PLANAS vs. GIL WON the president has the power to order the investigation VIII, sec.
order the investigation VIII, sec. 11, subsec. 1, last clause.) In the fulfillment of this duty which
Facts: Petitioner , a member of the municipal board of the City of
Manila, criticized the acts of certain government officials in connection
with the general election for Assemblymen held on November 8, 1938
in one of the local dailies. The statement as published in the issue of
La Vanguardia of November 17, 1938, included the following
statements:
“… In Manila, the opposition should have won the November 8
elections, but lost instead because of a disastrous division due to
people who commercialized their candidacies.
"The Constitution prohibits the reelection of the President precisely so
that the President may devote all his time to the administration of
public affairs for the welfare of the people, but the President was the
first to play politics. Publicly expressing his preference for candidates
of his liking; and with the President all other officials of the government
also moved, taking part in electoral campaigns.
"With the government machinery feverishly functioning to flatten the
opposition and prevent candidates supported by the people from going
to the National Assembly, and with frauds and violations of all rules of
the civil service to push to victory the candidates of the Nacionalista
Party and the administration, all constructive opposition in the country
is useless ...
"… It is reasonable to believe that the President is from this moment
paving the way for his reelection. It is to be feared that the new
National Assembly will change this wise provision of our Constitution to
permit the reelection of President Manuel L. Quezon."
The day following the publication of the foregoing statement, the
petitioner received a letter, where she is informed that she needs to
appear before the Commisioner of Civil Service to prove her
statements otherwise she may be suspended or removed from office.
At the appointed time, the petitioner, accompanied by her counsel,
appeared at the office of the respondent and delivered to him a letter,
Annex B, in which she voiced objection to the authority of the
respondent to conduct the investigation. The respondent
Commissioner did not desist from proceeding with the investigation,
but announced before adjourning the hearing of November 22nd that
he would decide the question raised as to his jurisdiction on November
26, 1938.
It was at this state of the investigation that the petitioner filed in this
court her original petition for prohibition of November 25, 1938, in
which she at the same time prayed for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining the respondent commisioner from
continuing with the investigation.
Issues:
WON the courts have jurisdiction over this case
WON the investigation is in accordance with the law
Ratio/Holding: The petition is hereby dismissed, with costs against the
petitioner.
1. Yes.
In the present case, the President is not a party to the proceeding. The
Commissioner of Civil Service is the party respondent and the theory is
advanced by the Government that because an investigation
undertaken by him is directed by authority of the President of the
Philippines, this court has no jurisdiction over the present proceedings
instituted by the petitioner, Carmen Planas. The argument is
farfetched. A mere plea that a subordinate officer of the government is
acting under orders from the Chief Executive may be an important
averment, but is neither decisive nor conclusive upon this court. Like
the dignity of his high office, the relative immunity of the Chief
Executive from judicial interference is not in the nature of a sovereign
passport for all the subordinate officials and employees of the
Executive Department to the extent that at the mere invocation of the
authority that it purports the jurisdiction of this court to inquire into the
validity or legality of an executive order is necessarily abated or
suspended.
Not infrequently, "the writ is granted, where it is necessary for the
orderly administration of justice, or to prevent the use of the strong arm
of the law in an oppressive or vindictive manner, or a multiplicity of
actions." (Dimayuga and Fajardo vs. Fernandez [1922]) This court,
therefore, has jurisdiction over the instant proceedings and will
accordingly proceed to determine the merits of the present
controversy.
2. Yes.
It is not denied that the President did authorize the issuance of the
order, but it is contended "that the said investigation with a view to
petitioner's suspension or removal is against Article VII, sec. 11 (1) of
the Constitution of the Philippines and is not warranted by any
statutory provision." (Par. XV [b], amended petition.) It, therefore,
becomes necessary to inquire into the constitutional and legal authority
of the President to order the investigation which has given rise to the
present controversy.
A perusal of our Constitution will show that extensive authority over the
public service is granted the President of the Philippines. Article VII of
the Constitution begins in its section 1 with the declaration that "The
Executive power shall be vested in a President of the Philippines." All
executive authority is thus vested in him, and upon him devolves the
constitutional duty of seeing that the laws are "faithfully executed." (Art.
he cannot evade, he is granted specific and express powers and
functions. (Art. VII, sec. 11.) In addition to these specific and express
powers and functions, he may also exercise those necessarily implied
and included in them. (Myers vs. United States [1926]) The National
Assembly may not enact laws which either expressly or impliedly
diminish the authority conferred upon the President of the Constitution.
(Cf. Concepcion vs. Paredes [1921]) The Constitution provides that the
President "shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus,
and offices" (Art. VII, sec. 11 [1], first clause) and shall "exercise
general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by
law" (Ibid, second clause). This power of control and supervision is an
important constitutional grant. The President in the exercise of the
executive power under the Constitution may act through the heads of
the executive departments.
Independently of any statutory provision authorizing the President to
conduct an investigation of the nature involved in this proceeding, and
in view of the nature and character of the executive authority with
which the President of the Philippines is invested, the constitutional
grant to him of power to exercise general supervision over all local
governments and to take care that the laws be faithfully executed must
be construed to authorize him to order an investigation of the act or
conduct, of the petitioner herein. Supervision is not a meaningless
thing. It is an active power. It is certainly not without limitation, but it at
least implies authority to inquire into facts and conditions in order to
render the power real and effective. If supervision is to be
conscientious and rational, and not automatic and brutal, it must be
founded upon a knowledge of actual facts and conditions disclosed
after careful study and investigation.
Viewed from the totality of powers conferred upon the Chief Executive
by our Constitution, we should be reluctant to yield to the proposition
that the President of the Philippines who is endowed with broad and
extraordinary powers by our Constitution, and who is expected to
govern with a firm and steady hand without vexatious or embarrassing
interference and much less dictation from any source, is yet devoid of
the power to order the investigation of the petitioner in this case. We
should avoid that result.
The deliberations of the Constitutional Convention show that the grant
of the supervisory authority to Chief Executive in this regard was in the
nature of a compromise resulting from the conflict of views in that
body, mainly between the historical view which recognizes the right of
local self-government (People ex rel. Le Roy vs. Hurlbut [1871]) and
the legal theory which sanctions the possession by the state of
absolute control over local governments (Booten vs. Pinson, [1915]).
The result was the recognition of the power of supervision and all its
implications and the rejection of what otherwise would be an imperium
in, imperio to the detriment of a strong national government.

Apart from the constitutional aspect, we find that section 64 of the
Administrative Code of 1917 provides as follows:
"In addition to his general supervisory authority, the Governor-General
(President) shall have such specific powers and duties as are
expressly conferred or imposed on him by law and also, in particular,
the powers and duties set forth in this chapter.
"Among such special powers and duties shall be:
*******
"(c) To order, when in his opinion the good of the public service so
requires, an investigation of any action or the conduct of any person in
the Government service, and in connection therewith to designate the
official, committee, or person by whom such investigation shall be
conducted."
This provision of the law, in existence before the taking effect of the
Constitution, still subsists. It is not inconsistent with the Constitution
and has not been abrogated or repealed by the National Assembly.
(See sec. 2, Art. XV, Constitution.)
3. Yes.
The interest of the public service requires that these charges be
investigated, so that, if found to be true, appropriate action may be
taken against the parties alleged to have been guilty of illegal acts, and
if found untrue and made without justifiable motives, the party making
them may be proceeded against in accordance with section 2440, in
connection, with section, 2078, of the Revised Administrative Code."
Assuming that this is not one of the grounds provided by law for which
the petitioner may be investigated administratively (sec. 2078, Rev.
Adm. Code), there is weight in the argument that the investigation
would still be in order if for no other purpose than to cause a full and
honest disclosure of all the facts so that, if found proper and justified,
appropriate action may be taken against the parties alleged to have
been guilty of the illegal acts charged. The enforcement of the law and
the maintenance of peace and order are primarily an executive
obligation. The declaration that the President should "take care that the
laws be faithfully executed" is more an imposition of an obligation than
a conferment of power. His oath requires him to "faithfully and
conscientiously fulfill" his duties as President, "preserve and defend"
the Constitution and "execute" the law. This duty of the Executive to
see that the laws be faithfully executed is not limited to the
enforcement of legislative acts or the express terms of the Constitution
but also includes the due enforcement of rights, duties, obligations,
prerogatives and immunities growing out of the Constitution itself and
of the protection implied by the nature of the government under the
Constitution. (Cunningham vs. Neagle)
We are vigilantly alive to the necessity of maintaining and protecting
the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech and of the press, no
less than the right of assembly and petition which, according to
Stimson (The American Constitution As It Protects Private Rights,
152), is its origin rather than its derivation. In the present case,
however, the petitioner is not denied the right, nor is she being
investigated because she had exercised that right. She has a perfect
right to criticize the Government, its administration, its policies and
officials, but she may not, on the plea of freedom of speech and of the
press, impute violations of law and the commission of frauds and
thereafter fold her arms and decline to face an investigation conducted
to elicit the truth or falsity of the charges formulated by her. Otherwise,
the guarantee which, in the language of Wendell Phillips, is "at once
the instrument, and the guarantee, and the bright consummate flower
of all liberty" would degenerate into an unbridled license, and render
the Government powerless to act.
GPI vs. SPRINGER
Facts: This is an original action of quo warranto brought in the name of
the Government of the Philippine Islands against three directors of the
National Coal Company who were elected to their positions by the
legislative members of the committee created by Acts. Nos. 2705 and
2822. The purpose of the proceeding is to test the validity of the part of
section 4 of Act No. 2705, as amended by section 2 of Act No. 2822,
which provides that "The voting power of all such stock (in the National
Coal Company) owned by the Government of the Philippine Islands
shall be vested exclusively in a committee consisting of the Governor-
General, the President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives.
Sometime in the 1900s, the National Coal Company (NCC) was
created by the Philippine Congress. The law created it (Act No. 2822)
provides that: “The voting power … shall be vested exclusively in a
committee consisting of the Governor-General, the President of the
Senate, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.”
In November 1926, the Governor-General (Leonard Wood) issued E.O.
No. 37 which divested the voting rights of the Senate President and
House Speaker in the NCC. The EO emphasized that the voting right
should be solely lodged in the Governor-General who is the head of
the government (President at that time was considered the head of
state but does not manage government affairs). A copy of the said EO
was furnished to the Senate President and the House Speaker.
However, in December 1926, NCC held its elections and the Senate
President as well as the House Speaker, notwithstanding EO No. 37
and the objection of the Governor-General, still elected Milton
Springer and four others as Board of Directors of NCC. Thereafter, a
quo warranto proceeding in behalf of the government was filed against
Springer et al questioning the validity of their election into the Board of
NCC.
Issue: Whether or nor EO no. 37 is invalid.
Rulings: No. E.O. No 37 is valid. It is in accordance with the doctrine of
separation of powers. The Supreme Court emphasized that the
legislature creates the public office but it has nothing to do with
designating the persons to fill the office. Appointing persons to a public
office is essentially executive. The NCC is a government owned and
controlled corporation. It was created by Congress. To extend the
power of Congress into allowing it, through the Senate President and
the House Speaker, to appoint members of the NCC is already an
invasion of executive powers. The Supreme Court however notes that
indeed there are exceptions to this rule where the legislature may
appoint persons to fill public office. Such exception can be found in the
appointment by the legislature of persons to fill offices within the
legislative branch – this exception is allowable because it does not
weaken the executive branch.
OCCENA vs. COMELEC
FACTS: The challenge in these two prohibition proceedings is against
the validity of three Batasang Pambansa Resolutions proposing
constitutional amendments. Petitioners urged that the amendments
proposed are so extensive in character that they go far beyond the
limits of the authority conferred on the Interim Batasang Pambansa as
successor of the Interim National Assembly. For them, what was done
was to revise and not to amend.
Petitioners Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales, both members of
the Philippine Bar and former delegates to the 1971 Constitutional
Convention that framed the present Constitution, are suing as
taxpayers. The rather unorthodox aspect of these petitions is the
assertion that the 1973 Constitution is not the fundamental law. The
suits for prohibition were filed respectively on March 6 and March 12,
1981.
ISSUE(S):
WON the 1973 Constitution is already in effect.
WON the Interim Batasang Pambansa has the power to propose
amendments.
WON the three resolutions are valid.
HELD: Yes. It is much too late in the day to deny the force and
applicability of the 1973 Constitution. In the dispositive portion of
Javellana v. The Executive Secretary, dismissing petitions for
prohibition and mandamus to declare invalid its ratification, this Court
stated that it did so by a vote of six to four. It then concluded: “This
being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the
new Constitution being considered in force and effect.” With such a
pronouncement by the Supreme Court and with the recognition of the
cardinal postulate that what the Supreme Court says is not only
entitled to respect but must also be obeyed, a factor for instability was
removed. The Supreme Court can check as well as legitimate. In
declaring what the law is, it may not only nullify the acts of coordinate
branches but may also sustain their validity. In the latter case, there is
an affirmation that what was done cannot be stigmatized as
constitutionally deficient. The mere dismissal of a suit of this character
suffices. That is the meaning of the concluding statement in Javellana.
Since then, this Court has invariably applied the present Constitution.
The latest case in point is People v. Sola, promulgated barely two
weeks ago. During the first year alone of the effectivity of the present
Constitution, at least ten cases may be cited.
Yes. The existence of the power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa is
indubitable. The applicable provision in the 1976 Amendments is quite
explicit. Insofar as pertinent it reads thus: “The Interim Batasang
Pambansa shall have the same powers and its Members shall have
the same functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges, and
disqualifications as the interim National Assembly and the regular
National Assembly and the Members thereof.” One of such powers is
precisely that of proposing amendments. Article XVII, Section 15 of the
1973 Constitution in its Transitory Provisions vested the Interim
National Assembly with the power to propose amendments upon
special call by the Prime Minister by a vote of the majority of its
members to be ratified in accordance with the Article on Amendments.
When, therefore, the Interim Batasang Pambansa, upon the call of the
President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos, met as a
constituent body it acted by virtue Of such impotence its authority to do
so is clearly beyond doubt. It could and did propose the amendments
embodied in the resolutions now being assailed.
Yes. The question of whether the proposed resolutions constitute
amendments or revision is of no relevance. It suffices to quote from the
opinion of Justice Makasiar, speaking for the Court, in Del Rosario v.
Commission on Elections to dispose of this contention. Whether the
Constitutional Convention will only propose amendments to the
Constitution or entirely overhaul the present Constitution and propose
an entirely new Constitution based on an Ideology foreign to the
democratic system, is of no moment; because the same will be
submitted to the people for ratification. Once ratified by the sovereign
people, there can be no debate about the validity of the new
Constitution. The fact that the present Constitution may be revised and
replaced with a new one … is no argument against the validity of the
law because ‘amendment’ includes the ‘revision’ or total overhaul of
the entire Constitution. At any rate, whether the Constitution is merely
amended in part or revised or totally changed would become
immaterial the moment the same is ratified by the sovereign people.”
WHEREFORE, the petitions are dismissed for lack of merit.
SEC OF DOTC vs. MABALOT
FACTS: The Sec. of DOTC issued to LTFRB Chairman MO 96-735,
transferring the regional functions of that office to DOTCCAR Regional
Office, pending creation of a Regional LTFRO. Later, the new Sec. of
DOTC issued DO 97-1025, establishing the DOTCCAR Regional
Office as the Regional Office of the LTFRB to exercise regional
functions of the LTFRB in the CAR subject to the direct supervision
and control of the LTFRB Central Office. Mabalot protested.
