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HOOVER INSTITUTION PRESS

Stanford University, Stanford, California 94305
The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, founded at
Stanford University in 1919 by the late President Herbert Hoover,
is a center for advanced study and research on public and international
affairs in the twentieth century. The views expressed in its publications
are entirely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views
o f the staff, officers, or Board o f Overseers o f the Hoover Institution.

Hoover Institution Publications 156

© 1976 by the Board of Trustees of the

Leland Stanford Junior University
All rights reserved
Printed in the United States of America
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 75-41903
International Standard Book Number 0-8179-6561-3
 F or

Ruth
John T.
Kathleen
Maureen
 Contents

Preface ix

Chapter
1. The Setting 1
2. The Early Years 7
3. Ideology—Unity Above All Else 23
4. The Growth of the Party in Syria 47
5. The Merger 63
6. The Road to the Formation of the UAR 79
7. The Growth of the Party outside Syria 99
8. The High Tide of Arab Unity 115
9. The Black Year (I)—Syria 131
10. The Black Year (II)—Iraq and the
Split with Nasir 149
11. The National Party Congresses of 1959
and 1960 169
12. The New Party 187
13. Changes in Ideology 211
14. Springtime of Hope; Another Attempt
at Unity 231
15. Nine Months in Iraq 255
16. Military Ascendancy in Syria 281
17. Concluding Observations 309

Appendix A. National Congresses and Commands 327

Appendix B. Regional Congresses and Commands—
Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon 333
Appendix C. A Small Profile of Leading Party Members 343
Appendix D. The Constitution of the Bacth Party 345

Bibliography 353

Index 363
 Preface

This volume traces the rise, the spread, the successes, and the disasters of
the Bacth Party from its founding to the great schism in 1966, when its
founders were expelled from Syria and the party split into two mutually
antagonistic organizations. Since that time, two Bacth parties have existed
and have pursued their separate ways. Sharing as they do a common origin,
each claims to be the sole legitimate descendent of the original party. The
material included in this book can provide a background for the reader of
today who seeks to understand the attitudes of the Bacthists of the 1970s,
the sorts of institutions the parties have established, and the issues that
divide Damascus and Baghdad. Today the parties differ not only from each
other but also from the party as it began and lived its formative years. The
conflicting aims and political philosophy of the leaders of the party, long
concealed behind their common acceptance of the notion that the Bacth was
cAflaq and Bitar’s party, are treated in some detail. So are the appearance
of military men in the party apparatus, how they captured it in Syria, and
why they failed to capture it in Iraq.
A word on transliteration. I have used a modification of the system used
in the Middle East Journal. There are no diacritical marks and no initial
hamza. Where commonly accepted place-name spellings exist, (e.g.,
Beirut, Damascus) I have used them.
A large part of the research and the initial drafting of some three-
quarters of this manuscript was undertaken during a year of residence as
research associate at the Hoover Institution, 1968-1969, during which I
made substantial use of the material in the Institution’s library, in particu­
lar, its files of Middle Eastern periodicals. I wish to extend particular
thanks to the personnel of that Institution—the Curator and Assistant
Curator of the Near East Collection, George Rentz and Michel Nabti, the
librarians, the staff in various offices, and Alan Belmont, former Associate
Director.
Thanks are due to a number of other people who were of great help in
this enterprise. I owe a great deal to my former colleague, Gordon H.
Torrey, who shared his knowledge of Syria—and indeed of the entire
Middle East—and generously allowed me to use his collection of material
on that area. Professor Torrey also read the manuscript and made a number
of useful suggestions. Joseph Estassi assisted me through translating and
abstracting much useful material. The manuscript has a quality of precision
it would have lacked but for the typing, grammatical skills, and dedication
to perfection of Mrs. Bettie Neff, who typed the final text. A few prefer to
remain anonymous, but I greatly appreciate exchanges of views with them
and the insights they helped me acquire. Special appreciation goes to my
wife, who transcribed the initial draft and gave constant support to the
whole endeavor.
While I am grateful to all who helped in this enterprise, none bears any
responsibility for the contents of this book. That must be mine. The Central
Intelligence Agency, in whose Offices of National Estimates and Political
Research I have worked since 1960, granted me a sabbatical year during
which I did much of the research for this book. The work is based entirely
on publicly available material; I used no information available to me solely
because of my employment in the Agency or the federal government. The
judgments and opinions expressed herein are mine and do not necessarily
reflect those of the Agency or government.

John F. Devlin
McLean, Virginia
April 1975
 The Setting

In 1939 when World War II broke out in Europe, a climate favoring major
political change was developing in the Arab East. Twenty years earlier, the
victorious allies had completed a century-long process of reducing the
Ottoman Empire to its Turkish nucleus. Their final step was the removal of
Istanbul’s Arab provinces from Ottoman control. Ostensibly the provinces
were liberated; in fact, one suzerainty was replaced by another. Britain and
France divided the conquered area according to their own interests—Iraq,
Transjordan, and Palestine went to Britain, Syria and Lebanon to France.
Outright colonial acquisition having become somewhat unfashionable,
owing to the rise of a multitude of colonial movements for national
independence, the allied powers invented the mandate. Under the mandate
system, the League of Nations awarded the various territories taken from
Germany and Turkey to the victors to administer and guide along the road
to self-government and independence. In the Middle East, a few out-of-
the-way areas escaped foreign control, but in the 1920s and 1930s the vast
bulk of the Arab people lived in states dominated by European powers,
either under the mandates or earlier arrangements, such as Britain’s in
Egypt and the Sudan or France’s in North Africa.
Undoubtedly there were some benefits to the mandate system. Arab
areas had been liberated from Ottoman rule, which had been both corrupt
in administration and increasingly Turkish nationalist in spirit in the years
before 1914. The new administrations were more honest and more effi­
cient. In all the mandated territories, a substantial number of local
notables, seeing the benefits to be gained and judging direct opposition to
French and British control to be ineffective, accepted the idea and practice
of foreign tutelage. But valuable as British and French supervision and
assistance were in providing needed technical and administrative skills,
these services were scarcely sufficient to make them popular with the
people in the several states, who had not been given much choice in
accepting the mandates. Foreign troops garrisoned their land; really impor­
tant decisions were made by advisers, high commissioners, or these
2 THE BACTH PARTY

gentlemen’s superiors in London or Paris; and political activity was

severely restricted.
The decades between the two world wars were marked by opposition to
tutelary control in virtually all of the Arab East. The British in Iraq had a
major revolt on their hands in 1920 even before the mandate was granted.
They had to move with great care to ensure that Faysal I, whom they
brought to Iraq in 1921, was accepted by Iraqi political leaders.1 Indeed,
just over ten years later, strong political forces in Iraq compelled Britain to
terminate the mandate and seek formal independence for the country. In
Syria, the French successfully resisted pressure for independence until
World War II, but had to employ extreme measures to do so, including
dividing the country into five separate states at one point. In Palestine, the
issue was not so much mandatory rule as it was that of Jewish immigration
and the establishment of a Jewish state under Britain’s aegis. Egypt,
enjoying a greater measure of domestic political liberty than the others,
haggled endlessly over Britain’s role as protector and its special position in
the country.
The natural consequence of the political ferment throughout the Arab
East was the growth of the Arabs’ desire to rule themselves, a desire that in
fact pre-dated the First World War. The movement for Arab self-rule was
centered in the Ottoman Province of Syria, which encompassed what are
now Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan, and the Turkish district of Iskanderun
(formerly known as the Sanjak of Alexandretta), and Damascus was in a
special way “ the” Arab city. Organizations seeking Arab independence
had appeared there well before 1914, and the Turks had hanged a number
of Arab patriots there in 1915. Damascus was the logical goal of the Amir
Faysal’s forces operating east of the Jordan Valley in cooperation with
Allenby in the final campaigns against the Turks in 1918.
Faysal set up a short-lived government in Damascus, that lasted until
French forces smashed his army at Maysalun on the Damascus road two
years later and sent him into exile. Although his government could show
few successes to its credit in those years, it had no great failures either. Its
extinction, which was a cruel blow to the aspirations of Arab nationalists,
severely damaged the reputations of the European states as fair, trustwor­
thy, and sincere guardians and promoters of Arab independence.
Moreover, the ease with which French forces took a solitary Syria helped
Arab political thinkers to conclude that Arab unity, a worthy and natural
cause in its own right, was essential if they were to become strong enough
to shake off foreign control.
Independence, or the struggle for it, took precedence over efforts to
build Arab unity, however, in the inter-war period. For the most part,
political groups in each Arab state worked and fought for liberty without
regard to groups engaged in the same struggle next door. They did not.
The Setting 3

however, work in total isolation from one another. News traveled; what
happened in one capital usually became known in others. People traveled,
too; a fair number of Arabs moved from one country to another. Iraq, for
example, attracted teachers from the Levant where, because modem
education had been introduced earlier than in Iraq, more qualified people
were available. As time passed, contacts grew stronger, experiences were
exchanged, comparisons made, similarities noted. The notion that the
Arabs were one community and should form one polity began to circulate
more widely.
Acceptance of the concept of Arab unity did not come easily; many
resisted the notion for sectarian, cultural, or personal reasons. The idea of
unity had not even penetrated some parts of the Arab world before World
War II. The heartland of the idea—and for all practical purposes its
birthplace—was geographic Syria. The former Ottoman province, now
divided into many parts, was itself an object lesson, a microcosm of the
entire Arab world. External forces had divided it; individually, its parts
were weak; collectively, they formed a logical and historic unity. By
extension the concept applied to the entire Arab world; wipe out the
unnatural divisions imposed by external powers and the Arabs would
regain the power, prestige, and glory they had enjoyed for centuries. Such
was the dream, talked about in coffeehouses, written of in pamphlets and
books, spoken of in lectures.2
Political realities in the late 1930s seemed to be arrayed overwhelm­
ingly against the possibility of creating an independent state embracing all
Arabs. The North African states had scarcely heard of the idea;
Bourguiba’s Neo-Destour Party had begun its unilateral fight for Tunisian
independence from French protection. In Egypt, getting the British out of
the Nile Valley was the paramount issue. In greater Syria itself, the Syrian
Nationalist Party (al-Hizb al-Qawmi al-Suri), which Antun Sacadah
founded in the early 1930s, advocated the reunification of the former
Ottoman province of Syria with Iraq and Cyprus as a natural entity.
But in all states there were, and would continue to be, cabinet ministers,
politicians, military officers, administrators, and others whose entire lives
and careers were bound up in their own states; for such as these, unity had
little appeal. Some, of course, believed in collaboration and cooperation
among Arabs; others had designs on their smaller Arab neighbors, as, for
example, Iraq with respect to Kuwait and Egypt with respect to the Sudan.
These notions of cooperation, however, led to the establishment of the
Arab League, an organization which, because it required unanimity among
its members in order to act, rarely acted at all.
A number of events in the late 1930s and early 1940s provided the
stimulus for the formation of the Bacth Party. Three stand out. Probably
most important was the crushing defeat of France by the Nazis in 1940 and
4 THE BACTH PARTY

the consequent weakening of its power in its overseas dominions, even

though Syria and Lebanon remained under the control of the Vichy
Government after the fall of France. Indeed, the territory was made
available to the German Air Force to provide support to Rashid cAli
Gaylani’s movement in Iraq in the spring of 1941. The dangers of pro-Nazi
control of these areas led the British and the Free French to invade both
Syria and Lebanon in June 1941. The Free French representative. Delegate
General Catroux, promised in a statement issued the day the invasion
began that the Lebanese and Syrians would “ be from henceforth sovereign
and independent peoples.” 3 Five years of political turmoil and civil strife,
ending with the French shelling of Damascus, were to pass before his
promise was completely redeemed. However, it served to open up political
possibilities in Syria.
A second, earlier event had deeply affected public opinion in Syria. In
the process of carving up the former Ottoman dominions after the conclu­
sion of World War I, the Allied Powers had devised a special status for the
Sanjak of Alexandretta, an Ottoman province at the northeast comer of the
Mediterranean, after a year or more of righting between French and
Turkish forces in 1920 and 1921. The heavily Turkish districts of the
former Ottoman wilayet of Aleppo were transferred to the new Turkish
Republic; the Sanjak remained a part of Syria under a separate regime with
special facilities for its Turkish minority. Turkish was to be an official
language and the Turks were to “ have all facilities for the development of
their culture.” 4 This system had worked reasonably well until 1936,
although Nortem Syria had a long record of raids and counter-raids
between Arab and Turkish sections of the population during this period.
In 1936, the Turkish government and the Turks in the Sanjak became
concerned because the draft treaty under which France planned to grant
independence to Syria would have put the Sanjak under Syrian Arab
control rather than French control. Hence the Turks continued to press for
substantial revisions of the special agreement of 1921, even though the
French National Assembly had refused to ratify the treaty. In 1938,
elections in the Sanjak produced a Turkish majority in the legislature and a
solidly Turkish administration, and in 1939, France and Turkey reached an
agreement whereby the Sanjak formally became a part of the Turkish
Republic.
Incorporation of the Sanjak into the Turkish Republic outraged many
Syrians, who believed, with considerable justification, that the government
in Ankara had moved Turks into the Sanjak in large numbers in order to
achieve a majority. Opinion in Syria overwhelmingly took the view that the
Sanjak of Alexandretta was an integral part of Syria and that the French had
simply connived in the illicit transfer of a piece of Syrian territory to
The Setting 5

Turkish control. Syrian feelings of outrage were reinforced by the arrival of

Arab refugees from the Sanjak, including many politically active men, who
moved to Syria after the 1938 elections.
The third event to pave the way for the Bacth Party was the formation of
the Rashid cAli Gaylani government in Iraq in the spring of 1941. Iraq had
become formally independent in 1932, but retained close ties to Britain,
especially in defense and security affairs. By treaty, Britain retained the
right to maintain certain forces in Iraq. When, under the pressure created
by German military successes, London introduced larger forces, the
nationalist government of Gaylani objected. Fighting broke out and the
Iraqis tried to capture the British base at Habbaniyah. Military develop­
ments in Iraq caught the attention of young Arab nationalists in Syria, and
several Syrians, acting in accordance with the principles of Arab unity,
went to Iraq to offer their services to the Gaylani regime. Among them
were Akram Hawrani, soon to become a leader of an anti-feudal movement
in the Hama district of central Syria, Jamal Atasi, and some young military
officers. When British forces crushed the Gaylani movement, all were
deported or fled from Iraq to Syria, where they were interned by the French
authorities.5
So, twenty years after the first hopes of pan-Arab nationalists had
crumbled with the rout of Fay sal’s army at May salun—twenty years in
which most Arab political effort had focused on individual states—the time
was ripe for the formation of a pan-Arab political party. The failures of
individual countries to assert their independence against tutelary powers,
the alienation of Arab soil, a growing sense of Arab purpose as distinct
from Syrian, Iraqi, or other purpose, symbolized by the Syrians who
rushed to side with Gaylani, all played their part. So, too, did opportunity
itself. To the nationalists in Syria, England must have seemed too powerful
to be shaken loose from its control of Iraq. But France, weakened by its
defeat at the hands of the Germans, was another matter, and Syria seemed a
more fertile field of action.

Notes
1. Philip W. Ireland, Independent Iraq (London: Jonathan Cape, 1937), de­
scribes the methods used to gain an official 96 percent majority for Faisal in a
referendum (pp. 332-34).
2. There are several standard works on the subject of Arab unity, e.g., George
Antonius, The Arab Awakening (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1938); Hazim Zaki
6 THE BACTH PARTY

Nuseibeh, The Ideas o f Arab Nationalism (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press,
1956); Fayez A. Sayegh, Arab Unity: Hope and Fulfillment (New York: Devin-
Adair, 1958). See also William L. Cleveland, The Making o f an Arab Nationalist
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971), which is a study of Satic
al-Husri, who was a prolific exponent of the concepts of Arab nationalism and
unity.
3. S. H. Longrigg, Syria and Lebanon Under the French Mandate (London:
Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 310.
4. Ibid., p. 119.
5. Patrick Seale, The Struggle fo r Syria: A Study o f Post-war Arab Politics,
1945-1958 (London: Oxford-University Press, 1965), p. 10, n. 6.
 - 2 -

The Early Years

The founders of the Bacth were, on the surface, a trio unlikely to effect
major—indeed revolutionary—change in society and politics. Three intel­
lectuals, each a school teacher for some period, who came of age
politically in the early years of the French mandate, Michel cAflaq, Greek
Orthodox Christian from Damascus, Salah al-Din Bitar, Sunni Muslim
from the Maydan quarter of the same city, and Zaki Arsuzi, cAlawi from
Alexandretta, shared a belief in Arab nationalism. All three had been
educated at the Sorbonne in Paris, and the first two worked in harmony for
more than a quarter-century in active politics. Arsuzi was a loner, as­
sociated for short periods with various nationalist groups, able to attract
disciples, but unwilling to participate long in any organization of which he
was not the acknowledged leader. The contributions that cAflaq and Bitar,
on the one hand, and Arsuzi, on the other, made to the founding of the
Bacth must be discussed separately, for paradoxically, all three were never
members of one party, though many of Arsuzi’s followers joined the Bacth
as the years went by. The fourth figure, who made a great input to the
Bacth, Akram Hawrani, came along much later, and is discussed in
Chapter 5.
Zaki Arsuzi, the oldest of the three and first in the field of politics, was
especially active in opposing France’s treatment of Alexandretta under the
mandate. He may have inherited a taste for political activism from his
father, who had been noted—and penalized—for anti-Ottoman activities.
Similarly, Zaki Arsuzi lost his teaching job in 1934 for opposing manda­
tory policies too vigorously.1 Even so, Arsuzi remained very active in
politics as a member of the National Action League (cAsabat al-cAmal
al-Qawmi). The League, which flourished among young Syrians from
1932 to the outbreak of World War II, opposed the mandate and in its early
years supported the National Bloc in its struggle for Syrian independence.
The League was a purist’s organization; it forbade cooperation with the
mandatory power and expelled Sabri al-cAsali, one of its founders, when
he became a deputy in the assembly.
8 THE BACTH PARTY

The League fought as best it could for the retention of the Sanjak of
Alexandretta, even as it sensed its inevitable loss. Arsuzi was in the thick
of this struggle in 1937 both within the League and outside it. He was, for
example, active in organizing the executive committee of a pro-Arab
congress convened in Antioch at the end of June 1937, which attracted
delegates from many of the major towns in the Sanjak. The delegates
included Armenians, Circassians, and Kurds2; apparently anyone who
might be anti-Turkish was welcome. Toward the end of the year Arsuzi
was arrested for involvement in an Arab-Turkish fracas, again in Antioch.3
Antioch seems to have been his primary locus of activity at this time; he is
named as the League’s spokesman in Antioch protesting to the French High
Commissioner at the cession of Cilicia to Turkey.4 Once the elections of
September 1938 confirmed Turkish control (the Turkish majority in the
assembly voted to set up an autonomous Republic of Hatay, which was
scarcely independent), there was no future for such as Zaki Arsuzi. He left
for Damascus.
By this time the National Action League had fallen on bad times. Arsuzi
left it, and the National Bloc politicians had little use for it. Naturally
enough, some intellectual circles in Damascus felt that there should be a
political organization to advance the cause of Arabism and debated the
subject frequently. Once in 1939, a group composed of Michel Quzman,
Zaki Arsuzi, Michel cAflaq, Salah al-Din Bitar, Shakir al-cAs, and Ilyas
Qandalaft got as far as deciding to form an organization, but it did not last
beyond the first meeting.5 This is the only occasion that Arsuzi and cAflaq
and Bitar were in any way associated in the same organization. Arsuzi had
a personal dislike for cAflaq, who appears to have reciprocated the
feeling.6
Despite their personal animosity, the two men shared some political
views. That the Arabs were one nation, for example, was the cardinal
principle of a party, the Arab Nationalist (qawmi) Party, which Arsuzi
founded early in 1939.7 The party also stressed the need of the Arabs to
reach back centuries into their past for inspiration and to shuck off foreign
influences that had long held sway in Arab lands. In keeping with Arsuzi’s
domineering personality, the party espoused the view that Arabs should
have a single leader who would release the latent energies of the Arab
nation.8 Exclusively his personal creation, the Arab Nationalist Party did
not survive Arsuzi’s move to Iraq to teach for the 1939-1940 school term.
Back in Damascus in 1940, Arsuzi once again collected a small circle of
admirers. Soon he formed a party with a membership of six—all
students—typically after lecturing to them for hours. Named al-Bacth
al-cArabi (the Arab Resurrection), it included Sami al-Jundi, who was just
beginning his first year at the university, and cAbd al-Halim Qaddur. The
The Early Years 9

number of members rose as high as two dozen in the course of the next two
years, even though the hazards of political activism were substantial; three
members were jailed for distributing leaflets.9 The little group faltered
when Arsuzi was exiled from Damascus in 1941, but revived a bit the next
year.10
Arsuzi’s little party was one of many such groups which flourished in
intellectual circles in Syria’s cities at this period. One similar in numbers
and composition collected around Michel cAflaq and Salah al-Din Bitar,
who had returned to Damascus after taking degrees at the Sorbonne in
1932. For the next ten years they taught at the Tajhiz Secondary School in
that city. During this time, they slowly established reputations as writers
and political thinkers. cAflaq published articles in al-Tariq al-ShuyuHyah
(the Communist Way) and in the newspaper al-Ayyam. 11 In all likelihood,
his publication in the former is the origin of the frequently repeated
assertion that cAflaq had been a Communist early in his career (see Chapter
3 below). But most important for the future Bacth Party, the two began to
gather followers and to exert an influence that persisted as those followers
went on to university and into professional life, especially as teachers, for
the major recruiting ground of the party in Syria’s provinces would be the
government secondary schools.
cAflaq’s and Bitar’s group began its political activity in much the same
way that Arsuzi’s students had—listening to the words of a master, then
spreading the master’s views in conversation and in an occasional tract.
cAflaq, recalling this beginning activity, cited 1940 as the date for the
Bacth’s founding.12 Potential recruits for both groups came from the same
pool. Jundi makes the point that only he and one other of Arsuzi’s little
band had not studied under cAflaq; Jundi had gone to secondary school in
Aleppo. Indeed, members, but not the masters, of one group frequently
attended meetings of the other.
Although they worked in parallel ways and aimed at similar goals, there
was little cooperation. Arsuzi was jealous of his own prestige. He reacted
with great hostility when Jundi showed him an cAflaq group tract signed
al-Bacth al-cArabi, saying: “ This is an imperialist scheme to block our
access to the people by using a movement bearing our name.’’13 Arsuzi
grew to be suspicious of just about everyone who didn’t follow him
uncritically. His suspicions, combined with family illness and poverty,
caused him to move to Lattaqiyah in 1944 and then down the coast to
Tartus. He virtually ceased political activity for a time. His group broke
up, but retained their personal loyalties to the master.14 In the 1950s,
Arsuzi again taught high school in Damascus, where he was “ the cAlawi
intellectual in residence in the capital [and] . . . close to . . . [cAlawi]
Syrian university students . . . .’’15
10 THE BACTH PARTY

There have been serious disagreements as to the relative importance of

Arsuzi and of cAflaq in stimulating the movement that became the Bacth
Party. The interpretation that “ In 1943 cAflaq and Bitar plus only some ten
followers absorbed the only real contribution of al-Arsouzi’s [sic] Alex-
andretta group by effecting a merger and calling the new party . . . the
Bacath,” 16 is the one offered by cAflaq’s supporters. The charge that
cAflaq never had an original thought and that he stole both Arsuzi’s ideas
and followers has been made by anti-cAflaq people.17 In fact, the two had
much in common in their intellectual background, in their French educa­
tion, in their family history of opposition to external rulers, and in their
belief in Arabism. In all likelihood each influenced the other to some
degree—though neither would be willing to admit it—as would appear
from Jundi’s description of the membership of each circle.
What came to be the significant difference, however, was that Arsuzi
virtually dropped out of public and literary life in the early 1940s. cAflaq
and Bitar were just gathering momentum. In 1942, the two had come to
feel that their life work lay in the field of politics and not in teaching.
Deciding to devote their efforts to freeing Syria from French control, they
resigned the teaching posts they had held in the Tajhiz Secondary School in
Damascus ever since their return from Paris and went into full-time
political work. They issued a number of bulletins and pamphlets in the
name of “ The Arab Revitalization (ihyâ') Movement,” but also used the
Bacth label on occasion. These activities were conducted on a very modest
scale; pamphlets and statements were circulated, mostly among secondary
schools and university students, by the dozen or so adherents and sup­
porters of cAflaq and Bitar. Their organization, if the rudimentary circle of
disciples could be called that, continued after Arsuzi’s had collapsed,
acting as a pole of attraction for anyone with nationalist, pan-Arab ideas.
Arsuzi could, and did, retain the loyalty of his followers, but even such
persons as Sami al-Jundi, cAbd al-Halim Qaddur, and Wahib al-Ghanim
(of whom more later) became members of the Bacth Party led by Bitar and
cAflaq.
cAflaq’s and Bitar’s movement attracted additional supporters as a
consequence of the abortive effort by Rashid cAli Gaylani’s government in
Iraq to face down the British. The two organized demonstrations in
Damascus in Gaylani’s favor. Among the Syrians who went to Iraq to offer
their services to the short-lived Gaylani regime were Jamal al-Atasi, a
member of cAflaq’s circle, and Akram Hawrani of Hama.
Arsuzi differed from cAflaq; he refused to give support to Gaylani’s
cause, apparently sensing that it didn’t have much chance of succeeding.18
Many years later, Arsuzi claimed that cAflaq’s opportunism in this
instance—supporting the Axis, which came to Gaylani’s aid, while profes-
The Early Years 11

sing to hold progressive ideas—was the chief reason for his aversion to
him.19 This charge seems to be an oversimplification, albeit one that would
be in line with Arsuzi’s character. In fact, each was so sure that he was the
proper leader of the Arab resurrection that neither could defer to the other.
From 1943 on, cAflaq, Bitar, and their supporters used the term Bacth
(resurrection) in place of the earlier more common use of ihya'
(revitalization). The first mention of Harakat al-Bacth al-cArabi (the Arab
Resurrection Movement) appears in a statement issued by cAflaq and Bitar
in support of Shukri Quwatli in June 1943.20 Although the movement
gained some new members, it seems unlikely that it numbered more than a
score of people in 1943.21
In 1943, after delaying for a year, the French finally agreed to hold
elections for a national assembly in Syria. cAflaq and Bitar put themselves
up as candidates for seats from Damascus. In a flyer issued over their
signatures in June they appealed to voters on grounds of patriotism and
nationalism. They were quite specific in saying that rather than forming a
political party, they represented the Arab Bacth movement in the new age
(al-Jil al-Jadid), a movement they expected to remain a militant move­
ment for a long time to come.22 Another flyer advertised the two as
representing “ Arab spirit against materialistic communism” and “ the vital
Arab history against dead reaction,” 23 but neither was elected. (cAflaq got
only 245 votes.24) Indeed, their strength never lay in the electoral field.
cAflaq ran for parliament two more times and was defeated on both
occasions. Bitar finally secured a parliamentary seat after a closely con­
tested run-off in 1954.
Despite electoral failure, the movement was launched, and it began to
pick up strength and supporters as the years went by. For the remainder of
the mandatory period, the Bacthists engaged in propaganda against the
French and, at times, against certain Syrian politicians; they also pros­
elytized among secondary school students. In the relatively freer political
atmosphere obtaining under the Syrian ministries formed after the 1943
election, the movement expanded both vertically and horizontally. By this
time the secondary school students who had been indoctrinated by cAflaq
and Bitar throughout the 1930s had begun to move up into the Syrian
university, where they spread the movement’s doctrines among their fellow
students, and out to the provinces after graduation.
The size of the Bacth in these early years, indeed, throughout its
history, is a matter on which precise information frequently is lacking. I
have not been able to gain access to any official party statistics on numbers
of members or supporters or of the precise number of subdivisions in the
party. There are only occasional snippets of information on the size of
membership. The editor of the Nidal al-Bacth series, an informed Bacthist,
12 THE BAeTH PARTY

estimated the number of Bacthists in the spring of 1945 in the hundreds.25

Bacth documents give fuller but by no means complete indication of the
organizational status of the movement. By April 1945, however, it had
grown to the point where personal contact through open meetings of all
adherents was no longer an adequate means of communicating with all its
members. In that month, the first internal party circular, discussing the
Bacth’s views of the newly formed Arab League, was distributed to
members.26 The bulk of the members were still concentrated in Damascus
but branches were established in the districts of Homs, Lattaqiyah, and
Aleppo.
At this point also, the movement’s leaders began to consider the Bacth a
political party rather than a movement. In August 1944, cAflaq signed a
propaganda bulletin on behalf of the Arab Bacth Bureau (Maktab al-Bacth
al-cArabi).21 “ Party” (hizb) begins to replace “ movement” (harakah) in
the signature or the heading on Bacth documents, and on July 10, 1945,
cAflaq, Salah al-Din Bitar, and Midhat Bitar identified themselves as the
central executive body of the Arab Bacth Party (Hizb al-Bacth al-cArabi)
when they applied for a license to function as a legal political party.28
Although the three were applying for a license to function as a party in
Syria, the application pointed out that the Bacth Party was interested in all
parts of the Arab nation and addressed its appeal to all Arabs. The theme of
pan-Arabism appears constantly in its bulletins, statements, and broad­
sheets. The request for a license was not granted. The party renewed its
application for a license in May 1946, after the French had left Syria.29
Legal or not, the Bacth was in full swing as a political party by the end
of 1945. In December of that year, a general meeting of the party
membership was held in Damascus. It issued a statement ranging over a
broad array of Arab problems, the Palestine question, relations with
England and France, and conditions in virtually all Arab countries.30 At
about this time, the central executive body of the party was expanded to
include Jalal al-Sayyid, from Dayr al-Zur in northeast Syria. He, cAflaq,
Salah, and Midhat Bitar were to remain the leadership body until the
formal founding congress of the party was held in 1947. Arsuzi’s follow­
ers, as a group, remained distinct from the organized Bacth Party through
1945 and 1946,31 though individuals did join.32
Dissemination of the party’s ideas and expansion of its influence among
politically conscious elements required something better than handbills,
occasional pamphlets, and articles in those newspapers whose editors could
be persuaded to publish writings of these somewhat intense young men.
Hence, after the departure of the French, the party moved to obtain its own
press outlet, and the first issue of its daily newspaper, al-Bacth, appeared
on July 3, 1946. Salah Bitar was the responsible editor, i.e., the man who
The Early Years 13

would be subject to legal action if the paper contravened Syrian law, and
cAflaq was the political editor. The paper was issued under the party
slogan, “ One Arab nation, one immortal mission.” Its checkered career
reflected the fortunes of the party to a considerable extent. Over the years,
it has been suspended, ceased publication for a time, been a weekly and a
daily. In its first sixteen months as a daily paper, it averaged an issue every
two days. It was suspended for the greater part of 1948 and 1949.
Nonetheless, it served the party’s purposes well, enabling it to reach an
audience outside the schools and cultural organizations in which its
members were located, and helping the party faithful to keep in touch with
the thinking of their leaders.
Of great importance, also, was the stream of broadsheets and pamphlets
and the numerous speeches before groups of students and in schools and
cultural clubs, which Michel cAflaq and Salah al-Din Bitar and, to a lesser
extent, brother Bacthist intellectuals, produced or gave during the first
fifteen years or so of the movement’s existence. In the 1950s, books and
more learned articles, some individually printed, some in responsible and
respectable journals, spread the party’s philosophy even further.
cAflaq’s own personality was a very strong factor in the spread of the
party’s doctrine and influence. Small and slightly built, cAflaq was neither
a dynamic nor a heroic figure, but his intensity and devotion to the Arab
nation and to the principles he believed in were of great influence in
attracting idealistic followers to the Bacth cause. He was a romantic. Jundi
describes him as having “ the guilelessness of a child and the aspiration of
the old; in his personality were contradictory elements of strength and
weakness.” 33 He could inspire people, but he wanted things done his way.
Operating in a society in which financial irregularity was common­
place, cAflaq has enjoyed a reputation of living simply and caring little for
wealth; indeed, his indifference to public appearance is somewhat legend­
ary. There is a story, told by those who knew him personally, that his
concentration on political work and activity was so intense at times that he
would get a new suit only when his friends would go and buy him a new set
of clothing, because they felt it simply was not proper for the leader of an
important party to look quite so shabby.
Throughout 1946, the Bacth Party continued its campaign to hasten the
French withdrawal, to Syrianize the administration and the army, and to
spread its triple slogan of independence, unity, and socialism for the entire
Arab world. During this period, it acted pretty much as would any
conventional political party in an Arab state. The party was not a secret
organization in any sense. Its leaders issued pamphlets and publications in
their own names and opened an office in Damascus and branch offices
elsewhere in Syria. It advocated participation in the parliamentary system.
14 THE BACTH PARTY

Except for its pan-Arabism, it was on the surface a perfectly ordinary

political movement consisting mostly of high school and college students.
Its leaders were in their early to mid-thirties and most of its adherents were
under twenty-five. It received almost no notice from political commen­
tators on the Syrian scene and, in all likelihood, was considered by the
old-time Syrian politicians as an ephemeral movement which would
disappear once the students left college and got involved in more practical
political organizations.
For the party itself, however, size was becoming a problem. It had
started to issue internal circulars for party members as early as 1945, a
practice the party continued when necessary in succeeding years. From
time to time the leaders found it necessary to call a general meeting to
discuss general affairs and gain a sense of party feeling on various Arab
problems. By 1947, the party had branches in Syria’s half-dozen major
cities and members in many of the larger provincial towns, and the party
leaders realized the time had come to put the organization on a more formal
basis. They also wanted to institutionalize the relationship they had had for
several years with Arsuzi’s followers. According to Wahib al-Ghanim,
cAflaq and Bitar visited him in Lattaqiyah early in 1947 to arrange the
amalgamation of the two groups. Al-Ghanim, representing Arsuzi, whose
personal dislike of cAflaq persisted and who remained politically inactive,
insisted that the program of the new party should include socialist goals as
well as the purely nationalist objectives sought by cAflaq and Bitar. As
al-Ghanim tells it, cAflaq agreed after many hours of argument, because he
wanted above all else to have a unified party. Bitar also agreed
unwillingly.34 It is unclear how large a faction al-Ghanim represented; he
had begun to attract his own followers in Lattaqiyah. At any rate,
amalgamation was agreed on.
The founding congress of the party began on April 4, 1947 at the Luna
Park Coffee House in Damascus. Open to any party members who were
able to come,35 the congress was attended mostly by Syrians, naturally, but
Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq were represented by students studying in Syria.
The 247 people36 who attended were mostly students, teachers, govern­
ment employees, and private professional people. Jalal al-Sayyid was
elected chairman of the congress, and three secretaries were selected. All
were Syrians, Shakir Fahham, cAbd al-Rahman Mardini, and cAbd
al-Muncim Sharif. Michel cAflaq gave the opening address and Salah Bitar
a statement of policy. The congress approved the constitution of the party,
which was read, discussed, and accepted, article by article.37
The congress also adopted an internal statute (nizam dakhili) for the
party. I have not seen a copy of this first version of the internal statute,
which has been amended at least three times since, but from a reference to
it by the Bacthist writer, Naji cAllush, that section dealing with the rights
The Early Years 15

and duties of party members which appeared in the 1963 version (published
in Arab Political Documents, 1963) was substantially the same as it was in
1947 38
The congress ended by electing Michel cAflaq as camid or doyen—later
Secretary General, the term employed in this study—of the party and
choosing an executive body consisting of Salah al-Din Bitar, Jalal al-
Sayyid, and Wahib al-Ghanim. Midhat Bitar withdrew as a candidate for
this body and gradually dropped out of party activity.39 A cousin of Salah
Bitar and a member of the original group of Bacthists, he was the first in a
long line of dropouts. With his replacement by Wahib al-Ghanim, the four
Syrians who ran the party represented the capital (cAflaq and Bitar), the
eastern region (Jalal al-Sayyid), and the coast (al-Ghanim). Al-Ghanim
also represented the Zaki Arsuzi element. Inclusion of the Arsuzi group
added numerical strength and geographic diversity (many were cAlawis
living in the Lattaqiyah region) to the party but in incorporating a faction
not completely in harmony with the party leadership, it was a portent of
things to come, of the factionalization that was to plague the party
throughout its history. These four men remained the executive leadership
of the Arab Bacth Party until it merged with Hawrani’s Arab Socialist Party
early in 1953.
With this congress, the Bacth Party completed its transition from a
movement to an organized political party. Bacthists themselves refer to the
three-day April 1947 congress as the founding date of their party. The
Bacth was to receive one additional mass increment of membership through
its merger with Hawrani’s Arab Socialist Party in 1953, when common
enmity of the Bacthists and the Hawranists to Adib Shishakli’s rule finally
brought them to mute their differences of approach and of temperament
sufficiently to merge after eight years of to-ing and fro-ing on the subject.
Aside from this merger, the party grew by the recruitment of adherents and
new believers into the organization set up at the founding congress.
Until the 1950s, the Bacth Party got along with a simple organizational
apparatus. The secretary general and his three-man executive committee
ran the party. cAflaq and Bitar lived and worked in Damascus, where
involvement in Syrian national politics and editing and publishing the party
newspaper, al-Bacth, were their principal activities. They, in effect,
constituted the party headquarters. As numbers grew, branches (furiic:
singular fa rc) were established in cities and towns in Syria. By the end of
1951, branches were established in Damascus, Homs, Aleppo, Banyas,
and Lattaqiyah40, although it is virtually certain that these and other cities,
such as Dayr al-Zur, had Bacth branches by the time of the 1947 congress.
As the party spread to other Arab countries, branches were set up in
various cities and towns outside Syria. The first was in what was then the
Kingdom of Transjordan in 1948. Others followed in the next several
16 THE BACTH PARTY

years, and for a time, this arrangement of headquarters in Damascus and

branches wherever a group of members existed sufficed. Communication
among Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan was fairly easy; distances are not great
and surface transport plentiful.
But the growth in number of branches, the establishment of a party
organization in distant Iraq, presaging such organizations elsewhere, and
finally, the merger of the Bacth Party and Hawrani’s Arab Socialist Party,
made adoption of a more formal organization imperative. In the early
1950s, therefore, a formal terminology for the party organization in the
several Arab states was worked out. It drew on language and terminology
which cAflaq, at any rate, had used in his writings as early as the
mid-1930s. The party considered the entire Arab world as the nation
(al-qawm). The central party executive body became the National Com­
mand (al-qiyadah al-qawmiyah). Each political subdivision—a state,
whether independent or under foreign tutelage—was called a region (qutr)\
a region with a sufficiently large party organization was headed by a
Regional Command (qiyadah qutriyah). Below this came branches (furüc)
with their commands; below the branch came the section (shucbah), and
below it, at a later date in the party’s history, the division (firqah). Each
could be the highest party body in a given country, according to the number
of party members in that country.
The Second National Congress of the party, held in June 1954, formally
adopted this organizational system. The size, composition, and function of
each unit in the party organization are spelled out in the Internal Statutes of
the party adopted at that congress. The following description is drawn from
these statutes as amended at the Sixth National Congress in 1963.41 There
were also amendments at the Third and the Fifth National Congresses, held
in 1959 and 1962, respectively. I believe that the 1954 statutes had only
four levels of organization, namely:
nation qawm
region qutr
branch fa rc
section shucbah
and that the division (firqah) was added later as membership grew.42
Party members are grouped in “ circles” (halaqah), the smallest
administrative unit. Each circle comprises from three to seven members,
and three to seven such circles make up a division. The division, therefore,
may have anywhere from nine to forty-nine members; it is the basic
organizational unit in the party.43 Each division has a command elected by
division members. This command controls much of the day-to-day ac­
tivities of the party members. It establishes circles of members, appoints
secretaries for the circles, organizes circles of supporters, receives and
screens applications for membership.44
The Early Years 17

The section is composed of two or more divisions; hence, its minimum

membership is eighteen persons (two divisions of nine persons each). It has
a command, also elected, but indirectly. At each organizational level from
the section up to the national, there is a congress made up of elected and ex
officio party members. The section congress is composed of members of
the section command elected at the previous congress and of persons
elected by the several division commands, the number of such persons to
be determined by the Regional Command on the basis of the number of
active members in the division. This congress elects a section command.45
Both the division and section have as principal executive officer a secre­
tary, appointed by the body above it in the system, i.e., the section
command appoints the division’s secretary and the branch appoints the
section’s secretary.
The branch is composed of two or more sections, with a minimum
membership of thirty-six persons (two sections of eighteen each). In
practice, such a small number would be rare; usually a branch covers an
entire city or province. It may also represent a country if the party has
insufficient members in a country to form more than one branch and thus is
not able to have a regional command. The branch congress is composed of
section secretaries plus members elected by each section command; the
branch command determines the number of such members in accordance
with the number of active section members.46 The branch command,
elected by this congress, directs the work of subordinate organizations; it
may admit new members; unlike the lower organizations, it elects its own
secretary.47
Above the branches stands the region, a term the Bacth Party uses both
for a particular geographic entity, e.g., Syria, Libya, and for its organiza­
tion in such an entity where the party structure is complete, e.g., the Syrian
region, the Iraqi region. Here we are concerned with the latter usage. The
regional organization normally would be composed of more than one
branch, but this is merely implied, not specifically stated, in the statutes.48
The region may also have sections, not attached to a branch, within it. The
regional congress consists of branch secretaries, members of branch or
isolated section commands, and other representatives elected by branch
congresses. The regional congress, which should meet annually if condi­
tions permit, elects the Regional Command, holds votes of confidence in
that Command, and debates and approves the programs, policies, and
budgets prepared by the Command.49 The Regional Command, whose
members must have had at least one year’s experience as member of a
branch or section command, runs the affairs of the region, may dismiss
members, may accept as members persons “ with certain political affilia­
tions,” and may dissolve the command of any branch, section, or division
in the region and call for election of a new command.50 From the Second to
18 THE BACTH PARTY

the Sixth National Congress of the party (1954-1963), Regional Com­

mands consisted of a regional secretary and eight members. At the Sixth
Congress, the elected Regional Commands in Syria and Iraq—where the
party was in power—were increased to fifteen members. Other Regional
Commands continued to have eight members.
From the description above, it is clear that the number of levels in the
Bacth Party organization in a given country is directly related to the size of
its membership in that country. From a calculation of the minimum
membership requirements, three circles of three persons for a division of
nine persons; two divisions to a section, eighteen persons; two sections to a
branch, thirty-six persons; and two branches for a region, seventy-two or,
in round numbers, say, seventy-five active members would be sufficient
for the party organization in a given country to form a full-fledged regional
organization. In practice, the number would almost certainly be higher,
because the absolute minimum cannot be assumed for every organizational
unit, and because there may be one or more “ isolated” divisions or
sections not attached to an immediately superior body. Thus it is probably
more accurate to assume that the minimum number of active members
likely to be on hand before forming a full regional organization is
somewhere between one and two hundred.
Although this methodology does not provide much help in estimating
the actual size of the party once it has attained regional status, especially in
Syria, where it had a sizable number of branches even in the early days, the
methodology does provide some approximation of party membership in
other countries, particularly those where the highest level of party organi­
zation is the branch or the section. A country in which the party organiza­
tion has attained only the branch level, e.g., Libya in 196451, probably
would have between fifty and a hundred and fifty members.
I raise this point at some length here because reliable figures on party
membership for the most part are not available. The party does not issue
such figures, and party members who are not fairly highly placed may have
only a vague notion of their party’s size. Figures given from time to time
by observers of the Middle Eastern scene appear to be little more than
guesses—perhaps informed guesses—but nonetheless guesses. Moreover,
such observers often do not distinguish between actual party members,
probationary members, who may be in that status for as long as two years,
associates organized in a circle of party supporters, and well-wishers or
sympathizers who have no organizational connection with the party,
lumping them all as “ Bacthists.” And the ratio of such probationers,
supporters, and sympathizers to party members may be as high as ten to
one.52
Returning to the organizational structure of the party, the senior
executive and policy-making body is the National (pan-Arab) Command.
The Early Years 19

This body, which began as a three-man elected committee, plus the

Secretary General, expanded to five when Hawrani and the Bacth joined
forces, and was enlarged to seven members at the Second National
Congress and to nine at the Third. In 1963, it grew to thirteen members,
including the Secretary General.53 The National Congress, composed
of all members of Regional Commands, plus at least five other members
from each region and one member per section for those areas where
the organization has reached only to section or branch status, elects
the National Command, which includes the secretaries of the regional
organizations.54
The National Command has sweeping authority, subject only to votes
of confidence by the National Congress, to create party organizations, to
direct lesser party organizations which “ cannot, for any reason, lead
themselves,” to accept or reject the party’s cooperation with other political
organizations and the party’s participation in governments or representative
assemblies in any region, to dissolve Regional Commands, and to establish
and direct party policy on all national (pan-Arab) and international issues.
The National Command speaks for the party, decides what the party will
publish in its own name, and accepts or rejects party participation in Arab
or international organizations and congresses.55 To carry out these func­
tions, the National Command, as it developed over the years, came to have
a secretariat, a cultural and research department, a propaganda, publica­
tions, and information department, a liaison department, and a financial
department.56
Congresses at the various levels of the party are supposed to convene
yearly and require the attendance of an absolute majority of the members
entitled by party statute to attend. Extraordinary sessions of congresses,
once elected, at any level may be held at the call of the National or
Regional commands or by written demand of two-thirds of the particular
congress’ members.57 In practice, congresses were rarely held as fre­
quently as required by party rules, particularly when the party was
operating in a hostile atmosphere. Article CXIII permits the Regional
Command to “ dispense with all or part of these statues” on permission
of the National Command. Other reasons have interfered with such con­
gresses from time to time, as will appear in succeeding chapters.
This discussion of the party organization anticipates to an extent events
that are considered in subsequent chapters. It is introduced here in order to
acquaint the reader with the terminology of the party organization as it
came into existence in the period between 1947 to 1953 and as it began to
spread across the eastern part of the Arab world. In theory, the organiza­
tional structure of the party provided for a good deal of internal democracy
through elections at the various levels. And it often worked that way. But
the power of the Regional Command, and especially of its secretary, could
20 THE BACTH PARTY

be used to insure that certain party bodies were responsive to his wishes. A
vigorous, ambitious regional secretary, such as cAli Salih Sacdi in Iraq,
could virtually dictate the party’s regional policy. And the party’s founders
were very averse to decisions, reached through majority vote at party
congresses, which were not to their liking. Tension between the ideology
of the national Bacth leaders—especially in wanting the party to be an elite
vanguard—and the specific, pragmatic, local wants and needs of regional
bosses, is a constant feature of the Bacth Party’s history.
Faults notwithstanding, the organization came into being. Fairly
rudimentary in 1947, it developed to fit the needs of an expanding party;
the same cannot be said of its ideology, to which we turn next, again
reaching ahead to provide a framework for the political discussion in
subsequent chapters.

Notes
1. Sylvia G. Haim, “ The Ba’ath in Syria,” in People and Politics in the
Middle East, Michael Curtis (ed.) (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books,
1971), p. 135.
2. Oriento Moderno, Vol. 17, No. 7, July, 1937, pp. 334-35. Sami al-Jundi,
al-Bacth (Beirut: Dar al-Nahar li al-Nashr, 1969, p. 21), refers to Arsuzi as the
leader of the Arab cause in Alexandretta.
3. Oriento Moderno, loc. cit., p. 551.
4. Ibid., p. 139.
5. Jundi, al-Bacth, p. 21.
6. Eric Rouleau, “ The Syrian Enigma: What is the Bacth?” , in Irene Gendzier
(ed.), A Middle East Reader (New York: Pegasus, 1969), p. 159. This article
appeared earlier in Le Monde Diplomatique, Sept., 1967.
7. Jundi, al-Bacth, pp. 21-22. Throughout this book, I have rendered qawmi as
“ nationalist” and watani as “ patriotic” ; the former frequently has a pan-Arab
connotation. Similarly, I have rendered watan as “ fatherland” and qawmiyah as
“ nationalism.” Unless otherwise specified, these are the translations used.
8. Ibid., p. 23.
9. Ibid., p. 29. Jundi notes with pride that these were the first Ba'thists to be
jailed for the cause.
10. Haim, “ Ba’ath in Syria,” p. 139.
11. Jundi, al-Bacth, p. 31. Haim, “ Ba’ath in Syria,” p. 132, says th atcAflaq
and Bitar founded a magazine called “ The Vanguard” (al-Talicah).
12. Michel cAflaq, “ Thawriyat al-Wihdah al-cArabiyah,” in Ma'rakat al-
Masir al-Wahid (Beirut: Dar al-cIlm li al-Malayin, 1958), p. 18. The article was
written in 1953.
13. Jundi, al-BaHh, pp. 30-31.
14. Ibid., p. 30.
The Early Years 21

15. Michael H. Van Dusen, “ Political Integration and Regionalism in Syria,”

Middle East Journal, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Spring 1972), pp. 123-36, especially p. 133.
16. Robert T. Phillips, “ Michel Aflaq and the Ba’athist Ideology,” January,
1966, p. 6, unpublished paper, American University of Beirut. The author told me
in 1968 that the view was conveyed to him by a Lebanese Bacthist leader, who may
have been Jibran Majdalani.
17. Mutac Safadi, Hizjb al-Baeth, Ma’sat al-Mawlid, Ma’sat al-Nihayah (The
Bacth Party: Its Tragic Birth, Its Tragic End) (Beirut: Dar al-Adab, 1964), p. 66.
18. Jundi, al-Bacth, p. 31.
19. Rouleau, “ Syrian Enigma,” p. 159. Arsuzi was then in his late sixties.
After he died in 1969, the Bacth government in Damascus established a scholarship
in his name.
20. Nidal al-Bacth, Beirut (Beirut: Dar al-Talicah, 1963), Vol. I, p. 28.
Hereafter cited as Nidal with appropriate volume number; there are seven volumes.
21. Kamel S. Abu Jaber, The Arab Ba’th Socialist Party (Syracuse, N.Y.:
Syracuse University Press, 1966), p. 23, lists a dozen of the more prominent
members of the movement; nowhere does Abu Jaber mention Arsuzi, however.
22. Nidal I, pp. 28-30, especially p. 29.
23. Nidal I, p. 33; flyer dated July 24, 1943. The Nidal series contains many
reprints of leaflets, broadsheets, and flyers. I have preferred to cite Nidal as a
source when available rather than the original document, even in cases where there
is a copy of the original in the Hoover Institution Library.
24. Jundi, al-Bacth, p. 31.
25. Nidal I, p. 103. The editor is Bashir Dacuq.
26. Nidal I, pp. 36-39.
27. Nidal I, pp. 41-42. Jundi says that until 1945 the Bacth had no proper office
and had difficulty even getting a bulletin printed (al-Bacth, p. 41).
28. Nidal I, pp. 104-105.
29. Press Review, U. S. Legation, Damascus, Syria, May 26, 1946.
30. Nidal I, pp. 118-27.
31. Rouleau, “ Syrian Enigma,” p. 164.
32. Jundi, al-Bacth, p. 36, says that he joined in March 1946.
33. Ibid., p. 34.
34. Rouleau, “ Syrian Enigma,” p. 164; Van Dusen, “ Political Integration,”
p. 133.
35. Nidal I, p. 171.
36. Rouleau, “ Syrian Enigma,” p. 165. This could easily have been almost the
entire membership.
37. Nidal I, pp. 164-65. See the following chapter for a discussion of this
document.
38. Naji cAllush, al-Thawrah wa al-Jamahir (Beirut: Dar al-Talicah, 1962),
pp. 101-2.
39. Abu Jaber, Arab Ba’th, p. 23.
40. Nidal I, pp. 159, 282; II, pp. 73, 75; 155.
41. Citations in footnotes 43-50 and 53-57 are from the Internal Statutes
published in Arab Political Documents 1963 (Beirut: American University Press,
1964), pp. 445-62.
42. An unpublished study of the Bacth Party written in 1965 lists only these
four organizational levels. The writer refers to the party’s Internal Statutes, almost
certainly an earlier version than that of 1963.
22 THE BACTH PARTY

43. Art. XIX.

44. Art. XXI.
45. Art. XXVII.
46. Art. XXXI.
47. Arts. XXXII and XXXIII.
48. Arts. XXXV and XXXVI.
49. Arts. XXXVI, XXXVIII, and XXXIX.
50. Arts. XXXVII and XL.
51. Azmat al-Bacth al-cArabi al-Ishtiraki min Khilal Tajribatihi fi al-cIraq (The
Crisis o f the Arab Socialist Resurrection Party Resulting from Its Experience in
Iraq) (Beirut: Dar al-Shacb,. 1964), p. 6.
52. Ali Khalil, The Socialist Parties in Syria and Lebanon, unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, The American University, Washington, D.C., 1962, p. 107. The
author was a member of the Bacth Party organization in Lebanon when this work
was completed. Two years later he was elected a member of its National Com­
mand. He has since left the party.
53. Art. XLVI.
54. Art. XLIV. See Appendix A for the composition of the several National
Commands from 1947 to the Eighth National Congress of 1965.
55. Art. IL.
56. Art. LXVIII. There are also departments or bureaus for labor, women’s,
youth and student, and peoples’ organizations.
57. Art. LXXII and LXXIII. For example, the Syrian Regional Congress
chosen in 1965 met in ordinary session March 17-April 5 of that year, in
extraordinary session in June and again in August, and finally in March 1966 after
the coup that ousted cAflaq and his followers.
 - 3 -

Ideology—
Unity Above All Else

This chapter discusses the beliefs and principles of the Bacth Party as they
developed in the 1940s and 1950s. It draws heavily on official party
documents—its constitution, statements of policy, instructions to the
membership—and on the writings of Bacthist leaders, principally Michel
cAflaq, and to a lesser extent, Bitar; the two dominated the ideological
writing of the party until the middle years of the United Arab Republic.
Although some other Bacthist leaders wrote, e.g., Munif Razzaz, Jamal
Atasi, Wahib al-Ghanim, most of the literature produced in party leaflets,
handbills, papers, and the like both inside and outside Damascus, was
written by or directly reflected the thoughts of “ the professor” and his
close associates. During these years the party paper, al-Bacth, was pub­
lished under the close supervision of cAflaq or Bitar or both; they also
wrote extensively in it. Indeed, Macrakat al-Masir al-Wahid (The Battle
for One Destiny)1—one of two collections of cAflaq’s writings—consists
chiefly of editorial articles he wrote for al-Bacth in 1956-1958.
The impact of Bacth ideology on the political thought of the Arab world
was enormous, and cAflaq deserves much credit for the compelling way in
which he placed his beliefs before the citizenry and attracted many to his
cause. But it would be a mistake to conclude that all Bacthists accepted all
formally proclaimed party doctrines. We shall have occasion below to see
how, in a number of areas, there were sharp differences of opinion and
belief on the part of members and of leaders as well, in addition to
substantial discrepancies between doctrine and practice.
A large part of cAflaq’s impact upon and influence over the generation
he taught had its source in the sort of person he was. It is important to note
that his influence was on the next generation. Aside from a relatively small
number of close associates who gathered with them in the early days,
people of cAflaq’s, Bitar’s, and Arsuzi’s generation were not attracted to
them or the doctrines they preached. cAflaq’s immediate followers were
drawn from the pupils he and Bitar taught and from later classes of students
24 THE BACTH PARTY

whom these pupils taught, either directly in schools, or through circles of

friends and associates.
To his students, and his students’ students, cAflaq was an appealing
figure. In a society where conventional standards emphasized polished
appearance and ostentatious trappings of power, and where common belief
gave everyone his price, cAflaq was sufficiently unusual to stand out.
Personally honest, he cared little for personal appearance and was content
to lead a simple life. These traits held a certain appeal to many of the
younger generation and helped to promote the doctrine of Arab nationalism
and resurrection that he expounded.
The message cAflaq preached was fundamentally Arabism, that the
Arabs as one people—the Ummah cArabiyah—had a distinct existence and
a special role in the world. For him and for his followers this belief was a
self-evident truth, as it was also for a growing number of politically
conscious Arabs who did not associate themselves with the Bacth Party or
who did not accept all of its other doctrines. In cAflaq’s view, devotion to
and love for one’s homeland were articles of faith which needed no
reasoned explanation. Writing in 1940, he said:

The nationalism for which we call . . . is the same sentiment that binds the
individual to his family, because the fatherland is only a large household and
the nation a large family.2

This belief is repeated in the opening article of the Bacth Party Constitution
of 1947 which says:

The Arabs form one nation. This nation has the natural right to live in a
single state and to be free to direct its own destiny.3

cAflaq went back to the most important historical experience of the

Arab people for the foundation of his doctrine of the special mission of the
Arab nation. In a speech given at Damascus University at a celebration of
the Prophet’s birthday—and it was somewhat remarkable that a Christian
would make a speech on such an occasion—he stressed that Islam was
essentially an Arab movement, of which the prime importance was the
renewal and fulfillment of Arabism.4 “ The virtues open or hidden, which
he [Muhammad] praised, the defects which he criticized, are specifically
Arab virtues and defects.” 5 A true understanding of Islam would show that
it was the means whereby the Arabs could be brought back to the correct
path after they had allowed material affairs to triumph over the spirit—the
inner being of the nation.6 Whereas in Muhammad’s time Arab and
Muslim were equivalent, in the twentieth century, there was “ a new Arab
developed and perfected.” 7
Ideology 25

Today we give the name “ patriot” or “ nationalist” to certain persons of the

nation (ummah) . . . meaning by it those persons who have faith in their
country’s cause . . . so in the past the Muslim was the Arab, with faith in the
new religion, because he combined the qualities necessary to understand that
this religion represented a bold move of Arabism (curubah) toward unity,
power, and upward progress. . . . the power of Islam . . . has revived to
appear in our days under a new form, that of Arab nationalism
(qawmiyah). . . .8

Even Christian Arabs must know and love Islam as the most valuable
element of their nationalism.9
This view of Islam was hardly likely to appeal to the orthodox Muslim.
But cAflaq and his followers were not speaking to the orthodox. Their
audience, their potential adherents, were young, educated in schools
heavily influenced by Europe and America, men to whom traditional
Islamic practices and beliefs were largely irrelevant. But this sort of
connection with Islam in its days of glory and conquest—conquests which,
cAflaq carefully pointed out, were for religious duty, not territorial
aggrandizement10—emphasizing its societal aspects, had wide appeal.
Secular nationalists could accept the connection of present-day Arabism
with the first century of Islam and its successes, secure in the belief that
they were part of the mainstream of Arab Islam, but free of the encum­
brances and rigid practices that had come to dominate Islam over the
centuries since Muhammad’s time. Nationalism would take the place of
Islam as the focus of belief for the Arabs.
It is, of course, quite easy to criticize several aspects of this association
between twentieth-century Arab nationalism and the age of Islamic con­
quest. For example, the people in the area now comprehended in the Arab
world, outside of the Arabian Peninsula, had never even heard Arabic
spoken in 630. Even today, the states of the Arab League include ten
million Berbers, three million non-Arabic-speaking Sudanese, a million
and a half or more Kurds, and numerous smaller non-Arab groups within
their borders. But criticism of cAflaq’s views along these lines, however
accurate, or an analysis of how right or wrong he was in this or that
historical judgment would miss the point that, to him and to tens of
thousands of others, Arab nationalism is accepted by preacher and be­
lievers without need for proof or demonstration. In a way cAflaq was
himself a prophet, not in the sense of foretelling the future, but in the Old
Testament sense of leading his people out of the errors into which they had
fallen onto the new path of resurrection (bacth).
This Arab nationalism is a constant and recurring theme in the writings
of the Bacth Party. It is an essential component of the first of the three goals
of the party—unity—the others being liberation and socialism. The party
26 THE BACTH PARTY

aimed at uniting the entire Arab fatherland, which it defined as that portion
of the earth inhabited by the Arab nation, its boundaries being, starting
clockwise from Syria, the Taurus Mountains, the Zagros Mountains, the
Gulf of Basra (usually referred to in Western writing as the Persian Gulf,
now commonly called the Arab Gulf by Arabs), the Arabian Sea, the
mountains of Ethiopia, the Sahara, the Atlantic Ocean, and the Mediterra­
nean Sea.11 Except where seacoasts are involved, these boundaries are
vague, for the mountain ranges are many miles wide and the Sahara
enormous. In practice, the Bacth Party adopted the present outer bound­
aries of the member states of the Arab League as equivalent to the vaguer
dimensions given above, even though these boundaries were drawn, almost
without exception, at the instance of European powers, and even though
ten percent of the population of the states of the Arab League speak
languages other than Arabic, either as their first or only tongue. This is a
case where custom and familiarity take precedence over the logic of
doctrine.
Although it regards areas long inhabited exclusively by non-Arabs
—Iraqi Kurdistan and Bahr al-Ghazal, Upper Nile, and Equatoria prov­
inces of Sudan—as inseparable from the Arab homeland, the Bacth Party
has also been devoted to proclaiming the Arab nature of three areas now
under the rule of non-Arab governments. These areas are Cilicia and
Alexandretta (Iskanderun) in Turkey, referred to above, Khuzistan Prov­
ince of Iran, referred to by the Bacth as Ahwaz District,12 once ruled by an
Arab family and with a majority of Arab speakers in its population, and
Israel. Israel did not figure prominently in early Bacth writing. The party
leaders, in tune with most opinion in the Arab states prior to the 1948-1949
war, do not appear to have thought that a Zionist state would survive once
Britain gave up its mandate over Palestine. The party began to show
concern over the drift of events in Palestine in the pages of al-Bacth at the
end of 1947 and the beginning of 1948.13 Though the party continued to be
concerned and to write frequently and lengthily about the recovery of Arab
territories—the anniversaries of the Balfour Declaration and of the transfer
of the Sanjak of Alexandretta to Turkey were almost always commemo­
rated with a party statement—it paid consistently greater attention in its
literature to the theme of strengthening the Arab nation through unifying it.
The Arab nationalist doctrine preached by cAflaq had at its heart a call
for a revitalization of Arab society. This is the essence of the sacred
mission (risalah khalidah) of the party and is what cAflaq intended to
convey when he used the word inqilab. Thus, in a talk given to a party
branch in February 1950, he said:

Revolution (inqilab), then, before being a political and social program, is

that prime propelling power, that powerful psychic current, that mandatory
Ideology 27

struggle, without which the re-awakening of the nation is not to be under­

stood. This is what we understand by revolution.14

Thus, inqilab meant changing people rather than system. Once the people,
or enough of them, had undergone an interior transformation, “ liberating
the intellect. . . and releasing the source of faith in the soul,” 15 change in
the system would follow automatically. cAflaq envisioned the Bacth
movement as an elite vanguard (talicah) whose task it was to convert the
people, to lead them along the road that would end in the construction of a
new, vital society in which the Arab people would enjoy all their just
glories in an independent united state.
This interpretation of inqilab as transformation came to have a consid­
erable influence on the party in the forties and early fifties. Article VI of
the Bacth Constitution states:

The Arab Bacth Party is a transforming Party; it believes that its chief aims of
resurrecting Arab nationalism and building socialism can only be achieved
by transformation and struggle. . . . Hence the party decides in favor o f . . .
the transformation of the present rotten situation, a transformation which is
to include all sectors of life—intellectual, economic, social and political.16

But this interpretation was not accepted by all members even then.
Inqilab can also mean overthrow; it is conventionally used in contemporary
Arab writing for coup d’état. cAflaq found it necessary to warn his
followers that the inqilab (coup d’état) of Husni Zacim in March 1949
was only a step in the direction of inqilab as the Bacth understood it.17
Given the heterogeneous mixture of the participants at the first party
congress in 1947, “ people from the right and from the left, conservatives
and socialists, monarchists and republicans,” 18 these warnings were
doubtlessly needed. The temptation to the party’s followers to see quick
action, including the use of military force, as an acceptable means of
accomplishing the “ transformation” grew as the years passed, until in the
1960s cAflaq’s understanding of inqilab became submerged in the activist
belief in forced transformation carried out by an elite represented by the
Bacth Party.
The common factor uniting the people who associated themselves with
the party, as the first organized political movement to preach total Arab
unity, was a belief in Arab nationalism and unity. The party had been
founded at an opportune moment. For twenty years or more, the belief that
the Arab people were one and of right ought to be politically united had
been gaining greater and greater acceptance in Arab intellectual circles.
The weakening of France and England in World War II offered unprec­
edented opportunities for nationalist political parties to make gains, and
28 THE BACTH PARTY

the growing number of educated youth pouring out of high schools and
universities were ripe for recruitment to a party espousing unity and
nationalism as its basic platform. In large numbers these young people
accepted the proposition that the artificial division of the Arab world by
outside powers into separate states was a primary cause of the region’s
political, social, and economic backwardness.
With equal facility they accepted the doctrine that the old political
parties were corrupt, subservient to the imperialist powers, or dedicated to
the preservation of the political and economic interests of a particular class.
(And indeed, many were all three.) The Bacthists found a receptive
audience for the fundamental principles laid down in their constitution:

The Arab fatherland constitutes an indivisible political and economic unity.

No Arab country can live apart from the others. . . . The Arab fatherland
belongs to the’Arabs . . . . The Arab nation is characterized by virtues . . .
having an abundance of vitality and creativity and the capacity for renewal
and resurrection. . . . Colonialism and all that accompanies it is a criminal
enterprise. (Fundamental Principles 1 and 3)19

Not all who accepted these views became Bacthists, by any means. A
very large number of the politically aware, including some of the more
prominent theoreticians of Arab unity such as Satic al-Husri and Fayiz
Sayigh, belonged to no particular political party. Others flirted with parties
or political societies in their school days, but dropped these associations as
they grew older. Still others were attracted, by personal circumstances or
their education and associates, to other movements, such as the Arab
Nationalists (the harakiyuri).
In the 1950s, a very substantial number came to see in Egypt’s
President Nasir the man who would unify the Arab world. But Nasir, for all
his enormous personal prestige and authority—indeed perhaps because of
these attributes—didn’t try to organize followers outside Egypt into politi­
cal organizations until the early 1960s. The Bacth was first in the field as
an organized pan-Arab political movement. First in Syria, then in Iraq,
Jordan, and elsewhere, those truly committed to pan-Arab unity in the late
forties and fifties turned to it in large numbers. Work for Arab unity gave
members and potential members none of the problems that some other
principles of Bacth doctrine did.
In its constitution the Bacth Party envisaged a political system that
rested on an inherent inconsistency. The constitution asserted that
sovereignty belonged to the people, who were the source of all authority in
the state (Art. 5). The governmental system in the Arab state was to be a
constitutional elective system, with the executive responsible to a directly
elected legislature (Art. 14). At the same time, the Bacth Party had the
Ideology 29

special task of working to raise the people’s material and cultural standards
so that they would be able to exercise their rights in their personal lives and
in the national life (Art. 5). And, while all citizens of the Arab state could
participate in its life, citizenship would be denied to anyone who “ advo­
cated or joined an ethnic (cunsuri) anti-Arab group or who forsook the Arab
fatherland for a colonialist end” (Art. 11). Finally, freedom of association
in clubs, parties, youth organizations, and the like would obtain only
“ within the limits of the Arab nationalist idea” (Art. 41). The supremacy
of the state, guided by the Bacth Party, was affirmed in a provision that:

The educational policy of the Party aims at creating a new Arab generation
(al-Jil al-cArabi al-Jadid), which believes in the unity of the nation and in
the eternity of its mission. . . . [Hence] Teaching is an exclusive function of
the state; all foreign and private institutions should be closed. (Policy in
Education, preamble and Art. 45)

Labor unions and peasants organizations were encouraged but were to be

associated with the state (Art. 40).
Despite the commitment to the people as the source of all power and to
the principle of a government responsible to its citizens through their freely
chosen representatives, the constitutional provisions embodied a political
attitude that permitted the party to decide what was good for the people and
to run the state, because it was the standard-bearer in the immortal mission
of resurrecting Arab society from the slough into which it had sunk in
recent centuries. This is not to say that the 247 Bacthists attending the
founding Congress in 1947, who argued and approved the party constitu­
tion, produced a document with the deliberate intention of hoodwinking the
populace. Some of the inconsistencies noted above derived from the
several trends of thought represented at the founding congress. Others
derived from the belief on the part of the party’s founders that they had the
answers to Arab society’s problems and difficulties in the Bacth message of
revival.
Take the question of responsible parliamentary government, prescribed
in the party constitution as the regime of the unified state, which the Bacth
envisaged (Art. 14). The Jordanian Bacthist leader, Munif Razzaz, writing
in 1952, elaborated on this article in the following words:

It is not possible for this sense of community [among the individuals in a

society] to be completely achieved except through a popular democratic
system; by democratic meaning a freely elected parliamentary system with
the government directly responsible to the representatives of the people; by
popular meaning one built on the will of the majority of the Ummah wherein
each person enjoys freedom of thought and opinion in the widest
application.20
30 THE BACTH PARTY

He went on to assert that the right to vote must be open to all citizens, men
and women, rich and poor, without pressure or fear, that deputies must be
elected for a fixed term, that candidacy must be open to all, without regard
to wealth, race, or religion. (The last was a particularly important point to
the Bacth. All Arab parliaments assigned seats on the basis of religion, and
the Bacth was trying to abolish such sectarian distinctions in favor of an
all-embracing Arabism.) Razzaz held that persons and organizations must
enjoy complete social and economic and political rights and freedoms, and
said further that if the government lacked the votes of an absolute majority
of the deputies, it must resign.21
Razzaz was the most articulate defender of the principle of representa­
tive government among the Bacth Party writers. After elaborating on the
subject of representation noted above, he devoted a half-dozen pages to the
evils of dictatorship.22 Indeed, his entire book is permeated with a liberal
political philosophy. Zaki Arsuzi’s adherent, Wahib al-Ghanim, writing in
1953, also flatly endorsed the elective process as follows: “ The parliamen­
tary democratic system is the ideal form for guaranteeing to the individual
the freedom to control his country’s affairs.” 23
Bacthists participated in parliamentary elections in countries with an
elected parliament where the party apparatus existed and they were
permitted to run. Party members campaigned for office in parliamentary
elections in Syria in 1943, 1947, 1949, and 1954, in Jordan in 1950, 1951,
1954, and 1956, and were prepared to run in Iraq even in the second
election in 1954, had other opposition parties been willing. How much the
participation of members and local party organizations in elections in these
years was a matter of principle and how much a matter of making use of the
political mechanism available is problematical. The electoral process had
not fallen into the complete disrepute of later years, and some, at least, of
the early members felt a genuine attachment to a representative system of
government.
By 1957 or so, support of parliamentary representative government as
the system the party wanted to achieve had declined considerably. Three
principal reasons may be adduced for this decline. First, successes by party
members in the elections noted above had been few. Except for the return
of sixteen members and half as many Bacthist supporters to parliament in
Damascus in 1954 after the merger with Hawrani’s Arab Socialist Party,
Bacthists never garnered more than two or three seats in any national
election, free or rigged. Lacking a mass base, young and relatively
unknown Bacthist intellectuals had little vote-getting power. The few who
did manage to get elected—and re-elected—e.g., Wahib al-Ghanim in
Lattaqiyah, Jalal al-Sayyid in Dayr al-Z ur,cAbdallah Rimawi in Ramallah,
Jordan, succeeded primarily because of the personal followings they had
built up in their respective districts.
Ideology 31

Second, elections in the various Arab states had been controlled by the
regimes in power more often than not since mandatory days.24 The brief
liberalization of the elective process that permitted ten members of the
opposition National Front to win seats in the Iraqi house on June 9, 1954
ended in two months with the dissolution of parliament and its replacement
by a house that was totally under government control.25 A nationalist
government in Jordan formed after fairly open elections in the fall of 1956
ended six months later in the spring of 1957 with the re-imposition of
palace rule. The chances of replacing, through the ballot box, regimes such
as those in Baghdad and Amman, which so thoroughly dominated affairs
and which regarded Bacthists as subversives, seemed remote indeed.
Third, lack of commitment on the part of many party leaders to the
concept of representative democracy cannot but have helped to weaken the
faith of party members in it. cAflaq and Bitar had very little to say in their
writings about the specifics of the system of government the Bacth Party
should strive for. An article of Bitar’s in 1950, “ Democracy and the
Democracies,” drew a distinction between the circumstances that per­
mitted the growth of democracy in the West and those that obtained under
the Ottoman sultans; Bitar implied that classic Western democracy would
be out of place in the successor states to the Ottoman Empire. The article
noted good points of both capitalist and communist systems, and may be
construed at best as neutral on the subject of representative government.26
Moreover, both cAflaq and Bitar supported the government of Sami
Hinnawi and, for a time, those of Husni Zacim and Adib Shishakli, each of
which came to power by extralegal means. Bitar, during a Syrian cabinet
crisis of November 1956, urged that the army take over the government
behind a civilian facade.27
cAflaq’s and Bitar’s writings and speeches in the 1950s simply ignore
the topic of the system of government the Bacthists wanted. They concen­
trated on the issues of liberation from imperialism and the road to Arab
unity. Indeed, unity far overshadowed freedom and socialism in the
amounts of time, energy, and printer’s ink the party expended in the
mid-1950s. The achievement of unity did not seem likely as long as
reactionaries and exploiters controlled certain Arab governments; only
their ouster, necessarily by force, and their replacement by liberated
regimes would promote the cause of unity. Thus, in Syria, cAflaq and Bitar
came to view the electoral process primarily as a useful means of gaining
power, and they were prepared to abandon it when, at the end of 1957, the
greater goal of a Bacth-dominated unity between Syria and Egypt appeared
to be attainable.28
The special role of the Bacth in leading the Arab nation came to be the
dominant theme of the party fairly early in its history. The party constituted
the vanguard (talicah) of the people. Its members were the new Arab
32 THE BACTH PARTY

generation (al-Jil al-cArabi al-Jadid), who would carry out its mission of
raising society from the sleep into which it had fallen.
After cAflaq’s first reference to the new Arab generation in 1943, the
terms vanguard and new Arab generation recur constantly in Bacth
literature.29 More precisely, this new generation was to breathe life into
Arab society. Bacth means literally resurrection; it is used in connection
with the resurrection of the Christian messiah, Jesus; Easter, is yawm
al-bacth (the day of resurrection). While the doctrine of a vanguard with a
mission had certain inconsistencies in respect to a free parliamentary
government (how could the vanguard be assured that the voters would
follow it?), it admirably suited the propagation of the concepts of unity,
liberation, and socialism.
Like unity, the Bacth’s second major goal, liberation from foreign
domination, needed little if any argumentation to make it acceptable to
potential followers. There were few Arabs in the generation that came to
maturity in the decade following World War II who did not wish to see the
Arab states liberated from all vestiges of foreign control. Syria was more
free than most major Arab states after 1946. The independent status of
Egypt and Iraq, for example, at that period soon came under attack by
nationalists because the regimes in those countries allowed special military
privileges to the United Kingdom and were deemed subservient to the
desires of London and other Western capitals. For the Bacth, Arab unity
was the keystone to Arab liberation:

Despite the identical needs of the Arab people in their several regions, much
of their struggle is uncoordinated and wasted.
This principle of division not only prevents movements in the various Arab
countries from uniting, but even pushes them into opposing and quarrelling
with one another.
Hence this truth is apparent: the Arab people will never unify their struggle
until they struggle for unity.30

Socialism, the third of the Bacth slogans, is also intimately bound up

with other elements of the party doctrine. In fact, eAflaq, in an early
writing (1946), went so far at one point as to equate it with nationalism.
“ The Arab nationalists are the socialists,” hence “ there is neither incom­
patibility nor contradiction nor war between nationalists and socialists.” 31
The subservience of socialism to nationalism and later to unity remained.
The Arab struggle for liberation, in cAflaq’s view, was also the struggle for
socialism; getting rid of the ruling group, the agents of imperialism, would
at once bring liberation and social justice.32 Even at this early period,
socialism took second place to nationalism. Thus, “ the social and
Ideology 33

economic question is the issue of prime importance in our life, but it is

directly related to the wider issue of nationalism,” and “ we want socialism
to serve our nationalism.” 33 cAflaq’s consistency in this view may be seen
in a passage written in 1956, which describes the struggle for socialism as
an element of the struggle for unity.34
The socialism envisaged in the party constitution of 1947 and in the
early party writings—indeed in Bacth writings up to the time of the
formation of the United Arab Republic—is of a particularly mild sort. The
party constitution shows no trace of Marxist thought; it describes the party
as socialist, asserting that “ socialism is a necessity which emanates from
the depths of Arab nationalism. . . . socialism constitutes the ideal social
order . . . [for] the Arab people. . .” (Art. 4). Yet the party was the Arab
Bacth Party; the word socialist was not added to the name until the merger
with Akram Hawrani’s Arab Socialist Party in 1953. In fact, although the
term socialism is used in cAflaq’s early writings, the concept occupied far
less of his thought than did unity, resurrection, independence, and
nationalism.
There is even some evidence that he and Bitar resisted the inclusion of
socialism as a basic part of the Bacth constitution. Wahib al-Ghanim,
talking from the perspective of twenty years, said that the inclusion of
socialist concepts in that document was a condition that Zaki Arsuzi and his
group required from cAflaq, Bitar, and their faction, before Arsuzi’s
followers would join the latter in holding the founding Congress of 1947.
Al-Ghanim says that cAflaq and Bitar came to see him, as the spokesman
for the Arsuzi group. (Arsuzi did not attend the founding Congress and
never held any office in the party. His writings, Bacth al-Ummah
al-cArabiyah, printed in 1954, were not issued in the party’s name.)
According to al-Ghanim, after many hours of argument, cAflaq, in
order to bring this faction, many of whom had been his students, into a
unified party, relented and persuaded Bitar to follow.35 It is quite possible
that the dispute was over the degree of prominence socialism should have
in the party, inasmuch as cAflaq had already espoused it in his writings. In
1944, however, he had called socialism “ no more than a flexible economic
system adaptable to every country’s needs.” 36 Al-Ghanim says of this
incident: “ At that time [the beginning of 1947], I held socialist ideas,
tinged with Marxism which I had been studying since the Soviet victory at
Stalingrad, and I considered that the unified party should have a leftist
orientation.” 37
However much al-Ghanim’s socialist beliefs were “ tinged with Marx­
ism,” what came out in the constitution was a series of propositions to
correct inequities and imbalances in the distribution of material goods in
Arab society—in sum, a call for social justice and a better deal for the poor
and underprivileged. Insofar as it was socialist, it was akin to the socialism
34 THE BACTH PARTY

of the Fabians of Great Britain. cAflaq would not agree with this assess­
ment, because he saw great differences between Arab and Western vari­
eties of socialism. Writing in 1950, he defined socialism as “ . . .not an
aim in itself, but rather a necessary means to guarantee society the highest
standard of production with the farthest limit of cooperation and solidarity
among the citizens . . . Arab society . . . needs a social order with deeper
foundations, wider horizons, and more forceful realization than moderate
British socialism.” 38
A Soviet analyst has the following to say on the topic: “ The concept of
socialist structure [as it] appeared in articles and speeches . . . [in] the
period of the birth of the new movement [the Bacth] . . . . was just a hazy
outline on a barely developed ideological negative.” 39 The constitution
called for a just redistribution of wealth (Art. 27), state ownership of public
utilities, natural resources, large industry, and transport, (Art. 29), state
control of foreign and domestic trade (Art. 36), limiting agricultural
holdings to the amount the owner could cultivate, under some state
supervision (Art. 30), and worker participation in management and in
profit-sharing (Art. 32). The rights of private property and of inheritance
were specifically recognized (Arts. 32 and 33).
Prominent in the constitution and in the party writings of the 1940s and
1950s dealing with socialism was concern about the exploitation of one
group of citizens by another. Thus, “ . . .the party forbids the exploitation
of the work of others” (Art. 28), and “ Just laws will be promulgated to
limit the workman’s daily hours of work . . . to protect his rights, to ensure
social security for him in old age . . .” (Art. 40). Further, “ Separation of
the classes and differentiation among them are abolished . . . the party
carries on its struggle among the laboring and oppressed classes of society
so . . . the citizens will recover the whole of their human dignity and will
be enabled to live in the shadow of a just social order . . . .” (Art. 42).
cAflaq wrote in 1950: “ . . . socialism in the Arab Bacth is limited to
economic organization that aims to reconsider the distribution of wealth in
the Arab fatherland and to lay out economic bases which would guarantee
equality and economic justice among the citizens. . . .” 40 Again in 1955,
after explaining that socialism could be defined as a doctrine or a system,
with specific origins, cAflaq wrote that all of these were reducible to the
simple statement that “ socialism is the sharing of the resources of the
country by its citizens.” 41
In some respects, cAflaq found it easier to define his concept of
socialism by explaining what it was not instead of what it was. And one
thing it definitely was not was communism. cAflaq and Bitar had gone to
Paris as patriotic nationalists. Their contacts in France with the Communist
movement led them to believe they had “ found support among communists
Ideology 35

for the nationalist cause.” 42 Upon their return to Syria both cAflaq and
Bitar were on good terms with the local Communist Party for several years.
But these relations came to an abrupt end when the Communist Party of
France supported the 1936 Blum government, which proceeded to continue
the mandate instead of putting the treaty which was to grant independence
in force. Syrian nationalists were bitterly disappointed that the Communists
took this stand. In an article published the same year, cAflaq said, “ If I am
asked for a definition of socialism, I shall not look for it in the works of
Marx and Lenin.” 43 For cAflaq and his followers the element differentia­
ting their ideas from communism lay in the cardinal position they gave to
nationalism. As we have discussed earlier in this chapter, everything in
Bacthist doctrine revolved in some way around the central points of
promoting the resurgence of the Arab nation and unifying it. Arab unity
and the particular importance of the Arab nation clashed head-on with the
internationalism of communism. cAflaq could not harmonize the two. He
noted in 1950 that Tito was considered an outcast by the Communist
movement because he put Yugoslav national interests ahead of those of
international communism.44 Marxist views of the class struggle did not
square with cAflaq’s nationalist ideology either. In “ Our View of
Capitalism and the Class Struggle” (1956), he wrote:

Marxism greatly exaggerated its [the class struggle’s] importance, gave it

worldwide application, and ignored to a large extent the vital historical
development of nationalism. It also erroneously considers that the bonds
which tie exploiter to exploited are closer than those tying one class to its
own nationalism.45 il ^ 7 0 6 0 3
cAflaq held consistently to his concept of socialism and to his opposi­
tion to communism; for the most part his ideas were accepted by his
followers until well after the changes in Communist tactics which followed
the death of Stalin. The Bacth went so far as to call the Syrian Communist
Party “ a pillar of shucubiyah” in May 1945.46 But the Communist Parties
in the Arab countries sought a number of goals in common with the
Bacthists, as became apparent in the years after the end of the Second
World War. Both were fighting local reactionaries and feudalists, both
were fighting imperialism, both were interested in improving the lot of the
workers and peasants, and competing for their allegiance. In time, an
ambivalent attitude grew up within the party on the issue of Communists.
Although Communists were internationalists and ipso facto not good Arab
nationalists, the Bacthists would cooperate with them in seeking common
goals, often uniting to oppose a particular regime. Embodied in the form of
a national front, this cooperation, hesitant and far from wholehearted, did
36 THE BACTH PARTY

occur in Iraq from 1956 to 1958, and in Syria for a year or so from the end
of 1956 until a few months before the UAR was formed. But such
cooperation was, on the whole, hesitant, half-hearted, and easily dis­
rupted. The two parties fought more often and more intensely than they
cooperated.
Changes in Bacthist attitudes regarding socialism began to appear in the
mid-1950s. Jamal Atasi, writing in 1956, repeated the party’s oft-stated
differences between communism and Bacthism, but noted that Bacthists
could learn a good deal from the manner in which socialism had been put
into practice in the socialist countries.47 In Bacth literature, terms such as
masses of the people (jamahir al-shacb) and people’s organizations
(al-munazzamat al-shacbiyah) began to appear more frequently, along with
a greater attention to, and emphasis on, conflict among classes.
Atasi said in a companion article, for example, “ Socialism cannot
realize its goals unless it starts from the [fact of] division, difference, and
conflict among society’s structures and classes.” 48 He ended this article
with a call for all oppressed elements—workers, peasants, and other
stragglers—to unite in order to change Arab society by the only means
possible, “ straggle and overturning it.” His use of inqilab here would be
read by many as a call to revolution, not transformation of society by
internal renewal.49 To be sure, cAflaq did not deny the class straggle, but
he definitely subordinated it to considerations of Arab nationalism,
whereas Atasi and others were concerned to give socialism in practice the
equal footing which the Bacth slogan, “ Liberation, unity, socialism,”
offered in words. They did not succeed, and socialism ran a poor third to
the other two.50
Munif Razzaz, an early member of the party in Jordan, and author of a
widely read book, Landmarks o f the New Arab Life, which has been cited
above, wrote an article in 1957, which has since become a minor classic of
Bacth literature. Entitled Why Socialism Now?, it takes a very different
approach to socialism than cAflaq did.

Socialism is a way of life, not just an economic order. It extends to all

aspects of life—economics, politics, training, education, social life, health,
morals, literature, science, history, and others, both great and small.51

In contrast to the tone of much Bacth writing at the time, for example, the
weekly issues of al-BaHh in Damascus, which concentrated heavily on the
theme of unity, Razzaz sought to demonstrate that socialism, freedom, and
unity were interrelated and interdependent. He began his article by noting
that some persons (unnamed) were saying that socialism was a nice thing,
to be sure, but that it should wait on the accomplishment of freedom from
Ideology 37

imperialism and the achievement of unity. He contended that such a view

was wrong and said that:

Socialism, freedom and unity are not different names for different things,
. . . but different facets of one basic law (sharc) from which they spring . . .

That basic law or fundamental principle was respect for man’s worth:

If I believe in man and in man’s worth, then I should believe in unity,

nationalism, freedom, and socialism because each of them represents a facet
of man’s fundamental value.52

Razzaz ended his article by saying, in reply to the hypothetical question as

to when socialism will be achieved, that it had already been achieved “ to
the degree that freedom and unity have been achieved.” 53
If one examines the writings of Bacthists and publications of the party
over the ten years after the founding Congress in 1947, the lack of
treatment of certain topics prominent in the party constitution and the
highly intellectual, theoretical level of most Bacth literature are striking.
There is, for example, virtually no mention of land reform; the relatively
few references to labor unions are concerned almost exclusively with the
political role of such organizations. There seems to have been no effort on
the part of the Bacthist leaders to formulate even skeleton programs for
putting into practice the principles of social and economic reform they
advocated, against the day when the Bacth Party might achieve a position
of influence or control in a particular country.
There are, of course, a number of reasons for the Bacthist writers’
concentration on the theoretical to the exclusion of the practical. First,
party activity naturally focused on getting rid of or transforming the
existing political and social structure. Achievement of power may have
seemed so remote to party members that concern for what should follow its
attainment was not warranted. Party activity was in the political field, and
party writing naturally was heavily political.
Second, the principal Bacthist writers, who accounted for the bulk of
the material produced in the 1947-1957 period, were, in addition to cAflaq
himself, the “ professor’s” close associates and disciples. They were in
broad agreement that the first requirement of Arab society at that time was
a thoroughgoing change in attitude, an interior renaissance; this is the
essential burden of argument of cAflaq’s “ Nationalism is Love Before All
Else,” written in 1940.54
Third, the written or spoken word has, in Arab society, a value of its
own both for speaker and for hearer. A call for nationalism and freedom is,
38 THE BACTH PARTY

in a way, an actual step toward realization of nationalism and freedom.

There is a great deal of satisfaction and sense of accomplishment in
composing, say, a broadsheet on a given topic and distributing it, whether
or not it has an impact on anyone. Receptivity to books and pamphlets
extolling the virtues of Arab nationalism, pointing out the self-evident
utility of pan-Arab unity, and attacking the evils of feudalism was high, not
only among the literate populace, but among the typical party recruits as
well. Even if party leaders tried, they would have generated little interest
among their followers by discussing hypothetical cases of reorganizing
government administration in anticipation of the time the party might wield
power. The party member was likely to think of administration as some­
thing that any educated man—like himself—could carry out competently.
The constantly repeated calls of the Bacth Party for a rebirth of the Arab
spirit, for the replacement of those who collaborated with imperialism by
true Arabs, for an increased measure of social justice, and above all for
unity, had great appeal to certain elements in the population of the Arab
states. Obviously, monarchs, landlords, industrialists, and similar folk
were anything but enchanted by the ideas of cAflaq, Hawrani, and Bitar.
Nor were workers and peasants—their interests were primarily the simpler
ones of better wages and enough food. As an ideological party, founded
and guided by intellectuals, the Bacth’s appeal was almost exclusively to
people with education and with some pretensions to intellectuality.
An examination of biographic data on members of the party in the
1940s and 1950s shows a striking homogeneity of social background and
education. For the most part, information is more complete on those who
have reached a level of responsibility in branch, regional, or national
commands or who have held public office as cabinet minister, member of
parliament, senior civil servant, or military officer. Although this group
represents the elite rather than the rank and file of the party, the smaller
number of ordinary Bacthists on whom I have been able to find data show
much the same characteristics. Thus, although the findings discussed
below lack that degree of statistical perfection which is desirable in social
science analysis, I believe they present a reasonably accurate picture of the
membership of the party.
One or two caveats about this topic are in order, however. For the
obvious reasons that the party has risen to power in Syria and in Iraq and
has not had to remain clandestine, much more information is available on
organization and membership in those countries than in others. Lebanon’s
tolerance for Bacthist activity puts it third in availability of information,
followed by Jordan. Information on Bacthists in other countries is scrappy.
A second caveat is what might be called the accidents of recruitment.
By this I mean the home town, place of education, circle of relatives, and
Ideology 39

friends of those who first brought the Bacth message to a particular country
or city. The party did not systematically try to establish its organization in
all areas in accordance with a master plan. Rather, members recruited
candidates for membership among their relatives, their neighbors, and
those with whom they came in contact in their normal professional life, in
schools, and among their acquaintances. Over a period of years, this
practice has led to a predominance of party members from particular towns
or districts. Iraq provides a clear example; a very high proportion of its
present (1975) leaders come from the districts of Tikrit, Samarra, and
Hadithah. This development has meant, for example, that the Bacth Party
has continued the Sunni Muslim dominance of Iraq, which has charac­
terized that country since the mandate period. In Syria, many cAlawis and
Druzes were brought into the party by Bacth teachers in the government
district secondary schools.
To a very large extent, party members were recruited during their
secondary school years; a minority joined during their university careers.
Recruits had to remain in a supporter or probationary status until they were
eighteen, but this did not lessen their enthusiasm for politics. By the late
1940s, most cadets, for example, had made some degree of political
commitment by the time they entered the Homs military academy. In
Syria, the Bacth attracted many in the Lattaqiyah and Aleppo areas; “ as
many as three-fourths of . . . [an Aleppo] high school class were Bacthi in
the late 1940s.’’55 Many Bacthist students upon graduation from college
went on to advanced study in their own country or abroad. Of 122 Bacthists
who held regional or national command posts, twenty-four are known to
have advanced degrees, primarily in the fields of medicine, law, and
letters. A substantial number of medical men have achieved senior status in
the party—Nur al-Din Atasi, Yusuf Zucayyin, Ibrahim Makhus, Wahib
al-Ghanim, cAbd al-Majid al-Rafici, and Munif Razzaz are a few exam­
ples. Once finished with education, the typical Bacthist went to work in his
profession, in a government department, or as a teacher. Of the 122
persons identified as having held membership in a regional or national
command from 1947 through 1965, only one, the Syrian Khalid al-Hakim,
member of the regional command from September 1963 to March 1964,
followed a non-white-collar profession; he was a labor leader, and a
genuine worker. (See Appendix C for a fuller treatment of this topic.)
In Syria, the party teachings were spread by cAflaq’s and Bitar’s
students in the Tajhiz Secondary School, the state school that drew the
largest number of Damascenes and boys from the districts near
Damascus.56 As pupils from this school moved up into university studies in
Syria and abroad or out into the countryside, they carried the Bacth doctrine
with them. In the provincial centers, where government schools began to
40 THE BACTH PARTY

increase in the 1940s, these original disciples brought the Bacth message to
boys from the countryside, mostly sons of rural families with newfound
means of sending their children to school.57 A number of refugees from the
Sanjak of Alexandretta who were attracted to the Arsuzi component of the
Bacth had connections with the cAlawis in the Lattaqiyah district and
attracted a number of village youth who came to study in the Lattaqiyah
secondary school. cAflaq, as a Christian, had ties with families in the
May dan district of Damascus, which in turn had connections in the Hawran
and Jabal Druze, and thus brought many Druzes into the growing party.58
Mansur al-Atrash, son of Druze leader Sultan al-Atrash, studied in Tajhiz
Secondary School and at the American University of Beirut, joining the
party in 1946 at the age of twenty-one.
Mutac Safadi, writing in 1964, no longer as a friend of the party, though
he had once been a member, commented that this growth pattern in Syria,
involving so many Bacthists from the cAlawi, Druze, Ismacili, and Christ­
ian minorities, had several unfortunate effects. The party was limited in its
ability to deal with the Sunni Muslim classes in the cities. The great
concentration of the nascent party’s effort on intellectuals or the educated
operated to limit severely the Bacth’s ability to relate to the working classes
in the cities—Sunni for the most part—and to the peasants. While recruits
with a rural background had become numerous, these recruits were
primarily interested in improving their own status, not the status of their
peasant neighbors.59 Although Safadi cites these and other aspects of the
party’s approach (e.g., its contribution to the great politicization of
secondary and college students in Syria and the resulting strikes and
demonstrations which cut teaching to 60-70 days a year at times) as defects
to be deplored, he appears to be basically correct. Jundi says much the
same thing, criticizing the Bacth leaders for not achieving domination of
Damascus before moving into the countryside. He asserts that they never
properly understood the city, with its historic cultural past.60 Heavy
recruitment in the Lattaqiyah area accounts for the heavy concentration of
cAlawis in the party, army, and government of Syria in the early 1970s. An
cAlawi Bacthist soldier, Hafiz al-Asad, became president in 1971.
There were, of course, many Sunnis in the Syrian party, including
prominent members such as Bitar, Jamal Atasi, and Jalal al-Sayyid, but
their numbers appear to have been low in proportion to the number of
Sunnis in the Syrian population. The merger of the Bacth with Hawrani’s
Arab Socialist Party in 1953 tended to obscure this imbalance, because
Hawrani’s supporters were drawn almost exclusively from the Sunni
Muslim districts around Hama.
Students spread the party and its teachings outside Syria as they went
abroad to study. A division of university students was functioning in Beirut
Ideology 41

in 1951, for example, where Bacthists were associated with al-cUrwa

al-Wuthqa (The Firm Bond), an Arab nationalist group. In Lebanon, the
pattern of recruitment almost exclusively among intellectuals prevailed.
The confessional nature of Lebanese society imposed limitations on the
party’s development. While its command in the late 1950s could show a
suitably ecumenical spirit by including a Greek Orthodox (Jibran Majda-
lani), a Sunni Muslim (cAbd al-Majid Rafici), and a Shici Muslim (cAli
Khalil), the general antipathy of Christians to schemes that involved
linking Lebanon organically to other Arab states limited the Bacth’s appeal
to that part of the Lebanese population. Moreover, Rafici’s personal appeal
drew a substantial coterie of followers in his home town of Tripoli, which
is predominantly Sunni Muslim. For these reasons, Bacthists in Lebanon
have most frequently come from the Muslim community.
Iraqis studying in Beirut and Damascus brought Bacth doctrines back to
Baghdad. Some of the earliest members were Shicis, e.g., Fu’ad Rikabi,
the Iraqi region’s first secretary, and Talib Husayn Shabib, his immediate
successor. But most of the party membership came to be drawn heavily
from families who hailed from the districts of Tikrit and Samarra in
Baghdad Liwa on the Tigris River north of Baghdad, and from Ana, Hit,
and Haditha districts in Dulaym Liwa on the Euphrates River northwest of
Baghdad. Early Bacthists in Jordan were a mix, a few near-contemporaries
of the party founders. Munif Razzaz came of a Damascus family; others
had family ties to Syria, too; still others were attracted in the customary
way while studying abroad.
The typical Bacthist in the late 1940s and 1950s was a college or
university student or a fairly recent graduate. He—the party had very few
women members in these years, despite its official position on women’s
equality (Art. 12 of the Constitution)—had joined the party in his late teens
or early twenties. He came from a family which, although usually far from
wealthy, was able to afford to send its son to secondary school and perhaps
college, or was at least far enough from the poverty line that it could allow
a potential wage-earner to continue at school on government money instead
of looking for employment at an early age. He was almost certain to have
been educated in a system that owed much of its educational philosophy
and curriculum to European or American ideas. Once finished with his
education, he would be found employed as a teacher, as a government
official, or following a profession such as law or medicine. If he was a
government official, his status would depend greatly on the attitude of his
government. If his government’s attitude was friendly (as Syria’s was for a
good part of the time), he might have some real authority; if it was
unfriendly—a likely case elsewhere—he would probably occupy a position
somewhat above that of a clerk, but one with little authority. Senior civil
42 THE BACTH PARTY

servants, who were trusted by the various Arab regimes, wielded the real
power in government ministries. Any Bacthist employed by his govern­
ment could expect, and often experienced, dismissal, suspension, or
incarceration for his political views or actions.
The typical Bacthist was likely to have accepted wholeheartedly the
thesis that the Arabs were once a great, united state, that many of their
present woes derived from the artificial divisions of that great natural entity
by external forces, that the road to unity was being blocked by outside
powers and their domestic Arab friends—“ agents of imperialism” would
be the term used to describe the latter—and that this situation must be
changed. Such beliefs were held widely by most of his contemporaries.
The Bacthist differed from them in that he had heard of the new party,
perhaps been introduced to it by a relative or friend, and saw in it a
mechanism for translating the belief into reality—a pan-Arab party, dedi­
cated to fundamental change in the social and governmental system under
which he lived. The first of its kind in the Arab world, the party appeared
to offer more than the stale, personal political movements of established
leaders or than the few Arab parties which had some substance but were
devoted to affairs in a single country.
A good number of these typical Bacthists were likely to have become
virtually mesmerized by the personality and the writings of Michel cAflaq.
cAflaq’s honesty and intensity came across most strongly, of course, to
those who were able to enjoy close contact with him through residence in
Damascus. In a small way, he was a modem Arab prophet with a band of
disciples. Safadi described cAflaq as a religious shaykh, surrounded first
by a circle of lesser shaykhs and then by a group of disciples.61 Although
Safadi’s statement was meant as a criticism—Safadi was an exponent of
mass political action—it is not an inaccurate description.
The decade from 1947 to 1957 was to be one in which cAflaq’s
strengths, notably the ability to convince an audience of the necessity of
Arab resurrection, coincided with the deep convictions of politically aware
Arabs that unity would solve many of their problems. The Bacth Party,
formally established in 1947, was the first Arab party to declare the entire
Arab world to be its proper field of action. “ Unity, liberation, socialism.
One Arab nation having an immortal mission,” were the party slogans at
the head of every publication. An idea had met its proper time; unity was in
the wind, and the Bacth Party would be its standard bearer.
Ideology 43

Notes
1. Macrakat al-Masir al-Wahid (Beirut: Dar al-cIlm li al-Malayin, 1958).
2. “ Nationalism is Love Before Everything Else,” in Fi Sabil al-Bacth (Beirut:
Dar al-Talicah, 1963), p. 45. Hereafter cited as Fi Sabil, always from this edition
unless otherwise specified. An English translation of this article is in Sylvia G.
Haim (ed.), Arab Nationalism: An Anthology (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1962), pp. 242-43.
3. My translation. The text of the constitution as approved at the First Party
Congress is in Nidal al-Bacth (Beirut: Dar al-Talicah, 1963), pp. 172-81; cited
hereafter as Nidal. English translations are in Haim, Arab Nationalism, pp.
233-41. I have also examined a pamphlet version printed in June 1947, loaned to
me by Prof. G. H. Torrey. The text is identical to that in Nidal. The title page of the
1947 pamphlet states that the party was founded in 1940 and terms it “ a political,
nationalist, populist, socialist, transforming organization’’ (siyasiyah, qawmiyah,
shacbiyah, ishtirakiyah, inqilabiyah munazzamah).
4. “ Dhikra al-Rasul al-cArabi” (“ In Commemoration of the Arab Mes­
senger” ), Fi Sabil, p. 54. A French translation is in Orient, Vol. 9, No. 35, 1965,
pp. 147-58.
5. “ Dhikra,” p. 55.
6. Ibid., p. 52.
7. Ibid., p. 55.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid., p. 58.
10. Ibid., p. 55. cAflaq’s approach to Islam differs in some respects from that
of Satic al-Husri: see William L. Cleveland, The Making o f an Arab Nationalist
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 121 ff.
11. Constitution, Art. 7. Such boundaries for the Arab fatherland are given by
others also. See Satic al-Husri, cUrubah Awwalan (Arabism First) (Beirut: Dar
al-cIlm li al-Malayin, 1961), p. 11, for a similar list.
12. Nidal I, “ Statement on the Decisions of the First Arab Bacth Congress,” p.
186.
13. See Nidal I, pp. 224 et seq.
14. Haim, Arab Nationalism, pp. 244-45. The text is also in Fi Sabil,
pp. 176-80.
15. Fi Sabil, p. 178.
16. Nidal I, p. 175. Haim, in her translation of the constitution, renders inqilabi
as revolutionary (Arab Nationalism, p. 235). I use transformation because it seems
to me to be closer to cAflaq’s meaning as presented in his political writings. cAflaq
discussed inqilab in this context in his speech at the First National Congress in
1947. See Bashir Dacuq (ed.), Nidal Hizb al-Bacth al-cArabi al-Ishtiraki cAbr
Mu’tamaratihi al-Qawmiyah 1947-1964 (Beirut: Daral-Talicah, 1971), pp. 20-23,
hereafter cited as cAbr Mu’tamaratihi.
17. Nidal I, p. 291.
18. Eric Rouleau, “ The Syrian Enigma: What is the Bacth?” Le Monde
Diplomatique, Sept. 1967, p. 6.
19. Nidal I, pp. 172-73. Citations to the party constitution in the following
pages are to its numbered articles, not to pages in Nidal or Haim.
20. Munif Razzaz, Maealim al-Hayah al-cArabiyah al-Jadidah (Landmarks of
the New Arab Life) (4th printing; Beirut: Dar al-cIlm li al-Malayin, 1960), p. 166.
The book was first published in Cairo in 1953.
44 THE BACTH PARTY

21. Ibid., pp. 168-69.

22. Ibid., pp. 172-78.
23. “ Socialism and Human Freedom,” in Michel cAflaq et al., Dirasat fi
al-Ishtirakiyah (Beirut: Dar al-Talicah, 1960). Despite the publication dates, both
Razzaz and Ghanim wrote these words during the regime of Adib Shishakli in
Syria.
24. C. J. Edmonds, Kurds, Turks, and Arabs (London: Oxford University
Press, 1957, p. 383), stated the matter clearly. Referring to the March 1924
elections in Iraq, he said: “ Parties and declared policies being unknown, most of
the secondary electors . . . applied to official sources for guidance as to how they
should exercise their novel rights. . . . No pressure was brought to bear on the
secondary electors, but in later years the precedent thus set came to be more and
more abused until ‘the elections’ came to be Government nomination open and
unashamed, and failure to secure a result with ‘no surprises’ was as much as the
Mutasarrif s [provincial governor’s] place was worth.”
25. George Grassmuck, “ The Electoral Process in Iraq, 1952-1958,” Middle
East Journal, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Autumn 1960), 408-10; cited hereafter as MEJ.
26. Salah al-Din Bitar, in his Al-Siyasah al-cArabiyah bayn al-Mabda’ wa
al-Tatbiq (Arab Politics in Principle and Practice) (Beirut: Dar al-Talicah, 1960),
pp. 28-33.
27. Gordon H. Torrey, Syrian Politics and the Military, 1945-1958
(Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1964), p. 325.
28. Democracy has remained officially the Ba'th’s favored system of govern­
ment. Ali Khalil, in The Socialist Parties in Syria and Lebanon, unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, American University Washington, D. C., 1962, says, “ The Bacth
Party believes that the Arab people will find their liberty through democracy . . . .
if laws are legislated by the elected representatives of the people, the liberties of the
people will be guaranteed” (pp. 85-86). Khalil was chosen a member of the
National Command in 1963.
29. Nidal I, p. 33, in an election campaign flyer.
30. Michel cAflaq, “ Thawriyat al-Wihdah al-cArabiyah” (March 1953) in
Macrakat al-Masir al-Wahid (Beirut: Dar al-cIlm li al-Malayin, 1958), pp. 23-24.
31. In “ Features of Arab Socialism,” Fi Sabil, p. 204. In a later writing,
cAflaq said, “ Nationalism, which is solicitude for the good of the nation, and
socialism are nearly identical.” Fi Sabil, “ Labor and Socialism” (1955), p. 216.
32. Fi Sabil, p. 204.
33. Ibid., pp. 205 and 207.
34. “ The Role of Labor in Achieving Socialist Unity,” Fi Sabil, pp. 218-19.
35. Rouleau, “ Syrian Enigma,” p. 6.
36. “ Our Position in Respect of Communist Theory,” Fi Sabil; p. 199.
37. Rouleau, “ Syrian Enigma,” p. 6.
38. “ Arab Socialism Defined in Relation to the Aims of the Arab Resurrec­
tion” (1950), in Dirasat fi al-Ishtirakiyah, p. 33.
39. Yu. Ostrovityanov, “ The Past and Present of the Bacth Party's National
Socialism,” World Economy and International Relations (Moscow), No. 1, 1966.
Translation by Joint Publications Research Service, No. 34,201, p. 3.
40. Fi Sabil, p. 210, “ [Differences] Among Our Socialism, Communism, and
National Socialism.”
41. Ibid., p. 215, “ Labor and Socialism.”
42. From “ Al-Qawmiyah al-cArabiyah wa Mawqifuha min al-Shuyuciyah”
(“ Arab Nationalism and Its Position in Regard to Communism” ), 1944. Quoted in
Ideology 45

