of the assailed Resolution is reproduced below:
16
Honorable Supreme Court’s Decision dated January 30, 2002
TO BE
YEAR ACQUISITION
REAL PROPERTY FORFEITED
ACQUIRED COST
PROPERTIES
1.Residential lot in Damarinas Village, Makati [TCT

1968 91,140,.00
No. 247560]
2.Nine (9) Residential lots, Tagaytay City [TCT No.

1968 9,340.00 9,340.00
8695-8703]
3.Residential House, Dasmarinas Village, Makati 1969 175,900.00
4.Residential Lot, Greenhills, San Juan, MM [TCT

1973 87,288.00 87,288.00
No. 7765]
5.Residential lot, Capitol District, Quezon City [TCT

1972 72,750.00 72,750.00
No. 189558]
6.Condominium Unit, Montepino Condominium,

1973 100,000.00
Baguio City
7.Residential lot, Valle Verde, Pasig City, MM [TCT

1976 263,165.00 263,165.00
No. (491374)10848]
8.Residential House, Valle Verde, Pasig City 1978 250,000.00 250,000.00
9.Residential lot, Calapan, Oriental Mindoro [TCT

1978 5,000.00 5,000.00
No. 2887]
10.Orchard and Cocoland, Puerto Galera, Oriental

1978 1,000.00 1,000.00
Mindoro [TCT No. 10926]
OTHER INVESTMENTS
A.Philippine Columbian Club 1968-75 24,750.00
B.Makati Sports Club [Stock Certificate No. A-2271] 1975 25,000.00 25,000.00
C.Manila Polo Club [Membership Certificate No.

