VALERIO E. KALAW, Petitioner, vs. MA.

ELENA FERNANDEZ, Respondent

Psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code refers
to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even prior to the celebration of the marriage that is
permanent as to deprive the party of the awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial
bond he or she was about to assume. Although the Family Code has not defined the term psychological
incapacity, the Court has usually looked up its meaning by reviewing the deliberations of the sessions of
the Family Code Revision Committee that had drafted the Family Code in order to gain an insight on the
provision.

MA. SOCORRO CAMACHO-REYES, Petitioner,vs. RAMON REYES,

Courts should be extra careful before making a finding of psychological incapacity or vicariously
diagnosing personality disorders in spouses where there are none. On the other hand, blind adherence
by the courts to the exhortation in the Constitution and in our statutes that marriage is an inviolable
social

2006 LEONILO ANTONIO Petitioner, vs. MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, Respondent

Article 36 of the Family Code states that "[a] marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."
The concept of psychological incapacity as a ground for nullity of marriage is novel in our body of laws,
although mental incapacity has long been recognized as a ground for the dissolution of a marriage.

Republic versus Court of Appeals and Molina

In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals6 this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that
"psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that
(t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic
condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former
presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila,7 Justice
Vitug wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability."

Chi Ming Tsoi vs. Court of Appeals,

One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate children based on the
universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage."
Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage.
In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital
obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.

LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-
SANTOS

Justice Sempio-Diy cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the
Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch 1), who opines that
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying
out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be
incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.

RENATO A. CASTILLO, Petitioner, vs.LEA P. DE LEON CASTILLO,

The validity of a marriage and all its incidents must be determined in accordance with the law in effect at
the time of its celebration. In this case, the law in force at the time Lea contracted both marriages was
the Civil Code. The children of the parties were also born while the Civil Code was in effect i.e. in 1979,
1981, and 1985. Hence, the Court must resolve this case using the provisions under the Civil Code on
void marriages, in particular, Articles 80, 81, 82, and 83 (first paragraph); and those on voidable
marriages are Articles 83 (second paragraph), 85 and 86.

DOREEN GRACE PARILLA MEDINA, A.K.A. "DOREEN GRACE MEDINA KOIKE," Petitioner, v. MICHIYUKI
KOIKE, THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, METRO MANILA, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND
CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE, Respondent

At the outset, it bears stressing that Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our
courts cannot grant it. However, Article 26 of the Family Code - which addresses foreign marriages or
mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner - allows a Filipino spouse to contract a subsequent
marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by an alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry. The provision reads:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)

BRENDA B. MARCOS, petitioner, vs. WILSON G. MARCOS, respondent.

In Republic v. CA and Molina,8 the guidelines governing the application and the interpretation of
psychological incapacity referred to in Article 36 of the Family Code9 were laid down by this Court as
follows:

"1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and
unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it 'as the
foundation of the nation.' It decrees marriage as legally 'inviolable,' thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be 'protected' by the state.

2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged
in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of
the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the
parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of
the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as
a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the time of the celebration' of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their 'I do's.' The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of
a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of
children and prescribing medicine to cure them but not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear
and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, 'mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.

6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code
as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to
parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition,
proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent.

In ruling that Albios’ marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA characterized such as akin to a
marriage by way of jest. A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as a
joke, with no real intention of entering into the actual marriage status, and with a clear understanding
that the parties would not be bound. The ceremony is not followed by any conduct indicating a purpose
to enter into such a relation.27 It is a pretended marriage not intended to be real and with no intention
to create any legal ties whatsoever, hence, the absence of any genuine consent. Marriages in jest are
void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent consent, but for a complete absence of consent.
There is no genuine consent because the parties have absolutely no intention of being bound in any way
or for any purpose.

MARLYN MONTON NULLADA, Petitioner vs. THE HON. CIVIL REGISTRAR OF MANILA, AKIRA ITO, SHIN ITO
AND ALL PERSONS WHO HAVE OR CLAIM ANY INTEREST, Respondents

At the outset, the Court explains that it allows the direct recourse from the decision of the RTC on the
ground that the petition raises a pure question of law on the proper application of Article 26 of the
Family Code. "Direct recourse to this Court from the decisions and final orders of the RTC may be taken
where only questions of law are raised or involved." In this case, the RTC's resolve to dismiss the petition
filed before it delved solely on its application of the statutory provision to the facts undisputed before it.
This question of law was directly resolved by the Court in the recent case of Republic of the Philippines v.
Marelyn Tanedo Manalo, which was promulgated by the Court subsequent to the filing of the present
petition.

The legal provision that is pertinent to the case is Article 26 of the Family Code, which states:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), [36, 37] and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. MARELYN TANEDO MANALO, Respondent.:

Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after the marriage, are of two types: (1)
absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and (2) limited divorce or a
mensa et thoro, which suspends it and leaves the bond in full force. In this jurisdiction, the following
rules exist:

1. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it.

2. Consistent with Articles 15 and 17 of the New Civil Code, the marital bond between two Filipinos
cannot be dissolved even by an absolute divorce obtained abroad.

3. An absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who both aliens, may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.

4. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the former is allowed to contract a subsequent
marriage in case the absolute divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry.

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209,
otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines, which took effect on August 3, 1988. Shortly
thereafter , E.O. No. 227 was issued on July 17, 1987. Aside from amending Articles 36 and 39 of the
Family Code, a second paragraph was added to Article 26. This provision was originally deleted by the
Civil Code Revision Committee (Committee),but it was presented and approved at a Cabinet meeting
after Pres. Aquino signed E.O. No. 209. As modified, Article 26 now states:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the
where country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him her to remarry under Philippine
law.