Patrick Seale, The Struggle for Syria: A Study o f Post-war Arab Politics,
1945-1958 (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 149.
43. In “ The Wealth of Life,” Fi Sabil, p. 26.
44. In “ [Differences] Among,” p. 210.
45. Ibid., p. 222. See also Tarif Khalidi, “ A Critical Study of the Political
Ideas of Michel Aflaq,” Middle East Forum, Vol. 42, No. 2 (1966), 60-61.
46. Nidal I, p. 88. In a footnote to our article, “ Arab Socialism” in Thompson
and Reischauer (eds.). Modernization o f the Arab World (New York: Van Nos­
trand, 1966), Gordon Torrey and I termed shucubiyah “ a movement in Abbasid
days which tended to glorify Persia and debase the Arabs. In the contemporary
Arab Lexicon, the term signifies any trend which deviates from reform
nationalism.” We have been chided for this by Messrs. Sami Hanna and George
Gardner on the grounds that it “ does not adequately alert the reader to the wider
ramifications of the concept” (Hanna and Gardner, “ Al-Shu’ubiyah Updated,”
MEJ, Vol. 20, No. 3, footnote 6, p. 336). They have a point; the reader who
wishes extensive detail on the wider ramifications is referred to their article. In
Bacth writings, the term is used pejoratively for a variety of people and movements,
e.g., cAbd al-Karim Qasim of Iraq and the Hizb al-Qawmi al-Suri, all in Bacthist
eyes insufficiently dedicated to Arab nationalism and unity.
47. “ Socialism: Past and Future,” in Dirasat fi al-Ishtirakiyah, p. 97.
48. “ Socialism Liberates by Struggle,” ibid., p. 113.
49. Ibid., p. 116. The Arabic reads, “ Fa là sabil li-tabdil hadha al-mujtamac ilà
bi al-nidal wa al-inqilâb.”
50. The party later recognized this extreme emphasis on unity as a mistake.
“ Internal Circular,” October 1960, reporting the results of the Fourth National
Congress, Nidal IV, pp. 181-219, especially p. 203.
51. The article appears in Dirasat fi al-Ishtirakiyah, pp. 117-37. This quotation
is from p. 120. Razzaz’s article has been separately issued, and was reprinted (c.
1968) in the bulletin of the Arab Students’ Association in the United States.
52. Ibid., pp. 129-30.
53. Ibid., p. 137.
54. Fi Sabil, pp. 45-46.
55. Michael H. Van Dusen, Intra- and Inter-Generational Conflict in the
Syrian Army. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Johns Hopkins University, 1971,
pp. 300, 314 ff., and 320. The quotation is from p. 320.
56. Mutac Safadi, Hizb al-Bacth, Ma’sat al Mawlid, Ma’sat al-Nihayah (The
Bacth Party, Its Tragic Birth, Its Tragic End) (Beirut: Dar al-Adab, 1964) p. 56;
Jundi, al-Bacth, p. 31.
57. Safadi, Hizb al-Bacth, p. 68.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid., p. 69.
60. Jundi, al-Bacth, pp. 38-39.
61. Safadi, Hizb al-Bacth, p. 84.
 - 4 -

The Growth of the Party in Syria

Armed with an ideology and an organizational structure, the fledgling party

began its formal career. Even in 1947 its few hundred members were far
from being a homogeneous group, although it is accurate to say that all
members believed in Arab nationalism and unity. Three principal factions
were distinguishable in Syria at that time, the first headed by cAflaq and
Bitar and centered in Damascus; the second, Wahib al-Ghanim’s group in
the Lattaqiyah area, which included many followers of Zaki Arsuzi; and
the third, Jalal al-Sayyid’s group in Dayr al-Zur district. Within these
major factions there were substantial differences of opinion, although the
extent of these differences was for the most part hidden at that time. Even
cAflaq and Bitar viewed the party’s role from different perspectives, the
one focusing on its elite nature, the other more concerned with progress
through conventional political activity.
The first item of Syrian domestic politics to come up was the election of
a new parliament. The campaign officially began in early June for elections
to be held on July 7, 1947. In fact, however, one major political issue had
been fought over for many months—the question of whether the new
parliament should be elected indirectly, a process which would have
favored, and accordingly was favored by, the National Bloc, which had
been in office since 1943, or whether direct elections should be held.
Al-Bacth had campaigned vigorously for direct elections on the grounds
that direct elections alone were democratic, represented the will of the
masses, and could operate to end authoritarian government.1
The Bacth was only a small voice in the widespread opposition to
indirect elections by students, labor, and such “ little people” as could
make themselves heard in Syria. In several articles in the party paper the
Bacth Party distinguished between “ constitutionalists” and “ rulers,” the
latter one of the party’s favorite targets, by which it meant the notables,
those of wealth, power, and influence.2 In a statement relating decisions
taken at the first national congress, which was issued April 13, 1947, the
Bacth Party asked for direct and free elections, for a neutral government to
48 THE BACTH PARTY

supervise them, and for the right of candidates or their representatives to be

poll-watchers, plus the abolition of the old practice of allotting seats in the
parliament on the basis of religion.3 By May the principal political groups
had bowed to public complaints and agreed to hold direct elections, but
qualified this freedom by imposing residence requirements for candidates,
which effectively excluded a number of potential opposition politicians
from running for office.4
The election campaign formally opened June 4. A special meeting of
party leaders decided that the Bacth should enter the campaign and
cooperate with other political groups and with workers to take effective
steps to assure free elections.5 Although the party, in accordance with the
non-sectarian views expressed in its constitution, had opposed the tradi­
tional pattern of allotting seats on the basis of religion, it went along with
an electoral system that carried on this tradition. Among the 1,800 or so
aspirants for 140 seats, cAflaq and Bitar ran as candidates from Damascus,
the former for a Greek Orthodox seat. Neither they nor any other party
candidate was successful. Even before polling day the Bacth protested the
partisan attitude of the government, asserting that the government’s claim
to neutrality was false.6 After the elections the party continued to allege
widespread fraud, especially in Lattaqiyah, where its members fared badly.
It insisted that the elections did not really represent popular attitudes and
asked that they be voided.7
The election campaign was, in fact, a new type of activity for an
inexperienced party. It would have been surprising if the Bacth had won
any seats. It was not a widely known movement; its membership was
small; and, in any case, the multiplicity of candidates splintered the protest
votes the Bacth might have hoped to get. The elections did, however, spell
defeat for the National Bloc and facilitated the rise of a new faction of
Syrian political leaders. These leaders, however, were men of backgrounds
similar to those of the National Bloc, for the most part notables, representa­
tives of important families having large land holdings or commercial
interests. The similarity in basic outlook of the two would permit political
alliances in the years ahead. The parliament that convened at the end of the
summer of 1947 was filled with men who were perfectly content with the
system that preserved their prerogatives of power and wealth.
For the Bacth Party, the natural course was to continue in its posture
of opposition to domination by “ feudalists, reactionaries, and ex­
ploiters” —its favorite and constantly repeated epithets for the wealthy,
powerful landed families such as the Jabiris, the Kikhyas, the cAzms, and
so on. To this task of opposition the party turned, contributing to the
general turmoil that characterized Syria in 1947 and 1948. The party
leadership met in Damascus on September 19 and 20, just as the newly
Growth o f the Party in Syria 49

elected parliament was opening for business in the capital. The meeting,
which was attended by representatives of all party branches, adopted a
statement made public the following month which dealt with Syrian and
with broader Arab issues. Domestically it focused on the inequitability of
government by the privileged, on criticism of elections in which the
popular will had been thwarted, on the efforts to amend the constitution to
permit the re-election of President Quwatli, and on the necessity to reduce
the prices of the necessities of life for the masses.8
The campaign against the re-election of Quwatli brought the Bacth more
into public notice during the next six months as a party lined up with the
established political opposition. The party paper, al-Bafth, was among the
loudest voices opposing the several maneuvers in which Quwatli and his
supporters engaged in order to permit him to continue in office. These
measures included constitutional amendments to allow the President to
succeed himself and to select a method of voting; election by the parlia­
ment was favored. Bacth opposition to Quwatli’s re-election was so
vigorous that the party paper was shut down early in March 1948; party
rallies and meetings also were broken up and participants arrested. A
notable case of this sort occurred in March at a meeting in the party
headquarters. Salah Bitar had barely hit his stride in a speech opposing the
constitutional amendment when a bunch of toughs from pro-amendment
forces tried to break into the room. The police arrived shortly afterwards,
ignored those who had tried to break up the meeting, and arrested fifty
student participants in the Bacth meeting. The party issued an outraged
statement of protest, citing the misuse of the police force as a reason for not
re-electing Quwatli.9 Despite all their efforts, the Bacth Party and other
opposition forces were unsuccessful. The necessary amendment was
passed, and Quwatli was re-elected by the parliament on April 18, 1948.
The vote was unanimous, although a number of opposition deputies
absented themselves from the session.
While these parliamentary and political maneuverings were going on in
1947 and 1948, the drama of central importance to post-war Arab politics
was reaching its climax in neighboring Palestine. The Bacthists, as
nationalists subscribing to a doctrine of unity of all the Arabs within a
territory defined by their constitution, were vigorously opposed to the
establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine, although they were, like many
others, slow to realize the strength of the Zionist challenge. They had
memorialized the United States representative in Damascus as early as
1944, protesting support by both major United States political parties for
Jewish immigration and the founding of a Jewish state in Palestine.10
cAflaq wrote a letter similar in tone protesting President Roosevelt’s public
support of Jewish immigration in 1945.11 At the end of that year, after a
50 THE BACTH PARTY

general meeting, the party issued a document summarizing its views on

various Arab issues and problems; half the space was devoted to
Palestine.12 The Anglo-American committee proposal of 1946 to allow
100,000 immigrants to enter Palestine had drawn a critical response from
the party.13
The documents issued at the first national congress—the constitution
and the explanation of the congress’ decisions—dealt with Palestine only
indirectly. Although it is included in the bounds of the Arab nation by
definition, Palestine is not specifically mentioned in either document.
Palestine appears to have been mentioned in the 1946-1947 period rela­
tively few times. The party was concerned, of course, about the Palestine
question, but two factors kept it from devoting much effort to it. First, the
leaders were deeply involved in efforts to establish a party organization, to
pull the various Bacth factions together, to organize the founding congress,
and to find a role for the Bacth in Syrian politics. Second, the magnitude of
the Palestine issue was not really apparent until the British decision of
February 14, 1947 to abandon the mandate of Palestine and to refer the
matter to the United Nations. In effect, this decision by London left the
contestants to thresh out a solution to the problem. It is likely that Bacthists
in Syria followed the prevailing Arab opinion of the time that things would
probably work out all right, and that in any event the Arabs would
overpower the Jews if the issue actually came to fighting. The presentation
of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP)
memorandum advocating partition in August 1947 jolted the Arabs
considerably.
By the late fall of 1947, and certainly by the time of the passage of the
UN General Assembly partition plan on November 29, the seriousness of
the Palestine issue had become apparent to Arab opinion. In Syria, perhaps
more than in other countries because of its long association with Arab
nationalism and Arab unity and its ties with Palestine in Ottoman days,
excitement and interest mounted. The news of the UN’s approval of the
partition of Palestine into an Arab and Jewish state caused riots in
Damascus and Aleppo. The rioting in Aleppo was especially severe; some
seventy-five Jews were killed. Syrian officers resigned from the army to
right with Arab partisans, notably those led by Fawzi Qawuqji. Many
political figures made pledges to go to the front in Palestine; Akram
Hawrani was one of two who lived up to his pledge.14 Optimism about
success of the Palestinian cause ran very high, so high that the dimensions
of al-nakbah, the disaster, as it came to be known, were all the greater.
The Bacth shared the general attitude of excitement, of anti-Zionist
rhetoric, and of enthusiasm for the Arab cause in Palestine. At the turn of
the year 1947-1948, it began to push the cause of armed struggle in its
Growth o f the Party in Syria 51

official utterances, demanding in mid-January that the people as well as the

Palestinian fighters be armed. The party decided to conscript all its
members to fight in Palestine. The first contingent was ordered to the front
under the command of the party executive committee, but the military
capabilities of this untrained group were never tested. The authorities
refused to assist such groups. They were especially hostile to anything that
might help the Bacth, which was waging a vigorous campaign in opposition
to the Syrian establishment’s efforts to procure Quwatli’s re-election.15
The party did use public information media to propagandize in favor of the
Arab cause and to drum up support for it. It also went ahead and formed a
permanent bureau for Palestine in June 1948.16 Although Palestine had not
been ignored in the earlier period, as we have seen above, from this time on
it became a central topic of party rhetoric, both printed and oral. Few
general party documents of the 1950s or 1960s failed to include attacks on
imperialism for its support of Zionism or exhortations to Arabs to believe
that unity was necessary in order to restore Arab rights in Palestine.
In Syria, however, politics went on as usual during 1948, despite the
drama in Palestine. As noted, Quwatli’s re-election was an event of major
importance. The failures of the Syrian army in Palestine became linked in
the public mind with corruption in the use of government funds earmarked
for defense purposes and of misuse of public contributions for the Pales­
tinian cause. The Bacth continued to criticize the government as best it
could, hampered by the shutting down of its newspaper in March 1948 and
the closing of party offices in several cities in Syria on the grounds that the
party was disturbing public order with demonstrations. The Bacth assailed
the Mardam cabinet of August 1948 and demanded free elections in a
document issued on September 7. For this attack cAflaq was arrested and
eventually, in November, sentenced to six months in jail, a sentence the
court reduced to two months in view of his patriotic activity in the struggle
against the French.17
The party was not intimidated by the arrest of its head. While he was
awaiting trial, it fired off a stiff note denouncing the “ horrid new crime”
the government had perpetrated againstcAflaq and protesting the treatment
he received in jail.18 It accused the government of Jamil Mardam of gross
mismanagement in dealing with the demonstrations which spread across
Syria in the latter part of November. Asserting that the cabinet was guilty
of shedding the blood of hundreds (there were tens of dead and hundreds of
injured, according to a separate telegram sent in cAflaq’s name to the prime
minister), it called for the downfall of the government, punishment for all
ministers and police who had shed blood, and the formation of a govern­
ment truly representing the popular will.19
The Bacth continued to assert not only that the government should go,
52 THE BACTH PARTY

but also that the chamber of deputies should be dissolved because most of
its members held office fraudulently because they did not represent the will
of the people. What Syria needed, said the party, were new free elections
which would bring an honest government into office. This party message
was sent on December 3, the day the Mardam cabinet resigned and the day
Colonel Husni Zacim began to implement martial law, closed the schools,
and imposed press censorship. Later, on December 17, another bulletin
criticizing the new cabinet of Khalid al-cAzm was issued.20 For the Bacth,
it was the whole group of people who dominated parliament and played
musical chairs in the cabinets who had to go; the party did not seek merely
to exchange one politician or political group for another.
In reality, the Bacth did quite well for itself in this period, the two years
or so following its formal founding in 1947. In the tumult of Syrian
political life, which was shot with corruption, with the parliament fre­
quently unable to function for lack of a quorum, with a constant stream of
cabinet crises, the Bacth sounded a consistently clear message, which
boiled down to one of “ throw the rascals out and replace them with honest
citizens who will represent and work for the Syrian people.” The party was
on the side of the angels in expressing this view and in espousing both the
Palestinian cause and the cause of Arab nationalism and unity. Its leaders,
not having tasted office, were not tainted with corruption. They had been
jailed by the French and by independent Syria for political activity. In its
newspaper, in speeches, and in pamphlets the party frequently voiced
opinions that some political groups in parliament would find embarrassing
to voice themselves, even though they might be glad to have such views
expressed. cAflaq, in his trial of October 1948, had fifteen lawyers
defending him, and parliamentary members, even of the National Party,
spoke up for him at this time. He was, after all, being tried for activities
which they or their followers employed in Syrian politics, too.21
As consistent proponents of clean government, the Bacth came in these
few years to enjoy a substantial measure of success. It attracted new
members and, in the eyes of many, came to represent, in an imprecise and
unorganized but nonetheless real way, the aspirations of far more people
than were ever enrolled in its ranks. The good name it enjoyed for fighting
the establishment helped to draw readers for its doctrine of unity and
nationalism. On paper, on speaker’s rostrums, and frequently in the streets,
the Bacth was in the thick of the political tumult which left “ the Syrian
people . . . thoroughly disillusioned with their leaders . . . [and] ripe for a
benevolent despot who would . . . restore the nation’s self-confidence.” 22
The restorer turned out to be short on benevolence and long on despotism.
Husni Zacim, commander-in-chief of the army, seized power on March
30, 1949, with the full backing of an army which was angry at the way the
Growth o f the Party in Syria 53

politicians were running the country and especially at the poor support the
government had provided for the troops facing the Israelis. Zacim tried to
get politicians to cooperate with him but most refused to extend their
support. He was unable to form a civilian government, so he dissolved
parliament. Relying on the help of those few politicians who would take a
government role—among them former Minister of Finance Hasan Jabbara
and chamber of deputies member Akram Hawrani—Zacim himself ended
up heading the government, which was formed in mid-April.
The Bacth Party welcomed Zacim’s coup, as many Syrians did. Its
leaders expected Zacim to rout out the evils of the past, to usher in a “ new
age,” and to work for a “ strong productive national life” in Syria. These
phrases appear in an open letter addressed by the party command to the
leader of the army, in which the Bacth also asked for “ securing public
liberties according to the constitution” and “ holding free elections.” 23 On
April 7, cAflaq spoke at a demonstration in Damascus in favor of the new
regime, which he believed would afford the Syrians an opportunity to build
a true government based on the will of the people. He cautioned that Syria
had not yet achieved revolution (inqilab) in his sense of the word, but
through Zacim’s coup it had taken a step toward a real revolution, “ which
would secure for the Arabs in all regions Arab socialism and Arab
unity.” 24
The party’s rationale for supporting Zacim’s coup was set forth in a
critical memorandum from cAflaq addressed to Zacim on May 24. The
following excerpts show what the Bacth had expected from the coup:

The positive party attitude toward the coup was based on the following
reasons:
1. The party had lost hope of improvement under the previous regime,
where the president had rigged elections, and things were done illegally. It
considered the coup an opportunity to restore legitimacy to the government
and rights to the people.
2. The party’s confidence was raised by the first announcements of the
coup which stressed principles of liberation, constitutionalism, progres­
siveness, and socialism, which are close to the party’s principles.
3. It was confident also since a number of officers in the vanguard of
the coup are known to us as having a nationalist ideology and being worthy
of responsibility.
4. Its satisfaction that rallying the people and the people’s national
consciousness around the coup would act to prevent internal division and
external exploitation and would lead to a new age.
All these add up to a new government resting on the confidence of the
people, government by responsible persons which is going to hold free
elections to return to constitutional life.
54 THE BACTH PARTY

The document went on to note that Zacim appointed the wrong people, that
the regime was not doing what it had promised, and ended with the
following demands:

The party views the road of the true revolution as one which takes the
following steps:
First: the formation of a government from the parties which represented
the opposition in the previous regime, because these parties represent the
people.
Second: restoration of'complete liberty, especially for the parties and the
press.
Third: holding elections free from pressure and interference. . . .25

By this time Zacim had come to like running Syria. He did not
understand how to attract support from political forces and preferred to
keep them to the side. He was extravagant, imperial, and in effect became
a nuisance to his erstwhile supporters both in and out of the army. Zacim
dissolved political organizations on May 29 and arrested some political
figures, including cAflaq (for writing the memorandum quoted above).
Zacim wasn’t about to allow criticism of his regime. The Bacth Party paper
never did appear during his short reign, and the Bacthists’ hopes of
elections and of a government representative of the people faded away.
Bitar, writing the following year on the anniversary of the coup, said,
“ The coups which occurred [in 1949] were military and their goals were
limited to those of the soldiers.” 26
Husni Zacim lasted only four and a half months. He was ousted early in
the morning of August 14 in what was becoming the classic example of
“ the Syrian coup.” Dissident army units seized the radio station, sur­
rounded the presidential palace, shut off access to the city, and took over
power with little or no fighting. The new leader. Colonel Sami Hinnawi,
invited political leaders to discuss with him how to govern Syria. This time
the politicians weren’t as stand-offish as they had been with Zacim, and
Hinnawi was not dazzled by delusions of grandeur, as Zacim had been. A
civil cabinet was installed three days later under Hashim Atasi. It included
such familiar political figures as Khalid al-cAzm, Rushdi Kikhya, cAdil
cAzmah, Majd al-Din Jabiri. There were also two newcomers in the
cabinet, Akram Hawrani of Hama as Minister of Agriculture and the
former Damascus school teacher and Bacth Party Secretary, Michel cAflaq,
as Minister of Education.
The Bacth Party had come a long way in a short time. cAflaq had
become well-known, a person who counted for something in Syrian
politics. The Bacth’s consistency in opposing the French, attacking corrup-
Growth o f the Party in Syria 55

tion, favoring the people against the establishment, crusading for the Arab
cause in Palestine, and calling for Arab unity and liberation had been
popular and well received. It had incurred the hostility of the establish­
ment. It had been harassed. The party paper had been suppressed fre­
quently; in its first two and a half years, it managed only about 250 issues,
although it was nominally a daily. Its leaders had been arrested and
sentenced by the French and by post-independence governments. Even a
story describing cAflaq’s craven attitude in jail, which circulated after his
arrest by Zacim, didn’t affect his political standing at that time. cAflaq was
reported to have lost his nerve under threat of ill treatment, to have told his
captors that he and his followers were only political amateurs, and to have
signed a statement supporting “ my leader Zacim” which appeared in the
Damascus press.27
This episode did, however, hurt cAflaq’s standing within the party.
Many of the idealistic young men in the Bacth felt that cAflaq should have
died rather than dishonor the party by signing such a document. cAflaq
added to his difficulties by failing either to admit that he actually signed a
document or to deny it convincingly. When the issue of his behavior in jail
came up at a party meeting late in 1949, cAflaq evaded a straight answer.
The topic kept cropping up as the years passed, and it was used by cAflaq’s
enemies to defame him.28 Soon after his imprisonment, second-echelon
members of the party made clandestine efforts to dump cAflaq and replace
him with Wahib al-Ghanim, who was popular with the younger members.
But al-Ghanim rejected an invitation to become head of the party, an
invitation tendered to him by an illegal meeting in Homs. Al-Ghaniiq was
interested enough to attend the meeting, but he refused either to leave
Lattaqiyah or to head a movement aimed at centering the party in that
town.29 Only two and a half years after its formal founding, a potentially
serious split in the party had appeared. It was to be the first of many.
The principal focus of political activity under Hinnawi was the election
of a constituent assembly. The very notion of such an assembly produced a
political dispute between the Shacb Party and the Nationalists, the latter
claiming that the parliament of 1947, which Zacim had deposed, was still
legal. The National Party could not make its views prevail, and the election
was held. Some of its members ran as independents, and others, for
example, the Aleppo branch, boycotted the elections for the constituent
assembly. The Bacth and the Shacb Party entered into negotiations to form
an election coalition but could not agree. The Shacb was discouraged from
cooperation with the Bacth by the religious leaders, who attacked it as
anti-religious. For its part, the Bacth was attracted by some elements of the
Shacb and by some who cooperated with it, such as Hawrani, but it was out
of sympathy with such establishment figures as Kikhya and Qudsi. In the
56 THE BACTH PARTY

end, each party ran its own lists.30 Bacth election statements stressed
personal freedom, social justice, anti-imperialist struggle, and Arab
unity.31
When the voting was over on November 15, 1949, the Shacb had won
the most seats, some 45. Independents got about 40 and lesser parties
divided the remainder. For the Bacth, Jalal al-Sayyid won in Dayr al-Zur;
cAflaq was the only cabinet minister running who failed to win a seat. Bitar
too was beaten. Although the elections were generally fair, cAflaq was
annoyed at the outcome and resigned from the cabinet, charging that a
“ foreign hand” (which observers took to mean Great Britain) had inter­
fered in the elections.32 Actually, the party’s disappointing showing
resulted from a number of factors. The*party was still quite small, not
attuned organizationally to electoral politics, and probably ill-financed.
Moreover, cAflaq had represented the Bacth in a cabinet whose only other
congenial figure was Akram Hawrani. There had been plenty of friction
between cAflaq, Hawrani and Shacb Party leaders who were representa­
tives of the ruling classes, some of it in regard to issues that the Bacth
opposed as a party. The Shacb was pushing for unity between Iraq and
Syria, even though Iraq was a monarchy. In 1945, well before the formal
founding congress, Salah Bitar had chastized President Quwatli for using
the existence of monarchial governments in Iraq and Jordan as an excuse
for not bringing Syria into a Greater Syria unity.33 By 1949 the Bacth had
refined its ideas on this issue; it no longer favored uniting one country,
Syria, which was independent and republican, with a second which was a
“ tool of imperialism and a monarchy.” 34
Indeed, the issue of unity was the immediate cause of the next military
intrusion into Syrian politics. The forces favoring unity with Iraq predomi­
nated in the newly elected constituent assembly, and they had supporters
even in the Syrian army. But other political figures, notably Akram
Hawrani and certain of his key associates in the army, were adamantly
opposed to any scheme that might give the Iraqi regent, cAbd al-Ilah, a
chance of exercising power in Syria. The Iraqi regent had visited Damascus
during the election campaign. Though he had been discreet in his public
utterances, the mere fact of his visit prompted people to believe that some
scheme of Iraqi-Syrian unity was about to go into effect. Many of the
senior Syrian officers did not want to lose their prerogatives in a combined
army; together with a number of anti-union politicians, they formed an
alliance with Colonel Adib Shishakli, the commanding officer of the First
Brigade. Colonel Shishakli deposed Hinnawi on December 19, 1949; for
the third time in eight months the army had openly worked its will on the
Syrian political scene. After a week of negotiations, Khalid al-cAzm put
together a cabinet acceptable to the military leaders.
Growth o f the Party in Syria 57

Hawrani, who obtained the post of Minister of Defense in the new

cabinet, as a consequence of his role in the ousting of Hinnawi, felt it
necessary to break his association with the Shacb Party. He formally
established his Arab Socialist Party on January 5, 1950. His principal area
of support was his own district of Hama, where he had put together an
alliance of peasants, working-class elements, and shopkeepers from the
city. Never strong on ideology, he borrowed from the Bacth Party constitu­
tion when writing a constitution for his own political organization.35
Indeed, he and the Bacth shared many concepts, including those of
republican government and of social justice for the masses. For Hawrani,
especially, the latter included a better deal for the peasants through land
reform and restrictions on the power of landlords. He was a champion of
the cause of the peasants in rural areas around Hama against the big
families and city merchants. In the 1950s, the peasant-small shopkeeper
alliance gave him the power base he needed to become the most powerful
single figure in Syrian politics.
cAzm’s cabinet was not to the liking of the Bacth which attacked its
program and, indeed, its very existence. The Bacth believed that the Shacb
should form the government. Although the party could make considerable
noise, its power was limited, and the cAzm cabinet was confirmed with
only seven opposing votes. He lasted five months until Hawrani, acting for
the army, withdrew confidence from him; his government was followed in
mid-1950 by a Shacb government under Qudsi.
The Bacth operated on the fringes of parliamentary and government
activity during the two years, 1950 and 1951, that Adib Shishakli and his
fellow officers ran the affairs of Syria from behind the scenes. It continued
active in the political field through the traditional means of press and
oratory. It attacked the draft constitution, which the constituent assembly
considered in the spring of 1950, for its platitudinous treatment of agricul­
tural and industrial labor. It asked that the constitution specify limits on the
size of landholdings and that it include provisions to curb the greed of
factory owners.36 The party was in tune with much of the assembly on
these issues, but held no position in the several cabinets while Shishakli’s
shadow rule persisted. The Bacth occasionally overstepped the bounds of
permissible political activity. Jalal al-Sayyid and Amin Ruwayhah, both
members of the constituent assembly, were arrested on charges of plotting
in mid-1950. They were acquitted and returned to the parliament in the
following year. Al-Sayyid tried to dramatize his and the party’s unhappi­
ness with the government by withdrawal from parliament for two months in
1951 on the grounds that it was doing nothing.37
1950 was also a year marked by internal differences and dissension
within the party. The newspaper, al-Bacth, which had resumed publication
58 THE BACTH PARTY

during the Hinnawi period, became a weekly in May 1950 and remained a
weekly until it was closed in 1952. The party council—the precursor of the
National Command—met twice in 1950, the first time in April.378 It issued
a short announcement that cAflaq was reelected as Secretary General but
did not issue a statement or list of decisions as it had at earlier meetings of
the council. The standard party views, which had become familiar to
Syrians through its writings, e.g., attacks on feudalists, espousal of land
reform, and the like, were put forth in a series of editorials written by Salah
Bitar in al-BaHh on April 14, 17, 18, and 20, 1950. Bitar’s unusually
prominent role in espousing party doctrine or positions is evidence of a
fairly serious dispute within the leadership at this time. There were press
reports that Bitar was about to resign because cAflaq would not allow Jalal
al-Sayyid a more prominent role.38 At the end of the summer, cAflaq went
on an extended trip to Brazil, ostensibly to talk with Arab communities
there about Arab problems. In fact, this trip was the first of his periodic
withdrawals from political, and especially party, activity when things were
not going to his liking. By absenting himself he hoped to compel his
associates to meet his terms, relying on personal appeal, charisma, and
reputation as the essential party ideologue and spokesman.
cAflaq was gone for a considerable period of time, and during this
period—roughly the latter half of 1950 and a substantial part of
1951—Bitar continued his more prominent role. Bitar’s different view of
the proper role of the party resulted in a change of emphasis in party
activity. cAflaq was a firm believer in the party’s role as a political
vanguard, awakening the Arabs by oratory and exhortation and making a
better society through the means of true revolutionary change within each
person. He had, and was to continue to have, great success in putting this
concept and his ideas of unity and nationalism across to students and
intellectuals. He did not direct his message to the masses in any concrete
way, even though the party literature and his writings frequently refer to
such concepts as the will of the people, people’s government, and so on.
For cAflaq, the message was so obvious and so truly right that it was bound
to win.
Salah Bitar was a little more practical, more aware of what it took to
convert the best and most reasonable of political programs into political
muscle, votes, and parliamentary seats. He wanted to attract more fol­
lowers, more people who would vote for the party, in order to give it an
effective platform from which to implement the ideas which he held as
strongly as cAflaq did. He was personally no more at ease with peasants
and workers than cAflaq was, but he did see the need to do more in their
direction than the writing and oratory that were customary Bacth practice.
Later in 1950 and in 1951, party statements issued after the meetings of the
Growth o f the Party in Syria 59

party council, as well as other documents, devoted considerable attention

to matters of direct concern to the mass of the people. Thus, two of the four
editorial commentaries by Bitar in April 1950 referred to above dealt with
land reform and with the exploiting of labor by industrialists. The decisions
of the party council meeting of December 28-29, 1950 emphasized the
necessity for reducing the price of bread and other daily necessities.39
In this period, the party also organized labor bureaus in its branches and
an overall party labor bureau for Syria. A congress of labor bureau
representatives from all branches met at Homs on February 22-23, 1951. It
issued a statement suggesting specific amendments to the labor law and
asked for the distribution of state lands to peasants.40 The congress also
required each branch to develop a strategic plan to improve the condition of
the working class.41 The labor bureau issued a call for the working class,
peasants and laborers, to struggle for its rights, a struggle which would be
helped and supported by the Bacth.42 The party’s interest in these matters
was evidenced by similar statements throughout the year, for example,
those of the Aleppo and Homs branches concerning the textile workers’
troubles and a May Day pronouncement by the regional labor bureau.43
And a party council, meeting in Lattaqiyah in July 1951, stated:

The true people’s rule is one which rests on labor, which considers the
peasants and the worker and its support, bring its efforts to freedom, to raise
their [living] standards, and creates a productive society, free of class
exploitation and of foreign economic exploitation.44

But purely political matters were never far from the first priority of the
party leaders. Bacthists, along with others, were becoming progressively
disenchanted with the way in which Shishakli and his associates were
guiding affairs in Syria. The July party statement cited above also noted
that the second and third coups of 1949, those of Hinnawi and Shishakli,
were supposed to have corrected the errors of the first and had not. The
statement averred that people wanted feudalists out of the government, that
they wanted the constitutional assembly dissolved and free elections held
under a new election law.45 In the political field, the cabinet was finding it
more and more difficult to operate. When Macruf Dawalibi formed a new
government after an extended crisis in November 1951 and took the
Ministry of Defense portfolio, it was more than Shishakli could stand,
because Dawalibi, who was no particular friend of the military, had said
that he would try to limit the army’s power in political life. Shishakli took
over the government on November 29, 1951, disbanding the Shacb and the
National Parties but sparing Hawrani’s Arab Socialist Party and the Bacth
Party for a time.
60 THE BACTH PARTY

The Bacth, however, was none too happy with Shishakli’s move. In a
statement in al-Bacth on December 8, 1951, the party criticized the
continuing intervention by the military in politics, because such interven­
tion had not achieved the results people hoped for. “ Since the third coup,
governments have succeeded one another in power which have not rep­
resented the will of the people nor achieved a true people’s government.”
The statement noted that the party had rejected an invitation to participate
in the Dawalibi government and called again for a return to constitutional
government through elections and a transitional cabinet. The Bacth said it
would not participate in government under any other condition.46 The party
followed this statement with an editorial in al-Bacth on December 29
emphasizing its support of constitutional life and of people’s democratic
government.47 It continued to pursue this line of argument in an article in
the paper on January 26, 1952, which prompted Shishakli to shut it down.
Ten weeks later, on April 6, he formally suppressed the Bacth Party, as
well as Hawrani’s Arab Socialist Party.
By this time Shishakli was very much in charge of Syria. He ordered
students and teachers to cease participation in politics, forbade strikes and
demonstrations, and enforced these regulations. For the Bacth this edict
meant virtual suppression of all organized party activities, because a very
large number of its members were either teachers or students and because
its paper was shut down. Indeed, except for the formation of Shishakli’s
Arab Liberation Front in August, political life was dormant in Syria during
a large part of 1952, a strange state of affairs for a politically active
country.
Of course, political discussions and planning were going on beneath the
surface. In 1952, politicians were not much bothered by the government as
long as they limited the expression of their ideas and notions to oral
exchanges in coffee houses or in one another’s houses. At the end of
December 1952, however, Shishakli found it necessary to dismiss a
number of officers and to arrest some of them, along with a number of
civilians, including cAflaq, Bitar, and Hawrani. The group who were
arrested do not appear to have been trying to organize a coup but to
generate some political steam by expressing their ideas more in public and
by agitating for a return to a parliamentary life. In early January of 1953 the
three escaped—or were allowed to escape—and soon turned up in Leba­
non, where they received the status of political refugees.48
The suppression of the Bacth Party almost five years to the day from its
founding congress, and the arrest and flight of its leaders at the turn of the
year marked the end of a formative period. The two to three hundred
members of April 1947 had grown to five hundred in Syria alone,49 with a
few hundred more in neighboring countries—in effect, it had tripled its
Growth of the Party in Syria 61

size. The party had fought for its goals within the parliamentary structure in
Syria. Though doing poorly in elections, its influence had grown on the
political scene; cAflaq had even been a minister briefly. The Bacth had
dallied with the Syrian military establishment—and had been rather unsuc­
cessful, for two of the three soldier leaders had suppressed it and jailed its
leaders. In the next period of its life the Bacth underwent a qualitative
change, which altered its nature even as it greatly increased the party’s size
and strength.

Notes

1. Al-Bacth, Jan. 22, 1947, in Nidal al-Bacth (Beirut: Dar al-Talicah, 1963), I,
p. 157. Hereafter cited as Nidal. The paper was twice suspended for short periods
during the campaign.
2. Nidal I, p. 149.
3. Nidal I, p. 188.
4. Gordon H. Torrey, Syrian Politics and the Military, 1945-1958 (Columbus:
Ohio State University Press, 1964), p. 88.
5. Nidal I, pp. 194-95, reproduction of a June 17 election flyer over the names
of cAflaq and Bitar.
6. Nidal I, pp. 201-2; statement of cAflaq and Bitar, July 2, 1947.
7. Nidal I, pp. 206-7; party statement of July 18, 1947.
8. Published Oct. 11, 1947 in al-Bacth; reproduced in Nidal I, pp. 209-23.
9. Nidal I, pp. 245-47; the statement is signed by cAflaq as party secretary and
is dated March 5, probably a misprint for March 15, inasmuch as the meeting is
reported in the statement (p. 246) as having been held on March 14, 1948.
10. Nidal I, pp. 41-42; document of Aug. 10, 1944 signed “ for the Arab Bacth
Bureau [maktab]" by cAflaq.
11. Nidal I, pp. 69-70; letter dated March 23, 1945 to the United States
representative in Syria and signed by cAflaq for the Arab Bacth Bureau.
12. “ Arab Political Problems,” Dec. 14, 1945, in Nidal I, pp. 118-27.
13. Nidal I, p. 137; statement dated May 2, 1946.
14. Torrey, Syrian Politics, p. 104.
15. See Nidal I, pp. 224-25.
16. See statements of Jan. 23, Feb. 9, and Feb. 15, 1948 in Nidal I, pp.
234-37, 240-42, and 243-44.
17. Nidal I, pp. 253-65. See also Torrey, Syrian Politics, p. 108.
18. Statement of Oct. 21, 1948 in Nidal I, pp. 266-69.
19. Statement of Dec. 1, 1948 in Nidal I, pp. 270-72.
20. Nidal I, pp. 273-75 and 276-78.
21. Toney, Syrian Politics, p. 109.
22. Ibid., p. 115.
23. Nidal I, pp. 286-87; document of April 4, 1949.
24. Nidal I, pp. 290-91.
62 THE BACTH PARTY

25. Nidal I, pp. 292-97; first quotation is from pp. 292-93, second from
p. 296.
26. Nidal II, p. 44.
27. Mutac Safadi, Hizb al-Bacth, Ma’sat al-Mawlid, Ma’sat al-Nihayah (The
Bacth Party, Its Tragic Birth, Its Tragic End) (Beirut: Dar al-Adab, 1964), p. 5.
28. Sami al-Jundi, al-Bacth (Beirut: Dar al-Nahar li al-Nashr, 1969), pp.
54-55. Arab World, April 8, 1964, mentioned the statement in a comment on
al-Bacth’s article of that date referring to the party’s past history. Al-BaHh told of
the arrest but did not discuss the signing of a document.
29. Jundi, al-Bacth, pp. 55-56.
30. Torrey, Syrian Politics, pp. 149-50.
31. There are three such statements, all reprinted from the Nov. 14, 1949 (the
day before elections) issue of al-Bacth, in Nidal II, pp. 19-24. These are the only
items from the Hinnawi period in the Nidal collection.
32. Torrey, Syrian Politics, pp. 151-52. Both Torrey and Abu Jaber (The Arab
Ba’th Socialist Party [Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1966], p. 31)
say that the party elected three of its candidates. Amin Ruwayhah and Wahib
al-Ghanim appear to have been the other two. cAflaq told Seale (The Struggle fo r
Syria: A Study o f Post-war Arab Politics, 1945-1958 [London: Oxford University
Press, 1965], pp. 78-79) years later that Rushdi Kikhya, the Shacb Party Minister
of Interior, had rigged the elections against the Bacth.
33. Nidal I, pp. 51-52.
34. See for example the party’s statement of Jan. 9, 1950 (Nidal II, pp. 33-38)
for a full exposition of its position. Concern about British military privileges in Iraq
and about monarchism are evident.
35. Abu Jaber, Arab Ba’th Socialist Party, p. 34.
36. Bitar, writing in al-Bacth, April 18 and 20, 1950 (Nidal II, pp. 54-57).
37. Al-Shacb, July 2, 1951 and Review of the Syrian Press, U.S. Embassy,
Damascus, Sept. 25, 1951.
37a. Nidal n , pp. 47-48; in his later document collection, Bashir Dacuq, ed.,
cAbr Mu’tamaratihi, p. 7, says that only one party council, that of December
28-29, was held in 1950.
38. Review of the Syrian Press, June 15, 1950.
39. Statement of Dec. 30, 1950, published in al-Bacth, Jan. 20, 1951 (Nidal II,
pp. 84-87).
40. Nidal H, pp. 98-102; reprinted from al-Bacth, March 3, 1951. Later in the
year the Bureau became the Labor and Peasants Bureau; Nidal II, p. 152.
41. Statement by Khalid Ahmad at a Labor Congress in Dai^a, Syria, reported
in al-Bacth, Aug. 21, 1970.
42. Nidal II, pp. 95-97.
43. See Nidal H, pp. 115-26 for these items, among others.
44. The statement, covering a number of topics, is in Nidal II, pp. 127-33; the
quotation is from p. 129.
45. Ibid., pp. 128 and 129.
46. Nidal H, pp. 163-66. Bacth leaders may also have sensed that the military
was about to move, and this would have reinforced their antipathy to serving in
Dawalibi’s government.
47. Nidal II, pp. 176-77.
48. Mid-East Mirror, Jan. 10, 1953, pp. 1-3. The three said that Syrian
officers had helped them flee.
49. Jundi, al-Bacth, p. 36.
 - 5 -

The Merger

From the safety of Lebanese exile, cAflaq, Bitar, and Hawrani promptly
began to attack the Shishakli regime. They, along with the Communist
Party, which had long been illegal, were the chief voices of opposition to
his government. Most other parties in Syria opposed Shishakli’s or,
indeed, any army rule, but were not looking for fundamental change.
Sharing a common exile for opposing Shishakli appears to have stimulated
once again the notion that the three combine their forces formally. Both
parties opposed feudalism and were seeking social reform. The idea of a
political alliance between the two Bacth leaders and Hawrani had come up
as early as 1947. It surged up again briefly in mid-1950 when the two tried
to negotiate a merger with Hawrani’s newly formed Arab Socialist Party.1
This time, the reasons for joining forces were more compelling. Shishakli
was in power; he looked very strong; a great deal would be needed to oust
him. Hawrani had strength in the army and considerable vote-getting
appeal. cAflaq and Bitar led a smaller party, but the Bacthists enjoyed
reputations as nationalists and patriots. Their leaders had won a consider­
able audience for the party’s ideas. Working together, the two parties
would be stronger than they would be working separately.
Akram Hawrani was, however, a very different sort of political figure
from his two companions in exile. He had no history of devotion to the
cause of Arab unity. Ideology was not his strong point. Bom of a
prominent Sunni Muslim family in Hama, about the same age as cAflaq, he
took his degree in law from Damascus University in the early 1930s. The
merged Arab Socialist Resurrection Party was the fourth political organiza­
tion in which he had been active. Hawrani had belonged to the Hizb
al-Qawmi al-Suri and was prominent in that party’s Hama organization. He
was a founder of the Youth Party (Hizb al-Shabibah), which flourished in
that city in the late 1930s, Nominally a part of the Hizb al-Qawmi al-Suri,
the Youth Party under Hawrani’s leadership diverged from Antun
Sacadah’s direction. In time, Hawrani split entirely with Sacadah, and the
Youth Party petered out.
64 THE BACTH PARTY

As a deputy in the Syrian parliaments of 1947 and 1949, Hawrani

cooperated extensively with the Shacb (People’s) Party, especially with its
liberal wing. He had been Minister of Agriculture in the August 1949
cabinet with cAflaq and had been Minister of Defense in Khalid al-cAzm’s
cabinet of December 1949 to June 1950. In January 1950, Hawrani
founded the Arab Socialist Party as his own political vehicle. Equally
important, he had established an extensive network of ties in the Syrian
officer corps.2 Many a captain and major would take his cue from, or do a
favor for, the man from Hama who stood against the feudalists.
It did not take the three leaders long after arriving in Beirut to formally
join forces. The merger (indimaj) took effect by February 1953.3 Because
the three were together in exile in Lebanon, and because of the way in
which Bacth statements and documents later avoided precise information
about the time and manner of the merger, I judge that it was accomplished
by the three leaders without any direct referral to the Bacth Party cadres or
to a meeting of the party council. Hawrani did not appear to have referred
to his party membership either, but then the Arab Socialist Party was pretty
much his personal creation and instrument; he was in a position to make
such a major decision without causing trouble in the ranks. The Bacth
Party, however, had an organization; decisions were supposed to be made
at meetings of the party council held about twice a year. The party council
does not appear to have met any time in 1952 or in 1953 prior to the
appearance in February of tracts over the name of the Arab Socialist
Resurrection Party, as the new combined political organization was
known.4 The date the merger took place is often given as late 1953,
apparently because Bacth spokesmen gave that impression to the press in
October 1953, a time when political parties were allowed to resume open
activity in preparation for Shishakli’s controlled parliamentary election in
the fall.5
For the leaders of the merged and enlarged party, 1953 was a year of
intense opposition to Shishakli’s dictatorship. The three, plus Jalal al-
Sayyid and Midhat Bitar, were among the hundred or so Syrian political
figures who signed a document asking for a proper constitution.6 Because
their activity was becoming annoying, Shishakli persuaded the Lebanese
government to force the three to leave Lebanon in June 1953 and go to
Europe for several months. The three leaders returned to Syria only after
Shishakli had run elections in October, which the newly enlarged Bacth,
along with most other political parties, had boycotted. At about this time,
the party held a general meeting in Homs in which it called for a national
front with the aim of securing “ the people’s desires in ending this evil
period.” 7
Shishakli had enough control over the political organizations to make
The Merger 65

life difficult for them in Syria, and the Bacth worked through a variety of
political fronts, for example, “ the Free Workers’’ and “ the Permanent
Committee of the Congress of Students in Hawran.” 8 But the subterfuges
were not sufficient to keep the three leaders from being jailed in January
1954, as manifestations of opposition to Shishakli continued to grow, and
violence broke out in many parts of the country. Bacthists of both the
traditional and Hawranist factions were active in these manifestations of
violence. Numbers of Bacthists were arrested. Shishakli was becoming
progressively unpopular with the people and even with parts of the army.
His unpopularity culminated in a rising on February 25, 1954 and his
departure for exile the next day. Significantly, one of the three chief
conspirators was a young captain from Hama, Mustafa Hamdun, who was
“ a close friend and political disciple of Akram al-Hawrani.” 9 Many
another of Hawrani’s followers in the army were among the officers who
rose against Shishakli.
The ouster of Shishakli opened the way for a return to parliamentary
government. There was, inevitably, considerable argument among Syrian
political leaders as to how this change should come about. The Nationalists
wanted a return to the 1947-1949 parliament in which they had been
dominant. The Shacb and others wished the parliament elected in
November 1949 to be brought back. The solution was a compromise—a
coalition cabinet headed by Sabri al-cAsali and the recall of the 1949
parliament—on the understanding that new elections would be held soon.
The Bacth rejected participation in the cAsali cabinet on the grounds that it
was feudalist and oppressive, and a handful of Bacthist deputies in
parliament, e.g., Hawrani and al-Sayyid, voted against it when the vote of
confidence came up on March 15.10 Despite the prominent role the party
had played in building up the pressure that had led to the fall of Shishakli, it
was still outweighed by conventional forces, at least as far as parliament
went. The newly united party looked ahead to new elections as an
opportunity to advance its position.
The Bacth at this time was beset with internal problems. Since the
merger of the Arab Socialist and Bacth Parties, a five-man executive
committee, all Syrians, had directed its affairs. This committee consisted
of cAflaq, Bitar, and Jalal al-Sayyid from the Bacth Party, and Hawrani and
one other from the Arab Socialist Party.11 The naming of the committee
members was not in accord with Bacth party regulations, which required its
leadership to be chosen at a party congress. There was considerable
discontent at the merger among prominent Bacthists, especially in Syria,
both in regard to the merger itself and in regard to the manner in which it
was effected. Moreover, the party’s growth in the other regions—Jordan,
Lebanon, and Iraq—was reaching the point where a few people from each
66 THE BACTH PARTY

of these regions attending general party meetings in Syria were no longer

able to represent their party unit adequately.
Both issues, the question of leadership and the representation of party
organizations of other countries in the national organization, came up at a
major party meeting held in Homs in the fall of 1953, while cAflaq, Bitar,
and Hawrani were still abroad. This congress was attended by representa­
tives from party branches both inside and outside Syria. It made a number
of decisions which were communicated to the membership in a then-secret
party bulletin.12 These decisions were to hold a large national congress
with specific numbers of delegates from each region and with an agenda
agreed to in advance, to try and get cAflaq, Bitar, and Hawrani, “ the
leaders banished from the Arab world,” back into Syria, and to work
against military dictatorship and for a representative form of government
with freedom of action for political parties.
The tension within the party over the issue of merger was, understand­
ably enough, not openly expressed in this document. But it existed. There
is a tone in the wording of the party bulletin just referred to which implies
that the leaders should return to answer for their actions. Shishakli had,
after all, lifted his ban on political party activity in early September 1953,
but the three leaders did not return to Syria until the latter half of October.
There was, however, no opportunity to deal with party organizational
problems while Shishakli was still in power. Moreover, the party organiza­
tions in other countries, Jordan, Iraq, and Lebanon, needed time to arrange
their own affairs and to provide delegates for a party congress. After
Shishakli was ousted, political affairs could be managed more easily in
Syria. A Syrian regional congress, required in order to prepare for the
larger meeting, was held shortly after Shishakli’s ouster, in early March
1954.13
The national congress, termed officially the Second National Congress
of the Party, was held in June 1954. The meeting was marked by
contention, even though it succeeded in setting up the organization that was
to serve the party in the years ahead—the National Command, the Regional
Command, the Branch Command, and so on. The major party crisis in
Syria over the merger had two aspects. There were those who disliked
Hawrani and felt he was insufficiently ideological and insufficiently
amenable to discipline. Then, too, the Arab Socialist Party was responsible
for about half of the combined membership, which numbered about 2,500
at that tim e.14 If the former Arab Socialist Party members were to be given
a share of the leadership proportionate to their numbers, the positions of
Bacthists in higher party commands would be threatened. Many members
were outspoken in criticism of the merger, so the problem could not be
solved by expelling a handful of people. Quite a number did, in fact, quit
The Merger 67

the party when matters were not resolved to their satisfaction; Jalal
al-Sayyid was the most prominent among them. One measure of Bacthist
discontent and internal trouble is the scarcity of information on this
congress. The Nidal series mentions that it was held, that a new National
Command was elected, that the internal statutes then used for the Syrian
region were adopted for the party as a whole, and that a secretariat for the
National Command was established in Damascus, but nothing more.15
The new National Command reflected the determination of the Bacth
element in the merger not to allow Hawrani to dominate “ their” party. The
seven members chosen were cAflaq, Bitar, and Hawrani from Syria,
cAbdallah Nacwas and cAbdallah Rimawi from Jordan, cAli Jabir from
Lebanon, and Fu’ad Rikabi from Iraq. Four seats on the National Com­
mand went to Bacthists from regions other than Syria, whose total member­
ship probably was less than a third that of the Syrian region. But it was one
way to keep Hawrani’s people from getting a share of the top command
posts proportionate to their numerical strength. The congress ended with
the selection of a four-man committee, cAflaq, Bitar, Hawrani, and
Rimawi, which was assigned the task of trying to deal with the party crisis
in Syria.16
The merger brought to the Bacth in Syria numerical strength and the
high level of political skill of Hawrani, as well as his extensive array of
followers in the middle levels of the Syrian army officer corps. Such men
as Mustafa Hamdun, cAbd al-Ghani Qannut, and Riyad Malki were
prominent among those in the Syrian army helping the Bacth in the years
ahead. (The officers from rural minorities, for example, Hafiz al-Asad,
Salah Jadid, and Salim Hatum, who had been attracted by cAflaq’s
doctrines as spread by Bacthist teachers in their secondary schools in the
1940s and early 1950s, were still in the military academy or at the company
grade level in the service.) The new Arab Socialist Resurrection Party,
even taking such dropouts as Jalal al-Sayyid into consideration, was
substantially stronger in conventional political terms than the sum of the
two parties separately. They complemented one another geographically.
Hawrani’s people were concentrated primarily in and around the province
of Hama, while the Bacthists were more thickly sown in Aleppo,
Lattaqiyah, and Jabal Druze.
But the effort to combine the two disparate groups into one party simply
did not work; they remained separate, and the troubles between them were
never really solved. The committee formed at the 1954 national congress
accomplished little, which was not surprising, because only one of its four
members, cAbdallah Rimawi, was able to project a fresh view of the
problem. He was, however, distinctly junior in age and in political
reputation to the other three. One measure of the discord within the party is
68 THE BACTH PARTY

that no national congress was held until 1959, despite the party’s statutory
requirements that such a congress be held periodically and despite requests
from other regions for such a congress.17
1955 saw a tremendous dust-up within the newly merged party.
Another regional congress convened fairly early in the year, probably in
late February or March. It was a tumultuous affair, with members of each
major faction hurling accusations at the leaders of the other. The congress
did not issue a statement on its deliberations.18 The differences were so
acute that the party newspaper, al-Bacth, which had resumed publication as
a daily in April 1954 but had appeared rather irregularly after the Sep­
tember parliamentary elections, ceased to appear for more than a year.
Some months after the congress, cAflaq, in an internal party circular,
referred to the party crisis as a question of “ whether the Party could
overcome . . . its situation and create out of the tumult, in which it was
embroiled, a stronger and tougher organization . . . .” 19 The next few
years would show that it could not.
The immediate political concern in Syria after Shishakli’s ouster how­
ever, was to get a new parliament elected, which accounts for the
submergence of intra-party quarrels for a time. Elections were first set for
June 15, 1954, but the issue of what sort of cabinet would supervise them
was not settled until Sacid al-Ghazzi formed a caretaker government on
June 19. He set the elections for August 20, but they were later postponed
to September 24-25 because various political groups felt that other groups
would have an advantage if the elections were held soon.
The September 1954 balloting was a turning point in Syrian history.
These elections, which were generally free of government interference,
brought to parliament new faces in large numbers and substantially reduced
the number of representatives of traditional political groups. The Shacb and
the Nationalists had tried under Quwatli’s urging to work out joint lists in
order not to split the conservative vote. But mutual jealousies prevented
much collaboration between the two, and for the most part they competed
rather than collaborated. The new Arab Socialist Resurrection Party
demonstrated the electoral virtues of the Bacth and ASP merger. The joint
party put up thirty candidates and elected just over half of them. Hawrani’s
list made a sweep of the five seats in Hama. Wahib al-Ghanim won in
Lattaqiyah, Mansur al-Atrash in Suwayda, Bitar in Damascus (although he
needed a run-off), and several others as well. The total number of Bacth
Party winners was sixteen, with perhaps half as many more supporters
from among the nearly fifty independents who were elected.
Other winners on the left side of the political spectrum included Khalid
Bakdash, the secretary of the Communist Party of Syria, and Khalid
The Merger 69

al-cAzm, an independent with a substantial group of his own followers.

The “ leftists” did not constitute a majority of parliament in 1954, and they
certainly were not a cohesive force, but the size of the left’s representation,
and especially its increase relative to the Shacb decrease in parliamentary
seats, started a momentum which in the course of a few years decisively
put the left in charge of the political scene in Syria. It must be remembered
that the left meant more than mere domestic politics; except for the
Communists, it meant at least some degree of pan-Arab nationalism. And
in this concern for pan-Arabism it was much different from the old guard in
Syria, who at most had visions of joining their opposite numbers in Iraq in
a loose political association. It was much different, too, from the Fertile
Crescent scheme of al-Hizb al-Qawmi al-Suri, which showed little strength
in these elections.20
However, the great improvement in its parliamentary representation did
not mean that the left was in a position to take charge of Syrian politics in
September 1954. The first post-election cabinet was formed only after two
weeks of haggling. The Bacth opposed Khalid al-cAzm’s attempts to form a
government, fearing that the post of Prime Minister would give him a leg
up in the struggle for the presidency. It also opposed Faris al-Khuri who,
nonetheless, was able to form a conventional cabinet of familiar political
figures. The Bacth continued to oppose Khuri’s government while it was in
office, especially over the issues of foreign policy and of the budget which,
according to Bitar, favored the upper classes and not the country as a
whole.21
The National Bloc withdrew its support for Khuri’s government in
February 1955. The ensuing efforts to form a government ended with Sabri
al-cAsali as Prime Minister. Two major elements of his support were
Khalid al-cAzm and his flock of independents and the Bacth Party, which
provided one minister, Wahib al-Ghanim. Hawrani did not want a cabinet
post, preferring to work inside the parliament. The party published a
statement justifying its participation in this cabinet. It noted that the natural
place for “ an ideological revolutionary (inqilabi) party such as ours” was
in the opposition but argued that, in view of the bad policies it tended to
follow, especially in foreign affairs (a reference to the Shacb’s traditional
stance in favor of Iraq, which was just then allying itself with Turkey, Iran,
and the United Kingdom in the Baghdad Pact), “ the Shacb party must be
not permitted to head the government.” Hence the Bacth leadership
decided to support a nationalist government and finally to participate in one
if such a government could not be formed otherwise.22 cAsali’s cabinet
won its vote of confidence by only thirteen votes. It obviously had needed
Bacthist support. cAsali’s domestic program reflected many of the social
70 THE BACTH PARTY

welfare elements of Bacth doctrine. The Bacth’s position as a coalition

partner and its strength in parliament allowed it to move ahead in the
process of placing its adherents in various positions in the government.23
Fortuitous circumstances in the spring of 1955 allowed the Bacth Party
to cut one of its ideological opponents in Syria down to virtually nothing. A
fanatic from the Hizb al-Qawmi al-Suri assassinated cAdnan Malki, a
pro-Bacth army officer, on April 22. Malki’s associates in the army were
gravely distressed by this action and turned on the Hizb al-Qawmi al-Suri
for vengeance. Its adherents were dismissed from the army and hounded
out of the civil government, and many of its leaders were jailed and
eventually brought to trial. The army was supported in these actions by the
Bacth, especially the cAflaq-Bitar wing, which was cheered to see the
political power of one of its enemies reduced to zero in Syria. It had long
considered PPS founder Antun Sacadah’s doctrine of Fertile Crescent unity
heretical in the light of its own pan-Arabism. It was more than a little ironic
that it was the army officer allies of one-time al-Hizb al-Qawmi al-Suri
member Akram Hawrani who carried out the repression.
In August 1955, the Shacb and the Nationalists collaborated, along with
a large number of independents, to procure the election of Shukri Quwatli
as President of Syria. The rest of the cabinet coalition, cAzm’s independent
bloc and the Bacth, had been pushing for cAzm as the most acceptable
candidate. Even though the Bacth was not especially fond of cAzm, its
leaders preferred him to Quwatli. These two groups effectively withdrew
support from the cabinet. Wahib al-Ghanim resigned from his post of
Minister of Health on party orders on August 25. But the traditional forces
were still strong and Quwatli was chosen. After his inauguration, a new
cabinet, again of the traditional sort, was formed; it was headed by Sacid
al-Ghazzi and had no leftist representation. Expected to run things for only
a few months, it lasted until June 1956, but it was a relatively weak and
ineffective government. The traditional political forces in Syria demon­
strated that, although they could get together on an issue such as the
election of Quwatli, they could not collaborate over an extended period in
governing the country. The Bacth Party, of course, did not look upon
Ghazzi’s government with favor. It issued a rebuttal to his request for a
vote of confidence, which, among other things, said that Ghazzi was
ignoring the Zionist danger and was insufficiently militant in opposing the
Turkish-Iraqi Pact.24
During much of 1955 and on into 1956, the problems of an organiza­
tional nature brought about by the merger and the differences in ideology
and approach between Hawrani on the one hand, and cAflaq and Bitar on
the other, were compounded by a split in views over Bacth policy in respect
to Egypt. The internal differences had led to the closing of al-Bacth in
The Merger 71

March 1955. In my view, the party was unable to speak with one voice and
Hawrani was unwilling to let cAflaq and Bitar, who dominated the press
outlet then just as they had earlier, write just what they wanted. He had
come to see the value of close cooperation and unity with Egypt well before
cAflaq and Bitar did.
The two factions almost separated toward the end of 1955. Deprived of
a newspaper voice, the cAflaq and Bitar faction bought and published the
newspaper al-Hadarah for a time. They used Jalal al-Sayyid who, of
course, was already opposed to Hawrani, as an editor. But finally practical
politics prevailed. The Egyptian regime came to have a very different
image by the end of 1955, one of pan-Arabism and of positive neutralism,
a change that affected attitudes of the members of the party and, finally, of
its leaders.25 cAflaq came around to the views of others in regard to Egypt.
Symbolic of the restored unity was the resumption of publication of
al-Bacth as a weekly on April 20, 1956, three days after the Bacth Party’s
official announcement favoring the unity of Syria and Egypt. Once again,
profound differences among Bacthists showed, and some preferred to quit
the party rather than go along with the leaders. (A fuller story of the shift of
the party’s attitude toward Egypt is contained in Chapter 6.)
This patching up of the party’s internal differences and the agreement to
work for the unity of Syria and Egypt came at the same time that the
Bacthists and other political leaders were trying a new tactic to counter the
fragmentation and fighting that constantly beset Syrian politics. This tactic
was the national pact (mithaq qawmi), a statement of principles and goals
to which all parties would subscribe and which would form the basic
platform of future cabinets. A committee representing all political parties
and blocs began meetings in February 1956, and in March produced a
charter that opposed Zionism and imperialism, called for a strengthened
military establishment, and urged domestic social welfare measures for
labor and peasants. The Bacth signed the charter, although it expressed
itself unsatisfied with much of it and with the conduct of representatives of
other parties who had tried to stop the movement toward unity with Egypt
and to render meaningless calls for opposition to imperialism and for
positive neutralism.26 The party did, nonetheless, manage to get a good
deal of its ideas in the way of social justice goals, land distribution, and the
like into the text of the national pact.
A new cabinet, of course, was required for a “ national pact” govern­
ment. It took several months to put one together. Ghazzi finally quit as
Prime Minister at the beginning of June 1956, after a violent demonstration
by the Bacth against him.27 The Bacth successfully opposed Quwatli’s first
choice for Prime Minister, and Sabri al-cAsali formed a cabinet composed
of three Shacb Party members, two Nationalists, two Bacthists, and two
72 THE BACTH PARTY

from cAzm’s independent bloc on June 14. The Bacth’s two posts went to
Bitar as Minister of Foreign Affairs and Hawrani’s man, Khalil Kallas, as
Minister of National Economy. The party viewed this cabinet as far from
the real nationalist government “ which would come about only under a
true democratic system when the country was freed from its social and
economic chains” and when there was a progressive chamber of deputies.
The Bacth considered the cabinet a real step forward, however, the best it
could get at the time, as well as a necessity for the country.28
From this point one may date the dominance of the left in Syrian
politics, a dominance which led to the establishment of the United Arab
Republic—and ultimately to the destruction of this particular left group in
Syria. If one were to judge by numbers and positions occupied, the left did
not look overpowering—two ministers, the speaker of the house of
deputies (Hawrani won this post in 1957), twenty-odd deputies under Bacth
Party discipline or willing to follow its lead, one Communist, and a number
of independents. But in reality its power was greater. The two dozen or so
deputies were attracting followers from among other independents, who
had come to believe that the left was rising and the traditionalists slipping,
and who adjusted their policies accordingly. In any event, the single most
important factor was the Syrian army. Its commanders and officers had
absorbed the new political theories of socialism and especially of Arab
nationalism. Many politicians, but none so consistently or skillfully as
Hawrani, had built ties to these men, who grew more powerful and
influential as they rose in rank. None perhaps was more important than
cAbd al-Hamid Sarraj, head of the Syrian intelligence and security ap­
paratus, the Deuxieme Bureau.
The left had truly come to dominate Syrian politics with the cAsali
cabinet of June 1956. But the “ left” must be understood as a movement,
an atmosphere, a climate of opinion, rather than a homogeneous political
organization. The Bacth itself had two principal factions; that of cAflaq and
Bitar was dubious about collaboration with the Communist Party of Syria,
which was gaining ground in the country. The personal ambitions of
various leftists were an impediment to harmony of the left. But in the
eighteen months that elapsed between the formation of the cAsali cabinet
and the approval of unity with Egypt, events tended to keep the left
together rather than to encourage it or drive it to split.
It was not only the unity of the left in general that displayed dangerous
fissures. The lack of harmony within the merged Arab Socialist Bacth Party
kept threatening to tear the organization apart. The party, gamely trying to
act as if it were a unit, convened a Regional Congress which met July
9-12, 1957, and which managed—unlike the 1955 congress—to put out a
statement. But many of those who attended were not selected from
The Merger 73

subordinate party organs, according to the Internal Statutes. And the

discussion focused on the prevalence of a spirit of individualism, on the
need to implement party slogans. Decision No. 8 stated, “ The Party at the
present stage must achieve internal cohesion, strengthen the spirit of
discipline and order in it, purify it of unworthy elements high among its
members, work to make contact with the masses . . . .” 29 The language
would be read by many as an admission of dissension at the highest level.
Nonetheless, the goal of unity and the strength the merged party wielded in
the conventional political arena kept the organization together.
Against the forces of the left, the traditional political leaders were
disunited, even though the Nationalists, the Shacb, and their variety of
independents actually had a numerical majority in parliament, as the
election of Quwatli had showed. But they were incapable of cooperating.
Most were protecting their own fiefs and were unable to see that guarding
their neighbors’ special interests was as important to their future as
protecting their own. The left dominance of the formal political
structure—parliament, cabinet, and military—continued to be opposed by
these traditional forces. The struggle for Syria was fought in the streets and
by political machination. Clashes between political factions occurred in
various cities and towns. For example, Bacth opponents bombed the
Aleppo officers’ club and the party headquarters in that city in early 1957,
and two Bacthists were killed in a town near Aleppo in July of that year.30
But some of those who really hated the rise of the left despaired of
stopping it by conventional means and turned to a traditional remedy
—external assistance from well-disposed governments. Conservative
Syrian politicians found ready support in Baghdad and Ankara. Iraq and
Turkey had responded to the United States-United Kingdom policy of
creating Middle East defense organizations to contain the spread of
communism. They were naturally concerned at the rise of the left in Syria.
The presence of Bakdash in parliament, the relative freedom afforded the
Communist Party in Syria, and the story that Bacth founder cAflaq had
himself been a Communist helped to confirm the belief of leaders in those
two countries that left and Communist were virtually synonymous. For a
man such as Nuri al-Sacid of Iraq there was, for all practical purposes, no
distinction between the Bacth and Communist Parties. Both were socialist
and opposed to the established and traditional order.
But the right wing’s efforts to reverse the left’s forward progress were
impeded by a number of factors. The Anglo-French-Israeli attack on Suez
and Egypt in the fall of 1956 was widely, and correctly, interpreted by
Arab and Syrian public opinion as an attempt to destroy Nasir’s regime,
which was admired for its nationalism and its progressive cast. The effort
produced a surge of antipathy to those who were considered to be
74 THE BAeTH PARTY

associates or friends of the United Kingdom or France, all the stronger

because those two countries had associated themselves with Israel in an
attack on an Arab state. Many Arab politicians muted their Western
associations for fear of acquiring the taint of “ imperialist agent.” The
failure of the Anglo-French-Israeli effort against Nasir boosted nationalist
Arab fervor, a development which favored the left as long-time exponents
of Arab nationalism. The 1956 Suez crisis in effect weakened the forces of
the old guard in Syria, lessening its ability to attract and hold supporters,
and vastly strengthened the nationalist left.
Conservative forces were not, of course, ready to believe in 1956 that
the left had won. With parliamentary elections two years off—and in their
view likely to be rigged—other avenues to power were needed. A group of
Syrian politicians conspired with the Iraqis in 1956 to unseat the govern­
ment by force. The scheme was exposed in November of that year just after
the Suez invasion. The trials of the conspirators concluded February 26,
1957; 12 of 42 defendants received the death sentence and many others
long terms of imprisonment.31 None of the death sentences were carried
out. The Syrian political exiles tried again; this time the plans were
exposed in August 1957, in what became known popularly as the “ Ameri­
can Plot.” Three American diplomats stationed in Damascus were expelled
from the country, and a number of Syrian conspirators received jail or
death sentences in the subsequent trials.32
Suez, foreign-based plots, and the hurly-burly of inter-Arab affairs left
little time for anything else in Syrian politics. Domestic affairs took a back
seat to nationalist and pan-Arab concerns. The Bacth was a party of social
welfare, of socialist ideas, and the betterment of the working and peasant
classes. But the 1956-1957 period showed little practical consequences of
this attitude despite the fact that cAsali’s government was formed on the
basis of the national pact and that that pact contained a good deal of Bacthi
social welfare goals. The party’s emphasis on labor activity, labor bureaus,
and peasant organizations which was apparent in the early 1950s virtually
ceased during this period, partly because controlling the government
mechanism became the de facto goal of the Bacth and the left generally,
and partly because of the lack of interest of the Bacth leaders. Hawrani was
interested in power; Bitar and cAflaq were uneasy in dealing with groups
that really represented the masses. No significant social or economic
measures were passed by this Syrian parliament—even though its left
component was increased by four in April 1957 by-elections—during the
years of left dominance. Bitar, writing years later, admitted that the merger
was a superficial union and that the Bacth neither planned for the future nor
gave its cadres adequate guidance.33
The Merger 75

The triumph of the merged Bacth party was to be celebrated in the

sphere of Arab unity, not in that of domestic politics or domestic social
welfare. Retirements from the military services in the wake of the “ Ameri­
can Plot” left the army almost totally in the hands of the nationalist left, a
crucial factor in the final stages of the unity negotiations. The marriage of
convenience between the Bacth and the Communists broke up when the
former joined the military in pushing for a unitary state, rather than a
federation, in the late fall of 1957. The end of a decade of intense effort by
the Bacth saw two of its three goals achieved in part—unity of the two
liberated Arab states; socialism ran a very poor third in Syria.

Notes
1. Gordon H. Torrey, Syrian Politics and the Military, 1945-1958 (Columbus:
Ohio State University Press, 1964), p. 167.
2. This is but a brief sketch of Hawrani’s early career. Further information
about him may be found in Man Hum Fi al-cAlam al-cArabi (Who’s Who in the
Arab World) (Damascus: Maktab Dirasat al-Suriyah wa al-Arabiyah, 1957), Vol. I
(Suriya). Patrick Seale, The Struggle for Syria: A Study o f Post-war Arab Politics,
1945-1958 (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 38-39, has a good
assessment of the man, although he incorrectly gives 1945 as the founding date of
the Arab Socialist Party. See Michael H. Van Dusen, Intra- and Inter-Generational
Conflict in the Syrian Army, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Johns Hopkins
University, 1971, p. 313, for Hawrani’s officer associates.
3. Seale, Struggle fo r Syria, p. 158, says that the merger occurred in
November-December 1952, but he also says it “ Dates from their flight together
across the mountains from Shishakli’s tyranny” (loc. cit.) The escape actually
occurred in January 1953, not long after the three had been arrested.
4. Nidal al-Bacth (Beirut: Dar al-Talicah, 1963), II, pp. 193-94; hereafter cited
as Nidal.
5. Mid-East Mirror, Oct. 24, 1953, p. 16; hereafter cited as MEM; Torrey,
Syrian Politics, p. 228. Kamel S. Abu Jaber, The Arab Ba’th Socialist Party
(Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1966), p. 32, says that the two parties
merged on March 5, 1954, a date which seems unreasonable in view of statements
issued by the Arab Socialist Resurrection Party the previous year, but which
reflects formal confirmation of the merger at a party council, the First Syrian
Regional Congress.
6. MEM, June 27, 1953, p. 9.
7. Nidal II, p. 192.
8. See Nidal H, pp. 217-20 for an example of tracts signed by these groups.
9. Seale, Struggle for Syria, p. 141.
10. Torrey, Syrian Politics, pp. 245-46.
76 THE BACTH PARTY

11. Robert T. Phillips, “ Michel Aflaq and the Ba’athist Ideology,” January
1966, p. 6, unpublished paper, American University of Beirut. He names Antun
Maqdisi as the other ASP man, but in view of Maqdisi’s lack of prominence either
before or after this period, I am inclined to think that this identification may be in
error.
12. Text in Nidal IV, pp. 14-16.
13. Sami al-Jundi, al-Bacth (Beirut: Dar al-Nahar li al-Nashr, 1969), p. 67;
Abu Jaber, Arab Ba’th, p. 32. No party statement appears to have issued following
this congress.
14. Jundi, al-Bacth, p. 36.
15. Nidal IV, p. 13. This volume, subtitled “ The National Command:
1955-1961,” has only the editor’s summary, “ The Party Command Between the
First and Second National Congresses” (pp. 11-13), and the October 1953 bulletin
cited above (pp. 14-16) for the period before 1955. cAbr Mu’tamaratihi, p. 8, gives
only a few lines.
16. Naji cAllush, al-Thawrah wa al-Jamahir (The Revolution and the Masses)
(Beirut: Dar al-Talicah, 1962), pp. 101-102.
17. Calls for a national congress became very persistent after the dissolution of
the party in Syria in early 1958. See cAllush, al-Thawrah, p. 129.
18. Jundi, al-Bacth, p. 72. Jundi then headed the Salamiyah shucbah; he
professes in his book to have been surprised by the factionalism he found on
visiting Damascus to help in preparations for the congress (pp. 71-72).
19. Quoted in cAllush, al-Thawrah, p. 102.
20. Much of the general political discussion in this section is drawn from
Torrey, Syrian Politics, Chapter VIII, especially pp. 254-64. Election information
and results also appeared in MEM, Sept. 11 and 18, Oct. 9, 1954 and L’Orient of
Beirut, Sept. 26, 1954. Nidal III has little coverage of this election except to reprint
one general exhortation to vote for the party, and two of Bitar’s campaign
statements (pp. 24-30).
21. Nidal III, pp. 43-53 and 66-82.
22. Statement published in al-Bacth, Feb. 19, 1955, and reprinted in Nidal III,
pp. 89-93. Quotes are from pp. 89 and 92.
23. Torrey, Syrian Politics, pp. 278 and 287.
24. Nidal III, pp. 130-53.
25. Toney, Syrian Politics, pp. 301-2.
26. Nidal III, p. 184. The text of the Bacth Party’s draft of the national charter
as presented to the drafting committee is in Nidal III, pp. 185-90. It appeared in
al-Bacth, issue No. 3 of May 4, 1956. The text of the approved national pact
appeared, inter alia, in al-Jaridah (Beirut) of March 8, 1956.
27. Nabil M. Kaylani, “ The Rise of the Syrian Bacth 1940-1958: Political
Success, Party Failure,” International Journal o f Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. Ill,
No. 1 (Jan. 1972), p. 19.
28. Nidal III, pp. 204-5; statement in al-Bacth of June 15, 1956. The editor of
Nidal notes that Bitar became Foreign Minister in this cabinet; he does not refer to
Kallas.
29. Al-Bacth, July 19, 1957, cited in cAUush, al-Thawrah, pp. 103-4. He notes
that the congress slightly revised the Internal Statute.
30. MEM, March 31, 1957, p. 21, and July 28, 1957, p. 21.
31. George M. Haddad, Revolutions and Military Rule in the Middle East,
Volume II: The Arab States (New York: Robert Speller and Sons, 1971), pp.
The Merger 77

227-28. See also Torrey, Syrian Politics, pp. 329-31 and Seale, Struggle for Syria,
pp. 265-82. Haddad’s description of the Syrian scene in these years provides a
good example of the way in which conservatives lumped Communists, leftists, and
Nasirists together.
32. Torrey, Syrian Politics, pp. 360 ff; Seale, Struggle for Syria, pp. 283-94;
Haddad, Revolutions and Military Rule, p. 230.
33. Salaheddin Bitar, “ The Rise and Decline of the Baath,” Middle East
International, No. 3 (June 1971), p. 15.
 - 6 -

The Road to the Formation of the UAR

The organic unity of the Arab world and the need to gather all its
components in a single political entity is a basic tenet of the Bacth Party. It
is embodied in the party constitution, and was the party’s chief goal in the
1950s. The Bacth leaders believed political unity to be the first, absolutely
indispensable step to take before other Arab problems of feudalism, social
inequality, economic backwardness, and the like could be solved. Hence,
for years the party had worked for the development in each Arab region of
a vanguard which would, in time, permit the forging of political unity
among these regions. Although the party had spread considerably in the
years since its founding Congress, the Bacth vanguard was nowhere near
providing the political muscle necessary to lead two or more Arab states
into unification. Even in Syria, where the party was powerful in the
mid-1950s, it could not work its will in all respects. Thus in its formative
years the Bacth Party had had no opportunity to construct a form of political
unity or face the problems such a process would involve.
The Bacth’s devotion to Arab unity solidified in the mid-1940s. The
Bacth initially made no distinction concerning the type of government that
the various Arab states had. In 1945, Salah Bitar, in a statement signed on
behalf of “ The Arab Bacth Bureau,” criticized Syrian President Quwatli
for arguing that Iraq and Jordan, having monarchial forms of government,
should not be united with Syria and Lebanon.1 The Bacth leaders at this
period favored the idea of a Greater Syria which would unite these four
countries, a view that was later a source of embarrassment to the Bacth
leaders; some tried to argue that the Bacthists had never supported the
concept of Greater Syria.2 The party did flatly repudiate “ The Greater
Syria Scheme” two years later.3
The Bacthists do not seem to have ever advocated partial unity as a
substitute for complete unity, but rather as a step toward complete unity.
At a later date, the Bacth came to entertain favorably the idea of union
between Syria and Iraq, believing that uniting Syria and Iraq would, under
certain circumstances, be beneficial to itself and to the Arab world, but this
union was never feasible. As Jalal al-Sayyid, one of the party’s founders.
80 THE BACTH PARTY

said in an interview in the Damascus paper A lif Ba late in October 1950,

“ Unity between Iraq and Syria would unify Arab efforts against im­
perialism, which is a major target of the Party, and therefore the Bacth is
for such unity, but the unity must be between the peoples in the two
countries and not just between two governments.’’4
For much of its early life, the Bacth movement had no sister state with a
compatible government with which to put the slogan of unity into concrete
form. When the revolutionary regime overthrew the monarchy in Egypt in
1952, the new government seemed to hold little promise from the Bacth’s
point of view. Indeed, it seemed to the Bacth leaders to be a military
government of the sort they were already familiar with in Syria under
Shishakli. The party was suspicious of the Revolutionary Command
Council (RCC) in Egypt, particularly in view of the close relations between
it and Shishakli’s government in 1953.5 Moreover, up to the time of
Shishakli’s overthrow in February 1954, Bacth leaders in Syria were fully
occupied in their struggle against his regime and had little time to pay much
attention to affairs beyond Syria’s borders.
Even after the ousting of Shishakli, when the party was permitted
freedom of action in Syria—including the freedom to publish its
newspaper—it was consistently critical of the Egyptian regime. “ We see
that the task of the military regime there [Egypt] was finished in its early
days when it toppled the throne and threw out the monarchy.’’ “ The unity
of the Arab nation and of the Arab question which we hear them [the
Egyptian leaders] talk about did not prevent them from agreement with the
oppressive government formerly existing here in Syria, nor did it prevent
them from disdain for the wishes of the Arab people in the Syrian
region.’’6 Again on May 23, al-Bacth showed its outrage at Jamal cAbd
al-Nasir for allegedly saying to the visiting Syrian defense minister that it
didn’t matter to him if Syria allied itself with Jordan or Iraq or even
Turkey. Al-Bacth was highly critical of Nasir’s lack of ability or interest in
distinguishing between Arabs and Turks.7
On July 5, al-Bacth wrote again criticizing Egyptian RCC member
Major Salah Salim and “ his agents” —an epithet usually reserved by
Bacthist writers for supporters of Western powers. The paper referred to
“ errors which the men of the revolution in Egypt have made when they
have considered the power of the Army as being of more import than the
power of popular revolution internally.” And again, “ The Arab people do
not agree with the distorted political concept which says that each Arab
state is independent in its internal affairs from its sister Arab states,” 8 this
last in reply to an assertion to that effect by Major Salim. The proposed
agreement between Britain and Egypt, whereby Britain was to evacuate the
Suez Canal base within twenty months, was severely criticized by the
Road to the Formation o f the UAR 81

Bacthists, for they saw it as a reliance on contradictions, that is “ seeking

help against Britain from the United States, i.e., against imperialism from
imperialism.” 9
The Bacth was severely critical of Egyptian-Iraqi closeness in 1954.
The party paper did say that it was important to distinguish between, and to
properly characterize, the government of Egypt and the reactionary gov­
ernments in other Arab regions, meaning such countries as Iraq and Jordan,
but it went on to say, “ We find the two types agreeing in fundamental
method more than they disagree.” 10 At the end of the summer a headline in
an al-Bacth editorial at the time of Salah Salim’s visit to Iraq—a visit that
became the turning point in Iraqi-Egyptian relations, because the Egyptians
got the impression that the Iraqis would not move to closer and more
formal relations with Western powers, as in fact they did early the
following year—said, “ Dictatorship in Egypt and reaction in Iraq are
trying to support Western imperialism in the name of unifying an Arab
policy.” 11 And at the end of the year, the Egyptian regime was still “ the
dictatorial government . . . [which is] trying to isolate the Egyptian
question from the Arab question.” 12 Little more than a year later, in
February 1956, the Bacth Party adopted a slogan of unity between Egypt
and Syria as its most important policy. It proceeded to drive ahead with this
slogan in the years 1956 and 1957 until the drive came to fruition in the
establishment of the United Arab Republic (UAR) in February 1958.
What brought about the complete reversal of the Bacthist position in
regard to the Egyptian regime? I believe the answer lies principally in
developments during 1955, a year of substantial change in the international
alignments of some of the eastern Arab states. 1955 was also marked by the
appearance of new disputes and new associations among those states. At
the end of 1954 all the eastern Arab governments—Egypt, Saudi Arabia,
Iraq, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon—were on more or less civil terms with
the Western powers, i.e., Great Britain, France, and the United States, and
maintained at least superficially polite relations among themselves. By the
end of 1955, Egypt and Syria had established a fairly harmonious relation­
ship; the two were at loggerheads with Iraq and Jordan; and Saudi Arabia
was siding with Egypt.
1955 marks the beginning of a period when the Arab states could be
conveniently divided into two broad groupings whose membership some­
times changed. The first group, generally termed conservative, included
those states whose governments or rulers continued to see advantages in
maintaining a close association with the powers they were familiar with,
namely, the Western powers, and which were governed by those who had
enjoyed power for some decades. The second, often called radical or
revolutionary, comprised governments dominated by a younger genera-
82 THE BACTH PARTY

tion, newly come to power, enjoying the support of a majority of intellec­

tuals and of a substantial segment of the urban population. These govern­
ments espoused radical social and economic change; internationally, they
held positive neutralism and good relations with the USSR and other
countries of the socialist camp as fundaments of their policy.
The changed situation was brought about by a number of distinct but
related developments. Important in themselves, these developments also
led to a radical change in the Bacth Party’s appreciation of the Egyptian
regime, which had already made a decision to break out of the isolation of
the Nile valley and to assert a position of leadership among the Arab states.
On the second anniversary of the Egyptian revolution, Cairo announced
that “ Egypt has started a new era of relations with the Arabs—an era based
on true and frank fraternity, facing up to and thinking out problems and
endeavoring to solve them. The aim of the Revolution Government is for
the Arabs to become One Nation with all its sons collaborating for the
common welfare . . . . The Revolution also believes that the weight of the
defense of the Arab states falls Erst and foremost on the Arabs and they are
worthy of undertaking it.’’13 By this declaration Nasir said, in effect, that
Egypt was becoming an Arab power in the full sense of the term.
Britain agreed to evacuate the Suez Canal base by an agreement signed
on October 19, 1954. As a government of the new generation, a generation
that felt a sense of humiliation at the unequal status imposed on Arab
countries in past treaties and pacts entered into with stronger powers, the
RCC in Cairo wished to avoid any further inequitable treaties. Relying on
Arab solidarity, it had tried throughout the summer and fall of 1954 to
persuade Iraq to stay with the 1950 Arab Collective Security Pact. Thus
Egypt took the view that,

Iraq derives a guarantee more than adequate from the [Arab] Collective
Security pact, and from the fact that the Arabs are regarded as a cohesive
bloc which does not reject cooperation with the West if Arab freedom and
security are respected.14

The Iraqi view was substantially different. Nuri al-Sacid was solidly in
control of that country as a consequence of rigged elections in August
1954, suppression of political activity, and control of the press. He saw
Iraq’s security as enhanced by alliances with his neighbors and with
Britain. Although he and Nasir discussed the matter, they evidently talked
at cross purposes. Whether their lack of full understanding of one another
was deliberate or inadvertent is not clear.15
The Egyptian reaction to the joint communique from Ankara and
Baghdad of January 13, 1955 announcing the formation of the Turkish-
Iraqi pact was formidable. Cairo had not expected such a dramatic
Road to the Formation o f the UAR 83

development just at that time. Nasir called for a conference of Arab prime
ministers to deal with the situation, a conference Nuri al-Sacid of Iraq
refused to attend. Egyptian radio and press propaganda were turned against
the alliance and attacks were also made on Nuri himself.16 The Egyptian
campaign against the Turkish-Iraqi alliance continued as a standard feature
of Egyptian-Iraqi relations for the remaining three years of the existence of
the Hashemite Kingdom of Iraq. The campaign took on a new dimension
after Britain acceded to the alliance, which then became known as the
Baghdad Pact, at the beginning of April 1955. Egypt by this time had
placed itself squarely in the forefront of the Arab struggle against the
remnants of imperialism.
In the course of these developments, the governments of Egypt and
Syria drew closer together. Syrian antipathy toward Turkey for the Alex-
andretta annexation still rankled, and, of course, the sizable leftist element
in the 1954 Parliament was anti-imperialist. Sabri al-cAsali’s cabinet of
February 13 rested heavily on Bacth support, along with that of Khalid
al-cAzm. On March 2, 1955, at Egyptian urging, Damascus and Cairo
signed an agreement: (1) seeking the formation of a federation of all Arab
states that publicly repudiated the Turkish-Iraqi Defense Treaty, (2) setting
up a unified command of the armies of member states of the federation, and
(3) unifying the foreign, financial, and cultural policies of members of the
federation.17 The Egyptians had been mightily helped in persuading the
new government in Damascus to sign this agreement by a vigorous Israeli
raid on Gaza on February 28 in which thirty-five to forty people were
killed.
Internationally, the Egyptian regime, and Nasir personally, took
another major step in the spring of 1955, reinforcing it later in the year. In
April, at the Bandung Conference Nasir emerged as a strong supporter of
positive neutralism, thus placing himself further on the side of the Syrians
and against the Iraqis, whose Foreign Minister, Fadil Jamali, took a
vigorous and generally intemperate pro-Western stance at Bandung. Nasir
had already received a visit from Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India
in Cairo prior to the Bandung Conference, and he visited India in
connection with his trip to Bandung. His association with Nehru continued
to prosper, and President Tito of Yugoslavia shortly became linked with
Nehru and Nasir. The association blossomed into a steady round of
consultations among them; in a fairly short time, they emerged as the three
most prominent spokesmen for neutralism and the “ third world.”
Nasir’s espousal of positive neutralism and his leap into a leadership
role among countries of the third world put him in harmony with Bacth
ideology on this subject. The party leaders were particularly proud of
having been the first in the Arab world, as they claimed, to have put
forward a policy of positive neutralism. As cAflaq said in 1956, “ . . . [the
84 THE BACTH PARTY

Egyptian government] adopted the policy of neutralism, which our Party

had first called for seven years previously.” 18 Bacth Party leaders tended to
assume that their advocacy of positive neutralism had been one of the
principal causes of the Egyptian leader’s conversion to the doctrine. Such
an assumption appears unwarranted; meetings and exchanges with Afro-
Asian leaders at Bandung and, especially, Nasir’s new-found rapport with
Nehru seem to have been the determining factors. However unwarranted
the assumption was, it contributed greatly to the development of the Bacth
Party’s belief in the mid-1950s that it was effecting changes in Arab
political attitudes and, in particular, that it was helping to provide an
ideology for the Egyptian revolution.
The final big event of 1955 was Nasir’s announcement on September 27
of an arms deal between Egypt and Czechoslovakia. The Czech arms
supply broke the long-standing capability of the Western Powers to control
the quantities and types of arms flowing into the Middle East and to
determine generally when and to whom these arms would go. The
Egyptian-Czech agreement was widely hailed in many parts of the Arab
world, particularly in Syria but also by political leaders in most Arab
capitals.19 They interpreted his move not in terms of the possible dangers
of eventual Communist infiltration of the Middle East, but in terms of the
Arab-Israeli conflict and of Arab independence.
In the space of ten months, the Egyptian revolutionary regime jumped
into a position of preponderant influence in the eastern Arab world. Egypt,
the largest and wealthiest of the Arab states, headquarters of the Arab
League, center of Arab publishing and film industries, had long been an
important factor in Arab councils. But, under the leadership of the
immensely popular Jamal cAbd al-Nasir, revolutionary Egypt began to play
a qualitatively different role in the last half of 1955. The Egyptian regime
led the fight against “ Western imperialism” and its mechanism, the
Baghdad Pact. Nasir became a widely acknowledged spokesman for
positive neutralism. Egypt began to take on a new status as principal Arab
military opponent of Israel. All these developments contributed to a
reassessment of the Egyptian regime within the Bacth Party; this reassess­
ment resulted in the adoption of unity between Egypt and Syria as a
fundament of party policy early in 1956.
Exactly at what point the weight of party opinion swung away from
hostility to the Egyptian regime toward a favorable view cannot be
determined with precision. The party newspaper was not published for
about a year, from the spring of 1955 until April 20, 1956. Extant writings
by party leaders on any subject during this period are rather scarce, and
none of them deal with the issue of unity between Egypt and Syria nor of
the party’s view of the Egyptian regime in any detail. However, criticism
Road to the Formation o f the UAR 85

of the United Kingdom-Egyptian agreement of October 1954 for evacua­

tion of the Suez Canal base appears to have eased after mid-1955. The
Bacth Party must have noted that the evacuation went ahead smoothly and
that, month by month, installations were being turned over to Egypt and
English soldiers were leaving Arab soil. Even if imperialism was helping
imperialism, Arabs were gaining a victory.
A collection of Salah al-Din Bitar’s writings, al-Siyasah a l-cArabiyah
bayn al-M abda' wa al-Tatbiq, contains an article called “ The Start of the
Road Toward Arab Unity,” which specifically advocates the unity of Syria
and Egypt.20 In al-Siyasah, this article is dated 1955, but the same article is
printed in N idal al-B acth (Vol. HI, pages 179-183), where it is cited as
having been printed in the newspaper al-Bacth on May 4, 1956. It is
possible that al-Bafth, which had just reappeared in circulation, published
an article written in 1955. If such is the case. Bitar did advocate unity
between Syria and Egypt at some point in 1955, though after the British
joined the Baghdad Pact on April 4, as the text of the article shows. I am
inclined to think, however, that the date given in N idal al-B acth is correct
and the date given in al-Siyasah is an error.21 Bitar’s article appears to
follow closely the tenor of the Bacth Party’s official pronouncement of
April 17, 1956. It would have been seriously out of harmony with the
Ba'th’s view of Egypt a year earlier.
Indications of a changed attitude on the part of the Bacth Party toward
the Egyptian regime had appeared, however, in a reply issued by the party
on September 24, 1955 to Syrian Prime Minister Sacid al-Ghazzi’s policy
statement of a few days earlier. The reply lists the areas where Egypt has
officially agreed with us, i.e., the party: (a) the Arabs must avoid foreign
military pacts; (b) Arab policy requires aiming for an independent Arab
stance in international affairs (i.e., positive neutralism); and (c) Arab
regions must strengthen themselves, use all gifts and capabilities, form an
organization for Arab economy and an Arab common market, establish a
united Arab army with a unified leadership and a common treasury.22 This
reply marks a considerable advancement over the rigorous criticism di­
rected at the Egyptian regime less than a year before. Patrick Seale notes
that “ the Czech arms deal was a turning point in the Bacth’s relations with
cAbd al-Nasir. Both sides found themselves in full agreement in opposing
the West which, in their view, supported Israel and imposed conditions on
arms supplied the Arabs.” 23 In view of the Bacth Party policy statement
quoted just above, which was issued three days before Nasir announced the
Egyptian-Czech arms deal, I am inclined to believe that the real turning
point was the action or series of actions Egypt took to show its Arabism by
fighting against the Baghdad Pact and against imperialism and by the
prominent action taken by Nasir to make positive neutralism a key point of
86 THE BACTH PARTY

Egyptian foreign policy. There is no question in my mind that the

Egyptian-Czech arms deal helped to improve Nasir’s standing in Bacthist
eyes—and speeded the process up considerably—but I doubt that it was in
fact the turning point in their relations.
There are, moreover, indications that there were disputes among the
Bacth leaders as to the attitude the party should take toward Egypt. On
January 21, 1956, cAflaq gave a talk to the members of the Beirut section
of the party, which was printed and distributed in a circular issued in the
Lebanese region the following month.24 In this talk, cAflaq said it was easy
for military plotters to seize control from governments of feudalists and
reactionaries and their myrmidons and supporters, who had twisted democ­
racy and constitutions to serve their own ends. The people were discour­
aged from hoping that any change would improve their position. They were
not prepared to fight for democracy, for as it had been practiced, they had
gotten no benefit from it.25
The situation in Egypt had been similar to that in Syria in the sense that
both countries had had a corrupt government, but there was a difference.
Syria had had a people’s movement; Egypt had not.26 Hence the revolution
in Egypt had a logical justification. The people could not overthrow the
regime, so a military group did. In cAflaq’s view the regime in Egypt was a
progressive one but no more than that. It was not revolutionary in the Bacth
meaning of the term, “ the organized struggle of the people based on
ideology. The struggle aims at the heart of the existing situation and gets at
its roots, replacing existing conditions with new sound conditions; that is,
it alters the fundamentals of the life of the nation.’’27 This is cAflaq’s
understanding of inqilab again. cAflaq went on to say that fundamental
change cannot be achieved by using the army as a means, but only by the
people’s struggle. There had been progress, i.e., reform, in Egypt but no
fundamental change. Capitalism, for example, cooperated with the gov­
ernment. And clearly the government in Egypt did not have the capacity to
solve all the problems of feudalism, capitalism, and so forth. It was the
party’s responsibility to work to bring the Egyptian government a step
closer to revolution, since Egypt’s progressivism placed it midway be­
tween reaction and revolution.28
cAflaq asserted that there was a danger that Bacthists would consider
such reforms as land distribution and the Egyptian government’s efforts to
adopt an independent policy toward the West despite its continued ties with
Britain to be correct and to constitute a real revolutionary policy. He said,
“ the new [Egyptian] constitution shows that the government will become
daily more incapable of continuing reforms and progressive steps because
it records a dictatorial tendency preventing the people from exercising their
rights and from active participation in arranging their lives and
Road to the Formation o f the UAR 87

capabilities.” 29 The new Egyptian constitution, even though it put con­

straints on imperialism and reaction, also constrained the people. While it
marked a good step forward in the matter of Egypt’s Arabism, owing to
pressure on its rulers from Arab public opinion, it was only a little step.
Finally, in cAflaq’s view, the constitution was not based on pan-Arabism:
‘‘We can say that the Egyptian constitution like every recent Arab
constitution is founded in the logic of division [of the Arab nation].” 30
At the very time this document was being circulated within the
Lebanese branch of the party, in Syria the Idlib section (shucbah) issued a
document summarizing party views on a number of points. In treating of
unity, it listed two points that related to Egypt: (1) the party has adopted the
Arab pact for political, economic, and military unity among Egypt, Syria,
and Saudi Arabia; and (2) the party is increasing its efforts to achieve unity
between Syria and Egypt.31 This document seems to indicate that around
the end of January or the beginning of February the leaders of the Bacth
Party had decided to work for the union of Syria and Egypt, a decision they
formally announced a few months later. The editor of the Nidal al-Bacth
series notes that (1) the party had decided to work for the union of Syria
and Egypt about two or three months before it issued the April 17, 1956
statement publicly advocating unity, because it had become satisfied ‘‘that
the rulers of Egypt were pursuing an independent Arab policy,” and (2) it
chose the tenth anniversary of the evacuation of foreign troops from Syria
to raise the slogan of unity before the masses.32
cAflaq himself also said in a public speech in February 1956 that a
month before, when the national pact (mithaq qawmi) was proposed in
Syria, ‘‘our Party demanded complete union with Egypt; the other parties
without exception rejected it.” 33 The admittedly inadequate evidence on
this subject leads me to believe that a fairly vigorous dispute raged among
some of the party leaders over this point during a good part of 1955. We
know that cAflaq and Hawrani had a running battle throughout this period,
and this issue appears to have been a major point of contention between
them. From the evidence available, it would seem that Hawrani was the
person more strongly in favor of calling for unity with Egypt and that
cAflaq, as always, was more worried about ideology. The latter was
seriously concerned that, while Egypt’s foreign policy had improved—a
process he credited very largely to the atmosphere created by Bacth Party
propaganda over the years—Egypt was still a dictatorship, even though it
had made some progress internally. He seems to have gone along reluc­
tantly with the party decision.
On April 17, 1956 the National Command of the party issued a
comprehensive statement on various Arab problems, setting forth its
opinions on developments in the Arab world. In addition to supporting
88 THE BACTH PARTY

positive neutralism, the struggle against imperialism and Zionism, and

action to include Jordan in the bilateral Syrian-Egyptian pact, it called for
the unity of Egypt and Syria as a starting point on the road to complete
Arab unity.34
Whatever disputes there may have been about the decision to seek
unity, once it was made, the party leaders plunged vigorously into working
to unify the two countries. I have referred above (page 85) to Bitar’s article
of May 4, 1956 elaborating on the theme of unity of Egypt and Syria as the
starting point on the road to Arab unity. cAflaq wrote editorials on April
27, May 25, and June 1, 1956; in these and later articles he repeated the
themes of the necessity of Arab unity, the.joining of Egypt and Syria as a
first step toward larger unity, the requirement for a truly revolutionary
(inqilabi) attitude. Even so, some uneasiness about Nasir remained; cAflaq
recalled in the June 1 article that only two years before, the Egyptian rulers
hadn’t cared whether Syria united with Iraq or Turkey. He also noted that
only at Bandung had Nasir adopted a view that the Syrian people had
adopted years earlier—namely, neutralism.35 These writings deal with
unity as unity and say little about the compatibility of the Egyptian and
Syrian systems. As time went by, the party leaders became mesmerized
with constructing a unity based largely on harmony in foreign policy,
paying little if any attention to the problems of meshing two systems of
government. This neglect led to serious troubles once union had been
achieved.
With the Bacth represented by Bitar and Kallas—Ministers of Foreign
Affairs and National Economy, respectively—in the new cabinet of Prime
Minister cAsali, formed on June 14, 1956, the Prime Minister announced
on July 5 that a ministerial committee had been formed to study ways to
bring about a federal union between Egypt and Syria.36 His announcement
was approved in the Syrian Parliament in what the Bacth Party newspaper
referred to the next day as an historic session, because it was “ the first time
that a legally constituted majority had called for the beginning of discus­
sions with an Arab region [Egypt] to establish a unity which would be open
to all Arab regions.” 37 Little of practical consequence emerged from this
Syrian initiative, largely because within a very few weeks the Arab world
in general and Egypt in particular were plunged into the Suez crisis. Nasir
announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal less than three weeks after
the Syrian parliament approved cAsali’s union committee, and the subse­
quent turmoil did not really calm down until early 1957.
The Suez crisis advanced the cause of Arab unity substantially, how­
ever; it also made the Egyptian role more central and Jamal cAbd al-Nasir
more essential. Egypt and Nasir added to the 1955 successes of the arms
deal with Czechoslovakia and of achieving a leading role in the third world
even greater laurels in many Arab minds. The Egyptians showed that they
Road to the Formation o f the (JAR 89

were capable of running the Canal as efficiently as the foreign-owned Suez

Canal Company had. They stood firm in the face of threats from Western
nations. And if they were defeated in battle, well, who could reasonably
expect Egypt alone to resist successfully an attack by three states simul­
taneously? The aftermath of the Israeli-British-French attack is well
known; diplomatic intervention by the United States occasioned a cease­
fire; in time, the Israelis withdrew, the Canal was cleared and opened, and
Nasir reaped enormous prestige from the successful outcome.
In Syria, there was widespread support for Egypt during these six
months. Nasir had referred to Syria’s wish for union with Egypt in his
speech announcing the nationalization of the Canal, and the Syrian gov­
ernment offered full support to him.38 Syria joined Jordan and Egypt in a
military pact on October 23. (The year had seen a great deal of trouble and
bloodshed along the borders of the three states and Israel). When Israeli
forces struck into Sinai on October 29, Syrian forces were eager to
participate, but were dissuaded by Cairo. But Syrian nationalists, who
needed no orders, did blow up the oil pipeline from Iraq to the
Mediterranean.39 Cutting the pipeline not only harmed Britain and France,
whose oil companies had majority ownership of the line and the oil fields in
Iraq, but also served to strike at the Baghdad government, which had been
supporting an effort by ousted Syrian politicians to regain power. Sarraj
exposed the scheme at the end of November.40
The early months of 1957 saw continued growth of nationalist and unity
sentiment. cAsali had reshuffled his cabinet on December 31, 1956; the
Shacb representation ceased, and Khalid al-cAzm became Minister of
Defence. President Eisenhower’s effort to rally forces in the Middle East
against international communism were not well received in Syria. Al-Bacth
attacked the mission of Congressman Richards, who visited a number of
Middle Eastern capitals to explain the Eisenhower Doctrine, as an effort to
oppose Arab nationalism and to tear the Arab liberation front apart.41
Those in Syria favoring union were only strengthened by these events;
uniting with Egypt came to have greater appeal among wider circles of the
population.
Nasir himself was by no means as eager for the union as were the
political leaders in Syria. When a Syrian mission arrived unexpectedly in
Cairo early in March 1957, announcing that it had come to begin negotia­
tions for a federal union, Nasir “ indicated a certain reticence.” 42 In an
interview with R. K. Karanjia of the Indian weekly, Blitz, in March 1957
he stated:

I am not thinking in terms of any federation or confederation or such

constitutional formulae for the present. They will not help our cause as much
as unity of thought and faith in Arab nationalism will. In fact, such
90 THE BACTH PARTY

constitutional frames can only create antagonisms to the Arab ideal and
become weapons in the hands of our enemies to sabotage the ideal. Any
study of history will convince you how paramount Arab nationalism is and
the unity forged by its shining flames is to every Arab people. I feel that once
foreign influences are removed Arab unity will follow automatically. All
Arab peoples from the Atlantic to the Persian Gulf today stand united against
the aggressors. That is more important to me than any plans of confederation
or federation.43

The appeal of unity, already gathering considerable support in Syria

outside the Bacth Party as well as within it, was further heightened by a
number of events during the summer and fall of 1957. The Syrian
government announced on August 12 that it had uncovered an American
plot to overthrow the regime and promptly expelled three American
diplomats. This was the second such disclosure that Damascus had made in
less than a year. How much the Syrian charges represented the facts has
been disputed by observers. Seale says, “ On examining the evidence
—confused and untidy though it is—it is hard to dismiss them [the Syrian
charges] as fabrications.’’44 George Kirk conveys the impression that the
Syrian charges were overdrawn, although he does not totally discount
them.45
Whatever the facts, the crucial point was that the Syrians—government
and people—believed that foreigners, and specifically Western govern­
ments, were out to overthrow the regime in Damascus. These beliefs were
reinforced by Turkish troop maneuvers along the Syrian border in Sep­
tember and by statements by American spokesmen emphasizing the growth
of Soviet influence in Syria.46 Foreign Minister Bitar, speaking in the UN
General Assembly, charged the U.S. “ with the press campaign directed
against Syria and accompanied by other more serious activities, for which
the United States is largely responsible.’’ Bitar cited “ economic, financial,
political and military pressures used against Syria to try to make [it] accept
political subordination to the United States.” 47
In Egypt too, attitudes toward unity were changing, though not so
rapidly. Whereas in March Nasir had been reluctant to talk about any
constitutional unity arrangements, on July 22 he referred to political union
as a “ desired national aim.” 48 More important, the Egyptians were
showing the Syrians by their actions that the two countries could work
together. Cairo, extending its horizons farther into the Arab world, worked
to get Syria on its side. It did not seek union with Syria, but much of what it
did in regard to Syria in 1955 through 1957 seemed to Syrians to
demonstrate that Egypt had become a convert to the cause of Arab unity.49
In September, a delegation of Syrian officers visited Cairo to discuss what
might be done to counter external threats and demonstrations of force. On
Road to the Formation o f the VAR 91

October 13, a contingent of Egyptian troops arrived at Lattaqiyah to assist

Syrians to defend their country, and later in the fall the Egyptian and Syrian
armies were placed under a joint command headed by the Egyptian cAbd
al-Hakim cAmir.
Several elements entered into the decision on the Syrian side to form the
United Arab Republic. As far as the Bacth Party was concerned, organic
political unity between Egypt and Syria was a good thing in and of itself. It
would provide the starting point for the broader—and ultimately
complete—Arab unity in which the party believed and for which it had
worked. Bitar had written on April 4, 1956 that “ the first stage on the road
to Arab unity would be union between Syria and Egypt, the two Arab
countries which are the most liberated, but the second stage would be to
work to increase in Arab countries the necessary conditions for their
adhesion as rapidly as possible to this union. The union of Syria and of
Egypt could not be solid, strong, and lasting if other Arab regions, with
their Arab people and their immense material and spiritual capabilities,
were not joined to it.” 50
Moreover, many Syrian political leaders and army officers were con­
vinced that the Baghdad Pact powers and the United States were trying to
overthrow the government in Damascus and replace it with a more
conservative one. They saw association with Egypt as a means of
strengthening Syria’s capability to resist such efforts. Bacthists and others
in Syria had seen King Husayn oust the government of Sulayman Nabulsi
in Jordan after only six months in office, reinstate government by the
palace, and turn successfully to the United States for support. At the same
time, some of these same leaders, including Bacthists, were becoming
concerned at the growing strength of the Communist movement.
The merged Bacth had joined with the Communists in a loose National
Front in 1955, a move Hawrani had pushed against the desires of cAflaq
and Bitar. The front had served as a device to attract other independent
politicians. By the fall of 1957, strains between Bacthists and Communists
had begun to appear; the latter supported cAzm in a race with Hawrani for
the post of Speaker of Parliament. The Bacth feared that, in Syria’s first
municipal elections, the Communists would make enough of a showing to
be an embarrassment, especially in view of the fact that the Shacb Party
was boycotting the voting. Hence the government postponed the municipal
elections, scheduled for the middle of November 1957.51
1958 was to have seen new parliamentary elections in Syria. The parties
that had managed to dominate the political situation in Syria since
mid-1956 were far from confident that they could hold their existing
electoral strength, let alone increase it. Much of the administration’s power
resulted from its ability to profit from splits between and incapacities of
other parties and groups. Elections might well have shown the real
92 THE BACTH PARTY

strength—or lack thereof—of the administration. Moreover, if elections

were announced for the new year, “ attention would be diverted from the
quest for union to the preparation for the campaign. In addition, the split
between Communists and Bacthists would allow the ‘reactionary’ parties to
gain ground. And the election campaign would also destroy the existing if
superficial unanimity on the union issue without which, as the Bacth knew,
cAbd al-Nasir would not agree to act.” 52
Yet another factor was the severe factionalization of the Syrian Army.
The army was so badly splintered that no one group could dominate it; yet
the groups could not really agree to cooperate wholeheartedly among
themselves. Several factions saw benefits in seeking unity with Egypt,
each hoping that it would be able to dominate such a union when it came
about.53 In fact, the delegation of Syrian officers that went to Egypt on
January 12, 1958, headed by the chief of staff, was the group that pushed
the union negotiations beyond the point of no return.
Probably the single most important factor in consummating the union
between Egypt and the UAR was the personality of Jamal cAbd al-Nasir.
He was not only the leader of the first successful effort in modem Arab
times to oust a corrupt and inefficient government but also in many ways
the personification of the hopes, dreams, and ambitions of a very large
number of politically conscious Arabs in the eastern states of the Arab
world. Unity had been talked about, opposition to colonial powers had
been talked about, arming to face Israel had been talked about—but Nasir
had done something about these issues. In a passage written years after the
event, Munif Razzaz, one-time Bacth Party Secretary General, put it this
way:

During this period, the Arab personality of cAbd al-Nasir came into being;
his leadership began to spill over Egypt’s borders and to fill the hearts of the
Arab masses in all parts of the Arab homeland with a power that had not
previously occurred in modem Arab history. His successive revolutionary
achievements—from agricultural reform ending the role of feudalism, free­
ing the peasants from feudal slavery, breaking the West’s capacity to keep
arms away [from the Arabs], following a policy of positive neutralism,
supporting fedayin operations in Palestine, then nationalizing the Canal,
defiantly opposing the tripartite aggression, nationalizing foreign businesses,
achieving the withdrawal [of Israeli, British, and French forces], beginning
the industrial revolution, down to signing the agreement on the High
Dam—all followed in a period not longer than four years and took hold of
the innermost being of the Arab masses in all areas. These are deprived
masses who occupy the homeland and who scarcely finish one struggle
before starting another, since they are totally deprived both of bread and of
dignity. Yet the consequence of all these great profound sequential achieve­
ments are but a small matter when put side by side with the great nationalist
Road to the Formation o f the UAR 93

accomplishment when he liberated Egypt from the claws of provincial

isolation into which the former government and political parties had placed
it, putting it on the ascending Arab nationalist cause stretching from the
Atlantic to the Gulf when he opened his heart and Egypt’s heart to the
progressive struggling Arab movements and supported every movement of
liberation in any Arab region in a revolutionary profundity which did not
concern itself with shifting political positions. In all this, therefore, cAbd
al-Nasir entered the heart of every Arab and truly became the leader of the
Arab progressive movement and its director and its inspiration as well.54

Coming from a man who suffered much as a result of disputes between his
own party and cAbd al-Nasir, this is a solid tribute. In my view, it
accurately portrays the tremendous enthusiasm and emotional drive which
had been built up for Arab unity, and specifically unity between Egypt and
Syria, by the end of 1957. Now largely spent, this drive had formidable
political and emotional effects in the Arab world in the late 1950s, effects
that are already being forgotten by participants and observers alike.
Nasir was far less enthusiastic about unity than the Syrians. He detailed
his reluctance several times in the course of speeches and interviews in
later years. For example, in an interview with Hasanayn Haykal of
al-Ahram on July 2, 1959, he said, “ As regards the unity of the area, the
Syrian people took the initiative as soon as the aggression [of 1956] was
over and demanded in Damascus the proclamation of the United Arab
Republic.” He told Dana Adams Schmidt of The New York Times in
November 1959 that “ we had not prepared ourselves for it [the unity].” 55
In a speech on the first anniversary of the union, February 21, 1959, Nasir
said, “ I confess that I did not think that our merger with Syria would take
place in such a short time. The merger was a hope we all dreamt of, but we
believed that the future was the time to witness it and not the present. . . .
When I found it was your will to unite, I had no right to oppose this wish.
Rather it was my duty to make clear to the people what they had to face
. . . to explain to them the efforts and sacrifices involved. If then the
people are prepared to pay the price then their will becomes a duty.” 56
This “ price” became a main point of difference in the final union
negotiations. The differences between the authoritarian system of govern­
ment that Nasir and his associates had employed in Egypt and the
representative cabinet system in Syria centered on the issues of political
parties and the degree of centralization of government. The Egyptian
constitution of January 16, 1956 gave the president almost total powers,
including authority to command the armed forces, promulgate laws, and
appoint and dismiss ministers. Political parties had been dissolved in Egypt
on January 16, 1953. Ten days later the regime established the Liberation
Rally as a single political movement to substitute for them. On many
94 THE BACTH PARTY

occasions Nasir made it clear that political parties would have no role to
play in Egypt’s future. In May 1955, he stressed in a speech that there
would be no party politics because such politics had distorted freedom,
changing it from the freedom of the majority to the freedom of the
minority.57 And a few months later, “ When I said restoring parliamentary
life, I did not mean the restoration of a parliament such as the one that
existed in the past and consisted of a minority dominating the majority. The
revolution did not say it would restore representative life but declared that
it would set up a sound representative system. There is a difference
between restoration and establishment.” 58
The ideas of the Bacth and those of Nasir were congruent largely in the
international and Arab fields, as we have seen. The question of a political
system came up in practice toward the end of 1957 when discussions had
gone on for some time and when an enormous momentum for unity had
built up.59 When Nasir demanded as a condition for unity that the Syrian
political system conform to that of Egypt and that all parties be dissolved,
the Bacth Party leaders felt compelled to go along with him. Later they
were to admit that a few top leaders present and active in Damascus made
the decision without formal reference to the existing seven-member na­
tional command and without consulting any other elements of the party
inside or outside Syria. In effect, the decision was taken by Bitar, cAflaq,
Hawrani, and one or two others. This decision, of course, was made in
flagrant disregard of party rules, but these few men had become accus­
tomed to making decisions in the party’s name. Faced with the choice of
achieving unity by dissolving the party or keeping the party intact and
opposing the formation of a political union for which they had struggled for
fifteen years, the party leaders chose to dissolve the Arab Socialist
Resurrection Party in Syria.60
The Bacthists had prepared the way for union between Syria and Egypt.
But they did not bring it into being; nor did any other political party. As
late as December 9, cAflaq was proposing a bill for a federal union between
Syria and Egypt, but it never got as far as parliament. A stampede for unity
was on, and the Syrian army was the driving force. After a good deal of
going back and forth between Cairo and Damascus, a delegation of Syrian
army officers arrived in Cairo in January 1958 for the crucial round of talks
with Nasir. Bitar was involved in discussions with the group beforehand
and later joined the negotiations in Cairo.61 The officers and Bitar brought
Nasir’s terms back to Syria, where the cabinet made one final effort to
retain more autonomy for Syria. It was Bitar’s task to take the new draft
plan to Cairo; Nasir refused it. The Syrian officers then told the politicians
to accept union on the terms Nasir wanted.62 They then accepted Nasir’s
terms, except for Khalid Bakdash and his Communists; he went into exile;
Road to the Formation o f the UAR 95

they went underground. The Bacth, Nationalist, and Shacb parties cheered
the union and began the steps for dissolution.