1978 32,000.00 32,000.00
0125]
D.Baguio Country Club 1985 60,000.00
TOTAL 1,395,543.00
On April 6, 2006, a writ of execution was issued by the Sandiganbayan pursuant to the above resolution. 17
On August 30, 2006, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the April 3 Resolution. 18
Meanwhile, during the pendency of this petition before this Court, the Sandiganbayan issued its December 11, 2006
Resolution granting petitioners’ Motion To Quash Writ on the ground that its April 3, 2006 Resolution, executing this
Court’s Judgment, had not yet attained finality due to the timely filing by petitioners of a motion for reconsideration.
Accordingly, it ordered the Writ of Execution, dated April 6, 2006, quashed. 19
In this present petition for review on certiorari, petitioners present the following:
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
WHETHER OR NOT BUGARIN’S HEIRS SHOULD BE ACCORDED THEIR RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
WHETHER OR NOT THE ASSAILED RESOLUTIONS ARE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DECISION OF THE
SUPREME COURT IN THE REPUBLIC CASE.
WHETHER OR NOT THE REPUBLIC CASE SHOULD BE SATISFIED BY FIRST EXHAUSTING ALL OF THE
JUDGMENT DEBTOR’S PERSONAL PROPERTIES BEFORE PROCEEDING AGAINST ANY REAL PROPERTY
PURSUANT TO SECTION 8(D), RULE 39 OF THE RULES OF COURT. 20
Foremost in petitioners’ arguments is their claim that they have been deprived of their right to due process of law
when the Sandiganbayan, in its April 3, 2006 Resolution, ordered for the forfeiture of Bugarin’s properties pursuant
to the January 30, 2002 Decision of this Court in the Republic case. They fault the selection process laid down in
the said case which purportedly denied them the opportunity to show that "not all of the late Bugarin’s properties
may be forfeited." Petitioners accuse the Sandiganbayan of allegedly reducing their rights to a simple mathematical
21
equation of subtracting the late Bugarin’s amassed wealth against his lawful income for the same period and using
the difference as basis for choosing the properties to be forfeited for the sole reason that their total acquisition cost
was closest to said difference. They, thus, want that another round of trial or hearing be conducted for "further
22
reception of evidence" to determine which among the properties enumerated in the Republic case are ill-gotten
23 24
wealth.
The Court finds no merit in the petition.
Section 2 of R.A. No. 1379, or the "Act declaring forfeiture in favor of the state any property found to have been
unlawfully acquired by any public officer or employee providing for the proceedings therefor," provides:
SEC 2. Filing of Petition. Whenever any public officer or employee has acquired during his incumbency an amount
of property which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other
lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property, said property shall be presumed prima facie to
have been unlawfully acquired. x x x.
Thus, when the government, through the PCGG, filed forfeiture proceedings against Bugarin, it took on the burden
of proving the following:
1. The public official or employee acquired personal or real properties during his/her incumbency;
2. This acquisition is manifestly disproportionate to his/her salary or other legitimate income; and
3. The existence of which gives rise to a presumption that these same properties were acquired prima
facie unlawfully.
After the government had established these, the burden to debunk the presumption was shifted to Bugarin. He had
to explain and adequately show that his acquisitions, even though they might appear disproportionate, were
nonetheless lawfully acquired. Section 6 of RA No. 1379 reads:
SEC.6. Judgment. If the respondent is unable to show to the satisfaction of the court that he has lawfully acquired
the property in question, then the court shall declare such property, forfeited in favor of the State, and by virtue of
such judgment the property aforesaid shall become property of the State, x x x.
It is evident in the case of Republic that upon filing the petition for forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan, the
government through the PCGG offered evidence to establish that the properties acquired by Bugarin during his
incumbency as NBI Director were manifestly disproportionate to the income he derived for the same period
establishing that presumption of prima facie unlawful acquisitions. For his part, Bugarin also offered his evidence.
This included no less than 15 witnesses and documentary evidence consisting of 48 exhibits. As earlier stated, the
Sandiganbayan dismissed the petition for insufficiency of evidence. On review, this Court assessed that the
dismissal was plagued with manifest errors and misapprehension of facts, thus, impelling this Court to once more
"pore over the evidence." In the end, it concluded that "respondent's (Bugarin’s) properties acquired from 1968 to
1980 which were out of proportion to his lawful income for the said period should be forfeited in favor of the
government for failure of the respondent to show, to the Court's satisfaction, that the same were lawfully acquired." 25
In this case, petitioners point out that "realizing that it did not have the power to receive evidence and to try facts,
this Honorable Court remanded the case to the Sandiganbayan for further reception of evidence as to what
properties should be forfeited in favor of the State."26
Nothing can be farther from the truth. In the Republic case, the Court already made a determination of what
properties were to be ordered forfeited. There were tables showing summaries of Bugarin’s real property
acquisitions, business investments, as well as shares in exclusive clubs, which were laid out and evaluated.
Proceeds of sales, rentals, fees and pensions were likewise enumerated and studied. The case was ordered
remanded to the Sandiganbayan to determine which properties, among those enumerated as forfeited, were to be
actually seized or taken in favor of the government and which were to remain with petitioners.
The Court pored over the evidence adduced during the hearing at the Sandiganbayan. In the Republic
case, Bugarin argued that some of the properties that were subject of the forfeiture proceedings were acquired by
him and his wife before he became the NBI Director; that the acquisition cost of the properties he acquired during
his incumbency was only ₱2.79 million; that in addition to his salaries as NBI Director, he received allowances from
both government and private entities; and lastly, that his income was also derived from his and his wife’s
investments. 27
The Court then took account of, and then valuated, all of Bugarin’s claims regarding his income from several
sources. The professional fee Bugarin received from a private law firm, although such act could have earned him an
administrative sanction, was nonetheless included but not the proceeds of his GSIS loan granted sometime in 1983.
Some rentals were similarly excluded from his lawful income because these were earned from 1981 to 1986, which
was beyond the period in question (1968 to 1980). The Court reasoned that the income from these rentals could not
have been used to finance the purchase of real properties and shareholdings prior to 1981. Besides, the legality of
said rentals is in itself of serious doubt since the source (the real property) from where it was derived was not wholly
acquired from lawful income. From the incomes that remained or were not excluded, the Court proceeded to deduct
28
the total personal expenses of Bugarin and his family based on an "extremely" conservative computation by the
Sandiganbayan in order to arrive at the difference which represented Bugarin’s lawful or disposable income that, in
turn, could have been used in acquiring his properties. Against this amount, the Court then compared his acquired
properties, and to quote:
From the summary of Bugarin’s assets, it can readily be seen that all of his real properties were purchased or
constructed, as the case may be, from 1968 to 1980. The total acquisition cost thereof was ₱1,705,583.00. With the
exception of those that had been liquidated, those acquired from 1981 onward, and those whose year of acquisition
could not be determined, his shareholdings in various corporations and other investments amounted to ₱464,580.00
Hence, for the period from 1968 to 1980, he amassed wealth in the amount of ₱2,170,163.00.
On the other hand, his total income from 1967 to 1980 amounted only to ₱ 766,548.00, broken down as follows:
Professional fees reflected in his Statement of Assets and Liabilities for