HELD: YES. The President – through his duly constituted political
agent and alter ego, the DOTC Secretary in the present case – may
legally and validly decree the reorganization of the Department,
particularly the establishment of DOTC-CAR as the LTFRB Regional
Office at the Cordillera Administrative Region with the concomitant
transfer and performance of public functions and responsibilities
appurtenant to a regional office of the LTFRB.
Public Office may be created through any of the ff. modes:
1) by the Constitution,
2) by law, or
3) by authority of law.
The creation and establishment of LTFRB-CAR Regional Office was
made pursuant to the third mode which could be decreed for instance,
through and Executive Order issued by the President or an order of an
administrative agency such as the Civil Service Commission under the
Administrative Code. In the case at bar, the DOTC Secretary issued
the assailed Memorandum and Department Order pursuant to
Administrative Order No. 36 of the President establishing the regional
officer in the CAR.
The said Administrative Order did not merely authorize but directed the
various departments and agencies of government to immediately
undertake the creation and establishment of their regional offices in the
CAR.
What law then gives the President the power to reorganize? It is
Presidential Decree No. 1772 which amended Presidential Decree No.
1416. These decrees expressly grant the President of the Philippines
the continuing authority to reorganize the national government. In fine,
the “designation” and subsequent “establishment” of DOTC-CAR as
the Regional Office of LTFRB in the Cordillera Administrative Region
and the concomitant exercise and performance of functions by the
former as the LTFRB-CAR Regional Office, fall within the scope of the
continuing authority of the President to effectively reorganize the
Department of Transportation and Communications.
Reorganization is regarded as valid provided it is pursued in good faith,
and, as a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in good faith if it
is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient.
EUGENIO vs. CSC
FACTS: Eugenio is the Deputy Director of the Philippine Nuclear
Research Institute. She applied for a Career Executive Service (CES)
Eligibility and a CESO rank,. She was given a CES eligibility and was
recommended to the President for a CESO rank by the Career
Executive Service Board.
Then respondent Civil Service Commission passed a Resolution which
abolished the CESB, relying on the provisions of Section 17, Title I,
Subtitle A. Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 allegedly
conferring on the Commission the power and authority to effect
changes in its organization as the need arises. Said resolution states:
“Pursuant thereto, the Career Executive Service Board, shall now be
known as the Office for Career Executive Service of the Civil Service
Commission. Accordingly, the existing personnel, budget, properties
and equipment of the Career Executive Service Board shall now form
part of the Office for Career Executive Service.”
Finding herself bereft of further administrative relief as the Career
Executive Service Board which recommended her CESO Rank IV has
been abolished, petitioner filed the petition at bench to annul, among
others, said resolution.
ISSUE: WON CSC given the authority to abolish the office of the CESB
HELD: the petition is granted and Resolution of the respondent
Commission is hereby annulled and set aside
NO
1. The controlling fact is that the CESB was created in PD No. 1 on
September 1, 1974. It cannot be disputed, therefore, that as the CESB
was created by law, it can only be abolished by the legislature. This
follows an unbroken stream of rulings that the creation and abolition of
public offices is primarily a legislative function
In the petition at bench, the legislature has not enacted any law
authorizing the abolition of the CESB. On the contrary, in all the
General Appropriations Acts from 1975 to 1993, the legislature has set
aside funds for the operation of CESB.
Respondent Commission, however, invokes Section 17, Chapter 3,
Subtitle A. Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 as the
source of its power to abolish the CESB.
But as well pointed out by petitioner and the Solicitor General, Section
17 must be read together with Section 16 of the said Code which
enumerates the offices under the respondent Commission.
As read together, the inescapable conclusion is that respondent
Commission’s power to reorganize is limited to offices under its control
as enumerated in Section 16..
2. . From its inception, the CESB was intended to be an autonomous
entity, albeit administratively attached to respondent Commission. As
conceptualized by the Reorganization Committee “the CESB shall be
autonomous. It is expected to view the problem of building up
executive manpower in the government with a broad and positive
outlook.”
The essential autonomous character of the CESB is not negated by its
attachment to respondent Commission. By said attachment, CESB
was not made to fall within the control of respondent Commission.
Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the purpose of attaching one
functionally inter-related government agency to another is to attain
“policy and program coordination.” This is clearly etched out in Section
38(3), Chapter 7, Book IV of the aforecited Code, to wit:
(3) Attachment. — (a) This refers to the lateral relationship between
the department or its equivalent and attached agency or corporation for
purposes of policy and program coordination. The coordination may be
accomplished by having the department represented in the governing
board of the attached agency or corporation, either as chairman or as
a member, with or without voting rights, if this is permitted by the
charter; having the attached corporation or agency comply with a
system of periodic reporting which shall reflect the progress of
programs and projects; and having the department or its equivalent
provide general policies through its representative in the board, which
shall serve as the framework for the internal policies of the attached
corporation or agency.
LARIN vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FACTS: Petitioner Aquilino Larin is the Assistant Commissioner of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue, and he also appears to be a co- accused
in two criminal cases for violating Section 268(4) of the National
Internal Revenue Code and Section 3 of R.A. 3019. Subsequently
petitioner was convicted and this was reported to the President, the
then Senior Deputy Executive Secretary by the authority of the
president issued Memo order 164 creating an executive committee to
investigate the administrative charges.
The committee required that petitioner filed a position paper with
regard to the charges against him, the petitioner complied, and
however his statement was that he cannot comment on the merits of
the case for fear of being cited in contempt by the court. Petitioner also
alleged that the committee doesn’t have any jurisdiction over his
person, that the case cannot be validly filed without violating res
judicata, his rights against double jeopardy and lastly to proceed with
the investigation would be redundant and oppressive against him.
While all this is pending, the president issued an order for the
streamlining of BIR, in which case the office of the petitioner was
abolished by the order. His office being abolished, the petitioner was
not reinstated as an assistant commissioner of BIR, instead another
Administrative order was issued in which it stated that he is being
dismissed for being guilty of grave misconduct in connection to the
criminal cases filed against him.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the dismissal of the petitioner was valid or not. a. Who has
the power to discipline the petitioner b. Was due process observed c.
What is the effect of the petitioners acquittal in the criminal case d.
Does the president have the power to reorganize BIR e. Was the
reorganization done in bad faith.
HELD: The court ruled that the office of the petitioner falls under the
category of Career Executive Service, which is appointed by the
president and being a presidential appointee, it follows that the
president have the power to discipline the petitioner. Despite the fact
that the constitution grants the president the power to appoint and the
inherent power to remove, such power is not without limit. Under the
Administrative code of 1987, career services are characterized to have
security of tenure, therefore the petitioner is protected from being
willfully removed by the president, the only way that the petitioner can
be validly removed is for a valid cause and in accordance with the
procedural due process. According to the Court it found that, although
the procedural due process was followed and complied with the
petitioner was not removed for a valid cause, since to start with the
committee was created to investigate the administrative aspect of the
criminal cases being faced by the petitioner at that time. Now taking
into consideration that the petitioner was acquitted from the criminal
cases, the court believes that there is no ground for the administrative
case to continue. It is admitted that criminal cases and administrative
cases usually progress independently, however in this case it was
proven in the criminal case that the petitioner never committed any of
the alleged acts, therefore the case for the administrative case was
also terminated, and therefore there is no longer any valid cause for
the removal of the petitioner.
As for the validity of E.O. 132 which reorganized the BIR, the court
ruled that the president has the authority to do so, as seen in the
preamble of the E.O. which stated the legal basis of its issuance.
Though it is admitted that the president had the power to reorganize
the BIR, the court stated that such power is not limitless, the
reorganization to be valid must be done in good faith. In the instant
case the court found that the reorganization was done in bad faith or at
least there are indications of bad faith, such as when the E.O.
abolished the intelligence and investigation office and at the same time
creating Intelligence and Investigation service to do the same functions
of the abolished office. Most importantly is the non reappointment of
the petitioner, the petitioner being a holder of a career service, should
have been prioritized or preferred in appointing people to new offices
created by the reorganization, but in this case the petitioner was never
reappointed instead he was dismissed from service without any
separation benefits at all. The court ruled that the petitioner is
reinstated as an assistant commissioner and is entitled to back wages.
PHIL. ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC. VS. TORRES
Facts: DOLE Dept. Order No. 16 temporarily suspends the recruitment
by private employment agencies of Filipino DH going to Hong Kong in
view of the need to establish mechanisms that will enhance the
protection for the same.
The DOLE, through POEA took over the business of deploying such
HK-bound workers. Pursuant to the above order, POEA issued
memorandum circular no. 30 providing guidelines on the government
processing and deployment of Filipino domestic helpers to HK and the
accreditation of HK recruitment agencies intending to hire Filipino
domestic helpers, and the memorandum circular No. 30, pertaining to
the processing of employment contracts of domestic workers for HK.
Petitioner contends that respondents acted with grave abuse of
discretion and/or in excess of their rule-making authority in issuing said
circulars.
Issue: WON the take-over of the business deploying DH to HK by
DOLE and POEA through an administrative order and circular is valid.
Held: Yes. Article 36 of the Labor Code grants the Labor Secretary the
power to restrict and regulate recruitment and placement activities. The
challenge administrative issuance discloses that the same fall within
the administrative and police powers expressly or by necessary
implication conferred upon the respondents.
CARPIO vs EXECUITVE SECRETARY
FACTS: Petitioner Antonio Carpio as citizen, taxpayer and member of
the Philippine Bar, filed this petition, questioning the constitutionality of
RA 6975 with a prayer for TRO.
RA 6875, entitled “AN ACT ESTABLISHIGN THE PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE UNDER A REORGANIZED DEPARTMENT OF
THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES,” allegedly contravened Art. XVI, sec. 6 of the 1986
Constitution: “The State shall establish and maintain one police force,
which shall be national in scope and civilian in character, to be
administered and controlled by a national police commission. The
authority of local executives over the police units in their jurisdiction
shall be provided by law.”
ISSUES: Whether or not RA 6975 is contrary to the Constitution
Whether or not Sec. 12 RA 6975 constitutes an “encroachment upon,
interference with, and an abdication by the President of, executive
control and commander-in-chief powers”
HELD:
Power of Administrative Control
NAPOLCOM is under the Office of the President.
SC held that the President has control of all executive departments,
bureaus, and offices. This presidential power of control over the
executive branch of government extends over all executive officers
from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk. In the landmark case of
Mondano vs. Silvosa, the power of control means “the power of the
President to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former with that of the latter.” It is said to be at the very
“heart of the meaning of Chief Executive.”
As a corollary rule to the control powers of the President is the
“Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency.” As the President cannot be
expected to exercise his control powers all at the same time and in
person, he will have to delegate some of them to his Cabinet
members.
Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single
executive, “all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts
of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive
departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and,
except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the
Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation
demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and
through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of
such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of
business, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive,
are presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
Thus, “the President’s power of control is directly exercised by him
over the members of the Cabinet who, in turn, and by his authority,
control the bureaus and other offices under their respective
jurisdictions in the executive department.”
The placing of NAPOLCOM and PNP under the reorganized DILG is
merely an administrative realignment that would bolster a system of
coordination and cooperation among the citizenry, local executives and
the integrated law enforcement agencies and public safety agencies.
Power of Executive Control
Sec. 12 does not constitute abdication of commander-in-chief powers.
It simply provides for the transition period or process during which the
national police would gradually assume the civilian function of
safeguarding the internal security of the State. Under this instance, the
President, to repeat, abdicates nothing of his war powers. It would bear
to here state, in reiteration of the preponderant view, that the
President, as Commander-in-Chief, is not a member of the Armed
Forces. He remains a civilian whose duties under the Commander-in-
Chief provision “represent only a part of the organic duties imposed
upon him. All his other functions are clearly civil in nature.” His position
as a civilian Commander-in-Chief is consistent with, and a testament
to, the constitutional principle that “civilian authority is, at all times,
supreme over the military.”
BLAQUERA vs ALCALA
Facts: On Feb. 21, 1992, then Pres. Aquino issued AO 268 which
granted each official and employee of the government the productivity
incentive benefits in a maximum amount equivalent to 30% of the
employee’s one month basic salary but which amount not be less than
P2, 000.00. Said AO provided that the productivity incentive benefits
shall be granted only for the year 1991. Accordingly, all heads of
agencies, including government boards of government-owned or
controlled corporations and financial institutions, are strictly prohibited
from granting productivity incentive benefits for the year 1992 and
future years pending the result of a comprehensive study being
undertaken by the Office of the Pres.
The petitioners, who are officials and employees of several
government departments and agencies, were paid incentive benefits
for the year 1992. Then, on Jan. 19, 1993, then Pres. Ramos issued
AO 29 authorizing the grant of productivity incentive benefits for the
year 1992 in the maximum amount of P1,000.00 and reiterating the
prohibition under Sec. 7 of AO 268, enjoining the grant of productivity
incentive benefits without prior approval of the President. Sec. 4 of AO
29 directed all departments, offices and agencies which authorized
payment of productivity incentive bonus for the year 1992 in excess of
P1, 000.00 to immediately cause the refund of the excess. In
compliance therewith, the heads of the departments or agencies of the
government concerned caused the deduction from petitioners’ salaries
or allowances of the amounts needed to cover the alleged
overpayments.
Issue: Whether or not AO 29 and AO 268 were issued in the valid
exercise of presidential control over the executive departments
Held: The Pres. is the head of the government. Governmental power
and authority are exercised and implemented through him. His power
includes the control of executive departments as provided under Sec.
17, Art. VII of the Constitution.
Control means the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside
what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties
and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. The
Pres. can, by virtue of his power of control, review, modify, alter or
nullify any action or decision of his subordinate in the executive
departments, bureau or offices under him.
When the Pres. issued AO 29 limiting the amount of incentive benefits,
enjoining heads of government agencies from granting incentive
benefits without approval from him and directing the refund of the
excess over the prescribed amount, the Pres. was just exercising his
power of control over executive departments.
The Pres. issued subject AOs to regulate the grant of productivity
incentive benefits and to prevent discontent, dissatisfaction and
demoralization among government personnel by committing limited
resources of government for the equal payment of incentives and
awards. The Pres. was only exercising his power of control by
modifying the acts of the heads of the government agencies who
granted incentive benefits to their employees without appropriate
clearance from the Office of the Pres., thereby resulting in the uneven
distribution of government resources.
The President’s duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin. So,
too, is his control of executive departments.
Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. POEA
FACTS: A Chief Officer of a ship was killed in an accident in Japan.
The widow filed a complaint for charges against the Eastern Shipping
Lines with POEA, based on a Memorandum Circular No. 2, issued by
the POEA which stipulated death benefits and burial for the family of
overseas workers. ESL questioned the validity of the memorandum
circular as violative of the principle of non-delegation of legislative
power. It contends that no authority had been given the POEA to
promulgate the said regulation; and even with such authorization, the
regulation represents an exercise of legislative discretion which, under
the principle, is not subject to delegation. Nevertheless, POEA
assumed jurisdiction and decided the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 2 is
a violation of non-delegation of powers.
HELD: No. SC held that there was a valid delegation of powers.
The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section
4(a) of Executive Order No. 797. … “The governing Board of the
Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided shall promulgate the
necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of the
adjudicatory functions of the Administration (POEA).”
