Leo Strauss and the American Academy Abbot, James Soci: May/Jun 2001; 38, 4 ProQuest pes REVIEW ESSAY Leo Strauss and the American Academy Leo Strauss, the Straussans, and the American Regime ‘By Kenneth L Deutsch and John A. Murey, eds. New York: Rowman & Litleeld Publishers, 1999. Reviewed by James R. Abbott ‘The present volume, published on the centenary of Leo Strauss birth, ts ‘nothing mot ambitious. Editors Ken- eth L. Deutsch and John A. Murley, along with twenty-eight other con. tributors, have set thee sights on the totality of the Strausian legacy 4 (0 talofthiny-one essays onganized in five sections assess Steauss'sAmerican aca. demic career, speeifically his tenures at the University of Chicago and St Johan's College; the basic themes of his ‘work and their enduring significance; Straus's influence ona firs generation ff students: how this and subsequent ‘enerations of Straussians have eval ated American political insti and the collection concludes with ‘commentary on how Seraussians have used their traning for technical, wo- cctional ends, AS one might expect with such a volume, the essays are uneven in quabty and thematic coher tence is not always evident. Joseph ‘Gropsey’s contaibution, for example, running slightly more than a page, hardly seems worth the effort. Larry Arnhar’s analysis of Roger Master's ‘work on evolutionary biology is not ‘quite at home amid essays on the po: litical thought of Lincoln and the American founders. In aiming so high the editors may have undermined themselves. Hud the editors aimed a litle lower they might have found more solid ground on which to orga nize « more penetrating, albeit less ‘comprehensive work. The irony would not have been loston Strauss. Despite this, and the fact that contributions from the likes of Thomas Pangle and Harvey Mansfield are sadly missing, {bere i much in this volume to ree commend it OF course there fs nothing in tis ‘work that will resolve the runge of pinion on just what Kind of thinker Strauss was and where he ukimately stood in reyatl to the tensions be- fevcen reason and revelation, the an- cients and moderns, philosophy and the city and whether he judged these tension to be categorically opposed for reconcilabie. Several contributors ‘ein usthat Strauss has heen ele virtually everything under the ideo- logial map. There are those who re far him as defender of tera (mo ern) democracy. whose very ‘commitment to democracy demanded that he not be its Mater: others ine Sint onthe elitist and conservative na ture of Stausy’teachingsand contend that his ertique of democracy and ‘modernism in general was dismissive sul others ake this poston to a ex treme, lain he was ight wing ad reactionary, hellbent on raving the modern and recreating an ancient ‘world wherein philosopher kings ‘Would asume thei rightful place 3s ruler. A recent interpretation frames Strauss a¢a closet Nietschean who preached miiism in the guise of Pl tonic philosophy Few sock thinkers Ihave Beem 0 many things 0 0 many people. ‘Among other things, this range of ‘opinion demonstrates the poverty of the ideological eategores we routinely ‘deploy 10 organize and understand Social thought. I tend t0 think that Strauss orientation cannot be neat captured by any one of these catego ses as each is part and parcel ofthe ‘modernism (and now postmodernism) hhe sought to transcend, a modernism he judged intrinsically problematic in both its Uberal and conservative ex pressions. To be sure, Strauss work has been adopted principally by con- servatives, which helps explain his Jess than stellar reputation among aca ddemies. But this does not necessarily ‘mean that his commitments were rightwing. In fact, the conservative embrace of Strauss would appear highly selective as it tends to ignore the very serious issues Strauss ruses with regard to value and evaluation Ronald J. Terchek’s work placing Strauss in the debate between liberal: ism and communitariansm is one of several articles inthis volume that sug gests this point. Strauss could not abide by a communitarinism, despite ‘es general appeal to conservatives, that lowered the human horizon while felativizing the good it promulgated. By conflating tradition with the good, ‘hey not only lose sight of the funda- ‘mental tension between tradition of convention and the good: they forfeit the higher standard in ight of which we may justify our commitment 10 the tradtion(s) they espouse. In the ‘end, communitarians are compelled to argue that tradition 28 such war rants our commitment. But if tradition 4s such warrants commitment, any ‘tradition and therefore no singe tad tion can command our respect ‘Communiarians find themselves on low and not so solid ground as