₱ 55,000.00
December 1969
Professional fees from the Law Firm of San Juan, Africa, Gonzales and San
210,000.00
Agustin from 1978 to 1980 at the rate of ₱ 70,000 per annum
Proceeds from the sale of his lot in Iloilo City in 1968 15,000.00
Salaries and Allowances from the NBI as reflected in his Income Statement
486,548.00
(assuming that this is accurate) 29
Total ₱ 766,548.00
It bears repeating that the proceeds of the loan granted to him by the GSIS in 1983 and the rental income from 1981
to 1986, as well as the proceeds of the sale of his real property in 1984, could not have been utilized by him as his
funds for the real properties and investment he acquired in 1980 and in the preceding years. His lawful income for
the said period being only ₱ 766,548.00, the same was grossly insufficient to finance the acquisition of his assets for
the said period whose aggregate cost was ₱ 2,170,163.00. This gross disparity would all the more be emphasized
had there been evidence of his actual family and personal expenses and tax payments.
Premises considered, respondent’s (Bugarin’s) properties acquired from 1968 to 1980 which were out of proportion
to his lawful income for the said period should be forfeited in favor of the government for failure of the respondent to
show, to the Court’s satisfaction, that the same was lawfully acquired. 30
Based on the assiduous reassessment of evidence in the Republic case, and after finding that Bugarin’s properties
acquired during the period in question were grossly disproportionate to his lawful income during the same period
without any satisfactory explanation as to how this came to be, the Court granted the petition, reversed and set
aside the Sandiganbayan’s dismissal of the forfeiture proceedings, and ordered forfeited in favor of the government
Bugarin’s properties acquired from 1968 to 1980 that were disproportionate to his lawful income earned during the
same period. The case was then remanded to the Sandiganbayan "for proper determination of properties to be
forfeited" in favor of the government.
31
The preceding summary of the Republic case, readily shows that Bugarin was accorded due process. He was given
his day in court to prove that his acquired properties were lawfully attained. A review of the full text of the said case
will reveal that the summary of properties acquired by Bugarin during his tenure as NBI Director was based on his
very own exhibits. From this enumeration, the Court set aside those properties that had been liquidated or those
that had been obtained in 1981 onwards. Even those properties whose acquisition dates could no longer be
determined were also excluded, all to the benefit of Bugarin. What remained was a trimmed down listing of
properties, from which the Sandiganbayan may choose in executing the order of forfeiture of the Court.
Moreover, in arriving at the amount representing his lawful income or disposable income during his incumbency as
NBI Director, the Court subtracted from Bugarin’s income as stated in "Exhibit -’38," the personal expenses of his
family, which according to the Court was quite conservative, again redounding to the benefit of Bugarin.
The essence of due process is the right to be heard. Based on the foregoing, Bugarin or his heirs were certainly not
32
denied that right. Petitioners cannot now claim a different right over the reduced list of properties in order to prevent
forfeiture, or at the least, justify another round of proceedings.
This Court continues to emphasize that due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded a fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy. Thus, when the party seeking due process was in
33
fact given several opportunities to be heard and air his side, but it is by his own fault or choice he squanders these
chances, then his cry for due process must fail. 34
When the case was remanded to the Sandiganbayan for execution, petitioners were likewise accorded due process.
Records of this case reveal that every motion by petitioners for resetting of hearing dates was granted, and every
motion filed, either for reconsideration or leave of court, was heard. Although their counsel claimed that he did not
receive the notice for the first hearing set on January 12, 2005 because it seemed that it was "sent to the wrong
address," the fact remains that by March 3, 2005, he had informed the Sandiganbayan of the mistake and, in fact,
35
provided it with the correct address. More importantly though, after the January 12, 2005 setting, five (5) more
36
hearings were set – May 5 and 6, September 29 and 30, and November 10, 2005. This time, petitioners were
37
represented. Instead of questioning the order of January 12, 2005, which required the government to submit its list
of properties to be forfeited from the delimited list found in the Republic decision, or seek leave to provide that court
with their own alternative list of properties from the same delimited list, petitioners chose to pursue the course of
seeking for the nth time the dismissal of the case altogether, an issue that had long been resolved and settled by
this Court in Republic.
In that hearing set on May 5, 2005, petitioners’ collaborating counsel, in open court, sought leave to file a motion to
dismiss. Necessarily, the hearing for that day and the following day were cancelled. On May 10, petitioners filed a
Manifestation and Ad Cautelam Motion to Dismiss, dated May 5, 2005. The OSG pointed out that, save for the
38
caption and the appellation of the parties, the above motion to dismiss was an exact replica of motion to dismiss
filed and eventually dismissed by the Court in Republic. Eventually petitioners’ motion for leave to file a motion to
39
dismiss was denied on August 8, 2005. The said Manifestation and Ad Cautelam Motion to Dismiss was
40
subsequently ordered stricken off the record by the Sandiganbayan on September 1, 2005. Unrelenting, petitioners
41
sought reconsideration which again resulted in the cancellation of the September 29 and 30 settings. Hearing was
next reset to November 10, 2005 but this also did not push through because petitioners’ motion for reconsideration
had not been resolved at that point. Hearing was eventually held on March 21, 2006. With petitioners duly
represented and despite the absence of the counsels for the government, the Sandiganbayan issued an order
declaring the case submitted for resolution and that it would determine which properties shall be forfeited. And as
42
expected, petitioners also sought reconsideration for this.
In the case of Philippine Guardian’s Brotherhood, Inc. v. COMELEC, this Court elucidated on this all too important
43
right to due process,
On the due process issue, we agree with the COMELEC that PGBI's right to due process was not violated for PGBI
was given an opportunity to seek, as it did seek, a reconsideration of Resolution No. 8679. The essence of due
process, we have consistently held, is simply the opportunity to be heard; as applied to administrative proceedings,
due process is the opportunity to explain one's side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The