It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the
law cannot be delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to
determine how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall be.
The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the
legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the
legislature to the delegate.
The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in
general are particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With the
proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar
problems, the national legislature has found it more and more
necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue
rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called
the “power of subordinate legislation.”
With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad
policies laid down in a statute by “filling in’ the details which the
Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. This
is effected by their promulgation of what are known as supplementary
regulations, such as the implementing rules issued by the Department
of Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations have the force and
effect of law.
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a
valid delegation of legislative power:
1. Completeness test – the law must be complete in all its terms and
conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the
delegate the only thing he will have to do is enforce it.
2. Sufficient standard test – there must be adequate guidelines or
stations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s
authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.
Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative right to alter either by subtraction or addition the standards set in RA
authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of No. 8180 for it has no powers to make laws.
the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.
TATAD vs. THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
FACTS: The petitions challenge the constitutionality of RA No. 8180
entitled “An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For
Other Purposes.” The deregulation process has two phases: (a) the
transition phase (Aug. 12, 1996) and the (b) full deregulation phase
(Feb. 8, 1997 through EO No. 372).
Sec. 15 of RA No. 8180 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative
power to the President and the Sec. of Energy because it does not
provide a determinate or determinable standard to guide the Executive
Branch in determining when to implement the full deregulation of the
downstream oil industry, and the law does not provide any specific
standard to determine when the prices of crude oil in the world market
are considered to be declining nor when the exchange rate of the peso
to the US dollar is considered stable.
Issue: w/n the provisions of RA No. 8180 and EO No. 372 is
unconstitutional.
sub-issue: (a) w/n sec. 15 violates the constitutional prohibition on
undue delegation of power, and (b) w/n the Executive misapplied RA
No. 8180 when it considered the depletion of the OPSF fund as factor
in fully deregulating the downstream oil industry in Feb. 1997.
HELD/RULING:
(a) NO. Sec. 15 can hurdle both the completeness test and the
sufficient standard test. RA No. 8180 provided that the full deregulation
will start at the end of March 1997 regardless of the occurrence of any
event. Thus, the law is complete on the question of the final date of full
deregulation.
Sec. 15 lays down the standard to guide the judgment of the President
—he is to time it as far as practicable when the prices of crude oil and
petroleum in the world market are declining and when the exchange
rate of the peso to the US dollar is considered stable.
Webster defines “practicable” as meaning possible to practice or
perform, “decline” as meaning to take a downward direction, and
“stable” as meaning firmly established.
(b) YES. Sec. 15 did not mention the depletion of the OPSF fund as a
factor to be given weight by the Executive before ordering full
deregulation. The Executive department failed to follow faithfully the
standards set by RA No. 8180 when it co0nsidered the extraneous
factor of depletion of the OPSF fund. The Executive is bereft of any
 ABELLA vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
Facts: Petitioner Francisco A. Abella, Jr., a lawyer, retired from the
Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA), now the Philippine
Economic Zone Authority (PEZA)... as Department Manager of the
Legal Services Department.
held a civil service... eligibility for the position of Department Manager,
having completed the training program for Executive Leadership and
Management in 1982 under the Civil Service Academy... which was
then the required eligibility for said... position.
Civil Service Commission issued Memorandum Circular
Positions Covered by the Career Executive Service
In addition to the above identified positions and other positions of the
same category which had been previously classified and included in
the CES, all other third level positions of equivalent category in all
branches and instrumentalities of the national government,... including
government owned and controlled corporations with original charters
are embraced within the Career Executive Service provided that they
meet the following criteria:... position is a career position... position is
above division chief level... duties and responsibilities of the position
require the performance of executive or managerial functions.
Status of Appointment of Incumbents of Positions Included Under the
Coverage of the CES.
Incumbents of positions which are declared to be Career Executive
Service positions for the first time pursuant to this Resolution who hold
permanent appointments... thereto shall remain under permanent
status in their respective positions.
However, upon promotion or transfer to other Career Executive
Service (CES) positions, these incumbents shall be under temporary
status in said other CES positions until they... qualify.'
Two years after his retirement, petitioner was hired by the Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) on a contractual basis.
was issued by SBMA a permanent employment as Department
Manager III, Labor and Employment Center.
However, when... said appointment was submitted to respondent Civil
Service Commission Regional Office No. III, it was disapproved on the
ground that petitioner's eligibility was not appropriate.
petitioner was issued a temporary appointment
Petitioner appealed the disapproval... by respondent to the Civil
Service Commission, which issued Resolution No. 000059, dated
January 10, 2000, affirming the action taken by respondent.
petitioner filed with [the CA] a petition for review
CA shunned the issue of constitutionality, arguing that a constitutional
question should not be passed upon if there are other grounds upon
which the case may be decided.
appellate court ruled that only the appointing officer may request
reconsideration of the action taken by the CSC on appointments.
Thus, it held that petitioner did not have legal standing
CA added that petitioner was not the real party in interest, as his
appointment was dependent on the CSC's approval.
he had no vested right... petitioner brought this recourse to this Court.
Issues:
Whether or not Respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in ruling that petitioner lacks the
personality to question the disapproval
Whether or not Respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in ruling that petitioner is not the real
party in interest to question the disapproval
Whether or not Respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in dismissing petitioner's appeal on a
mere technicality considering that petitioner is questioning the
constitutionality of respondent office' issuance of Section 4... of CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 21, s. 1994, which deprived petitioner his
property right without due process of law.
Ruling:
Petition is partly meritorious.
permanent appointment in the career service is issued to a person who
has met the requirements of the position to which the appointment is
made in accordance with the provisions of law,... implies the civil
service eligibility of the appointee.
appointing authority has the discretion to choose whom to appoint, the
choice is subject to the caveat that the appointee possesses the
required qualifications.
To make it fully effective, an appointment to a civil service position
must comply with all legal requirements.[16] Thus, the law requires the
appointment to be submitted to the CSC which will ascertain, in the
main, whether the proposed appointee is... qualified to hold the
position and whether the rules pertinent to the process of appointment
were observed.
Powers and Functions of the Commission.
Approve all appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions
in the civil service, except those of presidential appointees, members
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, police forces, firemen, and
jailguards, and disapprove those where the appointees do not...
possess the appropriate eligibility or required qualifications.
take effect immediately upon issue by the appointing authority if the
appointee assumes his duties immediately and shall remain effective
until it is disapproved by the Commission, if this... should take place,
without prejudice to the liability of the appointing authority for
appointments issued in violation of existing laws
Provided, finally, That the Commission shall keep a record of
appointments of all officers and employees in the civil service.
All... appointments requiring the approval of the Commission as herein
provided, shall be submitted to it by the appointing authority within
thirty days from issuance, otherwise, the appointment becomes
ineffective thirty days thereafter.
appointing officer and the CSC acting together, though not
concurrently but consecutively, make an appointment complete.
CSC determines whether the appointee possesses the appropriate civil
service eligibility or... the required qualifications. If the appointee does,
the appointment must be approved; if not, it should be disapproved.
While petitioner does not challenge the legality of this provision, he
now claims that it is merely a technicality, which does not prevent him
from requesting reconsideration.
The power of appointment necessarily entails the exercise of judgment
and discretion.
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be
performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best
lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law.
he does, then the... appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that
there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This
is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only
the appointing authority can decide.
the selection of the appointee -- taking into account the totality of his
qualifications, including those abstract qualities that define his
personality -- is the prerogative of the appointing authority."[24] No
tribunal, not even this
Court,[25] may compel the exercise of an appointment for a favored
person.
CSC's disapproval of an appointment is a challenge to the exercise of
the appointing authority's discretion. The appointing authority must
have the right to contest the disapproval.
the appointing authority stands to be adversely affected when the CSC
disapproves an appointment. Thus, the said authority can "defend its
appointment since it knows... the reasons for the same.
While there is justification to allow the appointing authority to challenge
the CSC disapproval, there is none to preclude the appointee from
taking the same course of action.
Aggrieved parties, including the Civil Service Commission, should be
given the right to file... motions for reconsideration or to appeal
"legal standing" and "real party in interest" become relevant
Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in some
cases suits are brought not by parties who have been personally
injured by the operation of a law or by official action taken, but by
concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public...
interest.
question as to 'real party-in-interest' is whether he is 'the party who
would be [benefited] or injured by the judgment, or the 'party entitled to
the avails of the suit.
If legal standing is granted to challenge the constitutionality or validity
of a law or governmental act despite the lack of personal injury on the
challenger's part, then more so should petitioner be allowed to contest
the CSC Order disapproving his appointment. Clearly,... he was
prejudiced by the disapproval, since he could not continue his office.
Although petitioner had no vested right to the position,[33] it was his
eligibility that was being questioned. Corollary to this point, he should
be granted the opportunity to prove his eligibility. He had a personal
stake in the outcome... of the case, which justifies his challenge to the
CSC act that denied his permanent appointment.
the rule refers to a real or present substantial interest as distinguished
from a mere expectancy; or from a future, contingent, subordinate, or...
consequential interest.
As a general rule, one who has no right or interest to protect cannot
invoke the jurisdiction of the court as a party-plaintiff in an action.
Although the earlier discussion demonstrates that the appointing
authority is adversely affected by the CSC's Order and is a real party in
interest, the appointee is rightly a real party in interest too. He is also
injured by the CSC disapproval, because he is prevented... from
assuming the office in a permanent capacity. Moreover, he would
necessarily benefit if a favorable judgment is obtained, as an approved
appointment would confer on him all the rights and privileges of a
permanent appointee.
Section 2 of Rule VI of CSC Memorandum Circular 40, s. 1998 should
not be interpreted to restrict solely to the appointing authority the right
to move for a reconsideration of, or to appeal, the disapproval of an
appointment.
PD 807 and EO 292, from which the CSC... derives the authority to
promulgate its rules and regulations, are silent on whether appointees
have a similar right... there is no legislative intent to bar... appointees
from challenging the CSC's disapproval.
The view that only the appointing authority may request
reconsideration or appeal is too narrow. The appointee should have
the same right.
Parenthetically, CSC Resolution 99-1936[38] recognizes the right of
the adversely affected party to appeal... to the CSC Regional Offices
prior to elevating a matter to the CSC Central Office.[39] The adversely
affected party necessarily includes the appointee.
Alleging that his civil service eligibility was rendered ineffective and
that he was consequently deprived of a property right without due
process,[45] petitioner challenges the constitutionality of CSC
Memorandum Circular 21, s. 1994.
argues that his eligibility, through the Executive Leadership and
Management (ELM) training program, could no longer be affected by a
new eligibility requirement. He claims that he was eligible for his
previous position as department manager of the Legal
Services Department, PEZA; hence, he should retain his eligibility for
the position of department manager III... notwithstanding the
classification of the latter as a CES position.
Civil Service laws have expressly empowered the CSC to issue and
enforce... rules and regulations to carry out its mandate.
In the exercise of its authority, the CSC deemed it appropriate to
clearly define and identify positions covered by the Career Executive
Service.
the CSC had to issue guidelines to meet this objective, specifically
through the issuance of the... challenged Circular.
Positions in the career service, for which appointments require
examinations, are grouped into three major levels:... first level shall
include clerical, trades, crafts, and custodial service positions which
involve non-professional or sub[-]professional work in a non-
supervisory or supervisory capacity requiring less than four years of
collegiate studies... second level shall include professional, technical,
and scientific positions which involve professional, technical, or
scientific work in a non-supervisory or supervisory capacity requiring at
least four years of college work up to Division Chief level... third level
shall cover positions in the Career Executive Service
Those in the third level (CES positions) require Career Service
Executive Eligibility (CSEE) as a requirement for permanent
appointment.
The challenged Circular did not revoke petitioner's ELM eligibility. He
was appointed to a CES position; however, his eligibility was
inadequate. Eligibility must necessarily conform to the requirements of
the position, which in petitioner's case was a CSEE
The challenged Circular protects the rights of incumbents as long as
they remain in the positions to which they were previously appointed.
They are allowed to retain their positions in a permanent capacity,
notwithstanding the lack of CSEE. Clearly, the Circular... recognizes
the rule of prospectivity
The government service of petitioner ended when he retired in 1996;
thus, his right to remain in a CES position, notwithstanding his lack of
eligibility, also ceased. Upon his reemployment[56] years later as
department manager III at SBMA in
2001, it was necessary for him to comply with the eligibility prescribed
at the time for that position.
First, security of tenure in the Career Executive Service -- except in the
case of first and second level employees in the civil service -- pertains
only to rank, not to the position... to which the employee may be
appointed.
Second, petitioner had neither rank nor position prior to his
reemployment. One cannot claim security of tenure if one held no
tenure prior to appointment.
classification of positions in career service was a quasi-legislative, not
a quasi-judicial, issuance. This distinction determines whether prior
notice and hearing are necessary.
In exercising its quasi-judicial function, an administrative body
adjudicates the rights of persons before it, in accordance with the
standards laid down by the law.
determination of facts and the applicable law, as basis for official action
and the... exercise of judicial discretion, are essential for the
performance of this function... due process requirements, as
enumerated in Ang Tibay, must be observed. These requirements
include prior... notice and hearing.
quasi-legislative power is exercised by administrative agencies through
the promulgation of rules and regulations within the confines of the
granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegation of certain powers
flowing from the separation of the great branches... of the government.
Prior notice to and hearing of every affected party, as elements of due
process, are not required since there is no determination of past
events or facts that have to be established or ascertained. As a
general rule, prior... notice and hearing are not essential to the validity
of rules or regulations promulgated to govern future conduct.
the challenged Circular was an internal matter addressed to heads of
departments, bureaus and agencies. It needed no prior publication,
since it had been issued as an incident of the administrative body's
power to issue guidelines for government officials to... follow in
performing their duties.
Since petitioner had no CES eligibility, the CSC correctly denied his
permanent appointment. The appointee need not have been
previously heard, because the nature of the action did not involve the
imposition of an administrative disciplinary measure.
CSC, in approving or disapproving an appointment, merely examines
the conformity of the appointment with the law and the appointee's
possession of all the minimum qualifications and none of the
disqualification.
Petition is GRANTED insofar as it seeks legal standing for petitioner,
but DENIED insofar as it prays for the reversal of the CSC Resolutions
disapproving his appointment.
SMART COMMUNICATIONS vs. NTC
Facts: The NTC issued Billing Circular 13-6-2000 which promulgated
rules and regulations on the billing of telecommunications services.
Petitioners filed with the RTC a petition to declare the circular as
unconstitutional. A motion to dismiss was filed by the NTC on the
ground of petitioner’s to exhaust administrative remedies. The RTC
denied the motion to dismiss but on certiorari, the CA reversed RTC.
Held: 1. Administrative bodies had (a) quasi-legislative or rule-making
powers and (b) quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers.
Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to make rules and
regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the
confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and
separability of powers. To be valid, such rules and regulations must
conform to, and be consistent with, the provisions of enabling statute.
Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power is the power to hear
and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to
apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by law
itself in enforcing and administering the same law. In carrying out their
quasi-judicial functions, the administrative officers or bodies are
required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold
hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them for their
official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial.
2. The determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by
an administrative body contravenes the law or the constitution is within
the judicial power as defined by the Constitution which is “ the duty of
the Courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there haw been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.” The NTC circular was issued
pursuant to its quasi-legislative or rule-making power. Hence, the
action must be filed directly with the regular courts without requiring
exhaustion of administrative remedies.
