Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC             March 4, 2003

RE: PROPOSED RULE ON DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF VOID

MARRIAGES AND ANNULMENT OF VOIDABLE MARRIAGES

RESOLUTION

          Acting on the letter of the Chairman of the Committee on Revision of the Rules of
Court submitting for this Court's consideration and approval the Proposed Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,
the Court Resolved to APPROVE the same.

          The Rule shall take effect on March 15, 2003 following its publication in a
newspaper of general circulation not later than March 7, 2003

          March 4, 2003

Davide, C.J. Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Sandoval-

Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio Morales, Callejo, Sr. and Azcuna
Ynares-Santiago, on leave
Corona, on official leave

RULE ON DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF VOID MARIAGES AND

ANNULMENT OF VOIDABLE MARRIAGES

Section 1. Scope - This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of te
Philippines.

          The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.

Section 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.

(a) Who may file. - A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be
filed solely by the husband or the wife. (n)

(b) Where to file. - The petition shal be filed in the Family Court.

(c) Imprecriptibility ofaction or defense. - An Action or defense for the declaration of

absolute nullity of void marriage shall not prescribe.

(d) What to allege. - A petition under Article 36 of Family Code shall specially allege te
complete facts showing the either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from
complying with the essential marital obligations of marriages at the time of the celebration
of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.

          The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are
indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but
expert opinion need not be alleged.
Section 3. Petition for annulment of voidable marriages. -

(a) Who may file. - The following persons may file a petition for annulment of voidable
marriage based on any of the grounds under article 45 of the Family Code and within the
period herein indicated:

(1) The contracting party whose parent, or guardian, or person exercising substitute
parental authority did not give his or her consent, within five years after attaining the age
of twenty-one unless, after attaining the age of twenty-one, such party freely cohabitated
with the other as husband or wife; or the parent, guardian or person having legal charge
of the contracting party , at any time before such party has reached the age of twenty-
one;

(2) The sane spouse who had no knowledge of the other's insanity; or by any relative,
guardian, or person having legal charge of the insane, at any time before the death of
either party; or by the insane spouse during the a lucid interval or after regaining sanity,
provided that the petitioner , after coming to reason, has not freely cohabited with the
other as husband or wife;

(3) The injured party whose consent was obtained by fraud, within five years after the
discovery of the fraud, provided that said party, with full knowledge of the facts
constituting the fraud, has not freely cohabited with the other as husband or wife;

(4) The injured party whose consent was obtained by force, intimidation, or undue
influence, within five years from the time the force intimidation, or undue influence
disappeared or ceased, provided that the force, intimidation, or undue influence having
disappeared or ceased, said party has not thereafter freely cohabited with the other as
husband or wife;

(5) The injured party where the other spouse is physically incapable of consummating the
marriage with the other and such incapability continues and appears to be incurable,
within five years after the celebration of marriage; and

(6) Te injured party where the other party was afflicted with a sexually-transmissible
disease found to be serious and appears to be incurable, within five years after the
celebration of marriage.

(b) Where to file. - The petition shall be filed in the Family Court.

Section 4. Venue. - The Petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city
where the petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to
the date of filing. Or in the case of non-resident respondent, where he may be found in
the Philippines, at the election of the petitioner.

Section 5. Contents and form of petition. - (1) The petition shall allege the complete facts
constituting the cause of action.

(2) It shall state the names and ages of the common children of the parties and specify
the regime governing their property relations, as well as the properties involved.

          If there is no adequate provision in a written agreement between the parties, the

petitioner may apply for a provisional order for spousal support, the custody and support
of common children, visitation rights, administration of community or conjugal property,
and other matters similarly requiringurgent action.
(3) It must be verified and accompanied celebration of marriage. (b) Where to file.-The
petition shall be filed in the Family Court.

Section 4. Venue. - The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city
where the petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to
the date of filing, or in the case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found in
the Philippines at the election of the petitioner.

Section 5. Contents and form of petition. - (1) The petition shall allege the complete facts
constituting the cause of action.

(2) it shall state the names and ages of the common children of the parties and specify
the regime governing their property relations, as well as the properties involved.

          If there is no adequate provision in a written agreement between the parties, the

petitioner may apply for a provisional order for spousal support, custody and support of
common children, visitation rights, administration of community or conjugal property, and
other matters similarly requiring urgent action.

(3) it must be verified and accompanied by a certification against forum shopping. The
verification and certification must be signed personally by me petitioner. No petition may
be filed solely by counsel or through an attorney-in-fact.

          If the petitioner is in a foreign country, the verification and certification against

forum shopping shall be authenticated by the duly authorized officer of the Philippine
embassy or legation, consul general, consul or vice-consul or consular agent in said
country.

(4) it shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition on the
Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the City or Provincial Prosecutor, within
five days from the date of its filing and submit to the court proof of such service within the
same period.

          Failure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for
immediate dismissal of the petition.

Section 6. Summons. - The service of summons shall be governed by Rule 14 of the

Rules of Court and by the following rules:

(1) Where the respondent cannot be located at his given address or his whereabouts are
unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry, service of summons may, by
leave of court, be effected upon him by publication once a week for two consecutive
weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines and in such places as the
court may order In addition, a copy of the summons shall be served on the respondent at
his last known address by registered mail or any other means the court may deem
sufficient.

(2) The summons to be published shall be contained in an order of the court with the
following data: (a) title of the case; (b) docket number; (c) nature of the petition; (d)
principal grounds of the petition and the reliefs prayed for; and (e) a directive for the
respondent to answer within thirty days from the last issue of publication.

Section 7. Motion to dismiss. - No motion to dismiss the petition shall be allowed except
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the parties; provided,
however, that any other ground that might warrant a dismissal of the case may be raised
as an affirmative defense in an answer.

Section 8. Answer. - (1) The respondent shall file his answer within fifteen days from
service of summons, or within thirty days from the last issue of publication in case of
service of summons by publication. The answer must be verified by the respondent
himself and not by counsel or attorney-in-fact.

(2) If the respondent fails to file an answer, the court shall not declare him or her in
default.

(3) Where no answer is filed or if the answer does not tender an issue, the court shall
order the public prosecutor to investigate whether collusion exists between the parties.

Section 9. Investigation report of public prosecutor. - (1) Within one month after receipt
of the court order mentioned in paragraph (3) of Section 8 above, the public prosecutor
shall submit a report to the court stating whether the parties are in collusion and serve
copies thereof on the parties and their respective counsels, if any.

(2) If the public prosecutor finds that collusion exists, he shall state the on the finding of
collusion within ten days from receipt of a copy of a report The court shall set the report
for hearing and If convinced that the parties are in collusion, it shall dismiss the petition.

(3) If the public prosecutor reports that no collusion exists, the court shall set the case for
pre-trial. It shall be the duty of the public prosecutor to appear for the State at the pre-
trial.

Section 10. Social worker. - The court may require a social worker to conduct a case
study and submit the corresponding report at least three days before the pre-trial. The
court may also require a case study at any stage of the case whenever necessary.

Section 11. Pre-trial. -

(1) Pre-trial mandatory. - A pre-trial is mandatory. On motion or motu proprio, the court

shall set the pre-trial after the last pleading has been served and filed, or upon receipt of
the report of the public prosecutor that no collusion exists between the parties.

(2) Notice of pre-trial. - (a) The notice of pre-trial shall contain:

(1) the date of pre-trial conference; and

(2) an order directing the parties to file and serve their respective pre-trial briefs in such
manner as shall ensure the receipt thereof by the adverse party at least three days
before the date of pre-trial.

(b) The notice shall be served separately on the parties and their respective counsels as
well as on the public prosecutor. It shall be their duty to appear personally at the pre-trial.

(c) Notice of pre-trial shall be sent to the respondent even if he fails to file an answer. In
case of summons by publication and the respondent failed to file his answer, notice of
pre-trial shall be sent to respondent at his last known address.

Section 12. Contents of pre-trial brief. - The pre-trial brief shall contain the following:
(a) A statement of the willingness of the parties to enter into agreements as may be
allowed by law, indicating the desired terms thereof;

(b) A concise statement of their respective claims together with the applicable laws and
authorities;

(c) Admitted facts and proposed stipulations of facts, as well as the disputed factual and
legal issues;

(d) All the evidence to be presented, including expert opinion, if any, briefly stating or
describing the nature and purpose thereof;

(e) The number and names of the witnesses and their respective affidavits; and

(f) Such other matters as the court may require.

          Failure to file the pre-trial brief or to comply with its required contents shall have
the same effect as failure to appear at the pre-trial under the succeeding paragraphs.

Section 13. Effect of failure to appear at the pre-trial. - {a) If the petitioner fails to appear
personally, the case shall be dismissed unless his counsel or a duly authorized
representative appears in court and proves a valid excuse for the non-appearance of the
petitioner.

(b) If the respondent has filed his answer but fails to appear, the court shall proceed with
the pre-trial and require the public prosecutor to investigate the non-appearance of the
respondent and submit within fifteen days thereafter a report to the court stating whether
his non-appearance is due to any collusion between the parties. If there Is no collusion,
the court shall require the public prosecutor to intervene for the State during the trial on
the merits to prevent suppression or fabrication of evidence.

Section 14. Pre-trial conference. -At the pre-trial conference, the court:

(a) May refer the issues to a mediator who shall assist the parties in reaching an
agreement on matters not prohibited by law.

          The mediator shall render a report within one month from referral which, for good
reasons, the court may extend for a period not exceeding one month.

(b) In case mediation is not availed of or where it fails, the court shall proceed with the
pre-trial conference, on which occasion it shall consider the advisability of receiving
expert testimony and such other makers as may aid in the prompt disposition of the
petition.

Section 15. Pre-trial order. - {a) The proceedings in the pre-trial shall be recorded. Upon
termination of the pre-trial, the court shall Issue a pre-trial order which shall recite in
detail the matters taken up In the conference, the action taken thereon, the amendments
allowed on the pleadings, and except as to the ground of declaration of nullity or
annulment, the agreements or admissions made by the parties on any of the matters
considered, including any provisional order that may be necessary or agreed upon by the
parties.

(b) Should the action proceed to trial, the order shall contain a recital of the following;
(1) Facts undisputed, admitted, and those which need not be proved subject to Section
16 of this Rule;

(2) Factual and legal issues to be litigated;

(3) Evidence, including objects and documents, that have been marked and will be
presented;

(4) Names of witnesses who will be presented and their testimonies in the form of
affidavits; and

(5) Schedule of the presentation of evidence.

(c) The pre-trial order shall also contain a directive to the public prosecutor to appear for
the State and take steps to prevent collusion between the parties at any stage of the
proceedings and fabrication or suppression of evidence during the trial on the merits.

(d) The parlies shall not be allowed to raise issues or present witnesses and evidence
other than those stated in the pre-trial order.

The order shall control the trial of the case, unless modified by the court to prevent
manifest injustice.

(e) The parties shall have five days from receipt of the pre-trial order to propose
corrections or modifications.

Section 16. Prohibited compromise. - The court-shall not allow compromise on

prohibited matters, such as the following:

(a) The civil status of persons;

(b) The validity of a marriage or of a legal separation;

(c) Any ground for legal separation;

(d) Future support;

(e) The jurisdiction of courts; and

(f) Future legitime.

Section 17. Trial. - (1) The presiding judge shall personally conduct the trial of the case.
No delegation of the reception of evidence to a commissioner shall be allowed except as
to matters involving property relations of the spouses.

(2) The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of marriage must be
proved. No judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, or confession of judgment
shall be allowed.

(3) The court may order the exclusion from the courtroom of all persons, including
members of the press, who do not have a direct interest in the case. Such an order may
be made if the court determines on the record that requiring a party to testify in open
court would not enhance the ascertainment of truth; would cause to the party
psychological harm or inability to effectively communicate due to embarrassment, fear, or
timidity; would violate the right of a party to privacy; or would be offensive to decency or
public morals.

(4) No copy shall be taken nor any examination or perusal of the records of the case or
parts thereof be made by any person other than a party or counsel of a party, except by
order of the court.

Section 18. Memoranda. - The court may require the parties and the public prosecutor,
in consultation with the Office of the Solicitor General, to file their respective memoranda
support of their claims within fifteen days from the date the trial is terminated. It may
require the Office of the Solicitor General to file its own memorandum if the case is of
significant interest to the State. No other pleadings or papers may be submitted without
leave of court. After the lapse of the period herein provided, the case will be considered
submitted for decision, with or without the memoranda.

Section 19. Decision. - (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall
declare therein that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued
by the court only after compliance with Article 50 and 51 of the Family Code as
implemented under the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties.

(2) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the public prosecutor, shall be served
with copies of the decision personally or by registered mail. If the respondent summoned
by publication failed to appear in the action, the dispositive part of the decision shall be
published once in a newspaper of general circulation.

(3) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen days from notice to the
parties. Entry of judgment shall be made if no motion for reconsideration or new trial, or
appeal Is filed by any of the parties the public prosecutor, or the Solicitor General.

(4) Upon the finality of the decision, the court shall forthwith issue the corresponding
decree if the parties have no properties.

          If the parties have properties, the court shall observe the procedure prescribed in
Section 21 of this Rule.

          The entry of judgment shall be registered in the Civil Registry where the marriage
was recorded and In the Civil Registry where the Family Court'granting the petition for
declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of marriage is located.

Section 20. Appeal. -

(1) Pre-condition. - No appeal from the decision shall be allowed unless the appellant has
filed a motion for reconsideration or new trial within fifteen days from notice of judgment.

(2) Notice of appeal. - An aggrieved party or the Solicitor General may appeal from the
decision by filing a Notice of Appeal within fifteen days from notice of denial of the motion
for reconsideration or new trial. The appellant shall serve a copy of the notice of appeal
on the adverse parties.

Section 21. Liquidation, partition and distribution, custody, support of common children

and delivery of their presumptive iegltimes. - Upon entry of the judgment granting the
petition, or, in case of appeal, upon receipt of the entry of judgment of the appellate court
granting the petition, the Family Court, on motion of either party, shall proceed with the
liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, including custody,
support of common children and delivery of their presumptive legitimes pursuant to
Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code unless such matters had been adjudicated in
previous judicial proceedings.

Section 22. Issuance of Decree of Declaration of Absolute Nullity or Annulment of

Marriage." (a) The court shall issue the Decree after;

(1) Registration of the entry of judgment granting the petition for declaration of nullity or
annulment of marriage in the Civil Registry where the marriage was celebrated and in the
Civil Registry of the place where the Family Court is located;

(2) Registration of the approved partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses,
in the proper Register of Deeds where the real properties are located; and

(3) The delivery of the children's presumptive legitimes in cash, property, or sound
securities.

(b) The court shall quote in the Decree the dispositive portion of the judgment entered
and attach to the Decree the approved deed of partition.

          Except in the case of children under Articles 36 and 53 of the Family Code, the
court shall order the Local Civil Registrar to issue an amended birth certificate indicating
the new civil status of the children affected.

Section 23. Registration and publication of the decree; decree as best evidence. - (a)
The prevailing party shall cause the registration of the Decree in the Civil Registry where
the marriage was registered, the Civil Registry of the place where the Family Court is
situated, and in the National Census and Statistics Office. He shall report td the court
compliance with this requirement within thirty days from receipt of the copy of the Decree.

(b) In case service of summons was made by publication, the parties shall cause the
publication of the Decree once in a newspaper of general circulation.

(c) The registered Decree shall be the best evidence to prove the declaration of absolute
nullity or annulment of marriage and shall serve as notice to third persons concerning the
properties of petitioner and respondent as well as the properties or presumptive legitimes
delivered to their common children.

Section 24. Effect of death of a party; duty of the Family Court or Appellate Court. - (a) In
case a party dies at any stage of the proceedings before the entry of judgment, the court
shall order the case closed and terminated, without prejudice to the settlement of the
estate in proper proceedings in the regular courts.

(b) If the party dies after the entry of judgment of nullity or annulment, the judgment shall
be binding upon the parties and their successors in interest in the settlement of the estate
in the regular courts.

Section 25. Effectlvity. - This Rule shall take effect on March 15, 2003 following its
publication in a newspaper of general circulation not later than March 7, 2003.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 179922             December 16, 2008

JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS, petitioner,

vs.
FELICIDAD SANDOVAL, also known as FELICIDAD S. VDA. DE CARLOS or
FELICIDAD SANDOVAL CARLOS or FELICIDAD SANDOVAL VDA. DE CARLOS,
and TEOFILO CARLOS II, respondents.

DECISION

REYES, R.T., J.:

ONLY a spouse can initiate an action to sever the marital bond for marriages solemnized
during the effectivity of the Family Code, except cases commenced prior to March 15,
2003. The nullity and annulment of a marriage cannot be declared in a judgment on the
pleadings, summary judgment, or confession of judgment.

We pronounce these principles as We review on certiorari the Decision1 of the Court of

Appeals (CA) which reversed and set aside the summary judgment 2 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in an action for declaration of nullity of marriage, status of a child, recovery
of property, reconveyance, sum of money, and damages.

The Facts

The events that led to the institution of the instant suitare unveiled as follows:

Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate. They left six parcels of land to
their compulsory heirs, Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos. The lots are
particularly described as follows:

Parcel No. 1

Lot No. 162 of the MUNTINLUPA ESTATE SUBDIVISION, Case No. 6137 of the Court of
Land Registration.

Exemption from the provisions of Article 567 of the Civil Code is specifically reserved.

Area: 1 hectare, 06 ares, 07 centares.

Parcel No. 2
A parcel of land (Lot No. 159-B), being a portion of Lot 159, situated in the Bo. of
Alabang, Municipality of Muntinlupa, Province of Rizal, x x x containing an area of
Thirteen Thousand Four Hundred Forty One (13,441) square meters.

Parcel No. 3

A parcel of land (Lot 159-B-2 of the subd. plan [LRC] Psd-325903, approved as a non-
subd. project), being a portion of Lot 159-B [LRC] Psd- Alabang, Mun. of Muntinlupa,
Metro Manila, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the NE, points 2 to 4 by Lot 155, Muntinlupa
Estate; on the SE, point 4 to 5 by Lot 159-B-5; on the S, points 5 to 1 by Lot 159-B-3; on
the W, points 1 to 2 by Lot 159-B-1 (Road widening) all of the subd. plan, containing an
area of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY (130) SQ. METERS, more or less.

PARCEL No. 4

A parcel of land (Lot 28-C of the subd. plan Psd-13-007090, being a portion of Lot 28,
Muntinlupa Estate, L.R.C. Rec. No. 6137), situated in the Bo. of Alabang, Mun. of
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. Bounded on the NE, along lines 1-2 by Lot 27, Muntinlupa
Estate; on the East & SE, along lines 2 to 6 by Mangangata River; and on the West.,
along line 6-1, by Lot 28-B of the subd. plan x x x containing an area of ONE THUSAND
AND SEVENTY-SIX (1,076) SQUARE METERS.

PARCEL No. 5

PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 50, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. de Solocan. Linda por el
NW, con la parcela 49; por el NE, con la parcela 36; por el SE, con la parcela 51; y por el
SW, con la calle Dos Castillas. Partiendo de un punto marcado 1 en el plano, el cual se
halla a S. gds. 01'W, 72.50 mts. Desde el punto 1 de esta manzana, que es un mojon de
concreto de la Ciudad de Manila, situado on el esquina E. que forman las Calles Laong
Laan y Dos. Castillas, continiendo un extension superficial de CIENTO CINCUENTA
(150) METROS CUADRADOS.

PARCEL No. 6

PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 51, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. De Solocon. Linda por el
NW, con la parcela 50; por el NE, con la parcela 37; por el SE, con la parcela 52; por el
SW, con la Calle Dos Castillas. Partiendo de un punto Marcado 1 en el plano, el cual se
halla at S. 43 gds. 01'E, 82.50 mts. Desde el punto 1 de esta manzana, que es un mojon
de concreto de la Ciudad de Manila, situado on el esquina E. que forman las Calles
Laong Laan y Dos. Castillas, continiendo una extension superficial de CIENTO
CINCUENTA (150) METROS CUADRADOS.3

During the lifetime of Felix Carlos, he agreed to transfer his estate to Teofilo. The
agreement was made in order to avoid the payment of inheritance taxes. Teofilo, in turn,
undertook to deliver and turn over the share of the other legal heir, petitioner Juan De
Dios Carlos.

Eventually, the first three (3) parcels of land were transferred and registered in the name
of Teofilo. These three (3) lots are now covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
234824 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City; TCT No. 139061 issued by the
Registry of Deeds of Makati City; and TCT No. 139058 issued by the Registry of Deeds
of Makati City.

Parcel No. 4 was registered in the name of petitioner. The lot is now covered by TCT No.
160401 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City.
On May 13, 1992, Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by respondents Felicidad and
their son, Teofilo Carlos II (Teofilo II). Upon Teofilo's death, Parcel Nos. 5 & 6 were
registered in the name of respondent Felicidad and co-respondent, Teofilo II. The said
two (2) parcels of land are covered by TCT Nos. 219877 and 210878, respectively,
issued by the Registry of Deeds of Manila.

In 1994, petitioner instituted a suit against respondents before the RTC in Muntinlupa
City, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-1964. In the said case, the parties submitted and
caused the approval of a partial compromise agreement. Under the compromise, the
parties acknowledged their respective shares in the proceeds from the sale of a portion
of the first parcel of land. This includes the remaining 6,691-square-meter portion of said
land.

On September 17, 1994, the parties executed a deed of extrajudicial partition, dividing
the remaining land of the first parcel between them.

Meanwhile, in a separate case entitled Rillo v. Carlos,4 2,331 square meters of the

second parcel of land were adjudicated in favor of plaintiffs Rillo. The remaining 10,000-
square meter portion was later divided between petitioner and respondents.

The division was incorporated in a supplemental compromise agreement executed on

August 17, 1994, with respect to Civil Case No. 94-1964. The parties submitted the
supplemental compromise agreement, which was approved accordingly.

Petitioner and respondents entered into two more contracts in August 1994. Under the
contracts, the parties equally divided between them the third and fourth parcels of land.

In August 1995, petitioner commenced an action, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-135,
against respondents before the court a quo with the following causes of action: (a)
declaration of nullity of marriage; (b) status of a child; (c) recovery of property; (d)
reconveyance; and (e) sum of money and damages. The complaint was raffled to Branch
256 of the RTC in Muntinlupa.

In his complaint, petitioner asserted that the marriage between his late brother Teofilo
and respondent Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence of the required marriage
license. He likewise maintained that his deceased brother was neither the natural nor the
adoptive father of respondent Teofilo Carlos II.

Petitioner likewise sought the avoidance of the contracts he entered into with respondent
Felicidad with respect to the subject real properties. He also prayed for the cancellation
of the certificates of title issued in the name of respondents. He argued that the
properties covered by such certificates of title, including the sums received by
respondents as proceeds, should be reconveyed to him.

Finally, petitioner claimed indemnification as and by way of moral and exemplary

damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs of suit.

On October 16, 1995, respondents submitted their answer. They denied the material
averments of petitioner's complaint. Respondents contended that the dearth of details
regarding the requisite marriage license did not invalidate Felicidad's marriage to Teofilo.
Respondents declared that Teofilo II was the illegitimate child of the deceased Teofilo
Carlos with another woman.

On the grounds of lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter,
respondents prayed for the dismissal of the case before the trial court. They also asked
that their counterclaims for moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees, be
granted.

But before the parties could even proceed to pre-trial, respondents moved for summary
judgment. Attached to the motion was the affidavit of the justice of the peace who
solemnized the marriage. Respondents also submitted the Certificate of Live Birth of
respondent Teofilo II. In the certificate, the late Teofilo Carlos and respondent Felicidad
were designated as parents.

On January 5, 1996, petitioner opposed the motion for summary judgment on the ground
of irregularity of the contract evidencing the marriage. In the same breath, petitioner
lodged his own motion for summary judgment. Petitioner presented a certification from
the Local Civil Registrar of Calumpit, Bulacan, certifying that there is no record of birth of
respondent Teofilo II.

Petitioner also incorporated in the counter-motion for summary judgment the testimony of
respondent Felicidad in another case. Said testimony was made in Civil Case No. 89-
2384, entitled Carlos v. Gorospe, before the RTC Branch 255, Las Piñas. In her
testimony, respondent Felicidad narrated that co-respondent Teofilo II is her child with
Teofilo.5

Subsequently, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa submitted to the trial court
its report and manifestation, discounting the possibility of collusion between the parties.

RTC and CA Dispositions

On April 8, 1996, the RTC rendered judgment, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendant's (respondent's) Motion for Summary

Judgment is hereby denied. Plaintiff's (petitioner's) Counter-Motion for Summary
Judgment is hereby granted and summary judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
plaintiff as follows:

1. Declaring the marriage between defendant Felicidad Sandoval and Teofilo Carlos
solemnized at Silang, Cavite on May 14, 1962, evidenced by the Marriage Certificate
submitted in this case, null and void ab initio for lack of the requisite marriage license;

2. Declaring that the defendant minor, Teofilo S. Carlos II, is not the natural, illegitimate,
or legally adopted child of the late Teofilo E. Carlos;

3. Ordering defendant Sandoval to pay and restitute to plaintiff the sum

of P18,924,800.00 together with the interest thereon at the legal rate from date of filing of
the instant complaint until fully paid;

4. Declaring plaintiff as the sole and exclusive owner of the parcel of land, less the
portion adjudicated to plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 11975, covered by TCT No. 139061 of
the Register of Deeds of Makati City, and ordering said Register of Deeds to cancel said
title and to issue another title in the sole name of plaintiff herein;

5. Declaring the Contract, Annex "K" of complaint, between plaintiff and defendant
Sandoval null and void, and ordering the Register of Deeds of Makati City to cancel TCT
No. 139058 in the name of Teofilo Carlos, and to issue another title in the sole name of
plaintiff herein;
6. Declaring the Contract, Annex M of the complaint, between plaintiff and defendant
Sandoval null and void;

7. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210877 in the names of defendant Sandoval and
defendant minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to
issue another title in the exclusive name of plaintiff herein;

8. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210878 in the name of defendant Sandoval and
defendant Minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to
issue another title in the sole name of plaintiff herein.

Let this case be set for hearing for the reception of plaintiff's evidence on his claim for
moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees, appearance fees, and litigation
expenses on June 7, 1996 at 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon.

SO ORDERED.6

Dissatisfied, respondents appealed to the CA. In the appeal, respondents argued, inter
alia, that the trial court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in rendering summary
judgment annulling the marriage of Teofilo, Sr. and Felicidad and in declaring Teofilo II as
not an illegitimate child of Teofilo, Sr.

On October 15, 2002, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC ruling, disposing as
follows:

WHEREFORE, the summary judgment appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and in lieu thereof, a new one is entered REMANDING the case to the court of origin for
further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.7

The CA opined:

We find the rendition of the herein appealed summary judgment by the court a
quo contrary to law and public policy as ensconced in the aforesaid safeguards. The fact
that it was appellants who first sought summary judgment from the trial court, did not
justify the grant thereof in favor of appellee. Not being an action "to recover upon a claim"
or "to obtain a declaratory relief," the rule on summary judgment apply (sic) to an action
to annul a marriage. The mere fact that no genuine issue was presented and the desire
to expedite the disposition of the case cannot justify a misinterpretation of the rule. The
first paragraph of Article 88 and 101 of the Civil Code expressly prohibit the rendition of
decree of annulment of a marriage upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of
judgment. Yet, the affidavits annexed to the petition for summary judgment practically
amount to these methods explicitly proscribed by the law.

We are not unmindful of appellee's argument that the foregoing safeguards have
traditionally been applied to prevent collusion of spouses in the matter of dissolution of
marriages and that the death of Teofilo Carlos on May 13, 1992 had effectively dissolved
the marriage herein impugned. The fact, however, that appellee's own brother and
appellant Felicidad Sandoval lived together as husband and wife for thirty years and that
the annulment of their marriage is the very means by which the latter is sought to be
deprived of her participation in the estate left by the former call for a closer and more
thorough inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the case. Rather that the summary
nature by which the court a quo resolved the issues in the case, the rule is to the effect
that the material facts alleged in the complaint for annulment of marriage should always
be proved. Section 1, Rule 19 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

"Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. - Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or

otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may,
on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of
marriage or for legal separation, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always
be proved." (Underscoring supplied)

Moreover, even if We were to sustain the applicability of the rules on summary judgment
to the case at bench, Our perusal of the record shows that the finding of the court  a
quo for appellee would still not be warranted. While it may be readily conceded that a
valid marriage license is among the formal requisites of marriage, the absence of which
renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to Article 58 of the
Civil Code the failure to reflect the serial number of the marriage license on the marriage
contract evidencing the marriage between Teofilo Carlos and appellant Felicidad
Sandoval, although irregular, is not as fatal as appellee represents it to be. Aside from
the dearth of evidence to the contrary, appellant Felicidad Sandoval's affirmation of the
existence of said marriage license is corroborated by the following statement in the
affidavit executed by Godofredo Fojas, then Justice of the Peace who officiated the
impugned marriage, to wit:

"That as far as I could remember, there was a marriage license issued at Silang, Cavite
on May 14, 1962 as basis of the said marriage contract executed by Teofilo Carlos and
Felicidad Sandoval, but the number of said marriage license was inadvertently not placed
in the marriage contract for the reason that it was the Office Clerk who filled up the
blanks in the Marriage Contract who in turn, may have overlooked the same."

Rather than the inferences merely drawn by the trial court, We are of the considered view
that the veracity and credibility of the foregoing statement as well as the motivations
underlying the same should be properly threshed out in a trial of the case on the merits.

If the non-presentation of the marriage contract - the primary evidence of marriage - is

not proof that a marriage did not take place, neither should appellants' non-presentation
of the subject marriage license be taken as proof that the same was not procured. The
burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage, it must be emphasized, rests upon the
plaintiff and any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.

Considering that the burden of proof also rests on the party who disputes the legitimacy
of a particular party, the same may be said of the trial court's rejection of the relationship
between appellant Teofilo Carlos II and his putative father on the basis of the
inconsistencies in appellant Felicidad Sandoval's statements. Although it had effectively
disavowed appellant's prior claims regarding the legitimacy of appellant Teofilo Carlos II,
the averment in the answer that he is the illegitimate son of appellee's brother, to Our
mind, did not altogether foreclose the possibility of the said appellant's illegitimate
filiation, his right to prove the same or, for that matter, his entitlement to inheritance rights
as such.

Without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case, We find appellee's bare
allegation that appellant Teofilo Carlos II was merely purchased from an indigent couple
by appellant Felicidad Sandoval, on the whole, insufficient to support what could well be
a minor's total forfeiture of the rights arising from his putative filiation. Inconsistent though
it may be to her previous statements, appellant Felicidad Sandoval's declaration
regarding the illegitimate filiation of Teofilo Carlos II is more credible when considered in
the light of the fact that, during the last eight years of his life, Teofilo Carlos allowed said
appellant the use of his name and the shelter of his household. The least that the trial
court could have done in the premises was to conduct a trial on the merits in order to be
able to thoroughly resolve the issues pertaining to the filiation of appellant Teofilo Carlos
II.8

On November 22, 2006, petitioner moved for reconsideration and for the inhibition of
the ponente, Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador. The CA denied the twin motions.

Issues

In this petition under Rule 45, petitioner hoists the following issues:

1. That, in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment under the Decision,
Annex A hereof, and in denying petitioner's Motion for reconsideration under the
Resolution, Annex F hereof, with respect to the nullity of the impugned marriage,
petitioner respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed a grave
reversible error in applying Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code, despite the fact that the
circumstances of this case are different from that contemplated and intended by law, or
has otherwise decided a question of substance not theretofore decided by the Supreme
Court, or has decided it in a manner probably not in accord with law or with the applicable
decisions of this Honorable Court;

2. That in setting aside and reversing the Summary Judgment and, in lieu thereof,
entering another remanding the case to the court of origin for further proceedings,
petitioner most respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed a serious
reversible error in applying Section 1, Rule 19 (now Section 1, Rule 34) of the Rules of
Court providing for judgment on the pleadings, instead of Rule 35 governing Summary
Judgments;

3. That in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment and, in lieu thereof,
entering another remanding the case to the court of origin for further proceedings,
petitioner most respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of
discretion, disregarded judicial admissions, made findings on ground of speculations,
surmises, and conjectures, or otherwise committed misapplications of the laws and
misapprehension of the facts.9 (Underscoring supplied)

Essentially, the Court is tasked to resolve whether a marriage may be declared void ab
initio through a judgment on the pleadings or a summary judgment and without the
benefit of a trial. But there are other procedural issues, including the capacity of one who
is not a spouse in bringing the action for nullity of marriage.

Our Ruling

I. The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must be proved.

Neither judgment on the pleadings nor summary judgment is allowed. So is
confession of judgment disallowed.

Petitioner faults the CA in applying Section 1, Rule 19 10 of the Revised Rules of Court,
which provides:

SECTION 1. Judgment on the pleadings. - Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or

otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may,
on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of
marriage or for legal separation, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always
be proved.
He argues that the CA should have applied Rule 35 of the Rules of Court governing
summary judgment, instead of the rule on judgment on the pleadings.

Petitioner is misguided. The CA did not limit its finding solely within the provisions of the
Rule on judgment on the pleadings. In disagreeing with the trial court, the CA likewise
considered the provisions on summary judgments, to wit:

Moreover, even if We are to sustain the applicability of the rules on summary judgment to
the case at bench, Our perusal of the record shows that the finding of the court  a quo for
appellee would still not be warranted. x x x11

But whether it is based on judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment, the CA was
correct in reversing the summary judgment rendered by the trial court. Both the rules on
judgment on the pleadings and summary judgments have no place in cases of
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage and even in annulment of marriage.

With the advent of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, known as "Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages," the question on the
application of summary judgments or even judgment on the pleadings in cases of nullity
or annulment of marriage has been stamped with clarity. The significant principle laid
down by the said Rule, which took effect on March 15, 2003 12 is found in Section 17, viz.:

SEC. 17. Trial. - (1) The presiding judge shall personally conduct the trial of the case. No
delegation of evidence to a commissioner shall be allowed except as to matters involving
property relations of the spouses.

(2) The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of marriage must be

proved. No judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, or confession of
judgment shall be allowed. (Underscoring supplied)

Likewise instructive is the Court's pronouncement in Republic v. Sandiganbayan.13 In that

case, We excluded actions for nullity or annulment of marriage from the application of
summary judgments.

Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, save for annulment of marriage or declaration

of its nullity or for legal separation, summary judgment is applicable to all kinds of
actions.14 (Underscoring supplied)

By issuing said summary judgment, the trial court has divested the State of its lawful right
and duty to intervene in the case. The participation of the State is not terminated by the
declaration of the public prosecutor that no collusion exists between the parties. The
State should have been given the opportunity to present controverting evidence before
the judgment was rendered.15

Both the Civil Code and the Family Code ordain that the court should order the
prosecuting attorney to appear and intervene for the State. It is at this stage when the
public prosecutor sees to it that there is no suppression of evidence. Concomitantly, even
if there is no suppression of evidence, the public prosecutor has to make sure that the
evidence to be presented or laid down before the court is not fabricated.

To further bolster its role towards the preservation of marriage, the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages reiterates the duty of the public prosecutor, viz.:

SEC. 13. Effect of failure to appear at the pre-trial. - (a) x x x

(b) x x x If there is no collusion, the court shall require the public prosecutor to intervene
for the State during the trial on the merits to prevent suppression or fabrication of
evidence. (Underscoring supplied)

Truly, only the active participation of the public prosecutor or the Solicitor General will
ensure that the interest of the State is represented and protected in proceedings for
declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing the fabrication or suppression of
evidence.16

II. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely
by the husband or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced
before the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2) Marriages celebrated during
the effectivity of the Civil Code.

Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment

of Voidable Marriages, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not
be filed by any party outside of the marriage. The Rule made it exclusively a right of the
spouses by stating:

SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. -

(a) Who may file. - A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be
filed solely by the husband or the wife. (Underscoring supplied)

Section 2(a) of the Rule makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to file a petition
for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage. The rationale of the Rule is
enlightening, viz.:

Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable

marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be
filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of
the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate
heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and, hence, can
only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular
courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to
seek its dissolution.17 (Underscoring supplied)

The new Rule recognizes that the husband and the wife are the sole architects of a
healthy, loving, peaceful marriage. They are the only ones who can decide when and
how to build the foundations of marriage. The spouses alone are the engineers of their
marital life. They are simultaneously the directors and actors of their matrimonial true-to-
life play. Hence, they alone can and should decide when to take a cut, but only in
accordance with the grounds allowed by law.

The innovation incorporated in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC sets forth a demarcation line
between marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil
Code. The Rule extends only to marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family
Code which took effect on August 3, 1988. 18

The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages marks the
beginning of the end of the right of the heirs of the deceased spouse to bring a nullity of
marriage case against the surviving spouse. But the Rule never intended to deprive the
compulsory or intestate heirs of their successional rights.
While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the
compulsory or intestate heirs are without any recourse under the law. They can still
protect their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment
of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, compulsory
or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a
proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for
the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. 19

It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases already commenced
before March 15, 2003 although the marriage involved is within the coverage of the
Family Code. This is so, as the new Rule which became effective on March 15, 2003 20 is
prospective in its application. Thus, the Court held in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps.
Medinaceli,21 viz.:

As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers marriages under the Family
Code of the Philippines, and is prospective in its application.22 (Underscoring supplied)

Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case against respondent Felicidad in 1995.
The marriage in controversy was celebrated on May 14, 1962. Which law would govern
depends upon when the marriage took place.23

The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the
applicable law is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its
celebration.24 But the Civil Code is silent as to who may bring an action to declare the
marriage void. Does this mean that any person can bring an action for the declaration of
nullity of marriage?

We respond in the negative. The absence of a provision in the Civil Code cannot be
construed as a license for any person to institute a nullity of marriage case. Such person
must appear to be the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. 25 Elsewise stated, plaintiff must be the
real party-in-interest. For it is basic in procedural law that every action must be
prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest. 26

Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest or an interest in issue to
be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity
about the question involved or a mere incidental interest. One having no material interest
to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an action. When plaintiff
is not the real party-in-interest, the case is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of
action.27

Illuminating on this point is Amor-Catalan v. Court of Appeals,28 where the Court held:

True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents
were married, or even in the Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who can file
a petition to declare the nullity of marriage; however, only a party who can
demonstrate "proper interest" can file the same. A petition to declare the nullity of
marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended  in the name of the real
party-in-interest and must be based on a cause of action. Thus, in Niñal v. Badayog, the
Court held that the children have the personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of
marriage of their deceased father to their stepmother as it affects their successional
rights.

xxxx
In fine, petitioner's personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage cannot
be ascertained because of the absence of the divorce decree and the foreign law
allowing it. Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for reception of additional
evidence is necessary to determine whether respondent Orlando was granted a divorce
decree and whether the foreign law which granted the same allows or restricts
remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained and the same did not
allow respondent Orlando's remarriage, then the trial court should declare respondent's
marriage as bigamous and void ab initio but reduced the amount of moral damages
from P300,000.00 to P50,000.00 and exemplary damages from P200,000.00
to P25,000.00. On the contrary, if it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained
which allowed Orlando to remarry, then the trial court must dismiss the instant petition to
declare nullity of marriage on the ground that petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan lacks
legal personality to file the same.29 (Underscoring supplied)

III. The case must be remanded to determine whether or not petitioner is a real-
party-in-interest to seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage in controversy.

In the case at bench, the records reveal that when Teofilo died intestate in 1992, his only
surviving compulsory heirs are respondent Felicidad and their son, Teofilo II. Under the
law on succession, successional rights are transmitted from the moment of death of the
decedent and the compulsory heirs are called to succeed by operation of law. 30

Upon Teofilo's death in 1992, all his property, rights and obligations to the extent of the
value of the inheritance are transmitted to his compulsory heirs. These heirs were
respondents Felicidad and Teofilo II, as the surviving spouse and child, respectively.

Article 887 of the Civil Code outlined who are compulsory heirs, to wit:

(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and
ascendants;

(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their
legitimate children and descendants;

(3) The widow or widower;

(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;

(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the Civil Code. 31

Clearly, a brother is not among those considered as compulsory heirs. But although a
collateral relative, such as a brother, does not fall within the ambit of a compulsory heir,
he still has a right to succeed to the estate. Articles 1001 and 1003 of the New Civil Code
provide:

ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or
widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and
sisters or their children to the other half.

ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving

spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in
accordance with the following articles. (Underscoring supplied)

Indeed, only the presence of descendants, ascendants or illegitimate children excludes

collateral relatives from succeeding to the estate of the decedent. The presence of
legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted child or children of the deceased precludes succession
by collateral relatives.32 Conversely, if there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate
children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate
of the decedent.33

If respondent Teofilo II is declared and finally proven not to be the legitimate, illegitimate,
or adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner would then have a personality to seek the nullity of
marriage of his deceased brother with respondent Felicidad. This is so, considering that
collateral relatives, like a brother and sister, acquire successional right over the estate if
the decedent dies without issue and without ascendants in the direct line.

The records reveal that Teofilo was predeceased by his parents. He had no other siblings
but petitioner. Thus, if Teofilo II is finally found and proven to be not a legitimate,
illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner succeeds to the other half of the estate
of his brother, the first half being allotted to the widow pursuant to Article 1001 of the New
Civil Code. This makes petitioner a real-party-interest to seek the declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage of his deceased brother with respondent Felicidad. If the subject
marriage is found to be void ab initio, petitioner succeeds to the entire estate.

It bears stressing, however, that the legal personality of petitioner to bring the nullity of
marriage case is contingent upon the final declaration that Teofilo II is not a legitimate,
adopted, or illegitimate son of Teofilo.

If Teofilo II is proven to be a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo, then

petitioner has no legal personality to ask for the nullity of marriage of his deceased
brother and respondent Felicidad. This is based on the ground that he has no
successional right to be protected, hence, does not have proper interest. For although
the marriage in controversy may be found to be void from the beginning, still, petitioner
would not inherit. This is because the presence of descendant, illegitimate, 34 or even an
adopted child35 excludes the collateral relatives from inheriting from the decedent.

Thus, the Court finds that a remand of the case for trial on the merits to determine the
validity or nullity of the subject marriage is called for. But the RTC is strictly instructed
to dismiss the nullity of marriage case for lack of cause of action if it is proven by
evidence that Teofilo II is a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo
Carlos, the deceased brother of petitioner.

IV. Remand of the case regarding the question of filiation of respondent Teofilo II
is proper and in order. There is a need to vacate the disposition of the trial court as to
the other causes of action before it.

Petitioner did not assign as error or interpose as issue the ruling of the CA on the remand
of the case concerning the filiation of respondent Teofilo II. This notwithstanding, We
should not leave the matter hanging in limbo.

This Court has the authority to review matters not specifically raised or assigned as error
by the parties, if their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just resolution of the
case.36

We agree with the CA that without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case,
petitioner's bare allegation that respondent Teofilo II was adopted from an indigent
couple is insufficient to support a total forfeiture of rights arising from his putative filiation.
However, We are not inclined to support its pronouncement that the declaration of
respondent Felicidad as to the illegitimate filiation of respondent Teofilo II is more
credible. For the guidance of the appellate court, such declaration of respondent
Felicidad should not be afforded credence. We remind the CA of the guaranty provided
by Article 167 of the Family Code to protect the status of legitimacy of a child, to wit:

ARTICLE 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
(Underscoring supplied)

It is stressed that Felicidad's declaration against the legitimate status of Teofilo II is the
very act that is proscribed by Article 167 of the Family Code. The language of the law is
unmistakable. An assertion by the mother against the legitimacy of her child cannot affect
the legitimacy of a child born or conceived within a valid marriage. 37

Finally, the disposition of the trial court in favor of petitioner for causes of action
concerning reconveyance, recovery of property, and sum of money must be vacated.
This has to be so, as said disposition was made on the basis of its finding that the
marriage in controversy was null and void ab initio.

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is MODIFIED as follows:

1. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court in regard to the action on the
status and filiation of respondent Teofilo Carlos II and the validity or nullity of marriage
between respondent Felicidad Sandoval and the late Teofilo Carlos;

2. If Teofilo Carlos II is proven to be the legitimate, or illegitimate, or legally adopted son

of the late Teofilo Carlos, the RTC is strictly INSTRUCTED to DISMISS the action for
nullity of marriage for lack of cause of action;

3. The disposition of the RTC in Nos. 1 to 8 of the fallo of its decision is VACATED AND
SET ASIDE.

The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to conduct trial on the merits with dispatch and to
give this case priority in its calendar.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice
 ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's
Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 169766               March 30, 2011

ESTRELLITA JULIANO-LLAVE, Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HAJA PUTRI ZORAYDA A. TAMANO and ADIB
AHMAD A. TAMANO, Respondents.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

A new law ought to affect the future, not what is past. Hence, in the case of subsequent
marriage laws, no vested rights shall be impaired that pertain to the protection of the
legitimate union of a married couple.

This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision 1 dated August 17, 2004 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 61762 and its subsequent Resolution 2 dated
September 13, 2005, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City, Branch 89 declaring petitioner Estrellita Juliano-Llave’s (Estrellita) marriage
to Sen. Mamintal A.J. Tamano (Sen. Tamano) as void ab initio.

Factual Antecedents

Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married Estrellita twice – initially under
the Islamic laws and tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City 3 and, subsequently,
under a civil ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June
2, 1993.4 In their marriage contracts, Sen. Tamano’s civil status was indicated as
‘divorced.’

Since then, Estrellita has been representing herself to the whole world as Sen. Tamano’s
wife, and upon his death, his widow.

On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda)
and her son Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf of the rest
of Sen. Tamano’s legitimate children with Zorayda, 5 filed a complaint with the RTC of
Quezon City for the declaration of nullity of marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano
for being bigamous. The complaint 6 alleged, inter alia, that Sen. Tamano married
Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under civil rites, and that this marriage remained subsisting
when he married Estrellita in 1993. The complaint likewise averred that:

11. The marriage of the deceased and Complainant Zorayda, having been celebrated
under the New Civil Code, is therefore governed by this law. Based on Article 35 (4) of
the Family Code, the subsequent marriage entered into by deceased Mamintal with
Defendant Llave is void ab initio because he contracted the same while his prior marriage
to Complainant Zorayda was still subsisting, and his status being declared as "divorced"
has no factual or legal basis, because the deceased never divorced Complainant
Zorayda in his lifetime, and he could not have validly done so because divorce is not
allowed under the New Civil Code;

11.1 Moreover, the deceased did not and could not have divorced Complainant Zorayda
by invoking the provision of P.D. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal
Laws, for the simple reason that the marriage of the deceased with Complainant Zorayda
was never deemed, legally and factually, to have been one contracted under Muslim law
as provided under Art. 186 (2) of P.D. 1083, since they (deceased and Complainant
Zorayda) did not register their mutual desire to be thus covered by this law; 7

Summons was then served on Estrellita on December 19, 1994. She then asked from the
court for an extension of 30 days to file her answer to be counted from January 4,
1995,8 and again, another 15 days9 or until February 18, 1995, both of which the court
granted.10

Instead of submitting her answer, however, Estrellita filed a Motion to Dismiss 11 on
February 20, 1995 where she declared that Sen. Tamano and Zorayda are both Muslims
who were married under the Muslim rites, as had been averred in the latter’s disbarment
complaint against Sen. Tamano. 12 Estrellita argued that the RTC has no jurisdiction to
take cognizance of the case because under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1083, or the
Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines (Muslim Code), questions and issues
involving Muslim marriages and divorce fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of shari’a
courts.

The trial court denied Estrellita’s motion and asserted its jurisdiction over the case for
declaration of nullity.13 Thus, Estrellita filed in November 1995 a certiorari petition with this
Court questioning the denial of her Motion to Dismiss. On December 15, 1995, we
referred the petition to the CA14 which was docketed thereat as CA-G.R. SP No. 39656.

During the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 39656, the RTC continued to try the case since
there can be no default in cases of declaration of nullity of marriage even if the
respondent failed to file an answer. Estrellita was allowed to participate in the trial while
her opposing parties presented their evidence. When it was Estrellita’s turn to adduce
evidence, the hearings set for such purpose 15 were postponed mostly at her instance until
the trial court, on March 22, 1996, suspended the proceedings 16 in view of the CA’s
temporary restraining order issued on February 29, 1996, enjoining it from hearing the
case.17

Eventually, however, the CA resolved the petition adverse to Estrellita in its Decision
dated September 30, 1996. 18 Estrellita then elevated the appellate court’s judgment to
this Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 126603. 19

Subsequent to the promulgation of the CA Decision, the RTC ordered Estrellita to

present her evidence on June 26, 1997. 20 As Estrellita was indisposed on that day, the
hearing was reset to July 9, 1997. 21 The day before this scheduled hearing, Estrellita
again asked for a postponement.22

Unhappy with the delays in the resolution of their case, Zorayda and Adib moved to
submit the case for decision,23 reasoning that Estrellita had long been delaying the case.
Estrellita opposed, on the ground that she has not yet filed her answer as she still awaits
the outcome of G.R. No. 126603.24

On June 29, 1998, we upheld the jurisdiction of the RTC of Quezon City, 25 stating as one
of the reasons that as shari’a courts are not vested with original and exclusive jurisdiction
in cases of marriages celebrated under both the Civil Code and PD 1083, the RTC, as a
court of general jurisdiction, is not precluded from assuming jurisdiction over such cases.
In our Resolution dated August 24, 1998, 26 we denied Estrellita’s motion for
reconsideration27 with finality.

A few days before this resolution, or on August 18, 1998, the RTC rendered the
aforementioned judgment declaring Estrellita’s marriage with Sen. Tamano as void ab
initio.28

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

The RTC, finding that the marital ties of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda were never severed,
declared Sen. Tamano’s subsequent marriage to Estrellita as void ab initio for being
bigamous under Article 35 of the Family Code of the Philippines and under Article 83 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines.29 The court said:

A comparison between Exhibits A and B (supra) immediately shows that the second
marriage of the late Senator with [Estrellita] was entered into during the subsistence of
his first marriage with [Zorayda]. This renders the subsequent marriage void from the
very beginning. The fact that the late Senator declared his civil status as "divorced" will
not in any way affect the void character of the second marriage because, in this
jurisdiction, divorce obtained by the Filipino spouse is not an acceptable method of
terminating the effects of a previous marriage, especially, where the subsequent
marriage was solemnized under the Civil Code or Family Code. 30

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In her appeal,31 Estrellita argued that she was denied her right to be heard as

the RTC rendered its judgment even without waiting for the finality of the Decision of the
Supreme Court in G.R. No. 126603. She claimed that the RTC should have required her
to file her answer after the denial of her motion to dismiss. She maintained that Sen.
Tamano is capacitated to marry her as his marriage and subsequent divorce with
Zorayda is governed by the Muslim Code. Lastly, she highlighted Zorayda’s lack of legal
standing to question the validity of her marriage to the deceased.

In dismissing the appeal in its Decision dated August 17, 2004, 32 the CA held that
Estrellita can no longer be allowed to file her answer as she was given ample opportunity
to be heard but simply ignored it by asking for numerous postponements. She never filed
her answer despite the lapse of around 60 days, a period longer than what was
prescribed by the rules. It also ruled that Estrellita cannot rely on her pending petition
for certiorari with the higher courts since, as an independent and original action, it does
not interrupt the proceedings in the trial court.
As to the substantive merit of the case, the CA adjudged that Estrellita’s marriage to Sen.
Tamano is void ab initio for being bigamous, reasoning that the marriage of Zorayda and
Sen. Tamano is governed by the Civil Code, which does not provide for an absolute
divorce. It noted that their first nuptial celebration was under civil rites, while the
subsequent Muslim celebration was only ceremonial. Zorayda then, according to the CA,
had the legal standing to file the action as she is Sen. Tamano’s wife and, hence, the
injured party in the senator’s subsequent bigamous marriage with Estrellita.

In its September 13, 2005 Resolution, 33 the CA denied Estrellita’s Motion for
Reconsideration/Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration where it debunked the
additional errors she raised. The CA noted that the allegation of lack of the public
prosecutor’s report on the existence of collusion in violation of both Rule 9, Section 3(e)
of the Rules of Court34 and Article 48 of the Family Code 35 will not invalidate the trial
court’s judgment as the proceedings between the parties had been adversarial, negating
the existence of collusion. Assuming that the issues have not been joined before the
RTC, the same is attributable to Estrellita’s refusal to file an answer. Lastly, the CA
disregarded Estrellita’s allegation that the trial court erroneously rendered its judgment
way prior to our remand to the RTC of the records of the case ratiocinating that G.R. No.
126603 pertains to the issue on the denial of the Motion to Dismiss, and not to the issue
of the validity of Estrellita’s marriage to Sen. Tamano.

The Parties’ Respective Arguments

Reiterating her arguments before the court a quo, Estrellita now argues that the CA erred
in upholding the RTC judgment as the latter was prematurely issued, depriving her of the
opportunity to file an answer and to present her evidence to dispute the allegations
against the validity of her marriage. She claims that Judge Macias v. Macias 36 laid down
the rule that the filing of a motion to dismiss instead of an answer suspends the period to
file an answer and, consequently, the trial court is obliged to suspend proceedings while
her motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction has not yet been resolved with
finality. She maintains that she merely participated in the RTC hearings because of the
trial court’s assurance that the proceedings will be without prejudice to whatever action
the High Court will take on her petition questioning the RTC’s jurisdiction and yet, the
RTC violated this commitment as it rendered an adverse judgment on August 18, 1998,
months before the records of G.R. No. 126603 were remanded to the CA on November
11, 1998.37 She also questions the lack of a report of the public prosecutor anent a finding
of whether there was collusion, this being a prerequisite before further proceeding could
be held when a party has failed to file an answer in a suit for declaration of nullity of
marriage.

Estrellita is also steadfast in her belief that her marriage with the late senator is valid as
the latter was already divorced under the Muslim Code at the time he married her. She
asserts that such law automatically applies to the marriage of Zorayda and the deceased
without need of registering their consent to be covered by it, as both parties are Muslims
whose marriage was solemnized under Muslim law. She pointed out that Sen. Tamano
married all his wives under Muslim rites, as attested to by the affidavits of the siblings of
the deceased.38

Lastly, Estrellita argues that Zorayda and Adib have no legal standing to file suit because
only the husband or the wife can file a complaint for the declaration of nullity of marriage
under Supreme Court Resolution A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.39

Refuting the arguments, the Solicitor General (Sol Gen) defends the CA’s reasoning and
stresses that Estrellita was never deprived of her right to be heard; and, that filing an
original action for certiorari does not stay the proceedings of the main action before the
RTC.
As regards the alleged lack of report of the public prosecutor if there is collusion, the Sol
Gen says that this is no longer essential considering the vigorous opposition of Estrellita
in the suit that obviously shows the lack of collusion. The Sol Gen also supports private
respondents’ legal standing to challenge the validity of Estrellita’s purported marriage
with Sen. Tamano, reasoning that any proper interested party may attack directly or
collaterally a void marriage, and Zorayda and Adib have such right to file the action as
they are the ones prejudiced by the marital union.

Zorayda and Adib, on the other hand, did not file any comment.

Issues

The issues that must be resolved are the following:

1. Whether the CA erred in affirming the trial court’s judgment, even though the latter was
rendered prematurely because: a) the judgment was rendered without waiting for the
Supreme Court’s final resolution of her certiorari petition, i.e., G.R. No. 126603; b) she
has not yet filed her answer and thus was denied due process; and c) the public
prosecutor did not even conduct an investigation whether there was collusion;

2. Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano was bigamous;
and

3. Whether Zorayda and Adib have the legal standing to have Estrellita’s marriage
declared void ab initio.

Our Ruling

Estrellita’s refusal to file an answer eventually led to the loss of her right to answer; and
her pending petition for certiorari/review on certiorari questioning the denial of the motion
to dismiss before the higher courts does not at all suspend the trial proceedings of the
principal suit before the RTC of Quezon City.

Firstly, it can never be argued that Estrellita was deprived of her right to due process.
She was never declared in default, and she even actively participated in the trial to
defend her interest.

Estrellita invokes Judge Macias v. Macias 40 to justify the suspension of the period to file
an answer and of the proceedings in the trial court until her petition
for certiorari questioning the validity of the denial of her Motion to Dismiss has been
decided by this Court. In said case, we affirmed the following reasoning of the CA which,
apparently, is Estrellita’s basis for her argument, to wit:

However, she opted to file, on April 10, 2001, a ‘Motion to Dismiss,’ instead of filing an
Answer to the complaint. The filing of said motion suspended the period for her to file her
Answer to the complaint. Until said motion is resolved by the Respondent Court with
finality, it behooved the Respondent Court to suspend the hearings of the case on the
merits. The Respondent Court, on April 19, 2001, issued its Order denying the ‘Motion to
Dismiss’ of the Petitioner. Under Section 6, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
[now Section 4], the Petitioner had the balance of the period provided for in Rule 11 of
the said Rules but in no case less than five (5) days computed from service on her of the
aforesaid Order of the Respondent Court within which to file her Answer to the complaint:
x x x41 (Emphasis supplied.)
Estrellita obviously misappreciated Macias. All we pronounced therein is that the trial
court is mandated to suspend trial until it finally resolves the motion to dismiss that is filed
before it. Nothing in the above excerpt states that the trial court should suspend its
proceedings should the issue of the propriety or impropriety of the motion to dismiss be
raised before the appellate courts. In Macias, the trial court failed to observe due process
in the course of the proceeding of the case because after it denied the wife’s motion to
dismiss, it immediately proceeded to allow the husband to present evidence ex parte and
resolved the case with undue haste even when, under the rules of procedure, the wife
still had time to file an answer. In the instant case, Estrellita had no time left for filing an
answer, as she filed the motion to dismiss beyond the extended period earlier granted by
the trial court after she filed motions for extension of time to file an answer.