requirement is satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the
controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is absolute lack of notice and hearing x x x. We find it obvious under the
attendant circumstances that PGBI was not denied due process. x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners should have realized in the fallo, as well as in the body of the Republic decision, that the properties listed
by this Court were all candidates for forfeiture. At that point, no additional proof or evidence was required. All that
was needed was for the Sandiganbayan, as the court of origin, to make sure that the aggregate sum of
the acquisition costs of the properties chosen remained within the amount which was disproportionate to the income
of Bugarin during his tenure as NBI Director. To reiterate, the case was only remanded to the Sandiganbayan to
implement the Court’s ruling in the Republic case.
To grant the petition and order the Sandiganbayan to receive evidence once again would be tantamount to
resurrecting the long-settled disposition in the Republic case. This cannot be permitted. In settling this once and for
all, Section 10 of R.A. No. 1379 is instructive.
SEC. 10. Effect of Record of Title. The fact that any real property has been recorded in the Registry of Property or
office of the Registry of Deeds in the name of respondent or of any person mentioned in paragraph (1) and (2) of
subsection (b) of section one hereof shall not prevent the rendering of the judgment referred to in section six of this
Act.
And paragraphs (1) and (2) referred to provide,
1. Property unlawfully acquired by the respondent, but its ownership is concealed by its being recorded in the name
of, or held by, the respondent’s spouse, ascendants, descendants, relatives, or any other person.
2. Property unlawfully acquired by the respondent, but transferred by him to another person or persons on or after
the effectivity of this Act.
It is equally clear in the earlier quoted fallo of the Republic that this Court had already made a determination, nay, a
declaration that the properties of the late Bugarin acquired from 1968 to 1980 which were disproportionate to his
lawful income were ordered forfeited in favor of the State. Following Section 6 of R.A. No. 1379, this means that the
late Bugarin, now being represented by the petitioners, failed to convince the Court that the delimited list of
properties were lawfully acquired. With this failure, the said properties have been ordered forfeited to the extent or
up to that which is disproportionate to his lawful or disposable income which was likewise determined by the Court in
that case.
The properties, consisting of real and other investments, acquired within the subject period were identified and listed
down in the case of Republic. Both the acquisition dates which were likewise indicated there were reckoned. Still
in Republic, the lawful income of Bugarin during the same period was also determined by the Court based on his
very own "Exhibit ‘38’" minus that tempered amount representing his as well as his family’s personal expenses.
Therefore, when the case was returned to the Sandiganbayan, it was not, as petitioners ardently claim – to conduct
another full blown trial or proceeding to determine or establish the very same things that this Court had long decided
in Republic. Rather, it was to choose from among the Court’s identified and declared reduced list of properties that
would approximate the amount which was beyond or out of proportion to Bugarin’s lawful income also identified and
declared by the High Tribunal in the same case.
The immutability of judgment that has long become final and executory is the core, the very essence of an effective
and efficient administration of justice. Thus, in Labao v. Flores, this Court reiterated the importance of the doctrine:
44
Needless to stress, a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be
modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and
whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land. All the issues between the
parties are deemed resolved and laid to rest once a judgment becomes final and executory; execution of the
decision proceeds as a matter of right as vested rights are acquired by the winning party. Just as a losing party has
the right to appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the
decision on the case. After all, a denial of a petition for being time-barred is tantamount to a decision on the merits.
Otherwise, there will be no end to litigation, and this will set to naught the main role of courts of justice to assist in
the enforcement of the rule of law and the maintenance of peace and order by settling justiciable controversies with
finality.
As regards the third issue, petitioners argue that since proceedings in the Republic case are civil in nature, the
Sandiganbayan, in executing the Republic decision, the late Bugarin’s personal properties should have been
exhausted before resorting to the forfeiture of real properties following Section 8, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
Once again, petitioners are mistaken. Categorizing forfeiture proceedings as civil rather than criminal is all too
simple. Petitioners, who at one point already took the opposite view, should know better. Forfeiture proceedings
under R.A. No. 1379 is a peculiarity.
In the Republic case, this Court held that it is civil in nature because the proceeding does not terminate in the
imposition of a penalty but merely in the forfeiture of the properties illegally acquired in favor of the government. In
addition, the procedure followed was that provided for in a civil action. Yet, in the case of Cabal v. Kapunan, the
45
Court also declared that forfeiture partakes the nature of a penalty. Thus, while the procedural aspect of these
proceedings remain civil in form, the very forfeiture of property found to be unlawfully acquired is inescapably in the
nature of a penalty.46
Necessarily, petitioners' position must fail. In forfeiting the properties of Bugarin enumerated in the list, the ultimate
end was to abandon and surrender the properties unlawfully acquired in favor of the government. It is not to simply
satisfy some certain or specific amount which can be done by merely proceeding with the personal properties first
and real properties next. More than the amount, it is the property, whether real 9r personal, that is illegally acquired
that is being sought to be seized or taken in favor of the government.
The properties of Bugarin in the list have been found unlawfully acquired. The same have been ordered forfeited in
favor of the government a decade ago. It is high time that the Republic decision be finally carried out.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, The Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan dated April 3, 2006 and August 30,
2006, implementing the January 30, 2002 Decision of the Court in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, are
hereby AFFIRMED.