3. Where the act of administrative agency was performed pursuant to
its quasi-judicial function, exhaustion of administrative remedy is
required, before going to court.
4. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only where the
administrative agency exercises its quasi-judicial or adjudicatory
function. Thus, in cases involving specialized disputes, the same must
be referred to an administrative agency of special competence
pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. This doctrine of primary
jurisdiction applies where the claim requires the resolution of issues
which, under a regulatory scheme, has been placed within the special
competence of an administrative body. In such case, the judicial
process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the
administrative body for its view.
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES VS. CA
FACTS: Two fiber drums were shipped owned by Eastern Shipping
from Japan. The shipment as insured with a marine policy. Upon
arrival in Manila unto the custody of metro Port Service, which
excepted to one drum, said to be in bad order and which damage was
unknown the Mercantile Insurance Company. Allied Brokerage
Corporation received the shipment from Metro, one drum opened and
without seal. Allied delivered the shipment to the consignee’s
warehouse. The latter excepted to one drum which contained spillages
while the rest of the contents was adulterated/fake. As consequence of
the loss, the insurance company paid the consignee, so that it became
subrogated to all the rights of action of consignee against the
defendants Eastern Shipping, Metro Port and Allied Brokerage. The
insurance company filed before the trial court. The trial court ruled in
favor of plaintiff an ordered defendants to pay the former with present
legal interest of 12% per annum from the date of the filing of the
complaint. On appeal by defendants, the appellate court denied the
same and affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE
(1) Whether the applicable rate of legal interest is 12% or 6%.
(2) Whether the payment of legal interest on the award for loss or
damage is to be computed from the time the complaint is filed from the
date the decision appealed from is rendered.
HELD
(1) The Court held that the legal interest is 6% computed from
the decision of the court a quo. When an obligation, not constituting a
loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on the amount
of damaes awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at
the rate of 6% per annum. No interest shall be adjudged on
unliquidated claims or damages except when or until the demand can
be established with reasonable certainty. When the judgment of the
court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executor, the rate
of legal interest shall be 12% per annum from such finality until
satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an
equivalent to a forbearance of money. The interest due shall be 12%
PA to be computed fro default, J or EJD.
(2) From the date the judgment is made. Where the demand is
established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run
from the time the claim is made judicially or EJ but when such certainty
cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made,
the interest shll begin to run only from the date of judgment of the court
is made.
(3) The Court held that it should be computed from the decision
rendered by the court a quo.
ARANETA VS. GATMAITAN
Facts: Sometime in 1950, trawl operators from Malabon, Navotas and
other places migrated to this region most of them settling at Sabang,
Calabanga, Camarines Sur, for the purpose of using this particular
method of fishing in said bay. On account of the belief of sustenance
fishermen that the operation of this kind of gear caused the depletion
of the marine resources of that area, there arose a general clamor
among the majority of the inhabitants of coastal towns to prohibit the
operation of trawls in San Miguel Bay. In response to these pleas, the
President issued Executive Order prohibiting the use of trawls in San
Miguel Bay.
A group of Otter trawl operators took the matter to the court by filing a
complaint for injunction and/or declaratory relief with preliminary
injunction with the Court of First Instance praying that a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued to restrain the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources and the Director of Fisheries from enforcing
said executive order; to declare the same null and void, and for such
other relief as may be just and equitable in the premises. The CFI
declared the Executive Order invalid; the injunction prayed for is
ordered to issue;
Issue: Whether the EO Executive Orders are valid and does not
encroach the authority of the Legislature in the said Prohibition.
Held: Yes, EO Executive Orders are valid for having been issued by
authority of the Constitution, the Revised Administrative Code and the
Fisheries Act. The opinion of the SC that with or without said Executive
Orders, the restriction and banning of trawl fishing from all Philippine
waters come, under the law, within the powers of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, who in compliance with his duties
may even cause the criminal prosecution of those who in violation of
his instructions, regulations or orders are caught fishing with trawls in
the Philippine waters. Under the law the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources has authority to regulate or ban the fishing by trawl
which, it is claimed. The President of the Philippines exercise that
same power and authority according to Section 10(1), Article VII of the
Constitution of the Philippines which states that The President shall
have control of all the executive departments, bureaus or offices,
exercises general supervision over all local governments as may be
provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed, and
according to Section 63 of the Revised Administrative Code which
states that Administrative acts and commands of the President of the
Philippines touching the organization or mode of operation of the
Government or rearranging or readjusting any of the district, divisions,
parts or ports of the Philippines, and all acts and commands governing
the general performance of duties by public employees or disposing of
issues of general concern shall be made in executive orders, and
Section 74 of the Revised Administrative Code also provides that all
executive functions of the government of the Republic of the
Philippines shall be directly under the Executive Departments subject
to the supervision and control of the President of the Philippines in
matters of general policy. The Departments are established for the
proper distribution of the work of the Executive, for the performance of
the functions expressly assigned to them by law, and in order that each
branch of the administration may have a chief responsible for its
direction and policy. Each Department Secretary shall assume the
burden of, and responsibility for, all activities of the Government under
his control and supervision.
For administrative purposes the President of the Philippines shall be
considered the Department Head of the Executive Office.
TAYUG RURAL BANK vs CENTRAL BANK
Facts: Plaintiff-Appellee, Tayug Rural Bank, Inc., is a banking
corporation. During the period from December 28, 1962 to July 30,
1963, it obtained thirteen (13) loans from Defendant-Appellant, Central
Bank of the Philippines, by way of rediscounting,... The loans,
amounting to P813,000.00 as of July 30, 1963, were all covered by
corresponding promissory notes prescribing the terms and conditions
of the aforesaid loans. On December 23, 1964, Appellant, thru the
Director of the Department of Loans and Credit, issued Memorandum
Circular No. DLC-8, informing all rural banks that an additional penalty
interest rate of ten per cent (10%) per annum would be assessed on all
past due loans... beginning January 4, 1965.
Appellee Rural Bank sued Appellant in the Court of First Instance of
Manila,... On June 27, 1969, A... to recover the 10% penalty imposed
by Appellant... and to restrain Appellant from continuing the imposition
of the... penalty. Appellant filed a counterclaim for the outstanding
balance and overdue accounts of Appellee in the total amount of
P444,809.45 plus accrued interest and penalty at 10% per annum on
the outstanding balance until full payment.
In its answer to the counterclaim, Appellee prayed for the dismissal of
the counterclaim, denying Appellant's allegations, stating that if
Appellee has any unpaid obligations with Appellant, it was due to the
latter's fault on account of its flexible and double standard policy... in
the granting of rediscounting privileges to Appellee and its subsequent
arbitrary and illegal imposition of the 10% penalty
The lower court, in its Order d... upholding the stand of plaintiff Rural
Bank, decided the case in its favor.
Appellant appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of
Appeals,... the Court of Appeals, finding no controverted facts and
taking note of the statement of the... lower court in its pre-trial Order
dated March 3, 1970 that only a legal question has been raised in the
pleadings, (Record on Appeal, p. 61), ruled that the resolution of the
appeal will solely depend on the legal issue of whether or not the
Monetary Board had authority to... authorize Appellant Central Bank to
impose a penalty rate of 10% per annum on past due loans of rural
banks which had failed to pay their accounts
Issues:
the issue is reduced to the sole question as to whether or not the
Central Bank can validly impose the 10% penalty on Appellee's past
overdue loans beginning July 4, 1965, by virtue of Memorandum
Circular No. DLC-8 dated December 23, 1964.
Ruling:
The answer is in the negative.
As to the supervising authority of the Monetary Board of the Central
Bank over Rural Banks, the same is spelled-out under Section 10 of
R.A. 720, as follows:
"SEC. 10. The power to supervise the operation of any Rural Bank by
the Monetary Board of the Central Bank as herein indicated, shall
consist in placing limits to the maximum credit allowed any individual
borrower; in prescribing the interest rate; in... determining the loan
period and loan procedure; in indicating the manner in which technical
assistance shall be extended to Rural Banks; in imposing a uniform
accounting system and manner of keeping the accounts and records of
the Rural Banks; in undertaking regular credit... examination of the
Rural Banks; in instituting periodic surveys of loan and lending
procedures, audits, test check of cash and other transactions of the
Rural Banks; in conducting training courses for personnel of Rural
Banks; and, in general, in supervising the business... operation of the
Rural Banks."
Nowhere in any of the above-quoted pertinent provisions of R.A. 720
nor in any other provision of R.A. 720 for that matter, is the Monetary
Board authorized to mete out on rural banks an additional penalty rate
on their past due accounts with Appellant. As correctly stated... by the
trial court, while the Monetary Board possesses broad supervisory
powers, nonetheless, the retroactive imposition of administrative
penalties cannot be taken as a measure supervisory in character
(Record on Appeal, p. 141).
Administrative rules and regulations have the force and effect of law
(Valerio v. Hon. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, 7
SCRA 719; Commissioner of Civil Service v. Cruz, 15 SCRA 638; R.B.
Industrial Development Company, Ltd. v. Enage, 24 SCRA

365; Director of Forestry v. Muñoz, 23 SCRA 1183; Gonzalo Sy v.
Central Bank of the Philippines, 70 SCRA 570).
There are, however limitations to the rule-making power of
administrative agencies. A rule shaped out by jurisprudence is that
when Congress authorizes promulgation of administrative rules and
regulations to implement given legislation, all that is required is that
the... regulation be not in contradiction with it, but conform to the
standards that the law prescribes (Director of Forestry v. Muñoz, 23
SCRA 1183). The rule delineating the extent of the binding force to be
given to administrative rules and regulations was explained by... the
Court in Teoxon v. Member of the Board of Administrators (33 SCRA
588), thus: "The recognition of the power of administrative officials to
promulgate rules in the implementation of the statute, as necessarily
limited to what is provided for in the legislative... enactment, may be
found as early as 1908 in the case of United States v. Barrias (11 Phil.
327) in 1914 U.S. v. Tupasi Molina (29 Phil. 119), in 1936 People v.
Santos (63 Phil. 300), in 1951 Chinese Flour Importers Ass. v. Price
Stabilization Board (89 Phil.
439), and in 1962 Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Social Security
Commission (4 SCRA 627). The Court held in the same case that "A
rule is binding on the courts so long as the procedure fixed for its
promulgation is followed and its scope is within the statute... granted
by the legislature, even if the courts are not in agreement with the
policy stated therein or its innate wisdom x x x." On the other hand,
"administrative interpretation of the law is at best merely advisory, for it
is the courts that finally determine what the law... means." Indeed, it
cannot be otherwise as the Constitution limits the authority of the
President, in whom all executive power resides, to take care that the
laws be faithfully executed. No lesser administrative, executive office,
or agency then can, contrary to the express... language of the
Constitution, assert for itself a more extensive prerogative.
Necessarily, it is bound to observe the constitutional mandate. There
must be strict compliance with the legislative enactment. The rule has
prevailed over the years, the latest... restatement of which was made
by the Court in the case of Bautista v. Junio (L-50908, January 31,
1984, 127 SCRA 342).
In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation
issued to implement said law, the basic law prevails because said rule
or regulation cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic
law (People v. Lim, 108 Phil. 1091). Rules that subvert the... statute
cannot be sanctioned (University of St. Tomas v. Board of Tax
Appeals, 93 Phil. 376; Del Mar v. Phil. Veterans Administration, 51
SCRA 340). Except for constitutional officials who can trace their
competence to act to the fundamental law itself, a... public official must
locate in the statute relied upon a grant of power before he can
exercise it. Department zeal may not be permitted to outrun the
authority conferred by statute.
DOLE PHILIPPINES vs ESTEVA
Facts: Respondents are members of the Cannery Multi-Purpose
Cooperative (CAMPCO). CAMPCO was organized in accordance with
Republic Act No. 6938, otherwise known as the Cooperative Code of
the Philippines. Members of CAMPCO live in communities surrounding
petitioner's plantation and are relatives of petitioner's employees.
petitioner and CAMPCO entered into a Service Contract. Pursuant to
the foregoing Service Contract, CAMPCO members rendered services
to petitioner. The Sangguniang Bayan of Polomolok, South Cotabato,
passed Resolution No. 64, on 5 May 1993, addressed to then
Secretary Ma. Nieves R. Confessor of the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE), calling her attention to the worsening working
conditions of the... petitioner's workers and the organization of
contractual workers into several cooperatives to replace the individual
labor-only contractors that used to supply workers to the petitioner.
Acting on the said Resolution, the DOLE Regional Office No. XI in
Davao City organized a
Task Force that conducted an investigation into the alleged labor-only
contracting activities of the cooperatives in Polomolok. The Senior
Legal Officer of petitioner wrote a letter addressed to Director Henry M.
Parel of DOLE Regional Office No. XI, supposedly to correct the
misinformation that petitioner was involved in labor-only contracting,
whether with a cooperative or any private... contractor. He further
stated in the letter that petitioner was not hiring cooperative members
to replace the regular workers who were separated from service due to
redundancy; that the cooperatives were formed by the immediate
dependents and relatives of the permanent workers... of petitioner; that
these cooperatives were registered with the CDA; and that these
cooperatives were authorized by their respective constitutions and by-
laws to engage in the job contracting business. Director Parel of DOLE
Regional Office No. XI issued an Order
WHEREFORE, premises considered, ADVENTURER'S MULTI
PURPOSE COOPERATIVE, HUMAN RESOURCE MULTI PURPOSE
COOPERATIVE and CANNERY MULTI PURPOSE COOPERATIVE
are hereby declared to be engaged in labor only contracting which is a
prohibited activity. The same cooperatives are therefore... ordered to
cease and desist from further engaging in such activities. The reason
why "labor-only" contracting is prohibited under the Labor Code is that
it encourages circumvention of the provisions of the Labor Code on the
workers' right to security of tenure and to self-organization.
The DOLE Regional Office No. XI was informed that CAMPCO and two
other cooperatives "continued to operate at DOLE Philippines, Inc.
despite the cease and desist Order" it had... issued. It therefore
commanded the Sheriff to proceed to the premises of CAMPCO and
the two other cooperatives and implement its Order dated 19 October
1993
Issues: two department orders issued by DOLE. Department Order No.
10, series of 1997, amended the implementing rules of Books III and VI
of the Labor Code
Ruling: A basic rule observed in this jurisdiction is that no statute,
decree, ordinance, rule or regulation shall be given retrospective effect
unless explicitly stated.
The Orders of DOLE Regional Director Parel, dated 19 September
1993, and of DOLE Undersecretary Trajano, dated 15 September
1994, were issued pursuant to the visitorial and enforcement power
conferred by the Labor Code
It is obvious that the visitorial and enforcement power granted to the
DOLE Secretary is in the nature of a quasi-judicial power. Quasi-
judicial power has been described by this Court in the following
manner
Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power on the other hand is
the power of the administrative agency to adjudicate the rights of
persons before it. It is the power to hear and determine questions of
fact to which the legislative policy is to apply... and to decide in
accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing
and administering the same law. The administrative body exercises its
quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial manner an act which
is essentially of an executive or... administrative nature, where the
power to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary
for the performance of the executive or administrative duty entrusted to
it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions the administrative
officers or bodies... are required to investigate facts or ascertain the
existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw
conclusions from them as basis for their official action and exercise of
discretion in a judicial nature. Since rights of specific persons are
affected it... is elementary that in the proper exercise of quasi-judicial
power due process must be observed in the conduct of the
proceedings.[30] (Emphasis supplied.)