they fervently seek to redress our many so- ial ils For similar reasons Strauss could rot entertain modern liberalism (and by extension modern social science). AAS this volume makes clear, modern Uberalism spoke of rights without foundation, -had no notion of virtue apart from pleasure, judged the good [person to be the individual who gets Along with others, a kind of liontzing Of otherdirectedness, and forever ‘understood the high i ight ofthe low. ‘Our ibcralism was likewise marked by a lowering ofthe human horizon and REVIEW ESSAY 85 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission,the relativizing of the principles for which it ostensibly stands. Modern ti- cralism could not give an accounting. ofits own voice, and could not pro- vide the ground on which to justify and make sense of its value claims. Strauss understood that his work challenged the onhodoxy of his day, and he contended that the place for any orthodoxy was on the right. Be that as it may, few social thinkers cut as deeply into the assumptions of mod: cen liberalism and by extension mod: ‘ern social science as Strauss. Pethaps hhe was more of a radical, properly understood, than most would allow He certainly brought to his classroom an altogether diferent approach to the problems of our time, to the crisis of the modern West. And bis influence ‘on students was nothing short of trans- formative. Hadley Arkes, among other contributors, report that Strauss’s classes attracted a diverse student population, which routinely consisted ‘of Catholic Priests anda number of war veterans, as well as individuals ap- proaching senior citizenship along ‘with a smattering of traditional aged students, many of them Jewish Strauss'sappeal grew in the 1960s with, the radical student movement and its concern over value and impatience ‘with facts. By all accounts he was a remarkable pedagogue, a man of small stature who in a soft voice ereated an environment Arkes claimed was filled with an air of religious engagement. Accordingly, Harry V Jaffa likened bis ‘experience with Strauss toa religious ‘conversion (which will no doubt con- firm the suspicions of critics who Claim Strauss was a cultlike leader in search of disciples). Having graduated from ale committed toa sociology of knowledge approach to social life Jaffa enrolled at the University of Chi ‘cago graduate program where he real {zed that all along he had been lost io a cave, Strauss freed him of his shack es. As with so many scholars of his gen ‘eration, Strauss cannot be understood pact from the horrors of Nazi Ger- ‘many;the ease with which human free- ddom was eradicated in an ostensibly liberal society, and how leading think 84 SOCIETY + MAY /JUNE 2001 ers of the time, most notably Heidegger, condoned and even par- ticipated in the Nazi movement ‘Strauss had encountered Heidegger, then the young assistant t0 Husserl while spending a postdoctoral year at Freiburg) Among the lessons Strauss took from this unconscionable expe: rience was that human beings must never cease posing questions sur: rounding the good society. Nor should ‘humans defer to convention or history {in coming to terms with how they ‘ought (0 live. As he once wrote in 1959, “The biggest event of 1933 ‘would rather seem to have proved, if such proof was necessary, that man cannot abandon the question of the ‘g00d society, and that he cannot free himself from the responsbbiliy for an- swering it by deferring to History oF to any other power diflerent from his ‘Yet Strauss was convinced that ‘western social thinkers in the post-war cera had abandoned the philosophic quest forthe good, embracing instead. ‘hat he simply called the “historical sense, “the view acconling to which values and value judgements have no validity independent of time and place. His influential Natural Right and Iis- tory begins with the lament that American social thought had surren dered the natural right principles on which the nation was founded and had embraced the distinctively German historicism which, the authors of this volume make clea, continues © domi nate social science and animate polit ‘al discourse. Strauss understood the abandonment of these principles to ‘come in the wake of a long and com: pilex intellectual process initiated by “Machiavellis conflation ofthe real and. {deal as he aspired to build science that could effectively control circum stance; this intellectual process, Strauss held, ended with Nietasche Machiavelli, whom Strauss re garded as the founder of modern so- Cial science, was precursor ro Hobbes, Lockeand Rousseau, the other"waves™ ‘of modern philosophy, who were sin larly inclined to take humans as they are, not as they should be, as they sought a world