Estrellita argues that the trial court prematurely issued its judgment, as it should have
waited first for the resolution of her Motion to Dismiss before the CA and, subsequently,
before this Court. However, in upholding the RTC, the CA correctly ruled that the
pendency of a petition for certiorari does not suspend the proceedings before the trial
court. "An application for certiorari is an independent action which is not part or a
continuation of the trial which resulted in the rendition of the judgment complained
of."42 Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is explicit in stating that "[t]he petition shall not
interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent from further
proceeding in the case." 43 In fact, the trial court respected the CA’s temporary restraining
order and only after the CA rendered judgment did the RTC again require Estrellita to
present her evidence.

Notably, when the CA judgment was elevated to us by way of Rule 45, we never issued
any order precluding the trial court from proceeding with the principal action. With her
numerous requests for postponements, Estrellita remained obstinate in refusing to file an
answer or to present her evidence when it was her turn to do so, insisting that the trial
court should wait first for our decision in G.R. No. 126603. Her failure to file an answer
and her refusal to present her evidence were attributable only to herself and she should
not be allowed to benefit from her own dilatory tactics to the prejudice of the other party.
Sans her answer, the trial court correctly proceeded with the trial and rendered its
Decision after it deemed Estrellita to have waived her right to present her side of the
story. Neither should the lower court wait for the decision in G.R. No. 126603 to become
final and executory, nor should it wait for its records to be remanded back to it because
G.R. No. 126603 involves strictly the propriety of the Motion to Dismiss and not the issue
of validity of marriage.

The Public Prosecutor issued a report as

to the non-existence of collusion.

Aside from Article 48 of the Family Code and Rule 9, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court,
the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC)44 also requries the participation of the public
prosecutor in cases involving void marriages. It specifically mandates the prosecutor to
submit his investigation report to determine whether there is collusion between the
parties:

Sec. 9. Investigation report of public prosecutor.–(1) Within one month after receipt of
the court order mentioned in paragraph (3) of Section 8 above, the public prosecutor
shall submit a report to the court stating whether the parties are in collusion and serve
copies thereof on the parties and their respective counsels, if any.
(2) If the public prosecutor finds that collusion exists, he shall state the basis thereof in
his report. The parties shall file their respective comments on the finding of collusion
within ten days from receipt of a copy of the report. The court shall set the report for
hearing and if convinced that the parties are in collusion, it shall dismiss the petition.

(3) If the public prosecutor reports that no collusion exists, the court shall set the case for
pre-trial. It shall be the duty of the public prosecutor to appear for the State at the pre-
trial.

Records show that the trial court immediately directed the public prosecutor to submit the
required report,45 which we find to have been sufficiently complied with by Assistant City
Prosecutor Edgardo T. Paragua in his Manifestation dated March 30, 1995, 46 wherein he
attested that there could be no collusion between the parties and no fabrication of
evidence because Estrellita is not the spouse of any of the private respondents.

Furthermore, the lack of collusion is evident in the case at bar. Even assuming that there
is a lack of report of collusion or a lack of participation by the public prosecutor, just as
we held in Tuason v. Court of Appeals, 47 the lack of participation of a fiscal does not
invalidate the proceedings in the trial court:

The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage and legal
separation proceedings is to determine whether collusion exists between the parties and
to take care that the evidence is not suppressed or fabricated. Petitioner's vehement
opposition to the annulment proceedings negates the conclusion that collusion existed
between the parties. There is no allegation by the petitioner that evidence was
suppressed or fabricated by any of the parties. Under these circumstances, we are
convinced that the non-intervention of a prosecuting attorney to assure lack of collusion
between the contending parties is not fatal to the validity of the proceedings in the trial
court.48

The Civil Code governs the marriage of Zorayda and the late Sen. Tamano; their
marriage was never invalidated by PD 1083. Sen. Tamano’s subsequent marriage to
Estrellita is void ab initio.

The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958,
solemnized under civil and Muslim rites. 49 The only law in force governing marriage
relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under
the provisions of which only one marriage can exist at any given time. 50 Under the
marriage provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is not recognized except during the
effectivity of Republic Act No. 39451 which was not availed of during its effectivity.

As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamano’s prior marriage to Zorayda has been
severed by way of divorce under PD 1083, 52 the law that codified Muslim personal laws.
However, PD 1083 cannot benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides that the
law applies to "marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only
the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim
law or this Code in any part of the Philippines." But we already ruled in G.R. No. 126603
that "Article 13 of PD 1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties were
married both in civil and Muslim rites."53

Moreover, the Muslim Code took effect only on February 4, 1977, and this law cannot
retroactively override the Civil Code which already bestowed certain rights on the
marriage of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda. The former explicitly provided for the prospective
application of its provisions unless otherwise provided:
Art. 186 (1). Effect of code on past acts. —Acts executed prior to the effectivity of this
Code shall be governed by the laws in force at the time of their execution, and nothing
herein except as otherwise specifically provided, shall affect their validity or legality or
operate to extinguish any right acquired or liability incurred thereby.

It has been held that:

The foregoing provisions are consistent with the principle that all laws operate
prospectively, unless the contrary appears or is clearly, plainly and unequivocably
expressed or necessarily implied; accordingly, every case of doubt will be resolved
against the retroactive operation of laws. Article 186 aforecited enunciates the general
rule of the Muslim Code to have its provisions applied prospectively, and implicitly
upholds the force and effect of a pre-existing body of law, specifically, the Civil Code – in
respect of civil acts that took place before the Muslim Code’s enactment. 54

An instance of retroactive application of the Muslim Code is Article 186(2) which states:

A marriage contracted by a Muslim male prior to the effectivity of this Code in accordance
with non-Muslim law shall be considered as one contracted under Muslim law provided
the spouses register their mutual desire to this effect.

Even granting that there was registration of mutual consent for the marriage to be
considered as one contracted under the Muslim law, the registration of mutual consent
between Zorayda and Sen. Tamano will still be ineffective, as both are Muslims whose
marriage was celebrated under both civil and Muslim laws. Besides, as we have already
settled, the Civil Code governs their personal status since this was in effect at the time of
the celebration of their marriage. In view of Sen. Tamano’s prior marriage which
subsisted at the time Estrellita married him, their subsequent marriage is correctly
adjudged by the CA as void ab initio.

Zorayda and Adib, as the injured parties, have the legal personalities to file the
declaration of nullity of marriage. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which limits to only the husband
or the wife the filing of a petition for nullity is prospective in application and does not shut
out the prior spouse from filing suit if the ground is a bigamous subsequent marriage.

Her marriage covered by the Family Code of the Philippines, 55 Estrellita relies on A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003 claiming that under Section
2(a)56 thereof, only the husband or the wife, to the exclusion of others, may file a petition
for declaration of absolute nullity, therefore only she and Sen. Tamano may directly
attack the validity of their own marriage.

Estrellita claims that only the husband or the wife in a void marriage can file a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage. However, this interpretation does not apply if the reason
behind the petition is bigamy.

In explaining why under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC only the spouses may file the petition to
the exclusion of compulsory or intestate heirs, we said:

The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of

Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders explicates
on Section 2(a) in the following manner, viz:

(1) Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for annulment of voidable
marriages and declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petitions cannot be
filed by the compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. [Section 2;
Section 3, paragraph a]

Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable
marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be
filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of
the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate
heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and hence can
only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular
courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to
seek its dissolution.57

Note that the Rationale makes it clear that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to
the "aggrieved or injured spouse." If Estrellita’s interpretation is employed, the prior
spouse is unjustly precluded from filing an action. Surely, this is not what the Rule
contemplated.

The subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only
discovered during the connubial period that the marriage was bigamous, and especially if
the conjugal bliss had already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit
from the bigamous marriage, it would not be expected that they would file an action to
declare the marriage void and thus, in such circumstance, the "injured spouse" who
should be given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting previous marriage. The latter is
clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and
the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an
emotional burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be a
reminder of the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which
sanctity is protected by the Constitution.

Indeed, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC precludes the son from impugning the
subsequent marriage.  But in the case at bar, both Zorayda and Adib have legal
1âwphi1

personalities to file an action for nullity. Albeit the Supreme Court Resolution governs
marriages celebrated under the Family Code, such is prospective in application and does
not apply to cases already commenced before March 15, 2003. 58

Zorayda and Adib filed the case for declaration of nullity of Estrellita’s marriage in
November 1994. While the Family Code is silent with respect to the proper party who can
file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage prior to A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, it has
been held that in a void marriage, in which no marriage has taken place and cannot be
the source of rights, any interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally
without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the
marriage.59 Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply, Adib, as one of the children of
the deceased who has property rights as an heir, is likewise considered to be the real
party in interest in the suit he and his mother had filed since both of them stand to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit.60

Since our Philippine laws protect the marital union of a couple, they should be interpreted
in a way that would preserve their respective rights which include striking down bigamous
marriages. We thus find the CA Decision correctly rendered.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed August 17, 2004 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 61762, as well as its subsequent Resolution issued
on September 13, 2005, are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 196049               June 26, 2013

MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER,
vs.
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR
OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL
OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 107,
Quezon City, through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court on a pure question of law. The petition assails the Order 1 dated 31 January 2011 of
the RTC in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 and its Resolution dated 2 March 2011 denying
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC dismissed the petition for "Judicial
Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)" based on
improper venue and the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.

The Facts

Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz
Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines 2 on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit
well with petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he
resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.

In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first
marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in
Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay
allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact
Fujiki.3

Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In
2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which
declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. 4 On
14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of
Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the
Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between
Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family
Code of the Philippines; 5 and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon
City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage
between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the
Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO). 6

The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an Order
dismissing the petition and withdrawing the case from its active civil docket. 7 The RTC
cited the following provisions of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC):

Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. –

(a) Who may file. – A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be
filed solely by the husband or the wife.

xxxx

Sec. 4. Venue. – The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city
where the petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to
the date of filing, or in the case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found in
the Philippines, at the election of the petitioner. x x x

The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross violation" of the
above provisions. The trial court based its dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC which provides that "[f]ailure to comply with any of the preceding requirements
may be a ground for immediate dismissal of the petition." 8 Apparently, the RTC took the
view that only "the husband or the wife," in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file
the petition to declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki.

Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
contemplated ordinary civil actions for declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage.
Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply. A petition for recognition of foreign
judgment is a special proceeding, which "seeks to establish a status, a right or a
particular fact,"9 and not a civil action which is "for the enforcement or protection of a
right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong." 10 In other words, the petition in the RTC
sought to establish (1) the status and concomitant rights of Fujiki and Marinay as
husband and wife and (2) the fact of the rendition of the Japanese Family Court judgment
declaring the marriage between Marinay and Maekara as void on the ground of bigamy.
The petitioner contended that the Japanese judgment was consistent with Article 35(4) of
the Family Code of the Philippines 11 on bigamy and was therefore entitled to recognition
by Philippine courts.12

In any case, it was also Fujiki’s view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied only to void
marriages under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological
incapacity.13 Thus, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC provides that "a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages may be filed solely by the husband or the
wife." To apply Section 2(a) in bigamy would be absurd because only the guilty parties
would be permitted to sue. In the words of Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of course, difficult to realize
that the party interested in having a bigamous marriage declared a nullity would be the
husband in the prior, pre-existing marriage." 14 Fujiki had material interest and therefore
the personality to nullify a bigamous marriage.

Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of
the Rules of Court is applicable. Rule 108 is the "procedural implementation" of the Civil
Register Law (Act No. 3753)15 in relation to Article 413 of the Civil Code. 16 The Civil
Register Law imposes a duty on the "successful petitioner for divorce or annulment of
marriage to send a copy of the final decree of the court to the local registrar of the
municipality where the dissolved or annulled marriage was solemnized." 17 Section 2 of
Rule 108 provides that entries in the civil registry relating to "marriages," "judgments of
annulments of marriage" and "judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning"
are subject to cancellation or correction. 18 The petition in the RTC sought (among others)
to annotate the judgment of the Japanese Family Court on the certificate of marriage
between Marinay and Maekara.

Fujiki’s motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the trial court "gravely
erred" when, on its own, it dismissed the petition based on improper venue. Fujiki stated
that the RTC may be confusing the concept of venue with the concept of jurisdiction,
because it is lack of jurisdiction which allows a court to dismiss a case on its own. Fujiki
cited Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate Court 19 which held that the "trial court cannot
pre-empt the defendant’s prerogative to object to the improper laying of the venue by
motu proprio dismissing the case." 20 Moreover, petitioner alleged that the trial court
should not have "immediately dismissed" the petition under Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC because he substantially complied with the provision.

On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. In its
Resolution, the RTC stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies because the petitioner, in
effect, prays for a decree of absolute nullity of marriage. 21 The trial court reiterated its two
grounds for dismissal, i.e. lack of personality to sue and improper venue under Sections
2(a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. The RTC considered Fujiki as a "third person" 22 in
the proceeding because he "is not the husband in the decree of divorce issued by the
Japanese Family Court, which he now seeks to be judicially recognized, x x x." 23 On the
other hand, the RTC did not explain its ground of impropriety of venue. It only said that
"[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x as a ground for dismissal of this case[,] it
should be taken together with the other ground cited by the Court x x x which is Sec. 2(a)
x x x."24

The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition based on Braza v. The
City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental. 25 The Court in Braza ruled
that "[i]n a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or
Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify
marriages x x x."26 Braza emphasized that the "validity of marriages as well as legitimacy
and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper
party, and not through a collateral attack such as [a] petition [for correction of entry] x x
x."27
The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity of marriage
between Marinay and Maekara. The trial court held that this is a "jurisdictional ground" to
dismiss the petition.28 Moreover, the verification and certification against forum shopping
of the petition was not authenticated as required under Section 5 29 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC. Hence, this also warranted the "immediate dismissal" of the petition under the same
provision.

The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor General and the Letters
of Marinay and Maekara

On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on the petition for
review.30 The public respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the
Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the NSO, participated through the Office of
the Solicitor General. Instead of a comment, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation
and Motion.31

The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTC’s "pronouncement
that the petitioner failed to comply with x x x A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC x x x be set aside"
and that the case be reinstated in the trial court for further proceedings. 32 The Solicitor
General argued that Fujiki, as the spouse of the first marriage, is an injured party who
can sue to declare the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara void. The
Solicitor General cited Juliano-Llave v. Republic33 which held that Section 2(a) of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave, this Court
explained:

[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only
discovered during the connubial period that the marriage was bigamous, and especially if
the conjugal bliss had already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit
from the bigamous marriage, it would not be expected that they would file an action to
declare the marriage void and thus, in such circumstance, the "injured spouse" who
should be given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting previous marriage. The latter is
clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and
the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an
emotional burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be a
reminder of the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which
sanctity is protected by the Constitution. 34

The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court
judgment may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding. 35 In Corpuz v. Santo Tomas,36 this
Court held that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule
108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular
fact."37 While Corpuz concerned a foreign divorce decree, in the present case the
Japanese Family Court judgment also affected the civil status of the parties, especially
Marinay, who is a Filipino citizen.

The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the procedure to
record "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons" in the
civil registry as required by Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other words, "[t]he law
requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences
upon a person’s legal capacity and status x x x." 38 The Japanese Family Court judgment
directly bears on the civil status of a Filipino citizen and should therefore be proven as a
fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.

Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in assailing
a void marriage under Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De Castro39 and Niñal v.
Bayadog40 which declared that "[t]he validity of a void marriage may be collaterally
attacked."41

Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with the directive for
them to comment on the petition.42 Maekara wrote that Marinay concealed from him the
fact that she was previously married to Fujiki. 43 Maekara also denied that he inflicted any
form of violence on Marinay. 44 On the other hand, Marinay wrote that she had no reason
to oppose the petition. 45 She would like to maintain her silence for fear that anything she
say might cause misunderstanding between her and Fujiki. 46

The Issues

Petitioner raises the following legal issues:

(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment
of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.

(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a
foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.

(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding
for cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court.

The Ruling of the Court

We grant the petition.

The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a
foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic,47 this Court held that the rule in
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or
annulment of marriage "does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy." 48

I.

For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to
prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a
copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under
Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of
Court.49 Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an official
publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of the
judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the
certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine
foreign service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office. 50

To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign
judgment would mean that the trial court and the parties should follow its provisions,
including the form and contents of the petition, 51 the service of summons,52 the
investigation of the public prosecutor, 53 the setting of pre-trial, 54 the trial55 and the
judgment of the trial court. 56 This is absurd because it will litigate the case anew. It will
defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to limit repetitive litigation
on claims and issues."57 The interpretation of the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the
case on the merits. In Mijares v. Rañada,58 this Court explained that "[i]f every judgment
of a foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on
his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously concluded
litigation."59

A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition
and legal capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not
automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts
must determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other
mandatory laws.60 Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights
and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon
citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad." This is the rule of lex nationalii in
private international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for effectivity in the
Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its citizen,
over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal
capacity of such citizen.

A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require
relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under
which the foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the
status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of
another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a
fact according to the rules of evidence.

Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final
order against a person creates a "presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties
and their successors in interest by a subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules
of Court states that "the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact."
Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not
allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign judgment is
admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds external to
its merits, i.e. , "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact." The rule on limited review embodies the policy of efficiency and
the protection of party expectations,61 as well as respecting the jurisdiction of other
states.62

Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine courts have recognized foreign
divorce decrees between a Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are successfully proven
under the rules of evidence. 64 Divorce involves the dissolution of a marriage, but the
recognition of a foreign divorce decree does not involve the extended procedure under
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not have a
divorce law, Philippine courts may, however, recognize a foreign divorce decree under
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to
remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad. 65

There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese
Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the
ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court
judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are
declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a
crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence
of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and
25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
 II.

Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it
may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court
provides that "[a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a
status, a right, or a particular fact." Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a
person’s life which are recorded by the State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act
No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence such as birth, death or
marriage,66 which the State has an interest in recording. As noted by the Solicitor
General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared that "[t]he recognition of the foreign
divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special
proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the
status or right of a party or a particular fact."67

Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order or
decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil
register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating
thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil
registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)

Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court
judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy
because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same
reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of
marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of
the Japanese Family Court.

There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in
maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising
from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a
bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public record of his
marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only to
preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances 68) his most intimate human relation, but also to
protect his property interests that arise by operation of law the moment he contracts
marriage.69 These property interests in marriage include the right to be supported "in
keeping with the financial capacity of the family" 70 and preserving the property regime of
the marriage.71

Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, 72 but a
spouse’s right in a marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under Title III
("Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code. 73 A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC cannot "diminish, increase, or modify" the substantive right of the spouse to
maintain the integrity of his marriage.74 In any case, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC preserves this substantive right by limiting the personality to sue to the husband or
the wife of the union recognized by law.

Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting
marriage to question the validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On
the contrary, when Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity
of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife"75—it refers to the
husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code,
bigamous marriages are void from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous
marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the law. The husband or the wife of
the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to file a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC.

Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the
beginning, is the civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, 76 which penalizes
bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy
because any citizen has an interest in the prosecution and prevention of crimes. 77 If
anyone can file a criminal action which leads to the declaration of nullity of a bigamous
marriage,78 there is more reason to confer personality to sue on the husband or the wife
of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in the public interest of
prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also personally interested in the purely civil
aspect of protecting his marriage.

When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an
injured party and is therefore interested in the judgment of the suit. 79 Juliano-Llave ruled
that the prior spouse "is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only
threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most
of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse." 80 Being a real party in interest,
the prior spouse is entitled to sue in order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For this
purpose, he can petition a court to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the bigamous
marriage and judicially declare as a fact that such judgment is effective in the Philippines.
Once established, there should be no more impediment to cancel the entry of the
bigamous marriage in the civil registry.

III.

In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this Court
held that a "trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in a special proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. 81 Thus, the
"validity of marriage[] x x x can be questioned only in a direct action" to nullify the
marriage.82 The RTC relied on Braza in dismissing the petition for recognition of foreign
judgment as a collateral attack on the marriage between Marinay and Maekara.

Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a foreign

judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the
foreign country.

To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot
substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent
circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family
Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the
requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of
marriage,83 support pendente lite of the spouses and children, 84 the liquidation, partition
and distribution of the properties of the spouses, 85 and the investigation of the public
prosecutor to determine collusion.86 A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment
of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family
Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial
Court "where the corresponding civil registry is located." 87 In other words, a Filipino
citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of
marriage in the civil registry.

However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry
entry based on the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of
the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. There is neither circumvention of the
substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under Philippine law, nor of the
jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is
not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the
effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried
and decided under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply
in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of
the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the
jurisdiction of the foreign court.

Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect
of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the
validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code provides that "[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner
is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law." In Republic v. Orbecido,88 this Court recognized the
legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article 26 which is "to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse" 89 under the laws of his or
her country. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only authorizes
Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the
Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits
because it is tantamount to trying a case for divorce.

The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the anomaly
that results from a marriage between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow divorce, and a
foreign citizen, whose laws allow divorce. The anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse
being tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his
or her country. The correction is made by extending in the Philippines the effect of the
foreign divorce decree, which is already effective in the country where it was rendered.
The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is based on this Court’s decision
in Van Dorn v. Romillo90 which declared that the Filipino spouse "should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served." 91

The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino
and a foreign citizen who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the
ground of bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file a petition abroad to declare the marriage
void on the ground of bigamy. The principle in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code applies because the foreign spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying the
marriage, is capacitated to remarry under the laws of his or her country. If the foreign
judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be discriminated—
the foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot remarry.

Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are
empowered to correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage
while the foreign spouse is free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the
Family Code, Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign
judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the foreign judgment does not contravene
domestic public policy. A critical difference between the case of a foreign divorce decree
and a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for the
nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine public policy as expressed in Article
35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse
has the option to undergo full trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy available to him or her.
Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage, without prejudice to a criminal prosecution for bigamy.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute
their judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the
"family rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity" of the foreign
citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the
question of whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a
foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign
country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party,
under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.

For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is
inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any
alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want
of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
If there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the
judgment, Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of
the comity of nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that the foreign
judgment is already "presumptive evidence of a right between the parties." Upon
recognition of the foreign judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the judgment
serves as the basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The
recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent event
that establishes a new status, right and fact 92 that needs to be reflected in the civil
registry. Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency between the recognition of the
effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public records in the Philippines. 1âwphi1

However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is without

prejudice to prosecution for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. 93 The
recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for
extinction of criminal liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code.
Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, "[t]he term of prescription [of the
crime of bigamy] shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine
archipelago."

Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the need to
address the questions on venue and the contents and form of the petition under Sections
4 and 5, respectively, of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011 and the
Resolution dated 2 March 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in
Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court
is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition for further proceedings in accordance with this
Decision.

SO ORDERED.

Brion, Del Castillo, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

 SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 141528             October 31, 2006

OSCAR P. MALLION, petitioner,
vs.
EDITHA ALCANTARA, respondent.

DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising a
question of law: Does a previous final judgment denying a petition for declaration of
nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity bar a subsequent petition for declaration
of nullity on the ground of lack of marriage license?

The facts are not disputed:

On October 24, 1995, petitioner Oscar P. Mallion filed a petition 1 with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 29, of San Pablo City seeking a declaration of nullity of his marriage
to respondent Editha Alcantara under Article 36 of Executive Order No. 209, as
amended, otherwise known as the Family Code, citing respondent’s alleged
psychological incapacity. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. SP 4341-95. After
trial on the merits, the RTC denied the petition in a decision 2 dated November 11, 1997
upon the finding that petitioner "failed to adduce preponderant evidence to warrant the
grant of the relief he is seeking." 3 The appeal filed with the Court of Appeals was likewise
dismissed in a resolution4 dated June 11, 1998 for failure of petitioner to pay the docket
and other lawful fees within the reglementary period.

After the decision in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95 attained finality, petitioner filed on July
12, 1999 another petition 5 for declaration of nullity of marriage with the RTC of San Pablo
City, this time alleging that his marriage with respondent was null and void due to the fact
that it was celebrated without a valid marriage license. For her part, respondent filed an
answer with a motion to dismiss6 dated August 13, 1999, praying for the dismissal of the
petition on the ground of res judicata and forum shopping.

In an order7 dated October 8, 1999, the RTC granted respondent’s motion to dismiss, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, for Forum Shopping and Multiplicity of Suits, the Motion to Dismiss is
GRANTED. This case is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.8

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was also denied in an order 9 dated January 21,
2000.

Hence, this petition which alleges, as follows:

A. IN DISMISSING PETITIONER’S PETITION FOR THE DECLARATION OF HIS

MARRIAGE AS NULL AND VOID AB INITIO FOR LACK OF THE REQUISITE
MARRIAGE LICENSE BECAUSE OF (THE) DISMISSAL OF AN EARLIER PETITION
FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF THE SAME MARRIAGE ON THE GROUND OF
HIS WIFE’S PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY UNDER ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY
CODE, THE TRIAL COURT HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE WHICH
HAS PROBABLY NOT HERETOFORE BEEN DETERMINED SQUARELY AND
DEFINITIVELY BY THIS COURT, OR HAD DECIDED IT IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD
WITH LAW.

B. IN DISMISSING PETITIONER’S PETITION FOR THE DECLARATION OF NULLITY

OF HIS MARRIAGE FOR LACK OF THE REQUISITE MARRIAGE LICENSE, THE
TRIAL COURT HAD CONFUSED, DISTORTED AND MISAPPLIED THE
FUNDAMENTAL RULES AND CONCEPTS ON RES JUDICATA, SPLITTING OF A
CAUSE OF ACTION AND FORUM SHOPPING.10

Petitioner argues that while the relief prayed for in the two cases was the same, that is,
the declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent, the cause of action in the earlier
case was distinct and separate from the cause of action in the present case because the
operative facts upon which they were based as well as the evidence required to sustain
either were different. Because there is no identity as to the cause of action, petitioner
claims that res judicata does not lie to bar the second petition. In this connection,
petitioner maintains that there was no violation of the rule on forum shopping or of the
rule which proscribes the splitting of a cause of action.
On the other hand, respondent, in her comment dated May 26, 2000, counters that while
the present suit is anchored on a different ground, it still involves the same issue raised in
Civil Case No. SP 4341-95, that is, the validity of petitioner and respondent’s marriage,
and prays for the same remedy, that is, the declaration of nullity of their marriage.
Respondent thus contends that petitioner violated the rule on forum shopping. Moreover,
respondent asserts that petitioner violated the rule on multiplicity of suits as the ground
he cites in this petition could have been raised during the trial in Civil Case No. SP 4341-
95.

The petition lacks merit.

The issue before this Court is one of first impression. Should the matter of the invalidity of
a marriage due to the absence of an essential requisite prescribed by Article 4 of the
Family Code be raised in the same proceeding where the marriage is being impugned on
the ground of a party’s psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code?

Petitioner insists that because the action for declaration of nullity of marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity and the action for declaration of nullity of marriage on
the ground of absence of marriage license constitute separate causes of action, the
present case would not fall under the prohibition against splitting a single cause of action
nor would it be barred by the principle of res judicata.

The contention is untenable.

Res judicata is defined as "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a
thing or matter settled by judgment. It also refers to the rule that a final judgment or
decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the
parties or their privies in all later suits on points and matters determined in the former
suit."11

This doctrine is a rule which pervades every well-regulated system of jurisprudence and
is founded upon the following precepts of common law, namely: (1) public policy and
necessity, which makes it to the interest of the State that there should be an end to
litigation, and (2) the hardship on the individual that he should be vexed twice for the
same cause. A contrary doctrine would subject the public peace and quiet to the will and
neglect of individuals and prefer the gratification of the litigious disposition on the part of
suitors to the preservation of the public tranquility and happiness.12

In this jurisdiction, the concept of res judicata is embodied in Section 47 (b) and (c) of
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, thus:

SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. — The effect of a judgment or final order
rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or
final order, may be as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment or final order against a specific thing or in respect to the
probate of a will, or the administration of the estate of a deceased person, or in respect to
the personal, political, or legal condition or status of a particular person or his relationship
to another, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title to the thing, the will or
administration, or the condition, status or relationship of the person; however, the probate
of a will or granting of letters of administration shall only be prima facie evidence of the
death of the testator or intestate;

(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly
adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto,
conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent
to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same
thing and under the same title and in the same capacity; and,

(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest,
that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order
which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and
necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.

The above provision outlines the dual aspect of res judicata.13 Section 47 (b) pertains to it
in its concept as "bar by prior judgment" or "estoppel by verdict," which is the effect of a
judgment as a bar to the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand
or cause of action. On the other hand, Section 47 (c) pertains to res judicata in its
concept as "conclusiveness of judgment" or otherwise known as the rule of auter action
pendant which ordains that issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot
again be raised in any future case between the same parties involving a different cause
of action.14 Res judicata in its concept as a bar by prior judgment obtains in the present
case.

Res judicata in this sense requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) the
former judgment is final; (2) it is rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; (3) it is a judgment or an order on the merits; and (4) there is --
between the first and the second actions -- identity of parties, of subject matter, and of
causes of action.15

Petitioner does not dispute the existence of the first three requisites. What is in issue is
the presence of the fourth requisite. In this regard, the test to determine whether the
causes of action are identical is to ascertain whether the same evidence will sustain both
actions, or whether there is an identity in the facts essential to the maintenance of the
two actions. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the two actions are
considered the same, and a judgment in the first case is a bar to the subsequent action. 16

Based on this test, petitioner would contend that the two petitions brought by him seeking
the declaration of nullity of his marriage are anchored on separate causes of action for
the evidence necessary to sustain the first petition which was anchored on the alleged
psychological incapacity of respondent is different from the evidence necessary to
sustain the present petition which is anchored on the purported absence of a marriage
license.

Petitioner, however, forgets that he is simply invoking different grounds for the same
cause of action. By definition, a cause of action is the act or omission by which a party
violates the right of another. 17 In both petitions, petitioner has the same cause - the
declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent. What differs is the ground upon which
the cause of action is predicated. These grounds cited by petitioner essentially split the
various aspects of the pivotal issue that holds the key to the resolution of this
controversy, that is, the actual status of petitioner and respondent’s marriage.

Furthermore, the instant case is premised on the claim that the marriage is null and void
because no valid celebration of the same took place due to the alleged lack of a marriage
license. In Civil Case No. SP 4341-95, however, petitioner impliedly conceded that the
marriage had been solemnized and celebrated in accordance with law. Petitioner is now
bound by this admission. The alleged absence of a marriage license which petitioner
raises now could have been presented and heard in the earlier case. Suffice it to state
that parties are bound not only as regards every matter offered and received to sustain or
defeat their claims or demand but as to any other admissible matter which might have
been offered for that purpose and of all other matters that could have been adjudged in
that case.18
It must be emphasized that a party cannot evade or avoid the application of res
judicata by simply varying the form of his action or adopting a different method of
presenting his case. 19 As this Court stated in Perez v. Court of Appeals:20

x x x the statement of a different form of liability is not a different cause of action,

provided it grows out of the same transaction or act and seeks redress for the wrong.
Two actions are not necessarily for different causes of action simply because the theory
of the second would not have been open under the pleadings in the first. A party cannot
preserve the right to bring a second action after the loss of the first merely by having
circumscribed and limited theories of recovery opened by the pleadings in the first.

It bears stressing that a party cannot divide the grounds for recovery. A plaintiff is
mandated to place in issue in his pleading, all the issues existing when the suit
began. A lawsuit cannot be tried piecemeal. The plaintiff is bound to set forth in his
first action every ground for relief which he claims to exist and upon which he
relied, and cannot be permitted to rely upon them by piecemeal in successive
action to recover for the same wrong or injury.

A party seeking to enforce a claim, legal or equitable, must present to the court,
either by the pleadings or proofs, or both, on the grounds upon which to expect a
judgment in his favor. He is not at liberty to split up his demands, and prosecute it
by piecemeal or present only a portion of the grounds upon which a special relief
is sought and leave the rest to the presentment in a second suit if the first fails.
There would be no end to litigation if such piecemeal presentation is
allowed. (Citations omitted.)

In sum, litigants are provided with the options on the course of action to take in order to
obtain judicial relief. Once an option has been taken and a case is filed in court, the
parties must ventilate all matters and relevant issues therein. The losing party who files
another action regarding the same controversy will be needlessly squandering time, effort
and financial resources because he is barred by law from litigating the same controversy
all over again.21

Therefore, having expressly and impliedly conceded the validity of their marriage
celebration, petitioner is now deemed to have waived any defects therein. For this
reason, the Court finds that the present action for declaration of nullity of marriage on the
ground of lack of marriage license is barred by the decision dated November 11, 1997 of
the RTC, Branch 29, of San Pablo City, in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, J., Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Garcia, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995

LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-
SANTOS, respondents.

VITUG, J.:

Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most likely, controversial provision introduced by
the Family Code is Article 36 (as amended by E.O. No. 227 dated 17 July 1987), which
declares:

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.

The present petition for review on certiorari, at the instance of Leouel Santos ("Leouel"),
brings into fore the above provision which is now invoked by him. Undaunted by the
decisions of the court a quo  and the Court of Appeal,  Leouel persists in beseeching its
1 2

application in his attempt to have his marriage with herein private respondent, Julia
Rosario Bedia-Santos ("Julia"), declared a nullity.

It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the rank of First Lieutenant in the
Philippine Army, first met Julia. The meeting later proved to be an eventful day for Leouel
and Julia. On 20 September 1986, the two exchanged vows before Municipal Trial Court
Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed, shortly thereafter, by a church wedding.
Leouel and Julia lived with the latter's parents at the J. Bedia Compound, La Paz, Iloilo
City. On 18 July 1987, Julia gave birth to a baby boy, and he was christened Leouel
Santos, Jr. The ecstasy, however, did not last long. It was bound to happen, Leouel
averred, because of the frequent interference by Julia's parents into the young spouses
family affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start a "quarrel" over a number of
other things, like when and where the couple should start living independently from
Julia's parents or whenever Julia would express resentment on Leouel's spending a few
days with his own parents.

On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to work as a nurse
despite Leouel's pleas to so dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, or on 01
January 1989, Julia called up Leouel for the first time by long distance telephone. She
promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never did.
When Leouel got a chance to visit the United States, where he underwent a training
program under the auspices of the Armed Forces of the Philippines from 01 April up to 25
August 1990, he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in touch with, Julia but all
his efforts were of no avail.

Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed with the regional trial
Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 30, a complaint for "Voiding of marriage Under Article
36 of the Family Code" (docketed, Civil Case No. 9814). Summons was served by
publication in a newspaper of general circulation in Negros Oriental.

On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer (through counsel), opposed the
complaint and denied its allegations, claiming, in main, that it was the petitioner who had,
in fact, been irresponsible and incompetent.

A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of nullity of their marriage
was ruled out by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (in its report to the court).

On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences had repeatedly been

set, albeit unsuccessfully, by the court, Julia ultimately filed a manifestation, stating that
she would neither appear nor submit evidence.

On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. 3

Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeal. The latter affirmed the decision of the trial court. 4

The petition should be denied not only because of its non-compliance with Circular 28-
91, which requires a certification of non-shopping, but also for its lack of merit.

Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate
with him, for more than five years are circumstances that clearly show her being
psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life. In his own words, Leouel asserts:

. . . (T)here is no leave, there is no affection for (him) because respondent Julia Rosario
Bedia-Santos failed all these years to communicate with the petitioner. A wife who does
not care to inform her husband about her whereabouts for a period of five years, more or
less, is psychologically incapacitated.

The family Code did not define the term "psychological incapacity." The deliberations
during the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee, which has drafted the Code,
can, however, provide an insight on the import of the provision.

Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

xxx xxx xxx

Art. 36. . . .

(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of
marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential
marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.

On subparagraph (7), which as lifted from the Canon Law, Justice (Jose B.L.) Reyes
suggested that they say "wanting in sufficient use," but Justice (Eduardo) Caguioa
preferred to say "wanting in the sufficient use." On the other hand, Justice Reyes
proposed that they say "wanting in sufficient reason." Justice Caguioa, however, pointed
out that the idea is that one is not lacking in judgment but that he is lacking in the
exercise of judgment. He added that lack of judgment would make the marriage voidable.
Judge (Alicia Sempio-) Diy remarked that lack of judgment is more serious than
insufficient use of judgment and yet the latter would make the marriage null and void and
the former only voidable. Justice Caguioa suggested that subparagraph (7) be modified
to read:

"That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack of
incapacity is made manifest after the celebration."

Justice Caguioa explained that the phrase "was wanting in sufficient use of reason of
judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage" refers to defects in the mental
faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea in subparagraph (7), but lack of
appreciation of one's marital obligations.

Judge Diy raised the question: Since "insanity" is also a psychological or mental
incapacity, why is "insanity" only a ground for annulment and not for declaration or
nullity? In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that in insanity, there is the appearance of
consent, which is the reason why it is a ground for voidable marriages, while
subparagraph (7) does not refer to consent but to the very essence of marital obligations.

Prof. (Araceli) Baviera suggested that, in subparagraph (7), the word "mentally" be
deleted, with which Justice Caguioa concurred. Judge Diy, however, prefers to retain the
word "mentally."

Justice Caguioa remarked that subparagraph (7) refers to psychological impotence.

Justice (Ricardo) Puno stated that sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent
with one but not with another. Justice (Leonor Ines-) Luciano said that it is called
selective impotency.

Dean (Fortunato) Gupit stated that the confusion lies in the fact that in inserting the
Canon Law annulment in the Family Code, the Committee used a language which
describes a ground for voidable marriages under the Civil Code. Justice Caguioa added
that in Canon Law, there are voidable marriages under the Canon Law, there are no
voidable marriages Dean Gupit said that this is precisely the reason why they should
make a distinction.

Justice Puno remarked that in Canon Law, the defects in marriage cannot be cured.

Justice Reyes pointed out that the problem is: Why is "insanity" a ground for void ab
initio marriages? In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that insanity is curable and there are
lucid intervals, while psychological incapacity is not.

On another point, Justice Puno suggested that the phrase "even if such lack or incapacity
is made manifest" be modified to read "even if such lack or incapacity becomes
manifest."

Justice Reyes remarked that in insanity, at the time of the marriage, it is not apparent.

Justice Caguioa stated that there are two interpretations of the phrase "psychological or
mentally incapacitated" — in the first one, there is vitiation of consent because one does
not know all the consequences of the marriages, and if he had known these completely,
he might not have consented to the marriage.

xxx xxx xxx

Prof. Bautista stated that he is in favor of making psychological incapacity a ground for
voidable marriages since otherwise it will encourage one who really understood the
consequences of marriage to claim that he did not and to make excuses for invalidating
the marriage by acting as if he did not understand the obligations of marriage. Dean
Gupit added that it is a loose way of providing for divorce.

xxx xxx xxx

Justice Caguioa explained that his point is that in the case of incapacity by reason of
defects in the mental faculties, which is less than insanity, there is a defect in consent
and, therefore, it is clear that it should be a ground for voidable marriage because there
is the appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the simple reason that
there are lucid intervals and there are cases when the insanity is curable. He emphasized
that psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to do with
consent; it refers to obligations attendant to marriage.

xxx xxx xxx

On psychological incapacity, Prof. (Flerida Ruth P.) Romero inquired if they do not
consider it as going to the very essence of consent. She asked if they are really removing
it from consent. In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that, ultimately, consent in general is
effected but he stressed that his point is that it is not principally a vitiation of consent
since there is a valid consent. He objected to the lumping together of the validity of the
marriage celebration and the obligations attendant to marriage, which are completely
different from each other, because they require a different capacity, which is eighteen
years of age, for marriage but in contract, it is different. Justice Puno, however, felt that
psychological incapacity is still a kind of vice of consent and that it should not be
classified as a voidable marriage which is incapable of convalidation; it should be
convalidated but there should be no prescription. In other words, as long as the defect
has not been cured, there is always a right to annul the marriage and if the defect has
been really cured, it should be a defense in the action for annulment so that when the
action for annulment is instituted, the issue can be raised that actually, although one
might have been psychologically incapacitated, at the time the action is brought, it is no
longer true that he has no concept of the consequence of marriage.

Prof. (Esteban) Bautista raised the question: Will not cohabitation be a defense? In
response, Justice Puno stated that even the bearing of children and cohabitation should
not be a sign that psychological incapacity has been cured.

Prof. Romero opined that psychological incapacity is still insanity of a lesser degree.
Justice Luciano suggested that they invite a psychiatrist, who is the expert on this matter.
Justice Caguioa, however, reiterated that psychological incapacity is not a defect in the
mind but in the understanding of the consequences of marriage, and therefore, a
psychiatrist will not be a help.

Prof. Bautista stated that, in the same manner that there is a lucid interval in insanity,
there are also momentary periods when there is an understanding of the consequences
of marriage. Justice Reyes and Dean Gupit remarked that the ground of psychological
incapacity will not apply if the marriage was contracted at the time when there is
understanding of the consequences of marriage. 5

xxx xxx xxx

Judge Diy proposed that they include physical incapacity to copulate among the grounds
for void marriages. Justice Reyes commented that in some instances the impotence that
in some instances the impotence is only temporary and only with respect to a particular
person. Judge Diy stated that they can specify that it is incurable. Justice Caguioa
remarked that the term "incurable" has a different meaning in law and in medicine. Judge
Diy stated that "psychological incapacity" can also be cured. Justice Caguioa, however,
pointed out that "psychological incapacity" is incurable.

Justice Puno observed that under the present draft provision, it is enough to show that at
the time of the celebration of the marriage, one was psychologically incapacitated so that
later on if already he can comply with the essential marital obligations, the marriage is
still void ab initio. Justice Caguioa explained that since in divorce, the psychological
incapacity may occur after the marriage, in void marriages, it has to be at the time of the
celebration of marriage. He, however, stressed that the idea in the provision is that at the
time of the celebration of the marriage, one is psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations, which incapacity continues and later becomes
manifest.

Justice Puno and Judge Diy, however, pointed out that it is possible that after the
marriage, one's psychological incapacity become manifest but later on he is cured.
Justice Reyes and Justice Caguioa opined that the remedy in this case is to allow him to
remarry.6

xxx xxx xxx

Justice Puno formulated the next Article as follows:

Art. 37. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated, to comply with the essential obligations of marriage shall
likewise be void from the beginning even if such incapacity becomes manifest after its
solemnization.
Justice Caguioa suggested that "even if" be substituted with "although." On the other
hand, Prof. Bautista proposed that the clause "although such incapacity becomes
manifest after its solemnization" be deleted since it may encourage one to create the
manifestation of psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa pointed out that, as in other
provisions, they cannot argue on the basis of abuse.

Judge Diy suggested that they also include mental and physical incapacities, which are
lesser in degree than psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa explained that mental
and physical incapacities are vices of consent while psychological incapacity is not a
species of vice or consent.

Dean Gupit read what Bishop Cruz said on the matter in the minutes of their February 9,
1984 meeting:

"On the third ground, Bishop Cruz indicated that the phrase "psychological or mental
impotence" is an invention of some churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that
is why it is considered a weak phrase. He said that the Code of Canon Law would rather
express it as "psychological or mental incapacity to discharge . . ."

Justice Caguioa remarked that they deleted the word "mental" precisely to distinguish it
from vice of consent. He explained that "psychological incapacity" refers to lack of
understanding of the essential obligations of marriage.

Justice Puno reminded the members that, at the last meeting, they have decided not to
go into the classification of "psychological incapacity" because there was a lot of debate
on it and that this is precisely the reason why they classified it as a special case.

At this point, Justice Puno, remarked that, since there having been annulments of
marriages arising from psychological incapacity, Civil Law should not reconcile with
Canon Law because it is a new ground even under Canon Law.

Prof. Romero raised the question: With this common provision in Civil Law and in Canon
Law, are they going to have a provision in the Family Code to the effect that marriages
annulled or declared void by the church on the ground of psychological incapacity is
automatically annulled in Civil Law? The other members replied negatively.

Justice Puno and Prof. Romero inquired if Article 37 should be retroactive or prospective
in application.

Justice Diy opined that she was for its retroactivity because it is their answer to the
problem of church annulments of marriages, which are still valid under the Civil Law. On
the other hand, Justice Reyes and Justice Puno were concerned about the avalanche of
cases.

Dean Gupit suggested that they put the issue to a vote, which the Committee approved.

The members voted as follows:

(1) Justice Reyes, Justice Puno and Prof. Romero were for prospectivity.

(2) Justice Caguioa, Judge Diy, Dean Gupit, Prof. Bautista and Director Eufemio were for
retroactivity.

(3) Prof. Baviera abstained.

Justice Caguioa suggested that they put in the prescriptive period of ten years within
which the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage should be filed in court. The
Committee approved the suggestion. 7

It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision Committee in ultimately deciding
to adopt the provision with less specificity than expected, has in fact, so designed the law
as to allow some resiliency in its application. Mme. Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a
member of the Code Committee, has been quoted by Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo
in Salita vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R. No. 106429, 13 June 1994); thus: 8

The Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that the
giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis. Rather, the Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision
on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not
binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken
from Canon Law.

A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law,  which9

reads:

Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:

1. who lack sufficient use of reason;

2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning essentila

matrimonial rights and duties, to be given and accepted mutually;

3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential obligations
of marriage. (Emphasis supplied.)

Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all that persuasive for having no
juridical or secular effect, the jurisprudence under Canon Law prevailing at the time of the
code's enactment, nevertheless, cannot be dismissed as impertinent for its value as an
aid, at least, to the interpretation or construction of the codal provision.

One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his treaties,   giving an account on how the third
10

paragraph of Canon 1095 has been framed, states:

The history of the drafting of this canon does not leave any doubt that the legislator
intended, indeed, to broaden the rule. A strict and narrow norm was proposed first:

Those who cannot assume the essential obligations of marriage because of a grave
psycho-sexual anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam psychosexualem) are unable to contract
marriage (cf. SCH/1975, canon 297, a new canon, novus);

then a broader one followed:

. . . because of a grave psychological anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam psychicam) . . .

(cf. SCH/1980, canon 1049);

then the same wording was retained in the text submitted to the pope (cf. SCH/1982,
canon 1095, 3);

finally, a new version was promulgated:

because of causes of a psychological nature (ob causas naturae psychiae).

So the progress was from psycho-sexual to psychological anomaly, then the term
anomaly was altogether eliminated. it would be, however, incorrect to draw the
conclusion that the cause of the incapacity need not be some kind of psychological
disorder; after all, normal and healthy person should be able to assume the ordinary
obligations of marriage.

Fr. Orsy concedes that the term "psychological incapacity" defies any precise definition
since psychological causes can be of an infinite variety.

In a book, entitled "Canons and Commentaries on Marriage," written by Ignatius

Gramunt, Javier Hervada and LeRoy Wauck, the following explanation appears:

This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the

essentials of marriage. Some psychosexual disorders and other disorders of personality
can be the psychic cause of this defect, which is here described in legal terms. This
particular type of incapacity consists of a real inability to render what is due by the
contract. This could be compared to the incapacity of a farmer to enter a binding contract
to deliver the crops which he cannot possibly reap; (b) this inability to commit oneself
must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life
and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring; (c) the
inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. The mere difficulty of
assuming these obligations, which could be overcome by normal effort, obviously does
not constitute incapacity. The canon contemplates a true psychological disorder which
incapacitates a person from giving what is due (cf. John Paul II, Address to R. Rota, Feb.
5, 1987). However, if the marriage is to be declared invalid under this incapacity, it must
be proved not only that the person is afflicted by a psychological defect, but that the
defect did in fact deprive the person, at the moment of giving consent, of the ability to
assume the essential duties of marriage and consequently of the possibility of being
bound by these duties.

Justice Sempio-Diy   cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former
11

Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of

Manila (Branch 1), who opines that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or
serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties
required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be
incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved.

It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most
importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the use
of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant
to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some
ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances
(cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's "Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and their
Parallels in Canon Law," quoting from the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorder by the American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's "Handbook II for
Marriage Nullity Cases"). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed
independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on
marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their
mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance
to the marriage. This pschologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the
spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54
of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of
nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."

The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a
party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to
Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcholism, lesbianism or
homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for
legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code,
however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being
themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of
psychological incapacity.

Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance
that may have some bearing on the degree, extent, and other conditions of that
incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no
precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered
opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with expertise in psychological
disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.

Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We should continue to be

reminded that innate in our society, then enshrined in our Civil Code, and even now still
indelible in Article 1 of the Family Code, is that —

Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man a woman

entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is
the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except
that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the
limits provided by this Code. (Emphasis supplied.)

Our Constitution is no less emphatic:

Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation.
Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.

Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and
shall be protected by the State. (Article XV, 1987 Constitution).

The above provisions express so well and so distinctly the basic nucleus of our laws on
marriage and the family, and they are doubt the tenets we still hold on to.

The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close to the
standards required to decree a nullity of marriage. Undeniably and understandably,
Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither
law nor society itself can always provide all the specific answers to every individual
problem.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno
Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

It is difficult to dissent from a well-written and studied opinion as Mr. Justice

Vitug's ponencia. But, after an extended reflection on the facts of this case, I cannot see
my way clear into holding, as the majority do, that there is no ground for the declaration
of nullity of the marriage between petitioner and private respondent.

To my mind, it is clear that private respondent has been shown to be psychologically

incapacitated to comply with at least one essential marital obligation, i.e. that of living and
cohabiting with her husband, herein petitioner. On the other hand, it has not been shown
that petitioner does not deserve to live and cohabit with his wife, herein private
respondent.

There appears to be no disagreement that the term "psychological incapacity" defies

precision in definition. But, as used in Article 36 of the Family Code as a ground for the
declaration of nullity of a marriage, the intent of the framers of the Code is evidently to
expand and liberalize the grounds for nullifying a marriage, as well pointed out by Madam
Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero in her separate opinion in this case.

While it is true that the board term "psychological incapacity" can open the doors to
abuse by couples who may wish to have an easy way out of their marriage, there are,
however, enough safeguards against this contingency, among which, is the intervention
by the State, through the public prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the
parties and/or fabrication of evidence.

In their case at bench, it has been abundantly established that private respondent Julia
Rosario Bedia-Santos exhibits specific behavior which, to my mind, shows that she is
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her essential marital obligations, to writ:

a. It took her seven (7) months after she left for the United States to call up her husband.

b. Julia promised to return home after her job contract expired in July 1989, but she
never did and neither is there any showing that she informed her husband (herein
petitioner) of her whereabouts in the U.S.A.

c. When petitioner went to the United States on a mission for the Philippine Army, he
exerted efforts to "touch base" with Julia; there were no similar efforts on the part of Julia;
there were no similar efforts on the part of Julia to do the same.
d. When petitioner filed this suit, more than five (5) years had elapsed, without Julia
indicating her plans to rejoin the petitioner or her whereabouts.

e. When petitioner filed this case in the trial court, Julia, in her answer, claimed that it is
the former who has been irresponsible and incompetent.

f. During the trial, Julia waived her right to appear and submit evidence.

A spouse's obligation to live and cohabit with his/her partner in marriage is a basic
ground rule in marriage, unless there are overpowering compelling reasons such as, for
instance, an incurable contagious disease on the part of a spouse or cruelty of one
partner, bordering on insanity. There may also be instances when, for economic and
practical reasons, husband and wife have to live separately, but the marital bond
between the spouses always remains. Mutual love and respect for each other would, in
such cases, compel the absent spouse to at least have regular contracts with the other to
inform the latter of his/her condition and whereabouts.

In the present case, it is apparent that private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos has
no intention of cohabiting with petitioner, her husband, or maintaining contact with him. In
fact, her acts eloquently show that she does not want her husband to know of her
whereabouts and neither has she any intention of living and cohabiting with him.

To me there appears to be, on the part of private respondent, an unmistakeable

indication of psychological incapacity to comply with her essential marital obligations,
although these indications were made manifest after the celebration of the marriage.

It would be a great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this Court to give a much too
restrictive interpretation of the law and compel the petitioner to continue to be married to
a wife who for purposes of fulfilling her marital duties has, for all practical purposes,
ceased to exist.

Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in the ruling the Court makes
today. Is it not, in effect directly or indirectly, facilitating the transformation of petitioner
into a "habitual tryster" or one forced to maintain illicit relations with another woman or
women with emerging problems of illegitimate children, simply because he is denied by
private respondent, his wife, the companionship and conjugal love which he has sought
from her and to which he is legally entitled?

I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family Code is a sanction for absolute
divorce but I submit that we should not constrict it to non-recognition of its evident
purpose and thus deny to one like petitioner, an opportunity to turn a new leaf in his life
by declaring his marriage a nullity by reason of his wife's psychological incapacity to
perform an essential marital obligation.

I therefore vote to GRANT the petition and to DECLARE the marriage between petitioner
Leouel Santos and private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos VOID on the basis of
Article 36 of the Family Code.

ROMERO, J., concurring:

I agree under the circumstances of the case, petitioner is not entitled to have his
marriage declared a nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity of private
respondent.
However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines and the Civil Code Revision Committee of the UP Law Center, I wish to
add some observations. The letter  dated April 15, 1985 of then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-
1

Diy written in behalf of the Family Law and Civil Code Revision Committee to then
Assemblywoman Mercedes Cojuangco-Teodoro traced the background of the inclusion
of the present Article 36 in the Family Code.

During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had thought of including a chapter
on absolute divorce in the draft of a new Family Code (Book I of the Civil Code) that it
had been tasked by the IBP and the UP Law Center to prepare. In fact, some members
of the Committee were in favor of a no-fault divorce between the spouses after a number
of years of separation, legal or de-facto. Justice J.B.L. Reyes was then requested to
prepare a proposal for an action for dissolution of marriage and the effects thereof based
on two grounds: (a) five continuous years of separation between the spouses, with or
without a judicial decree of legal separation, and (b) whenever a married person would
have obtained a decree of absolute divorce in another country. Actually, such a proposal
is one for absolute divorce but called by another name. Later, even the Civil Code
Revision Committee took time to discuss the proposal of Justice Reyes on this matter.

Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision Committee and Family Law
Committee started holding joint meetings on the preparation of the draft of the New
Family Code, they agreed and formulated the definition of marriage as —

"a special contract of permanent partnership between a man and a woman entered into
in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is an inviolable
social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and
not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations
during the marriage within the limits provided by law."

With the above definition, and considering the Christian traditional concept of marriage of
the Filipino people as a permanent, inviolable, indissoluble social institution upon which
the family and society are founded, and also realizing the strong opposition that any
provision on absolute divorce would encounter from the Catholic Church and the Catholic
sector of our citizenry to whom the great majority of our people belong, the two
Committees in their joint meetings did not pursue the idea of absolute divorce and
instead opted for an action for judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage based on
grounds available in the Canon Law. It was thought that such an action would not only be
an acceptable alternative to divorce but would also solve the nagging problem of church
annulments of marriages on grounds not recognized by the civil law of the State. Justice
Reyes was thus requested to again prepare a draft of provisions on such action for
celebration of invalidity of marriage. Still later, to avoid the overlapping of provisions on
void marriages as found in the present Civil Code and those proposed by Justice Reyes
on judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage on grounds similar to the Canon Law, the
two Committees now working as a Joint Committee in the preparation of a New Family
Code decided to consolidate the present provisions on void marriages with the proposals
of Justice Reyes. The result was the inclusion of an additional kind of void marriage in
the enumeration of void marriages in the present Civil Code, to wit:

"(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of
marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential
marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration."

as well as the following implementing provisions:

"Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked or pleaded only on the basis
of a final judgment declaring the marriage void, without prejudice to the provision of
Article 34."

"Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage
shall not prescribe."

xxx xxx xxx

It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our country today may already
dissolved or annulled on the grounds proposed by the Joint Committee on declaration of
nullity as well as annulment of marriages, thus rendering an absolute divorce law
unnecessary. In fact, during a conference with Father Gerald Healy of the Ateneo
University as well as another meeting with Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the Archdiocese of
Pampanga, the Joint Committee was informed that since Vatican II, the Catholic Church
has been declaring marriages null and void on the ground of "lack of due discretion" for
causes that, in other jurisdictions, would be clear grounds for divorce, like teen-age or
premature marriages; marriage to a man who, because of some personality disorder or
disturbance, cannot support a family; the foolish or ridiculous choice of a spouse by an
otherwise perfectly normal person; marriage to a woman who refuses to cohabit with her
husband or who refuses to have children. Bishop Cruz also informed the Committee that
they have found out in tribunal work that a lot of machismo among husbands are
manifestations of their sociopathic personality anomaly, like inflicting physical violence
upon their wives, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and
psychological anomaly. . . . (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, by incorporating what is now Article 36 into the Family Code, the Revision
Committee referred to above intended to add another ground to those already listed in
the Civil Code as grounds for nullifying a marriage, thus expanding or liberalizing the
same. Inherent in the inclusion of the provision on psychological incapacity was the
understanding that every petition for declaration of nullity based on it should be treated
on a case-to-case basis; hence, the absence of a definition and an enumeration of what
constitutes psychological incapacity. Moreover, the Committee feared that the giving of
examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis. But the law requires that the same be existing at the time of marriage although it
be manifested later.

Admittedly, the provision on psychological incapacity, just like any other provision of law,
is open to abuse. To prevent this, "the court shall take order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion
between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed."  Moreover, the judge, in interpreting the provision on a case-to-case basis,
2

must be guided by "experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological

disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil
courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provisions was taken from Canon Law." 3

The constitutional and statutory provisions on the family  will remain the lodestar which
4

our society will hope to achieve ultimately. Therefore, the inclusion of Article 36 is not to
be taken as an abandonment of the ideal which we all cherish. If at all, it is a recognition
of the reality that some marriages, by reason of the incapacity of one of the contracting
parties, fall short of this ideal; thus, the parties are constrained to find a way of putting an
end to their union through some legally-accepted means.