Notes
1. Nidal al-Bacth (Beirut: Dar al-Talicah, 1963), I, pp. 51 -52; hereafter cited as
Nidal. The item is in a document comprising the Ba'th’s reply to a speech by
Quwatli.
2. Kamel S. Abu Jaber, The Arab Ba’th Socialist Party (Syracuse, N.Y.:
Syracuse University Press, 1966), p. 24. See Ali Khalil, The Socialist Parties in
Syria and Lebanon, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. The American University,
Washington, D.C., 1962, pp. 117-18, for an example of such an argument.
3. Nidal I, p. 220, in a party statement on Syrian internal issues and Arab
issues, Oct. 11, 1947. The document is on pp. 209-23.
4. La Documentation Française. “ Articles et Documents,” No. 2020, Nov.
20, 1950, citing the Damascus newspaper, Alif Ba, of Oct. 28, 1950.
5. Abu Jaber, Arab Ba’th, pp. 38-39.
6. Al-Bacth, May 17, 1954, quoted in Nidal II, pp. 255-56.
7. Article reprinted in Nidal II, pp. 257-59.
8. Article reprinted in Nidal II, pp. 267-68.
9. Al-Bacth, July 30, 1954, reprinted in Nidal II, pp. 278-80. The quotation is
on p. 279.
10. Loc. cit.
11. Al-Bacth, Aug. 31, 1954, quoted in Nidal III, p. 22.
12. Nidal III, p. 41. The quotation is from a party statement of Dec. 6, 1954.
13. BBC No. 486, July 21, 1954, quoted in Patrick Seale, The Struggle for
Syria: A Study o f Post-war Arab Politics, 1945-1958 (London: Oxford University
Press, 1965), p. 198.
14. Elizabeth Monroe, Britain s Moment in the Middle East (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins Press, 1963), p. 181.
15. Ibid. Chapter 6 of Monroe’s volume gives a lucid account of Egyptian-Iraqi
rivalry in the mid-1950’s.
16. See, for example, Mid-East Mirror, Jan. 22, 1955; p. 2; hereafter cited as
MEM.
17. MEM, Mar. 5, 1955, summarized the points of agreement.
18. Nidal IV, p. 42; 'Aflaq’s remarks were made on Jan. 21, 1956.
19. MEM of Oct. 8, 1955 said, “ the Arab World hailed Colonel Nasser’s
policy to [sic] buy arms from any quarter.”
20. (Beirut: Dar al-Talicah, 1960), pp. 43-48.
21. The accurate editing of Nidal in the many instances where I have been able
to check the text against original documents is a principal reason for this judgment.
But it must be recorded that both Bitar’s Siyasah and the Nidal series are issued by
the same publishing house. Anthony Nutting, Nasser (New York: E. P. Dutton,
1972), p. 220, says that Bitar was in favor of Syrian-Egyptian union when he
visited Cairo in the fall of 1955.
96 THE BACTH PARTY

22. Nidal III, p. 141.

23. Seale, Struggle for Syria, p. 236.
24. Nidal IV, pp. 33-46. The Nidal editor notes that he printed as much of the
speech, as he had and that, although the talk appears complete, an undetermined
amount of text is missing.
25. Ibid., pp. 35-36.
26. Ibid., p. 38.
27. Ibid., pp. 39-40.
28. Ibid., pp. 40-41.
29. Ibid., p. 42.
30. Ibid., pp. 44-45.
31. Nidal III, pp. 166-67. The document is dated to the first half of February
1956 and covers pp. 160-69 of the volume.
32. Ibid., p. 170.
33. Michel cAflaq, Macrakat al-Masir al-Wahid (The Battle o f the Sole De­
stiny) (Beirut: Dar al-cIlm li al-Malayin, 1958), p. 46.
34. Nidal IV, p. 59.
35. These are reprinted in Macrakat, pp. 66-77; citations to the June 1 editorial
are on pp. 75-76.
36. Gordon H. Torrey, Syrian Politics and the Military, 1945-1958
(Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1964), p. 311. cAsali, Bitar, and Minister
of Interior Ahmad Qanbar were the three members.
37. The article is reprinted in Nidal HI, p. 210. Seale, Struggle fo r Syria, pp.
258-59 quotes the Chamber of Deputies resolution of approval.
38. Seale, Struggle for Syria, pp. 260-61.
39. Ibid., p. 262.
40. Ibid., pp. 265-81. Seale devotes a chapter to this effort sponsored by the
Iraqi regime (pp. 263-82), basing his narrative on records of the trials of the
accused in Syria. He also cites evidence given by prominent Iraqi figures in the
People’s Court proceedings in Baghdad after the fall of the Iraqi monarchy in 1958.
Seale names (p. 276, footnote 8) ex-Bacthist Jalal al-Sayyid as a member of the
plotting group.
41. Nidal III, pp. 254-57, issue of March 15, 1957.
42. Torrey, Syrian Politics, p. 332.
43. Quoted in Torrey, loc. cit.
44. Seale, Struggle for Syria, p. 293.
45. George Kirk, Contemporary Arab Politics (New York: Praeger, 1961), pp.
97-98.
46. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, speaking to the UN General Assem­
bly on Sept. 19, 1957, said, “ . . .Turkey now faces growing military danger from
the major buildup of Soviet arms in Syria on her southern border.” See also Seale,
Struggle for Syria, pp. 296 and 300. In the considerable space he devotes to this
crisis (pp. 289-302), Seale strongly criticizes the United States government for
faulty assessments which magnified out of proportion the extent of Communist
influence and Communist prospects in Syria in mid-1957.
47. United Nations Department of Public Information, United Nations Review
(New York: Columbia University, 1957), Vol. IV, No. 5, p. 100.
48. Seale, Struggle for Syria, p. 305.
49. Ibid., p. 314.
Road to the Formation o f the UAR 97

50. Salah al-Din Bitar, in al-Siyasah al-cArabiyah bayn al-Mabda’ wa al-

Tatbig (Arab Policy in Principle and Practice, (Beirut: Dar al-Talicah, 1960),
p. 48.
51. Torrey, Syrian Politics, pp. 372-73.
52. Seale, Struggle for Syria, p. 317.
53. Of the twenty Syrian officers who signed the unity pledge on Jan. 11, 1958,
the preponderance served loyally during the UAR and supported Nasir later. A few
were Hawrani’s supporters; Amin al-Hafiz was the only one who became a
prominent Bacthist in the post-UAR period. All but three of the twenty had
graduated from the military academy after 1947. Michael H. Van Dusen, Intra-
and Inter-Generational Conflict in the Syrian Army, unpublished Ph.D. disserta­
tion, Johns Hopkins University, 1971, p. 428.
54. Munif Razzaz, al-Tajribah al-Murrah (The Bitter Experience) (Beirut: Dar
Ghandur, 1967), pp. 51-52.
55. Jamal cAbd al-Nasir, Speeches and Press Interviews 1959, Cairo, p. 595.
56. Ibid., pp. 19-20.
57. MEM, May 21, 1955, pp. 2-3.
58. Quoted in MEM, July 9, 1955, p. 3.
59. Seale, Struggle for Syria, p. 318, quotes a conversation with cAflaq on this
point.
60. Nidal IV, pp. 199-200, passage from “ Decisions of the Fourth National
Congress.”
61. BBC, Summary o f World Broadcasts, Second Series, No. 1297. Part IV,
1297/E/8-9. E represents a special annex which reproduces the Cairo Unity Talks
of March and April 1963. Hereafter this source is referred to as Tri-partite Talks,
followed by the BBC issue and page citation as above, e.g., 1297/E/2-. Anthony
Nutting, Nasser (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1972), p. 214, credits Bitar with being
the impelling force which convinced the Syrian officers to go to Cairo in January
1958 and seek union. This would seem to be the role Bitar described himself as
playing, but it is very questionable whether he had that degree of influence on these
officers.
62. Seale, Struggle fo r Syria, pp. 322-23.
 - 7 -

Growth of the Party outside Syria

In following developments in Syria up to the formation of the United Arab

Republic, the story of the Bacth Party’s spread into other Arab states has
been left far behind. From the beginning, the party’s founders had had
aspirations and goals that encompassed the entire Arab world. Even in the
earliest years, they worked to transmit these ideas to Arabs from Lebanon,
Jordan, Iraq and farther afield. Up to the time of the Palestine war,
however, the Bacth remained confined to Syria. It had, to be sure, attracted
members and adherents among non-Syrian students in Damascus Univer­
sity. They, in turn, began to spread the Bacth message across the Arab
world, and in the process, created party organizations in several eastern
Arab states—and won some recruits as far west as Libya—by 1958, when
the UAR was founded.

Jordan

The first party branch (farc) outside Syria was established in what was
then the Kingdom of Transjordan in 1948. It was founded by a number of
students from the Syrian University at Damascus, among them Sulayman
al-Hadidi and Amin Shuqayr.1 After the 1948-1949 war with Israel and
cAbdallah’s incorporation of that part of Palestine which was controlled by
Jordanian forces into the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in 1949, the party
spread to the Jordanian West Bank, where it quickly attracted activists
from such centers as Nablus and Jerusalem. Among the earliest of these
was cAbdallah Rimawi, soon to become secretary of the party organization
in Jordan, and, later, for six months a minister in the Jordanian cabinet, the
only Bacthist ever to achieve such distinction in the Hashemite Kingdom.
One of the first things that the new organization did after it was
established in Palestine was to issue a newspaper, al-Yaqzah, a weekly first
published about 1950 on the West Bank. In the course of the next several
years al-Yaqzah was to appear somewhat sporadically, because it was
100 THE BACTH PARTY

closed several times for contravening the rather narrow limits established
by the Jordanian monarchy for discussion of public events.
After formally joining the Palestinian West Bank and Transjordan to
form the Kingdom of Jordan,cAbdallah granted Jordanian citizenship to all
Palestinians living in the Kingdom. As a further step, he found it necessary
to have the West Bank represented in the Jordanian parliament. The
chamber of deputies then existing was dissolved, and new elections were
held in April 1950. In these elections two Bacthists, cAbdallah Rimawi
from Ramallah and cAbdallah Nacwas from Jerusalem, were elected to the
chamber. Their election almost certainly reflected their own personal
appeal and popularity as nationalists and activists rather than any strength
of the Bacth organization at the time, for little more than a year had elapsed
since the party had appeared on the West Bank. Of the five thousand votes
cast for Nacwas in Jerusalem, it is unlikely that more than a few score came
from Bacth Party members or party sympathizers. Nonetheless, the two
men contrived to keep the Bacth represented in the Jordanian Parliament for
several years.
Until his death by assassination in 1951 King cAbdallah spent a good
deal of his energy on domestic affairs, dealing with the problem of
reconciling his own patriarchal and authoritarian system of government
with the efforts of the more sophisticated, more politically advanced,
Palestinians to obtain a greater share in government. The Bacthist represen­
tatives played a part in this effort and ended up in jail for their efforts at
least once. New parliamentary elections were held in late August 1951, a
month after King cAbdallah’s assassination. Both Rimawi and Nacwas,
released from jail only two days before polling day, managed to get
elected. They did not, of course, run on a party ticket; no parties were legal
in Jordan at the time. Both appear to have increased their voting strength
over what they commanded in the 1950 election.2
cAbdallah was succeeded as king by his son Talal, who took on, as one
of his first moves, the drafting and promulgation of a new and fairly liberal
constitution for the Kingdom of Jordan. The new constitution provided,
among other things, for the legalization of political organizations. The
Bacth was the first to take advantage of this provision by requesting,
immediately after it came into effect on January 8, 1952, a license to form
a political party. The request was made by Nacwas, Rimawi, Munif
Razzaz, Sulayman al-Hadidi, Amin Shuqayr, and other Bacthists. The
Jordanian government refused the Bacth request the next month.3
Talal was deposed on August 7, 1952 on grounds of mental incompe­
tence and incapacity to rule and was succeeded by his son Husayn, then a
minor, whose prerogatives were assumed by a Regency Council. Aqil
Abidi gives the following assessment of Talal’s year on the throne:
Growth o f the Party outside Syria 101

The dethronement of Talal was a turning point and an unprecedented event in

the history of Jordan. During his short term of rule, significant advances
were made in the political and constitutional field. A striking development
was that the King willingly abdicated his autocratic powers and prerogatives
and was content to make the constitution and parliament supreme. After his
deposition these powers passed into the hands of a small oligarchy. During
his short kingship, Talal had tried to transform his rule into reign.4

I do not propose to discuss here the validity of Abidi’s judgment, nor

the thomy matter of Talal’s fitness for rule. Whatever his degree of
competence or incompetence to be king, his liberalization of politics had
helped the Bacthists to disseminate their program and to recruit adherents.
The party held its first regional congress in Jordan—and indeed the first
such congress to be held outside Syria—during 1952 and elected a
Regional Command with cAbdallah Rimawi as Regional Secretary.5 The
opposition elements in the parliament elected in 1951 made their voices
heard on a number of occasions. Seventeen of them, for example, walked
out of the parliament in 1952 when the cabinet refused to retract a personal
attack it had made on cAbdallah Nacwas, the Bacth deputy from Jerusalem.
In 1954, the oligarchy ruling in Jordan tired of the clamor and pressure
by the Bacthists and other opposition elements for greater political freedom
and proceeded to clamp down on political activities. On June 28 the cabinet
rejected for a third time (the party had also applied in 1953) the Bacth
Party’s application, made in the name of eleven members, to carry out
political activity on the grounds that the “ aims {of] . . . party were
opposed to the existing system of government, to the existence of Jordan,
and to the principles of the constitution.’’6 It did, however, grant a license
ten days later to the National Socialist Party, which was a purely Jordanian
organization led by Sulayman Nabulsi. In August 1954 the Bacth news­
paper al-Yaqzah was closed again, not to reappear for a year or more.
The Bacthists appealed the turndown of their request for licensing to the
Jordanian courts, and in August 1955 the Jordanian Supreme Court
revoked the Jordanian cabinet’s June 1954 decision, which had refused
permission for a group of eleven people to establish the Arab Socialist
Resurrection Party in Jordan. The court ruled that the first clause in the
proposed party’s constitution, stating that the Arab world was indivisible,
was identical with a similar clause in the Jordanian constitution itself. The
court also ruled that another clause in the party constitution, stressing that
the party would “ struggle” and not depend on “ slow evolution,” did not
indicate that the party intended to use violence against the present regime.7
This decision was very gratifying to the Bacthists and its effect was felt
in the parliamentary elections of the following year, but for the moment the
102 THE BACTH PARTY

activities of the Bacth Party were severely proscribed and its opportunities
for public expression seriously limited. Elections had been held in the fall
of 1954, but were so substantially controlled by the government that no
embarrassing voices, likely to annoy the government or regime, were
allowed to be heard in parliament.8
Deprived of legal and constitutional opportunities for expressing opin­
ion, the Bacthists, along with other opposition elements, such as Nabulsi’s
National Socialists and the Communists, turned to distributing broadsheets
and manifestos and to public demonstrations. All these elements opposed
attempts by Britain and the United States to bring Jordan into the Baghdad
Pact. Their efforts helped to build the public antipathy which resulted in
massive demonstrations against the pact in December 1955 and again early
in 1956. The Bacth organized some of these demonstrations, although it
has claimed that it always tried to keep them from getting out of hand and
from involving violence. Nonetheless, substantial loss of life did result on
a number of occasions.
In 1956 things began to look up for the elements in Jordan opposed to
the old regime. The King abruptly dismissed Sir John Bagot Glubb,
long-time British commander of the Arab Legion, Jordan’s army, in March
1956, thus retrieving much of the popularity he had lost through the
government’s efforts to have Jordan join the Baghdad Pact. He next
indicated that he would relinquish the long-standing British subsidy of the
Jordanian government in favor of contributions from his Arab
neighbors—Syria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. He promoted a young Pales­
tinian officer, cAli Abu Nuwar, to the rank of major general and to the
position of chief of staff of the army. He dissolved the parliament that had
been chosen in the controlled elections of 1954 and called for new elections
in October 1956.
These elections were almost certainly the freest Jordan had yet known.
Candidates were permitted to campaign under party labels. The regime did
not intervene on behalf of its favorites. The Bacth Party attempted to join in
an electoral coalition with Nabulsi’s National Socialist Party and with the
National Front, the latter a Communist-dominated organization. The Bacth
at this period was suspicious of the Communists and while it wanted to
enter into an agreement to share constituencies, in the end it could not bring
itself to do so. The Bacth, on the one hand, and the National Socialists and
the National Front, which did collaborate, on the other, competed rather
than collaborated in many of the contests. Their inability to join forces cost
the Bacth heavily in the elections. Of the forty seats in parliament, the
National Socialists got twelve, the largest single bloc in Parliament, the
National Front got three, and the Bacth two. These three parties joined with
some independents to form a government under Nabulsi’s premiership in
the tension-filled days just prior to the tripartite attack on Egypt.
Growth o f the Party outside Syria 103

The Bacth had put up thirteen candidates for parliament and succeeded
in electing only two, the perennial Rimawi and the poet, Kamal Nasir, both
from Ramallah. cAbdallah Nacwas was one of those defeated, running
from his old constituency in Jerusalem. Naji cAUush, a Palestinian
Bacthist, lists a number of reasons for the party’s poor showing in these
elections. First, the party had a weak organization; many of its members
were new to it and, moreover, were students, with limited ability to
influence public opinion. Second, the party campaign was rather poorly
prepared and organized. Third, the party was overconfident; it relied on
mass forces but did not make sufficient efforts to cooperate with other mass
organizations. Fourth, leading Communists and reactionaries, fearing the
Bacth, joined forces against its candidates. Fifth, reactionaries opposed the
party automatically, as a consequence of its spread to all parts of Jordan.9
The first three reasons noted above were the operative ones, in my
view. As in Syria, so in Jordan the party considered itself a vanguard of the
masses and their natural leader. Its membership, however, was almost
exclusively drawn from students and from those with secondary or univer­
sity educations. Bacthist association with, and understanding of, workers,
shopkeepers, and the like in Jordan was severely limited. The one Bacthist
doctrine with a widespread appeal was that of pan-Arabism; in the tense
weeks between the Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal and the
tripartite invasion of Egypt, its pan-Arabism doubtless helped the party at
the polls. But Nabulsi was also a pan-Arabist. He was believed to favor
Jordan’s close association with Egypt and he and his party were more
widely known in Jordan.
The six months between the convening of the new parliament in the last
week of October 1956 and the flight of Nabulsi, Rimawi, Abu Nuwar, and
several dozen other Jordanians to Syria in April 1957 were the high-water
mark of nationalist politics in Jordan. The Bacth had a part in this time of
success but its role was that of an associate, not of a leader. The party held
one position in the Cabinet; Rimawi was Minister of State for Foreign
Affairs. The Bacth undoubtedly contributed to the pace of nationalist
efforts in Jordan to force major change in a very short time; but it was only
a small supporting element in the coalition which Sulayman Nabulsi led.
And Rimawi was rash; he “ was reported to have boasted of an imminent
‘republican flag on the bonnet’ of his car.” 10
The coalition’s goals for Jordan were very different from the basic ideas
of the young King Husayn. This was shown immediately after the 1956
elections, when a congress of nationalist elements meeting in Nablus
passed (on October 24) a resolution demanding that Jordan break diplo­
matic relations with France for the latter’s kidnapping of Ahmad Ben Bella
and four other Algerian revolutionary leaders. This resolution was pre­
sented to the new chamber of deputies, which passed it.11 The efforts of
104 THE BACTH PARTY

Nabulsi’s coalition to destroy the special British position in Jordan were

greatly helped by the association of France and Britain with Israel in the
attack on Egypt. The lower house of the Jordanian parliament approved a
plan to replace the British subsidy with one from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and
Syria on January 22, 1957, and the upper house followed four days later.
At the same time, the palace was looking to the United States for economic
aid on a large scale, which was not at all what Nabulsi and his associates
had in mind.
The Anglo-Jordanian treaty was officially terminated on March 13.12
Shortly thereafter, the King publicly welcomed the Eisenhower Doctrine
newly proposed by the American president as a means of countering the
extension of Communist and Soviet activity in the area. Both Nabulsi and
Rimawi differed with the King on this issue in public, and Nabulsi said that
Jordan would welcome Soviet aid but reject American aid. Finally on April
10, 1957, the King asked for Nabulsi’s resignation, thus setting in train a
stormy two weeks.
The Bacth Party does not appear to have played a significant role in the
military maneuvering and in the efforts by Major General cAli Abu Nuwar
to take over the government in Amman, which ended with King Husayn’s
dramatic confrontation of wavering troops at Zarka on April 13, 1957. At
Abu Nuwar’s trial some months later, he was quoted by a Jordanian army
officer as having said, “ Yes, I am a Bacthist. I can say so a million
times.” 13 John Bagot Glubb also stated that Abu Nuwar was a Bacth Party
member, and described a military conspiracy to overthrow King Husayn in
which Nabulsi and Abu Nuwar were the chief actors, supported by the
Communists.14 I am inclined to doubt that the Bacth, as a party, sought
Husayn’s overthrow at this time. The party was too weak to accomplish
such a goal. It was, however, associated with the larger nationalist group
and followed its lead. I am also inclined to doubt that Abu Nuwar was a
Bacthist; the statement above seems more like a rhetorical flourish in which
he was claiming identity with the Bacthists because of their nationalist-
reformist and pan-Arab stance. At any rate, the King dismissed Abu Nuwar
and sent him into exile.
On April 15, Husayn was able to effect the formation of a cabinet
headed by Husayn al-Khalidi, with Nabulsi as Foreign Minister. Khalidi’s
government, however, did not get much support from the parties that had
formed the previous government—the Bacth, the National Socialists, and
the National Front, even with Nabulsi in the cabinet. The three groups
convened a congress at Nablus on the West Bank on April 22; the meeting
attracted 250 representatives of political groups and 23 of the 40 deputies in
the lower house of parliament.15 The congress passed resolutions calling
for rejection of the Eisenhower Doctrine, formation of a federal union of
Growth o f the Party outside Syria 105

Jordan, Egypt, and Syria, adoption of a government policy of positive

neutrality, reinstatement of all arrested and exiled officers, the expulsion of
the King’s uncle, Sharif Nasir, and the removal of the King’s Chef de
Cabinet, Bahjat Talhuni, the dissolution of a military investigating com­
mittee, which the congress claimed had been formed to “ try the free
officers” (by which it meant of course Abu Nuwar and his associates), and
the formation of a nationalist government.16
These demands were presented to the Prime Minister on the following
day by a delegation of four representing the National Socialists, the
National Front, the Arab Nationalist Movement, the independents, and the
Bacth, the latter represented by Bahjat Abu Gharbiyah. The cabinet
rejected the demands. Khalidi’s government was not effective, however, in
controlling the situation, and it resigned. Ibrahim Hashim formed a new
government on April 25, and, working closely with the King, it ordered the
dissolution of all political parties, imposed censorship, suspended the
constitution, and began a general crackdown on political activity in the
country. In the next few days several hundred people, identified mostly as
Communists and Bacthists but including nationalists and many on the left
side of the political spectrum, were arrested. cAbdallah Rimawi fled to
Damascus, where he helped contribute to press reports exaggerating the
extent of the arrests.17
There was no real need for exaggeration, for the arrests did extensive
damage to the Bacth organization. Rimawi, Abu Gharbiyah, and others
—probably including a majority of the Jordanian Regional Command
—remained abroad in Syria, and dozens of adherents (the numbers are
obscure) were arrested in Jordan. The men arrested included the future
Regional Secretary, Munif Razzaz, but few of those so far associated in
public with the leadership of the party.18 In the trials which were held
between August 1957 and the early part of 1958, ten or more Bacthists
received sentences ranging from one year to three years on charges of
illegal demonstrations and of spreading subversive rumors. Newspaper
reports of the trials leave the impression that for every Bacthi sentenced, at
least three people identified as Communists were sentenced. Rimawi
himself was sentenced in absentia to fifteen years. Bahjat Abu Gharbiyah
was sentenced to three years. Although I have found no record of it,
Deputy Kamal Nasir probably was sentenced; in any event, he spent most
of the next decade in exile, gradually withdrawing from party activity. In
the late 1960s he emerged as a spokesman for the Palestine Liberation
Organization.
We will return to the Bacth in Jordan later and to the activities of some
Jordanian Bacthists in the national structure of the party, but it will be
to a party functioning clandestinely, periodically repressed, and lacking
106 THE BACTH PARTY

information outlets. It will be a far different party from the Bacth of the first
ten years in Jordan with its virtually constant representation in parliament,
its newspaper, and its functioning as a legitimate political organization.

Iraq

The Bacth Party spread to Iraq somewhat later than it did to Jordan,
beginning in a very small way in 1951. Represented by a handful of
students recruited in Damascus and Beirut, about all it was able to do at
first was to paint Bacthist slogans on walls in the cities from time to time.
The party had grown sufficiently by the fall of 1952 for its participation in
the riots of that period against the government’s policies to draw notice in
one Baghdad paper that the Arab Bacth Party existed in Iraq and had a role
in these demonstrations. The party issued its first handbill over the
signature, Arab University Youth in Iraq, at this time.19
A year later, in October 1953, the first number of the semi-clandestine
newspaper of the Bacth Party in Iraq was issued. For its first two numbers it
was called al-cArabi al-Jadid (The New Arab), but in December 1953 the
name was changed to al-lshtiraki (The Socialist). A small publication
printed on a battered mimeograph machine, al-lshtiraki managed to get out
four issues in the first five months of its life, but its subsequent appearance
was irregular. Nonetheless, the paper was useful as a device to maintain the
spirit of the organization. Around this time the Bacth also was able to
popularize its ideas by publishing a few articles in the Baghdad newspaper,
al-Hurriyah, through the efforts of the editor’s son, then a student attracted
to the party, until the editor was warned by the authorities that such
material should not properly appear in a newspaper licensed by the
government.20
Even in 1954, however, the party was still a fairly small organization. It
put up no candidates in the parliamentary elections of June 1954. There is
some evidence that the leaders of the National Front in Iraq, which was
formed by the Istiqlàl and National Democratic Parties in Iraq in prepara­
tion for these elections, and which had some Communists associated with it
on an individual basis, asked the Bacth to participate. The party decided not
to enter the Front, however, because it was not sufficiently organized.21
Moreover, just at this time the entire Bacth Party was preparing for its
second national congress, held in June 1954, which was of considerable
importance to all Bacthists, including those in Iraq. It is very likely that the
Bacth organization in Iraq did not have sufficient membership to deal with
both items at the same time. At any event, the Bacth contented itself with
Growth o f the Party outside Syria 107

issuing one election manifesto in mid-May 1954, which called upon the
voters to give their support to progressive candidates.
In the succeeding four years the party grew in membership and
supporters. When Adnan Menderes, Prime Minister of Turkey, visited
Baghdad the second week of January 1955, the Bacth organized students’
strikes and passed out handbills against the forthcoming Turkish-Iraqi Pact,
mostly in Baghdad. Bacthists found themselves receiving considerable
attention from the Iraqi security authorities as a result. Many were arrested
and a number were expelled from colleges and schools. In June 1955 the
security police raided two centers of the Bacth Party (which the authorities
referred to as nests), seizing the party’s mimeograph machine and a
quantity of printed leaflets. The newspaper talked of arrests of more than a
hundred people, but only twenty-two were brought to trial.22 Chances are
that a substantially larger number were swept up by the police and then
released for lack of evidence—a common practice of the security police in
that period.
The trials were held in August and September 1955. The most promi­
nent of those arrested was Fu’ad Rikabi, Regional Secretary and member
of the National Command. The Iraqi authorities, however, do not seem to
have known of Rikabi’s role on the National Command. cAbdallah
Rimawi, also a National Command member, and Sulayman al-Hadidi,
members of the bar in Jordan, came to Baghdad hoping to participate in the
defense of their fellow Bacthists, but were not permitted to do so. The
Bacthists were, however, defended by some of the more important lawyers
of the political opposition in Iraq, Fa’iq al-Sammara’i for one. The trials
and the arrests earlier in the year at the time of the demonstrations against
Menderes taught the Bacthists that they needed to spread their efforts more
widely, and they made some efforts to increase the party organization
outside of the capital city of Baghdad.23 But Baghdad remained the
principal focus of party activity, because higher education in Iraq was
concentrated in the capital. The experience of being in jail also tended to
weed out those who were not militants nor dedicated to the ideals of the
party.
The size and capabilities of the party may be gauged by observing that
this arrest, which kept twenty-two party members out of circulation for
several months, practically stopped party activities,24 and caused a com­
plete breakdown in the party propaganda apparatus. The party newspaper
was not published again until mid-summer of 1956, and other public and
propaganda activities were limited. The party did pull itself together
sufficiently to hold its first congress of the Iraqi region in December 1955.
The bulk of those attending were students, intellectuals, professional men,
and lower-level government officials. A few members were workers and
108 THE BACTH PARTY

peasants, but the party simply did not have the capability to create cadres
among the workers and peasants, who had themselves barely begun to
associate with political organizations. For some time only a few would be
able to take on the role of party cadres and professional workers.25
The party’s next prominent appearance came in the summer and fall of
1956. It tried to organize a strike in support of Egypt over the Suez Canal
issue in August but had relatively little success. It participated with other
groups opposed to Nuri al-Sacid’s regime and policies in the extensive riots
and demonstrations that occurred in various cities and towns of Iraq in
November 1956 during the Suez crisis. Nuri’s government took vigorous
measures against demonstrations and riots at this time, and the Bacthists
themselves acknowledged they could scarcely get a hundred feet into the
main street in Baghdad from the side alleys before they were driven back
and dispersed by the police riot squads, which were posted all around the
city.26
The Bacth continued to be harassed by the police and security au­
thorities of Nuri al-Sacid’s regime for the next two years. There were
arrests of Bacthists in July 1957 and again in October, in Basra, for
example.27 On the whole, the Bacth received far gentler treatment than did
the Communists during this period, largely because it advocated
nationalism and was not tied to a non-Arab power, as the Communist Party
was. It continued to organize itself, held a second regional congress toward
the end of 1957, and established itself in the total Bacth Party structure as a
full-fledged region with a regional command and a more or less intact
organizational pyramid below the regional command,28 and at least
skeletal branch organizations in the cities of Basrah, Mosul, and Kirkuk.
Its growth, paradoxically, was aided by a policy of Nuri al-Sacid.
Around the turn of 1954-1955, Nuri had the parliament pass a law
providing for military training during the school vacation period in the
summer for students who, in the regime’s view, had been troublemakers,
had been prominently involved in demonstrations, or displayed political
ideas of which the regime did not approve. Nuri hoped both to punish the
students by putting them through a fairly vigorous training during these
months and to use the influence of the army, which he had helped to create
and which he believed was loyal to crown and regime, to inculcate in the
students appropriate patriotic ideas and sentiments. To some extent at least,
exactly the opposite happened. Fu’ad Rikabi, the Regional Secretary, and
cAli Salih Sacdi, who became important in later years, were among those
packed off to this summer training camp in the north of Iraq. Rikabi and
Sacdi not only converted some of their fellow students among the other
nationalist and opposition elements in the training camp, but also sue-
Growth o f the Party outside Syria 109

ceeded in converting the camp commanding officer, Major Salih Mahdi

cAmmash, and some other Iraqi military officers to the tenets of the
party.29 These men formed the nucleus of the party organization in the
army.
The Bacth had rejected participation in a national front in 1954, and
enthusiasm for the front sagged after the Nuri government dismissed the
parliament elected in May 1954 and held new elections later in the
summer. In these elections, 85 per cent of the seats were uncontested, and
virtually no opposition figures were seated. Later, the various opposition
parties came to be more aware that the government made relatively little
distinction among the Bacthist, Istiqlal, and National Democratic Parties.
Because they were all opposed in one way or another to the regime, and the
regime did its best to control them, it was felt that collaboration would do
no harm. The Bacth urged the formation of a national front in al-lshtiraki in
mid-summer 1956. Around the end of 1956, a national front was formed
after nationalists of all sorts found themselves in vigorous opposition to
Nuri and the palace over Iraq’s failure at least to break relations with the
United Kingdom for its part in the tripartite attack on Egypt. The Bacth
takes almost complete credit for the formation of this front, which is an
exaggeration of its influence. The Bacth Party’s efforts to get the front to
participate in the national elections held in the spring of 1958 failed. These
elections were, in fact, a virtual repetition of those of August 1954; when
voting day came around, 125 of 145 seats were uncontested, and contests
for the others were fought between two supporters of the regime.30
The Bacth did play its part in creating the circumstances that led to the
revolution of July 14, 1958. It was, however, a small organization. It
probably numbered only a few hundred members at the time of the
revolution and was only one element in a population of which, it is fair to
say, 90 to 95 per cent of the politically conscious urban and small-town
elements were opposed to the regime. None of the fourteen principal
military participants in the July revolution—the Central Organization of the
Free Officers—were Bacthists.31 And there were only a few among the
dozens of officers who, one way or another, were behind the Central
Organization. Although many newspaper and magazine articles in 1958
identified cAbd al-Salam cArif as a Bacthist, he was, in fact, never a party
member. He was close to the party because he was a family relative of
Fu’ad Rikabi, and in 1958 he shared both the Bacth’s belief in all-
embracing Arab unity and its immediate goal of bringing Iraq into the
United Arab Republic. When the successful military conspirators formed
the cabinet on July 14, 1958, the Bacth obtained one post, that of the
Minister of Development, for its Regional Secretary, Fu’ad Rikabi. The
110 THE BACTH PARTY

other eight civilian cabinet posts went to people well known for their
opposition to the old regime, most of them far better known than Rikabi or
even than the Bacth itself. But the Iraqi Bacth rose to great prominence in
Qasim’s time, as we shall see in subsequent chapters.

Lebanon

A few individuals who belonged to the Bacth were living in Lebanon at

the time of the first party congress in 1947, but there was no organization
as such. There was a group of Bacthist students at the American University
of Beirut (AUB) later that year, but it was around the turn of the year
1949-1950 before a Lebanese organization was established.32 In a country
where the confessional balance among various religions is of critical
importance and where a majority, or close to a majority, of the population
rejects the notion of Arab unity, a party whose basic plank is Arab unity is
forced to tread carefully. In consequence, the Bacth played a rather quiet
and discreet role in Lebanon for the first ten years or so of its existence.
In Lebanon, as in the other countries, Bacthists were to be found for the
most part among students and recent graduates. These members issued
broadsheets from time to time and participated in the Arab nationalist
affairs of the student community. The earliest Bacth publication in Lebanon
known to me is a one-page handbill signed by the University Students
Section, Beirut, of the party in 1951.33 Beyond these activities, the party
concentrated on recruiting and organizing. In early 1956, its membership
in Beirut was sufficient only to staff a section (shucbah), i.e., less than fifty
members. However, the party in Lebanon was able to hold its first regional
congress in 1956 and elect its first Regional Command.34 Khalid Yashruti,
a Palestinian from Acre and an engineering student at AUB, was among the
command’s members. Two other leaders delicately referred to the
“ isolationism” of a large part of the population from the Arab mainstream
during these years in an interview with the Beirut paper L ’Orient on
November 29, 1958.
But the dramatic events of 1958 had given the Bacth an opportunity to
come to the fore by then. It had put up candidates for a few of the seats in
north Lebanon in the 1957 parliamentary elections, but no Bacthist even
came close to winning. The Bacth Party naturally threw its support on the
side of the group of figures and political parties known as the United
National Front, which was for Arab unity or at least for closer association
with “ progressive” forces. In time this came “ to represent in addition to
political leaders and public figures [organizations such as] . . . Najjadah,
. . . the National Organization [Muslim], . . . Jumblat’s [Progressive
Growth o f the Party outside Syria 111

Socialist Party] PSP, the Bacth . . .” 35 in the events of 1958, which began
with the assassination of Nasib Matni and ended with civil war in Lebanon.
In early May 1958, the party organization in Tripoli issued a manifesto
saying “ the spirit of treason prevails in the current regime . . . which has
made of this country a haven for the conspirators and a center for
intrigues.” 36 In the flood of reporting of the bloody and confused events of
the next three or four months, the Bacth was seldom mentioned promi­
nently by name, but its adherents did participate, particularly in the Tripoli
district and in fighting the Hizb al-Qawmi al-Suri, headquartered in
Lebanon since its elimination from Syrian political life in 1955. By the
time the civil war had died down and a semblance of order had returned to
Lebanon, the party was sufficiently prominent to be accorded its own
separate interview in a review of Lebanese political parties conducted by
L'Orient. The article noted that up to the time of the insurrection the Bacth
had worked only to prepare itself to enter the political scene in Lebanon. Its
leaders recognized the insurrection as an opportune moment for them to
project themselves into the scene, and those leaders who were interviewed,
cAli Jabir and cAbd al-Majid Rafici, said that the party had supporters in
Baalbek and southern Lebanon, as well as in Tripoli, and of course, Beirut.
A final and most important result of the party’s new respectability was
its obtaining a license to print a newspaper in Lebanon. The paper,
al-Sahafah, which began publication on November 11, 1958, served as the
mouthpiece of the party, which then had no official organ anywhere in the
Arab world. The dissolution of the party organization in Syria at the time of
the formation of the UAR eight months earlier had required al-Bacth to
close. Significantly, the Bacth leaders felt it advisable to take cognizance of
the confessional balance in Lebanon. The paper’s control was shared by
Jibran Majdalani, a Greek Orthodox, cAbd al-Wahhab Shumitli, a Sunni,
and the responsible editor was Maurice Saqr, Maronite. Majdalani and
Saqr had but recently joined the Bacth, after leaving Kamal Jumblat’s
Progressive Socialist Party.37

Elsewhere

The foregoing catalogues the expansion of the Bacth Party into the three
regions where it was to have its greatest power or influence. The growth of
the party was not confined to these regions, however, and I should not
close this chapter without mentioning briefly the appearance of the party in
other Arab states. Appearance is not quite the word, because the party’s
activity in many of these states was clandestine owing to the hostility of the
regimes of the states to the idea of pan-Arab unity under a socialist party.
112 THE BACTH PARTY

For the most part, glimmerings and hints, rather than solid information,
are what we have to go on. In Saudi Arabia, for example, a large number of
people were jailed as a consequence of labor troubles at Aramco in 1953.
Among them was cAli Ghannam, who eleven years later was elected a
member of the Bacth National Command.38 Ghannam appears to have been
among the first Bacth adherents in Saudi Arabia and probably was head of
the party apparatus there for many years. In the British crown colony of
Aden, there was for a short time a newspaper, al-BaHh, which was
suspended by the British authorities around the end of 1956.39 And there
have long been good relations between the People’s Socialist Party (PSP)
of Aden and its leaders, e.g., cAbdallah al-Asnaj, and the Bacth Party in
Syria, relations that show up in the favorable treatment accorded the PSP in
its disputes with Cairo in the 1960s. It would be going far beyond any
available evidence to say that the PSP is a Bacthist party, but there is an
affinity between the two.
Libya represents the limits of Bacth expansion along the North African
littoral in the party’s first ten years of official existence. A branch of the
party was set up there in 1954; it attracted students, intellectuals, and trade
unionists.40 Growth was fairly rapid, so much so that the Fourth National
Congress of the party in 1960 could refer to past party developments in
Libya as very heartening.41 But here, as in Jordan in 1957, it was due to
suffer an eclipse shortly.
Bacthist doctrine made little progress in Egypt in the 1950s for a number
of reasons. Relatively few Egyptians went to study in Beirut or Damascus,
so there were not many prospective messengers to bring back the doctrine.
Egypt was caught up in its own revolution from 1952 on, and there was
plenty to occupy the politically interested at home. Moreover, Egyptian
interest in pan-Arabism flowered late; it followed Nasir’s domestic suc­
cess. He brought Egyptian opinion along with him in the 1950s. And Bacth
activity was just as illegal as that of any other party after the Egyptian
revolution.

Notes
1. Naji cAllush, al-Thawrah wa al-Jamahir (The Revolution and the Masses)
(Beirut: Dar al-Talicah, 1962), p. 48.
2. Aqil Abidi, Jordan, A Political Study, 1948-1957 (New York: Asia Publish­
ing house, 1965), p. 209.
Growth o f the Party outside Syria 113

3. Munib al-Madi and Sulayman al-Musa, Ta’rikh al-Urdunn fi al-Qarn

al-cIshrin (The History o f Jordan in the Twentieth Century) (Beirut: Maktabah Ras
Beirut, 1959), p. 599, gives the date as February 5; Mid-East Mirror, Jan. 12,
1952, p. 20, reports that the request came immediately after the new constitution
came into effect. Hereafter cited as MEM.
4. Abidi, Jordan, p. 108.
5. Al-Bacth, April 7, 1964.
6. Madi and Musa, loc. cit.
7. Abidi, Jordan, p. 206, note 29.
8. Ibid., p. 118.
9. cAllush, al-Thawrah, pp. 104-5.
10. Abidi, Jordan, p. 166. The author says in a footnote that Rimawi’s conduct
contravened Bacth Party instructions from Syria.
11. Ibid., pp. 144-45.
12. Middle East Journal “ Chronology,” Vol. 11, No. 2, Spring 1957, p. 182;
hereafter cited as MEJ.
13. MEM, Aug. 11, 1957, p. 15. The witness, Captain Salamah Mihawish,
said that Abu Nuwar went on, “ I shall not be like Nuri Said, a stooge of
imperialism.” Captain Mihawish added, “ I and many of my fellow officers
inferred from this lecture that Ali Abu Nuwar had become disobedient to the king.”
14. John B. Glubb, A Soldier with the Arabs (London: Hodder and Stoughton,
1957), pp. 431-34. His description of the April 1957 events was written on June 1,
1957. Glubb was not in Jordan at the time and does not cite sources for the story.
15. Abidi, Jordan, p. 161. The Ba'thists held two of seventeen seats on the
congress’s executive committee; their representatives were Sulayman al-Hadidi and
Bahjat Abu Gharbiyah.
16. MEM, April 28, 1957, pp. 3-4.
17. Cairo’s Middle East News Agency claimed 964 had been arrested by April
28. Ibid., p. 8.
18. Ibid.
19. Nidal al-Bacth (Beirut: Dar al-Talicah, 1963), V, pp. 7-8; hereafter cited as
Nidal.
20. Ibid., p. 11. Sacd Qasim Hammudi later became a prominent party
member. He was tried for complicity in the 1959 assassination attempt on Prime
Minister Qasim, ran the trade-union newspaper during the brief Bacth rule in 1963,
and was appointed editor of the daily al-Jumhuriyah after the Bacth took power in
Baghdad in 1968.
21. Nidal V, p. 118, editor’s note.
22. Iraq Times, Aug. 12, 1955.
23. Al-Bacth, April 7, 1964.
24. Nidal V, p. 98.
25. Ibid., pp. 13 and 237. Only two regional congresses were held prior to the
July 1958 revolution, but four regional councils were convened, the last two in June
1956 and November 1957. These were meetings of party leaders, but they were not
preceded by elections, and attendees could be selected by the command.
26. Nidal V, p. 17 quoting a report from the Iraqi Region to the National
Command.
27. MEM, July 28, 1957, p. 27 and Oct. 13, 1957, p. 20. See also Iraq Times,
Oct. 12, 1957.
114 THE BACTH PARTY

28. Al-Bacth, April 7, 1964.

29. Conversation with a Bacthist studying in the United States, Oct. 1965.
30. George Grassmuck, “ The Electoral Process in Iraq, 1952-1958,” MEJ,
Vol. 14, No. 4 (1960), pp. 397-415.
31. Majid Khadduri, Republican Iraq (London: Oxford University Press,
1969), pp. 17 and 30-32. Khadduri mentions Salih Mahdi cAmmash (p. 30) and
later Ahmad Hasan Bakr (p. 95 note) as Bacthists; but of the two hundred-plus Free
Officers, no more than a handful were party members.
32. Nidal IV, pp. 11-12.
33. An undated copy of this handbill, criticizing the performance of the Arab
League on its sixth anniversary, i.e., 1951, is in the Hoover Institution Library.
34. Michael Suleiman, Political Parties in Lebanon (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
University Press, 1967), p. 124.
35. Fahim Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon (Washington, D.C.: Middle East Insti­
tute, 1961), p. 50.
36. Quoted in The Arab World (Beirut), May 9, 1958, p. 3.
37. Their reasons, including Jumblaf s lack of assistance to cAflaq, Bitar, and
Hawrani during their exile in 1953 and Jumblat’s tendency toward Druze sec­
tarianism, are detailed in Limadha Tarakna al-Hizb al-Taqqadumi al-Ishtiraki
(Why We Left the Progressive Socialist Party), written by Majdalani, Saqr, and
Clovis Maqsud, and published in Beirut, 1956. Maqsud did not join the Bacth.
38. Al-Nahar (Beirut), Feb. 26, 1964, quoted in Arab World of that date.
39. Gebran (Jibran) Majdalany, “ The Arab Socialist Movement,” in W. Z.
Laqueur (ed.). The Middle East in Transition (New York: Praeger, 1958), pp.
337-50, especially p. 348.
40. MEM, Feb. 26, 1966, p. 7.
41. Nidal IV, pp. 194-95.
 - 8 -

The High Tide of Arab Unity

The year 1958—and particularly the period from March to September

—was a high point in post-war Arab politics. For a few heady months, it
looked to Arabs and foreigners alike as if the long talked-of Arab unity
movement was at last coming to fruition. Nasir was the hero of the hour.
He had won victories in overturning the Egyptian monarchy, ousting the
British from Suez, and resisting the tripartite attack in 1956. He had
imparted a sense of dignity not only to Egyptians but also to all Arabs by
these actions. The Syrians had come to him begging for unity and had
accepted his terms for establishment of that unity. He appeared to be
winning the contest between “ progressive” Arab forces and those regimes
associated with Western powers. In short, he was at the height of his power
and influence at the time of the formation of the United Arab Republic.
The Bacth Party in Syria rode the crest of the wave with Nasir. They
believed that their efforts in educating Arab public opinion were the
fundamental reasons for the establishment of the UAR. Moreover, in
common with many other Arabs, they had come to have great trust and
faith in Nasir’s ability to provide the dynamic leadership that they felt the
Arab world needed. The Bacthist leaders and the party organization pitched
in with a will to get the United Arab Republic started. The party agreed
during the negotiations in January to freeze political party activities in
Syria and to form a United Syrian Front.1 A few days later Akram Hawrani
said that he would not hesitate to agree to the Bacth ceasing its political
activity in favor of the Egyptian National Union, which would be extended
to Syria, because such an action would help to achieve the unified Arab
state.2 The Bacthist leaders, of course, believed that they would have a
major role in at least the Syrian portion of the National Union, a role which
would permit them to have a substantial influence on the policy formula­
tions of the UAR. Michel cAflaq was quoted in the Beirut paper L ’Orient
of February 25, 1958 as saying, “ We will be officially dissolved but we
will be present in the new unified party, the National Union. Bom of the
union of the two countries, this movement cannot be animated by princi­
ples other than those of the Bacth.”
116 THE BACTH PARTY

The Bacth leaders proclaimed the dissolution of the party in Syria on the
day following the announcement that Syrians had voted virtually one
hundred per cent to accept the UAR and to have Nasir as its president. The
Syrian Communist Party leader, Khalid Bakdash, left the countiy shortly
after the union was announced, and his party went into opposition, refusing
to dissolve. The leaders of the remaining political parties dissolved their
parties reluctantly. The comment of the liberal Syrian statesman, Faris
al-Khuri, that he recognized that the union was a mistake but did not feel
able to stand up against the tide of popular opinion favoring it, was typical
of the attitudes of Syria’s traditional political leaders.3
On March 6, nearly two weeks after the plebiscite by which the Syrians
accepted the union, the new cabinet for the United Arab Republic was
announced. It included four Bacthists: Akram Hawrani as one of four
vice-presidents, Salah Bitar as Minister of State, Khalil Kallas, Minister of
Economy and Commerce for the Syrian Region, and Mustafa Hamdun as
Minister of Social Affairs for the Syrian Region. Both Kallas and Hamdun
belonged to Hawrani’s faction of the party. This ratio indicated Hawrani’s
personal strength and, what was more important, Nasir’s appreciation of
that strength.4
The first few months of the new union were taken up with sorting out
the responsibilities of the various members in the government and getting it
functioning. It was the end of March, for example, before President Nasir
publicly announced what the duties and responsibilities of the four vice-
presidents were to be. Hawrani drew the tasks of preparing and coordi­
nating general administrative policies and supervising the implementation
of these policies. As late as April 4, Bitar was quoted in al-Siyasah of
Beirut to the effect that his duties “ would consist of the political aspects of
the UAR, internal and external as well, but the discussions are not over
yet.” 5 The provisional constitution of the UAR gave virtually dictatorial
powers to President Nasir. Moreover, both the manner of establishment of
the UAR and the detailed control exercised from Cairo pointed up the
authoritarian nature of the governmental structure. The Syrians were
overwhelmed and dominated by the Egyptians from the very beginning.
Even the executive council of the Syrian Region met in Cairo under Nasir’s
chairmanship.6
There were considerable possibilities for disagreement or friction in the
situation, and in due course frictions arose. But, as we have seen, the
harmony between Nasir’s views and those of the Bacth leaders on interna­
tional and pan-Arab affairs had been the real key to the Bacthists’ swing to
the Egyptian as implementer of the union. A number of developments and
trends in these affairs during 1958 served to keep relations between Nasir
and Bacth leaders in fairly good array and to push into the background the
The High Tide o f Arab Unity- Ill

developing concerns of these leaders about the way “ the ra’is” was
conducting the affairs of the United Arab Republic.
A most important factor in this first year of the UAR was the tremen­
dous enthusiasm the negotiations for unity and its subsequent announce­
ment had generated in the Arab world. Spontaneous and widespread
demonstrations of support had taken place in virtually all of Syria and,
indeed, in many Arab cities and towns outside Syria and the UAR. (In
sharp contrast, the formation of the United Arab States, the hastily
arranged federal union between Iraq and Jordan, which also took place in
February, was greeted by the populace in Baghdad, at any rate, with
virtually total apathy.)
In their enthusiasm, many Arabs came to believe that the long-sought
Arab unity was now within reach. This atmosphere contributed substan­
tially to the suppression of any hesitancies the Bacth leaders may have
entertained about dissolving their organization, turning over virtually
complete power to President Nasir, and trusting in his good will and good
judgment. For a while it seemed as if the new UAR was truly to be the first
step in a greater Arab union. A vigorous propaganda war broke out
between the United Arab Republic and the federal union of Iraq and
Jordan. The old regimes appeared to be on the defensive. Syrian security
chief cAbd al-Hamid Sarraj’s charge on March 5 that King Sacud had tried
to foment a plot to assassinate Nasir and so to thwart the Egyptian-Syrian
union was seen by many as proof of the conservatives’ defensiveness.
Sarraj claimed that the Sacudi King was prepared to pay nearly a million
dollars for this service and flourished a signed check to prove it.7
More serious developments followed. On May 8, 1958, newspaper
editor Nasib Matni was assassinated in Beirut. His murder provided the
spark which plunged Lebanon into four months of bitter civil war. These
months of trouble had their effect on the Bacth position in Lebanon and also
on the party in the UAR. Briefly, Lebanon became a battleground between
elements allied with President Camille Shamcun and a group of political
forces, largely Muslim, which came to be known as the opposition. The
dispute between “ loyalists” and “ opposition” began when the Cabinet of
Sami al-Sulh accepted the Eisenhower Doctrine on March 16, 1957. Many
in Lebanon opposed the cabinet’s move, but it was approved by Parlia­
ment. A half-dozen deputies abstained from voting. These deputies formed
the nucleus of a United National Front, formed in late April 1957, which
adopted a six-point program as a platform to contest the parliamentary
elections of that year. Prominent among the Front’s demands were that the
Lebanese constitution not be amended to enable President Shamcun to
stand for re-election, that Lebanon remain neutral and not agree to join
foreign military pacts, and that it pursue a policy of close, but impartial,
118 THE BACTH PARTY

cooperation with other Arab states. This last point was directed at
Shamcun’s and Sulh’s policy of close ties with Iraq and Jordan; King
Husayn had crushed the nationalists and restored supreme royal authority
in Jordan in April 1957. The Lebanese election campaign of 1957 was
attended by considerable violence, and its conduct was far from impartial.
Thus Fahim Qubain says, “ Cumulative evidence indicates that the
elections—by and large—were fraudulent.” 8 The government won an
absolute majority and the opposition got only eight seats; some traditional
winners were defeated. Certainly the opposition believed the elections
were rigged.
Through the summer and fall, tension continued. “ Bombings, clan
feuds, sabotage, gun-running and clashes between armed bands and the
gendarmes in mountain areas began to occur, and then [to] increase in their
frequency and in their damage to life and property. This state of affairs
went on until the crisis began in earnest in May 1958.” 9 Relations between
the Lebanese and Syrian governments deteriorated, a condition which was
not improved by the announcement of the formation of the UAR and the
great welcome given to Nasir by many Lebanese who traveled to Damascus
to visit him. Shamcun’s desire for re-election contributed to upsetting the
delicate balance of Lebanon’s confessional political system, for the opposi­
tion was determined that he not be re-elected. Other causes may be briefly
summarized as Muslim dissatisfaction with Christian predominance in the
society, widespread corruption, personal disputes, and the polarization of
Arab politics between traditional and revolutionary states. As Qubain puts
it, “ Fear—real or imaginary—of the unity movement under the leadership
of President Nasir by a segment of the Lebanese population [the Christians]
and support for it by another segment [the Muslims] were important factors
in bringing about the 1958 crisis.” 10
The United Arab Republic put its entire governmental apparatus at the
service of the opposition in the civil war that racked Lebanon in the spring
and summer of 1958. This support was of vastly more significance to the
opposition forces than the contribution of the small Bacth organization
within Lebanon. Press and radio in Cairo and Damascus provided political
and propaganda support, making virtually identical points in similar ways
during the period from May to early August when the crisis was at its
height.11 In addition, arms and volunteers in substantial numbers moved
via back roads and trails from Syria into Lebanon. This activity in support
of the opposition, although directed and approved ultimately from Cairo,
had the wholehearted support of the Bacthists in Syria.
The Lebanese troubles were in full swing when a military coup toppled
the Iraqi monarchy. Early on the morning of July 14, the Nineteenth
Infantry Brigade of the Iraq Army—en route to Jordan to replace a similar
The High Tide o f Arab Unity 119

unit stationed there for some months—diverged from its route, seized the
radio station and other crucial points in Baghdad, attacked the palace, and
after a short but brisk fight with the palace guard, killed King Fay sal and
Crown Prince cAbd al-Ilah. Apart from the fight at the royal palace, there
were only a few half-hearted attempts at resistance. Nuri al-Sacid hid, but
was discovered and killed by a mob. In the space of a few hours Iraq
became a republic and was enthusiastically acclaimed as such by the
populace. The insurrectionist forces were led by a “ Free Officers” group,
which had sought an opportunity to strike at the monarchy and Nuri
al-Sacid for more than a year. By mid-day on July 14, they had a new
government, headed by Brigadier cAbd al-Karim Qasim.12 To many an
Arab nationalist the fall of Nuri and of the Hashemites in Iraq appeared as a
sure sign that the forces of progress and Arab unity were on the march.
The Iraqi Revolution grew out of a profound malaise on the part of
younger, politically conscious elements at the way the country had been
run for years. They objected to the continued concentration of decision­
making within a self-perpetuating group, which had an attitude and
approach they felt to be out of date and which associated Iraq with the
colonialist West. The younger generation objected to the government’s
decision to join the Baghdad Pact. They objected to Iraq’s failure to take a
sufficiently “ Arab” stand during the tripartite Suez attack in 1956. They
objected to the regime’s very close ties to Britain and to the United States.
Although the Free Officers had been organized for some time, the repeti­
tion in May 1958 of rigged elections, such as had been held in late summer
of 1954, when Nuri al-Sacid installed a completely hand-picked parlia­
ment, was the last straw. In the elections of May 1958, four-fifths of the
candidates were returned unopposed.13 Potential opponents had taken
stock of the situation as election day neared, decided that the regime had
already selected the winning candidates, and withdrew. Nuri’s tactics
appear to have extinguished any dim hopes Iraqis had held for meaningful
opposition through legal means.
Political elements in Iraq provided much of the impetus for the
revolution. But political methods, even through resort to the street, had had
little success in Iraq since the riots of 1952 toppled the government of
Arshad al-cUmari. The July 14th revolution was carried out solely by the
group of “ Free Officers” who shared the widespread sentiments of
antipathy to Nuri and the palace. The political elements knew something
was in the wind and probably were canvassed for support “ if and when”
the military move succeeded. Bacth Regional Secretary Fu’ad Rikabi was
probably informed by cAbd al-Salam cArif that a coup was imminent.14
The cabinet appointed on July 14 included many persons long known for
opposition to the regime; the only Bacthist in it was Rikabi who was named
120 THE BACTH PARTY

Minister of Development. Of the dozen or so Free Officers prominent in

planning the revolution, Tahir Yahya al-Tikriti became a Bacthist, but not
until 1963. Ahmad Hasan Bakr, then a colonel, and Salih Mahdi cAmmash
were among the 150 officers said to have knowingly associated themselves
with the conspiracy.15 There may have been a few other Bacthists among
the Free Officers.
The July 14th revolution was, of course, welcomed by the Bacth Party
in Iraq, which was quick to come to the support of the new regime. Its
members and supporters took to the streets along with others in celebration.
In an internal party circular issued at the end of August, the party, in giving
political guidance to its members, described itself as “ standing in the front
rank of those defending the revolution.” The document stated that as a
consequence it gave full support to the government.16 The Arab unity
espoused by cAjif and by the Bacth Party, plus the personal association of
cArif and Rikabi, brought the party close to the regime in the early months.
cAflaq visited Iraq in late July to add his voice to those advocating union of
Iraq with the UAR. Around the end of the month, the Bacth took over
publication of al-Jumhuriyah under the editorship of party member Sacdun
Hamadi.17
In the UAR news of the revolution was received with great joy,
tempered with concern over the American landings in Lebanon on July 15
and the movement of British troops to Jordan, which followed shortly.
Nasir, in his annual July speech commemorating the 1952 revolution in
Egypt, predicted the triumph of Arab nationalism in Jordan, Lebanon, and
Algeria as a natural consequence of the establishment of the UAR and of
the revolution in Iraq.18 cArif made a number of speeches in Iraq and,
during a visit there, in Syria the week after the coup, which indicated
clearly that, as far as he was concerned, Iraq should join the UAR
immediately. Jabir cUmar, appointed Minister of Education on July 14
after two years as a political refugee in Syria, was quoted on July 16 as
saying, “ Iraq will now march with the UAR toward . . . the realization of
complete Arab unity.” 19
cArif was cheered in Syria, he was cheered in Baghdad, and he was
cheered in other Iraqi cities—but he did not represent a consensus within
the Free Officers and, above all, he did not speak for cAbd al-Karim
Qasim. The virtually unknown Qasini demonstrated his talents as a skillful
political manipulator, as well as a successful plotter, from the very
beginning. He was not about to surrender to Cairo’s domination as
willingly as Syria had; an astute observer, he could see Egyptian control
growing in the northern province of the UAR. Qasim had the backing of
substantial elements within the Free Officers and in the body politic of
Iraq, in which he had the support of the National Democratic Party. Its
The High Tide o f Arab Unity 121

head, Kamal Chadirchi, for example, said in early September that Iraq
could not live in isolation, but that every Arab country had to face its own
problems independently.20 This statement echoed a Qasim speech of
August 29, in which the Prime Minister said that any union with the UAR
would be slow in coming. The Communists were adamantly opposed to
union, and a substantial number of them were released from jail and in­
cluded in a general pardon for all political crimes granted on September 4.
Qasim’s determination to show that he was in charge of Iraq became
apparent less than two months after the overthrow of the monarchy. cArif,
who appears to have sensed that his political status was slipping, in a
speech on September 10 called for setting up the Revolutionary Council
that the Free Officers had planned before the revolution.21 A day later,
Qasim relieved Colonel cArif of the position of Deputy Commander in
Chief of the armed forces. Two weeks later, on September 30, cArif was
out of the cabinet. Along with him, Fu’ad Rikabi lost his post as Minister
of Development and Jabir cUmar lost his as Minister of Education. Their
jobs were covered by Muhammad Hadid of the NDP and Hudayb Hajj
Hammud, respectively. Rikabi was retained in the cabinet with the title of
Minister of State but, in fact, had little to do with the government
thereafter. He resigned a bit later, but his resignation was not formally
acted on until after the turn of the year, when Qasim revamped his cabinet
and got rid of a half a dozen persons whose policies were too pan-Arab or
who had shown themselves lacking in cooperation with the “ Sole
Leader.’’ While Rikabi had not been notably effective as Minister of
Development, his downgrading derived from his politics rather than his
inefficiency.
The events of September 30 ushered in six months of confrontation
between Qasim and his allies—a grouping which had as its common
denominator the feeling that Iraq’s principal concerns should be Iraqi rather
than pan-Arab—and an opposition comprised of a mixed bag of pan-
Arabists, officers who resented Qasim’s shoving the Free Officer group
aside, and other disgruntled elements. For the most part, those in opposi­
tion to Qasim saw Nasir’s leadership and Iraq’s association with the UAR
as the means of political salvation for the country. Although cArif was its
most noticeable figure, he had along with him the Bacth Party, some
independent nationalists such as Siddiq Shanshal and Fa’iq Sammara’i, and
the long-time political exile Rashid cAli Gaylani, who had lived abroad
since failing in his 1941 attempt to curtail British power in Iraq as well as
that of the Iraqi monarchy.
cArif was dispatched as Iraqi ambassador to Bonn on October 12 and
was seen off at the airport by Premier Qasim. He never took up the post,
but returned to Baghdad on his own initiative on November 4, shortly to be
122 THE BACTH PARTY

thrown in jail after allegedly threatening Qasim with a pistol in the latter’s
office. He was formally charged with “ plotting against the country’s
interest. ” The regime was worried about cA rif s potential strength and took
measures to counter it, including the critical one of granting a major
increase in military pay on the day that cA rif s arrest was announced. On
the following day a number of Bacthists were reportedly rounded up, and
on November 7 the unofficial party newspaper al-Jumhuriyah was closed
and five members of its staff arrested.
The Qasim regime looked on the Bacth as cA rif s natural ally. Indeed,
the close personal association and espousal of Arab unity shared by Rikabi
and cArif led commentators at the time to refer to Arif as a Bacth leader.22
In fact, cArif was not then, or at any time in the future, a member of the
Bacth Party, although it is possible that at a later date he had the status of
candidate. cAli Salih Sacdi’s faction later criticized Michel cAflaq on the
grounds that “ he [cAflaq] asked membership in the Party for cAbd
al-Salam cArif” during the struggle in Iraq in 1963.23
Qasim’s assertion of a radical yet independent posture offended the
Bacthists in Iraq and Syria; it also offended Nasir, for the same reasons and
for differing reasons. Both the Bacth and Nasir were working for Arab
solidarity and unity, while in Iraq persons politically allied to them were
being oppressed, threatened with detention, and ultimately jailed. Unity
was not following the course that pan-Arabists had expected. Nor was the
Baghdad government treating Nasir as the paramount figure in the Arab
world, a status he had come to enjoy in recent years, particularly since the
formation of the UAR. It seems fair to say that he had come to expect a
certain deference due him as the head of the largest Arab state and as a
generally acknowledged spokesman for the third world. Moreover, Qasim
was giving extensive freedom to the Communists in Iraq as part of his
policy of balancing off domestic forces, a policy that Nasir disliked. The
Communist Party had been heavily repressed under the monarchy, but it
had continued to organize and to function clandestinely in and out of jail.24
When the Communists were released from jail, they moved into the newly
established popular resistance forces in substantial numbers and exploited
the fact that, unlike the Bacth, they had substantial numbers of members or
adherents in the working classes. According to Bacthist Naji cAllush, the
Iraqi Communist Party, in leadership and organization, was stronger than
other parties. In particular, the Bacth was relatively deficient in leadership
and the capacity to propagandize.25
The Bacth in Iraq soon came to recognize that the Communists were not
only enemies but were very dangerous enemies. The Bacth Party in Iraq
had called for “ full cooperation with all patriotic movements to support the
revolution and to achieve its goals” at the end of August.26 In an internal
The High Tide o f Arab Unity 123

party circular issued on November 5, the day following 'A rif’s arrest, it
changed this attitude, declaring, “ Upholding the revolution and its princi­
ples can be achieved only by the Communists dropping their program to
dominate the government.” 27 The first days of November marked the
beginning of a contest for power which destroyed the National Front put
together by the NDP, the Istiqlal, the Ba'th, and the Communists in the
aftermath of the 1956 Suez crisis. Opposition to Nuri al-Sacid had held the
Front together prior to July 14, despite substantial differences among the
four elements.
Some semblance of the front lasted until the end of November, when a
National Front political rally in Baghdad with five thousand participants
raised three slogans: (1) seek the best means of creating ties to the UAR on
a democratic basis, (2) demand assurances that Iraq will follow an Arab
policy based on freedom and positive neutrality, and (3) create a planned
economy stressing industrialization and raised living standards.28 This
rally appears not to have included the Ba'th, which would not have
approved the phrase “ unity with the UAR on a democratic basis” —a
Communist slogan similar to the one used by the Communists in Syria a
year before as an indirect way of opposing unity with non-democratic
Egypt. The month of December, at any rate, saw a definite break in the old
National Front. The Ba'th, Siddiq Shanshal’s Istiqlal, and a number of
independent politicians formed a new bloc.29 The National Democratic
Party remained associated with the Communists in supporting Qasim and
his regime, and early in 1959 the two parties formed a new united front.
By December, a major war of words had broken out between the Ba'th
and the Communists, not only in Iraq, but also in the UAR and in Lebanon.
The new Ba'th daily newspaper in Beirut, al-Sahafah, had been in
operation for only two weeks when it accused the Communists of “ unwit­
tingly serving the cause of Israel and imperialism” and of constituting “ a
major obstacle to Arab unity while . . . claiming that they acknowledge
it.” 30 On their part, the Communists accused the Ba'th of supporting cAbd
al-Salam 'A rifs efforts to subvert the Iraqi regime. On December 9,
al-Sahafah lashed out at the Communists for trying to falsify student
elections in Iraq. According to al-Sahafah, the “ unionists” did well in the
secondary school elections but felt forced to boycott those at the university
level because the Communists had the upper hand, a fact the Ba'th paper
attributed in part to Communist control of, or better access to, the news
media, particularly television and the press.
While the first rounds in the newspaper war were going on, the
Baghdad government announced that it had discovered and foiled a serious
plot against the regime. It alleged that the conspiracy was “ the work of
some corrupt elements with the help of the foreigners outside Iraq.” 31 A
124 THE BACTH PARTY

few days later the word leaked out that one of those arrested in this alleged
plot was Rashid cAli Gaylani, and that most of those arrested were, in fact,
unionists or other pro-UAR elements. Al-Sahafah on December 12 pub­
lished a long article naming many of those arrested and stressing that there
was no question of foreign intrigue in the movement, because they were all
“ unionists.” Among those it named were Tahir Yahya (al-Tikriti), Direc­
tor of Police and Public Security, Captain (Salih) Madhi cAmmash, and Lt.
Col. Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, the latter two prominent Bacthists in the army,
and all three destined to play major roles in the Bacth movement in Iraq.32
The paper also named a number of other patriotic and nationalist lawyers
and public men.
Rashid cAli’s efforts had been monitored by Qasim’s men, and the
plotters were arrested on December 7. The principal plotters were tried and
convicted on December 10, although Rashid cAli himself did not receive
the death penalty until ten days later.33 cArif was brought before the
People’s Court in Baghdad in a secret trial beginning on December 27. The
court tried to convict cArif of associating with a forbidden group, namely
the Bacth, of trying to bring Iraq into the UAR, and of threatening Qasim’s
life.
Even in the controlled atmosphere of Col. Fadhil Mihdawi’s court,
witnesses could not demonstrate with any conviction that cArif was
associated with the Bacth, other than on the basis of his friendship and
personal relationship with Rikabi, or for that matter, that he had even
actually threatened Qasim’s life. The key witness in regard to the incident
of cArif drawing a pistol in Qasim’s office, Fu’ad cArif (no relative), was
conveniently looking out a window when it happened. cAbd al-Salam cArif
said at the trial that Qasim had told him he only had to stay abroad three
weeks and then he could return. Because the various witnesses could not
agree as to whethercArif actually tried to bring Iraq into the UAR by illegal
means, he was acquitted on this point, but he was found guilty of attempted
assassination and sentenced to death. His sentence and Rashid cAli
Gaylani’s were announced at the end of January 1959.34
For a few weeks the Bacth paper in Beirut carried the burden of the
verbal war with the Communists, while the official UAR press and UAR
public figures said nothing. Up to the end of December, al-Sahafah was
careful to distinguish between “ Mobsters,” as it called the Communists,
and the USSR, which “ has been a great friend of the Arabs for the past
three years in the Arabs’ fight against imperialism and economic
backwardness.” 35 In the same issue, al-Sahafah printed a long article by
Yasin al-Hafiz (a former Communist Party chief in Dayr al-Zur, Syria),
which extolled Marxism as a doctrine but condemned the deportment of
Communiists in Iraq in their fight against Arab union. This signed article
The High Tide o f Arab Unity 125

said something the al-Sahafah editorial had refrained from asking when it
wondered “ whether the Soviet Union supports our [the Arabs’] liberation
while divided but not while united.” 36
On the same day, however, at a speech in Port Said, Nasir accused the
Syrian Communists of trying to break up the UAR and of being hostile to
Arab nationalism. Nasir’s speech signaled the start of a broad, long-term
repression of Communists in both wings of the UAR, a repression in which
the Bacthists in Syria joined with enthusiasm. The next day Jamal Atasi,
Bacth leader in Syria, warned in an article in al-Sahafah that “ regional
communism . . . has begun the battle, secretly here in Syria, openly and in
an insolent fashion in Iraq. It is now up to communism to suffer the
consequences.” 37 Around the end of December the press reported that
every Communist in Syria was either jailed or being hunted by Interior
Minister Sarraj’s forces, who quickly followed Nasir’s cue.
Throughout January and February of 1959, while the press in the UAR
and the Bacth and Communist papers in Beirut fought their war of words,
the struggle for supremacy was also battled out in the cities and towns of
Iraq between the “ unionists” and the “ separatists,” “ mobsters,” and
“ shucubiyun” —the Bacth’s pet terms for their opponents. Street fights,
demonstrations, and occasional killings marked the contest. The Com­
munists clearly showed greater organizational ability and capacity to turn
tough militant elements into the street. The Communists’ adeptness at
infiltrating the popular resistance forces served them in good stead. They
steadily improved their position, while the Bacthists’ lack of past contact
with the masses worked to their discomfiture. In an effort to damage Qasim
politically, al-Sahafah accused him in mid-January of collaborating with
the British.38 On January 17, Cairo’s Akhbar al-Yawm charged that both
the Communists and the British ambassador had delivered identical warn­
ings of a Gaylani coup plot in December to cAbd al-Karim Qasim.39
Both the Bacthists and the UAR official and semiofficial press con­
tinued to make some distinction between Arab Communist parties and the
Arabs’ good friend, the USSR. Indeed, al-Sahafah expressed irritation at
Western gloating over the false belief that there was an estrangement
between the UAR and the Soviet Union, saying, “ These conclusions [are]
of the wishful thinking brand,” as a careful reading of Khrushchev’s
speech at the Twenty-First Congress of the CPSU and of the reply in
al-Ahram would show. It added that friendship and cooperation did not
imply agreement on every point.40
But al-Sahafah did note several days later that Nurredin Muhiedinov, in
speaking at the same conference, had gone beyond Khrushchev’s position.
“ When Muhiedinov charges that the Arab movement is in the service of
imperialism, his words mean the Soviet Union has departed from the real
126 THE BACTH PARTY

meaning of cooperation and friendship and has entered as a party in an

internal dispute.” 41 Radio Moscow repaid this in kind by saying on
February 24, “ the Arab Socialist Resurrection Party is deeply engaged in
collaborating with imperialism. Leaders of this party are leading a cam­
paign against the young republic of Iraq, proving thereby their perfidy and
the falsity of their attachment to the cause of Arab unity.” 42
Around the beginning of 1959, probably as a reaction to the sentencing
of cArif and Gaylani, the UAR leaders concluded that stronger methods
were needed to get rid of Qasim, who was becoming too much of a
nuisance. They could see that the struggle in the Iraqi streets was clearly
going in favor of the Communists and other anti-unionist forces. Contacts
were established between UAR leaders in Syria and a group of officers,
mostly assigned to units in northern Iraq, and arms and ammunition were
smuggled into Iraq for the use of civilians and for army units kept short of
ammunition.43 A group of the Free Officers, including two members of the
prerevolution Central Organization, felt that Qasim was going too far and
was distorting the purposes of the Iraqi revolution; they did not like
communism and wanted closer association with the UAR.
The Communists planned to hold a big rally in March in Mosul, a city
in which they had not been doing well, and brought in demonstrators from
all over the country. Local unionist youth rejected the warnings of military
commanders in the area, who realized that the Communists were using, or
could use, the rally to identify and destroy their enemies. If such was the
Communist plan, it worked. After three days of trouble focusing around
the demonstrations in Mosul, the local commander, Colonel cAbd al-
Wahhab Shawwaf felt forced to move; on March 8, he proclaimed a
rebellion, but the rest of his group in the army could not move. Elements of
his own Fifth Division turned against him and no other units followed him.
Qasim probably knew in advance that something was stirring.
The revolt was over in short order. Troops loyal to Qasim prevented use
of the local radio station. Shawwaf was killed when aircraft bombed his
headquarters. In the repression of pro-rebel elements that followed, many
lives were lost as Communist-led mobs swung through Mosul, and tribes­
men from the surrounding area took advantage of the breakdown in
authority to loot and destroy. Reports of the numbers killed in the
Communist massacres afterwards vary. The Bacth writer, Jibran Majda-
lani, says five thousand;44 contemporary accounts reported two thousand
deaths. The repression was bloody. The Bacth was not deeply involved in
the anti-Qasim coup; its senior officers had already been jailed over the
Gaylani and cArif episodes. It did, nonetheless, lose a number of militants
in the repression. The fight between the Bacth and Nasir on the one hand,
and Qasim and his Communist supporters on the other, was far from over.
The High Tide o f Arab Unity 127

It continued for many months and assumed other forms. For two months in
the spring of 1959, Nasir and the Soviet Union were at loggerheads. In a
speech in late March Khrushchev accused Nasir of being a brash young
man. Nasir lashed back. He told the Indian weekly Blitz in April that the
Communists had earlier planned a coup in Syria. “ It was really to liquidate
this conspiracy t h a t . . . the union with Egypt was rushed through.” 45 But
prudence prevailed. After all, the USSR supplied Nasir’s military
muscle—a factor of crucial importance. In mid-May, Nasir stated that
Khrushchev had given him renewed assurances of Soviet non-intervention
in the UAR’s affairs. Then the Communists in Iraq overreached themselves
by fomenting bloody sectarian and ethnic troubles between Kurds and
Turcomans in the cities of Arbil and Kirkuk in July. With much of his
opposition in the army disposed of, and with the battle for control of the
streets won, Qasim could afford to crack down on the Communists. The
Bacth and Nasir were still after him, but the methods they employed had to
change.
The events in Iraq and in its neighboring states during the six months
from September 1958 to March 1959 shattered the psychological impetus
to unity, which had begun with Nasir’s post-Suez emergence as a pan-Arab
hero. The force of the drive toward unity reached great intensity with the
formation of the UAR, and appeared to many to be unstoppable when Nuri
and the monarchy were ousted in Iraq. For years, Arab writers and
politicians had propounded the idea that getting rid of “ imperialism”
would automatically lead to an era of great progress and to the reuniting of
the Arab states. It came as a severe blow to Arab nationalists generally and
to Syrians especially when cAbd al-Karim Qasim not only balked at
bringing Iraq into the mainstream of Arab affairs, but also defeated the best
efforts of Nasir and of many of his own countrymen to force him to do so.
Qasim’s interests lay solely in Iraq and its immediate neighborhood,
especially the Persian Gulf. He just was not a pan-Arabist. A Western
scholar described the situation in these words: “ They [the Syrians] had also
joined Egypt in order to stimulate the overthrow of conservative regimes
and bring such countries as Iraq into an Arab union. . . . If revolutionary
Iraq would not join the union, who else ever would?” 46
Yet keeping Iraq out of the UAR had been a close-run thing. Had the
unionists gained control of the revolutionary government and succeeded in
associating Iraq with the UAR in some fashion, the momentum would
probably have swept other countries along; emotional fervor for Arab unity
was running high in Libya, for example. At the least, political balance
within the UAR would have been altered, and events in Syria would have
taken a different course. The Bacth Party would have had more weight in
an enlarged Arab state, thanks to its alliance with unionist forces in Iraq.
128 THE BACTH PARTY

The relative weakness of the party in Iraq would have been insufficient to
counterbalance Nasir totally, but it might have mitigated the Bacth’s
troubles in 1959, and Syria would not have seceded from the UAR at the
time and in the manner it did. Such musings, of course, belong to the ifs of
history. The UAR did remain confined to Syria and Egypt, and the
incompatibility of the Bacth Party and the Nasirist system, submerged
while the excitement in Iraq attracted attention, became unmistakably clear
in 1959.

Notes
1. Arab World, Jan. 21, 1958, p. 5.
2. Ibid., Jan. 24, 1958, p. 4. Salah Bitar said the same five years later, BBC
Tri-partite Talks, ME/1303/E/5 and 7.
3. Patrick Seale, The Struggle for Syria: A Study o f Post-war Arab Politics,
1945-1958 (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 324.
4. BBC Tri-partite Talks, ME/1297/E/7. This was the second series of meet­
ings, in which cAflaq and Bitar were trying to explain to Nasir that Hawrani had
been awarded an unfair share of the posts. The Egyptian leader told them, “ Then
Akram al-Hawrani’s picture to me at that time was not like this. To me Akram was
the Bacth Party.” Anthony Nutting, Nasser (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1972), pp.
247-48, says that Bitar hurt his own and his faction’s chances for ministerial posts
by criticizing Mahmud Fawzi, whom Nasir trusted.
5. Arab World, April 4, 1958, p. 1.
6. Ibid., May 27, 1958, p. 6. In 1963, when cAflaq and Bitar tried to tell Nasir
that Egyptian domination of Syrian affairs was a principal cause of the UAR’s
failure, Nasir replied, “ . . .1 did not participate in ruling the Syrian region . . . .
the Syrian ministers enjoyed absolute rule.” BBC Tri-partite Talks, ME/1298/E/2.
7. Middle East Journal, Vol. 12, No. 2, p. 191; hereafter cited as MEJ.
8. Fahim I. Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon (Washington, D.C.: Middle East
Institute, 1961), p. 56.
9. Ibid., p. 59.
10. Ibid., p. 44. Chapter 3 of this work discusses the causes of the Lebanese
troubles in some detail.
11. Ibid., p. 171.
12. For a discussion of the Free Officers’ movement, of the planning, and of
the coup, see Uriel Dann, Iraq Under Qassem (New York: Praeger, 1969),
Chapters 1, 2, and 3. Dann’s volume is a first-rate study of Iraqi politics during the
five years of Qasim’s rule. Majid Khadduri, Republican Iraq (London: Oxford
University Press, 1969), Chapters II and III, is also very useful on this topic.
13. George Grassmuck, “ The Electoral Process in Iraq, 1952-1958,” MEJ,
Vol. 14, No. 4 (1960), p. 414.
14. Conversation with an Iraqi Bacthist, October 1965.
The High Tide o f Arab Unity 129

15. Dann, Iraq Under Qassem, pp. 20 and 86; the latter page mentions Bakr’s
and cAmmash’s association with cA rif s moves against Qasim in the fall of 1958.
Arab World, Feb. 20, 1963, and Mid-East Mirror, Feb. 16, 1963, identify Bakr
and cAmmash as active Free Officers in 1958.
16. Nidal al-Bacth (Beirut: Dar al-Talicah, 1963), VII, pp. 20-21; hereafter
cited as Nidal.
17. Dann, Iraq under Qassem, p. 72. Most of the six Arabic dailies published
in Baghdad prior to the coup were suppressed on July 14 and then appeared under
new management.
18. MEJ, Chronology, Vol. 12, No. 4, p. 445.
19. Arab World, July 16, 1958, p. 5.
20. Ibid., Sept. 3, 1958, p. 9.
21. Khadduri, Republican Iraq, p. 94.
22. See, for example, Beirut’s al-Jaridah quoted in Arab World of Sept. 16,
1958, and Beirut’s L’Orient of Nov. 6, 1958.
23. Azmat al-Bacth al-cArabi al-Ishtiraki min Khilal Tajribatihi fi al-Hraq (The
Crisis o f the Arab Socialist Resurrection Party Resulting from Its Experience in
Iraq (Beirut: Dar al-Shacb, 1964), p. 48.
24. It had been the practice of the Nuri al-Sacid regime to jail persons convicted
of Communist activity for extended periods, the length depending on the degree of
the offense. Most such prisoners were incarcerated in jails in remote parts of the
country. A notable example was the jail at Nuqrat al-Salman in the southern desert
district bordering on Saudi Arabia. The rigors of these jails discouraged a certain
number of Communists or Communist sympathizers from continuing in the
movement, but the Iraqi prison system did permit dedicated Communists to
function and even to recruit supporters. Although roughly treated, Communist
prisoners were not isolated in the jails, but were permitted to meet and talk among
themselves and to other persons held for political crimes. Prison security was such
that communication between those in jail and party members outside was possible,
although subject to certain hazards and probably rather slow. The result of these
conditions was that when the Communists were released from jail under the general
amnesty, their organization was intact, they were toughened by the rigors of the
prison system, and their skills in clandestine activity were, if anything, improved.
25. Naji cAllush, al-Thawrah wa al-Jamahir (The Revolution and the Masses)
(Beirut: Dar al-Talicah, 1962), p. 125.
26. Nidal VII, p. 24.
27. Ibid., p. 32.
28. Arab World, Nov. 27, 1958, p. 3.
29. Ibid., Dec. 30, 1958, quotingal-Sahafah, the newly published Bacth paper
in Beirut.
30. Ibid., Dec. 8, 1958, p. 5.
31. MEJ, Chronology, Vol. 13, No. 1, p. 84.
32. Al-Sahafah seems to have lumped together the cArif and the Gaylani
moves, but whether by accident or design is unclear. Dann (Iraq Under Qassem, p.
86) says that Bakr and 'Ammash were seized in connection with cA rif s activities.
33. Dann, Iraq Under Qassem, pp. 131-33.
34. This description of cA rif s trial is drawn from Simon Jarjy, “ Le Procès de
Abd-al-Salam Aref,” Orient, No. 12, 4th quarter 1959, pp. 77-93. Dann’s
account, in Iraq Under Qassem, pp. 86-89, is essentially the same; both rely on
Volume V of the published records of the People’s Court.
130 THE BACTH PARTY

35. Quoted in Arab World, Dec. 23, 1958, p. 4.

36. Loc. cit.; Hafiz’s writings influenced Bacth ideological development in the
late fifties and early sixties. See Chapter 13 below.
37. Ibid., Dec. 24, 1958, p. 2.
38. Ibid., Jan. 12, 1959, p. 4.
39. Ibid., Jan. 19, 1959, p. 4.
40. Ibid., Jan. 30, 1959, p. 3.
41. Ibid., Feb. 2, 1959, p. 8.
42. Ibid., Feb. 25, 1959, p. 1. On the same night it snowed in Beirut for the
first time in years. The right-wing press promptly attributed the snow to masses of
cold air blowing in from Russia.
43. Dann, Iraq Under Qassem, pp. 166-67. Dann gives no source for this
information, but there is no reason to doubt the UAR’s involvement. Writing nearer
the time of the Mosul revolt, Benjamin Shwadran said (The Power Struggle in Iraq
[New York: Council for Middle Eastern Affairs, 1960], p. 42), “ In view of the
general practice in inter-Arab politics, it would be more than likely that the
anti-Qassim elements contacted the UAR leadership and asked for assistance. And
it can be safely assumed that some of the UAR leaders encouraged—if not more
than that—the dissidents to active revolt. . . . [but] Cairo denied any direct
responsibility for the revolt.”
44. Writing in Middle East Forum, Vol. 41, No. 2, p. 44.
45. Quoted in Arab World, April 17, 1959.
46. Malcolm Kerr, The Arab Cold War 1958-1964 (Oxford: University Press,
1965), p. 24.
 - 9 -

The Black Year (I)—Syria

The actions of the Qasim regime in Iraq effectively destroyed the Arab
nationalist myth that the ousting of reactionary and monarchical govern­
ments would automatically result in progress toward unity. The destruction
of this myth had a great effect in the UAR, where the first year of the
United Arab Republic’s existence was marked by divisions among the
nationalists who had fought to create it. The divisions among the Syrian
nationalists came to the surface after Qasim had made it clear that he
intended to go his own way and that he possessed the physical resources
needed to maintain his control of Iraq.
The first major issue was the question of exactly where power lay in the
UAR, at least in regard to the governing of the Syrian Region. We have
seen that the Bacth’s decision to pursue union with Egypt was based
essentially on its leaders’ approval of Nasir’s attitude toward other Arab
states and toward international affairs, and that the party had reluctantly
agreed to dissolve itself as the price of union. Some Bacth leaders
developed grave misgivings about the dissolution, a move that disturbed
many of the rank and Hie inside and outside Syria and shook their
confidence in the party leadership. Al-Bacth continued its criticism of the
union until it ceased publication on April 20, 1958. At the time the UAR
was formed, however, the top party leadership was far from viewing
dissolution of the party in Syria (and of course of the tiny Bacth organiza­
tion in Egypt) as a complete disaster. A meeting of the Syrian Regional
Congress on February 1, 1958 endorsed the decision to dissolve
unanimously.1
Power within the new government was an issue of particular importance
to Akram Hawrani. In his view, one did not go into politics if one could not
exercise power. Hawrani was one of the two Syrian Vice-Presidents in the
first UAR government. Two of his followers, Mustafa Hamdun and Khalil
Kallas, were appointed Ministers of Social Affairs and Economy, respec­
tively, for the Syrian Province. Another associate, cAbd al-Hamid Sarraj,
who was not a party member, although he had cooperated with the Bacth
132 THE BACTH PARTY

for a number of years, ended up in the all-important post of Minister of

Interior for Syria. Hawrani’s faction in the party won three of the four posts
held by Bacthists in this first UAR government, clear evidence of his
practical political skill. Salah Bitar was appointed to the fourth post. Union
Minister of State in Cairo. When Nasir revamped the UAR cabinet in
October 1958, Hawrani remained a Vice-President; he also became UAR
Minister of Justice, and Bitar became Union Minister of Culture and
Guidance. Riyad Malki and cAbd al-Ghani Qannut, two other Bacthists
added to the Syrian wing of the cabinet—properly called the Executive
Council of the Syrian Region—were also Hawrani’s followers. Bitar tried
to get cAbdallah cAbd al-Da’im, a member of his and cAflaq’s faction,
appointed but failed because “ Akram [Hawrani] was the Bacth Party” to
Nasir.2 Even though former Bacthists held more positions in the UAR
government than did members of any other Syrian political movement,
they were limited to four of the fourteen posts held by Syrians in the first
cabinet and six of the twenty-one in the revised cabinet.
Other Bacthist leaders who placed great emphasis on ideology per­
suaded themselves that their ideological, educative work, over the years,
had been the decisive factor in bringing about the formation of the United
Arab Republic. In February 1958, Michel cAflaq said that he regarded the
creation of the UAR as a natural outcome of the Bacth struggle in the Arab
world. He went on to say, ‘‘Nasir’s activity did not follow a philosophic
principle. It has drawn strength from the physical forces which support it.
But it has been compatible with ours in the sense that our efforts are
moving toward a common goal and must result in union of all Arab states
[now] separated by imperialism. Nasir’s activity . . has responded in
short to a movement begun by the Bacth.” 3 Finally, most of the Bacthist
leaders in Syria believed that they would be asked to provide the organiza­
tional muscle for the National Union which was to be established in the
Syrian Province. They expected that the National Union would be formed
fairly rapidly. In early June 1958, for example, Hawrani was quoted in the
press as saying that formation of the National Union local committees
would be completed by July.4 In the interview in L'Orient mentioned
above, Michel cAflaq stated, “ We will be officially dissolved but we will
be present in the new unified party, the National Union. Bom of the union
of two countries this movement can not be inspired by principles other than
those of the Bacth.” The Bacth leaders in Syria were so sure of themselves
in this regard that they did not wait for the government’s order of March 12
for all parties to dissolve but dissolved the party within forty-eight hours of
the announcement of the results of the plebiscite accepting the UAR. Party
members in Damascus sent a cable directly to Nasir telling him of the
dissolution.5
Syria 133

Whether the negotiations in Cairo that led to the union ever specifically
discussed the future role of the Bacth Party is unclear. The Bacthist leaders
have never accused Nasir of breaking a flat promise to them concerning the
role Bacthists would have in the United Arab Republic. On the whole, it
seems unlikely that Nasir would have promised specifically to give
substantial powers within Syria to one Syrian party, even to the party most
favorable to him. He may have made some statement implying a major role
for the party, however, or allowed the Bacthist leaders to make such an
interpretation of an ambiguous remark. The leaders may even have drawn a
totally unwarranted conclusion that they were to have a favored place in the
new system. Whatever the case, it is clear that cAflaq and Bitar believed
that the Bacth would enjoy such a favored position.
Certainly, nothing in Nasir’s past statements and actions indicated that
organized political forces, other than those directly responsive to the
government’s direction, would be tolerated. The revolutionary regime had
abolished parties in Egypt on January 17, 1953, and Nasir had made his
own views about political parties very clear. In a speech on May 19, 1955,
he stressed that there would be no party politics in the new national
parliament, which he promised for January 1956, because such politics, in
his view, distorted freedom, changing it from the freedom of the majority
to the freedom of the minority.6 Nasir repeated this view in speeches in
Upper Egypt in early July 1955. In one speech he said, “ When I said
restoring parliamentary life, I did not mean the restoration of a parliament
such as the one that existed in the past and consisted of a minority
dominating the majority. The revolution did not say it would restore
representative life, but declared it would set up a sound representative
system. There is a difference between restoration and establishment.’’7
Nasir repeated his belief that political parties were unresponsive to the
needs of his country many times during the 1950s. He stressed that parties
represented factions and groups and that what his country needed was a
political organization that represented all the population. In February 1959,
he said, “ We had called for the dissolution of political parties as a
prerequisite for building up a new society, since it was not possible to set
up a cooperative social democratic society on a deteriorated one which
used to hinge on discrimination, class differences, exploitation, domina­
tion, despotism, let alone collaboration with the imperialists and foreign
countries.” 8 On January 26, 1960, in an interview with West German
press correspondents he said,

. . . we declared that there would be no parties. This was one of my

conditions before the Union. Why? Well, my idea about parties in our
country or in this area as a whole is that some of those parties will be in
134 THE BACTH PARTY

cooperation with colonial powers getting help and money from them. Others
will be supported by communism. . . . So we see these two parties working,
supported by elements from abroad, to take over the power reins in our
country. . . . The National Union is not a one-party system because a
one-party system is a monopoly by a few people in politics and the
elimination of the rest. Our national union idea [is]. . . to elect the peoples’
representatives, thus having the whole country participating in the National
Union.9

Although both these statements were made after the formation of the UAR,
they repeat the theme set in 1955—that political activity by individuals or
groups representing segments of the body politic was alien to Nasir’s
philosophy.
Despite the Bacthist leaders’ illusions regarding the power they would
wield in the UAR, the disparities between the two regions of the United
Arab Republic inexorably centered power in Cairo rather than in Damas­
cus. Egypt was many times larger than Syria in population; its economy
was bigger and more diverse; its armed forces larger. Moreover, in 1958,
Jamal cAbd al-Nasir was a truly unique figure in the Arab world. Both in
reputation and in personal ability, he towered over many of the Syrian
leaders. He had, in the course of six years, risen from the status of the most
important member of a group of revolutionaries to the presidency of the
largest Arab state. The remaining members of the Revolutionary Command
Council, who had worked with him for years, were more and more working
under him. Finally, the provisional constitution of the United Arab
Republic, promulgated in 1956, gave him vast personal power in almost all
aspects of government.
Nasir himself took care to reinforce his status as the paramount figure in
the UAR from its very inception. In a multitude of speeches and interviews
in 1958 and early 1959, in which he spoke of the formation of the UAR,
Nasir mentioned only one Syrian, Shukri Quwatli, as instrumental in
bringing about the union. Quwatli’s principal contribution to the formation
of the UAR had been leaving the presidency of Syria gracefully; for this
gesture he received the title of First Arab Citizen. Except for Quwatli,
Nasir gave credit only to the “ great Syrian people” and on a few occasions
to the noble Syrian Army for their role in forming the UAR. He never said
that the Bacth Party—or any other groups or persons—was instrumental in
bringing about the union. He almost certainly was annoyed at cAflaq’s
declaration in the interview in L ’Orient quoted above that he (Nasir) lacked
a philosophy.
Activity within the UAR during the first months of its existence
indicated clearly where the power lay. Hawrani moved to Cairo as
Syria 135

Vice-President despite some indications of a desire to stay in Syria.10

Bitar’s job as Minister of State, also in Cairo, appeared to have little
substance and gave him small exposure to the Syrian people. In June 1958
there were rumors that Bitar would be given a ministerial post with the job
of dealing with UAR citizens living abroad—who would for the most part
have been Syrians—a rather unimportant post for a man who had been
Foreign Minister of Syria for the previous two years. At the end of March,
1958, Sayyid Mai^i, Agriculture Minister for the Egyptian Region, an­
nounced that Syria’s agricultural problems would be dealt with by Egyptian
experts, and stories began to appear, in the Beirut press at least, that the
Egyptians were moving in to reorganize the Syrian Army.
Events in other countries related to the issues of Arab unity, com­
munism in Arab states. Western imperialism, and disputes with
monarchies—the points on which Nasir and the Bacth agreed—distracted
Syrian attention during most of 1958. But the continual postponement of
the formation of the National Union (even though National Union elections
were postponed in Egypt too), and the mounting evidence that Bacthists
were not being given true policy-making roles in the UAR undoubtedly
worried Bacthist leaders. The Bacthists could not compel Nasir to comply
with any of their desires. Yet, in 1959, around the first anniversary of the
Union, the Bacthist leaders still had hopes; they suggested to Nasir that a
six-man super-executive be formed for the purpose of making basic policy
decisions for the UAR. cAflaq, Bitar, and Hawrani proposed that they and
three Egyptians appointed by Nasir constitute this body. Nasir rejected this
proposal.11
Widespread discontent was brewing in Syria at the manner in which the
United Arab Republic functioned in practice. Inevitably a number of points
of friction appeared in combining two distinct societies and two disparate
governmental systems. Friction arose because of differing bureaucratic
practices—Syria was influenced by French tutelage during the mandate and
Egypt by the British—differing pay scales, differences in the general
manner of running the government and the country. Egyptian society was
far more homogeneous than that of Syria. For generations Egypt had been
accustomed to central control. Syria, with its minorities and its political
history of division and subdivision and fluctuating geographic borders, was
ill-prepared for subservience to Egyptian rules and regulations. Moreover,
a severe drought in Syria during the first three years of the UAR’s existence
required abnormally high food imports. In addition, lack of confidence on
the part of businessmen in what the new government was going to do
caused a business slowdown.
In such circumstances it was natural for any person or group of persons
not totally committed to the idea of union to blame virtually any and all
136 THE BACTH PARTY

grievances on the union and on those who took credit for bringing it about.
Syria’s businessmen, an independent lot used to operating in a laissez-faire
fashion, were particularly chagrined at the degree of centralization of the
new UAR government. Many of Syria’s important business families were
involved in commerce and industry and in agriculture. The UAR Agrarian
Reform Law 161, issued in 1958, limited the size of land holdings to about
200 acres of irrigated land or 740 acres of dry-farmed land. Although the
Syrian land reform program was not as drastic as land reform had been in
Egypt, it angered many Syrian landholders considerably. Bacthist Mustafa
Hamdun, appointed Minister of Agricultural Reform, proceeded to imple­
ment the new law’s provisions with vigor. The reform law was in line with
principles outlined in the Bacth Party constitution, and land reform was the
foundation of Hawrani’s political strength among the peasantry of the
Hama district.
Stories of businessmen’s unhappiness began to appear in the Beirut
press. For example, an article in the Beirut paper L O rient on November 1,
1958 claimed that revolutionary Iraq was proving a pole of attraction to
Syrians discouraged by the economic conditions in Syria. The article went
on to say that Syrian landlords and businessmen blamed the Bacth Party,
which had led the campaign for the merger and for socialization, more than
they blamed Nasir. Naturally, stories of dissatisfaction in Syria reached
Nasir’s ears.
The UAR president invited a group of Syrian businessmen to come to
Cairo in December of 1958 to discuss their economic grievances. The
businessmen presented Nasir with a memorandum setting forth their
complaints about economic matters in Syria. These complaints included
increased demands for foreign currency, upsets in the agricultural sector
and in the relationship between land owner, sharecropper, and farmer
(which would, they believed, undoubtedly result in neglect of the land and
lowered production), restrictions on trade, lack of stability in industry, and
fears of Egyptian competition in certain industries. The memorandum said
that Syria’s economic troubles were caused principally by the poor winter
crops, the discouraging prospects for the coming season, and the promulga­
tion of “ legislation which affects the essence of Syria’s social and
economic life, on the basis of general principles, with no regard for the
peculiar conditions in the Northern Province.’’ In regard to agrarian
reform, the memorandum said, “ We do not in principle object to social
justice, but the law was never considered in the light of conditions
prevailing in the Syrian province.”
Among the remedies the memorandum proposed were a curtailment of
state intervention, assurance that economic legislation enacted for the
Syrian Region should be designed to increase economic prosperity, and
Syria 137

that certain legislation should be enacted gradually so as not to harm the

Syrian economy. Finally it asked for a clearly stated UAR economic policy
that would define the role of the state for businessmen.12 Nasir did little at
the time to deal with the Syrian businessmen’s complaints, although he
promised to do what he could. He was, however, almost certainly im­
pressed by the tendency of the Syrian businessmen to blame those who
were on the spot in Syria. The Bacthists, with followers of Akram Hawrani
responsible for the Ministries of National Economy and of Agrarian
Reform in the Syrian Region, made useful scapegoats for Syria’s diffi­
culties, diverting blame from him and from the government in Cairo.
During this same first year, Interior Minister for the Syrian Province
cAbd al-Hamid Sarraj moved away from his former collaboration with the
Bacth leaders and became more closely concerned with serving Cairo’s
interests. Recognizing Nasir’s power, Sarraj worked to build a position of
power and influence, based on the controls of Syria’s security services,
which was shortly to make him de facto administrator of the Syrian
Province. In mid-1958, he was reported to have dismissed a large number
of Hawrani’s followers from the army and had a serious row with
Hawrani.13 Other Syrian military officers emulated his tactics and in due
course were rewarded with ministerial positions.
As the UAR entered its second year, Bacthists in government positions
made some moves in the press which can only have irritated Nasir and his
colleagues in Cairo. The Syrian press, along with other Syrian businesses,
had been harmed by the formation of the UAR. As early as April 2, 1958,
the Damascus paper al-Sham said, “ With dissolution of political parties
and organizations in our country, many sources of press income ceased to
exist. . . . The invasion of the better papers in the Egyptian region . . .
have actually [made them] the papers in the [Syrian] capital.’’14 At the end
of 1958, a new press law required all papers to turn in their publishing
permits and to obtain new ones. In the shuffle that followed, Riyad Malki
in his capacity as Minister of National Guidance permitted at least two new
newspapers to be published by men who had been members of the Bacth
Party at the time of its dissolution. The first of these, al-Wihdah, which
appeared about March 20, 1959, was edited by Jalal Faruq al-Sharif. A
month later a new political daily, al-Jamahir, was launched under the
editorship of long-time Bacth militant, Jamal Atasi. These papers were
recognized by Bacthists and non-Bacthists inside and outside of Syria as the
work of party members.15 Both editors were well known; Atasi, in
particular, had been active in the movement since its earliest days. Many
looked on the papers as unofficial Bacthist organs.
The first issue of al-Jamahir (on April 28) published a story hinting at
disharmony between Nasir and the Bacthist leaders. According to the story,
138 THE BACTH PARTY

a Communist leader in Aleppo, one Ahmad Muhaffal, told Akram Hawrani

that Nasir had sent a cabinet minister to the Syrian Communists offering
them an opportunity to conduct partisan political activities on the condition
that they damage the standing of Hawrani and his associates, whom Nasir
wanted out of public life. According to Muhaffal, the Egyptian ruler’s
purpose was to get rid of the Bacth and to turn the UAR into a federation
rather than a unitary state.16 The story itself seems to be a fabrication,
because the events took place at a time when Nasir was on bad terms with
the Communists in the UAR as well as in other Arab countries. The story
was published at the time Nasir was embroiled in his two-month feud with
Soviet Premier Khrushchev. Moreover, neither then nor later did Nasir
show any inclination to move the UAR toward a federal union; on the
contrary, he moved in the reverse direction. I am inclined to think that
Atasi published this story, which may describe what was actually Com­
munist activity undertaken to ease the pressure on them, as a hint to Nasir
not to hamper the Bacth in Syria.
If so, Atasi made a mistake. Nasir, who tended to react to events and
circumstances rather than to plan ahead, was almost certain to have taken
umbrage at a well-known Bacthist publishing a story of this sort. In
addition, the fact that a Bacthist minister authorized two of his associates to
publish newspapers must have appeared to Nasir as a resurgence of the
party activity he was determined to extinguish in the UAR.17 The prelimi­
nary and organizational work for the National Union was almost com­
pleted, and the forthcoming elections of local committees of the National
Union offered Nasir an opportunity to let the Syrian voters vent their
dissatisfaction for the state of affairs in Syria on the Bacth Party. In the
process, he could also show the Bacthists that he needed neither their
ideology nor their political support. He had two potent weapons at hand.
The first was widespread and continuing grumbling among the Syrians at
the business and agricultural situation, at the growing centralization of the
government, and at the increasing numbers of Egyptians in Syria. The
Bacthists had claimed that they had brought about the union; the Syrian
people would blame them for its undesirable effects. His second weapon
was the control of the Ministry of Interior apparatus by cAbd al-Hamid
Sarraj.
The National Union was designed as an all-embracing organization in
which local committees or councils would be directly elected, at the ratio
of one representative for every five hundred people. In Syria, this meant
that there would be some 9,445 members of local councils. Above the local
councils would be provincial councils, and at the top the general council of
the National Union for the entire United Arab Republic. When the
campaign opened in late spring 1959, the Bacthists weighed in with heavy
Syria 139

support for the National Union. On June Aal-Wihdah said, “ The National
Union aims at implementing the objects of the 23 July revolution . .
especially the creation of a new society on sound democratic, socialist,
cooperative bases. . . . No such society could exist so long as there are
political parties to divide the nation. . . . The Syrian people realize that;
hence their unanimous voting last year for union, the dissolution of all
political parties and for the creation of a national union. . . .” 18 A week
later, and only a month before the election, L ’Orient of Beirut reported that
various political and economic factions were silently boycotting National
Union elections, but noted that the Bacth was not among them and that it
was, in fact, gathering strength for a big electoral push.19
As the campaign progressed, however, a new tone crept into reporting
from newspapers of various persuasions. Withdrawals by candidates who
smelled defeat jumped sharply in the last week of June. Such withdrawals
by candidates who sensed that they could not win enough votes even to
retain their campaign deposit, were, of course, not uncommon in Syrian
elections. But the number of withdrawals began to appear ominously large.
The Damascus paper al-Ayyam noted that five hundred people in Syria had
been elected unopposed by June 23; this number jumped to nearly seven
hundred by June 25 and the number of withdrawals was increasing daily.20
On June 25, Atasi’s al-Jamahir published an article on the selection of a
candidate in the Kurdish district of Damascus alleging that candidates had
been picked by the notables of the district. The next day, al-Wihdah said,
“ The thing we fear most is that partisanship should again rear its head.
Supporters of some dissolved political parties would connive to supporting
[sic] one candidate, while some other party would do the same for another.
The dissolved right-wing parties’ supporters may actually form a bloc
against supporters of other parties.” 21
On the same day, al-Jamahir addressed itself more specifically to
certain developments that worried its editor. It said in part, “ Reactionaries
and agents, apart of [sic] the lies they fabricate and of [sic] the propaganda
they spread around over changes, withdrawals, and the rest to disfigure the
truth are now casting a new colour upon the electoral campaign. They are
alleging that this campaign is directed against a certain particular trend and
against particular individuals among the mass of the citizenry. What they
really aim at is to hit all patriotic trends . . . and of the gain achieved [by]
the union and the revolution rule. . . .” 22 This cautious and somewhat
obscure language indicated that some Bacthist leaders recognized that their
former political enemies in Syria were encountering few obstacles, if any,
in the National Union election, while Bacthists were running into obstruc­
tive officialdom. Three days later al-Jamahir reported that reactionary and
feudalistic elements were becoming very strong in the city quarters and in
140 THE BACTH PARTY

the villages. It said, “ The most dangerous aspect of the National Union
elections is that such coalitions among the reactionary and opportunistic
elements . . . should succeed even on a small scale.” 23
The Bacthists had more than they could cope with. The party organiza­
tion in Syria had been disbanded for more than a year; “ former Bacthists”
who were still loyal had to rely for guidance on what they could read
between the lines of the editorial and news stories in such papers as
al-Jamahir. The Bacthist leaders had no official blessing for their efforts.
Indeed, some of them were tied up in Cairo with government business
throughout most of the campaign. Moreover, the Bacthists were faced with
a notable lack of cooperation from Interior Minister Sarraj, who announced
on June 29 that senior Ministry of Interior officials would supervise the
elections to ensure their impartiality.24 The Bacthists were, in fact, op­
posed by the Ministry of Interior, many of whose officials interpreted the
Minister’s “ impartiality” as a signal discreetly to hinder Bacthists and to
aid their opponents. The elections were carried out by people in small
districts voting for lists of eight or ten candidates. A growing number of
electoral list coalitions in the cities refused to admit Bacthists to their lists.
The Bacthist leaders had tried to conduct a partisan campaign while
officially condemning partisanship, a paradox that was clear to many
people. Equally clear was Cairo’s lack of support for the Bacthists. One
Beirut paper, al-Jumhuriyah, ran a headline on June 30 saying, “ Nasir
Wages War on Bacthists.”
A week before the elections, on July 1, al-Jamahir served notice in its
usual veiled terms that the “ former Bacthists” were withdrawing from the
elections. It said.