free of the ambiguities, contingencies and conflict that plagued the ancients Strauss held that ‘what the moderns regarded as an ex: pansion of life's possiblities was at the same time a lowering of the human horizon. As addressed nicely by Aryeh Botwinick, Strauss saw thatthe mod ‘em effort to control conditions, to ‘more effectively manage life's pro: ‘cesses, came at the expense of the higher purposes such control would ‘normally serve and in terms of which such processes were evaluated. Oras Christopher A. Colomo put it in his essay on Joseph Cropsey, the ‘conflation of the real and ideal meant that modern philosophic inquiry be- san with an assumed rather than at- ued good that claimed immunity from Criticism. No longer understoodas the quest for evident knowledge of the whole, philosophy necessarily degen- crated into ideology. Thus did mod: ern philosophy culminate with Nictasche's historicism whereby asser- tions of truth are identical with asser- tions of power and questions of value are reframed as preferences without foundation. In this sense, the postmodern turn is not so much a re action against the modern ats Fulfill Strauss was thus inclined to judge modern democracy (read: American Democracy) to have been founded on low and precarious ground. Modern democracy could not defend its own Principles against its enemies; these principles came to be understood as ‘mere preferences—one set of values” among many, not any one of which ‘may be defended on reasoned grounds And the claim as to the relativity of all values, deprecating each and every ‘one of them, erodes the basis for com- ‘mitment. Modern democracy, then, ‘was all too vulnerable. In light of Strauss's concerns, among the most intriguing essays in this volume review analyses that place the American founding on higher and more stable terrain. Unfortunately, few of these ‘examples appear to acknowledge the very serious challenges they pose toa Straussian understanding of intellec: tual history and by extension our present inability to speak intelligibly Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.about value. Still, they re well worth, reading, ‘Will Morrisey’s article on Paul idelherg's work, forexample, frames the early republic as a mixed regime, ‘more Aristotelean than Machiavellian, ‘more a politics of reason and honor than a polities of passion, incorporat {ng institutional safeguards against the vices of popular democracy, and pur suing aristocratic ends, understood as virtue, viaa democratic facade. Against ‘many Straussians, who tend to revere the philosopher and devalue all other types, Fidelberg gives statesmanship {ts due as it isthe statesman theough ‘whom the philosopher speaks. Mar- tin Diamond's effort t0 reconcile Strauss and Madison is cogently pre- sented by Michael PZuckert, Distanc {ng himself from the aristocratic Frame- work offered by Eidelberg (not 10 ‘mention Charles Beard), Diamond used Tocqueville to make a ease for the possibility of virtue in modern democ- racy, a virtue that makes the Ameri- can regime an authentically political regime. Virtue is shaped inthe private sphere, rather than by public laws Zackert suggests that Diamond came to see that the American regime pur- sued ends similar to the classics but through very different means, A similar reassessment of the Ameri- ‘ean founding and of the founders is “observed in the work of Harry V Jaffa Charles R. Kesler’s essay shows that Jaffa had initially interpreted the Ameri ‘ean founding as a moving away from nature, The founders framed nature in ‘ways typical of modern philosophy:as a beginning away from which one ‘must travel if one is 10 progress. ASa ‘result, the founders could not help but understand the high in terms of the low. For Jaffa, Lincoln was the tower- {ng figure who returned America’s political footing to the classical under- ‘standing of nature. Lincoln conceived ‘of nature asan end towards which we strive. The natural state of equality is not something we are free to escape ‘but a transcendental end we are obl- gated to pursue, Animated less by “rights” than by “what is right, ~ Lincoln's government became an in steument of justice, rather than the necessary evil Jefferson believed it to be. Jaffa’ Lincoln was the uncommon, ‘man on whom the equality of all men depends. Since his formidable work fon Lincoln was published over four decades ago, however, Jafa’s evalua- tion ofthe founding, in particular, the Declaration of Independence, has be- come more favorable, and he has ‘come to see Lincoln's prophetic voice in erms echoing the nation's founders. Kesler reports that the long. awaited first volume of Jaff's A New Birth of Freedom, some forty years in the mak: ng, will Soon be in print ‘The founding is not the only sub- Ject on which Straussians evince a sub- stantial range of opinion. The ever: present tensions in Strauss’s work between reason and revelation, the ‘city and philosophy, are likewise un- derstood in a multitude of ways. The ‘essays by Deutsch and Miller, for ex ample, show that for every inteepre- tation that places Strauss on the side ‘of reason, there isan argument claim {ng that he had ultimately sided with, revelation Jaffa’ article proposing the reconciliation of Athens and Jerusalem, according to which reason is the eso- {eric foundation for revelation will not settle the matter. [would tend to agree with Terchek as well as with Bruce Gregory Smith that Strauss sought ‘more to preserve the very tensions the modern project was designed to re: solve. Indeed, the obliteration of these tensions would mean a thoroughly ‘corrupt regime, asthese very tensions allow for philosophy and truth, ‘According to Miller, the only issue ‘on which Straussians do agree revolves around Strauss’ critique of modern social science. There was nothing ambiguous about where Strauss stood in relation to modern social science {in both its positivist and historicist ‘manifestations (Positivism, for Strauss, ‘was historicism indifferent guise ) His critique of Max Weber's historical and value-neutral sociology in Natural Right and History was unrelenting, ‘That Strauss chose to emphasize that Weber was our century's greatest $o- ‘ial scientist made his critique all the more dismissive, Strauss's other e- ‘marks on the subject, for example, his, famous conclusion to “An Epilogue, ~ are as caustic as Miller concedes. His likening social scientists to fiddling Neros, excused on grounds that they {knew neither that they fiddled nor that Rome burned, was suggestive of acer tain contempt Strauss uncompromising position, Miller rightly notes, stemmed from bis ‘conviction that modern social science ‘was both a reflection of and unwitting contributor to our current crisis, the crisis over value, In denying the pos- sibility of reasoned discourse on the subject of value, while surreptitiously advancing their own visions of what ought to be, Strauss believed that ‘modern social scientists had created litle but confusion; what is more, they ‘undermined their legitimacy in de- fending their value positions against Any and allalternatives, against any and all threats. What can one say, afterall, ff a science that asserts as a matter of trans historical truth that trans-histor- cal truth does not exist; advances in trinsic goods a it denies the possibil ity of intrinsic goods; and urges commitment to value systems as it devalues them? It might be said that much has ‘changed in the social sciences since Strauss took them to task. Valueneu- trality, for example, and all its bag. sage, are no longer authoritative. Un fortunately, there are contributors to this volume, Milleramong them, who seem to think thatthe likes of Talcott Parsons still run the social science show. But clearly the ideological move: ‘ments of the 1960s brought to the fore an explicitly valuedriven social sci fence that questioned the possibility and/or desirability of value-neutral approaches to social lif. This is par ticularly the case for the discipline of Sociology. But the recent explosion of valuedriven social science would not satisfy Strauss. Positivism operates {nthe guise ofthe historcism it always was. Thus valuedriven sociologists, for ‘example, persist in denying the possi bility of universal truths as they assert them, render value judgements as they caution against doing same, and urge ‘commitment to value systems a they devalue them, In other words, value REVIEW ESSAY 85 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.driven sociologists provide no ground ‘on which to justify our commitment to their visions of the good, or they simply urge commitment ro value sys- tems while undermining the basis ac ‘cording to which we may justify our deference to their ideals, In this context it is worth noting the contributions by Straussians who have used their training for practical, vocational ends. In many ways, the ‘essays by Gary J.Schmidt (coauthored ‘with Abram N,Shulsky) and Susan Orr extend Strauss's critique of social sci ‘ence, Schmid and Shulsky report from, ‘world of intelligence. They show how modern social science techniques, adopted by our intelligence agencies {in the aftermath of World War I, have provide litle but distorted images of foreign regimes. Assuming all regimes ‘could be understood by a single typol ‘ogy because universal processes Rov cerned al regimes, intelligence person: fel found themselves armed with descriptive