Any criticism directed at the way that judges have interpreted the provision since its
enactment as to render it easier for unhappily-married couples to separate is addressed,
not to the wisdom of the lawmakers but to the manner by which some members of the
Bench have implemented the provision. These are not interchangeable, each being
separate and distinct from the other.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

It is difficult to dissent from a well-written and studied opinion as Mr. Justice

Vitug's ponencia. But, after an extended reflection on the facts of this case, I cannot see
my way clear into holding, as the majority do, that there is no ground for the declaration
of nullity of the marriage between petitioner and private respondent.

To my mind, it is clear that private respondent has been shown to be psychologically

incapacitated to comply with at least one essential marital obligation, i.e. that of living and
cohabiting with her husband, herein petitioner. On the other hand, it has not been shown
that petitioner does not deserve to live and cohabit with his wife, herein private
respondent.

There appears to be no disagreement that the term "psychological incapacity" defies

precision in definition. But, as used in Article 36 of the Family Code as a ground for the
declaration of nullity of a marriage, the intent of the framers of the Code is evidently to
expand and liberalize the grounds for nullifying a marriage, as well pointed out by Madam
Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero in her separate opinion in this case.

While it is true that the board term "psychological incapacity" can open the doors to
abuse by couples who may wish to have an easy way out of their marriage, there are,
however, enough safeguards against this contingency, among which, is the intervention
by the State, through the public prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the
parties and/or fabrication of evidence.

In their case at bench, it has been abundantly established that private respondent Julia
Rosario Bedia-Santos exhibits specific behavior which, to my mind, shows that she is
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her essential marital obligations, to writ:

a. It took her seven (7) months after she left for the United States to call up her husband.

b. Julia promised to return home after her job contract expired in July 1989, but she
never did and neither is there any showing that she informed her husband (herein
petitioner) of her whereabouts in the U.S.A.

c. When petitioner went to the United States on a mission for the Philippine Army, he
exerted efforts to "touch base" with Julia; there were no similar efforts on the part of Julia;
there were no similar efforts on the part of Julia to do the same.

d. When petitioner filed this suit, more than five (5) years had elapsed, without Julia
indicating her plans to rejoin the petitioner or her whereabouts.

e. When petitioner filed this case in the trial court, Julia, in her answer, claimed that it is
the former who has been irresponsible and incompetent.

f. During the trial, Julia waived her right to appear and submit evidence.
A spouse's obligation to live and cohabit with his/her partner in marriage is a basic
ground rule in marriage, unless there are overpowering compelling reasons such as, for
instance, an incurable contagious disease on the part of a spouse or cruelty of one
partner, bordering on insanity. There may also be instances when, for economic and
practical reasons, husband and wife have to live separately, but the marital bond
between the spouses always remains. Mutual love and respect for each other would, in
such cases, compel the absent spouse to at least have regular contracts with the other to
inform the latter of his/her condition and whereabouts.

In the present case, it is apparent that private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos has
no intention of cohabiting with petitioner, her husband, or maintaining contact with him. In
fact, her acts eloquently show that she does not want her husband to know of her
whereabouts and neither has she any intention of living and cohabiting with him.

To me there appears to be, on the part of private respondent, an unmistakeable

indication of psychological incapacity to comply with her essential marital obligations,
although these indications were made manifest after the celebration of the marriage.

It would be a great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this Court to give a much too
restrictive interpretation of the law and compel the petitioner to continue to be married to
a wife who for purposes of fulfilling her marital duties has, for all practical purposes,
ceased to exist.

Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in the ruling the Court makes
today. Is it not, in effect directly or indirectly, facilitating the transformation of petitioner
into a "habitual tryster" or one forced to maintain illicit relations with another woman or
women with emerging problems of illegitimate children, simply because he is denied by
private respondent, his wife, the companionship and conjugal love which he has sought
from her and to which he is legally entitled?

I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family Code is a sanction for absolute
divorce but I submit that we should not constrict it to non-recognition of its evident
purpose and thus deny to one like petitioner, an opportunity to turn a new leaf in his life
by declaring his marriage a nullity by reason of his wife's psychological incapacity to
perform an essential marital obligation.

I therefore vote to GRANT the petition and to DECLARE the marriage between petitioner
Leouel Santos and private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos VOID on the basis of
Article 36 of the Family Code.

ROMERO, J., concurring:

I agree under the circumstances of the case, petitioner is not entitled to have his
marriage declared a nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity of private
respondent.

However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines and the Civil Code Revision Committee of the UP Law Center, I wish to
add some observations. The letter  dated April 15, 1985 of then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-
1

Diy written in behalf of the Family Law and Civil Code Revision Committee to then
Assemblywoman Mercedes Cojuangco-Teodoro traced the background of the inclusion
of the present Article 36 in the Family Code.

During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had thought of including a chapter
on absolute divorce in the draft of a new Family Code (Book I of the Civil Code) that it
had been tasked by the IBP and the UP Law Center to prepare. In fact, some members
of the Committee were in favor of a no-fault divorce between the spouses after a number
of years of separation, legal or de-facto. Justice J.B.L. Reyes was then requested to
prepare a proposal for an action for dissolution of marriage and the effects thereof based
on two grounds: (a) five continuous years of separation between the spouses, with or
without a judicial decree of legal separation, and (b) whenever a married person would
have obtained a decree of absolute divorce in another country. Actually, such a proposal
is one for absolute divorce but called by another name. Later, even the Civil Code
Revision Committee took time to discuss the proposal of Justice Reyes on this matter.

Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision Committee and Family Law
Committee started holding joint meetings on the preparation of the draft of the New
Family Code, they agreed and formulated the definition of marriage as —

"a special contract of permanent partnership between a man and a woman entered into
in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is an inviolable
social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and
not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations
during the marriage within the limits provided by law."

With the above definition, and considering the Christian traditional concept of marriage of
the Filipino people as a permanent, inviolable, indissoluble social institution upon which
the family and society are founded, and also realizing the strong opposition that any
provision on absolute divorce would encounter from the Catholic Church and the Catholic
sector of our citizenry to whom the great majority of our people belong, the two
Committees in their joint meetings did not pursue the idea of absolute divorce and
instead opted for an action for judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage based on
grounds available in the Canon Law. It was thought that such an action would not only be
an acceptable alternative to divorce but would also solve the nagging problem of church
annulments of marriages on grounds not recognized by the civil law of the State. Justice
Reyes was thus requested to again prepare a draft of provisions on such action for
celebration of invalidity of marriage. Still later, to avoid the overlapping of provisions on
void marriages as found in the present Civil Code and those proposed by Justice Reyes
on judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage on grounds similar to the Canon Law, the
two Committees now working as a Joint Committee in the preparation of a New Family
Code decided to consolidate the present provisions on void marriages with the proposals
of Justice Reyes. The result was the inclusion of an additional kind of void marriage in
the enumeration of void marriages in the present Civil Code, to wit:

"(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of
marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential
marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration."

as well as the following implementing provisions:

"Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked or pleaded only on the basis
of a final judgment declaring the marriage void, without prejudice to the provision of
Article 34."

"Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage
shall not prescribe."

xxx xxx xxx

It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our country today may already
dissolved or annulled on the grounds proposed by the Joint Committee on declaration of
nullity as well as annulment of marriages, thus rendering an absolute divorce law
unnecessary. In fact, during a conference with Father Gerald Healy of the Ateneo
University as well as another meeting with Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the Archdiocese of
Pampanga, the Joint Committee was informed that since Vatican II, the Catholic Church
has been declaring marriages null and void on the ground of "lack of due discretion" for
causes that, in other jurisdictions, would be clear grounds for divorce, like teen-age or
premature marriages; marriage to a man who, because of some personality disorder or
disturbance, cannot support a family; the foolish or ridiculous choice of a spouse by an
otherwise perfectly normal person; marriage to a woman who refuses to cohabit with her
husband or who refuses to have children. Bishop Cruz also informed the Committee that
they have found out in tribunal work that a lot of machismo among husbands are
manifestations of their sociopathic personality anomaly, like inflicting physical violence
upon their wives, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and
psychological anomaly. . . . (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, by incorporating what is now Article 36 into the Family Code, the Revision
Committee referred to above intended to add another ground to those already listed in
the Civil Code as grounds for nullifying a marriage, thus expanding or liberalizing the
same. Inherent in the inclusion of the provision on psychological incapacity was the
understanding that every petition for declaration of nullity based on it should be treated
on a case-to-case basis; hence, the absence of a definition and an enumeration of what
constitutes psychological incapacity. Moreover, the Committee feared that the giving of
examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis. But the law requires that the same be existing at the time of marriage although it
be manifested later.

Admittedly, the provision on psychological incapacity, just like any other provision of law,
is open to abuse. To prevent this, "the court shall take order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion
between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed."  Moreover, the judge, in interpreting the provision on a case-to-case basis,
2

must be guided by "experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological

disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil
courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provisions was taken from Canon Law." 3

The constitutional and statutory provisions on the family  will remain the lodestar which
4

our society will hope to achieve ultimately. Therefore, the inclusion of Article 36 is not to
be taken as an abandonment of the ideal which we all cherish. If at all, it is a recognition
of the reality that some marriages, by reason of the incapacity of one of the contracting
parties, fall short of this ideal; thus, the parties are constrained to find a way of putting an
end to their union through some legally-accepted means.

Any criticism directed at the way that judges have interpreted the provision since its
enactment as to render it easier for unhappily-married couples to separate is addressed,
not to the wisdom of the lawmakers but to the manner by which some members of the
Bench have implemented the provision. These are not interchangeable, each being
separate and distinct from the other.
 THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 155800             March 10, 2006

LEONILO ANTONIO Petitioner,
vs.
MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, Respondent.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

Statistics never lie, but lovers often do, quipped a sage. This sad truth has unsettled
many a love transformed into matrimony. Any sort of deception between spouses, no
matter the gravity, is always disquieting. Deceit to the depth and breadth unveiled in the
following pages, dark and irrational as in the modern noir tale, dims any trace of certitude
on the guilty spouse’s capability to fulfill the marital obligations even more.

The Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of

Appeals dated 29 November 2001 and 24 October 2002. The Court of Appeals had
reversed the judgment3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati declaring the
marriage of Leonilo N. Antonio (petitioner) and Marie Ivonne F. Reyes (respondent), null
and void. After careful consideration, we reverse and affirm instead the trial court.
Antecedent Facts

Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years old and
respondent was 36 years of age. Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married
before a minister of the Gospel4 at the Manila City Hall, and through a subsequent church
wedding5 at the Sta. Rosa de Lima Parish, Bagong Ilog, Pasig, Metro Manila on 6
December 1990.6 Out of their union, a child was born on 19 April 1991, who sadly died
five (5) months later.

On 8 March 1993,7 petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent declared

null and void. He anchored his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging
that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage. He asserted that respondent’s incapacity existed at the time their
marriage was celebrated and still subsists up to the present. 8

As manifestations of respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed

that respondent persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation,
income, educational attainment and other events or things, 9 to wit:

(1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate son, 10 and
instead introduced the boy to petitioner as the adopted child of her family. She only
confessed the truth about the boy’s parentage when petitioner learned about it from other
sources after their marriage.11

(2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted to rape and kill
her when in fact, no such incident occurred.12

(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician, Dr. Consuelo

Gardiner, and told some of her friends that she graduated with a degree in psychology,
when she was neither.13

(4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated with Blackgold
Recording Company (Blackgold); yet, not a single member of her family ever witnessed
her alleged singing activities with the group. In the same vein, she postulated that a
luncheon show was held at the Philippine Village Hotel in her honor and even presented
an invitation to that effect 14 but petitioner discovered per certification by the Director of
Sales of said hotel that no such occasion had taken place. 15

(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and under those
names, sent lengthy letters to petitioner claiming to be from Blackgold and touting her as
the "number one moneymaker" in the commercial industry worth P2 million.16 Petitioner
later found out that respondent herself was the one who wrote and sent the letters to him
when she admitted the truth in one of their quarrels. 17 He likewise realized that Babes
Santos and Via Marquez were only figments of her imagination when he discovered they
were not known in or connected with Blackgold. 18

(6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she altered her payslip
to make it appear that she earned a higher income. She bought a sala set from a public
market but told petitioner that she acquired it from a famous furniture dealer. 19 She spent
lavishly on unnecessary items and ended up borrowing money from other people on false
pretexts.20

(7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of calling up his
officemates to monitor his whereabouts. When he could no longer take her unusual
behavior, he separated from her in August 1991. He tried to attempt a reconciliation but
since her behavior did not change, he finally left her for good in November 1991. 21
In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante Herrera Abcede (Dr. Abcede), a
psychiatrist, and Dr. Arnulfo V.

Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the tests they
conducted, that petitioner was essentially a normal, introspective, shy and conservative
type of person. On the other hand, they observed that respondent’s persistent and
constant lying

to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It undermined the basic relationship that

should be based on love, trust and respect. 22 They further asserted that respondent’s
extreme jealousy was also pathological. It reached the point of paranoia since there was
no actual basis for her to suspect that petitioner was having an affair with another
woman. They concluded based on the foregoing that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations. 23

In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that she performed her marital obligations
by attending to all the needs of her husband. She asserted that there was no truth to the
allegation that she fabricated stories, told lies and invented personalities. 24 She presented
her version, thus:

(1) She concealed her child by another man from petitioner because she was afraid of
losing her husband.25

(2) She told petitioner about David’s attempt to rape and kill her because she surmised
such intent from David’s act of touching her back and ogling her from head to foot. 26

(3) She was actually a BS Banking and Finance graduate and had been teaching
psychology at the Pasig Catholic School for two (2) years.27

(4) She was a free-lance voice talent of Aris de las Alas, an executive producer of
Channel 9 and she had done three (3) commercials with McCann Erickson for the
advertisement of Coca-cola, Johnson & Johnson, and Traders Royal Bank. She told
petitioner she was a Blackgold recording artist although she was not under contract with
the company, yet she reported to the Blackgold office after office hours. She claimed that
a luncheon show was indeed held in her honor at the Philippine Village Hotel on 8
December 1979.28

(5) She vowed that the letters sent to petitioner were not written by her and the writers
thereof were not fictitious. Bea Marquez Recto of the Recto political clan was a resident
of the United States while Babes Santos was employed with Saniwares. 29

(6) She admitted that she called up an officemate of her husband but averred that she
merely asked the latter in a diplomatic matter if she was the one asking for chocolates
from petitioner, and not to monitor her husband’s whereabouts. 30

(7) She belied the allegation that she spent lavishly as she supported almost ten people
from her monthly budget of P7,000.00.31

In fine, respondent argued that apart from her non-disclosure of a child prior to their
marriage, the other lies attributed to her by petitioner were mostly hearsay and
unconvincing. Her stance was that the totality of the evidence presented is not sufficient
for a finding of psychological incapacity on her part. 32

In addition, respondent presented Dr. Antonio Efren Reyes (Dr. Reyes), a psychiatrist, to
refute the allegations anent her psychological condition. Dr. Reyes testified that the
series of tests conducted by his assistant, 33 together with the screening procedures and
the Comprehensive Psycho-Pathological Rating Scale (CPRS) he himself conducted, led
him to conclude that respondent was not psychologically incapacitated to perform the
essential marital obligations. He postulated that regressive behavior, gross neuroticism,
psychotic tendencies, and poor control of impulses, which are signs that might point to
the presence of disabling trends, were not elicited from respondent. 34

In rebuttal, Dr. Lopez asseverated that there were flaws in the evaluation conducted by
Dr. Reyes as (i) he was not the one who administered and interpreted respondent’s
psychological evaluation, and (ii) he made use of only one instrument called CPRS which
was not reliable because a good liar can fake the results of such test. 35

After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioner’s evidence and held that
respondent’s propensity to lying about almost anything−her occupation, state of health,
singing abilities and her income, among others−had been duly established. According to
the trial court, respondent’s fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and
personalities enabled her to live in a world of make-believe. This made her
psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and
significance to her marriage. 36 The trial court thus declared the marriage between
petitioner and respondent null and void.

Shortly before the trial court rendered its decision, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the
Archdiocese of Manila annulled the Catholic marriage of the parties, on the ground of
lack of due discretion on the part of the parties. 37 During the pendency of the appeal
before the Court of Appeals, the Metropolitan Tribunal’s ruling was affirmed with
modification by both the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, which held instead that
only respondent was impaired by a lack of due discretion. 38 Subsequently, the decision of
the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal was upheld by the Roman Rota of the
Vatican.39

Petitioner duly alerted the Court of Appeals of these rulings by the Catholic tribunals. Still,
the appellate court reversed the RTC’s judgment. While conceding that respondent may
not have been completely honest with petitioner, the Court of Appeals nevertheless held
that the totality of the evidence presented was insufficient to establish respondent’s
psychological incapacity. It declared that the requirements in the case of Republic v.
Court of Appeals40 governing the application and interpretation of psychological
incapacity had not been satisfied.

Taking exception to the appellate court’s pronouncement, petitioner elevated the case to
this Court. He contends herein that the evidence conclusively establish respondent’s
psychological incapacity.

In considering the merit of this petition, the Court is heavily influenced by the credence
accorded by the RTC to the factual allegations of petitioner. 41 It is a settled principle of
civil procedure that the conclusions of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses
are entitled to great respect from the appellate courts because the trial court had an
opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses while giving testimony which may
indicate their candor or lack thereof. 42 The Court is likewise guided by the fact that the
Court of Appeals did not dispute the veracity of the evidence presented by petitioner.
Instead, the appellate court concluded that such evidence was not sufficient to establish
the psychological incapacity of respondent. 43

Thus, the Court is impelled to accept the factual version of petitioner as the operative
facts. Still, the crucial question remains as to whether the state of facts as presented by
petitioner sufficiently meets the standards set for the declaration of nullity of a marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code. These standards were definitively laid down in the
Court’s 1997 ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals 44 (also known as the Molina case45),
and indeed the Court of Appeals cited the Molina guidelines in reversing the RTC in the
case at bar.46 Since Molina was decided in 1997, the Supreme Court has yet to squarely
affirm the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. 47 In fact,
even before Molina was handed down, there was only one case, Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court
of Appeals,48 wherein the Court definitively concluded that a spouse was psychologically
incapacitated under Article 36.

This state of jurisprudential affairs may have led to the misperception that the remedy
afforded by Article 36 of the Family Code is hollow, insofar as the Supreme Court is
concerned.49 Yet what Molina and the succeeding cases did ordain was a set of
guidelines which, while undoubtedly onerous on the petitioner seeking the declaration of
nullity, still leave room for a decree of nullity under the proper circumstances. Molina did
not foreclose the grant of a decree of nullity under Article 36, even as it raised the bar for
its allowance.

Legal Guides to Understanding Article 36

Article 36 of the Family Code states that "[a] marriage contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization." 50 The concept of psychological incapacity as a
ground for nullity of marriage is novel in our body of laws, although mental incapacity has
long been recognized as a ground for the dissolution of a marriage.

The Spanish Civil Code of 1889 prohibited from contracting marriage persons "who are
not in the full enjoyment of their reason at the time of contracting marriage." 51 Marriages
with such persons were ordained as void, 52 in the same class as marriages with underage
parties and persons already married, among others. A party’s mental capacity was not a
ground for divorce under the Divorce Law of 1917, 53 but a marriage where "either party
was of unsound mind" at the time of its celebration was cited as an "annullable marriage"
under the Marriage Law of 1929.54 Divorce on the ground of a spouse’s incurable insanity
was permitted under the divorce law enacted during the Japanese occupation. 55 Upon the
enactment of the Civil Code in 1950, a marriage contracted by a party of "unsound mind"
was classified under Article 85 of the Civil Code as a voidable marriage. 56 The mental
capacity, or lack thereof, of the marrying spouse was not among the grounds for
declaring a marriage void ab initio.57 Similarly, among the marriages classified as
voidable under Article 45 (2) of the Family Code is one contracted by a party of unsound
mind.58

Such cause for the annulment of marriage is recognized as a vice of consent, just like
insanity impinges on consent freely given which is one of the essential requisites of a
contract.59 The initial common consensus on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of
the Family Code was that it did not constitute a specie of vice of consent. Justices
Sempio-Diy and Caguioa, both members of the Family Code revision committee that
drafted the Code, have opined that psychological incapacity is not a vice of consent, and
conceded that the spouse may have given free and voluntary consent to a marriage but
was nonetheless incapable of fulfilling such rights and obligations. 60 Dr. Tolentino likewise
stated in the 1990 edition of his commentaries on the Family Code that this
"psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations does not affect
the consent to the marriage."61

There were initial criticisms of this original understanding of Article 36 as phrased by the
Family Code committee. Tolentino opined that "psychologically incapacity to comply
would not be
juridically different from physical incapacity of consummating the marriage, which makes
the marriage only voidable under Article 45 (5) of the Civil Code x x x [and thus] should
have been a cause for annulment of the marriage only." 62 At the same time, Tolentino
noted "[it] would be different if it were psychological incapacity to understand the
essential marital obligations, because then this would amount to lack of consent to the
marriage."63 These concerns though were answered, beginning with Santos v. Court of
Appeals,64 wherein the Court, through Justice Vitug, acknowledged that "psychological
incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage." 65

The notion that psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the
obligations of marriage, as opposed to a mere inability to comply with them, was further
affirmed in the Molina66 case. Therein, the Court, through then Justice (now Chief Justice)
Panganiban observed that "[t]he evidence [to establish psychological incapacity] must
convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such
extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereto." 67 Jurisprudence since
then has recognized that psychological incapacity "is a malady so grave and permanent
as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond
one is about to assume."68

It might seem that this present understanding of psychological incapacity deviates from
the literal wording of Article 36, with its central phase reading "psychologically
incapacitated to comply

with the essential marital obligations of marriage." 69 At the same time, it has been
consistently recognized by this Court that the intent of the Family Code committee was to
design the law as to allow some resiliency in its application, by avoiding specific
examples that would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis. Rather, the preference of the revision committee was for "the judge to interpret
the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, in the findings of
experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals which, although not binding on

the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from
Canon Law."70

We likewise observed in Republic v. Dagdag:71

Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a
marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case.
Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a
ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with
another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the
appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of
the trial court.72

The Court thus acknowledges that the definition of psychological incapacity, as intended
by the revision committee, was not cast in intractable specifics. Judicial understanding of
psychological incapacity may be informed by evolving standards, taking into account the
particulars of each case, current trends in psychological and even canonical thought, and
experience. It is under the auspices of the deliberate ambiguity of the framers that the
Court has developed the Molina rules, which have been consistently applied since
1997. Molina has proven indubitably useful in providing a unitary framework that guides
courts in adjudicating petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the same
time, the Molina guidelines are not set in stone, the clear legislative intent mandating a
case-to-case perception of each situation, and Molina itself arising from this evolutionary
understanding of Article 36. There is no cause to disavow Molina at present, and indeed
the disposition of this case shall rely primarily on that precedent. There is need though to
emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for
declaration of nullity under Article 36.

Of particular notice has been the citation of the Court, first in Santos then in Molina, of
the considered opinion of canon law experts in the interpretation of psychological
incapacity. This is but unavoidable, considering that the Family Code committee had
bluntly acknowledged that the concept of psychological incapacity was derived from
canon law,73 and as one member admitted, enacted as a solution to the problem of
marriages already annulled by the Catholic Church but still existent under civil law. 74 It
would be disingenuous to disregard the influence of Catholic Church doctrine in the
formulation and subsequent understanding of Article 36, and the Court has expressly
acknowledged that interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the local Church, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts.75 Still, it must be emphasized that the Catholic Church is hardly the sole source of
influence in the interpretation of Article 36. Even though the concept may have been
derived from canon law, its incorporation into the Family Code and subsequent judicial
interpretation occurred in wholly secular progression. Indeed, while Church thought on
psychological incapacity is merely persuasive on the trial courts, judicial decisions of this
Court interpreting psychological incapacity are binding on lower courts. 76

Now is also opportune time to comment on another common legal guide utilized in the
adjudication of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. All too frequently, this
Court and lower courts, in denying petitions of the kind, have favorably cited Sections 1
and 2, Article XV of the Constitution, which respectively state that "[t]he State recognizes
the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its
solidarity and actively promote its total developmen[t]," and that "[m]arriage, as an
inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
State." These provisions highlight the importance of the family and the constitutional
protection accorded to the institution of marriage.

But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state protection to
marriage as a social institution and the foundation of the family. It remains the province of
the legislature to define all legal aspects of marriage and prescribe the strategy and the
modalities to protect it, based on whatever socio-political influences it deems proper, and
subject of course to the qualification that such legislative enactment itself adheres to the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This being the case, it also falls on the legislature to
put into operation the constitutional provisions that protect marriage and the family. This
has been accomplished at present through the enactment of the Family Code, which
defines marriage and the family, spells out the corresponding legal effects, imposes the
limitations that affect married and family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for
declaration of nullity and those for legal separation. While it may appear that the judicial
denial of a petition for declaration of nullity is reflective of the constitutional mandate to
protect marriage, such action in fact merely enforces a statutory definition of marriage,
not a constitutionally ordained decree of what marriage is. Indeed, if circumstances
warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV need not be the only constitutional considerations
to be taken into account in resolving a petition for declaration of nullity.

Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a

psychologically incapacitated person as a nullity, should be deemed as an implement of
this constitutional protection of marriage. Given the avowed State interest in promoting
marriage as the foundation of the family, which in turn serves as the foundation of the
nation, there is a corresponding interest for the State to defend against marriages ill-
equipped to promote family life. Void ab initio marriages under Article 36 do not further
the initiatives of the State concerning marriage and family, as they promote wedlock
among persons who, for reasons independent of their will, are not capacitated to
understand or comply with the essential obligations of marriage.

These are the legal premises that inform us as we decide the present petition.

Molina Guidelines As Applied in This Case

As stated earlier, Molina established the guidelines presently recognized in the judicial

disposition of petitions for nullity under Article 36. The Court has consistently
applied Molina since its promulgation in 1997, and the guidelines therein operate as the
general rules. They warrant citation in full:

1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and
our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution
devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It
decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim
of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected"’ by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must
be psychological–not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such
root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.

3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their "I do’s." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such
time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or

incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to
those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job.
Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing
medicine to cure them but not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise
his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor
in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.

6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of

the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of
the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.

7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic

Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect
by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision
Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in
1983 and which provides:

"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume
the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature."

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil
laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such
harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate
tribunal. Ideally—subject to our law on evidence—what is decreed as canonically invalid
should also be decreed civilly void.77

Molina had provided for an additional requirement that the Solicitor General issue a
certification stating his reasons for his agreement or opposition to the petition. 78 This
requirement however was dispensed with following the implementation of A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC, or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages. 79 Still, Article 48 of the Family Code mandates that the
appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned be on behalf of the State to
take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed. Obviously, collusion is not an issue in this case, considering
the consistent vigorous opposition of respondent to the petition for declaration of nullity.
In any event, the fiscal’s participation in the hearings before the trial court is extant from
the records of this case.

As earlier noted, the factual findings of the RTC are now deemed binding on this Court,
owing to the great weight accorded to the opinion of the primary trier of facts, and the
refusal of the Court of Appeals to dispute the veracity of these facts. As such, it must be
considered that respondent had consistently lied about many material aspects as to her
character and personality. The question remains whether her pattern of fabrication
sufficiently establishes her psychological incapacity, consistent with Article 36 and
generally, the Molina guidelines.

We find that the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines in Molina.

First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological
incapacity of his spouse. Apart from his own testimony, he presented witnesses who
corroborated his allegations on his wife’s behavior, and certifications from Blackgold
Records and the Philippine Village Hotel Pavillon which disputed respondent’s claims
pertinent to her alleged singing career. He also presented two (2) expert witnesses from
the field of psychology who testified that the aberrant behavior of respondent was
tantamount to psychological incapacity. In any event, both courts below considered
petitioner’s evidence as credible enough. Even the appellate court acknowledged that
respondent was not totally honest with petitioner. 80

As in all civil matters, the petitioner in an action for declaration of nullity under Article 36
must be able to establish the cause of action with a preponderance of evidence.
However, since the action cannot be considered as a non-public matter between private
parties, but is impressed with State interest, the Family Code likewise requires the
participation of the State, through the prosecuting attorney, fiscal, or Solicitor General, to
take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed. Thus, even if the petitioner is able establish the psychological
incapacity of respondent with preponderant evidence, any finding of collusion among the
parties would necessarily negate such proofs.

Second. The root cause of respondent’s psychological incapacity has been medically or
clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly
explained in the trial court’s decision. The initiatory complaint alleged that respondent,
from the start, had exhibited unusual and abnormal behavior "of peren[n]ially telling lies,
fabricating ridiculous stories, and inventing personalities and situations," of writing letters
to petitioner using fictitious names, and of lying about her actual occupation, income,
educational attainment, and family background, among others. 81

These allegations, initially characterized in generalities, were further linked to medical or

clinical causes by expert witnesses from the field of psychology. Petitioner presented two
(2) such witnesses in particular. Dr. Abcede, a psychiatrist who had headed the
department of psychiatry of at least two (2) major hospitals, 82 testified as follows:

WITNESS:

Given that as a fact, which is only based on the affidavit provided to me, I can say that
there are a couple of things that [are] terribly wrong with the standards. There are a
couple of things that seems (sic) to be repeated over and over again in the affidavit. One
of which is the persistent, constant and repeated lying of the "respondent"; which, I think,
based on assessment of normal behavior of an individual, is abnormal or pathological. x
xx

ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)

Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that because of these actuations of the respondent
she is then incapable of performing the basic obligations of her marriage?

A- Well, persistent lying violates the respect that one owes towards another. The lack of
concern, the lack of love towards the person, and it is also something that endangers
human relationship. You see, relationship is based on communication between
individuals and what we generally communicate are our thoughts and feelings. But then
when one talks and expresse[s] their feelings, [you] are expected to tell the truth. And
therefore, if you constantly lie, what do you think is going to happen as far as this
relationship is concerned. Therefore, it undermines that basic relationship that should be
based on love, trust and respect.

Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that due to the behavior of the respondent in
constantly lying and fabricating stories, she is then incapable of performing the basic
obligations of the marriage?

xxx
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)

Q- Mr. witness, based on the testimony of Mr. Levy Mendoza, who is the third witness for
the petitioner, testified that the respondent has been calling up the petitioner’s
officemates and ask him (sic) on the activities of the petitioner and ask him on the
behavior of the petitioner. And this is specifically stated on page six (6) of the transcript of
stenographic notes, what can you say about this, Mr. witness?

A- If an individual is jealous enough to the point that he is paranoid, which means that
there is no actual basis on her suspect (sic) that her husband is having an affair with a
woman, if carried on to the extreme, then that is pathological. That is not abnormal. We
all feel jealous, in the same way as we also lie every now and then; but everything that is
carried out in extreme is abnormal or pathological. If there is no basis in reality to the fact
that the husband is having an affair with another woman and if she persistently believes
that the husband is having an affair with different women, then that is pathological and
we call that paranoid jealousy.

Q- Now, if a person is in paranoid jealousy, would she be considered psychologically

incapacitated to perform the basic obligations of the marriage?

A- Yes, Ma’am.83

The other witness, Dr. Lopez, was presented to establish not only the psychological
incapacity of respondent, but also the psychological capacity of petitioner. He concluded
that respondent "is [a] pathological liar, that [she continues] to lie [and] she loves to
fabricate about herself."84

These two witnesses based their conclusions of psychological incapacity on the case
record, particularly the trial transcripts of respondent’s testimony, as well as the
supporting affidavits of petitioner. While these witnesses did not personally examine
respondent, the Court had already held in Marcos v. Marcos85 that personal examination
of the subject by the physician is not required for the spouse to be declared
psychologically incapacitated. 86 We deem the methodology utilized by petitioner’s
witnesses as sufficient basis for their medical conclusions. Admittedly, Drs. Abcede and
Lopez’s common conclusion of respondent’s psychological incapacity hinged heavily on
their own acceptance of petitioner’s version as the true set of facts. However, since the
trial court itself accepted the veracity of petitioner’s factual premises, there is no cause to
dispute the conclusion of psychological incapacity drawn therefrom by petitioner’s expert
witnesses.

Also, with the totality of the evidence presented as basis, the trial court explicated its
finding of psychological incapacity in its decision in this wise:

To the mind of the Court, all of the above are indications that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of marriage. It has been
shown clearly from her actuations that respondent has that propensity for telling lies
about almost anything, be it her occupation, her state of health, her singing abilities, her
income, etc. She has this fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities.
She practically lived in a world of make believe making her therefore not in a position to
give meaning and significance to her marriage to petitioner. In persistently and constantly
lying to petitioner, respondent undermined the basic tenets of relationship between
spouses that is based on love, trust and respect. As concluded by the psychiatrist
presented by petitioner, such repeated lying is abnormal and pathological and amounts
to psychological incapacity.87
Third. Respondent’s psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at
the time of and even before the celebration of marriage. She fabricated friends and made
up letters from fictitious characters well before she married petitioner. Likewise, she kept
petitioner in the dark about her natural child’s real parentage as she only confessed when
the latter had found out the truth after their marriage.

Fourth. The gravity of respondent’s psychological incapacity is sufficient to prove her

disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage. It is immediately discernible
that the parties had shared only a little over a year of cohabitation before the exasperated
petitioner left his wife. Whatever such circumstance speaks of the degree of tolerance of
petitioner, it likewise supports the belief that respondent’s psychological incapacity, as
borne by the record, was so grave in extent that any prolonged marital life was dubitable.

It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not adopted as false
pretenses in order to induce petitioner into marriage. More disturbingly, they indicate a
failure on the part of respondent to distinguish truth from fiction, or at least abide by the
truth. Petitioner’s witnesses and the trial court were emphatic on respondent’s inveterate
proclivity to telling lies and the pathologic nature of her mistruths, which according to
them, were revelatory of respondent’s inability to understand and perform the essential
obligations of marriage. Indeed, a person unable to distinguish between fantasy and
reality would similarly be unable to comprehend the legal nature of the marital bond,
much less its psychic meaning, and the corresponding obligations attached to marriage,
including parenting. One unable to adhere to reality cannot be expected to adhere as well
to any legal or emotional commitments.

The Court of Appeals somehow concluded that since respondent allegedly tried her best
to effect a reconciliation, she had amply exhibited her ability to perform her marital
obligations. We are not convinced. Given the nature of her psychological condition, her
willingness to remain in the marriage hardly banishes nay extenuates her lack of capacity
to fulfill the essential marital obligations. Respondent’s ability to even comprehend what
the essential marital obligations are is impaired at best. Considering that the evidence
convincingly disputes respondent’s ability to adhere to the truth, her avowals as to her
commitment to the marriage cannot be accorded much credence.

At this point, it is worth considering Article 45(3) of the Family Code which states that a
marriage may be annulled if the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, and Article
46 which enumerates the circumstances constituting fraud under the previous article,
clarifies that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or
chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of
marriage." It would be improper to draw linkages between misrepresentations made by
respondent and the misrepresentations under Articles 45 (3) and 46. The fraud under
Article 45(3) vitiates the consent of the spouse who is lied to, and does not allude to
vitiated consent of the lying spouse. In this case, the misrepresentations of respondent
point to her own inadequacy to cope with her marital obligations, kindred to psychological
incapacity under Article 36.

Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations as
embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code. Article 68, in particular, enjoins the
spouses to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual
help and support. As noted by the trial court, it is difficult to see how an inveterate
pathological liar would be able to commit to the basic tenets of relationship between
spouses based on love, trust and respect.

Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact
that the marriage of the parties was annulled by the Catholic Church. The appellate court
apparently deemed this detail totally inconsequential as no reference was made to it
anywhere in the assailed decision despite petitioner’s efforts to bring the matter to its
attention.88 Such deliberate ignorance is in contravention of Molina, which held that
interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect
by our courts.

As noted earlier, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila decreed the
invalidity of the marriage in question in a Conclusion89 dated 30 March 1995, citing the
"lack of due discretion" on the part of respondent. 90 Such decree of nullity was affirmed by
both the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, 91 and the Roman Rota of the
Vatican.92 In fact, respondent’s psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a
restrictive clause93 was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibiting respondent from
contracting another marriage without the Tribunal’s consent.

In its Decision dated 4 June 1995, the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
pronounced:

The JURISRPRUDENCE in the Case maintains that matrimonial consent is considered

ontologically defective and wherefore judicially ineffective when elicited by a Part
Contractant in possession and employ of a discretionary judgment faculty with a
perceptive vigor markedly inadequate for the practical understanding of the conjugal
Covenant or serious impaired from the correct appreciation of the integral significance
and implications of the marriage vows.

The FACTS in the Case sufficiently prove with the certitude required by law that based
on the depositions of the Partes in Causa and premised on the testimonies of the
Common and Expert Witnesse[s], the Respondent made the marriage option in
tenure of adverse personality constracts that were markedly antithetical to the
substantive content and implications of the Marriage Covenant, and that seriously
undermined the integrality of her matrimonial consent in terms of its deliberative
component. In other words, afflicted with a discretionary faculty impaired in its
practico-concrete judgment formation on account of an adverse action and
reaction pattern, the Respondent was impaired from eliciting a judicially binding
matrimonial consent. There is no sufficient evidence in the Case however to prove as
well the fact of grave lack of due discretion on the part of the Petitioner. 94

Evidently, the conclusion of psychological incapacity was arrived at not only by the trial
court, but also by canonical bodies. Yet, we must clarify the proper import of the Church
rulings annulling the marriage in this case. They hold sway since they are drawn from a
similar recognition, as the trial court, of the veracity of petitioner’s allegations. Had the
trial court instead appreciated respondent’s version as correct, and the appellate court
affirmed such conclusion, the rulings of the Catholic Church on this matter would have
diminished persuasive value. After all, it is the factual findings of the judicial trier of facts,
and not that of the canonical courts, that are accorded significant recognition by this
Court.

Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement in Molina that such

psychological incapacity be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It
was on this score that the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court, the
appellate court noting that it did not appear certain that respondent’s condition was
incurable and that Dr. Abcede did not testify to such effect. 95

Petitioner points out that one month after he and his wife initially separated, he returned
to her, desiring to make their marriage work. However, respondent’s aberrant behavior
remained unchanged, as she continued to lie, fabricate stories, and maintained her
excessive jealousy. From this fact, he draws the conclusion that respondent’s condition is
incurable.

From the totality of the evidence, can it be definitively concluded that respondent’s
condition is incurable? It would seem, at least, that respondent’s psychosis is quite grave,
and a cure thereof a remarkable feat. Certainly, it would have been easier had
petitioner’s expert witnesses characterized respondent’s condition as incurable. Instead,
they remained silent on whether the psychological incapacity was curable or incurable.

But on careful examination, there was good reason for the experts’ taciturnity on this
point.

The petitioner’s expert witnesses testified in 1994 and 1995, and the trial court rendered
its decision on 10 August 1995. These events transpired well before Molina was
promulgated in 1997 and made explicit the requirement that the psychological incapacity
must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such requirement
was not expressly stated in Article 36 or any other provision of the Family Code.

On the other hand, the Court in Santos, which was decided in January 1995, began its
discussion by first citing the deliberations of the Family Code committee, 96 then the
opinion of canonical scholars,97 before arriving at its formulation of the doctrinal definition
of psychological incapacity.98 Santos did refer to Justice Caguioa’s opinion expressed
during the deliberations that "psychological incapacity is incurable," 99 and the view of a
former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila
that psychological incapacity must be characterized "by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability." 100 However, in formulating the doctrinal rule on
psychological incapacity, the Court in Santos omitted any reference to incurability as a
characteristic of psychological incapacity.101

This disquisition is material as Santos was decided months before the trial court came
out with its own ruling that remained silent on whether respondent’s psychological
incapacity was incurable. Certainly, Santos did not clearly mandate that the incurability of
the psychological incapacity be established in an action for declaration of nullity. At least,
there was no jurisprudential clarity at the time of the trial of this case and the subsequent
promulgation of the trial court’s decision that required a medical finding of incurability.
Such requisite arose only with Molina in 1997, at a time when this case was on appellate
review, or after the reception of evidence.

We are aware that in Pesca v. Pesca,102 the Court countered an argument

that Molina and Santos should not apply retroactively

with the observation that the interpretation or construction placed by the courts of a law
constitutes a part of that law as of the date the statute in enacted. 103 Yet we approach this
present case from utterly practical considerations. The requirement that psychological
incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable is one that
necessarily cannot be divined without expert opinion. Clearly in this case, there was no
categorical averment from the expert witnesses that respondent’s psychological
incapacity was curable or incurable simply because there was no legal necessity yet to
elicit such a declaration and the appropriate question was not accordingly propounded to
him. If we apply Pesca without deep reflection, there would be undue prejudice to those
cases tried before Molina or Santos, especially those presently on appellate review,
where presumably the respective petitioners and their expert witnesses would not have
seen the need to adduce a diagnosis of incurability. It may hold in those cases, as in this
case, that the psychological incapacity of a spouse is actually incurable, even if not
pronounced as such at the trial court level.
We stated earlier that Molina is not set in stone, and that the interpretation of Article 36
relies heavily on a case-to-case perception. It would be insensate to reason to mandate
in this case an expert medical or clinical diagnosis of incurability, since the parties would
have had no impelling cause to present evidence to that effect at the time this case was
tried by the RTC more than ten (10) years ago. From the totality of the evidence, we are
sufficiently convinced that the incurability of respondent’s psychological incapacity has
been established by the petitioner. Any lingering doubts are further dispelled by the fact
that the Catholic Church tribunals, which indubitably consider incurability as an integral
requisite of psychological incapacity, were sufficiently convinced that respondent was so
incapacitated to contract marriage to the degree that annulment was warranted.

All told, we conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration of
nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The RTC correctly ruled, and the Court of
Appeals erred in reversing the trial court.

There is little relish in deciding this present petition, pronouncing as it does the marital
bond as having been inexistent in the first place. It is possible that respondent, despite
her psychological state, remains in love with petitioner, as exhibited by her persistent
challenge to the petition for nullity. In fact, the appellate court placed undue emphasis on
respondent’s avowed commitment to remain in the marriage. Yet the Court decides these
cases on legal reasons and not vapid sentimentality. Marriage, in legal contemplation, is
more than the legitimatization of a desire of people in love to live together.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the RTC dated 10 August
1995, declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent NULL and VOID under
Article 36 of the Family Code, is REINSTATED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairman

ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairman, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Attestation by the
Division’s Chairman, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court’s Division.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 149498             May 20, 2004

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
LOLITA QUINTERO-HAMANO, respondent.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

Before us is a petition for review of the decision 1 dated August 20, 2001 of the Court of
Appeals2 affirming the decision3 dated August 28, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of
Rizal, Branch 72, declaring as null and void the marriage contracted between herein
respondent Lolita M. Quintero-Hamano and her husband Toshio Hamano.
On June 17, 1996, respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint for declaration
of nullity of her marriage to her husband Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the
ground of psychological incapacity.

Respondent alleged that in October 1986, she and Toshio started a common-law
relationship in Japan. They later lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio
went back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. On November 16, 1987, she gave
birth to their child.

On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married by Judge Isauro M. Balderia of the
Municipal Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite. Unknown to respondent, Toshio was
psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities, which incapacity
became manifest only after the marriage. One month after their marriage, Toshio
returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his
family. After sending money to respondent for two months, Toshio stopped giving
financial support. She wrote him several times but he never responded. Sometime in
1991, respondent learned from her friends that Toshio visited the Philippines but he did
not bother to see her and their child.

The summons issued to Toshio remained unserved because he was no longer residing
at his given address. Consequently, on July 8, 1996, respondent filed an ex parte motion
for leave to effect service of summons by publication. The trial court granted the motion
on July 12, 1996. In August 1996, the summons, accompanied by a copy of the petition,
was published in a newspaper of general circulation giving Toshio 15 days to file his
answer. Because Toshio failed to file a responsive pleading after the lapse of 60 days
from publication, respondent filed a motion dated November 5, 1996 to refer the case to
the prosecutor for investigation. The trial court granted the motion on November 7, 1996.

On November 20, 1996, prosecutor Rolando I. Gonzales filed a report finding that no
collusion existed between the parties. He prayed that the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor be allowed to intervene to ensure that the evidence submitted was not
fabricated. On February 13, 1997, the trial court granted respondent’s motion to present
her evidence ex parte. She then testified on how Toshio abandoned his family. She
thereafter offered documentary evidence to support her testimony.

On August 28, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which
read:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the marriage between petitioner Lolita M. Quintero-

Hamano and Toshio Hamano, is hereby declared NULL and VOID.

The Civil Register of Bacoor, Cavite and the National Statistics Office are ordered to
make proper entries into the records of the afore-named parties pursuant to this
judgment of the Court.

SO ORDERED.4

In declaring the nullity of the marriage on the ground of Toshio’s psychological incapacity,
the trial court held that:

It is clear from the records of the case that respondent spouses failed to fulfill his
obligations as husband of the petitioner and father to his daughter. Respondent remained
irresponsible and unconcerned over the needs and welfare of his family. Such
indifference, to the mind of the Court, is a clear manifestation of insensitivity and lack of
respect for his wife and child which characterizes a very immature person. Certainly,
such behavior could be traced to respondent’s mental incapacity and disability of entering
into marital life.5

The Office of the Solicitor General, representing herein petitioner Republic of the
Philippines, appealed to the Court of Appeals but the same was denied in a decision
dated August 28, 1997, the dispositive portion of which read:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, and pursuant to applicable law and

jurisprudence on the matter and evidence on hand, judgment is hereby rendered
denying the instant appeal. The decision of the court a quo is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.6

The appellate court found that Toshio left respondent and their daughter a month after
the celebration of the marriage, and returned to Japan with the promise to support his
family and take steps to make them Japanese citizens. But except for two months, he
never sent any support to nor communicated with them despite the letters respondent
sent. He even visited the Philippines but he did not bother to see them. Respondent, on
the other hand, exerted all efforts to contact Toshio, to no avail.

The appellate court thus concluded that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to
perform his marital obligations to his family, and to "observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity, and render mutual help and support" pursuant to Article 68 of the Family Code of
the Philippines. The appellate court rhetorically asked:

But what is there to preserve when the other spouse is an unwilling party to the cohesion
and creation of a family as a social inviolable institution? Why should petitioner be made
to suffer in a marriage where the other spouse is not around and worse, left them without
even helping them cope up with family life and assist in the upbringing of their daughter
as required under Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code? 7

The appellate court emphasized that this case could not be equated with Republic vs.
Court of Appeals and Molina 8 and Santos vs. Court of Appeals. 9 In those cases, the
spouses were Filipinos while this case involved a "mixed marriage," the husband being a
Japanese national.

Hence, this appeal by petitioner Republic based on this lone assignment of error:

The Court of Appeals erred in holding that respondent was able to prove the
psychological incapacity of Toshio Hamano to perform his marital obligations, despite
respondent’s failure to comply with the guidelines laid down in the Molina case.10

According to petitioner, mere abandonment by Toshio of his family and his insensitivity to
them did not automatically constitute psychological incapacity. His behavior merely
indicated simple inadequacy in the personality of a spouse falling short of reasonable
expectations. Respondent failed to prove any severe and incurable personality disorder
on the part of Toshio, in accordance with the guidelines set in Molina.

The Office of the Public Attorney, representing respondent, reiterated the ruling of the
courts a quo and sought the denial of the instant petition.

We rule in favor of petitioner.

The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the
family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the
family.11 Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. 12

Respondent seeks to annul her marriage with Toshio on the ground of psychological
incapacity. Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines provides that:

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.

In Molina, we came up with the following guidelines in the interpretation and application
of Article 36 for the guidance of the bench and the bar:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and
our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. x x x

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts
and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that
the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or
one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not
have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given
valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so
as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis (Salita vs. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June 13, 1994), nevertheless such root
cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their "I do’s." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such
time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or

incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to
those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job.
Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing
medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and
raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor
in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of
the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of
the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect
by our courts. x x x

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General
to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein
his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor-General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for
resolution of the court. The Solicitor-General shall discharge the equivalent function of
the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.13 (emphasis supplied)

The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court
in Santos: "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical
antecedence and (c) incurability." 14 The foregoing guidelines do not require that a
physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the
root cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is important is the presence of
evidence that can adequately establish the party’s psychological condition. For indeed, if
the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be
resorted to.15

We now proceed to determine whether respondent successfully proved Toshio’s

psychological incapacity to fulfill his marital responsibilities.

Petitioner showed that Toshio failed to meet his duty to live with, care for and support his
family. He abandoned them a month after his marriage to respondent. Respondent sent
him several letters but he never replied. He made a trip to the Philippines but did not care
at all to see his family.

We find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was
psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities. Toshio’s act of
abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be
due to some kind of psychological illness. After respondent testified on how Toshio
abandoned his family, no other evidence was presented showing that his behavior was
caused by a psychological disorder. Although, as a rule, there was no need for an actual
medical examination, it would have greatly helped respondent’s case had she presented
evidence that medically or clinically identified his illness. This could have been done
through an expert witness. This respondent did not do.

We must remember that abandonment is also a ground for legal separation. 16 There was
no showing that the case at bar was not just an instance of abandonment in the context
of legal separation. We cannot presume psychological defect from the mere fact that
Toshio abandoned his family immediately after the celebration of the marriage. As we
ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility
and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of
doing so due to some psychological, not physical, illness.17 There was no proof of a natal
or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates a person from accepting and complying
with the obligations essential to marriage. 18

According to the appellate court, the requirements in Molina and Santos do not apply

here because the present case involves a "mixed marriage," the husband being a
Japanese national. We disagree. In proving psychological incapacity, we find no
distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. We cannot be lenient in the
application of the rules merely because the spouse alleged to be psychologically
incapacitated happens to be a foreign national. The medical and clinical rules to
determine psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis of studies of human
behavior in general. Hence, the norms used for determining psychological incapacity
should apply to any person regardless of nationality.

In Pesca vs. Pesca,19 this Court declared that marriage is an inviolable social institution
that the State cherishes and protects. While we commiserate with respondent,
terminating her marriage to her husband may not necessarily be the fitting denouement.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The decision dated August
28, 1997 of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

Vitug, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in addition to
those enumerated in the Civil Code) to assail the validity of a marriage, namely,
"psychological incapacity." Since the Code's effectivity, our courts have been
swamped with various petitions to declare marriages void based on this ground.
Although this Court had interpreted the meaning of psychological incapacity in the
recent case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals, still many judges and lawyers find
difficulty in applying said novel provision in specific cases. In the present case
and in the context of the herein assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, the
Solicitor General has labelled — exaggerated to be sure but nonetheless
expressive of his frustration — Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in
the world." Hence, this Court in addition to resolving the present case, finds the
need to lay down specific guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article
36 of the Family Code.

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the

January 25, 1993 Decision  of the Court of Appeals  in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858
1 2

affirming in toto the May 14, 1991 decision of the Regional Trial Court of La
Trinidad,  Benguet, which declared the marriage of respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina
3

to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on the ground of "psychological incapacity" under

Article 36 of the Family Code.

The Facts

This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent Roridel O.
Molina of a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina.
Essentially, the petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985
at the San Agustin Church  in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after a
4

year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a

husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends
on whom he squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for aid and
assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in
frequent quarrels between them; that sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved
of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family;
that in October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which their
relationship was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila
and went to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left
Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus
shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital
obligations and was a highly immature and habitually quarrel some individual who
thought of himself as a king to be served; and that it would be to the couple's best
interest to have their marriage declared null and void in order to free them from what
appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the start.

In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no
longer live together as husband and wife, but contended that their misunderstandings
and frequent quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on
maintaining her group of friends even after their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform
some of her marital duties such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the
household and handle their finances.

During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:

1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the Church of St.
Augustine, Manila;

2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina was born on
July 29, 1986;

3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;

4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;
5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;

6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner wife.

Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that of her
friends Rosemarie Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a
social worker, and of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio General
Hospital and Medical Center. She also submitted documents marked as Exhibits "A" to
"E-1." Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial
conference.

On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The
appeal of petitioner was denied by the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's
decision. Hence, the present recourse.

The Issue

In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made an erroneous
and incorrect interpretation of the phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as provided under
Art. 36 of the Family Code) and made an incorrect application thereof to the facts of the
case," adding that the appealed Decision tended "to establish in effect the most liberal
divorce procedure in the world which is anathema to our culture."

In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court relied  heavily on the trial
5

court's findings "that the marriage between the parties broke up because of their
opposing and conflicting personalities." Then, it added it sown opinion that "the Civil
Code Revision Committee (hereinafter referred to as Committee) intended to liberalize
the application of our civil laws on personal and family rights. . . ." It concluded that:

As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically incapacity as a broad

range of mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how he or
she regards the marital union, his or her personal relationship with the other spouse, as
well as his or her conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of
marriage. If said conduct, observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the union
to self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage, then there is enough
reason to leave the spouses to their individual fates.

In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no indiscretion in analyzing and
deciding the instant case, as it did, hence, We find no cogent reason to disturb the
findings and conclusions thus made.

Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of Appeals.

The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is
not equivalent to psychological incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply
the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but
a defect in their psychological nature which renders them incapable of performing such
marital responsibilities and duties."

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals  this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C.
6

Vitug, ruled that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor
physical) incapacity . . . and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law
has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases
of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the
time the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of
the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila,  Justice Vitug
7

wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability."

On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the
psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a
"difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital
obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in
no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties
failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they
must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor physical)
illness.

The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could
nor get along with each other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem;
neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison
showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological
incapacity. Dr. Sison testified:
8

COURT

Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on your findings that it is

better for the Court to annul (sic) the marriage?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q There is no hope for the marriage?

A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.

Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are psychologically unfit for each
other but they are psychologically fit with other parties?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?

A Yes, Your Honor.

The Court has no more questions.

In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were
constitutive of psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration. While
some effort was made to prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of
"thoughtfulness and gentleness" on Reynaldo's part of being "conservative, homely and
intelligent" on the part of Roridel, such failure of expectation is nor indicative of
antecedent psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows love's temporary blindness
to the faults and blemishes of the beloved.
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the facts of this
case vis-a-vis existing law and jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the
Family Code and the difficulty experienced by many trial courts interpreting and applying
it, the Court decided to invite two amici curiae, namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V.
Cruz,  Vicar Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
9

the Catholic Church in the Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. Puno,   a member of the
10

Family Code Revision Committee. The Court takes this occasion to thank these friends of
the Court for their informative and interesting discussions during the oral argument on
December 3, 1996, which they followed up with written memoranda.

From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for
the guidance of the bench and the bar:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and
our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution
devotes an entire Article on the Family,   recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation."
11

It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the

whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code   echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
12

emphasizes the permanence, inviolability and solidarity

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must
be psychological — not physical. although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis,   nevertheless such
13

root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature
explained. Expert evidence may be given qualified psychiatrist and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such
time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent

or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to
those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job.
Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing
medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and
raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness
must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the
person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of

the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of
the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect
by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision
Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in
1983 and which provides:

The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume
the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature.  14

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil
laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such
harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decision of such appellate
tribunal. Ideally — subject to our law on evidence — what is decreed as canonically
invalid should also be decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code
provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect.
Here, the State and the Church — while remaining independent, separate and apart from
each other — shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting
and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General
to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly staring therein
his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for
resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of
the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.

In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to grant the
petition. Such ruling becomes even more cogent with the use of the foregoing guidelines.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., and
Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

Regalado, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concurs in the result.

 
 Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., concuring opinion:

I concur in the result of the decision penned by Mr. Justice Panganiban but only because
of the peculiar facts of the case. As to whether or not the psychological incapacity exists
in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in any
field of the law, on the facts of the case. In Leouel Santos v. Court of Appeals and Julia
Rosario-Bedia Santos, G.R. No. 112019, 4 January 1995, 240 SCRA 20-36, I
maintained, and I still maintain, that there was psychological incapacity on the part of the
wife to discharge the duties of a wife in a valid marriage. The facts of the present case,
after an indepth study, do not support a similar conclusion. Obviously, each case must be
judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but
according to its own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for
annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case.
The trial judge must take pains in examining the actual millieu and the appellate court
must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.

ROMERO, J., separate opinion:

The majority opinion, overturning that of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
Regional Trial Court ruling. upheld petitioner Solicitor General's position that "opposing
and conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to psychological incapacity, for the latter "is
not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties,
but a defect in their Psychological nature which renders them incapable of performing
such marital responsibilities and duties.

In the present case, the alleged personality traits of Reynaldo, the husband, did not
constitute so much "psychological incapacity" as a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or
"neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. "It is not enough to prove that
the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is
essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological (not physical) illness."

I would add that neither should the incapacity be the result of mental illness. For if it were
due to insanity or defects in the mental faculties short of insanity, there is a resultant
defect of vice of consent, thus rendering the marriage annulable under Art. 45 of the
Family Code.

That the intent of the members of the U.P. Law Center's Civil Code Revision Committee
was to exclude mental inability to understand the essential nature of marriage and focus
strictly on psychological incapacity is demonstrated in the way the provision in question
underwent revisions.

At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision read:

(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of
marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential
marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.
The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally produced the following
revised provision even before the session was over:

(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack or
incapacity becomes manifest after the celebration.

Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has dropped any reference to
"wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature or
marriage" and to "mentally incapacitated." It was explained that these phrases refer to
"defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea . . . but lack of
appreciation of one's marital obligation." There being a defect in consent, "it is clear that it
should be a ground for voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent
and it is capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid intervals and
there are sanity is curable. . . . Psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties
and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to
marriage." 1

My own position as a member of the Committee then was that psychological incapacity
is, in a sense, insanity of a lesser degree.

As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term "psychological or mental

impotence," Archbishop Oscar Cruz opined in he earlier February 9, 1984 session that
this term "is an invention of some churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that is
why it is considered a weak phrase." He said that the Code of Canon Law would rather
express it as "psychological or mental incapacity to discharge. . . ." Justice Ricardo C.
Puno opined that sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent with one but not
with another.

One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the interpretation and
application of Art. 36 is: "Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard
to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex."

The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the inclusion of the phrase"
and is incurable" but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista commented that this would give rise to the
question of how they will determine curability and Justice Caguioa agreed that it would be
more problematic. Yet the possibility that one may be cured after the psychological
incapacity becomes manifest after the marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno and
Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa suggested that the remedy was to allow the
afflicted spouse to remarry.

For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void marriages, viz:

1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage as contract;

2. reasons of public policy;

3. special cases and special situations.

The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under "special cases and special
situations," hence its special treatment in Art. 36 in the Family Code as finally enacted.

Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for avoiding or
annulling marriages that even comes close to being psychological in nature.
Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the marriage, such
marriage which stands valid until annulled is capable of ratification or convalidation.

On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential requisites, some
marriages are void from the beginning.

With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the provisions on Marriage, the
drafters, now open to fresh winds of change in keeping with the more permissive mores
and practices of the time, took a leaf from the relatively liberal provisions of Canon Law.

Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are incapable of
contracting marriage: "3. (those) who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are
unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage" provided the model for what is
now Art. 36 of the Family Code: "A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest
only after its solemnization.

It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only two types of
marriages with respect to their validity: valid and void. Civil Law, however, recognizes an
intermediate state, the voidable or annullable marriages. When the Ecclesiastical
Tribunal "annuls" a marriage, it actually declares the marriage null and void, i.e., it never
really existed in the first place, for a valid sacramental marriage can never be dissolved.
Hence, a properly performed and consummated marriage between two living Roman
Catholics can only be nullified by the formal annulment process which entails a full
tribunal procedure with a Court selection and a formal hearing.

Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by Civil Law as severing the
marriage ties as to capacitate the parties to enter lawfully into another marriage. The
grounds for nullifying civil marriage, not being congruent with those laid down by Canon
Law, the former being more strict, quite a number of married couples have found
themselves in limbo — freed from the marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic Church
but yet unable to contract a valid civil marriage under state laws. Heedless of civil law
sanctions, some persons contract new marriages or enter into live-in relationships.

It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous situations that the
Civil Law Revision Committee decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of
psychological incapacity into the Family Code — and classified the same as a ground for
declaring marriages void ab initio or totally in existent from the beginning.

A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old Code, while it did not
provide directly for psychological incapacity, in effect recognized the same indirectly from
a combination of three old canons: "Canon #1081 required persons to 'be capable
according to law' in order to give valid consent; Canon #1082 required that persons 'be at
least not ignorant' of the major elements required in marriage; and Canon #1087 (the
force and fear category) required that internal and external freedom be present in order
for consent to be valid. This line of interpretation produced two distinct but related
grounds for annulment, called 'lack of due discretion' and 'lack of due competence.' Lack
of due discretion means that the person did not have the ability to give valid consent at
the time of the wedding and therefore the union is invalid. Lack of due competence
means that the person was incapable of carrying out the obligations of the promise he or
she made during the wedding ceremony.

"Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and 1960s
involving sexual disorders such as homosexuality and nymphomania laid the foundation
for a broader approach to the kind of proof necessary for psychological grounds for
annulment. The Rota had reasoned for the first time in several cases that the capacity to
give valid consent at the time of marriage was probably not present in persons who had
displayed such problems shortly after the marriage. The nature of this change was
nothing short of revolutionary. Once the Rota itself had demonstrated a cautious
willingness to use this kind of hindsight, the way was paved for what came after
1970. Diocesan Tribunals began to accept proof of serious psychological problems that
manifested themselves shortly after the ceremony as proof of an inability to give valid
consent at the time of the ceremony.

Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a psychological expert

became increasingly important in such cases. Data about the person's entire life, both
before and after the ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were asked to
give professional opinions about a party's mental at the time of the wedding. These
opinions were rarely challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack
of valid consent.

The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not amount to
the addition of new grounds for annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the
Church to the advances made in psychology during the past decades. There was now
the expertise to provide the all-important connecting link between a marriage breakdown
and premarital causes.

During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a legal
contract to that of a covenant. The result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in
annulment cases that a person who could intellectually understand the concept of
marriage could necessarily give valid consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and
assume the real obligations of a mature, lifelong commitment are now considered a
necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial consent. 2

Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological incapacity, "not
only to sexual anomalies but to all kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a
spouse or both spouses from assuming or carrying out the essential obligations of
marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each
others' body for heterosexual acts, but is, in its totality, the right to the community of the
whole of life, i.e., the right to a developing. lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since
1973 have refined the meaning of psychological or psychic capacity for marriage as
presupposing the development of an adult personality; as meaning the capacity of the
spouses to give themselves to each other and to accept the other as a distinct person;
that the spouses must be 'other oriented' since the obligations of marriage are rooted in a
self-giving love; and that the spouses must have the capacity for interpersonal
relationship because marriage is more than just a physical reality but involves a true
intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of the obligations of marriage depends.
according to Church decisions, on the strength of this interpersonal relationship. A
serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held to impair the relationship
and consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations. The marital
capacity of one spouse is not considered in isolation but in reference to the fundamental
relationship to the other spouse. 3

Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the mature
marital relationship:

The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a
permanent and faithful commitment to the marriage partner; (2) openness to children and
partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to
cope with the ordinary stresses and strains of marriage, etc.
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that might lead to
the failure of a marriage:

At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal communion even with

the best intentions of the parties. Among the psychic factors possibly giving rise to his or
her inability to fulfill marital obligations are the following: (1) antisocial personality with its
fundamental lack of loyalty to persons or sense of moral values; (2) hyperesthesia, where
the individual has no real freedom of sexual choice; (3) the inadequate personality where
personal responses consistently fallshort of reasonable expectations.

xxx xxx xxx

The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts whether he or
she has a case for an annulment on any other terms. A situation that does not fit into any
of the more traditional categories often fits very easily into the psychological category.

As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting a shift in their
use. Whereas originally the emphasis was on the parties' inability to exercise proper
judgment at the time of the marriage (lack of due discretion), recent cases seem to be
concentrating on the parties' to assume or carry out their responsibilities an obligations
as promised (lack of due competence). An advantage to using the ground of lack of due
competence is that the at the time the marriage was entered into civil divorce and
breakup of the family almost is of someone's failure out marital responsibilities as
promised at the time the marriage was entered into. 4

In the instant case, "opposing and conflicting personalities" of the spouses were not
considered equivalent to psychological incapacity. As well in Santos v. Court of
Appeals cited in the ponencia, the Court held that the failure of the wife to return home
from the U.S. or to communicate with her husband for more then five years is not proof of
her psychological incapacity as to render the marriage a nullity.  Therefore, Art. 36 is
5

inapplicable and the marriages remain valid and subsisting.

However in the recent case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,  this Court upheld both
6

the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals in declaring the presence of
psychological incapacity on the part of the husband. Said petitioner husband, after ten
(10) months' sleeping with his wife never had coitus with her, a fact he did not deny but
he alleged that it was due to the physical disorder of his wife which, however, he failed to
prove. Goaded by the indifference and stubborn refusal of her husband to fulfill a basic
marital obligation described as "to procreate children based on the universal principle
that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage," the
wife brought the action in the lower court to declare the marriage null.

The Court, quoting Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan
Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch I) on Psychological
incapacity concluded:

If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential
marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage
tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn
refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus,
the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is
considered a sign of psychological incapacity.

We declared:
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found
themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital
obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied judgment of respondent appellate
court.

1 concur with the majority opinion that the herein marriage remains valid and subsisting
absent psychological incapacity (under Art. 36 of the Family Code) on the part of either or
both of the spouses.

VITUG, J., concurring:

I fully concur with my esteemed 'colleague Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in

his ponencia, and I find to be most helpful the guidelines that he prepared for the bench
and the bar in the proper appreciation of Article 36 of Executive Order No. 209 ("The
Family Code of the Philippines"). The term "psychological incapacity" was neither defined
nor exemplified by the Family Code. Thus —

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.

The Revision Committee, constituted under the auspices of the U.P. Law Center, which
drafted the Code explained:

(T)he Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis,
guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil
courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law. 1

Article 36 of the Family Code was concededly taken from Canon 1095 of the New Code
of Canon Law —

Canon 1095. (The following persons) are incapable of contracting marriage; (those) —

1. who lack sufficient use of reason;

2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning essential

matrimonial rights and duties, to be given and accepted mutually;

3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential obligations
of marriage —

that should give that much value to Canon Law jurisprudence as an aid to the
interpretation and construction of the statutory enactment.
2

The principles in the proper application of the law teach us that the several provisions of
a Code must be read like a congruent whole. Thus, in determining the import of
"psychological incapacity" under Article 36, one must also read it along with, albeit to be
taken as distinct from, the other grounds enumerated in the Code, like Articles 35, 37, 38
and 41 that would likewise, but for distinct reasons, render the marriage merely voidable,
or Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal separation. Care must be observed so
that these various circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the law were
indifferent on the matter.

I would wish to reiterate the Court's' statement in Santos vs. Court of Appeals;  viz:
3

(T)he use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not
been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned
by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like
circumstances. . . Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed
independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on
marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their
mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability of the spouse to have sexual
relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code
which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void
marriage to be "legitimate."

The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a
party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to
Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or
homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for
legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code,
however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being
themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of
psychological
incapacity.4

In fine, the term "psychological incapacity," to be a ground for then nullity of marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code, must be able to pass the following tests; viz:

First, the incapacity must be psychological or mental, not physical, in nature;

Second, the psychological incapacity must relate to the inability, not mere refusal, to
understand, assume end discharge the basic marital obligations of living together,
observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering mutual help and support;

Third, the psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is contracted
although its overt manifestations and the marriage may occur only thereafter; and

Fourth, the mental disorder must be grave or serious and incurable.

It may well be that the Family Code Revision Committee has envisioned Article 36, as not
a few observers would suspect, as another form of absolute divorce or, as still others
would also put it, to be a alternative to divorce; however, the fact still remains that the
language of the law has failed to carry out, even if true, any such intendment. It might
have indeed turned out for the better, if it were otherwise, there could be good reasons to
doubt the constitutionality of the measure. The fundamental law itself, no less, has laid
down in terse language its unequivocal command on how the State should regard
marriage and the family, thus —
Section 2, Article XV:

Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and
shall be protected by the State.

Section 12, Article II:

Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen
the family as a basic autonomous social institution . . . .

Section 1, Article XV:

Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation.
Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.
(The 1987 Constitution)

The case of Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51, might here be significant not so much for
the specific issue there resolved but for the tone it has set. The Court there has held that
constitutional provisions are to be considered mandatory unless by necessary
implication, a different intention is manifest such that to have them enforced strictly would
cause more harm than by disregarding them. It is quite clear to me that the constitutional
mandate on marriage and the family has not been meant to be simply directory in
character, nor for mere expediency or convenience, but one that demands a meaningful,
not half-hearted, respect.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., concuring opinion:

I concur in the result of the decision penned by Mr. Justice Panganiban but only because
of the peculiar facts of the case. As to whether or not the psychological incapacity exists
in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in any
field of the law, on the facts of the case. In Leouel Santos v. Court of Appeals and Julia
Rosario-Bedia Santos, G.R. No. 112019, 4 January 1995, 240 SCRA 20-36, I
maintained, and I still maintain, that there was psychological incapacity on the part of the
wife to discharge the duties of a wife in a valid marriage. The facts of the present case,
after an indepth study, do not support a similar conclusion. Obviously, each case must be
judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but
according to its own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for
annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case.
The trial judge must take pains in examining the actual millieu and the appellate court
must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.

ROMERO, J., separate opinion:

The majority opinion, overturning that of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
Regional Trial Court ruling. upheld petitioner Solicitor General's position that "opposing
and conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to psychological incapacity, for the latter "is
not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties,
but a defect in their Psychological nature which renders them incapable of performing
such marital responsibilities and duties.
In the present case, the alleged personality traits of Reynaldo, the husband, did not
constitute so much "psychological incapacity" as a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or
"neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. "It is not enough to prove that
the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is
essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological (not physical) illness."

I would add that neither should the incapacity be the result of mental illness. For if it were
due to insanity or defects in the mental faculties short of insanity, there is a resultant
defect of vice of consent, thus rendering the marriage annulable under Art. 45 of the
Family Code.

That the intent of the members of the U.P. Law Center's Civil Code Revision Committee
was to exclude mental inability to understand the essential nature of marriage and focus
strictly on psychological incapacity is demonstrated in the way the provision in question
underwent revisions.

At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision read:

(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of
marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential
marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.

The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally produced the following
revised provision even before the session was over:

(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack or
incapacity becomes manifest after the celebration.

Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has dropped any reference to
"wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature or
marriage" and to "mentally incapacitated." It was explained that these phrases refer to
"defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea . . . but lack of
appreciation of one's marital obligation." There being a defect in consent, "it is clear that it
should be a ground for voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent
and it is capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid intervals and
there are sanity is curable. . . . Psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties
and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to
marriage." 1

My own position as a member of the Committee then was that psychological incapacity
is, in a sense, insanity of a lesser degree.

As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term "psychological or mental

impotence," Archbishop Oscar Cruz opined in he earlier February 9, 1984 session that
this term "is an invention of some churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that is
why it is considered a weak phrase." He said that the Code of Canon Law would rather
express it as "psychological or mental incapacity to discharge. . . ." Justice Ricardo C.
Puno opined that sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent with one but not
with another.

One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the interpretation and
application of Art. 36 is: "Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard
to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex."

The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the inclusion of the phrase"
and is incurable" but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista commented that this would give rise to the
question of how they will determine curability and Justice Caguioa agreed that it would be
more problematic. Yet the possibility that one may be cured after the psychological
incapacity becomes manifest after the marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno and
Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa suggested that the remedy was to allow the
afflicted spouse to remarry.

For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void marriages, viz:

1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage as contract;

2. reasons of public policy;

3. special cases and special situations.

The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under "special cases and special
situations," hence its special treatment in Art. 36 in the Family Code as finally enacted.

Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for avoiding or
annulling marriages that even comes close to being psychological in nature.

Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the marriage, such
marriage which stands valid until annulled is capable of ratification or convalidation.

On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential requisites, some
marriages are void from the beginning.

With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the provisions on Marriage, the
drafters, now open to fresh winds of change in keeping with the more permissive mores
and practices of the time, took a leaf from the relatively liberal provisions of Canon Law.

Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are incapable of
contracting marriage: "3. (those) who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are
unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage" provided the model for what is
now Art. 36 of the Family Code: "A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest
only after its solemnization.

It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only two types of
marriages with respect to their validity: valid and void. Civil Law, however, recognizes an
intermediate state, the voidable or annullable marriages. When the Ecclesiastical
Tribunal "annuls" a marriage, it actually declares the marriage null and void, i.e., it never
really existed in the first place, for a valid sacramental marriage can never be dissolved.
Hence, a properly performed and consummated marriage between two living Roman
Catholics can only be nullified by the formal annulment process which entails a full
tribunal procedure with a Court selection and a formal hearing.

Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by Civil Law as severing the
marriage ties as to capacitate the parties to enter lawfully into another marriage. The
grounds for nullifying civil marriage, not being congruent with those laid down by Canon
Law, the former being more strict, quite a number of married couples have found
themselves in limbo — freed from the marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic Church
but yet unable to contract a valid civil marriage under state laws. Heedless of civil law
sanctions, some persons contract new marriages or enter into live-in relationships.

It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous situations that the
Civil Law Revision Committee decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of
psychological incapacity into the Family Code — and classified the same as a ground for
declaring marriages void ab initio or totally in existent from the beginning.

A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old Code, while it did not
provide directly for psychological incapacity, in effect recognized the same indirectly from
a combination of three old canons: "Canon #1081 required persons to 'be capable
according to law' in order to give valid consent; Canon #1082 required that persons 'be at
least not ignorant' of the major elements required in marriage; and Canon #1087 (the
force and fear category) required that internal and external freedom be present in order
for consent to be valid. This line of interpretation produced two distinct but related
grounds for annulment, called 'lack of due discretion' and 'lack of due competence.' Lack
of due discretion means that the person did not have the ability to give valid consent at
the time of the wedding and therefore the union is invalid. Lack of due competence
means that the person was incapable of carrying out the obligations of the promise he or
she made during the wedding ceremony.

"Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and 1960s
involving sexual disorders such as homosexuality and nymphomania laid the foundation
for a broader approach to the kind of proof necessary for psychological grounds for
annulment. The Rota had reasoned for the first time in several cases that the capacity to
give valid consent at the time of marriage was probably not present in persons who had
displayed such problems shortly after the marriage. The nature of this change was
nothing short of revolutionary. Once the Rota itself had demonstrated a cautious
willingness to use this kind of hindsight, the way was paved for what came after
1970. Diocesan Tribunals began to accept proof of serious psychological problems that
manifested themselves shortly after the ceremony as proof of an inability to give valid
consent at the time of the ceremony.

Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a psychological expert

became increasingly important in such cases. Data about the person's entire life, both
before and after the ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were asked to
give professional opinions about a party's mental at the time of the wedding. These
opinions were rarely challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack
of valid consent.

The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not amount to
the addition of new grounds for annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the
Church to the advances made in psychology during the past decades. There was now
the expertise to provide the all-important connecting link between a marriage breakdown
and premarital causes.

During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a legal
contract to that of a covenant. The result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in
annulment cases that a person who could intellectually understand the concept of
marriage could necessarily give valid consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and
assume the real obligations of a mature, lifelong commitment are now considered a
necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial consent. 2
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological incapacity, "not
only to sexual anomalies but to all kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a
spouse or both spouses from assuming or carrying out the essential obligations of
marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each
others' body for heterosexual acts, but is, in its totality, the right to the community of the
whole of life, i.e., the right to a developing. lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since
1973 have refined the meaning of psychological or psychic capacity for marriage as
presupposing the development of an adult personality; as meaning the capacity of the
spouses to give themselves to each other and to accept the other as a distinct person;
that the spouses must be 'other oriented' since the obligations of marriage are rooted in a
self-giving love; and that the spouses must have the capacity for interpersonal
relationship because marriage is more than just a physical reality but involves a true
intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of the obligations of marriage depends.
according to Church decisions, on the strength of this interpersonal relationship. A
serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held to impair the relationship
and consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations. The marital
capacity of one spouse is not considered in isolation but in reference to the fundamental
relationship to the other spouse. 3

Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the mature
marital relationship:

The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a
permanent and faithful commitment to the marriage partner; (2) openness to children and
partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to
cope with the ordinary stresses and strains of marriage, etc.

Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that might lead to
the failure of a marriage:

At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal communion even with

the best intentions of the parties. Among the psychic factors possibly giving rise to his or
her inability to fulfill marital obligations are the following: (1) antisocial personality with its
fundamental lack of loyalty to persons or sense of moral values; (2) hyperesthesia, where
the individual has no real freedom of sexual choice; (3) the inadequate personality where
personal responses consistently fallshort of reasonable expectations.

xxx xxx xxx

The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts whether he or
she has a case for an annulment on any other terms. A situation that does not fit into any
of the more traditional categories often fits very easily into the psychological category.

As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting a shift in their
use. Whereas originally the emphasis was on the parties' inability to exercise proper
judgment at the time of the marriage (lack of due discretion), recent cases seem to be
concentrating on the parties' to assume or carry out their responsibilities an obligations
as promised (lack of due competence). An advantage to using the ground of lack of due
competence is that the at the time the marriage was entered into civil divorce and
breakup of the family almost is of someone's failure out marital responsibilities as
promised at the time the marriage was entered into. 4

In the instant case, "opposing and conflicting personalities" of the spouses were not
considered equivalent to psychological incapacity. As well in Santos v. Court of
Appeals cited in the ponencia, the Court held that the failure of the wife to return home
from the U.S. or to communicate with her husband for more then five years is not proof of
her psychological incapacity as to render the marriage a nullity.  Therefore, Art. 36 is
5

inapplicable and the marriages remain valid and subsisting.

However in the recent case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,  this Court upheld both
6

the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals in declaring the presence of
psychological incapacity on the part of the husband. Said petitioner husband, after ten
(10) months' sleeping with his wife never had coitus with her, a fact he did not deny but
he alleged that it was due to the physical disorder of his wife which, however, he failed to
prove. Goaded by the indifference and stubborn refusal of her husband to fulfill a basic
marital obligation described as "to procreate children based on the universal principle
that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage," the
wife brought the action in the lower court to declare the marriage null.

The Court, quoting Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan
Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch I) on Psychological
incapacity concluded:

If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential
marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage
tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn
refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus,
the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is
considered a sign of psychological incapacity.

We declared:

This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found
themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital
obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied judgment of respondent appellate
court.

1 concur with the majority opinion that the herein marriage remains valid and subsisting
absent psychological incapacity (under Art. 36 of the Family Code) on the part of either or
both of the spouses.

VITUG, J., concurring:

I fully concur with my esteemed 'colleague Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in

his ponencia, and I find to be most helpful the guidelines that he prepared for the bench
and the bar in the proper appreciation of Article 36 of Executive Order No. 209 ("The
Family Code of the Philippines"). The term "psychological incapacity" was neither defined
nor exemplified by the Family Code. Thus —

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.

The Revision Committee, constituted under the auspices of the U.P. Law Center, which
drafted the Code explained:

(T)he Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis,
guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil
courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law. 1

Article 36 of the Family Code was concededly taken from Canon 1095 of the New Code
of Canon Law —

Canon 1095. (The following persons) are incapable of contracting marriage; (those) —

1. who lack sufficient use of reason;

2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning essential

matrimonial rights and duties, to be given and accepted mutually;

3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential obligations
of marriage —

that should give that much value to Canon Law jurisprudence as an aid to the
interpretation and construction of the statutory enactment. 2

The principles in the proper application of the law teach us that the several provisions of
a Code must be read like a congruent whole. Thus, in determining the import of
"psychological incapacity" under Article 36, one must also read it along with, albeit to be
taken as distinct from, the other grounds enumerated in the Code, like Articles 35, 37, 38
and 41 that would likewise, but for distinct reasons, render the marriage merely voidable,
or Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal separation. Care must be observed so
that these various circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the law were
indifferent on the matter.

I would wish to reiterate the Court's' statement in Santos vs. Court of Appeals;  viz:
3

(T)he use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not
been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned
by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like
circumstances. . . Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed
independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on
marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their
mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability of the spouse to have sexual
relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code
which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void
marriage to be "legitimate."

The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a
party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to
Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or
homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for
legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code,
however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being
themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of
psychological
incapacity.4

In fine, the term "psychological incapacity," to be a ground for then nullity of marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code, must be able to pass the following tests; viz:

First, the incapacity must be psychological or mental, not physical, in nature;

Second, the psychological incapacity must relate to the inability, not mere refusal, to
understand, assume end discharge the basic marital obligations of living together,
observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering mutual help and support;

Third, the psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is contracted
although its overt manifestations and the marriage may occur only thereafter; and

Fourth, the mental disorder must be grave or serious and incurable.

It may well be that the Family Code Revision Committee has envisioned Article 36, as not
a few observers would suspect, as another form of absolute divorce or, as still others
would also put it, to be a alternative to divorce; however, the fact still remains that the
language of the law has failed to carry out, even if true, any such intendment. It might
have indeed turned out for the better, if it were otherwise, there could be good reasons to
doubt the constitutionality of the measure. The fundamental law itself, no less, has laid
down in terse language its unequivocal command on how the State should regard
marriage and the family, thus —

Section 2, Article XV:

Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and
shall be protected by the State.

Section 12, Article II:

Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen
the family as a basic autonomous social institution . . . .

Section 1, Article XV:

Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation.
Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.
(The 1987 Constitution)

The case of Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51, might here be significant not so much for
the specific issue there resolved but for the tone it has set. The Court there has held that
constitutional provisions are to be considered mandatory unless by necessary
implication, a different intention is manifest such that to have them enforced strictly would
cause more harm than by disregarding them. It is quite clear to me that the constitutional
mandate on marriage and the family has not been meant to be simply directory in
character, nor for mere expediency or convenience, but one that demands a meaningful,
not half-hearted, respect.
 THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 136490               October 19, 2000

BRENDA B. MARCOS, petitioner,
vs.
WILSON G. MARCOS, respondent.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be

established by the totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement, however, that
the respondent should be examined by a physician or a psychologist as a conditio sine
qua non for such declaration.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,

assailing the July 24, 1998 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No.
1 

55588, which disposed as follows:

"WHEREFORE, the contested decision is set aside and the marriage between the parties
is hereby declared valid."2

Also challenged by petitioner is the December 3, 1998 CA Resolution denying her Motion
for Reconsideration.

Earlier, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had ruled thus:

"WHEREFORE, the marriage between petitioner Brenda B. Marcos and respondent

Wilson G. Marcos, solemnized on September 6, 1982 in Pasig City is declared null and
void ab initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code. The conjugal properties, if any, is
dissolved [sic] in accordance with Articles 126 and 129 of the same Code in relation to
Articles 50, 51 and 52 relative to the delivery of the legitime of [the] parties' children. In
the best interest and welfare of the minor children, their custody is granted to petitioner
subject to the visitation rights of respondent.

"Upon finality of this Decision, furnish copy each to the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Pasig City where the marriage was solemnized, the National Census and Statistics
Office, Manila and the Register of Deeds of Mandaluyong City for their appropriate action
consistent with this Decision.

"SO ORDERED."

The Facts

The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:

"It was established during the trial that the parties were married twice: (1) on September
6, 1982 which was solemnized by Judge Eriberto H. Espiritu at the Municipal Court of
Pasig (Exh. A); and (2) on May 8, 1983 which was solemnized by Rev. Eduardo L.
Eleazar, Command Chaplain, at the Presidential Security Command Chapel in
Malacañang Park, Manila (Exh. A-1). Out of their marriage, five (5) children were born
(Exhs. B, C, D, E and F).

"Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the Armed Forces of the Philippines in 1973. Later
on, he was transferred to the Presidential Security Command in Malacañang during the
Marcos Regime. Appellee Brenda B. Marcos, on the other hand, joined the Women's
Auxilliary Corps under the Philippine Air Force in 1978. After the Edsa Revolution, both of
them sought a discharge from the military service.

"They first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were assigned at the Malacañang
Palace, she as an escort of Imee Marcos and he as a Presidential Guard of President
Ferdinand Marcos. Through telephone conversations, they became acquainted and
eventually became sweethearts.

"After their marriage on September 6, 1982, they resided at No. 1702 Daisy Street, Hulo
Bliss, Mandaluyong, a housing unit which she acquired from the Bliss Development
Corporation when she was still single.

"After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the military service in 1987 and then
engaged in different business ventures that did not however prosper. As a wife, she
always urged him to look for work so that their children would see him, instead of her, as
the head of the family and a good provider. Due to his failure to engage in any gainful
employment, they would often quarrel and as a consequence, he would hit and beat her.
He would even force her to have sex with him despite her weariness. He would also
inflict physical harm on their children for a slight mistake and was so severe in the way he
chastised them. Thus, for several times during their cohabitation, he would leave their
house. In 1992, they were already living separately.

"All the while, she was engrossed in the business of selling "magic uling" and chickens.
While she was still in the military, she would first make deliveries early in the morning
before going to Malacañang. When she was discharged from the military service, she
concentrated on her business. Then, she became a supplier in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines until she was able to put up a trading and construction company, NS Ness
Trading and Construction Development Corporation.

"The 'straw that broke the camel's back' took place on October 16, 1994, when they had
a bitter quarrel. As they were already living separately, she did not want him to stay in
their house anymore. On that day, when she saw him in their house, she was so angry
that she lambasted him. He then turned violent, inflicting physical harm on her and even
on her mother who came to her aid. The following day, October 17, 1994, she and their
children left the house and sought refuge in her sister's house.

"On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself [to] medical examination at the
Mandaluyong Medical Center where her injuries were diagnosed as contusions (Exh. G,
Records, 153).

"Sometime in August 1995, she together with her two sisters and driver, went to him at
the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong to look for their missing child, Niko. Upon seeing them, he
got mad. After knowing the reason for their unexpected presence, he ran after them with
a samurai and even [beat] her driver.

"At the time of the filing of this case, she and their children were renting a house in
Camella, Parañaque, while the appellant was residing at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong.

"In the case study conducted by Social Worker Sonia C. Millan, the children described
their father as cruel and physically abusive to them (Exh. UU, Records, pp. 85-100).

"The appellee submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A. Dayan, Ph.D., for

psychological evaluation (Exh. YY, Records, pp. 207-216), while the appellant on the
other hand, did not.

"The court a quo found the appellant to be psychologically incapacitated to perform his

marital obligations mainly because of his failure to find work to support his family and his
violent attitude towards appellee and their children, x x x."
3

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Reversing the RTC, the CA held that psychological incapacity had not been established
by the totality of the evidence presented. It ratiocinated in this wise:

"Essential in a petition for annulment is the allegation of the root cause of the spouse's
psychological incapacity which should also be medically or clinically identified, sufficiently
proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision. The incapacity must be proven
to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage and shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. It must also be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the parties to assume the essential obligations of marriage as set forth in
Articles 68 to 71 and Articles 220 to 225 of the Family Code and such non-complied
marital obligations must similarly be alleged in the petition, established by evidence and
explained in the decision.

"In the case before us, the appellant was not subjected to any psychological or
psychiatric evaluation. The psychological findings about the appellant by psychiatrist
Natividad Dayan were based only on the interviews conducted with the appellee. Expert
evidence by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists is essential if only to prove
that the parties were or any one of them was mentally or psychically ill to be truly
incognitive of the marital obligations he or she was assuming, or as would make him or
her x x x unable to assume them. In fact, he offered testimonial evidence to show that he
[was] not psychologically incapacitated. The root cause of his supposed incapacity was
not alleged in the petition, nor medically or clinically identified as a psychological illness
or sufficiently proven by an expert. Similarly, there is no evidence at all that would show
that the appellant was suffering from an incapacity which [was] psychological or mental -
not physical to the extent that he could not have known the obligations he was assuming:
that the incapacity [was] grave, ha[d] preceded the marriage and [was] incurable." 4

Hence, this Petition. 5

Issues

In her Memorandum, petitioner presents for this Court's consideration the following
6 

issues:

"I. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals could set aside the findings by the
Regional Trial Court of psychological incapacity of a respondent in a Petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage simply because the respondent did not subject himself
to psychological evaluation.

II. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented and the demeanor of all the
witnesses should be the basis of the determination of the merits of the Petition." 7

The Court's Ruling

We agree with petitioner that the personal medical or psychological examination of

respondent is not a requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity.
Nevertheless, the totality of the evidence she presented does not show such incapacity.

Preliminary Issue: Need for Personal Medical Examination

Petitioner contends that the testimonies and the results of various tests that were
submitted to determine respondent's psychological incapacity to perform the obligations
of marriage should not have been brushed aside by the Court of Appeals, simply
because respondent had not taken those tests himself. Petitioner adds that the CA
should have realized that under the circumstances, she had no choice but to rely on
other sources of information in order to determine the psychological capacity of
respondent, who had refused to submit himself to such tests.

In Republic v. CA and Molina, the guidelines governing the application and the
8 

interpretation of psychological incapacity referred to in Article 36 of the Family Code 9 

were laid down by this Court as follows:

"1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and
our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution
devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it 'as the foundation of the nation.' It
decrees marriage as legally 'inviolable,' thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim
of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be 'protected' by the state.

x x x           x x x          x x x

2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must
be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such
root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.

3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the time of the celebration' of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their 'I do's.' The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such
time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or

incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to
those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job.
Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing
medicine to cure them but not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise
his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, 'mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness
must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the
person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.

6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of

the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of
the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.

7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic

Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect
by our courts.

x x x           x x x          x x x

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General
to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein
his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for
resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of
the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095." 10

The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court
in Santos v. Court of Appeals: "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
11 

gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." The foregoing guidelines do not
require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated.
In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is important is the
presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological condition.
For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need
not be resorted to.

Main Issue: Totality of Evidence Presented

The main question, then, is whether the totality of the evidence presented in the present
case -- including the testimonies of petitioner, the common children, petitioner's sister
and the social worker -- was enough to sustain a finding that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated.

We rule in the negative. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent
failed to provide material support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse
and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological
incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already
present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.

Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job
and was not gainfully employed for a period of more than six years. It was during this
period that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support, and
even left the family home.

Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the
inception of the marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence showing that his
condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver.
1âwphi1

Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that
cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a
serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage.
It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties
and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These marital
obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family
Code.

Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not
be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral
corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity,
abandonment and the like. At best, the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to
12 

grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.

Because Article 36 has been abused as a convenient divorce law, this Court laid down
the procedural requirements for its invocation in Molina. Petitioner, however, has not
faithfully observed them.

In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of petitioner to
show that the alleged psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurability; and for her failure to observe the guidelines outlined
in Molina.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and assailed Decision AFFIRMED, except that

portion requiring personal medical examination as a conditio sine qua non to a finding of
psychological incapacity. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 167523             June 27, 2008

NILDA V. NAVALES, petitioner,
vs.
REYNALDO NAVALES, respondent. *

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision1 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 76624 promulgated on February 16, 2005 which
affirmed the Judgment2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 59 of Toledo City, in
Civil Case No. T-799 dated January 2, 2002, declaring the nullity of the marriage of
Reynaldo and Nilda Navales on the ground of psychological incapacity.

The facts are as follows:

Reynaldo Navales (Reynaldo) and Nilda Navales (Nilda) met in 1986 in a local bar where
Nilda worked as a waitress. The two became lovers and Nilda quit her job, managed a
boarding house owned by her uncle and studied Health Aide financed by Reynaldo.
Upon learning that Nilda's uncle was prodding her to marry an American, Reynaldo, not
wanting to lose her, asked her to marry him. This, despite his knowledge that Nilda was
writing her penpals and was asking money from them and that she had an illegitimate
son by a man whose identity she did not reveal to him. 3 The two got married on
December 29, 1988, before the Municipal Trial Court Judge of San Fernando, Cebu. 4

Reynaldo claims that during the first year of their marriage, their relationship went well.
Problems arose, however, when Nilda started selling RTWs and cosmetics, since she
could no longer take care of him and attend to household chores. 5 Things worsened
when she started working as an aerobics instructor at the YMCA, where, according to
Reynaldo, Nilda's flirtatiousness and promiscuity recurred. She wore tight-fitting outfits,
allowed male clients to touch her body, and introduced herself as single. Reynaldo
received phone calls from different men looking for Nilda. There was also a time when
Nilda chose to ride with another man instead of Reynaldo; and another when Nilda went
home late, riding in the car of the man who kissed her. Reynaldo also claims that Nilda
refused to have a child with him, as it would destroy her figure. 6 On June 18, 1992,
Reynaldo left Nilda and never reconciled with her again. 7

On August 30, 1999, Reynaldo filed a Petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage and Damages before the RTC, Toledo City, Cebu, docketed as Civil Case No.
T-799 claiming that his marriage with Nilda did not cure Nilda's flirtatiousness and sexual
promiscuity, and that her behavior indicates her lack of understanding and appreciation
of the meaning of marriage, rendering the same void under Article 36 of the Family
Code.8

Reynaldo testified in support of his petition and presented telephone directories showing
that Nilda used her maiden name "Bacon" instead of "Navales." 9 Reynaldo also
presented Josefino Ramos, who testified that he was with Reynaldo when Reynaldo first
met Nilda at the bar called "Appetizer," and that he (Ramos) himself was attracted to
Nilda since she was sexy, beautiful, and jolly to talk with. 10 Reynaldo also presented
Violeta Abales, his cousin, who testified that she was a vendor at the YMCA where Nilda
worked and was known by her maiden name; that she knows Nilda is sexy and wears
tight fitting clothes; that her companions are mostly males and she flirts with them; and
that there was one time that Reynaldo fetched Nilda at YMCA but Nilda went with
another man, which angered Reynaldo. 11

Finally, Reynaldo presented Leticia Vatanagul, a Clinical Psychologist and Social Worker
who drafted a Psychological Assessment of Marriage dated March 28, 2001. 12 In said
Assessment, Vatanagul concluded that Nilda is a nymphomaniac, who has a borderline
personality, a social deviant, an alcoholic, and suffering from anti-social personality
disorder, among others, which illnesses are incurable and are the causes of Nilda’s
psychological incapacity to perform her marital role as wife to Reynaldo. 13

Nilda, for her part, claims that Reynaldo knew that she had a child before she met him,
yet Reynaldo continued courting her; thus, their eventual marriage. 14 She claims that it
was actually Reynaldo who was linked with several women, who went home very late,
kept his earnings for himself, and subjected her to physical harm whenever she called his
attention to his vices. She worked at the YMCA to cope with the needs of life, and she
taught only female students. Reynaldo abandoned her for other women, the latest of
whom was Liberty Lim whom she charged, together with Reynaldo, with
concubinage.15 Nilda presented a certification from the YMCA dated October 17, 2001
stating that she was an aerobics instructress for a program that was exclusively for
ladies,16 as well as a statement of accounts from PLDT showing that she used her
married name, Nilda B. Navales.17

On January 2, 2002, the RTC rendered its Decision disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in the above-entitled

case declaring defendant Nilda B. Navales as psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her
marital obligations with plaintiff Reynaldo V. Navales and further declaring their marriage
contracted on December 29, 1988, before the Municipal Judge of the Municipal Trial
Court of San Fernando, Cebu, as null and void.18

The RTC held that:

x x x From the testimonies and evidences x x x adduced, it was clearly established that
the defendant had no full understanding of [the] effects of marriage and had no
appreciation of [the] consequences of marriage as shown by her x x x act of concealing
her marital status by using her maiden name "Nilda T. Bacon", augmenting her pretense
of being still single through the telephone directories; by her refusal to accompany with
[sic] her husband despite of the latter's insistence, but rather opted to ride other man's
jeep, whose name her husband did not even know; by her act of allowing a man other
than her husband to touch her legs even in her husband's presence; by allowing another
man to kiss her even in the full view of her husband; by preferring to loss [sic] her
husband rather than losing her job as aerobic instructress and on top of all, by refusing to
bear a child fathered by her husband because it will destroy her figure, is a clear
indication of the herein defendant's psychological incapacity. 19

Nilda filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the RTC denied on April 10, 2002. 20

The CA dismissed Nilda’s appeal, ruling that the RTC correctly held that Nilda concealed
her marital status, as shown by the telephone listings in which Nilda used her maiden
name; that nymphomania, the condition which the expert said Nilda was afflicted with,
was a ground for psychological incapacity; and that the RTC correctly gave weight to the
four pieces of testimonial evidence presented by Reynaldo vis-a-vis the lone testimony of
Nilda.21

Nilda now comes before the Court alleging that:

The petitioner is not psychologically incapacitated to comply [with] her marital

obligations as a wife.

II

Psychological incapacity, if ever existing, of the wife is NOT PERMAMENT or

INCURABLE and was NEVER EXISTING AT THE TIME OF THE CELEBRATION OF
MARRIAGE.
 III

The petitioner is not a nymphomaniac.

IV

The effort of herein petitioner into the case shows that she is consciously and
nobly preserving and continue to believe that marriage is inviolable rather [sic].

The guidelines of Molina case in the application of Article 36 of the New Family
Code has not been strictly complied with.22

Nilda claims that she did not fail in her duty to observe mutual love, respect and fidelity;
that she never had any illicit relationship with any man; that no case for inchastity was
initiated by Reynaldo against her, and that it was actually Reynaldo who had a pending
case for concubinage.23 She questions the lower courts’ finding that she is a
nymphomaniac, since she was never interviewed by the expert witness to verify the truth
of Reynaldo's allegations. There is also not a single evidence to show that she had
sexual intercourse with a man other than her husband while they were still living
together.24

Nilda also avers that the guidelines in Republic of the Phillippines. v. Molina 25 were not
complied with. The RTC resolved the doubt on her motive for using her maiden name in
the telephone directory in favor of the dissolution of the marriage instead of its
preservation. The expert opinion was given weight, even though it was baseless to
establish that petitioner had psychological incapacity to comply with her marital
obligations as a wife; and that, assuming that such incapacity existed, it was already
existing at the time of the marriage; and that such incapacity was incurable and grave
enough to bring about the disability of the wife to assume the essential obligations of
marriage.26

Reynaldo, for his part, argues that while the petition is captioned as one under Rule 45, it
is actually a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, since it impleads the CA as respondent
and alleges that the CA acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction. 27 Reynaldo also claims that the
issues raised by Nilda necessarily require a review of the factual findings of the lower
courts, which matters have already been decided and passed upon, and factual findings
of the courts a quo are binding on this Court; that only questions of law may be raised
before this Court; that the RTC, in reaching its decision, complied with the requirements
of Molina; that the Solicitor General was represented by the City Prosecutor of Toledo
City; and that Reynaldo discharged the burden of proof to show the nullity of his marriage
to Nilda.

Reynaldo further averred that he testified on his behalf; presented corroborating

witnesses, one of whom is an expert clinical psychologist, as well as documentary
evidence in support of his cause of action; that Molina did not require that the
psychologist examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated; that Nilda
did not rebut the psychologist's findings and did not present her own expert to disprove
the findings of Vatanagul; that Nilda's psychological incapacity, caused by nymphomania,
was duly proven to have been existing prior to and at the time of her marriage to
Reynaldo and to have become manifest during her marriage, based on the testimonies of
Reynaldo and his witnesses; and that such incapacity was proven to be incurable, as
shown by the report of Vatanagul. 28
Nilda filed a Reply, and both parties filed their respective memoranda reiterating their
arguments.29

Simply stated, the issue posed before the Court is whether the marriage between
Reynaldo and Nilda is null and void on the ground of Nilda's psychological incapacity.

The answer, contrary to the findings of the RTC and the CA, is in the negative.

Preliminarily, let it be stressed that it is the policy of our Constitution to protect and
strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution, and marriage as the
foundation of the family.30 The Constitution decrees marriage as legally inviolable and
protects it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. 31 The Family Code under Article
4832 therefore requires courts to order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned, in
cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, to appear on behalf of
the State in order to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care
that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Indeed, only the active participation of
the Public Prosecutor or the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) will ensure that the
interest of the State is represented and protected in proceedings for annulment and
declarations of nullity of marriage by preventing collusion between the parties, or the
fabrication or suppression of evidence.33

While the guidelines in Molina requiring the OSG to issue a certification on whether or not
it is agreeing or objecting to the petition for annulment has been dispensed with by A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC or the Rule on the Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages, 34 still, Article 48 mandates the appearance and active
participation of the State through the fiscal or the prosecuting attorney. 35

In this case, contrary to the assertion of the RTC that the OSG actively participated in the
case through the Office of the City Prosecutor, records show that the State's participation
consists only of the Report dated November 29, 1999 by Assistant City Prosecutor
Gabriel L. Trocio, Jr. stating that no collusion exists between the parties; 36 the OSG's
Opposition to the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage dated June 2, 2000; 37 and
the cross-examination conducted by Prosecutor Trocio on Reynaldo 38 and his witness
Abales.39 There were no other pleadings, motions, or position papers filed by the Public
Prosecutor or OSG; and no controverting evidence presented by them before the
judgment was rendered. Considering the interest sought to be protected by the
aforestated rules, the Court finds the State's participation in this case to be wanting. 40

But even on the merits, the Court finds that the totality of evidence presented by
Reynaldo, contrary to its appreciation by the RTC and the CA, is insufficient to sustain a
finding that Nilda is psychologically incapacitated.

Generally, factual findings of trial courts, when affirmed by the CA, are binding on this
Court. Such principle however is not absolute, such as when the findings of the appellate
court go beyond the issues of the case; run contrary to the admissions of the parties; fail
to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different
conclusion; or when there is a misappreciation of facts.41 Such is the case at bar.

Psychological incapacity, in order to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article
3642 of the Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even
before the celebration of marriage. It is a malady that is so grave and permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one
is about to assume. As all people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated
traits associated with certain personality disorders, there is hardly any doubt that the
intention of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. 43

In Santos v. Court of Appeals,44 the Court held that psychological incapacity must be

characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. 45 In Republic of
the Philippines v. Molina,46 the Court further set forth guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Article 36 of the Family Code, thus:

1. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. x x x

2. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must
be psychological --- not physical, although its manifestation and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known that
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root
cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.

3. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their "I do's". The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such
time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

4. Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent

or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to
those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. x
x x.

5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness
must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the
person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.

6. The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of

the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of
the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.

7. Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic

Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect
by our courts. x x x.47
In this case, Reynaldo and his witnesses sought to establish that Nilda was a flirt before
the marriage, which flirtatiousness recurred when she started working as an aerobics
instructress. The instances alleged by Reynaldo, i.e., the occasion when Nilda chose to
ride home with another man instead of him, that he saw Nilda being kissed by another
man while in a car, and that Nilda allowed other men to touch her body, if true, would
understandably hurt and embarrass him. Still, these acts by themselves are insufficient to
establish a psychological or mental defect that is serious, incurable or grave as
contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code.

Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to

assume basic marital obligations. 48 Mere "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the
performance of marital obligations or "ill will" on the part of the spouse is different from
"incapacity" rooted on some debilitating psychological condition or illness. 49 Indeed,
irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological
incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a person's refusal or
unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage and not due to some
psychological illness that is contemplated by said rule. 50

As admitted by Reynaldo, his marriage with Nilda was not all that bad; in fact, it went well
in the first year of their marriage. As in other cases, an admission of a good and
harmonious relationship during the early part of the marriage weakens the assertion of
psychological defect existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage which deprived
the party of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and its concomitant
responsibilities.51

In determining the import of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36, the same must
be read in conjunction with, although to be taken as distinct from, Articles
35,52 37,53 3854 and 4155of the Family Code that would likewise, but for different reasons,
render the marriage void ab initio; or Article 45 that would make the marriage merely
voidable; or Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal separation. 56 These various
circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the
matter.57 Indeed, Article 36 should not be equated with legal separation, in which the
grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral
pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual
infidelity, abandonment and the like.58

Reynaldo presented telephone directories in which Nilda used her maiden name "Bacon"
to prove that Nilda represented herself as single. As noted by the CA, however, the
telephone listings presented by Reynaldo were for the years 1993 to 1995, 59 after
Reynaldo admittedly left Nilda on June 18, 1992. Apart from Reynaldo and Abalales's
testimony, therefore, Reynaldo has no proof that Nilda represented herself as single
while they were still living together. The Court cannot agree with the RTC, therefore, that
said telephone listings show that Nilda represented herself to be single, which in turn
manifests her lack of understanding of the consequences of marriage.

Reynaldo also presented Clinical Psychologist Vatanagul to bolster his claim that Nilda is
psychologically incapacitated. While it is true that the Court relies heavily on
psychological experts for its understanding of the human personality, 60 and that there is
no requirement that the defendant spouse be personally examined by a physician or
psychologist before the nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity may be
declared,61 still, the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be identified as a
psychological illness, its incapacitating nature fully explained, 62 and said incapacity
established by the totality of the evidence presented during trial. 63
The Court finds that the psychological report presented in this case is insufficient to
establish Nilda's psychological incapacity. In her report, Vatanagul concluded that Nilda
is a nymphomaniac, an emotionally immature individual, has a borderline personality, has
strong sexual urges which are incurable, has complete denial of her actual role as a wife,
has a very weak conscience or superego, emotionally immature, a social deviant, not a
good wife as seen in her infidelity on several occasions, an alcoholic, suffers from anti-
social personality disorder, fails to conform to social norms, deceitful, impulsive, irritable
and aggresive, irresponsible and vain. 64 She further defined "nymphomia" as a psychiatric
disorder that involves a disturbance in motor behavior as shown by her sexual
relationship with various men other than her husband. 65

The report failed to specify, however, the names of the men Nilda had sexual relationship
with or the circumstances surrounding the same. As pointed out by Nilda, there is not
even a single proof that she was ever involved in an illicit relationship with a man other
than her husband. Vatanagul claims, during her testimony, that in coming out with the
report, she interviewed not only Reynaldo but also Jojo Caballes, Dorothy and Lesley
who were Reynaldo's sister-in-law and sister, respectively, a certain Marvin and a certain
Susan.66 Vatanagul however, did not specify the identities of these persons, which
information were supplied by whom, and how they came upon their respective
informations. Indeed, the conclusions drawn by the report are vague, sweeping and lack
sufficient factual bases. As the report lacked specificity, it failed to show the root cause of
Nilda's psychological incapacity; and failed to demonstrate that there was a "natal or
supervening disabling factor" or an "adverse integral element" in Nilda's character that
effectively incapacitated her from accepting, and thereby complying with, the essential
marital obligations, and that her psychological or mental malady existed even before the
marriage.67 Hence, the Court cannot give weight to said assessment.

The standards used by the Court in assessing the sufficiency of psychological reports
may be deemed very strict, but that is only proper in view of the principle that any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage and the indissolubility of the
marital vinculum.68

Reynaldo also claims that Nilda does not want to get pregnant which allegation was
upheld by the trial court. A review of the records shows, however, that apart from the
testimony of Reynaldo, no other proof was presented to support such claim. Mere
allegation and nothing more is insufficient to support such proposition. As petitioner
before the trial court, it devolves upon Reynaldo to discharge the burden of establishing
the grounds that would justify the nullification of the marriage. 69

While Reynaldo and Nilda's marriage failed and appears to be without hope of
reconciliation, the remedy, however, is not always to have it declared void ab initio on the
ground of psychological incapacity. A marriage, no matter how unsatisfactory, is not a
null and void marriage.70 And this Court, even as the highest one, can only apply the
letter and spirit of the law, no matter how harsh it may be. 71

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 76624 promulgated on February 16, 2005 and the Decision dated
January 2, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 59 of Toledo City, in Civil Case No.
T-799 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage and damages, docketed as Civil Case No. T-799, is DISMISSED.

Costs against respondent.

SO ORDERED.
 MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 161793               February 13, 2009

EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE, Petitioner,

vs.
ROWENA ONG GUTIERREZ YU-TE, Respondent,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Oppositor.
 DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Far from novel is the issue involved in this petition. Psychological incapacity, since its
incorporation in our laws, has become a clichéd subject of discussion in our
jurisprudence. The Court treats this case, however, with much ado, it having realized that
current jurisprudential doctrine has unnecessarily imposed a perspective by which
psychological incapacity should be viewed, totally inconsistent with the way the concept
was formulated—free in form and devoid of any definition.

For the resolution of the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court assailing the August 5, 2003 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CV No. 71867. The petition further assails the January 19, 2004
Resolution2 denying the motion for the reconsideration of the challenged decision.

The relevant facts and proceedings follow.

Petitioner Edward Kenneth Ngo Te first got a glimpse of respondent Rowena Ong
Gutierrez Yu-Te in a gathering organized by the Filipino-Chinese association in their
college. Edward was then initially attracted to Rowena’s close friend; but, as the latter
already had a boyfriend, the young man decided to court Rowena. That was in January
1996, when petitioner was a sophomore student and respondent, a freshman. 3

Sharing similar angst towards their families, the two understood one another and
developed a certain degree of closeness towards each other. In March 1996, or around
three months after their first meeting, Rowena asked Edward that they elope. At first, he
refused, bickering that he was young and jobless. Her persistence, however, made him
relent. Thus, they left Manila and sailed to Cebu that month; he, providing their travel
money and she, purchasing the boat ticket.4

However, Edward’s ₱80,000.00 lasted for only a month. Their pension house
accommodation and daily sustenance fast depleted it. And they could not find a job. In
April 1996, they decided to go back to Manila. Rowena proceeded to her uncle’s house
and Edward to his parents’ home. As his family was abroad, and Rowena kept on
telephoning him, threatening him that she would commit suicide, Edward agreed to stay
with Rowena at her uncle’s place.5

On April 23, 1996, Rowena’s uncle brought the two to a court to get married. He was
then 25 years old, and she, 20. 6 The two then continued to stay at her uncle’s place
where Edward was treated like a prisoner—he was not allowed to go out
unaccompanied. Her uncle also showed Edward his guns and warned the latter not to
leave Rowena.7 At one point, Edward was able to call home and talk to his brother who
suggested that they should stay at their parents’ home and live with them. Edward
relayed this to Rowena who, however, suggested that he should get his inheritance so
that they could live on their own. Edward talked to his father about this, but the patriarch
got mad, told Edward that he would be disinherited, and insisted that Edward must go
home.8

After a month, Edward escaped from the house of Rowena’s uncle, and stayed with his
parents. His family then hid him from Rowena and her family whenever they telephoned
to ask for him.9

In June 1996, Edward was able to talk to Rowena. Unmoved by his persistence that they
should live with his parents, she said that it was better for them to live separate lives.
They then parted ways.10
After almost four years, or on January 18, 2000, Edward filed a petition before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 106, for the annulment of his
marriage to Rowena on the basis of the latter’s psychological incapacity. This was
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-00-39720. 11

As Rowena did not file an answer, the trial court, on July 11, 2000, ordered the Office of
the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Quezon City to investigate whether there was collusion
between the parties.12 In the meantime, on July 27, 2000, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) entered its appearance and deputized the OCP to appear on its behalf
and assist it in the scheduled hearings.13

On August 23, 2000, the OCP submitted an investigation report stating that it could not
determine if there was collusion between the parties; thus, it recommended trial on the
merits.14

The clinical psychologist who examined petitioner found both parties psychologically
incapacitated, and made the following findings and conclusions:

BACKGROUND DATA & BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY:

EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE is a [29-year-old] Filipino male adult born

and baptized Born Again Christian at Manila. He finished two years in
college at AMA Computer College last 1994 and is currently unemployed.
He is married to and separated from ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE. He
presented himself at my office for a psychological evaluation in relation to
his petition for Nullification of Marriage against the latter by the grounds of
psychological incapacity. He is now residing at 181 P. Tuazon Street,
Quezon City.

Petitioner got himself three siblings who are now in business and one deceased sister.
Both his parents are also in the business world by whom he [considers] as generous,
hospitable, and patient. This said virtues are said to be handed to each of the family
member. He generally considers himself to be quiet and simple. He clearly remembers
himself to be afraid of meeting people. After 1994, he tried his luck in being a Sales
Executive of Mansfield International Incorporated. And because of job incompetence, as
well as being quiet and loner, he did not stay long in the job until 1996. His interest lie[s]
on becoming a full servant of God by being a priest or a pastor. He [is] said to isolate
himself from his friends even during his childhood days as he only loves to read the Bible
and hear its message.

Respondent is said to come from a fine family despite having a lazy father and a
disobedient wife. She is said to have not finish[ed] her collegiate degree and shared
intimate sexual moments with her boyfriend prior to that with petitioner.

In January of 1996, respondent showed her kindness to petitioner and this became the
foundation of their intimate relationship. After a month of dating, petitioner mentioned to
respondent that he is having problems with his family. Respondent surprisingly retorted
that she also hates her family and that she actually wanted to get out of their lives. From
that [time on], respondent had insisted to petitioner that they should elope and live
together. Petitioner hesitated because he is not prepared as they are both young and
inexperienced, but she insisted that they would somehow manage because petitioner is
rich. In the last week of March 1996, respondent seriously brought the idea of eloping
and she already bought tickets for the boat going to Cebu. Petitioner reluctantly agreed to
the idea and so they eloped to Cebu. The parties are supposed to stay at the house of a
friend of respondent, but they were not able to locate her, so petitioner was compelled to
rent an apartment. The parties tried to look for a job but could not find any so it was
suggested by respondent that they should go back and seek help from petitioner’s
parents. When the parties arrived at the house of petitioner, all of his whole family was all
out of the country so respondent decided to go back to her home for the meantime while
petitioner stayed behind at their home. After a few days of separation, respondent called
petitioner by phone and said she wanted to talk to him. Petitioner responded immediately
and when he arrived at their house, respondent confronted petitioner as to why he
appeared to be cold, respondent acted irrationally and even threatened to commit
suicide. Petitioner got scared so he went home again. Respondent would call by phone
every now and then and became angry as petitioner does not know what to do.
Respondent went to the extent of threatening to file a case against petitioner and
scandalize his family in the newspaper. Petitioner asked her how he would be able to
make amends and at this point in time[,] respondent brought the idea of marriage.
Petitioner[,] out of frustration in life[,] agreed to her to pacify her. And so on April 23,
1996, respondent’s uncle brought the parties to Valenzuela[,] and on that very same
day[,] petitioner was made to sign the Marriage Contract before the Judge. Petitioner
actually never applied for any Marriage License.