They [those whom the paper said withdrew] have faith in the revolution’s
way and in the union’s way, the way both were achieved. They have faith in
all the achievements of the revolution and of the union’s rule. They have
faith in the methods as well as in ends. [The] fact that they had their own,
different methods of work in a certain field—that of how the National Union
should be formed and of how National Union elections should be
conducted—brought to them the realization that their approach might lead
them into a battle, a struggle and a split.
The National Union was not conceived as opening a fight of this nature, not
even with reactionarism [sic], or it may be that it did not find that the time for
that battle was ripe.
That is why those we have mentioned have decided now to sit aside.
But they do not want their attitude to be interpreted as negative, regarding
either the government, the government’s experiment or to [sic] the
Syria 141

government’s leadership. Still unabated is their earlier trust which led them
into cooperation . . . into support and into the union.25

But the Bacthists were not pulling together. On July 3, al-Sahafah, the
Bacthist paper in Beirut, which had said little about the election up to this
point, noted that withdrawals and resignations from the National Union
elections had ceased and that the Lebanese press had distorted the reasons
for the withdrawals. The following day it said that some “ revolutionary
socialist’ ’ candidates and even some who had won unopposed had with­
drawn for personal reasons. The article noted the intrusion of reactionaries
and opportunists into the campaign and ended with an affirmation of the
Arab masses’ faith in Nasir. And on July 5 it mentioned the names of
“ revolutionary socialist’’ candidates who were standing up to reactionary
blocs in the National Union elections.26
On the eve of the elections, Salih Bitar and Akram Hawrani finally
returned from Cairo and plunged into the fight. They were joined by Khalil
Kallas and Mustafa Hamdun for the last day’s politicking. Al-Sahafah on
July 7 reported that they were to take over “ the leadership of the electoral
campaign’’ in the northern region. The paper issued lists of candidates in
several districts, which included a few notable Bacthists. These Bacthist
leaders and their Beirut paper tried to reverse the tide flowing against them
and their supporters by attacking reactionaries and by denying that trouble
existed between the Syrians and the Egyptians.27 By election day, how­
ever, 1,470 Syrian candidates had been returned unopposed; they rep­
resented about 15 per cent of the seats that were up for election. The Beirut
press reported that anti-Bacth feeling was running high in parts of Damas­
cus, where Bitar had to force his way through crowds to reach the polling
station, and in other areas.
The massive withdrawals left only about 100 to 150 Bacthist candidates
in the race, including all the Bacthist ministers and other stalwarts such as
Sami al-Jundi and cAbdallah cAbd al-Da’im. Of this relative handful of
candidates, about 80 to 90 per cent won election to the National Union
local committees, principally in the Dayr al-Zur region, in Jabal Druze
where the Atrash name assured the success of the Bacth list in Suwayda,
and in Hama. Although he won, even on his home ground, Hawrani got
800 votes less than his fellow townsman, Interior Minister Sarraj, who ran
in a different constituency. Elsewhere there were scattered victories by
individual Bacthists who had not withdrawn. All in all, there were about a
hundred or so “ former Bacthists” among the 9,445 members of the local
committees; Bacthists may have formed a majority on as many as a half a
dozen of the several hundred local councils.
142 THE BACTH PARTY

Two weeks after the election, in his annual speech celebrating the
Egyptian revolution, Nasir spoke of the National Union elections and the
relationship of political parties to the Union. He said:

The one-party system is based on an oligarchy which monopolizes political

activities, but the National Union is an experiment unprecedented in history.
To avoid any such monopoly or contact between local parties and foreign
bodies, the only means was to form a National Union through elections. All
the people elected the National Union, thus obviating political monopoly,
the existence of factions arid classes.
Now I want to emphasize that the National Union can and will never be a
continuation of the parties system especially as regards Syria. We got rid of
the party system in Egypt seven years ago, created the National Union, and
in Syria allowed everybody to join. Yet some people persist in talking but
[sic] nonsense and all that it can do is to create dissension between the sons
of one country. Those who regress into the party system and take their orders
from their old party bosses, are nothing but traitors for by doing so they
defeat the prime purpose of the National Union and this benefits no one but
our enemies. This I say clearly and wish it to be clear to all. No more parties,
the parties are gone and over with. We all join the National Union elections
and no candidate’s name was eliminated on account of his being objection­
able. Everyone who cared to stand for elections was welcomed to do so.28

President Nasir obviously felt little “ need” for the Bacth Party and its
ideology.
The National Union elections spelled the formal end of Bacthist efforts
to gain control of the Syrian Province of the UAR, although it was some six
months more before the various Bacthist ministers finally resigned from the
government. The elections taught the Bacthists some clear lessons about
Nasir’s relations with the party and about the party’s own strength. While it
cannot be proved that Nasir ordered Interior Minister Sarraj’s refusal to
favor the Bacthists and his assistance to candidates known to oppose the
party, it is inconceivable that Sarraj would have adopted such policies
without firm indications of the Egyptian leader’s approval. Nasir recog­
nized that popular dissatisfaction in Syria at certain aspects of the UAR
experiment was rising and that much criticism was being directed at the
Bacth. The temptation to use the Bacthists as a lightning rod to divert
criticism from himself prevailed. In later years Nasir recognized that the
way in which the National Union in Syria had been formed was a mistake:

We initiated it [the National Union] in 1957, but the truth is that our ideas
about the National Union proved to be unsound as it embraced contradic­
tions. . . . Our idea then was to solve social problems peacefully within the
Syria 143

framework of the Union. But this thinking proved unsuccessful. Syria

provided the proof, because Al-Kuzbari, the Premier of the first Cabinet,
was the Secretary of the National Union in Damascus.29

But having politicians of Kuzbari’s outlook in the National Union was the
lesser of two mistakes. The greater mistake was the suppression of all
Syrian political groups (the National Union was, in effect, a rubber stamp),
which left the fractious Syrians with no one to blame but the “ ra’is”
himself.
Two observations are in order concerning the strength of the “ former
Bacthists.” First, the dissolution of the party apparatus in 1958 broke down
effective communication between the Bacthist leaders and their organized
followers; without such communication, the leaders could exert little if any
control over these followers. The former party members had to take
guidance from the press, which, as we have noted, was not running in
harmony. While al-Sahafah in Beirut tried to minimize the withdrawals
and emphasize victories, al-Jamahir in Damascus stressed withdrawals and
the activities of the party’s enemies. The last-minute plunge of Hawrani,
Bitar, Kallas, and Hamdun into the fray on the final day gave the
impression of a frantic effort to salvage something from the mess. “ Former
Bacthists” were bound to be confused.
Second, and more important, the Bacth Party could not have won even a
substantial minority of seats in the National Union local committees in a
completely open contest. A total of 1,470 candidates were elected unop­
posed, and about an equal number withdrew. Even if one assumes that all
who withdrew were Bacthists or Bacthist sympathizers, this number plus
the hundred or so Bacthists elected would total only about 1,600 out of
9,445 places, i.e., about 17 per cent. (In fact, it is almost certain that some
of the 1,470 who withdrew did so not because they were Bacthists but
merely because they thought they were going to lose their election
deposits.) The total party membership at the time of dissolution had run in
the low thousands. Even if all members had stayed loyal—and many had
not—this membership was manifestly too small to compete successfully in
this type of mass election. The Bacth could have fielded strong slates in
certain cities, city districts, and provincial capitals, but its strength in the
country as a whole was low, in many places virtually nil. It would have
been numerically swamped in an open election for 9,000 seats.
The Bacth thus proved to itself that, in the UAR, it depended on Nasir
and on his supporters and that Nasir’s “ need” for an ideology was
nowhere near as compelling, at least to him, as the party leaders had
believed. The election also showed that, although the Bacth had been the
driving force for union and the single most powerful party in Syria, it was
144 THE BACTH PARTY

far from a majority party and that it had had sound reason to be apprehen­
sive of Syrian parliamentary elections had they been held in 1958. July 8,
1959, demonstrated to Nasir and everyone else that Bacthists were in the
UAR government on sufferance. The Bacthist leaders continued to deny
any difference between themselves and Nasir and blamed the National
Union election results on the machinations of evil elements.
Yet, a showdown between Nasir and the Bacthists was coming. The
efforts of some Bacthists to conduct affairs in Syria without constant
reference to Cairo could not be sustained long after the National Union
debacle. On August 2, Jamal Atasi’s al-Jamahir ceased publication,
ostensibly for financial reasons, after only thirteen weeks. Jalal Sharif s
al-Wihdah was shortly afterward absorbed into the official UAR publishing
house, Dar al-Tahrir. By the end of the summer, reports were circulating
that Akram Hawrani had become so annoyed with Nasir that he was
boycotting all official ceremonies for a time, and that Salah Bitar and other
Bacthists were following Hawrani’s example. In addition. Bitar was
distracted from official duties in the summer of 1959 by preparations for
the third National Congress of the party, which took place from August 31
to September 2. No Syrian Bacthist had any party standing to attend party
meetings, but cAflaq and other non-Syrian Bacthists would have consulted
Bitar, at least, extensively. There were reports of dismissal of a score or so
of officers from the Syrian army on grounds of being affiliated with the
Bacth Party.30
On September 14, Nasir summarily relieved Riyad Malki of his post as
Minister for National Guidance for the Syrian Region. From all appear­
ances the suspension came without warning; Malki heard the news while
touring the Damascus Fair after a full day of work which included plans for
future activity for his ministry. There is little doubt that Nasir had not liked
Malki’s licensing of newspapers edited and published by Bacthists. Earlier
in the summer, control of the Syrian Broadcasting Station had been taken
away from Malki. According to the pro-UAR Beirut newspaper
al-Siyasah, Malki had attributed to Cairo leaders statements about the
reasons for closing of certain Damascus newspapers (the Bacthist ones)
which al-Siyasah said had never been made.31 Another pro-UAR paper in
Beirut, al-Kifah, said that Nasir fired Malki because he had participated in
the recent Bacth meeting, i.e., the third National Congress of the party,
which was held at the end of August.32
Yet a third pro-UAR Beirut paper, al-Hawadith, listed four reasons for
Malki’s ouster, three of which connected him with partisan (Bacthi)
activities, e.g., restricting appointments in his ministry to former Bacthists,
such as appointing as his Director of Propaganda, Sami al-Jundi, whose
sole qualification, according to al-Hawadith, was his former membership
Syria 145

in the party.33 Undoubtedly all were factors, but the real reason for Malki’s
dismissal was his lack of discretion in failing to conceal his sympathies for
the Bacth. Malki, rather than disguising his pro-Bacth sentiments, took
vigorous positions to publicize them.
The common approach to broader Arab affairs shared by Nasir and the
Bacthists also suffered damage in mid-1959. In the course of building
support against Qasim and against the Communists, the regime in Cairo
took steps to restore relations with certain Arab monarchies. King Sacud,
pilloried by the UAR information media for his attempted assassination of
Nasir in early 1958, was received with honor in Cairo in September 1959.
Relations between Amman and Cairo also improved for a time in the last
half of 1959, though by no means to the same degree. Finally, Nasir and
the United States resumed more friendly relations, largely because both
parties disliked the actions of the Communists in Iraq. Although Bacthists
were also opposed to the Communists in Iraq, they saw no need for the
UAR to associate itself closely with one of the two major powers, a stance
that was contrary to their long-held doctrine of positive neutralism.
Despite the outcome of the National Union elections and the demotion
of the Bacth, affairs in Syria still were not moving to Cairo’s satisfaction.
The harvest again was poor; complaints of Egyptian competition and
interference continued; and discontent was stirring in the army. On October
22, Nasir appointed Field Marshal cAbd al-Hakim cAmir as his pro-consul
in Syria, an event that caused Tawfiq Maqdisi to write in Beirut’s
al-Jaridah, “ One year and eight months have elapsed since the union took
place. Events took place, obstacles arose, faces and names changed . . .
suddenly people here in Syria and people in Egypt awoke to the fact that for
one year and eight months they had done nothing but go around in circles
til they found themselves back to their starting point. . . . It was just as if
the union never existed.” 34
By this time, many Bacthists almost certainly did wish that the union
had never existed, at least in its present form. Relations with Cairo were
near the breaking point; the Bacthists had been unable to arrest the steady
decline in their fortunes. The national party congress of August and
September had resulted in the breakaway of a large pro-Nasir faction (see
Chapter 11). The Bacthists had neither their own organization nor an
important role in the National Union. Their ministers were virtually
without power, either in the Syrian Region or in Cairo. Small wonder that
Bitar stayed away from Cairo for most of September, October, and
November. But the party’s downward path in Syria was paralleled by a
series of misfortunes in Iraq, as the following chapter tells.
146 THE BAeTH PARTY

Notes
1. Sami al-Jundi, al-Bacth (Beirut: Dar al-Nahar li al-Nashr, 1969), p. 76.
2. BBC, Tri-partite Talks, ME/1297/E/7. In the Syrian executive council,
Hamdun became Minister for Agricultural Reform, Kallas remained in Economy,
Qannut replaced Hamdun in Social Affairs, and Malki took Culture and Guidance.
3. L’Orient (Beirut), Feb. 25, 1958.
4. Arab World, June 4, 1958, p. 6. See also BBC, Tri-partite Talks
ME/1303/E/5.7, and 12.
5. Arab World, Feb. 26, 1958.
6. Mid-East Mirror, May*21, 1955, p. 2; hereafter cited as MEM.
7. Quoted in MEM, July 9, 1955, p. 2. Nasir also noted in this speech that the
political parties had opposed land reform.
8. Jamal cAbd al-Nasir, Speeches and Press Interviews 1959, p. 37.
9. Ibid., 1960, p. 132. Even so, Nasir told cAflaq and Bitar in 1963 that the
dissolution of political parties was “ more at the suggestion of Syria than us."
BBC, Tri-partite Talks ME/1303/E/8.
10. Arab World, March 24, 1958, quotingSadaLubnan, PPS paper in Beirut.
11. BBC, Tri-partite Talks ME/1303/E/9ff.
12. Arab World, June 10, 1959, pp. 7-9, summarizing and quoting from
al-Bina’ (Beirut), a PPS newspaper.
13. Ibid., also citing al-Bina’, Sept. 30, 1958.
14. Ibid., April 3, 1958, p. 5.
15. cAllush, Thawrah, p. 138. cAllush records that Sulayman al-cIsa also got a
publishing permit, but his paper—if it ever appeared—was very short-lived.
16. Arab World, April 29, 1959.
17. Nasir later claimed to have seen a reactivation of the dissolved Bacth Party
in these sorts of actions. BBC, Tri-Partite Talks ME/1303/E/6.
18. Quoted in Arab World* June 4, 1959, p. 7.
19. Ibid., June 11, 1959, p. 7.
20. Ibid., June 23, 1959, p. 8, and June 25, 1959, p. 7.
21. Ibid., June 26, 1959, p. 5.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid., June 30, 1959, p. 6, quoting al-Jamahir of the previous day.
24. Ibid., June 30, 1959, pp. 6-7.
25. Quoted in Arab World, July 2, 1959, p. 6.
26. Al-Sahafah, July 3, 4, and 5, 1959. Jundi, al-Bacth, p. 80, records that
efforts to impede his candidacy included stories that he was an agent for the
intelligence service.
27. See al-Sahafah, July 9, 1959, and cAflaq’s speech of Feb. 18, 1966 in
al-Ahrar, Feb. 25, 1966.
28. Nasir, Speeches and Press Interviews 1959, p. 287. The speech was made
on July 22, 1959. Later, in a more candid mood, Nasir conceded that within the
National Union, “ there was a political organization formed of the elements who
believed.” BBC, Tri-partite Talks ME/1304/E/17.
29. BBC, Tri-partite Talks ME/1304/E/4. Nasir was referring to Ma'mun
al-Kuzbari’s premiership following Syria’s withdrawal from the UAR.
30. Arab World, Aug. 24, 1959, summarizes an analytical report by the Arab
News Agency on Nasir and the Bacth. According to al-ldhacah (Beirut), cited in
Arab World June 29, 1959, p. 6, a decree imposing heavy penalties on army
Syria 147

personnel who became involved in political activity aimed against the regime was
issued, allegedly because some officers were favoring Bacthist candidates.
31. Arab World, Sept. 23, 1959, p. 4.
32. Ibid., Sept. 18, 1959, p. 3. But, in fact, there were no Syrian delegates at
the congress, because there was no Syrian organization to choose them. cAflaq
attended in his capacity as Secretary General. Malki had submitted his resignation
to Nasir—or at least threatened to—after the broadcasting station had been removed
from his control, but had been talked out of resigning by Bitar.
33. Ibid., Sept. 25, 1959, p. 1.
34. Cited in Arab World, Oct. 27, 1959, p. 2.
 - 10 -

The Black Year ( I I ) -

Iraq and the Split with Nasir

The party had run into serious difficulties in Iraq by the end of 1958.
Although it welcomed the revolution of July 14, 1958 euphorically, the
Bacth played no part in the coup and ended up with a minor role in the
government. It had joined other political groups in Iraq in calling for close
association with the United Arab Republic. The Bacth Party considered that
Iraq’s entry into the UAR would have greater importance than the entry of
another region, for example, Saudi Arabia or Kuwait, because of Iraq’s
past history of nationalist leadership and its position in 1958 in the
vanguard of those working for nationalism.1 The unionist effort was
closely tied to cAbd al-Salam cArif; his ouster and Party Regional Secretary
Fu’ad Rikabi’s downgrading in the fall of 1958 cost the party what little
capacity it had had to get its own people into government positions or even
to protect them from harassment by political enemies in public office. The
party, having lost its newspaper, was particularly bitter at its inability to get
its views across to the Iraqi public, as the Communists continued to
infiltrate the press and radio.2
In their efforts to take advantage of the revolution and to defeat the
Communists, the Bacth leaders in Iraq strove to increase the size of the
party. It grew rapidly following the revolution, especially in the latter part
of 1958 and through the period of the Mosul revolt in March 1959. In its
eagerness to build numerical strength, however, the party command
deviated from the standards of admission prescribed by the party’s internal
statute, and a substantial number of peoph were admitted to membership
without adequate screening.3 Persons were frequently admitted solely
because they were good Arab nationalists and pro-unionists. But this rapid
and uncontrolled expansion had two negative consequences. First, the
party leadership lacked control over the members; the actions and words of
poorly indoctrinated recruits embroiled the party in difficulties. Second,
the party’s enemies found it relatively easy to penetrate the organization
and learn at least some of its secrets.
150 THE BACTH PARTY

The Bacth Party’s steady loss of ground to the Communists in the fight
for control of the mass organizations, i.e., students’ associations, labor
unions, and peasants’ organizations, can be at least partially accounted for
by inadequate communications and the leaders’ lack of control of their
diffuse and swelling membership. In the secondary schools and univer­
sities, Bacthists were fairly numerous, although concentrated in particular
areas. For example, the Baghdad residential and educational district of
cAzamiyah had a high concentration of nationalists, among whom Bacthists
were both prominent and numerous. The Bacth had little contact with the
working class, however, and little time to open communications channels
to Bacthist groups in other cities and towns. Accentuating the party’s
limitations was the impressive organizational power of the Communist
Party, which was bolstered by a growing feeling among many Iraqis that
the Communist movement was on the rise. The Bacth Party’s Regional
Command for Iraq admitted that Communists dominated the labor unions,
the peasants’ organization, the union of students, the popular resistance
forces, and the committees for the defense of the republic in a statement
issued on June 20, 1959.4 But domination of these organizations was
already far along by the time of the Shawwaf rebellion, which broke out in
Mosul in March 1959.
Qasim put down this revolt with relative ease; he probably received
warning in advance that conspiracies were being hatched within the Iraqi
army officer corps. The Bacthists themselves helped alert the “ Sole
Leader” by an article published in the March 5 issue of al-Sahafah in
Beirut, which said that the “ free officers of Iraq” were distributing
pamphlets in Iraq critical of the regime.5 The revolt involved a sizable
number of Iraqi officers of the colonel and brigadier level, most of them
associated with the First and Second Divisions. The UAR leaders sup­
ported the plans for the Shawwaf s movement with arms. Actual rebellion
in Mosul broke out prematurely as a direct result of a massive peace
partisans rally in that city on March 6, which was followed by rioting
between pro- and anti-Communist elements.6
The Bacth Party favored the revolt, without being deeply involved in it.
Fu’ad Rikabi claims that Subhi cAbd al-Hamid, a leading nationalist
officer, asked him a month before the Mosul revolt if the Bacth could
cooperate in the impending military move against Qasim, specifically by
assassinating the Prime Minister. The Regional Command at first favored
the idea, but, after studying the matter for a few days, decided that it held
too many risks and dropped it.7 A number of Bacthists took part in the
disturbances in Mosul, but the revolt was essentially a military action, and
there were few Bacthists left in uniform by that time. The party newspaper
in Beirut gave the revolt fulsome support, as did the rest of the pro-UAR
Iraq and the Split with Nasir 151

press. In these circumstances it is hardly surprising that Majid Amin, chief

prosecutor in Mihdawi’s court, offered condolences to Michel cAflaq and
Akram Hawrani, as well as to Jamal cAbd al-Nasir, for the failure of the
revolt.8
The Bacth’s pro-UAR bias made it a natural target for repression once
Qasim prevailed. Sweeping arrests of those suspected of opposing Qasim
or of unionist sympathies, which took place following the revolt, did the
party considerable harm. The leaders were compelled to go underground to
avoid capture. Some arrests were made merely to detain and shake up the
arrestees. For example, a group of students coming to Cairo early in April
told the press that although 78 of them had refused to renounce the Bacth
Party despite arrest and threats of physical intimidation, they were released
and allowed to leave the country.9 The party leadership in Iraq criticized
the Qasim regime for its post-Mosul actions and entertained again for a
time the notion of assassinating the Prime Minister. An Iraqi Regional
Party bulletin for members and supporters distributed in April 1959
condemned Qasim’s government for the widespread arrests and killings of
Bacthists, when “ events showed that Shawwaf s movement in Mosul was,
first, a local movement and, second, a military one and that no party
authority had any connection with it.” 10
The Bacth blamed the Baghdad government for large-scale arrests and
for some mistreatment of Bacthists, but, in the party’s view, the Com­
munists remained its deadliest enemies. The Communists took the lead in
the bloodletting that followed the Mosul troubles. Many Iraqis were
butchered; dragging the victim behind a car until he was dead was one
method frequently employed. The toll of victims of the Shawwaf affair has
been estimated from the 100 cited by regime spokesman Hashim Jawad
—certainly much too low—to 5,000. Both sides invoked a wealth of
unsupported statistics to prove that their opponents had indulged in
wholesale atrocities while they had exercised superhuman restraint. The
available evidence leaves no doubt, however, that the number of Com­
munists and their supporters who lost their lives during the revolt was very
much smaller than the number of anti-Communists killed in the
aftermath.11
Bacth leaders were personally unharmed, but a number of rank and file
members, as well as Bacth supporters, lost their lives.12 For the Bacth in
Iraq, these bloody events laid the foundation of a pervasive hatred of the
Iraqi Communists—a hatred which demanded opportunity for revenge.
There was, however, little the Bacthist leaders could do in practice except
write about it. They believed that the Qasim government was under
Communist influence, but stopped short of saying that it was totally
dominated by Communists. In a bulletin for members only issued in March
152 THE BACTH PARTY

1959, the Party’s National Command said, “ Turning from a call for
neutralism and nonalignment, the communists are now working to push the
country [Iraq] into the eastern camp and to introduce it into the cold war
and into international conflict. . . .” 13
The party feared the consequences of a Communist takeover of the
government. In a section of the above-quoted document headed, “ What
will happen should the communists capture the government?,” the party
command noted that Communist control of Iraq would isolate an important
part of the Arab nation from the rest of the Arab world and delay the Arab
nationalist revival. Apart from this, the Communists’ first aim would be to
attack the Bacth Party, its chief ideological foe; in addition to attacking the
Bacth Party, the Communists would have the apparatus of a state to support
weak Communist movements elsewhere in the Arab world. Finally, they
would introduce the cold war into the Arab nation, striking a blow at the
policy of positive neutralism.14
But even as the National Command was issuing this document, events
in Iraq were turning against the Communists, Their extensive reprisals after
the Mosul revolt had an adverse impact within the country, where rumor
expanded an already bloody and brutal story. Prime Minister Qasim
himself apparently began to have reservations about the growth of Com­
munist strength. In a speech on May 1 he said that he was opposed to the
inauguration of political party activity in Iraq at that time. Kamal
Chadirchi’s National Democratic Party, which at the time provided a
substantial proportion of Qasim’s civilian ministers, promptly agreed to
suspend political activity, and on May 20 dissolved itself.15 The Com­
munists, who had hoped to gain official entry into the government, were
highly critical of the NDP for this action. They were especially critical of
the fact that the decision had been taken when the party leader Chadirchi
was in Moscow and that eleven of the party’s principal leaders dissented
from the decision to dissolve, although the majority supported it.16
Qasim’s “ publicly expressed wish” 17 that he did not wish to have
political parties active in Iraq had run head-on into a Communist drive for
participation as a party in the Iraqi government. The Communist Party
newspaper, Ittihad al-Shacb, said on May 10 that the Communist Party was
prepared to cooperate within certain limits with Bacthists, Socialists, and
Independents for the sake of widening support for the Qasim regime.18 The
Bacth Party had in fact continued active, striving to form a new national
front with Iraqi socialists and democrats, under the motto “ The Arabs are
one nation, Arab nationalism is eternal.” 19 But the National Democratic
Party’s suspension of activity and dissolution of its organization forced the
Communist Party of Iraq to take similar action. The Communists could not
press their demand for participation as a party in the government without
Iraq and the Split with Nasir 153

some other political support, however. A few days after the NDP’s
dissolution, the Communists withdrew their demand for party participation
in the government.20
The Regional Command in Iraq responded to these developments with
new guidance for its followers. On June 20 it issued a special directive in
which Bacth Party members were asked to understand the new position in
the country. After referring to an earlier political resolution sent by the
Regional Command to subordinate commands in Iraq (a document not
reproduced in the Nidal al-Bacth series), the June 20 directive discussed the
extent of Communist domination of mass organizations and referred to
communism and imperialism as the chief enemies of the Bacth and of Arab
nationalism. It pointed out that the Communist oppression of nationalists,
torture of prisoners, seizure of control of information media, and driving of
nationalist elements out of government ministries collectively presented the
party with an opportunity to indoctrinate persons of nationalist inclinations
with pro-Bacth ideals. The Bacth instructed its members to work to isolate
the Communists, but to look on other participants in the now defunct
National Front of 1956 as potential allies, inasmuch as the Communists
quarreled with all of them. It noted that even Prime Minister Qasim had
become annoyed at one of the Communist conspiracies.
The document went on to say that the party must use these elements to
help isolate the Communists from the masses and from nationalist forces,
and that the party must win over to its side some who in the beginning were
associated with communism—especially National Democratic Party peo­
ple. The party was first of all to solidify its connections with the masses; it
was also to keep the memory of Communist crimes and errors before the
people. Thus, “ Party commands in every region of Iraq should increase
their activity among workers, peasants, and students, and try to drive the
communists out of the trade unions, [peasant] associations, and [student]
unions, replacing them by elements supporting the Party and the nationalist
movement or [at least] opposing the communist party. Achieving a tangible
result in this demands considerable time, but we must get started
now. . . .” 21
The party in Iraq even let up in its attack on Prime Minister Qasim. In a
statement issued on the first anniversary of the July 14th revolution, it
spoke of several goals achieved during the first months of the revolution,
for example, the withdrawal from (participation in) the Baghdad Pact and
the enactment of land reform; it severely criticized the Communists for
their crimes, especially in “ the four months following the Mosul revolt.”
Prime Minister Qasim was neither given personal credit for these achieve­
ments nor blamed; he was not even mentioned.22 In Beirut, however, the
Bacthist paper al-Sahafah reported that the Qasim government had released
154 THE BACTH PARTY

students from prison; it also carried a number of stories about torture of

Bacthists, including stories of mistreatment told about cAbd al-Hamid
Mar^i and Yusra Sacid Thabit, a sister of Regional Command member
Ayyad Sacid Thabit. This line was followed by most other pro-UAR Beirut
papers.
The summer of 1959 marked a decisive turn in the fortunes of the
Communists in Iraq, not, however, as a result of any victory by the Bacth
or its allies, even though their fight with the Communists went on
throughout the spring and summer. The decline in Communist fortunes was
due rather to their overreaching and to the atrocities in July in Kirkuk, in
which nearly a hundred people were murdered in sectarian disputes
between the Kurdish and the Turkman communities. The victims were
chiefly Turkmans; long-standing Kurdish antipathy to them had been
stirred up by the Communists. Qasim publicly denounced these actions in
July and early August.23 Although Qasim did not attack the Communist
Party as such, the Communists and everyone else in Iraq knew that he and
that party had come to a point of crisis.
The Bacth viewed the struggle in Iraq as one between themselves and
the Communists for control of the country; Qasim, of course, did not. The
“ Sole Leader” was interested in remaining sole leader, and he proceeded
to consolidate his power. Ten days after Qasim’s first attack on the
Communists for the Kirkuk atrocities, those accused of involvement in the
Mosul revolt went on trial before Mihdawi’s People’s Court. The trial went
on for several weeks; the defendants, who included a number of very well
respected military officers, including Brigadier Nazim Tabaqchali and
Rifkat al-Hajj Sirri, publicly accused the regime of extracting confessions
under torture. Despite the accusations of torture and the defense that they
were acting in the best interests of their country, Tabaqchali and twelve
other officers were sentenced to death. The official announcement of the
sentence came on September 18, and the sentence was carried out on
September 21. Aware that the execution of officers as popular as Tabaq­
chali and al-Hajj Sirri could arouse popular repercussions, Qasim attemp­
ted to soften the effects by executing four persons from the old regime who
had been under sentence of death since early 1959, including a former
Interior Minister and the head of the security service.
Any hopes that Qasim had of deflecting criticism were disappointed.
The press and radio in Cairo and Damascus and pro-UAR papers elsewhere
protested the executions of Tabaqchali and his associates in the most
violent terms. There were mass demonstrations in the major cities of Syria
and, according to the Egyptian Middle East News Agency, even in Iraqi
cities as well.24 A stream of anti-Qasim vituperation pouring out from the
UAR and pro-UAR press was still at full tide more than two weeks later
when a new event diverted attention from the executions.
Iraq and the Split with Nasir 155

On October 7 a team of six Bacthists intercepted Qasim’s car while it

was driving along Rashid Street, the main artery in the old city of Baghdad,
from the Ministry of Defense to his home. Three of the team opened fire on
the Prime Minister’s car, two provided protection, and the sixth supervised
the operation. A seventh member, whose task was to block the Prime
Minister’s route with a car, got stuck in traffic and was unable to reach the
site in time. The assassins fired twenty to thirty shots into the Prime
Minister’s car, killed the chauffeur, and wounded Qasim in the shoulder.
Qasim’s guards returned the fire; one Bacthist was killed and two wounded.
The survivors fled, leaving their comrade cAbd al-Wahhab Ghariri dead in
the street. Qasim himself was rushed to the hospital, where he stayed for
the next two months. He was not critically wounded, however, and
appeared on television the night of the assassination attempt to show that he
was alive and still able to carry on.
The Bacthists had botched the job. The surviving team members left the
scene believing that Qasim was dead from two bullets in the head, and so
reported to Fu’ad and cAbdallah Rikabi.25 To make matters worse,
Ghariri’s corpse gave the authorities an excellent lead; they were able to
locate his residence fairly readily. It had been used by the party as a
meeting spot, and as a place to hide a printing press and to store party
documents. Acting on evidence the police found there, the authorities
made an extensive sweep, caught and jailed a large number of Bacthists and
a few other enemies of the regime as well. The roundup was completed
before the end of October, before the news that the Bacth was involved in
the assassination became public.26 In a press conference given when he left
the hospital in December, Qasim all but implicated the Bacth in the
assassination attempt, and Mihdawi, the head of the People’s Court, flatly
accused the party in a statement made on December 7.
The origins of the attempt on Qasim’s life went back six months, to the
Regional Command’s decision not to join in what became the Mosul
rebellion. The story appears in the trials of the assassins and their Bacthist
associates before Mihdawi’s court and in Fu’ad Rikabi’s account, written
some years after the event. There are no important discrepancies between
the two sources about the event and the people involved. Rikabi takes some
pains in his book to convey the impression that the entire Regional
Command of the party in Iraq agreed to the operation. For reasons
discussed below, it seems likely that not all members of the command were
in agreement, and that one or two may not have been involved at all.
The attempt came about in this way. After Shawwaf s revolt had failed,
the Bacthist leaders reconsidered their earlier notion of eliminating Qasim
by assassination. Regional Secretary Fu’ad Rikabi and three other mem­
bers of the Regional Command, cAbdallah Rikabi, Ayyad Sacid Thabit,
and Khalid cAli Salih al-Dulaymi, formed a committee to oversee the
156 THE BACTH PARTY

operation.27 They studied Qasim’s daily routine and decided that he was
vulnerable while traveling to and from his office in the Ministry of
Defense. They assembled a team of party volunteers, procured firearms
and hand grenades, and began to train the volunteers at a rural site near
Musayyib, some forty miles from Baghdad. They set up an observation
post in a dentist’s office overlooking the entrance to the Defense Ministry
compound, from which a signal could be telephoned to the assassins
waiting in a flat in the heart of the city.28
By June, organizing and training had progressed sufficiently for the
operation to be carried out. At this point, the Regional Command decided
to halt the operation, because, Rikabi says, only then had the Command
realized that it had made no plans to follow up a successful assassination.29
Although this reason cannot be ruled out, a more likely reason was that the
Command sensed an opportunity to drive a wedge between Qasim and the
Communists. Its internal circular of June 20 (cited above) adverts to this
issue, and for that matter, so does Rikabi himself.30 Rikabi, however,
asserts that the Regional Command met in late July and decided to plan a
revolution to do away with Qasim. Command member cAbdallah Rikabi
contacted the retired Bacthist Major, Salih Mahdi cAmmash, who obtained
promises from some anti-Qasim free officers to try to prevent Communist
elements from taking over the country, in the event Qasim was killed.31
cAbdallah Rikabi headed a committee of Thabit, Dulaymi, and Midhat
Ibrahim Jumcah—all four from the Regional Command—to oversee the
operation.32
What seems to have given the final impetus to the Ba'thist’s plans were
the executions of Tabaqchali and his associates. According to Rikabi, the
Regional Command met on October 1 and decided to take on the task of
liberating Iraq.33 At least one witness before Mihdawi’s court said the
same thing. The Party Command warned members in Baghdad to be alert
for new developments, but for reasons of security did not pass down word
of the proposed assassination. Once the assassination organization got
down to work, it ran into difficulties. Qasim failed to appear on the first
day that the assassins had selected—either October 3 or 4. On October 5,
he did not drive along Rashid Street. On the sixth, Qasim’s small
motorcade moved so rapidly that it arrived at the chosen spot before the
squad reached it.34 On the day the attempt was actually made, several
things went wrong. The man who was to block Qasim’s route locked his
keys in the car; Thabit used his own car instead but could not arrive on the
scene on time; the squad failed to press the attack—one member was
unable to throw his hand grenade because he could not get it out of his
pocket.35 Finally, the squad left the scene believing that Qasim was dead.
Within hours they realized that they had failed. The Bacthist leaders
Iraq and the Split with Nasir 157

hoped that the authorities might not be able to trace Ghariri’s political
connections, and the Regional Command, or a part of it, met and decided
to pass the word for members to sit tight. Shortly, however, they learned
that Shakir Hulaywah, a member of the original assassination team, had
been arrested and turned state’s evidence. Hulaywah knew a great deal,
and he was probably annoyed at the party because he had been disciplined
for an unauthorized trip to Syria in the spring to see if the National
Command favored the assassination.36 Once the Bacthists realized how
much the authorities knew, many of those who could, fled to Syria; many
more were arrested.
On December 26, Mihdawi’s People’s Court met for the first time since
it sentenced Tabaqchali and his fellow army officers in September. The
court charged 77 persons with involvement in the attempt to assassinate
Prime Minister Qasim, of whom 21 were tried in absentia. The majority of
the accused were Bacthists, including almost all the members of the
Regional Command and many lesser functionaries. In the course of the
court’s often confused proceedings, the six persons present who were
accused of actually carrying out the attempt—Thabit, Dulaymi, Ahmad
Taha cAzzuz, Salim cIsa Zaybaq, cAbd al-Hamid Mai^i, and Samir cAbd
al-cAziz Najm—readily admitted being members of the Bacth Party and of
following Regional Command orders in carrying out the assassination.
Khalid cAli Salih Dulaymi went so far as to say that he thought the attempt
was an error, but that he had followed party discipline in carrying it out.37
The assassins took considerable pains to shield other members by testifying
that only the Regional Command members and the executive group, that is
the assassination squad, knew of the plans. For example, Thabit identified
Faysal Habib Khayzaran as a member of the Baghdad branch command but
said that Khayzaran knew nothing about the assassination attempt.38
Mihdawi and his court accused the United Arab Republic and the Bacth
Party National Command of involvement in and responsibility for the
attack and did their best to discredit the party in Iraq. The sentence they
pronounced on February 26 assigned guilt to the National Command for
having planned the assassination. The National Command itself had denied
involvement in a long manifesto carried on the front page of al-Sahafah on
January 15, 1960. It said in part: “ The National Leadership [Command] of
the Party denies all allegations that the Party organized the attempt and it
considers that Qasim’s own assassinations of the people’s leaders, of Army
officers and of the intellectual youth, by means of street dragging and
without benefit of trial, except in Mihdawi’s false tribunal, are the things
which incited a number of patriotic youth in a spirit of self-defense to
defend themselves in that manner.” 39 At the Fourth National Congress of
the party held in June 1960, the following resolution was adopted: “ The
158 THE BACTH PARTY

Congress decided to condemn positions of those Party commands which

deviated from populist methods in the struggle and which turned to
non-populist methods, relying on military revolts and political
assassinations.” 40 The same document also referred to . . some
movements [which] perpetrated enormous crimes by relying on political
assassination in order to effect changes in the reactionary conditions of
some regions.” 41 In an article by Lebanese Regional Command member
Jibran Majdalani, which appeared in al-Sahafah on September 5, 1960,
party leaders were severely critical of assassination as a political weapon.42
These various statements are consistent with the attitude of the party’s
long-established leaders toward the use of violence and of military force in
domestic Arab politics—even though that outlook underwent considerable
change later. The Third National Congress of the Party took place only five
or six weeks before the assassination attempt on Qasim. There is nothing in
the statement the congress issued bearing on the situation in Iraq.43 As the
next chapter tells, that Congress was concerned primarily with the conse­
quences of the formation of the UAR and of the decision to dissolve the
party in Syria, and with factionalism. Moreover, the assassination was
originally planned in April; it was dropped in June. Rikabi states that the
Regional Command decided in late July to do away with Qasim’s govern­
ment, an unlikely time for the Bacthists in Iraq to have made the decision,
because Qasim was blaming the Communists, indirectly but unmistakably,
for the Kirkuk massacres. Some nationalist officers and civilians had been
released from jail; things were hardly rosy for the Bacth, but they were
looking up a bit.
It is more likely that Iraqi Bacth leaders brought back encouragement
from the UAR leaders in Syria to try to unseat Qasim. Several pieces of
evidence tend to support this view. In the first place, Rikabi sided with
Jordanian Regional Secretary Rimawi—both were National Command
members at this time—in favor of virtual autonomy for each Regional
Command within the framework of a virtually powerless pan-Arab Party
structure in the fight over this major issue at the third congress (see below).
Rikabi wrote, “ The National Command did not legally exist then
[July-August 1959], as a result of a number of reasons, foremost being the
dissolution of the Party in Syria at the time of the UAR” ; he argued that,
therefore, it could not take decisions. He wanted to meet with National
Command members as individuals.44 Rikabi, Dulaymi, and other Iraqi
Regional Command members, attending the third congress had plenty of
opportunity to meet with Rimawi and his people and with UAR authorities
in Syria. Rimawi, exiled from Jordan and living in Cairo, lent himself to
the UAR’s purposes. He formed his own party after being expelled from
the Bacth in 1959, and early in 1960, two persons arrested in Jordan on
Iraq and the Split with Nasir 159

terrorist charges stated that they were acting on Rimawi’s orders.45

The government witness, Hulaywah, said that during his trip to Syria in
August 1959, he concluded that Syrian Interior Minister cAbd al-Hamid
Sarraj was in favor of an assassination attempt, but that Nasir was not.
Hulaywah claimed to have spoken with cAflaq and with Sarraj; he did not
implicate cAflaq.46 Another Iraqi came to Syria in July 1959 and got in
touch with an unnamed colonel through Sami al-Jundi. The Iraqi told Jundi
that the Regional Command in Baghdad was determined to assassinate
Qasim, even though the National Command opposed it.47 Moreover,
Samir cAbd al-cAziz Najm, who was wounded in the assassination attempt,
testified that the party was working in the interests of the UAR, which
would help the Bacthists in Iraq with arms and money if Fu’ad Rikabi
requested them.48 cAflaq and other Bacth leaders knew that the UAR had
earlier provided money for the Iraqi Bacth.49 There were direct contacts
between the Bacthists in Iraq and the UAR embassy in Baghdad, both in the
spring and after the plan was revived.50
If the evidence is not conclusive, it certainly permits the interpretation
that certain UAR authorities in Damascus encouraged Rikabi to undertake
the assassination attempt. There is no evidence in the trial or in Rikabi’s
book that the UAR was prepared to back up such an attempt by physical
intervention. Encouraging Rikabi and his associates required little more
than urging on them an action they had already shown a desire to carry out
and promising them help in the event they succeeded in assassinating
Qasim.
The UAR leaders had been outraged at the execution of Tabaqchali and
his associates. (At that time, execution was an unusual fate for Arab
military personnel who had failed in a revolutionary attempt. The custom­
ary punishment was a death sentence or life at hard labor, which could be
commuted to lesser punishment some time later, or even, eventually,
pardon.) And the UAR had helped these officers to plan the Mosul
rebellion. All in all, it seems likely that cAbd al-Hamid Sarraj, Syrian
Minister of Interior, used individual Bacthists and portions of the Bacth
Party organization in Iraq and in Jordan to work on behalf of the UAR. The
secretaries of the two regions suited his purpose. cAbdallah Rimawi of
Jordan had been at loggerheads with cAflaq well before he left the party in
the summer of 1959, and Rikabi was almost certainly becoming disen­
chanted in 1959. After Rikabi left the party in 1960, he became a
prominent Nasirist and later a member of Rimawi’s “ Revolutionary”
Bacth Party.51
By the late fall of 1959, woes had begun to pile up on the Bacth Party.
Its hoped-for rebirth in the National Union was still-bom; the party
organization in Syria had ceased to exist; the Jordan Regional Secretary
160 THE BACTH PARTY

had been expelled, taking with him a substantial number of followers; the
organization in the Iraqi Region had been badly damaged by its losing
battle with the Communists and its ill-fated attempt on Qasim’s life; Nasir
had fired a Bacthist minister in Syria; and the remaining Bacthists in the
UAR government had little influence on policy or action. According to a
party circular issued in March 1960, the Bacthist ministers had pushed
constantly for a reorganization in order “ to give wide powers to the
ministries” and for “ speedy restoration of the people’s political organiza­
tion by construction of the national union on a democratic basis.” 52 These
demands, repeated throughout 1958 and again in 1959, were disregarded.
When the government was reorganized in latç 1958, Nasir’s personal rule,
if anything, increased. Some central ministers were given practically no
responsibility and others had no work whatever to do, while ministers with
previous expertise in the Egyptian Region government were given addi­
tional executive authority.53 Toward the end of October 1959, Nasir
appointed Marshal cAbd al-Hakim cAmir his pro-consul in charge of Syria.
Although some of these events, notably Rimawi’s defection and the
troubles in Iraq between the Bacth and Qasim, had a basis of their own, all
were in some way connected with Nasir and the UAR. It must have been a
bitter blow to the Bacth Party leaders to realize that their brave dreams of
providing an ideology that would inspire the National Union and make the
UAR the first element in an all-Arab political union had evaporated. Had
they looked back at their own words, they would have seen that their view
of Egypt as a “ dictatorship,” as the party called it in August 1954,54 was
perhaps a better description of the state of affairs than the “ guarantee” of
freedom, as cAflaq described the UAR on February 12, 1958.55
Indeed, it was a description to which the Bacth would soon return. The
Bacthists must have been chagrined that UAR government leaders, espe­
cially Sarraj, who had been close to the Bacth in Syria prior to the union,
were intriguing with the party secretaries in Iraq and Jordan to engage in
political actions not only without party discussion but 'also in direct
opposition to the feelings of the principal Bacth Party leaders. Finally, they
saw that Cairo did not consider Syrians competent to run their own country
and that Nasir’s closest personal associate was to be sent to take charge of
the northern region.
The Party’s National Command, newly elected at the Third National
Congress with cAflaq as its sole Syrian member, sometime in the late fall
of 1959 decided that the Bacthist ministers in the UAR government should
resign. cAflaq entertained the idea of trying to induce some Egyptians to
join them. As he told it, he was encouraged by one Da’ud Uways to think
that two Egyptian ministers would join the Bacthists in resigning. Hawrani
and Bitar discouraged cAflaq from pursuing this notion and only the
Iraq and the Split with Nasir 161

Bacthists resigned.56 On December 30, 1959, Nasir announced that he had

accepted the resignations of Hawrani, Bitar, Hamdun, and Qannut. Khalil
Kallas resigned a few days later, once an investigation within his depart­
ment was finished.
The Bacth Party was at pains to create the impression that the resigna­
tions of the ministers did not signify a split between itself and the President
of the United Arab Republic. Al-Sahafah on December 31, 1959, denied
the tendentious rumors spread by some ill-intentioned quarters about an
alleged battle between the Bacthists and the leaders of the United Arab
Republic. The Bacthists said that the existence of differences of view
between people devoted to their nation did not mean that a battle has taken
place. The Bacthists who had the honor to take an effective part in the
creation of the union would continue to be loyal to and to work for the
union, for its protection, and for the consolidation of its bases.57 A few
days later the paper said, “ The resignation of some of the leaders who did
much to free the Syrian province from imperialism and feudalism . . .
having played a basic role in the crystalization of the union, does not mean
that they have abandoned their activity in the service of the UAR, rather
this may be an opportunity for them to increase this positive activity into
defending the union. . . ,’’58
President Nasir was less concerned, for the Bacth Party must have
looked pretty feeble to him in December 1959. Just a few weeks after the
resignations, in an interview with certain West German press representa­
tives, he was asked the question, “ After the resignation of some of the
ministers . . . the impression in Europe was not quite all right [sic].” The
President answered, “ What happened after the resignation of the Bacthists?
They resigned. But in any country ministers resign and the President
accepts their resignation.” End of answer.59
The split between Nasir and the Bacthists spilled into the newspapers at
the time of the second anniversary of the formation of the UAR. On
February 22, 1960, Al-Sahafah carried a long article issued with the
concurrence of the National Command. The article began by discussing the
Syrian struggle within the parliamentary system against dictatorship and
the Syrian development of “ popular democratic forces and the ripening of
progressive thought.” It drew a contrast with the situation in Egypt:
“ Egypt in different circumstances emerged from its provincial isolation
and discovered its true Arab nature.” 60 The Bacth had hoped that the union
would serve to increase the people’s accomplishments in the two regions,
especially in preparing the masses and organizing them to assist in making
social and economic progress. The party wanted to draw on the people’s
knowledge to facilitate broad interaction with Egypt, “ where there is a
popular revolutionary vacuum” owing to the throttling of the popular
162 THE BACTH PARTY

movement before the revolution, which could not be adequately reversed

after 1952.61
“ This interaction and popular movement will never be realized except
by an increase of democratic freedom in the sphere of the republic leading
to awakening mass enterprises, promoting people’s slogans in a responsi­
ble manner, and creating enthusiasm among patriots for participation in
building the new society. Mass participation demands that the people be
organized and grouped in their own peoples, political, and syndical
organizations, representing village, town, and union institutions in such a
way as to assure supervision of the conduct of the government and defense
of it as well. . . .” 62
Finally, “ the republic, as the organism which raised slogans of libera­
tion, unity, democracy, and progress, will be able to influence the Arab
revolution only to the degree that these slogans flourish in its own
territories.’’ “ These regions [Algeria and the Maghrib] will never be eager
for unity if they have seen in it a loss or a decrease of their achievements,
of which they are proud and for which they strive.’’63
Nasir replied in his anniversary speech the following day:

If any group, faction, or political party tries to deceive this nation they will
not succeed because the people are fully alert. If any group among us comes
forward and claims a monopoly of politics we will tell them that our basic
objective is to establish a society free from political exploitation. If a group
or scores of persons claim that they are the trustees of the people and that
they represent the basis of the revolution, I tell them that the people are the
true foundation of the revolution and no group of persons have the right to
claim trusteeship over this people or claim that it represents the basis of the
people. To us such a claim is derogatory to the people. As I have said this
people is a creator of things and is a nation which leads. When we announced
the national union, this was an announcement that we believe in this people
as a whole and in all its trends—men, women and youth as the foundation of
the revolution and the pivot of the revolution. If a group or faction of persons
denies this right of the people and the characteristics of the people and claims
for itself or for a score of persons brought together by being opportunists that
they are the basis of the revolution, we can tell them that this is an act of
opportunism and that this nation . . . can never leave a loophole for
opportunists to pass through. . . .64

Few who heard or read Nasir’s speech had any doubt as to whom he meant
by the group or faction of persons.
While the Bacth leaders avoided personal attacks and harsh criticism in
their public pronouncements, they were not so circumspect in papers
circulated among party members. In the circular the National Command
issued in March 1960, they said, “ Government in the United Arab
Iraq and the Split with Nasir 163

Republic is a personal one, relying on the president, professional aides,

and intelligence and propaganda services and pressure.” The document
went on to say that experts in intelligence who had proved their capabilities
and their loyalty to the president in Egypt were employed and that the
“ civil service of the Syrian region saw officers and employees of the
Egyptian intelligence apparatus show up in every directorate.” 65 Further,
“ what those responsible did, in trying to apply in both provinces of the
republic, was not merely to impose the former Egyptian governmental
system in its administrative sense but in its general content in popular
matters; they were ignorant of the experience of the Syrian region and the
great nationalist victories which it had achieved in the field of popular
work.” 66
Given their very different views of the way a political system should
work, conflict between Nasir and the Bacthists was inevitable. Nasir
clearly saw political parties as a source of trouble—and said so. From this
belief stemmed his several attempts to construct a political mechanism
embracing all the segments of Egyptian society with an interest in the
governance of the country. The National Union was the second in a series
of such mechanisms that by 1970 numbered four. The National Union had
a wide organizational base with each member of a local committee
representing about five hundred citizens. The pyramidal organizational
structure would, in theory, permit ideas, complaints, and petitions to flow
up to the decision-making levels of government. This apparatus would
harmonize with the governmental structure that had developed in Egypt
since 1952, where first the Revolutionary Command Council had made
decisions as a group, and later Nasir began to make the decisions with the
advice of his revolutionary colleagues. An organization of the National
Union sort might suggest and advise, but it had no power to compel; the
regime made doubly sure of this by having most district committee
members appointed from above, rather than elected from below. There was
little room for give and take in such an arrangement.
This system contrasted sharply with the political situation in Syria after
1946, where a multitude of political parties—each with a power base in a
region, a group, a class, and perhaps an ideology—competed for power
and influence. The Syrian political system was hardly utopian; venality
was common, and political activity included a fair measure of strong-arm
tactics, but there was no single focus of power to decide ultimate questions
or even to adjudicate between rivals. They had to argue or fight it out
among themselves.
The Bacth had been bom in this system; playing the game under these
rules, it had done reasonably well. It also had developed a system, however
imperfect, of arguing out at least some party decisions within the party
structure. It was prepared to use what political power it had to advance its
164 THE BACTH PARTY

own interests, and it had expected to do just that within the National Union.
In a way, the party tried to have the best of two worlds. It dissolved itself
organizationally in the UAR, but many of its members, particularly the
leaders, continued to act and talk as if they were still party members, which
was, no doubt, nàtural. The party still existed elsewhere in the Arab world,
and some of its leaders were members of the party in its pan-Arab sense but
ex-members in its Syrian sense.
To Nasir and his colleagues, however, such activity looked very
different. As he said in 1963:-

I thought the party had dissolved itself, but it appeared later it had not. It was
still vocal. We began to get the impression that it was operating under­
ground, working for a hostile policy. It is this which brought us to the
situation we reached in our political relations within unity. None of you,
before unity, came out with .the idea that the progressive parties or organiza­
tions could play a role in unity. That was not part of our thought. You, of
course, entertained partisan thoughts based on the standpoint of the Bacth
Party. But when I think, I do so in a wider framework. To me there are two
trends—nationalist and non-nationalist—which are by no means reconcil­
able. Unity of aim embraces the nationalist trends which should all be
grouped in one.67

People were acting like party members, which was bad in and of itself;
and when a “ Bacthist” minister acted on his own without reference to the
top, as Riyad Malki did in authorizing the publishing of papers edited by
former Bacthists, such action was viewed by the top as insubordination. In
the Egyptians’ view, other Bacth activities, e .g ., al-Sahqfah’s commenting
on the National Union elections and praising certain Bacthi victories, the
attendance of UAR ministers at party meetings, were not only traitorous
but flatly contradicted the party’s promise to dissolve itself. The Bacth
stood out because other Syrian political parties adopted a relatively low
profile during the first year of the UAR.
The split between Nasir and the Bacthists does not seem to have caused
the Egyptian leader deep concern. His prestige as a pan-Arab leader was
still very high; few had recognized that the erratic and verbose Qasim’s
refusal to join “ the Arab caravan’ ’ marked the end of the great unity surge
of the 1950s. Even though Nasir subsequently admitted that it would have
been better to allow some partisan activity in the Syrian province of the
UAR, he held the Bacthist leaders in little esteem and almost certainly
regarded their resignations as a net gain. The Bacthists themselves do not
seem to have had any notions that their resignations would greatly affect
the UAR government. The leaders made no effort to reconstitute the party
organization in Syria during the remaining lifetime of the UAR; their
Iraq and the Split with Nasir 165

principal concern was the party as a pan-Arab organization. The problems

of the organization, already tom by factionalism, occupied much of their
time for several years as they struggled with organizational and policy
matters.

Notes
1. Internal Circular, “ On the Present Situation in Iraq,” issued by the party’s
General Secretariat, March 1959, in Nidal al-Bacth (Beirut: Dar al-Talieah, 1963)
IV, p. 79; hereafter cited as Nidal.
2. Ibid., p. 78.
3. Interview with an Iraqi Bacthist, October 1965.
4. Nidal VII, p. 53.
5. Quoted in Arab World, March 5, 1959, p. 4.
6. See Uriel Dann, Iraq Under Qassem (New York: Praeger, 1969), Chapter
13, for a discussion of the Shawwaf rebellion.
7. Fu’ad Rikabi, al-Hall al-Awhad (The Only Solution) (Cairo: al-Sharikah
al-cArabiyah li al-Tibacah wa al-Nashr, 1963), pp. 28-29.
8. Arab World, March 11, 1959, p. 3.
9. Ibid., April 2, 1959, p. 5.
10. Nidal VII, p. 47.
11. Dann, Iraq Under Qassem, p. 176, and Majid Khadduri, Republican Iraq
(London: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 110-11.
12. Seeal-Bacth, April 7, 1964, for identities of some victims. An Iraqi named
Hilal Naji later published in Egypt a crude propaganda booklet about these events.
Titled The Bloody Hands in Iraq, it contains pictures of atrocities and identifies
several dozen victims, both civilian and military.
13. Nidal IV, p. 77. This circular is cited in Footnote 1 above; it was the second
in a series of party releases issued in preparation for the Third National Congress.
14. Ibid., pp. 80-82.
15. The dissolution was announced in the unofficial NDP newspaper, al-Ahali,
of that date. See Dann, Iraq Under Qassem, p. 208.
16. Ibid., pp. 208-9.
17. MEJ, Chronology, Vol. 13, No. 3, p. 292.
18. Cited in Arab World, May 11, 1959, p. 2.
19. Al-Sahafah (Beirut), April 26, quoted in Arab World, April 27, 1959, p. 8.
20. Arab World, May 25, 1959, p. 7.
21. Nidal VII, p. 57.
22. Ibid., pp. 73-75, “ The First Anniversary of the July 14 Revolution.”
23. Oies M. Smolansky, The Soviet Union and the Arab East Under
Khrushchev (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1974), pp. 160-61; Khadduri,
Republican Iraq, pp. 124-25; Dann, Iraq Under Qassem, pp. 223-26.
24. Arab World, Sept. 25, 1959.
166 THE BACTH PARTY

25. Rikabi, al-Hall al-Awhad, p. 83. This book, cited frequently below, is
Rikabi’s apologia for the assassination attempt—the “ only solution” to Qasim’s
misrule.
26. Ibid., p. 93. The Arab press had speculated widely as to the identity of
Qasim’s would-be killers in the days immediately following the attempt.
27. Ibid., p. 30.
28. Ibid., pp. 36, 40-44. See also Mid-East Mirror, Jan. 3, 1960, pp. 3 and 5,
reporting on the trials of the persons accused of the attempt. Hereafter cited as
MEM.
29. Rikabi, al-Hall al-Awhad, p. 45.
30. Ibid., pp. 49-51.
31. Ibid., pp. 52-53.
32. Ibid., p. 58.
33. Ibid., p. 67.
34. Ibid., pp. 72-73,
35. Ibid., pp. 81-82. Among those on the scene were Saddam Husayn Tikriti,
Samir cAbd al-cAziz al-Najm, Ahmad Taha cAzzuz, cAbd al-Karim Shaykhli, and
Hatim al-cAzzawi. The first two were wounded.
36. Ibid., pp. 90 and 92; see also MEM, Jan. 3, 1960, p. 3.
37. MEM, Jan. 3, 1960, p. 4.
38. MEM, Jan. 17, 1960, p. 13.
39. Quoted in Arab World, Jan. 15, 1960, p. 1.
40. Nidal IV, p. 189.
41. Ibid., p. 185.
42. This article was reprinted in Middle East Forum, Vol. 36, No. 9, Nov.
1960, pp. 26-27.
43. The statement is in Nidal IV, pp. 92-112.
44. Rikabi, al-Hall al-Awhad, p. 52. Rikabi was referring to the circumstance
that three of the National Command’s seven members were Syrians and were, so to
speak, dissolved.
45. Arab World, March 29, 1960, p. 6.
46. MEM, Jan. 24, 1960, p. 7.
47. Sami al-Jundi, al-Bacth (Beirut: Dar al-Nahar li al-Nashr, 1969), p. 81.
Jundi implies that the colonel was more important to the Iraqis’ plans than was the
National Command.
48. MEM, Jan. 10, 1960, p.
49. BBC, Tri-partite Talks, ME/1285/E/11. This payment, amounting to 6,000
Egyptian pounds, according to the Iraqis, and to 70,000 according to Nasir, was
made in 1958 and 1959.
50. Dann, Iraq Under Qassem, p. 254. Dann also describes a second assassina­
tion scheme, run by Midhat al-Hajj Sirri, which the Baghdad authorities did not
distinguish clearly from Rikabi’s. Sirri was among the 77 persons arraigned before
Mihdawi’s court.
51. Arab World, Jan. 2, 1962, p. 1.
52. Nidal IV, p. 153, “ Our Position on the Government of the UAR.”
53. Ibid., p. 154. See also BBC, Tri-partite Talks, ME/1297/E/5.
54. Al-Baeth, Aug. 31, 1954, in Nidal III, p. 22.
55. Arab World, Feb. 12, 1958, p. 6.
Iraq and the Split with Nasir 167

56. BBC, Tri-partite Talks, ME/1297/E/15-16; cAflaq strongly implied here

that the Egyptians had tried to trap him into making a move against Nasir’s
leadership.
57. Arab World, Dec. 31, 1959, p. 3.
58. Ibid., Jan. 4, 1960, pp. 8-9.
59. Jamal cAbd al-Nasir, Speeches and Press Interviews, January-March
I960, p. 131.
60. The article is reproduced in Nidal IV, pp. 122-27; these citations are to
p. 123.
61. Ibid., p. 125.
62. Ibid., pp. 125-26.
63. Ibid., p. 126.
64. Nasir, Speeches and Press Interviews, January-March I960, p. 92; speech
of Feb. 23, 1960.
65. Nidal IV, pp. 139 and 140.
66. Ibid., p. 142. The document also explained the reasons for the resignation
of the Bacthist ministers.
67. BBC, Tri-partite Talks, ME/1303/E/6.
 - 11 -

The National Party Congresses

of 1959 and 1960

The Bacth’s role in the formation of the UAR, the decision of its leaders to
dissolve the party organizations in Syria and Egypt, and the Bacth’s
subsequent falling out with Nasir and loss of influence had long-term
effects on party organization and discipline. In the three years between
mid-1959 and mid-1962, splits and defections in Jordan, Iraq, and Leba­
non resulted in the withdrawal from the party of well over half the
leadership in each region. In Syria, cooperation between the cAflaq and
Bitar faction and Akram Hawrani’s Arab Socialist followers dwindled after
the “ former Bacthist” ministers resigned, and the two finally split in June
1962 after nearly ten stormy years of association. This is getting ahead of
the story, however. In the period following the establishment of the UAR,
the party leaders’ principal organizational task was twofold, first, to defend
the decision to dissolve the party, and second, to deal with dissidence in
various party commands. The most appropriate method of discharging the
task was to hold a national congress of the Party, bringing together party
representatives from organizations wherever they existed.
At the time the party leaders in Syria agreed to dissolve the party
organization in the UAR, it had been nearly four years since the party had
held a national congress. (Party statutes required that a national congress be
held every two years or so unless events seemed to warrant postponement.)
Events within and without Syria had been such as to prevent the National
Command from calling a congress. First, there had been the Suez imbro­
glio in 1956, then the Jordanian troubles in the spring of 1957, Syria’s fears
of intervention by Baghdad Pact powers later in the year, and finally, the
excitement over the formation of the UAR. A very important cause of
postponement was the difference between the approach of Hawrani’s wing
of the party and the approach of cAflaq, Bitar, and their followers. Hawrani
was less of a pan-Arabist than cAflaq and Bitar. Syria was his field of
action; he did not take kindly to the disciplinary aspects of the Bacth and
would have jibbed at giving Bacthists from other countries any say about
political affairs in Syria.
170 THE BACTH PARTY

The dissolution of the party in the UAR, however, severely jolted the
rank and file; it generated requests for a national congress from party
members in all regions. The various regional organizations, concerned at
developments since 1954, were even more concerned by immediate prob­
lems. What would the Bacth Party be like without its original organization,
the party in Syria? How would the National Command function when three
of its seven members were Syrians? Did the party indeed have a future as
an organized political body?1 But 1958 was an even more tumultuous year
than its predecessors. Civil war in Lebanon, revolution in Iraq, and other
developments delayed agreement on the make-up of a preparatory commis­
sion for the congress. It was not until December 1958 that Secretary
General cAflaq announced that the congress would be held, and the
preparatory committee held its first meeting on January 8, 1959.2
cAflaq and his supporters distributed an outline of points to be discussed
to the preparatory committee. In this outline the Secretary General sug­
gested three principal issues for the Third National Congress to consider:
(a) serious disregard of the internal statute of the party in day-to-day
activity and wide differences in its application within various units of the
party; (b) organizational disruption so severe that it was no longer possible
to say that the party was functioning as one political movement; and (c) the
consequences of the dissolution of the Bacth in the UAR, including
widespread confusion among party cadres, and doubts about the party’s
future.3
The preparatory committee’s session revealed deep differences between
cAflaq and Jordan Regional Secretary Rimawi. cAflaq’s position as Secre­
tary General was not legally affected by the party’s dissolution in Syria,
and he had not taken any official role in the United Arab Republic. Points
(a) and (b) above were directed at Rimawi and probably, to some degree, at
Iraq Party Secretary Fu’ad Rikabi. Since fleeing Jordan in 1957, cAbdallah
Rimawi had become a disciple of Nasir and, from his exile in Cairo, had
endeavored to direct the party’s activities in Jordan to benefit the Nasir
government. Like Rikabi, he maintained that the National Command
elected in 1954 had lost its authority to direct the party and that the Syrians
should not be members of the National Command because their regional
organization had been dissolved. Besides himself and Rikabi, only the
Lebanese cAli Jabir was left. Nacwas had died in the summer of 1958.
The differences between cAflaq and Rimawi were neither solved nor
submerged in the meetings of the preparatory committee, of which Rimawi
was a member. Although he participated in the preparatory committee’s
selection of a three-man group to assist the Secretary General in running
the national congress, he was not able to control the congress.4 The
congress met from August 28 to September 1, 1959 in Beirut. It was
The National Party Congresses 171

attended by “ representatives of Party organizations in Iraq, Lebanon,

Jordan, the Arabian Peninsula, the Gulf, South Arabia, the Arab Maghreb,
organizations of Palestinians and of student Party members in Arab
universities and other universities outside the Arab world. . . .” 5 About a
hundred people attended.6 There were, of course, no Syrian delegates.
Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon, as the largest party organizations outside Syria,
provided most of the delegates. Under a regulation promulgated by the
preparatory committee, the congress was to be attended by representatives
from the three Regional Commands (Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon), from the
Branch Commands, and by one member elected by each division (firqah)
of the party from among its own members.7
This last provision was probably a device to help bolster cAflaq’s forces
in the congress. Stripped of the support of the dissolved Syrian regional
organization, he and his supporters undoubtedly felt the need for additional
support and believed they could get it more easily from the cadres in a
region such as Jordan, where the Regional Secretary, Rimawi, was
opposed to them. Normally, a regional secretary would have a great deal of
influence over the delegates selected by regional branch commands, but
would probably have been much less able to influence elections in the
divisions at the bottom of the organizational pyramid. Maneuvers permit­
ting the party organization to be bypassed were later banned; the Sixth
National Congress issued revised statutes which limited active participation
in congresses to Regional Command members and delegates elected by the
highest party congress in the country.8
The Third National Congress focused essentially on three issues: first,
the responsibility for and consequences of the dissolution in Syria; second,
“ a dangerous trend aimed at freeing regional organizations from the
National Command” i.e., the question of whether the party would con­
tinue as a centralized entity;9 third, whether the party would retain its
distinctive identity as a populist ideological organization or become merely
“ an echo of the policy of the United Arab Republic.” 10 The faction headed
by Rimawi wanted each Regional Command to be virtually independent of
the national organization. He favored having National Command members
selected by each Regional Command, rather than being chosen by the
National Congress as a whole, as had been the practice in 1947 and 1954.
Rimawi also had come to believe strongly that the party should work at the
direction of the UAR government.
cAflaq and his supporters were highly vulnerable on the issue of the
dissolution of the party in Syria. The Bacth leaders in Syria had made the
decision to dissolve on their own. There had not even been a meeting of the
National Command to examine what the effects of the dissolution might
be. A year later, following the Fourth National Congress, the National
172 THE BACTH PARTY

Command said: “ It is appropriate to record at this point that the decision to

dissolve the Party in the Syrian Province was not made by a national
congress of the Party nor by the National Command in an organized way;
the Party commands outside Syria had no useful opinion on the matter but
were confronted with a fait accompli.” 11 The various Regional Commands
were not consulted on the subject. The most that the leaders did was to
appoint a committee drawn from the Syrian Region to examine the
probable consequences of dissolution. This committee appears to have
reported orally to the leadership that it did not rind any practical or
ideological justification for the dissolution.12 Its advice went unheeded.
Illegal though it had been by party standards, the dissolution would
probably not have been a cause of major trouble if the party had obtained
an influential position in the UAR. However, the “ former Bacthists” in
Syria had failed to gain even a significant voice in the recently completed
National Union elections, and the Syrian Party leaders could not justify the
dissolution on the grounds that it had resulted in increased power for the
party. Moreover, Rimawi and his partisans in the congress could argue
that, in dissolving the organization in Syria without reference to the
National Command, the party leaders had acted with the sort of regional
autonomy that they now wanted for all party regions.
Some participants almost certainly argued that, in ordering dissolution,
the Syrian Bacth leaders had put their fortunes and Syria’s interests above
the fortunes and interests of the party in other Arab regions. While the
report of the Third National Congress does not refer to this aspect directly,
the Fourth National Congress report does. One of the flaws in party
organization prior to the formation of the UAR, said the report, was the
excessive influence exerted by the party organization in the Syrian region
because of its role as the original home of the party; in Syria, it said, “ . . .
Party decisions were taken on the basis of understanding of the general
national pan-Arab situation, but were actively influenced by the particular
local circumstances of the Party in Syria.” 13
But cAflaq and his supporters, the traditional leaders, threatened with
loss of power and control, could not afford to admit serious mistakes. They
were determined to get official party approval for their dissolution of the
party in Syria, to maintain the National Command’s authority over the
Regional Commands, and to have the Congress declare its support of the
concept and existence of the United Arab Republic.
Details of the proceedings, like those of most of the early Bacth
meetings, are lacking. Naji cAllush, who appears either to have been a
participant or to have talked extensively to participants, says that somewhat
more than a bare majority of the delegates supported the party leaders’
position on the issues of a centralized party with regional organizations
The National Party Congresses 173

subordinate to the national apparatus and of maintaining the party’s

character as a populist ideological movement, distinct from the UAR. After
extensive debate, Rimawi and his Jordanian colleague Bahjat Abu Ghar-
biyah withdrew, after Abu Gharbiyah charged that the party was working
against the United Arab Republic. They were followed by 34 other
participants, mostly Jordanian refugees in Damascus. The congress ap­
pointed a committee to work out a compromise, but the effort failed. The
congress then proceeded to elect a new National Command, to revise the
Internal Statutes in some respects, and resolved to hold a new national
congress in a year’s time.14 The new command numbered nine members in
addition to cAflaq as Secretary General: cAli Jabir, cAbd al-Wahhab
Shumitli, Ghassan Shararah (Lebanese), Khalid Yashruti (Palestinian),
Rikabi, Talib Shabib, Sacdun Hamadi (Iraqis), Munif Razzaz and Amin
Shuqayr (Jordanians).15 cAli Jabir and Fu’ad Rikabi were the only hold­
overs. The congress also issued a statement affirming the party’s complete
support for the United Arab Republic. When Rimawi refused to support
this statement, the National Command expelled him and publicized the
expulsion in the September 8 issue of al-Sahafah16 Before he was formally
expelled, Rimawi published an article in the PPS Beirut paper al-Bina’ on
September 6, 1959, in which he said that all Jordanian delegates had
withdrawn from the National Congress of the party because it was illegal.
He insisted that he remained Secretary in Jordan and that everything that
was said about him was a pack of lies.
A month after the congress concluded, al-Sahafah published a “ politi­
cal statement issued by the National Command of the Bacth Party, October
10, 1959, following the Third National Congress of the Party.’’17 Intended
for publication, the statement was largely a public relations piece, only
hinting at divisions in the party and the tumult at the Third Congress. The
statement noted the party’s role as a vanguard, criticized developments
under Qasim in Iraq, discussed the party’s growth in such areas as the
Sudan, the Gulf, and the Maghrib, and stressed that existing circumstances
required a “ new outburst of energies.” The statement devoted the follow­
ing three paragraphs to the UAR:

The Bacth Party, which shared with the Revolutionary Command in Egypt in
creating the United Arab Republic in response to the wishes of millions of
our people both in Egypt and Syria and outside them and which worked to
consolidate and protect this republic, still has the serious responsibility of
strengthening its foundations, of defending it, and of cooperating firmly with
its leadership in achieving the aims of the Arab people and of their mision.
The National Party Congress, from which sprang the new command,
announces its agreement with the decision of the previous command to
174 THE BACTH PARTY

dissolve the Party in the United Arab Republic. This decision was taken in
consideration of this being the first national congress held since the above
mentioned dissolution decision.
The new departure which the Party is undertaking following the new national
reorganization will increase the strength and effectiveness of its struggle in
the other parts of the Arab homeland, and it [the party] supports cooperation
with the leadership of the United Arab Republic.18

That the party was not being strictly accurate in attributing the decision
to dissolve to the previous National Command as a whole was hinted at in a
different portion of the October 10 statement: “ The Party had benefited
. . . from past experiences in which some encroachments on the principle
of collective leadership have occurred. It has worked on correcting these
excesses and on protecting the principle of collective leadership by raising
the ideological and organizational level of its members, by its eagerness to
achieve democracy and centralization in its organization to the greatest
possible extent, and by imposing the principle of criticism and self-
criticism on its command. . . .” 19
Participants in the congress could read these words as applying to the
Syrian Party leaders, but also to Rimawi, and—by an extraordinary
coincidence—to cAbdallah Rikabi and his associates on the Regional
Command in Iraq for their unauthorized attempt on October 7 to assassi­
nate Qasim. The victory of the cAflaq faction over Rimawi’s in the battle
over organization and authority was reflected in the following passages:

The national unity of our Party embodies the correctness of its faith in the
unity of the Arab nation . . . and the correctness of our struggle to achieve
this unity in practice on the popular democratic foundation which in turn is
the base for our Party and organization.
The practice of the command in collective leaderships is to take decisions by
majority in accordance with plans and directions of Party congresses and to
be responsible to these congresses. This guarantees the Party true democracy
in its apparatus and gives scope . . . for raising standards of Party struggle
. . . to assure the soundness of the Party’s policy and the capability and
loyalty of its commands.
The Party leadership in each region pursues a program of Party struggle and
policy in every stage in the light of the big plan of national policy.20

In addition to dealing with the questions of the party’s dissolution in

Syria, of its relations with the United Arab Republic, and of national versus
regional control of the party, the statement also asserted that the party was
ready to cooperate with revolutionary forces in all Arab states and to
The National Party Congresses 175

“ work to join with other national parties and groups in popular fronts, on
issues on which there is agreement with those parties.” 21 It criticized
Communist activities in Arab states and reaffirmed the party’s support for
positive neutralism.22
Finally, it promised that the party would “ double its efforts in every
region to increase the masses’ consciousness of their nationalist achieve­
ment and of their own interests and to explain and strengthen the progres­
sive content of nationalist thought which our Party considers ‘the will of
the Arab people that they be liberated and united and that they be given the
opportunity to achieve the Arab identity in history and that they cooperate
with all nations in everything that helps humanity advance towards that
which is good and beneficial.’ ” 23
But it was a battered party, greatly reduced in size and virtually without
capacity to influence the policy of any Arab state, that made such
promises. The party apparatus in Syria had been disbanded for nearly two
years. cAbdallah Rimawi took with him virtually all the Jordanian Bacthist
leaders in exile, plus a large number of followers in Jordan. The party
apparatus in Jordan had already been hurt by the Amman government’s
repression of political activity since April 1957. By unhappy coincidence,
only two days before the National Command issued its statement, Bacthists
in Iraq had tried and failed to assassinate Qasim. In a matter of weeks, the
Iraqi Regional Command was scattered and several dozen Bacthists put in
jail. Lower echelons of the party structure in Iraq had to function on their
own initiative for a time.
Some adherents were being recruited in Aden, in the Gulf, and in
Libya, but their numbers appear to have been small. Only in Lebanon did
the party have a reasonably sound position. Although its numbers were not
large, its daily newspaper, al-Sahafah, continued to provide an outlet for
party views, and its members were able to organize and proselytize. But
even in Lebanon, the party had weaknesses. Al-Sahafah was forced to
convert to a weekly in the spring of 1960, because it could no longer sell
issues in Syria.24 But there were probably not enough buyers in Lebanon
even to support a weekly; despite efforts to increase support for the paper,
it folded late in 1960.
The Third National Congress was in some respects a holding operation,
as evidenced by its promise to hold another national congress in a year’s
time. That year might be characterized as one of decay at the center and
new growth at the periphery. This growth featured reconstruction of the
party organization in Iraq and Jordan, as well as advances in Libya. But the
year was also characterized by the appearance of a second Bacth Party.
cAbdallah Rimawi tried to demonstrate that he and his followers
possessed the legitimate Bacthist heritage by setting up a rival party
176 THE BACTH PARTY

organization in May 1960. It purported to represent party members in all

Arab states except the United Arab Republic. The Rimawi group an­
nounced on May 19 that a party convention had appointed a temporary
command consisting of himself, Bahjat Abu Gharbiyah, Sulayman al-
Hadidi, Shaykhun Habusi, and Hafiz cAbd al-Hadi—all Jordanians.25
Later in the year, the Beirut press reported that Rimawi’s group announced
the holding of a second convention and the appointment of a new “ national
revolutionary command.” The word revolutionary was a trademark of
Rimawi’s party for as long as it was in existence; it was officially termed
the Arab Bacth Revolutionary Socialist Party (Hizb al-Bacth al-cArabi
al-Thawri al-Ishtiraki). Rimawi established his rival Bacth organization
with Cairo’s support; the Egyptians probably felt it would help attract
support for the UAR in other Arab states. He obviously needed Cairo’s
agreement to found a party and keep it functioning, particularly a party that
had its headquarters in Damascus and later in Cairo, even though it had no
members from Egypt or Syria. Information on the size of this party is even
harder to come by than information on the size of the regular Bacth Party,
but it does not appear to have been large. Most of Rimawi’s followers were
Jordanians, and he later gained some support from Iraqis. Fu’ad Rikabi
joined the Revolutionary Bacth in late 1961 or early 1962. Within a few
months of the rival party’s founding in 1960, however, it was weakened by
the arrest of Abu Gharbiyah and other members inside Jordan.
Rimawi’s party lasted until sometime in 1962 or perhaps 1963, but its
chief function during the year between the Third and Fourth National
Congresses was to sow confusion. The existence of two Bacth parties must
have produced uncertainty in the minds of party supporters as to which
organization to favor, a circumstance that may have deterred potential
recruits and, in addition, caused some party militants to cease their
activity.
The year between the Third and Fourth congresses brought few ad­
vances to the party. Its national leaders were engrossed in preparing for the
Fourth Congress, in keeping the identity of the party separate from that of
Rimawi’s group, and, simply, in political survival. The document issued
by the National Command at the end of the Fourth Congress seemed to
recognize August 1959 to August 1960 as a period of marking time when it
said, “ . . . great responsibilities devolve upon us [the Bacthists] to revive
the populist movements and give them their proper role in the leadership of
the Arab battle. These responsibilities oblige us, as a vanguard party, to
resume building our Party in a revolutionary way and to establish goals and
slogans for the struggle in the coming phase.” 26
The Fourth National Congress convened in Beirut in August 1960, just
a year after the Third Congress, in accordance with the decision of that
The National Party Congresses 177

congress. cAflaq and his close associates probably agreed to hold the
Fourth Congress in order to keep wavering delegates on their side when the
party was facing Rimawi’s defection the previous year. The Bacthists made
an effort to avoid public notice in 1960 and to a large extent succeeded.
They issued no public statement and the party organ al-Sahafah ignored the
existence of the congress. Two documents relating to the congress indicate
that the delegates concentrated their attention on deciding how the party
should conduct itself in respect to the United Arab Republic, on correcting
past errors, and on devising ways to inspire the party membership and
commands to work harder.
The principal source of information on this congress is a document
circulated to party members only by the National Command after the
congress. It has been cited above in connection with responsibility for
dissolution of the party in the UAR. It is a frank, outspoken document,
critical of past errors and deviations from party philosophy. It did not
criticize party members by name but it did identify some organizational
components and groups. Because it was not intended for anyone outside
the party, it could avoid posturing for public relations purposes.27
The Congress reasserted the thesis that the National Party took prece­
dence over the regions, noting that “ primacy in political work [went] to big
national problems, following a national policy which is in harmony with
the national interests of the Party and treating the regional problems as a
function of the national policy of the Party.” 28 It asked that party
organizations make “ broad and deep study(ies) of conditions in the
regions—from both political and economic points of view—so that, in the
light of this study, it will be possible to define the regional missions of the
Party, thus setting out detailed lines of actions suited to conditions in the
regions, along with the broad program of national activity.” 29
The Congress noted that reliance on non-populist methods in Iraq and in
Jordan had tom the people’s movement apart from within. It also referred
to “ reliance by some agents on creating divisions within the one Party,”
i.e., the Bacth, a slap at Rimawi and Rikabi.30 The two deviationists were
also the target of the following decision: “ The Congress decided to
condemn the positions of the Party commands which deviated from
populist methods in the struggle and turned to non-populist methods,
relying on military revolts and political assassinations.” 31 The Congress
was critical of the National Command, accusing it of “ not putting its best
efforts on the national level” and requiring from it “ attention to activity on
the national level, and the establishment of Party organizations in all Arab
regions as well as attention to their [the organizations’] work.” 32 It went
on to view the “ character of the Party in the past period as having failed
often to project itself, in its attitude and its work, as an independent and
178 THE BACTH PARTY

distinctive organization. Hence the Congress recommends that the National

Command emphasize the independence of the Party, in its focus and
method, from those of the Arab Republic and to make our nationalist
approach clear to democratic revolutionary and progressive elements.” 33
As mentioned above, the Fourth National Congress repudiated the
decision of the Syrian party leaders to dissolve the party in the UAR. The
Congress also rejected the Third National Congress’s approval of the
dissolution, although noting that the dissolution had been taken on the basis
of the situation prevailing at the time. It went on to say, “ The National
Congress, in condemning from an ideological viewpoint the decision to
dissolve the Party, disapproves the non-revolutionary methods which were
employed as justification for this decision and which came about from a
dependence on promises and intentions which derived neither from a
scientific study of the political and economic situation, nor from the
possibilities of its development, nor from the dependence on populist
guarantees of revolutionary force.” 34 In effect, the party organization was
telling the Secretary General that his famous statement of February 25,
1958, “ We will be officially dissolved but we will be present in the new
unified Party of the National Union. Bom of the union of the two countries,
this movement cannot be animated by principles other than those of the
Bacth” was a colossal mistake based on an equally colossal miscalculation.
(See Chapter 8 above.)
After listing a number of factors that had operated in favor of unity—the
party’s expectation of a broad new Held of activity in the National Union,
the idealization of unity as a sort of utopia, the union of the two largest and
most progressive Arab regions, the lessening of caution resulting from
Nasir’s great popularity—the Congress noted the party’s errors:

First, the regional organizations were not consulted in the matter but were
faced with a fait accompli.
Second, the Party’s position was based on personal factors rather than “ on
those real scientific factors which are required of the leadership of a
revolutionary socialist party.” 35
Third, Party leaders were aware of errors of policy and ideology in the
Egyptian province, but believed that “ these symptoms were not incompati­
ble with the sound intention and capacity for accuracy of the leaders of
Egypt. This simplistic political view, combined with the trusteeship mental­
ity which characterized the Party Command, led the Command to believe
that the unity would permit the Party to play its true leading role, to educate
cAbd al-Nasir and ‘his group of ignorant ones’ (jamacataha al-jahilin) and to
push them in the right direction. It is not (at all) clear that the Party
leadership was aware, in a serious way in any of the earlier stages, that these
The National Party Congresses 179

errors and deviations were a natural and inevitable consequence of a specific

system of government. In respect to these errors and deviations, the only
possible solution was basic and radical change in the system itself.
Moreover, the Party Command’s sentiment of cherishing the efforts of cAbd
al-Nasir in actively thrusting Egypt into .the Arab arena was based on a
concept at variance with the Party’s principles, since, in the way it expressed
appreciation of cAbd al-Nasir’s efforts, it left the impression that it valued
action emanating from leaders more than it valued mass action as the
exclusive means of correcting errors.” 36
Fourth, the Party had started a movement toward unity and then found it had
a juggernaut on its hands that it could not control. ‘‘After the first moves on
the road to unity were made, it became clear that between the two
possibilities—union on a dictatorial basis or separatism—zeal and support
did not allow a choice. When the Party found itself on the horns of this
dilemma, it could only choose unity, even though [the unity was] deprived of
the content [which the Party] required as a socialist movement.” 37

The document did not disown unity. Indeed, at the Fourth Congress and
afterward, the party took pains to emphasize that it continued to believe in
the UAR. As long as the UAR lasted, the party refrained from attacking
Nasir publicly. It did feel free to criticize certain aspects of the UAR, such
as the undemocratic composition of the National Union, and it called on its
members and former members to work to achieve democracy within the
UAR and to obtain a greater role for the people in that government.38 The
decision not to criticize Nasir was not to Akram Hawrani’s liking; he was
ready to oppose Nasir and the UAR, at least verbally. Only a few weeks
after the Congress, Hawrani told a visitor that there was no union, only a
process of Egyptianization of Syria.39
The party document devoted much space to a series of recommenda­
tions for Bacth Party activity in various Arab regions. It called for the
creation of a popular front of all people’s Palestinian organizations, a front
that was to be independent of the control of any government. The Congress
asked that the party reorganize in Jordan and regain its role as leader after
destroying the remnants of Rimawi’s faction. It took particular note of a
good start of party growth in Libya, especially because the Bacth there
relied on the people and on the labor movement. It charged the party
organization in Iraq with the task of working to construct “ a people’s force
for terminating existing conditions.” 40
Fearful of losing freedom of action in the only area in which it could
operate fairly freely—although not legally—and of attracting too much
hostile attention, the Congress approved a program presented to it by the
Lebanese Regional Command. This program envisioned moderate opposi­
tion to the regime in Lebanon, one involving criticism only if the Lebanese
180 THE BACTH PARTY

government took steps affecting the people. It forbade “ opening a cam­

paign aiming at radical change” in Lebanon.41 The Congress recognized
that the confessional structure of Lebanese politics and the deep-seated
opposition to pan-Arabism on the part of many Lebanese presented certain
difficulties for it. It addressed the problems in these words:

The command finds—after studying the situation in Lebanon—that the Arab

concept is linked in the minds of part of the people to Islamic confes-
sionalism and to subordination to the United Arab Republic. Hence, it has
decided that it is preferable to explain, our nationalist concept and make clear
its progressive, lay understanding and to avoid uncritical, romantic ways of
making the nationalist concept understood. Therefore, in the current phase,
our struggle should center on affirming the lay nature of our campaign and its
socialist inclusiveness as the focus of popular support, rather than sectarian
[differences] of groups and classes of people. This strategy means that we do
not raise slogans of unity with the UAR or any other Arab region [in
Lebanon], but that we are content to work for Arab unity as an ultimate goal,
not as a political program advanced for implementation now.42

More than half of the document sent out to members by the National
Command consisted of a “ Report on Methods of Party Work, submitted by
the National Command of the Congress and approved by the Congress.”
Essentially a critique of poor party work in past years, it opened by calling
upon members to renew their faith in the party and to work harder to
increase its political effectiveness. It attributed much of the loss of faith on
the part of party members to the effects of the 1958 dissolution: “ The
decision to dissolve the Party in the United Arab Republic created wide­
spread agitation in Party circles and in the opinion of those who supported
the Party; the dangers of this agitation were not made clear until after the
subsidence of the great wave of enthusiasm which accompanied the act of
unity.” 43
The report noted that a prominent error in theory had been overem­
phasis on unity to the detriment of the principles of socialism and
democracy. It said:

Party writings focused almost exclusively on unity, while socialism and

democracy were overshadowed and fell to a secondary level in the thinking
of Party members. The distinguishing characteristic of the Bacth was its
national character; for example, application for membership in the Party
centered on Arab nationalism without mentioning the idea of socialism.
There is no doubt that in the past phase of the Party struggle such
concentration on the nationalist aspect had been required, in times when
opposition to unity filled people with doubt as to its reality. But focussing on
a particular aspect as a tactical necessity differs from concentration which
The National Party Congresses 181

becomes a hardened viewpoint. Party writings conveyed the impression that

Arab unity was of greater importance than socialism or democracy; past
Party writings attracted the Arab nationalists spontaneously while the
socialist hesitated before entering the Party.44

On the organizational level the report got down to a problem that had
bedeviled the party since its earliest years, one that was to continue to
bedevil it in the future. Regional and other organizations had not built and
maintained adequate contacts and associations with the masses, said the
report. Party decisions to strengthen labor bureaus remained unim­
plemented. Internal party educational programs were limited in scope and
effectiveness. “ Even studies published in the Party newspaper or in
educational or internal issuances are not read with proper care.” And
finally, and very accurately, “ workers, true farmers, and small tradesmen
comprise only a very small part of the Party cadre and are almost
non-existent in its commands.” 45 These were not idle words. Virtually all
those who attained posts at the National, Regional, and even Branch
Command level were at least secondary school graduates, a substantial
majority were college graduates, and a large number were people with
advanced degrees or other higher education. Almost all party members
were government employees, teachers, lawyers, and other white-collar
professionals.
The Congress ordered that more party resources be devoted to labor and
peasant bureaus and that these bureaus be given some executive powers,
i.e., to be able to carry on activity without constant reference to the
command to which they were attached. The Congress also urged reorgani­
zation of the party apparatus on an occupational basis so that supporters
might be taught in a manner likely to appeal to them.46 Regional and lesser
organizations were asked to assess the proportion of workers and peasants
in the ranks and to work to increase that proportion in the coming two
years. The National Command was to report to the next congress what had
been accomplished in this regard.47 Despite these exhortations, relatively
little was accomplished in regard to involving the masses. The National
Party Congress held in 1962 devoted itself only to certain immediate
problems resulting from Syria’s secession from the UAR, and later party
documents carry the same complaints about insufficient attention to work­
ers and peasants in the Regional Commands of the p âty . Within the years
covered by this study, only one worker achieved the status of Regional
Command member. The party remained one of doctors, lawyers, teachers,
and professional people, not one of workers and peasants.
Not much of a thread of continuity can be discerned in studying the
several national congresses held by the Bacth. Each of the eight held
between the founding congress of 1947 and that of 1965 was scheduled for
182 THE BACTH PARTY

the purpose of dealing with serious matters requiring prompt attention. The
party leaders appear to have sought to avoid holding National Congresses
unless compelled to. Thus the 1954 Congress was called in order to deal
with the consequences of merger with Hawrani’s ASP and with the fact of
growing party organizations outside of Syria; the 1959 one with a break­
away trend and with the UAR issue; 1962 with the aftermath of Syria’s
secession from the UAR. The 1960 National Congress was no exception; it
almost certainly was scheduled—and held—one year after the Third
Congress in order to placate the very large number of members who had
been shaken by the dissolution of 1958 but who did not wish to follow
Rimawi or to quit the party. The Fourth Congress had, of necessity, to deal
with the dissolution in a forthright manner before it could turn its energies
to the monumental task of trying to rebuild a party that could charitably be
described as a shambles. Moreover, it contained a large percentage of new
faces—from Iraq, where the post-Rikabi command was taking hold, and
from Jordan, where Munif Razzaz was trying to pick up the pieces of
Rimawi’s defection.
Party members’ reaction to the unilateral decision by cAflaq, Bitar, and
Hawrani to dissolve the party in Syria and to the party’s subsequent loss of
stature and influence marked the end of a period of virtually unchallenged
dominance by the party’s elder statesmen. cAflaq and Bitar had become
accustomed over the years to running party headquarters pretty much as
they saw fit—issuing statements on behalf of the party, publishing the
party newspaper, and—through their writings and speeches—providing the
ideology and the policy guidance of the Bacth Party as a whole. The Fourth
Congress statement censured them—although not by name—in clear lan­
guage that no party member could have misread. The censuring was not
confined to the dissolution issue. The Congress’ criticism of over-
concentration by the party on unity to the serious neglect of socialism and
democracy was also directed at cAflaq and Bitar. Both had concen­
trated almost exclusively on nationalism and unity in their writings and
addresses.
Whether cAflaq had anticipated that his leadership and judgment would
be so severely criticized is unclear. The various recommendations and
criticisms cited above were the work of four committees drawn from the
delegates to the congress. He was re-elected Secretary General; there is no
indication of an effort to oust or even downgrade him. But it was clear that
his authority had been severely impaired. Of the National Command
chosen at the Fourth National Congress, only cAflaq and cAli Jabir
(Lebanon) had served on the 1954 National Command. Five others were
repeaters from the 1959 Command—Razzaz, Shabib, Shararah, Shumitli,
and Yashruti. Three newcomers were the Iraqis, Faysal Habib Khayzaran
The National Party Congresses 183

and Khalid cAli Salih Dulaymi, and the Lebanese Ghalib Yaghi. In the
Regional Commands other names, soon to be more familiar in Arab
politics, had begun to appear. The young men who had been attracted to
the party by cAflaq’s early disciples were beginning to turn up on its
topmost level.
Not all of the Congress’s criticism and advice was directed at the
National Command. The issue of Bacth control of individual Arab govern­
ments (which given the party’s weakened state, seemed optimistic) was
discussed in a section of the report. It noted that government was an
essential instrument for achieving the party aims, and it specified certain
conditions the party must create in order to take over a government. These
were:

First, the existence of political leadership able to govern effectively; this

does not ever mean the availability of a specific number of Party members
with expertise in political activity. Rather, the Party apparatus in its entirety
must be of a sufficient calibre to be able to provide the material for [staffing]
the government, drawing up its programs and assuring their execution. . . .
Second, the existence of a popular base, well-organized and mobilized for
work and struggle, broad enough to be deeply involved in all sectors of
social and economic activity, possessed to the greatest extent of that
consciousness which will guard it from blind obedience and insure the
continuation of its revolutionism. . . .
Third, . . . that the society be ready and open for the great work of change
. . . [dots are in the original]. This ripening is never to mean the fulfilling of
hard and fast social, economic, and political conditions, because this state
[of society] can be accomplished in societies where economic, social, and
political circumstances differ and fluctuate widely.48

The report agreed that the party apparatus could take over the govern­
ment in one region, as long as such a takeover was “ a real result of
revolutionary work . . . so that it may serve as a vigorous and effective
mechanism for achieving the aims of the Party.” 49 The Congress, how­
ever, condemned again the policies of party commands that relied on
military revolts to achieve power.50 The Iraqi delegation had fought this
decision; cAli Salih Sacdi blamed it on cAflaq’s timidity.51 And it noted
“ the spread of military government and a military mentality in many of the
Arab regions puts on its [the Party’s] shoulders the responsibility to
organize peoples’ masses in the face of this new danger.” 52 The question
of the military and the party was destined to become a serious one in the
years ahead; Syrian officers in Egypt were already in the process of
forming their own Bacth military organization. The dispute between some
184 THE BACTH PARTY

of the Bacth Party leaders in Iraq and the National Command over the
legitimacy of using force to overthrow cAbd al-Karim Qasim came to a
head before 1963.
The Third and Fourth National Congresses form the bridge, as it were,
between the original Bacth Party, which cAflaq and Bitar somewhat
patemalistically looked on as “ theirs,” and the new party of the 1960s.
These congresses had to deal with more serious crises than the party had
faced earlier, but they solved them by way of internal party discussion and
struggle. Mass defections occurred in the process, as they had before. The
first of several splinter parties developed. And the leaders changed; only
one person, the Lebanese cAli Jabir, on the National Command before the
UAR remained on it into 1963, except for cAflaq. And the Secretary
General was no longer in a position to impose his ideas; his basic cadre of
Syrian adherents had been dissolved. The younger generation of party
leaders were rising to the top in all regions, leading a much changed party.