The DOLE Secretary, under Article 106 of the Labor Code, as
amended, exercise quasi-judicial power, at least, to the extent
necessary to determine violations of labor standards provisions of the
Code and other labor legislation. He can issue compliance orders and
writs of... execution for the enforcement of his orders.

It is well-established in this jurisdiction that the decisions and orders of
administrative agencies, rendered pursuant to their quasi-judicial
authority, have upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final
judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res... judicata. The rule
of res judicata, which forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially
determined by competent authority, applies as well to the judicial and
quasi-judicial acts of public, executive or administrative officers and
boards acting within... their jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts
having general judicial powers. The orderly administration of justice
requires that the judgments or resolutions of a court or quasi-judicial
body must reach a point of finality set by the law, rules and regulations,
so as to... write finis to disputes once and for all. This is a fundamental
principle in the Philippine justice system, without which there would be
no end to litigations.
Section 49(b) enunciates the first concept of res judicata known as "bar
by prior judgment," whereas, Section 49(c) is referred to as
"conclusiveness of judgment."
There is "bar by former judgment" when, between the first case where
the judgment was rendered, and the second case where such
judgment is invoked, there is identity of parties, subject matter and
cause of action. When the three identities are present, the judgment on
the merits... rendered in the first constitutes an absolute bar to the
subsequent action. But where between the first case wherein
Judgment is rendered and the second case wherein such judgment is
invoked, there is only identity of parties but there is no identity of cause
of action, the... judgment is conclusive in the second case, only as to
those matters actually and directly controverted and determined, and
not as to matters merely involved therein. This is what is termed
"conclusiveness of judgment."
The second concept of res judicata, conclusiveness of judgment, is the
one applicable to the case at bar.
This Court also notes that CAMPCO and DOLE still continued with
their Service Contract despite the explicit cease and desist orders
rendered by authorized DOLE officials. There is no other way to look at
it except that CAMPCO and DOLE acted in complete defiance and
disregard of... the visitorial and enforcement power of the DOLE
Secretary and his authorized representatives under Article 128 of the
Labor Code, as amended. For the NLRC to ignore the findings of
DOLE Regional Director Parel and DOLE Undersecretary Trajano is an
unmistakable and serious... undermining of the DOLE officials'
authority.
In summary, this Court finds that CAMPCO was a labor-only contractor
and, thus, petitioner is the real employer of the respondents, with
CAMPCO acting only as the agent or intermediary of petitioner.
Res judicata has dual aspects, "bar by prior judgment" and
"conclusiveness of judgment."
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition is DENIED.
ANG TIBAY vs. CIR
Facts: The Solicitor General in behalf of the respondent Court of
Industrial Relations has filed a motion for reconsideration wherein the
court has considered the legal conclusions stated in Spanish language.
The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on the other hand, prays
for the vacation of the judgment of the majority of this court and
remanded the case to the Court of Industrial Relations for new trial
averring among other issues that Toribio Teodoro claimed that there
was shortage of Ang Tibay leather shoes thus it made him necessary
to lay off the members of the National Labor Union, Inc. That the
supposed lack of leather materials claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but
a scheme to systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite
the breach of his contract with the Philippine Army. That the employer
Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating
against the National Labor Union, Inc. and unjustly favoring the
National Workers’ Brotherhood.
Issue: Whether or not the issues should be properly directed, resolved
or determined by the Court of Industrial Relation.
Held: Yes, The CIR is a special court whose functions are specifically
stated in the law of its creation. It is more an administrative than part of
the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a
more receptive organ of the Government. The CIR or any of its judges,
therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the
law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a
subordinate in arriving at a decision.
The CIR should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in
such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various
issues involved, and the reasons for the decision rendered. The
performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred
upon it.
Accordingly, the motion for new trial should be and the same is hereby
granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the
CIR with instruction that it reopen the case, receive all such evidence
as may be relevant and otherwise proceed in accordance w/ the
requirements set forth herein above.
PASCUAL vs BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS
Facts: Salvador Gatbonton and Enriqueta Gatbonton filed an
administrative case against Arsenio Pascual Jr.
for alleged immorality. At the initial hearing thereof, Gatbonton’s
counsel announced that he would present Pascual as his first witness.
Pascual objected, relying on the constitutional right to be exempt from
being a witness against himself. The Board of Examiners took note of
such a plea but scheduled Pascual to testify in the next hearing unless
in the meantime he could secure a restraining order from a competent
authority. Pascual filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila an
action for prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction against the
Board of Medical Examiners. The lower court ordered that a writ of
preliminary injunction issue against the Board commanding it to refrain
from hearing or further proceeding with such an administrative case
and to await the judicial disposition of the matter. Subsequently, a
decision was rendered by the lower court finding the claim of Pascual
to be well-founded and prohibiting the Board "from compelling the
petitioner to act and testify as a witness for the complainant in said
investigation without his consent and against himself." Hence, the
Board appealed.
Issue: Whether a medical practitioner charged with malpractice in
administrative case can avail of the constitutional guarantee not to be a
witness against himself.
Held: Yes. The case for malpractice and cancellation of the license to
practice medicine while administrative in character possesses a
criminal or penal aspect. An unfavorable decision would result in the
revocation of the license of the respondent to practice medicine.
Consequently, he can refuse to take the witness stand. The right
against self-incrimination extends not only to right to refuse to answer
questions put to the accused while on witness stand, but also to forgo
testimony, to remain silent and refuse to take the witness stand when
called by as a witness by the prosecution. The reason is that the right
against self incrimination, along with the other rights granted to the
accused, stands for a belief that while a crime should not go
unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such desirable
objective should not be accomplished according to means and
methods offensive to the high sense of respect accorded to the human
personality.
UNITED PEPSI-COLA vs. LAGUESMA
FACTS: Petitioner is a union of supervisory employees. It appears that
on March 20, 1995 the union filed a petition for certification election on
behalf of the route managers at Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc.
However, its petition was denied by the med-arbiter and, on appeal, by
the Secretary of Labor and Employment, on the ground that the route
managers are managerial employees and, therefore, ineligible for
union membership under the first sentence of Art. 245 of the Labor
Code, which provides:
Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor organization;
right of supervisory employees. — Managerial employees are not
eligible to join, assist or form any labor organization. Supervisory
employees shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization
of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or form separate
labor organizations of their own.
Petitioner brought this suit challenging the validity of the order,
dismissed.
Hence, this petition. Pressing for resolution its contention that the first
sentence of Art. 245 of the Labor Code, so far as it declares
managerial employees to be ineligible to form, assist or join unions,
contravenes Art. III, §8 of the Constitution which provides:
The right of the people, including those employed in the public and
private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes
not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
ISSUES:
(1) whether the route managers at Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines,
Inc. are managerial employees and
(2) whether Art. 245, insofar as it prohibits managerial employees from
forming, joining or assisting labor unions, violates Art. III, §8 of the
Constitution.
HELD: YES and NO
As a class, managers constitute three levels of a pyramid: (1) Top
management; (2) Middle Management; and (3) First-line Management
[also called supervisors].
FIRST-LINE MANAGERS — The lowest level in an organization at
which individuals are responsible for the work of others is called first-
line or first-level management. First-line managers direct operating
employees only; they do not supervise other managers. Examples of
first-line managers are the “foreman” or production supervisor in a
manufacturing plant, the technical supervisor in a research
department, and the clerical supervisor in a large office. First-level
managers are often called supervisors.
MIDDLE MANAGERS — The term middle management can refer to
more than one level in an organization. Middle managers direct the
activities of other managers and sometimes also those of operating
employees. Middle managers’ principal responsibilities are to direct the
activities that implement their organizations’ policies and to balance the
demands of their superiors with the capacities of their subordinates. A
plant manager in an electronics firm is an example of a middle
manager.
TOP MANAGERS — Composed of a comparatively small group of
executives, top management is responsible for the overall
management of the organization. It establishes operating policies and
guides the organization’s interactions with its environment. Typical
titles of top managers are “chief executive officer,” “president,” and
“senior vice-president.” Actual titles vary from one organization to
another and are not always a reliable guide to membership in the
highest management classification.
A distinction exists between those who have the authority to devise,
implement and control strategic and operational policies (top and
middle managers) and those whose task is simply to ensure that such
policies are carried out by the rank-and-file employees of an
organization (first-level managers/supervisors). What distinguishes
them from the rank-and-file employees is that they act in the interest of
the employer in supervising such rank-and-file employees.
“Managerial employees” may therefore be said to fall into two distinct
categories: the “managers” per se, who compose the former group
described above, and the “supervisors” who form the latter group.
#1: It appears that this question was the subject of two previous
determinations by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, in
accordance with which this case was decided by the med-arbiter.
To qualify as managerial employee, there must be a clear showing of
the exercise of managerial attributes under paragraph (m), Article 212
of the Labor Code as amended. Designations or titles of positions are
not controlling. As to the route managers and accounting manager, we
are convinced that they are managerial employees. Their job
descriptions clearly reveal so (Worker’s Alliance Trade Union (WATU)
v. Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc., Nov. 13, 1991)
This finding was reiterated in Case No. OS-A-3-71-92. entitled In Re:
Petition for Direct Certification and/or Certification Election-Route
Managers/Supervisory Employees of Pepsi-Cola Products Phils.Inc.
* doctrine of res judicata certainly applies to adversary administrative
proceedings
Thus, we have in this case an expert’s view that the employees
concerned are managerial employees within the purview of Art. 212.
At the very least, the principle of finality of administrative determination
compels respect for the finding of the Secretary of Labor that route
managers are managerial employees as defined by law in the absence
of anything to show that such determination is without substantial
evidence to support it.
The Court now finds that the job evaluation made by the Secretary of
Labor is indeed supported by substantial evidence. The nature of the
job of route managers is given in a four-page pamphlet, prepared by
the company, called “Route Manager Position Description,” the
pertinent parts of which read:
A. BASIC PURPOSE
A Manager achieves objectives through others.
As a Route Manager, your purpose is to meet the sales plan; and you
achieve this objective through the skillful MANAGEMENT OF YOUR
JOB AND THE MANAGEMENT OF YOUR PEOPLE.
These then are your functions as Pepsi-Cola Route Manager. Within
these functions — managing your job and managing your people —
you are accountable to your District Manager for the execution and
completion of various tasks and activities which will make it possible for
you to achieve your sales objectives.
Xxxx
Distinction is evident in the work of the route managers which sets
them apart from supervisors in general. Unlike supervisors who
basically merely direct operating employees in line with set tasks
assigned to them, route managers are responsible for the success of
the company’s main line of business through management of their
respective sales teams. Such management necessarily involves the
planning, direction, operation and evaluation of their individual teams
and areas which the work of supervisors does not entail.
The route managers cannot thus possibly be classified as mere
supervisors because their work does not only involve, but goes far
beyond, the simple direction or supervision of operating employees to
accomplish objectives set by those above them.
While route managers do not appear to have the power to hire and fire
people (the evidence shows that they only “recommended” or
“endorsed” the taking of disciplinary action against certain employees),
this is because thisis a function of the Human Resources or Personnel
Department of the company.
# 2: Constitutionality of Art. 245
Art.245 is the result of the amendment of the Labor Code in 1989 by
R.A. No. 6715, otherwise known as the Herrera-Veloso Law. Unlike the
Industrial Peace Act or the provisions of the Labor Code which it
superseded, R.A. No. 6715 provides separate definitions of the terms
“managerial” and “supervisory employees,” as follows:
Art. 212. Definitions. . . .
(m) “managerial employee” is one who is vested with powers or
prerogatives to lay down and execute management policies and/or to
hire transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline
employees. Supervisory employees are those who, in the interest of
the employer, effectively recommend such managerial actions if the
exercise of such authority is not merely routinary or clerical in nature
but requires the use of independent judgment. All employees not falling
within any of the above definitions are considered rank-and-file
employees for purposes of this Book.
The distinction between top and middle managers, who set
management policy, and front-line supervisors, who are merely
responsible for ensuring that such policies are carried out by the rank
and file, is articulated in the present definition. 30 When read in relation
to this definition in Art. 212(m), it will be seen that Art. 245 faithfully
carries out the intent of the Constitutional Commission in framing Art.
III, §8 of the fundamental law.
*Framer’s Intent: MR. LERUM. My amendment is on Section 7, page 2,
line 19, which is to insert between the words “people” and “to” the
following: WHETHER EMPLOYED BY THE STATE OR PRIVATE
ESTABLISHMENTS. In other words, the section will now read as
follows: “The right of the people WHETHER EMPLOYED BY THE
STATE OR PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS to form associations,
unions, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be
abridged.”
Nor is the guarantee of organizational right in Art. III, §8 infringed by a
ban against managerial employees forming a union. The right
guaranteed in Art. III, §8 is subject to the condition that its exercise
should be for purposes “not contrary to law.” In the case of Art. 245,
there is a rational basis for prohibiting managerial employees from
forming or joining labor organizations.
PETITION is DISMISSED.
DELFIN vs. INCIONG
Facts: This petition seeks the reversal of the decision of then Deputy
Minister of Labor Amado Inciong which affirmed the decision of the
National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC Case No. LR-4320.
The said decision of the NLRC reversed the decision of Labor Arbiter
Jose T. Collado, Jr., which ordered the reinstatement of complainants
(herein petitioners) to their former positions without loss of seniority
and other personnel privileges. The 136 petitioners herein are former
employees of private respondent Atlantic Container Corporation
(hereinafter called Atlantic for brevity). Petitioners organized
themselves into the Atlantic Container Employees Organization and
affiliated with... the Federation of Democratic Labor Unions (hereinafter
called FEDLU for brevity).
On February 11, 1964, Atlantic and FEDLU executed a Collective
Bargaining Agreement which was amended on August 31, 1964.
Claiming that Atlantic and its General Manager, private respondent
Roberto Jacinto, refused to implement the Collective
Bargaining, Agreement and its amendment, petitioners and FEDLU
struck on February 16, 1966. Thereafter, the Atlantic Container
Employees Organization and FEDLU filed Case No. 5195-ULP in the
Court of Industrial Relations (hereinafter called CIR for brevity)...
charging Atlantic, Roberto Jacinto and one Hedy F. Jacinto... collective
bargaining agreement and a supplemental agreement respectively,
which provide, among others, for union shop, grievance procedure,
check-off of union dues... and increase of salary; that respondents, in
bad faith refused to implement said provisions of the agreements
notwithstanding complainants' repeated demands; that soon thereafter,
respondents rotated the permanent employees who are active
members of the union; that on account of... said acts of respondents,
the union filed a notice of strike on February 9, 1966 and on February
16, 1966 it actually declared a strike; and that during the strike,
respondents told Benito Dolosa that he would be reinstated if he
resigned as president of the union... and dissolved the same.'... tlantic
Container Corporation and Roberto Jacinto, x x x guilty of unfair labor
practice (and ordering them) to cease and desist from further
committing the same; to reinstate complainants striking members
Benito Dolosa, Anastacio Gordola, Antonio Moreno, Jose Orzal,
Cornelio Aguilar, Ernesto Hausan and Mauro Wagan, with back wages
from February 16, 1966 up to a period of three years, without loss of
seniority... and to make good the benefits herein found to have been
denied them.'
'IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS,
respondents Roberto Jacinto, Atlantic Container Corporation, Inland
Industries, Inc., Lazaro Arriola, Bienvenido Katalbas, Paz Yulo, Goshi
de
Yulo and Aurora Jereza are hereby ordered, in their joint and several
capacities, to reinstate complainants to their former positions without
loss of seniority and other personnel privileges and to pay back wages
of three (3) years without any deduction... from earnings elsewhere.
filed the instant petition charging public respondents NLRC and Deputy
Minister Amado Inciong with grave abuse of discretion
Issues: The resolution of this petition rests primarily on the issue of
whether or not the second case (Case No. LR-4320) is barred by the
prior judgment in the first case (Case No. 5195) and if not, whether or
not petitioners' cause of action had prescribed.
Ruling: For a prior judgment to constitute a bar to a subsequent case,
the following requisites must concur: a) it must be a final judgment or
order; (b) the court rendering the same must have jurisdiction over the
subject matter and over the parties; (c) it must... be a judgment or
order on the merits, and (d) there must be between the two cases
identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action
There is no question that the first three (3) requisites are present in this
case.
Going now to the fourth requisite, private respondents NLRC and then
Deputy Minister Inciong did not commit any grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction when they ruled that there is, between
the first and the second complaints, identity of... causes of action,
subject matter and parties.
There is an identity of cause of action in the two cases, that is, the
unfair labor practices... committed by Atlantic against its employees
during its existence.
Since the judgment therein had become final and executory, the
subsequent filing of another ULP charge against Atlantic for the same
violations committed during its existence, is barred... by res judicata.
The bringing of the same action in the name of the individual members
of the union will not take out the case from the ambit of the principle of
res... judicata. Neither will the bringing in of new respondents in the
name of the new corporation Inland, its incorporators and private
respondent Roberto Jacinto, who is also its General Manager, help
petitioners' cause. When a labor union accuses an employer of acts of
unfair labor practice allegedly committed during a given period of time,
the charges should include all acts of unfair labor practice committed
against any and all members of the union during that... period. The
union should not, upon dismissal of the charges first preferred, be
allowed to split its cause of action and harass the employer with
subsequent charges based upon acts committed during the same
period of time. The underlying philosophy of the doctrine of res judicata
is that parties ought not to be permitted to litigate the same issue more
than once; that when a... right or fact has been juducially tried and
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or an opportunity for
such a trial has been given, the judgment of the court, so long as it
remains... unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and
those in privity with them in law or estate, (Marabao v. Mendoza, 119
SCRA 97 Sy Cao v. CA, 132 SCRA 302). It is to the interest of the...
public that there should be an end to litigation by the same parties and
their privies over a subject once fully and fairly adjudicated. Interest
republicae ut sit finis... litium. We agree however, with the Labor
Arbiter's finding that the closure of Atlantic and the establishment of
Inland for the purpose of avoiding any obligation which may be
adjudged against the former in favor of its employees was substantially
proven.
This is a sufficient reason, for the purpose of enforcing the judgment in
the first case, for applying the rule that when a second entity is born or
generated to subvert the law, resort to corporate fiction of distinctness
of personality is prevented.
 SUYAT, JR. vs. TORRES
Facts: robbery incident... allegedly committed by Randy Torres, Nelson
Torres, Marlon Bonson, and Bernardo Bautista. At the inquest
proper,... Bernardo Bautista admitted the sole responsibility... despite
this admission... preliminary investigation was still conducted upon
recommendation of the said inquest... prosecutor, and considering the
waiver of detention signed by the suspects, they were detained in the
provincial jail pending the termination of the preliminary investigation
Prosecutor Suyat, Jr. who, initially, demanded Imelda Torres the sum
of P20,000.00 for the dismissal of the case against the latter's two (2)
sons and nephew. Realizing, however,... that this amount is much
lower than what was required of Imelda Torres in the payment of cash
bond for every suspect, she decided to bargain the amount until
Prosecutor Suyat, Jr. finally agreed to the sum of P15,000.00 to be
given in his office the following day on June 9, 1993... at 3:00 p.m. in
the afternoon
Upon consultation with her lawyer Atty. Mariano Santiago, Imelda
Torres was referred by said counsel to the Anti-Organized Crime
Division of the National Bureau of Investigation for immediate
assistance
Anti-Organized Crime Division thru its Chief, Atty. Artemio Sacaguing,
ordered Special Agent Mar Panganiban to form a team for the purpose
of entrapping Prosecutor Suyat, Jr. Rosalina A. Espina, in her capacity
as Supervising Agent of the National Bureau of Investigation, filed with
the Department of Justice an unnumbered administrative complaint
accusing Prosecutor Suyat, Jr. of the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Rizal of grave misconduct and receiving for personal use
of a fee, gift or other valuable thing in the course of official duties... in
violation of Anti-Graft laws and Section 46, paragraphs b(4) and b(9) of
Executive Order No. 292 of the Administrative Code of 1987.
Secretary Franklin M. Drilon of the Department of Justice issued a
formal charge... against Prosecutor Suyat, Jr. as well as memorandum
placing him under preventive suspension for ninety (90) days
Secretary Franklin M. Drilon of the Department of Justice
recommended to the... then Executive Secretary Teofisto T. Guingona,
Jr. of the Office of the President the immediate dismissal of Prosecutor
Suyat, Jr. from the government service with forfeiture of all benefits
under the law
Executive Secretary Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. issued a memorandum
stating his concurrence with the recommendation of Secretary Franklin
M. Drilon, and recommended to President Fidel V. Ramos the approval
of the proposed Administrative Order dismissing
Prosecutor Suyat, Jr. from the government service with forfeiture of all
benefits under the law
Office of the President of the Philippines thru then Executive Secretary
Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. issued the first questioned order dismissing
Prosecutor Suyat, Jr. from the government service with forfeiture of all
benefits under the law as earlier... adverted to.
appellate court dismissed the petition for review... explicitly provided
under Section 1 of Revised Administrative
Circular No. 1-95 which took effect on June 1, 1995 that a final order
by any quasi-judicial agency shall be appealable to this Court by way
of petition for review.
Issues:
Office of the President thru Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed orders
because (a) the first questioned order is not supported by the...
evidence on record and is tainted with gross error of law and...
irregularities prejudicial to the interest of Prosecutor Suyat, Jr.; and (b)
the second and third questioned orders violates (sic) the prevailing
doctrine concerning pro forma motions for... reconsideration.
Ruling:
The petition is denied. Administrative Order No. 95... of the President
Had Become Final and Executory When... the Petitioner Filed His
Petition For Certiorari in... the Court of Appeals. The Petition for
Certiorari Filed... in the Court of Appeals Not A Substitute for the Lost
Remedy... of Appeal. The Errors Ascribed to the Office of the President
Are Errors of Judgment and Not Errors of Jurisdiction. The Issues
Raised in the Petition At Bar Are Factual.
TAN vs. DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY
Facts:
On April 15, 1963, Petitioner Wenceslao Tan won the bidding for the
license of logging operations on a public forest land in Olongapo.
On May 30, 1963, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
Benjamin M. Gozon promulgated Order no. 46 which gives the power
to the Director of Forestry to grant (a) new ordinary timber licenses
where the area covered thereby is not more than 3,000 hectares each;
and (b) the extension of ordinary timber licenses for areas not
exceeding 3,000 hectares.
On December 19, 1963 General memorandum Order No. 60 was
issued by the acting secretary, revoking the authority delegated to the
Director of Forestry which incidentally was the same date the license
for petitioner was signed.
Acting on claims of irregularity, the license for the petitioner was
revoked.
The RTC dismissed the complaint, hence the petitioner raised it
directly to the Court.
Issue:
1) Whether or not the license is void ab initio
2) Whether or not the Director of Forestry gravely abused its discretion
in revoking the license
Held: Yes.
a. The release of the license on January 6, 1964, gives rise to the
impression that it was ante-dated to December 19, 1963 on which date
the authority of the Director of Forestry was revoked.
b. While the timber license might have been signed on December 19,
1963 it was released only on January 6, 1964. Before its release, no
right is acquired by the licensee.
c. As pointed out by the trial court, the Director of Forestry had no
longer any authority to release the license on January 6, 1964.
Therefore, petitioner-appellant had not acquired any legal right under
such void license.
2. No. A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates
the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public
welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the
purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege,
which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or
public welfare as in this ceise.
Petition denied.
CALO vs. FUERTES
FACTS: In Cadastral Case No. 84, Butuan City entitled Francis C.
Calo, claimant-contestant, vs. Delfin C. Fuertes, applicant-respondent,
the Director of Lands rendered an opinion denying and dismissing
former's claim and contest against the homestead application of Delfin
C. Fuertes and ordered him to vacate the premises within60 days from
receipt of a copy of the opinion and stating that, upon finality thereof,
the homestead patent would be issued to Fuertes. His request for
reconsideration having been denied by the Director of Lands,
Francisco C. Calo brought to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources the case, who modified the opinion of the Director of Lands,
ordering Fuertes to reimburse Calo of the difference between the value
of the improvements that the latter introduced on the land in
controversy and the value of the consequential benefits derived by him
there from. Still dissatisfied with the opinion, Calo appealed to the
President of the Philippines, but withdrew it before the President could
act thereon. He later filed in the Court of First Instance of Agusan a
petition for writs of certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction
praying that the enforcement of the opinions of the Director of Lands
and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources be enjoined
among others. For failure to state a cause of action, for lack of
jurisdiction and for not exhausting all the administrative remedies
available to the petitioner in the ordinary course of law, the Court
resolves to dismiss as it hereby dismisses the herein petition with costs
against petitioner. The petitioner then appeals to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether the appeal to the President is a condition precedent

to the appeal to the Courts of Justice.

HELD: Yes. The appellant’s contention that, as the Secretary of

Agriculture and Natural Resources is the alter ego of the President and
his acts or decisions are also those of the latter, he need not appeal
from the decision or opinion of the former to the latter, and that, such
being the case, after he had appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources from the decision or opinion of the Director of
Lands, he had exhausted all the administrative remedies, is untenable.
The withdrawal of the appeal taken to the President of the Philippines
is tantamount to not appealing at all thereto. Such withdrawal is fatal
because the appeal to the President is the last step he should take in
an administrative case. Furthermore, a special civil action for certiorari
and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court lies only when
"there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law." In the case at bar, appeal from an opinion or
order by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to the
President of the Philippines is the plain, speedy and adequate remedy
available to the petitioner. Therefore, the judgment appealed from had
already become final and cannot be reviewed. The appeal is
dismissed, with costs against the petitioner-appellant.
 MONSANTO vs. FACTORAN
Facts: The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto
(then assistant treasurer of Calbayog City) of the crime of estafa
through falsification of public documents. She was sentenced to jail
and to indemnify the government in the sum of P4,892.50.The SC
affirmed the decision. She then filed a motion for reconsideration but
while said motion was pending, she was extended by then President
Marcos absolute pardon which she accepted (at that time, the rule was
that clemency could be given even before conviction). By reason of
said pardon, petitioner wrote the Calbayog City treasurer requesting
that she be restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer since
the same was still vacant. Her letter was referred to the Minister of
Finance who ruled that she may be reinstated to her position without
the necessity of a new appointment not earlier than the date she was
extended the absolute pardon.
Petitioner wrote the Ministry stressing that the full pardon bestowed on
her has wiped out the crime which implies that her service in the
government has never been interrupted and therefore the date of her
reinstatement should correspond to the date of her preventive
suspension; that she is entitled to backpay for the entire period of her
suspension; and that she should not be required to pay the
proportionate share of the amount of P4,892.50
The Ministry referred the issue to the Office of the President. Deputy
Executive Secretary Factoran denied Monsanto’s request averring that
Monsanto must first seek appointment and that the pardon does not
reinstate her former position.
Issues:
1. Is Monsanto entitled to backpay?
2. Is a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the
Chief Executive, entitled to reinstatement to her former position without
need of a new appointment?
3. May petitioner be exempt from the payment of the civil indemnity
imposed upon her by the sentence?
Held:
1. Pardon is defined as "an act of grace, proceeding from the power
entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the individual,
on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a
crime he has committed. It is the private, though official act of the
executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is
intended, and not communicated officially to the Court.
While a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the
existence of guilt so that in the eye of the law the offender is as
innocent as though he never committed the offense, it does not
operate for all purposes. The very essence of a pardon is forgiveness
or remission of guilt. Pardon implies guilt. It does not erase the fact of
the commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. It does not
wash out the moral stain. It involves forgiveness and not forgetfulness.
A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no
amends for the past. It affords no relief for what has been suffered by
the offender. It does not impose upon the government any obligation to
make reparation for what has been suffered. “Since the offense has
been established by judicial proceedings, that which has been done or
suffered while they were in force is presumed to have been rightfully
done and justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required.”
This would explain why petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be entitled
to receive backpay for lost earnings and benefits.
2. The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her
disqualification from holding public employment but it cannot go
beyond that. To regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she
must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new
appointment.
3. Civil liability arising from crime is governed by the Revised Penal
Code. It subsists notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any
reason the sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty or commutation
of sentence. Petitioner's civil liability may only be extinguished by the
same causes recognized in the Civil Code, namely: payment, loss of
the thing due, remission of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor
and debtor, compensation and novation.
GARCIA vs. COA
FACTS: Petitioner was a supervising lineman in the Region IV Station
of the Bureau of Telecommunications in Lucena City. A criminal case
of qualified theft was filed against him. The president grated him an
executive clemency. The petitioner filed a claim for back payment of
salaries. The petitioner was later recalled to the service on 12 March
1984 but the records do not show whether petitioner’s reinstatement
was to the same position of Supervising Lineman.
ISSUE: Whether Garcia is entitled to the payment of back wages after
having been reinstated pursuant to the grant of executive clemency.
HELD: The pardoned offender regains his eligibility for appointment to
public office which was forfeited by reason of the conviction of the
offense. But since pardon does not generally result in automatic
reinstatement because the offender has to apply for reappointment, he
is not entitled to back wages.
If the pardon is based on the innocence of the individual, it affirms this
innocence and makes him a new man and as innocent; as if he had
not been found guilty of the offense charged. 7 When a person is given
pardon because he did not truly commit the offense, the pardon
relieves the party from all punitive consequences of his criminal act,
thereby restoring to him his clean name, good reputation and
unstained character prior to the finding of guilt.
In the case at bar, the acquittal of petitioner by the trial court was
founded not on lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt but on the fact
that petitioner did not commit the offense imputed to him. Aside from
finding him innocent of the charge, the trial court commended
petitioner for his concern and dedication as a public servant. Verily,
petitioner’s innocence is the primary reason behind the grant of
executive clemency to him, bolstered by the favorable
recommendations for his reinstatement. This signifies that petitioner
need no longer apply to be reinstated to his former employment; he is
restored to his office ipso facto upon the issuance of the clemency.
Petitioner’s automatic reinstatement to the government service entitles
him to back wages. This is meant to afford relief to petitioner who is
innocent from the start and to make reparation for what he has
suffered as a result of his unjust dismissal from the service. The right to
back wages is afforded to those with have been illegally dismissed and
were thus ordered reinstated or to those otherwise acquitted of the
charges against them.
Therefore, the court ordered the full back wages from April 1 1975
(date when he was illegally dismissed) to March 12 1984 (reinstated)
to the petitioner.
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FACTS: Petitioners: Ignacio P. Lacsina, Luis R. Mauricio, Antonio R.