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1.) A.M. No.

SB-14-21-J September 23, 2014

- Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes

2013, part of which reads:

THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Grace.

Isang tanong lang kay Ms. Sula.

THE CHAIRMAN. Your attention is called sa page –

MS. SULA. Sandiganbayan po, sorry. Mayroon po siyang binanggit na ano po –

THE CHAIRMAN. Nandito sa page 20.

MS. SULA. Si Mr. Ong, po, Justice Ong po.

THE CHAIRMAN. Gregory Ong.

MS. SULA Opo.

MS. SULA. Opo.

xxxx Sige, huwag kang matakot, Benhur.

SEN. ANGARA. Okay.

MS. SULA. Si Mr. Ong po, Justice Ong po.

THE CHAIRMAN. Gregory Ong.

MS. SULA. Opo.

THE CHAIRMAN. Sa Sandiganbayan?

explained the visit he had made to Mrs. Napoles as testified by Sula.

1. THE KEVLAR CASE

A Si Justice Gregory Ong po.

A Ano po, the year 2010 po ma' am.

Q And you met him (Justice Ong) in 2012?

Q That was after the decision was promulgated?

Q Nagbigay ng pera kay Justice Gregory Ong?

A Opo, yung ang sabi niya (referring to Ms. Napoles).

Q Do you remember when she made that kind of statement?

Q So he could get 13% interest?

Q So it is the check of Justice Ong, not the check of Ms. Napoles?

Q That belongs to Justice Ong?

The Chairman (Senator Teofisto Guingona III)

Si Mr. Ong po. Justice Ong po.

A Hindi po, pag nakasuhan na po kami sa Sandiganbayan.

A Opo, yung PDAF sa Sandiganbayan.

Q Pagdating ng kaso sa Sandiganbayan?

Q Is that in your affidavit?

A Opo, doon sa Sandiganbayan.

Q x x x you told me that somebody will help in the Kevlar case?

3. That respondent was attending parties of the Napoleses; and

That is your prerogative.

I don't think it would be necessary, your honor.

Justice Gutierrez (to Atty. Geronilla)

The Court's Ruling

In Caneda v. Alaan, we held that:

Indeed, respondent must always bear in mind that:

'30. Social relations

As we held in Sibayan-Joaquin v. Javellana 25

I don't know, your honor.

I will heed to that advice, your honor.

Your honor, talking about ....

Q Do you admit you committed a lapse along that line?

G.R. No. 220598

G.R. No. 220953

The information reads:

remained pending and unresolved todate.

May 9, 2014, respectively.

In the November 5, 2013 Resolution, We said:

PETITIONER STRONGLY SUBMITS THAT PROSECUTION FAILED TO ESTABLISH BY PROOF BEYOND

B. THERE IS NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION BECAUSE THE SANDIGANBAYAN MERELY

2. ARROYO'S ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN THE PROCEEDINGS ARISING FROM OR RELATING TO SB-12-

D. ARROYO IS NOT ENTITLED TO A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER BECAUSE THE CRIMINAL

Ruling of the Court