categories that proved ill suited to their task, A Straussian sens tivity to nature expressed through multiplicity of contexts demands that ‘each regime be understood on its own, terms. Orr's essay, aptly titled "The Charm of Competence, "takes to task the therapeutic sate. She bases the article on her experiences in the field ‘of child weltare. Driven by a social science incapable of acknowledging virtue or vice, incapable of casting praise or blame, welfare professionals can only treat, and more and more treatment means medication. For Orr, the emphasis on treatment devoid of any notion of a good has lowered the subjects itis designed to help by re- ducing them to little more than the ‘material. The therapeutic state under ‘mines human freedom by failing t0 acknowledge the human soul. One ‘cannot help but sense that Orr harbors 4 contempt for modern social science because she is convinced that modern social science is contemptuous of the subjects it treats However compelling Strauss di- agnosis of the present crisis is, and however trenchant his eritique of ‘modern social science, one wonders ‘what Strauss had to offer to fx the time 86 SOCIETY + MAY /JUNE 2001 that is out of joint. It isan issue with which several contributors wrestle, and it should not surprise there are no definitive answers. We are instructed that Strauss sought re-establish the primacy of experience, or the presi entific understanding of political things, and to reorient our approach to the written word. This amounts to “constructivist” proposal for the so- cial sciences, which as Miller rightly notes, has not been given serious at- tention, For Strauss, the citizen's per: spective, the “appearance” for which moderns had little patience, was t0 be taken seriously and taken first. The moderns assumed that reality, when ‘not hiding beneath the appearances by which citizens live, was at any rate beyond the average citizens’ compre- hhension. Strauss saw opinion not as something to be unmasked or sub: verted but as a beginning because it spoke, however vaguely, tothe good. Miller thus calls for a Straussian‘in spired social science, a science that slarts with an appreciation of pre sc entific knowledge, and one that is bo ‘empirical and committed to reasoned discourse on value The ennobling of opinion is wo be matched with the ennobling of texts, Texts should be approached as the sources of edification they were in- fended t0 be. Ralph A. Rossum, for ‘example, addressing the area of con- stitutional scholarship, makes the ar- ‘gument that treating texts (and their authors)as epiphenomenal, thats, as simply sociological artifacts, betrays an arrogance according to which we ‘claim to know the authors better than they knew themselves. We thereby ‘lose the possibility ofa dialogue, and with it the possibilty for intellect ‘growth, because we have resolved that there are no more mysteries to discern about a regime and its ends, only in terests to be debunked, increasingly understood in terms of clas, race and. gender, ‘Of course the phenomenon of eso- teric writing lies at the heart of Strauss’ approach tothe written wor. Unfortunately, there is no concerted analysis in tis volume of Strauss'sdis- covery of esoteric writing as he made his way back to Plato through Maimonides and Farabi. Its certainly ‘mentioned and referenced but 20 se- rious discussion of the matter is present. which is unfortunate. But 1 Suppose the more pregnant question ‘concerns what Strauss hoped to show trough his effort to recover the clas: sical tradition and of what utility this recovery would have for us moderns, Gregory Bruce Smith understands the ambiguities surrounding Strauss's project as well as most, But as Ihave suggested above, a number of con- Uributors, Smith included, see Strauss's project as dedicated in part to a re fnewal of our appreciation of ambigu- ity itself. The good lie is understood as the life engaged with the tensions between reason and revelation, Ath- fens and Jerusalem, the city and phi- losophy. Strauss held that society will never be free ofthese tensions, ever free of these contradictions. Philoso- phy, then, could not culminate in a system of knowledge or a final truth but is understood as an activity, the ‘most vital activity in which serious individuals may participate. As Deutsch suggests, Strauss sought t0 position his students to appreciate the ways in which we may explore these serious questions of our time and all times. To engage these ques- tions, however, isto engage the prob- Jem of natura right. Indeed, explora- tion of these tensions presupposes the acknowledgement of natural right Miller's hopes fora constructive social science would be more solidly grounded