Quintos and Juan T. David for petitioners in 83896 and Juan T. David
for petitioners in 83815. Both petitions were consolidated and are
being resolved jointly as both seek a declaration of the
unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 issued by President
Corazon C. Aquino on July 25, 1987. Executive Order No. 284,
according to the petitioners allows members of the Cabinet, their
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other than
government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions.
The pertinent provisions of EO 284 is as follows:
Section 1: A cabinet member, undersecretary or assistant secretary or
other appointive officials of the Executive Department may in addition
to his primary position, hold not more than two positions in the
government and government corporations and receive the
corresponding compensation therefor.

Section 2: If they hold more positions more than what is required in
section 1, they must relinquish the excess position in favor of the
subordinate official who is next in rank, but in no case shall any official
hold more than two positions other than his primary position.
Section 3: AT least 1/3 of the members of the boards of such
corporation should either be a secretary, or undersecretary, or
assistant secretary.
The petitioners are challenging EO 284’s constitutionality because it
adds exceptions to Section 13 of Article VII other than those provided
in the constitution. According to the petitioners, the only exceptions
against holding any other office or employment in government are
those provided in the Constitution namely: 1. The Vice President may
be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Section 3 par.2 of
Article VII. 2. The secretary of justice is an ex-officio member of the
Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec. 8 of article VIII.
Issue: Whether or not Executive Order No. 284 is constitutional.
Decision: No. It is unconstitutional. Petition granted. Executive Order
No. 284 was declared null and void.
Ratio: In the light of the construction given to Section 13 of Article VII,
Executive Order No. 284 is unconstitutional. By restricting the number
of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant
secretaries may hold in addition their primary position to not more that
two positions in the government and government corporations, EO 284
actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct
contravention of the express mandate of Sec. 13 of Article VII of the
1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise
provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.
The phrase “unless otherwise provided in this constitution” must be
given a literal interpretation to refer only to those particular instances
cited in the constitution itself: Sec. 3 Art VII and Sec. 8 Art. VIII.
CAASI vs. CA
Facts: Merito Miguel was elected as mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan in
the local elections of January 18, 1988. His disqualification, however,
was sought by Mateo Caasi on the ground that under Section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code Miguel was not qualified because he is a
green card holder, hence, a permanent resident of the USA and not of
Bolinao. Sec. 48 provides:
Sec. 68. Disqualifications - Any person who is a permanent resident of
or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any
elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his
status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in
accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election
laws.
Miguel admitted that he holds a green card, but he denied that he is a
permanent resident of the United States. He argued that he obtained
the green card for convenience in order that he may freely enter the
United States for his periodic medical examination and to visit his
children there. He alleged that he is a permanent resident of Bolinao,
Pangasinan and that he voted in all previous elections, including the
plebiscite on February 2, 1987 for the ratification of the 1987
Constitution and the congressional elections on May 18, 1987. After
hearing, the Comelec dismissed the petition. It held that the
possession of a green card by the respondent Miguel does not
sufficiently establish that he has abandoned his residence in the
Philippines.
Issue: Whether a green card is proof that the holder thereof is a
permanent resident of the United States such that it would disqualify
him to run for any elective local position.
Held: Yes. Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent
residence in the U.S. and his possession of a green card attesting to
such status are conclusive proof that he is a permanent resident of the
United States. In the "Application for Immigrant Visa and Alien
Registration" which Miguel filled up in his own handwriting and
submitted to the US Embassy in Manila before his departure for the
United States in 1984, Miguel's answer to Question No. 21 therein
regarding his "Length of intended stay (if permanently, so state),"
Miguel's answer was, "Permanently." On its face, the green card that
was subsequently issued by the US Department of Justice and
Immigration and Registration Service to Miguel identifies him in clear
bold letters as a RESIDENT ALIEN. On the back of the card, the upper
portion, the following information is printed: “Alien Registration Receipt
Card. Person identified by this card is entitled to reside permanently
and work in the United States.” Despite his vigorous disclaimer,
Miguel's immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted an
abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. He did
not go to the United States merely to visit his children or his doctor
there. He entered the US with the intention to live there permanently as
evidenced by his application for an immigrant's (not a visitor's or
tourist's) visa.
Issue: Whether Miguel, by returning to the Philippines in November
1987 and presenting himself as a candidate for mayor of Bolinao in the
January 18, 1988 local elections, waived his status as a permanent
resident or immigrant of the United States
Held: No. To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines,
the law requires that the candidate who is a green card holder must
have "waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a
foreign country." Therefore, his act of filing a certificate of candidacy for
elective office in the Philippines, did not of itself constitute a waiver of
his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States.
The waiver of his green card should be manifested by some act or acts
independent of and done prior to filing his candidacy for elective office
in this country. Without such prior waiver, he was "disqualified to run
for any elective office." Miguel's application for immigrant status and
permanent residence in the U.S. and his possession of a green card
attesting to such status are conclusive proof that he is a permanent
resident of the U.S. despite his occasional visits to the Philippines. The
waiver of such immigrant status should be as indubitable as his
application for it. Absent clear evidence that he made an irrevocable
waiver of that status or that he surrendered his green card to the
appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor of Bolinao in the
local elections on January 18, 1988, the conclusion is that he was
disqualified to run for said public office.
Issue: Whether or not Miguel is disqualified from office.
Held: Yes. Miguel admits that he holds a green card, which proves
that he is a permanent resident or immigrant it of the United States, but
the records of this case are starkly bare of proof that he had waived his
status as such before he ran for election as municipal mayor of Bolinao
on January 18, 1988. We, therefore, hold that he was disqualified to
become a candidate for that office. Hence, his election was null and
void.
Residence in the municipality where he intends to run for elective office
for at least one (1) year at the time of filing his certificate of candidacy
is one of the qualifications that a candidate for elective public office
must possess. Miguel did not possess that qualification because he
was a permanent resident of the United States and he resided in
Bolinao for a period of only three (3) months (not one year) after his
return to the Philippines in November 1987 and before he ran for
mayor of that municipality on January 18, 1988.
● In banning from elective public office Philippine citizens who are
permanent residents or immigrants of a foreign country, the Omnibus
Election Code has laid down a clear policy of excluding from the right
to hold elective public office those Philippine citizens who possess dual
loyalties and allegiance. The law has reserved that privilege for its
citizens who have cast their lot with our country "without mental
reservations or purpose of evasion." The assumption is that those who
are resident aliens of a foreign country are incapable of such entire
devotion to the interest and welfare of their homeland for with one eye
on their public duties here, they must keep another eye on their duties
under the laws of the foreign country of their choice in order to
preserve their status as permanent residents thereof.
● Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that
"any public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or
acquire the status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure
shall be dealt with by law" is not applicable to Merito Miguel for he
acquired the status of an immigrant of the United States before he was
elected to public office, not "during his tenure" as mayor of Bolinao,
Pangasinan.
CUYEGKENG vs. CRUZ
Facts: Among the 12 nominees for the Board of Medical Examiners,
only 6 were shortlisted by the President, which includes Dr. Pedro
Cruz, a government physician. The petitioners, who are among the
nominees cut by the president, prayed for two causes of action. The
first, being that any one of them is qualified for the position and that Dr.
Cruz’s appointment be rendered illegal, thus null and void. While the
second, prays for a writ of preliminary injunction, ceasing, desisting
and refraining the respondent from assuming and performing the role
of Board Medical Examiner, and for the respondent to pay for the costs
of this suit. The petition for preliminary injunction was dismissed. The
Council of Philippine Medical Association, and incorporated
association intervened enjoining the petitioners in their prayer for relief.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners’ have valid causes of action.
Held: No. The Court Ruled that Respondent has a good and valid right
to his title on the grounds that one who does not claim to be entitled to
the office allegedly usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another
cannot question his title by quo warranto. This suggests that petitioners
have no cause of action against the respondent. While the intervenors
have no right to question the title of respondent. Hence, the petition for
quo warranto has no merit.
CSC vs. DE LA CRUZ
FACTS: Saturnino dela Cruz is an employee of DOTC, Air
TransportationOffice, he was a Check Pilot II. He was promoted to the
position: Chief Aviation Safety Regulation Officer of the Aviation Safety
Division.His promotion was assailed by Calamba, saying he did not
meet the 4 yrmanagerial & supervisory qualification for the
position.CSC-NCR upheld the protest and recalled the approval of the
appointment of Dela Cruz.Upon appeal of the ATO Director Gilo, CSC
reversed itself and approved theappointment. (decision of the CSC
kept changing)CA approved the appointment. He has the required
qualifications “planning,organizing, directing, coordinating and
supervising the enforcement of airsafety laws, rules and regulations
pertaining to licensing, rating and checkingof all airmen and mechanics
and regulation of the activities of flying schools.
HELD:
The requirement is 4 yrs of work in managerial position
AND/ORsupervisory position.“or” – either the 1st clause or 2nd clause
may be applied.Dela Cruz had excellent credentials and a “proven
excellent performance.”Every particular job has:3.formal – age,
number of academic units in a certain course, seminarsattended, etc.
and4.informal qualifications – resourcefulness, team spirit,
courtesy,initiative, loyalty, ambition, prospects for the future and best
interestof the service.Even if the law stated “&”,the Court held that he
has “substantially complied”3 yrs & 8mos.
YEE vs. DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS
FACTS:
 Antonia was a public-school teacher and had been appointed as
such teacher in the Division of Antique in 1951 and a civil service
eligible as a regular national teacher.
 Antonia married Mr. Ng Foo alias Pio Chet Yee , a Chinese citizen,
on August 10, 1957 is presently a Chinese citizen.
 On October 28, 1957, Antonia was removed from her teaching
service by virtue of Special Order No. 296, series of 1957, issued
by the Division Superintendent of Schools of Antique, pursuant to
the 2nd indorsement of the Director of Public Schools,
disauthorizing the continuance in the service of the petitioner on
account of Circular No. 40, series of 1947. (these decisions were
never appealed by Antonia)
 Prior to the effectivity of the order of removal, Antonia wrote two
letters: one for the Commissioner of Civil Service and one for the
Division Superintendent of Schools of Antique asking for
reinstatement.
 Antonia came to know for the first time of the actions taken on her
letters when the respondents Division Superintendent of Schools
and the Director of Public Schools submitted their evidence in
support of their motion to dismiss wherein it appears that
the Secretary of Education in its 3 rd indorsement concurs with the
recommendation of the Director of Public Schools for denial of the
reinstatement of the petitioner to the service and that in
its 4th indorsement the Commissioner of Civil Service likewise
concurs in the action separating Mrs. Antonio A. Yee from the
teaching service.
 Antonia filed an original petition for mandamus  against the Director
of Public Schools and the Division Superintendent of Schools and a
motion for leave to include the Secretary of Education and the
Commissioner of Civil Service.
Ruling of Lower Courts:
1. RTC ruled in favor of Antonia.
 Antonia was illegally removed from her position as school
teacher.
ISSUE: Whether Antonia is still qualified teacher under the Revised
Administrative Code, which provides that public teachers should be
Filipino citizens only. – NO.
 RULING:
Antonia’s removal was due to the loss of her Filipino citizenship.
 There is, however, no doubt that her removal as a public-school
teacher because of loss of Filipino citizenship is legal.
 Not being included in Sect. 671 of the Revised Administrative Code
which enumerates the officers and employees constituting the
unclassified service, teaching in a public school is in the classified
service – a public function which may be performed by Filipino
citizens only.
 An applicant for admission to examination for entrance into the civil
service must be a citizen of the Philippines (Sec. 675 of the
Revised Administrative Code). And after he had qualified himself to
be eligible for appointment to a civil service position and had been
appointed to such position, he must continue to be such citizen.
 A voluntary change of citizenship or a change thereof by operation
of law disqualifies him to continue holding the civil service position
to which he had qualified and had been appointed.
 Upon Antonia’s marriage to Ng Foo alias Pio Chet Yee, a Chinese
citizen, she ceased to be a citizen of the Philippines, and for that
reason she is no longer qualified to continue holding the civil
service position to which she had qualified and had been
appointed.
 Section 681 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides
that:
“In making selection from lists of certified eligibles furnished by the
Commissioner, appointing officer shall, when other qualifications are
equal, prefer:
First. Citizens of the Philippines. …”
 The preference provided in the law was operative during the period
before 4 July 1946 or before the Philippines became an
independent nation.
Disposition: IN VIEW OF THE CONCLUSION ARRIVED AT, the point
of exhaustion of administrative remedy need not be passed upon. The
judgment appealed from is REVERSED and petition denied, without
pronouncement as to costs in both instances.
TUANDA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts: Petitioners institute this special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to set aside
the resolution of Sandiganbayan and its orders denying petitioners'
motion for suspension of their arraignment. February 9, 1989 Delia
Estrellanes and Bartolome Binaohan were designated as industrial
labor sectoral representative and agricultural labor sectoral
representative for the Sangguniang Bayan of Jimalalud, Negros
Oriental by DILG Secretary Santos. They both took their oath of office
on February 16 and 17, 1989.
Then, petitioners filed a petition with the Office of the President for
review and recall of said designations. This was denied and enjoined
Tuanda to recognize private sectoral representatives. Estrallanes and
Binaohan then filed a petition for mandamus with RTC Negros Oriental
for recognition as members of the Sangguniang Bayan. It was
dismissed. The matter was then brought to RTC Dumaguete City
accusing Tuanda and others of taking advantage of their official
functions and unlawfully causing undue injury to Estrellanes and
Binaohan. Petitioners filed a motion with Sandiganbayan for
suspension of the Criminal Case on the ground that a prejudicial
question exists. The RTC rendered a decision declaring null and void
ab initio the designations issued by DILG for violation of the provisions
saying that the Sanggunian itself must make a determination first of the
number of sectors in the city/municipality to warrant representation.
Meanwhile, the Sandiganbayan has issued a resolution saying that the
private respondents have rendered such services and the said
appointments enjoy the presumption of regularity; for these reasons,
the private respondents were entitled to the slaries attached to their
office. Even if the RTC later declare the appointments null and void,
they would still be given salaries because of the period they acted as
representatives has made them a de facto officers. Petitioners filed a
motion for reconsideration of the resolution in view of the RTC
nullification of the appointments. But it was likewise denied along with
the cancellation of their arraignment, instead Sandiganbayan required
Tuanda and the others to submit a written show cause why they should
not be cited for contempt of court for their failure to appear in court
today for the arraignment. Hence, this special civil action for certiorari
and prohibition where petitioners attribute to respondent
Sandiganbayan the following errors:
A. The Respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying petitioners' motions for the suspension of the proceedings in
Criminal Case
B. The Respondent Court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in
refusing to suspend the proceedings that would entail a retrial and
rehearing by it of the basic issue involved
C. The Respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion and/or
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in effectively allowing
petitioners to be prosecuted under two alternative theories that private
respondents are de jure and/or de facto officers in violation of
petitioners' right to due process.
Issue: The legality of private respondents' designation as sectoral
representatives.
Held: The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to
avoid two conflicting decisions. 14 It has two essential elements:
(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the
issue raised in the criminal action; and
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal
action may proceed. 15
Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bench, we find that the
issue in the civil case, CA-G.R. CV No. 36769, constitutes a valid
prejudicial question to warrant suspension of the arraignment and
further proceedings in the criminal case against petitioners.