Respondent decided that they should stay first at their house until after arrival of the
parents of petitioner. But when the parents of petitioner arrived, respondent refused to
allow petitioner to go home. Petitioner was threatened in so many ways with her uncle
showing to him many guns. Respondent even threatened that if he should persist in
going home, they will commission their military friends to harm his family. Respondent
even made petitioner sign a declaration that if he should perish, the authorities should
look for him at his parents[‫ ]ۥ‬and relatives[‫ ]ۥ‬houses. Sometime in June of 1996, petitioner
was able to escape and he went home. He told his parents about his predicament and
they forgave him and supported him by giving him military escort. Petitioner, however, did
not inform them that he signed a marriage contract with respondent. When they knew
about it[,] petitioner was referred for counseling. Petitioner[,] after the counseling[,] tried
to contact respondent. Petitioner offered her to live instead to[sic] the home of petitioner’s
parents while they are still studying. Respondent refused the idea and claimed that she
would only live with him if they will have a separate home of their own and be away from
his parents. She also intimated to petitioner that he should already get his share of
whatever he would inherit from his parents so they can start a new life. Respondent
demanded these not knowing [that] the petitioner already settled his differences with his
own family. When respondent refused to live with petitioner where he chose for them to
stay, petitioner decided to tell her to stop harassing the home of his parents. He told her
already that he was disinherited and since he also does not have a job, he would not be
able to support her. After knowing that petitioner does not have any money anymore,
respondent stopped tormenting petitioner and informed petitioner that they should live
separate lives.

The said relationship between Edward and Rowena is said to be undoubtedly in the
wreck and weakly-founded. The break-up was caused by both parties[’] unreadiness to
commitment and their young age. He was still in the state of finding his fate and fighting
boredom, while she was still egocentrically involved with herself.

TESTS ADMINISTERED:

Revised Beta Examination

Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test

Draw A Person Test

Rorschach Psychodiagnostic Test

Sach’s Sentence Completion Test

MMPI

TEST RESULTS & EVALUATION:

Both petitioner and respondent are dubbed to be emotionally immature and recklessly
impulsive upon swearing to their marital vows as each of them was motivated by different
notions on marriage.

Edward Kenneth Ngo Te, the petitioner in this case[,] is said to be still unsure and
unready so as to commit himself to marriage. He is still founded to be on the search of
what he wants in life. He is absconded as an introvert as he is not really sociable and
displays a lack of interest in social interactions and mingling with other individuals. He is
seen too akin to this kind of lifestyle that he finds it boring and uninteresting to commit
himself to a relationship especially to that of respondent, as aggravated by her
dangerously aggressive moves. As he is more of the reserved and timid type of person,
as he prefer to be religiously attached and spend a solemn time alone.

ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE, the respondent, is said to be of the aggressive-rebellious

type of woman. She is seen to be somewhat exploitative in her [plight] for a life of wealth
and glamour. She is seen to take move on marriage as she thought that her marriage
with petitioner will bring her good fortune because he is part of a rich family. In order to
have her dreams realized, she used force and threats knowing that [her] husband is
somehow weak-willed. Upon the realization that there is really no chance for wealth, she
gladly finds her way out of the relationship.

REMARKS:

Before going to marriage, one should really get to know himself and marry himself before
submitting to marital vows. Marriage should not be taken out of intuition as it is
profoundly a serious institution solemnized by religious and law. In the case presented by
petitioner and respondent[,] (sic) it is evidently clear that both parties have impulsively
taken marriage for granted as they are still unaware of their own selves. He is extremely
introvert to the point of weakening their relationship by his weak behavioral disposition.
She, on the other hand[,] is extremely exploitative and aggressive so as to be unlawful,
insincere and undoubtedly uncaring in her strides toward convenience. It is apparent that
she is suffering the grave, severe, and incurable presence of Narcissistic and Antisocial
Personality Disorder that started since childhood and only manifested during marriage.
Both parties display psychological incapacities that made marriage a big mistake for
them to take.15

The trial court, on July 30, 2001, rendered its Decision 16 declaring the marriage of the
parties null and void on the ground that both parties were psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations. 17 The Republic, represented by the OSG,
timely filed its notice of appeal.18

On review, the appellate court, in the assailed August 5, 2003 Decision 19 in CA-G.R. CV
No. 71867, reversed and set aside the trial court’s ruling. 20 It ruled that petitioner failed to
prove the psychological incapacity of respondent. The clinical psychologist did not
personally examine respondent, and relied only on the information provided by petitioner.
Further, the psychological incapacity was not shown to be attended by gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurability. In sum, the evidence adduced fell short of the requirements
stated in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina 21 needed for the declaration of nullity of
the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. 22 The CA faulted the lower court for
rendering the decision without the required certification of the OSG briefly stating therein
the OSG’s reasons for its agreement with or opposition to, as the case may be, the
petition.23 The CA later denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in the likewise
assailed January 19, 2004 Resolution.24

Dissatisfied, petitioner filed before this Court the instant petition for review on certiorari.
On June 15, 2005, the Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to
submit their respective memoranda. 25

In his memorandum,26 petitioner argues that the CA erred in substituting its own judgment
for that of the trial court. He posits that the RTC declared the marriage void, not only
because of respondent’s psychological incapacity, but rather due to both parties’
psychological incapacity. Petitioner also points out that there is no requirement for the
psychologist to personally examine respondent. Further, he avers that the OSG is bound
by the actions of the OCP because the latter represented it during the trial; and it had
been furnished copies of all the pleadings, the trial court orders and notices. 27

For its part, the OSG contends in its memorandum, 28 that the annulment petition filed
before the RTC contains no statement of the essential marital obligations that the parties
failed to comply with. The root cause of the psychological incapacity was likewise not
alleged in the petition; neither was it medically or clinically identified. The purported
incapacity of both parties was not shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. And the clinical psychologist did not personally examine the respondent. Thus,
the OSG concludes that the requirements in Molina29 were not satisfied.30

The Court now resolves the singular issue of whether, based on Article 36 of the Family
Code, the marriage between the parties is null and void. 31

I.

We begin by examining the provision, tracing its origin and charting the development of
jurisprudence interpreting it.

Article 36 of the Family Code32 provides:

Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.

As borne out by the deliberations of the Civil Code Revision Committee that drafted the
Family Code, Article 36 was based on grounds available in the Canon Law. Thus, Justice
Flerida Ruth P. Romero elucidated in her separate opinion in Santos v. Court of
Appeals:33

However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines and the Civil Code Revision Commission of the UP Law Center, I wish
to add some observations. The letter dated April 15, 1985 of then Judge Alicia V.
Sempio-Diy written in behalf of the Family Law and Civil Code Revision Committee to
then Assemblywoman Mercedes Cojuangco-Teodoro traced the background of the
inclusion of the present Article 36 in the Family Code.

"During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had thought of including a chapter
on absolute divorce in the draft of a new Family Code (Book I of the Civil Code) that it
had been tasked by the IBP and the UP Law Center to prepare. In fact, some members
of the Committee were in favor of a no-fault divorce between the spouses after a number
of years of separation, legal or de facto. Justice J.B.L. Reyes was then requested to
prepare a proposal for an action for dissolution of marriage and the effects thereof based
on two grounds: (a) five continuous years of separation between the spouses, with or
without a judicial decree of legal separation, and (b) whenever a married person would
have obtained a decree of absolute divorce in another country. Actually, such a proposal
is one for absolute divorce but called by another name. Later, even the Civil Code
Revision Committee took time to discuss the proposal of Justice Reyes on this matter.

Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision Committee and Family Law
Committee started holding joint meetings on the preparation of the draft of the New
Family Code, they agreed and formulated the definition of marriage as —

‘a special contract of permanent partnership between a man and a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is an inviolable
social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and
not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations
during the marriage within the limits provided by law.’

With the above definition, and considering the Christian traditional concept of marriage of
the Filipino people as a permanent, inviolable, indissoluble social institution upon which
the family and society are founded, and also realizing the strong opposition that any
provision on absolute divorce would encounter from the Catholic Church and the Catholic
sector of our citizenry to whom the great majority of our people belong, the two
Committees in their joint meetings did not pursue the idea of absolute divorce and,
instead, opted for an action for judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage based on
grounds available in the Canon Law. It was thought that such an action would not only be
an acceptable alternative to divorce but would also solve the nagging problem of church
annulments of marriages on grounds not recognized by the civil law of the State. Justice
Reyes was, thus, requested to again prepare a draft of provisions on such action for
celebration of invalidity of marriage. Still later, to avoid the overlapping of provisions on
void marriages as found in the present Civil Code and those proposed by Justice Reyes
on judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage on grounds similar to the Canon Law, the
two Committees now working as a Joint Committee in the preparation of a New Family
Code decided to consolidate the present provisions on void marriages with the proposals
of Justice Reyes. The result was the inclusion of an additional kind of void marriage in
the enumeration of void marriages in the present Civil Code, to wit:

‘(7) those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of
marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential
marital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.

as well as the following implementing provisions:

‘Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked or pleaded only on the basis
of a final judgment declaring the marriage void, without prejudice to the provision of
Article 34.’

‘Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage
shall not prescribe.’

xxxxxxxxx

It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our country today may already be
dissolved or annulled on the grounds proposed by the Joint Committee on declaration of
nullity as well as annulment of marriages, thus rendering an absolute divorce law
unnecessary. In fact, during a conference with Father Gerald Healy of the Ateneo
University, as well as another meeting with Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the Archdiocese of
Pampanga, the Joint Committee was informed that since Vatican II, the Catholic Church
has been declaring marriages null and void on the ground of "lack of due discretion" for
causes that, in other jurisdictions, would be clear grounds for divorce, like teen-age or
premature marriages; marriage to a man who, because of some personality disorder or
disturbance, cannot support a family; the foolish or ridiculous choice of a spouse by an
otherwise perfectly normal person; marriage to a woman who refuses to cohabit with her
husband or who refuses to have children. Bishop Cruz also informed the Committee that
they have found out in tribunal work that a lot of machismo among husbands are
manifestations of their sociopathic personality anomaly, like inflicting physical violence
upon their wives, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and
psychosexual anomaly.34

In her separate opinion in Molina,35 she expounded:

At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision read:

"(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of
marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential
marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration."

The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally produced the following
revised provision even before the session was over:

"(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack or
incapacity becomes manifest after the celebration."

Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has dropped any reference to
"wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of
marriage" and to "mentally incapacitated." It was explained that these phrases refer to
"defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea . . . but lack of
appreciation of one's marital obligation." There being a defect in consent, "it is clear that it
should be a ground for voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent
and it is capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid intervals and
there are cases when the insanity is curable . . . Psychological incapacity does not refer
to mental faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to
marriage."

My own position as a member of the Committee then was that psychological incapacity
is, in a sense, insanity of a lesser degree.

As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term "psychological or mental

impotence," Archbishop Oscar Cruz opined in the earlier February 9, 1984 session that
this term "is an invention of some churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that is
why it is considered a weak phrase." He said that the Code of Canon Law would rather
express it as "psychological or mental incapacity to discharge . . ." Justice Ricardo C.
Puno opined that sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent with one but not
with another.

One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the interpretation and
application of Art. 36 is: "Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard
to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex."
The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the inclusion of the phrase
"and is incurable" but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista commented that this would give rise to
the question of how they will determine curability and Justice Caguioa agreed that it
would be more problematic. Yet, the possibility that one may be cured after the
psychological incapacity becomes manifest after the marriage was not ruled out by
Justice Puno and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa suggested that the remedy
was to allow the afflicted spouse to remarry.

For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void marriages, viz.:

1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage as contract;

2. reasons of public policy;

3. special cases and special situations.

The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under "special cases and special
situations," hence, its special treatment in Art. 36 in the Family Code as finally enacted.

Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for avoiding or
annulling marriages that even comes close to being psychological in nature.

Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the marriage, such
marriage which stands valid until annulled is capable of ratification or convalidation.

On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential requisites, some
marriages are void from the beginning.

With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the provisions on Marriage, the
drafters, now open to fresh winds of change in keeping with the more permissive mores
and practices of the time, took a leaf from the relatively liberal provisions of Canon Law.

Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are incapable of
contracting marriage: "3. (those) who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are
unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage" provided the model for what is
now Art. 36 of the Family Code: "A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest
only after its solemnization."

It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only two types of
marriages with respect to their validity: valid and void. Civil Law, however, recognizes an
intermediate state, the voidable or annullable marriages. When the Ecclesiastical
Tribunal "annuls" a marriage, it actually declares the marriage null and void, i.e., it never
really existed in the first place, for a valid sacramental marriage can never be dissolved.
Hence, a properly performed and consummated marriage between two living Roman
Catholics can only be nullified by the formal annulment process which entails a full
tribunal procedure with a Court selection and a formal hearing.

Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by Civil Law as severing the
marriage ties as to capacitate the parties to enter lawfully into another marriage. The
grounds for nullifying civil marriage, not being congruent with those laid down by Canon
Law, the former being more strict, quite a number of married couples have found
themselves in limbo—freed from the marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic Church
but yet unable to contract a valid civil marriage under state laws. Heedless of civil law
sanctions, some persons contract new marriages or enter into live-in relationships.

It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous situations that the
Civil Law Revision Committee decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of
psychological incapacity into the Family Code—and classified the same as a ground for
declaring marriages void ab initio or totally inexistent from the beginning.

A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old Code, while it did not
provide directly for psychological incapacity, in effect, recognized the same indirectly
from a combination of three old canons: "Canon #1081 required persons to be ‘capable
according to law’ in order to give valid consent; Canon #1082 required that persons ‘be at
least not ignorant’ of the major elements required in marriage; and Canon #1087 (the
force and fear category) required that internal and external freedom be present in order
for consent to be valid. This line of interpretation produced two distinct but related
grounds for annulment called ‘lack of due discretion’ and ‘lack of due competence.’ Lack
of due discretion means that the person did not have the ability to give valid consent at
the time of the wedding and, therefore, the union is invalid. Lack of due competence
means that the person was incapable of carrying out the obligations of the promise he or
she made during the wedding ceremony."

Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and 1960s involving
sexual disorders such as homosexuality and nymphomania laid the foundation for a
broader approach to the kind of proof necessary for psychological grounds for
annulment. The Rota had reasoned for the first time in several cases that the capacity to
give valid consent at the time of marriage was probably not present in persons who had
displayed such problems shortly after the marriage. The nature of this change was
nothing short of revolutionary. Once the Rota itself had demonstrated a cautious
willingness to use this kind of hindsight, the way was paved for what came after 1970.
Diocesan Tribunals began to accept proof of serious psychological problems that
manifested themselves shortly after the ceremony as proof of an inability to give valid
consent at the time of the ceremony.36

Interestingly, the Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for
fear that by so doing, it might limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of
ejusdem generis. The Committee desired that the courts should interpret the provision on
a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not
binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision itself was
taken from the Canon Law. 37 The law is then so designed as to allow some resiliency in
its application.38

Yet, as held in Santos, 39 the phrase "psychological incapacity" is not meant to

comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It refers to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly noncognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as expressed by Article 68 40 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity; and render help and
support. The intendment of the law has been to confine it to the most serious of cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. 41 This interpretation is, in fact, consistent with
that in Canon Law, thus:

3.5.3.1. The Meaning of Incapacity to Assume. A sharp conceptual distinction must be

made between the second and third paragraphs of C.1095, namely between the grave
lack of discretionary judgment and the incapacity to assume the essential obligation.
Mario Pompedda, a rotal judge, explains the difference by an ordinary, if somewhat
banal, example. Jose wishes to sell a house to Carmela, and on the assumption that they
are capable according to positive law to enter such contract, there remains the object of
the contract, viz, the house. The house is located in a different locality, and prior to the
conclusion of the contract, the house was gutted down by fire unbeknown to both of
them. This is the hypothesis contemplated by the third paragraph of the canon. The third
paragraph does not deal with the psychological process of giving consent because it has
been established a priori that both have such a capacity to give consent, and they both
know well the object of their consent [the house and its particulars]. Rather, C.1095.3
deals with the object of the consent/contract which does not exist. The contract is invalid
because it lacks its formal object. The consent as a psychological act is both valid and
sufficient. The psychological act, however, is directed towards an object which is not
available. Urbano Navarrete summarizes this distinction: the third paragraph deals not
with the positing of consent but with positing the object of consent. The person may be
capable of positing a free act of consent, but he is not capable of fulfilling the
responsibilities he assumes as a result of the consent he elicits.

Since the address of Pius XII to the auditors of the Roman Rota in 1941 regarding
psychic incapacity with respect to marriage arising from pathological conditions, there
has been an increasing trend to understand as ground of nullity different from others, the
incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage, especially the incapacity
which arises from sexual anomalies. Nymphomania is a sample which ecclesiastical
jurisprudence has studied under this rubric.

The problem as treated can be summarized, thus: do sexual anomalies always and in
every case imply a grave psychopathological condition which affects the higher faculties
of intellect, discernment, and freedom; or are there sexual anomalies that are purely so –
that is to say, they arise from certain physiological dysfunction of the hormonal system,
and they affect the sexual condition, leaving intact the higher faculties however, so that
these persons are still capable of free human acts. The evidence from the empirical
sciences is abundant that there are certain anomalies of a sexual nature which may
impel a person towards sexual activities which are not normal, either with respect to its
frequency [nymphomania, satyriasis] or to the nature of the activity itself [sadism,
masochism, homosexuality]. However, these anomalies notwithstanding, it is altogether
possible that the higher faculties remain intact such that a person so afflicted continues to
have an adequate understanding of what marriage is and of the gravity of its
responsibilities. In fact, he can choose marriage freely. The question though is whether
such a person can assume those responsibilities which he cannot fulfill, although he may
be able to understand them. In this latter hypothesis, the incapacity to assume the
essential obligations of marriage issues from the incapacity to posit the object of consent,
rather than the incapacity to posit consent itself.

Ecclesiastical jurisprudence has been hesitant, if not actually confused, in this regard.
The initial steps taken by church courts were not too clear whether this incapacity is
incapacity to posit consent or incapacity to posit the object of consent. A case c. Pinna,
for example, arrives at the conclusion that the intellect, under such an irresistible impulse,
is prevented from properly deliberating and its judgment lacks freedom. This line of
reasoning supposes that the intellect, at the moment of consent, is under the influence of
this irresistible compulsion, with the inevitable conclusion that such a decision, made as it
was under these circumstances, lacks the necessary freedom. It would be
incontrovertible that a decision made under duress, such as this irresistible impulse,
would not be a free act. But this is precisely the question: is it, as a matter of fact, true
that the intellect is always and continuously under such an irresistible compulsion? It
would seem entirely possible, and certainly more reasonable, to think that there are
certain cases in which one who is sexually hyperaesthetic can understand perfectly and
evaluate quite maturely what marriage is and what it implies; his consent would be
juridically ineffective for this one reason that he cannot posit the object of consent, the
exclusive jus in corpus to be exercised in a normal way and with usually regularity. It
would seem more correct to say that the consent may indeed be free, but is juridically
ineffective because the party is consenting to an object that he cannot deliver. The house
he is selling was gutted down by fire.

3.5.3.2. Incapacity as an Autonomous Ground. Sabattani seems to have seen his way
more clearly through this tangled mess, proposing as he did a clear conceptual
distinction between the inability to give consent on the one hand, and the inability to fulfill
the object of consent, on the other. It is his opinion that nymphomaniacs usually
understand the meaning of marriage, and they are usually able to evaluate its
implications. They would have no difficulty with positing a free and intelligent consent.
However, such persons, capable as they are of eliciting an intelligent and free consent,
experience difficulty in another sphere: delivering the object of the consent. Anne,
another rotal judge, had likewise treated the difference between the act of consenting
and the act of positing the object of consent from the point of view of a person afflicted
with nymphomania. According to him, such an affliction usually leaves the process of
knowing and understanding and evaluating intact. What it affects is the object of consent:
the delivering of the goods.

3.5.3.3 Incapacity as Incapacity to Posit the Object of Consent. From the selected rotal
jurisprudence cited, supra, it is possible to see a certain progress towards a consensus
doctrine that the incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage (that is to
say, the formal object of consent) can coexist in the same person with the ability to make
a free decision, an intelligent judgment, and a mature evaluation and weighing of things.
The decision coram Sabattani concerning a nymphomaniac affirmed that such a spouse
can have difficulty not only with regard to the moment of consent but also, and especially,
with regard to the matrimonium in facto esse. The decision concludes that a person in
such a condition is incapable of assuming the conjugal obligation of fidelity, although she
may have no difficulty in understanding what the obligations of marriage are, nor in the
weighing and evaluating of those same obligations.

Prior to the promulgation of the Code of Canon Law in 1983, it was not unusual to refer to
this ground as moral impotence or psychic impotence, or similar expressions to express
a specific incapacity rooted in some anomalies and disorders in the personality. These
anomalies leave intact the faculties of the will and the intellect. It is qualified as moral or
psychic, obviously to distinguish it from the impotence that constitutes the impediment
dealt with by C.1084. Nonetheless, the anomalies render the subject incapable of binding
himself in a valid matrimonial pact, to the extent that the anomaly renders that person
incapable of fulfilling the essential obligations. According to the principle affirmed by the
long tradition of moral theology: nemo ad impossibile tenetur.

xxxx

3.5.3.5 Indications of Incapacity. There is incapacity when either or both of the

contractants are not capable of initiating or maintaining this consortium. One immediately
thinks of those cases where one of the parties is so self-centered [e.g., a narcissistic
personality] that he does not even know how to begin a union with the other, let alone
how to maintain and sustain such a relationship. A second incapacity could be due to the
fact that the spouses are incapable of beginning or maintaining a heterosexual
consortium, which goes to the very substance of matrimony. Another incapacity could
arise when a spouse is unable to concretize the good of himself or of the other party. The
canon speaks, not of the bonum partium, but of the bonum conjugum. A spouse who is
capable only of realizing or contributing to the good of the other party qua persona rather
than qua conjunx would be deemed incapable of contracting marriage. Such would be
the case of a person who may be quite capable of procuring the economic good and the
financial security of the other, but not capable of realizing the bonum conjugale of the
other. These are general strokes and this is not the place for detained and individual
description.

A rotal decision c. Pinto resolved a petition where the concrete circumstances of the case
concerns a person diagnosed to be suffering from serious sociopathy. He concluded that
while the respondent may have understood, on the level of the intellect, the essential
obligations of marriage, he was not capable of assuming them because of his
"constitutional immorality."

Stankiewicz clarifies that the maturity and capacity of the person as regards the
fulfillment of responsibilities is determined not only at the moment of decision but also
and especially during the moment of execution of decision. And when this is applied to
constitution of the marital consent, it means that the actual fulfillment of the essential
obligations of marriage is a pertinent consideration that must be factored into the
question of whether a person was in a position to assume the obligations of marriage in
the first place. When one speaks of the inability of the party to assume and fulfill the
obligations, one is not looking at matrimonium in fieri, but also and especially at
matrimonium in facto esse. In [the] decision of 19 Dec. 1985, Stankiewicz collocated the
incapacity of the respondent to assume the essential obligations of marriage in the
psychic constitution of the person, precisely on the basis of his irresponsibility as regards
money and his apathy as regards the rights of others that he had violated. Interpersonal
relationships are invariably disturbed in the presence of this personality disorder. A lack
of empathy (inability to recognize and experience how others feel) is common. A sense of
entitlement, unreasonable expectation, especially favorable treatment, is usually present.
Likewise common is interpersonal exploitativeness, in which others are taken advantage
of in order to achieve one’s ends.

Authors have made listings of obligations considered as essential matrimonial

obligations. One of them is the right to the communio vitae. This and their corresponding
obligations are basically centered around the good of the spouses and of the children.
Serious psychic anomalies, which do not have to be necessarily incurable, may give rise
to the incapacity to assume any, or several, or even all of these rights. There are some
cases in which interpersonal relationship is impossible. Some characteristic features of
inability for interpersonal relationships in marriage include affective immaturity,
narcissism, and antisocial traits.

Marriage and Homosexuality. Until 1967, it was not very clear under what rubric
homosexuality was understood to be invalidating of marriage – that is to say, is
homosexuality invalidating because of the inability to evaluate the responsibilities of
marriage, or because of the inability to fulfill its obligations. Progressively, however, rotal
jurisprudence began to understand it as incapacity to assume the obligations of marriage
so that by 1978, Parisella was able to consider, with charity, homosexuality as an
autonomous ground of nullity. This is to say that a person so afflicted is said to be unable
to assume the essential obligations of marriage. In this same rotal decision, the object of
matrimonial consent is understood to refer not only to the jus in corpus but also the
consortium totius vitae. The third paragraph of C.1095 [incapacity to assume the
essential obligations of marriage] certainly seems to be the more adequate juridical
structure to account for the complex phenomenon that homosexuality is. The
homosexual is not necessarily impotent because, except in very few exceptional cases,
such a person is usually capable of full sexual relations with the spouse. Neither is it a
mental infirmity, and a person so afflicted does not necessarily suffer from a grave lack of
due discretion because this sexual anomaly does not by itself affect the critical, volitive,
and intellectual faculties. Rather, the homosexual person is unable to assume the
responsibilities of marriage because he is unable to fulfill this object of the matrimonial
contract. In other words, the invalidity lies, not so much in the defect of consent, as in the
defect of the object of consent.
3.5.3.6 Causes of Incapacity. A last point that needs to be addressed is the source of
incapacity specified by the canon: causes of a psychological nature. Pompedda proffers
the opinion that the clause is a reference to the personality of the contractant. In other
words, there must be a reference to the psychic part of the person. It is only when there
is something in the psyche or in the psychic constitution of the person which impedes his
capacity that one can then affirm that the person is incapable according to the hypothesis
contemplated by C.1095.3. A person is judged incapable in this juridical sense only to the
extent that he is found to have something rooted in his psychic constitution which
impedes the assumption of these obligations. A bad habit deeply engrained in one’s
consciousness would not seem to qualify to be a source of this invalidating incapacity.
The difference being that there seems to be some freedom, however remote, in the
development of the habit, while one accepts as given one’s psychic constitution. It would
seem then that the law insists that the source of the incapacity must be one which is not
the fruit of some degree of freedom. 42

Conscious of the law’s intention that it is the courts, on a case-to-case basis, that should
determine whether a party to a marriage is psychologically incapacitated, the Court, in
sustaining the lower court’s judgment of annulment in Tuason v. Court of Appeals, 43 ruled
that the findings of the trial court are final and binding on the appellate courts. 44

Again, upholding the trial court’s findings and declaring that its decision was not a
judgment on the pleadings, the Court, in Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, 45 explained that when
private respondent testified under oath before the lower court and was cross-examined
by the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in the form of testimony.
Importantly, the Court, aware of parallel decisions of Catholic marriage tribunals, ruled
that the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the marital
obligation of procreating children is equivalent to psychological incapacity.

The resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the case-to-case basis by
which the provision should be interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had, somehow,
been rendered ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict standards in Molina, 46 thus:

From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for
the guidance of the bench and the bar:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and
our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution
devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It
decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim
of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must
be psychological—not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such
root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such
time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or

incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to
those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job.
Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing
medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and
raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characterological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor
in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of

the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of
the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect
by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision
Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in
1983 and which provides:

"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume
the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature."

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil
laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such
harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate
tribunal. Ideally— subject to our law on evidence—what is decreed as canonically invalid
should also be decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code
provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect.
Here, the State and the Church—while remaining independent, separate and apart from
each other—shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting
and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General
to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein
his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for
resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of
the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. 47

Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority of the Court’s membership concurred in
the ponencia of then Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio V. Panganiban, three
justices concurred "in the result" and another three—including, as aforesaid, Justice
Romero—took pains to compose their individual separate opinions. Then Justice
Teodoro R. Padilla even emphasized that "each case must be judged, not on the basis of
a priori assumptions, predelictions or generalizations, but according to its own facts. In
the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to
say that no case is on ‘all fours’ with another case. The trial judge must take pains in
examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid
substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court." 48

Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent cases, 49 the Court has applied the
aforesaid standards, without too much regard for the law’s clear intention that each case
is to be treated differently, as "courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case
basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals."

In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules,
as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. Understandably,
the Court was then alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds,
and was sensitive to the OSG’s exaggeration of Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce
procedure in the world."50 The unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken
its toll on people who have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic
personality anomaly, which, like termites, consume little by little the very foundation of
their families, our basic social institutions. Far from what was intended by the Court,
Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly
or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed
sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously
debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled
marriages on account of the personality disorders of the said individuals. 51

The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the remedy provided by Article 36,
for there are ample safeguards against this contingency, among which is the intervention
by the State, through the public prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the
parties and/or fabrication of evidence. 52 The Court should rather be alarmed by the rising
number of cases involving marital abuse, child abuse, domestic violence and incestuous
rape.

In dissolving marital bonds on account of either party’s psychological incapacity, the

Court is not demolishing the foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity
of marriage, because it refuses to allow a person afflicted with a psychological disorder,
who cannot comply with or assume the essential marital obligations, from remaining in
that sacred bond. It may be stressed that the infliction of physical violence, constitutional
indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychosexual anomaly are
manifestations of a sociopathic personality anomaly. 53 Let it be noted that in Article 36,
there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void from the very
beginning.54 To indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity under Article 36 will simply
provide a decent burial to a stillborn marriage.
The prospect of a possible remarriage by the freed spouses should not pose too much of
a concern for the Court. First and foremost, because it is none of its business. And
second, because the judicial declaration of psychological incapacity operates as a
warning or a lesson learned. On one hand, the normal spouse would have become
vigilant, and never again marry a person with a personality disorder. On the other hand, a
would-be spouse of the psychologically incapacitated runs the risk of the latter’s disorder
recurring in their marriage.

Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment of Molina in this case.
We simply declare that, as aptly stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v.
Reyes,55 there is need to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the
disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the risk of being
redundant, we reiterate once more the principle that each case must be judged, not on
the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own
facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-
case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.

II.

We now examine the instant case.

The parties’ whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six (6) months. They met in
January 1996, eloped in March, exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in
June. The psychologist who provided expert testimony found both parties psychologically
incapacitated. Petitioner’s behavioral pattern falls under the classification of dependent
personality disorder, and respondent’s, that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality
disorder.56

By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of
decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the
expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties. 57

Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as follows:

Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a psychological expert

became increasingly important in such cases. Data about the person's entire life, both
before and after the ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were asked to
give professional opinions about a party's mental capacity at the time of the wedding.
These opinions were rarely challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence
of lack of valid consent.

The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not amount to
the addition of new grounds for annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the
Church to the advances made in psychology during the past decades. There was now
the expertise to provide the all-important connecting link between a marriage breakdown
and premarital causes.

During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a legal
contract to that of a covenant. The result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in
annulment cases that a person who could intellectually understand the concept of
marriage could necessarily give valid consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and
assume the real obligations of a mature, lifelong commitment are now considered a
necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial consent.
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological incapacity, "not
only to sexual anomalies but to all kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a
spouse or both spouses from assuming or carrying out the essential obligations of
marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each
other's body for heterosexual acts, but is, in its totality the right to the community of the
whole of life; i.e., the right to a developing lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since
1973 have refined the meaning of psychological or psychic capacity for marriage as
presupposing the development of an adult personality; as meaning the capacity of the
spouses to give themselves to each other and to accept the other as a distinct person;
that the spouses must be ‘other oriented’ since the obligations of marriage are rooted in a
self-giving love; and that the spouses must have the capacity for interpersonal
relationship because marriage is more than just a physical reality but involves a true
intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of the obligations of marriage depends,
according to Church decisions, on the strength of this interpersonal relationship. A
serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held to impair the relationship
and consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations. The marital
capacity of one spouse is not considered in isolation but in reference to the fundamental
relationship to the other spouse.

Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the mature
marital relationship:

"The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a
permanent and faithful commitment to the marriage partner; (2) openness to children and
partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to
cope with the ordinary stresses and strains of marriage, etc."

Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that might lead to
the failure of a marriage:

"At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal communion even with
the best intentions of the parties. Among the psychic factors possibly giving rise to his or
her inability to fulfill marital obligations are the following: (1) antisocial personality with its
fundamental lack of loyalty to persons or sense of moral values; (2) hyperesthesia, where
the individual has no real freedom of sexual choice; (3) the inadequate personality where
personal responses consistently fall short of reasonable expectations.

xxxx

The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts whether he or
she has a case for an annulment on any other terms. A situation that does not fit into any
of the more traditional categories often fits very easily into the psychological category.

As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting a shift in their
use. Whereas originally the emphasis was on the parties' inability to exercise proper
judgment at the time of the marriage (lack of due discretion), recent cases seem to be
concentrating on the parties' incapacity to assume or carry out their responsibilities and
obligations as promised (lack of due competence). An advantage to using the ground of
lack of due competence is that at the time the marriage was entered into civil divorce and
breakup of the family almost always is proof of someone's failure to carry out marital
responsibilities as promised at the time the marriage was entered into." 58 1avvphi1

Hernandez v. Court of Appeals 59 emphasizes the importance of presenting expert

testimony to establish the precise cause of a party’s psychological incapacity, and to
show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcos 60 asserts,
there is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be
personally examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. 61 Verily, the evidence must show a link,
medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the
psychological disorder itself.

This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the presentation
of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the
psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable
presence of psychological incapacity. 62 Parenthetically, the Court, at this point, finds it
fitting to suggest the inclusion in the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, 63 an option for the trial judge to refer the
case to a court-appointed psychologist/expert for an independent assessment and
evaluation of the psychological state of the parties. This will assist the courts, who are no
experts in the field of psychology, to arrive at an intelligent and judicious determination of
the case. The rule, however, does not dispense with the parties’ prerogative to present
their own expert witnesses.

Going back, in the case at bench, the psychological assessment, which we consider as
adequate, produced the findings that both parties are afflicted with personality disorders
—to repeat, dependent personality disorder for petitioner, and narcissistic and antisocial
personality disorder for respondent. We note that The Encyclopedia of Mental Health
discusses personality disorders as follows—

A group of disorders involving behaviors or traits that are characteristic of a person’s

recent and long-term functioning. Patterns of perceiving and thinking are not usually
limited to isolated episodes but are deeply ingrained, inflexible, maladaptive and severe
enough to cause the individual mental stress or anxieties or to interfere with interpersonal
relationships and normal functioning. Personality disorders are often recognizable by
adolescence or earlier, continue through adulthood and become less obvious in middle or
old age. An individual may have more than one personality disorder at a time.

The common factor among individuals who have personality disorders, despite a variety
of character traits, is the way in which the disorder leads to pervasive problems in social
and occupational adjustment. Some individuals with personality disorders are perceived
by others as overdramatic, paranoid, obnoxious or even criminal, without an awareness
of their behaviors. Such qualities may lead to trouble getting along with other people, as
well as difficulties in other areas of life and often a tendency to blame others for their
problems. Other individuals with personality disorders are not unpleasant or difficult to
work with but tend to be lonely, isolated or dependent. Such traits can lead to
interpersonal difficulties, reduced self-esteem and dissatisfaction with life.

Causes of Personality Disorders Different mental health viewpoints propose a variety of

causes of personality disorders. These include Freudian, genetic factors, neurobiologic
theories and brain wave activity.

Freudian Sigmund Freud believed that fixation at certain stages of development led to
certain personality types. Thus, some disorders as described in the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev.) are derived from his oral, anal and
phallic character types. Demanding and dependent behavior (dependent and passive-
aggressive) was thought to derive from fixation at the oral stage. Characteristics of
obsessionality, rigidity and emotional aloofness were thought to derive from fixation at the
anal stage; fixation at the phallic stage was thought to lead to shallowness and an
inability to engage in intimate relationships.  However, later researchers have found little
lawphil.net

evidence that early childhood events or fixation at certain stages of development lead to
specific personality patterns.
Genetic Factors Researchers have found that there may be a genetic factor involved in
the etiology of antisocial and borderline personality disorders; there is less evidence of
inheritance of other personality disorders. Some family, adoption and twin studies
suggest that schizotypal personality may be related to genetic factors.

Neurobiologic Theories In individuals who have borderline personality, researchers have

found that low cerebrospinal fluid 5-hydroxyindoleacetic acid (5-HIAA) negatively
correlated with measures of aggression and a past history of suicide attempts.
Schizotypal personality has been associated with low platelet monoamine oxidase (MAO)
activity and impaired smooth pursuit eye movement.

Brain Wave Activity Abnormalities in electroencephalograph (EEG) have been reported in

antisocial personality for many years; slow wave is the most widely reported abnormality.
A study of borderline patients reported that 38 percent had at least marginal EEG
abnormalities, compared with 19 percent in a control group.

Types of Disorders According to the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and

Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev., 1987), or DSM-III-R, personality
disorders are categorized into three major clusters:

Cluster A: Paranoid, schizoid and schizotypal personality disorders. Individuals who have
these disorders often appear to have odd or eccentric habits and traits.

Cluster B: Antisocial, borderline, histrionic and narcissistic personality disorders.

Individuals who have these disorders often appear overly emotional, erratic and dramatic.

Cluster C: Avoidant, dependent, obsessive-compulsive and passive-aggressive

personality disorders. Individuals who have these disorders often appear anxious or
fearful.

The DSM-III-R also lists another category, "personality disorder not otherwise specified,"
that can be used for other specific personality disorders or for mixed conditions that do
not qualify as any of the specific personality disorders.

Individuals with diagnosable personality disorders usually have long-term concerns, and
thus therapy may be long-term.64

Dependent personality disorder is characterized in the following manner—

A personality disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent and submissive behavior.

Such individuals usually lack self-esteem and frequently belittle their capabilities; they
fear criticism and are easily hurt by others’ comments. At times they actually bring about
dominance by others through a quest for overprotection.

Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early adulthood. Individuals who have
this disorder may be unable to make everyday decisions without advice or reassurance
from others, may allow others to make most of their important decisions (such as where
to live), tend to agree with people even when they believe they are wrong, have difficulty
starting projects or doing things on their own, volunteer to do things that are demeaning
in order to get approval from other people, feel uncomfortable or helpless when alone
and are often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned. 65 and antisocial personality
disorder described, as follows—

Characteristics include a consistent pattern of behavior that is intolerant of the

conventional behavioral limitations imposed by a society, an inability to sustain a job over
a period of years, disregard for the rights of others (either through exploitiveness or
criminal behavior), frequent physical fights and, quite commonly, child or spouse abuse
without remorse and a tendency to blame others. There is often a façade of charm and
even sophistication that masks disregard, lack of remorse for mistreatment of others and
the need to control others.

Although characteristics of this disorder describe criminals, they also may befit some
individuals who are prominent in business or politics whose habits of self-centeredness
and disregard for the rights of others may be hidden prior to a public scandal.

During the 19th century, this type of personality disorder was referred to as moral
insanity. The term described immoral, guiltless behavior that was not accompanied by
impairments in reasoning. lawphil.net

According to the classification system used in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev. 1987), anti-social personality disorder is one of the four
"dramatic" personality disorders, the others being borderline, histrionic and narcissistic. 66

The seriousness of the diagnosis and the gravity of the disorders considered, the Court,
in this case, finds as decisive the psychological evaluation made by the expert witness;
and, thus, rules that the marriage of the parties is null and void on ground of both parties’
psychological incapacity. We further consider that the trial court, which had a first-hand
view of the witnesses’ deportment, arrived at the same conclusion.

Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume
the essential marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and
rendering help and support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions without advice
from others, allows others to make most of his important decisions (such as where to
live), tends to agree with people even when he believes they are wrong, has difficulty
doing things on his own, volunteers to do things that are demeaning in order to get
approval from other people, feels uncomfortable or helpless when alone and is often
preoccupied with fears of being abandoned. 67 As clearly shown in this case, petitioner
followed everything dictated to him by the persons around him. He is insecure, weak and
gullible, has no sense of his identity as a person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and
has no goals and clear direction in life.

Although on a different plane, the same may also be said of the respondent. Her being
afflicted with antisocial personality disorder makes her unable to assume the essential
marital obligations. This finding takes into account her disregard for the rights of others,
her abuse, mistreatment and control of others without remorse, her tendency to blame
others, and her intolerance of the conventional behavioral limitations imposed by
society.68 Moreover, as shown in this case, respondent is impulsive and domineering; she
had no qualms in manipulating petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of committing
suicide.

Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the
precipitous marriage which they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and
void.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED.

The August 5, 2003 Decision and the January 19, 2004 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Decision,
dated July 30, 2001, REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 166562               March 31, 2009

BENJAMIN G. TING, Petitioner,
vs.
CARMEN M. VELEZ-TING, Respondent.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the November 17,
2003 Amended Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), and its December 13, 2004
Resolution2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 59903. The appellate court, in its assailed decision and
resolution, affirmed the January 9, 1998 Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 23, Cebu City, declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and
void ab initio pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. 4

The facts follow.

Petitioner Benjamin Ting (Benjamin) and respondent Carmen Velez-Ting (Carmen) first
met in 1972 while they were classmates in medical school. 5 They fell in love, and they
were wed on July 26, 1975 in Cebu City when respondent was already pregnant with
their first child.

At first, they resided at Benjamin’s family home in Maguikay, Mandaue City. 6 When their
second child was born, the couple decided to move to Carmen’s family home in Cebu
City.7 In September 1975, Benjamin passed the medical board examinations 8 and
thereafter proceeded to take a residency program to become a surgeon but shifted to
anesthesiology after two years. By 1979, Benjamin completed the preceptorship program
for the said field9 and, in 1980, he began working for Velez Hospital, owned by Carmen’s
family, as member of its active staff,10 while Carmen worked as the hospital’s Treasurer.11

The couple begot six (6) children, namely Dennis, born on December 9, 1975; James
Louis, born on August 25, 1977; Agnes Irene, born on April 5, 1981; Charles Laurence,
born on July 21, 1986; Myles Vincent, born on July 19, 1988; and Marie Corinne, born on
June 16, 1991.12

On October 21, 1993, after being married for more than 18 years to petitioner and while
their youngest child was only two years old, Carmen filed a verified petition before the
RTC of Cebu City praying for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on Article
36 of the Family Code. She claimed that Benjamin suffered from psychological incapacity
even at the time of the celebration of their marriage, which, however, only became
manifest thereafter. 13

In her complaint, Carmen stated that prior to their marriage, she was already aware that
Benjamin used to drink and gamble occasionally with his friends. 14 But after they were
married, petitioner continued to drink regularly and would go home at about midnight or
sometimes in the wee hours of the morning drunk and violent. He would confront and
insult respondent, physically assault her and force her to have sex with him. There were
also instances when Benjamin used his gun and shot the gate of their house. 15 Because
of his drinking habit, Benjamin’s job as anesthesiologist was affected to the point that he
often had to refuse to answer the call of his fellow doctors and to pass the task to other
anesthesiologists. Some surgeons even stopped calling him for his services because
they perceived petitioner to be unreliable. Respondent tried to talk to her husband about
the latter’s drinking problem, but Benjamin refused to acknowledge the same. 16

Carmen also complained that petitioner deliberately refused to give financial support to
their family and would even get angry at her whenever she asked for money for their
children. Instead of providing support, Benjamin would spend his money on drinking and
gambling and would even buy expensive equipment for his hobby. 17 He rarely stayed
home18 and even neglected his obligation to his children. 19

Aside from this, Benjamin also engaged in compulsive gambling. 20 He would gamble two
or three times a week and would borrow from his friends, brothers, or from loan sharks
whenever he had no money. Sometimes, Benjamin would pawn his wife’s own jewelry to
finance his gambling.21 There was also an instance when the spouses had to sell their
family car and even a portion of the lot Benjamin inherited from his father just to be able
to pay off his gambling debts. 22 Benjamin only stopped going to the casinos in 1986 after
he was banned therefrom for having caused trouble, an act which he said he purposely
committed so that he would be banned from the gambling establishments. 23

In sum, Carmen’s allegations of Benjamin’s psychological incapacity consisted of the

following manifestations:

1. Benjamin’s alcoholism, which adversely affected his family relationship and his
profession;

2. Benjamin’s violent nature brought about by his excessive and regular drinking;

3. His compulsive gambling habit, as a result of which Benjamin found it necessary to sell
the family car twice and the property he inherited from his father in order to pay off his
debts, because he no longer had money to pay the same; and

4. Benjamin’s irresponsibility and immaturity as shown by his failure and refusal to give
regular financial support to his family.24

In his answer, Benjamin denied being psychologically incapacitated. He maintained that

he is a respectable person, as his peers would confirm. He said that he is an active
member of social and athletic clubs and would drink and gamble only for social reasons
and for leisure. He also denied being a violent person, except when provoked by
circumstances.25 As for his alleged failure to support his family financially, Benjamin
claimed that it was Carmen herself who would collect his professional fees from Velez
Hospital when he was still serving there as practicing anesthesiologist. 26 In his testimony,
Benjamin also insisted that he gave his family financial support within his means
whenever he could and would only get angry at respondent for lavishly spending his
hard-earned money on unnecessary things. 27 He also pointed out that it was he who often
comforted and took care of their children, while Carmen played mahjong with her friends
twice a week.28

During the trial, Carmen’s testimony regarding Benjamin’s drinking and gambling habits
and violent behavior was corroborated by Susana Wasawas, who served as nanny to the
spouses’ children from 1987 to 1992. 29 Wasawas stated that she personally witnessed
instances when Benjamin maltreated Carmen even in front of their children. 30

Carmen also presented as witness Dr. Pureza Trinidad-Oñate, a psychiatrist. 31 Instead of

the usual personal interview, however, Dr. Oñate’s evaluation of Benjamin was limited to
the transcript of stenographic notes taken during Benjamin’s deposition because the
latter had already gone to work as an anesthesiologist in a hospital in South Africa. After
reading the transcript of stenographic notes, Dr. Oñate concluded that Benjamin’s
compulsive drinking, compulsive gambling and physical abuse of respondent are clear
indications that petitioner suffers from a personality disorder. 32

To refute Dr. Oñate’s opinion, petitioner presented Dr. Renato D. Obra, a psychiatrist and
a consultant at the Department of Psychiatry in Don Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical
Center, as his expert witness.33 Dr. Obra evaluated Benjamin’s psychological behavior
based on the transcript of stenographic notes, as well as the psychiatric evaluation report
prepared by Dr. A.J.L. Pentz, a psychiatrist from the University of Pretoria in South
Africa, and his (Dr. Obra’s) interview with Benjamin’s brothers. 34 Contrary to Dr. Oñate’s
findings, Dr. Obra observed that there is nothing wrong with petitioner’s personality,
considering the latter’s good relationship with his fellow doctors and his good track record
as anesthesiologist.35
On January 9, 1998, the lower court rendered its Decision 36 declaring the marriage
between petitioner and respondent null and void. The RTC gave credence to Dr. Oñate’s
findings and the admissions made by Benjamin in the course of his deposition, and found
him to be psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage. Specifically, the trial court found Benjamin an excessive drinker, a compulsive
gambler, someone who prefers his extra-curricular activities to his family, and a person
with violent tendencies, which character traits find root in a personality defect existing
even before his marriage to Carmen. The decretal portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the
marriage between plaintiff and defendant null and void ab initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the
Family Code. x x x

xxxx

SO ORDERED.37

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA. On October 19, 2000, the CA rendered a
Decision38 reversing the trial court’s ruling. It faulted the trial court’s finding, stating that no
proof was adduced to support the conclusion that Benjamin was psychologically
incapacitated at the time he married Carmen since Dr. Oñate’s conclusion was based
only on theories and not on established fact,39 contrary to the guidelines set forth in
Santos v. Court of Appeals40 and in Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals and Molina. 41

Because of this, Carmen filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the Molina
guidelines should not be applied to this case since the Molina decision was promulgated
only on February 13, 1997, or more than five years after she had filed her petition with
the RTC.42 She claimed that the Molina ruling could not be made to apply retroactively, as
it would run counter to the principle of stare decisis. Initially, the CA denied the motion for
reconsideration for having been filed beyond the prescribed period. Respondent
thereafter filed a manifestation explaining compliance with the prescriptive period but the
same was likewise denied for lack of merit. Undaunted, respondent filed a petition for
certiorari43 with this Court. In a Resolution 44 dated March 5, 2003, this Court granted the
petition and directed the CA to resolve Carmen’s motion for reconsideration. 45 On review,
the CA decided to reconsider its previous ruling. Thus, on November 17, 2003, it issued
an Amended Decision46 reversing its first ruling and sustaining the trial court’s decision. 47

A motion for reconsideration was filed, this time by Benjamin, but the same was denied
by the CA in its December 13, 2004 Resolution. 48

Hence, this petition.

For our resolution are the following issues:

I. Whether the CA violated the rule on stare decisis when it refused to follow the
guidelines set forth under the Santos and Molina cases;

II. Whether the CA correctly ruled that the requirement of proof of psychological
incapacity for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the
Family Code has been liberalized; and

III. Whether the CA’s decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent
null and void [is] in accordance with law and jurisprudence.

We find merit in the petition.

I. On the issue of stare decisis.

The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules
established by this Court in its final decisions. It is based on the principle that once a
question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed
to further argument.49 Basically, it is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same
issues,50 necessary for two simple reasons: economy and stability. In our jurisdiction, the
principle is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code. 51

This doctrine of adherence to precedents or stare decisis was applied by the English
courts and was later adopted by the United States. Associate Justice (now Chief Justice)
Reynato S. Puno’s discussion on the historical development of this legal principle in his
dissenting opinion in Lambino v. Commission on Elections 52 is enlightening:

The latin phrase stare decisis et non quieta movere means "stand by the thing and do not
disturb the calm." The doctrine started with the English Courts. Blackstone observed that
at the beginning of the 18th century, "it is an established rule to abide by former
precedents where the same points come again in litigation." As the rule evolved, early
limits to its application were recognized: (1) it would not be followed if it were "plainly
unreasonable"; (2) where courts of equal authority developed conflicting decisions; and,
(3) the binding force of the decision was the "actual principle or principles necessary for
the decision; not the words or reasoning used to reach the decision."

The doctrine migrated to the United States. It was recognized by the framers of the U.S.
Constitution. According to Hamilton, "strict rules and precedents" are necessary to
prevent "arbitrary discretion in the courts." Madison agreed but stressed that "x x x once
the precedent ventures into the realm of altering or repealing the law, it should be
rejected." Prof. Consovoy well noted that Hamilton and Madison "disagree about the
countervailing policy considerations that would allow a judge to abandon a precedent."
He added that their ideas "reveal a deep internal conflict between the concreteness
required by the rule of law and the flexibility demanded in error correction. It is this
internal conflict that the Supreme Court has attempted to deal with for over two
centuries."

Indeed, two centuries of American case law will confirm Prof. Consovoy's observation
although stare decisis developed its own life in the United States. Two strains of stare
decisis have been isolated by legal scholars. The first, known as vertical stare decisis
deals with the duty of lower courts to apply the decisions of the higher courts to cases
involving the same facts. The second, known as horizontal stare decisis requires that
high courts must follow its own precedents. Prof. Consovoy correctly observes that
vertical stare decisis has been viewed as an obligation, while horizontal stare decisis, has
been viewed as a policy, imposing choice but not a command. Indeed, stare decisis is
not one of the precepts set in stone in our Constitution.

It is also instructive to distinguish the two kinds of horizontal stare decisis —

constitutional stare decisis and statutory stare decisis. Constitutional stare decisis
involves judicial interpretations of the Constitution while statutory stare decisis involves
interpretations of statutes. The distinction is important for courts enjoy more flexibility in
refusing to apply stare decisis in constitutional litigations. Justice Brandeis' view on the
binding effect of the doctrine in constitutional litigations still holds sway today. In soothing
prose, Brandeis stated: "Stare decisis is not . . . a universal and inexorable command.
The rule of stare decisis is not inflexible. Whether it shall be followed or departed from, is
a question entirely within the discretion of the court, which is again called upon to
consider a question once decided." In the same vein, the venerable Justice Frankfurter
opined: "the ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not what
we have said about it." In contrast, the application of stare decisis on judicial
interpretation of statutes is more inflexible. As Justice Stevens explains: "after a statute
has been construed, either by this Court or by a consistent course of decision by other
federal judges and agencies, it acquires a meaning that should be as clear as if the
judicial gloss had been drafted by the Congress itself." This stance reflects both respect
for Congress' role and the need to preserve the courts' limited resources.

In general, courts follow the stare decisis rule for an ensemble of reasons, viz.: (1) it
legitimizes judicial institutions; (2) it promotes judicial economy; and, (3) it allows for
predictability. Contrariwise, courts refuse to be bound by the stare decisis rule where (1)
its application perpetuates illegitimate and unconstitutional holdings; (2) it cannot
accommodate changing social and political understandings; (3) it leaves the power to
overturn bad constitutional law solely in the hands of Congress; and, (4) activist judges
can dictate the policy for future courts while judges that respect stare decisis are stuck
agreeing with them.

In its 200-year history, the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to follow the stare decisis
rule and reversed its decisions in 192 cases. The most famous of these reversals is
Brown v. Board of Education which junked Plessy v. Ferguson's "separate but equal
doctrine." Plessy upheld as constitutional a state law requirement that races be
segregated on public transportation. In Brown, the U.S. Supreme Court, unanimously
held that "separate . . . is inherently unequal." Thus, by freeing itself from the shackles of
stare decisis, the U.S. Supreme Court freed the colored Americans from the chains of
inequality. In the Philippine setting, this Court has likewise refused to be straitjacketed by
the stare decisis rule in order to promote public welfare. In La Bugal-B'laan Tribal
Association, Inc. v. Ramos, we reversed our original ruling that certain provisions of the
Mining Law are unconstitutional. Similarly, in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, we
overturned our first ruling and held, on motion for reconsideration, that a private
respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the
extradition process.

An examination of decisions on stare decisis in major countries will show that courts are
agreed on the factors that should be considered before overturning prior rulings. These
are workability, reliance, intervening developments in the law and changes in fact. In
addition, courts put in the balance the following determinants: closeness of the voting,
age of the prior decision and its merits.

The leading case in deciding whether a court should follow the stare decisis rule in
constitutional litigations is Planned Parenthood v. Casey. It established a 4-pronged test.
The court should (1) determine whether the rule has proved to be intolerable simply in
defying practical workability; (2) consider whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance
that would lend a special hardship to the consequences of overruling and add inequity to
the cost of repudiation; (3) determine whether related principles of law have so far
developed as to have the old rule no more than a remnant of an abandoned doctrine;
and, (4) find out whether facts have so changed or come to be seen differently, as to
have robbed the old rule of significant application or justification. 53

To be forthright, respondent’s argument that the doctrinal guidelines prescribed in Santos

and Molina should not be applied retroactively for being contrary to the principle of stare
decisis is no longer new. The same argument was also raised but was struck down in
Pesca v. Pesca,54 and again in Antonio v. Reyes.55 In these cases, we explained that the
interpretation or construction of a law by courts constitutes a part of the law as of the date
the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court is overruled, and a
different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in
favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith, in
accordance therewith under the familiar rule of "lex prospicit, non respicit."
II. On liberalizing the required proof for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article
36.

Now, petitioner wants to know if we have abandoned the Molina doctrine.

We have not.

In Edward Kenneth Ngo Te v. Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te, 56 we declared that, in
hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as
the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. We said that instead
of serving as a guideline, Molina unintentionally became a straightjacket, forcing all cases
involving psychological incapacity to fit into and be bound by it, which is not only contrary
to the intention of the law but unrealistic as well because, with respect to psychological
incapacity, no case can be considered as on "all fours" with another. 57

By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36, it is logical and
understandable to give weight to the expert opinions furnished by psychologists
regarding the psychological temperament of parties in order to determine the root cause,
juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of the psychological incapacity. However,
such opinions, while highly advisable, are not conditions sine qua non in granting
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. 58 At best, courts must treat such opinions
as decisive but not indispensable evidence in determining the merits of a given case. In
fact, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity, then actual medical or psychological examination of the person concerned
need not be resorted to. 59 The trial court, as in any other given case presented before it,
must always base its decision not solely on the expert opinions furnished by the parties
but also on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings.

It was for this reason that we found it necessary to emphasize in Ngo Te that each case
involving the application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged not on the
basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own
attendant facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals.

Far from abandoning Molina, we simply suggested the relaxation of the stringent
requirements set forth therein, cognizant of the explanation given by the Committee on
the Revision of the Rules on the rationale of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC), viz.:

To require the petitioner to allege in the petition the particular root cause of the
psychological incapacity and to attach thereto the verified written report of an accredited
psychologist or psychiatrist have proved to be too expensive for the parties. They
adversely affect access to justice o poor litigants. It is also a fact that there are provinces
where these experts are not available. Thus, the Committee deemed it necessary to relax
this stringent requirement enunciated in the Molina Case. The need for the examination
of a party or parties by a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist and the presentation of
psychiatric experts shall now be determined by the court during the pre-trial conference. 60

But where, as in this case, the parties had the full opportunity to present professional and
expert opinions of psychiatrists tracing the root cause, gravity and incurability of a party’s
alleged psychological incapacity, then such expert opinion should be presented and,
accordingly, be weighed by the court in deciding whether to grant a petition for nullity of
marriage.

III. On petitioner’s psychological incapacity.

Coming now to the main issue, we find the totality of evidence adduced by respondent
insufficient to prove that petitioner is psychologically unfit to discharge the duties
expected of him as a husband, and more particularly, that he suffered from such
psychological incapacity as of the date of the marriage eighteen (18) years ago.
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s and the appellate court’s rulings declaring the
marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio.

The intendment of the law has been to confine the application of Article 36 to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. 61 The psychological illness that
must have afflicted a party at the inception of the marriage should be a malady so grave
and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume. 62 1avvphi1.zw+

In this case, respondent failed to prove that petitioner’s "defects" were present at the time
of the celebration of their marriage. She merely cited that prior to their marriage, she
already knew that petitioner would occasionally drink and gamble with his friends; but
such statement, by itself, is insufficient to prove any pre-existing psychological defect on
the part of her husband. Neither did the evidence adduced prove such "defects" to be
incurable.