Notes

1. National Command, Circular Bulletin, Oct. 1960, in Nidal al-Bacth (Beirut:

Dar aI-Talicah, 1963), p. 196; hereafter cited as Nidal. See also Fu’ad Rikabi,
al-Hall al-Awkad (The Only Solution) (Cairo: al-Sharikah al-cArabiyah li
al-Tibacah wa al-Nashr, 1963), p. 52.
2. Naji cAllush, al-Thawrah wa al-Jamahir (The Revolution and the Masses)
(Beirut: Dar al-Talicah, 1962), p. 129.
3. Ibid., pp. 130-31. cAllush summarizes the preparatory committee docu­
ment. Nidal IV does not contain it. In fact, this volume, dealing with National
Command matters, has only a November 1957 item out of the period from April
1956 to January 1959. cAbr Mu tamaratihi contains (pp. 61-86) a January 1960
National Command statement issued after the Congress for circulation to party
members. cAllush’s account follows this closely.
4. cAllush, al-Thawrah, p. 131.
5. Al-Sahafah, Sept. 2, 1959, in Nidal IV, p. 90; see also Arab World, Sept. 2,
1959.
6. cAllush, al-Thawrah, pp. 132-33.
7. Al-Bacth, April 7, 1964 and cAllush, al-Thawrah, p. 131.
8. American University (Beirut), Arab Political Documents, 1963, pp. 451-52.
9. Nidal IV, p. 88; the words are from the editor’s introduction to the
Congress’s Political Statement.
10. cAllush, al-Thawrah, p. 132.
11. Circular Bulletin, Oct. 1960, Nidal IV, pp. 199-200.
The National Party Congresses 185

12. cAllush, al-Thawrah, p. 127. Sami al-Jundi, al-Bacth (Beirut: Dar al-Nahar
li al-Nashr, 1969), p. 76, claims that the Syrian Regional Command unanimously
approved the dissolution after the leaders had decided on it.
13. Circular Bulletin, Oct. 1960, Nidal IV, p. 201.
14. cAllush, al-Thawrah, pp. 132-33.
15. See Appendix C for a listing of all National Commands and the changes
therein.
16. cAllush, al-Thawrah, p. 133. Al-Bina’ (Beirut) said on Sept. 3, 1959 that
Kamal Nasir was one who left the party with Rimawi. The National Command
statement of January 1960 devotes considerable space to the reasons for Rimawi’s
expulsion (cAbr Mu’tamaratihi, pp. 72-86).
17. Nidal IV, pp. 92-112.
18. Ibid., p. 105.
19. Ibid., p. 101. The January 1960 National Command statement stressed that
some party commands were not adhering to the twin requirements of democracy in
party units and obedience to party orders.
20. Ibid., pp. 102, 101, 111 respectively.
21. Ibid., p. 103.
22. Ibid., pp. 107-8 and 110.
23. Ibid., p. 110. The source of the inner quotation is not given.
24. So said the PPS newspaper al-Bina’ (Beirut) of April 21, 1960, cited in
Arab World of that date.
25. Middle East Record I960, pp. 462 and 498.
26. Nidal IV, p. 185.
27. Nidal IV, pp. 180-219, “ Decisions of the Fourth National Congress.” It is
one of the most straightforward documents in the entire Nidal al-Bacth series.
28. Ibid., p. 186.
29. Ibid., p. 182.
30. Ibid., pp. 183 and 185.
31. Ibid., p. 189.
32. Ibid., p. 186.
33. Ibid., p. 187.
34. Ibid., pp. 188-89.
35. Ibid., p. 201.
36. Ibid., p. 202.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid., p. 192.
39. cAllush, al-Thawrah, p. 141. cAllush implies that Hawrani’s followers
were pushing for a propaganda war against Nasir.
40. Nidal IV, pp. 193, 194, 195.
41. Ibid., p. 1%.
42. Ibid., pp. 195-96.
43. Ibid., p. 198.
44. Ibid., p. 203.
45. Ibid., pp. 207 and 208.
46. Ibid., p. 209.
47. Ibid., p. 210.
48. Ibid., p. 215.
49. Ibid.
186 THE BACTH PARTY

50. Ibid., p. 189.

51. Azmat al-Baeth al-cArabi al Ishtiraki min Khilal Tajribatihi fi al-cIraq (The
Crisis o f the Arab Socialist Resurrection Party Resulting from Its Experience in
Iraq) (Beirut: Dar al-Shacb, 1964), p. 43.
52. Nidal IV, p. 206.
 - 12 -

The New Party

Some years ago, Avraham Ben-Tsur coined the term “ Neo-Bacth” to

describe the Bacth Party that re-emerged in Syria in the early 1960s. It is an
apt term, but it applies to the entire party, not only the portion in Syria. For
the Bacth Party of the 1960s was a very different party from that of the
1940s and 1950s, with new people in leadership roles, new emphases in
ideology, and a new power factor—military officers acting in its name.
Underlying all these was a new stratum of members. Many persons left the
party during the turmoil of the UAR years—and not only in Syria. Indeed,
it seems almost a dictum that relatively few party members stay with the
organization past the age of thirty or so, except in regions where the party
holds power.1 This chapter and the next discuss the party as it recovered
from the debacle it experienced in 1959.
The splits, defections, and expulsions the party organization suffered in
its four principal regions—Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan—resulted in
the departure from the party of a substantial number of members who had
been associated with it for a long time. In many cases, those who left or
were expelled had been among the first to adopt the doctrine in their own
country. This was true, for example, of 'Abdallah Rimawi and Sulayman
al-Hadidi in Jordan, of Fu’ad Rikabi and Ayyad Thabit in Iraq, of Sami
al-Jundi and Wahib al-Ghanim in Syria, and of a substantial number of
important but less prominent figures in all three countries. Most dropped
out of organized political activity, but Rimawi’s Arab Revolutionary Party
attracted members from Iraq and Lebanon in addition to its basic cadre of
Jordanians.
The political climate in the Arab world had altered radically since the
years of the party’s founding and spread throughout the Fertile Crescent.
Only a few states remained under European tutelage. And old forms of
political life were disappearing. In Syria and in Jordan the party had
worked through the parliamentary system in the 1950s; it had even been
prepared to work through such a system in Iraq. But elective parliaments in
which parties dedicated to basic change in a governmental structure could
188 THE BACTH PARTY

function, even under restraints, had become a thing of the past. The
possibility of participating in a parliamentary system was ruled out in
Jordan after April 1957, and, although Qasim kept promising elections and
a parliament for Iraq, he never got around to implementing these promises.
In Syria, the party had broken into several fragments, and the country was
to experience only one more election, that of the short-lived parliament
following the secession from the UAR.
In much of the Arab world, Bacthists were compelled to take the path of
clandestine organization, sometimes in circumstances of severe govern­
mental repression. Moreover, the Syrian Bacthist leaders had themselves
abandoned the party principle of responsible democratic government in the
expectation of gaining a prominent role in the UAR government and in its
single party, the National Union. The lack of legitimate means for political
expression, the party leaders’ own abandonment of the principle of
responsible government, and severe repression led many Bacthists of the
1960s to conclude that violence and force were necessary to obtain power
and thus to achieve the party’s goals.
Prominent among forcible methods was the use of military power. The
military coup was already a familiar phenomenon in the area. Iraq had seen
several in the 1930s; Syria had gone through a long series in the 1940s and
early 1950s; the Egyptian regime had come to power by coup d’état; and
similar efforts had been made against the monarchy in Jordan. The party
had recruited adherents among the armies of several states during the
1950s. Such recruiting was done by the existing party organizations; hence
recruits among the military had less seniority and lower positions in its
hierarchy than the civilians who founded it. As a party constructed
essentially on traditional civilian political lines, the Bacth found that
soldiers who were Bacthists didn’t fit into the party’s organizational
scheme. There were Bacthists in various Arab armies but no party ap­
paratus in any of them.2 Nor did military men have much chance to
advance in the party hierarchy. There were no military members in any
Regional Command prior to the 1960s, even though some Bacthist army
officers wielded great influence, particularly Akram Hawrani’s army
associates in Syria. In the aftermath of the 1959 debacle, however, military
men came to occupy increasingly prominent positions in the party ap­
paratus in Iraq and eventually in that of Syria. This increase in membership
among the military gave the party the option of employing the classic coup
d’état as an avenue to power.
It was only later in the 1960s that the party leaders came to recognize
the full implications of the threat to their authority, to the civilian structure
of the party, and to its traditional philosophy posed by the involvement in
the party of military personnel in substantial numbers. Writing in 1967,
The New Party 189

Munif Razzaz noted that the party had made a serious error in not paying
careful attention to the appearance of the military apparatus in the party.
The party thought that the army, which reflected the Arab people, would
have the same sorts of ideas and the same social divisions as the people
themselves did.3 (The party was inconsistent in that it opposed military
revolts in principle but had been willing to support them when they seemed
beneficial to the party itself. For example, the Bacth had first supported,
then opposed, Husni Zacim in Syria, and it had supported Sami Hinnawi.)
Razzaz argued that the army, though it had roots in the poorer classes,
was not itself a poor class, especially after it had gained privileges for
itself—whether by revolution or by other means. Moreover, the system
was not democratic, and the top levels of any army were not necessarily
representative of majority views in the army as a whole. A military coup
could tend either to right or left depending on the faction that was
dominant, and even a leftist military government opposed to capitalism and
feudalism would also be opposed to freedoms of the citizens. Hence, in
most cases, even a leftist military government would turn out to be
“ counter-revolutionary.” 4 But these views were the result of hindsight
acquired after a series of misfortunes. In the 1960s, Bacthists in the armies
of Iraq and Syria were to play vital roles in the reconstruction of the party
and in its eventual accession to power.

Iraq

The Bacthists’ bungled attempt to assassinate Qasim severely damaged

the party’s organization in Iraq. The 77 persons accused of complicity in
the attempt included almost all its top leadership. Information available to
the Iraqi security services prior to the event, plus that found in the
apartment rented by the execution squad in Ras al-Qaryah quarter, led to a
sweeping roundup. Many fled to the safety of Syria or Kuwait. By the end
of November 1959, when Fu’ad and cAbdallah Rikabi, accompanied by
Hazim Jawad, reached Syria, half the pre-assassination Regional Com­
mand members were in jail and the other half abroad. Six of the eight
members of the Baghdad Branch Command were in jail and two were in
exile. The Kirkuk Branch Command had also ceased to exist; four of
its members were in jail, one had fled abroad, and another,
cAbd al-Wahhab al-Ghariri, had died in the assassination attempt. In
Baghdad the division commands in cAzamiyah (a party stronghold) and
Karkh, the old heart of the city on the east bank, were almost wiped out.
Smaller party organizations such as that in the residential district of
190 THE BACTH PARTY

Karradah and that in the district of the oil refinery at Dawrah lost their
secretaries and some members.5
The assassination attempt had been planned and directed by the Re­
gional Command. Rikabi said that the decision to undertake an assassina­
tion was made unanimously in February 1959 at a meeting of seven
members of the Command—Rikabi, his cousin cAbdallah Rikabi, Thabit,
Dulaymi, Jumcah, Talib Shabib, and Karim Shantaf.6 A subcommittee of
the first four was formed in March to oversee the operation; Jumcah
replaced Fu’ad Rikabi later, and that group of four continued in command
until the attempt had been made. They recruited the remainder of those in
the operation directly, without going through the subordinate commands of
the party.
Rikabi’s account makes no further mention of Shantaf or Shabib after
the February meeting. He speaks of Regional Command meetings, one in
June that postponed the operation, one in July that got the operation going
again, and finally, one on October 1 at which the Command decided to
shoulder the responsibility of liberating Iraq. He does not specify who
attended these meetings. It is at least possible that Shabib, who was tried in
absentia and acquitted—the only one of those not physically present at the
trials to be so acquitted—and perhaps Shantaf, although he received a life
sentence—were cut out of the operation when Rikabi and his associates
decided to revitalize it. Shabib may have been out of the country during
September and October.
At any rate, the bungled attempt on Qasim’s life presented Rikabi’s
enemies with a good opportunity to get rid of him. Even before the attempt,
the National Command had let some members in Iraq know that a change
in party leadership in Iraq would be welcome.7 The Regional Command
dissolved itself on November 29, 1959.8 The four members in exile—the
two Rikabis, Jumcah, and Shabib—probably met in Beirut or Damascus. In
accordance with custom and party regulation, the National Command
stepped in and formed a provisional Regional Command9, with Talib
Shabib as Regional Secretary. The identities of the remaining members are
uncertain, but cAli Salih Sacdi and Faysal Habib Khayzaran were almost
certainly among them. Sacdi had not been brought to trial, but the police
had an arrest warrant out for him as a leading party member. He left Iraq
illegally for Syria to have some badly needed dental work done, because he
couldn’t have it done safely in Baghdad. Rikabi mentions his surprise at
meeting up with Sacdi in Fallujah, where both had gone to the same party
comrade for help in getting over the border.10 Rikabi tried to retain control
of the party organization, but he was outside the country and his followers
inside too few, even though he sought and received some assistance from
the UAR authorities in his efforts.11 The provisional Regional Command
The New Party 191

specifically excluded him from membership on February 2, 1960, and the

Regional Congress of the party held in July of 1960 preferred charges
against him for his conduct while secretary of the region. Foremost among
these charges, of course, was his role in carrying out the assassination
attempt. After these charges were presented to the Fourth National Con­
gress in August 1960, Rikabi was censored and suspended from party
activity. Talib Shabib and Fay sal Khayzaran were named to the new
command chosen at that congress. Two months later this National Com­
mand ordered Rikabi to reply to the charges brought by the Regional
Command. When, after several months, he failed to respond, he was
expelled from the party on June 15, 1961.12 As of January 1962 he was
named a member of the Command of Rimawi’s Revolutionary Bacth
Party.13
Shabib appears to have remained abroad for most of the rest of the
Qasim era.14 But his new command took the initial steps to revitalize the
battered party. In the months following its February meeting it distributed
two circulars to party members. The second contained instructions to
promote a new version of a national front; it specifically warned members
to remember that a national front was neither a goal nor a principle, but
merely a political tactic.15 It also told members that the party had two
choices before it, i.e., to struggle with all its energies in behalf of the
people, or to adopt a non-revolutionary position because reaction and
imperialism were too strong for it.16 The party’s obvious choice was the
first.
Sacdi returned to Baghdad in the spring of 1960. He proceeded to bring
into play his formidable conspiratorial talents, a process facilitated by the
imprisonment or exile of the top leadership of the party. Some of these
prisoners and exiles, e.g., Ayyad Thabit, threw in their political fortunes
with Rikabi; others dropped out of party activity. A fair number were still
in the thick of party affairs in 1963. Sacdi not only could tighten up
membership qualifications and improve security—which he did—but also
could place members sympathetic to his way of doing things in positions of
power and influence. Persons like Hani Fukayki, Muhsin Shaykh Radi,
and H am dicAbd al-Majid (after he got out of jail) moved up rapidly in the
party hierarchy. Starting by building the Baghdad Branch organization,
which was the largest party organization and one that had been very hard
hit, Sacdi and his aides were prominent at the clandestine Regional Party
Congress in July of 1960, at which a new Regional Command was
chosen.17 In a fairly short time, Sacdi came to dominate the regional
apparatus in organizational and membership matters. The loose recruiting
practices of the previous year were discontinued. Candidates for member­
ship were required to remain in probationary status for as long as four
192 THE BACTH PARTY

years—as against the customary practice of a year or a year and a half

elsewhere in the party. Rikabi’s remaining supporters were forced out, as
were others whose attitudes were uncongenial to the new command.18
Sacdi himself became Regional Secretary at the Regional Congress of May
1962, and both he and Hamdi cAbd al-Majid were on the National
Command chosen later that year. Repression by the Qasim regime caused a
substantial number of those who joined in the first months after the July
14th revolution to drop out. In consequence, by the end of 1962, the party
in Iraq had a membership .of only 700 or 800 people, although they were
backed up by a good many thousand probationary members and
supporters.19
Under the post-Rikabi leadership, the Bacthists used several ap­
proaches. They worked to oppose the Communists and the Qasim regime
through people’s organizations (munazzamat shacbiyah) such as labor
unions, student federations, and peasants’ organizations. The party utilized
these groups to protest against the regime and to fight the Communists
through strikes and demonstrations. It worked to increase the effectiveness
of these organizations through the tactic of a popular front. The party also
used the popular front tactic to improve ties with other nationalist elements,
principally the Istiqlal Party and a variety of independent Iraqi political
figures. A second element in the party’s strategy was the building of
strength within the army. Bacthist recruitment of new military members
continued slowly and military members of older standing moved up in
grade, although from time to time Bacthists were dropped from the army as
Qasim discharged officers he considered dangerous to him.
On the whole, 1960 was a year of preparation for the Bacthists,
although they did get involved in some street fights and riots. In the worst
of these, a May Day procession headed by Fadil Mihdawi and Majid Amin
provoked a disturbance between the Communists and the nationalists,
which ended up with five dead and fifty wounded. Nonetheless, 1960 was
perhaps the least troubled year for Qasim’s rule. At the end of the year,
political conditions in Iraq had evolved to the point where a commentator
in the Beirut press could write that the Communists on one side and the
Arab nationalists, led by the Bacth, on the other, left Qasim and his
non-Communist supporters in the middle of the political spectrum.20 On
the whole, things looked fairly quiet in Iraq as the new year began, and in
mid-January 1961 Qasim suspended a curfew that had been in effect for the
previous eighteen months.
Over the longer term, Qasim’s style of government favored the growth
of Bacth Party power in Iraq. Qasim began as the leader of a group of army
officers, and early in his regime had the support of large numbers of people
of nationalist persuasion. As time passed, he developed a policy of
governing by balancing forces. Although he had used Communist support
The New Party 193

earlier, he moved to restrict the power of the Communists after their

atrocities in Mosul and Kirkuk in 1959, although the Communists sup­
ported him as the best head of government they were likely to get. He, of
course, turned against the Bacthists after they tried to assassinate him in
October 1959. As “ sole leader,” he came to identify himself as the savior
of the common people, especially the peasants on the farm and in the
squatters’ colonies around Baghdad. In following his policy of balance, he
gradually cut down the strength of most organized political groups. As
each showed potential for power or independence, he moved to undercut it
in turn. In time, he lost the respect and support of almost all political
elements in the population, as well as that of the unorganized but large
urban middle class, which had been terrified by the atrocities perpetrated
by the Communists during 1959.
By late 1961 or so, Qasim’s direct source of power and support had
shrunk to the control of the civilian apparatus of government and of the
armed forces. He retained this control until the end of his regime, and a
pouion of the army fought desperately for him on the day he was
overthrown. He had, however, no reserves to call upon once a significant
portion of the army had turned against him.
In addition, from the fall of 1960 on, Qasim and his government were
plagued with widespread dissidence and eventually a full-scale revolt in
most of the Kurdish districts of Iraq. The Baghdad government retained
control of the principal towns and the main communications routes in the
northeastern provinces of the country—Arbil, Sulaymaniyah, and
Mosul—but substantial areas of the countryside passed out of effective
government control and under that of the Kurdish leader, Mulla Mustafa
Barzani and his supporters in the winter of 1960-1961—and stayed there.
Qasim’s government did not admit the existence of trouble until September
1961. Despite a constant stream of statements that “ the highwaymen”
were about to be mopped up, the Kurdish troubles dragged on, tying down
large portions of the Iraqi Army. Failure of the army to make headway
against the Kurds in time increased popular resentment against the regime.
In external affairs, the intensity of the competition between Baghdad
and Cairo diminished after 1959. Animosity between the two remained,
but came to the surface only when Iraq and Jordan improved their relations
in 1960, and again when Qasim made a forceful claim to Kuwait in 1961.
Cairo extended diplomatic support to the Kuwaitis. Egyptian-Iraqi animos­
ity never returned to the level it reached in 1959 and was not a significant
element in the growth of the Iraqi Bacth or in Qasim’s deteriorating
political position.
The Bacth efforts to promote a national front were helped by the party’s
nationalist ideology and reputation and by the fright of many Iraqis caused
by the Communists’ excesses in 1959. The party scored some successes in
194 THE BACTH PARTY

its campaign to gain support among people’s organizations. Thus, in the

cigarette workers union elections held late in 1960, a list of candidates with
nationalist sympathies beat one with Communist sympathies.21 A
nationalist-oriented united teachers front beat a rival Communist-supported
professional organization in eleven of fourteen provinces in nationwide
teachers’ elections early the next year.22 Teachers’ elections had about the
same results in 1962. The government also closed several important
Communist papers, including the principal party organ, Ittihad al-Shacb,
as well as several branches of Communist-front organizations during 1961.
Although Communist strength in Iraq suffered a decline over these
years, the competition between Communists and nationalists, a term which
included Bacthists, pan-Arabists, and other non-Communist elements,
went on. On occasion, the streets turned into battlefields between the
Communists and nationalists, each of which were concentrated in particu­
lar quarters of Baghdad. The Bacth had its greatest concentration of
strength in cAzamiyah, the residential area just north of the old city which
contained many of the government colleges. Violent demonstrations were
led by the nationalists over a rise in gasoline prices on March 27 and 28,
1961. Casualties ran to nineteen dead and forty wounded, according to one
account,23 and the Bacth Party issued a bulletin on May 8 containing
pictures and names of eight of its members killed in these riots.24
Although the party still labored under various difficulties and was
subject to repression by the regime, its organizational work began to pay
off. The number and variety of its publications increased. In mid-1962 the
party paper al-Ishtiraki resumed publication as a monthly and continued
until the revolution in February 1963. Even the seizure of a major party
press with pamphlets, books, and so forth earlier in 1962 did not slow the
party publications program noticeably.25 Arrests of Bacthists for illegal
activities continued, but so did releases of those previously arrested. Even
the five Bacthists sentenced to death for the assassination attempt had their
death sentences commuted; all were eventually released by Qasim.
The party’s small numerical strength was augmented by the enrollment
and training of many hundreds of candidate members and supporters in a
para-military organization. Headed by retired Colonel cAbd al-Karim
Mustafa Nasrat, this organization—which formally took the title
Nationalist Guard (al-haras al-qawmi) in 1963—provided the muscle for
the party’s street brawls with the Communists. Its very existence, in
addition to its fair degree of discipline, was to prove very useful in the early
days of the post-Qasim era.
Less obvious than the demonstrations, the brawling, the publications,
and so forth, was the party’s success in working its way into the army. The
nucleus of this effort had been Nuri al-Sacid’s disciplinary training program
The New Party 195

for anti-regime youth in 1955. It had grown, despite Qasim’s efforts, to

respectable size. The party handled this organization in a separate military
section distinct from the regular party organization.26 Most of its adherents
in the Iraqi army and air force were field grade; some were retired during
Qasim’s regime, e.g., Ahmad Hasan Bakr and cAbd al-Karim Nasrat, but
continued to keep up their military associations. In addition, non-Bacthist
officers joined forces with the Bacthists out of dislike for Qasim.
By the latter half of 1962, the Regional Command felt that it was in a
strong enough position to overthrow Qasim, and so reported this to the
National Command.27 The National Congress of 1960 was, of course, on
record as opposing the seizure of power by coup d’état except in special
circumstances. According to Sacdi’s faction, the only advice the Iraqi
Regional Command got from cAflaq on this subject was a warning of the
risks involved.28 The Regional Command was not to be deterred, however,
and it had not been specifically forbidden to use force. The Bacthists
proceeded to plan a military move against Qasim but were forced to
postpone their designs at least once before their successful attempt of
February 8, 1963, which is discussed in a succeeding chapter.29

Syria

In its mother country, the party underwent almost total disintegration

during the UAR period. The dissolution of the party, and the manner in
which it had been decided upon, snapped the ties that bound many party
members to the organization, destroying the faith of many in the party and
in its leadership. What guidance the “ former members” had been able to
get from the short-lived newspapers edited by Bacthists in 1959 and from
statements by Bacthist ministers disappeared by the end of that year.
Hawrani and his faction wanted to re-establish the party organization after
he. Bitar, and their associates resigned from the UAR government in
December 1959. But cAflaq and Bitar resisted. They were still devoted to
the concept of unity and stuck by the bargain they had made to dissolve.
They were also fearful of Sarraj’s power.30 In August 1960, they suc­
ceeded in getting the Fourth National Congress to commit itself to “ the
defense of the unity of the two provinces by positive criticism of conditions
in the republic and by exposing imperialist and reactionary criticism which
benefits provincialism and damages unity.” 31 They managed to win this
commitment despite the criticism the Congress directed against those who
carried out the dissolution of the party in Syria.
This commitment to defense of the UAR was highly unpalatable to
Hawrani and to his faction. The Hama politician had reached, or was
1% THE BACTH PARTY

shortly to reach, the conclusion that the union was a total failure. A man
essentially concerned with political power, Hawrani had little interest in
the UAR once it ceased to be a useful vehicle through which he could
exercise power. As one observer put it, in relation to an earlier period,
“ Hawrani is a natural leader . . . He devotes himself to politics with
aggressive, singleminded energy. He enjoys power, and what distinguishes
him from his contemporaries is a clear, unmuddled sense that there is no
point in being in politics without obtaining it.” 32
Little of consequence involving the Bacth happened in Syria in the
twelve months following the Fourth National Congress. cAflaq lived in
Lebanon, conducting party business on behalf of the National Command.
Hawrani for the most part lived quietly in Hama. In January 1961 he and
Sabri al-cAsali had petitioned Nasir to restore the Syrian Region’s lost
freedom. According to the report, the two demanded that Nasir “ should
personally step in to put an end to the arbitrariness of the rulers in the
province which is assuming more and more the shape of a real
dictatorship.” 33 The National Command did issue a statement supporting
the socialization decrees of July 1961 in Syria, which was distributed
widely in the press but which the Egyptian papers did not publish. The
party also supported these decisions in an internal circular distributed to
party members in August 1961.34
Dissatisfaction with the UAR continued to grow in Syria. There were
some Syrians who chose to work with Cairo. But almost everyone disliked
the Egyptians’ propensity to assume superior airs; businessmen disliked the
nationalization laws; and military officers resented subordination to Egyp­
tian command. In August 1961, Nasir made a serious misstep; he removed
cAbd al-Hamid Sarraj from his post in Syria and, in a major governmental
change, appointed him Vice President in charge of internal security for the
entire UAR. But Sarraj found himself lacking real authority and returned to
Syria in disgust. Without Sarraj at its apex, the efficiency of Syria’s
security apparatus slumped. The opportunity was not lost on the discon­
tented. On September 28, 1961, elements of the Syrian Army seized
control of the northern province of the UAR and sentcAbd al-HakimcAmir
back to Cairo. Although initially disposed to contest this secession, Nasir
quickly realized that opposing it by physical force was out of the question.
It might not work and, in any event, would put him in the position of
having to “ conquer” fellow Arabs. He made the best of a bad situation,
ordered his troops not to contest the move, and recalled troops being flown
to Syria. Following the secession, Ma’mun al-Kuzbari formed a new
government featuring conservative politicians of the pre-Union period. The
move by the Syrian Army, supported by many of the traditional middle-and
upper-class political leaders, was the culmination of three and one-half
years of Syrian frustrations under the UAR.
The New Party 197

The Bacthists had no part in the secession movement. Indeed, the

actions of various members and factions of the “ former” Bacth in the
months following September 1961 indicated the degree of confusion and
anarchy into which the party in Syria had fallen. There were “ tens” of
little blocs and groups, each claiming to carry the mantle of Bacth
legitimacy.35 The National Command had some followers, but they were
unorganized. Akram Hawrani and his long-time supporters formed a
sizable group, probably the most prominent one bearing the Bacth name.
Party members from the lower echelons began to reorganize independently
of the National Command in 1961; they became the nucleus of the
“ regionalist” faction, i.e., the group that thought of Bacthism primarily in
Syrian terms and only secondarily in pan-Arab ones. Sami Sufan, Sami
al-Jundi, and others put together a pro-unity group called the Socialist
Unionist Movement. Riyad Malki headed a faction for a time in 1962;
others went their own way. Most important—and least known at this
time—Bacthist officers in the Syrian army and air force had begun their
own independent organization, the military committee—of which more
will be said later.
Differences among Bacthists existed at the very summit of the party. On
October 2, 1961, sixteen prominent Syrian political leaders, representing
most shades of opinion, signed a manifesto that supported “ the Syrian
Armed Forces in their blessed revolution.” The manifesto called for free
elections as soon as possible, blamed the September 28 coup on Nasir’s
regime of oppression, and asked the Syrians’ brothers in Egypt to free
themselves from dictatorial rule.36 Hawrani and Bitar were among the
sixteen. For Hawrani, this manifesto was the beginning of a vigorous battle
with Nasir and Syrian supporters of Egypt for the next year and a half. For
Bitar, it was a mistake he was to regret bitterly in the future. Nasir
reproached him for it as a part of the “ long account [I have] to settle with
brother Salah” in March 1963.37 Fellow Bacthists remembered Bitar’s
inconsistency in the years to come and denied him high party office.
cAflaq and other National Command members with him in Beirut were
jolted by Bitar’s association with the October manifesto. The National
Command on October 5 referred to dangerous developments in respect to
the secessionist militarist movement and reactionary government in Syria.
In a statement, it described secession as the consequence of one-man rule,
which the party had protested “ since the early months of the union,” with
the aim of correcting mistakes in the unity without risking deviationist
dangers.38 Although the document condemned secession, it devoted more
space and stronger language to the mistakes of one-man (i.e., Nasir’s) rule
which brought the mentality of military coup government to Syria.39 It
asserted that democratic conditions in both regions would guarantee
renewed unity on a sound basis.40
198 THE BACTH PARTY

Ten days later the National Command issued a second statement

attacking reactionary interests in Syria. It said, “ Secession has opened the
door of Syria to great imperialist and reactionary forces. Syrian reaction,
whose interest coincided in the past with the dictatorial regime which
struck at progressive forces in 1958 [presumably a reference to the
Lebanese events of that year], is now trying hard to divert political life in
Syria towards a military dictatorship to secure its economic interests and is
persisting in striking at and isolating progressive forces and rendering the
people’s revolutionary spirit ineffective. . . .” 41
In its fragmented state, the party was a virtual cipher as far as its
practical effect on Syrian politics was concerned. Hawrani and his sup­
porters were an exception to this general rule; they were very active—and
very much going their own way. There was also a measure of cooperation
between Hawrani and Bitar. Bitar apparently acted on the belief that, while
the majority of Bacthists might not like the breakup of the UAR, Bacthist
interests would be advanced by members’ participation in Syrian politics.
Bitar, along with Hawrani and Riyad Malki, signed the National Charter,
proclaimed on November 10, 1961, by 63 of Syria’s political leaders as a
preparation for parliamentary elections. Bitar probably was motivated by a
desire to mitigate what he and other socialists regarded as the reactionary
character of the secessionist regime. The charter as promulgated included a
number of points that were consistent with conventional party doctrine,
e.g., a democratic, parliamentary government, adherence to socialist
principles, and adherence to the agrarian reform law enacted under the
UAR.42
Parliamentary elections, which were run on a non-party basis, were
held on December 1. Hawrani and half a dozen supporters in Hama won
handily by the same device they used in 1954, that is, running in an
electoral district that included both the rural area and the city. The
peasants, Hawrani’s traditional supporters, were told by him that his
opponents were in favor of reversing the land reform program, and they
voted strongly for his list. Of the rest of the dozen “ former Bacthists’’ who
were elected, a few more were Hawrani people from outside the Hama
area; Wahib al-Ghanim won from his solid constituency in Lattaqiyah; a
Bacthist won in Banyas and another in Suwayda. Bitar was defeated in his
own Damascus constituency, and conservatives defeated socialists in
Homs.43 The principal victor of the elections was the old Shacb Party,
which placed two of its members, Nazim al-Qudsi and Macruf Daw alibi, as
President and Prime Minister, respectively.
The Bacth name was carried in Syrian politics for the ensuing four
months principally by Hawrani and his faction. In December, he was
quoted as saying, “ The Bacthist Socialists do not insist on participating in
The New Party 199

the Cabinet, but they have laid down their conditions [for this].” 44 Early in
1962, he led an unsuccessful fight against proposals to amend the 1961
agricultural reform law. Amendments raising the maximum size of a land
holding and permitting the landlords to regain land which had been
acquired by cultivators under the 1958 law were passed by parliament in
February. The short parliamentary phase of the secessionist era ended with
a move by army officers, headed by cAbd al-Karim Nahlawi, on March 28,
1962 against the government. After turning Out the government and
dismissing parliament, the soldiers were at a loss. The army contained so
many diverse elements that formulating a cohesive policy was extraordi­
narily difficult. In order to compose differences, a congress of Syrian army
factions met in Homs on April 1. This congress decided to exile Nahlawi
and his followers, for fear that he might become a military dictator. It also
opted for a return to civilian government, a return which included the
restoration of Qudsi to the presidency.
In the middle of these events, a group of unionist officers—some
Nasirists, e.g., Jasim cAlwan and Lu’ayy Atasi, some Bacthists, e.g.,
Hamad cUbayd—put into action plans aimed at reunion with Egypt. Their
timing was poor and their movements uncoordinated; some expected
support failed to materialize, and many of the plotters were not on active
service and had to rely on associates who were.45 The move began on April
2 when units of the Aleppo garrison led by Hamad cUbayd raised the UAR
flag over military headquarters. When failure of the plot became apparent,
some surrendered, some were seized, and some fled. In time, a dozen were
brought to trial, some in absentia. In court, cUbayd said that he was against
secession and also against the March 28 army movement.46 cUbayd went
on to describe the movement as aimed at setting matters to rights within the
army, not as one designed to bring Syria back into the UAR, because
reunion was a political matter and the Syrian Army was not involved in
politics.47 The last statement was surely a bit of hyberbole.
When the crisis caused by the March 28 coup was finally papered over
by the formation of a cabinet under Bashir al-cAzmah on April 16,
Hawrani’s faction was included in the cabinet symbolically. He said in an
interview published in a Beirut newspaper that his faction had been offered
six seats. His supporters did not think that they should take them, however,
and, although he disagreed, he said, he deferred to the wishes of his
supporters.48 cAbdallah cAbd al-Da’im, a partisan of cAflaq and Bitar, was
Minister of Information. The new government moved quickly to reverse
the objectionable provisions of the agriculture reform amendments as one
of its. first items of business.49
The Cairo press was not favorably impressed by the new government.
Al-Akhbar of Cairo referred to it as an unholy alliance of “ moderate
200 THE BACTH PARTY

reactionaries and opportunist Bacthists.” The latter epithet was directed

specifically at Akram Hawrani, who was also depicted as chiefly responsi­
ble for the breakup of the UAR.50 It is unlikely that the rulers in Cairo were
aware of the depth of the split that had developed between Hawrani and the
cAflaq-Bitar faction by that time. Hawrani returned the attack in kind by
referring to Nasir on the following day as neither unionist nor socialist.
This was the first of a series of public and rather intemperate blasts by
Hawrani at Nasir, to which the Cairo press responded with equal intemper­
ance. A few days later Hawrani accused Nasir of trying to set up an Arab
empire and of running a fascist dictatorship.51
Just at this time the Fifth National Congress of the party convened at
Homs, on May 8. With the party organization in Syria still defunct, there
were no Syrian delegates, save for cAflaq as Secretary General. The
questions of unity, of the party’s political position in Syria, and of
reconstituting the party organization in Syria were the principal topics
discussed at this Congress. The party leadership recognized that there were
many points of view on unity and much damage to the party that needed
repair. They tried to steer a middle course between those who wanted to
call for immediate unity and those who rejected unity entirely on the
assumption that it would take the same form as the earlier UAR. The latter
point of view was particularly prominent in the Lebanese Regional Com­
mand. cAflaq and his associates relied on the Iraqi delegation to resist the
Lebanese drive against unity.52 In addition, he had support in the Lebanese
Regional organization from such men as Majdalani and Rafici. At its
conclusion, the Congress took note of the divergent views:

The obscurity of the former Party position left a broad area for personal
interpretation and individual explanation. This was noticeable at the con­
gress where there were a number of opinions regarding the union of Egypt
and Syria.

The Congress resolved that.

The Party considers that the most valuable and advantageous way to fight
these deviations [i.e., those which distorted the union and caused the
secession] is by calling for unity between Syria and Egypt, with the clear
understanding—which the Party has continuously expressed—that the union
is a union of the people, a union of popular forces, and a union of popular
struggle founded on the support of the people, relying on them and deriving
from them democratic popular bases far removed from one-man rule, from
police state rule, and from provincial rule.53

The Congress rejected any party association with the cAzmah govern­
ment in Damascus. It resolved that any minister or member of a committee
The New Party 201

would have to resign or be expelled from the party.54 Shortly before the
Congress, the government in Damascus had appointed several committees
of politicians to analyze important issues. Six Bacthists, cAflaq among
them, were named as members of the Arab Affairs Committee, that is, the
committee dealing with unity, and at least one to the political organization
and public freedom committee. cAflaq announced on May 21 that he had
withdrawn from the Arab Affairs Committee, to which he said he had been
named without his consent. Several others followed his example, and on
the same day Minister of Information cAbd al-Da’im was reported to have
offered his resignation. It was not, however, formally accepted until
mid-June, and it is somewhat unclear as to when he actually ceased
functioning as minister. The report of the Congress criticized Hawrani and
his faction, without naming them, as follows,

The socialist greets the reactionary because he is a Syrian reactionary, the

reactionary greets the ‘socialist’ because he is a Syrian ‘socialist.’ The
reactionary can abandon some of his privileges and profits in order not to
expose the country to danger but the ‘socialist’ abandons some of his
revolutionism and joins the reactionary to save the ‘entity’ from ruin. Syrian
Arabism opposes federal unity between Egypt and Syria, a chain of dis­
agreements and contradictions—we separate in order to unite, we go back to
being provincials in order to become a new united Arab, we are fanatics in
order to be tolerant, we are self-absorbed in order to open up, we hate in
order to love, we want separatism ended and want to support it because we
want unity, we work for secession, support it using any reactionary, shucubi
forces against the people’s forces and then announce that we can, in the
future, achieve unity—after having shattered our nationalist and progressive
ranks and any popular support we had.55

Even though strong criticism was directed against Hawrani and his
faction, the National Command was most reluctant to take direct action
against them. It waited until Hawrani issued a manifesto in the name of the
Bacth Socialist Party of Syria about June 20, criticizing the original Bacth
Party and its role in the union and condemning any return to union with
Egypt. The following day, cAflaq, as Secretary General of the National
Command of the party, issued a statement saying, “ The National Com­
mand of the Arab Socialist Bacth Party declares, in virtue of the resolutions
taken by the National Congress held around the middle of last May, that the
faction which issued that manifesto [i.e., Hawrani’s] is no longer related to
the Party, having broken its national union [sic].” 56 With this the stormy
nine-year-old association of the Bacth Party and Hawrani’s Arab Socialist
Party was formally and finally dissolved. In those years, the merged
Bacth-Arab Socialist Party had become the strongest political force in
Syria, had led the way toward union with Egypt, and then destroyed itself.
202 THE BACTH PARTY

The leaders of the two factions had tried to maintain their collaboration and
had succeeded for a time. But the association weakened after the Bacthists
resigned from the UAR government, and the secession of Syria from the
UAR and succeeding events showed cAflaq and his partisans that no further
support for unity could be expected from Hawrani. Separation was the only
course open.
The Fifth National Congress also told the newly elected National
Command to get on with the job of getting a party organization back on its
feet in Syria. Hawrani’s people were pre-empting the Bacth label. cAflaq
and Bitar did manage to get al-Bacth in print again, as a weekly, but they
published only twelve issues between July 21 and October 6, 1962, when
the paper was suspended. There was virtually nothing to start the party
with, however, and there was little in the way of consensus among “ former
members” as to policies and views. The old guard—for the last time
—pulled together a majority on the issue of the party in Syria; the Congress
authorized the National Command to organize party circles (halaqah)
itself, and to use virtually anyone it needed to get these circles started.
In addition, the Congress authorized the National Command, when the
time came to appoint a provisional Regional Command for Syria, to
include non-Syrians among its members. It said, “ The emotion and
personalism which have dominated the minds of a majority of responsible
members, have rendered them unsuitable for disciplined Party work and
unsuitable for reorganizing a Party already disfigured by a great split
among its members, divided and suspicious as a consequence of the
dissolution.” 57 There were still no Syrians on the newly chosen National
Command except for cAflaq; Sacdi and cAbd al-Majid replaced their fellow
Iraqis, Shabib and Khayzaran. Jibran Majdalani, cAbd al-Majid Rafici, and
Khalid cAli joined Yashruti and cAli Jabir from Lebanon, replacing three
anti-unionists. Razzaz and Shuqayr were the Jordanians. With the Iraqis
deeply involved in their regional problems and Razzaz in jail, the old guard
had room to maneuver. They made use of such old-time Bacthists as Shibli
cAysami and cAbd al-Karim Zuhur, and relied also on Lebanese such as
Majdalani.
But the task was monumental, because most “ former Bacthists” were
scattered and disorganized.58 The leaders perforce had to turn to a new
stratum of Bacthists who had not been prominent in the party structure
before the formation of the UAR. Many were those who came to be known
as regionalists, a term used by Munif Razzaz in The Bitter Experience and
Ben-Tsur in his article “ The Neo-Ba’th Party of Syria.” The regionalists
were mostly men in their late twenties and thirties; they tended to be
contemptuous of the old leadership of the party for its performance during
the UAR period; they were socialists, in some cases extreme socialists; but
they were interested more in Syria than in pan-Arab matters.
The New Party 203

The fragmentation of the party and the differing trends of thought made
slow work of the reorganization, even though cAflaq appointed a provi­
sional command only a month after the Fifth National Congress.59 By the
time of the Bacth coup in Iraq in February 1963, there were still very few
people enrolled in the new Syrian regional organization, and the party had
developed no strong ties with the masses. At a National Command meeting
only a few weeks before the Syrian coup of March 1963, cAflaq expressed
the view that the party was not yet well enough organized to become
involved in a movement against the secessionist government.60
The weakness of the new Bacth organization was serious enough. Of far
greater importance, however, was the development of a separate party
organization in the Syrian army. This Bacthist activity in the army dated
back to the days of the UAR when a number of Syrian officers stationed in
Egypt had formed a Bacth military organization. Bacthist officers in the
Syrian army had been shaken up even more than the civilians by the union.
Most had been transferred abroad, some to UAR embassies, many to
Egypt. Eight of ten nationalist Syrian officers transferred to Egypt in
August 1958 were Bacthists. Another batch were transferred in 1959,
including the most important Bacthists.61 Scarcely any Bacthists were left
in positions of authority in Syria by 1960. There were three things these
officers resented about the UAR. First, the union itself; second, Nasir’s
one-man rule; and third, the party leaders who had brought the party and
these officers to its present situation. Toward the end of 1959, thirteen of
these officers formed the Bacthist military committee.62 Prominent among
those organizing in Egypt were Salah Jadid, Muhammad cUmran, and
Hafiz al-Asad.63
The committee reached a series of basic decisions early in its life. They
were:

1— To place responsibility for dissolving the Party . . . [on] the National

Command. Since the core of the Party and its true strength is in Syria,
dissolving it there means the dissolution of the [whole] Party. Hence, the
continuation of the National Command is meaningless.

2— The Internal Statute provides, for the Party’s good, for forming new
commands up to the highest level, without the permanent commands
blocking this; [hence] to reject the principle of Party fatherhood (i.e.,
expelling the three professors as responsible for the dissolution . . .).

3— Non-cooperation with those who do not subscribe to this methodology.

4 — Non-cooperation, except when local circumstances require, with all who

cooperate with the system of unity.

5— Build the Party anew.64

204 THE BACTH PARTY

Although they called themselves Bacthists and were organized as

Bacthists, the associations of officers in the military organization with the
party varied. Some of them had personal connections with particular party
leaders; some had connections with members who were in rebellion against
the party leaders. In this respect they were near the regionalist wing, which
was beginning to organize itself toward the end of the union period, “ . . .
but the military organization remained independent of any wing of the
party and of its National Command.” 65 These officers had nothing to do
with the secession. They returned to Syria after it was completed. Members
of the organization, e.g., Hamad cUbayd, were involved in some way in
the events of March 28, 1962, but so were Bacth officers who were not
connected at the time with the military organization and non-Bacthist
pro-Nasirists as well. Many Bacthist members were expelled from the army
after this event, but the group remained together.
The fourteen officers who founded the military committee are a rep­
resentative sample of the post-independence Syrian officer corps. The men
who entered the corps did so because it offered the best opportunity for
social and economic mobility, especially to those near the bottom of the
ladder. And, as secondary school education became more widely available,
more and more cadets came from rural backgrounds, reaching a majority in
the graduating class of 1952 and maintaining it thereafter. Thus the
proportion of minority members entering the academy was larger than their
share of the total population. The military committee was an extreme case;
of its fourteen founders, more than half were minorities—four cAlawis,
two Druzes, and two Ismacilis. There were three Sunnis, and of the other
three, one may have been an cAlawi.
A distinguishing aspect of this military committee was its complete lack
of an organizational link to the National Command of the party or to the
provisional Syrian Regional Command that was re-established in 1962; the
committee’s independence was to have important results in the future. By
the beginning of 1963, the Bacth military organization had become a
strong, organized group, dominated by a handful of men of small-town or
rural origins—many from the Jabal cAlawi.

Lebanon

Lebanon had a dual role as the party center and as the one area where
Bacthists could function in comparative freedom. cAflaq lived in Lebanon
and engaged in national party work, as he had been directed to do by the
party congress. This proximity caused certain troubles, however. Acting
on recommendations from the Fourth Party Congress, the National Com­
mand instructed the Regional Command to become more overtly active.
The New Party 205

The Lebanese were most reluctant to do so, but cAflaq pressed the issue.
The National Command sent a letter to all delegates to a Lebanese Regional
Congress meeting at the turn of the year 1960-1961 stressing that the party
needed a place from which to direct its pan-Arab activity, some sort of
official standing, and better means to counteract hostile propaganda.66 The
efforts of cAflaq and his associates were not notably successful; the party
weekly folded in the fall of 1960 for lack of funds—partly because it was
banned from most Arab countries. The party tried to start a monthly
ideological and political magazine but was unable to muster sufficient
support.67
The stresses which the National Command’s presence brought added to
the strains in the party. Lebanese Bacthists were divided over how to treat
the UAR. Some Lebanese Bacthists chose to follow cAbdallah Rimawi’s
Revolutionary Bacth Party. From time to time, pro-Rimawi and orthodox
Bacthists in Lebanon came to blows.66 More important issues arose the
next year in Lebanon, and, as in Syria, they were those of “ regionalism”
and of restoring unity with Egypt. One faction of the Lebanese Party,
including some of its early leaders, made a vigorous effort at a Regional
Congress early in 1962 to prevent that congress from proposing that a
national congress be convened in May. The majority opposed this faction,
which continued to agitate against the UAR and unity even after the Fifth
National Congress.69
The feuding and contention went on until the newly chosen National
Command, which included several loyal Lebanese members—cAbd al-
Majid Rafici, Khalid Yashruti, Khalid al-cAli, and Jibran Majdalani
—came to fear that perhaps loyal members were unable to hold the
Lebanese regional organization. Accordingly, the National Command
decided in mid-August to expel the deviant members. Execution of this
decision was delayed until September 10 to give the loyal faction time to let
ordinary members know about the matter—and to keep as many of them in
the organization as possible.70 The regionalist faction broke their version
of the news on September 14, announcing in the name of the Lebanese
Regional Command that the Nasirites—Majdalani, Yashruti, and Muhsin
Abu Mayzar—had been expelled for being linked with the intelligence
service of an unnamed Arab state, presumably the UAR. The announce­
ment added that other Lebanese Party stalwarts, such as cAli Jabir, cAbd
al-Majid al-Rafici, and Khalid cAli, had been referred to the party disci­
plinary board. Significantly, the regionalist faction had to publish this news
in the Communist paper al-Nida’ . 71 Al-Bacth denied the validity of this
statement the next day, saying that the persons who had made this
announcement had already been expelled from the party. In the end, the
Lebanese organization remained largely intact, but such disputes reduced
its effectiveness.
206 THE BAeTH PARTY

In other regions, the question of re-establishing unity with Egypt does

not appear to have been as crucial an issue. The Jordanian organization
continued its clandestine existence, struggling against constant repression,
but remained small.
The Libyan organization, which had looked very promising in 1960,
had been crippled by arrests of some 160 Bacthist militants in June and July
of 1961. The government charged them with preparing a coup, though their
actions were largely the traditional Bacth ones of distributing pamphlets
calling for freeing Libya Q f foreign forces.72 In time, 87 Bacthists were
given sentences ranging from 6 to 32 months in jail, a blow from which
Libya’s Bacthists did not recover for several years.
At the beginning of 1963, the Bacth Party—still apparently led by
Professor cAflaq—had greatly changed. In Syria, a Bacth military organi­
zation was plotting its course toward a coup. Syria-firsters were common
among once pan-Arab Bacthists, and the old guard had few followers. In
Iraq, the party was directed by a group of tough, conspiratorial figures,
bent on a coup d’état. In Lebanon—as in the two major regions—argument
over relations with Egypt split the party. And the ideology that motivated
the Bacthists had also undergone much change.

Notes
1. A number of former Palestinian Bacthists became active in the Palestine
Liberation cause, especially after 1967, among them Bahjat Abu Gharbiyah, Kamal
Nasir (both on the Palestine Liberation Organization’s executive board at one time),
and Khalid Yashruti. The latter two are now deceased; Nasir was killed by Israeli
commandos in a raid on Beirut in April 1973. A very large number of Ba'thists
simply dropped out of politics.
2. Munif Razzaz, al-Tajribah al-Murrah (The Bitter Experience) (Beirut: Dar
Ghandur, 1967), p. 36.
3. Ibid., p. 35. See also Azmat al-Bacth al-cArabi al Ishtiraki min Khilal
Tajribatihi fi al-Hraq (The Crisis o f the Arab Socialist Resurrection Party Resulting
from Its Experience in Iraq (Beirut: Dar al-Shacb, 1964), p. 29, “ The army as a
body is not a social class. . . . ”
4. Razzaz, Tajribah, pp. 38-39. Razzaz also (p. 36) criticized the party for
neglecting enlisted men and favoring officers, saying that this practice had injurious
effects later when officers undertook military coups and came to dominate party
and state. Actually, such concentration on officers was merely a reflection in the
military apparatus of party practice on the civilian side. Enlisted men in the several
Arab armies were drawn from the peasant and urban working classes, which were
virtually unrepresented in the civilian party.
The New Party 207

5. Press accounts of the trial proceedings, correlated with Fu’ad Rikabi, al-Hall
al-Awhad (The Only Solution) (Cairo: al-Sharikah al-cArabiyah li al-Tibacah wa
al-Nashr, 1963), demonstrate these losses.
6. Rikabi, al-Hall al-Awhad, p. 29.
7. Middle East Record 1961, p. 271; hereafter cited as MER. The National
Command’s effort came before the Third National Congress.
8. Cited in MER 1961, p. 271.
9. See cAbr Mu’tamaratihi, pp. 87-89, for the Command’s justification of this
move.
10. Rikabi, al-Hall al-Awhad, pp. 102-103.
11. BBC Tri-partite Talks, ME/1285/E/7. Sacdi cited evidence of Egyptian
support for Rikabi; Nasir’s disclaimer of such support is unconvincing. Rikabi
claimed in his own book that even before leaving Baghdad on Nov. 13, 1959, “ we
had succeeded in forming a new kernel of a new command” (p. 98), but the
National Command’s appointment of a provisional command superseded whatever
Rikabi had started.
12. Al-Nahar (Beirut), June 25, 1961, cited in MER 1961, p. 271.
13. Arab World, Jan. 2, 1962. Rikabi’s career after this was linked to the
fortunes of pro-Egyptian forces in Iraqi politics. He was jailed under the Bacth
regime of 1963, but became Assistant Secretary General of the Arab Socialist
Union in Iraq and a cabinet minister in 1964. Jailed again in 1969 by the Bacthists,
he was killed in jail in 1971 by a fellow inmate, the official account said.
14. Arab World, Feb. 20, 1963; Mid-East Mirror, Feb. 16, 1963.
15. Nidal al-Bacth (Beirut: Dar al-Talicah, 1963), VII, “ Internal Party Circular
of May 1960,” p. 86; hereafter cited as Nidal.
16. Ibid., p. 96.
17. MER 1961, p. 271.
18. Arab Political Documents 1964, p. 21, p. 31, citing minutes of the
Extraordinary Syrian Regional Congress of February 1964.
19. Ibid., p. 31. cAflaq here was criticizing Sacdi for reducing the size of the
party so drastically. Razzaz, Tajribah, p. 89, says that there were less than 800
members in the Iraqi Region as of the February 1963 coup.
20. Arab World, Nov. 30, 1960, p. 7.
21. MEM, Dec. 3, 1960, p. 16.
22. Arab World, Feb. 13, 1961, pp. 7 and 9.
23. MEM, April 8, 1961, p. 6.
24. Nidal VII, pp. 158-61.
25. MEM, April 14, 1962, p. 24, and al-Bacth, Aug. 11, 1962.
26. Azmah, p. 118. It would have been linked at the Regional Command level.
27. Ibid., p. 43.
28. Ibid.
29. Uriel Dann, Iraq Under Qassem (New York: Praeger, 1969), p. 365.
30. BBC, Tri-partite Talks, ME/1303/E/14-15.
31. Nidal IV, p. 192.
32. Patrick Seale, The Struggle for Syria: A Study o f Post-war Arab Politics,
1945-1958 (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 158-59.
33. L'Orient (Beirut), cited in Arab World, Jan. 16, 1961, pp. 5-6.
34. Nidal IV, p. 247 for the statement, pp. 248-51 for the circular.
35. Razzaz, Tajribah, p. 57.
36. Damascus Radio, Oct. 2, 1961.
208 THE BACTH PARTY

37. BBC, Tri-Partite Talks, ME/1297/E/5. Bitar had already issued a retraction
for signing this document and could only argue that this single incident was
outweighed by his long service in the cause of unity. (Ibid., ME/1303/E/5).
38. Nidal VI, p. 12.
39. Ibid., p. 13. Sami al-Jundi, al-Bacth (Beirut: Dar al-Nahar li al-Nashr,
1969), p. 87, refers to the confusion that the simultaneous praise of union and
criticism of Nasir caused.
40. Ibid., p. 14. This was in harmony with the decisions of the Fourth National
Congress to criticize the mistakes of the UAR but not the concept of unity.
41. Ibid., p. 16.
42. Arab World, Nov. 13,-1961, pp. 5-7.
43. MER 1961, pp. 503-5 for election results.
44. Arab World, Dec. 20, 1961, pp. 1-2.
45. Itamar Rabinovich, Syria Under the Baeth 1963-1966: The Army-Party
Symbiosis. (Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1972), pp. 30-34. Jundi,
al-Bacth, pp. 89-95, has details of the April move as seen from CA1wan’s side.
Jundi notes that Salah Jadid did not provide the cooperation he had promised.
46. MEM, Aug. 11, 1962, p. 11.
47. Al-Bacth, Aug. 11, 1962.
48. Al-Nahar (Beirut), quoted in Arab World, May 3, 1962, pp. 1-2.
49. MEM, May 5, 1962, p. 2.
50. Arab World, May 2, 1962, pp. 1-2 and 5.
51. Ra'y al-Ustadh Akram al-Hawrani f i al-Wihdah al-cArabiyah (Damascus:
No publisher indicated. May 20, 1962), p. 10.
52. Arab Political Documents 1964, p. 33, citing minutes of the Extraordinary
Syrian Regional Congress of February 1964. See also Rabinovich, Syria Under the
Bacth, pp. 37-38.
53. Nidal VI, “ Internal Circular on the Fifth National Congress,” pp. 81
and 86.
54. Nidal VI, p. 90.
55. Ibid., p. 87.
56. Quoted in Arab World, June 21, 1962, p. 3. The statement is not in the
Nidal series.
57. Nidal VI, pp. 89 and 91.
58. Razzaz, Tajribah, p. 75. Bacthists were meeting secretly; Salaheddin
(Salah al-Din) Bitar, “ The Rise and Decline of the Baath,” Middle East Interna­
tional, Nos. 3 and 4 (June and July 1971), pt. H, p. 14.
59. Arab World, June 21, 1962. It apparently included Bitar, Zuhur,
and 'Aysami. Rabinovich, Syria Under the Bacth, says there were only four
persons on it.
60. Razzaz, Tajribah, pp. 89-90. In this section and in Chapter 14, considera­
ble material is drawn from Ben-Tsur’s article, “ The Neo-Bà’th Party of Syria,”
which is based for the most part on Bacthist documents captured at Qunaytirah after
the June 1967 war. He quotes from a file of an internal party organ, al-Munadil,
and from internal party organizational reports. The picture Ben-Tsur draws of the
party in Syria in the 1962-1966 period is consistent with that sketched by Razzaz in
Tajribah, which is also used extensively in the present volume.
61. Jundi, al-Bacth, p. 85.
62. Ibid.
The New Party 209

63. Razzaz, Tajribah, p. 87. Jundi says that cUmran was its head. There appear
to have been fourteen members; the other eleven were Ahmad al-Mir,
cAbd-al-Karim Jundi, Salim Hatum, Hamad cUbayd, cUthman Kancan,
Muhammad Rabah Tawil, Husayn Milhim, Sulayman Haddad, Mustafa Hajj cAli,
Ahmad Suwaydani, and Musa Zucbi.
64. Jundi, al-Baeth, p. 86. Jundi says that these were kept secret, but that he
had gotten them from friends in the government when he was writing his book, i.e.,
in 1969 or thereabouts.
65. Razzaz, Tajribah, p. 88.
66. Bashir Dacuq (ed.), NidalHizb al-Bacth al-cArabi al-Ishtiraki eAbr Bayanat
Qiyadatihi al-Qawmiyah (Beirut: Dar al-Talicah, 1971), pp. 131-33. The letter and
an introduction are reproduced from a Lebanese Regional Circular of March 1961.
67. Ibid., pp. 141-42, a section o n al-Sahafah in a monthly information report
of January 1961 issued by the Secretary General’s office.
68. See, for example, Arab World, July 17, 1961, p. 1.
69. BBC, Tri-partite Talks, ME/1309/E/11-12. Three of the faction’s mem­
bers, cAbd al-Wahhab Shumitli, Ghassan Shararah, and Ghalib Yaghi, lost their
seats on the National Command at this Congress.
70. Al-Bacth, Sept. 22, 1962, contains a lengthy statement explaining and
defending the Command’s action.
71. Arab World, Sept. 14, 1962, p. 4.
72. Al-Bacth, Oct. 6, 1962.
 - 13 -

Changes in Ideology

Changed conditions in the Arab world, the very large turnover in party
leadership, and the Bacth’s experiences in the 1940s and 1950s were
among the factors leading to ideological change in the 1960s. Michel
cAflaq’s status was much diminished, even though he remained Secretary
General of the party. His writings were still honored by many as the canon
of Bacth doctrine, but he now wrote relatively little, and what he wrote
scarcely added to the ideas he had so successfully spread in the 1940s and
1950s. Moreover, the failures of the 1950s—the tempestuous years of
association with Hawrani’s Arab Socialist Party and, most important, the
dissolution of the Bacth Party in Syria in 1958—were attributed to him. In
the early 1950s, cAflaq had been revered by the younger element in the
party, and collective democracy within the party had worked well enough,
because many members freely accepted cAflaq’s ideas.
By the early 1960s, however, younger members had come to have ideas
of their own—ideas derived from party failures and their own failures and
their own experiences. Those who had been isolated in Syria without a
party leadership or who conducted a clandestine struggle in Iraq felt that
cAflaq simply did not address himself to their situations. cAli Salih Sacdi,
in a bitter confrontation in 1964 after the debacle in Iraq, accused cAflaq of
providing the party in Iraq with platitudes instead of practical guidance in
its struggle against Qasim. Sacdi also accused cAflaq of withdrawing to
sulk rather than face controversial issues at party congresses.1 Bitar no
longer commanded widespread support and allegiance among the party
cadres in Syria after 1963.2 With the one-time intellectual and political
leaders of the party so out of touch both with current situations and with the
party members, there was plenty of room for other ideas to grow.
Ideological differences expressed in published works within the party
emerged full-blown in 1963 and succeeding years, or so it seemed.
This sudden appearance of diversity is somewhat misleading, however,
inasmuch as it was Bacth control of two governments in 1963 and Syria
afterward that gave the party access to the press and to various public
212 THE BACTH PARTY

relations media. But earlier events and ideas played a part in ideological
development. Indeed, some contradictions and divergences dated back to
the earliest days of the party.
The contradiction between the Bacth view of itself as a vanguard with
the sacred mission of revitalizing the Arab nation and its espousal of
principles of responsible parliamentary government had plagued the party
as far back as 1949, when it supported the coup of Sami Hinnawi.
Elections were, however, going out of fashion. In fact, during the 1960s,
Arab voters were offered some choice among parliamentary candidates
only in Syria in December 1961, Kuwait in 1963, and the quadrennial
elections in Lebanon. The Fourth National Congress had been critical of
the employment of the military coup by the Party.3 When the Bacthists
seized power in Iraq in February 1963, and national party leaders rushed to
Baghdad to congratulate their Iraqi comrades, no one expressed any
opposition to the Iraqi technique of seizing power. Nor did Ba'th civilian
leaders appear at all reluctant to take office in Syria after the March 8, 1963
military coup.
The new trend had been foreshadowed in 1961, prior to the breakup of
the UAR, when a longtime Syrian Bacthist, Professor 'Abdallah cAbd
al-Da’im, published The New Arab Age (al-Jil al-cArabi al-Jadid). He
devoted approximately a fourth of the book to the topic of democracy and
the way that concept must be understood. He argued that the will of the
majority, the traditional basis of democracy, is subject to distortion by
those in office or otherwise having power, e.g., in the communications
media. He believed that representative government also has shortcomings
in that elected representatives let problems of being re-elected to office take
priority over the business of governing.4 For cAbd al-Da’im, the failure of
parliamentary government in many Arab states was due to domination of
one class over others, e.g., landlords over peasants. Hence, the logical
solution, he said, was a system of social democracy that prevents class
exploitation.5 Jamal Atasi, another longtime Ba'thist, wrote in 1962 or
1963 that “ socialist criticism of bourgeois democracy and its parliamen-
tarianism showed that political democracy will not become a true expres­
sion of the will of the people . . . unless it is coupled with an economic
democracy that returns national wealth to all of the people. . . .’’6
cAbd al-Da’im wanted a system that permitted political and social
freedom for all members of society, but he laid considerable emphasis on
the need to balance individual freedom with the needs of society.7 But, he
noted, because Arab society was backward and political freedom restricted
by economic and social fetters, a special style of democracy was required.8
He described favorably the “ guided democracy” Sukarno practiced in
Changes in Ideology 213

Indonesia and, without saying so flatly, conveyed the notion that some­
thing very like Sukarno’s system was what Arab society needed.9
cAbd al-Da’im, moving slowly away from his earlier beliefs, still
adhered to them sufficiently to accept a ministry for several months in the
spring of 1962 under the post-UAR Syrian parliamentary government.
Other party members of his generation were much more critical of
parliamentary government. About the time that the Bacthists seized control
of Syria in 1963, two collections of political articles written some months
previously were published in Damascus. Jamal Atasi, quoted above, Ilyas
Murqus, cAbd al-Karim Zuhur, and Yasin al-Hafiz were the principal
contributors. These articles were sharply critical of old party ways.
Hafiz’ article was a critique of past party experience. He censured
parliamentary government, asserting that it is generally a cover for
capitalist control and, for the Arab states, a system imported from the West
and without political roots. He also criticized the party for trying to
increase the quantity of its representation at the expense of its quality.10 He
ended his article with a call for freedom and democracy—the freedom of
the organized masses and a revolutionary socialist democracy.11
Ilyas Murqus, in the same publication, devoted an entire article to “ The
Collapse of the Parliamentary System.” For Murqus, as for Hafiz and
Atasi, parliamentary government in the West reflected, and was directly
associated with, the rise of the bourgeoisie. In Egypt, the establishment of
parliament in 1924 was not accompanied by the political and social
liberalization that the people sought. Both in Egypt and in Syria, those with
influence and power were the masters of the parliament.12 He cites the
parliamentary elections of December 1961 as a model of deterioration of
parliamentary government, giving rise to the division between parliament
and people and between government and people.13 He ended his article by
saying that, “ the experiences of the great people’s revolutions show that
revolution cannot be restricted by formal and absolute democracy but that it
moves toward a specific goal through the means which accomplish that
goal.” 14 In effect, if one cannot win by votes, he should employ force.
This ferment led to the presentation, at the Sixth National Congress in
October 1963, of a report that reshaped the party’s position on the
governmental structure it should espouse and, indeed, its position on all the
major ideological issues facing it. Entitled “ Some Theoretical Propositions
(or Theses),” this report—divided into sections on Unity, Freedom, and
Socialism, and an introduction added at cAflaq’s insistence—is the major
doctrinal statement adopted by the party in the post-UAR period.15 The
report severely criticized the party for failing to take a stand on the
inappropriateness of “ liberal bourgeois concepts of political freedom” to
214 THE BACTH PARTY

modern Arab society and for accepting the parliamentary system as an

adequate basis for political action.16 Freedom, it said, was not an absolute
but was shaped by the situation; “ power should shift from the feudal
bourgeois to the toiling classes, hence the parliamentary way should be
avoided. . . .” 17 The people’s democracy, led by a vanguard party, would
limit the political freedom of the bourgeois and upper classes, just as those
elements, when in power, had limited the freedom of the masses.18
The Congress formally adopted this reasoning, albeit in less blunt
language. Resolution No. 6 of the public statement of that congress says,
“ . . . the congress has asserted that the party’s obligation toward the
masses of the people is conducive to setting up a democratic and radical
revolutionary experiment in both regions [Iraq and Syria].” 19 The congress
went on to say that the bourgeois class was no longer able to fulfill any
positive role in the economic field. It emphasized the importance of
management by the workers of the means of production and, in Resolution
9, approved “ a detailed policy for developing this [i.e., the government]
machinery in a democratic and revolutionary manner which would enable it
to effectively take part in the socialization process.” 20 In sum, by 1963 the
Bacth had ceased to lend even verbal support to the concept of responsible
parliamentary government, even though it remains as an ideal in the party
constitution to this day. For the Bacth, people’s democracy had taken the
place of parliamentary representative democracy as the goal to be pursued.
It was true that parliamentary government had not worked very effec­
tively in Syria or, for that matter, in most other Arab states. At least, it had
not worked to the benefit of the Bacth or other advocates of revolutionary
change. Murqus—and probably others as well—did not place great value
on the principal virtue of a parliamentary system, that is, provision of an
orderly non-violent means for the transfer of power. He and other Bacthists
saw the parliamentary system as inseparable from the process whereby one
group or class rose to power and then stayed in office. Because many
Bacthists had no reservations about using violence, and because almost all
wanted their system to replace the existing one, parliamentary government
per se had little to recommend it except as a way to win power. A slow,
tortuous, and unsure route to power, parliamentarianism could benefit the
Bacthists very little once their party was in power.
One could argue that a party with genuine broad-based support could
rely on a free vote. But the Bacth was never broadly based; it was an elite
vanguard aimed at changing society and especially at getting rid of what it
considered to be the exploiting classes, and had no wish to support a
give-and-take system. The Bacth—and others like it—turned to the one-
party system (sometimes allied with parties holding kindred views) repre­
senting the popular will through a mass organization such as a people’s
Changes in Ideology 215

assembly. As it happened, the system tied in nicely with a form of rule

common in the region under both monarchy and republic—an authoritarian
centralized government.
As noted in Chapter 3, the party’s understanding of socialism had begun
to change as early as the mid-1950s, and this evolution continued. Several
factors were involved. To begin with, socialist ideas and their application
had developed in a variety of ways in the former colonial world, in Europe,
and also within the communist camp. The interplay between the different
versions of communism affected Arab thought on the subject. Some
versions were considered by Arab, observers to be more successful than
others. For example. Communist movements in India and Yugoslavia were
seen to be highly nationalistic, and the Tito government was clearly not as
subservient to international communism as local Arab Communist parties
were. The internationalism of Arab Communist parties conflicted head-on
with pan-Arab nationalism and is a major reason why Arab Communist
parties have not attracted a large following among Arab intellectuals. Of
course, Bacthists and many other Arabs continued to identify capitalism
with imperialism, as a system that benefited only the wealthy few at the
apex of Arab society who collaborated with the foreign colonialists.
Within the Bacth Party, persons of vastly different backgrounds from
those of the first generation of leaders were emerging on the branch,
regional, and even the national levels by the early 1960s. This rise of
members through the ranks was facilitated in Iraq by the extensive
disruption and loss of members during the five years of Qasim’s rule. It
was symbolized by the disappearance of the ineffective Rikabi and the
emergence of the tough, conspiratorial Sacdi as Regional Secretary.
In Syria, the students recruited by Bacthist teachers in the schools and
provincial capitals had grown up in an environment substantially different
from that of the city-bred intellectuals who had founded and led the party in
earlier days. When those who were to lead the party in the 1960s in Syria
went on from the secondary school recruiting grounds to the military
academy or the university, they brought with them the attitudes and
priorities of their provincial and rural origins. They were interested in rural
improvements through establishment of agricultural cooperatives, the edu­
cation of peasants, breaking up large estates, and land redistribution. Their
writings, and, even more, their activities, throughout the decade of the
1960s conveyed their desire to achieve practical results in society, an
atmosphere that contrasted markedly with the theorizing of Bacthist leaders
in the 1950s.
The Bacth had done nothing whatever in the field of socialism in Syria
prior to 1958. It had concentrated almost exclusively on the wielding of
power and on the drive for unity. The first major anti-capitalist moves in
216 THE BACTH PARTY

Syria had been made at Nasir’s direction during the UAR period. The land
reform begun in 1958 had sharply limited ownership of agricultural land.
Of course, Bacth Party organizations in other Arab states, lacking political
power, had no chance to implement socialist ideas and could only work to
increase the acceptability of socialist ideas in their societies.
By the time the Bacth re-emerged as a political force in 1963, dissatis­
faction with the party’s previous views and performance in the field of
socialism had grown quite strong. A founding member of the party, Jamal
Atasi, used these notable.words: “ . . . the Arab-Bacth movement has
outrun the text of its 1947 constitution at least as regards socialism.” 21
That constitution had espoused the principle of limited private ownership,
but Atasi wrote, ‘‘The first objective of socialism is the abolition of private
ownership of the means of production, and the application of a system of
social ownership to them (i.e., the means of production) is a necessity . . .
to eliminate exploitation.” 22 He also said, ‘‘To change the old system, it is
necessary . . . to change the economic, social, and legal structures on
which the old system is based. Revolutionary forces have to seize power
for this change in order to proceed along the way of socialism and set up
the state for the broader interest of the masses.” The effective revolution­
ary tool is a party which can ‘‘take over the government as well as create a
people’s democracy and, subsequently, organize the socialist state.” 23
Atasi viewed Nasir’s nationalization moves both in Syria during the
union and in Egypt in 1962 as measures of state capitalism, steps leading to
socialism but definitely not socialist. Part of his criticism derived from his
judgment that the nationalization measures were imposed from above by
one man’s will rather than as an expression of the will of the masses. For
Atasi, ‘‘the revolutionary party must be closely connected with the toiling
masses; its leadership and organization must emanate from the will of the
masses.” 24 This last point is of considerable importance; Atasi came close
to being a classic socialist insisting on the necessity of class struggle for
real socialism. He asserted that only when the individual is aware that he is
oppressed and exploited will he begin the long struggle to free himself, and
he must do this in conjunction with others of his class.25 He worried that
land reform—though a good thing in itself—might lead the peasants, if
they became satisfied, to abandon the workers, who should be their natural
allies in the fight against exploitation and capitalism.26
Atasi was a believer in a socialism, not in different socialisms for
different countries. But he also was a strong pan-Arabist. He vigorously
condemned regionalism and those who used the term ‘‘Arab socialism” to
denote a distinct socialism in what appeared to be an attack on, or at least, a
strong divergence of opinion from Michel cAflaq, who found a special
Arab character in just about everything dealing with the Arab world.27 For
Changes in Ideology 217

Atasi, however, Arab socialism was a meaningful term used primarily to

fight regionalism, that is, the concept that the Bacth Party had a proper
existence within one region, i.e., one Arab country, rather than the whole
Arab nation. It was not proper to use the term Arab socialism to distinguish
between a particularly Arab socialism and other socialisms.28
Although, in the end, Atasi’s attachment to the concept of Arab unity
was stronger than his attachment to the party—he was expelled in 1963 and
later formed the Arab Socialist Union in Syria—the ideas of socialism that
he articulated had wide support. Again the resolutions of the Sixth National
Congress of the party held in Damascus in October 1963 reflect the
ideological report. The second resolution stated, “ The congress decided
that the socialist goals of the party must be put into effect immediately,
because a thorough socialist revolution must use the workers and peasants
as the basis for the revolution and for the Party simultaneously.” 29 The
Congress decided to proceed with the socialist transformation of society, in
which workers, peasants, revolutionary intelligentsia, and small
bourgeoisie would participate, but not middle bourgeoisie, because they
were considered a likely ally of neo-colonialism.30 The Congress stressed
that management by workers of the means of production must be achieved
and that “ the establishment of collective farms run by the peasants on land
covered by the agrarian reform law [in Syria and Iraq]—these being
considered a sound socialist starting point for the transformation of social
relations in the countryside—is a revolutionary objective for which the
party is striving.31
The Bacthists in Iraq were not afforded an opportunity to put these ideas
into practice. They were ousted within a month of the conclusion of the
congress. Syria had nationalized the banks in May 1963. But, plagued by
political infighting within the party, the government could take no steps on
the road to socialism for some time. Some Syrian industry was nationalized
in 1964, and the sweeping January 1965 nationalization decrees put all of
the rest of Syria’s major industry under state control. Land ownership
remained private; eventually land seized from big landlords was distributed
to small farmers, and a system of agricultural cooperatives was established.
By the late 1960s, moves toward socialism had taken half of Syria’s
economy out of private hands.
Much of the struggle within the party revolved around the key ideologi­
cal issue of Arab unity. cAflaq and his supporters clung to the view that
unity was essential, and that the mistakes made by the UAR did not
invalidate the concept. In Syria and in Iraq, substantial pro-Nasir sentiment
had built up in the 1950s, and it lasted well into the following decade.
Much of this pro-Nasir feeling existed among non-Bacthists, for example,
cAbd al-Salam cArif and his supporters in Iraq. Many Bacthists who wanted
218 THE BACTH PARTY

to follow Egyptian leadership split off in 1959, - joining Rimawi’s

Egyptian-financed Bacth party. Syrians, of course, could not join this
party, because such political activity was forbidden in the UAR. Following
the separation, Syria’s pro-Nasir unionists came alive both in and out of the
Bacth party. Some formed a socialist unionist group in protest over Akram
Hawrani’s and Salah Bitar’s signing the document approving secession in
October 1961. Others stayed with the reconstituted Syrian Bacth organiza­
tion and joined the effort to put together a three-country unity in the weeks
following the Iraqi and Syrian coups of 1963. The collapse of this effort,
due largely to the anti-Egyptian bias of the Bacth military organization (see
Chapter 14), drove some to quit the Bacth Party or got them expelled. Such
was the fate of Jamal Atasi, mentioned above, and cAbd al-Karim Zuhur, a
one-time follower of Akram Hawrani, both of whom left the ranks in the
summer of 1963.32
Though a substantial number of Bacthists held to the concept of unity or
specifically to pro-Nasir views, large numbers took the opposite side. The
events of 1958-1961 shook the belief of many Bacthists in the virtues of a
united Arab state. For many, life in the UAR had been largely a matter of
Egyptians lording it over Syrians and imposing Egyptian administration,
Egyptian politics, and Egyptian officialdom on the Syrians without giving
them very much to say about it. There was resentment also at the way
Egyptians had helped some conservative Syrian figures and hindered good
left-wing Bacthists in the national union elections of 1959. Many Syrian
Bacthists believed that these actions were expressions of a deliberate policy
on the part of the Egyptians. Resentment at union and at Egypt was
particularly strong among those Syrian military officers who, because they
were considered politically unreliable by their fellows or by the Egyptians,
were transferred out of the country during the UAR days. The Bacthists
were naturally high on the list of the politically unreliable, and a fair
number of Bacthists officers ended up in Egypt by 1960 and 1961. Here,
with no party apparatus to sustain them, they formed their own Bacth
Military Organization.33 Salah Jadid, Hafiz al-Asad, and Muhammad
cUmran were involved in this organization from the very beginning; all
three had very prominent roles in Syria after 1963.
This resentment toward Nasir, his associates, and Egyptian domination
blossomed into a “ Syria-first” syndrome, which was not openly expressed
as anti-Arab unity (Bitar was the only regular Bacthist who signed or
publicly approved the October 1961 document applauding the secession).
Civilian Bacthists in Syria began to form their own group toward the end of
the union period, even though the national party leadership did not try to
reconstruct the Syrian organization until the summer of 1962, almost a year
later. They came to be called “ regionalists” (qutriyyun), a term used
Changes in Ideology 219

pejoratively by the old guard. The anti-Nasir and anti-unionist attitude of

these civilian and military groups and individuals naturally extended to
dislike of the leaders who had brought the party to such a low state in the
quest—a quest that failed—for Arab unity. The two groups, civilian and
military, sharing these views were separate and stayed so for some time
after the breakup of the UAR.34 (The Bacth Military Organization played
no part in the secession of Syria from the United Arab Republic in
September 1961.) The two groups, however, found a common cause later
in opposition to the policies of the old-guard National Command of the
party.
Hawrani and his faction had few of the ideological hangups about unity
and regionalism that cAflaq and his associates did. The UAR had not
worked to his party’s advantage and he was delighted to have only Syria as
a field of political operations again. But he was not a lodestone for the
regionalists. Hawrani was a political boss—a “zacim .” The regionalists
wanted a share of power, not to follow an old-time political leader.
Hawrani was willing to work through parliament, a system at which he had
been fairly successful; the regionalists were sure that such a system would
no longer function in terms of Syrian political realities or of what they
wished to achieve. Hawrani relied on his Hama constituency whereas the
regionalists came from all over Syria.
By the time the first post-UAR Syrian Regional Congress was held in
September 1963, the tripartite Syrian-Iraqi-Egyptian union had fallen apart
before it had even been formally approved. By this time, the question of
unity between Syria and Iraq, both Bacthist states, had come up. The
regional congress, unable to agree on the unity issue, brought the question
up to the national congress held the following month. Between the two
congresses, the National Command issued a statement commemorating the
second anniversary of the secession. Dated September 27, 1963, it con­
demned the secession, criticized Nasir, and praised unity. It advocated “ a
populist socialist democratic state combining Syria and Iraq.” 35 The
Regional Command elected at the September 1963 congress, strongly
regionalist in orientation, did not associate itself with the statement.
Regionalism, or, at least, diminished enthusiasm for unity, was show­
ing strength elsewhere in the party. The ideological report submitted to the
Sixth Congress was at best lukewarm on the subject. It gave due credit to
the party, i.e., the old-guard leaders, for being the first to work for unity,
to tie it to socialism and to change in Arab society; in effect, to raise the
consciousness of the Arabs on the issue. But the report charged that the
party had allowed the concept of unity to petrify.36 Arab unity is a way to
achieve salvation from underdevelopment and to speed the progress of
Arab economy, inasmuch as many states are too small to advance easily on
220 THE BACTH PARTY

their own.37 Nonetheless, decentralization is the practical way to apply

socialist democracy; unity should come as the crowning achievement of
Arab revolutionary militancy, although intermediate stages were possible.
There must, in any event, be harmonious unity of means and systems, not
just of goals.38
The Sixth National Congress, in Resolution 15, said, “ The congress
approved the principle of establishing bilateral unity between Syria and
Iraq on a federal unity basis, taking into consideration the existing
circumstances in each region. The congress considers the new federated
state as a step toward a comprehensive unity, which will ensure fusing the
revolutionary powers of both regions and create new circumstances which
will help realize further unity steps.’’39 Even though some of this phraseol­
ogy was concocted to relate to the tripartite declaration of April 17, 1963, it
called for a fairly mild form of association “ in principle” between two
states, each led by elements of a party whose principal canon was Arab
unity. “ Regionalism” was primarily a Syrian phenomenon, to be sure, but
it had some support in Iraq as well, as illustrated by this resolution. When
out of power, of course, Bacthists in Iraq and in other regions needed and
wanted central party support in their own particular struggles against the
government they were aiming to supplant.
Despite the continuance in party office at the national level of men with
a pan-Arab outlook—Razzaz, A trash, cAysami, the Lebanese Majdalani,
and the Saudi cAli Ghannam, all from the National Commands chosen in
February 1964 and May 1965—the subject of unity is notable by its
absence from party publications at the national level in these years. A
National Command statement issued at the close of the Eighth National
Congress of May 1965, which was devoted primarily to internal party
matters, briefly mentioned an ideological report that analyzed the previous
unity experiment and the means of achieving unity again. The congress
also charged the new National Command with revising the party constitu­
tion to reflect the new phase in “ the campaign for socialist transformation
in union struggle” ; it blamed the breakup of the UAR on imperialism; and
it praised the Syrian Army for undermining the secessionist regime. Unity
was scarcely mentioned otherwise.40
After the Bacth government in Iraq fell in November 1963, and bitter
hostility had erupted between Nasir and the Bacthists, both old guard and
regionalist, there was no longer any opportunity for practical expression of
unity. The primary tasks of the Bacthists were to rebuild the party in Iraq
and to increase membership in other countries; in Syria much energy was
expended on the contest for power within the party. Unity remained the
goal, duly mentioned and extolled in party publications, although not
Changes in Ideology 221

nearly as frequently as in the past, but its advocates’ voices were muted and
its possibilities slim. The once favorable climate of the 1950s had changed
throughout the Arab world. The “ regionalist” philosophy had won in
Syria before the regionalists actually took over in February 1966.
Even so, unity could not be dropped as an ultimate goal. After the major
split that developed in the Bacth Party after the ouster of the old guard in
1966, each faction continued to act as the united party had. There are now
two National Commands, one situated in Damascus, the other in Baghdad,
both competing for the allegiance of regional organizations elsewhere in
the Arab world, and both with members in a variety of Arab regions. This
competition has become sharpest in Lebanon, where regional organizations
attached to both competing National Commands are still functioning in
1974, as I write this. Each country, that is Syria and Iraq, maintains a more
or less fictional organization in the other region; each has a few of the
other’s former citizens on its National Command. Neither has tampered
with the 1947 party constitution so far. Of the two, the Baghdad-based
Bacthists are the more pan-Arab in outlook; cAflaq is titular head of their
party. They appear to have rather more adherents in other regions than does
Damascus, and these adherents are more active. From time to time, there
are rumors of attempts to re-unify the party, but both sets of leaders act as if
this goal is not likely to be approached in their political lifetime.
Along with the increased emphasis on socialism and reduced attention
to unity, Bacth relations with the socialist camp underwent a substantial
change. These relations varied both at different times and in different
regions. The Iraqi Region is the simplest to deal with. When the Bacth
seized power there in February 1963, the local Communist party was its
bitterest opponent. Bloodshed during the takeover, harsh treatment of
Communists in detention camps, and resumption of the Kurdish war meant
very poor relations with the USSR and, of course, with the local Com­
munist Party. “ . . . 1963 . . . was a year of blood and death . . . the
cruelty of the executioner in 1963 . . . was unparalleled in this long-
suffering country,” 41 said a Soviet writer two years later. Over the years
Moscow had come to regard Qasim with a measure of disfavor, because he
had pushed the Iraqi Communists aside, and they no longer had much
effect on the Iraq government’s decisions, policies, or running of the
country.42 Qasim had also prosecuted the war with the Kurds in the face of
frequent public Soviet expressions of support for the Kurds’ right to a
distinctive status in the country.
But the Bacthist regime was far harsher than Qasim in its treatment of
the Communists. It also renewed hostilities with the Kurds and insisted on
holding all power in its own hands. Relations with the Soviets deteriorated;
222 THE BACTH PARTY

the USSR threatened to suspend its aid program, and by the fall of 1963,
fighting against the Kurds had reportedly slowed down because of short­
ages of ammunition and spare parts for Soviet-supplied weapons.43
But there was a second school of thought in the Iraqi Bacth when it
came to dealings with the USSR. cAli Salih Sacdi agreed with the drafters
of the ideological report who stressed the party’s early adherence to
positive neutralism and its “ non-commitment to the big international
camps.” He and they believed that the basic theses of the socialist camp
were closer to the interests of the Arab nation than those of the imperialist
camp, despite errors the USSR had made and despite the enmity of Arab
Communists toward Arab unity and nationalism.44
Other attitudes about local Communists were developing within the
party, most noticeably in Syria. There, regionalists found it easier to find a
community of interest with local Communists whose customary field of
activity was limited to individual countries. The change within the Bacth
Party in regard to the Communists took place over a span of several years,
especially in Syria. Certain of the writings of Jamal Atasi and Yasin
al-Hafiz indicate substantially greater receptivity to Communist ideas than
Bacthists had been accustomed to express earlier.45 Forces within the party
were shifting during 1964. Those favoring greater state participation in the
economy grew more powerful, as evidenced by the passage of the
nationalization decrees of January 1965, which were received favorably by
the Syrian Communists and by the Soviets. Over the years, the Soviets had
expressed a particular dislike for cAflaq. His absence from Syria during
most of the last half of 1964 helped to change the Soviet attitude, as the
nationalization decrees were clearly not his doing. The Soviet press
commented favorably on the resolute step taken by President Amin
al-Hafiz against religious and business interests. At the time of nationaliza­
tion, for example, an article in Izvestia on February 20, 1965 noted that
Bacthists in Syria had never been as bad as those in Iraq, that Syrian
Bacthists had been critical of the 1963 Bacth government in Baghdad, that
cAflaq was of little consequence now, and finally, “ that a number of other
Bacthist leaders today acknowledge his mistakes.” 46
Bacthists in Syria, having taken “ progressive” steps, made consider­
able efforts to establish a grouping of progressive and socialist parties in
the first half of 1965. The theme of the Bacthists’ approach was that all
forces opposed to colonialism needed to band together to deal with the
common foe instead of wasting their energy in disputes with one another.
cAflaq himself admitted that the Bacth had taken part in such disputes and
called for progressive socialist movements in the Arab world to band
together.47 The Bacth Party decided to form a front with Communist
Parties in Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon. In Syria the united front was to be
Changes in Ideology 223

demonstrated by the presence of three to five Communists on the Syrian

revolutionary council.48 In February, Syrian Communist Party leader
Bakdash was cautiously optimistic about these moves.49
Cooperation with the Communists, however, was easy in principle but
difficult in practice. There was opposition to it within the Syrian regional
organization. But most important, even those who supported cooperation
put a very high (and in the last analysis top) priority on the primacy of the
Bacth. Although they agreed with the Communists on such matters as
opposition to imperialism and the need for the socialist transformation of
society, few Bacthists were disposed to surrender authority or power to
others. The Bacthist concept of a joint front was one in which the Bacth
lead and directed and others followed, which is exactly what the Com­
munists would have done had they had the chance. The Bacth position was
discussed in the course of the Eighth National Congress in 1965. The
Congress agreed that the party would exchange visits with liberation
movements in other countries and with “ a number of socialist and
communist parties.” On the question of the front, the Congress said that it
could not favor a reactionary movement against a progressive movement,
and that “ the practical result of. any stand must in its final result be in the
interest of progressive forces.” 50 But this is a far cry from a true front
among parties.
Only a few days after the congress was over, the press in Beirut
reported that efforts to bring about cooperation between the Communist
Parties and the Bacth had failed.51 The transitional party program for Syria
put the reason for the failure rather bluntly, noting that the Bacth was only
the vanguard for the people, but as such it represented the people’s will and
hence must govern.52 Although it could not collaborate much with Com­
munists in Syria, and although it clearly chose the socialist camp as
opposed to the imperialist camp, the Bacth noted that because there were
differences among the states of the socialist camp, it should adopt a
separate stand toward each socialist country.53
The full development of the new ideology in the areas of people’s
democracy, socialism, and relations with other progressive forces took
place after the regionalists and the military seized power in February 1966.
The cabinet formed after that coup included two Communists, and Com­
munist participation in the cabinet was virtually constant from that point
on. A progressive front dominated by the party was finally established in
1972. In the years after February 1966 the Bacth at last developed into a
vanguard party with great interplay with the masses. After 1963, the party
began to construct a series of mass people’s organizations for peasants,
labor, youth and students, and women which came to be countrywide
organizations with a pyramidal structure paralleling that of the party.
224 THE BACTH PARTY

There were also a host of organizations covering more specialized

groups of people—teachers, artisans, and so on. The principal leaders in
these organizations were Bacthists; the rank and file were not. The
organizations engaged in continuous rounds of conferences, education
sessions, political rallies, and the like. They have provided a training
ground for party militants aiming at the higher echelons of the party; for
example, Ahmad Khatib, head of the teachers’ organization in the early
1960s, was named to the provisional Regional Command after Hafiz
al-Asad took over in November 1970, and was appointed temporary
President of Syria by that body. The mass organizations also afforded an
opportunity for the Bacth leaders to let their ideas filter down, to get some
feedback from below, and to give the populace some sense of participation
in the process of running the country.54
The Bacth in post-UAR Syria showed a substantially greater interest in
Palestine than it had in earlier days. The party had, from the time of its
formal establishment in 1947, expressed continuing concern about Pales­
tine, an Arab land usurped by non-Arabs. No November 2nd passed
without mention of the evils of the Balfour Declaration. The party strongly
and publicly supported Arab states fighting with the Israelis, whether it was
Egypt in the Suez War or Jordan coping with retaliatory acts on its border
villages. This support for the Palestinians is cast in an anti-imperialist,
anti-Zionist framework. The Fourth National Congress in 1960 called for a
collective front of all peoples’ Palestinian organizations in the Arab world
and for action by Arab governments to prevent Tel Aviv from carrying out
its plan to divert the waters of the Jordan River to southern Israel.55 The
Sixth Congress in 1963 enlarged this position, saying in the ideological
report, “ . . .th e liberation of Palestine depends on the unity and growth of
Arab progressive forces,” and in Resolution 21 advocating the creation of
a Palestine liberation front with the support of all Arab states. It also
concluded that the Palestinians had to become the vanguard for the
liberation of Palestine.56
In 1965 the Eighth National Congress took an even stronger stand:

The Palestine issue is a fundamental issue for the determination of the

Party’s policy and plan of action in and out of power. . . . Commitment to
the Palestine issue means commitment to its liberation. . . . To give prece­
dence to the liberation of Palestine means to modify our Arab and interna­
tional policy in light of the stand of foreign states and Arab countries toward
the liberation issue.57

An internal circular issued by the National Command in September 1965

recognized that the solution of the Palestinian problem had become
Changes in Ideology 225

inextricably bound up with problems of Arab societies, which several Arab

revolutionary movements aimed to solve. It apologetically admitted that
the Arabs would be unable to defend the Jordan tributaries, if they tried to
keep Israel from completing its water diversion project.58 This
approach—one of not expecting perfect results immediately—was most
uncongenial to the doctrinaire regionalists in Syria. In the Palestine issue,
as in the issues of socialism, of state ownership and so on, the regionalists
wanted to translate into action the words the party had been uttering for
years. The Syrian Regional Command, dominated by regionalists, which
was engaged in the next to last round of the contest with the National
Command and old guard for control of the party, wrote and circulated a
memo attacking the old guard for following the non-revolutionary road of
participating in Arab summit conferences and submitting to Nasir’s leader­
ship when he forced the Palestinians to follow his bidding and when
Palestine was represented by self-appointed people like Ahmad Shuqayri.
The regional leadership said, “ We demand the rectification of the positions
taken and to issue a declaration evaluating the summit conferences,
especially the third summit conference. We also insist that you [the
National Command] work out without delay a plan for the liberation of
Palestine in accordance with the congresses of the party.’’59
The Bacthist position in respect to the Palestine issue became more
militant after the regionalists and activists assumed power in 1966. The
second regional congress, which reconvened in March of that year (new
party elections were not held; those previously elected to the second
regional congress gathered in an extraordinary session from March 10-13
and March 20-27), debated the issue. A statement issued at the conclusion
said that the Congress

expresses its belief that the traditional line of policy regarding the liberation
of Palestine has always been a fabricated device to remove the frontiers
existing between the progressive and reactionary forces . . . that this
traditional method of dealing with the question means an evasion of the
battle . . . and [that] it has become clear that the liberation battle can only be
waged by progressive Arab forces through a popular liberation war, which
history has proved is the only course for victory against all aggressive
forces—regardless of supremacy of their potential and methods.60

A party internal document on much the same lines stressed the enormous
sacrifices that might be necessary to defeat Israel and liberate Palestine.61
The regime in Syria began to work along the lines of a people’s
liberation struggle. Terrorists operating out of Jordan, but inspired and
provisioned by Syrians, became more active. Tensions rose in 1966 and
226 THE BACTH PARTY

1967; in May 1967 tensions on the Syrian-Israeli border led to Egyptian

mobilization, deployment of troops in Sinai, and blockade of the Straits of
Tiran. In the June war of 1967 that followed, Syria lost the Golan Heights.
The Syrian Bacthists continued to support guerrilla (fedayeen) organiza­
tions, which grew rapidly in numbers and activity after 1967. Syria
established its own fedayeen organization, Saciqah, commanded by loyal
Bacthists. The support for the concept of a war of liberation reached its
logical conclusion with the Syrian Bacthists’ support for the fedayeen effort
to carve out an autonomous position in Jordan. The Syrians committed tank
units to assist the fedayeen in north Jordan in September 1970. This effort
failed—the Jordanians defeated the Syrian armor—and it resulted in the
ouster of virtually the entire Regional and National Commands of the
Damascus-based party. Men like Atasi, Zucayyin, Makhus, Jadid, and
Tawil, who had sat on Regional or National Commands since 1963 or 1964
were ousted, leaving Hafiz al-Asad and Mustafa Talas as the sole sur­
vivors. The National and Regional Commands elected in 1971 were totally
new and followed a markedly different policy in regard to Jordan, the
Palestine liberation organizations, and so on. The wheel has turned. But
this is the barest outline of a very complicated tale, which is not properly
part of this history.
The events of 1970 point up one final quasi-ideological development,
especially with respect to Syria. It is essentially an effort to legitimize an
existing situation, one that is impossible to change. As we have seen in
earlier pages, military force, the coup d’état, or the threat thereof, was the
engine that brought the Bacth to power in 1963 in Syria and Iraq. As
Chapter 16 illustrates, military power has been a constant factor in the
political maneuvering since the 1963-1966 period. Traditional party
thought had given scant consideration to the military. Soldiers could join
the party just as other Arabs could and presumably would follow the
system as well or as ill as other party members.62 But events didn’t work
out that way. The army, or parts of it, individuals or groups, acted in the
party’s name. After the fact, there were efforts to sanctify this activity in
Syria, where the phenomenon had a unique flavor owing to the total
absence of a civilian party organization for more than four years. This
legitimizing effort resulted in the concept of the “ ideological army.’’
The Sixth National Congress, at which military officers were elected to
the National Command for the first time (they had made their appearance
on the Syrian and Iraqi Regional Commands elected a month or two
before), devoted a resolution to the necessity of ideological and doctrinal
education in the armed forces. It aimed at creating a realistic approach on
the part of military and civilian elements which would “ permit a merger of
the army and the people in a joint revolutionary destiny.” 63 Feeling in the
Changes in Ideology 227

party was stronger than these words indicate. “ Some Theoretical Proposi­
tions” stated that “ the democratic exercise of politics” was not only the
right of military personnel but also an absolute requirement for building
socialism.64
The statement issued by the National Command following the Eighth
National Congress in 1965 said that the party needed to “ build an
ideological army free from adventurist mentality and from greed for
power.” 65 The party program adopted at the Syrian regional congress in
June 1965 stated that the army should be subordinate to civilian govern­
ment. Again, the February 1966 coup and the history of the party since that
time shows that a different view prevailed. At the extraordinary regional
congress of March 1966 the conferees “ condemned all previous attempts
to wipe out the ideological experiment in the army.” They also recom­
mended giving the ideological army an opportunity “ to participate in
planning the party’s policy by having it represented at the conferences like
all the other civilian party sectors,” 66 which was but a recognition of
reality. The army might be ideological, but it was, above all else, an army
with weapons and with officers willing to use those weapons in the internal
affairs of the country. The party tried to monitor and control the Bacthist
soldiers’ activities in a legal and orderly fashion, but in the final analysis,
the military organization of the party, as represented by a relatively small
handful of officers on its guiding committee, made the ultimate political
and ideological choices in Syria.
In this chapter, Syria has provided many of the examples of changes of
ideology, which is natural because the party has been in power in Syria for
a good many years. But much of what has happened there in terms of
ideological change is also reflected in other regions. The Bacth party,
which started with unity as its overwhelming top priority, which was
prepared to work within a variety of Middle Eastern political systems,
which wanted social justice in the society, had pretty much disappeared by
the early 1960s. In its place arose Bacth organizations which focused
primarily on their own region, which advocated, and created where
possible, authoritarian centralized governments, which rested heavily on
military power and which were very close to other socialist movements and
were less distinctively Bacthist. The state-party apparatus built by the Bacth
in Syria and in Iraq is designed to fulfill these aims. How the traditional
Bacth apparatus failed in its final effort at unity and how the new party
apparatus in these countries went about trying to build the new version of
Bacthism is the subject of the remaining chapters of this book.
228 THE BACTH PARTY

Notes

1. Arab Political Documents 1964, “ Minutes of the Extraordinary Syrian

Regional Congress,” Feb. 2, 1964, pp. 33.
2. Munif Razzaz, al-Tajribah al-Murrah (The Bitter Experience) (Beirut: Dar
Ghandur, 1967), pp." 109, 146, 165.
3. Nidal al-Bacth (Beirut: Dar al-Talicah, 1963), IV, p. 189; hereafter cited as
Nidal.
4. cAbdallah cAbd al-Da’im, al-Jil al-cArabi al-Jadid (The New Arab Age)
Beirut: Dar al-cIlm li al-Malayin, 1961), pp. 147-51.
5. Ibid., p. 155.
6. Jamal Atasi, “ Arab Socialism and the Myth of [its] Special Qualities, ’’ in Fi
al-Fikr al-Siyasi (2 vols.; Damascus: Dar Dimishq, 1963), I, 170-71.
7. cAbd al-Da’im, al-Jil al-cArabi, pp. 166-67.
8. Ibid., pp. 176-77.
9. Ibid., pp. 179-82. For Bitar’s support of this, see Erskine Childers, “ Notes
on a Road Past Suez,” Middle East Forum, Vol. 39, No. 3 (March 1963), pp.
15-18.
10. Yasin al-Hafiz, “ Hawl Tajribah Hizb al-Bacth” (About the Experience o f
the Ba^ih Party), Fi al-Fikr al-Siyasi, Vol. 1, pp. 194-97.
11. Ibid., p. 201.
12. Ilyas Murqus, “ Collapse of the Parliamentary System,” Fi al-Fikr al-
Siyasi, Vol. 2, p. 169.
13. Ibid., p. 174.
14. Ibid., p. 176.
15. Text in Nidal VI, pp. 232-91. Itamar Rabinovich, Syria Under the Bacth
1963-1966: The Army-Party Symbiosis (Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press,
1972), p. 81, mentions cAflaq’s part; he also prints a translation of the section
headed “ Freedom” in his Annex F, pp. 243-64. Razzaz, Tajribah, p. 64,
mentions the report’s uniqueness.
16. Nidal VI, pp. 262-63.
17. Ibid., p. 268.
18. Ibid., p. 266.
19. Ibid., p. 224.
20. Ibid., pp. 224-25.
21. Jamal Atasi, “ Arab Socialism,” Fi al-Fikr, Vol. 1, p. 152.
22. Ibid., p. 154.
23. Ibid., pp. 155-56.
24. Ibid., p. 156; see also Atasi, “ Problems in Socialist Struggle,” Fi al-Fikr
al-Siyasi, Vol. 2, p. 129, and “ Some Theoretical Propositions,” Nidal VI, p. 273.
25. Atasi, “ Problems,” p. 110.
26. Ibid., p. 116.
27. Atasi, “ Arab Socialism,” pp. 140-41.
28. Ibid., pp. 157-58.
29. Nidal VI, p. 222.
30. Ibid., p. 224.
31. Ibid., p. 225. The point is also covered (ibid., p. 289) in “ Some
Theoretical Propositions.”
32. Arab World, March 13, 1964, p. 2.
Changes in Ideology 229

33. Razzaz, Tajribah, p. 87; Sami al-Jundi, al-Bacth, p. 85.

34. Razzaz, Tajribah, p. 88; see also pp. 258 ff.
35. Nidal VI, pp. 209-15.
36. Ibid., pp. 248 and 250-51.
37. Ibid., pp. 253-54.
38. Ibid., pp. 256-57.
39. Ibid., p. 227.
40. “ Statement by the National Command,” Damascus Radio, May 4, 1965.
Razzaz, in describing his work after becoming Secretary General at the Eighth
National Congress, gives the clear impression that he and others were totally
absorbed by the struggle within the party for dominance in Syria. Neither he nor
anyone else seems to have had any time for the cause of unity.
41. G. I. Mirsky, Soviet View o f Arab Nationalism (Moscow, 1965), p. 58.
Translated by Joint Publications Research Service, No. 40,767, April 25, 1967.
42. Ibid., p. 56; see also Oies M. Smolansky, The Soviet Union and the Arab
East Under Khrushchev (Lewisburg, Pa.: Bucknell University Press, 1974), pp.
183 ff.
43. MEJ, Chronology, Vol. 17, No. 4, Autumn 1963, pp. 425-26.
44. Nidal VI, pp. 260-61.
45. See Atasi, “ Problems,” Fi al-Fikr, Vol. 2, pp. 101-49, and Yasin Hafiz,
“ Tacrib al-Marksiyah,” in Hawl Bacd Qadaya al-Thawrah al-cArabiyah (Concern­
ing Some Issues o f the Arab Revolution) (Beirut: Dar al-Talicah, 1965), pp.
271-79.
46. Reported in Mizan, Vol. 7, No. 3, March 1965, p. 16. Pravda repeated
much the same line on April 16, 1965;Mizan Vol. 7, No. 5, May 1965, pp. 24-25.
On the attitude of the Communist Party of Syria toward the nationalization decrees,
see a statement of the Central Committee, al-Akhbar (Beirut), January 17, 1965.
47. cAflaq statement in al-Bacth, reported in al-Jaridah (Beirut), Jan. 14,
1965.
48. According to cAbd al-Majid Rafici, Ba'th leader in Lebanon, Arab World,
Feb. 5, 1965.
49. Ibid., March 24, 1965, citing an article by Bakdash in al-Akhbar (Beirut).
50. Damascus Radio, May 4, 1965. The statement is also in Orient No. 34, 2nd
Quarter 1965, pp. 197-210.
51. Arab World, May 10, 1965, citing al-Jaridah.
52. Bacth Party, Transitional Program for Syria, July 22, 1965, as approved by
the June 11-13 extraordinary session of the Second Regional Congress. The
National Command’s party program of the same date takes the very different line
that the Bacth is a leading party, guiding the people, not a sole organization
ordering the people about. Commandement National, Programme du Parti, pp.
10-17, issued by the Ministry of Information. For a general discussion of changes
in Syria after February 1966, see Eric Rouleau, “ La Syrie Baasiste ou la fuite à
gauche,” Le Monde, Oct. 13, 14, 16-17, 18 and 19, 1966.
53. Damascus Radio, May 4, 1965; Orient, see footnote 50.
54. The National Command Program of July 22, 1965 provided guidance on
the way the party should deal with these mass organizations. See pp. 31-44 of
Programme du Parti.
55. Nidal IV, p. 192, in “ Internal Circular” on the Congress.
56. Nidal VI, p. 266, “ Some Theoretical Propositions,” and pp. 229-30,
“ Decisions” of the Congress.
230 THE BACTH PARTY

57. Damascus Radio, May 4, 1965; Orient No. 34, 2nd Quarter 1965, pp.
197-210.
58. Excerpts from the National Command Internal Circular No. 8/4, Sept. 29,
1965, are contained in Avraham Ben-Tsur, ed., The Syrian Bacth Party and Israel
(Documents from Internal Party Publications), Givat Haviva: Center for Arab and
Afro-Asian Studies, 1968, pp. 6 and 8. Here, as in his “ Neo-Ba’th Party of Syria,”
Ben-Tsur utilizes documents taken from Bacth Party offices in Qunaytirah, Syria,
after the June 1967 War.
59. Excerpts from Memorandum of the Syrian Regional Command, ibid., pp.
8 - 10.
60. Regional Command statement on the results of the recent extraordinary
congress, Damascus Radio, April 1, 1966.
61. Excerpts from the Internal Political Report, circulated after the extraordi­
nary Congress; Ben Tsur, Syrian Bacth Party and Israel, pp. 19-21.
62. Razzaz, Tajribah, contains an extensive discussion of this problem, pp.
35-45.
63. Nidal VI, p. 227.
64. Ibid., p. 277.
65. National Command Statement, Radio Damascus, May 4, 1965.
66. Regional Command Statement, Radio Damascus, April 1, 1966.
 - 14 -