All the elements of a prejudicial question are clearly and unmistakably
present in this case. There is no doubt that the facts and issues
involved in the civil action (No. 36769) and the criminal case (No.
16936) are closely related. The filing of the criminal case was premised
on petitioners' alleged partiality and evident bad faith in not paying
private respondents' salaries and per diems as sectoral
representatives, while the civil action was instituted precisely to resolve
whether or not the designations of private respondents as sectoral
representatives were made in accordance with law. Private
respondents insist that even if their designations are nullified, they are
entitled to compensation for actual services rendered. We disagree. As
found by the trial court and as borne out by the records, from the start,
private respondents' designations as sectoral representatives have
been challenged by petitioners. They began with a petition filed with
the Office of the President copies of which were received by private
respondents on 26 February 1989, barely eight (8) days after they took
their oath of office. Hence, private respondents' claim that they have
actually rendered services as sectoral representatives has not been
established.
Finally, we find unmeritorious respondent Sandiganbayan's thesis that
even in the event that private respondents' designations are finally
declared invalid, they may still be considered de facto public officers
entitled to compensation for services actually rendered.
The conditions and elements of de facto officership are the following:
1) There must be a de jure office;
2) There must be color of right or general acquiescence by the public;
and
3) There must be actual physical possession of the office in good faith.
Sandiganbayan Resolution was set aside.
FUNA vs. AGRA
FACTS: Petitioner alleges that Hon. Alberto C. Agra was appointed by
the president to be the Acting Secretary of Justice and that Agra was
also subsequently appointed as Acting Solicitor General in concurrent
capacity. Respondent has a different story, he alleged that he was
assigned to be the Acting Solicitor General first then was subsequently
assigned to be the Acting Secretary of Justice. Agra also alleged that
he relinquished his position as Acting Solicitor General but kept
performing his duties until his successor was appointed.
Nothwithstanding the conflict in the versions of the parties, the fact that
Agra has admitted to holding the two offices concurrently in acting
capacities is settled, which is sufficient for purposes of resolving the
constitutional question that petitioner raises herein.
ISSUE: Whether or not the designation of Agra as the Acting
Secretary of Justice, concurrently with his position of Acting Solicitor
General, violate the constitutional prohibition against dual or multiple
offices for the Members of the Cabinet and their deputies
DECISION: Granted
RATIO DECIDENDI: According to the Public Interest Center, Inc. v.
Elma, the only two exceptions: (1) those provided for under the
Constitution, such as Section 3, Article VII, authorizing the Vice
Presided to become a member of the Cabinet; and (2) posts occupied
by Executive officials specified in Section 13, Article VII without
additional compensation in ex officio capacities as provided by law and
as ewquires by the primary functions of the officials’ offices. The
primary functions of the Office of the Solicitor General are not related
or necessary to the primary functions of the Department of Justice.
Considering that the nature and duties of the two offices are such as to
render it improper, from considerations of public policy, for one person
to retain both, an incompatibility between the offices exists, further
warranting the declaration of Agra’s designation as the Acting
Secretary of Justice, concurrently with his designation as the Acting
Solicitor General, to be void for being in violation of the express
provisions of the Constitution.
CANTILLO vs. ARRIETA
FACTS: October 1962: Jose Cantillo was originally appointed
Temporary Municipal Policeman of Maramag Bukidnon, took his oath
and served as such. His appointment was attested to by the Provincial
Treasurer, and the Commissioner of Civil Service. At the time of his
original appointment, he was 41 years old and still only at second year
high school. November 1964: Petitioner was given another
appointment in the same municipality, took his oath, acted and
qualified as such. However, this appointment was only “Provisional”.
The same was attested by the Provincial Treasurer and Commissioner
of Civil Service.
January 1967: Petitioner was given another appointment, same
municipality, took oath, acted and qualified, attested to by Prov.
Treasurer and Commissioner of Civil Service. October 1967: Petitioner
was suspended from the service due to filing of criminal charges for
Infidelity in the Custody of the Prisoner. The Provincial Fiscal moved
for the dismissal of the case due to insufficiency of evidence. After the
dismissal, petitioner presented oral and written request for
reinstatement and claimed for payment of back salaries pursuant to
Sec 4 of Republic Act 557 stating that when a municipal policeman is
charged and subsequently acquitted, he shall be entitled to back
wages.

ISSUE: Whether or not Cantillo is entitled to back wages.
HELD: NO. Section 9 of the same law enumerates the qualifications for
municipal police, namely: not less than 23 nor more than 33 years old;
and completed high school. As to the first, he was already 41 years old
as of his first appointment and 46 years during his last appointment. As
the second, he only reached second year. These infirmities precluded
the reinstatement; it was not mere absence of civil service eligibility but
of qualifications for the office.
ACHACOSO vs. MACARAIG
FACTS: Tomas D. Achacoso was appointed Administrator of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
In compliance with a request addressed by the President of the
Philippines to “all Department Heads, Undersecretaries, Assistant
Secretaries, Bureau Heads,” and other government officials, he filed a
courtesy resignation.
This was accepted by the President, “with deep regrets.”
The Secretary of Labor requested him to turn over his office to the
Deputy Administrator as officer-in-charge.
he protested his replacement and declared he was not surrendering
his office because his resignation was not voluntary but filed only in
obedience to the President’s directive.
On the same date, respondent Jose N. Sarmiento was appointed
Administrator of the POEA, vice the petitioner.
Achacoso was informed thereof the following day and was again asked
to vacate his office.
He filed a motion for reconsideration but this was denied. He then
came to this Court for relief.
The petitioner invokes security of tenure against his claimed removal
without legal cause. Achacoso contends that he is a member of the
Career Service of the Civil Service and so enjoys security of tenure,
which is one of the characteristics of the Career Service as
distinguished from the Non-Career Service. 1 Claiming to have the
rank of undersecretary, he says he comes under Article IV, Section 5
of P.D. 807, otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree, which
includes in the Career Service:
3.Positions in the Career Executive Service; namely, Undersecretary,
Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director,
Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief of Department
Service and other officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by
the Career Executive Service Board, all of whom are appointed by the
President.
His argument is that in view of the security of tenure enjoyed by the
above-named officials, it was “beyond the prerogatives of the
President” to require them to submit courtesy resignations. Such
courtesy resignations, even if filed, should be disregarded for having expiration of his term. This is allowed by the Constitution only when it is
been submitted “under duress,” as otherwise the President would have for cause as provided by law. The acting appointee is separated
the power to remove career officials at pleasure, even for capricious precisely because his term has expired. Expiration of the term is not
reasons covered by the constitutional provision on security of tenure.
The respondents assert he is not entitled to the guaranty because he is
not a career official (the petitioner did not possess the necessary LUEGO CASE (143 SCRA 327) NOT APPLICABLE TO CASE AT
qualifications when he was appointed Administrator of the POEA in BAR. — The case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission is not
1987). applicable because the facts of that case are different. The petitioner in
Luego was qualified and was extended a permanent appointment that
ISSUE: WON Achacoso is protected by the security of tenure clause could not be withdrawn on the ground that it was merely temporary. In
the case at bar, the petitioner was not eligible and therefore could be
HELD: NO. The Court finds for the respondent. appointed at best only in a temporary capacity. The other cases he
cites, viz. Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila v. Intermediate
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; SECURITY OF TENURE; Appellate Court, Palma-Fernandez v. De la Paz, and Dario v. Mison,
PERMANENT APPOINTMENT ISSUED ONLY TO PERSONS are also not pertinent because they also involved permanent
QUALIFIED. — A permanent appointment can be issued only “to a appointees who could not be removed because of their security of
person who meets all the requirements for the position to which he is tenure.
being appointed, including the appropriate eligibility prescribed.”
The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Service does not
automatically confer security of tenure on its occupant even if he does
not possess the required qualifications.
PERSONS APPOINTED WITHOUT THE REQUISITE
QUALIFICATION DEEMED IN ACTING CAPACITY. — The mere fact
that a position belongs to the Career Service does not automatically
confer security of tenure on its occupant even if he does not possess
the required qualifications. Such right will have to depend on the nature
of his appointment, which in turn depends on his eligibility or lack of it.
A person who does not have the requisite qualifications for the position
cannot be appointed to it in the first place or, only as an exception to
the rule, may be appointed to it merely in an acting capacity in the
absence of appropriate eligibles.
TEMPORARY APPOINTMENT; PURPOSE. — The purpose of an
acting or temporary appointment is to prevent a hiatus in the discharge
of official functions by authorizing a person to discharge the same
pending the selection of a permanent or another appointee.
4.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CONDITION IMPOSED ON APPOINTEE. — The
person named in an acting capacity accepts the position under the
condition that he shall surrender the office once he is called upon to do
so by the appointing authority.
EXPIRATION OF TERM; METHOD OF TERMINATING TEMPORARY
EMPLOYMENT. — In these circumstances, the acting appointee is
separated by a method of terminating official relations known in the law
of public officers as expiration of the term. His term is understood at
the outset as without any fixity and enduring at the pleasure of the
appointing authority. When required to relinquish his office, he cannot
complain that he is being removed in violation of his security of tenure
because removal imports the separation of the incumbent before the
 Canonizado v. Aguirre (323 SCRA 312, 2000)
Facts: Dela Torres, Canonizado, Pureza and Adiong were appointed
Commissioners of NAPOLCOM. They were appointed separately, in
various years and their terms had not expired at the time the
amendatory law to R.A. 6975 was passed. R.A. 8551 declared the
terms of sitting commissioners as expired upon its effectivity.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners were removed by virtue of a valid
abolition.
Ruling: NO. Reorganization takes place when there is an alteration of
the existing structure of government offices or units therein, including
the lines of control, authority and responsibility between them. It
involves a reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition
thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. Naturally, it
may result in the loss of ones position through removal or abolition of
an office. However, for a reorganization to be valid, it must also pass
the test of good faith, laid down in Dario v.n:
...As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in "good faith" if it is
for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In
that event, no dismissal (in case of a dismissal) or separation actually
occurs because the position itself ceases to exist. And in that case,
security of tenure would not be a Chinese wall. Be that as it may, if the
"abolition," which is nothing else but a separation or removal, is done
for politieasons or purposely to defeat security of tenure, or otherwise
not in good faith, no valid "abolition" takes place and whatever
"abolition" is done, is void ab initio. There is an invalid "abolition" as
where there is merely a change of nomenclature of positions, or where
claims of economy are belied by the existence of ample funds.
Under R.A. 6975, the NAPOLCOM was described a collegial body
within the DILG whereas R.A. 8551 made it an agency attached to the
department for policy and program coordination. This does not result in
the creation of an entirely new office.
PAREDES vs. ABAD
Facts:
The principal ground of the dismissal orders 3 now challenged before
Us on certiorari, is that under Section 9, Art. XVII 4 of the Transitory
Provisions of the New Constitution, the election protests filed by the
petitioners have become moot and academic, for the reason that the
private respondents are now holding their respective positions under a
new term, indefinite as it is, the original four-year term to which they
have been elected having expired upon the ratification of the New
Constitution on January 17, 1973. This ruling of the respondent-Judges
is clearly untenable. When Section 9, Art. XVII of the Transitory
Provisions of the New Constitution, upon the ratification of said
Constitution on January 17, 1973, made indefinite the four-year term of
the elective provincial, city and municipal officials, said four-year term
had not yet expired - it was to expire on December 31, 1975. More
than this, the law under which they were elected to a four-year term
provides for a hold-over. 5 We hold that, as far as these elective
officials are concerned, said constitutional provision refers only to
those who had been duly elected; they are the ones who should
continue in office until otherwise provided by law or decreed by the
incumbent President.
Ruling:
The respondent-Judges committed a clear error when they dismissed
the election protests filed by the herein petitioners against the private
respondents who had been proclaimed elected and had assumed their
respective positions[1] for a... four-year term[2] as a result of the
November 8, 1971 elections.
When Section 9, Art. XVII of the Transitory Provisions of the New
Constitution, upon the ratification of said Constitution on January 17,
1973, made indefinite the four-year term of the... elective provincial,
city and municipal officials, said four-year term had not yet expired it
was to expire on December 31, 1975. More than this, the law under
which they were elected to a four-year term provides for a hold-over.[5]
We hold that, as... far as these elective officials are concerned, said
constitutional provision refers only to those who had been duly elected;
they are the ones who should continue in office until otherwise
provided by law or decreed by the incumbent President.
AIthough Section 9, Art. XVII of the New Constitution made the term of
the petitioners indefinite,[7] it did not foreclose any challenge by the
herein petitioners, in an election protest... of the "right" of the private
respondents to continue holding their respective offices. What has
been directly affected by said constitutional provision is the "term", not
the "right" to the office, although the "right" of an incumbent to an office
which he is legally... holding is co-extensive with the "term" thereof.
It must be emphasized that the "right" of the private respondents to
continue in office indefinitely arose not only by virtue of Section 9 of
Art. XVII of the New Constitution but principally from their having been
proclaimed elected to their respective positions as a result of... the
November 8, 1971 elections.
It is erroneous to conclude that under Section 9, Art. XVII of the New
Constitution, the term of office of the private respondents expired, and
that they are now holding their respective offices under a new term.
We are of the opinion that they hold their respective... offices still under
the term to which they have been elected, although the same is now
indefinite... although the term of office of an official or employee
holding a position that is primarily... confidential is indefinite, the term is
deemed to have expired only when the appointing power expresses its
decision to put an end to the services of the incumbent; when this
event takes place, his term is then considered to have expired.
Consequently, it is only when by... law or by decree of the incumbent
President the services of an incumbent elective official are put to an
end that his present indefinite term of office will be considered to have
expired.
The Constitutional Convention could not have intended, as in fact it did
not intend, to shield or protect those who had been unduly elected. To
hold that the right of the herein private respondents to the respective
offices which they are now holding, may no longer be... subject to
question, would be tantamount to giving a stamp of approval to what
could have been an election victory characterized by fraud, threats,
intimidation, vote buying, or other forms of irregularities prohibited by
the Election Code to preserve inviolate the sanctity of... the ballot.
Such a situation would certainly be against the goals of the New
Society, which are "to reform the social, economic and political
institutions in our country;" "to clean the government of its corrupt and
sterile elements;" and to implement a "general program... for a new
and better Philippines."
Section 7 of Art. XVII of the New Constitution provides that "all existing
laws not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until
amended, modified or repealed by the National Assembly." And there
has been no amendment, modification or repeal of Section 220 of... the
Election Code of 1971 which gave the herein petitioners the right to file
an election contest against those proclaimed elected.
According to Section 8, Art. XVII of the New Constitution, "all courts
existing at the time of the ratification of this Constitution shall continue
and exercise their jurisdiction until otherwise provided by law in
accordance with this Constitution, and all cases pending in said...
courts shall be heard, tried and determined under the laws then in
force." Consequently, the Courts of First Instance presided over by the
respondent-Judges should continue and exercise their jurisdiction to
hear, try and decide the election protests filed by the herein...
petitioners.
Principles:
There is a difference between the "term" of office and the "right" to hold
an office. A "term" of office is the period during which an elected
officer or appointee is entitled to hold office, perform its functions and
enjoy its privileges and emoluments. A "right" to... hold a public office
is the just and legal claim to hold and enjoy the powers and
responsibilities of the office.
In other words, the "term" refers to the period, duration or length of
time during which the occupant of an office is entitled to stay... therein,
whether such period be definite or indefinite.