The evaluation of the two psychiatrists should have been the decisive evidence in
determining whether to declare the marriage between the parties null and void. Sadly,
however, we are not convinced that the opinions provided by these experts strengthened
respondent’s allegation of psychological incapacity. The two experts provided
diametrically contradicting psychological evaluations: Dr. Oñate testified that petitioner’s
behavior is a positive indication of a personality disorder, 63 while Dr. Obra maintained that
there is nothing wrong with petitioner’s personality. Moreover, there appears to be
greater weight in Dr. Obra’s opinion because, aside from analyzing the transcript of
Benjamin’s deposition similar to what Dr. Oñate did, Dr. Obra also took into consideration
the psychological evaluation report furnished by another psychiatrist in South Africa who
personally examined Benjamin, as well as his (Dr. Obra’s) personal interview with
Benjamin’s brothers.64 Logically, therefore, the balance tilts in favor of Dr. Obra’s findings.

Lest it be misunderstood, we are not condoning petitioner’s drinking and gambling

problems, or his violent outbursts against his wife. There is no valid excuse to justify such
a behavior. Petitioner must remember that he owes love, respect, and fidelity to his
spouse as much as the latter owes the same to him. Unfortunately, this court finds
respondent’s testimony, as well as the totality of evidence presented by the respondent,
to be too inadequate to declare him psychologically unfit pursuant to Article 36.

It should be remembered that the presumption is always in favor of the validity of

marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio.65 In this case, the presumption has not
been amply rebutted and must, perforce, prevail.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED.

The November 17, 2003 Amended Decision and the December 13, 2004 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59903 are accordingly REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
 CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES *

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 164493               March 10, 2010

JOCELYN M. SUAZO, Petitioner,
vs.
ANGELITO SUAZO and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the appeal filed by petitioner Jocelyn Suazo (Jocelyn) from the July 14, 2004
Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)1 in CA-G.R. CV No. 62443, which reversed the
January 29, 1999 judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 119, Pasay City in
Civil Case No. 97-1282. 2 The reversed RTC decision nullified Jocelyn’s marriage with
respondent Angelito Suazo (Angelito) on the ground of psychological incapacity.
 THE FACTS

Jocelyn and Angelito were 16 years old when they first met in June 1985; they were
residents of Laguna at that time. After months of courtship, Jocelyn went to Manila with
Angelito and some friends. Having been gone for three days, their parents sought
Jocelyn and Angelito and after finding them, brought them back to Biñan, Laguna. Soon
thereafter, Jocelyn and Angelito’s marriage was arranged and they were married on
March 3, 1986 in a ceremony officiated by the Mayor of Biñan.

Without any means to support themselves, Jocelyn and Angelito lived with Angelito’s
parents after their marriage. They had by this time stopped schooling. Jocelyn took odd
jobs and worked for Angelito’s relatives as household help. Angelito, on the other hand,
refused to work and was most of the time drunk. Jocelyn urged Angelito to find work and
violent quarrels often resulted because of Jocelyn’s efforts.

Jocelyn left Angelito sometime in July 1987. Angelito thereafter found another woman
with whom he has since lived. They now have children.

Ten years after their separation, or on October 8, 1997, Jocelyn filed with the RTC a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, as
amended. She claimed that Angelito was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential obligations of marriage. In addition to the above historical narrative of their
relationship, she alleged in her complaint:

xxxx

8. That from the time of their marriage up to their separation in July 1987,
their relationship had been marred with bitter quarrels which caused
unbearable physical and emotional pains on the part of the plaintiff
because defendant inflicted physical injuries upon her every time they
had a troublesome encounter;

9. That the main reason for their quarrel was always the refusal of the
defendant to work or his indolence and his excessive drinking which
makes him psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital
obligations making life unbearably bitter and intolerable to the plaintiff
causing their separation in fact in July 1987;

10. That such psychological incapacity of the defendant started from the
time of their marriage and became very apparent as time went and
proves to be continuous, permanent and incurable;

xxxx

Angelito did not answer the petition/complaint. Neither did he submit himself to a
psychological examination with psychologist Nedy Tayag (who was presumably hired by
Jocelyn).

The case proceeded to trial on the merits after the trial court found that no collusion
existed between the parties. Jocelyn, her aunt Maryjane Serrano, and the psychologist
testified at the trial.

In her testimony, Jocelyn essentially repeated the allegations in her petition, including the
alleged incidents of physical beating she received from Angelito. On cross-examination,
she remained firm on these declarations but significantly declared that Angelito had not
treated her violently before they were married.

Asst. Sol. Gen. Kim Briguera:

Q. Can you describe your relationship with the respondent before you got married?

A. He always go (sic) to our house to court me.

Q. Since you cited violence, after celebration of marriage, will you describe his
behavioural (sic) pattern before you got married?

A. He show (sic) kindness, he always come (sic) to the house.

Q. So you cannot say his behavioral pattern composing of violent nature before you got
married (sic), is there any signs (sic) of violence?

A. None maam (sic), because we were not sweethearts.

Q. Even to other people?

A. He also quarrel (sic).3

Maryjane Serrano corroborated parts of Jocelyn’s testimony.

When the psychologist took the witness stand, she declared:

Q. What about the respondent, did you also make clinical interpretation of his behavior?

A. Apparently, the behavior and actuation of the respondent during the time of the
marriage the respondent is suffering from anti-social personality Disorder this is a serious
and severe apparently incurable (sic). This disorder is chronic and long-standing before
the marriage.

Q. And you based your interpretation on the report given by the petitioner?

A. Based on the psychological examination wherein there is no pattern of lying when I

examined her, the petitioner was found to be very responsive, coherent, relevant to
marital relationship with respondent.

Q. And the last page of Exhibit "E" which is your report there is a statement rather on the
last page, last paragraph which state: It is the clinical opinion of the undersigned that
marriage between the two, had already hit bottom rock (sic) even before the actual
celebration of marriage. Respondent(’s) immature, irresponsible and callous emotionality
practically harbors (sic) the possibility of having blissful relationship. His general behavior
fulfill(s) the diagnostic criteria for a person suffering from Anti Social Personality Disorder.
Such disorder is serious and severe and it interferred (sic) in his capacity to provide love,
caring, concern and responsibility to his family. The disorder is chronic and long-standing
in proportion and appear(s) incurable. The disorder was present at the time of the
wedding and became manifest thereafter due to stresses and pressure of married life. He
apparently grew up in a dysfunctional family. Could you explain what does chronic
mean?
A. Chronic is a clinical language which means incurable it has been there long before he
entered marriage apparently, it came during early developmental (sic) Basic trust was not
develop (sic).

Q. And this long standing proportion (sic).

A. That no amount of psychological behavioral help to cure such because psychological

disorder are not detrimental to men but to others particularly and this (sic) because the
person who have this kind of disorder do not know that they have this kind of disorder.

Q. So in other words, permanent?

A. Permanent and incurable.

Q. You also said that this psychological disorder is present during the wedding or at the
time of the wedding or became manifest thereafter?

A. Yes, ma’am."

xxxx

Court:

Q. Is there a clinical findings (sic)?

A. That is the clinical findings. Personality Disorder labeled on Anti-Social Personality

Disorder (sic).

Q. How was shown during the marriage (sic)?

A. The physical abuses on the petitioner also correlated without any employment
exploitative and silent (sic) on the part of the respondent is clearly Anti-Social Disorder.

Q. Do the respondent know that he has that kind of psychological disorder (sic)?

A. Usually a person suffering that psychological disorder will not admit that they are
suffering that kind of disorder (sic).

Court:

Q. So because of this Anti-Social Disorder the petitioner suffers a lot (sic)?

A. Yes, because the petitioner is a victim of hardships of marital relation to the

respondent (sic).

Court:

Q. Was the Anti-Social Personality Disorder also shown to the parents (sic)?

A. Yes, according to the petitioner, respondent never give due respect more often than
not he even shouted at them for no apparent reason (sic).

Court:
Q. Did you say Anti-Social Disorder incurable (sic)?

A. Yes, sir.

Court:

Q. Is there a physical violence (sic)?

A. Actually, I could see the petitioner is tortured mentally of the respondent (sic).

Court:

Q. How was the petitioner tortured?

A. She was able to counter-act by the time she was separated by the respondent (sic).

Court:

Q. Do you mean to tell us that Anti-Social disorder is incurable?

A. Yes, sir.

Court:

Q. Why did you know?

A. Anti-Social disorder is incurable again because the person itself, the respondent is not
aware that this kind of personality affect the other party (sic).

Court:

Q. This Anti-Social behavior is naturally affected the petitioner (sic)?

A. They do not have children because more often than not the respondent is under the
influence of alcohol, they do not have peaceful harmonious relationship during the less
than one year and one thing what is significant, respondent allowed wife to work as
housemaid instead of he who should provide and the petitioner never receive and enjoy
her earning for the five months that she work and it is also the petitioner who took
sustainance of the vices. (sic)

Q. And because of that Anti-Social disorder he had not shown love to the petitioner?

A. From the very start the respondent has no emotion to sustain the marital relationship
but what he need is to sustain his vices thru the petitioner (sic).

Court:

Q. What are the vices?

A. Alcohol and gambling.

Court:

Q. And this affected psychological incapacity to perform marital obligation?

A. Not only that up to this time from my clinical analysis of Anti-Social Personality
Disorder, he is good for nothing person.4

The psychologist also identified the Psychological Report she prepared. The Report
pertinently states:5

Report on the psychological condition of JOCELYN M. SUAZO, a petitioner for "Nullity of

Marriage" versus ANGELITO D. SUAZO

GENERAL DATA

[This pertains to Jocelyn’s]

BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY

xxxx

Husband is Angelito D. Suazo, 28 years old reached 3rd year high

school, a part time tricycle driver, eldest among 4 siblings. Father is a
machine operator, described to be an alcoholic, womanizer and a heavy
gambler. While mother is a sales agent. It was a common knowledge
within their vicinity that she was also involved in an illicit relationship.
Familial relationship was described to be stormy, chaotic whose bickering
and squabbles were part and parcel of their day to day living.

TEST RESULTS AND EVALUATION

Projective data reveal an introvert person whose impulse life is

adequately suppressed so much so that it does not create inner tension
and anxiety. She is fully equipped in terms of drives and motivation
particularly in uplifting not, only her socio-emotional image but was as her
morale. She may be sensitive yet capable of containing the effect of such
sensitiveness; in order to remain in goodstead (sic) with her immediate
environment.

She is pictured as a hard-working man (sic) who looks forward for a better
future in spite of difficulties she had gone through in the past. She is fully
aware of external realities of life that she set simple life goals which is
(sic) commensurate with her capabilities and limitations. However, she
needs to prioritize her interest in order to direct her energy toward specific
goals. Her tolerance for frustration appears to be at par with her coping
mechanism that she is able to discharge negative trends appropriately.

REMARKS :

[Already cited in full in the psychologist’s testimony quoted above] 6

The Office of the Solicitor General – representing the Republic of the

Philippines – strongly opposed the petition for declaration of nullity of the
marriage. Through a Certification filed with the RTC, it argued that the
psychologist failed to examine and test Angelito; thus, what she said
about him was purely hearsay.

THE RTC RULING

The RTC annulled the marriage under the following reasoning:

While there is no particular instance setforth (sic) in the law that a person may be
considered as psychologically incapacitated, there as (sic) some admitted grounds that
would render a person to be unfit to comply with his marital obligation, such as
"immaturity, i.e., lack of an effective sense of rational judgment and responsibility,
otherwise peculiar to infants (like refusal of the husband to support the family or
excessive dependence on parents or peer group approval) and habitual alcoholism, or
the condition by which a person lives for the next drink and the next drinks" (The Family
Code of the Phils, Alicia Sempio-Diy, p.39, 1988 ed.)

The evidence presented by the petitioner and the testimony of the petitioner and Dr.
Tayag, points (sic) to one thing – that the petitioner failed to establish a harmonious
family life with the respondent. On the contrary, the respondent has not shown love and
respect to the petitioner manifested by the former’s being irresponsible, immature,
jobless, gambler, drunkard and worst of all – a wife beater. The petitioner, unable to bear
any longer the misbehavior and attitude of the respondent, decided, after one year and
four months of messy days, to leave the respondent.

In this regard, the petitioner was able to prove that right from the start of her married life
with the respondent, she already suffered from maltreatment, due to physical injuries
inflicted upon her and that she was the one who worked as a housemaid of a relative of
her husband to sustain the latter’s niece (sic) and because they were living with her
husband’s family, she was obliged to do the household chores – an indication that she is
a battered wife coupled with the fact that she served as a servant in his ( sic) husband’s
family.

This situation that the petitioner had underwent may be attributed to the fact that at the
time of their marriage, she and her husband are still young and was forced only to said
marriage by her relatives. The petitioner and the respondent had never developed the
feeling of love and respect, instead, the respondent blamed the petitioner’s family for said
early marriage and not to his own liking.

Applying the principles and the requisites of psychological incapacity enunciated by this
Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals, 7 the RTC concluded:

The above findings of the psychologist [referring to the psychologist’ testimony quoted
above] would only tend to show that the respondent was, indeed, suffering from
psychological incapacity which is not only grave but also incurable.

Likewise, applying the principles set forth in the case of Republic vs. Court of Appeals
and Molina, 268 SCRA 198, wherein the Supreme Court held that:

x x x x [At this point, the RTC cited the pertinent Molina ruling]

The Court is satisfied that the evidence presented and the testimony of the petitioner and
Dr. Familiar (sic) [the psychologist who testified in this case was Nedy Tayag, not a Dr.
Familiar] attesting that there is psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent to
comply with the essential marital obligations has been sufficiently and clearly proven and,
therefore, petitioner is entitled to the relief prayed for.

A claim that the marriage is valid as there is no psychological incapacity of the

respondent is a speculation and conjecture and without moral certainty. This will
enhanced (sic) a greater tragedy as the battered wife/petitioner will still be using the
surname of the respondent, although they are now separated, and a grim and sad
reminder of her husband who made here a slave and a punching bag during the short
span of her marriage with him. The law on annulment should be liberally construed in
favor of an innocent suffering petitioner otherwise said law will be an instrument to
protect persons with mental illness like the serious anti-social behavior of herein
respondent.8

THE CA RULING

The Republic appealed the RTC decision to the CA. The CA reversed the RTC decision,
ruling that:

True, as stated in Marcos vs Marcos 343 SCRA 755, the guidelines set in Santos vs
Court of Appeals and Republic vs Court of Appeals do not require that a physician
personally examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. The
Supreme Court adopted the totality of evidence approach which allows the fact of
psychological incapacity to be drawn from evidence that medically or clinically identify the
root causes of the illness. If the totality of the evidence is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need
not be resorted to. Applied in Marcos, however, the aggregate testimony of the aggrieved
spouse, children, relatives and the social worker were not found to be sufficient to prove
psychological incapacity, in the absence of any evaluation of the respondent himself, the
person whose mental and psychological capacity was in question.

In the case at bench, there is much scarcer evidence to hold that the respondent was
psychologically incapable of entering into the marriage state, that is, to assume the
essential duties of marriage due to an underlying psychological illness. Only the wife
gave first-hand testimony on the behavior of the husband, and it is inconclusive. As
observed by the Court in Marcos, the respondent may have failed to provide material
support to the family and has resorted to physical abuse, but it is still necessary to show
that they were manifestations of a deeper psychological malaise that was clinically or
medically identified. The theory of the psychologist that the respondent was suffering
from an anti-social personality syndrome at the time of the marriage was not the product
of any adequate medical or clinical investigation. The evidence that she got from the
petitioner, anecdotal at best, could equally show that the behavior of the respondent was
due simply to causes like immaturity or irresponsibility which are not equivalent to
psychological incapacity, Pesca vs Pesca 356 SCRA 588, or the failure or refusal to work
could have been the result of rebelliousness on the part of one who felt that he had been
forced into a loveless marriage. In any event, the respondent was not under a permanent
compulsion because he had later on shown his ability to engage in productive work and
more stable relationships with another. The element of permanence or incurability that is
one of the defining characteristic of psychological incapacity is not present.

There is no doubt that for the short period that they were under the same roof, the
married life of the petitioner with the respondent was an unhappy one. But the marriage
cannot for this reason be extinguished. As the Supreme Court intimates in Pesca, our
strict handling of Article 36 will be a reminder of the inviolability of the marriage institution
in our country and the foundation of the family that the law seeks to protect. The concept
of psychological incapacity is not to be a mantra to legalize what in reality are convenient
excuses of parties to separate and divorce.

THE PETITION

Jocelyn now comes to us via the present petition to challenge and seek the reversal of
the CA ruling based on the following arguments:

1. The Court of Appeals went beyond what the law says, as it totally disregarded the
legal basis of the RTC in declaring the marriage null and void – Tuason v. Tuason (256
SCRA 158; to be accurate, should be Tuason v. Court of Appeals) holds that "the finding
of the Trial Court as to the existence or non-existence of petitioner’s psychological
incapacity at the time of the marriage is final and binding on us (the Supreme Court);
petitioner has not sufficiently shown that the trial court’s factual findings and evaluation of
the testimonies of private respondent’s witnesses vis-à-vis petitioner’s defenses are
clearly and manifestly erroneous";

2. Article 36 of the Family Code did not define psychological incapacity; this omission
was intentional to give the courts a wider discretion to interpret the term without being
shackled by statutory parameters. Article 36 though was taken from Canon 1095 of the
New Code of Canon Law, which gives three conditions that would make a person unable
to contract marriage from mental incapacity as follows:

"1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:

(1) who lack the sufficient use of reason;

(2) who suffer from grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning essential matrimonial
rights and duties which are to be mutually given and accepted;

(3) who are not capable of assuming the essential obligations of matrimony due to
causes of a psychic nature."

The decision of the RTC, Jocelyn claims, intelligently conforms to these criteria. The
RTC, being clothed with discretionary functions, applied its finding of psychological
incapacity based on existing jurisprudence and the law itself which gave lower court
magistrates enough latitude to define what constitutes psychological incapacity. On the
contrary, she further claims, the OSG relied on generalities without being specific on why
it is opposed to the dissolution of a marriage that actually exists only in name.

Simply stated, we face the issue of whether there is basis to nullify Jocelyn’s marriage
with Angelito under Article 36 of the Family Code.

THE COURT’S RULING

We find the petition devoid of merit. The CA committed no reversible error of law in
setting aside the RTC decision, as no basis exists to declare Jocelyn’s marriage with
Angelito a nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code and its related jurisprudence.

The Law, Molina and Te

Article 36 of the Family Code provides that a marriage contracted by any party who, at
the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.

A unique feature of this law is its intended open-ended application, as it merely

introduced an abstract concept – psychological incapacity that disables compliance with
the contractual obligations of marriage – without any concrete definition or, at the very
least, an illustrative example. We must therefore apply the law based on how the concept
of psychological incapacity was shaped and developed in jurisprudence.

Santos v. Court of Appeals9 declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized

by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. It should refer to "no less
than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage." It must be confined to "the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage."10

The Court laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of the
law in Republic v. Court of Appeals11 (Molina) as follows:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and
our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution
devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It
decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim
of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must
be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties or one of them was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such
root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such
time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or

incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to
those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. x
xx

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor
in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of

the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of
the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect
by our courts x x x

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General
to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein
his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for
resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of
the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.12

Molina, subsequent jurisprudence holds, merely expounded on the basic requirements of

Santos.13

A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,14 further clarified that there is no requirement that the
defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or
psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based
on psychological incapacity. Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to introduce expert
opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if the totality of evidence shows
that psychological incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability
can be duly established.15

Pesca v. Pesca16 clarifies that the Molina guidelines apply even to cases then already
pending, under the reasoning that the court’s interpretation or construction establishes
the contemporaneous legislative intent of the law; the latter as so interpreted and
construed would thus constitute a part of that law as of the date the statute is enacted. It
is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself later overruled, and a different view is
adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties
who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance therewith
under the familiar rule of "lex prospicit, non respicit."

On March 15, 2003, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 08-11-10 SC, Rules) promulgated by the
Court took effect. Section 2(d) of the Rules pertinently provides:

(d) What to allege. – A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically
allege the complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically
incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time
of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
celebration.

The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of
psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion
need not be alleged.

Section 12(d) of the Rules requires a pre-trial brief containing all the evidence presented,
including expert opinion, if any, briefly stating or describing the nature and purpose of
these pieces of evidence. Section 14(b) requires the court to consider during the pre-trial
conference the advisability of receiving expert testimony and such other matters as may
aid in the prompt disposition of the petition. Under Section 17 of the Rules, the grounds
for the declaration of the absolute nullity or annulment of marriage must be proved.
All cases – involving the application of Article 36 of the Family Code – that came to us
were invariably decided based on the principles in the cited cases. This was the state of
law and jurisprudence on Article 36 when the Court decided Te v. Yu-Te 17 (Te) which
revisited the Molina guidelines.

Te begins with the observation that the Committee that drafted the Family Code did not
give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that by so doing, it would limit the
applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis; that the Committee
desired that the courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, by the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and
by decisions of church tribunals that, although not binding on the civil courts, may be
given persuasive effect since the provision itself was taken from the Canon Law. 18 Te
thus assumes it a basic premise that the law is so designed to allow some resiliency in its
application.19

Te then sustained Santos’ doctrinal value, saying that its interpretation is consistent with
that of the Canon Law.

Going back to its basic premise, Te said:

Conscious of the law’s intention that it is the courts, on a case-to-case basis, that should
determine whether a party to a marriage is psychologically incapacitated, the Court, in
sustaining the lower court’s judgment of annulment in Tuason v. Court of Appeals, ruled
that the findings of the trial court are final and binding on the appellate courts.

Again, upholding the trial court’s findings and declaring that its decision was not a
judgment on the pleadings, the Court, in Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, explained that when
private respondent testified under oath before the lower court and was cross-examined
by the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in the form of testimony.
Importantly, the Court, aware of parallel decisions of Catholic marriage tribunals, ruled
that the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the marital
obligation of procreating children is equivalent to psychological incapacity.

With this as backdrop, Te launched an attack on Molina. It said that the resiliency with
which the concept should be applied and the case-to-case basis by which the provision
should be interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered
ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict standards in Molina. Molina, to Te, has
become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it; wittingly or
unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed
sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously
debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage.

Te then enunciated the principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a
priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but according to its own facts. Courts
should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings
of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals.

As a final note though, Te expressly stated that it is not suggesting the abandonment of
Molina, but that, following Antonio v. Reyes, it merely looked at other perspectives that
should also govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36.
The subsequent Ting v. Velez-Ting20 follows Te’s lead when it reiterated that Te did not
abandon Molina; far from abandoning Molina, it simply suggested the relaxation of its
stringent requirements, cognizant of the explanation given by the Committee on the
Revision of the Rules on the rationale of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages: 21
To require the petitioner to allege in the petition the particular root cause of the
psychological incapacity and to attach thereto the verified written report of an accredited
psychologist or psychiatrist have proved to be too expensive for the parties. They
adversely affect access to justice of poor litigants. It is also a fact that there are provinces
where these experts are not available. Thus, the Committee deemed it necessary to relax
this stringent requirement enunciated in the Molina Case. The need for the examination
of a party or parties by a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist and the presentation of
psychiatric experts shall now be determined by the court during the pre-trial conference.

Te, therefore, instead of substantially departing from Molina, 22 merely stands for a more
flexible approach in considering petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages based on
psychological incapacity. It is also noteworthy for its evidentiary approach in these cases,
which it expounded on as follows:

By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of
decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the
expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.

xxxx

Hernandez v. Court of Appeals emphasizes the importance of presenting expert

testimony to establish the precise cause of a party’s psychological incapacity, and to
show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcos asserts,
there is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be
personally examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show a link,
medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the
psychological disorder itself.

This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the presentation
of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the
psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable
presence of psychological incapacity.23 [Underscoring supplied]

This evidentiary approach is repeated in Ting v. Velez-Ting. 24

Under this evolutionary development, as shown by the current string of cases on Article
36 of the Family Code, what should not be lost on us is the intention of the law to confine
the application of Article 36 to the most serious cases of personality disorders, clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage; that the psychological illness that must have afflicted a party at the inception of
the marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is about to
assume.25 It is not enough that the respondent, alleged to be psychologically
incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to
perform these obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor – an adverse
integral element in the respondent’s personality structure that effectively incapacitated
him from complying with his essential marital obligations – must be shown. 26 Mere
difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will on the part
of the spouse is different from incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological
condition or illness; irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of
psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a person’s
refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage. 27
If all these sound familiar, they do, for they are but iterations of Santos’ juridical
antecedence, gravity and incurability requisites. This is proof of Santos’ continuing
doctrinal validity.

The Present Case

As the CA did, we find Jocelyn’s evidence insufficient to establish Angelito’s

psychological incapacity to perform essential marital obligations. We so conclude based
on our own examination of the evidence on record, which we were compelled to
undertake because of the differences in the trial court and the appellate court’s
appreciation and evaluation of Jocelyn’s presented evidence.

a. The Expert Opinion Evidence

Both the psychologist’s testimony and the psychological report did not conclusively show
the root cause, gravity and incurability of Angelito’s alleged psychological condition.

We first note a critical factor in appreciating or evaluating the expert opinion evidence –
the psychologist’s testimony and the psychological evaluation report – that Jocelyn
presented. Based on her declarations in open court, the psychologist evaluated
Angelito’s psychological condition only in an indirect manner – she derived all her
conclusions from information coming from Jocelyn whose bias for her cause cannot of
course be doubted. Given the source of the information upon which the psychologist
heavily relied upon, the court must evaluate the evidentiary worth of the opinion with due
care and with the application of the more rigid and stringent set of standards outlined
above, i.e., that there must be a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the
psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a psychological incapacity that is
grave, severe and incurable.

In saying this, we do not suggest that a personal examination of the party alleged to be
psychologically incapacitated is mandatory; jurisprudence holds that this type of
examination is not a mandatory requirement. While such examination is desirable, we
recognize that it may not be practical in all instances given the oftentimes estranged
relations between the parties. For a determination though of a party’s complete
personality profile, information coming from persons intimately related to him (such as the
party’s close relatives and friends) may be helpful. This is an approach in the application
of Article 36 that allows flexibility, at the same time that it avoids, if not totally obliterate,
the credibility gaps spawned by supposedly expert opinion based entirely on doubtful
sources of information.

From these perspectives, we conclude that the psych`ologist, using meager information
coming from a directly interested party, could not have secured a complete personality
profile and could not have conclusively formed an objective opinion or diagnosis of
Angelito’s psychological condition. While the report or evaluation may be conclusive with
respect to Jocelyn’s psychological condition, this is not true for Angelito’s. The
methodology employed simply cannot satisfy the required depth and comprehensiveness
of examination required to evaluate a party alleged to be suffering from a psychological
disorder. In short, this is not the psychological report that the Court can rely on as basis
for the conclusion that psychological incapacity exists. 1avvphi1

Other than this credibility or reliability gap, both the psychologist’s report and testimony
simply provided a general description of Angelito’s purported anti-social personality
disorder, supported by the characterization of this disorder as chronic, grave and
incurable. The psychologist was conspicuously silent, however, on the bases for her
conclusion or the particulars that gave rise to the characterization she gave. These
particulars are simply not in the Report, and neither can they be found in her testimony.
For instance, the psychologist testified that Angelito’s personality disorder is chronic or
incurable; Angelito has long been afflicted with the disorder prior to his marriage with
Jocelyn or even during his early developmental stage, as basic trust was not developed.
However, she did not support this declaration with any factual basis. In her Report, she
based her conclusion on the presumption that Angelito apparently grew up in a
dysfunctional family. Quite noticeable, though, is the psychologist’s own equivocation on
this point – she was not firm in her conclusion for she herself may have realized that it
was simply conjectural. The veracity, too, of this finding is highly suspect, for it was
based entirely on Jocelyn’s assumed knowledge of Angelito’s family background and
upbringing.

Additionally, the psychologist merely generalized on the questions of why and to what
extent was Angelito’s personality disorder grave and incurable, and on the effects of the
disorder on Angelito’s awareness of and his capability to undertake the duties and
responsibilities of marriage.

The psychologist therefore failed to provide the answers to the more important concerns
or requisites of psychological incapacity, all of which are critical to the success of
Jocelyn’s cause.

b. Jocelyn’s Testimony

The inadequacy and/or lack of probative value of the psychological report and the
psychologist’s testimony impel us to proceed to the evaluation of Jocelyn’s testimony, to
find out whether she provided the court with sufficient facts to support a finding of
Angelito’s psychological incapacity.

Unfortunately, we find Jocelyn’s testimony to be insufficient. Jocelyn merely testified on

Angelito’s habitual drunkenness, gambling, refusal to seek employment and the physical
beatings she received from him – all of which occurred after the marriage. Significantly,
she declared in her testimony that Angelito showed no signs of violent behavior,
assuming this to be indicative of a personality disorder, during the courtship stage or at
the earliest stages of her relationship with him. She testified on the alleged physical
beatings after the marriage, not before or at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
She did not clarify when these beatings exactly took place – whether it was near or at the
time of celebration of the marriage or months or years after. This is a clear evidentiary
gap that materially affects her cause, as the law and its related jurisprudence require that
the psychological incapacity must exist at the time of the celebration of the marriage.

Habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while indicative of

psychological incapacity, do not, by themselves, show psychological incapacity. All these
simply indicate difficulty, neglect or mere refusal to perform marital obligations that, as
the cited jurisprudence holds, cannot be considered to be constitutive of psychological
incapacity in the absence of proof that these are manifestations of an incapacity rooted in
some debilitating psychological condition or illness.

The physical violence allegedly inflicted on Jocelyn deserves a different treatment. While
we may concede that physical violence on women indicates abnormal behavioral or
personality patterns, such violence, standing alone, does not constitute psychological
incapacity. Jurisprudence holds that there must be evidence showing a link, medical or
the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological
disorder itself. The evidence of this nexus is irretrievably lost in the present case under
our finding that the opinion of the psychologist cannot be relied upon. Even assuming,
therefore, that Jocelyn’s account of the physical beatings she received from Angelito
were true, this evidence does not satisfy the requirement of Article 36 and its related
jurisprudence, specifically the Santos requisites.
On the whole, the CA correctly reversed the RTC judgment, whose factual bases we now
find to be clearly and manifestly erroneous. Our ruling in Tuason recognizing the finality
of the factual findings of the trial court in Article 36 cases (which is Jocelyn’s main anchor
in her present appeal with us) does not therefore apply in this case. We find that, on the
contrary, the CA correctly applied Article 36 and its related jurisprudence to the facts and
the evidence of the present case.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of merit. We AFFIRM
the appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62443. Costs against
the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 166357               January 14, 2015

VALERIO E. KALAW, Petitioner,
vs.
MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

BERSAMIN, J.:

In our decision promulgated on September 19, 2011,  the Court dismissed the complaint
1

for declaration of nullity of the marriage of the parties upon the following ratiocination, to
wit:

The petition has no merit. The CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the trial
court's Decision for lack of legal and factual basis.
 xxxx

In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that his wife (respondent) suffers from
psychological incapacity. He presented the testimonies of two supposed expert
witnesses who concluded that respondent is psychologically incapacitated, but the
conclusions of these witnesses were premised on the alleged acts or behavior of
respondent which had not been sufficiently proven. Petitioner’s experts heavily relied on
petitioner’s allegations of respondent’s constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty
parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their children. Petitioner’s experts
opined that respondent’s alleged habits, when performed constantly to the detriment of
quality and quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother and wife, constitute a
psychological incapacity in the form of NPD.

But petitioner’s allegations, which served as the bases or underlying premises of the
conclusions of his experts, were not actually proven. In fact, respondent presented
contrary evidence refuting these allegations of the petitioner.

For instance, petitioner alleged that respondent constantly played mahjong and
neglected their children as a result. Respondent admittedly played mahjong, but it was
not proven that she engaged in mahjong so frequently that she neglected her duties as a
mother and a wife. Respondent refuted petitioner’s allegations that she played four to five
times a week. She maintained it was only two to three times a week and always with the
permission of her husband and without abandoning her children at home. The children
corroborated this, saying that they were with their mother when she played mahjong in
their relative’s home. Petitioner did not present any proof, other than his own testimony,
that the mahjong sessions were so frequent that respondent neglected her family. While
he intimated that two of his sons repeated the second grade, he was not able to link this
episode to respondent’s mahjong-playing. The least that could have been done was to
prove the frequency of respondent’s mahjong-playing during the years when these two
children were in second grade. This was not done. Thus, while there is no dispute that
respondent played mahjong, its alleged debilitating frequency and adverse effect on the
children were not proven.

Also unproven was petitioner’s claim about respondent’s alleged constant visits to the
beauty parlor, going out with friends, and obsessive need for attention from other men.
No proof whatsoever was presented to prove her visits to beauty salons orher frequent
partying with friends. Petitioner presented Mario (an alleged companion of respondent
during these nights-out) in order to prove that respondent had affairs with other men, but
Mario only testified that respondent appeared to be dating other men. Even assuming
arguendothat petitioner was able to prove that respondent had an extramarital affair with
another man, that one instance of sexual infidelity cannot, by itself, be equated with
obsessive need for attention from other men. Sexual infidelity per seis a ground for legal
separation, but it does not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity.

Given the insufficiency of evidence that respondent actually engaged in the behaviors
described as constitutive of NPD, there is no basis for concluding that she was indeed
psychologically incapacitated. Indeed, the totality of the evidence points to the opposite
conclusion. A fair assessment of the facts would show that respondent was not totally
remiss and incapable of appreciating and performing her marital and parental duties. Not
once did the children state that they were neglected by their mother. On the contrary,
they narrated that she took care of them, was around when they were sick, and cooked
the food they like. It appears that respondent made real efforts tosee and take care of her
children despite her estrangement from their father. There was no testimony whatsoever
that shows abandonment and neglect of familial duties. While petitioner cites the fact that
his two sons, Rio and Miggy, both failed the second elementary level despite having
tutors, there is nothing to link their academic short comings to Malyn’s actions.
After poring over the records of the case, the Court finds no factual basis for the
conclusion of psychological incapacity. There is no error in the CA’s reversal of the trial
court’s ruling that there was psychological incapacity. The trial court’s Decision merely
summarized the allegations, testimonies, and evidence of the respective parties, but it did
not actually assess the veracity of these allegations, the credibility of the witnesses, and
the weight of the evidence. The trial court did not make factual findings which can serve
as bases for its legal conclusionof psychological incapacity.

What transpired between the parties is acrimony and, perhaps, infidelity, which may have
constrained them from dedicating the best of themselves to each other and to their
children. There may be grounds for legal separation, but certainly not psychological
incapacity that voids a marriage.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals’ May
27, 2004 Decision and its December 15, 2004 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 64240 are
AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. 2

In his Motion for Reconsideration,  the petitioner implores the Court to take a thorough
3

second look into what constitutes psychological incapacity; to uphold the findings of the
trial court as supported by the testimonies of three expert witnesses; and consequently to
find that the respondent, if not both parties, were psychologically incapacitated to perform
their respective essential marital obligation.

Upon an assiduous review of the records, we resolve to grant the petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration.

Psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even prior to the
celebration of the marriage that is permanent as to deprive the party of the awareness of
the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was about to assume.
Although the Family Code has not defined the term psychological incapacity, the Court
has usually looked up its meaning by reviewing the deliberations of the sessions of the
Family Code Revision Committee that had drafted the Family Code in order to gain an
insight on the provision. It appeared that the members of the Family Code Revision
Committee were not unanimous on the meaning, and in the end they decided to adopt
the provision "with less specificity than expected" in order to have the law "allow some
resiliency in its application."  Illustrative of the "less specificity than expected" has been
4

the omission by the Family Code Revision Committee to give any examples of
psychological incapacity that would have limited the applicability of the provision
conformably with the principle of ejusdem generis, because the Committee desired that
the courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience,
the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and the decisions of
church tribunals that had persuasive effect by virtue of the provision itself having been
taken from the Canon Law. 5

On the other hand, as the Court has observed in Santos v. Court of Appeals,  the 6

deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee and the relevant materials on
psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage have rendered it obvious
that the term psychological incapacity as used in Article 36 of the Family Code"has not
been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned
by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like
circumstances," and could not be taken and construed independently of "but must stand
in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage." Thus correlated:-
x x x "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as
so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly
any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.
The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to
have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the
Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity
of the void marriage to be "legitimate."7

In time, in Republic v. Court of Appeals,  the Court set some guidelines for the
8

interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code, as follows:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and
our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution
devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It
decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim
of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must
be psychological — not physical, althoughits manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such
root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven tobe existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their "I do’s." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such
time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or

incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to
those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job.
Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing
medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and
raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor
in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of

the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of
the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect
by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision
Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in
1983 and which provides:

"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume
the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature."

Since the purpose of including suchprovision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil
laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such
harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate
tribunal. Ideally — subject to our law on evidence — whatis decreed as canonically
invalid should also be decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, inview of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code
provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect.
Here, the State and the Church — while remaining independent, separate and apart from
each other — shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting
and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General
to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein
his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for
resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of
the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. 9

The foregoing guidelines have turned out to be rigid, such that their application to every
instance practically condemned the petitions for declaration of nullity to the fate of certain
rejection. But Article 36 of the Family Code must not be so strictly and too literally read
and applied given the clear intendment of the drafters to adopt its enacted version of
"less specificity" obviously to enable "some resiliency in its application." Instead, every
court should approach the issue of nullity "not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations, but according to its own facts" in recognition of the verity
that no case would be on "all fours" with the next one in the field of psychological
incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage; hence, every "trial judge must take
pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, asmuch as possible,
avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court."
10
In the task of ascertaining the presence of psychological incapacity as a ground for the
nullity of marriage, the courts, which are concededly not endowed with expertise in the
field of psychology, must of necessity rely on the opinions of experts in order to inform
themselves on the matter, and thus enable themselves to arrive at an intelligent and
judicious judgment. Indeed, the conditions for the malady of being grave, antecedent and
incurable demand the in-depth diagnosis by experts. 11

II

The findings of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) on the existence or non-existence of a
party’s psychological incapacity should be final and binding for as long as such findings
and evaluation of the testimonies of witnesses and other evidence are not shown to be
clearly and manifestly erroneous.  In every situation where the findings of the trial court
12

are sufficiently supported by the facts and evidence presented during trial, the appellate
court should restrain itself from substituting its own judgment.  It is not enough reason to
13

ignore the findings and evaluation by the trial court and substitute our own as an
appellate tribunal only because the Constitution and the Family Code regard marriage as
an inviolable social institution. We have to stress that the fulfilment of the constitutional
mandate for the State to protect marriage as an inviolable social institution  only relates
14

to a valid marriage. No protection can be accordedto a marriage that is null and void ab
initio, because such a marriage has no legal existence. 15

In declaring a marriage null and void ab initio, therefore, the Courts really assiduously
defend and promote the sanctity of marriage as an inviolable social institution. The
foundation of our society is thereby made all the more strong and solid.

Here, the findings and evaluation by the RTC as the trial court deserved credence
because it was in the better position to view and examine the demeanor of the witnesses
while they were testifying.  The position and role of the trial judge in the appreciation of
16

the evidence showing the psychological incapacity were not to be downplayed but should
be accorded due importance and respect.

Yet, in the September 19, 2011 decision, the Court brushed aside the opinions tendered
by Dr. Cristina Gates,a psychologist, and Fr. Gerard Healy on the ground that their
conclusions were solely based on the petitioner’s version of the events.

After a long and hard second look, we consider it improper and unwarranted to give to
such expert opinions a merely generalized consideration and treatment, least of all to
dismiss their value as inadequate basis for the declaration of the nullity of the marriage.
Instead, we hold that said experts sufficiently and competently described the
psychological incapacity of the respondent within the standards of Article 36 of the Family
Code. We uphold the conclusions reached by the two expert witnesses because they
were largely drawn from the case records and affidavits, and should not anymore be
disputed after the RTC itself had accepted the veracity of the petitioner’s factual
premises. 17

Admittedly, Dr. Gates based her findings on the transcript of the petitioner’s testimony, as
well as on her interviews of the petitioner, his sister Trinidad, and his son Miguel.
Although her findings would seem to be unilateral under such circumstances, it was not
right to disregard the findings on that basis alone. After all, her expert opinion took into
consideration other factors extant in the records, including the own opinions of another
expert who had analyzed the issue from the side of the respondent herself. Moreover, it
is already settled that the courts must accord weight to expert testimony on the
psychological and mental state of the parties in cases for the declaration of the nullityof
marriages, for by the very nature of Article 36 of the Family Code the courts, "despite
having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead,
must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental
temperaments of the parties." 18

The expert opinion of Dr. Gates was ultimately necessary herein to enable the trial court
to properly determine the issue of psychological incapacity of the respondent (if not
alsoof the petitioner). Consequently, the lack of personal examination and interview of
the person diagnosed with personality disorder, like the respondent, did not per se
invalidate the findings of the experts. The Court has stressed in Marcos v. Marcos  that 19

there is no requirement for one to bedeclared psychologically incapacitated to be

personally examined by a physician, because what is important is the presence of
evidence that adequately establishes the party’s psychological incapacity. Hence, "if the
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity,
then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to." 20

Verily, the totality of the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts
that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. If other
evidence showing that a certain condition could possibly result from an assumed state of
facts existed in the record, the expert opinion should be admissible and be weighed as
an aid for the court in interpreting such other evidence on the causation.  Indeed, an
21

expert opinion on psychological incapacity should be considered as conjectural or

speculative and without any probative value only in the absence of other evidence to
establish causation. The expert’s findings under such circumstances would not constitute
hearsay that would justify their exclusion as evidence.  This is so, considering that any
22

ruling that brands the scientific and technical procedure adopted by Dr. Gates as
weakened by bias should be eschewed if it was clear that her psychiatric evaluation had
been based on the parties’ upbringing and psychodynamics.  In that context, Dr. Gates’
23

expertopinion should be considered not in isolation but along with the other evidence
presented here.

Moreover, in its determination of the issue of psychological incapacity, the trial court was
expectedto compare the expert findings and opinion of Dr. Natividad Dayan, the
respondent’s own witness, and those of Dr. Gates.

In her Psychological Evaluation Report,  Dr. Dayan impressed that the respondent had
24

"compulsive and dependent tendencies" to the extent of being "relationship dependent."

Based from the respondent’s psychological data, Dr. Dayan indicated that:

In her relationship with people, Malyne is likely to be reserved and seemingly detached in
her ways. Although she likes to be around people, she may keep her emotional distance.
She, too, values her relationship but she may not be that demonstrative of her affections.
Intimacy may be quite difficult for her since she tries to maintain a certain distance to
minimize opportunities for rejection. To others, Malyne may appear, critical and
demanding in her ways. She can be assertive when opinions contrary to those of her own
are expressed. And yet, she is apt to be a dependent person. At a less conscious level,
Malyne fears that others will abandon her. Malyne, who always felt a bit lonely, placed an
enormous value on having significant others would depend on most times.

xxxx

But the minute she started to care, she became a different person— clingy and
immature, doubting his love, constantly demanding reassurance that she was the most
important person in his life. She became relationship-dependent. 25

Dr. Dayan was able to clearly interpret the results of the Millon Clinical Multiaxial
Inventory test  conducted on the respondent, observing that the respondent obtained
26

high scores on dependency, narcissism and compulsiveness, to wit:

Atty. Bretania

Q : How about this Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory?

A : Sir, the cut of the score which is supposed to be normal is 73 percental round and
there are several scores wherein Mrs. Kalaw obtained very high score and these are on
the score of dependency, narcissism and compulsion.

Q : Would you please tell us again, Madam Witness, what is the acceptable score?

A : When your score is 73 and above, that means that it is very significant. So, if 72 and
below, it will be considered as acceptable.

Q : In what area did Mrs. Kalaw obtain high score?

A : Under dependency, her score is 78; under narcissism, is 79; under compulsiveness, it
is 84.
27

It is notable that Dr. Dayan’s findings did not contradict but corroborated the findings of
Dr. Gates to the effect that the respondent had been afflicted with Narcissistic Personality
Disorder as well as with AntiSocial Disorder. Dr. Gates relevantly testified:

ATTY. GONONG

Q : Could you please repeat for clarity. I myself is [sic] not quite familiar with psychology
terms. So, more or less, could you please tell me in more layman’s terms how you
arrived at your findings that the respondent is self-centered or narcissistic?

A : I moved into this particular conclusion. Basically, if you ask about her childhood
background, her fatherdied in a vehicular accident when she was in her teens and
thereafter she was prompted to look for a job to partly assume the breadwinner’s role in
her family. I gathered that paternal grandmother partly took care of her and her siblings
against the fact that her own mother was unable to carry out her respective duties and
responsibilities towards Elena Fernandez and her siblings considering that the husband
died prematurely. And there was an indication that Elena Fernandez on several
occasions ever told petitioner that he cannot blame her for being negligent as a mother
because she herself never experienced the care and affection of her own mother herself.
So, there is a precedent in her background, in her childhood, and indeed this seems to
indicate a particular script, we call it in psychology a script, the tendency to repeat
somekind of experience or the lack of care, let’s say some kind of deprivation, there is a
tendency to sustain it even on to your own life when you have your own family. I did
interview the son because I was not satisfied with what I gathered from both Trinidad and
Valerio and even though as a young son at the age of fourteen already expressed the he
could not see, according to the child, the sincerity of maternal care on the part of Elena
and that he preferred to live with the father actually.

Q : Taking these all out, you came to the conclusion that respondent is self-centered and
narcissistic?

A : Actually respondent has some needs which tempts [sic] from a deprived childhood
and she is still insearch of this. In her several boyfriends, it seems that she would jump
from one boyfriend to another. There is this need for attention, this need for love on other
people.

Q : And that led you to conclude?

A : And therefore I concluded that she is self-centered to the point of neglecting her duty
as a wife and as a mother. 28

The probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere statement of her
theory or opinion, but rather in the assistance that she can render to the courts in
showing the facts that serve as a basis for her criterion and the reasons upon which the
logic of her conclusion is founded.  Hence, we should weigh and consider the probative
29

value of the findings of the expert witnesses vis-à-vis the other evidence available.

The other expert of the petitioner was Fr. Healy, a canon law expert, an advocate before
the Manila Archdiocese and Matrimonial Tribunal, and a consultant of the Family Code
Revision Committee. Regarding Father Healy’s expert testimony, we have once declared
that judicial understanding of psychological incapacity could be informed by evolving
standards, taking into account the particulars of each case, by current trends in
psychological and even by canonical thought, and by experience.  It is prudent for us to
30

do so because the concept of psychological incapacity adopted under Article 36 of the

Family Code was derived from Canon Law.

Father Healy tendered his opinion onwhether or not the respondent’s level of immaturity
and irresponsibility with regard to her own children and to her husband constituted
psychological incapacity, testifying thusly:

ATTY. MADRID

Q : Now, respondent Ma. Elena Fernandez claims that she is not psychologically
incapacitated. On the facts as you read it based on the records of this case before this
Honorable Court, what can you say to that claim of respondent?

A : I would say it is a clear case of psychological incapacity because of her immaturity

and traumatic irresponsibility with regards to her own children.

Q : So what you are saying is that, the claim of respondent that she is not psychologically
incapacitated is not true?

A : Yes. It should be rejected.

Q : Why do you say so?

A : Because of what she has manifested in her whole lifestyle, inconsistent pattern has
been manifested running through their life made a doubt that this is immaturity and
irresponsibility because her family was dysfunctional and then her being a model in her
early life and being the bread winner of the family put her in an unusual position of
prominence and then begun to inflate her own ego and she begun to concentrate her
own beauty and that became an obsession and that led to her few responsibility of
subordinating to her children to this lifestyle that she had embraced.

Q : You only mentioned her relationship with the children, the impact. How about the
impact on the relationship of the respondent with her husband?

A : Also the same thing. It just did notfit in to her lifestyle to fulfill her obligation to her
husband and toher children. She had her own priorities, her beauty and her going out
and her mahjong and associating with friends. They were the priorities of her life.

Q : And what you are saying is that, her family was merely secondary?
A : Secondary.

Q : And how does that relate to psychological incapacity?

A : That she could not appreciate or absorb or fulfill the obligations of marriage which
everybody takes for granted. The concentration on the husband and the children before
everything else would be subordinated to the marriage withher. It’s the other way around.

Her beauty, her going out, her beauty parlor and her mahjong, they were their priorities in
her life.

Q : And in medical or clinical parlance, what specifically do you call this?

A : That is narcissism where the person falls in love with himself is from a myt[h]ical case
in Roman history.

Q : Could you please define tous what narcissism is?

A : It’s a self-love, falling in love with oneself to make up for the loss of a dear friend as in
the case of Narcissus, the myth, and then that became known in clinical terminology as
narcissism. When a person is so concern[ed] with her own beauty and prolonging and
protecting it, then it becomes the top priority in her life.

xxxx

Q : And you stated that circumstances that prove this narcissism. How do you consider
this narcissism afflicting respondent, it is grave, slight or ….?

A : I would say it’s grave from the actual cases of neglect of her family and that causes
serious obligations which she has ignored and not properly esteemed because she is so
concern[ed] with herself in her own lifestyle. Very serious.

Q : And do you have an opinion whether or not this narcissism afflicting respondent was
already existing at the time or marriage or even thereafter?

xxxx

A : When you get married you don’t develop narcissism or psychological incapacity. You
bring with you into the marriage and then it becomes manifested because in marriage
you accept these responsibilities. And now you show that you don’t accept them and you
are not capable of fulfilling them and you don’t care about them.

Q : Is this narcissism, Fr. Healy, acquired by accident or congenital or what?

A : No. The lifestyle generates it. Once you become a model and still the family was
depended [sic] upon her and she was a model at Hyatt and then Rustan’s, it began to
inflate her ego so much that this became the top priority in her life. It’s her lifestyle.

Q : What you are saying is that, the narcissism of respondent even expanded after the
marriage?

A : That could have expanded because it became very obvious after the marriage
because she was neglecting such fundamental obligations.
Q : And how about the matter of curability, is this medically or clinically curable, this
narcissism that you mentioned?

A : Let’s say, it was manifested for so many years in her life. It was found in her family
background situation. Say, almost for sure would be incurable now.

Q : What specific background are you referring to?

A : Well, the fact when the father died and she was the breadwinner and her beauty was
so important to give in her job and money and influence and so on. But this is a very
unusual situation for a young girl and her position in the family was exalted in a very very
unusual manner and therefore she had that pressure on her and in her accepting the
pressure, in going along with it and putting it in top priority.
31

Given his credentials and conceded expertise in Canon Law, Father Healy’s opinions and
findings commanded respect. The contribution that his opinions and findings could add to
the judicial determination of the parties’ psychological incapacity was substantive and
instructive. He could thereby inform the trial court on the degrees of the malady that
would warrant the nullity of marriage, and he could as well thereby provideto the trial
court an analytical insight upon a subject as esoteric to the courts as psychological
incapacity has been. We could not justly disregard his opinions and findings.
Appreciating them together with those of Dr. Gates and Dr. Dayan would advance more
the cause of justice. The Court observed in Ngo Te v. Yu-Te: 32

By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of
decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the
expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.

Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as follows:

Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a psychological expert

became increasingly important in such cases. Data about the person's entire life, both
before and after the ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were asked
togive professional opinions about a party's mental capacity at the time of the wedding.
These opinions were rarely challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence
of lack of valid consent.

The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not amount to
the addition of new grounds for annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the
Church to the advances made in psychology during the past decades. There was now
the expertise to provide the all-important connecting link between a marriage breakdown
and premarital causes.

During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a legal
contract to that of a covenant. The result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in
annulment cases that a person who could intellectually understand the concept of
marriage could necessarily give valid consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and
assume the real obligations of a mature, lifelong commitmentare now considered a
necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial consent.

Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological incapacity, "not
only to sexual anomalies but to all kinds ofpersonality disorders that incapacitate a
spouse or both spouses from assuming or carrying out the essential obligations of
marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each
other's body for hetero sexual acts, but is, in its totality the right to the community of the
whole of life; i.e., the right to a developing lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since
1973 have refined the meaning of psychological or psychic capacity for marriage as
presupposing the development of an adult personality; as meaning the capacity of the
spouses to give themselves to each other and to accept the other as a distinct person;
that the spouses must be `other oriented' since the obligations of marriage are rooted in
a self-giving love; and that the spouses must have the capacity for interpersonal
relationship because marriage is more than just a physical reality but involves a true
intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of the obligations ofmarriage depends,
according to Church decisions, on the strength of this interpersonal relationship. A
serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held to impair the relationship
and consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations. The marital
capacity of one spouse is not considered in isolation but in reference to the fundamental
relationship to the other spouse.

Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the mature
marital relationship:

"The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a
permanent and faithful commitment to the marriage partner; (2) openness to children and
partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to
cope with the ordinary stresses and strains of marriage, etc."

Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that might lead to
the failure of a marriage:

"At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal communion even with
the best intentions of the parties. Among the psychic factors possibly giving rise to his
orher inability to fulfill marital obligations are the following: (1) antisocial personality with
its fundamental lack of loyalty to persons or sense of moral values; (2) hyperesthesia,
where the individual has no real freedom of sexual choice; (3) the inadequate personality
where personal responses consistently fall short of reasonable expectations.

xxxx

The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts whether he or
she has a case for an annulment on any other terms. A situation that does not fit into any
of the more traditional categories often fits very easily into the psychological category.

As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting a shift in their
use. Whereas originally the emphasis was on the parties' inability to exercise proper
judgment at the time of the marriage (lack of due discretion), recent cases seem to be
concentrating on the parties' incapacity to assume or carry out their responsibilities and
obligations as promised(lack of due competence). An advantage to using the ground of
lack of due competence is that at the time the marriage was entered into civil divorce and
breakup of the family almost always is proof of someone's failure to carry out marital
responsibilities as promisedat the time the marriage was entered into."

Hernandez v. Court of Appeals emphasizes the importance of presenting expert

testimony to establish the precise cause of a party's psychological incapacity, and to
show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcosasserts,
there is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be
personally examined by a physician, if the totalityof evidence presented is enough to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show a link,
medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the
psychological disorder itself.
This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the presentation
of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the
psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable
presence of psychological incapacity. 33

Ngo Tealso emphasized that in light of the unintended consequences of strictly applying
the standards set in Molina,  the courts should consider the totality of evidence in
34

adjudicating petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code, viz:

The resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the case-to-case basis by
which the provision should be interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had, somehow,
been rendered ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict standards in Molina, thus:

xxxx

Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority of the Court’s membership concurred in
the ponencia of then Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio V. Panganiban, three
justices concurred "in the result" and another three--including, as aforesaid, Justice
Romero--took pains to compose their individual separate opinions. Then Justice Teodoro
R. Padilla even emphasized that "each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori
assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but according to its own facts. In the field
of psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no
case is on ‘all fours’ with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the
factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its
own judgment for that of the trial court."

Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent cases, the Court has applied the aforesaid
standards, without too much regard for the law's clear intention that each case is to be
treated differently, as "courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis;
guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals."

In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules,
as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. Understandably,
the Court was then alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds,
and was sensitive to the OSG's exaggeration of Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce
procedure in the world." The unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken its
toll on people who have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic
personality anomaly, which, like termites, consume little by little the very foundation of
their families, our basic social institutions. Far fromwhat was intended by the Court,
Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly
or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed
sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, tocontinuously
debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled
marriages on account of the personality disorders of the said individuals.

The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the remedy provided by Article 36,
for there are ample safeguards against this contingency, among which is the intervention
by the State, through the public prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the
parties and/or fabrication of evidence. The Court should rather be alarmed by the rising
number of cases involving marital abuse, child abuse, domestic violence and incestuous
rape.

In dissolving marital bonds on account of either party's psychological incapacity, the

Court isnot demolishing the foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity
of marriage, because it refuses to allow a person afflicted with a psychological disorder,
who cannot comply with or assume the essential marital obligations, from remaining in
that sacred bond. It may be stressed that the infliction of physical violence, constitutional
indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psycho sexual anomaly are
manifestations of a sociopathic personality anomaly. Let itbe noted that in Article 36,
there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void from the very
beginning. To indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity under Article 36 will simply
provide a decent burial to a stillborn marriage.

xxxx

Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment of Molina in this case.
We simply declare that, as aptly stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes,
there is need to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the
disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the risk of being
redundant, we reiterate once more the principle that each case must be judged, not on
the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own
facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-
case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals. 35

III

In the decision of September 19, 2011,the Court declared as follows:

Respondent admittedly played mahjong, but it was not proven that she engaged in
mahjong so frequently that she neglected her duties as a mother and a wife. Respondent
refuted petitioner’s allegations that she played four to five times a week. She maintained
it was only two to three times a week and always withthe permission of her husband and
without abandoning her children at home. The children corroborated this, saying that
theywere with their mother when she played mahjong in their relatives home.Petitioner
did not present any proof, other than his own testimony, that the mahjong sessions were
so frequent that respondent neglected her family. While he intimated that two of his sons
repeated the second grade, he was not able to link this episode to respondent’s
mahjong-playing. The least that could have been done was to prove the frequency of
respondent’s mahjong-playing during the years when these two children were in second
grade. This was not done. Thus, while there is no dispute that respondent played
mahjong, its alleged debilitating frequency and adverse effect on the children were not
proven.  (Emphasis supplied)
36

The frequency of the respondent’s mahjong playing should not have delimited our
determination of the presence or absence of psychological incapacity. Instead, the
determinant should be her obvious failure to fully appreciate the duties and
responsibilities of parenthood at the time she made her marital vows. Had she fully
appreciated such duties and responsibilities, she would have known that bringing along
her children of very tender ages to her mahjong sessions would expose them to a culture
of gambling and other vices that would erode their moral fiber.