Springtime of Hope;
Another Attempt at Unity

Free Men of Iraq, Students, Peasants, Workers, this is your revolution

—support it, God is with us, and glory will be for the Arabs. Sons of the
valiant people, valiant soldiers and officers—your triumphant revolution has
been staged and the criminal traitor has been wiped out after he had toyed
with the destinies of the people and betrayed the trust of the glorious July
revolution. Sons of the people and of the army, the revolution has been
staged to restore the July revolution to the sons of July and to the people of
July. Sons of our valiant people, the regime of the criminal tyrant has been
destroyed, right and justice have been restored. Happiness and joy prevail in
our beloved country. All citizens without discrimination enjoy their full
rights, liberties, and complete security for themselves and their properties.1

With these words the Bacth Party in Iraq announced its coup against cAbd
al-Karim Qasim in the morning hours of February 8, 1963. As it turned
out, the announcement was somewhat premature, for it took nearly a day of
hard fighting before the Ministry of Defense was captured and before
Qasim, Mihdawi, and two lesser associates surrendered, were given a
drumhead court martial, and then executed on the morning of February 9.
The move against Qasim had been set up by a student strike, which had
gone on for the previous six weeks. The strike began in late December over
an incident involving the son of Fadil Mihdawi. Young Mihdawi had been
roughed up in an altercation with nationalist students at his secondary
school, and had called for his father’s bodyguards, who, in turn, beat up
the students who had abused young Mihdawi. In protest, the nationalist and
Bacth-influenced student organization went out on strike. The secondary
students were joined shortly by students from the university, in many cases
with the support and encouragement of the faculty. Qasim’s regime had
responded to the strike by expelling a number of students and detaining
others. By the time two weeks had gone by, the students were demanding
232 THE BACTH PARTY

the release and readmission to class of their fellows, an end to governmen­

tal interference in the affairs of the university, and free elections for the
countrywide student organization.2
The magnitude and duration of the strike concerned Qasim. Only ten
percent of the students took their mid-term exams. Qasim was also aware
of plots and movements against him within the armed forces. One Damas­
cus newspaper reported that Qasim told an interviewer that twenty-nine
plots had been mounted against him in the previous three and a half years.3
On January 6 and again on February 3, Qasim ordered the retirement of
nearly a hundred serving officers. He also rounded up some Bacthist
civilian leaders.4 The retirements of February 3 and subsequent arrests of
civilian and military Bacthists worried the Bacth leaders who were still free,
for they feared that Salih Mahdi cAmmash, who was one of those retired,
and cAli Salih Sacdi would reveal Bacth plans if the security police exerted
pressure on them. Hence they determined to move ahead quickly with their
plans to oust Qasim.5
The Bacth organization in Iraq was by no means strong enough to
organize and carry out a coup against Qasim’s regime using only its own
resources and party members, because it had few members serving in
positions of any responsibility in the military forces. cAmmash, a lieuten­
ant colonel, and Hardan cAbd al-Ghaffar al-Tikriti, commander of the
Kirkuk air base, were the highest-ranking officers on active duty. The
Bacth had, however, a number of sympathizers in the armed forces, and
there were a small number of retired Bacthist majors and lieutenant
colonels who maintained connections with the armed forces. Uriel Dann
says that, by the end of 1961, “ a joint Bacth-Free Officers committee, later
to be known as the National Council of Revolutionary Command (NCRC)
was in existence. The same leadership remained until after the 14th
Ramadan coup.” Dann lists Sacdi, Talib Shabib, Hazim Jawad, Musari
al-Rawi, Hamdi cAbd al-Majid, and two retired officers, cAbd al-Sattar
cAbd al-Latif and cAbd al-Karim Mustafa Nasrat, along with cAmmash, as
the Bacth members of this committee.6 This group included most of the
Regional Command members. Dann also identified a number of Bacthists
in the army or air force who were also involved, including retired colonels
Tahir Yahya and Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, and Rashid Muslih.7 All these
men came into important posts after the February 8 revolution, and several
were named as members of the NCRC then or in subsequent months.
Bacthi sources themselves have stated that non-Bacthists brought into
the planning for this coup were later taken into the party without adequate
preparation for their roles as party members. Sacdi’s faction was later to
regret very much the inclusion o f cAbd al-Salam cArif in the plotting and to
recognize that it had probably not been necessary to bring cArif into it at
Another Attempt at Unity 233

all. At the time, however, the conspirators felt they needed a well-known
figurehead with the impeccable credentials of a free officer from the
anti-Nuri revolution and a long history of opposition to cAbd al-Karim
Qasim.8 Munif Razzaz makes the point that the party in Iraq had been hurt
in organizing a party-army movement against Qasim’s regime, because the
party had to share the government largely with rightist elements, most of
whom were in the army, and because the plotters had agreed on getting rid
of Qasim but on little beyond that.9
The plotters had tried several times before to mount a movement against
Qasim but had been forced to call off their plans before putting them into
execution. Dann lists February 14, July 18, and December 2, 1962 as dates
on which coups had been planned.10 Ironically, Qasim was fairly well
aware of plots and movements among the military forces, which was, of
course, precisely what had caused him to make the rather sweeping
retirements in January and February. In so doing, however, he destroyed
the utility of one of his principal sources of information, an army captain in
whom cAmmash confided, thinking that the captain was a loyal Bacthist.
With cAmmash in detention and out of touch with the Bacth plotters, the
captain did not learn of the plans and intentions of the Bacth plotters as they
moved into action on February 4. Thus, a coup mounted in haste on a
now-or-never basis by men who had operational control of very few army
units turned out to be the one to topple the Sole Leader.11 In terms of armed
support, the plotters could muster one tank regiment commanded by Col.
Khalid al-Hashimi from Abu Ghurayb, west of Baghdad, and six or eight
aircraft from Habbaniyah and Kirkuk Air Bases, whose commanding
officers, cArif cAbd al-Razzaq and Hardan al-Tikriti, respectively, were
among the conspirators. The plotters took care to assassinate the com­
mander of the air force, Colonel Awqati, to prevent him from interfering
with the operations.
The other armed force on which the conspirators could rely was the
Bacth militia. During the preceding few years, the Bacth Party had created
in the Baghdad area a partly trained group of young men who had been
involved in many scuffles and skirmishes in the city streets. On February 8,
some two thousand men, many armed with machine guns, were brought
out of the Bacthist stronghold, the cAzamiyah quarter of Baghdad, half to
follow retired Colonel cAbd al-Karim Nasrat in surrounding and firing
upon the Ministry of Defense, half to follow Tahir Yahya Tikriti down to
Rashid Army Camp on the south edge of Baghdad to prevent the troops
there from breaking out in support of Qasim.12 The Bacthist leaders put
great stress on this force. The third bulletin issued by the NCRC (the first
announced the revolution and the second fired eighteen of Qasim’s princi­
pal military supporters) established the National Guard, based on this
234 THE BACTH PARTY

militia. Colonel Nasrat was named its commander (but was replaced within
a few weeks by Mundhir Wandawi), and it was given the assignment “ . . .
to help the forces of the army and police in taking care of the
citizens. . . .” 13 Later in the day the location of National Guard centers
where recruits could enlist was announced on the radio.
The reasons for the prompt action by the Bacthists in respect to the
National Guard were two. First, the leaders felt unsure of their ability to
control the army, if the coup should succeed. As noted above, they had felt
obliged to bring cArif in to be president and other non-Bacthists to receive
most of the senior military commands. Second, the plotters knew that they
had direct control of only a very few military units in the vicinity of
Baghdad and that most of their military supporters were not on active
service. They anticipated, and met, fairly stiff resistance from the troops of
the 19th Brigade defending the Ministry of Defense area where Qasim
made his headquarters. (I visited Baghdad a month after the coup and the
evidence of fighting around the Ministry was still quite obvious, both in the
fresh new brick in the walls and buildings and in the extensive damage that
had not yet been repaired.) Moreover, the plotters anticipating opposition
by Communist supporters of the Qasim regime, planned to use the National
Guard against any Communist forces that might appear. It was felt that the
very appearance of armed and organized pro-coup para-military units on
the streets would help to rally support to the rebels’ cause.
By the morning of February 9 the coup was a success. Military
commanders around the country were sending in cables of support or
quietly turning over their jobs to enthusiastic supporters of the NCRC. The
Bacthists, particularly the National Guard, turned their major efforts to
breaking the Communist Party and gaining control of the streets in all parts
of the capital. Fighting between the Communists and armed pro-Bacth
forces was heavy, especially in the first days. Gunfire and house-to-house
searches went on nightly for well over a week. The Communists must have
realized that the tolerance shown to them under the Qasim regime would be
replaced by real hostility under the Bacthists and fought desperately. The
National Guard and a good many of the regular military were taking
revenge for Communist atrocities committed during the disturbances in
Mosul and Kirkuk in 1959 and in other cities and towns throughout Iraq
during the heyday of Communist control of “ the street” that year.
The extent of the killing and bloodshed in these first days has never
been accurately determined. Communist talk of thousands killed in Bagh­
dad and other cities is probably an exaggeration. Press reports at the time
cite figures running into the hundreds. The Lebanese Bacthist Jibran
Majdalani said, “ The fight was rough and cruel. In addition to high
Another Attempt at Unity 235

casualties in the military ranks, over two hundred civilian members and
sympathizers of the Bacth were killed, mainly by communist commandos,
who continued a harassing fight many days after Kassem’s fall. . . .” 14 It
is, I think, safe to say that somewhere between five hundred and a thousand
people died in the course of the ten days beginning of February 8, 1963.
The majority were among those defending Qasim, for the most part
Communists or persons allied or associated with the Communist Party of
Iraq.
Reaction from within and without Iraq helped dampen the frenzy of
anti-Communist activity. Hazim Jawad, member of the Regional Com­
mand and spokesman for the government in these early days, showed
considerable sensitivity to the “ unjust propaganda campaign which the
propaganda media in some of the socialist countries have been launching”
against the new regime. He lectured the press that their task was “ to report
the facts about our glorious revolution without bias or distortion and to
report our sincerely held feelings toward our people as well as toward all
people of the world. The revolution has several facts which it would like to
qualify to world public opinion.”
Among these facts was the action of “ a handful of Iraqi communists
[who] carried arms from the first moment of the revolution in order to
defend Qasim’s dictatorial regime and to conclude with him a bloody
alliance founded on killing the revolutionaries among the peasants, work­
ers, intelligentsia, and military revolutionaries. The revolution had no
alternative but to take urgent measures to safeguard itself, and therefore
arrested all the resisting groups and referred them to courts of justice for
judgment.” He went on to say that no killing took place after the first two
days of the revolution—an assertion that was manifestly incorrect.15 By the
time Jawad issued this statement, however, the nightly gun battles in the
districts of Baghdad in which Communists predominated were over, the
National Guard was continuing to man checkposts all over the city, and
such excesses as it carried out were conducted largely within detention
centers, away from public scrutiny.
Although the new regime was clearly dominated by the Bacth Party, it
chose not to emphasize its Bacthist nature. Its first broadcast carried the
Bacth slogan of “ Unity, Freedom, and Socialism.” The cabinet announced
late on February 8, 1963 was half-Bacthist but also contained several
prominent figures who had anti-Qasim reputations; for example, the Kurds
Baba cAli Shaykh Mahmud and Fu’ad cArif, as well as Free Officer and
long-time Qasim opponent Naji Talib. The regime’s closeness to Egypt
was apparent from the first. cAbd al-Salam cArif, of course, had long been
known as a supporter of unity and an admirer of Nasir. Naji Talib, long an
236 THE BACTH PARTY

exile, was favorably disposed toward Egypt. Many of the Bacth leaders and
many of the military figures who had been associated with them also
appear to have been well disposed toward Egypt.
Bacth leaders outside Iraq lost no time in showing how close the new
regime was to their party. cAflaq and Bitar had been in Tanganyika
attending an Afro-Asian solidarity conference when the Iraqi coup occur­
red. They hurried back to Beirut, where they held a meeting of the National
Command. cAflaq then headed a ten-man all-Bacth delegation, half-Syrian,
half-Lebanese, which arrived in Baghdad on February 18.16 Two days later
the NCRC announced that cAli Salih Sacdi was to lead an official
delegation to the celebrations in Cairo commemorating the fifth anniver­
sary of the founding of the UAR. Of its senior members, all but the Kurd,
Fu’ad cArif, were party members. According to Bitar, they went to Cairo at
the party’s direction.17 Sacdi did not call for unity at this meeting but he
came very close to it, saying, “ The 14th Ramadan revolution . . . opens
the door for a meeting between Cairo and Baghdad. . . . This meeting
enlarged to the limit over into action and fraternal solidarity—the extreme
limit being the unity of our Arab nation.’’18
While events in Iraq were occupying the center of attention in the Arab
world, Syria was going through a cabinet crisis against a background of
growing malaise in the military establishment. Khalid al-cAzm had formed
a government on September 17, 1962, which promised elections sometime
in the year 1963. Preparatory maneuvering for these elections had begun by
the turn of the year. Hawrani’s socialist group had been exchanging
political broadsides with the Muslim Brotherhood for some time; their
differences occasionally degenerated into clashes. Then three members of
the cabinet who belonged to Hawrani’s bloc resigned at the end of January;
they were joined after a time by three others, leaving six cabinet posts
empty. cAzm tried throughout February to compromise the differences
between Hawrani and the Muslim Brotherhood but had made no discern­
ible progress after nearly six weeks of effort. His attempts at domestic
political peacemaking were not helped by the failure of the Damascus
government’s efforts to establish friendly ties with the new regime in
Baghdad. The Foreign Minister of Syria said on February 13, “ There is
nothing to prevent the establishment of a federal union with brotherly Iraq,
to serve as a good and attractive model for a federation bringing all the
Arabs together in one state.” 19 Baghdad government spokesmen snubbed
the Syrians’ move by failing to list Syria as one of the four liberated Arab
regions—the UAR, Algeria, Iraq, and Republican Yemen.
The Syrian military establishment had serious misgivings about the
trend of political developments in Syria. In mid-January, four of the
officers who had instigated the events of March 28, 1962 resisted an order
Another Attempt at Unity 237

to transfer from the military to the diplomatic service. They returned to

Syria, tried to rally support among the military, failed, and were packed off
to four European capitals as ministers plenipotentiary. The unhappiness of
various factions in the Syrian Army was a matter of public knowledge.
Two Beirut newspapers on February 20 carried stories reporting that Syrian
Army officers were agitating for change of government. According to
al-Kifah, young officers in the southern front wanted a change of govern­
ment whereby cAflaq’s Bacthists would be represented in a new cabinet.
Al-Nahar was somewhat more precise and, as it turned out, more accurate.
It named Colonel Ziyad al-Hariri, commander of the southern front, as a
leader of the officers agitating for a change in the government, particularly
the removal of the incumbent Foreign Minister. Al-Nahar summed the case
up rather neatly in one sentence, “ The officers know what they do not
want, but they do not know exactly what they do want.” 20
A few days later a group of officers met in Damascus; sixteen of them,
representing the entire group, signed a telegram to the government com­
plaining about the detention of hundreds of officers in Mazza prison.
Among the sixteen signers were Lu’ayy Atasi, who was to be chosen chief
of the Syrian NCRC after the coup, and three members of the Bacth
Military Organization in the Syrian Army, Lt. Col. Muhammad cUmran,
Major Hamad cUbayd, and Captain Mustafa Talas. Lu’ayy Atasi and
fifteen officers, probably the same, also sent a telegram of support to
President cArif of Iraq.21 Just a few days before, a Bacth faction headed by
Riyad Malki, independent both of Hawrani’s and of cAflaq’s groups,
declared that the solution to Syria’s problems lay in a progressive revolu­
tion on the pattern of that which had just taken place in Iraq. The Malki
group statement criticized cAzm’s government for not being serious in
combating Nasirism, and it called for a Syrian-Iraqi union as the nucleus
for a broader Arab union.22
The Beirut paper, al-Nahar, had been accurate in flagging the com­
manding officer of the troops southwest of Damascus, Ziyad al-Hariri, as a
leader of a movement against the civilian government in Damascus. He
was backed by a number of other officers, some of them independents and
some members of the Bacth Military Organization. The latter, independent
of party authority, acted on its own. It told the civilian Bacthist leaders that
a military coup was in the offing, but it communicated this information
personally, not officially, and apparently without apprising them of the
details.23 The Bacthist leaders were, as was everyone in Syria, aware of
stirrings within the military, but did not favor action at that time. At a
meeting of the National Command held a few days after the February 8th
coup in Iraq, cAflaq said that he was opposed to a move against the cAzm
government at that time, because he felt the party had not made sufficient
238 THE BACTH PARTY

progress in the months since it began to reconstitute its organization in the

summer of 1962.24 The Bacth Military Organization—if they even heard of
this view—paid no attention, but continued to back Hariri in his move­
ment, which was solely military and which was directed against the
inequities of the secessionist regime.
Hariri’s group included Bacthists, Nasirists, and non-party nationalists.
According to Razzaz, about the only point this group agreed on was ending
the secession from the UAR; they had no positive program. But the
Bacthists were not, in fact, interested in restoring the UAR; going back
under Nasir was not at all what they had in mind. The Bacth Military
Organization was the kernel of the revolt, even though its chief members
were not prominent by name in the NCRC.25 Hariri had secured the
cooperation of Rashid Qutayni, Chief of Military Intelligence, and of
Muhammad al-Sufi, a high-ranking officer in army headquarters; these two
withdrew from the plot at the last moment, claiming that news of it had
leaked. Hariri rescheduled the coup for the following day, March 8, told
his Bacthist and other supporters in the army, and took over power just four
weeks to the day from the coup in Baghdad.26 Hariri led a force from the
southwest frontier into Damascus before dawn and had control of the city
by 6:30 in the morning. Casualties were few, there was a little resistance
from the air force and some hesitation on the part of some army units near
Homs, but by noon Syria had experienced its sixth successful military coup
since achieving independence.
After restoring thirty-odd cashiered officers, including several
Bacthists, to their positions in the army, and promoting himself from
colonel to major-general, Hariri and his fellows set out to consolidate their
newly won position. Sufi and Qutayni were made Minister of Defense and
Deputy Chief of Staff, respectively. For a Chief of the National Council of
Revolutionary Command (NCRC), Hariri and his associates settled on
Colonel Lu’ayy Atasi. “ A mild mannered and relatively inexperienced
young m an,” Atasi was chosen because of the respect he had among
various army factions.27 He had been detained after signing the February
20 telegram to the government and was in jail when the coup occurred, but
was escorted out and promoted to lieutenant-general. At this point, the
NCRC consisted entirely of military members. In addition to Atasi,
Qutayni, Hariri, and Sufi, it included Salah Jadid and Muhammad cUmran,
Bacthists, Fahd Shacir, independent but strongly pro-Bacthist, Lt. Col.
Fawwaz Muharib and Col. Ghassan Haddad, pro-Nasirists, and Major
Musa Zucbi, a Bacth supporter. Civilians were added later; none had been
chosen as of March 15.28
The NCRC on March 9 assigned itself the authority to form a cabinet
and then announced a twenty-man cabinet headed by Salah Bitar, of whom
Another Attempt at Unity 239

half were Bacthists.29 Other ministers represented the Arab Nationalist

Movement, the Socialist Unity Movement and the United Arab Front, all
three pro-Nasir and in favor of immediate Syrian-Egyptian unity. The
cabinet was empowered to execute the policies prepared by the NCRC; its
lack of real power was the reason, according to head of the United Arab
Front, Nihad al-Qasim, why his faction agreed to be only a minority in the
cabinet.30 Nihad al-Qasim and his Arab Nationalist and Socialist Unity
Movement associates expected to have a prominent role in the NCRC, if
not in the cabinet, and were very annoyed when, in the course of the unity
talks in Cairo, they learned that the military Bacthists and their military
associates had planned that seven of the ten civilian members who were to
be added to the NCRC were to be Bacthists.31
Promptly the next day a Bacth-dominated delegation from Baghdad
arrived in Damascus. It consisted of cAli Salih Sacdi, Talib Shabib, Salih
Mahdi cAmmash, Chief of Staff Tahir Yahya, two divisional commanders,
the director of military operations, and commander of the National Guard,
Mundhir Wandawi. Sacdi, shortly after arriving, proposed in a public
statement that (1) the armies in the five liberated Arab states (Syria was
now added to the four) have the right to intervene in, land in, and cross any
of their respective borders when confronted by an outright attack or internal
imperialist or reactionary plot; (2) a joint military command be formed
among the five countries; and (3) a supreme political command be
established for political planning in the five states.
After discussions with a Syrian delegation headed by Bitar and includ­
ing Jamal Atasi, Bacthist Minister of Information, Nihad al-Qasim, and the
three highest-ranking military officers, Lu’ayy Atasi, Rashid Qutayni, and
Ziyad Hariri, the two parties issued a joint communiqué saying, “ The two
sides emphasize the need to combat every policy which may lead to the
establishment of various axes among the liberated Arab states. They also
expressed their absolute belief that the rapprochement between Cairo and
Baghdad should be expanded to include the three Arab countries, that is,
the UAR, the Iraqi Republic, and the Syrian Republic. They also expressed
their absolute belief in the need to unify plans in order to lay down the basis
for unity between these three countries.” 32 In sum, the communiqué
watered down Sa'di’s sweeping proposals.
Iraqi Foreign Minister Talib Shabib took a delegation to Cairo and met
with President Nasir on the evening of March 11 ; in the course of the
meeting, the Iraqi delegation proposed that the UAR, Syria, and Iraq enter
into discussions for the purpose of establishing a new unified Arab state
among the three of them. The Iraqi proposal was accepted, and on March
14, 'Ammash and Shabib returned to Cairo to open the first session of what
was to become a month-long marathon of talks intended to lead to
240 THE BACTH PARTY

formation of a unified state of Syria, Iraq, and Egypt.33 That day al-Bacth,
which had resumed publication on March 12, carried the slogan calling for
tripartite unity, and the same day Lu’ayy Atasi said in a broadcast on
Damascus Radio, “ Your valiant army has vowed . . . to bring about the
unity of Iraq, Syria, and the UAR. . . . To make every sacrifice for the
sake of creating the Arab state on strong foundations, the state that works
best and defends Arab reality, and which will further expand until it
becomes the great socialist Arab state. . . .” 34
The meetings in Cairo were divided into three series. The first series
lasted from March 14-16; they involved small delegations from each
country discussing and arguing over what was to be the basis of unity,
including the key question of the role of political parties in such a union.
The second, which involved only Syrians and Egyptians, consisted of a
three-day meeting, essentially between Nasir and the Bacth leaders cAflaq
and Bitar, which was devoted to rehashing the past and mutual recrimina­
tions at the sins of each side during the UAR days. The third series partly
repeated the second, but was devoted primarily to arguing out the language
and wording of the document that was to become the declaration of
tripartite unity issued on April 17, 1963.
Cairo was represented at all meetings by President Nasir, Field Marshal
cAbd al-Hakim cAmir, cAbd al-Latif Baghdadi, and Kamal al-Din Husayn.
In addition, cAli Sabri, Amin Huwaydi, and cAbd al-Majid Farid took part.
President Nasir did most of the speaking for the Egyptians; according to the
minutes published in al-Ahram and broadcast on Cairo Radio, he was
responsible for 90 to 95 percent of the speaking on the Egyptian side. Iraq
was represented by cAmmash, Sa'di, Shabib, and at the third series of
talks, by Ahmad Hasan Bakr, all four party members, plus cAbd al-
Rahman Bazzaz, newly appointed Iraqi ambassador in Cairo. The Syrian
delegation is more properly described in the plural, because the make-up of
the delegation changed, and only Fahd Sha'ir attended all the meetings.
The Syrian delegation to the first series on March 14-16 consisted of four
of the military members of the NCRC—Hariri, Qutayni, Muharib, and
Sha'ir, and three cabinet ministers, Deputy Prime Minister Nihad al-
Qasim, Agriculture Minister cAbd al-Halim Suwaydan, and Economy
Minister cAbd al-Karim Zuhur, the only Ba'th Party member on this
delegation.
Ba'thist representation was larger in the later meetings. At the second
series, only Sha'ir and Lu’ayy Atasi were present, in addition to cAflaq and
Bitar, on the Syrian side. The third series, beginning on April 6, was
attended by an unwieldy delegation of seventeen Syrians, including most
of the members of the NCRC and half the cabinet, including the Ba'thists
Bitar, Zuhur, and Shibli 'Aysami, plus representatives of the Arab
Another Attempt at Unity 241

Nationalist Movement, the Socialist Unity Movement, and the Arab Unity
Front. Of the prominent Bacthist officers, only Muhammad cUmran came,
and he said little.35 The rest of the Bacth Military Organization members
stayed home and proceeded to widen their power and control. As Munif
Razzaz put it, the army Bacthists sent the non-Bacthists to the Cairo talks
while they themselves stayed in Damascus preparing to oust the Nasirists
from the army.36 They knew who was going to be in charge in Syria, and
Nasir, who suspected as much, would soon find it out, too.
Before dealing with the substance of the talks, it is necessary to say a
few words about the principal source. Beginning on June 21, 1963, the
Egyptian newspaper al-Ahram published a record of the meetings which it
called a verbatim transcript of each session. Was it? Political leaders in
Syria and Iraq challenged the completeness and accuracy of the record as
carried in al-Ahram, but only in general terms, not in detail. The transcript
of these talks is one of the most intriguing documents on contemporary
Arab politics. It tells a great deal about the ideas, methods, and reactions of
the various participants. Much that is in the transcript rings true. But it is
not the whole truth. In the first place, there were a number of private
meetings between Nasir and members of the delegations, at which impor­
tant points were discussed, and sometimes settled, for which no transcript
has been presented, though the fact and substance of the meetings were
referred to in the plenary sessions. For example, Nasir met with Iraqi Prime
Minister Bakr between the ninth and tenth sessions of the third series and
got him to agree to a twenty-month transitional period instead of the
three-year period that the Iraqi delegation had been arguing for in the full
sessions. Nasir also talked privately with cAbd al-Karim Zuhur between the
third and fourth sessions of the first series of talks.37 In addition, the
al-Ahram material does not pretend to cover various subcommittee sessions
which drafted language and proposals for the unity declaration. Finally,
although the Algerian leader Houari Boumedienne attended one or two of
the sessions, he is not mentioned anywhere in the transcript of the talks.
Second, internal evidence of the transcripts indicates that there has been
some doctoring of the record. The end of the ninth session of the third
series, which was held the evening of April 14, contains a passage in which
Lu’ayy Atasi says, “ . . . Tomorrow morning we have seventeenth April
[Italics added.] We have evacuation day [referring to the commemoration
of the French evacuation of Syria in 1946] and we must go.” 38 There was
some sort of session on the evening of April 16 before the final text was
assembled for signing and promulgation, but there is no record of such a
session in the transcript. It would appear that these remarks were trans­
posed from this session. This is the only case where there is clear evidence
that words were taken out of order and context, but one may presume that it
242 THE BACTH PARTY

is not unique. In the second session of the first series, words that are
logically Nasir’s are attributed to Zuhur.39 Moreover, Nasir’s remarks
throughout this record are so consistent and orderly that one suspects that
they may have been edited, not so much for substance as for smoothness,
continuity, and clarity. Finally, the reader of these minutes may be
permitted to doubt that the Syrian and Iraqi participants never used any
terms but Excellency and Mr. President when addressing Nasir, or that he
never used a courtesy title in addressing them; the closest he ever came to
doing so in the transcript was to refer to them as Brother So and S o .40
The Bacthists in Syria and Iraq cried foul when the Egyptians published
the aforementioned record and charged that it was full of distortions.
Neither the Iraqis nor the Syrians presented anything specific to support
their charge; they apparently did not have a transcript, whereas the
Egyptians were able to record the conversations. I have little doubt that
what they meant by distortion was the way in which their spokesmen,
cAflaq and Bitar in particular, were made to appear incoherent, fumbling,
and often virtually tongue-tied in the presence of the masterful Nasir. Nasir
was, of course, in a commanding position. It was the Bacthists who wanted
his cooperation and not the reverse, and he gave cAflaq and Bitar a very
hard time indeed. Again it is possible that certain portions of the transcript
that did not reflect too creditably on the UAR were omitted. All things
considered, however, I believe that the minutes represent with reasonable
accuracy what transpired, but that they fall short of total reliability.41
There is a long and excellent discussion of the Cairo talks by Malcolm
Kerr in Chapter 3 of his Arab Cold War, and I do not intend to cover the
same ground here. Rather, the remainder of this chapter will discuss the
conflicting purposes of the several parties to the Cairo talks, conflicts that
caused the talks to drag on, and yet resulted only in a modest federal union
proposal, which came unstuck in a matter of weeks.
The Egyptians and the Iraqi delegations were internally united in
purpose and in tactics. Nasir, according to the transcript, carried almost the
entire burden for the Egyptian side. cAbd al-Hakim cAmir made some
comments, and on at least one occasion was briskly corrected by Nasir.
The Iraqi delegation, virtually all Bacthists, was led by Shabib and Sacdi,
who did most of the talking. Only minor differences of view among the
Iraqis emerged from the record. Bazzaz, who was not a Bacthist, was
involved largely in questions of drafting and of legal matters when the text
of the tripartite declaration was discussed in the third series.
The Syrians were a different matter. The NCRC and the cabinet were
represented by at least four groups: first, the pro-unity anti-secession
officers, such as Lu’ayy Atasi, Ziyad Hariri, and Rashid Qutayni; second,
the Nasirist politicians, e.g., Sami Sufan and Nihad al-Qasim; third, the
Another Attempt at Unity 243

traditional Bacthists, cAflaq, Bitar, cAysami, and Zuhur; and fourth, the
Bacth Military Organization representative, Muhammad cUmran, who was
largely passive. The Syrian Bacth regionalists, both civilian and military,
stayed home. They had little wish to see the talks succeed and saw an
opportunity to widen their power base. The effectiveness of the Syrians in
Cairo varied. cAbd al-Karim Zuhur comes across as a lucid if somewhat
long-winded ideologue. Fahd Shacir also appears as a fairly straightforward
talker. Lu’ayy Atasi appears to be out of his element; talking as if he
expected union to be accomplished easily, he was confused by the
arguments raging among Nasir, the Iraqis, and the several Syrian groups.
Except cUmran, all the Syrian participants genuinely wanted union, but
the type of union they wanted and their reasons for wanting it varied. Atasi,
Hariri, and Qutayni seemed genuinely to have wanted to wipe out the sin of
secession. Nihad al-Qasim and Hani al-Hindi represented factions that
wanted union with Egypt, with or without Iraq, of almost any sort, the
closer the better. Such a union would give them support against the
Bacthists in Syria, who already had half the cabinet seats and looked, as the
talks went on, as if they were about get a majority of the NCRC. cAflaq,
Bitar and their associates, principally cAbd al-Karim Zuhur and Shibli
cAysami, were seeking the union that the party had been preaching for
twenty years, but they were determined to avoid the mistakes of the UAR
days, mistakes their party publications and internal documents had been
criticizing since 1960. They were not about to agree to a union proposal
that would give Jamal cAbd al-Nasir an unbridled executive role outside
Egypt. All three factions, however, saw union and Nasir’s presence in it as
strengthening their positions.
Nasir himself was less than enthusiastic at the prospect. But he could
not refuse to go along when successor regimes to that which had humiliated
him by breaking up the UAR and to that of the despised cAbd al-Karim
Qasim publicly called for discussions with a view to establishing unity. His
strategy during the talks was to throw roadblocks in front of other
delegations while appearing to be in favor of unity. Thus, in the first series
of talks, he went to considerable lengths to widen the existing differences
between Bacthists and Nasirists in Syria. For example, he made a particular
point of Zuhur’s alleged assertion that seven of ten civilians to be added to
the National Council of Revolutionary Command would be Bacthists,
which provoked an outcry from Nihad al-Qasim that the Bacth was
scheming behind the backs of the unionist forces to take sole power.42
Nasir stated time after time in this round that he refused to contract a unity
with the Bacth Party alone in Syria. He thus put pressure on the military
leaders in Syria to give greater representation and broader powers to the
other unionist forces. When the combined eloquence of the Syrian and
244 THE BACTH PARTY

other Iraqi Bacthists during the first series failed to convince Nasir that the
Bacth Party of 1963 was not identical to the Bacth of 1958 and 1959, he
agreed to meet with cAflaq and Bitar to try to clear things up.
cAflaq and Bitar underwent very rough treatment during the three days
they spent in Cairo. Bitar had an especially hard time of it, for Nasir was
not going to let him forget that he had signed a document approving Syria’s
secession from the UAR in 1961. He accused both of sabotaging the UAR
by the resignations of 1959, especially for their effort to get some
Egyptians to resign from the UAR government at the same time.43 He kept
harping about forces in Syria that had virtually made a career of trying to
break up the union. He accused the Bacthist leaders of wanting to set up a
Bacth organization in Egypt, although they did not have the means to do so,
adding that he was above trying such tricks in other countries, though he
did have the means. He derided the Bacth’s understanding of socialism.44
The whole record shows Nasir as completely in control of the talks,
constantly humiliating the two Syrians, whose position was not helped by
Lu’ayy Atasi’s frequently irrelevant interventions.
Nasir’s concern in both the first and second series of talks, aside from
clearing up past differences, was to avoid being caught “ between the
hammer and anvil’’ of two sections of the Bacth, i.e., those in Syria and in
Iraq, a phrase he used repeatedly.45 Hence he stressed the need for a
unified political leadership in each country and in the proposed unified
state as well. He told the other delegates that such a political apparatus
already existed in Egypt, namely the Socialist Union.
Nasir recognized that the Bacth was not prepared to share control in Iraq
and that there was little he could do about it, except to hope that cAbd
al-Salam cArif and others like him would try to chart a course favorable to
his policies. Hence, Nasir concentrated his efforts on establishing a unified
political leadership in Syria.46 For him, the unified political leadership
meant one that was not composed of representatives of various factions. He
said, “ The question here is: are we going to give our votes in the council
according to our own personal opinions, or according to prior
instructions—for instance, if you agree with my opinion, when it comes to
voting are you going to change your mind and adopt the Party’s view? That
is the real issue. ’’47 Nasir also expressed his view this way: “ . . . after the
establishment of the single national movement there will be a political
unity which will bind the entire federal state. There will be no difference
between an Iraqi, a Syrian, or an Egyptian. There may be a majority of
Syrians, Egyptians, or Iraqis, but they represent one thing—the political
organization or [sic—misprint for of] a single Arab movement. This is
equal to everybody representing the State or the Arab movement.’’48
Another Attempt at Unity 245

Yet another time he said, . . the political leadership of the region

. . . should represent the unionist front . . . and all the people . . . we
assume that the political leadership of the region will represent the Bacth,
the Arab Nationalists, the Socialist Unionists, and the National Arab Front.
Then in the formation of the political leadership of the State, it would not
matter what colour this is and what colour that, or if two come from the
Bacth Party or not. We would not say that the political leadership of the
state should be formed of one Bacth member, an Arab Nationalist and a
Socialist.” 49 This is Nasir again, with his abhorrence of parties and
factions and special interest groups, striving to organize a political group­
ing like the series of Unions he had created in Egypt. In theory, all those
participating would be so dedicated to the ideals of the state that dissension
based on factions or groups of interested people or parties or the like would
be eliminated. In practice, this meant they would be under the control of
the top figures of that state. Nasir’s political philosophy had no place for a
person or group with a power base independent of the head of government.
In reading the transcript of the talks, the impression is clear that the
Egyptian leaders would have been the happiest of people if the negotiations
for unity had never been brought up, and only slightly less happy if they
had collapsed in mid-course. The verbal drubbing Nasir gave cAflaq and
Bitar in the second series of meetings, plus other clear indications of
Nasir’s lack of trust in the Bacth Party, gave the Syrian and Iraqi Bacthist
leaders every opportunity to back out and even to put the blame for failure
of the talks on Nasir. They did not withdraw from the talks for a number of
reasons. First, they genuinely believed in unity and, while they did not
want a union run by Nasir, they had come to recognize that a union without
Nasir had little chance of success. Second, the unification of three
“ liberated Arab states” would make the union and its constituent elements
powerful factors in the Middle East. Third, the Syrian Bacthists, plus
Hariri, Atasi, and Qutayni, believed Nasir would be a powerful protector
against, “ reactionary” forces threatening their regime. Fourth, the Iraqi
Bacthists considered union a weapon they could use to control non-Bacthist
elements in their country.
During the two and a half weeks between the second and third series of
meetings the Egyptians tried a new tack to impede the course of unity.
Such, at any rate, is my interpretation of the attack by Hasanayn Haykal in
al-Ahram on March 31. Haykal accused cAflaq and Bitar of running “ a
covert provocation operation against the UAR” in al-Bacth. Haykal
centered his attack on two al-BaHh editorials, the first of which had called
pro-Nasirist unionist forces in Syria “ more royalist than a king” for
demanding immediate unity when even Nasir was willing to wait for
246 THE BACTH PARTY

negotiations. Haykal chose to interpret this wording as an implication that

Nasir was demanding monarchical powers over Syria, an interpretation that
reflected Nasir’s sensitivity to and resentment of earlier Bacth charges that
he had governed Syria in a dictatorial fashion from 1958 to 1961. The
second editorial appeared in al-Bacth on March 27; it discussed populist
organizations and was essentially a criticism of the 1958 National Union
experience. Haykal interpreted the editorial as criticism of the current
Socialist Union then being formed in Egypt.50
The Bacthist leaders were annoyed by this attack and by the appearance
of large groups of demonstrators in Damascus streets on March 31, calling
for immediate unity with Egypt. The Syrians cleared the streets by
imposing a curfew, although they took care not to criticize Cairo directly.
In public, the Bacthists referred only to “ painful provocations.” 51 In
private, at the first session of the third series of meetings in Cairo, Prime
Minister Bitar stood up to Nasir’s charges that the Bacth was slandering the
UAR and charged, in turn, that Nasir was trying to overthrow his
government.52
One reason for the delay between the second and third series of talks
was the eruption of a struggle for power among the several pro-unity forces
and groups in Syria. Encouraged by support received from Nasir in the
Cairo talks, by the UAR press, and by broadcasts over Cairo’s Voice of the
Arab Nation radio, six unionist ministers presented their resignations to
Bitar on March 24. Actual resignation would have shattered any Bacthist
hope of union, inasmuch as a split of the unionist forces within Syria would
allow Nasir to back out of the unity talks; he had clearly insisted on unity
with the people of Syria and not just with the Bacth. Deputy Prime Minister
Nihad al-Qasim claimed that the Bacth had been running the show since the
March coup and said that he and his colleagues felt as if they were
cuckolds.53 Bacthist Information Minister Jamal Atasi said on the same day
that the Arab Unity Front, the Arab Nationalist Movement, and the
Socialist Unionists did not have control over their popular bases (their
members and supporters). He went on to say, “ It is now difficult to work
out a National Charter in which the goals of all unionist groups can be
defined . . . [but] the Bacth will not agree to any pressure exerted on it to
give this group or that side certain privileges or positions which this group
or that side does not deserve.” 54
The need of all parties at least to appear united overcame for the time
these divisive sentiments. On the same day that the above-mentioned press
stories appeared, the Bacth, the Arab Nationalist Movement, the Socialist
Unionists and the United Arab Front agreed to form a unionist front. They
also agreed on the composition of a delegation to the third round of talks
which was to begin the following day in Cairo. The statement issued by the
Another Attempt at Unity 247

four groups affirmed the necessity of achieving union among the UAR,
Syria, and Iraq, of defending the March 8th revolution and its aims, and of
having an organized people’s base.55 The unwieldy delegation to the third
round of talks numbered seventeen; about half were military men, includ­
ing a majority of those on the NCRC; three civilian Bacthists and five other
civilian ministers represented the other three groups in the front. It was
anything but a united delegation, and the minutes of the third séries are
replete with disputes among the Syrians. In addition, Ziyad al-Hariri came
to Cairo at the very end of the series to settle some outstanding issues.
After ten days of arguing, of committees and sessions running late into
the night, of committees and subcommittees drafting language, the three
delegations produced an agreed-upon declaration of federal unity early in
the morning of April 17. Its constitutional principles allotted the federal
government authority in foreign affairs, defense, and national security,
financial control of federal projects, and coordination of economic plan­
ning, information and education, laws and communications. A transitional
period of up to twenty-five months was stipulated, five months to prepare
for and hold a referendum on the constitution (which was to be prepared in
the meantime), and on the choice of president. After the referendum,
twenty months were provided for building up the federal constitutional
institutions. The regions were given extensive powers during this transition
period, a point on which the Iraqis and Syrians had insisted because, they
said, of opposition within their own respective regions. The matter of
reconciling varying approaches by political groups in the several regions
was to be taken care of during this period. In Egypt, of course, the Socialist
Union would perform the function of a unionist front. The Syrians had
come up with a statement of intent in the unity front formed in early April,
and Iraq was expected to follow suit.56
Nasir had preferred not to enter a new unity arrangement and, with his
efforts to prevent such a union or to place in power people favorable to him
in Syria failing, he wished to withdraw. He soon found that he had allies,
of a sort, in an unexpected quarter. As we have noted, the Syrian
delegation did not by any means represent all the elements in the Syrian
body politic. In the interval between the second and third sessions of the
Cairo talks, the Bacth Military Organization had greatly improved its
position. Brigadier Amin al-Hafiz, a Bacthist, had been appointed Deputy
Military Governor as well as Minister of Interior, a post he had held since
March 8. He had moved decisively to restore order when demonstrations
on March 31 by various factions, principally pro-Nasirist groups, began to
get out of order. Hafiz had been considered a possible candidate for head of
the NCRC, but at the time of the coup he had been half a world away,
assigned “ to what must surely be the world’s most useless sinecure, the
248 THE BACTH PARTY

post of Syrian Military Attache in Buenos Aires.” 57 A Sunni Muslim and a

former instructor in the military academy, he was well thought of by his
fellow officers. In his dual position of Military Governor and Minister of
Interior, he added considerable weight to the Bacthist side.
After the declaration of April 17, the press and radio in all three regions
(the Bacth had won the use of their term for region [qutr] in the Cairo
negotiations) were filled with praise of the new union—for a few days. All
the talk in Cairo hadn’t really settled the question of authority or balance of
power in the Unity Front in Syria. The first word in al-Bacth’s summary of
the principal points of the agreement published on April 18 had been
“ parties,” a word anathema to Nasir. By the end of the week, Hasanayn
Haykal and al-Bacth were differing in print over the role of parties in the
regional fronts,58 but after a couple of exchanges, both were distracted by
events in Jordan. The Egyptians concentrated most of their editorial Ere on
the Jordanian government for repression of demonstrations and distur­
bances that broke out following the April 17th declaration of unity. In
Syria, during this period, the representatives of the four constituent
elements of the unity front met for a week beginning on April 22 in an
effort to thresh out an acceptable compromise. The principal issue, of
course, was control. According to one source, the Bacthist representatives
insisted on half the seats in the front’s command plus veto power.59 Bitar
virtually confirmed this explanation later, saying that the only real point of
disagreement was that of decision-making in the front’s command. He said
that the Bacth had proposed that it have half the seats and the others have
half, with an independent member in case of tie.60 Such a balance was too
close for the other unionists, who would not trust the “ independence” of
the tie-breaking member, and no agreement was reached.
The storm broke on May 2 and was all over the Beirut press—but not
the Syrian press—the following day. The NCRC had discharged some
forty-five officers and NCOs on the last day of April, all of pro-Egyptian
sympathy or reputation. Those discharged included one member of the
NCRC itself, Fawwaz Muharib, two brothers of Arab Nationalist Move­
ment leader Hani al-Hindi, and several officers newly appointed to sensi­
tive security posts, e.g., the Chief of G2 and the deputy commanding
officer of internal security forces. Two senior members of the NCRC,
Rashid Qutayni and Muhammad Sufi, resigned in protest and were
promptly followed by five ministers representing the unionist forces in the
cabinet.61 The five ministers gave their reasons for resignation to the press;
the reasons added up to charges that the Bacth Party had insisted on
dominating Syria in a spirit of partisanship, and that, in their view, the
required degree of cooperation among all unionist forces was not
forthcoming.62
Another Attempt at Unity 249

For a week the Bacthist leaders in Syria tried to act as if everything were
normal. Shibli cAysami, Minister of Agricultural Reform, who had taken a
prominent role in Cairo and who had also been the Bacth’s representative in
the talks among the several unionist groups, told the press that efforts to
construct the front were underway. He was promptly contradicted by Nihad
al-Qasim.63 The pro-UAR press in Beirut was severely critical of the
activities of the Syrian leadership, but the Cairo press and radio, including
Radio Sawt al-cArab, were more cautious. Nasir was on a visit to Algeria
from May 1-8, half of the time at sea, and cAbd al-Hakim cAmir was
doubtless being careful, in Nasir’s absence, not to take any position from
which retreat might be difficult. The NCRC met repeatedly in Syria, on
one occasion for fifteen straight hours, to deal with the situation. It tried to
split the Arab Unity Front from the other unionist groups, but did not
succeed. On May 8, the NCRC sent Lu’ayy Atasi to Cairo to talk to cAmir,
who is reported to have said to him, “ How do you expect me to negotiate
with persons who consider Nasirism a crime?’’64
On May 8, the angry words and demonstrations degenerated into
violence. Serious rioting broke out in Damascus and Aleppo and recurred
the following day. Minister of Interior and Deputy Military Governor
Hafiz—Atasi was de jure military governor but Hafiz exercised all his
powers—used the security forces to break up riots. A number of people
were killed and wounded. As usual, no precise figures are available;
estimates varied from the 50 and 70 killed reported by Beirut’s al-Jaridah
and al-Safa’ respectively on May 9 to an official total of one policeman
killed reported by the Syrian government.65 In addition to strong action in
the streets, Syrian military authorities hauled arrested persons before courts
and had them sentenced to sixteen to eighteen months in jail before the end
of the day. Deputy Military Governor Hafiz also suspended the two
principal press organs of the pro-Nasir unionist forces, the Arab Nationalist
Movement’s Sawt al-Jamahir and al-Wihdah al-cArabiyah on May 8. Both
their editors were jailed. The Cairo press and radio responded with cries of
outrage. On May 11, the Bitar cabinet quit, and so did Prime Minister
Bakr’s cabinet in Baghdad.
The events of the first ten days of May effectively finished off the
tripartite unity. Within twenty-four hours of his resignation, Bakr formed a
new cabinet, one in which organized political forces friendly to Nasir were
not included. The Bacth in Syria failed to persuade second-rank members
of the Arab Nationalist Movement and the Socialist Unionist Front to enter
the cabinet on Bacthist terms. The Bacth eventually formed a cabinet in
which it was the only organized group represented. Thus exactly what
Nasir had tried to avoid throughout the talks came to pass, that is, Egypt
was placed between the hammer and anvil of two Bacth governments. Both
250 THE BACTH PARTY

he and these two governments continued to talk unity and make motions of
carrying out the April 17th unity declaration. At the same time, Damascus
and Baghdad carried on a running debate with Cairo over the blame for the
difficulties besetting the three countries. As June wore on, the intensity of
the verbal attacks grew. On June 21, al-Ahram began to publish the record
of the tripartite talks.
Egypt’s only hope was to change at least one of the participating
governments if the tripartite unity was to work, and Syria was the obvious
target. Partisans of Cairo made two attempts. Neither was successful. The
first was through the street'demonstrations in May, referred to above. The
second was a serious effort at a coup d’état on July 18 in which a number
of people were killed. After a series of summary courts-martial im­
mediately after the attempt, twenty-seven people convicted of participating
in the coup were executed, punishment of virtually unprecedented severity
and speed. On July 22, the eleventh anniversary of the Egyptian revolu­
tion, Nasir went before the Egyptian people and said,

We do not believe that the UAR has a joint aim with the present fascist
regime in Damascus. . . . There cannot be a joint aim with a system based
on treachery and stabbing in the back. We believe that the present Bacth
regime in Damascus is an anti-unionist, anti-socialist regime. . . . We do
not consider that the Damascus government represents the Syria with which
we signed the tripartite unity agreement. . . . Therefore we have reached the
decision that this agreement—the tripartite unity agreement—commits us
with Syria, but does not at all commit us in any way with the existing fascist
Bacthist government in Syria.66

Nasir’s attack was entirely centered on Syria; he repeatedly charged the

Bacth with fascism. He virtually ignored Iraq.
The actions of the regime in Damascus had given Nasir plenty of excuse
for saying what he did; indeed, he could probably have said it earlier had he
wished to. Two months before, Sacdi had given him an opportunity,
saying, “ I would rather postpone discussion of Arab unity for a hundred
years than abolish the Bacth Party, which is the instrument towards
progress in every sphere, political, social, and unitary.” 67 But after the
failure of the coup attempt on July 18, Nasir could have had little hope that
a government to his liking would appear in Damascus. He had not wanted
to negotiate a union with the Bacth Party, yet that is precisely what he had
done. He probably did not realize during the talks in March and April that
the Bacth Military Organization had been the driving force behind the
March 8 coup. Its members, after all, were relatively young, they had
played little part in the to-ing and fro-ing of pre-UAR politics, and they had
stayed out of sight behind Hariri, Qutayni, and Atasi. cAflaq and Bitar
Another Attempt at Unity 251

themselves did not realize then—or for some time to come—that Hafiz,
Jadid, cUmran, Asad, and company were, in practice, the bosses of the
Bacth Party and of Syria. There is more than a slight irony in the fact that
one of these Bacthist officers, Hafiz al-Asad, with the support of Syrian
Socialist Unionists, signed the document bringing Syria into a federation
with Egypt and Libya in 1971. But the requirements of power change; in
1971 Asad was President, Commander-in-Chief, and Secretary General of
a very different Bacth Party; he needed domestic support; Nasir was dead;
Egypt wanted Syria as a balance against Libya; and the 1971 federation
was very loose.

Notes
1. Radio Baghdad, Feb. 8, 1963.
2. Al-Anwar (Beirut), cited in Arab World, Jan. 14, 1963, p. 7.
3. Arab World, Jan. 8, 1963, p. 6.
4. Ibid., Feb. 5, 1963, p. 8; Majid Khadduri, Republican Iraq (London: Oxford
University Press, 1969), p. 190.
5. Interview with an Iraqi Ba'thist, October, 1965. Khadduri, Republican Iraq,
says much the same, asserting that Ahmad Hasan Bakr “ issued instructions . . . to
raise the rebellion.” It is likely that such members of the Regional Command as
were out of jail participated in the decision. New York Times (Western Edition),
Feb. 15, 1963, says the decision was taken on the Monday prior to the coup, i.e.,
Feb. 4.
6. Uriel Dann, Iraq Under Qassem (New York: Praeger, 1969), p. 363.
7. Ibid. Khadduri, Republican Iraq, lists Bakr, cAmmash, Tikriti, Abd al-
Latif, Mundhir al-Wandawi, and Khalid al-Shawi as the principal officers who took
an active part in planning the revolt. There is a general congruence among available
sources as to the chief organizers.
8. Azmat al-Bacth al-cArabi al Ishtiraki min Khilal Tajribatihi fi al-cIraq (The
Crisis o f the Arab Socialist Resurrection Party Resulting from Its Experience in
Iraq (Beirut: Dar al-Shacb, 1964), pp. 29-30 and 57-58.
9. Munif Razzaz, al-Tajribah al-Murrah (The Bitter Experience) (Beirut: Dar
Ghandur, 1967), pp. 78 and 80.
10. Dann, Iraq Under Qassem, p. 365, referring to Qissat al-Thawrah
f i ’l-cIraq wa Suriyya, pp. 28-31. An interview with an Iraqi Ba'thist, October
1965, confirms that there had been previous attempts.
11. Interview with an Iraqi Bacthist, October 1965. This story was current
among party cadres.
12. Dann, Iraq Under Qassem, p. 367.
13. Radio Baghdad, Feb. 8, 1963.
14. Jibran Majdalani, “ The Baath Experience in Iraq,” Middle East Forum,
Vol. 41, No. 2 (Autumn, 1965), p. 44.
252 THE BACTH PARTY

15. Radio Baghdad, Feb. 23, 1963; the news conference was held on Feb. 17,
however, according to Iraq News Agency Bulletin No. 43, p. 13, of the seven­
teenth. On the continued fighting, see, for example, the New York Times (Western
Edition), Feb. 15, 1963.
16. Iraqi News Agency Bulletin No. 44, Feb. 18, 1963, p. 17. The Syrians
were Shibli cAysami, cAbd-al-Karim Zuhur, Khalid al-Hakim, and Jamal Atasi; the
Lebanese, Khalid Yashruti, cAbd al-Majid Rafici, cAli Khalil, Khalid cAli, and
Muhammed Khayr al-Duwayri.
17. BBC, Tri-partite Talks, ME/1304/E/6.
18. Radio Cairo, Feb. 21, 1963.
19. Mid-East Mirror, Feb. 16, 1963, p. 14; hereafter cited as MEM.
20. Cited in Arab World, Feb. 20, 1963, pp. 1-2.
21. cAdli Hashshad, Suqut al-Infisal (The End o f the Secession) (Cairo; Dar
al-Qawmiyah li al-Tibacah wa al-Nashr, 1963), p. 225.
22. Al-Nasr (Damascus), cited in Arab World, Feb. 15, 1963, p. 5.
23. Razzaz, Tajribah, p. 90; Sami al-Jundi, al-Bacth (Beirut: Dar al-Nahar li
al-Nashr, 1969), pp. 112 ff.
24. Razzaz, Tajribah, p. 90.
25. Ibid.
26. Malcolm Kerr, The Arab Cold War 1958-1964 (London: Oxford Univer­
sity Press, 1965), p. 58; Jundi, al-Bacth, pp. 112 ff.
27. Ibid., p. 59.
28. BBC, Tri-partite Talks, ME/1286/E/2.3, and 4.
29. Radio Damascus, March 9, 1963; these were the NCRC’s decisions 1
and 2.
30. BBC, Tri-partite Talks, ME/1286/E/5.
31. Ibid., ME/1292/E/3.
32. Sacdi’s proposals and the communiqué were carried on Radio Damascus,
March 10, 1963.
33. Radio Cairo, March 14, 1963.
34. Radio Damascus, March 14, 1963.
35. BBC, Tri-partite Talks, ME/1357/E/31-32, contains a-list of the par­
ticipants.
36. Razzaz, Tajribah, p. 97.
37. BBC, Tri-partite Talks, ME/1292/E/1-3.
38. Ibid., ME/1350/E/21; al-Ahram, July 21, 1963, p. 11.
39. Ibid., ME/1285/E/17.
40. In citing these talks, I have used the BBC translation of the minutes which
were broadcast over Radio Cairo after appearing in al-Ahram. The BBC version is
virtually complete and indicates precisely where it has left out passages—generally
those having to do with discussions of future meetings and the like. I have checked
a number of parts that seemed questionable in the BBC translation against the text
in al-Ahram and found no discrepancies. A portion of the record of these talks is in
Arab Political Documents 1963, pp. 75-217. This material is far from complete,
and the indications that material has been left out are confusing and misleading in
places.
41. Kerr, Arab Cold War, p. 65, says: “ The exact wording of the text in any
given passage, however, should be regarded with caution.” I agree. Anthony
Nutting, Nasser, (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1972), pp. 327 ff., seems to take the
record of the talks as an accurate one, however.
Another Attempt at Unity 253

42. BBC, Tri-partite Talks, ME/1286/E/3-5.

43. Ibid., ME/1297/E/5,12,15, and 16.
44. Ibid., ME/1304/E/14.
45. Ibid., ME/1304/E/9-11, ME/1309/E/6, and ME/1310/E/5.
46. Ibid., ME/1310/E/6-7.
47. Ibid., ME/1309/E/8.
48. Ibid., ME/1309/E/9.
49. Ibid., ME/1310/E/6.
50. Text of Haykal’s editorial carried on Radio Cairo, April 1, 1963.
51. Al-Bacth, April 3, 1963.
52. BBC, Tri-partite Talks, ME/1311/E/5.
53. Al-Hawadith (Beirut), cited in Arab World, April 5, 1963, p. 2.
54. Ibid., citing al-Jaridah (Beirut).
55. Al-Bacth, April 7, 1963; the news was not accorded top news treatment, but
was carried on page 2.
56. The text of the April 17 declaration is in Arab Political Documents 1963,
pp. 227-46.
57. Kerr, Arab Cold War, pp. 59-60.
58. Arab World, April 22, 1963, and al-Bacth, same date.
59. Al-Siyasah (Beirut), cited in Arab World, May 3, 1963, p. 3. This is the
same ratio of Bacth representation to that of other parties that obtained in the
National Progressive Front formed in Syria in 1972. The Bacth had eight represen­
tatives, and four other parties two representatives each. Bacth Secretary General
Hafiz al-Asad was, in addition, chairman.
60. Al-Bacth, May 12, 1963, cited in MEM, May 18, 1963, p. 5.
61. Arab World, May 3, 1963.
62. Ibid., May 6, 1963, p. 5.
63. Al-Nahar, May 4, 1963 and al-Siyasah May 5, 1963, respectively, cited in
Arab World, May 6, 1963, p. 6.
64. Arab World, May 10, 1963, p. 1.
65. MEM, May 11, 1963.
66. Cairo Radio, July 22, 1963.
67. Al-Hayah (Beirut), May 27, 1963 quoted in Chronology o f Arab Politics
1963 (Beirut: American University Press, 1964), p. 105.
 - 15 -

Nine Months in Iraq

The new Bacth government in Baghdad started >ts tenure i’i February 1963
with a number of factors in its favor, not the least of which was a general
sense of relief among the city population, and the middle and upper classes
in particular, at Qasim’s demise. After four and a half years, the personal
idiosyncrasies of the Sole Leader had worn a bit thin. Some Iraqis hoped
that the rather poor economic performance of the Qasim era would be
improved. Others had hopes for a broader-based regime. Many people in
the cities and towns retained a deep-seated fear that the Communist
excesses of 1959 might be repeated. There was, therefore, a widespread
hope that there would be an opportunity to “ turn over a new leaf” when
Qasim was overthrown and executed on February 9. Indeed, the middle
and upper classes’ memories of 1959 gave the new regime considerable
latitude for the anti-Communist actions it carried out during the first weeks
after the revolution.
The Bacth regime worked the Communists over with a vengeance. In
addition to those killed in the clean-up actions that went on for a week or
ten days after the February 8 coup, a half a dozen leading Communist Party
members were executed, the party First Secretary among them. At least
some of these men were put to death without benefit of any trial at all,
although the executions were publicly announced as having resulted from
trials and convictions.1 During the nine months of its existence, the Bacth
regime in Baghdad sentenced more than 150 people to death on charges of
crimes committed in Mosul and Kirkuk during 1959, of obstructing the
February 8th revolution, and of plotting against the regime after that
revolution. Virtually all those sentenced were identified as Communists or
in some way associated with the Communist Party or with Communist
countries. Of those sentenced, at least 100 were executed.2
A week after the coup, the USSR expressed concern in Pravda at “ the
wave of terror and persecution of Iraqi democrats.” 3 Pravda warned the
new Iraqi regime again on February 26, when it said, “ The danger arises
that imperialist forces, resorting to the tried and tested methods of bribery,
256 THE BACTH PARTY

blackmail and conspiracy, may get a chance to push the country step by
step on the road of giving up its policy of neutralism and leading to its
subordination to imperialist dictation specifically, the dictation of oil
monopolies.” 4
The Chinese People’s Daily said on February 23 that an “ immediate
stop must be put to the arrests and massacre of Iraqi communists and other
patriotic progressives.” 5 Criticism from Communist countries continued,
relations between Baghdad and Moscow dropped to such a degree that the
Soviets permitted an attack on the Iraqi Embassy in Moscow on March 14.
Others grew concerned at the violence in Baghdad. In April, Michel cAflaq
privately reprimanded the Bacth leaders in Iraq for deviating so far from the
party’s approved doctrine of positive neutralism and for following “ a
policy of murder and torture.” 6
Neither protests from Communist countries, nor reprimands from
fellow Bacthists—much less reproof from the Egyptians during the tripar­
tite unity talks—had any discernible effect on the anti-Communist vigor of
the Bacthist regime in Baghdad.7 Harsh treatment of Communists was a
continuing feature of Bacthist rule even though Regional Secretary cAli
Salih Sacdi made a distinction between Communist leaders and the Com­
munist organization on the one hand, and lesser members on the other. In a
news interview on March 12, 1963, he said, “ In regard to communism as
an organization, we shall uproot it mercilessly.” And, “ As for low level
communists as individuals, our attitude towards them was just and merciful
during the revolution.” He asserted that the regime would give Com­
munists a chance to participate in building the country after ascertaining
“ that they had been freed from treacherous bureaucratic leadership, that
they have discarded their narrow-minded hostility toward Arab
nationalism, and that they rid themselves of tendencies and inclinations
extending beyond the Arab homeland.” Sacdi asserted that Marxism as an
ideology was a source on which Bacthists drew with open minds and that
the Bacth Party had an open attitude toward the socialist camp.8 Despite the
distinctions that Sacdi drew in this press interview and his personal
inclination toward Marxist socialism, it was the National Guard, controlled
by Sacdi’s supporters, which committed many of the more serious
atrocities against the Communists during the early months of Bacthist rule
in Iraq.
The Iraqi government publicized three Communist-sponsored attempts
to oust it. It tried fifty men, chiefly noncommissioned officers and soldiers,
on charges of trying to organize a Communist movement in Mosul to
overthrow the regime on February 26.9 On March 12, the Military
Governor, Rashid Muslih, referred to a Communist plot that had been
crushed a few days earlier; he appears to have been referring to a move
Nine Months in Iraq 257

other than that in Mosul.10 This reported coup, which may have been
fictitious, may have been announced to cover the execution of Iraqi
Communist Party First Secretary Salim cAdil and two other Central
Committee members on March 9.
In the early hours of July 3, another anti-regime movement by enlisted
men occurred at Rashid Camp on the outskirts of Baghdad. For a time the
rebels had four senior Bacthists in their hands, Foreign Minister Talib
Shabib, Interior Minister Hazim Jawad, National Guard Commander
Mundhir Wandawi, and Deputy Guard Commander Najat Safi. After
several hours of confusion, the would-be rebels, faced with superior force,
surrendered and handed over their captives unharmed. Twenty-eight rebels
were sentenced to death. The Baghdad regime declared four members of
the Bulgarian Embassy persona non grata for instigating this attempt.11
While the trial of those involved in this event was in process, the regime
executed three more members of the Central Committee. These executions
came after a special instruction from the Bacth Party’s National Command
which “ convened a joint meeting with the Iraqi Regional Command in
June 1963 and passed an edict categorically prohibiting all forms of torture
and executions.” 12
Later in the year, Iraqi Communist Party Central Committee member
cAziz al-Hajj summed up the Communist reaction to the “ ruthless reprisals
against progressives” (i.e.. Communists) and “ wholesale killing of politi­
cal opponents by the Bacthists.” 13 After blaming Qasim for not listening to
Communist warnings of conspiratorial groups within the army, al-Hajj
asserted that Britain and the United States had helped the Bacthists to take
over Iraq and that “ the present regime in Iraq is simply a façade for
neo-colonialism.” Moreover, he said, “ The Bacthists even betrayed their
former allies—the pro-Nasir groups which took part in the coup but which
are now also being hounded.” 14 He went on to say, “ Discontent is
prevalent in the army, particularly among soldiers and n.c.o.’s; there is
dislike of the dirty war in Kurdistan and of the policy of killing the patriot
officers. The forming of a ‘national guard’ from among adolescents
befuddled by jingoist propaganda, declassed elements and all sorts of
riff-raff, is an expression not only of the fascism of the regime but also of
the Bacthists’ fear of the Army.” 15
With perhaps better foresight than he realized, al-Hajj said that the
imperialists were aware that the end of the Bacth, which lacked mass
support, was not far off. He said that “ the paramount task of the
democratic movement in Iraq is to abolish the Bacth regime and form a
genuinely democratic anti-imperialistic government. . . .” 16 In fact, how­
ever, the Communists had nothing to do with the army move against the
Bacth in November 1963. By that time, the Bacth’s repression had battered
258 THE BACTH PARTY

the Communist movement into near-impotence. Dozens of Communists

had left the party; some had made public recantation of communism on
Baghdad Radio and Television; the organization was badly disrupted.17
Despite its actions against the much-feared Communists, the Bacth
regime managed to lose the support—or more accurately, the toleration
—of much of the population of the country in fairly short order. The
National Front formed to oppose Qasim, composed of the Istiqlal, the
Bacth, and certain independents, did not function after the February coup to
any notable extent. The fairly brief association of the Arab Nationalists
Movement (Harakat Qawmiyun al-cArab) with that front had ceased well
before 1963, just months after the secession of Syria from the UAR.18 In
March 1963, the Arab Nationalists Movement newspaper in Beirut accused
the Iraqi National Guard of persecuting Movement adherents—a charge the
Iraqi regime rejected. Under the terms agreed to by Nasir and the two Bacth
regimes in the Cairo talks, a coalition of national forces was to be formed
in Iraq, as well as in Syria, in order to provide a base for unified popular
leadership. The popular front in Iraq does not appear to have been as
important to Nasir as the one in Syria was, for the Egyptian seemed to
accept the fact that the Bacth was running Iraq and that there were few other
organized political forces there. Even so, cabinet changes of May 13
dropped two Istiqlal members and replaced them with independent political
figures.
But organized political parties were only a small part of the political
scene in Iraq. The regime’s rapid loss of public tolerance resulted chiefly
from several factors. First was the party’s exclusivity; many senior posi­
tions in the regime were assigned to Bacthists or to persons who were not
noted for independence of thought or action. There were exceptions, of
course, because there simply were not enough party members in Iraq to fill
all the important jobs. Indeed, several officials who could be termed
Nasirists retained important jobs, among them Khayr al-Din Hasib and
Adib al-Jadir. But Bacthists predominated in the civilian apparatus of
government, especially at the policy-making level.
Second, the Bacthists were a relatively unknown quantity to almost all
Iraqis. Their leaders were young; they were neither members of well-
known families nor men of established professional reputation; they lacked
the aura of heroism of, say, Ben Bella in Algeria. Their sole recommenda­
tion to the populace was their competence in governing Iraq, but their
performance in government was not such as to win widespread approba­
tion. Domestically, the February 8th regime accomplished little that was
noteworthy or even likely to attract support either from the urban middle
classes, the business community, or from the masses. Government em­
ployees worried about losing their jobs to relatives of Bacthists they
Nine Months in Iraq 259

regarded as upstarts. The party press was filled with talk about socialism
and mass organization; and businessmen, worried about nationalization of
their firms, hesitated to take initiatives. The masses got a lot of slogans, a
bit of land reform, but not much else.
Several reasons may be adduced for the Bacthists’ poor performance in
governing Iraq during 1963. The circumstances under which the party
functioned during Qasim’s rule had required some talent for clandestinity
and conspiracy. As Regional Secretary, Sacdi met these requirements. He
was physically strong and given to extremes in speech and action; after the
February 8th coup he gained a reputation for carousing in public.19 He had
drastically reduced the size of the party after the failure of the assassination
attempt on Qasim in 1959, and his methods, while contrary to, or at best
skirting, party regulations, had converted an overgrown and unwieldy
organization into one able to function successfully under harassment and
repression by the Qasim regime. The conspiratorial capacities of Sacdi and
his associates were of substantially less value when the party was in power,
for the party then had need of people with administrative talents and broad
political vision, something few of its leaders possessed.
Members of the Iraqi Regional Command in 1963 averaged about thirty
years of age. Virtually none had held an important administrative job or,
indeed, a post with public responsibility of any significance in the rela­
tively few years they had spent between leaving college and becoming the
leaders of a party in charge of a country of seven million people.
Moreover, the party leadership itself was split, and leaders frequently acted
at cross purposes. Sacdi and his supporters were eager to spread socialism
in Iraq. Their views harmonized with the extreme socialist views held by a
group of party members in Syria. Sacdi’s faction inspired workers to take
over two privately owned factories in the early weeks of Bacth rule, a move
that alarmed the opposing faction, headed by Talib Shabib and Hazim
Jawad, who forced the restoration of the factories to their owners by
invoking the support of important military officers in the National Council
of the Revolutionary Command (NCRC).20 The Shabib-Jawad faction was
less doctrinaire and did not want to risk the turmoil that was certain to
follow any forcible attempts to impose socialism on Iraq. The two factions
had existed before February 8, but the absolute priority of ousting Qasim
had kept them from destructive contention.
The struggle between the two wings of the party was a thread that ran
through affairs in Iraq throughout the year, often touching on party
relations with other elements in the country, especially the Iraqi Army. The
February 8th coup was carried out by an alliance between the Bacth Party
and a group of military officers, who were sympathetic to at least some of
the party’s aims but were not members. And the real power in the army was
260 THE BACTH PARTY

in the hands of senior officers, who had not been members of the party
prior to the February revolution. Some were given party membership;
others, like cArif, were given important posts as the price of collaboration,
because the Bacth felt it needed allies. Thus the situation in Iraq differed
from that in Syria in two respects. In Syria, Bacthist officers had partial
control of the army and took full control of it fairly soon after the March
8th coup. In Syria, too, the Bacth Military Organization was independent
of the regular party apparatus, whereas in Iraq the Bacth Military Organiza­
tion was subordinate to thç Regional Command.21
The NCRC, in whose name the February 8th revolution had been
initiated and which was the effective decision-making body throughout the
nine months of the Bacthist regime in Iraq, consisted primarily of Bacthists
plus a few non-Bacth military officers. Its composition and powers were
legalized by a decree, issued by the NCRC itself on April 4, 1963, and
made retroactive to February 8. This decree specified that the NCRC was
to have a maximum of twenty members; it gave the NCRC power to enact,
amend, and repeal laws; command over the armed forces and other security
forces; authority to form, change, or dismiss cabinets; and general author­
ity to exercise executive functions in the country.22 Under this law, cArif as
President was only a figurehead; a simple majority of the NCRC was
sufficient to transact business and a two-thirds majority sufficient to enact
laws. The NCRC’s members were cAbd al-Salam cArif, Tahir Yahya,
Dhiyab al-cAlkawi, Hardan cAbd al-Ghaffar al-Tikriti, Anwar cAbd al-
Qadir al-Hadithi, cAbd al-Sattar cAbd al-Latif, Ahmad Hasan Bakr, Salih
Mahdi cAmmash, cAbd al-Karim Mustafa Nasrat, Mundhir al-Wandawi,
Khalid Makki al-Hashimi (all military officers), cAli Salih Sacdi, Muhsin
Shaykh Radi, Hamdi cAbd al-Majid, Talib Shabib, Hazim Jawad, cAbd
al-Hamid Khalkhal, Hani al-Fukayki (Regional Command members), and
Sacdun Hamadi.23 According to Sacdi, the NCRC was heavily weighted
against his adherents; “ . . . the military rightists—allies of the Party or
members—occupied from the beginning the overwhelming majority of
places” in the NCRC. In the Sacdi faction’s view, Jawad, Shabib, Hardan
Tikriti, Tahir Yahya, and cAbd al-Sattar cAbd al-Latif were the chief
rightists. Sacdi considered cAmmash and Bakr as “ roving rightists” who
tried for an accommodation between the two wings, taking a falsely
independent position. Sa'di’s own faction included Wandawi, cAbd al-
Majid, Fukayki, Shaykh Radi, and probably Khalkhal.24
Immediately after the February 8th revolution, many non-Bacthist
officers were appointed to important military commands. Party members
within the military for the most part had insufficient rank to be appointed to
such posts, as we have seen in an earlier chapter. Four of the five divisional
commanders were non-Bacthists; one was 'A rifs brother, 'A bd al-
Nine Months in Iraq 261

Rahman, later to be President of Iraq. A number of other senior military

commands went to persons whose association with the party was of recent
date; indeed some may have become party members after February 8.
Chief of Staff Tahir Yahya and Military Governor Rashid Muslih are
prominent examples. After the collapse of Bacth rule in Iraq, Sa'di’s
faction analyzed the party’s performance, noting the errors that had been
committed in regard to the Iraqi Army.
Among these errors were the return and promotion of military rightists;
Sa'di’s faction notes that “ the Army is not a social class . . . ” and that it is
composed of various elements. The party’s problem in Iraq was that those
who ended up getting the top posts had a “ rightist” mentality.25 Sa'di
tended to call anyone who didn’t follow his radical form of revolution and
dependence on mass organizations a rightist; in this particular assessment
he was accurate. His faction also criticized the “ childlike innocence” of
the Regional Command in allowing the formation of an NCRC, because
the Regional Command believed that the party should concentrate on party
work and simply give general guidance and direction to affairs in govern­
ment. The party did not see that “ the Party which had made the revolution
must run it directly and completely, that responsibility could not be
divided, that popular and official activity were one and the same thing.” 26
Almost from the beginning, the differences between the two wings of
the party appeared in their approach to running the country. As Regional
Secretary, Sa'di used his considerable skills to expand the influence of his
faction and to advance his socialist ideas. He promoted the development of
mass organizations, a theme prominent in Ba'th publications in the Iraqi
Region since about 1960. Among these mass organizations were a
peasant’s association, which developed branches in many of Iraq’s prov­
inces during this period; the students’ federation, whose activity had
precipitated the February 8th coup in the first place; a National Organiza­
tion for Popular Action, which was founded with great fanfare in the spring
of 1963; and some labor groups.
By far the most important of the mass organizations was the National
Guard (al-haras al-qawmi), which had played a significant part in the
success of the February 8th coup and in hunting down Communists
thereafter. Its exact size in February 1963 is open to question. Dann says
that “ at least 2,000 men . . . poured out o f ’ 'Azamiyah on the morning of
the coup.27 Dann’s figure seems reasonable, but he gives no source for it;
one may assume that there were additional members elsewhere. In any
event, at that time the National Guard was made up, for the most part, of
probationary members of the party and of party sympathizers, with a
relatively small number of members in the top posts. Immediately follow­
ing the coup, 'Abd al-Karim Nasrat, a retired army officer, was appointed
262 THE BACTH PARTY

Commander of the National Guard. But he was shifted to command of one

of the five army divisions within a week, because of differences with
cA rifs supporters.28 He was replaced by Mundhir Wandawi, who had
piloted the first airplane in the coup. Wandawi’s deputy was one Najat
al-Safi. The two remained in charge of the National Guard throughout the
nine months of Bacth rule, although Wandawi was slated for transfer when
the November crisis occurred. Both were partisans of cAli Salih Sacdi.
On the morning of the coup, the new regime called for recruits to join
the National Guard. This call was probably a signal to those already
associated in some way with the Guard to swing into action on behalf of the
Bacth. But it was also a genuine call for reinforcements to bolster the
Guard’s strength. Moreover, it was a shrewd psychological move; several
thousand recruits of college age were enrolled quickly. Guarding public
buildings and checking the credentials of citizens on the streets at night
kept a potentially disturbing element busy and out of trouble. The National
Guard commands for the Baghdad Region were announced on February 13
and those for each college in Baghdad University on February 18.29 On
March 23, al-Bacth quoted Hazim Jawad as saying that there were 70,000
National Guardsmen in Iraq. Sacdi said on May 27 that there were 20,000
members in the National Guard, a more likely figure.30 Most of the new
recruits were not Bacthists, of course, but some were undoubtedly Bacth
sympathizers. In April, both cArif and Bakr were photographed in National
Guard uniform carrying out (purportedly incognito) the National Guard
duty of checking papers of automobile passengers. The photographs were
published in al-Bacth of April 25, 1963, and the incident was mentioned
with distaste by Sacdi’s faction later.31 Checking credentials and perform­
ing guard duty were ostensibly the chief activities of the National Guard.
Its members were relatively polite and efficient and had one great advan­
tage, namely literacy, over the average enlisted man in the Iraqi Police
Force.
By late spring and early summer, however, stories of atrocities, of
torture, and of mistreatment of prisoners by guardsmen began to spread in
Iraq and abroad. As usual with such stories, the rumors lost nothing in the
telling, but there was sufficient truth in the tales of brutality in the National
Guard detention center in Baghdad on the west bank of the Tigris to lend
credence to stories of atrocity elsewhere. The National Guard also began to
change. It was no longer a unit assisting the regime and the party. Instead,
it began to exercise independent administrative and police functions on
behalf of Sacdi’s faction, aiming at changing the “ rightist” nature of the
regime. The conduct of the Guard became a basic point of dispute between
the two wings in the party and regime. In Sacdi’s view, “ what were called
Nine Months in Iraq 263

the errors of the National Guard was in fact its popular political inclination,
for even if the National Guard remained under control of the regime—it did
not respond to any direction but that of a popular and revolutionary
regime.” And, “ what the right [in the party] considered errors, the Party
left saw as defending the revolution.” 32
As the months went by, the political ideology of the Guard, as well as
its size and activity, began to worry the senior military leaders. Although
they had collaborated with the party, they were far from being doctrinaire
Socialists, and they were determined to keep military control in their hands.
cArif later said, after becoming ruler of Iraq in November 1963, that a
principal reason for military opposition to the Sacdi faction was the
National Guard’s efforts to act independently of the army. The senior
military officers must have viewed with concern Deputy Commander of the
Guard al-Safi’s statement in mid-September that, in addition to training in
street fighting, “ the command intends to open a special commando school
to train the National Guard in commando warfare.” 33 Coming at the time
the Sacdi faction was consolidating its hold on the Regional Command at
the Fifth Regional Congress of the party in Iraq, September 13-25, 1963,
this emphasis on activities which could weaken the army’s monopoly of
physical power led the generals to take steps against Sacdi’s faction. The
Guard’s leadership was one of their prime targets. Little happened during
October, when the Bacthists were occupied with the National Congress in
Damascus. On November 1, 1963, Baghdad announced that Wandawi was
to be commanding officer of the Iraqi Air Force unit assigned to the newly
created Syrian-Iraqi Unified Military Force.34 No units were actually
moved to Syria, however, and Wandawi was still in Iraq when the crisis
exploded ten days later.
Within the party apparatus, the Sacdi faction continued to better its
position during 1963, despite its troubles with the “ rightists” in the NCRC
and elsewhere. Sacdi had been shifted from the position of Minister of
Interior to that of Minister of Guidance in the May 13, 1963 cabinet
shuffle, but he remained a Deputy Prime Minister. Allowing him control of
both the Ministry of Interior’s police and security forces and of the
National Guard must have appeared to his opponents to be giving him too.
much personal power in the country. He looked on his removal from the
post of Interior Minister as a blow at his policies.35
In internal party affairs, however, he was riding very high. He suc­
ceeded in getting the Sixth National Congress of the party postponed twice,
once from the scheduled May 17 date to August and again from August to
October. Both postponements were made on the grounds that the party was
too busy organizing affairs in Iraq to hold party elections to choose
264 THE BACTH PARTY

delegates in time for these dates. With Iraq providing the largest single bloc
of delegates—twenty-five—to the National Congress, Sacdi was in a
position to force postponements.36
When elections were held in the Iraq branch and section congresses,
Sacdi’s partisans spread the word among party members that they had the
choice between a “ popular revolutionary party or reactionary rule.” The
Sacdists used variations on this distinction, e.g., “ revolutionary socialism
or mediocre reactionary reformism” and “ people’s socialist democratic
government or military dictatorship . . . under a false ‘ideology’.” 37 The
Sacdi faction noted a solidifying of trends and a gathering of supporters
during the seven months since the February 8th revolution:

In the Party elections, among the cadres, the socialist trend urged every
member to play an important role in defining the position of the Party cadres.
It is appropriate to record and that we make clear that this phenomenon was
prominent for the first time in the life of the Party, not only in Iraq but on the
national level also. In the congresses of branches and sections, there
occurred for the first time argument over the socialist trend of the Party, the
necessity of deepening and clarifying it, and ending its contradictions and
compromises. There was also discussion about the form of government and
its class character, hostile to the masses.38

The Iraqi Regional Congress of September 1963 was a stormy affair.

Sacdi and his faction feared that the fifty-four delegates elected to the
Regional Congress by subordinate party elements would be too hard to
manage, so he had these fifty-four choose twenty-seven among themselves
to participate in the congress, a unique and illegal practice, according to
party statutes. cAflaq, plus Syrian Bacth military leaders Muhammad
cUmran and Salah Jadid, came over from Syria at one point to sit in on the
congress and try to straighten out some of the difficulties between the two
factions, but they had little success.39 Sacdi secured a majority of the
twenty-seven participants at the congress. In his view, the party followed a
democratic revolutionary socialist road; it elected “ a new command
representing this trend in its majority.” And if the likes of Hazim Jawad
were named to the command, Sacdi felt their selection resulted from
pressure by military rightists in cooperation with cAflaq.40 Sacdi, however,
deemed it necessary to relinquish the post of Regional Secretary, so he
procured the election of Hamdi cAbd al-Majid to replace him.
The nine members of the new Regional Command—one more than was
specified by party statutes—included seven Sacdi supporters, including
Hani Fukayki, Sacdi himself, Abu Talib al-Hashimi, and probably Hamid
Khalkhal and Muhsin Shaykh Radi, even though the latter had been
Nine Months in Iraq 265

disciplined by the National Command.41 Jawad and cAdnan Qassab were

the two anti-Sacdists on the command.42 The congress’s resolutions were
“ an expression of the resolution of the mass of the people and the party to
proceed forward in an unhesitant way, supporting the revolution and
realizing its persistent aims of liquidation of reactionary feudalism and
enemies of the revolution,” according to press reports.43
Before turning to the final round of fighting within the 1963 Bacth
regime in Iraq, it is necessary to discuss one other major factor in Iraq
which affected the position of the regime, namely, the renewal of the
Kurdish war on June 10, 1963. The troubles in Kurdistan, which had been
going on for more than two years when Qasim was overthrown, calmed
down rapidly after the February 8th coup. Fighting had already declined to
a very low level because of cold weather and heavy winter snow in the
Kurdish mountains. On February 18, two Kurdish representatives, Jalal
Talabani and Salih Yusufi, came to Baghdad. After some discussion with
the regime, Talabani went off to Cairo later in the month at the same time
that the delegation led by Sacdi and Shabib went to congratulate Nasir on
the anniversary of forming the UAR.
The prompt appearance of Kurdish representatives in Baghdad after the
coup led to stories that the Kurds had prior knowledge of the coup of 1963
and had agreed to support it. Dana Adams Schmidt says that Ibrahim
Ahmad of the Democratic Party of Iraqi Kurdistan got in touch with Tahir
Yahya in 1962 and arranged to cooperate against Qasim. Schmidt says
that, in early 1963, Sacdi met directly with a Kurdish representative, Salih
Yusufi, and the two agreed on autonomy for the Kurds and for cooperation
in overthrowing Qasim.44 Dann adds that the Kurds agreed to let the
conspirators take refuge in Kurdish-held territory if the coup failed and that
they were to be warned of the day of the coup in advance in order to make
preparations to welcome the conspirators. But the coup was hurried
through, and the Kurds were not informed of it in advance.45
I doubt that the Bacth Party really intended to make a valid agreement
with the Kurds. Twice in the months just before the February 8th coup,
party publications commented adversely about the Kurdish movement. The
September 1962 issue of the party’s clandestine newspaper contained the
following:

The basic problem of national work in Iraq today is not the question of the
nationalist rights of the Kurds. It is getting rid of imperialist circumstances
and dictatorial government and erecting a democratic government from top
to bottom . . . which will include procuring for the Kurdish people their
nationalist ambitions and the enjoyment by the minority of its nationalist
rights. The failure to grasp this truth on the part of the leadership of the
266 THE BACTH PARTY

armed movement and of the (Kurdish Democratic) Party, because of nar­

rowness of political horizon and fanatic nationalism, on the one hand, and
because of chewing over such words as ruling nationalism and persecuted
nationalism in a time when both the Kurdish and Arab peoples are under
pressure and dictatorial government, on the other hand, has led to the
deviation of the leadership of this movement and its expulsion from the
national movement in Iraq.46

The document goes on to list a number of crimes committed by the Kurdish

Democratic Party.
The November 1962 issue of the same paper ran an article called “ The
Dangers of the Suspicious Movement in the North,’’ in which it said:

The armed movement, in spite of its opposition at the present time to

Qasim’s government, . . . cannot be considered as a part of a national
movement in Iraq opposed to imperialism and struggling to change the
present circumstances and to cause the downfall of personal
government. . . . There are suspicious connections between the leadership
of the movement and imperialist organizations, including connections be­
tween Mulla Mustafa and American agents.

Further on, the article refers to the presence of Kurdish reactionaries and
feudalists in the armed movement.47 It is plain from these articles that the
Bacth leadership had little good to say about either Mulla Mustafa or the
Kurdish Democratic Party. The contacts the Kurds had with the plotters
were primarily with such military officers as Tahir Yahya, men who were
far from being militant Bacthists. It was the Kurds’ misfortune that,
although they were suspicious of Bacthist intentions, they did not deal with
chief Bacthists and failed to get the agreement with the plotters in
writing.48
In the early weeks of the new regime, however, some regularization of
Kurdish-Arab affairs went on. Two Kurdish ministers were appointed,
neither of whom had been directly associated with the movement in the
north. These two ministers and Tahir Yahya went to meet Barzani on
March 4 and 5. A large number of Kurds arrested by Qasim’s regime were
freed on March 9, and on March 11, a general amnesty of those involved in
the Kurdish revolt was announced. What was more important was the
NCRC’s statement on March 9 favoring “ national government on the basis
of decentralization,” for the Iraqi Kurds. In commenting on this statement,
Sacdi said that “ granting the Kurds a decentralized system of government
is acknowledging a principle recognized in all modem states. . . . This
does not in any way mean secession nor does it mean delegation o f powers
on foreign, economic, or internal political matters fo r these are all within
Nine Months in Iraq 267

the competence o f the central government [italics mine].” While the Kurds
expressed optimism at these moves, at least one Kurdish spokesman noted
that “ certain Arab sources were reluctant to use the word autonomy” in
respect to Kurdistan.49
During the latter part of March, Kurdish leaders met to establish an
atmosphere of solidarity to back up the Kurdish delegation that was going
to try to negotiate a special status for the Kurds with the Baghdad
government. Once in Baghdad, the Kurds were unable to induce the
government, as a government, to talk specifically about the matters that
concerned them. They kept meeting unofficial spokesmen, because the
rulers in Baghdad were not ready to allow the Kurds any real measure of
self-government, as Sacdi’s words revealed. They were prepared only to
negotiate a subordinate status for the Kurds. Shabib said on April 14 during
the Cairo unity negotiations, “ War [with the Kurds] may break out at any
moment. The negotiations may fail.” He added that the Iraqi Army would
need only a month or so to finish off the Kurds if such a development came
to pass.50
After a month of much waiting and some meetings, including one with
Deputy Prime Minister Sacdi, the Kurdish delegation presented on April 24
a formal version of their familiar proposals for autonomy to the Baghdad
government. In sum, these proposals asked that Iraq be made a unified
state comprising two nationalities, Arabs and Kurds, with each enjoying
equal rights; that the Kurds would be allowed to exercise legislation in a
defined area including the northern provinces of Sulaymaniyah, Kirkuk,
and Arbil, and districts populated by a Kurdish majority in Mosul and
Diyalah provinces; that this region have a share in all revenues and be
represented on the twenty-man NCRC in proportion to its representation in
the population at large; and that the military forces in Kurdistan be
exclusively Kurdish, except in time of national emergency. While sweep­
ing, these proposals were not hew. More delay followed; the proposals
were not formally rejected, and the government took pains to deny in early
May that the talks had broken off. But, in fact, very little substantive
communication went on between the Baghdad government and the Kurds
over the next six weeks.51
On June 10 the NCRC issued a statement listing a large number of
crimes allegedly committed by the Kurds, including sheltering of Com­
munists, murderers, and fugitives from justice, and a number of alleged
instances of firing on Iraqi armed forces in Kurdistan. In most cases, the
Kurds were referred to as a feudal group or as secessionists.52 Sacdi held a
press conference the same day, saying that negotiations had continued
despite these incidents, that the “ government had proposed a draft law for
decentralized government but that the Kurds instead of accepting the
268 THE BACTH PARTY

government’s proposals sent a representative, Jalal Talabani, abroad to

publish a series of statements hostile to the existing revolutionary govern­
ment in Iraq.” In this conference, Sacdi is quoted as saying, “ If we review
the history of this man [Barzani] and his social background we must
conclude that he is an influential feudalist; his background is a criminal
one. . . . ” When asked whether the Barzani movement expressed the
aspirations of the Kurds, Sacdi said that the best proof that it did not was
that thousands of Kurds had asked to be allowed to fight against him.53
On the same day, June 10, units of the Iraqi army moved against
Kurdish-controlled areas to the accompaniment of public bulletins remark­
ably reminiscent of those issued by Qasim in 1961-1962. Great successes
for Iraqi arms were claimed almost daily, including the capture of the
village of Barzan and its surrounding district on August 4, an area which
Mulla Mustafa’s forces never attempted to control. The announcements of
victory were accompanied by an amnesty for Kurdish guerrillas who would
lay down their arms, an amnesty that was periodically renewed and
extended throughout the summer and fall. There were also optimistic
predictions that the war would last but a short time. A Baghdad newspaper,
for example, said on June 20 that the battle had already ended. The war
would “ be finished by winter,” according to an Iraqi general in August,
and the attack on “ the last Barzani stronghold was made on 14th
September.” 54
What, in fact, had happened was what had happened under Qasim, and
what was to happen again in future campaigns against the Kurds. That is,
the Iraqi army moved forward into those areas of Kurdistan where good
roads provided the army with the means of logistic support and where
wheeled and tracked vehicles could go, while the air force ranged unop­
posed, shooting at various targets, destroying villages, and generally
causing damage among noncombatants in the countryside. Hard-surfaced
roads that took wheeled traffic, however, were not very numerous in the
Kurdish mountains. While the Iraqi army could control provincial and most
district capitals, the vast majority of the Kurdish countryside remained in
Kurdish control, just as it had since 1961 (and as it remained through
several additional rounds of fighting and the four years following the
March 1970 cease-fire agreement). By the end of October 1963, the Iraqis
had concluded an agreement with the Syrian Bacthists whereby the Syrians
would send a brigade of Syrian troops into Iraq to assist in righting in
Mosul province, a development that further annoyed the USSR, already
opposed to the Bacth for persecuting Communists and renewing the
Kurdish war.55
It is tempting to say that the Kurdish war was a further cause of
estrangement between senior army officers and the Bacth. An argument in
Nine Months in Iraq 269

favor of such a statement would be that Baghdad and the Kurds agreed to a
cease-fire in February 1964. The Kurdish leaders may well have had closer
connections and better rapport with such leaders as Tahir Yahya than they
had with the Bacthists. But when the war broke out again in the summer of
1964, and these same leaders were in power, the Iraqi army experienced
the same lack of success. Certainly the army attacks and the NCRC
statements of June 10 were well coordinated. The Iraqi military does not
seem to have been at all hesitant to go back into action on that date. The
pride of the Iraqi army had been hurt by its earlier inability to suppress the
Kurdish rebellion, but the military leaders had not yet learned the hard
lessons of guerrilla warfare.
The basic cause of the recurrent outbreaks of hostility between Kurds
and the Baghdad government over the last decade was, and is, the Kurds’
lack of trust in the promises of any Baghdad government to deal fairly with
them. Hence the general pattern of Kurdish-govemment relations in
negotiations has been a Kurdish refusal to disarm until a central govern­
ment has fulfilled a substantial part of its bargain in regard to local
government and real autonomy. For its part, the government in Baghdad
has consistently insisted that it is the only body competent to make
decisions affecting the country. (The March 1970 agreement was made
possible because Baghdad did not demand that Barzani’s forces disarm.
Many of its provisions regarding political matters, i.e., ultimate
decision-making power, were not put into effect.)
As far as 1963 goes, I am convinced that the Bacth Party leaders in Iraq
had no intention of making a permanent agreement with Barzani. The
assessment of him and his movement published in the party paper before
the revolution when “ cooperation” was under discussion, is evidence of
the party’s attitude. It is likely that the NCRC, Bacthists and military alike,
wanted to keep the Kurds quiet until they felt settled in power and ready for
a showdown. Schmidt heads his chapter on this subject “ The Great Double
Cross,” which is a rather precise description of the party’s dealing with the
Kurds.
While the Kurdish war was absorbing the attention of the public and the
energies of the army, elections and congresses in the lower echelons of the
party took place in August in preparation for the Iraqi Regional Party
Congress, which met from September 13 to 25. Sa'di’s faction, in addition
to securing a seven-to-two majority on the Regional Command elected at
that Congress, also provided a majority of the twenty-five Iraqi delegates to
the Sixth National Congress of the party in Damascus in October. Yet each
of the Iraqi factions scored a victory in the course of that congress. Sa'di’s
joined with the extremist socialists from the Syrian and Lebanese regions to
push through a series of resolutions and decisions which, as we have seen
270 THE BACTH PARTY

in Chapter 13, substantially altered the rather mild socialism that the party
had been preaching for years. The Jawad-Shabib faction stood to gain by
the congress’s decision to expand the Regional Commands of Syria and
Iraq from eight to sixteen members, including the Regional Secretary.56
The Jawad-Shabib faction moved rapidly to exploit the opportunity
offered by the statutory expansion of the Regional Command. This faction
had little confidence that regular party elections would benefit it, because
of Sacdi’s power and perhaps because of lack of support for Jawad and
Shabib among the membership. Hence, they turned for allies to the Iraqi
military, especially to “ certain senior army officers [who] joined the Party
not from conviction.” 57 They had tried to use their military allies against
Sacdi’s faction at the September Regional Congress, without success.58 By
November, however, the military establishment had grown more annoyed
at the Bacthists, and Jawad and Shabib were willing to turn to non-Bacthist
military officers for help.59
The Jawad-Shabib faction succeeded in getting an extraordinary Re­
gional Congress convened on November 11, 1963, for the purpose of
electing the enlarged Regional Command. According to Sacdi’s faction,
half an hour after the congress began, a number of military rightists
appeared; they were not elected delegates to the congress “ and some were
not even members of the Party” ; they were carrying weapons.60 The Sacdi
faction claimed that what followed was done on the orders of cAflaq as part
of a plot leading to a takeover by the Iraqi army.61 Col. Muhammad
al-Mihdawi, Iraqi military attache in Syria, called for the election of a new
Regional Command which would exclude those who had dominated the
Sixth National Congress of the party (Sacdi’s people). The elections were
then held to the accompaniment of the rattle of weapons.62 “ The military
and civilian rightists took over the extraordinary Regional Congress of the
Party; by threat and by falsification, they appointed a rightist command for
the Party in Iraq.” 63 Five principal members of the Sacdi faction were
arrested, forcibly put on an airplane, and sent to Madrid on November 12,
with passports invalid for return to Iraq. The five, cAli Salih Sacdi, Hamdi
cAbd al-Majid, Muhsin Shaykh Radi, Hani Fukayki, and Abu Talib
al-Hashimi arrived in Madrid on November 12 with only the clothes they
were wearing.
The newly elected command published a statement on the morning of
November 13 which identified all its members—something unusual in
Bacth Party practice—and called upon the masses of the people, the
workers, the peasants, the intelligentsia, the armed forces, and all loyal
citizens to protect the socialist revolution from imperialist and reactionary
dangers. Of its sixteen members, six were military men, Ahmad Hasan
Bakr, Tahir Yahya, cAbd al-Sattar cAbd al-Latif, Muhammad Mihdawi,
Nine Months in Iraq 271

Salih Mahdi cAmmash, and Mundhir Wandawi. The other ten were Hazim
Jawad, Talib Shabib, Salim Sultan, cAli cAbd al-Karim, cAbd al-Sattar
Duri, Karim Shantaf, Tariq cAziz, Fa’iq Bazzaz, Hassan Hajj Waddai and
Fu’ad Shakir Mustafa.64
Of these sixteen, Wandawi was the chief Sacdi partisan. He still had
connections with the National Guard and, together with its formal com­
manders, influenced large numbers of guardsmen to demonstrate and riot
on November 13 in favor of Sacdi and his faction. He also piloted a plane in
a raid on the presidential palace. Bakr and cAmmash appealed to the
National Guard and others not to shed blood. They imposed a curfew on
the 13th. On the same day, the Baghdad branch of the party, terming itself
the highest legally elected body of the Bacth Party in Iraq, rejected the new
Regional Command as illegal owing to the manner of its election, and,
prompted by National Command members (Bakr and cAmmash were in
Baghdad), asked the National Command to take over control of Bacth
affairs in Iraq and to settle the party’s crisis.65
Secretary General cAflaq and two Syrian members of the National
Command, Amin al-Hafiz and Salah Jadid, as well as Minister of Union
Affairs cAbd al-Khaliq Naqshabandi, had come to Baghdad the evening of
November 13. Lebanese National Command members Jibran Majdalani
and Khalid al-cAli also came.66 They promptly deported Shabib, Jawad,
Tariq cAziz, Muhammad Mihdawi, and Midhat Ibrahim Jumcah, all of
whom arrived in Beirut on November 14, together with a couple of military
officers. The eight National Command members in Baghdad—three Iraqis
were in Spain and Munif Razzaz and Abu Mayzar were under political
restraint and unable to travel—issued a statement including the following
decisions:

(1) to consider the Regional Congress held in Baghdad on November 11 as

illegal and to dissolve the Regional Command- which it elected; (2) to
dissolve the Regional Command which was in power when the congress was
held; (3) to invest the National Command with all prerogatives of the
Regional Command of Iraq; (4) to investigate mistakes . . . ; (5) to restrict
the power of passing sentences on Iraqi Party members to the National
Command; (6) to hold Party elections in the Iraqi Region and to hold a
Regional Congress for the election of a new -Regional Command within a
period of four months.67

Sacdi’s faction initially viewed the expulsion of Jawad, Shabib, and

their associates with favor and acted as if they believed it gave them an
opportunity to regain control in Iraq. Regional Secretary Hamdi cAbd
al-Majid left Spain and went to Damascus on November 15 or 16, seeking
support. One of the four Syrian members of the National Command,
272 THE BACTH PARTY

Hammud al-Shufi, had refused to accompany cAfiaq to Damascus on

November 13, but eventually was persuaded to come when the Baghdad
Branch Command placed Iraq’s affairs in the hands of the National
Command as a unit and not in cAflaq’s hands individually.68 The members
of the National Command in Baghdad, namely the Syrians, cAflaq, Hafiz,
Jadid, and Shufi, the Lebanese Majdalani and cAli, plus Bakr and
’Ammash argued and discussed matters from November 14 to 17. The
Bacthist leaders would not agree to demands of the Iraqi generals to abolish
the National Guard. Syrian General Amin al-Hafiz made this point very
clear in a news conference after he returned to Damascus on November 21,
in which he said that cArif had his own point of view, but “ I personally
think the National Guard is a great power. It is formed mostly of good
Bacthist elements. . . .” 69
On November 17, the cabinet posts of five deported ministers from the
two factions were handed over to five acting ministers to the accompani­
ment of reports in the Middle East press that the Iraqi army was becoming
restless at the impasse between the Bacthists and the military leaders.
Action followed rumor quickly in this case. On the morning of November
18, army units rolled into Baghdad in response to an order by Field
Marshal cArif, President of the Republic and Commander in Chief of the
Armed Forces, to “ assume full control of the capital . . . and to crush all
resistance seeking to oppose the regime and harm the interests of the people
and the state.” The second paragraph o f cArif’s proclamation announced
that the National Guard was to be dissolved immediately, that every
member of the National Guard was to surrender his arms, ammunition, and
equipment to the nearest army unit or to be considered a traitor who could
be executed on the spot. It took the army most of the day to establish
control in Baghdad, but by late afternoon the situation was well in hand.70
From Hafiz’ explanation of events after he returned to Damascus, it
appears that the National Command members thought they had an agree­
ment with cArif to “ correct the deviations of certain elements in the
National Guard,” which they interpreted to mean arresting and cleaning
out the partisans of Sacdi and perhaps some of those responsible for
particular atrocities.71 In the news conference cited above, Hafiz said,
“ We were surprised on November 18 by unexpected activities on the part
of Bacthist military elements who had been among the heroes of the 14th of
Ramadan [the February 8 revolution]. . . . The movement of November 18
was made in the name of cAbd al-Salam cArif. In his statement he used the
expression ’non-national guard’ . . . my [Hafiz’] point of view which was
that the National Guard was national and included genuine and sound Arab
nationalist elements . . . but that . . . certain of its leaders had made
mistakes that had led to what happened.” 72 Hafiz went on to say that he
Nine Months in Iraq 273

and his associates from outside Iraq had nothing to do with the army moves
against the National Guard and in fact were not even consulted. He said
“ We tried to get in touch with them [the Iraqi military leaders] in order to
assist them in putting an end to the fight but we could not reach them
because the situation was very critical. . . . We wanted to go back to
Damascus at 2 p.m. but the pilots were in the city and we could not get out
of Baghdad.” 73
cArif and his associates promptly restructured the NCRC to consist
entirely of military officers. Of the eleven senior officers who were
statutory members of the NCRC, only Ahmad Hasan Bakr and Air Force
Commander Hardan cAbd al-Ghaffar Tikriti could be considered com­
mitted Bacthists. Chief of Staff Tahir Yahya was a member but, as
subsequent events were to show, his loyalty to the party was distinctly
secondary to his loyalty to cArif and to his own ambitions. Much the same
can be said of Military Governor General Rashid Muslih. The cabinet
appointed on November 20 was constituted pretty much the same way. It
included five or six Bacthists, including the above-mentioned Yahya,
Tikriti, and Muslih, plus Ahmad al-Juwari and cIzzat Mustafa as Ministers
of Education and Health. Bakr was given the post of Vice-President.
Although Hafiz tried to put the best face he could on these developments in
his November 21 news conference by stressing the importance of the posts
held by the Bacthists, he had to admit that most of the ministers were
non-Bacthists. No matter what appearances may have been, Bacthist rule in
Iraq was finished. cArif and his associates had moved decisively to exploit
the dislike within the military for the National Guard,, and they were in
control of the situation. They tolerated the presence of these few Bacthists
only for a relatively short time. Bakr’s job was abolished on January 4,
1964; Juwari and Mustafa were replaced at the end of January and returned
to their respective posts in the Ministry of Health and Baghdad University;
Tikriti was packed off to be Iraqi ambassador to Sweden in March; and
Yahya and Muslih abandoned their party connections and threw in their lot
with cArif and his regime.
The cArif regime moved swiftly against the National Guard and, after
the fighting of the first day, experienced very little difficulty in taking care
of it. Deprived of the support of powerful patrons in the party, the National
Guardsmen had little choice but to turn in their arms or, as they were
graciously permitted by a subsequent decree, to have those arms taken to
military centers by their relatives, should they fear to go there in person
themselves. A substantial number were eventually arraigned on charges of
opposing the movement of November 18th. Former National Guard Com­
mander Wandawi was charged not only with armed revolt, but also with
destruction of government property, including five expensive jet aircraft,
274 THE BACTH PARTY

which he had shot up, and the president’s office which he had damaged. He
and a number of other National Guardsmen fled to Syria, however, long
before the trials were held in the summer of 1964.
The events of November 11-18 dealt a severe blow to the Bacth
organization in Iraq. Once again, the regional leadership of the party had
been virtually wiped out. The National Command did not wish the
Sacdi-dominated Regional Command elected in September to resume its
functions after November 14. cAflaq and some of his associates on the
National Command had come to dislike Sacdi’s independent method of
operating, which contravened party rules and paid scant deference to
cAflaq’s views. They also were opposed to Sacdi’s extreme socialist
concepts. For their part, Jawad, Shabib, and their associates had handled
an attempt at grabbing power clumsily. cAflaq tried to reconstitute a
command during the turbulent week in November, but failed. After the
Seventh National Congress of the party in February 1964, the National
Command appointed a Provisional Regional Command, which “ consisted
of members known for their experience in struggle and their lack of
involvement in the setback or in the personal enmities causing it.” 74 Its
Regional Secretary was Saddam Husayn Tikriti.
The question of what had gone wrong in Iraq was the subject of
considerable examination and discussion in the months that followed. A
study entitled “ An Attempt to Explain the Present Crisis and to Assess the
Party’s Experiences in Iraq” was presented to the Extraordinary Syrian
Regional Congress of the party held early in February 1964.75 The
document laid the principal blame for the debacle in Iraq on the formation
of blocs around individuals, which developed into a cult of personality. It
said that ideological disputes were sometimes used to hide personal
conflicts, that the formation of blocs around particular members tended to
elevate men of inferior stature to party commands, and that the existence of
blocs impeded criticism and self-criticism.76 The document also criticized
the Iraqi Regional Command for defying the National Command’s wishes.
It scored the actions of the National Guard, its atrocities, its interference
with administration, and general obnoxiousness. Finally, it said that some
party leaders did not comprehend the transitional nature of the alliance they
had made with the army in order to oust Qasim.77 cAflaq was almost as
critical of Hazim Jawad for being involved with the military in Iraq as he
was of Sacdi’s actions. Sacdi tried to defend himself against these charges,
claiming that he had warned the Iraqi Regional Command of much of the
trouble they were getting, into and even admitted his error in bringing only
senior officers into the National Council.78 His arguments were to no avail.
The new National Command elected at the Seventh (and Extraordinary)
Nine Months in Iraq 275

National Congress of the party in February 1964 expelled Sacdi, Hamdi

cAbd al-Majid, and Muhsin Shaykh Radi from the party on March 2, 1964.
Sacdi responded in two ways. He and his associates charged that thé
Seventh National Congress was. illegal and proceeded to draw up the
document, cited frequently in this chapter, which they published under the
title of “ The Crisis of the Arab Socialist Resurrection Party Stemming
from Its Experiences in Iraq.” In addition to being an apologia, the
document is a slashing personal attack on Michel cAflaq.( Sacdi accused
cAflaq of manufacturing a plot to turn the Bacth Party in Iraq over to
right-wing militarists in the Iraqi army. He also accused the Secretary
General of being interested only in having a government called Bacthist for
which “ his” party would get the glory, regardless of what type of social
system this “ Bacthist” regime presided over.79
Even though he had been expelled from the party, Sacdi tried, through
those of his adherents who remained in Iraq, to retain control of as much of
the party apparatus as he could. His people established a “ Committee for
Regional Organization,” which issued pamphlets and tried to portray itself
as the official party organization. The National Command of the party did
not recognize this committee because “ those who imposed their leadership
on this committee have contributed to the Party’s setback in Iraq. The
committee emanated from an illegal meeting held under abnormal condi­
tions; only one-fourth of the quorum was present.” 80 Like other offshoots
of the party before it, Sacdi’s organization withered and died in a fairly
short time.
The party in Iraq made one effort to unseat cArif in September 1964.
This effort appears to have been organized and run by cAbd al-Karim
Nasrat, who had been fired from his divisional commander’s post shortly
after cArif took power. The key element of the plot was to have been half a
dozen fighter pilots of the Iraqi Air Force, who were going to shoot down
cA rif s plane after he took off from Baghdad Airport enroute to Cairo to
attend the second summit meeting of Arab heads of state. The plan was
betrayed by one of the pilots, who was not a Bacthist but was working for
cA rifs secret police. Five Iraqi Air Force pilots were rounded up and
executed. Nasrat, Col. Ahmad al-Jabburi, and former Prime Minister Bakr
were put into jail.81
Apart from this effort, the party in Iraq returned to the state of
clandestinity that had been its customary lot. From time to time it received
the unwelcome attentions of the Iraqi security forces. In 1965, Bacthists
accused of the September 1964 attempt o n cArif’s life were brought to trial.
A few Iraqi Bacthists found employment in Syria. Saddam Tikriti and his
comrades quietly planned for the day when they could avenge the events of
276 THE BACTH PARTY

November 1963. (They succeeded, again in cooperation with non-Bacth

army elements, in July 1968. Profiting from past experience, they
promptly got rid of those cooperating elements in a follow-up coup a
fortnight later.)
The nine months of Bacthist rule had little constructive impact on Iraq.
The party leadership was divided in outlook, preoccupied with internal
squabbles, fearful of accepting other Iraqis as partners, and incompetent in
the art of governing. No laws of importance were passed, nor any reforms
of consequence. In a sense, cA rif s regime was the successor to Qasim’s;
the Bacth interlude was, as it were, a preliminary act that almost everyone
forgot when the main attraction came on. But that interlude, with its
strong-arm repression of the Communists and the institutionalized violence
of the National Guard, contributed to the cycle of political murder and
repressive government now evident in the 1970s.