if contemporary social ci tence could acknowledge the possibil ity of natural right, The problem of natural right lies at the heart of the ‘problem of Strauss and social science ‘We certainly cannot fault this vol ‘ume for filing to reveal once and for all Strauss’s project. But where 1 do think this volume falls short isin pro- viding a deep and coherent portrait of Strauss the man as scholar-teacher. Frankly, I expected a more penetra ing look into the man who has changed the lives of so many, espe- cially from a volume commemorating the 100th anniversary of his birth. Iesides, I would think that educators Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.concerned about the future of the academy could not help but be inter. ested in learning more about an indi vidual whose pedagogy was so capt vating to so many students. Straussians have a reputation for not saying much bout their mentor. Very few even cite Strauss in their work, something Walter Berns explains as a desire to ascribe one’s own failings to oneself Be that as it may, we atch a glimpse Of Strauss from Arkes as well as Laurence Berns and Eva Brann, among others. But only a glimpse. George Anastaplos essay on Strauss’ Chicago career tries to do more, but Anastaplo takes too defensive an ap. proach, lamenting, for example, that Strauss was slighted by the Univer sity and slighted by his colleagues. He may very well have been. But I doubt the individual who wrote the ‘essays "What is Liberal Education? and “Liberal Education and Respon- sibility” cared much about having rooms named for him and other such ‘academic status honors at the Univer: sity of Chicago. By most accounts, ‘even Anastaplo’s, Strauss was fulfilled by his students and his texts, He had ro interest in the petty politics or pety trappings of academic Pond SEXUAL cry During the memorial service for Strauss at St John’s College, a student assistant, Theodore A. Blanton, deli cred a eulogy, a portion of which is reproduced in the essay by Berns and Brann. Blanton's words are clearly the most beautiful and revealing in this volume. They are suggestive of the remarkable distance the academy has traveled in but a short time-They meri citing here:"When I would leave his hhome he always took my hand and for everything I had done ‘But truly was the one who owed the thanks. Upon leaving his home I was both restful and restless: restful be: ie of the calmness and the sheer ht of his words to me and rest less because he instilled in me an ea erness to think and learn, Friendship appeared to me in fuller light friend ship is not that relationship where al is relaxed but the relationship where ‘one’s highest faculties are poised for ‘graceful movement. I believe in those ‘moments 1 was more fully human than at any other time Ata time when the university has hecome a corporate entity, desperate to sell anything to anybody who can atfordt, when scholarship és more and thanked more understood as grant getting andl THE PENGUIN ATLAS fact gathering when it is not being confused with social activism, when students more and more understand their collegiate experience as the as similation of narrow technical skills, it {s important to reflect on what the academy was to a group of persons sheltered from the grind of progress, SUGGESTED FURTHER READINGS Strauss, Leo “What is Political Philosophy?" in What és Political Philosophy? Ch ‘cago: University of Chicago Press, 1988, pp. 9:55, rauss, Leo. “An Epilogue” in Liberalism Ancient and Modern. Whaca, New York Cornell University Press, 1989, pp. 205-225, James R. Abbott is assistant profes ‘sor and cbatrperson of the Sociology Department at Rowan Universit Glassboro, New Jersey: Me is aulbor ‘most recently of Louts Sullivan, Ar hitecturat Mosernism, and the Cre ‘ation of Democratic Space: tn The ‘American Sociologist, available trough the Transaction Periodicals OF Human Sexual Behavior JUDITH MACKAY, M.D. “This atlas neoded to be. writen... Wl Undoubtedly prove useful for teachers at very acadomic level” ‘SRobent Koch insite tant health dimension in on ecucatonal Fulecolor maps and graphics iustata in ties In sexuality and sexual between ‘diferent cultures. They also reveal how far sexual behavior and soc tnd creative fasnion” vuoi Heath Organization sy age and gender Sivoree + soning + fety & intertity + pornography Bceneorehip 1 the futre of sex 1 Gating Be reationships = + sexual problems B counseling State of Women in the World Atlas © Third Editon Aiaisble JONI SEAGER. “A marvelous boot, arch source of information rentvely selected and saplayed”—Momens Review of Books PENGUIN PUTNAM oora nee screened? Bane re eet an REVIEW ESSAY Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.