Nonetheless, the long-term effects of the respondent’s obsessive mahjong playing surely
impacted on her family life, particularly on her very young children. We do find to be
revealing the disclosures made by Valerio Teodoro Kalaw  – the parties’ eldest son – in
37

his deposition, whereby the son confirmed the claim of his father that his mother had
been hooked on playing mahjong, viz:

ATTY. PISON: From the time before your parent’s separation, do you remember any
habit or activity or practice which your mother engaged in, before the separation?
WITNESS: Yeah, habit? She was a heavy smoker and she likes to play mahjong a lot,
and I can’t remember.

xxxx

ATTY. PISON: You said that your mother played mahjong frequently. How frequent, do
you remember?

WITNESS : Not really, but it was a lot. Not actually, I can’t, I can’t…

ATTY. PISON: How long would she stay playing mahjong say one session?

WITNESS : Really long cuz’we would go to my aunt’s house in White Plains and I think
we would get there by lunch then leave, we fall asleep. I think it was like one in the
morning. ATTY. PISON: You, you went there? She brought you?

WITNESS : Yeah, to play withmy cousins, yeah and my brothers & sisters.

ATTY. PISON: Were you brought all the time?

WITNESS: Yeah, almost all the time but sometimes, I guess she’d go out by herself. 38

The fact that the respondent brought her children with her to her mahjong sessions did
not only point to her neglect of parental duties, but also manifested her tendency to
expose them to a culture of gambling. Her willfully exposing her children to the culture of
gambling on every occasion of her mahjong sessions was a very grave and serious act of
subordinating their needs for parenting to the gratification of her own personal and
escapist desires. This was the observation of Father Healy himself. In that regard, Dr.
Gates and Dr. Dayan both explained that the current psychological state of the
respondent had been rooted on her own childhood experience.

The respondent revealed her wanton disregard for her children’s moral and mental
development. This disregard violated her duty as a parent to safeguard and protect her
children, as expressly defined under Article 209 and Article 220 of the Family Code, to
wit:

Article 209. Pursuant to the natural right and duty of parents over the person and
property of their unemancipated children, parental authority and responsibility shall
includethe caring for and rearing of such children for civic consciousness and efficiency
and the development of their moral, mental and physical character and well-being.

Article 220. The parents and those exercising parental authority shall have with respect
to their unemancipated children or wards the following rights and duties:

(1) To keep them in their company, to support, educate and instruct them by right precept
and good example, and to provide for their upbringing in keeping with their means;

(2) x x x x

(3) To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate in them honesty,
integrity, self-discipline, self-reliance, industry and thrift, stimulate their interest in civic
affairs, and inspire in them compliance with the duties of citizenship;

(4) To enhance, protect, preserve and maintain their physical and mental health at all
times;
(5) To furnish them with good and wholesome educational materials, supervise their
activities, recreation and association with others, protect them from bad company, and
prevent them from acquiring habits detrimental to their health, studies and morals;

(6) x x x x

(7) x x x x

(8) x x x x

(9) x x x x (emphasis supplied)

The September 19, 2011 decision did not properly take into consideration the findings of
the RTC to the effect that both the petitioner and the respondent had been
psychologically incapacitated, and thus could not assume the essential obligations of
marriage. The RTC would not have found so without the allegation to that effect by the
respondent in her answer,  whereby she averred that it was not she but the petitioner
39

who had suffered from psychological incapacity.

The allegation of the petitioner’spsychological incapacity was substantiated by Dr.

Dayan, as follows:

ATTY. BRETAÑA:

Q : You stated earlier that both parties were behaviorally immature?

A : Yes, sir.

Q : And that the marriage was a mistake?

A : Yes, sir.

Q : What is your basis for your statement that respondent was behaviorally immature?

A : Sir, for the reason that even before the marriage Malyn had noticed already some of
those short temper of the petitioner but she was very much in love and so she lived-in
with him and even the time that they were together, that they were living in, she also had
noticed some of his psychological deficits if we may say so. But as I said, because she is
also dependent and she was one who determined to make the relationship work, she
was denying even those kinds of problems that she had seen.

Q : To make it clear, Madam witness, I’m talking here of the petitioner, Mr. Kalaw. What
led you to conclude that Mr. Kalaw was behaviorally immature?

A : I think he also mentioned that his concept of marriage was not duly stable then. He
was not really thinking of marriage except that his wife got pregnant and so he thought
that he had to marry her. And even that time he was not also a monogamous person.

Q : Are you saying, Madam Witness, that ultimately the decision to marry lied on the
petitioner? A : I think so, Sir.

Q : Now, in your report, Madam Witness, you mentioned here that the petitioner admitted
to you that in his younger years he was often out seeking other women. I’m referring
specifically to page 18. He also admitted to you that the thought of commitment scared
him, the petitioner. Now, given these admissions by petitioner to you, my questions is, is
it possible for such a person to enter into marriage despite this fear of commitment and
given his admission that he was a womanizer? Is it possible for this person to stop his
womanizing ways during the marriage?

A : Sir, it’s difficult.

Q : It would be difficult for that person?

A : Yes, Sir.

Q : What is the probability of this person giving up his womanizing after marriage?

A : Sir, I would say the probability of his giving up is almost only 20%.

Q : So, it is entirely possible that the respondent womanized during his marriage with the
respondent?

A : Yes, Sir.

Q : What is the bearing of this fearof commitment on the part of the petitioner insofar as
his psychological capacity to perform his duties as a husband is concerned?

A : Sir, it would impair his ability to have sexual integrity and also to be fully committed to
the role of husband to Malyn.

Q : Madam Witness, you never directly answered my question on whether the petitioner
was psychologically incapacitated to perform his duty as a husband. You only said that
the petitioner was behaviorally immature and that the marriage was a mistake. Now, may
I asked [sic] you that question again and request you to answer that directly?

A : Sir, he is psychologically incapacitated. 40

Although the petitioner, as the plaintiff, carried the burden to prove the nullity of the
marriage, the respondent, as the defendant spouse, could establish the psychological
incapacity of her husband because she raised the matter in her answer. The courts are
justified in declaring a marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code
regardless of whether it is the petitioner or the respondent who imputes the psychological
incapacity to the other as long as the imputation is fully substantiated with proof. Indeed,
psychological incapacity may exist in one party alone or in both of them, and if
psychological incapacity of either or both is established, the marriage has to be deemed
null and void.

More than twenty (20) years had passed since the parties parted ways. By now, they
must have already accepted and come to terms with the awful truth that their marriage,
assuming it existed in the eyes of the law, was already beyond repair. Both parties had
inflicted so much damage not only to themselves, but also to the lives and psyche of their
own children. It would be a greater injustice should we insist on still recognizing their void
marriage, and then force them and their children to endure some more damage. This was
the very same injustice that Justice Romero decried in her erudite dissenting opinion in
Santos v. Court of Appeals: 41

It would be great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this Court to give a much too
restrictive interpretation of the law and compel the petitioner to continue to be married to
a wife who for purposes of fulfilling her marital duties has, for all practical purposes,
ceased to exist.
Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in the ruling the Court makes
today.  It is not, in effect, directly or indirectly, facilitating the transformation of petitioner
1âwphi1

into a "habitual tryster" or one forced to maintain illicit relations with another woman or
women with emerging problems of illegitimate children, simply because he is denied by
private respondent, his wife, the companionship and conjugal love which he has sought
from her and towhich he is legally entitled?

I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family Code is a sanction for absolute
divorce but I submit that we should not constrict it to non-recognition of its evident
purpose and thus deny to one like petitioner, an opportunity to turn a new leaf in his life
by declaring his marriage a nullity by reason of his wife’s psychological incapacity to
perform an essential marital obligation. In this case, the marriage never existed from the
beginning because the respondent was afflicted with psychological incapacity at and prior
to the time of the marriage. Hence, the Court should not hesitate to declare the nullity of
the marriage between the parties.

To stress, our mandate to protect the inviolability of marriage as the basic foundation of
our society does not preclude striking down a marital union that is "ill-equipped to
promote family life," thus:

Now is also the opportune time to comment on another common legal guide utilized in
the adjudication of petitions for declaration of nullity in the adjudication of petitions for
declaration of nullity under Article 36. All too frequently, this Court and lower courts, in
denying petitions of the kind, have favorably cited Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the
Constitution, which respectively state that "[t]he State recognizes the Filipino family as
the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively
promote its total development[t]," and that [m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is
the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State." These provisions
highlight the importance of the family and the constitutional protection accorded to the
institution of marriage.

But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state protection to
marriage as a social institution and the foundation of the family. It remains the province of
the legislature to define all legal aspects of marriage and prescribe the strategy and the
modalities to protect it, based on whatever socio-political influences it deems proper, and
subject of course to the qualification that such legislative enactment itself adheres to the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This being the case, it also falls on the legislature to
put into operation the constitutional provisions that protect marriage and the family. This
has been accomplished at present through the enactment of the Family Code, which
defines marriage and the family, spells out the corresponding legal effects, imposes the
limitations that affect married and family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for
declaration of nullity and those for legal separation. While it may appear that the judicial
denial of a petition for declaration of nullity is reflective of the constitutional mandate to
protect marriage, such action in fact merely enforces a statutory definition of marriage,
not a constitutionally ordained decree of what marriage is. Indeed, if circumstances
warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV need not be the only constitutional considerations
to be taken into account in resolving a petition for declaration of nullity. Indeed, Article 36
of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a psychologically
incapacitated person as a nullity, should be deemed as an implement of this
constitutional protection of marriage. Given the avowed State interest in promoting
marriage as the foundation of the family, which in turn serves as the foundation of the
nation, there is a corresponding interest for the State to defend against marriages ill-
equipped to promote family life. Void ab initio marriages under Article 36 do not further
the initiatives of the State concerning marriage and family, as they promote wedlock
among persons who, for reasons independent of their will, are not capacitated to
understand or comply with the essential obligations of marriage.  (Emphasis supplied)
42
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration; REVERSES and
SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on September 19, 2011; and REINSTATES the
decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court declaring the marriage between the
petitioner and the respondent on November 4, 1976 as NULL AND VOID AB INITIO due
to the psychological incapacity of the parties pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.

No pronouncement on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

TERESITA J. LEONARDO DE CASTRO

Associate Justice
Chairperson

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ *

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN **

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997

CHI MING TSOI, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.

TORRES, JR., J.:

Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a marriage in its journey over
troubled waters. Laws are seemingly inadequate. Over time, much reliance has been
placed in the works of the unseen hand of Him who created all things.
Who is to blame when a marriage fails?

This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife against her uncaring husband
in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 89) which decreed the annulment of
the marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner appealed the decision
of the trial court to respondent Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 42758) which affirmed
the Trial Court's decision November 29, 1994 and correspondingly denied the motion for
reconsideration in a resolution dated February 14, 1995.

The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial court and reproduced by the
Court of Appeals  its decision are as follows:
1

From the evidence adduced, the following acts were preponderantly established:

Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at the Manila
Cathedral, . . . Intramuros Manila, as evidenced by their Marriage Contract. (Exh. "A")

After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at the South Villa, Makati,
they went and proceeded to the house of defendant's mother.

There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first night of their
married life.

It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her expectations, that as newlyweds they
were supposed to enjoy making love, or having sexual intercourse, with each other, the
defendant just went to bed, slept on one side thereof, then turned his back and went to
sleep . There was no sexual intercourse between them during the first night. The same
thing happened on the second, third and fourth nights.

In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can enjoy together
during their first week as husband and wife, they went to Baguio City. But, they did so
together with her mother, an uncle, his mother and his nephew. They were all invited by
the defendant to join them. [T]hey stayed in Baguio City for four (4) days. But, during this
period, there was no sexual intercourse between them, since the defendant avoided her
by taking a long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair located at
the living room. They slept together in the same room and on the same bed since May
22, 1988 until March 15, 1989. But during this period, there was no attempt of sexual
intercourse between them. [S]he claims, that she did not: even see her husband's private
parts nor did he see hers.

Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio
Macalalag, a urologist at the Chinese General Hospital, on January 20, 1989.

The results of their physical examinations were that she is healthy, normal and still a
virgin, while that of her husband's examination was kept confidential up to this time.
While no medicine was prescribed for her, the doctor prescribed medications for her
husband which was also kept confidential. No treatment was given to her. For her
husband, he was asked by the doctor to return but he never did.

The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not
show his penis. She said, that she had observed the defendant using an eyebrow pencil
and sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother. And that, according to her, the
defendant married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain his residency status here
in the country and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man.
The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.

On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their marriage shall be annulled
by reason of psychological incapacity, the fault lies with his wife.

But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife annulled for several
reasons, viz: (1) that he loves her very much; (2) that he has no defect on his part and he
is physically and psychologically capable; and, (3) since the relationship is still very
young and if there is any differences between the two of them, it can still be reconciled
and that, according to him, if either one of them has some incapabilities, there is no
certainty that this will not be cured. He further claims, that if there is any defect, it can be
cured by the intervention of medical technology or science.

The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation
on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual contact between them. But, the reason for this,
according to the defendant, was that everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse with
his wife, she always avoided him and whenever he caresses her private parts, she
always removed his hands. The defendant claims, that he forced his wife to have sex
with him only once but he did not continue because she was shaking and she did not like
it. So he stopped.

There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant , why the plaintiff filed this case
against him, and these are: (1) that she is afraid that she will be forced to return the
pieces of jewelry of his mother, and, (2) that her husband, the defendant, will
consummate their marriage.

The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid because they are still very
young and there is still a chance to overcome their differences.

The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His penis was examined by
Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr., for the purpose of finding out whether he is impotent . As a result
thereof, Dr. Alteza submitted his Doctor's Medical Report. (Exh. "2"). It is stated there,
that there is no evidence of impotency (Exh. "2-B"), and he is capable of erection. (Exh.
"2-C")

The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to find out whether or not he
has an erection and he found out that from the original size of two (2) inches, or five (5)
centimeters, the penis of the defendant lengthened by one (1) inch and one centimeter.
Dr. Alteza said, that the defendant had only a soft erection which is why his penis is not
in its full length. But, still is capable of further erection, in that with his soft erection, the
defendant is capable of having sexual intercourse with a woman.

In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no collusion between the
parties and that the evidence is not fabricated." 2

After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as VOID the marriage entered

into by the plaintiff with the defendant on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Basilica
of the Immaculate Conception, Intramuros, Manila, before the Rt. Rev. Msgr. Melencio de
Vera. Without costs. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of
Quezon City. Let another copy be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Manila.

SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.

Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:

in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there was no sexual intercourse
between the parties without making any findings of fact.

II

in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion with petitioner
is a psychological incapacity inasmuch as proof thereof is totally absent.

III

in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private respondent to
have sex with each other constitutes psychological incapacity of both.

IV

in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the parties decreed by the lower
court without fully satisfying itself that there was no collusion between them.

We find the petition to be bereft of merit.

Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-89-3141, private
respondent has the burden of proving the allegations in her complaint; that since there
was no independent evidence to prove the alleged non-coitus between the parties, there
remains no other basis for the court's conclusion except the admission of petitioner; that
public policy should aid acts intended to validate marriage and should retard acts
intended to invalidate them; that the conclusion drawn by the trial court on the
admissions and confessions of the parties in their pleadings and in the course of the trial
is misplaced since it could have been a product of collusion; and that in actions for
annulment of marriage, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be
proved. 3

Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:

Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. — Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or

otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may,
on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of
marriage or for legal separation the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always
be proved.

The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the pleadings. What said provision
seeks to prevent is annulment of marriage without trial. The assailed decision was not
based on such a judgment on the pleadings. When private respondent testified under
oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by oath before the trial court and was
cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in form of a
testimony. After such evidence was presented, it be came incumbent upon petitioner to
present his side. He admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their
separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual intercourse between them.
To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as stated by the petitioner,
the Civil Code provides that no judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon
a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment (Arts. 88 and 101[par. 2]) and the
Rules of Court prohibit such annulment without trial (Sec. 1, Rule 19).

The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want their marriage to be
annulled. This only shows that there is no collusion between the parties. When petitioner
admitted that he and his wife (private respondent) have never had sexual contact with
each other, he must have been only telling the truth. We are reproducing the relevant
portion of the challenged resolution denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration,
penned with magisterial lucidity by Associate Justice Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes, viz:

The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this Court is not based on a
stipulation of facts. The issue of whether or not the appellant is psychologically
incapacitated to discharge a basic marital obligation was resolved upon a review of both
the documentary and testimonial evidence on record. Appellant admitted that he did not
have sexual relations with his wife after almost ten months of cohabitation, and it appears
that he is not suffering from any physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance or
unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality
disorder which to the mind of this Court clearly demonstrates an 'utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage' within the meaning of Article 36
of the Family Code (See Santos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4,
1995).4

Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that the alleged refusal
of both the petitioner and the private respondent to have sex with each other constitutes
psychological incapacity of both. He points out as error the failure of the trial court to
make "a categorical finding about the alleged psychological incapacity and an in-depth
analysis of the reasons for such refusal which may not be necessarily due to
physchological disorders" because there might have been other reasons, — i.e., physical
disorders, such as aches, pains or other discomforts, — why private respondent would
not want to have sexual intercourse from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989, in a short
span of 10 months.

First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent court made a finding
on who between petitioner and private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with
the other. The fact remains, however, that there has never been coitus between them. At
any rate, since the action to declare the marriage void may be filed by either party, i.e.,
even the psychologically incapacitated, the question of who refuses to have sex with the
other becomes immaterial.

Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record to show that any of the
parties is suffering from phychological incapacity. Petitioner also claims that he wanted to
have sex with private respondent; that the reason for private respondent's refusal may
not be psychological but physical disorder as stated above.

We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could have discussed with private
respondent or asked her what is ailing her, and why she balks and avoids him everytime
he wanted to have sexual intercourse with her. He never did. At least, there is nothing in
the record to show that he had tried to find out or discover what the problem with his wife
could be. What he presented in evidence is his doctor's Medical Report that there is no
evidence of his impotency and he is capable of erection.  Since it is petitioner's claim that
5

the reason is not psychological but perhaps physical disorder on the part of private
respondent, it became incumbent upon him to prove such a claim.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential
marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage
tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal.
Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the
prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is
considered a sign of psychological incapacity. 6

Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate
children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual
cooperation is the basic end of marriage." Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation will
finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the
senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation
is equivalent to psychological incapacity.

As aptly stated by the respondent court,

An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the husband's plea that the wife did
not want carnal intercourse with him does not inspire belief. Since he was not physically
impotent, but he refrained from sexual intercourse during the entire time (from May 22,
1988 to March 15, 1989) that he occupied the same bed with his wife, purely out of
symphaty for her feelings, he deserves to be doubted for not having asserted his right
seven though she balked (Tompkins vs. Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599, cited in I Paras, Civil
Code, at p. 330). Besides, if it were true that it is the wife was suffering from incapacity,
the fact that defendant did not go to court and seek the declaration of nullity weakens his
claim. This case was instituted by the wife whose normal expectations of her marriage
were frustrated by her husband's inadequacy. Considering the innate modesty of the
Filipino woman, it is hard to believe that she would expose her private life to public
scrutiny and fabricate testimony against her husband if it were not necessary to put her
life in order and put to rest her marital status.

We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what the evidence proved is the
unwillingness or lack of intention to perform the sexual act, which is not phychological
incapacity, and which can be achieved "through proper motivation." After almost ten
months of cohabitation, the admission that the husband is reluctant or unwilling to
perform the sexual act with his wife whom he professes to love very dearly, and who has
not posed any insurmountable resistance to his alleged approaches, is indicative of a
hopeless situation, and of a serious personality disorder that constitutes psychological
incapacity to discharge the basic marital covenants within the contemplation of the
Family Code. 7

While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is
actually the "spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal
mandate or court order" (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless
it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in
marriage is to say "I could not have cared less." This is so because an ungiven self is an
unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual
intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a
participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of
procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations.

It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private respondent.
That is — a shared feeling which between husband and wife must be experienced not
only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion.
Marital union is a two-way process. An expressive interest in each other's feelings at a
time it is needed by the other can go a long way in deepening the marital relationship.
Marriage is definitely not for children but for two consenting adults who view the
relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and a continuing
commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.

This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found
themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital
obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied judgment of respondent appellate
court.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES , the assailed decision of the Court of

Appeals dated November 29, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects and the petition
is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. NO. 158896             October 27, 2004

JUANITA CARATING-SIAYNGCO, petitioner,
vs.
MANUEL SIAYNGCO, respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals
promulgated on 01 July 2003, reversing the decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 102, Quezon City, dated 31 January 2001, which dismissed the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage filed by respondent herein Judge Manuel Siayngco
("respondent Manuel").

Petitioner Juanita Carating-Siayngco ("Petitioner Juanita") and respondent Manuel were

married at civil rites on 27 June 1973 and before the Catholic Church on 11 August 1973.
After discovering that they could not have a child of their own, the couple decided to
adopt a baby boy in 1977, who they named Jeremy.

On 25 September 1997, or after twenty-four (24) years of married life together,

respondent Manuel filed for the declaration of its nullity on the ground of psychological
incapacity of petitioner Juanita. He alleged that all throughout their marriage, his wife
exhibited an over domineering and selfish attitude towards him which was exacerbated
by her extremely volatile and bellicose nature; that she incessantly complained about
almost everything and anyone connected with him like his elderly parents, the staff in his
office and anything not of her liking like the physical arrangement, tables, chairs,
wastebaskets in his office and with other trivial matters; that she showed no respect or
regard at all for the prestige and high position of his office as judge of the Municipal Trial
Court; that she would yell and scream at him and throw objects around the house within
the hearing of their neighbors; that she cared even less about his professional
advancement as she did not even give him moral support and encouragement; that her
psychological incapacity arose before marriage, rooted in her deep-seated resentment
and vindictiveness for what she perceived as lack of love and appreciation from her own
parents since childhood and that such incapacity is permanent and incurable and, even if
treatment could be attempted, it will involve time and expense beyond the emotional and
physical capacity of the parties; and that he endured and suffered through his turbulent
and loveless marriage to her for twenty-two (22) years.

In her Answer, petitioner Juanita alleged that respondent Manuel is still living with her at
their conjugal home in Malolos, Bulacan; that he invented malicious stories against her
so that he could be free to marry his paramour; that she is a loving wife and mother; that
it was respondent Manuel who was remiss in his marital and family obligations; that she
supported respondent Manuel in all his endeavors despite his philandering; that she was
raised in a real happy family and had a happy childhood contrary to what was stated in
the complaint.

In the pre-trial order,3 the parties only stipulated on the following:

1. That they were married on 27 June 1973;

2. That they have one son who is already 20 years old.

Trial on the merits ensued thereafter. Respondent Manuel first took the witness stand
and elaborated on the allegations in his petition. He testified that his parents never
approved of his marriage as they still harbored hope that he would return to the
seminary.4 The early years of their marriage were difficult years as they had a hard time
being accepted as husband and wife by his parents and it was at this period that his wife
started exhibiting signs of being irritable and temperamental 5 to him and his parents.6 She
was also obsessive about cleanliness which became the common source of their
quarrels.7 He, however, characterized their union as happy during that period of time in
1979 when they moved to Malolos as they were engrossed in furnishing their new
house.8 In 1981, when he became busy with law school and with various community
organizations, it was then that he felt that he and his wife started to drift apart. 9 He then
narrated incidents during their marriage that were greatly embarrassing and/or
distressing to him, e.g., when his wife quarreled with an elderly neighbor; 10 when she
would visit him in his office and remark that the curtains were already dirty or when she
kicked a trash can across the room or when she threw a ballpen from his table; 11 when
she caused his office drawer to be forcibly opened while he was away; 12 when she
confronted a female tenant of theirs and accused the tenant of having an affair with
him;13 and other incidents reported to him which would show her jealous nature. Money
matters continued to be a source of bitter quarrels. 14 Respondent Manuel could not forget
that he was not able to celebrate his appointment as judge in 1995 as his wife did not
approve it, ostensibly for lack of money, but she was very generous when it came to
celebrations of their parish priest.15 Respondent Manuel then denied that he was a
womanizer16 or that he had a mistress.17 Lastly, respondent Manuel testified as to their
conjugal properties and obligations.18

Next, LUCENA TAN, respondent Manuel’s Clerk of Court, testified that petitioner Juanita
seldom went to respondent Manuel’s office. 19 But when she was there, she would call
witness to complain about the curtains and the cleanliness of the office. 20 One time,
witness remembered petitioner Juanita rummaging through respondent Manuel’s drawer
looking for his address book while the latter was in Subic attending a conference. 21 When
petitioner Juanita could not open a locked drawer she called witness, telling the latter that
she was looking for the telephone number of respondent’s hotel room in Subic. A process
server was requested by petitioner Juanita to call for a locksmith in the town proper.
When the locksmith arrived, petitioner Juanita ordered him to open the locked drawer. On
another occasion, particularly in August of 1998, witness testified that she heard
petitioner Juanita remark to respondent Manuel "sino bang batang bibinyagan na yan?
Baka anak mo yan sa labas?"22

As his third witness, respondent Manuel presented DR. VALENTINA GARCIA whose
professional qualifications as a psychiatrist were admitted by petitioner Juanita. 23 From
her psychiatric evaluation,24 Dr. Garcia concluded:

To sum up, Manuel de Jesus Siayngco and Juanita Victoria Carating-Siayngco

contributed to the marital collapse. There is a partner relational problem which affected
their capacity to sustain the marital bond with love, support and understanding.

The partner relational problem (coded V61/10 in the Fourth Edition of the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders or DSM IV) is secondary to the psychopathology
of both spouses. Manuel and Juanita had engaged themselves in a defective
communication pattern which is characteristically negative and deformed. This affected
their competence to maintain the love and respect that they should give to each other.

Marriage requires a sustained level of adaptation from both partners who are expected to
use healthy strategies to solve their disputes and differences. Whereas Juanita would be
derogatory, critical, argumentative, depressive and obsessive-compulsive, Manuel makes
use of avoidance and suppression. In his effort to satisfy the self and to boost his
masculine ego to cover up for his felt or imagined inadequacies, he became callused to
the detrimental effects of his unfaithfulness and his failure to prioritize the marriage. Both
spouses, who display narcissistic psychological repertoire (along with their other
maladaptive traits), failed to adequately empathize (or to be responsive and sensitive) to
each other’s needs and feelings. The matrimonial plot is not conducive to a healthy and a
progressive marriage. Manuel and Juanita have shown their psychologically [sic]
incapacity to satisfactorily comply with the fundamental duties of marriage. The clashing
of their patterns of maladaptive traits, which warrant the diagnosis of personality disorder
not otherwise specified (PDNOS, with code 301.9 as per DSM IV criteria) will bring about
more emotional mishaps and psychopathology. These rigid sets of traits which were in
existence before the marriage will tend to be pervasive and impervious to recovery. 25
In her defense, petitioner Juanita denied respondent Manuel’s allegations. She insisted
that they were a normal couple who had their own share of fights; that they were happily
married until respondent Manuel started having extra-marital affairs 26 which he had
admitted to her.27 Petitioner Juanita professed that she would wish to preserve her
marriage and that she truly loved her husband. 28 She stated further that she has
continuously supported respondent Manuel, waiting up for him while he was in law school
to serve him food and drinks. Even when he already filed the present case, she would
still attend to his needs.29 She remembered that after the pre-trial, while they were in the
hallway, respondent Manuel implored her to give him a chance to have a new family. 30

DR. EDUARDO MAABA, whose expertise as a psychiatrist was admitted by respondent

Manuel,31 testified that he conducted a psychiatric evaluation on petitioner Juanita, the
results of which were embodied in his report. Said report stated in part:

Based on the clinical interviews and the results of the psychological tests, respondent
Juanita Victoria Carating-Siayngco, was found to be a mature, conservative, religious
and highly intelligent woman who possess [sic] more than enough psychological
potentials for a mutually satisfying long term heterosexual relationship. Superego is
strong and she is respectful of traditional institutions of society like the institution of
marriage. She was also found to be a loving, nurturing and self-sacrificing woman who is
capable of enduring severe environmental stress in her social milieu. Finally, she is
reality-oriented and therefore capable of rendering fair and sound decision.

In summary, the psychiatric evaluation found the respondent to be psychologically

capacitated to comply with the basic and essential obligations of marriage. 32

CRISPINA SEVILLA, a friend of the spouses Siayngco since 1992 described the
Siayngcos as the ideal couple, sweet to each other. 33 The couple would religiously attend
prayer meetings in the community. 34 Both were likewise leaders in their
community.35 Witness then stated that she would often go to the house of the couple and,
as late as March 2000, she still saw respondent Manuel there. 36

On 31 January 2001, the trial court denied respondent Manuel’s petition for declaration of
nullity of his marriage to petitioner Juanita holding in part that:

The asserted psychological incapacity of the defendant is not preponderantly supported

in evidence. The couple [was] happily married and after four years of marital bliss [was]
blest with a son. Their life together continued years thereafter in peace and prosperity.

The psychiatric finding that defendant has been critical, depressed and obsessive
doubtless arose later in the parties’ relationship sometime in the early 90’s when the
defendant-wife started receiving letters that the plaintiff is playing footsy.

xxx     xxx     xxx

The present state of our laws on marriage does not favor knee-jerk responses to slight
stabs of the Pavlovian hammer on marital relations. A wife, as in the instant case, may
have succumbed, due to her jealousy, to the constant delivery of irritating curtain lectures
to her husband. But, as our laws now stand, the dissolution of the marriage is not the
remedy in such cases. In contrast to some countries, our laws do not look at a marital
partner as a mere refrigerator in the Kitchen even if he or she sometimes may sound like
a firetruck.37

A motion for reconsideration was filed but was denied in an order dated 04 May 2001. 38
On 01 July 2003, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision, relying mainly on the
psychiatric evaluation of Dr. Garcia finding both Manuel and Juanita psychologically
incapacitated and on the case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals. 39 Thus:

The report clearly explained the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity of
plaintiff Manuel and defendant Juanita. It appears that there is empathy between plaintiff
and defendant. That is – a shared feeling which between husband and wife must be
experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of
spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process. An expressive interest in each
other’s feelings at a time it is needed by the other can go a long way in deepening the
marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but for two consenting adults
who view the relationship with love "amore gignit amorem", sacrifice and a continuing
commitment to compromise conscious of its value as a sublime social institution (Chi
Ming Tsoi vs. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 324).

This court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found
themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital
obligations, can do no less, but reverse and set aside the decision of the lower court.
Plaintiff Manuel is entitled to have his marriage declared a nullity on the ground of
psychological incapacity, not only of defendant but also of himself. 40

Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred –

I. IN ITS FINDINGS THAT PETITIONER JUANITA IS PSYCHOLOGICALLY

INCAPACITATED

II. IN ITS FINDINGS OF FACT THAT PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT SEPARATED

ON MARCH 1997, THE TRUTH IS THAT THEY ARE STILL LIVING TOGETHER AS
HUSBAND AND WIFE AT THE TIME OF THE FILING OF THE PETITION UP TO THE
PRESENT

III. WHEN IT DID NOT FOLLOW THE GUIDELINES LAID DOWN BY THE SUPREME
COURT IN THE CASE OF REPUBLIC V. MOLINA

IV. IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE OF HEREIN PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT

NULL AND VOID ON GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY UNDER ARTICLE
36 OF THE FAMILY CODE

The Court’s Ruling

Our pronouncement in Republic v. Dagdag41 is apropos. There, we held that whether or

not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for the declaration of the nullity
of the marriage depends crucially on the facts of the case. Each case must be closely
scrutinized and judged according to its own facts as there can be no case that is on "all
fours" with another. This, the Court of Appeals did not heed.

The Court of Appeals perfunctorily applied our ruling in Chi Ming Tsoi despite a clear
divergence in its factual milieu with the case at bar. In Chi Ming Tsoi, the couple involved
therein, despite sharing the same bed from the time of their wedding night on 22 May
1988 until their separation on 15 March 1989, never had coitus. The perplexed wife filed
the petition for the declaration of the nullity of her marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity of her husband. We sustained the wife for the reason that an
essential marital obligation under the Family Code is procreation such that "the senseless
and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is
equivalent to psychological incapacity."
On the other hand, sexual intimacy for procreation is a non-issue herein. Rather, we have
here a case of a husband who is constantly embarrassed by his wife’s outbursts and
overbearing ways, who finds his wife’s obsession with cleanliness and the tight reign on
his wallet "irritants" and who is wounded by her lack of support and respect for his person
and his position as a Judge. In our book, however, these inadequacies of petitioner
Juanita which led respondent Manuel to file a case against her do not amount to
psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations.

It was in Santos v. Court of Appeals 42 where we declared that "psychological incapacity"

under Article 36 of the Family Code is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of
psychoses. It should refer, rather, to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. Psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability.43 In Republic v. Court of Appeals44 we expounded:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against
its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws
cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an
entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees
marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state. The Family Code
echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: a) medically or clinically
identified, b) alleged in the complaint, c) sufficiently proven by experts and d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must
be psychological – not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such
root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the "time of the celebration" of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their "I do’s." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such
time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or

incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to
those not related to marriage like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job.
Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing
medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and
raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor
in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of

the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of
the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect
by our courts.45

With the foregoing pronouncements as compass, we now resolve the issue of whether or
not the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity against petitioner Juanita and/or respondent Manuel.

A. RE: PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF RESPONDENT MANUEL

We reiterate that the state has a high stake in the preservation of marriage rooted in its
recognition of the sanctity of married life and its mission to protect and strengthen the
family as a basic autonomous social institution. 46 With this cardinal state policy in mind,
we held in Republic v. Court of Appeals 47 that the burden of proof to show the nullity of
marriage belongs to the plaintiff (respondent Manuel herein). Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity.

In herein case, the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in holding that
respondent Manuel is psychologically incapacitated. The psychological report of Dr.
Garcia, which is respondent Manuel’s own evidence, contains candid admissions of
petitioner Juanita, the person in the best position to gauge whether or not her husband
fulfilled the essential marital obligations of marriage:

She talked about her spouse, "My husband is kind, a good provider, cool, intelligent but a
liar, masamang magalit at gastador. In spite of what he has done to me, I take care of
him whenever he is sick. He is having extra marital affairs because he wants to have a
child. I believe that our biggest problem is not having a child. It is his obsession to have a
child with his girl now. He started his relationship with this girl in 1994. I even saw them
together in the car. I think that it was the girl who encouraged him to file the petition." She
feels that the problems in the relationship is [sic] "paulit-ulit," but, that she still is willing to
pursue it.

x x x. Overall, she feels that he is a good spouse and that he is not really psychologically
incapacitated. He apparently told her, "You and Jeremy should give me a chance to have
a new family." She answered and said, "Ikaw tinuruan mo akong to fight for my right.
Ipaglalaban ko ang marriage natin." 48

What emerges from the psychological report of Dr. Garcia as well as from the testimonies
of the parties and their witnesses is that the only essential marital obligation which
respondent Manuel was not able to fulfill, if any, is the obligation of fidelity. 49 Sexual
infidelity, per se, however, does not constitute psychological incapacity within the
contemplation of the Family Code.50 It must be shown that respondent Manuel’s
unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered personality which makes him completely
unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state 51 and not merely due to
his ardent wish to have a child of his own flesh and blood. In herein case, respondent
Manuel has admitted that: "I had [extra-marital] affairs because I wanted to have a child
at that particular point."52

B. RE: PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF PETITIONER JUANITA

As aforementioned, the presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage. Semper

praesumitur pro matrimonio. In the case at bar, respondent Manuel failed to prove that
his wife’s lack of respect for him, her jealousies and obsession with cleanliness, her
outbursts and her controlling nature (especially with respect to his salary), and her
inability to endear herself to his parents are grave psychological maladies that paralyze
her from complying with the essential obligations of marriage. Neither is there any
showing that these "defects" were already present at the inception of the marriage or that
they are incurable.53 In fact, Dr. Maaba, whose expertise as a psychiatrist was admitted
by respondent Manuel, reported that petitioner was psychologically capacitated to comply
with the basic and essential obligations of marriage. 54

The psychological report of respondent Manuel’s witness, Dr. Garcia, on the other hand,
does not help his case any. Nothing in there supports the doctor’s conclusion that
petitioner Juanita is psychologically incapacitated. On the contrary, the report clearly
shows that the root cause of petitioner Juanita’s behavior is traceable – not from the
inception of their marriage as required by law – but from her experiences during the
marriage, e.g., her in-laws’ disapproval of her as they wanted their son to enter the
priesthood,55 her husband’s philandering, admitted no less by him, 56 and her inability to
conceive.57 Dr. Garcia’s report paints a story of a husband and wife who grew
professionally during the marriage, who pursued their individual dreams to the hilt,
becoming busier and busier, ultimately sacrificing intimacy and togetherness as a couple.
This was confirmed by respondent Manuel himself during his direct examination. 58

Thus, from the totality of the evidence adduced by both parties, we have been allowed a
window into the Siayngcos’s life and have perceived therefrom a simple case of a
married couple drifting apart, becoming strangers to each other, with the husband
consequently falling out of love and wanting a way out.

An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage. Mere showing of
"irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes
psychological incapacity.59 As we stated in Marcos v. Marcos:60

Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that
cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifests themselves. It refers to a
serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage.
It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties
and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.

We are not downplaying the frustration and misery respondent Manuel might be
experiencing in being shackled, so to speak, to a marriage that is no longer working.
Regrettably, there are situations like this one, where neither law nor society can provide
the specific answers to every individual problem. 61

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated 01 July

2003 of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated
31 January 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 102 is reinstated
and given full force and effect. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
Puno, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.

epublic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 152577 September 21, 2005

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,

vs.
CRASUS L. IYOY, Respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, prays for
the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30
July 2001,1 affirming the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City,
Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October 1998, 2 declaring the marriage
between respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void on the basis
of Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
The proceedings before the RTC commenced with the filing of a Complaint 3 for
declaration of nullity of marriage by respondent Crasus on 25 March 1997. According to
the said Complaint, respondent Crasus married Fely on 16 December 1961 at Bradford
Memorial Church, Jones Avenue, Cebu City. As a result of their union, they had five
children – Crasus, Jr., Daphne, Debbie, Calvert, and Carlos – who are now all of legal
ages. After the celebration of their marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was
"hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant." In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the
United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their five children, the youngest then
being only six years old, to the care of respondent Crasus. Barely a year after Fely left for
the U.S.A., respondent Crasus received a letter from her requesting that he sign the
enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded the said request. Sometime in 1985,
respondent Crasus learned, through the letters sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got
married to an American, with whom she eventually had a child. In 1987, Fely came back
to the Philippines with her American family, staying at Cebu Plaza Hotel in Cebu City.
Respondent Crasus did not bother to talk to Fely because he was afraid he might not be
able to bear the sorrow and the pain she had caused him. Fely returned to the
Philippines several times more: in 1990, for the wedding of their eldest child, Crasus, Jr.;
in 1992, for the brain operation of their fourth child, Calvert; and in 1995, for unknown
reasons. Fely continued to live with her American family in New Jersey, U.S.A. She had
been openly using the surname of her American husband in the Philippines and in the
U.S.A. For the wedding of Crasus, Jr., Fely herself had invitations made in which she
was named as "Mrs. Fely Ada Micklus." At the time the Complaint was filed, it had been
13 years since Fely left and abandoned respondent Crasus, and there was no more
possibility of reconciliation between them. Respondent Crasus finally alleged in his
Complaint that Fely’s acts brought danger and dishonor to the family, and clearly
demonstrated her psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of
marriage. Such incapacity, being incurable and continuing, constitutes a ground for
declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36, in relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of
the Family Code of the Philippines.

Fely filed her Answer and Counterclaim 4 with the RTC on 05 June 1997. She asserted
therein that she was already an American citizen since 1988 and was now married to
Stephen Micklus. While she admitted being previously married to respondent Crasus and
having five children with him, Fely refuted the other allegations made by respondent
Crasus in his Complaint. She explained that she was no more hot-tempered than any
normal person, and she may had been indignant at respondent Crasus on certain
occasions but it was because of the latter’s drunkenness, womanizing, and lack of
sincere effort to find employment and to contribute to the maintenance of their household.
She could not have been extravagant since the family hardly had enough money for
basic needs. Indeed, Fely left for abroad for financial reasons as respondent Crasus had
no job and what she was then earning as the sole breadwinner in the Philippines was
insufficient to support their family. Although she left all of her children with respondent
Crasus, she continued to provide financial support to them, as well as, to respondent
Crasus. Subsequently, Fely was able to bring her children to the U.S.A., except for one,
Calvert, who had to stay behind for medical reasons. While she did file for divorce from
respondent Crasus, she denied having herself sent a letter to respondent Crasus
requesting him to sign the enclosed divorce papers. After securing a divorce from
respondent Crasus, Fely married her American husband and acquired American
citizenship. She argued that her marriage to her American husband was legal because
now being an American citizen, her status shall be governed by the law of her present
nationality. Fely also pointed out that respondent Crasus himself was presently living with
another woman who bore him a child. She also accused respondent Crasus of misusing
the amount of ₱90,000.00 which she advanced to him to finance the brain operation of
their son, Calvert. On the basis of the foregoing, Fely also prayed that the RTC declare
her marriage to respondent Crasus null and void; and that respondent Crasus be ordered
to pay to Fely the ₱90,000.00 she advanced to him, with interest, plus, moral and
exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses.
After respondent Crasus and Fely had filed their respective Pre-Trial Briefs, 5 the RTC
afforded both parties the opportunity to present their evidence. Petitioner Republic
participated in the trial through the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu. 6

Respondent Crasus submitted the following pieces of evidence in support of his

Complaint: (1) his own testimony on 08 September 1997, in which he essentially
reiterated the allegations in his Complaint; 7 (2) the Certification, dated 13 April 1989, by
the Health Department of Cebu City, on the recording of the Marriage Contract between
respondent Crasus and Fely in the Register of Deeds, such marriage celebration taking
place on 16 December 1961; 8 and (3) the invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their
eldest son, wherein Fely openly used her American husband’s surname, Micklus. 9

Fely’s counsel filed a Notice, 10 and, later on, a Motion, 11 to take the deposition of
witnesses, namely, Fely and her children, Crasus, Jr. and Daphne, upon written
interrogatories, before the consular officers of the Philippines in New York and California,
U.S.A, where the said witnesses reside. Despite the Orders 12 and Commissions13 issued
by the RTC to the Philippine Consuls of New York and California, U.S.A., to take the
depositions of the witnesses upon written interrogatories, not a single deposition was
ever submitted to the RTC. Taking into account that it had been over a year since
respondent Crasus had presented his evidence and that Fely failed to exert effort to have
the case progress, the RTC issued an Order, dated 05 October 1998, 14 considering Fely
to have waived her right to present her evidence. The case was thus deemed submitted
for decision.

Not long after, on 30 October 1998, the RTC promulgated its Judgment declaring the
marriage of respondent Crasus and Fely null and void ab initio, on the basis of the
following findings –

The ground bearing defendant’s psychological incapacity deserves a reasonable

consideration. As observed, plaintiff’s testimony is decidedly credible. The Court finds
that defendant had indeed exhibited unmistakable signs of psychological incapacity to
comply with her marital duties such as striving for family unity, observing fidelity, mutual
love, respect, help and support. From the evidence presented, plaintiff adequately
established that the defendant practically abandoned him. She obtained a divorce decree
in the United States of America and married another man and has establish [sic] another
family of her own. Plaintiff is in an anomalous situation, wherein he is married to a wife
who is already married to another man in another country.

Defendant’s intolerable traits may not have been apparent or manifest before the
marriage, the FAMILY CODE nonetheless allows the annulment of the marriage provided
that these were eventually manifested after the wedding. It appears to be the case in this
instance.

Certainly defendant’s posture being an irresponsible wife erringly reveals her very low
regard for that sacred and inviolable institution of marriage which is the foundation of
human society throughout the civilized world. It is quite evident that the defendant is
bereft of the mind, will and heart to comply with her marital obligations, such incapacity
was already there at the time of the marriage in question is shown by defendant’s own
attitude towards her marriage to plaintiff.

In sum, the ground invoked by plaintiff which is defendant’s psychological incapacity to

comply with the essential marital obligations which already existed at the time of the
marriage in question has been satisfactorily proven. The evidence in herein case
establishes the irresponsibility of defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy, firmly.
Going over plaintiff’s testimony which is decidedly credible, the Court finds that the
defendant had indeed exhibited unmistakable signs of such psychological incapacity to
comply with her marital obligations. These are her excessive disposition to material
things over and above the marital stability. That such incapacity was already there at the
time of the marriage in question is shown by defendant’s own attitude towards her
marriage to plaintiff. And for these reasons there is a legal ground to declare the
marriage of plaintiff Crasus L. Iyoy and defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy null and void ab
initio.15

Petitioner Republic, believing that the afore-quoted Judgment of the RTC was contrary to
law and evidence, filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, though,
in its Decision, dated 30 July 2001, affirmed the appealed Judgment of the RTC, finding
no reversible error therein. It even offered additional ratiocination for declaring the
marriage between respondent Crasus and Fely null and void, to wit –

Defendant secured a divorce from plaintiff-appellee abroad, has remarried, and is now
permanently residing in the United States. Plaintiff-appellee categorically stated this as
one of his reasons for seeking the declaration of nullity of their marriage…

Article 26 of the Family Code provides:

"Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be
valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37
and 38.

"WHERE A MARRIAGE BETWEEN A FILIPINO CITIZEN AND A FOREIGNER IS

VALIDLY CELEBRATED AND A DIVORCE IS THEREAFTER VALIDLY OBTAINED
ABROAD BY THE ALIEN SPOUSE CAPACITATING HIM OR HER TO REMARRY, THE
FILIPINO SPOUSE SHALL LIKEWISE HAVE CAPACITY TO REMARRY UNDER
PHILIPPINE LAW."

The rationale behind the second paragraph of the above-quoted provision is to avoid the
absurd and unjust situation of a Filipino citizen still being married to his or her alien
spouse, although the latter is no longer married to the Filipino spouse because he or she
has obtained a divorce abroad. In the case at bench, the defendant has undoubtedly
acquired her American husband’s citizenship and thus has become an alien as well. This
Court cannot see why the benefits of Art. 26 aforequoted can not be extended to a
Filipino citizen whose spouse eventually embraces another citizenship and thus becomes
herself an alien.

It would be the height of unfairness if, under these circumstances, plaintiff would still be
considered as married to defendant, given her total incapacity to honor her marital
covenants to the former. To condemn plaintiff to remain shackled in a marriage that in
truth and in fact does not exist and to remain married to a spouse who is incapacitated to
discharge essential marital covenants, is verily to condemn him to a perpetual
disadvantage which this Court finds abhorrent and will not countenance. Justice dictates
that plaintiff be given relief by affirming the trial court’s declaration of the nullity of the
marriage of the parties.16

After the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution, dated 08 March 2002, 17 denied its Motion for
Reconsideration, petitioner Republic filed the instant Petition before this Court, based on
the following arguments/grounds –
I. Abandonment by and sexual infidelity of respondent’s wife do not per se constitute
psychological incapacity.

II. The Court of Appeals has decided questions of substance not in accord with law and
jurisprudence considering that the Court of Appeals committed serious errors of law in
ruling that Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code is inapplicable to the case at bar. 18

In his Comment19 to the Petition, respondent Crasus maintained that Fely’s psychological
incapacity was clearly established after a full-blown trial, and that paragraph 2 of Article
26 of the Family Code of the Philippines was indeed applicable to the marriage of
respondent Crasus and Fely, because the latter had already become an American
citizen. He further questioned the personality of petitioner Republic, represented by the
Office of the Solicitor General, to institute the instant Petition, because Article 48 of the
Family Code of the Philippines authorizes the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to
the trial court, not the Solicitor General, to intervene on behalf of the State, in
proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages.

After having reviewed the records of this case and the applicable laws and jurisprudence,
this Court finds the instant Petition to be meritorious.

The totality of evidence presented during trial is insufficient to support the finding of
psychological incapacity of Fely.

Article 36, concededly one of the more controversial provisions of the Family Code of the
Philippines, reads –

ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.

Issues most commonly arise as to what constitutes psychological incapacity. In a series

of cases, this Court laid down guidelines for determining its existence.

In Santos v. Court of Appeals,20 the term psychological incapacity was defined, thus –

". . . [P]sychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly cognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as
so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly
any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated…
21

The psychological incapacity must be characterized by –

(a) Gravity – It must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage;
(b) Juridical Antecedence – It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and

(c) Incurability – It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be
beyond the means of the party involved. 22

More definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family
Code of the Philippines were handed down by this Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals
and Molina,23 which, although quite lengthy, by its significance, deserves to be
reproduced below –

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and
our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution
devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It
decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim
of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must
be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such
root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such
time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or

incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to
those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job…

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor
in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of
the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of
the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect
by our courts…

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General
to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein
his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for
resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of
the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.24

A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,25 further clarified that there is no requirement that the

defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or
psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based
on psychological incapacity. Such psychological incapacity, however, must be
established by the totality of the evidence presented during the trial.

Using the guidelines established by the afore-mentioned jurisprudence, this Court finds
that the totality of evidence presented by respondent Crasus failed miserably to establish
the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife Fely; therefore, there is no basis for
declaring their marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines.

The only substantial evidence presented by respondent Crasus before the RTC was his
testimony, which can be easily put into question for being self-serving, in the absence of
any other corroborating evidence. He submitted only two other pieces of evidence: (1)
the Certification on the recording with the Register of Deeds of the Marriage Contract
between respondent Crasus and Fely, such marriage being celebrated on 16 December
1961; and (2) the invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, in which Fely
used her American husband’s surname. Even considering the admissions made by Fely
herself in her Answer to respondent Crasus’s Complaint filed with the RTC, the evidence
is not enough to convince this Court that Fely had such a grave mental illness that
prevented her from assuming the essential obligations of marriage.

It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines

contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the
basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the
part of the errant spouse. 26 Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or
perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of
psychological incapacity under the said Article.27

As has already been stressed by this Court in previous cases, Article 36 "is not to be
confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore
manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even
before the celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one
is about to assume."28
The evidence may have proven that Fely committed acts that hurt and embarrassed
respondent Crasus and the rest of the family. Her hot-temper, nagging, and
extravagance; her abandonment of respondent Crasus; her marriage to an American;
and even her flaunting of her American family and her American surname, may indeed
be manifestations of her alleged incapacity to comply with her marital obligations;
nonetheless, the root cause for such was not identified. If the root cause of the incapacity
was not identified, then it cannot be satisfactorily established as a psychological or
mental defect that is serious or grave; neither could it be proven to be in existence at the
time of celebration of the marriage; nor that it is incurable. While the personal
examination of Fely by a psychiatrist or psychologist is no longer mandatory for the
declaration of nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines, by virtue of this Court’s ruling in Marcos v. Marcos,29 respondent Crasus must
still have complied with the requirement laid down in Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Molina30 that the root cause of the incapacity be identified as a psychological illness and
that its incapacitating nature be fully explained.

In any case, any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. 31 No less
than the Constitution of 1987 sets the policy to protect and strengthen the family as the
basic social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. 32

II

Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is not applicable to the case
at bar.

According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines –

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law.

As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the
couple getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the
marriage was celebrated. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision
cannot be applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at
the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. Although the
exact date was not established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC
that she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after she left for the
United States in 1984, after which she married her American husband in 1985. In the
same Answer, she alleged that she had been an American citizen since 1988. At the
time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality
principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound
by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even
when she was already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not
allow and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly
obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus.

III

The Solicitor General is authorized to intervene, on behalf of the Republic, in proceedings

for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages.

Invoking Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines, respondent Crasus argued that
only the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the RTC may intervene on behalf of
the State in proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages; hence, the
Office of the Solicitor General had no personality to file the instant Petition on behalf of
the State. Article 48 provides –

ART. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the
Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of
the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that the
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.

That Article 48 does not expressly mention the Solicitor General does not bar him or his
Office from intervening in proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of
marriages. Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of
1987, appoints the Solicitor General as the principal law officer and legal defender of the
Government.33 His Office is tasked to represent the Government of the Philippines, its
agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding,
investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. The Office of the Solicitor
General shall constitute the law office of the Government and, as such, shall discharge
duties requiring the services of lawyers.34

The intent of Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines is to ensure that the interest
of the State is represented and protected in proceedings for annulment and declaration of
nullity of marriages by preventing collusion between the parties, or the fabrication or
suppression of evidence; and, bearing in mind that the Solicitor General is the principal
law officer and legal defender of the land, then his intervention in such proceedings could
only serve and contribute to the realization of such intent, rather than thwart it.

Furthermore, the general rule is that only the Solicitor General is authorized to bring or
defend actions on behalf of the People or the Republic of the Philippines once the case is
brought before this Court or the Court of Appeals. 35 While it is the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal who actively participates, on behalf of the State, in a proceeding for annulment or
declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General takes
over when the case is elevated to the Court of Appeals or this Court. Since it shall be
eventually responsible for taking the case to the appellate courts when circumstances
demand, then it is only reasonable and practical that even while the proceeding is still
being held before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General can already exercise
supervision and control over the conduct of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal therein to
better guarantee the protection of the interests of the State.

In fact, this Court had already recognized and affirmed the role of the Solicitor General in
several cases for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages that were appealed
before it, summarized as follows in the case of Ancheta v. Ancheta36 –

In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals [268 SCRA 198 (1997)], this Court laid down
the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 48 of the Family Code, one of
which concerns the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the State:

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General
to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein
his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for
resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of
the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. [Id., at 213]
This Court in the case of Malcampo-Sin v. Sin [355 SCRA 285 (2001)] reiterated its
pronouncement in Republic v. Court of Appeals [Supra.] regarding the role of the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
State…37

Finally, the issuance of this Court of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, 38 which became effective on 15 March
2003, should dispel any other doubts of respondent Crasus as to the authority of the
Solicitor General to file the instant Petition on behalf of the State. The Rule recognizes
the authority of the Solicitor General to intervene and take part in the proceedings for
annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages before the RTC and on appeal to higher
courts. The pertinent provisions of the said Rule are reproduced below –

Sec. 5. Contents and form of petition. –

(4) It shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition on the
Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the City or Provincial Prosecutor, within
five days from the date of its filing and submit to the court proof of such service within the
same period.

Sec. 18. Memoranda. – The court may require the parties and the public prosecutor, in
consultation with the Office of the Solicitor General, to file their respective memoranda in
support of their claims within fifteen days from the date the trial is terminated. It may
require the Office of the Solicitor General to file its own memorandum if the case is of
significant interest to the State. No other pleadings or papers may be submitted without
leave of court. After the lapse of the period herein provided, the case will be considered
submitted for decision, with or without the memoranda.

Sec. 19. Decision. –

(2) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the public prosecutor, shall be served
with copies of the decision personally or by registered mail. If the respondent summoned
by publication failed to appear in the action, the dispositive part of the decision shall be
published once in a newspaper of general circulation.

(3) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen days from notice to the
parties. Entry of judgment shall be made if no motion for reconsideration or new trial, or
appeal is filed by any of the parties, the public prosecutor, or the Solicitor General.

Sec. 20. Appeal. –

(2) Notice of Appeal. – An aggrieved party or the Solicitor General may appeal from the
decision by filing a Notice of Appeal within fifteen days from notice of denial of the motion
for reconsideration or new trial. The appellant shall serve a copy of the notice of appeal
on the adverse parties.
Given the foregoing, this Court arrives at a conclusion contrary to those of the RTC and
the Court of Appeals, and sustains the validity and existence of the marriage between
respondent Crasus and Fely. At most, Fely’s abandonment, sexual infidelity, and bigamy,
give respondent Crasus grounds to file for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family
Code of the Philippines, but not for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of
the same Code. While this Court commiserates with respondent Crasus for being
continuously shackled to what is now a hopeless and loveless marriage, this is one of
those situations where neither law nor society can provide the specific answer to every
individual problem.39

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001, affirming the Judgment of the
RTC of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October 1998, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

The marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy remains valid and
subsisting.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO

Associate Justice

Chairman

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO

Associate Justice

Chairman, Second Division

 CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairman’s
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 165321               August 3, 2010

RICARDO P. TORING, Petitioner,
vs.
TERESITA M. TORING and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the appeal filed by petitioner Ricardo P. Toring from the May 31, 2004
decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 71882. The CA reversed the
August 10, 2001 judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 106 of Quezon City
in Civil Case No. Q-99-36662, 2 nullifying Ricardo's marriage with respondent Teresita M.
Toring on the ground of psychological incapacity.

THE FACTS
Ricardo was introduced to Teresita in 1978 at his aunt’s house in Cebu. Teresita was
then his cousin’s teacher in Hawaiian dance and was conducting lessons at his aunt’s
house. Despite their slight difference in age (of five years), the younger Ricardo found the
dance teacher attractive and fell in love with her. He pursued Teresita and they became
sweethearts after three months of courtship. They eloped soon after, hastened by the bid
of another girlfriend, already pregnant, to get Ricardo to marry her.

Ricardo and Teresita were married on September 4, 1978 before Hon. Remigio Zari of
the City Court of Quezon City. They begot three children: Richardson, Rachel Anne, and
Ric Jayson.

On February 1, 1999, more than twenty years after their wedding, Ricardo filed a petition
for annulment before the RTC. He claimed that Teresita was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage prior to, at the time of,
and subsequent to the celebration of their marriage. He asked the court to declare his
marriage to Teresita null and void.

At the trial, Ricardo offered in evidence their marriage contract; the psychological
evaluation and signature of his expert witness, psychiatrist Dr. Cecilia R. Albaran, and his
and Dr. Albaran’s respective testimonies. Teresita did not file any answer or opposition to
the petition, nor did she testify to refute the allegations against her. 3

Ricardo alleged in his petition and in his testimony at the trial that Teresita was an
adulteress and a squanderer. He was an overseas seaman, and he regularly sent money
to his wife to cover the family’s living expenses and their children’s tuition. Teresita,
however, was not adept in managing the funds he sent and their finances. Many times,
Ricardo would come home and be welcomed by debts incurred by his wife; he had to
settle these to avoid embarrassment.