Notes
1. Jibran Majdalani, “ The Baath Experience in Iraq,’’ Middle East Forum,
Vol. 41, No. 2, Autumn, 1965, p. 44.
2. Twenty-five Iraqis were executed at Baquba on March 11 and eleven others
on May 25 for resisting the February revolution; twenty-eight persons were
executed on June 23 for participation in the 1959 Kirkuk killings, eleven more in
Mosul in early July for acts committed at the time of Shawwaf s rebellion in 1959,
and twenty-one more at the end of the month for an attempt against the government
early in July. St t Middle East Journal “ Chronology,” Vol. 17, Nos. 1-4, pp.
116, 297-98, and 425-26; hereafter cited as MEJ.
3. Pravda of Feb. 15, 1963, quoted in MEJ, “ Chronology,” Vol. 17, Nos. 1
and 2, p. 115. See also Oies M. Smolansky, The Soviet Union and the Arab East
Under Khrushchev (Lewisburg, Pa.: Bucknell University Press, 1974), pp. 227 ff.,
for detail on the USSR’s reaction to the Bacthist actions.
4. Quoted in Mid-East Mirror, March 2, 1963, p. 10; hereafter cited as MEM.
5. Ibid.
6. cAflaq recalled this reprimand in a statement he made at an Extraordinary
Regional Congress in Syria the following year. Arab Political Documents 1964,
p. 26.
7. See, for example, BBC Tri-partite Talks, ME/1306/E/11.
8. Al-Bacth, March 12, 1963. Sa°di later complained that his colleagues refused
to reprint this interview in Iraq, even though it had appeared in the party’s own
newspaper. Majid Khadduri, Republican Iraq (London: Oxford University Press,
1969), p. 199, expresses the view that Sacdi, seeing affairs get out of hand, was
trying to halt excesses against Communists.
9. MEM, May 25, 1963, p. 16, reports the trial of these men.
Nine Months in Iraq 277

10. MEM, March 16, 1963, p. 11.

11. Baghdad Radio, July 22, 1963.
12. Majdalani, “ The Baath Experience,” p. 45.
13. In Problems o f Peace and Socialism, Vol. 6, No. 11, November 1963, p.
34. There were many criticisms of Iraq in Soviet publications in this period.
14. Ibid., p. 37.
15. Ibid., p. 39.
16. Ibid., p. 40.
17. Ironically, cAziz al-Hajj himself broke with the Communist Party of Iraq in
September 1967, and in 1969 made his peace with the Bacthist regime ruling in
Iraq.
18. BBC, Tri-partite Talks, ME/1306/E/1. Uriel Dann, Iraq Under Qassem
(New York: Praeger, 1969), p. 362, says that the ANM and the Bacth parted
company in June 1961.
19. Nasir referred to him as “ the man of pleasures,” a gibe greeted with
applause, in his speech of July 22, 1963, broadcast on Radio Cairo.
20. Azmat al-Bacth al-eArabi al Ishtiraki min Khilal Tajribatihi fi al-cIraq (The
Crisis o f the Arab Socialist Resurrection Party Resulting from Its Experience in
Iraq (Beirut: Dar al-Shacb, 1964), pp. 92-93.
21. The Military Bureau is the name given to a group of officers appointed by
cAflaq following the crisis of November 1963 which tore the Regional Command
apart (Azmah, pp. 119-20). It seems likely that a group with a similar name,
composed of the principal Bacthist military officers, existed prior to the February
coup and during 1963.
22. Baghdad Radio, April 4, 1963.
23. Khadduri, Republican Iraq, p. 197. Khadduri does not give the twentieth
name; it is possible that the post was not filled. Except for the first three, the NCRC
members were Bacthists of some standing.
24. Arab Political Documents 1964, p. 36, and Azmah, pp. 58-59.
25. Azmah, p. 29.
26. Ibid., pp. 57-58. Sa'di’s views in respect to the army are very similar to
those of Munif Razzaz, al-Tajribah al-Murrah (The Bitter Experience) (Beirut: Dar
Ghandur, 1967), pp. 36-39. Both wrote after leaving office and the party. In early
1963, neither was aware of the entanglements into which association with military
Ba'thists was going to lead the party.
27. Dann, Iraq Under Qassem, p. 367. It is more correctly the Nationalist
Guard.
28. Jerusalem Radio, Feb. 17, 1963, citing al-Hayah of Beirut.
29. Iraqi News Agency Bulletin No. 44, Feb. 18, 1963.
30. Chronology o f Arab Politics 1963, p. 105. Later Sa'di claimed that
110,000 persons were enrolled in party-controlled organizations in 1963 (Arab
Political Documents 1964, p. 34).
31. Chronology o f Arab Politics 1963, p. 104.
32. Ibid., pp. 105 and 107.
33. Baghdad Radio, Sept. 13, 1963. Wandawi repeated this statement on
Oct. 8.
34. Chronology o f Arab Politics 1963, p. 322.
35. Azmah, p. 60.
36. Arab Political Documents 1964, pp. 23, 28, and 30.
37. Azmah, p. 65.
278 THE BACTH PARTY

38. Ibid., p. 64.

39. Arab Political Documents 1964, pp. 28-29.
40. Azmah, p. 65.
41. Arab Political Documents 1964, p. 36.
42. Ibid., pp. 33-36, and Azmah, p. 65. This much of the Command’s
composition has been reconstructed from references in several sources.
43. Jerusalem Post, Sept. 27, 1963, quoting a Reuters dispatch. Substantially
the same message was carried on Baghdad Radio on September 26.
44. Dana Adams Schmidt, Journey Among Brave Men (Boston: Little, Brown
and Company, 1964), pp. 249-50. Ismet Cheriff Vanly, Le Kurdistan Irakien
Entité Nationale: Etude de la Revolution 1961 (Neuchâtel; Editions de la
Baconnière, 1970), pp. 174-75, refers to the first meeting but not the second. I am
dubious that a meaningful Sa'di-Yusufi discussion took place.
45. Dann, Iraq Under Qassem, pp. 344-45.
46. Nidal VII, pp. 306-7. This article, pp. 305-8, is one of several articles
from the September 1962 issue of al-Ishtiraki reprinted in this volume.
47. Nidal VII, p. 322. The article, on pp. 322-24, is the last in this volume
prior to the February revolution which mentions the Kurdish issue.
48. Vanly, Le Kurdistan Irakienne, p. 176.
49. MEM, March 16, 1963, pp. 14-15.
50. BBC, Tri-partite Talks, ME/1343/E/7.
51. See Schmidt, Journey, pp. 244-65, for a detailed discussion of this from
the Kurdish side. See also Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp. 268-72 and Vanly, Le
Kurdistan Irakienne, pp. 178-94.
52. Arab Political Documents 1963, pp. 285-88.
53. Ibid., pp. 288-90. Talabani had gone to Cairo in May where the Egyptians
received him and where the Kurdish side of the problem began to get sympathetic
press treatment. The April 17 Unity agreement was well on the way to collapse by
this time.
54. These representative statements were carried on Baghdad Radio, June 20,
in MEM, Aug. 24, p. 10, and MEM, Sept. 21, 1963 p. 17, respectively.
55. Pravda, Oct. 7, 1963, cited in Mizan, Vol. 5, No. 9, October 1963, p. 16.
See also Smolansky, The Soviet Union, pp. 234-39.
56. Arab Political Documents 1963, pp. 450-51. Art. XXXVIII of the revised
Internal Statutes.
57. Ibid. 1964, p. 25. The phrase describes those with whom the party as a
whole made an alliance to overthrow Qasim, but it also applies to those who helped
Jawad and Shabib in early November.
58. Ibid., p. 29.
59. The principal sources for the discussion of these events are, from the
National Command side, a party analysis of the experience in Iraq (ibid., pp.
19-25), 'Aflaq’s remarks on the same subject made at the Extraordinary Syrian
Regional Congress of February 1964 (ibid., pp. 25-32). From Sa'di’s side, there
are his reply to cAflaq (ibid., pp. 33-37) and the relevant portions of Azmah, which
is an apologia for his actions in Iraq. Other actors have made statements, e.g.,
Amin al-Hafiz and cAbd al-Salam cArif, but the Jawad-Shabib faction has not made
a presentation of its position, which has to be reconstructed from sources that are
not entirely unbiased. See also an Internal Circular on the Congress, cAbr
Mu’tamaratihi, pp. 255-74.
60. Azmah, p. 115.
Nine Months in Iraq 279

61. Ibid., pp. 61 and 115; also Arab Political Documents 1964, p. 36.
62. Azmah, p. 115.
63. Ibid., p. 60.
64. The statement was broadcast over Baghdad Radio on November 13. It is in
Arab Political Documents 1963, p. 470, reprinted from al-Kifah (Beirut), Nov. 14,
1963.
65. Baghdad Radio, Nov. 14, 1963.
66. Ibid., Nov. 13, 1963;’see also al-Jaridah, Nov. 20, 1970.
67. Al-Bacth, Nov. 15, 1963; also in Arab Political Documents 1963, pp.
471-72.
68. Azmah, p. 117.
69. Arab Political Documents 1963; p. 481. The National Command’s analysis
of the experience in Iraq severely criticized the conduct of the Guard in Iraq, but
ended its critique by saying, “ This does not mean that the National Guard should
have been disbanded. It only means that the Guard should have been organized to
serve the Party’s interests and to shun anything which did not lead to this.’’ Ibid.,
1964, p. 24.
70. New York Times, Nov. 19, 1963.
71. Arab Political Documents 1963, p. 479.
72. Ibid.
73. Ibid., pp. 481-82. Sacdi says, Azmah, p. 49, that cAflaq appointed a
command at this point, which included some military rightists on it. If so, it did not
last long. On p. 120 Azmah lists some of these rightists in the Military Bureau-
—Tahir Yahya, Hardan Tikriti, Rashid Muslih—and that they used ostensible Party
sanction to carry out the November 18 move.
74. Radio Damascus, April 4, 1964. Saddam Tikriti’s appointment is noted in
Azmah, p. 124.
75. See note 59 above.
76. Arab Political Documents 1964, pp. 21-22.
77. Ibid., pp. 22-25.
78. Ibid., p. 33.
79. Azmah, p. 49.
80. Damascus Radio, April 4, 1964.
81. New York Times, Sept. 23, 1964; Time, Oct. 2, 1964.
 - 16 -

Military Ascendancy in Syria

With the formation of a new government headed by Bitar on May 13,

1963, the Bacth regime ended any pretense of cooperation with other
organized civilian political forces in Syria. The new cabinet was composed
half of Bacthists and half of non-political technicians or independents who
were not affiliated with any particular political group. The only person in
the cabinet who had been prominent as a member of a non-Bacth unionist
group was Sami al-Jundi. A former party member, he was already on his
way back to the fold; less than a year later he was elected a member of the
Syrian Regional Command.
The situation in the military sector was different, however. The transfer
and retirement of forty-odd officers had been only a first step on the part of
the Bacth Military Organization in eliminating contenders for power. Of
the fairly large number of pro-Nasir officers in the Syrian Army, Ziyad
Hariri, in particular, had considerable strength. The originator and ex­
ecutor of the coup of March 8, he was a potential source of trouble to the
Military Organization.1 Lu’ayy Atasi was more a figurehead than a power
to be dealt with.
In June 1964, Hariri went to Algeria as a member of a government and
people’s delegation, headed by Prime Minister Bitar, which included a
number of prominent civilian Bacthists—cAflaq, Jamal Atasi, Shibli
cAysami, and Sami Durubi. The delegation’s official purpose was to
promote unity among “ the Arab countries with a similar system of
government and revolution.” 2 The delegation’s trip served to get Hariri out
of the way while the organization strengthened its position. The day after
the delegation reached Algiers, Hafiz, with the backing of the majority of
the NCRC, summoned the commanding officer of the 70th brigade and
many of his officers to army headquarters.3 (Whether he was acting with
the foreknowledge of cAflaq, Bitar, and other civilians is not clear.) There
the officers learned that ten of them were to be retired and twenty were to
be assigned to the diplomatic service. The way for this move had been
smoothed by a recent regulation issued by the NCRC which established
282 THE BACTH PARTY

equivalent grade and pay between the military and civilian sectors of the
Syrian government.4 Muhammad cUmran, a founder of the Military
Organization, took over command of the 70th Brigade.5
When Hariri returned to Damascus on June 25, as soon as the official
visit to Algiers was over, the NCRC tried to persuade him to accept the
post of military attache in the Syrian Embassy in Washington. But Hariri
had come back to rally his forces, not to submit meekly.6 (Most of the rest
of the delegation returned with him; significantly, however, Jamal Atasi
and Sami Durubi, already unhappy with the manner in which the regime
was excluding non-Bacthists from the government, stayed in Algiers for a
considerable time.) Hariri’s return opened a tense fortnight, as each side
maneuvered for position. The Bacthist officers did not completely domi­
nate the Syrian military establishment at this point. Through Hafiz al-Asad
they had control of the Syrian Air Force, and through other officers perhaps
half of the ground units, an important element in the balance of power in
the army. It is by no means certain that they could have called upon all of
them in a showdown. In order to bolster their position, the Bacthist leaders
announced the formation of a National Guard on June 30, placing it under
the command of Military Organization member Hamad cUbayd. Aware of
the potential trouble such an organization could cause, cUbayd made it
clear from the very first that the National Guard would benefit both from
the experiences and the mistakes of its counterpart in Baghdad, i.e., it
would remain under the army’s control.7 In his capacity as Minister of
Interior, Amin al-Hafiz made an extensive change, involving some sixty
people, in the police and security forces on July l . 8
By these moves and by careful maneuvering in the officer corps, the
Bacth Military Organization finally gained the upper hand by the end of the
first week in July. Hariri was under house arrest for a day or two and then
left for Paris on July 8, accompanied by two of his chief supporters. After
his departure, he dropped out of Syrian political life. Two days later Amin
al-Hafiz was promoted to Major General and appointed Chief of Staff and
Acting Defense Minister, in addition to the posts he already held as Deputy
Prime Minister, Minister of Interior, Military Governor, and member of
the NCRC.9 With Hariri and his supporters out of the way, the regime was
able to weather the Egyptian-backed attempt to topple it on July 18, which
has been discussed in Chapter 14. Although it was still not without
enemies, the Bacth Military Organization completed its control over the
Syrian military establishment when Lu’ayy Atasi resigned on July 27, and
was replaced by Amin al-Hafiz as commander of the armed forces and
president of the NCRC.10 In a cabinet change a week later, Hafiz lost his
two cabinet ministries but retained all his military posts, as well as his
position as head of the NCRC.
Military Ascendancy in Syria 283

The central theme of the remainder of this chapter is the conflict among
several factions within the Bacth. Of the civilian factions the most visible
was one I call the old guard—cAflaq, Bitar, Shibli cAysami, Jamal Atasi,
cAbd al-Rahman Mardini, Fahmi cAshuri, and other long-standing as­
sociates and followers of the party founders. Although this group stands
out because cAflaq and Bitar had been identified for so many years as the
leaders of the Bacth Party, it actually comprised a very small number of
people.11 It became smaller still when cAbd al-Karim Zuhur dropped out in
the spring of 1963, followed by Jamal Atasi and Sami Durubi, all in protest
at the exclusion of other unionist political forces from government in
Syria.12
A second group was the “ Marxist” faction represented by Hammud
al-Shufi, Muhammad Nawfal, Ahmad Abu Salih, and Yasin al-Hafiz. This
faction was pushing for an immediate application of fairly extreme socialist
measures, although it shared the pan-Arab goals of the old guard. It had the
support of substantial elements in other regions, particularly in Iraq and
Lebanon. A third faction were the regionalists (qutriyun), whose political
horizon was essentially that of the existing state of Syria. Symbolized by
Nur al-Din Atasi, Ibrahim Makhus, and Yusuf Zucayyin, this faction gave
lip service to unity, but in practice placed this goal very low on its scale of
values.
The second and third factions shared some attitudes. Both felt that the
old guard had outlived its usefulness. The membership of both groups
comprised newer elements in the party who had entered it in the early
1950s. Virtually all of the principal spokesmen were under thirty-five years
of age in 1963. They felt very strongly that the old leadership had
discredited itself by dissolving the party in the Syrian Region in 1958 and
by the consequences of the dissolution. In their eyes, of all the old leaders,
Bitar had fallen the lowest. He had not only participated in the party’s
dissolution for the sake of forming the UAR, but also signed a document
supporting the secession from the UAR. Thus, he was a particular target
not only of the regionalists for having wrecked the party in Syria, but also
of the unionists for having abandoned unity.13 A small fourth faction, the
Socialist Unionists, was represented by Sami al-Jundi and Sami Sufan; the
former made his peace for a time with cAflaq and Bitar. There were a large
number of unaffiliated ex-Bacthists; most of those who had been members
of the party at the time of dissolution in 1958 were not associated with any
of the factions described above.14
The Bacth Military Organization’s members had a great deal in common
with the regionalist faction. As a group, they were anti-Nasir; they wanted
to get rid of cAflaq, Bitar, and Hawrani (the latter, of course, had already
gone); and they were interested in running Syria, not taking second place in
284 THE BACTH PARTY

a larger unified state. Despite these common grounds, there were extensive
frictions within the Military Organization, frictions which became more
prominent as time went by. Hafiz’ meteoric rise between March and
November 1963 from Syrian military attache in Argentina to quasi-dictator
of Syria (when he became Prime Minister, in addition to most of his
military posts) naturally aroused jealousy. His strength was based on
personal appeal and on the aura of authority he built up by taking to himself
the half-dozen senior posts in the government. Muhammad cUmran, an
cAlawi, had great personal ambition and headed a faction of officers. So
did Salah Jadid, another cAlawi and a co-founder of the Military Organiza­
tion.
By the turn of the year 1963-1964, factions within the Military
Organization were already well developed. By that time, the Military
Organization was clearly dominant over the civilian wing. The Provisional
Regional Commànd appointed by the Fifth National Congress in the
summer of 1962, composed entirely of civilians, had set about reorganiz­
ing the party, but its structure was still very weak in March 1963.15 There
was much argument as to who would be allowed to return to the party fold.
Those who first gained control of organizational posts were in a good
position to admit those they trusted and to exclude those they did not trust.
The regionalists were most efficient at this game. Evidence of this
efficiency was discovered in documents found in Qunaytira after the Six
Day War of June 1967. Ben Tsur cites an organizational report of 1965 and
a speech by cAflaq at the National Command meeting of December 1965 as
sources for the following: “ By such means [admitting new members of its
own choosing—author], and by the skillful use of rules and regulations, the
new apparatus quickly succeeded in ousting from party headquarters and
frjm various branches the supporters of the old guard and of the all-Arab
leadership, and in consolidating itself more strongly on regionalist
lines.” 16 These maneuvers were to be very advantageous when party
election time came around.
Several months after the March 8th revolution, Bacth leaders on both
the civilian and military sides agreed to end the system of having separate
commands for the Military Organization and for the civilian Bacth organi­
zation in Syria. To end this double leadership, party elections at lower
organizational levels were held and representatives chosen for a Regional
Congress (the first since before the formation of the UAR), which met for a
week ending September 16, 1963.17 The Regional Command elected at
this congress reflected the new forces within the Syrian Region of the
Bacth. Its eight members included three from the military organization
—Hafiz al-Asad, Hamad cUbayd, and Muhammad Rabah Tawil. The five
civilians were Regional Secretary Nur al-Din Atasi, later to become
Military Ascendancy in Syria 285

prominent as a regionalist willing to work on behalf of the military, and

eventually to become chief of state, and four members of the Marxist
faction, namely, Hammud al-Shufi, Khalid al-Hakim, Muhammad
Nawfal, and Ahmad Abu Salih.18 Although relatively unknown at the
time, all of these men had been active in the reconstruction of the party.
Khalid al-Hakim was, as mentioned earlier, the first and only real worker
to sit on a Regional Command in any region. Both Shufi and Abu Salih
were members of the NCRC.
The new forces so successfully dominated this congress that they were
able to exclude Salah Bitar from the' Regional Command, although he had
been a member of the now-dissolved Provisional Command, a member of
the NCRC and Prime Minister, and a founder of the party. The Syrian
delegation to the Sixth National Congress of the party in October reflected
the same forces. These Syrians teamed up with allies from the Lebanese
Region and with the Sacdi faction from the Iraqi Region to deny Bitar
membership in the National Command.19 He left the prime ministership in
November. Early in 1964 the Regional Command expelled him from the
party, but cAflaq got him reinstated when a new National Command was
elected a few weeks later. Bitar said nothing publicly about these snubs. He
went off to Africa to represent Syria at one or two independence celebra­
tions. Though he was to be prime minister of Syria twice more, he was
never again elected to any office in the party he had helped found.
In a very real sense, Bitar’s personal failure and loss at these two
congresses symbolized what was happening to the Bacth Party at the time.
He belonged to an older generation; his formative years had been far
different than those of the regionalists and Marxists; he was, even in the
1950s, a cautious man, given to working slowly, and afraid of the
instability that might be caused by precipitous moves.20 Razzaz, a contem­
porary of Bitar, notes his caution and several times stresses Bitar’s lack of
awareness of his unpopularity with the party cadres.21 In sum, the Syrian
political world had left Salah al-Din Bitar behind. Though dedicated to the
resurrection of Arab society and to Arab unity, in many ways his outlook
was much the same as that of the Syrian politicans of the 1940s and 1950s
whom the Bacth’s own ideology had helped to replace. This similarity of
outlook explains, in large measure, why he signed the document support­
ing secession in October 1961 and ran for parliament under the secession
regime.
The Regional Congress of September 1963 took a long step toward
putting the Syrian Bacth solidly in the hands of the Military Organization.
The party leaders had not established clear lines of association between
themselves and the Military Organization after the March 8th coup. Misled
by the fact that the Military Organization people were Bacthists, and
286 THE BACTH PARTY

misjudging their own support among the party cadres, the leaders had let
matters drift.22 At the September Regional Congress they compounded this
error by joining the Military Organization’s command to the Regional
Party command. In this way, the principal Bacthist officers obtained
authority to supervise the civilian organization through their positions on
the Regional Command, but no civilians were given comparable authority
in respect to the Military Organization. It remained autonomous, subject
only to the directions of its own leaders. Even the Secretary General of the
party was excluded from its meetings. These serious errors “ . . . could
only mean turning over the Party to the Military Organization to direct and
organize as it pleased.” 23
Military domination was signified by a cabinet change, which took
place shortly after the conclusion of the Sixth National Congress. Bitar had
stayed on as Prime Minister through that meeting and then resigned. Amin
al-Hafiz formed a new government with Muhammad cUmran as Deputy
Prime Minister. Hafiz retained all his other positions except that of Chief of
Staff, which was taken over by Salih Jadid. The cabinet, as before,
consisted of about half Bacthists and half non-political figures. The
regionalists had three strong representatives, Nur al-Din Atasi, Ibrahim
Makhus, and Yusuf Zucayyin, among the Bacthists. Abu Salih represented
the Marxist group, and cAysami, A trash, and Naqshabandi the old guard.
Another of the old guard who had been in Bitar’s cabinet, Shakir Fahham,
was shunted aside into a non-political job of director of the Arab League
Manuscripts Institute.24 The militarists had also made progress in the
national party organization. After Hafiz and Jadid were named to the new
National Command, as well as the two Iraqi generals, Bakr and cAmmash,
one-third of the seats on the National Command were held by military
officers, a development unique in the Bacth’s history.
The Regional and National Party meetings, the change of government,
and the subsequent Iraqi troubles took up much of the party leaders’ time in
the fall of 1963. Then, in December, Nasir called for a summit conference
of heads of Arab states to be held early in 1964 with the aim of
coordinating Arab action against Israel’s proposed diversion of Jordan
River water. Hafiz attended the meeting, accompanied by Bitar and Fahd
Shacir, but not by any senior party members. The summit conference did
little to improve relations between Nasir and the Bacth Party, although
polemics were avoided.
While the Iraqi affair was a great blow to the party, it afforded party
leaders in Syria, both regionalists and military, a chance to get rid of a
troublesome element. The mechanism they used was a Syrian Regional
Congress, which had to be convened, to conform to the requirement that
the Syrian Regional Command be enlarged to sixteen members, as
Military Ascendancy in Syria 287

provided in the Revised Internal Statutes passed at the Sixth National

Congress.
The Syrian Regional Congress met from January 31 to February 5,
1964. As discussed in Chapter 15, its sessions included a vigorous verbal
duel between cAflaq and Sacdi, in which cAflaq appealed to Hafiz, Jadid,
and cUmran of the Syrian Military Organization for support against Sacdi.
Whatever the Syrian Military Organization may have felt about cAflaq
(many of its members wished to eliminate him), they cannot have wanted
people associated with Sacdi (and presumably capable of moves similar to
his) to occupy influential positions in Syria. Sacdi’s emphasis on a National
Guard independent of the military and on popular organizations under
civilian party control was not to their liking. As we have seen, the Military
Organization had kept the Syrian National Guard under the control of one
of its own members. Sacdi’s “ Marxist” associates had attempted to
introduce a resolution at the Sixth National Congress warning of the
dangers of military interference in political matters, but the military had
managed to get it watered down considerably.25
The new Regional Command elected at the end of the January-February
Congress reflected the Military Organization’s concerns and its.victory.
Seven seats went to members of the Military Organization, three of whom
had been members of the September 1963 Command. Only one of the five
civilian members of the previous command, Nur al-Din Atasi, was re­
elected. He and his civilian associates, Jamil Shayya and Yusuf Zucayyin,
plus the soldiers, held a majority of ten on a sixteen-member Regional
Command. The selection of Shibli cAysami, an old-guard cAflaqite, as
Regional Secretary, did not alter this power balance.
At the Seventh National Congress of the party, which met shortly
thereafter, much the same pattern prevailed. The extremists, lacking the
support they once received from Sacdi’s faction in Iraq, did poorly; none of
them were elected to the National Command. In the National Command
elected in February 1964 the Syrians had six members—cAflaq, cAysami,
and Atrash of the old guard, and Hafiz, cUmran, and Jadid of the Military
Organization.26 Bakr and cAmmash stayed on; Sacdi, cAbd al-Majid, and
Shaykh Radi were expelled from the party. Thus, in the space of six
months, military Bacthists had advanced from controlling only their own
organization within the Syrian army to dominating the Regional Command
in Syria and to holding one-third of the places on the National Command.
The military Bacthists, with a near-majority of the Regional Command
in their own right and a commanding majority when joined by the three
regionalists, also functioned as a bloc during this period. Their practice
was to convene meetings of the Military Organization Command to discuss
issues and to reach decisions on them. Then they would agree to remain
288 THE BACTH PARTY

committed to such decisions when the issues were brought before Regional
Command meetings or, for that matter, NCRC sessions.27 This practice
insured their continued control of party policy in Syria, inasmuch as they
had the willing support of Atasi, Makhus, and Zucayyin on most issues.
Moreover, as Razzaz wrote oh a different issue, but referring to the
National Command, “ The voice of Dr. Munif was one voice but the voice
of Major General Hafiz was the voice of an army.” 28
The old guard was virtually powerless in the face of the military-
regionalist alliance. Its leaders had taken office following a military coup.
cAflaq and his colleagues had succumbed to military and regionalist
demands that the Bacth dominate the abortive unionist front and the
government of Syria. In so doing, the old guard had lost valuable support
in the withdrawal of Jamal Atasi, Sami Durubi, cAbd al-Karim Zuhur, and
others. After the Sixth National Congress, the old guard had welcomed
military support in their effort to get rid of the extremist wing represented
by Sacdi, whose doctrines of class struggle and direct actions by people’s
organizations was not to the liking of either old guard or army.
Razzaz, writing when it was all over, said that the party leaders should
either have compelled the military to submit to party control, or to have
made a partnership arrangement that the civilian Bacth leadership could
leave if things went wrong.29 Instead, the party leaders continued to speak
and act as if the Bacth were a united party. In the public view, the
traditional Bacth leaders assumed responsibility for decisions and actions
over which, in fact, they had no control. For the Bacth Party in Syria, from
the summer of 1963 to February of 1966, was “ not one Party but two
parties.’’30
In analyzing the problem of the party in this period and its inability to
improve its position, Razzaz emphasizes the lack of communication
between the National Command and the party cadres. He gives more
emphasis to the Command’s shortcomings than to the impediments that
cAflaq stressed. The members of the National Command were too busy
with high-level disputes and policy matters. None of them had time to deal
with party members or even to write articles for the party paper. Hence, the
cadres, lacking instruction, direction, and guidance from the National
Command, were at the mercy of the military bloc which, together with the
regionalists, controlled most of the Branch Commands.31 By early 1965,
the party paper, al-Bacth, was selling little more than a thousand copies a
day to persons outside its regular subscription list—not a very impressive
total in a country of several millions.32
The old guard was aware of its weaknesses; it knew where the real
power lay in Syria. cAflaq found that even as Secretary General he did not
have unfettered access to the party cadres. Efforts to visit branches in the
Military Ascendancy in Syria 289

provinces were impeded by the Regional Command or by their supporters

in the branches.33 There were two tactics which the old guard could use,
however, to improve its state somewhat. The National Command and the
traditional leaders still counted a good deal in other regions; cAflaq was
able to fill the provisional Regional Commands in Iraq, required after the
debacle of November 1963, and Lebanon, where the elected command had
split apart as extremists and moderates fought, with pan-Arabists. And this
pan-Arabist strength would help when the next national congress was held.
cAflaq also used the technique of withdrawing from Syrian affairs,
going into self-imposed exile for six months in the hope of forcing the
military and the regionalists to cooperate more with the old guard.34 He
had left Damascus in June at the head of a nine-man Bacth Party delegation
for a visit to Algiers. The departure of the delegation was announced quite
prominently in the Syrian press, but it never reached Algeria, for the
Algerian FLN apparently refused to receive cAflaq, although later in the
summer Nur al-Din Atasi headed a Syrian delegation to all three Maghreb
countries. Perhaps cAflaq did not think it necessary to clear his visit with
the FLN; perhaps regionalist leaders Makhus and Zucayyin, who had
become acquainted with a number of the FLN leaders during the Algerian
revolution when they were working in Tunis, quietly sabotaged cAflaq’s
trip. This snub to his prestige appears to have been more than he could
take, for he did not return to Syria, but went to live with his brother in
Bonn.35
Just as the Seventh National Congress was breaking up, domestic
troubles began to spread in the cities of Syria. These difficulties stemmed
from economic stresses within the country and widespread dissatisfaction
with the form of government among religious leaders, the Syrian branch of
the Muslim Brotherhood, merchants, and others. There was rioting on
February 22 in Homs. Both the Baghdad and Cairo press claimed that
twenty-odd people were killed and a much larger number wounded.
Actually, there was little bloodshed. Nur al-Din Atasi, Minister of Interior
and a native of Homs, went to the city himself and succeeded in ending the
riots. With the regime’s customary speed, five men were sentenced to long
jail terms, on charges of crimes against the state, within twenty-four hours
of the riot’s outbreak.36 Talking to a delegation from Homs which came to
see him and present their grievances a few weeks later. Prime Minister
Hafiz is alleged to have said, “ You are lucky that the Minister of Interior is
your fellow townsman Nur al-Din Atasi. If I were Minister of Interior, I
would have ordered the markets of Homs shelled the day of the strike.” 37
If accurate, this was a prophetic remark, for anti-regime disturbances in
Syrian cities were far from over.
Early in April a student in Hama Secondary School was sentenced to a
290 THE BACTH PARTY

year in prison for erasing Bacth slogans from a blackboard in his school.
Fellow students threatened to go on strike, and on April 10 some preachers
in the mosques of Hama attacked the Bacth Party during their Friday
sermons. The next day there were more skirmishes, and a student was
killed. After a day of clashes and demonstrations, Hafiz lifted some of the
restrictions that had been imposed on the city, but shortly thereafter
troubles broke out again. Several National Guard members and soldiers
were killed and their bodies allegedly mutilated; this time Hafiz acted with
dispatch, bringing in troops to crush the troubles. Syrian official reports
tended to minimize the number of dead and wounded, but newspapers
abroad alleged that nearly a hundred people were killed, most of them
when a minaret on the Sultan Mosque, from which rebels had been firing at
the troops, was shelled and collapsed on top of those inside the mosque.
Hafiz asserted that a total of fifty civilians were killed or wounded in
Hama.38 As was now the regime’s practice, a number of those arrested
were quickly brought before security courts, and some sentenced to death;
they were, however, reprieved early in May. Syria was not to follow the
pattern of executing its enemies as the Bacth in Iraq had in 1963, except for
those convicted of participating in the abortive Nasirist coup effort in July
1963.
After the troubles in April, the Military Organization apparently felt
that its people would be better out of the public eye for a while. Hafiz and
cUmran resigned and, once again, Salah Bitar was asked to head the
government. A few old-guard names appeared in the new civilian cabinet,
e.g., party ideologue cAbdallah cAbd al-Da’im as Minister of Information
and Fahmi cAshuri as Interior Minister. None of the prominent regionalists
of the previous cabinet were included in the new cabinet.
The regime had introduced a new provisional constitution for Syria on
April 24. While proclaiming in its basic articles a number of the principles
incorporated in the constitution of the Bacth Party, the principal executive
power of the state was vested in a five-man Presidential Council, to be
chosen from among the members of a national revolutionary council.39 The
national revolutionary council was but another name for the NCRC,
although in Article 33, the constitution expressed the desire to have
members of the public added to it. The National Revolutionary Council,
therefore, was still a self-appointed, self-perpetuating body, consisting of
Military Organization leaders and some Bacthist civilians. Although it had
sweeping powers of legislation and supervision of the executive branch, in
practice it delegated those powers to the five-man Presidential Council,
which in May 1964 was composed of Hafiz as Chairman, cUmran as Vice
Chairman, Bitar, Nur al-Din Atasi, and Mansur al-Atrash. This line-up
—two military Bacthists, one regionalist, and two old guard—reflected the
Military Ascendancy in Syria 291

Bacth power balance in Syria far more accurately than did Bitar’s cabinet.
Except for Bitar, all members of the Presidential Council were members of
the Regional or National Commands of the party.
Within the limits permitted by the existence of the Presidential Council,
Bitar moved to re-establish public confidence in the Bacth regime. In a
summary of the new government’s policy, he said that the government was
particularly eager to “ provide freedom, security, confidence, equal oppor­
tunities, and to safeguard individual personal freedoms and respect for
public freedoms.” 40 On May 27 the Presidential Council laid down a
government policy in a longer document which “ established the domestic,
foreign, Arab, and economic policies and entrusted the government with
implementing them.” It repeated Bitar’s statement above; it referred to
Article 9 of the provisional constitution, which talked of the inviolability of
individual freedom. It balanced this passage with a paragraph on the
necessity of striking at the enemies of revolution, but did say, “ The
government will attempt to remove the causes which have led to detaining
certain misled citizens and depriving others of their civil rights.” The
statement fluctuated between supporting private ownership, which had
helped to lay the basis for industrial growth in Syria, and “ public
ownership of means of production as a fundamental condition for establish­
ing a socialist regime.” 41 The regime decided to have the state take up 25
per cent ownership of fifteen industrial establishments and make them joint
private-public ventures; it had already nationalized two textile firms the
previous day. What the regime was trying to do was to improve a poor
economic situation by encouraging private activity while continuing to
cling to the principle of state ownership and control.
The Bitar government did ease the situation somewhat. It freed 35
political prisoners in early June and released 145 other persons from
political isolation later in the month. Those sentenced to death in the April
demonstrations had already been reprieved, owing more to Hafiz’ decision,
apparently, than to the Bitar cabinet’s. Relations between the old guard and
the military command with its regionalist allies were not smooth at this
point, however, and the latter combination was quietly but surely growing
in strength. In mid-August, Article 18 C of the provisional constitution,
guaranteeing the independence of trade unions, was flouted when the
government discharged the governing body of the General Federation of
Trade Unions and replaced it with eleven of its own appointees. The chief
of those dismissed was Khalid al-Hakim, short-term member of the Syrian
Regional Command (from September 1963 to February 1964). The dis­
missal was carried out on the eve of elections, apparently to prevent
Hakim’s people from supervising those elections and, presumably, win­
ning substantially. Khalid al-Hakim had done much to antagonize the
292 THE BACTH PARTY

regime. Al-Hakim had stayed with the party when Shufi, Sacdi, and their
associates were expelled in March, and he permitted them to use trade-
union headquarters for meetings with like-minded radicals. Al-Hakim’s
weekly labor journal, Kifah al-cUmmal, had been suppressed several times
by Bitar’s government for criticism of government policies. Its issue of
May 26, 1964 had attacked the cabinet’s attempt to get the bourgeoisie to
repatriate capital and get industries into production.42 And Minister of
Labor Sulayman al-cAli was an associate of Jadid, not a partisan of
Hakim’s doctrinaire socialist approach. Whether someone in Bitar’s
cabinet or in the Presidential Council or in the Military Organization
instigated Hakim’s dismissal, the action did cut short one of the few party
mass organizations that had some vitality.
Bitar himself was out of office six weeks later, having failed in these
five months to accomplish much beyond getting a constitution issued,
easing tensions, and staying in office. The Military Organization forced
Bitar and Mansur al-Atrash off the Presidential Council, replacing them
with Jadid and Zucayyin.43 By this appointment, Zucayyin was reprieved
from a short political exile as ambassador to the United Kingdom. Amin
al-Hafiz remained chairman of the Presidential Council and also headed a
cabinet formed just prior to the second Arab summit conference, with Nur
al-Din Atasi as Deputy Prime Minister. Just as Bitar had all but excluded
the regionalists, so this cabinet excluded the old guard. The new govern­
ment included two members of the Military Organization in addition to
Hafiz, namely, cAbd al-Karim Jundi as Minister of Agrarian Reform and
Acting Interior Minister, and General Mamduh Jabir, who continued as
Minister of Defense. The Presidential Council, now composed of three
members of the Military Organization and two regionalists, divided up
responsibilities for broad sectors of the country’s affairs as follows: Jadid
for defense and security, cUmran for economic affairs, Atasi for labor and
general supervision, Zucayyin for agriculture and public services.44
Hafiz went abroad to Paris for an operation—real rather than
diplomatic—shortly after the second Arab summit was over. He returned to
a big welcome on November 12. Four days later, the Presidential Council
decreed a sweeping amnesty for political crimes committed in Syria,
including those committed as far back as 1955. Even those PPS members
accused of involvement in the murder of cAdnan Malki received
amnesty.45 Like others, this amnesty was not destined to last long, and the
in-and-out-of-detention quality of Syrian politics served to keep would-be
opposition elements off guard.
The old guard of the party leadership was especially distressed at the
return of a soldier to the Prime Ministry, at military domination of the
Presidential Council, and at the failure of party units to subordinate
Military Ascendancy in Syria 293

themselves to the wishes of the National Command. They still hoped to

work out a compromise, and, in late November, cAflaq was persuaded to
return to Damascus to try to iron out some problems at a joint meeting of
the Syrian Regional and the National Commands. This meeting, held early
in December 1964, achieved no results save that of showing the old guard
just how powerful the military apparatus really was. This power was
exposed through the solution of a conflict between the majority of the
military committee and one of its founders, Muhammad cUmran. cUmran
had objected to the committee’s methods for quite some time; he opposed
Hafiz’ domination in particular. The rest of the committee, for their part,
disliked and feared cUmran’s personal ambition. While Hafiz, too, had
ambitions, at that time he was cooperating closely with Salah Jadid and the
rest of the military committee.
Many of the military committee also were concerned at cUmran’s
efforts to form a sectarian cAlawite bloc in the army and at his inclination
to improve relations with the Nasirites in Syria and even with Nasir
himself.46 The military committee ordered cUmran to leave Syria, even
though he was a member of the National and Regional Commands and of
the Presidential Council. He was appointed ambassador to Spain “ in
accordance with his own request,’’ as the Damascus Radio politely put it,
on December 14. Hafiz some time later explained cUmran’s expulsion by
saying that while he had many good qualities and had participated in the
March 8th revolution, every condition and every effort needed different
people, hence “ the revolution considered it necessary that Major General
cUmran should at a specific period participate in an aspect other than the
internal affairs of the country in the service of the revolution and con­
sidered that the best thing was that he should serve in the foreign corps.” 47
The old guard was dismayed at such a naked display of the military
committee’s power. cAflaq had threatened to issue a statement disavowing
the current Syrian regime if strict party discipline was not observed and if
the army did not submit to the party.48 Most of the seats on the National
Command were held by men who were strongly pan-Arab in outlook and
dedicated to the party; in addition to cAflaq, there were cAysami and
Atrash from Syria, Majdalani and cAli from Lebanon, Razzaz from Jordan,
and Ghannam from Saudi Arabia. A majority of the National Command
voted to dissolve the Syrian Regional Command and appointed a supervi­
sory committee to run the party in the Syrian Region. But by this time the
military committee and its allies had control of almost all branch com­
mands in Syria. It stirred these commands up to accuse the National
Command of plotting against the party and exerted such pressure against
the National Command that it was forced to withdraw its dissolution order
within a few days.49 A face-saving compromise was arranged whereby the
294 THE BACTH PARTY

National Command’s decisions were held in abeyance, and new elections

for a Regional Congress and for a National Congress were scheduled to
take place shortly.50
The defeat of the old guard had been materially helped by two policy
decisions taken by the National Command early in 1964. At the Seventh
National Congress, the delegates had agreed that efforts should be made to
bring back into the fold persons formerly connected with the party in Syria.
Three members of the military committee were assigned the task of
persuading individuals from three groups of former members to rejoin.
Hafiz was assigned the Hawranists, cUmran the pro-UAR Socialist
Unionists, and Jadid those who had formed a separate regionalist organiza­
tion in 1961-1962 and still remained outside the fold. The first two failed in
their efforts. Indeed, Hafiz’ efforts were the cause of a continuous stream
of stories in the Lebanese press of coming rapprochement between
Hawrani and the Bacthists, because Hafiz, to woo his audience, publicly
said conciliatory things about Hawrani and his supporters. Jadid had
greater success and brought in many people of regionalist persuasion, not
as individuals but as blocs, which frequently became the party organization
in a given town or district.51
Party membership increased about fivefold in the course of a year, even
though there were also purges of members who were unsatisfactory to the
regionalists. The second decision, taken in reaction to the Iraqi disaster,
gave Regional Commands extensive power to appoint secretaries and
commands of lower organizational echelons. The combination of these two
decisions, used to the full by Jadid and his associates on the Syrian
Regional Command in 1964, placed most civilian Branch Commands
under the control of the military committee and its allies.
Having won their battle with the old guard, Syria’s military leaders
opened the year 1965 with a decree nationalizing 115 industrial establish­
ments, transferring from 75 to 90 per cent of their holdings to the state in
most cases, and 100 per cent in one-fifth of the cases. Hafiz explained that
the regime had given the private sector an opportunity to show its good
will, but that the sector unfortunately had not done what was expected of it.
Moreover, some entrepreneurs smuggled their capital abroad, and a small
group tried to plot against the government.52
The regime backed up its nationalization decree by appointing an
extraordinary military court empowered to deal with “ actions regarded as
contrary to the application of the socialist system in the state, whether they
actually took place, or were evidenced in speech or by writing or through
any means of expression or publication’’ and with crimes committed
against the provisions of Legislative Decrees Nos. 1 and 2, dated January 2
and 5, 1965 (the nationalization decrees), and of “ all legislative decrees
Military Ascendancy in Syria 295

issued or to be issued and connected with socialist transformation.” 53 For

good measure, the extraordinary military court was also given jurisdiction
over crimes against the security of the state. Upset by the nationalization
decrees, Syrian merchants were tempted to strike. At first they were cowed
by threats from the government, because they recognized that Hafiz’
threats carried considerable weight after what had happened in Hama the
previous year. Eventually, toward the end of January, a good part of the
commercial establishment in Damascus went on strike. The regime moved
with dispatch; it formally seized 69 businesses and pried the doors off a
number of others, and the strike Collapsed in three or four days.54 The
nationalization moves were praised by the Soviet press, contrasting
Moscow’s favorable attitude toward the regionalists and the Bacth military
with its long-standing dislike of “ the rightwing Bacthists.” 55
With their defeat of the old guard’s effort at confrontation in December,
the military Bacthists were riding high. Hafiz’s press conference of January
13 exuded confidence, listing all good things that the regime had done
—emptied the prisons, made radical amendments in the labor laws, applied
the agrarian reform law—estimating that 90 per cent of the people in Syria
supported the Bacth Party, and saying that reports of dissension within the
party were merely the result of mistakes or differences of view among
members. But the resistance to economic moves it had met in Damascus
inspired the regime to issue a profit-sharing decree and a rent-reduction
decree on January 24-25. The nationalization of 14 more business firms
followed on January 27. The Presidential Council, aware of the role that
religious preachers had played both in encouraging opposition to the
nationalization decrees and in dissidence in Homs the previous year,
decreed on January 28 that it would “ exercise all the powers of the higher
council of Awqaf [religious foundations] and of the local councils of
Awqaf ’ and that it “ shall have the right to appoint and dismiss the Imams,
preachers and religious teachers.” 56 Little further public opposition to
Bacth rule was to appear.
The National Command issued a statement on the second anniversary of
the March 8th revolution praising the achievements of the previous two
years and only hinting at dissatisfactions within the party. It admitted that
there were “ crises in the life of this Party and some obstacles preceded its
victories,” but that the revolution would proceed. “ The past two years
earned it more confidence in itself and in its future and enabled it to
discover its errors and qualities” and “ sincere progressive elements should
stand in the rank of the revolution and not obstruct it. The revolution
cannot overcome its difficulties and errors if the persons believing in Arab
unity, freedom, and socialism and all those who wish victory for the Arab
nations’ cause do not rally around it.” 57
296 THE BACTH PARTY

The old guard’s humiliation at its confrontation in December had been

partly concealed by an agreement to hold new Regional and National
Congresses. The Regional Congress met from March 17 to April 5, after
which the party issued a terse statement saying that the Congress had
debated the party’s organizational problems, studied various internal and
international questions, adopted suitable decisions, and elected a new
Regional Command.58 The military and the regionalists together domi­
nated the party apparatus, controlled the choice of delegates to the
Congress, secured all eleven seats on the Regional Command, and chose
all the delegates to the National Congress. Of the eleven Regional Com­
mand members, three were from the Military Organization.59 By the end of
this congress, the military Bacthists had become unchallengeable in their
control of the Regional Party apparatus, through a “ structure based on
instructions from above [italics in original] and rejecting the principle of
election of leaders from below.” 60
The Eighth National Congress of the party met at the end of April,
1965. Three-quarters of the delegates were non-Syrians, a ratio that
favored the old guard, inasmuch as pro-military sentiment was not strong
in other regions. The mood of the Congress favored patching up the quarrel
between the army and the old guard in Syria. Delegates wanted to settle or
at least paper over quarrels and they refused to permit cAflaq to deliver a
speech analyzing the reasons for the crisis. The delegates felt that, in the
light of the failure in Iraq and of the strong reaction by imperialists to the
nationalization moves of January, the first priority of the party had to be the
retention of power in Syria.61 A report on the relationship between the
party and the government was laid before the Congress. Because the
Congress as a whole felt it could not handle the problem, a committee was
formed to try to patch up the situation. Its members included Hafiz and
Jadid, cAflaq and Atrash.
This committee worked out a compromise. It recognized the existence
of a party military committee in the army, but limited the committee’s
authority to proper military affairs, that is, transfers and promotions, and
abolished its other roles, except that of representing the military faction in
the National Council. The compromise also authorized military representa­
tion in party commands, but forbade the military to dominate such
commands. It also made the party Military Organization into a Military
Bureau attached to the Regional Command and gave the Secretary General,
his deputy, or his delegate the right of direct communication with party
cadres, organs, and bureaus, including the Military Bureau, thus ending its
totally independent status. The officers agreed to limit their representation
on the Regional Command to three and on the National Command to two.
They accepted these limitations because they were confident of their ability
Military Ascendancy in Syria 297

to form a Regional Command subservient to themselves. The military also

effected the resignation of cAflaq from the post of Secretary General. As he
had done previously when his views were disregarded, cAflaq pulled back
from an active role. He had decided sometime before the congress to leave
the Secretary Generalship and the National Command as well, because he
felt he was subject to excessive attack from within the party. He was
re-elected to the National Command against his will and saw his long-time
associate, Munif Razzaz, elected to succeed him in the top post.62
In the statement issued after the Eighth National Congress the com­
promise was referred to in the following words: “ The commands and
branches have no power over the state’s administration in their areas except
through their Regional Commands. . . . The Army may not interfere in the
daily affairs of the state except within its jurisdiction and within the field of
its duty. Nor may it interfere in the work of the Party machinery. At the
same time Party members may not interfere in the army’s affairs except
through their commands which are responsible for such contact.” The
document went on to say that the leading elements within the army should
be given the opportunity to participate in bearing “ the responsibility of
leadership on the level of Party and government provided full time [my
italics] is given to these responsibilities.” And finally, “ the Regional
Command will assume its powers in guiding the army and the command of
the Party’s organization within the army through a military bureau, under
the Regional Command, which the Regional Command shall appoint.” 63
The old guard made its last effort to stop the growth of the power of the
Syrian military during the ten months between the end of the Congress and
February 23, 1966. As Razzaz describes it, the old guard had a working
majority of members on the National Command. Of the thirteen, two were
Iraqis unable to attend, cAflaq boycotted meetings until the end of the year,
while Razzaz, owing to a general similarity of outlook, could count on
support on most issues from Assistant Secretary General cAysami and
Mansur al-Atrash from Syria, Majdalani and Khalil from Lebanon, and
Ghannam of Saudi Arabia.64 Amin al-Hafiz, Hafiz al-Asad, and Ibrahim
Makhus were opposed to him on most issues. Razzaz was a realist. He
recognized that executive power in Syria was in the hands of the military
organization. He also saw that confrontation had not worked to the old
guard’s benefit and, moreover, that it wasn’t going to, as long as the
officers were able to control the Regional Party apparatus and Syrian
military units as well. His approach was to play up party education and
guidance, banking on the hope that many of the cadres would support the
National Command if they knew what the issues were. (It was about the
time he became Secretary General that Razzaz realized how little effect the
party newspaper had been having on Syria and Syrians.) Hence, he made
298 THE BACTH PARTY

statements on a great range of issues—domestic, Arab, and

international—relating them “ to scientific revolutionary bases of the
Party,” using the National Command’s increased authority in the less
sensitive economic, educational, and foreign fields as a platform for this
action.65
In his effort to rebuild the actual authority of the National Command,
Razzaz and his supporters had two opponents to contend with. One, of
course, was the Military Organization, which was in charge of the Syrian
army and in control of the Regional Command. The other consisted of
party founders cAflaq and Bitar, who took the doctrinaire view that the
military and their regionalist associates were wrong and should be opposed
head-on. cAflaq and Bitar, with a handful of supporters, constantly pressed
Razzaz and the National Command majority to dissolve the newly elected
Regional Command and to expel the “ deviators.” According to Razzaz
—and I am relying on his view on this dispute—Bitar believed that the
party cadres were in favor of this approach and would support the old
leadership. In the months following his election as Secretary General,
Razzaz traveled throughout Syria, and in his conversations with cadres and
local commands became convinced that Bitar was sadly misinformed.66
Moreover, Razzaz was aware that any attempt at expulsions of
“ deviators” would bring down the wrath of the military on the National
Command. Hence he fought against dissolution of the Regional Command
as long as he could.
During the months following the Eighth National Congress, a confron­
tation was building up between Amin al-Hafiz and Salah Jadid. Hafiz had
not been a member of the original Military Organization and his rapid
assumption of powers in 1963 had annoyed many officers. Hafiz, Jadid,
Asad, Hatum, and most of the rest of the Military Organization had hung
together until their ambitious colleague, Muhammad cUmran, was ousted
in December 1964. With cUmran gone, the dispute between Hafiz and
Jadid came to the surface. Razzaz assesses Jadid as a master at manipulat­
ing forces within Syria. Where Hafiz built strength on public appeal and on
an ability to move quickly, Jadid carefully constructed a circle of sup­
porters in the army and in the party.67
Both were prominent in dealing with a movement within the Military
Organization that protested that the military committee did not accurately
represent Bacthist officers. The protests, of which civilian Bacthists such as
Razzaz had been only vaguely aware, resulted in a congress of all military
branch and section commands in mid-1965. The congress voted over­
whelmingly to abolish the military committee and to form a drafting
committee to produce a new internal statute for the military organization.
The committee—Hafiz, Jadid, Hamad cUbayd, Hafiz al-Asad, and Razzaz
Military Ascendancy in Syria 299

plus three members of the Regional Command—produced the new statute,

and a second military congress approved it six weeks later.68 The statute
provided for a military bureau, in accordance with the Eighth National
Congress resolutions. It supplanted the elective principle with that of
appointment on the basis of “ ability in party and military functions and
Party seniority taking military rank into account.” 69 The new military
bureau included the familiar names—Hafiz, Jadid, Asad, cUbayd—and
three others. Hafiz and Jadid jockeyed for power through the first half of
the summer. In order to ease matters, the National Command finally
arranged a compromise whereby both Hafiz and Jadid would surrender
their respective military posts of army Commander-in-Chief and Chief of
Staff and retain their positions on the Presidential Council. An additional
feature of the compromise was a provision that no one could hold a position
on the Presidential Council and another state post simultaneously.70 They
could, of course, hold party offices.
This compromise required the formation of a new government, and one
headed by Yusuf Zucayyin was announced on September 23. But well
before that, the Syrian Regional Command resigned and called for an
extraordinary session of the Regional Congress, the third session of that
group; it had met from June 11 to 13 to debate and approve the party
program for the present phase, dealing principally with people’s organiza­
tion, socialist transformation, economic, social and cultural development.
Razzaz and his National Command majority decided to use the opportunity
afforded by the calling of this session to maneuver some people who were
not committed to either Hafiz or Jadid onto the Regional Command. In
order to do this, they decided to expand the Regional Command to sixteen
members, the size it had been from 1964 to April 1965. cAflaq and Bitar,
however, saw the Command’s resignation as a golden opportunity to
confront the military regionalist “ deviationists.” cAflaq, who as party
head for twenty years, was still influential, intervened to ask that nine of
the sixteen positions on the Regional Command go to old-guard Bacthists
with a pan-Arab outlook and, furthermore, that Bitar be one of the nine.
The demand for Bitar’s inclusion was illegal, because he was not even
elected as a delegate to the Regional Congress.71
Razzaz says that cAflaq and Bitar were relying on the support of
separated cadres, that is, their old associates now either purged or holding
themselves aloof from the party organization but faithful to its pan-Arab
principles, whereas Razzaz felt that the regular cadres simply would not
tolerate Bitar’s presence in a regional leadership.72 Whether Razzaz’
scheme to get some members not committed to the military/regionalist
faction on the enlarged Regional Command would have worked if cAflaq
and Bitar had not intruded is problematic. But the odds certainly were
300 THE BACTH PARTY

against him. The military Bacthists showed their power by choosing a

Regional Command which had Amin Hafiz as Regional Secretary and
Salah Jadid as Assistant Regional Secretary, each enjoying the support of
half of the members.73 There were no old guard members on the Regional
Command at all.
Jadid’s next maneuver, tied to the compromise noted above, severely
limited Hafiz power and caused him to seek an alliance with the old guard
and the National Command. Jadid moved with Machiavellian cunning,
proposing two of Hafiz’ men for the posts of Minister of Defense in the
revised cabinet and Chief of Staff. Razzaz describes this proposal as a
shrewd maneuver (a) to get Zucayyin as Prime Minister in place of Nur
al-Din Atasi, who was more or less neutral in the party infighting and
would have been a logical candidate, for fear that Atasi could not stand up
to Hafiz’ pressure, (b) to gain further control of the regional organization
while appearing to have surrendered, and (c) to win over Hafiz’ supporters,
i.e., Hatum, Talas, Tawil, and cUbayd, by making Hafiz appear dictato­
rial, while Jadid appeared to be making sacrifices for the good of the
party.74
Hafiz was still holding the chief executive post in the country. In late
August a 95-member National Council was appointed; it included all
members of the Regional Command, Syrians on the National Command,
members of the Military Organization and representatives of people’s
organizations. The council chose a chairman, Amin al-Hafiz, and four
members to govern.75
All events worked to favor Jadid. In August, Hafiz surrendered his
position as army commander, and his erstwhile supporter, Hamad cUbayd,
then Minister of Defense with responsibilities as army commander, joined
Jadid’s camp.76 The newly constituted Regional Command had had a
major voice in picking Zucayyin’s cabinet, which was not announced until
five weeks after the summer regional congress was over, but the National
Command was not consulted in its formation.77 One reason for the delay in
naming the cabinet was the absence of a number of leaders who were
attending a Casablanca Arab summit conference, but of at least equal
importance was the maneuvering needed to get the right people into the
right jobs outside the cabinet as well. With Hafiz’ former supporters falling
into Jadid’s camp, Jadid juggled transfers and promotions so that his
backers—many of them cAlawi co-religionists—were given important
military posts.
In addition to allying himself with the National Command against the
Regional Command, Amin Hafiz also put lines out in another direction.
His former antagonist, Muhammad cUmran, came to Damascus on leave
from his post as ambassador to Spain around the end of September 1965.
Military Ascendancy in Syria 301

At this time. Bitar had discussions with cUmran, which led to an under­
standing that cUmran and Hafiz, who was also party to these discussions,
could be the guardians of the party against “ deviation.” Bitar did not tell
the National Command about these talks.78 A number of vigorous actions
of the Syrian government and Regional Command in October and
November deeply concerned the National Command and the old guard. In
addition to shifts within the armed forces, which strengthened the cAlawi
and, to a lesser extent. Druze sects, and other Jadid group supporters, the
regime shifted provincial governors in October, bringing Regional Com­
mand supporters into the important govemorates of Damascus, Hama, and
Aleppo. It also rearrested Hawrani and his supporters, who had been under
only loose restrictions since spring.
As the power of the Military Organization and its regionalist allies
continued to grow, a few of their opponents in the party shifted views to
favor dissolution of the Regional Command as the only course open to the
old guard. cAflaq and Bitar attracted the support of cAysami, Ghannam,
and Amin al-Hafiz of the National Command.79 From December 8 to 20,
the National Command argued the issue. Razzaz and Atrash and the two
Lebanese, Majdalani and Khalil, argued that dissolution would have no
permanent effect, but they finally agreed to dissolution, but with great
reservations.
Before they could agree on just how to dissolve the Regional Com­
mand, Jadid’s people seized control of an army brigade at Homs on
December 20. In the face of such a flagrant abuse of power, the National
Command ordered the dissolution of the Regional Command on December
22, replacing it with a supreme party command consisting of the eleven
available National Command members (six Syrians and five from other
states) and ten Syrians, of whom five were old-guard members—Bitar,
Ilyas Farah, Zayd Haydar, Sulayman al-cAli, and cAbd al-Qadir Nayyal.
Five places were left for the regionalists, but they would not fill them.80
Zucayyin’s cabinet promptly resigned, as did three of the regionalist
members on the Presidential Council, Fayiz Jasim, Jamil Shayya, and Nur
al-Din Atasi.
The low estate of the old guard was shown by the nomination of Bitar as
Prime Minister and by the cabinet he selected. Razzaz says somewhat
lamely that Bitar was the only major political figure and statesman whom
the Bacthists had.81 The National Command called two ambassadors back
from abroad, apparently to offer them posts in the cabinet, but neither
would accept. Fahmi cAshuri, a long-time member, reassumed the post of
Minister of Interior he had held under Bitar in 1964. Most of the rest of the
cabinet were senior civil servants, many Bacthists, but neither cAysami nor
Atrash were in the cabinet. cUmran came back from Spain and took the
302 THE BACTH PARTY

post of Minister of Defense, according to Razzaz because cUmran was one

of the only two senior officers not committed to either Hafiz or Jadid. The
other was Fahd Shacir, who had only recently joined the party organiza­
tion, although he had supported the party for years.82 It appears that the
chief reason for Umran’s selection was the deal he had made with Hafiz
and Bitar a few months before.
But trying to arrest the forward momentum of the military Bacthists and
their regionalist allies was futile. The regime lasted two months, months
filled with infighting between the supreme party committee and Jadid’s
forces. The government was able to accomplish little. Exhortations to party
members and assertions that the authority of the National Command was
supreme did not affect the reality of power.83 All that the dissolution of the
Regional Command and the formation of a new government did was to
postpone the day of Jadid’s complete takeover for two months. Indeed, it
may have forced the final coup d’état, inasmuch as Jadid and his group
were apparently content to move forward little by little, gradually taking
over all powers. They probably would not have resorted to armed force if
they had not been thrown out of the Regional Command. Jadid and the rest
of the Military Organization leaders—Asad, cUbayd, cAbd al-Karim Jundi,
Mustafa Talas, Hatum—had most of the Syrian army at their beck and call.
The National Command’s futile efforts to counter the power of the
military Bacthists ultimately triggered a response. The Command hinted at
calling for a new national congress, and tried to persuade the cadres to
support it. On February 21, the Command sought to reach the heart of the
problem; it ordered the transfer of three key officers to non-sensitive
posts.84 Coming just after cAflaq’s blistering attack on the military
Bacthists in a speech to the al-Atraf (Damascus suburbs) Branch on
February 18, this move was a challenge that the military could not ignore.
They had the force and they used it.
The struggle ended on the morning of February 23, when Salim
Hatum’s commandos and other units loyal to Jadid seized power in
Damascus. In fighting which cost fifty lives, what was left of the old
organization was swept out.85 Amin al-Hafiz was wounded, surrendered,
and jailed. His personal guard unit had fought for him but was over­
whelmed. The rest of the old-guard Bacth leadership was either jailed,
proscribed and deported, or allowed to escape from Syria. Michel cAflaq
and Salah Bitar were expelled from the party and from Syria. The
government in Damascus and the Bacth Party organization were under the
complete control of a group of military officers, many of them cAlawis and
Druzes, allied with civilian regionalists. The party apparatus within Syria
was, for all practical purposes, responsive only to the wishes of that group.
Military Ascendancy in Syria 303

Three weeks after the coup, the party in Syria organized a Regional
Congress, which was attended by representatives of party branches in the
region and of some party organizations outside Syria. The conference
considered that the actions of the National Command on December 21 and
22, 1965 were a clear violation of internal regulations and of the Eighth
National Congress’s decisions. It went on to say, “ Although the method
followed to implement this movement [23rd February] was not the legiti­
mate Party method, the serious and imminent dangers which threatened the
existence of the Party and revolution as a result of the situation created by
the decisions and measures of the National Command . . . made it
inevitable to resort to this method to preserve the Party’s entity and the
revolution’s safety.” 86
The Congress elected a new Regional Command, eleven of whose
members had also been chosen at the September 1965 Congress; two others
had been on the National Command of 1965. The new regime took over all
the party assets and apparatus in Syria. In due course, it held a National
Congress, elected a National Command, and formally conducted itself as if
Syria were but one region in the greater. Arab nation. In fact, Syria became
more and more the focus of the new regime’s interest. It devoted relatively
little attention to events in countries outside Syria, except for Palestine.
The events of February 23, 1966 produced yet another split in the Bacth
Party. Even this split was not to be the last.

Notes

1. The party later tried to disparage Hariri’s role in the March 8 coup. See
al-BaHh, April 8, 1964.
2. Mid-East Mirror, June 22, 1963, p. 6; hereafter cited as MEM.
3. Al-Nahar (Beirut), June 25-26, cited in MEM, June 29, 1963, p. 2.
4. MEM, May 18, 1963, p. 18.
5. Arab World, June 26, 1963, p. 1.
6. Ibid.
7. Al-Bacth, July 3, 1963. To demonstrate its care, the regime publicized the
discharge of guardsmen for improper actions on a number of occasions during the
following two years.
8. MEM, July 6, 1963, p. 4.
9. Al-Bacth, July 10-11, 1963.
10. MEM, Aug. 3, 1963, p. 2.
304 THE BACTH PARTY

11. Indeed, the number of members actually enrolled in the party organization
in Syria was only a few hundred. See Munif Razzaz, al-Tajribah al-Murrah (The
Bitter Experience) (Beirut: Dar Ghandur, 1967), p. 89.
12. None of the three returned to the party, although Durubi served Syrian
Bacth governments as ambassador to Yugoslavia and Morocco.
13. Razzaz, Tajribah, pp. 109-10.
14. Ibid., p. 75.
15. Itamar Rabinovich, Syria Under the Bacth 1963-1966: The Army-Party
Symbiosis (Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1972), p. 56, citing internal party
documents, says that the Regional Command appointed in 1962 was at this point
replaced by an eighteen-member command representing various party elements.
Rabinovich’s book is devoted to the same period as this chapter is; he uses a variety
of internal party documents.
16. Avraham Ben-Tsur, “ The Neo-Bacth Party of Syria,” Journal o f Contem­
porary History, Vol. 3, No. 3 (1968), p. 168; Razzaz, Tajribah, p. I l l , says much
the same thing..
17. Razzaz, Tajribah, p. 92, and al-BaHh, Sept. 17, 1963. Sami al-Jundi,
al-Bacth (Beirut: Dar al-Nahar li al-Nashr, 1969), p. 130, says it took place earlier
in the summer.
18. Al-Nahar (Beirut), Feb. 9, 1964, cited in Michael W. Suleiman, Political
Parties in Lebanon (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1967), p. 126.
19. Razzaz, Tajribah, p. 96. Razzaz puts the onus for excluding Bitar on the
military organization, but in my view the military men would have needed the help
of regionalists and “ Marxists.”
20. Muta® Safadi, Hizb al-Bacth, Ma’sat al-Mawlid, Ma’sat al-Nihayah (The
Bacth Party, Its Tragic Birth, Its Tragic End (Beirut: Dar al-Adab, 1964), p. 75.
Safadi says that Bitar accused him and others in the Labor Bureau of the Damascus
Branch in the 1950s of acting like Communists by stirring up the workers to
demonstrate.
21. See, for. example, Razzaz, Tajribah, p. 146.
22. Ibid., p. 92.
23. Ibid., p. 93. cAflaq in his Feb. 18, 1966 speech said that it took less than a
year for the military to put fetters on the party.
24. Fahham nonetheless survived in the party, one of the very few 1940s-era
Bacthists to do so. He is now Minister of Education and, as of 1972, a member of
the Guidance Bureau of the Syrian Regional Command.
25. Ben Tsur, “ The Neo-Bacth,” pp. 174-75. Compare the warnings that
military coups risk the introduction of opportunism and reaction in “ Some
Theoretical Propositions” (Nidal VI, pp. 262-63) with the language of paragraph
14 of the Sixth National Congress statement (ibid., p. 227) which, though
platitudinous, does stress the military chain of command.
26. Al-Nahar (Beirut), Feb. 26, 1964, cited in Arab World, same date.
27. Razzaz, Tajribah, pp. 94 and 96.
28. Ibid., p. 186, note 2. Razzaz was writing of his experiences as Party
Secretary General in 1965, but the message also applies to the preceding years;
armed strength can “ outvote” a numerical majority on a council.
29. Ibid., p. 92.
30. Ibid., p. 95.
31. Ibid., pp. 113-14.
32. Ibid., p. 125. The subscriptions presumably went to government offices
and various public institutions.
Military Ascendancy in Syria 305

33. cAflaq, speech of Feb. 18, 1966, al-Ahrar, Feb. 25, 1966.
34. Razzaz, Tajribah, p. 115.
35. cAflaq, speech, al-Ahrar, Feb. 25, 1966.
36. New York Times, Feb. 24, 1964.
37. Al-Muharrir (a pro-Egyptian paper in Beirut), cited in Arab World, March
16, 1964, p. 2.
38. Middle East Journal, “ Chronology,” Vol. 18, No. 3 (Summer 1963),
p. 346.
39. Kamel S. Abu Jaber, The Arab Ba’th Socialist Party (Syracuse, N.Y.:
Syracuse University Press, 1966), p. 114, says that in this provisional constitution,
“ the Ba’th Party made its ideology the state policy of Syria.” He goes on to say,
“ Article 17 through 30 of this constitution are the basis on which rests the socialist
policies of the Syrian state.” I believe this exaggerates the Bacth-ness of this
document; there is very little difference between these articles and comparable ones
in the interim constitution of Iraq issued five days later by the non-Bacthist cArif
regime in Iraq.
40. Radio Damascus, May 14, 1964.
41. Ibid., May 25 and 27, 1964.
42. Arab World, May 27, 1964, p. 6.
43. Razzaz, Tajribah, p. 114.
44. Radio Damascus, Oct. 4, 1964.
45. Ibid., Nov. 14, and Jerusalem Post, Nov. 16, 1964.
46. Razzaz, Tajribah, p. 116, footnote. This difference over the correct attitude
toward Nasir and the Nasirites contributed to the personal rivalry existing between
cUmran and Hafiz.
47. Radio Damascus, Jan. 13, 1965, reporting Hafiz’ press conference.
48. Jerusalem Radio, Dec. 24, 1964.
49. Razzaz, Tajribah, pp. 116-17. cAflaq referred to accusations of this sort in
his speech of Feb. 18, 1966.
50. Jerusalem Radio, Dec. 24, 1964.
51. Razzaz, Tajribah, p. 111.
52. Radio Damascus, Jan. 13, 1965.
53. Ibid., Jan. 8, 1965.
54. Chronology o f Arab Politics 1965, pp. 70-71.
55. Pravda, Feb. 8, 1965, article broadcast over Moscow Radio, same date.
56. Radio Damascus, Jan. 28, 1965.
57. Ibid., March 8, 1965.
58. Al-Bacth, April 6, 1965.
59. Razzaz, Tajribah, p. 112. See Rabinovich, Syria Under the Bacth, pp.
145-63.
60. Ben Tsur, “ Neo-Bacth,” p. 179. He goes on to say that by these moves
“ the military gained decisive representation at all levels” of the party. I think it
unlikely that military and civilian party organizations were amalgamated below the
regional level; the Eighth National Congress forbade this (see below). But that the
military could get what it wanted done at any level is beyond question.
61. Razzaz, Tajribah, p. 119, and cAflaq, speech of Feb. 18, 1966. The
remainder of this chapter relies extensively on Razzaz’s memoir; it is the only
inside story of party developments. On a number of points he is corroborated, and
often supplemented, by Ben Tsur, whose sources were party internal documents
seized at Qunaytirah in June 1967.
62. Ibid., pp. 120-22.
306 THE BACTH PARTY

63. Radio Damascus, May 4, 1965; another translation, embodying a few

additional lines of material, is in Arab Political Documents 1965, pp. 176-86. See
also Orient, No. 34, 2nd Quarter 1965, pp. 197-210.
64. Razzaz, Tajribah, p. 144.
65. Ibid., p. 124. The National Command’s increased authority in these fields
was a part of the compromise reached at the Eighth National Congress, referred to
above (see p. 121).
66. Ibid., pp. 145-46.
67. Ibid., pp. 138-39 and 149. Jadid’s later career (as well as his earlier one)
confirms this assessment. He held the post of Assistant Regional Secretary from the
time of the Feb. 23, 1966 movement until Hafiz al-Asad ousted virtually the entire
national and regional apparatus after Syria’s ineffective intervention in the Jorda­
nian civil war in September 1970. Over the years Asad had secured the support of
key army officers. Jadid still controlled the party, but he had lost his ties with the
army.
68. Ibid., pp. 132-34.
69. Ben Tsur, “ Neo-Bacth,” pp. 179-80. Razzaz’s brief summary of these
statutes corroborates Ben Tsur’s. The latter states that the statutes were “ adopted
on the basis of the resolutions of the April 1965 congresses.” He further asserts that
these April congresses rejected “ the principle of election of leaders from below.”
He has, of course, had access to documents that I have not, but it would seem that,
in respect to the civilian Bacth organization, the elective principle was retained, at
least for delegates to congresses and to commands at the regional and national
level. (The 1963 revision of the Internal Statutes had already limited the authority
of lower commands to choose their secretaries.) Party elections were no doubt
manipulated—even dictated—by the Syrian military leaders, but they were not
formally abolished. See also Rabinovich, Syria Under the Bacth, pp. 158-59.
70. Razzaz, Tajribah, p. 141. When news of Jadid’s leaving the office of Chief
of Staff leaked out, observers interpreted it as victory for Amin al-Hafiz (see
al-Jaridah (Beirut) and Baghdad Radio, Aug. 3, 1965); news of Hafiz’ departure
from the post of Commander in Chief of the army came a few days later
(al-Jaridah, Aug. 10, 1965).
71. The Command shrank from sixteen to eleven members at the March-April
1965 session of the Second Regional Congress. Razzaz, Tajribah, p. 146.
72. Ibid., pp. 145-46. Bitar had been out of the country and did not attend
either the Regional or National Congresses of spring 1965.
73. Ibid., p. 148. On p. 147 Razzaz noted that his faction could get only a
quarter of the delegates to the Congress. See al-Bacth, Aug. 16, 1965 and Arab
Political Documents 1965, pp. 302-3, for the statement issued at the end of this
congress.
74. Razzaz, Tajribah, pp. 150-51. The four are named as supporters of Jadid in
al-Jaridah (Beirut), Aug. 16, 1965.
75. Al-Jaridah, Sept. 3, 1965. The other four were Nur al-Din Atasi, Jamil
Shayya, and Fayiz Jasim—all regionalists—plus Hasan Muraywid, a “ progressive
citizen.” Radio Damascus, Aug. 23, 1965.
76. MEM, Dec. 25, 1965, pp. 2-3. See Rabinovich, Syria Under the Ba^th, pp.
180 ff., for a discussion of these and subsequent events.
77. Razzaz, Tajribah, p. 156.
78. Ibid., p. 164.
79. Ibid., p. 163.
Military Ascendancy in Syria 307

80. Ibid., p. 182. The names are given in Suleiman, Political Parties in
Lebanon, pp. 128-29, note 23.
81. Razzaz, Tajribah, p. 178.
82. Ibid., p. 181.
83. See J. Jabale, “ La Crise du Ba’th,’’ Cahiers de L'Orient Contemporaine
(April 1966), pp. 6-12.
84. Rabinovich, Syria Under the Bacth, pp. 195-202.
85. MEM, March 5, 1966.
86. Radio Damascus, March 13, 1966.
 - 17 -

Concluding Observations

The events of February 1966 were, of course, far from the final chapter in
the story of the Bacth. But they mark a major, essential change and, as
such, a proper place to conclude this study. Since that time a very different
situation has prevailed, with two Bacth parties in existence, each claiming
legitimacy as the descendant of the original. Headquartered respectively in
Damascus and Baghdad, each has a National Command with representa­
tives of other regions on it. Each has a more or less notional structure in the
other’s region, and, in several Arab countries, there are two Bacth
organizations, one loyal to Baghdad, the other to Damascus. Following the
emergence of a Bacth-ruled state in Iraq in the summer of 1968, Michel
cAflaq and a handful of his followers joined the Baghdad-based Bacth
party, of which cAflaq is Secretary General and Shibli cAysami Assistant
Secretary General. For the most part, cAflaq has resided outside Iraq, and
his role has been a titular one.
With separate Bacth parties in power in two Arab states, competing with
one another and demonstrating an ability to rule their respective countries,
it does not seem possible to give anything like a definitive pronouncement
on the Bacth’s place in twentieth-century Arab politics; such a statement
must come at a later time. Nonetheless, some observations on its first
quarter century of existence are in order.
February 23, 1966 and its aftermath were characteristic of the Bacth
Party in a way, and might even be said to have carried on a party
tradition—a tradition of division—for factionalism has plagued the Bacth
from its very beginning. The party even started as a dual movement; Zaki
Arsuzi on the one hand, and cAflaq on the other, simultaneously attracted
groups of disciples in the early 1940s. These early disciples perpetuated the
divergent views and personal animosities of the two leaders within the
party. The merger of the Arab Socialist and the Bacth Parties generated
enormous tensions in the organization over the relatively short period that
the merger was in effect. These stresses gravely damaged the party in
Syria, had unfortunate repercussions in other regions, and, exacerbated by
310 THE BACTH PARTY

the subsequent dispute within the Bacth over its proper relationship to
Nasir, very nearly destroyed the party. It was already dissolved in Syria
when cAbdallah Rimawi took a large faction out of the party to support
Nasir in his quest for Arab unity to be followed by Rikabi and other Iraqis.
Bacth organizations in other regions were small and weak at that time.
As the party re-emerged in the 1960s, those of a strong radical persuasion
broke with the leaders and were expelled in early 1964. The struggle
between regionalists and pan-Arabists in Syria led to the major split of
February 1966. To a large extent, this division still exists—Baghdad is
more pan-Arabist than is Damascus—but the Syrian regime fractured again
in 1970, and yet another splinter group went into exile.
These recurrent divisions have harmed the party, sometimes depriving
it of able leaders, and time after time reducing its cadre of militants.
Different divisions were caused by different factors—some ideological,
some personal; some noble, some base. Moreover, many members
dropped out of the party over the years, including some of its founders.
Most of those prominent in the 1950s were gone from the Bacth roster by
1965; the bulk of those who lasted that long withdrew in the aftermath of
the February 1966 events. The factional splits and the departure of
members reflected a lack of consensus as to how the party should seek to
achieve its goals and, in some cases, what those goals were. From the very
beginning, diverse ideological points of view had been worked into the
party platform and structure. For years this diversity of views was, to a
large extent, overlooked in the party’s concentration on the drive for Arab
unity. Once a measure of Arab unity had been achieved, at the cost of the
Bacth’s submission to Nasir and the UAR’s failure, differences over issues
of social policy, form of government, and economic structure began to rise
to the surface.
The history of the Bacth Party, despite its civilian origin and fairly
conventional political beginnings, demonstrates the overriding importance
of military establishments as agents of political change in the contemporary
Arab world. The military came to dominate the party in Syria and to
provide the backdrop for an authoritarian style of government in Iraq.
Should the party come to power in another Arab state, the military would
probably have a similar position of importance there. In this field the Bacth
is merely paralleling the general line of development in the Arab world
since World War H, a period which has witnessed the substitution of
authoritarian military-based systems for Western-imported representative
government.
Yet the Bacth has been a major force on the Arab scene for a quarter of a
century, sometimes in ways that accord with the ideals of its originators,
and sometimes not. The writing and propaganda of its leaders paved the
Concluding Observations 311

way for the formation of the United Arab Republic, the sole practical
attempt at institutionalizing the unity so ardently advocated by Arabs. Both
the attempt at unity and its failure were of vast importance to the
subsequent history of the Arab East. The atmosphere of the late 1950s is
hard to re-create now, but pan-Arabism was a real political force in those
years. It contributed to the demise of several conservative regimes and was
a constant worry to others. The Bacth was the first, and only true, pan-Arab
party to appear in the Arab world. It had the misfortune, in a way, to come
up against the powerful, ambitious, and charismatic Nasir; he became the
active agent of Arab unity and, indirectly, the cause of the metamorphosis
of the Syrian Bacth into a “ regional” party.
In the sphere of liberation, the Bacth also played an important part. It
cannot claim to be the agent of deliverance from foreign or “ reactionary”
control for any Arab state. It helped in some, Iraq and Syria, for example,
as an element of the “ nationalist” forces struggling against traditional rule.
Its message helped to form a climate of opinion which favored the overturn
of such governments, though precise measurement of the significance of
that help is not possible. And the Baçth came, under the rule of the soldiers
in Syria and later in Iraq, to take an active role in the Palestine question,
sponsoring guerilla activity aimed at liberating Arab-claimed territory.
One area to which the Party founders, at any rate cAfIaq and Bitar, paid
little attention is that of improvement of material conditions for peasants
and laborers. Beginning at a time when the Communist Parties in the Arab
world virtually monopolized the word socialist, the Bacth offered a
non-Marxist, Arab nationalist, and rather moderate brand of that political
philosophy. Some of its militants tried to advance the cause of social
justice in the 1950s but got little support from the leaders. The Bacth
government in Syria during the 1960s has put into practice most of the
social and economic prescripts of the 1947 Bacth Party constitution, a
document which has been overtaken in the political sphere by develop­
ments throughout the Arab world. Syria today has a moderate form of
socialism; half the economy is in the public sector, half in the private. The
government makes substantial efforts to improve the lot of peasants, who
make up the bulk of the population, increasing the scope and the quality of
education, providing public services, and the like. Iraq is moving in the
same direction, although with some differences; the regime has had less
time in office and it places more emphasis on the public sector.
In Syria, the party has provided a mechanism by which the military
rules. The Bacthists in Syria have developed a one-party government that
has ruled with little change for ten years, no mean achievement in light of
the turbulent post-war political history of that country. The Bacth is like the
Neo-Destour Party of Tunisia in some ways, although the comparison
312 THE BACTH PARTY

cannot be pushed too far. In the Arab world, it is second only to the
Tunisian party in longevity as a political party that ultimately came to rule a
country. But the Bacth is not dependent on a single leader. The party has
survived many changes in its leadership and continues to do so.
The Bacth stands in marked contrast to Algeria’s FLN, which led the
struggle for independence but which has not been significant as a
mechanism of government or as an element of political support for those
who run Algeria today. In Syria, the party remains important to the soldiers
who govern the country, as witnessed by Asad’s takeover in 1970. Though
he ousted a legally chosen Regional Command, Asad and his followers
immediately issued a justification of their action, appointed a temporary
provisional command, and proceeded to new party elections within a
matter of months. A similar development took place in Iraq where,
following the abortive coup attempt of July 1973, the leaders at least
promised to move to party elections to choose a new command.
The Bacth has definitively opted for the system of the single-Party state.
The party apparatus provides the road for the ambitious to take if they wish
to reach the top. The career advantage probably lies now with the Bacthist
who is a military officer rather than with his civilian counterpart. But this
will not necessarily prevail forever. Military officers from small rural
towns took over the Syrian and Iraqi parties in the 1960s, replacing a
city-oriented ruling class. Times change and, while a military career still
offers chance of upward mobility to a disadvantaged Syrian or Iraqi, the
avenue of the party bureaucracy, with its pyramidal structure, schools for
cadres, and rewards for loyal service is an attractive alternative. Either path
is one which the party’s founders could hardly have foreseen as they met in
tiny groups in Damascus thirty-five years ago.
 Epilogue

Nearly nine years have passed since the bloody day in February 1966 that
tore the Bacth Party asunder. Nonetheless, the Bacth movements still
flourish. Bacthism has developed in ways its founders could not have
imagined thirty-five years ago. The change in the party’s direction is partly
due to changes in the environment in which the movement operates—the
Arab states are all independent and involved in the superpower rivalry that
affects the Middle East, for example; it is also partly due to the manner in
which party members have taken the movement and adapted it to interests
which they perceived as vitally important, although the founders did not.
In one very major respect, the Bacth has lived up to its revolutionary
intent. In both Syria and Iraq the once-dominant ruling groups have been
completely eliminated from power. In each country, both the nature of the
group that controls the government and the system by which it rules owe
much to ideas preached by the Bacth movement of the past. And each of the
two separate party organizations has come to see a greater degree of power
accumulate in the hands of one figure: Hafiz al-Asad in Syria and Saddam
Tikriti in Iraq. Neither is totally free of the influence of others, but neither
functions in a collegial system of power-sharing.
This epilogue surveys the principal issues and events involving the
Bacth since the February 1966 split. Developments in Syria and in Iraq, the
principal centers of Bacth power, have followed very different routes;
hence they are treated separately below.
In Syria, the coup of February 23 firmly and finally established the
paramountcy of the military and their regionalist supporters. They were not
further challenged by the old guard which, as the events of late 1965 and
early 1966 demonstrated, had little strength left in the party and virtually
none in the army. Within a year or so, a fair number of the old-guard senior
leadership drifted to Beirut and its environs, joining Syrian politicians of
earlier years and different persuasions in that natural refuge of Arab
political exiles. Some of the old guard quit the Bacth altogether. Bitar
renounced any connection with “ all Baaths” in 1968, confessing that his
party had been overtaken by the course of events and then destroyed by the
1966 “ putsch.” 1
314 THE BACTH PARTY

Syria’s successful military Bacthists nonetheless carried on the tradition

of division, which had characterized the party from its earliest days. The
military committee, which had seen one of its founding members,
Muhammed cUmran, defect to the side of the old guard a couple years
before, lost a second founder shortly after the February coup. Hamad
cUbayd, a Druze officer, was a member of the Provisional Regional
Command appointed just after the coup. After he failed to be elected to the
regular command chosen at the March 1966 Regional Congress, he
dropped out of political life.
Later in the year, yet another Druze officer and military committee
founder, Salim Hatum, whose commando troops had borne the brunt of the
fighting in February, fled abroad after failing in a bizarre effort to take over
the government. At one time during the attempt he held both Salah Jadid
and Nur al-din Atasi hostages in the provincial capital of Suwayda. But he
released them, either, as he told it, to avoid bloodshed and in the belief that
the leaders in Damascus would strike a compromise with him or, as others
put it, to avoid an assault being prepared by the Syrian army. Damascus
accused Hatum of collaborating with the old guard, specifically cAflaq,
Bitar, and Razzaz. But ascribing blame to them was almost a ritual matter,
and their involvement in Hatum’s attempt is unlikely. More worrisome to
the Syrian regime was the support rendered to Hatum by workers in various
cities. Clearly the labor scene was not properly orchestrated in Syria.
Some effort of the sort Hatum tried was probably inevitable during the
jockeying for power that went on within the regionalist group once it had
established its dominance over the old guard once and for all. Further
evidence of differences within the ruling establishment showed up in the
dismissal of a number of military officers at the end of 1966, including yet
another founding member of the military committee. In their efforts to
establish legitimacy, the new party leaders went to the extent of holding a
National Congress, the ninth, in September 1966, just a few weeks after
the Hatum incident. The Congress chose a National Command dominated
by seven Syrians but including three Jordanians (at least two of whom were
of Palestinian background), two Lebanese, and a Yemeni. There were no
Iraqis. The Congress admitted that the method used in ousting the previous
government was not compatible with party tradition but justified the action
as the only way “ to save the Party and the revolution” from the forces
represented by the former leaders,2 and from their rightist mentality.
Very striking in the statement issued by this congress is the new and
different emphasis given to the Palestine issue. The statement denounced
following “ the traditional approach to the liberation of Palestine,” which
had allowed Israel to come into being and to maintain its existence.
Because reactionary Arab regimes would use arms to crush the masses
Epilogue 315

rather than to liberate Palestine, progressive regimes should not join with
them. For the Bacth, “ the Palestine cause is the principal axis of the Party’s
strategy in all fields. . . . ” The Congress condemned Arab summit confer­
ences that brought kings and republican presidents together to continue the
traditional approach to the Palestine question, instead of uniting “ progres­
sive forces [which] is a must for the victory of the Arab revolution’s
cause.” And, because the “ agent reactionary regime in Jordan” supported
Israel, a “ progressive front must be established” in Jordan.3 Some of these
positions had already been announced unilaterally by Damascus, while
others, especially the emphasis on the liberation struggle, had roots in the
ideological report to the Sixth Congress, discussed in Chapter 13.
The military Bacthists, and their civilian junior partners, who controlled
the party and government in Syria were, to judge by their statements, and
even more by their actions over a four-year span, doctrinaire ideologues. In
the statement just referred to, the Congress mentioned other Arab states
only to criticize them. The several monarchies were natural targets; Iraq
was deemed in need of a front of progressive parties; the UAR was not
even mentioned. Liberating Palestine became something of an obsession,
that is to say, liberating Palestine through peoples’ forces, national libera­
tion struggle, and all that those concepts implied.
These Bacth leaders were not just talkers. Within a very short time after
the ouster of the old guard, and well before the Ninth National Congress,
Syria had become host to the action army of the Palestine Liberation
Organization, Fatah (Harakat al-Tahrir al-Filastiniyah). The regime as­
sisted what was then a small, not very well-known, and ill-respected group
devoted to the liberation of Palestine through guerrilla activity in Israel.
The preferred means of operation was to send the guerrillas through Jordan
to infiltrate into Israel so that Jordan, as the take-off point for the guerrillas,
would bear the brunt of any Israeli retaliation. Activity heated up in the fall
of 1966. At least a dozen sabotage attempts were made, until the death of
three Israeli soldiers in mid-November occasioned a devastating Israeli raid
on the West Bank village of Samuc. A few days earlier, Syria and the UAR
had signed a mutual defense agreement.
The stage was being set for the June 1967 War. And the Syrian Bacth
was making the scenery, if not designing the set, or directing the play.
Border incidents continued, and relations between Syria and Jordan
deteriorated. In mid-April, six Syrian aircraft were shot down by Israeli
planes over Syrian territory. The crisis itself began in mid-May, leading, as
is well known, to war in June. On the sixth day of the war, the Israelis took
the Golan Heights area, including the provincial capital of Qunaytirah,
from the Syrians.
Despite the shatteringly quick victory of the Israelis, the Bacth regime
316 THE BACTH PARTY

doggedly continued its policies. It refused to attend the Arab summit

meeting in Khartoum, which had been called to coordinate Arab policy in
the aftermath of the debacle. Damascus justified its absence on the grounds
that such collaborative efforts were not the unification of progressive mass
forces that its doctrine prescribed as necessary for Arab success. The
regime pursued this ideological bent, remaining isolated from the main­
stream of Arab politics, for another three years. Moreover, the disaster that
struck the Arab armies in 1967 opened the way for implementation of the
concept of liberation of Palestine through people’s forces, the doctrine the
Syrian Bacth leaders espoused. For twenty years, the Palestinians had, one
way or another, looked to others to recover their land and restore their
rights. Basically, the several Arab states themselves, dominated for most
of the period by Egypt’s Nasir, had directed the effort, controlled the
Palestine Liberation Organization, decided when to fight and when not to
fight. Now, with Arab military prowess in disrepute, a new group of
activist militants, dedicated to guerrilla war to liberate Palestine, emerged,
and Palestinians as well as other Arabs were ready to heed their call.
Because the Syrian Bacth had supported a small active group of
guerrillas prior to the war, the militants naturally looked to Syria for
direction. Damascus was not found wanting, as the movement began to
grow. Readers will recall how the mystique of the “ fedayeen” took hold in
the Arab world, especially after the fighting at Karamah, east of the Jordan
River in March 1968, when Arab forces inflicted substantial casualties on
the Israelis. The notion spread that, contrary to what had happened in June
1967, the Arab guerrillas could stand up to the Israelis. Young Palestinians
flocked to join the fedayeen. And, as is not uncommon in such circum­
stances, a variety of guerrilla organizations appeared. Toward the end of
1968 the Bacth regime in Syria saw the value of sponsoring its own
guerrilla organization, SaHqah (Harakat al-Quwwat al-cAsifah), led by
Palestinian Bacthists. In 1968, as in the pre-war era, it conducted raids
through Jordanian territory for the most part, and worked within Lebanon
to recruit and build an organization among Palestinians there.
The convolutions of the fedayeen story are well known. The Israelis
invoked stern security measures, together with a policy of reprisal strikes
against bases in Jordan to control infiltration by the guerrillas from the east
bank of the river. By mid-1969, the Israeli efforts had cut successful
raiding down to very modest proportions. The fedayeen organizations
charged King Husayn of Jordan with impeding guerrilla access to the
cease-fire line. Fatah and other organizations increasingly voiced the view
that the existence of the Hashemite monarchy was itself an impediment to
guerrilla effectiveness and demanded complete freedom from Jordanian
government control.
Epilogue 317

In this effort, the guerrillas were given extensive support by Damascus,

in line with the Ninth Congress decision. Weapons, training, and safe
haven in Syria, if needed, were supplied to them. After several confronta­
tions between King Husayn and the guerrillas, the matter came to a head in
September 1970. The simultaneous guerrilla hijacking of three aircraft to a
desert airstrip in Jordan apparently convinced King Husayn of the need to
reassert his government’s authority. In bitter fighting which lasted for
much of September, Jordan eventually prevailed. As the battles unfolded,
Palestinian forces asked for help, and a force of tanks under Palestine
Liberation Army (PLA) insignia moved into Jordan from Syria. (The
numbers reportedly involved—two brigades and an armored division
—indicated that the Syrian army must have participated, for the PLA had
relatively little armor of its own.) The Jordanians repulsed this force,
greatly aided by the unopposed use of their aircraft. To preserve the
Palestinian status of the force, Hafiz al-Asad, then Minister of Defense and
Chief of the Syrian Air Force, did not commit Syrian planes, and insofar as
the Syrian-sponsored incursion went, the affair was over in a few days.
This incursion into Jordan led to major changes in Syria six weeks later.
In effect, it provided an opportunity for Asad to settle a factional dispute
between his supporters and the group of military and civilian Bacthists
who, by their control of the party apparatus, dominated policy-making in
the government. The parameters of the dispute between the two factions
are unclear. Each was essentially regionalist and committed both to the
Palestine cause and to economic and social reordering in Syria. Asad’s
actions since taking power indicate that the dispute revolved around
methods rather than goals, that is to say, Asad is less doctrinaire and
certainly less committed to the concept of unification of peoples’ forces as
a prerequisite for advance on the Palestine issue. And personal disputes, as
well as a desire for power, were no doubt involved.
The struggle between the two factions had gone on at a series of party
congresses in the years from 1966 to 1969. Asad had many supporters in
the party’s structure, but the Jadid-Atasi-Zucayyin faction was able at each
party congress to dominate the elections for the Regional Command and
hence the party apparatus. Although Asad himself was a member of each
Regional Command, he was virtually without supporters on any of them. A
break came after the 1967 War, when Chief of Staff Suwaydani, another
Military Committee founder, was removed from his post and replaced by
Mustafa Talas. Talas joined Asad on the Regional Command in 1968.
More importantly, Talas as Chief of Staff, and Asad as Minister of
Defense, were in the key positions to control the army, a crucial factor in
November 1970.
After the debacle in Jordan, the Tenth National Congress of the Party,
318 THE BACTH PARTY

originally convened in 1968, met in extraordinary session the first two

weeks of November. Once again, Asad and his partisans were outvoted.
This time, however, he was prepared with the sort of votes that had
counted so often in Syria before. In a bloodless maneuver, Asad dismissed
the Regional Command, as a move to “ correct” deviations of the past. In
party elections held some months later in 1971, an entire new top layer of
Bacthists emerged from the provincial party organizations to take over this
command. Many also moved into major government posts. Into jail, exile,
or retirement went the old command, among them the remaining founding
members of the military committee. Only Hafiz al-Asad was left as the
survivor of those who had met secretly a dozen years earlier in Egypt.
Thus Syria experienced its one major change of administration in the
nine years since the ouster of the old guard in 1966. Change of administra­
tion is a more apt term than coup d’état, even though the change was
accomplished by threat of force. Policy at the top changed in some
respects, but the basic functioning of the system did not. Continuity of
administration and increasing stability of governmental structure have
marked the past ten years. In 1963, the Syrian Bacthists began to place their
members and people sympathetic to the party in administrative posts at the
national and local level, civil as well as military. Provincial governors,
district directors of agriculture and agricultural reform, of communica­
tions, and even of statistics, plus other local officials in a variety of fields
were appointed and what was more important, stayed long enough to learn
their jobs, to gain experience, and to train replacements before moving on.
For example, the current Minister of Economics and Foreign Trade,
Muhammad cImadi, served in a variety of posts in the Ministry of Planning
before joining the cabinet in 1973. Foreign Minister cAbd al-Halim
Khaddam was governor of both Hama and Damascus and a senior govern­
ment lawyer before joining the cabinet in 1969.
Asad’s policy differs with that of his predecessors most markedly in the
sphere of Arab affairs. He eased pressure on Jordan and, while continuing
to support the Palestine Liberation Organization, has placed it under a
substantial measure of restraint. The organizations forming the PLO are not
encouraged nowadays to overthrow regimes unpopular with or antagonistic
to the Bacth. Most obviously, Asad turned to conventional warfare by
armies of Arab states as the way to regain territory lost to the Israelis. After
bringing Syria back from its isolated position among Arab states, he joined
with Egypt in a simultaneous attack on Israel in October 1973.
The October War restored a great measure of self-confidence to
Syrians—and to Arabs generally as well. Negotiations after the fighting
was over have restored a small slice of the land Syria lost in 1967. Most
markedly the tenor of party pronouncements has changed. “ The main
Epilogue 319

battle . . . is . . . liberating all the Arab territories occupied in the

aggression of June 1967 and guaranteeing the national rights of the
Palestinian people,” said the Regional Command statement after a party
congress in June 1974. The Congress also “ stressed the strengthening of
Arab solidarity . . . the transcendence of peripheral issues which stand in
the way of the battle. . . .” 4 This statement does not mention unification
of progressive forces as a prerequisite for success.
Within Syria, too, a certain difference of emphasis has appeared in the
past four years. Asad made a positive appeal to Syrian businessmen to
return, promising them that portions of the economy would be open for the
private entrepreneur. He also broadened the regime’s base by establishing
in 1971 the long talked-of National Progressive Front, dominated by the
Bacth, which has eight seats plus the chairmanship of the governing board.
The Arab Socialist Union (Nasirist), the Arab Socialist Party (descended
from Akram Hawrani’s old party), the Socialist Unionists (a Bacth
splinter), and the Communist Party have two seats each. In return for
joining in a subordinate role, these parties were given the opportunity to
function legally, cabinet seats, and assured legitimacy. One key area was
denied them; the Bacth reserved to itself the conduct of political activity in
the armed forces.
But above all, the transformation in Syria that impresses most is the
sweeping change in the system of government and in the people who run it,
when one compares the past ten years with the first decade of Syria’s
independence. The cabinets of the earlier period are studded with such
names as Qudsi, cAzm, Ghazzi, cAsali, Jabri, representing personally or
indirectly the powerful urban Sunni families who dominated Syrian affairs.
These family names are absent from cabinets in the 1960s and 1970s,
where less notable names of men from such provincial towns as Banias,
Tartus, and Qunaytirah, are the norm. The Regional Command rosters
reflect the same rural and small-town origin for many of the party leaders.
This out-of-city background is a natural outgrowth of the party’s recruit­
ment pattern in its early years; it has also meant a much greater role for
minorities. Very little change can be discerned between the pre-Asad and
post-Asad periods, as the following table shows. Roughly equivalent
percentages apply for military posts, although information is not so readily
available for them. In 1972, however, the three top military men were the
cAlwi Commander-in-Chief Asad, the Sunni Minister of Defense Talas,
and the Christian Chief of Staff Shakkur.
These figures demonstrate that minorities have a role in government out
of proportion to their share of the population. cAlawis are very prominent
in the army and have been since the days of the military committee. Some
would translate this fact into cAlawi domination of Syria and interpret
320 THE BACTH PARTY

S ecta ria n R epr esen ta tio n on Sy ria n R eg io n a l C om m a n d s

(by percent)

Percent o f
Overall Population
1966-69 1971 fo r Comparison
Sunni 40 45 75
°Alawi 20 20 11
Druze 8 5 3
Isma°ili 8 — 1
Muslim (sect unknown) 12 15 —

Christian (Orthodox) 8 5 5
Unknown 4 10 —

every domestic disagreement in terms of a Sunni-0Alawi clash. The serious

disturbances in Syrian cities over the proposed constitution in the spring of
1973 could be given that interpretation. Rioters protested that the constitu­
tion did not specify Islam as the religion of state. In the end, the
constitution was modified to require that the head of state be a Muslim.
It seems that the issue here is a broader one, however. The Ba°th is a
secular party, and it is heavy with minorities. The system its adherents put
into effect in the 1960s has officially ended the time-honored millet system.
In the Syrian People’s Assembly, no seats were allotted on the basis of
religion, but on a social and class basis. The law requires that workers and
peasants occupy the majority of Assembly seats. Except for the head of
state, however, any post in Syria is open to a person of any religion. This
has struck at—whether it has destroyed it or not, time will tell—the former
Sunni dominance, especially the dominance of important Sunni families
from the big cities. Naturally those who have lost influence have reacted.
What is remarkable is not that they reacted violently, but that this decade of
Ba°th rule has seen relatively little protest of this nature.
The National Congress that the victorious Syrian regionalists held in the
fall of 1966 in Damascus formally expelled the Iraqi Ba°thist leaders. If
their expulsion bothered them, they didn’t let it show. Ba°thists in Iraq
continued working clandestinely toward seizure of power. Their time came
in 1968 in two coups of July 17 and 31. In the latter, the Ba°thists
eliminated the non-Ba°thist military officers who had helped make the
seizure of power possible earlier in the month. 1963 would not happen a
second time.
Much more than in Syria, the Ba°th in Iraq has been a party of
clandestinity. Repressed by the Nuri regime, by Qasim, by various
governments under the °Arif brothers, Ba°thists had to live and work
underground. The requirements of this exercise have shaped the party and
Epilogue 321

the men who run it, putting a premium on the abilities that enable a man to
survive in that environment. Such traits do not change when people assume
office.
The Bacth organization in Iraq has not undergone the sweeping changes
at the top that Syria has in the course of recent years. Saddam Husayn
Tikriti was appointed Provisional Regional Secretary following the events
of November 1963. He is still the dominant figure among the Iraqi
Bacthists, exercising that power since 1968 from the official position of the
Assistant Regional Secretary of the party. Ahmad Hasan Bakr, President
since 1968 and Regional Secretary, is to all appearances the party’s key
link to the army. Both have party careers stretching back into the
mid-1950s. Indeed there is a sizable contingent of Iraqi Bacthists with such
backgrounds, among them current Foreign Minister Sacdun Hamadi and
the journalists Tariq cAziz and Jacfar Hammudi.
The Iraqi Bacth has maintained an association with what is left of the
old guard and the traditional Bacth leadership. cAflaq visited Iraq two or
three times in 1969, always referred to as the Secretary General of the
party, the position he still holds. The commands chosen at the Ninth and
Tenth National Congresses (of 1969 and 1970, respectively), which were
sponsored by Baghdad, include Shibli cAysami as Assistant Secretary
General and such Syrians as Ilyas Farah and Zayd Haydar, plus the
Lebanese cAbd al-Majid Rafici. (The stress on legitimacy of origin has
required each Bacth to hold parallel “ national” congresses.) cAflaq’s role
is titular; he lives in Lebanon and apparently did not visit Baghdad in the
years from 1970 to 1974. Syrians and other non-Iraqis in the national party
apparatus devote themselves largely to the broad Arab aspects of Iraqi
Bacth activities.
But the revolution has devoured its children too. Half of those who were
Regional Command members at the time of the coup in 1968 have left,
died, or been put aside. And a number of once important leaders have been
murdered in circumstances where motive and perpetrators have not been
clearly explained. (The most spectacular was the 1971 shooting of Hardan
Tikriti while he was riding in the Iraqi ambassador’s car in Kuwait.) The
amount of internecine violence that has been reported suggests that such
violence has become an established feature of Bacth politics.
This violence reached an explosive point in the attempt by one faction
within the party to unseat the leadership in July 1973. The plans misfired.
One senior general was killed, the director general of security and a score
of others were executed, and one Regional Command member was given
life after reprieve from execution. The circumstances surrounding the coup
are somewhat obscure and some doubts remain that the complete story has
yet surfaced.
322 THE BACTH PARTY

This epilogue is not meant to contrast Iraq with Syria on every point; the
circumstances of the two are much different. But the differing status of the
military is worth stressing; leaders in Iraq are civilians for the most part,
forming a strong majority on the Revolutionary Command Council—the
principal governing body. Tikriti and Bakr have worked in partnership for
a decade. The revolutionary credentials of each go back twice as far and are
impeccable. Bakr was an anti-Nuri Free Officer in the 1950s and was later
jailed by Qasim. Tikriti was in the squad that tried to assassinate Qasim.
Today Bakr, from his office of President and with support of the military
establishment, controls the army. Owing to the variety of governments that
have ruled since the 1950s, the Iraqi army is not as heavily Bacthist as it is
in Syria. Precisely how this control works is not clear, aside from the
obvious caution the leaders display in giving key appointments only to
trusted officers, but work it does. And, the party has had the chance to put
large numbers of cadres in the officer corps in recent years. Nonetheless, it
is worth recalling that the army has been the ultimate arbiter of power in
Iraq since Bakr Sidqi’s coup in 1936. Nuri Sacid and the palace made an
alliance which lasted for most of the 1950s and thought they had the army
in hand. They did not allow for the great surge of nationalist and
anti-monarchical sentiment, however, that developed in the 1950s. History
will tell if something analogous is in the works now and whether the party
leaders have assessed their military supporters carefully enough.
Politically, the party has been careful to keep the sources of power in its
own hands. Its methods include the staffing of government ministries with
Bacth members wherever possible. After a considerable period of rather
brutal repression, the regime made a peace of sorts with the Communist
Party and its Soviet patron. April 1972 saw the conclusion of a friendship
treaty with the USSR; May, the entry of two Communists into the cabinet,
and the year was to have seen the final establishment of a progressive front
among the Bacth, the Communists, and the Kurdish Democratic Party. But
the Kurds stubbornly resisted joining until Kurds got some real power with
the positions they had been promised in 1970. In the end, Baghdad had to
settle for a two-party front, completely dominated by the Bacth, which
reserved to itself the field of political activity in the army.5 The front was,
in effect, the uppermost level of a system through which the Bacth ruled.
The complex of mass organizations built up in Iraq—some by taking over
existing syndicates for workers, peasants and so on, others newly
created—is somewhat less elaborate than in Syria, but it serves the same
purpose of mobilizing the citizenry for support of the regime.
There is, of course, one major portion of the Iraqi population which
does not support this regime, or indeed any other government of the past
fifteen years. There are substantial parts of northeast Iraq which did not see
Epilogue 323

a representative of the central government for a dozen years, except

perhaps for aircraft dropping bombs and rockets. In the first full year of its
rule, 1969, the Bacth government followed the familiar path of fighting and
simultaneously trying to divide the leadership of the Kurdish Democratic
Party, but the season’s fighting was inconclusive, as it had been in prior
years. The army advanced along the roads, controlling the main towns in
Kurdistan; the guerrillas stayed in the mountains harassing and ambushing
government troops. Years of fighting had by this time pretty well consoli­
dated the Kurds under Barzani’s leadership, no small development itself,
given the bitter tribal animosities that have marked Kurdish history. By
December of 1969, the Bacth government was talking of settlement.6 Talks
between the Kurds and the Bacth began in January but stalled, owing to
internal party disagreement apparently. Only after the Tenth National
Congress met in Baghdad in the last half of February 1970 did matters
move forward to the agreement of March 11, 1970, which put an end to
fighting, granted limited autonomy to the Kurds, and specified certain
positions for Kurds in the central government.
This agreement brought four years of relative quiet, considerable
improvements in education and other cultural matters in Kurdistan, and a
certain measure of economic development spending in the Kurdish areas.
But even in the year 1970 events signaled the intransigence of the problem.
The July 16, 1970 provisional constitution acknowledged Iraq as a country
of two nationalities, Arab and Kurdish. But it specified the Revolutionary
Command Council as the highest authority in the country and limited its
membership to members of the Arab Socialist Bacth Party. The Kurds
recognized that this meant that certain decisions concerning them would be
made in Baghdad by a governing body in which they had no representation.
They never filled the vice-presidential post they were entitled to and in
1971 were asking for representation on the Revolutionary Command
Council. No matter how much local autonomy they won, the Kurds would
not have a real role in directing the central affairs of the country. It may be
that the Bacth government hoped that the aging Barzani’s death would
cause the Kurdish movement to fragment. An attempt was made to
assassinate him in 1971 but it failed.
Fighting broke out again in 1974. Learning from the past, the govern­
ment conducted a much more vigorous offensive than it had earlier. The
army was, by now, much larger, better equipped, and had experience
gained from the fighting in October 1973 on the Syrian front. The Iraqi
army had driven deep into Kurdish territory in the fall of 1974, but when
the winter snow ended the fighting season, the results were again inconclu­
sive. The Iraqis did not succeed in driving through to the Iranian border,
although they inflicted much damage and drove large numbers of people as
324 THE BACTH PARTY

refugees into Iran. The scale of lighting was much larger, as a comparison
of news correspondents’ reporting with earlier accounts testifies.7 The
March 1975 agreement between Iraq and Iran cut off the Kurds’ support,
put an end to the fighting, and restored Baghdad’s authority in the North.
In the great Arab issue of Palestine, the Iraqi Bacth has been both
doctrinaire and largely removed from the struggle. The Iraqi forces that
moved to Jordan after the 1967 war were still there in 1970, but they stood
aloof from the fighting between the Jordanians and the guerrilla forces in
September of that year. The Iraqis subsequently pulled their troops out. At
the same time the Bacth in Iraq has given considerable support to Pales­
tinian guerrillas in general, and it formed its own Arab Liberation Front,
headed by a Palestinian member of its National Command, in 1969. In the
past year the Bacthists took the doctrinaire side of the dispute that split the
Palestinian Liberation Organization. The Baghdad-sponsored Arab Libera­
tion Front joined with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and
the PFLP-General Command to “ reject” any means but struggle as a way
to recover Palestine. As a result, and in a manner reminiscent of Syria in
the post-1967 war period, the Bacth regime in 1974 was, to a very large
extent, isolated among the Arab states.
Elsewhere than in Syria and Iraq, Bacthists have remained active. cAbd
al-Majid Rafici, Regional Secretary of the Iraqi-supported Bacth organiza­
tion in Lebanon, was elected a member of the Lebanese Parliament in April
1972. His Lebanese regional organization has enjoyed a close association
with other progressive and socialist forces in Lebanon for several years.
There is also a pro-Syrian Bacth organization in Lebanon, now run by
cAsim Qansu. The pro-Iraqi force is the larger, but each has a press outlet
and each is active on the Lebanese scene, especially in matters affecting the
complex issue of the fedayeen and Palestine.
Indications of Bacthist activity have appeared from time to time at
opposite ends of the Arab world in recent years. A number of Bacthist
students were jailed in 1969 in Tunisia for organizing an illicit political
group; Bacthist students were among the instigators of anti-Bourguiba
demonstrations there in 1972. A dozen students in the Sudan were
sentenced in October 1974 for establishing a party organization. And a
Sudanese member of the Iraqi-sponsored National Command died in a
plane crash en route to Sudan during the short-lived 1971 Communist
putsch against Numayri. The Yemeni army’s takeover in June 1974 was
explained by that country’s Chief of Staff as necessary to forestall a seizure
of power by the Bacthist faction beholden to Iraq.8 Whether he is correct or
not, a Bacthist organization has functioned in Yemen most of the time since
the Egyptians left in 1967.
At the close of 1974, Bacthism is still a going concern. Bacthists are
Epilogue 325

active in well over half the Arab countries—Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the
Gulf states, in addition to those noted above. In that respect, it may still be
said to be a pan-Arab movement. In other respects, it is a riven movement.
The great split of February 1966 has grown wider with the years. Bom in
division, frequently fractured, still divided, the Bacth movement reflects
the state of Arab relations in the mid-1970’s and indeed is a cause of those
relations.
Solidarity among states has replaced unification of states as the deter­
mining factor of pan-Arab politics. Egypt and Syria planned and carried
out a coordinated attack in October 1973. Iraq sent its forces to fight at
Syria’s side in that struggle, even though the two regimes are bitter
enemies, disputing not only the common Bacth heritage but oil transit
revenues and sharing of Euphrates River water. Egypt and Saudi Arabia,
despite their past enmity, work together on the issue of Palestine. These
cooperative efforts function in a way that never worked when the Bacth and
other pan-Arabists sought to forge a unified Arab state. Arab unity is dead
and its prophets are now old men whose vanished goals are but dreams.
Social justice and a better life for the masses are this generation’s goals, to
be sought within the state boundaries laid down half a century and more
ago. Those boundaries, dividing al-Ummah al-cArabiyah, spawned the
ideology of pan-Arab unity in the years between the two World Wars as the
only way to solve the region’s problems. These same boundaries then
defeated the unifiers’ best efforts to erase theih. The original Bacth
movement failed to generate a powerful pan-Arab unity movement; its
successors’ horizons are more limited and its goals perhaps more possible
to achieve.

Notes
1. Bitar, “ Rise and Decline,” Pt. 2, pp. 13-16, especially last two pages.
2. Statement by the National Command, Damascus Radio, Oct. 31, 1966.
3. Ibid.
4. Statement by the Regional Command, Damascus Radio, June 20, 1974.
5. See Arab World, May 31, 1972, pp. 11-12, for the desires of the Kurds and
the Communists in regard to the Front.
6. See, for example, “ How to Solve the Kurdish Issue,” al-Thawrah
(Baghdad), Dec. 17, 1969.
7. Compare Dana Adams Schmidt, Journey Among Brave Men (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1964), with Smith Hempstone’s series in the Washington Star-News, Aug.
31-Sept. 5, 1974.
8. Arab World, June 26, 1974, p. 8.
 A p p e n d ix A

National Congresses and Commands

(A single source is given where possible; in other cases, the lists have been
constructed from references in party documents and its press.)

First: April 4-6, 1947, Damascus

Approval Of Constitution of Hizb al-Bacth al-cArabi
National Command (called Executive Committee—al-hay’ah al-
tanfidhiyah—then)
Michel cAflaq (Secretary General) (Syrian)
Salah Bitar (Syrian)
Wahib al-Ghanim (Syrian)
Jalal al-Sayyid (Syrian)
(Nidal I, 167)

Second: June 1954, Damascus

Attended by representatives from Syria, Jordan, Iraq, and Lebanon,
who had been sent by constituted party organizations.
Settled some matters brought about by the merger with the Arab
Socialist Party.
Adopted an Internal Statute (operating rules) proposed by the Syrian
Region.
National Command
Michel cAflaq (Secretary General)
Akram Hawrani (Syrian)
Salah Bitar (Syrian)
Fu’ad Rikabi* (Iraqi)
cAli Jabir* (Lebanese)
cAbdallah Rimawi* (Jordanian)
cAbdallah Nacwas (Jordanian)
*(Rikabi, Jabir, and Rimawi were the Secretaries of their respective
Regions.)
328 THE BACTH PARTY

Third: August 28-September 1, 1959, Beirut

Attended by representatives from Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, North Africa,
Arabian Peninsula, the Gulf, and South Arabia.
Called to deal with problems caused by the dissolution of the party in
Syria; it approved the dissolution.
cAbdallah Rimawi and his followers—most of the Jordanian
delegation—quit/were expelled from the party.
National Command—enlarged to ten members
Michel cAflaq (Secretary General)
cAli Jabir (Lebanese)
cAbd al-Wahhab Shumitli (Lebanese)
Ghassan Shararah (Lebanese)
Fu’ad Rikabi (Iraqi)
Talib Shabib (Iraqi)
Sacdun Hamadi (Iraqi)
Khalid Yashruti (Palestinian, in Lebanese
organization)
Munif Razzaz (Jordanian)
Amin Shuqayr (Jordanian)

Fourth: Late August 1960, Beirut

Held to deal with matters left unresolved at Third National Congress.
Repudiated the previous Congress’ approval of the decision to dissolve
the party in Syria; made efforts to invigorate the party.
National Command
Michel cAflaq (Secretary General)
Talib Shabib (Iraqi)
Faysal Habib Khayzaran (Iraqi)
Khalid cAli Salih Dulaymi* (Iraqi)
cAli Jabir (Lebanese)
cAbd al-Wahhab Shumitli (Lebanese)
Ghassan Shararah (Lebanese)
Ghalib Yaghi (Lebanese)
Khalid Yashruti (Palestinian)
Munif Razzaz (Jordanian)
♦Probably a member.

Fifth: Mid-May 1962, Homs

Held in the wake of Syria’s secession from the UAR.
Authorized the Secretary General to re-constitute the party in Syria.
National Command
Michel cAflaq (Secretary General)
Appendix A 329

cAli Salih Sacdi (Iraqi)

Hamdi cAbd al-Majid (Iraqi)
cAli Jabir (Lebanese)
Jibran Majdalani (Lebanese)
cAbd al-Majid Rafici (Lebanese)
Khalid al-cAli (Lebanese)
Khalid Yashruti (Palestinian)
Munif Razzaz (Jordanian)
Amin Shuqayr (Jordanian)

Sixth: October 5-23, 1963, Damascus

Held while Bacth in power in Syria and Iraq.
Leftward movement apparent in text of decisions; military officers
appear on National Command; Syrians reappear on National
Command. Internal Statute revised.
National Command—enlarged to thirteen members
Michel cAflaq (Secretary General)
Amin al-Hafiz (Syrian) Military
Salah Jadid (Syrian) Military
Hammud al-Shufi (Syrian)
cAli Salih Sacdi (Iraqi)
Hamdi cAbd al-Majid (Iraqi)
Muhsin Shaykh Radi (Iraqi)
Ahmad Hasan Bakr (Iraqi) Military
Salih Mahdi cAmmash (Iraqi) Military
Jibran Majdalani (Lebanese)
Khalid al-cAli (Lebanese)
Munif Razzaz (Jordanian)
cAbd al-Muhsin Abu Mayzar (Jordanian)
(al-Nahar, reported on Jerusalem Radio November 3, 1963)

Seventh: February 12-18, 1964, Damascus

Held after party’s loss of control in Iraq; Ali Salih Sacdi and supporters
expelled; leftist trend of Sixth Congress reversed.
National Command
Michel cAflaq (Secretary General)
Amin al-Hafiz (Syrian) Military
Salah Jadid (Syrian) Military
Muhammad cUmran (Syrian) Military
Mansur al-Atrash (Syrian)
Shibli cAysami (Syrian)
Ahmad Hasan Bakr (Iraqi) Military
330 THE BACTH PARTY

Jibran Majdalani (Lebanese)

Khalid al-cAli (Lebanese)
cAbd al-Majid Rafici (Lebanese)
cAli Khalil (Lebanese)
Munif Razzaz (Jordanian)
cAli Ghannam (Saudi)
(al-Nahar in Arab World, February 26, 1964, p. 9)

Eighth: Early May 1965, Damascus

Replacement of cAflaq as Secretary General.
Struggle for control of Syria reached into this meeting.
National Command
Munif Razzaz (Secretary General)
Michel cAflaq (Syrian)
Amin al-Hafiz (Syrian) Military
Mansur al-Atrash (Syrian)
Shibli cAysami (Syrian)
Hafiz al-Asad (Syrian) Military
Ibrahim Makhus (Syrian)
Ahmad Hasan Bakr* (Iraqi) Military
Karim Mahmud Shantaf (Iraqi)
Jibran Majdalani (Lebanese)
cAli Khalil (Lebanese)
cAli Ghannam (Saudi)
One additional member is unknown.
*Probably a member, though he was in jail at the time.

With the split in the party that developed after February 1966, two National
structures developed, one in Damascus and one in Baghdad. The former
convened a National Congress in October 1966 and chose the following
National Command:
Nur al-Din Atasi (Syrian)
Salah Jadid (Syrian)
Yusuf Zucayyin (Syrian)
Ibrahim Makhus (Syrian)
Kamil al-Husayn (Syrian)
Muhammad al-Zucbi (Syrian)
Mustafa Rustum (Syrian)
Malik al-Amin (Lebanese)
Muhammad cAwdah (Lebanese)
cAli cAqil (Yemeni)
Dhafi Jumcani (Jordanian)
Appendix A 331

Mahmud Mucaytah (Jordanian)

Hakim al-Fayiz (Jordanian)

The Iraqi-based party convened a National Congress in 1969 and chose the
following Command, which is not complete:
Michel cAflaq (Secretary General)
Shibli cAysami (Asst. Secretary General)
Zayd Haydar (Syrian)
Muhammad Sulayman (Syrian)
Ilyas Farah (Syrian)
cAbd al-Majid Rafici (Lebanese)
Tariq cAziz (Iraqi)
Shafiq Kamali (Iraqi)

About a year earlier, some forty cAflaq supporters—mostly exiles living in

Lebanon—had met in a “ National” Congress in Beirut and had chosen
a Command, with cAflaq as Secretary General and with the Iraqis,
headed by Ahmad Hasan Bakr, in numerical preponderance. Many
old-time cAflaqists, e.g., Majdalani, Khalil, Atrash, Razzaz, Bitar,
refused to attend.
(al-Nahar, February 23, 1968)
 A p p e n d ix B

Regional Congresses and Commands—

Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon

I. Syria—Regional Congresses and Commands

Before Dissolution
First: March 1954
Arranged matters after the merger with Hawrani’s ASP and prepared
for the Second National Congress.
Second: 1955 (probably in March)
This congress was tumultuous; disagreements led to suspension of
publication of al-Bacth for a year.
Third: July 9-12, 1957

Post-UAR
(The party started numbering Syrian congresses anew, as if those held in
the days of the merger had not occurred.)

Provisional Regional Command

Appointed by the National Command, June 1962 (incomplete):
Hammud al-Shufi
Salah al-Din Bitar
cAbd al-Karim Zuhur

First Regional Congress September 10-16, 1963

Hammud al-Shufi (Secretary)
Nur al-Din Atasi
Khalid al-Hakim
Muhammad Nawfal
Ahmad Abu Salih
Hamad cUbayd Military
334 THE BACTH PARTY

Hafiz al-Asad Military

Muhammad Rabah al-Tawil Military
(Suleiman, Political Parties, p. 126)

First Regional Congress

Extraordinary Session February 1-5, 1964
Regional Command
Amin al-Hafiz Military
Muhammand cUmran Military
Salah Jadid Military
Hamad cUbayd Military
Muhammad Rabah al-Tawil Military
cAbd al-Karim al-Jundi Military
Hafiz al-Asad Military
Shibli cAysami (Secretary)
Nur al-Din Atasi
Sami al-Jundi
Walid Talib
Yusuf Zucayyin
Mahmud Jayyush
Jamil Shayya
Sulayman cAli
Fahmi al-cAshuri (Assistant Secretary)
(This Congress dealtwith problems stemming from the Sacdi
faction’s actions in Iraq; it recommended his and three other
expulsions. New command strongly regionalist.)

Second Regional Congress March 17-April 5, 1965

Regional Command
Amin al-Hafiz (Secretary) Military
Muhammad Zucbi (Assistant Secretary)
Salah Jadid Military
Hamad cUbayd Military
Jamil Shayya
Nur al-Din Atasi
Yusuf Zucayyin
Habib Haddad
Mustafa Rustum
cAdnan Shuman
Walid Talib
(Rabinovich, Syria Under the Bacth, p. 226)
Appendix B 335

Second Regional Congress

Extraordinary Session June 11-13, 1965
(According to an interview with a Bacth spokesman in al-Jaridah of
June 15, 1965, this congress discussed a number of Arab
problems, e.g., what the party’s position should be on Nasir,
Syria’s role in summit conferences. It also debated and ap­
proved a party program. It did not elect a new command.)

Second Regional Congress

Extraordinary Session August 8-14, 1965
Regional Command
Amin al-Hafiz (Secretary) Military
Salah Jadid Military
Hamad cUbayd Military
cAbd al-Karim Jundi Military
Mustafa Talas Military
Muhammad Rabah Tawil Military
Salim Hatum Military
Mustafa Rustum Military
Nur al-Din Atasi
Yusuf Zucayyin
Jamil Shayya
Muhammad cId al-Shawi
Husam Hayzah
Marwan Habash
Fa’iz al-Jasim
Muhammad Zucbi
(Arab Political Documents 1965, p. 303)

(This command was dismissed in December 1965 by the National

Command.)

Provisional Regional Command

Appointed by the National Command after dismissal of Regional
Command on December 21, 1965. It consisted of all members
of the National Command plus five Syrians appointed. (Some
National Command members were not in Syria or otherwise
not available to participate.)
Syrians
Michel cAflaq
Amin al-Hafiz
Mansur al-Atrash
336 THE BACTH PARTY

Shibli cAysami
Ibrahim Makhus
Hafiz al-Asad
Syrians Appointed
Salah Bitar
Ilyas Far ah
Zayd Haydar
Sulayman al-cAli
cAbd al-Qadir al-Nayyal
Other
Munif Razzaz
Jibran Majdalani
cAli Khalil
cAli Ghannam
Karim Mahmud Shantaf
Ahmad Hasan Bakr
(Radio Damascus, December 24, 1965)

Provisional Regional Command

Appointed following ouster of Hafiz, cAflaq, etc. by coup of
February 23, 1965
Salah Jadid Military
Salim Hatum Military
Muhammad Rabah al-Tawil Military
cAbd al-Karim Jundi Military
Mustafa Talas Military
Hamad cUbayd Military
Mustafa Rustum Military
Nur al-Din Atasi
Yusuf Zucayyin
Muhammad cId al-Shawi
Muhammad Zucbi
Marwan Habash
Fa’iz Jasim
Jamil Shayya
(Suleiman, Political Parties, p. 127)

Regional Command
Elected at Extraordinary Session of Second Regional Congress,
March 10-13 and 20-27, 1966
Salah Jadid Military
Ahmad Suwaydani Military
Appendix B 337

Muhammad Rabah al-Tawil Military

cAbd al-Karim Jundi Military
Hafiz al-Asad Military
Mustafa Rustum Military
Nur al-Din Atasi
Yusuf Zucayyin
Muhammad cId al-Shawi
Muhammad Zucbi
Marwan Habash
Fa’iz Jasim
Jamil Shayya
Habib Haddad
Kamil Husayn
Ibrahim Makhus
(Radio Damascus, March 27, 1966)

n. Iraq— Regional Congresses and Commands

First: December 1955 (list incomplete)

Fu’ad Rikabi, Secretary
Shams al-Din Kazim
Faysal Habib Khayzaran (probably)
Second: Late 1957
Fu’ad Rikabi, Secretary
Khalid cAli Salih al-Dulaymi
Midhat Ibrahim Jumcah
cAbdallah Rikabi
Talib Husayn Shabib
Karim Mahmud Shantaf
Ayyad Sacid Thabit
(Rikabi, al-Hall al-Awhad, p. 29)

Provisional Regional Command

Appointed by National Command, late 1959
Talib Husayn Shabib, Secretary
cAli Salih Sacdi
Sacdun Hamadi
Faysal Habib Khayzaran
Hazim Jawad
Khalid cAli Salih al-Dulaymi
338 THE BACTH PARTY

Shabib’s naming is substantiated; of the others all but Dulaymi were

out of Iraq and were natural appointments, but are educated
guesses.

Third: July 1960

Talib Husayn Shabib, Secretary
Sacdun Hamadi
Hazim Jawad
Faysal Habib Khayzaran
cAli Salih Sacdi
This congress was held in considerable secrecy. Many Bacth leaders
were still in jail following the Qasim assassination trials.
Except for Shabib and Sacdi, the list is conjectural. Hamid
Khalkhal and/or Muhsin Shaykh Radi may have been mem­
bers.

Fourth: May 1962

cAli Salih Sacdi, Secretary
Hamdi cAbd al-Majid
Hani al-Fukayki
Sacdun Hamadi
Hazim Jawad
Hamid Khalkhal
Muhsin Shaykh Radi
Talib Husayn Shabib
The civilian members of the NCRC appointed in February 1963
equate with the existing Regional Command.

Fifth: September 13-25, 1963

Hamdi cAbd al-Majid, Secretary
Hani Fakiki
Abu Talib al-Hashimi
Hazim Jawad
Hamid Khalkhal
cAdnan Qassab
cAli Salih Sacdi
Muhsin Shaykh Radi
Jawad and Qassab were the anti-Sacdists. This list, lacking one
name, has been constructed from various sources. The com­
mand was dissolved by the National Command on November
14, 1963.
Appendix B 339

Extraordinary Session o f Fifth Congress November 11, 1963

Ahmad Hasan Bakr
cAbd al-Sattar cAbd-al-Latif
Muhammad Mihdawi
Salih Mahdi cAmmash
Mundhir Wandawi
Tahir Yahya
cAli cAbd al-Karim
Fa’iq Bazzaz
Tariq cAziz
cAbd al-Sattar Duri
Hazim Jawad
Fuad Shakir Mustafa
Talib Husayn Shabib
Karim Mahmud Shantaf
Salim Sultan
Hassan Hajj Waddai
(Arab Political Documents 1963, p. 470)
The National Command dissolved this command on November 14,
1963.

Provisional Regional Command

Appointed by the National Command, February 1964
Saddam Husayn Tikriti, Secretary
Salih Mahdi cAmmash
Ahmad Taha cAzzuz
Muhammad Mahjub
cAbdallah Sallum Samarra’i
Karim Mahmud Shantaf
Hardan Tikriti
(Of these, five are named in al-Nahar, cited in Arab World, February
26, 1964. cAmmash and Shantaf are educated guesses.)

in. Jordan—Regional Commands

Because of conditions under which the Bacth operated, information on
the Regional Commands in Jordan is sparse. The first two lists
represent the major Bacth leaders for the respective periods, rather
than particular commands.

From 1950 to 1959

cAbdallah Rimawi (Secretary)
Bahjat Abu Gharbiyah
340 THE BACTH PARTY

Ibrahim al-Ayid
Sulayman al-Hadidi
'Abdallah Na'was
Munif Razzaz
Amin Shuqayr

From September 1959 to 1965

Munif Razzaz (Secretary)
cAbd-al-Muhsin Abu Mayzar
Amin Shuqayr
Jamal Sha'ir
Mahmud Mu'aytah

Regional Command as of May 1966

cAbd al-Ghani Musa al-Nahar (Secretary)
Wasfi Ya'qub 'Azar
Ayid Hanna Biqa'in
Fahd Najib Faniq
Fayiz al-Suhaymat
Munir al-Jundi
Jirjis Madinat
Ahmad al-Najdawi
(Statement by Biqa'in after he and other members were arrested.
First five identified selves. Radio Amman, August 15-17,
1966.)
This command probably was appointed in 1965 after Razzaz became
Secretary General.

IV. Lebanon—Regional Congresses and Commands

First: 1956
'A li Jabir
'A bd al-Majid Rafi'i
'Abd al-Wahhab Shumitli
Khalid Yashruti
Ghassan Shararah
Ghalib Yaghi
This list is constructed from references and educated guesswork.

There almost certainly was a regional congress in 1959 before the Third
National Congress, and another in January 1961.
Appendix B 341

1962: Held prior to April 20, 1962, on which date the Lebanese
Regional Command requested that a National Congress be held in
May. The Regional Command chosen at this Regional Congress
was dissolved by order of the National Command in August 1962
for dismissing Bacthists loyal to the National Command.
Al-Bacth, September 22, 1962. The following were probably
among the members.
cAli Jabir
Ghassan Shararah
cAbd al-Wahhab Shumitli
Ghalib Yaghi

1962: Provisional Regional Command, appointed in the latter part of

1962. The following probably were members.
Khalid al-cAli
cAli Khalil
Jibran Majdalani
cAbd al-Majid Rafici
Khalid Yashruti
Muhammad Khayr Duwayri

1963: Regional Command selected prior to the Sixth National Con­

gress. This command also split over the issues of ideology
signified by Sa'di’s faction. Among the members were:
Muhammad Khayr Duwayri (possibly Secretary)
cAli Jabir
cAbd al-Majid Rafi'i
Jibran Majdalani

1964: February. Provisional Regional Command, appointed by Na­

tional Command.
Khalid al-Ali
cAli Khalil
Jibran Majdalani
cAbd al-Majid Rafi'i
Khalid Yashruti
(al-Nahar in Arab World, March 4, 1964)
 A p p e n d ix C

A Small Profile of Leading Party Members

The following table shows the religion, education and profession, insofar
as they are known, of the 122 persons who are listed in Appendixes A and
B as members of the National Command or the Regional Commands of
Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Jordan from the party’s founding until the split
of 1966. Information is most complete on Syrians, and then on Lebanese,
Iraqis, and Jordanians, respectively. In most cases where educational level
is “ unknown,” a presumption of at least a bachelor’s degree or equivalent
could be made, but this table does not do so. Most Bacthists seem to have
completed college; Saddam Husayn Tikriti of Iraq is a rarity in that party
work so preoccupied him that he did not get a degree until 1970.

Saudi
Lebanon Syria Iraq Jordan Arabia Total
12 52 36 21 1 122
Religion
Sunni 2 22 6 8 1 39
Shici 3 17 8 28
(Alawi 6)
(Druze 7)
(Ismacili 4)
Other Muslim 3 5 15 — — 23
Greek Orthodox 1 2 — 1 — 4
Other Christian — 1 — — — 1
Unknown 3 5 7 12 — 27

Education
Bachelor’s 5 21 12 3 1 42
Higher 4 15 3 2 — 24
Military — 10 8 1 — 19
Unknown 3 6 13 15 — 37
344 THE BACTH PARTY

Saudi
Lebanon Syria Iraq Jordan Arabia Total
Profession
Medicine 1 8 1 1 — 11
Law 1 8 2 3 — 14
Letters 5 12 7 1 — 25
Military — 11 8 — — 19
Other 1 9 5 4 1 20
Unknown 4 4 13 12 —
33

Because this tabulation includes original party members as well as later

recruits—even a few who entered the party in the 1960s—it tends to
obscure certain developments which the pattern of recruiting brought
about, e.g., the rise to power of members of religious minorities and of
persons from provincial origins. In Syria, these trends show in the minority
representation of the founding members of the Bacth Military Organiza­
tion. Of fourteen members, more than half were from minorities—four
cAlawis, two Druzes, and two Ismacilis—and three were Sunnis; of the
remaining three, one appears to have been an cAlawi. There were no
Christians. The confessional breakdown of Syrian Regional Commands in
the 1966-1969 period shows approximately the same percentages as in the
table above; of the twenty-five, ten were Sunnis, nine were from Muslim
minorities—five cAlawis, two Druzes, two Ismacilis—two were Christian,
and the religion of the remaining four is not known, though three were
Muslims. But military men dominate the professional breakdown (eight of
the twenty-five). Fourteen of the number are of provincial origin, only
three from major cities (eight are unknown).
In the case of Iraq, the tabulation shows a larger number of Shicis than
Sunnis, because several of the early Bacth leaders, e.g., Fu’ad Rikabi and
Talib Shabib, were of that sect. Most of the “ other Muslim” and
“ unknown” categories probably are Sunnis. The composition of the party
and government leadership since the Bacth took power in 1968, shows an
overwhelming majority of people from the Sunni populated regions of
Tikrit, Samarra, Hadithah, and Ana. While this perpetuates the Sunni Arab
dominance of Iraq since independence, it also portrays—as in Syria—a
shift in the origins of political leaders from big-city families to provincials.
 A p p e n d ix D

The Constitution of the Bacth Party

Adopted in April 1947

Arab Nationalism: An Anthology, ed. Sylvia G. Haim, pp. 233-41.

Copyright © 1962 by The Regents of the University of California;
reprinted by permission of the University of California Press.

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES

First Principle: Unity and Freedom o f the Arab Nation

th e a rab s form one nation. This nation has the natural right to live in a
single state and to be free to direct its own destiny.
The Party of the Arab Ba‘th therefore believes that:
1) The Arab fatherland constitutes an indivisible political and
economic unity. No Arab country can live apart from the others.
2) The Arab nation constitutes a cultural unity. Any differences exist­
ing among its sons are accidental and unimportant. They will all disappear
with the awakening of the Arab consciousness.
3) The Arab fatherland belongs to the Arabs. They alone have the right
to administer its affairs, to dispose of its wealth, and to direct its destinies.

Second Principle: Personality o f the Arab Nation

The Arab nation is characterized by virtues which are the result of its
successive rebirths. These virtues are characterized by vitality and crea­
tiveness and by an ability for transformation and renewal. Its renewal is
always linked to growth in personal freedom, and harmony between its
evolution and the national interest.
The Party of the Arab Ba‘th therefore believes that:
1) Freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of belief, as well
as artistic freedom, are sacred. No authority can diminish them.
346 THE BACTH PARTY

2) The value of the citizens is measured—once all opportunities have

been given them—by the action they take to further the progress and
prosperity of the Arab nation, without regard to any other criterion.

Third Principle: The Mission o f the Arab Nation

The Arab nation has an eternal mission. This mission reveals itself in ever
new and related forms through the different stages of history. It aims at the
renewal of human values, at the quickening of human progress, at
increasing harmony and mutual help among the nations.
The Party of the Arab Ba‘th therefore believes that:
1) Colonialism and all that goes with it is a criminal enterprise. The
Arabs must fight it with all possible means, just as they must take it on
themselves to help, according to their physical and moral abilities, all
peoples fighting for their freedom.
2) Humanity constitutes a whole, the interests of which are solidary
and the values and civilization of which are common to all. The Arabs are
enriched by world civilization and enrich it in their turn. They stretch a
fraternal hand to other nations and collaborate with them for the establish­
ment of just institutions which will ensure for all the peoples prosperity and
peace, as well as moral and spiritual advance.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

Article 1 The Party of the “ Arab Ba‘th” is a universal Arab Party. It has
branches in all the Arab countries. It does not concern itself with regional
politics except in relation to the higher interests of the Arab cause.
Article 2 The headquarters of the party is for the time being located in
Damascus. It can be transferred to any other Arab city if the national
interest should require it.
Article 3 The Party of the Arab Ba‘th is a national party. It believes that
nationalism is a living and eternal reality. It believes that the feeling of
national awakening which intimately unites the individual to his nation is a
sacred feeling. This feeling has within itself a potential of creative power; it
binds itself to sacrifice, it seeks the exercise of responsibilities, and it
directs the individual personality in a concrete and active manner.
The national idea to which the party appeals is the will of the Arab
people to free themselves and to unite. It demands that the opportunity be
given to it to realize in history its Arab personality, and to collaborate with
all the nations in all the fields which will ensure the march of humanity
toward welfare and progress.
Article 4 The Party of the Arab Ba‘th is a socialist party. It believes that
socialism is a necessity which emanates from the depth of Arab nationalism
Appendix D 347

itself. Socialism constitutes, in fact, the ideal social order which will allow
the Arab people to realize its possibilities and to enable its genius to
flourish, and which will ensure for the nation constant progress in its
material and moral output. It makes possible a trustful brotherhood among
its members.
Article 5 The Party of the Arab Ba‘th is a popular party. It believes that
sovereignty is the property of the people, who alone is the source of all
authority. It believes that the value of the state is the outcome of the will of
the masses from which it issues and that this value is sacred only to the
extent that the masses have exercised their choice freely. That is why, in
the accomplishment of its mission, the party relies on the people with
whom it seeks to establish intricate contact, the spiritual, moral, material,
and physical level of whom it is trying to raise, in order that the people may
become conscious of its personality and that it may become able to exercise
its right in private and public life.
Article 6 The Party of the Arab Ba‘th is revolutionary. It believes that
its main objectives for the realization of the renaissance of Arab
nationalism or for the establishment of socialism cannot be achieved except
by means of revolution and struggle. To rely on slow evolution and to be
satisfied with a partial and superficial reform is to threaten these aims and
to conduce to their failure and their loss.
This is why the party decides in favor of:
1) The struggle against foreign colonialism, in order to liberate the
Arab fatherland completely and finally.
2) The struggle to gather all the Arabs in a single independent state.
3) The overthrow of the present faulty structure, an overthrow which
will include all the sectors of intellectual, economic, social, and political
life.
Article 7 The Arab fatherland is that part of the globe inhabited by the
Arab nation which stretches from the Taurus Mountain, the Pocht-i-Kouh
Mountains, the Gulf of Basra, the Arab Ocean, the Ethiopian Mountains,
the Sahara, the Atlantic Ocean, and the Mediterranean.
Article 8 The official language of the state, as well as that of all the
citizens, is Arabic. It alone is recognized in correspondence and in
teaching.
Article 9 The emblem of the Arab state is that of the Arab revolution
begun in 1916 to liberate and unify the Arab nation.
Article 10 An Arab is he whose language is Arabic, who has lived on
Arab soil, or who, after having been assimilated to Arab life, has faith in
his belonging to the Arab nation.
Article 11 To be excluded from the Arab fatherland: whoever has fought
for or has belonged to a factious anti-Arab association, whoever has lent
himself inside the Arab fatherland to colonial ends.
348 THE BACTH PARTY

Article 12 The Arab woman enjoys all the rights of citizenship. The
party struggles to raise up woman’s level in order to make her fit to
exercise these rights.
Article 13 The party strives to give all the citizens the same oppor­
tunities in the field of schooling and livelihood in order that, in the various
aspects of human activity, everyone should be equally able to show his real
abilities and to develop them to the maximum.

t h e w a y : i n t e r n a l p o l ic y - o f t h e p a r t y

Article 14 The regime of the Arab state will be a constitutional parliamen­

tary regime. Executive power is responsible before the legislative, which is
directly elected by the people.
Article 15 The national tie is the only tie that may exist in the Arab
state. It ensures harmony among all the citizens by melting them in the
crucible of a single nation and counteracts all religious, communal, tribal,
racial, or regional factions.
Article 16 The administrative system of the Arab state is a system of
decentralization.
Article 17 The party strives to make popular feeling universal and to
make the power of the people a living reality in the life of the individual. It
undertakes to give the state a constitution guaranteeing to all Arab citizens
absolute equality before the law, the right to express their opinions in
absolute freedom, and a true choice of their representatives, thus ensuring
for them a free life within the framework of the law.
Article 18 A single code of laws is to be established freely for the whole
of the Arab nation. This code will be in conformity with the spirit of the
times and will take into account the past experiences of the Arab nation.
Article 19 The judicial power will be independent. It will be free from
interference by other powers and enjoy total immunity.
Article 20 The rights of citizenship are granted in their totality to every
citizen living on Arab soil who is devoted to the Arab fatherland and who
has no connection with any factious association.
Article 21 Military service is compulsory in the Arab fatherland.

FOREIGN POLICY OF THE PARTY

Article 22 The foreign policy of the Arab state will be guided by the
interests of Arab nationalism and of the eternal mission of the Arabs which
seeks to establish in cooperation with other nations a free, harmonious, and
secure world, continuously advancing in progress.
Appendix D 349

Article 23 The Arabs will struggle with all their power to destroy the
foundations of colonialism and of foreign occupation and to suppress all
foreign political or economic influence in their country.
Article 24 Since the Arab people is the sole source of power, all treaties,
pacts, and documents concluded by governments which detract from the
total sovereignty of the Arabs will be abrogated.
Article 25 Arab foreign policy seeks to give a true picture of the will of
the Arabs to live in freedom, and of their sincere desire to see all other
nations enjoy the same liberty.

ECONOMIC POLICY OF THE PARTY

Article 26 The Party of the Arab Ba‘th is a socialist party. It believes that
the economic wealth of the fatherland belongs to the nation.
Article 27 The present distribution of wealth in the Arab fatherland is
unjust. Therefore a review and a just redistribution will become necessary.
Article 28 The equality of all the citizens is founded on human values.
This is why the party forbids the exploitation of the work of others.
Article 29 Public utilities, extensive natural resources, big industry, and
the means of transport are the property of the nation. The state will manage
them directly and will abolish private companies and foreign concessions.
Article 30 Ownership of agricultural land will be so limited as to be in
proportion to the means of the proprietor to exploit all his lands without
exploitation of the efforts of others. This will be under the control of the
state and in conformity with its over-all economic plan.
Article 31 Small industrial ownership will be so limited as to be related
to the standard of living of the citizens of the state as a whole.
Article 32 Workers will participate in the management of their factory.
In addition to their wages—fixed by the state—they will receive a propor­
tion of the profits, also fixed by the state.
Article 33 Ownership of immovable property is allowed to all the
citizens so long as they do not exploit it to the harm of others, and so long
as the state ensures for all citizens a minimum of immovable property.
Article 34 Property and inheritance are two natural rights. They are
protected within the limits of the national interest.
Article 35 Usurious loans are prohibited between citizens. One state
bank is to be founded to issue currency, which the national output will
back. This bank will finance the vital agricultural and industrial plans of
the nation.
Article 36 The state will control directly internal and external trade in
order to abolish the exploitation of the consumer by the producer. The state
350 THE BACTH PARTY

will protect them both, as it will protect the national output against the
competition of foreign foods and will ensure equilibrium between exports
and imports.
Article 37 General planning, inspired by the most modem economic
ideas, will be organized so that the Arab fatherland will be industrialized,
national production developed, new outlets opened for it, and the industrial
economy of each region directed according to its potential and to the raw
material it contains.

SOCIAL POLICY OF THE PARTY

Article 38 Family, Procreation, Marriage.

§1) The family is the basic cell of the nation. It is for the state to
protect, to develop, and to help it.
§2) Procreation is a trust given in the first place to the family, and then
to the state. Both must ensure its increase, and look to the health and
education of the descendants.
§3) Marriage is a national duty. The state must encourage it, facilitate
it, and control it.
Article 39 Public Health. The state will build, at its expense, institutions
of preventive medicine, dispensaries, and hospitals which will meet the
needs of all citizens, for whom the state ensures free medical treatment.
Article 40 Labor.
§1) Labor is an obligation for all those who are capable of it. It is for
the state to ensure that work is available to every citizen, whether
intellectual or manual.
§2) The employer must ensure at the least a decent standard of living
for his employee.
§3) The state sees to the maintenance of all persons incapable of work.
§4) Just laws will be promulgated to limit the workman’s daily hours of
work, to give him the right to paid weekly and annual holidays, to protect
his rights, to ensure social security for him in old age, and to indemnify
him for any cessation of work, whether partial or total.
§5) Free workmen’s and peasants’ unions will be established and
encouraged, so that they may constitute an instrument efficient in the
defense of their rights, in raising their standard of living, in developing
their abilities, in increasing the opportunities offered to them, in creating
among them a spirit of solidarity, and in representing them in joint works
councils.
§6) Joint works councils will be created in which the state and the
unions of workmen and peasants will be represented. These councils will
have power to decide the issues arising among the unions, the works
managers, and the representatives of the state.
Appendix D 351

Article 41 Culture and Society.

§1) The party seeks to develop a general national culture for the whole
Arab fatherland which shall be Arab, liberal, progressive, extensive,
profound, and humanist; it attempts to disseminate it in all sections of the
population.
§2) The state is responsible for the protection of the liberty of speech,
of publication, of assembly, of protest, and of the press, within the limits
of the higher Arab national interest. It is for the state to facilitate all the
means and the modalities which tend to realize this liberty.
§3) Intellectual work is one of the most sacred kinds. It is the state’s
concern to protect and encourage intellectuals and scientists.
§4) Within the limits of the Arab national idea, every freedom will be
given for the foundation of clubs, associations, parties, youth groupings,
and tourist organizations, as well as for obtaining profit from the cinema,
radio, television, and all the other facilities of modem civilization in order
to spread generally the national culture, and to contribute to the entertain­
ment of the people.
Article 42 Separation of the classes and differentiation among them are
abolished. The separation of the classes is the consequence of a faulty
social order. Therefore, the party carries on its struggle among the laboring
and oppressed classes of society so that such separation and differentiation
will come to an end and the citizens will recover the whole of their human
dignity and will be enabled to live in the shadow of a just social order in
which nothing will distinguish one citizen from another except intellectual
capacity and manual skill.
Article 43 Nomadism. Nomadism is a primitive social state. It de­
creases the national output and makes an important part of the nation a
paralyzed member and an obstacle to its development and progress. The
party struggles for the sedentarization of nomads by the grant of lands to
them, for the abolition of tribal customs, and for the application to the
nomads of the laws of the state.

POLICY OF THE PARTY IN EDUCATION AND TEACHING

The educational policy of the party aims at the creation of a new Arab
generation which believes in the unity of the nation, and in the eternity of
its mission. This policy, based on scientific reasoning, will be freed from
the shackles of superstitions and reactionary traditions; it will be imbued
with the spirit of optimism, of struggle, and of solidarity among all citizens
in the carrying out of a total Arab revolution, and in the cause of human
progress.
352 THE BACTH PARTY

Therefore the party decides as follows:

Article 44 A national Arab stamp will mark all the aspects of intellec­
tual, economic, political, architectural, and artistic life. The party estab­
lishes once again the links of the Arab nation with its glorious history and
urges it toward a future even more glorious and more exemplary.
Article 45 Teaching is one of the exclusive functions of the state.
Therefore, all foreign and private educational institutions are abolished.
Article 46 Education at all stages shall be free for all citizens. Primary
and secondary education shall be compulsory.
Article 47 Professional schools with the most modem equipment shall
be established, where education shall be free.
Article 48 Teaching careers and all that relates to education are set aside
for Arab citizens. An exception to this rule is made in the instance of higher
education.

AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION

Single Article The fundamental and general principles of the Constitution

cannot be amended. Other articles may, however, be amended, provided
that two-thirds of the General Council of the party agree thereto, on a
motion put by the Executive Council, or by a quarter of the members of the
General Council, or by ten members of the Party Organization.
 Bibliography

This is a selected list of material consulted in preparing this study. It does

not pretend to cover all articles or other material dealing with the Bacth.
From 1958 to 1963 or so, a fairly large number of pieces on the Bacth
appeared; some were purely reportorial and are now outdated, some merely
repeated conventional wisdom, and a few were poorly done. Items in those
categories have not been included in this bibliography.

GENERAL

Collections

Arab Political Documents 1963-1965. 3 vols. Beirut: American University

Press, 1964-1966.

Nidal al-Bacth (Bashir Dacuq, ed.), Beirut: Dar al-Talicah, 1963-1965.

Seven volumes:
I 1943-1949—to the Zacim coup in Syria.
II 1949-1954—Syrian Region.
HI 1954-1958—Syrian Region; ends with formation of UAR.
IV 1955-1961—The National Command.
V 1953-1958—Iraqi Region.
VI 1961-1963—The National Command, through the Sixth Na­
tional Congress.
VII 1958-1963—Iraqi Region, up to the eve of the February 1963
coup.

Nidal Hizb al-Bacth al-cArabi al-lshtiraki cAbr Mu’tamaratihi al-

Qawmiyah 1947-1964 and Nidal . . . cAbr Bayanat Qiyadatihi al-
Qawmiyah (Bashir Dacuq, ed.) 2 vols. Beirut: Dar al-Talicah, 1971.
Some new material but much from earlier seven volumes.

U.S. Government, Foreign Broadcast Information Service. Transcripts of

foreign radio broadcasts, cited in the text by the city from which the
broadcast originated.
354 THE BACTH PARTY

British Broadcasting Corporation. Summary o f World Broadcasts.

Chronologies, Yearbooks, Summaries

The Arab World, Beirut. A daily survey of the Arab press.

Cahiers de l’Orient Contemporain.
Chronology o f Arab Politics 1963-1966. 4 vols. Beirut, American Univer­
sity Press, 1964-1967.
Mid-East Mirror. Weekly survey. Cairo and (later) Beirut.
Middle East Journal. Chronology, quarterly in each issue.
Middle East Record. Vols. I and H, 1960 and 1961 (Y. Oron, ed.),
Jerusalem, 1955-65.
Mizan. Central Asian Research Bureau, London.
Oriento Moderno. Chronology of events.
Press Review. U.S. Legation/Embassy, Damascus, 1947-1958.

Principal Bacth Party Newspapers

al-Bacth (Damascus), three separately numbered series;

a. July 3, 1946-May 26, 1950, published as a daily, but several times
suppressed, on occasion for extended periods. From May 26, 1950
the paper appeared as a weekly until suppressed on January 27,
1952. The paper reappeared on April 8, 1954 as a daily; after several
months it became a weekly until it ceased publication on February
26, 1955. The final issue was No. 677.
b. April 20, 1956-April 20, 1958. Weekly, numbers 1-95.
c. July 21, 1962, eleven weekly issues, then closed until March 12,
1963; since then it has appeared as a daily.

al-Sahafah (Beirut). Began November 11, 1958 as a daily, changed to a

weekly April 4, 1960, and ceased publication in November 1960.

al-Ahrar (Beirut). March 26, 1964-March 1, 1966 as a daily. Weekly from

mid-March 1966 until suspended in August 1967.

Other Newspapers

al-Ahram (Cairo)
Iraq Times (Baghdad)
Bibliography 355

al-Jaridah (Beirut)
Jerusalem Post
L'Orient (Beirut)
New York Times

BOOKS

cAbd al-Da’im, Abdallah, al-Ishtirakiyah wa al-Dimuqratiyah (Socialism

and Democracy). Beirut: Dar al-Adab, 1961.
--------- . al-Jil al-cArabi al-Jadid (The New Arab Age). Beirut: Dar al-cIlm
li al-Malayin, 1961.
--------- . al-Qawmiyah wa al-Insaniyah (Nationalism and Humanity).
Beirut: Dar al-Adab, 1957.
--------- . al-Watan al-cArabi.wa al-Thawrah (The Arab Homeland and the
Revolution). Beirut: Dar al-Adab, 1963.
cAbd al-Nasir, Jamal. President Gamal Abdel-Nasser's Speeches and
Press Interviews, 1958, 1959, January-March 1960. Cairo, 1959 and
1960.
cAbd al-Rahim, Mahmud. Qiyadat Hizb al-Bacth al-Murtad (The Leader­
ship o f the Renegade Bacth Party). Cairo: Dar al-Qawmiyah li
al-Tibacah wa al-Nashr, 1963.
--------- . al-Shacb al-cArabi Yudin al-cAflaqiyin (The Arab People Despise
the Aflaqites). Cairo: Dar al-Qawmiyah li al-Tibacah wa al-Nashr,
1963.
Abidi, Aqil Hyder Hasan. Jordan, a Political Study, 1948-1957. New
York: Asia Publishing House, 1965.
Abu Jaber, Kamel S. The Arab Ba’th Socialist Party. Syracuse, N.Y.:
Syracuse University Press, 1966.
cAflaq, Michel. Macrakat al-Masir al-Wahid (The Battle o f the Sole Des­
tiny). Beirut: Dar al-cIlm li al-Malayin, 1958.
--------- . Fi Sabil al-Bacth (Towards the Resurrection). Beirut: Dar
al-Talicah, 1963. Enlarged and re-arranged from 1959 edition.
cAflaq, Michel, et al. Dirasat fi al-Ishtirakiyah (Studies in Socialism).
Beirut: Dar al-Talicah, 1960.
--------- , Munif Razzaz, et al. Dirasat fi al-Qawmiyah (Studies in
Nationalism). Beirut: Dar al-Talicah, 1960.
--------- , ----------, Akram Hawrani, Jamal Atasi. Haw I al-Qawmiyah wa
al-Ishtirakiyah (On Nationalism and Socialism). Cairo: al-Matbacah
al-cAlamiyah, 1957.
cAllush, Naji. al-Thawrah wa al-Jamahir (The Revolution and the
Masses). Beirut: Dar al-Talicah, 1962.
356 THE BACTH PARTY

--------- . Fi Sabil al-Harakah al-cArabiyah al-Thawriyah al-Shamilah

(Towards the Comprehensive Arab Revolutionary Movement). Beirut:
Dar al-Talicah, 1963.
Arsuzi, Zaki. al-Ummah al-cArabiyah: mahiyatuha, risalatuha,
mashakiluha (The Arab Nation: its essence, its mission, its problems).
Damascus: Dar al-Yaqza al-cArabiyah, 1958.
Atasi, Jamal, Yasin al-Hafiz, Ilyas Murqus, cAbd al-Karim Zuhur. Fi
al-Fikr al-Siyasi (On Political Thought). Damascus: Dar Dimishq,
1963. 2 vols.
cAysami, Shibli. Hawl al-Wihdah al-cArabiyah (On Arab Unity).
Damascus: Matbacat ibn Zaydun, 1957.
Anon. Azmat al-Bacth al-cArabi al-Ishtiraki min Khilal Tajribatihi f i
al-cIraq (The Crisis o f the Arab Socialist Bacth Deriving from Its
Experiences in Iraq). Beirut: Dar al-Shacb, 1964. This is an apologia by
Sacdi’s faction.
al-Bakri, cAbd al-Majid Shawqi. al-Bacth: Rati Khamis li al-Isticmar (The
Bacth: Fifth Column o f Imperialism). Mosul: Matbacat al-Jumhuriyah,
1964.
Be’eri, Eliezer. Army Officers in Arab Politics and Society. New York:
Praeger, 1970.
Bitar, Salah al-Din, and Michel cAflaq. al-Qawmiyah al-cArabiyah wa
Mawqifuha min al-Shuyuciyah (Arab Nationalism and Its Stand on
Communism). Damascus: Maktab al-Bacth al-cArabi, 1944.
--------- . Al-Siyasah al-cArabiyah bayn al-Mabda' wa al-Tatbiq (Arab
Policy in Principle and Practice). Beirut: Dar al-Talicah, 1960.
Cleveland, William L. The Making o f an Arab Nationalist. Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971.
Dann, Uriel. Iraq Under Qassem. New York: Praeger, 1969.
Glubb, John B. A Soldier With the Arabs. London: Hodder and Stoughton,
1957.
Haddad, George M. Revolutions and Military Rule in the Middle East. Vol.
II: The Arab States. New York: Robert Speller and Sons, 1971.
Haddad, Robert M. Syrian Christians in Muslim Society. Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1970.
al-Hafiz, Yasin. Hawl Bacd Qadaya al-Thawrah al-cArabiyah (Concerning
Some Issues o f the Arab Revolution). Beirut: Dar al-Talicah, 1965.
Haim, Sylvia G. Arab Nationalism: An Anthology. Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1962.
Hanna, Sami A ., and George H. Gardner. Arab Socialism: A Documentary
Survey. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1969.
Hashshad, cAdli, and cAtiyah cAbd al-Jawad. Suqut al-Infisal (The End o f
the Secession). Cairo: Dar al-Qawmiyah li al-Tibacah wa al-Nashr,
1963.
Bibliography 357

Hawrani, Akram, R a y al-Ustadh Akram al-Hawrani fi al-Wihdah

al-cArabiyah (The Views o f Professor Akram al-Hawrani on Arab
Unity). Damascus: no publisher, 1962 (May).
Hurewitz, J. C. Middle East Politics: the Military Dimension. New York:
Praeger, 1969.
al-Jundi, Sami. al-Bacth. Beirut: Dar al-Nahar li al-Nashr, 1969.
Kerr, Malcolm. The Arab Cold War 1958-1964. London: Oxford Univer­
sity Press, 1965.
Khadduri, Majid. Republican Iraq. London: Oxford University Press,
1969.
--------- . Arab Contemporaries: The Role o f Personalities in Politics.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1973.
Khalil, Ali. The Socialist Parties in Syria and Lebanon. Unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, The American University, Washington, D.C.,
1962.
Kirk, George. Contemporary Arab Politics. New York: Praeger, 1961.
Longrigg, S.H. Syria and Lebanon Under the French Mandate. London:
Oxford University Press, 1958.
al-Madi, Munib, and Sulayman Musa. Ta’rikh al-Urdunn fi al-Qarn
al-cIshrin. (The History o f Jordan in the Twentieth Century). Beirut:
Maktabah Ras Beirut, 1959?
Majdalani, Jibran, and others. Limadha Tarakna al-Hizb al-Taqaddumi
al-Ishtiraki (Why We Left the Progressive Socialist Party). Beirut: no
publisher indicated, 1956.
Man Hum f i al-cAlam al-cArabi (Who's Who in the Arab World). Vol. I,
Syria. Damascus: Maktab al-Dirasat al-Suriyah wa al-cArabiyah, 1957.
Mirsky, G.I. Soviet View o f Arab Nationalism. Moscow, 1965. (Transla­
tion by Joint Publications Research Service, No. 40,767, April 25,
1967.)
Monroe, Elizabeth. Britain’s Moment in the Middle East. Baltimore, Johns
Hopkins Press, 1963.
Naji, Hilal. The Bloody Hands in Iraq. Cairo: Kamak Publishing House,
1961.
Nutting, Anthony. Nasser. New York: E.P. Dutton, 1972.
Qubain, Fahim I. Crisis in Lebanon. Washington: Middle East Institute,
1961.
Rabinovich, Itamar. Syria Under the Bacth 1963-1966; The Army-Party
Symbiosis. Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1972.
Razzaz, Munif. The Evolution o f the Meaning o f Nationalism. New York:
Doubleday, 1963.
--------- . Limadha al-Ishtirakiyah al-An? (Why Socialism Now?)
Jerusalem, no date. (Also in cAflaq et al., Dirasat fi al-Ishtirakiyah,
q.v.)
358 THE BACTH PARTY

--------- . Macalim al-Hayah al-cArabiyah al-Jadidah (Landmarks o f the

New Arab Life). Beirut: Dar al-cIlm li al-Malayin, 1960. (Originally
published in Cairo, 1953).
--------- . al-Tajribah al-Murrah (The Bitter Experience). Beirut: Dar
Ghandur, 1967.
al-Rikabi, Fu’ad. al-Hall al-Awhad (The Only Solution). Cairo: al-
Sharikah al-Arabiyah li al-Tibacah wa al-Nashr, 1963.
Rimawi, cAbdallah. al-Harakah al-cArabiyah al-Wahidah (The One Arab
Movement). Beirut: Dar al-Nashr li al-Jamiciyin, 1964.
Saab, Edouard. La Syrie ou la Révolution dans la rancoeur. Paris: Julliard,
1968.
Safadi, Mutac. Hizb al-Bacth, Ma’sat al-Mawlid, Ma’sat al-Nihayah (The
Bacth Party, Its Tragic Birth, Its Tragic End). Beirut: Dar al-Adab,
1964.
Schmidt, Dana Adams. Journey Among Brave Men. Boston: Little, Brown
and Co., 1964.
Seale, Patrick. The Struggle fo r Syria: a Study o f Post-war Arab Politics,
1945-1958. London: Oxford University Press, 1965.
Shwadran, Benjamin. The Power Struggle in Iraq. New York: Council for
Middle Eastern Affairs, 1960.
Smolansky, Oies M. The Soviet Union and the Arab East Under
Khrushchev. Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1974.
Suleiman, Michael W. Political Parties in Lebanon. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
University Press, 1967.
Torrey, Gordon H. Syrian Politics and the Military, 1945-1958.
Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1964.
cUmran, Muhammad. Tajribati fi al-Thawrah. Beirut: no publisher indi­
cated, 1970.
Van Dusen, Michael H. Intra- and Inter-Generational Conflict in the
Syrian Army. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Johns Hopkins Univer­
sity, 1971.
Vanly, Ismet Cheriff. Le Kurdistan Irakien Entité Nationale: Etude de la
Revolution 1961. Neuchâtel: Editions de la Baconnière, 1970.
Vernier, Bernard. Armée et Politique au Moyen-Orient. Paris: Payot,
1966.
Yodfat, Aryeh. Arab Politics in the Soviet Mirror. Jerusalem: Israel
Universities Press, 1973.
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ARTICLES

cAbd al-Da’im ,cAbdallah. “ Min Stalin wa Khruschchev ila al-Ishtirakiyah

al-cArabiyah” (From Stalin and Khrushchev to Arab Socialism),
al-Macrifah (Ministry of Culture and Guidance, Damascus), Vol. 3,
No. 29 (July 1964), 6-15.
Ben-Moshe, Eliezer. “ The Test of the Ba’th,” New Outlook (Tel Aviv),
Vol. HI (July-August, 1960), 30-33.
Ben-Tsur, Avraham. “ The Neo-Ba’th Party of Syria,” Journal o f Con­
temporary History, Vol. 3, No. 3 (1968), 161-81.
--------- , ed. The Syrian Bacth Party and Israel (Documents from Internal
Party Publications), Givat Haviva, 1968.
Binder, Leonard. “ Radical Reform Nationalism in Syria and Egypt,” two
parts. The Muslim World (April and June 1959), 96-109, 213-31.
Bitar, Salah al-Din. “ Nationalisme et Socialisme,” Orient, No. 36 (4th
quarter 1965), pp. 163-67.
Bitar, Salaheddin (Salah al-Din). “ The Rise and Decline of the Baath,”
Middle East International, Nos. 3 and 4 (June and July 1971), 12-15,
13-16.
Childers, Erskine. “ Notes on a Road Past Suez,” Middle East Forum,
Vol. 39, No. 3 (March 1963), 15-18.
Delestre, Émile. “ La République arabe unie face à ITrak et au
communisme,” Orient, No. 9 (first quarter 1959), 13-22.
Devlin, John F., and Gordon H. Torrey. “ Arab Socialism,” in
Modernization o f the Arab World (Thompson and Reischauer, eds.).
New York: Van Nostrand, 1966, pp. 178-96.
Grassmuck, George. “ The Electoral Process in Iraq, 1952-1958,” Middle
East Journal, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Autumn 1960), 397-415.
Haim, Sylvia G. “ The Ba’ath in Syria,” in People and Politics in the
Middle East (Michael Curtis, ed.). New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction
Books, 1971, 132-41.
al-Hajj, Aziz. “ The Current Situation In Iraq,” World Marxist Review:
Problems o f Peace and Socialism, Vol. 6, No. 11 (November 1963),
34-41.
Jabale, J. “ La Crise du Ba’th,” Cahiers de l’Orient Contemporaine (April
1966), 6-12.
Jargy, Simon. “ Le Déclin d’un parti,” Orient, No. Il (third quarter
1959), 21-39.
--------- . “ Un page d’histoire de la révolution irakienne: le procès de Abd
al-Salam Aref,” Orient, No. 12 (fourth quarter 1959), 77-93.
--------- . “ Réalités Libanaises,” Orient, No. 9 (first quarter 1959), 46-47.
360 THE BACTH PARTY

--------- “ La Syrie, province de la R. A. U .,” Orient, No. 8 (fourth

quarter 1958), 17-32.
Kapeliuk, A. “ The Ba’ath Puts its Best Foot Forward,” New Outlook (Tel
Aviv), Vol. 8, No. 5 (July-August 1965), 34-36.
Kaylani, Nabil M. “ The Rise of the Syrian Bacth 1940-1958: Political
Success, Party Failure,” International Journal o f Middle Eastern
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Kerr, Malcolm. “ Arab Radical Notions of Democracy,” in St. Antony’s
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Khalidi, Tarif. “ A Critical Study of the Political Ideas of Michel Aflaq,”
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Majdalany, Gebran (Jibran). “ The Arab Socialist Movement,” in W. Z.
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--------- . “ The Baath Experience in Iraq,” Middle East Forum, Vol. 41,
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Oron, Yitzhak. “ The History and Ideas of the Arab Socialist Renais­
sance,” Hamizrah Hehadash Vol. IX, No. 4 (1959), 241-63. Pub­
lished in Hebrew; I used a translation.
Ostrovityanov, Yu. “ The Past and Present of the Ba’th Party’s National
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 Index
cAbd al-Da’itn, 'Abdallah, 132, 141, 199,
212-13, 290
cAbd al-Hadi, Hafiz, 176
cAbd al-Hamid, Subhi, 150
cAbd al-Ilah, Crown Prince of Iraq, 56, 119
cAbd al-Karim, cAli, 271
cAbdallah, King of Jordan, 100
cAbd al-Latif, cAbd al-Sattar, 232, 25ln,
260, 270
cAbd al-Majid, Hamdi, 191-92, 202, 232,
260, 264, 270-71, 287
cAbd al-Nasir, Jamal: on Arab unity, 28,
80-94, 120; and Suez Crisis, 73-74, 83,
88-89; a l-B a cth on, 80; as UAR leader,
115-18, 132-45, 146n, 286; andQasim,
121-22, 125-26; Soviet Union and, 127;
treatment of Bacth Party by, 128n,
131-45, 160-65, 196-97, 217-20,
310-11; unionists on, 170, 199, 205;
Bacthists on, 178-79, 200, 216-20, 235,
237-38, 283, 293, 305n; at tripartite
unity talks, 239-51; on Palestine, 316
cAbd al-Razzaq, cArif, 233
Abu Gharbiyah, Bahjat, 105, 113n, 176,
206n
Abu Salih, Ahmad, 283, 285-86
Aden, 112, 175
cAdil, Salim, 257
cAflaq, Michel: as Bacth Party founder,
7-16, 37-41, 183, 309; on Arab unity,
24-32, 53-55, 87-88, 195, 216,240-45;
on socialism, 32-35; and Bacth Party in
Syria, 47-61, 211, 281-84, 287-89,
293, 296-99, 301-2, 314; in Lebanon,
60, 63, 196, 204-5; in merged Arab
Socialist Resurrection Party, 65-74; vs.
Hawrani, 70-72, 74, 169, 200-202; on
Egypt, 83-88, 115, 195; on National
Front, 91; and Syrian Party dissolution,
94-95, 132-33, 146n, 171-73, 182,195;
on Iraq in UAR, 120, 122; on Bacthist
role in UAR, 132-35, 160-61; on Nasir,
134, 167n, 243; and Qasim, 159, 195; as
Secretary General, 170-74, 177, 184,
197-203, 206, 211; in Iraq, 221, 236,
256, 264, 270-75, 309, 321; Soviet view
of, 222; on cAzm government, 237; vs.
Sacdi, 275, 287
Agrarian Reform Law (Syria), 136-37,
198-99, 217, 295
agriculture, in Syria, 135-36, 198-99,
215-17
Ahmad, Ibrahim, 265
Ahmad, Khalid, 62n
al-A hram (Cairo): on USSR, 125; on
tripartite unity talks, 241-42, 245-46,
250, 252n
Ahwaz District (Iran), 26
al-A khbar (Cairo), 199-200
A khbar al-Yaw m (Cairo), 125
cAlawis: in Bacth Party, 7, 9, 15, 39-40; in
military, 204, 284, 293, 300-301; in
Syrian Regional Command, 320
Aleppo district, 12, 15, 39, 50, 59, 67
Alexandretta, see Sanjak of Alexan-
dretta, the
Algeria, 103, 120, 162, 281, 289
al-cAli, Khalid, 202, 205, 252n, 271
al-cAli, Sulayman, 292, 301
. A lif B a (Damascus), 80
al-cAlkawi, Dhiyab, 260
cAllush, Naji, 14, 103, 122, 172-73
cAlwan, Jasim, 199
“ American Plot,” 74-75
Amin, Majid, 151, 192
cAmir, cAbd al-Hakim, 91, 145, 160, 196,
240, 242, 249
Amman, 104
cAmmash, Salih Mahdi: in Bacth military
organization, 109, 114n, 120; and Bacth
Party in Iraq, 124, 260, 271, 286; in
coup against Qasim, 156, 232-33, 25ln;
at tripartite unity talks, 239-40
\nglo-Jordanian treaty, 104
Ankara, 4, 73
Antioch, 8
Arab Affairs Committee, 201
Arab Bacth Revolutionary Socialist Party,
176, 187, 191, 218, 323
A rab C old W ar (Kerr), 242
Arab Collective Security Pact (1950), 82
Arab common market, 85
364
al-cArabi al-Jadid, 106
Arab League, 3 ,1 2 , 25-26, 84
Arab League Manuscripts Institute, 286
Arab Legion, 102
Arab Liberation Front, 60, 324
Arab nationalism, see pan-Arabism
Arab Nationalist Movement, 239-41,
245-49
Arab Nationalists Movement, 258
Arab Nationalist Party, 8, 28, 105
Arab national pact, 71, 74, 87
Arab Resurrection Movement, fl
“ Arab Revitalization Movement,” 10
Arab Revolutionary Party, see Arab Bacth
Revolutionary Socialist Party
Arab Socialist Party, 57, 60, 319; Bacth
merger with, 15, 16, 30, 33, 40, 63-75,
309
Arab Socialist Resurrection Party, see Bacth
Party
Arab Socialist Union, 207n, 217, 246-49,
319
Arab unity, see pan-Arabism
Arab Unity Front, 239, 241, 245-49
Arif, cAbd al-Rahman, 260-61, 272-73,
275-76
cArif, cAbd al-Salam: and Iraqi revolution,
109, 119-26, 128n; pro-Nasir views of,
149, 217, 244; in coup against Qasim,
232-34; on NCRC, 260
cArif, Fu’ad, 124, 235
army: in Syria, 52-61, 63-65, 135, 137,
144-45, 199, 223,2 3 6 -38,296-97,311;
socialistic views of, 72; and UAR, 85,
91-92, 94, 196-97; in Iraq, 108-9,
118-20, 126-27, 150, 193, 256-76,
322-24; and Bacth Party, 144, 187-89,
192, 194-99, 203-4, 226-27, 296-97;
vs. National Guard, 257, 263, 272-73;
and Bacth Military Organization, 203,
281-82, 302; regionalists and, 281-303,
315-17; Alwis in, 319. See also
Bacth Military Organization; coup
d’états; National Guard
Arsuzi, Zaki, 7-15, 21n, 33, 40, 309
al-cAs, Shakir, 8
al-Asad, Hafiz: as President of Syria, 40,
224, 251,312, 313-19; in Bacth military
organization, 203, 218, 282, 284,
298-99, 302, 306n; on National
Command, 226, 297; as Bacth Secretary
General, 253n
al-cAsali, Sabri, 7, 65-14passim , 83, 88-89
cAshuri, Fahmi, 283, 290
al-Asnaj, cAbdallah, 112
Atasi, Hashim, 54
THE BACTH PARTY
al-Atasi, Jamal, 5, 10, 23, 137, 212,
216-17, 252n, 281-83, 288; on
communism, 36, 125, 222; on Arab
unity, 239, 246
Atasi, Lu’ayy, 199, 237-45, 249, 281
Atasi, Nur al-Din, 39, 283^90, 292,
300-301, 306n, 314
al-Atrash, Mansur, 40, 68, 286, 290, 292; in
National Command, 220, 287, 293, 297,
301
cAysami, Shibli: in National Command,
202, 220, 293, 297, 301; on Arab unity,
240, 243, 249, 281; visits Iraq, 252n; as
old guard member, 283, 286-87; in
Iraq’s Bacth Party, 309, 321
al-Ayyam (Damascus), 9, 139
cAziz, Tariq, 271, 321
al-cAzm, Khalid, 52-57 passim , 64, 68-70,
83, 89, 236-37
Azmah, 278n, 279n
Azmah, cAdil, 54
al-cAzmah, Bashir, 199-200
al-cAzzawi, Hatim, 166n
cAzzuz, Ahmad Taha, 157, 166n
Baghdad: as Iraqi Bacth headquarters, 41,
107, 150, 191-95, 235-36, 239, 255-76
passim ; conservatives in, 73; reaction to
United Arab States in, 117; revolutions
in, 119-20, 231-36; Qasim regime in,
120-24, 150-59; vs. Damascus as party
headquarters, 221, 309-10, 321; and
Moscow, 256
Baghdadi, cAbd al-Latif, 240
Baghdad Pact, 83-85, 91, 102, 119, 153
Bakdash, Khalid, 68, 73, 94, 116, 223
al-Bakr, Ahmad Hasan: in Iraqi military,
114n, 120, 124, 128n, 195, 251n;on
NCRC, 232, 260, 273; on unity, 240-41,
249; in National Guard, 262; in Bacth
Party Commands, 270-71, 286; and
cArif, 275; as President of Iraq, 321-22
Balfour Declaration, 224
Bandung Conference, 83-84
banks, 217
Barzani, Mulla Mustafa, 193, 266, 268-69,
323
al-Bacth: beginnings of, 12-13, 15, 23; on
Palestine, 26; on elections, 47; on
Quwatli, 49; on land reform, 58; on
military intervention, 60; on Nasir, 80;
on party dissolution, 131; on tripartite
unity, 245-46, 248; on National Guard,
Index
262; circulation of, 288
al-Bacth al-cArabi, 8-9
Bacth Military Organization: formation of,
183, 197, 203-4; in Syria, 218-19, 260,
281-302, 304n, 310-12, 313-19; in
coup against cAzm, 237-38, 250; on
tripartite unity, 241, 247-48
Bacth (Arab Socialist Resurrection) Party:
formation of, 3-5, 7-20; principles of,
23-42; and communists, 34-36, 75,
91-92,75, 102, 123-27, 149, 221-23; in
Syria, 47-61, 64-75; 187-88, 195-204,
211-21, 226-27, 309; merger with Arab
Socialist Party, 63-75; on Palestine,
49-51, 224-25; in UAR, 79-95,
115-17, 128, 131-45, 160-65, 172; vs.
Nasir, 80, 217-21; in Jordan, 99-106; in
Iraq, 106-10, 120-24, 149-59, 189-95,
254-76; in Lebanon, 110-11, 117-18,
204-6; dissolution of, 94, 116, 159,
169-84; factions of, 158-59, 170-77,
217-21, 281-303, 309-12, 313-25; on
coup d'états, 183, 189, 195, 212,
231-36; and tripartite unity talks,
241-51. See also cAflaq, Michel; Bacth
Military Organization; Bacth Party
constitution; National Command;
National Congress; Regional Command;
pan-Arabism
Bacth Party constitution, 24, 27-29, 33-34,
43n, 214, 216, 220-21, 345-52
Bazzaz, cAbd al-Rahman, 240, 242
Bazzaz, Fa’iq, 271
Ben Bella, Ahmad, 103
al-Bina (Beirut), 173
Bitar, Midhat, 12, 15, 64
Bitar, Salah al-Din: as Bacth Party founder,
7-15, 23, 31, 34-35, 38, 47-49; on
Syrian coup, 31,54; on peasants, 58-59,
311; as Minister of Foreign Affairs, 72,
90; and Arab Socialist Resurrection
Party, 67-74 passim , 94; on Arab unity,
85, 88, 95n, 197-98, 208n, 218; in UAR
Cabinet, 116, 132, 141, 143-45, 161;
and Syrian party dissolution, 146n, 182;
as old guard member, 211, 298-99,
301-2, 313; and Iraqi coup, 236; as
Prime Minister, 238-49, 281-86; on
Presidential Council, 290-91
Bitter Experience, The (Razzaz), 202
Blum government (France 1936), 35
Boumedienne, Houari, 241
Branch Command, 16-17, 66, 191, 293-94
Britain: and mandate system, 1-2, 135; Iraq
and, 5, 10, 32, 62n, 109, 119; on
communism, 73; Suez evacuation by.
365
80-82, 85, 89; and Jordan, 104, 120
businessmen: in Syria, 135-38, 196, 222,
295, 319; in Iraq, 259. See also economy
Cairo: as government headquarters, 89-90,
116-20 passim , 133-45 passim ,
196-200; and Rimawi’s party, 176;
tripartite unity talks in, 239-50
Cairo Unity Talks, 97n, 239-50
capitalism, 189, 215-16
Central Organization of the Free Officers,
109
Chadirichi, Kamal, 121, 152
Christians, 7, 24, 40-41, 118, 320
Cilicia, 8, 26
“ Committee for Regional Organization,”
275
common market, Arab, 85
Communist Party: Bacth Party and, 9,
34-36, 63-75 passim, 89, 91-92, 175,
215, 221-23, 311, 322; in Jordan,
102-5; in Iraq, 106, 108, 121-27, 129n,
149-56, 160, 192-94, 221-23, 234-35,
255-58, 276; and UAR, 116, 121, 125,
138, 145
Congress, see National Congress; Regional
Congress
constitution, see Bacth Party constitution
coup d'états: in Syria, 52-61, 196-97, 199,
223, 226, 238, 302-3, 313; in Iraq,
109-10, 118-20, 231-35, 321-22; Bacth
Party on, 183, 189, 195, 197, 212
“ Crisis of the Arab Socialist Resurrection
Party Stemming from Its Experiences in
Iraq, The" (Sacdi), 275
Czechoslovakia, 84-86, 88
Damascus, 2-15 passim, 47-48, 50, 118,
141, 159, 295; vs. Baghdad, 221,
309-10, 321 ; and unity with Egypt, 246,
249
Dann, Uriel, 232-33, 261
Dar al-Tahrir, 144
Dawalibi, Macruf, 59-60, 62n, 198
Dayr al-Zur district, 15, 47, 56
democracy, 180-82, 212-14
“ Democracy and the Democracies'' (Bitar),
31
Democratic Party of Kurdistan, 265-66,
322-23
Duexieme Bureau, 72
Druzes, 39-40, 67, 114n, 141, 204, 301,
314, 320
366
al-Dulaymi, KhalidcAli Salih, 155-57, 183,
190
Dulles, John Foster, 96n
Durubi, Sami, 281, 283, 288, 304n
al-Duwayri, Muhammad Khayr, 252n
economy, 85, 123, 219-20, 222, 291, 317;
Syrian businessmen on, 135-38, 196,
289, 295, 319
Egypt: Britain and, 1-3, 32, 80-82; and
unity with Syria, 70-72, 79-95,
200-201, 218; Anglo-French-Israeli
attack on, 73-74, 80, 88-89, 102-4,
108-9; and Iraq, 81-83, 120-28,
149-59, 193, 235-36; Czechoslovakian
arms agreement with, 84-86; Bacth Party
in, 112, 203, 218, 244; political parties
in, 133; Syrians on, 196; parliamentary
government in, 213; tripartite unity talks
in, 239-51; and Israeli War, 318-19. See
also cAbd al-Nasir, Jamal; United Arab
Republic
Egyptian National Union, 115, 132, 135
Eisenhower Doctrine, 89, 104, 117
elections, Bacth Party on, 28-31,47-49, 52,
212-14. See also parliamentary system
Fahham, Shakir, 14, 286, 304n
Farah, Ilyas, 301, 321
Fatah (Harakat a-Tahrir al-Filastiniyah),
317-18
Fawzi, Mahmud, 128n
Faysal I, 2, 5, 119
fedayeen organizations, 226, 318-19
Fertile Crescent scheme, 69-70
feudalism: Hawrani on, 5, 63-64; Bacthists
on, 35, 48, 58-59, 86, 161, 265; Nash-
on, 92; Razzaz on, 189; Kurds and, 266,
268
Firm Bond, The, 41
France: and mandate system, 1-4, 7, 135;
Bacth opposition to, 11, 13, 54;
Communist movement in, 34-35; attack
on Suez by, 73-74, 89; and Jordan,
103-4
Free Officers, 114n, 119-21, 126, 128n,
232, 322
“ Free Workers,” 65
Fukayki, Hani, 191, 260, 264, 270
Gaylani, Rashid cAli, 4 -5 , 10, 121, 124-26,
129n
Gaza, 83
THE BACTH PARTY
General Federation of Trade Unions (Syria),
291
Germany, 1, 3-5
al-Ghanim, Wahib: in Arsuzi’s party, 10,
14, 33; and Bacth Party, 15, 23, 39, 47,
55, 62n, 187; on elective process, 30; in
Syrian parliament, 68-70, 198
Ghannam, cAli, 112, 220, 293, 297, 301
Ghariri, cAbd al-Wahhab, 155, 157, 189
al-Ghazzi, Sacid, 68, 70-71, 85
Glubb, Sir John Bagot, 102, 104
Golan Heights, 226, 315
Greater Syria unity, 56, 79
guerrilla organizations, 226, 315-17,
323-24
Habusi, Shaykhun, 176
al-Hadarah, 71
Haddad, Ghassan, 238
Haddad, Sulayman, 209n
Hadid, Muhammad, 121
al-Hadidi, Sulayman, 99, 100, 107, 113n,
176, 187
al-Hadithi, Anwar cAbd al-Qadir, 260
al-Hafiz, Amin, 97n, 222, 247-249, 251,
278n, 286-302, 305n, 306n
al-Hafiz, Yasin, 124, 213, 222, 283
al-Hajj, cAziz, 257, 277n
Hajj cAli, Mustafa, 209n
al Hajj Sirri, Midhat, 166n
al-Hajj Sirri, R ifat, 154
al-Hakim, Khalid, 39, 252n, 285, 291-92
Hamadi, Sacdun, 120, 173, 260, 321
Hama district, 5, 10, 57, 63, 67-68, 219
Hamdun, Mustafa: in Syrian military, 65,
67; in UAR cabinet, 116, 131, 136, 143,
161
Hammud, Hudayb Hajj, 121
Hammudi, Sacd Qasim, 113n
Harakat al~Bacth al-cArabit 11
al-Hariri, Ziyad, 237-47 passim, 281-82,
303n
Hashemite Kingdom, 83, 99
Hashim, Ibrahim, 105
al-Hashimi, Abu Talib, 264, 270
al-Hashimi, Khalid, 233, 260
Hasib, Khayr al-Din, 258
Hatum, Salim, 67, 209n, 298, 300, 302, 314
al-Hawadith (Beirut), 144
Hawrani, Akram, 5, 10, 75n; and Bacth
Party, 7, 38, 63-75, 198-202; Arab
Socialist Party of, 15, 16,40, 59, 319; in
Palestine, 50; in Syrian government,
53-57, 60; vs. cAflaq, 70-71, 74, 87,
169, 200-202; on National Front, 91; on
UAR, 115, 131, 141, 143-44, 161, 179,
 Index
185n, 195-97, 218; in UAR cabinet,
116, 128n, 132, 134-35; on land reform,
136, 198-99; post-UAR party of, 219,
294, 301
Haydar, Zayd, 301, 321
Haykal, Hasanayn, 245-46, 248
al-Hindi, Hani, 243
Hinnawi, Sami, 31, 54-56, 189
al-Hizb al-Qawmi al-Suri, 69, 70, 111
Homs district, 12, 15, 59, 64, 66, 289, 301
Hulaywah, Shakir, 157, 159
al-Hurriyah (Baghdad), 106
Husayn, Kamal al-Din, 240
Husayn, King of Jordan, 91, 100-101, 104,
118, 316-17
al-Husri, Satic, 6n, 28
Huwaydi, Amin, 240
cImadi, Muhammad, 318
imperialism: Bacthistson, 31, 191, 198,215;
and Communists, 35, 223; Egypt on,
83-84; vs. Arab nationalism, 124-27,
132, 153; and UAR, 135, 161, 220
India, 215
Indonesia, 212-13
industry, Syrian, 217
inqilab, 26-27, 36, 43n, 53, 86
Internal Statutes, of Bacth Party, 16, 2 In,
170, 173
Iran, 324
Iraq: and British, 1-5, 10, 32; Bacth Party in,
16, 20, 28, 30, 38-39, 41, 65, 106-10,
149, 215; on union with Syria, 56,
79-80, 219; and Egypt, 81-83, 109,
120-28, 149-59, 193; as member of
United Arab States, 117; revolution in,
118-20, 212, 231-36, 310-12; Qasim
regime in, 120-28, 131, 189-95; Arab
Bacth Revolutionary Socialist Party in,
187; Bacth government in, 220-22,
255-76, 321-25; and tripartite unity
attempt, 239-51. See also Communist
Party
al-cIsa, Sulayman, 146n
al-Ishtiraki, 106, 194
Iskanderun, see Sanjak of Alexandretta, the
Islam, 24-25, 43n. See also Muslims
Ismacilis, 40, 204, 320
Israel, 53, 123, 286; Bacth Party on, 26,
224-26, 314-16; and Egypt, 73-74, 84,
89, 318-19. See also Palestine
• Istanbul, 1
Istiqlal Party (Iraq), 106, 109, 123, 192, 258
Ittihad al-Shacb (Iraq), 152, 194
Izvestia, 222
367
Jabbara, Hasan, 53
al-Jabburi, Ahmad, 275
Jabir, cAli: in National Command, 67, 170,
173, 182, 184, 202; on Lebanese civil
war, 111 ; disciplinary action against, 205
Jabir, Mamduh, 292
Jabiri, Majd al-Din, 54
Jadid, Salah: in military organization, 67,
203, 208n, 218, 251, 284, 287, 293-94,
296; in Bacth Party, 238, 264, 271, 292,
306n; and Hafiz, 286, 298-302; and
Hatum, 314
al-Jadir, Adib, 258
al-Jamahir (Damascus), 137, 139-40,
143-44
Jamali, Fadil, 83
Jasim, Fayiz, 301, 306n
Jawad, Hashim, 151
Jawad, Hazim, 189, 232, 235, 257, 260; vs.
Sacdi, 259, 265, 270-71, 274
Jews, 2, 49-50
Jordan, 31, 65, 89, 91, 187, 225-26, 306n,
315-17; and Britain, 1, 104, 120; Bacth
Party in, 15, 28, 30, 38, 99-106, 206,
325; on unity, 56, 117, 248; Rimawi
faction in, 170-79, 187
Jumcah, Midhat Ibrahim, 156, 190, 271
Jumblat, Kamal, 110-11, 114n
al-Jumhuriyah (Beirut), 113n, 120, 122, 140
Jundi, cAbd al-Karim, 209n, 292, 302
al-Jundi, Sami, 8-10, 13, 76n, 141, 144,
159, 281; and split with Bacthists, 187,
197, 283
al-Juwari, Ahmad, 273
Kallas, Khalil, 72, 88, 141, 143; in UAR
cabinet, 116, 131, 161
Kancan, cUthman, 209n
Kerr, Malcolm, 242
Khaddam, cAbd al-Halim, 318
al-Khalidi, Husayn, 104
Khalil, cAli, 41, 252n, 297, 301
Khalkhal, cAbd al-Hamid, 260, 264
Khatib, Ahmad, 224
Khayzaran, Faysal Habib, 157, 182, 190-91
Khrushchev, Nikita, 125, 127, 138
al-Khuri, Faris, 69, 116
Khuzistan Province (Iran), 26
al-Kifah (Beirut), 144, 237
Kikhya, Rushdi, 54, 55, 62n
Kirkuk, 108, 127, 154, 158, 193,
234,255,276n
Kurdistan, 127, 154, 193, 221, 257,
265-69, 278n, 322-24
al-Kuzbari, Ma’mun, 143, 146n, 196
368
labor organizations: Bacth party on, 29, 37,
58-59, 74, 223, 261, 291, 295, 311,
322; Communists on, 35, 150, 153,
192-94; in Libya, 179; and Hatum, 314
Landmarks c f the New Arab Life (Razzaz),
36
land reform: Bacthists on, 37, 57-59, 153,
215-17, 259; national pact including, 71 ;
UAR laws on, 136, 146n, 198, 216. See
also Agrarian Reform Law
Lattaqiyah district, 9, 12, 15, 3 9 „4 7 -4 8 ,59,
67
League of Nations, 1
Lebanon, 1, 4, 60, 63-65, 187, 200, 221,
316; Bacth Party in, 38, 41, 110-11,
123, 175, 179-80, 204-6, 289, 323; civil
war in, 117-18
Levant, the, 3
Liberation Rally (Egypt), 93
Libya, 18, 112, 127, 175, 179, 206, 251
LO rient (Beirut), 110-11, 115, 132-39
passim
Maghrib region, 162, 173
Mahmud, Baba cAli Shaykh, 235
Majdalani, Jibran, 41, 111, 126, 200,
234-35; in National Command, 202,
205, 220, 271, 293, 297, 301
Makhus, Ibrahim, 39, 283, 286, 288-89,
297
Malki, cAdnan, 70, 292
Màlki, Riyad, 67, 197-98, 237; and UAR
cabinet, 132, 137, 144-45, 147n, 164
mandate system, 1-2, 7, 11, 35
Maqdisi, Tawfiq, 145
Mahrakat al-Masir al-Wahid, 23
Mardam, Jamil, 51-52
Mardini, cAbd al-Rahman, 14, 283
Mar*i, cAbd al-Hamid, 154, 157
Mai*i, Sayyid, 135
Marxism, 33, 35, 124-25, 256, 283, 285
Matni, Nasib, 111, 117
Mayzar, Muhsin Abu, 205, 271
Mendeies, Adnan, 107
Mihawish, Sal amah, 113n
Mihdawi, Fadhil, 124, 151, 154-57
al-Mihdawi, Muhammad, 270
Milhim, Husayn, 209n
Military Bureau, 277n, 279n, 2% , 299
military power, see army
al-Mir, Ahmad, 209n
Mosul Rebellion, 108, 126, 149-52, 155,
159, 193, 234, 255, 276n
Muhaffal, Ahmad, 138
Muhammad (the Prophet), 24-25
THE BACTH PARTY
Muharib, Fawwaz, 238, 240, 248
Muhiedinov, Nunedin, 125
Muraywid, Hasan, 306n
Murqus, Ilyas, 213-14
Muslih, Rashid, 232, 256, 261, 273, 279n
Muslim Brotherhood, 236, 289
Muslims, 7, 24-25, 39-41, 63, 118, 204,
248, 319-20
Mustafa, Fu’ad Shakir, 271
Mustafa, cIzzat, 273
Nabulsi, Sulayman, 91, 101-4
al-Nahar (Beirut), 237
Nahlawi, cAbd al-Karim, 199
Najjadah, 110
Najm, Samir cAbd al-cAziz, 157, 166n
Naqshabandi, cAbd al-Khaliq, 271, 286
Nasir, Jamal, see cAbd al-Nasir, Jamal
Nasir, Kamal, 103, 105, 185n, 206n
Nasir, Sharif, 105
Nasrat, Colonel cAbd al-Karim Mustafa,
194-95, 233-34, 260-62, 275
National Action League, 7-8
National Bloc, 7-8, 47-48, 69
National Charter, for parliamentary
elections, 198
National Command, 152, 157-63, 170-84,
184n, 185n, 190, 195-205, 257,
271-75, 309; organization of, 16-20, 58,
66-67; on unity, 87-88; regionalists vs.
old guard in, 219-27; military
organization in, 284-303 passim,
327-31
National Congress, 76n; founding, 14-15,
19, 29, 50; second, 66-67, 106; third,
144, 170-75; fourth, 157-58, 176-84,
195, 212, 224; fifth, 200-202; sixth,
171, 213-26 passim, 263-64, 268, 285,
315; seventh, 274-75, 287, eighth, 220,
223-24, 229n, 2% ; ninth, 314-15; tenth,
318-19, 323, 327-31
National Council of Revolutionary
Command (NCRC): in Iraq, 232-43
passim , 247-48, 259-61, 273; on
Kurdistan, 266-67, 269; in Syria,
281-82, 285, 290, 2% , 300
National Democratic Party, 106, 109,
120-21, 123, 152-53
National Front, 31, 35-36, 91, 102-9
passim, 123, 191, 193
National Guard: in Iraq, 194, 233-35,
258-63 passim, 271-74, 276, 279n; in
Syria, 282, 287
nationalism, see pan-Arabism
Index
“ Nationalism is Love Before All Else”
(cAflaq), 37
National Organization for Popular Action,
261
national pact, 71, 74, 87
National Party (Syria), 52, 55, 59, 68, 73
National Progressive Front, 253n, 319
National Revolutionary Council, 290-91;
Presidential Council of, 290-93, 295,
299
National Socialist Party (Jordan), 101-2,
104-5
National Union, 115, 132-43 passim, 146n,
159-60, 163, 178-79, 188
Nacwas, cAbdallah, 67, 100-101, 103, 170
Nawfal, Muhammad, 283, 285
Nayyal, cAbd al-Qadir, 301
NCRC, see National Council of
Revolutionary Command
Nehru, Jawaharlal, 83-84
“ Neo-Bacth” Party, 187
“ Neo-Bacth Party of Syria, The”
(Ben-Tsur), 202
Neo-Destour Party (Tunisia), 3
neutralism, see positive neutralism
New Arab Age, The (Da’im), 212
Nidal al-Bacth, 11, 21n, 67, 95n, 205
Nuwar, cAli Abu, 102, 104, 113n
old guard, 202, 219-20, 225, 321; as party
faction, 283-303, 313-14
Ottoman Empire, 1-4
“ Our View of Capitalism and the Class
Struggle” (cAflaq), 35
Palestine, 1-2, 26, 49-52, 55, 99-106,
224-25, 311, 314-19, 324
Palestine Liberation Organization, 105,
206n, 224, 315-18, 324
pan-Arab ism, 3-16 passim, 45n, 69, 72,
103, 110, 160, 180, 182, 208n; Bacth
views on, 24-42, 75, 160, 195-96,
200-202, 215-18, 325; and UAR
formation, 79-94, 115-28, 132, 164;
party splits and, 217-21, 283-89 passim,
299, 310-11; and tripartite unity talks,
239-51
parliamentary system, 13, 29-31, 47-49,
187-88, 212-14; Nasir on, 94, 133-34
peasant organizations, 38, 40, 92; Bacth
Party on, 29, 57, 58, 74, 181, 215, 223,
261, 311; and Communist Party, 35,
150, 153, 192; land reform and, 136,
216-17
369
People’s Court, 96n, 124, 129n, 151,
154-55, 166n
People's Daily (China), 256
People’s Socialist Party (Aden), 112
“ Permanent Committee of the Congress of
Students in Hawran,” 65
Persian Gulf, 127
political parties: Bacthists on, 28; in Iraq,
44n; ban on, 54, 59, 93-94, 100, 105,
139; Nasir on, 133-34, 163-64, 248;
Qasim on, 152
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine,
324
positive neutralism: Egypt on, 71, 82-85;
Bacth Party on, 88, 145; in Iraq, 123,
222, 256; Communists and, 152
Pravda (Soviet Union), 255-56
Presidential Council, 290-93, 295, 299
Progressive Socialist Party (Lebanon),
110-11
Qaddur, cAbd al-Halim, 8, 10
Qanbar, Ahmad, 96n
Qandalaft, Ilyas, 8
Qannut, cAbd al-Ghani, 67, 132, 161
Qansu, cAsim, 324
Qasim, cAbd al-Karim: regime of, 110,
119-28, 129n, 150-54, 131, 145,
188-95, 231-36, 278n; assassination
attempt on, 155-59, 166n, 174, 189, 322;
Soviet view of, 221
al-Qasim, Nihad, 239-49 passim
Qassab, cAdnan, 265
qawmi, 20n
Qawuqji, Fawzi, 50
al-Qudsi, Nazim, 55, 57, 198-99
Qutayni, Rashid, 238-48 passim
Quwatli, Shukri: Bacthists on, 11, 49, 51,
56, 71,79, 95n; and Shacb Party, 68, 70,
73; Nasir on, 134
Quzman, Michel, 8
Radi, Muhsin Shaykh, 191, 260, 264-65,
270, 287
al-Rafici, cAbd al-Majid, 39, 41, 111, 200,
202, 205, 252n, 321, 324
al-Rawi, Musari, 232
Razzaz, Munif: as Bacth leader, 23, 39, 105,
173, 202, 220, 271,293, 297-300; Bacth
writings of, 29-30, 36-37, 92-93, 189,
233, 238, 241, 285, 288, 301
Regional Command, 16-19, 66, 110, 172,
270; in Iraq, 150, 190-91, 195, 257-65,
370
270-71, 274, 289, 321-22; in Qasim
assassination attempt, 155-59, 174,
189-91; vs. National Command, 171-77
passim, 204-5; in Syria, 185n, 202, 204,
219, 224-26, 281-89 passim, 293-303
passim, 312, 317-20; and military, 188,
232, 263, 333-41
Regional Congress: and regional command,
17; in Syria, 6 6 ,6 8 , 1 31,219,225,227,
229n, 284-87, 294-99 passim, 303,
333-37; in Jordan, 101, 339^40; in Iraq,
107-8, 113n, 263-64, 269-70, 337-39;
in Lebanon, 110, 205, 340-41
regionalists, 197, 202, 205, 218-27, 243;
and military, 204, 283-303, 310-11,
313-20
religion, 30, 222, 320, 343-44. See also
Christians; Muslims
revolution: cAflaq on, 26-27, 53-54, 86;
Atasi on, 36; in Iraq, 109-10, 118-24,
149
Revolutionary Command Council (RCC),
80, 82, 134, 163, 173, 223, 322-23
Rikabi, 'Abdallah, 155-56, 189-90
Rikabi, Fu’ad: as Ba'th leader, 41, 67,
107-9, 119-21, 173, 215; on Arab unity,
122, 310; and cArif, 124, 149; and
Qasim assassination attempt, 155-56,
158-59, 174, 189-91; in Revolutionary
Ba'th Party, 176, 187, 207n
Rimawi, 'Abdallah, 30, 67, 99-101, 103,
107, 113n, 158-59, 310; rival party of,
158-59, 170-77, 179, 185n, 187, 205,
218
Ruwayhah, Amin, 57, 62n
Sa'adah, Antun, 3, 63, 70
Sabri, 'A li, 240
Sa'di, 'A li Salih, 20, 108, 122, 183,
190-92, 207n, 211, 215, 232, 236; on
Communists, 222, 256, 276n; on
tripartite unity, 239-40, 242, 250; party
faction of, 259-75, 287-88, 292
Safadi, M uta', 40, 42
Safi, Najat, 257, 262
al-Sahafah (Beirut), 111, 123-25, 129n,
150, 161, 173, 175; on National Union,
141, 143, 164; on Qasim, 153, 157-58
al-Sa'id, Nuri, 73, 119, 123; in control of
Iraq, 82-83, 108-9, 129n; military
training program of, 194-95, 322
SaHqah, 226, 316
Salim, Salah, 80-81
al-Sammara’i, Fa’iq, 107, 121
THE BACTH PARTY
Sanjak of Alexandretta, the, 2 ,4 -5 , 7-8, 26,
83
Saqr, Maurice, 111
Sarraj, 'A bd al-Hamid, 72, 89, 117, 125; in
UAR government, 131-32, 137-38,
140-42, 159-60, 195-96
Sa'ud, King, 117, 145
Saudi Arabia, 87, 112, 149, 325
Sayigh, Fayiz, 28
al-Sayyid, Jalal, as Ba'th leader, 12, 14-15,
30, 47, 56-58, 64-71 passim, 80, 96n
Schmidt, Dana Adams, 265
separatists, 125
Shabib, Talib Husayn: in Ba'th Party, 41,
173, 190-91, 257, 259, 265, 267, 271,
274; on NCRC, 232, 260; at tripartite
unity meetings, 239-40, 242
Sha'b Party, 55-57, 59, 64, 68, 73, 198
Sha'ir, Fahd, 238, 240, 243, 286, 302
al-Sham (Damascus), 137
Sham'un, Camille, 117-18
Shanshal, Siddiq, 121, 123
Shantaf, Karim, 190, 271
Shararah, Ghassan, 173, 209n
al-Sharif, Jalal Faruq, 137
al-Shawi, Khalid, 251n
Shawwaf, 'A bd al-Wahhab, 126, 150-51,
155, 276n
Shaykhli, 'A bd al-Karim, 166n
Shayya, Jamil, 287, 301, 306n
Shi'i Muslim, 41
Shishakli, Adib, 15, 31, 56-60, 63-66, 80
al-Shufi, Hammud, 272, 283, 285, 292
Shumitli, 'A bd al-Wahhab, 111, 173, 209n
Shuqayr, Amin, 99, 173, 202
Shuqayri, Ahmad, 225
al-Siyasah (Beirut), 116, 144
socialism, 72, 202, 244, 256, 259, 264; as
Ba'th Party issue, 31-37, 180-82, 198,
213-17, 222-23, 311
Socialist Unionist Movement (Syria), 197,
218, 244-49, 283, 294, 319
Socialist Unity Movement (Syria), 239, 241,
246-49
“ Some Theoretical Propositions,” 213-14,
227
Soviet Union, 96n, 125, 127, 221-22,
255-56, 322
students 110, 215, 223, 231-32, 261; in
Ba'th Party, 11, 13-14, 23-24, 28, 39,
41; and Communist Party, 150, 192
Suez, 73-74, 80-82, 88-89, 103, 108, 119
Sufan, Sami 197, 242, 283
al-Sufi, Muhammad, 238. 248
al-Sulh, Sami, 117-18
Sultan, Salim, 271
Index
Sunni Muslim, 7, 39-41, 63, 204, 248,
319-20
Suwaydan, cAbd al-Halim, 240, 317
Suwaydani, Ahmad, 209n, 319
Syria: as French territory, 1-2, 4; Arsuzi’s
party in, 8-9; pre-UAR Bacth Party in,
28, 30, 38-40, 47-61, 65-75;
Communist Party in, 35, 125, 138,
222-23; in UAR, 70-71, 79-95,
115-28, 131-45,160-64, 200-201,218;
Bacth Party dissolution in, 116, 159,
169-84; and secession from UAR,
160-61, 181, 196-97, 202, 219;
post-UAR Bacth Party in 187-88,
195-204, 211-21, 309; army of, 196,
203, 218, 227, 236-38, 281-303,
310-12, 313-20; and tripartite unity
talks, 239-51; guerrilla organizations in,
226, 315-17. See also cAflaq, Michel;
United Arab Republic
Syrian-Iraqi Unified Military Force, 263
Syrian Nationalist Party, 3
Syrian People’s Assembly, 320
Tabaqchali, Nazim, 154, 156, 159
Tajhiz Secondary School, 9, 10, 39
Talabani, Jalal, 265, 268, 278n
Talal, King of Jordan, 100-101
Talas, Mustafa, 226, 237, 300, 302, 317,
319
Talhuni, Bahjat, 105
Talib, Naji, 235-36
al-Tariq al-Shuyuciyah, 9
Tawil, Muhammad Rabah, 209n, 284, 300
Thabit, Ayyad Sacid, 155-57, 187, 190-91
Thabit, Yusra Sacid, 154
al-Tikriti, Hardan cAbd al-Ghaffar, 232-33,
251n, 260, 273, 279n, 322
Tikriti, Saddam Husayn, 166n, 274-75,
313, 321-322
al-Tikriti, Tahir Yahya, 120, 124, 232-33,
239, 260-61, 265-73 passim, 279n
Tito Marshal, 83, 215
Transjordan, see Jordan
Tripoli, 111
Tunisia, 3, 324
Turcomans, 127, 154
Turkey, 1 ,4 -5 , 8, 26, 73, 90, 96n; and pact
with Iraq, 70, 82-83, 107
Turkish-lraqi Pact, 70, 82-83, 107
cUbayd, Hamad: in Syrian army, 199, 204,
237, 298-300, 302; in Military
Organization, 209n; in National Guard,
371
282; on Regional Command, 284, 314
cUmar, Jabir, 120-21
al-cUmari, Arshad, 119
Ummah cArabiyah, 24, 325
cUmran, Muhammad, 241, 264, 286,
300-302, 305n, 314; in Bacth Military
Organization, 203, 209n, 218, 237-38,
243, 251, 282, 284-94 passim, 298
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 96n,
125, 127, 221-22, 255-56, 322
United Arab Front, 239, 241, 245-49
United Arab Republic (UAR): establishment
of, 7 2,81, 115-17, 310-11; background
of, 79-95; Iraq and, 109, 120-28,
149-59, 193, 235-36; role of Bacth Party
in, 115-16, 128, 131-45, 159-65, 172,
310; political parties in, 116, 169-84;
Soviet Union and, 125, 127; Syria’s
succession from, 160-61, 181, 196-97,
202, 219; Bacth Party on, 169-70,
178-79, 195-200, 205-6; Bacth Military
Organization on, 203, 218-19, 283-84;
tripartite unity talks on, 238-51; mutual
defense agreement of, 315. See also
cAbd al-Nasir, Jamal; pan-Arabism
United Arab States, 117
United National Front, 110, 117
United Nations Special Committee on
Palestine (UNSCOP), 50
United States, 49-50, 73, 89-91, 104,
119-20, 145
United Syrian Front, 115
unity, see pan-Arabism
al-cUrwa al-Wuthqa, 41
Uways, Da’ud, 160
Waddai, Hassan, Hajj, 271
Wandawi, Mundhir, 234, 239, 25In, 257-62
passim , 271, 273
watani, 20n
Why Socialism Now? (Razzaz), 36
al-Wihdah, 137-39, 144
women, Bacth Party on, 41, 223
Yaghi, Ghalib, 183, 209n
Yahya, Tahir, see al-Tikriti, Tahir Yahya
al-Yaqzah (Palestine), 99, 101
Yashruti, Khalid, 110, 173, 202, 205, 206n
Yemen, 236, 325
Youth Party (Syria), 63
Yugoslavia, 215
Yusufi, Salih, 265
372
Zacim, Husni, 27, 31, 52-54, 189
Zaybaq, Salim cIsa, 157
Zionism, 49-51, 88, 224
Zucayyin, Yusuf, 39, 283-92 p a ssim ,
299-301, 317
THE BACTH PARTY
Zucbi, Musa, 209n, 238
Zuhur, cAbd al-Karim, 202, 208n, 240-41,
243, 252n, 283, 288