Aside from neglect in paying debts she incurred from other people, Teresita likewise
failed to remit amounts she collected as sales agent of a plasticware and cosmetics
company. She left the family’s utility bills and their children’s tuition fees unpaid. She also
missed paying the rent and the amortization for the house that Ricardo acquired for the
family, so their children had to live in a small rented room and eventually had to be taken
in by Ricardo’s parents. When confronted by Ricardo, Teresita would simply offer the
excuse that she spent the funds Ricardo sent to buy things for the house and for their
children.

Ricardo likewise accused Teresita of infidelity and suspected that she was pregnant with
another man’s child. During one of his visits to the country, he noticed that Teresita’s
stomach was slightly bigger. He tried to convince her to have a medical examination but
she refused. Her miscarriage five months into her pregnancy confirmed his worst
suspicions. Ricardo alleged that the child could not have been his, as his three instances
of sexual contact with Teresita were characterized by "withdrawals"; other than these, no
other sexual contacts with his wife transpired, as he transferred and lived with his
relatives after a month of living with Teresita in Cebu. Ricardo reported, too, of rumors
that his wife represented herself to others as single, and went out on dates with other
men when he was not around.

Ricardo opined that his wife was a very extravagant, materialistic, controlling and
demanding person, who mostly had her way in everything; had a taste for the nightlife
and was very averse to the duties of a housewife; was stubborn and independent, also
most unsupportive, critical and uncooperative; was unresponsive to his hard work and
sacrifices for their family; and was most painfully unmindful of him. 4 He believed that their
marriage had broken down beyond repair and that they both have lost their mutual trust
and love for one another.5
Dr. Cecilia R. Albaran testified that a major factor that contributed to the demise of the
marriage was Teresita’s Narcissistic Personality Disorder that rendered her
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her essential marital obligations. To quote Dr.
Albaran:

Teresita, the respondent[,] has [sic] shown to manifest the following pervasive pattern of
behaviors: a sense of entitlement as she expected favorable treatment and automatic
compliance to her wishes, being interpersonally exploitative as on several occasions she
took advantage of him to achieve her own ends, lack of empathy as she was unwilling to
recognize her partners [sic] feelings and needs[,] taking into consideration her own
feelings and needs only, her haughty and arrogant behavior and attitude and her
proneness to blame others for her failures and shortcomings. These patterns of behavior
speaks [sic] of a Narcissistic Personality Disorder, which started to manifest in early
adulthood. The disorder is considered to be grave and incurable based on the fact that
individuals do not recognize the symptoms as it is ego syntonic and they feel there is
nothing wrong in them. Because of that[,] they remain unmotivated for treatment and
impervious to recovery.6

She based her diagnosis on the information she gathered from her psychological
evaluation on Ricardo and Richardson (Ricardo and Teresita’s eldest son). She admitted,
though, that she did not personally observe and examine Teresita; she sent Teresita a
personally-delivered notice for the conduct of a psychiatric evaluation, but the notice
remained unanswered.

In opposing the petition for annulment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
contended that there was no basis to declare Teresita psychologically incapacitated. It
asserted that the psychological evaluation conducted on Ricardo (and his son
Richardson) only revealed a vague and general conclusion on these parties’ personality
traits but not on Teresita’s psychological makeup. The OSG also argued that the
evidence adduced did not clinically identify and sufficiently prove the medical cause of
the alleged psychological incapacity. Neither did the evidence indicate that the alleged
psychological incapacity existed prior to or at the time of marriage, nor that the incapacity
was grave and incurable.

The RTC agreed with Ricardo, and annulled his marriage to Teresita. In short, the RTC
believed Dr. Albaran’s psychological evaluation and testimony and, on the totality of
Ricardo’s evidence, found Teresita to be psychologically incapacitated to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. The OSG appealed the decision to the CA.

The CA reversed the RTC decision and held that the trial court’s findings did not satisfy
the rules and guidelines set by this Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Molina.7 The RTC failed to specifically point out the root illness or defect that caused
Teresita’s psychological incapacity, and likewise failed to show that the incapacity
already existed at the time of celebration of marriage.

The CA found that the conclusions from Dr. Albaran’s psychological evaluation do not
appear to have been drawn from well-rounded and fair sources, and dwelt mostly on
hearsay statements and rumors. Likewise, the CA found that Ricardo’s allegations on
Teresita’s overspending and infidelity do not constitute adequate grounds for declaring
the marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code. These allegations, even if
true, could only effectively serve as grounds for legal separation or a criminal charge for
adultery.

THE PETITION AND THE PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS

Ricardo faults the CA for disregarding the factual findings of the trial court, particularly the
expert testimony of Dr. Albaran, and submits that the trial court – in declaring the nullity
of the marriage – fully complied with Molina.

In its Comment,8 the OSG argued that the CA correctly reversed the RTC’s decision,
particularly in its conclusion that Ricardo failed to comply with this Court’s guidelines for
the proper interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code. Reiterating its
earlier arguments below, the OSG asserts that the evidence adduced before the trial
court failed to show the gravity, juridical antecedence, or incurability of the psychological
incapacity of Teresita, and failed as well to identify and discuss its root cause. The
psychiatrist, likewise, failed to show that Teresita was completely unable to discharge her
marital obligations due to her alleged Narcissistic Personality Disorder.

Ricardo’s Reply9 reiterated that the RTC decision thoroughly discussed the root cause of
Teresita’s psychological incapacity and identified it as Narcissistic Personality Disorder.
He claimed that sufficient proof had been adduced by the psychiatrist whose expertise on
the subject cannot be doubted. Interestingly, Ricardo further argued that alleging the root
cause in a petition for annulment under Article 36 of the Family Code is no longer
necessary, citing Barcelona v. Court of Appeals.10

These positions were collated and reiterated in the memoranda the parties filed.

THE COURT’S RULING

We find the petition unmeritorious, as the CA committed no reversible error when it

set aside the RTC’s decision for lack of legal and factual basis.

In the leading case of Santos v. Court of Appeals, et al.,11 we held that psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability, to be sufficient basis to annul a marriage. The
psychological incapacity should refer to "no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity
that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage." 12

We further expounded on Article 36 of the Family Code in Molina and laid down definitive
guidelines in the interpretation and application of this article. These guidelines
incorporate the basic requirements of gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability
established in the Santos case, as follows:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and
our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution
devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It
decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim
of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must
be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis (Salita v. Magtolis, 233
SCRA 100, 108), nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological
illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such
time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or

incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to
those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job.
Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing
medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and
raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor
in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of

the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of
the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect
by our courts.13

Subsequent jurisprudence on psychological incapacity applied these basic guidelines to

varying factual situations, thus confirming the continuing doctrinal validity of Santos. In so
far as the present factual situation is concerned, what should not be lost in reading and
applying our established rulings is the intent of the law to confine the application of Article
36 of the Family Code to the most serious cases of personality disorders; these are the
disorders that result in the utter insensitivity or inability of the afflicted party to give
meaning and significance to the marriage he or she contracted. Furthermore, the
psychological illness and its root cause must have been there from the inception of the
marriage. From these requirements arise the concept that Article 36 of the Family Code
does not really dissolve a marriage; it simply recognizes that there never was any
marriage in the first place because the affliction – already then existing – was so grave
and permanent as to deprive the afflicted party of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was to assume or had assumed. 14

In the present case and guided by these standards, we find the totality of the petitioner’s
evidence to be insufficient to prove that Teresita was psychologically incapacitated to
perform her duties as a wife. As already mentioned, the evidence presented consisted of
the testimonies of Ricardo and Dr. Albaran, and the latter’s psychological evaluation of
Ricardo and Richardson from where she derived a psychological evaluation of Teresita.

a. Dr. Albaran’s psychological evaluation and testimony

Dr. Albaran concluded in her psychological evaluation that Teresita suffers from
Narcissistic Personality Disorder that rendered her psychologically incapacitated to
assume essential marital obligations. To support her findings and conclusion, she banked
on the statements told to her by Ricardo and Richardson, which she narrated in her
evaluation. Apparently relying on the same basis, Dr. Albaran added that Teresita’s
disorder manifested during her early adulthood and is grave and incurable.

To say the least, we are greatly disturbed by the kind of testimony and evaluation that, in
this case, became the basis for the conclusion that no marriage really took place
because of the psychological incapacity of one of the parties at the time of marriage.

We are in no way convinced that a mere narration of the statements of Ricardo and
Richardson, coupled with the results of the psychological tests administered only on
Ricardo, without more, already constitutes sufficient basis for the conclusion that Teresita
suffered from Narcissistic Personality Disorder. This Court has long been negatively
critical in considering psychological evaluations, presented in evidence, derived solely
from one-sided sources, particularly from the spouse seeking the nullity of the marriage.

In So v. Valera,15 the Court considered the psychologist’s testimony and conclusions to

be insufficiently in-depth and comprehensive to warrant the finding of respondent’s
psychological incapacity because the facts, on which the conclusions were based, were
all derived from the petitioner’s statements whose bias in favor of his cause cannot be
discounted. In another case, Padilla-Rumbaua v. Rumbaua,16 the Court declared that
while the various tests administered on the petitioner-wife could have been used as a fair
gauge to assess her own psychological condition, this same statement could not be
made with respect to the respondent-husband’s psychological condition. To our mind,
conclusions and generalizations about Teresita’s psychological condition, based solely
on information fed by Ricardo, are not any different in kind from admitting hearsay
evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence. 17

To be sure, we have recognized that the law does not require that the allegedly
incapacitated spouse be personally examined by a physician or by a psychologist as a
condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code.18 This recognition, however, does not signify that the evidence, we shall
favorably appreciate, should be any less than the evidence that an Article 36 case, by its
nature, requires.

Our recognition simply means that the requirements for nullity outlined in Santos and
Molina need not necessarily come from the allegedly incapacitated spouse. In other
words, it is still essential – although from sources other than the respondent spouse – to
show his or her personality profile, or its approximation, at the time of marriage; the root
cause of the inability to appreciate the essential obligations of marriage; and the gravity,
permanence and incurability of the condition.

Other than from the spouses, such evidence can come from persons intimately related to
them, such as relatives, close friends or even family doctors or lawyers who could testify
on the allegedly incapacitated spouse’s condition at or about the time of marriage, or to
subsequent occurring events that trace their roots to the incapacity already present at the
time of marriage.
In the present case, the only other party outside of the spouses who was ever asked to
give statements for purposes of Teresita’s psychological evaluation was Richardson, the
spouses’ eldest son who would not have been very reliable as a witness in an Article 36
case because he could not have been there when the spouses were married and could
not have been expected to know what was happening between his parents until long
after his birth.

We confirm the validity of this observation from a reading of the summary of Richardson’s
interview with the pyschologist: Richardson’s statement occupied a mere one paragraph
(comprising eleven sentences) in the psychological evaluation and merely recited
isolated instances of his parents fighting over the foreclosure of their house, his father’s
alleged womanizing, and their differences in religion (Ricardo is a Catholic, while Teresita
is a Mormon).19

We find nothing unusual in these recited marital incidents to indicate that Teresita
suffered from some psychological disorder as far back as the time of her marriage to
Ricardo, nor do we find these fights to be indicative of problems traceable to any basic
psychological disorder existing at the time of marriage. For one, these points of dispute
are not uncommon in a marriage and relate essentially to the usual roots of marital
problems – finances, fidelity and religion. The psychologist, too, never delved into the
relationship between mother and son except to observe their estranged relationship due
to a previous argument – a money problem involving Ricardo’s financial remittances to
the family. To state the obvious, the psychologist’s evaluation never explained how the
recited incidents, made by one who was not even born at the time of the spouses’
marriage, showed a debilitating psychological incapacity already existing at that time.

Of more serious consequence, fatal to Ricardo’s cause, is the failure of Dr. Albaran’s
psychological evaluation to fully explain the details – i.e., the what, how, when, where
and since when – of Teresita’s alleged Narcissistic Personality Disorder. It seems to us
that, with hardly any supporting evidence to fall back on, Dr. Albaran simply stated out of
the blue that Teresita’s personality disorder manifested itself in early adulthood,
presuming thereby that the incapacity should have been there when the marriage was
celebrated. Dr. Albaran never explained, too, the incapacitating nature of Teresita’s
alleged personality disorder, and how it related to the essential marital obligations that
she failed to assume. Neither did the good doctor adequately explain in her psychological
evaluation how grave and incurable was Teresita’s psychological disorder.

Dr. Albaran’s testimony at the trial did not improve the evidentiary situation for Ricardo,
as it still failed to provide the required insights that would have remedied the evidentiary
gaps in her written psychological evaluation. In fact, Dr. Albaran’s cross-examination only
made the evidentiary situation worse when she admitted that she had difficulty
pinpointing the root cause of Teresita’s personality disorder, due to the limited
information she gathered from Ricardo and Richardson regarding Teresita’s personal and
family history. To directly quote from the records, Dr. Albaran confessed this limitation
when she said that "[t]he only data that I have is that, the respondent seem [sic] to have
grown from a tumultuous family and this could be perhaps the [sic] contributory to the
development of the personality disorder." 20 Dr. Albaran’s obvious uncertainty in her
assessment only proves our point that a complete personality profile of the spouse,
alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, could not be determined from meager
information coming only from a biased source.

b. Ricardo’s testimony

Ricardo testified in court that Teresita was a squanderer and an adulteress. We do not,
however, find Ricardo’s characterizations of his wife sufficient to constitute psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Article 36 contemplates downright
incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations.
Mere "difficulty," "refusal, or "neglect" in the performance of marital obligations or "ill will"
on the part of the spouse is different from "incapacity" rooted on some debilitating
psychological condition or illness.21

Ricardo’s testimony merely established that Teresita was irresponsible in managing the
family’s finances by not paying their rent, utility bills and other financial obligations.
Teresita’s spendthrift attitude, according to Ricardo, even resulted in the loss of the
house and lot intended to be their family residence. This kind of irresponsibility, however,
does not rise to the level of a psychological incapacity required under Article 36 of the
Family Code. At most, Teresita’s mismanagement of the family’s finances merely
constituted difficulty, refusal or neglect, during the marriage, in the handling of funds
intended for the family’s financial support.

Teresita’s alleged infidelity, even if true, likewise does not constitute psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. In order for sexual infidelity to constitute
as psychological incapacity, the respondent’s unfaithfulness must be established as a
manifestation of a disordered personality, completely preventing the respondent from
discharging the essential obligations of the marital state; 22 there must be proof of a natal
or supervening disabling factor that effectively incapacitated her from complying with the
obligation to be faithful to her spouse.23

In our view, Ricardo utterly failed in his testimony to prove that Teresita suffered from a
disordered personality of this kind. Even Ricardo’s added testimony, relating to rumors of
Teresita’s dates with other men and her pregnancy by another man, would not fill in the
deficiencies we have observed, given the absence of an adverse integral element and
link to Teresita’s allegedly disordered personality.

Moreover, Ricardo failed to prove that Teresita’s alleged character traits already existed
at the inception of their marriage. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
psychological incapacity must exist at the time of the celebration of the marriage, even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. 24 In the absence of this
element, a marriage cannot be annulled under Article 36.

Root cause of the psychological incapacity needs to be alleged in a petition for

annulment under Article 36 of the Family Code

Citing Barcelona,25 Ricardo defended the RTC decision, alleging that the root cause in a
petition for annulment under Article 36 of the Family Code is no longer necessary. We
find this argument completely at variance with Ricardo’s main argument against the
assailed CA decision – i.e., that the RTC, in its decision, discussed thoroughly the root
cause of Teresita’s psychological incapacity as Narcissistic Personality Disorder. These
conflicting positions, notwithstanding, we see the need to address this issue to further
clarify our statement in Barcelona, which Ricardo misquoted and misinterpreted to
support his present petition that "since the new Rules do not require the petition to allege
expert opinion on the psychological incapacity, it follows that there is also no need to
allege in the petition the root cause of the psychological incapacity."26

In Barcelona, the petitioner assailed the bid for annulment for its failure to state the "root
cause" of the respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity. The Court resolved this
issue, ruling that the petition sufficiently stated a cause of action because the petitioner –
instead of stating a specific root cause – clearly described the physical manifestations
indicative of the psychological incapacity. This, the Court found to be sufficiently
compliant with the first requirement in the Molina case – that the "root cause" of the
psychological incapacity be alleged in an Article 36 petition.
Thus, contrary to Ricardo’s position, Barcelona does not do away with the "root cause"
requirement. The ruling simply means that the statement of the root cause does not need
to be in medical terms or be technical in nature, as the root causes of many
psychological disorders are still unknown to science. It is enough to merely allege the
physical manifestations constituting the root cause of the psychological incapacity.
Section 2, paragraph (d) of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (Rules)27 in fact provides:

SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.

xxxx

(d) What to allege. – A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specially allege
the complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated
from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriages at the time of the
celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
celebration.

The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are

indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage
but expert opinion need not be alleged.

As we explained in Barcelona, the requirement alleging the root cause in a petition for
annulment under Article 36 of the Family Code was not dispensed with by the adoption of
the Rules. What the Rules really eliminated was the need for an expert opinion to prove
the root cause of the psychological incapacity. The Court further held that the Rules,
being procedural in nature, apply only to actions pending and unresolved at the time of
their adoption.1avvphi1

To sum up, Ricardo failed to discharge the burden of proof to show that Teresita suffered
from psychological incapacity; thus, his petition for annulment of marriage must fail.
Ricardo merely established that Teresita had been remiss in her duties as a wife for
being irresponsible in taking care of their family’s finances – a fault or deficiency that
does not amount to the psychological incapacity that Article 36 of the Family Code
requires. We reiterate that irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion,
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves warrant a
finding of psychological incapacity, as the same may only be due to a person’s difficulty,
refusal or neglect to undertake the obligations of marriage that is not rooted in some
psychological illness that Article 36 of the Family Code addresses. 28

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the decision of

the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71882. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN ROBERTO A. ABAD *

Associate Justice Associate Justice

 MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice
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CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 181174               December 4, 2009

MA. CRISTINA TORRES BRAZA, PAOLO JOSEF T. BRAZA and JANELLE ANN T.
BRAZA, Petitioners,
vs.
THE CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR OF HIMAMAYLAN CITY, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL,
minor PATRICK ALVIN TITULAR BRAZA, represented by LEON TITULAR, CECILIA
TITULAR and LUCILLE C. TITULAR, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Petitioner Ma. Cristina Torres (Ma. Cristina) and Pablo Sicad Braza, Jr. (Pablo), also
known as "Pablito Sicad Braza," were married 1 on January 4, 1978. The union bore Ma.
Cristina’s co-petitioners Paolo Josef2 and Janelle Ann3 on May 8, 1978 and June 7, 1983,
respectively, and Gian Carlo4 on June 4, 1980.

Pablo died5 on April 15, 2002 in a vehicular accident in Bandung, West Java, Indonesia.
During the wake following the repatriation of his remains to the Philippines, respondent
Lucille Titular (Lucille) began introducing her co-respondent minor Patrick Alvin Titular
Braza (Patrick) as her and Pablo's son. Ma. Cristina thereupon made inquiries in the
course of which she obtained Patrick's birth certificate 6 from the Local Civil Registrar of
Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental with the following entries:

Name of Child : PATRICK ALVIN CELESTIAL TITULAR

Date of Birth : 01 January 1996
Mother : Lucille Celestial Titular
Father : Pablito S. Braza
Date Received at the Local
January 13, 1997
Civil Registrar :
Annotation : "Late Registration"
"Acknowledge (sic) by the father Pablito Braza
Annotation/Remarks :
on January 13, 1997"
Legitimated by virtue of subsequent marriage of parents
on April 22, 1998 at Manila. Henceforth, the child shall be
Remarks :
known as Patrick Alvin Titular Braza (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Ma. Cristina likewise obtained a copy 7 of a marriage contract showing that Pablo and
Lucille were married on April 22, 1998, drawing her and her co-petitioners to file on
December 23, 2005 before the Regional Trial Court of Himamaylan City, Negros
Occidental a petition8 to correct the entries in the birth record of Patrick in the Local Civil
Register.

Contending that Patrick could not have been legitimated by the supposed marriage
between Lucille and Pablo, said marriage being bigamous on account of the valid and
subsisting marriage between Ma. Cristina and Pablo, petitioners prayed for (1)
the correction of the entries in Patrick's birth record with respect to his legitimation, the
name of the father and his acknowledgment, and the use of the last name "Braza"; 2) a
directive to Leon, Cecilia and Lucille, all surnamed Titular, as guardians of the minor
Patrick, to submit Parick to DNA testing to determine his paternity and filiation; and 3) the
declaration of nullity of the legitimation of Patrick as stated in his birth certificate and, for
this purpose, the declaration of the marriage of Lucille and Pablo as bigamous.

On Patrick’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, the trial court, by Order 9 of
September 6, 2007, dismissed the petition without prejudice, it holding that in a special
proceeding for correction of entry, the court, which is not acting as a family court under
the Family Code, has no jurisdiction over an action to annul the marriage of Lucille and
Pablo, impugn the legitimacy of Patrick, and order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test,
hence, the controversy should be ventilated in an ordinary adversarial action.

Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration having been denied by Order 10 of November 29,
2007, they filed the present petition for review.

Petitioners maintain that the court a quo may pass upon the validity of marriage and
questions on legitimacy even in an action to correct entries in the civil registrar.
Citing Cariño v. Cariño,11 Lee v. Court of Appeals 12 and Republic v. Kho,13 they contend
that even substantial errors, such as those sought to be corrected in the present case,
can be the subject of a petition under Rule 108.14
The petition fails. In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108
(Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no
jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiation.

Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis a vis Article 412 of the Civil Code 15 charts the
procedure by which an entry in the civil registry may be cancelled or corrected. The
proceeding contemplated therein may generally be used only to correct clerical, spelling,
typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry. A clerical error is one which
is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding; an error made by a clerk or a
transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing, or a harmless change such as a correction of
name that is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the parent.
Substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in
which all interested parties are impleaded and due process is properly observed. 16

The allegations of the petition filed before the trial court clearly show that petitioners seek
to nullify the marriage between Pablo and Lucille on the ground that it is bigamous and
impugn Patrick’s filiation in connection with which they ask the court to order Patrick to be
subjected to a DNA test.

Petitioners insist, however, that the main cause of action is for the correction of Patrick’s
birth records17 and that the rest of the prayers are merely incidental thereto.

Petitioners’ position does not lie. Their cause of action is actually to seek the declaration
of Pablo and Lucille’s marriage as void for being bigamous and impugn Patrick’s
legitimacy, which causes of action are governed not by Rule 108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003, and Art. 171 18 of the Family Code,
respectively, hence, the petition should be filed in a Family Court as expressly provided
in said Code. 1avvphi1

It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally, validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and

filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party,
and not through collateral attack such as the petition filed before the court a quo.

Petitioners’ reliance on the cases they cited is misplaced.

Cariño v. Cariño was an action filed by a second wife against the first wife for the return
of one-half of the death benefits received by the first after the death of the husband.
Since the second wife contracted marriage with the husband while the latter’s marriage to
the first wife was still subsisting, the Court ruled on the validity of the two marriages, it
being essential to the determination of who is rightfully entitled to the death benefits.

In Lee v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that contrary to the contention that the petitions
filed by the therein petitioners before the lower courts were actions to impugn legitimacy,
the prayer was not to declare that the petitioners are illegitimate children of Keh Shiok
Cheng as stated in their records of birth but to establish that they are not the latter’s
children, hence, there was nothing to impugn as there was no blood relation at all
between

the petitioners and Keh Shiok Cheng. That is why the Court ordered the cancellation of
the name of Keh Shiok Cheng as the petitioners’ mother and the substitution thereof with
"Tiu Chuan" who is their biological mother. Thus, the collateral attack was allowed and
the petition deemed as adversarial proceeding contemplated under Rule 108.

In Republic v. Kho, it was the petitioners themselves who sought the correction of the
entries in their respective birth records to reflect that they were illegitimate and that their
citizenship is "Filipino," not Chinese, because their parents were never legally married.
Again, considering that the changes sought to be made were substantial and not merely
innocuous, the Court, finding the proceedings under Rule 108 to be adversarial in nature,
upheld the lower court’s grant of the petition.

It is thus clear that the facts in the above-cited cases are vastly different from those
obtaining in the present case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the
above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 189538               February 10, 2014

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are
the Regional Trial Court  (RTC) Decision  dated May 5, 2009 and Order  dated August 25,
1 2 3

2009 in SP. Proc. No. 16519-CEB. The assailed decision granted respondent Merlinda L.
Olaybar's petition for cancellation of entries in the latter's marriage contract; while the
assailed order denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Republic of the
Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).

The facts of the case are as follows:

Respondent requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate of No

Marriage (CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend of
five years. Upon receipt thereof, she discovered that she was already married to a certain
Ye Son Sune, a Korean National, on June 24, 2002, at the Office of the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities (MTCC), Palace of Justice. She denied having contracted said marriage
and claimed that she did not know the alleged husband; she did not appear before the
solemnizing officer; and, that the signature appearing in the marriage certificate is not
hers.  She, thus, filed a Petition for Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage Contract,
4

especially the entries in the wife portion thereof.  Respondent impleaded the Local Civil
5

Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband, as parties to the case.

During trial, respondent testified on her behalf and explained that she could not have
appeared before Judge Mamerto Califlores, the supposed solemnizing officer, at the time
the marriage was allegedly celebrated, because she was then in Makati working as a
medical distributor in Hansao Pharma. She completely denied having known the
supposed husband, but she revealed that she recognized the named witnesses to the
marriage as she had met them while she was working as a receptionist in Tadels
Pension House. She believed that her name was used by a certain Johnny Singh, who
owned a travel agency, whom she gave her personal circumstances in order for her to
obtain a passport.  Respondent also presented as witness a certain Eufrocina Natinga,
6

an employee of MTCC, Branch 1, who confirmed that the marriage of Ye Son Sune was
indeed celebrated in their office, but claimed that the alleged wife who appeared was
definitely not respondent.  Lastly, a document examiner testified that the signature
7

appearing in the marriage contract was forged. 8

On May 5, 2009, the RTC rendered the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, the petition is granted in favor of the

petitioner, Merlinda L. Olaybar. The Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City is directed to
cancel all the entries in the WIFE portion of the alleged marriage contract of the petitioner
and respondent Ye Son Sune.

SO ORDERED. 9

Finding that the signature appearing in the subject marriage contract was not that of
respondent, the court found basis in granting the latter’s prayer to straighten her record
and rectify the terrible mistake.10

Petitioner, however, moved for the reconsideration of the assailed Decision on the
grounds that: (1) there was no clerical spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors
in the marriage contract for it to fall within the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court; and (2) granting the cancellation of all the entries in the wife portion of the alleged
marriage contract is, in effect, declaring the marriage void ab initio.
11

In an Order dated August 25, 2009, the RTC denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration couched in this wise:

WHEREFORE, the court hereby denies the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the
Republic of the Philippines. Furnish copies of this order to the Office of the Solicitor
General, the petitioner’s counsel, and all concerned government agencies.

SO ORDERED. 12

Contrary to petitioner’s stand, the RTC held that it had jurisdiction to take cognizance of
cases for correction of entries even on substantial errors under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court being the appropriate adversary proceeding required. Considering that
respondent’s identity was used by an unknown person to contract marriage with a
Korean national, it would not be feasible for respondent to institute an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage since it is not one of the void marriages under Articles
35 and 36 of the Family Code. 13
Petitioner now comes before the Court in this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the assailed RTC Decision and Order
based on the following grounds:

I.

RULE 108 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT APPLIES ONLY

WHEN THERE ARE ERRORS IN THE ENTRIES SOUGHT TO BE
CANCELLED OR CORRECTED.

II.

GRANTING THE CANCELLATION OF "ALL THE ENTRIES IN THE

WIFE PORTION OF THE ALLEGED MARRIAGE CONTRACT," IS IN
EFFECT DECLARING THE MARRIAGE VOID AB INITIO. 14

Petitioner claims that there are no errors in the entries sought to be cancelled or
corrected, because the entries made in the certificate of marriage are the ones provided
by the person who appeared and represented herself as Merlinda L. Olaybar and are, in
fact, the latter’s personal circumstances.  In directing the cancellation of the entries in the
15

wife portion of the certificate of marriage, the RTC, in effect, declared the marriage null
and void ab initio.  Thus, the petition instituted by respondent is actually a petition for
16

declaration of nullity of marriage in the guise of a Rule 108 proceeding. 17

We deny the petition.

At the outset, it is necessary to stress that a direct recourse to this Court from the
decisions and final orders of the RTC may be taken where only questions of law are
raised or involved. There is a question of law when the doubt arises as to what the law is
on a certain state of facts, which does not call for the examination of the probative value
of the evidence of the parties.  Here, the issue raised by petitioner is whether or not the
18

cancellation of entries in the marriage contract which, in effect, nullifies the marriage may
be undertaken in a Rule 108 proceeding. Verily, petitioner raised a pure question of law.

Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets forth the rules on cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry, to wit:

SEC. 1. Who may file petition. – Any person interested in any act, event,
order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been
recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the
cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional
Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is
located.

SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. – Upon good and

valid grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled
or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations;
(e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring
marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i)
acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss
or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of
filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.

SEC. 3. Parties. – When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil

register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim
 any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the
proceeding.

SEC. 4. Notice and Publication. – Upon the filing of the petition, the court
shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and
cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the
petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week
for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in
the province.

SEC. 5. Opposition. – The civil registrar and any person having or

claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is
sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the
last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto.

SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. – The court in which the proceedings is

brought may make orders expediting the proceedings, and may also grant
preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties
pending such proceedings.

SEC. 7. Order. – After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition
or issue an order granting the cancellation or correction prayed for. In
either case, a certified copy of the judgment shall be served upon the civil
registrar concerned who shall annotate the same in his record.

Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry. The proceedings may either be
summary or adversary. If the correction is clerical, then the procedure to
be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status,
citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the
procedure to be adopted is adversary. Since the promulgation of Republic
v. Valencia  in 1986, the Court has repeatedly ruled that "even substantial
19

errors in a civil registry may be corrected through a petition filed under

Rule 108, with the true facts established and the parties aggrieved by the
error availing themselves of the appropriate adversarial proceeding."  An20

appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has
conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and
properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given
opportunity to demolish the opposite party’s case, and where the
evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered. 21

It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and a hearing may be dispensed
with, and the remedy [is] granted upon mere application or motion. However, a special
proceeding is not always summary. The procedure laid down in Rule 108 is not a
summary proceeding per se. It requires publication of the petition; it mandates the
inclusion as parties of all persons who may claim interest which would be affected by the
cancellation or correction; it also requires the civil registrar and any person in interest to
file their opposition, if any; and it states that although the court may make orders
expediting the proceedings, it is after hearing that the court shall either dismiss the
petition or issue an order granting the same. Thus, as long as the procedural
requirements in Rule 108 are followed, it is the appropriate adversary proceeding to
effect substantial corrections and changes in entries of the civil register.
22

In this case, the entries made in the wife portion of the certificate of marriage are
admittedly the personal circumstances of respondent. The latter, however, claims that
her signature was forged and she was not the one who contracted marriage with the
purported husband. In other words, she claims that no such marriage was entered into or
if there was, she was not the one who entered into such contract. It must be recalled that
when respondent tried to obtain a CENOMAR from the NSO, it appeared that she was
married to a certain Ye Son Sune. She then sought the cancellation of entries in the wife
portion of the marriage certificate.

In filing the petition for correction of entry under Rule 108, respondent made the Local
Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband Ye Son Sune, as parties-
respondents. It is likewise undisputed that the procedural requirements set forth in Rule
108 were complied with. The Office of the Solicitor General was likewise notified of the
petition which in turn authorized the Office of the City Prosecutor to participate in the
proceedings. More importantly, trial was conducted where respondent herself, the
stenographer of the court where the alleged marriage was conducted, as well as a
document examiner, testified. Several documents were also considered as evidence.
With the testimonies and other evidence presented, the trial court found that the
signature appearing in the subject marriage certificate was different from respondent’s
signature appearing in some of her government issued identification cards.  The court
23

thus made a categorical conclusion that respondent’s signature in the marriage certificate
was not hers and, therefore, was forged. Clearly, it was established that, as she claimed
in her petition, no such marriage was celebrated.

Indeed the Court made a pronouncement in the recent case of Minoru Fujiki v. Maria Paz
Galela Marinay, Shinichi Maekara, Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, and the
Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the National Statistics Office  that:
24

To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot
substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent
circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family
Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the
requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of marriage, support
pendente lite of the spouses and children, the liquidation, partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses and the investigation of the public prosecutor to determine
collusion. A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also
necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the
Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the
corresponding civil registry is located. In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve
his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.

Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to show the
existence of marriage.  Rather, respondent showed by overwhelming evidence that no
1âwphi1

marriage was entered into and that she was not even aware of such existence. The
testimonial and documentary evidence clearly established that the only "evidence" of
marriage which is the marriage certificate was a forgery. While we maintain that Rule 108
cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage, we cannot nullify the
proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had been given the opportunity to
contest the allegations of respondent; the procedures were followed, and all the evidence
of the parties had already been admitted and examined. Respondent indeed sought, not
the nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to speak of, but the correction of
the record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence. Otherwise
stated, in allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the
wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there
was no marriage to speak of.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The
Regional Trial Court Decision dated May 5, 2009 and Order dated August 25, 2009 in
SP. Proc. No. 16519-CEB, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson

ROBERTO A. ABAD JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 131, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's
Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 104818 September 17, 1993

ROBERTO DOMINGO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and DELIA SOLEDAD AVERA represented by her Attorney-
in-Fact MOISES R. AVERA, respondents.

Jose P.O. Aliling IV for petitioner.

De Guzman, Meneses & Associates for private respondent.

ROMERO, J.:

The instant petition seeks the reversal of respondent court's ruling finding no grave
abuse of discretion in the lower court's order denying petitioner's motion to dismiss the
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of property.
On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed a petition before
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig entitled "Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and
Separation of Property" against petitioner Roberto Domingo. The petition which was
docketed as Special Proceedings No. 1989-J alleged among others that: they were
married on November 29, 1976 at the YMCA Youth Center Bldg., as evidenced by a
Marriage Contract Registry No. 1277K-76 with Marriage License No. 4999036 issued at
Carmona, Cavite; unknown to her, he had a previous marriage with one Emerlina dela
Paz on April 25, 1969 which marriage is valid and still existing; she came to know of the
prior marriage only sometime in 1983 when Emerlina dela Paz sued them for bigamy;
from January 23 1979 up to the present, she has been working in Saudi Arabia and she
used to come to the Philippines only when she would avail of the one-month annual
vacation leave granted by her foreign employer since 1983 up to the present, he has
been unemployed and completely dependent upon her for support and subsistence; out
of her personal earnings, she purchased real and personal properties with a total amount
of approximately P350,000.00, which are under the possession and administration of
Roberto; sometime in June 1989, while on her one-month vacation, she discovered that
he was cohabiting with another woman; she further discovered that he had been
disposing of some of her properties without her knowledge or consent; she confronted
him about this and thereafter appointed her brother Moises R. Avera as her attorney-in-
fact to take care of her properties; he failed and refused to turn over the possession and
administration of said properties to her brother/attorney-in-fact; and he is not authorized
to administer and possess the same on account of the nullity of their marriage. The
petition prayed that a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction be
issued enjoining Roberto from exercising any act of administration and ownership over
said properties; their marriage be declared null and void and of no force and effect; and
Delia Soledad be declared the sole and exclusive owner of all properties acquired at the
time of their void marriage and such properties be placed under the proper management
and administration of the attorney-in-fact.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the petition stated no cause of
action. The marriage being void ab initio, the petition for the declaration of its nullity is,
therefore, superfluous and unnecessary. It added that private respondent has no property
which is in his possession.

On August 20, 1991, Judge Maria Alicia M. Austria issued an Order denying the motion
to dismiss for lack of merit. She explained:

Movant argues that a second marriage contracted after a first marriage by a man with
another woman is illegal and void (citing the case of Yap v. Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA
229) and no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void marriage
(citing the cases of People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033; People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845).
Indeed, under the Yap case there is no dispute that the second marriage contracted by
respondent with herein petitioner after a first marriage with another woman is illegal and
void. However, as to whether or not the second marriage should first be judicially
declared a nullity is not an issue in said case. In the case of Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS,
the Supreme Court ruled in explicit terms, thus:

And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observed that although the
second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first
marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of its nullity. (37
SCRA 316, 326)

The above ruling which is of later vintage deviated from the previous rulings of the
Supreme Court in the aforecited cases of Aragon and Mendoza.
Finally, the contention of respondent movant that petitioner has no property in his
possession is an issue that may be determined only after trial on the merits. 1

A motion for reconsideration was filed stressing the erroneous application of Vda. de
Consuegra v. GSIS  and the absence of justiciable controversy as to the nullity of the
2

marriage. On September 11, 1991, Judge Austria denied the motion for reconsideration
and gave petitioner fifteen (15) days from receipt within which to file his answer.

Instead of filing the required answer, petitioner filed a special civil action
of certiorari and mandamus on the ground that the lower court acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying the motion to dismiss.

On February 7, 1992, the Court of Appeals  dismissed the petition. It explained that the
3

case of Yap v. CA  cited by petitioner and that of Consuegra v. GSIS relied upon by the
4

lower court do not have relevance in the case at bar, there being no identity of facts
because these cases dealt with the successional rights of the second wife while the
instant case prays for separation of property corollary with the declaration of nullity of
marriage. It observed that the separation and subsequent distribution of the properties
acquired during the union can be had only upon proper determination of the status of the
marital relationship between said parties, whether or not the validity of the first marriage
is denied by petitioner. Furthermore, in order to avoid duplication and multiplicity of suits,
the declaration of nullity of marriage may be invoked in this proceeding together with the
partition and distribution of the properties involved. Citing Articles 48, 50 and 52 of the
Family Code, it held that private respondent's prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of
their marriage may be raised together with other incidents of their marriage such as the
separation of their properties. Lastly, it noted that since the Court has jurisdiction, the
alleged error in refusing to grant the motion to dismiss is merely one of law for which the
remedy ordinarily would have been to file an answer, proceed with the trial and in case of
an adverse decision, reiterate the issue on appeal. The motion for reconsideration was
subsequently denied for lack of merit. 5

Hence, this petition.

The two basic issues confronting the Court in the instant case are the following.

First, whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary. If in
the affirmative, whether the same should be filed only for purposes of remarriage.

Second, whether or not SP No. 1989-J is the proper remedy of private respondent to
recover certain real and personal properties allegedly belonging to her exclusively.

Petitioner, invoking the ruling in People v. Aragon  and People v. Mendoza,  contends

6 7

that SP. No. 1989-J for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property filed
by private respondent must be dismissed for being unnecessary and superfluous.
Furthermore, under his own interpretation of Article 40 of the Family Code, he submits
that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is required only for purposes
of remarriage. Since the petition in SP No. 1989-J contains no allegation of private
respondent's intention to remarry, said petition should therefore, be dismissed.

On the other hand, private respondent insists on the necessity of a judicial declaration of
the nullity of their marriage, not for purposes of remarriage, but in order to provide a basis
for the separation and distribution of the properties acquired during coverture.

There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private respondent celebrated
while the former's previous marriage with one Emerlina de la Paz was still subsisting, is
bigamous. As such, it is from the beginning.  Petitioner himself does not dispute the
8

absolute nullity of their marriage.

9

The cases of People v. Aragon and People v. Mendoza relied upon by petitioner are

cases where the Court had earlier ruled that no judicial decree is necessary to establish
the invalidity of a void, bigamous marriage. It is noteworthy to observe that Justice Alex
Reyes, however, dissented on these occasions stating that:

Though the logician may say that where the former marriage was void there would be
nothing to dissolve, still it is not for the spouses to judge whether that marriage was void
or not. That judgment is reserved to the courts. . . . 10

This dissenting opinion was adopted as the majority position in subsequent cases
involving the same issue. Thus, in Gomez v. Lipana,   the Court abandoned its earlier
11

ruling in the Aragon and Mendoza cases. In reversing the lower court's order forfeiting

the husband's share of the disputed property acquired during the second marriage, the
Court stated that "if the nullity, or annulment of the marriage is the basis for the
application of Article 1417, there is need for a judicial declaration thereof, which of course
contemplates an action for that purpose."

Citing Gomez v. Lipana, the Court subsequently held in Vda. de Consuegra

v. Government Service Insurance System, that "although the second marriage can be
presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still
subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity."

In Tolentino v. Paras,  however,

12
the Court turned around and applied
the Aragon and Mendoza ruling once again. In granting the prayer of the first wife asking
for a declaration as the lawful surviving spouse and the correction of the death certificate
of her deceased husband, it explained that "(t)he second marriage that he contracted
with private respondent during the lifetime of his first spouse is null and void from the
beginning and of no force and effect. No judicial decree is necessary to establish the
invalidity of a void marriage."

However, in the more recent case of Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy   the Court reverted to
13

the Consuegra case and held that there was "no need of introducing evidence about the
existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time they married each other, for then
such a marriage though void still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration of
such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married
woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel."

Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the
matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either
as a cause of action or a ground for defense.   Where the absolute nullity of a previous
14

marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole
basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage be free from legal infirmity is a final
judgment declaring the previous marriage void.  15

The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision Committee   which 16

drafted what is now the Family Code of the Philippines took the position that parties to a
marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the
fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they
can be allowed to marry again. This is borne out by the following minutes of the 152nd
Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees where the present Article 40,
then Art. 39, was discussed.

B. Article 39. —
The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final judgment
declaring the marriage void, except as provided in Article 41.

Justice Caguioa remarked that the above provision should include not only void but also
voidable marriages. He then suggested that the above provision be modified as follows:

The validity of a marriage may be invoked only . . .

Justice Reyes (J.B.L. Reyes), however, proposed that they say:

The validity or invalidity of a marriage may be invoked

only . . .

On the other hand, Justice Puno suggested that they say:

The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only . . .

Justice Caguioa explained that his idea is that one cannot determine for himself whether
or not his marriage is valid and that a court action is needed. Justice Puno accordingly
proposed that the provision be modified to read:

The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final judgment
annulling the marriage or declaring the marriage void, except as provided in Article 41.

Justice Caguioa remarked that in annulment, there is no question. Justice Puno,

however, pointed out that, even if it is a judgment of annulment, they still have to produce
the judgment.

Justice Caguioa suggested that they say:

The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final judgment
declaring the marriage invalid, except as provided in Article 41.

Justice Puno raised the question: When a marriage is declared invalid, does it include the
annulment of a marriage and the declaration that the marriage is void? Justice Caguioa
replied in the affirmative. Dean Gupit added that in some judgments, even if the marriage
is annulled, it is declared void. Justice Puno suggested that this matter be made clear in
the provision.

Prof. Baviera remarked that the original idea in the provision is to require first a judicial
declaration of a void marriage and not annullable marriages, with which the other
members concurred. Judge Diy added that annullable marriages are presumed valid until
a direct action is filed to annul it, which the other members affirmed. Justice Puno
remarked that if this is so, then the phrase "absolute nullity" can stand since it might
result in confusion if they change the phrase to "invalidity" if what they are referring to in
the provision is the declaration that the marriage is void.

Prof. Bautista commented that they will be doing away with collateral defense as well as
collateral attack. Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the provision is that there
should be a final judgment declaring the marriage void and a party should not declare for
himself whether or not the marriage is void, while the other members affirmed. Justice
Caguioa added that they are, therefore, trying to avoid a collateral attack on that point.
Prof. Bautista stated that there are actions which are brought on the assumption that the
marriage is valid. He then asked: Are they depriving one of the right to raise the defense
that he has no liability because the basis of the liability is void? Prof. Bautista added that
they cannot say that there will be no judgment on the validity or invalidity of the marriage
because it will be taken up in the same proceeding. It will not be a unilateral declaration
that, it is a void marriage. Justice Caguioa saw the point of Prof. Bautista and suggested
that they limit the provision to remarriage. He then proposed that Article 39 be reworded
as follows:

The absolute nullity of a marriage for purposes of remarriage may be invoked only on the
basis of final judgment . . .

Justice Puno suggested that the above be modified as follows:

The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of establishing
the validity of a subsequent marriage only on the basis of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void, except as provided in Article 41.

Justice Puno later modified the above as follows:

For the purpose of establishing the validity of a subsequent marriage, the absolute nullity
of a previous marriage may only be invoked on the basis of a final judgment declaring
such nullity, except as provided in Article 41.

Justice Caguioa commented that the above provision is too broad and will not solve the
objection of Prof. Bautista. He proposed that they say:

For the purpose of entering into a subsequent marriage, the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may only be invoked on the basis of a final judgment declaring such nullity,
except as provided in Article 41.

Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the above provision is that if one enters into a
subsequent marriage without obtaining a final judgment declaring the nullity of a previous
marriage, said subsequent marriage is void ab initio.

After further deliberation, Justice Puno suggested that they go back to the original
wording of the provision as follows:

The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage
only on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void, except as
provided in Article 41. 
17

In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the
protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void,
marries again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the
person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy.  18

Just over a year ago, the Court made the pronouncement that there is a necessity for a
declaration of absolute nullity of a prior subsisting marriage before contracting another in
the recent case of Terre v. Terre.   The Court, in turning down the defense of respondent
19

Terre who was charged with grossly immoral conduct consisting of contracting a second
marriage and living with another woman other than complainant while his prior marriage
with the latter remained subsisting, said that "for purposes of determining whether a
person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first
marriage was null and void ab initio is essential."

As regards the necessity for a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of marriage,

petitioner submits that the same can be maintained only if it is for the purpose of
remarriage. Failure to allege this purpose, according to petitioner's theory, will warrant
dismissal of the same.

Article 40 of the Family Code provides:

Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
(n)

Crucial to the proper interpretation of Article 40 is the position in the provision of the word
"solely." As it is placed, the same shows that it is meant to qualify "final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void." Realizing the need for careful craftsmanship in
conveying the precise intent of the Committee members, the provision in question, as it
finally emerged, did not state "The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked solely for purposes of remarriage . . .," in which case "solely" would clearly
qualify the phrase "for purposes of remarriage." Had the phraseology been such, the
interpretation of petitioner would have been correct and, that is, that the absolute nullity
of a previous marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of remarriage, thus rendering
irrelevant the clause "on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void."

That Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause denotes that such final
judgment declaring the previous marriage void need not be obtained only for purposes of
remarriage. Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances where a party might well
invoke the absolute nullity of a previous marriage for purposes other than remarriage,
such as in case of an action for liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of
property between the erstwhile spouses, as well as an action for the custody and support
of their common children and the delivery of the latters' presumptive legitimes. In such
cases, evidence needs must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the
existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need
not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous
marriage void. Hence, in the instance where a party who has previously contracted a
marriage which remains subsisting desires to enter into another marriage which is legally
unassailable, he is required by law to prove that the previous one was an absolute nullity.
But this he may do on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void.

This leads us to the question: Why the distinction? In other words, for purposes of
remarriage, why should the only legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous
marriage an absolute nullity be a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void?
Whereas, for purposes other than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable?

Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution as an "inviolable social

institution, is the foundation of the family;" as such, it "shall be protected by the State."  In
20

more explicit terms, the Family Code characterizes it as "a special contract of permanent
union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal, and family life."   So crucial are marriage and the family to the
21

stability and peace of the nation that their "nature, consequences, and incidents are
governed by law and not subject to stipulation . . ."   As a matter of policy, therefore, the
22

nullification of a marriage for the purpose of contracting another cannot be accomplished

merely on the basis of the perception of both parties or of one that their union is so
defective with respect to the essential requisites of a contract of marriage as to render it
void ipso jure and with no legal effect — and nothing more. Were this so, this inviolable
social institution would be reduced to a mockery and would rest on very shaky
foundations indeed. And the grounds for nullifying marriage would be as diverse and far-
ranging as human ingenuity and fancy could conceive. For such a social significant
institution, an official state pronouncement through the courts, and nothing less, will
satisfy the exacting norms of society. Not only would such an open and public declaration
by the courts definitively confirm the nullity of the contract of marriage, but the same
would be easily verifiable through records accessible to everyone.

That the law seeks to ensure that a prior marriage is no impediment to a second sought
to be contracted by one of the parties may be gleaned from new information required in
the Family Code to be included in the application for a marriage license, viz, "If previously
married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved and annulled."  23

Reverting to the case before us, petitioner's interpretation of Art. 40 of the Family Code
is, undoubtedly, quite restrictive. Thus, his position that private respondent's failure to
state in the petition that the same is filed to enable her to remarry will result in the
dismissal of SP No. 1989-J is untenable. His misconstruction of Art. 40 resulting from the
misplaced emphasis on the term "solely" was in fact anticipated by the members of the
Committee.

Dean Gupit commented the word "only" may be misconstrued to refer to "for purposes of
remarriage." Judge Diy stated that "only" refers to "final judgment." Justice Puno
suggested that they say "on the basis only of a final judgment." Prof. Baviera suggested
that they use the legal term "solely" instead of "only," which the Committee
approved.   (Emphasis supplied)
24

Pursuing his previous argument that the declaration for absolute nullity of marriage is
unnecessary, petitioner suggests that private respondent should have filed an ordinary
civil action for the recovery of the properties alleged to have been acquired during their
union. In such an eventuality, the lower court would not be acting as a mere special court
but would be clothed with jurisdiction to rule on the issues of possession and ownership.
In addition, he pointed out that there is actually nothing to separate or partition as the
petition admits that all the properties were acquired with private respondent's money.

The Court of Appeals disregarded this argument and concluded that "the prayer for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be raised together with the other incident
of their marriage such as the separation of their properties."

When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the final judgment therein
shall provide for "the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the
spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of their
presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial
proceedings."   Other specific effects flowing therefrom, in proper cases, are the
25

following:

Art. 43. xxx xxx xxx

(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be,
shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad
faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community property or conjugal partnership
property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the
children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or, in default of children, the innocent
spouse;

(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the donee
contracted the marriage in bad faith, such donations made to said donee are revoked by
operation of law;
(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse who acted in
bad faith as a beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such designation be stipulated
as irrevocable; and

(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be disqualified
to inherit from the innocent spouse by testate and intestate succession. (n)

Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage
shall be void ab initio and all donations by reason of marriage and testamentary
disposition made by one in favor of the other are revoked by operation of law. (n)  26

Based on the foregoing provisions, private respondent's ultimate prayer for separation of
property will simply be one of the necessary consequences of the judicial declaration of
absolute nullity of their marriage. Thus, petitioner's suggestion that in order for their
properties to be separated, an ordinary civil action has to be instituted for that purpose is
baseless. The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of
marriage, one of which is the separation of property according to the regime of property
relations governing them. It stands to reason that the lower court before whom the issue
of nullity of a first marriage is brought is likewise clothed with jurisdiction to decide the
incidental questions regarding the couple's properties. Accordingly, the respondent court
committed no reversible error in finding that the lower court committed no grave abuse of
discretion in denying petitioner's motion to dismiss SP No. 1989-J.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of respondent Court
dated February 7, 1992 and the Resolution dated March 20, 1992 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Bidin and Melo, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

VITUG, J., concurring:

I concur with the opinion so well expressed by Mme. Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero. I
should like, however, to put in a modest observation.

Void marriages are inexistent from the very beginning and, I believe, no judicial decree
is required to establish their nullity, except in the following instances:

(a) For purposes of remarriage pursuant to the provision of Article 40 of the Family
Code; viz.:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage
on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. (n)

(b) A marriage celebrated prior to the effectivity of the Family Code in case a party
thereto was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations
of marriage (Article 36, Family Code), where an action or defense for the declaration of
nullity prescribes ten (10) years after the Family Code took effect (Article 39, Family
Code); otherwise, the marriage is deemed unaffected by the Family Code.

A void marriage, even without its being judicially declared a nullity, albeit the preferability
for, and justiciability (fully discussed in the majority opinion) of, such a declaration, will
not give it the status or the consequences of a valid marriage, saving only specific
instances where certain effects of a valid marriage can still flow from the void marriage.
Examples of these cases are children of void marriages under Article 36 (due to
psychological incapacity) and Article 53, in relation to Article 52 (due to failure of partition,
delivery of presumptive legitimes of children and recording thereof following the
annulment or declaration of nullity a prior marriage), conceived or born before the judicial
declaration of nullity of such void marriages, who the law deems as legitimate (Article 54,
Family Code).

In most, if not in all, other cases, a void marriage is to be considered extant  per se.
Neither the conjugal, partnership of gain under the old regime nor the absolute
community of property under the new Code (absent a marriage settlement), will apply;
instead, their property relations shall be governed by the co-ownership rules under either
Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. I must hasten to add as a personal view,
however, that the exceptional effects on children of a void marriage because of the
psychological incapacity of a party thereto should have been extended to cover even the
personal and property relations of the spouses. Unlike the other cases of void marriages
where the grounds therefor may be established by hard facts and with little uncertainty,
the term "psychological incapacity" is so relative and unsettling that until a judicial
declaration of nullity is made its interim effects can long and literally hang on the balance
not only insofar as the spouses themselves are concerned but also as regards third
persons with whom the spouses deal.

# Separate Opinions

VITUG, J., concurring:

I concur with the opinion so well expressed by Mme. Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero. I
should like, however, to put in a modest observation.

Void marriages are inexistent from the very beginning and, I believe, no judicial decree
is required to establish their nullity, except in the following instances:

(a) For purposes of remarriage pursuant to the provision of Article 40 of the Family
Code; viz.:

The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage
on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. (n)
(b) A marriage celebrated prior to the effectivity of the Family Code in case a party
thereto was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations
of marriage (Article 36, Family Code), where an action or defense for the declaration of
nullity prescribes ten (10) years after the Family Code took effect (Article 39, Family
Code); otherwise, the marriage is deemed unaffected by the Family Code.

A void marriage, even without its being judicially declared a nullity, albeit the preferability
for, and justiciability (fully discussed in the majority opinion) of, such a declaration, will
not give it the status or the consequences of a valid marriage, saving only specific
instances where certain effects of a valid marriage can still flow from the void marriage.
Examples of these cases are children of void marriages under Article 36 (due to
psychological incapacity) and Article 53, in relation to Article 52 (due to failure of partition,
delivery of presumptive legitimes of children and recording thereof following the
annulment or declaration of nullity a prior marriage), conceived or born before the judicial
declaration of nullity of such void marriages, who the law deems as legitimate (Article 54,
Family Code).

In most, if not in all, other cases, a void marriage is to be considered extant  per se.
Neither the conjugal, partnership of gain under the old regime nor the absolute
community of property under the new Code (absent a marriage settlement), will apply;
instead, their property relations shall be governed by the co-ownership rules under either
Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. I must hasten to add as a personal view,
however, that the exceptional effects on children of a void marriage because of the
psychological incapacity of a party thereto should have been extended to cover even the
personal and property relations of the spouses. Unlike the other cases of void marriages
where the grounds therefor may be established by hard facts and with little uncertainty,
the term "psychological incapacity" is so relative and unsettling that until a judicial
declaration of nullity is made its interim effects can long and literally hang on the balance
not only insofar as the spouses themselves are concerned but also as regards third
persons with whom the spouses deal.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-5877             September 28, 1954

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ARTURO MENDOZA, defendant-appellant.

Nestor A. Andrada for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Pompeyo Diaz and Solicitor Felicisimo R. Rosete for
appellee.
PARAS, C.J.:

The defendant, Arturo Mendoza, has appealed from a judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Laguna, finding him guilty of the crime of bigamy and sentencing him to
imprisonment for an indeterminate term of from 6 months and 1 day to 6 years, with
costs.

The following facts are undisputed: On August 5, 1936, the appellant and Jovita de Asis
were married in Marikina, Rizal. On May 14, 1941, during the subsistence of the first
marriage, the appellant was married to Olga Lema in the City of Manila. On February 2,
1943, Jovita de Asis died. On August 19, 1949, the appellant contracted another
marriage with Carmencita Panlilio in Calamba, Laguna. This last marriage gave rise to
his prosecution for and conviction of the crime of bigamy.

The appellant contends that his marriage with Olga Lema on May 14, 1941 is null and
void and, therefore, non-existent, having been contracted while his first marriage with
Jovita de Asis August 5, 1936 was still in effect, and that his third marriage to Carmencita
Panlilio on August 19, 1949 cannot be the basis of a charge for bigamy because it took
place after the death of Jovita de Asis. The Solicitor General, however, argues that, even
assuming that appellant's second marriage to Olga Lema is void, he is not exempt from
criminal liability, in the absence of a previous judicial annulment of said bigamous
marriage; and the case of People vs. Cotas, 40 Off. Gaz., 3134, is cited.

The decision invoked by the Solicitor General, rendered by the Court of Appeals, is not
controlling. Said case is essentially different, because the defendant therein, Jose Cotas,
impeached the validity of his first marriage for lack of necessary formalities, and the
Court of Appeals found his factual contention to be without merit.

In the case at bar, it is admitted that appellant's second marriage with Olga Lema was
contracted during the existence of his first marriage with Jovita de Asis. Section 29 of the
marriage law (act 3613), in force at the time the appellant contracted his second marriage
in 1941, provides as follows:1âwphïl.nêt

Illegal marriages. — Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the
lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse
shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:

(a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;

(b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the
second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or
the absentee being generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse
present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, the marriage so contracted
being valid in either case until declared null and void by a competent court.

This statutory provision plainly makes a subsequent marriage contracted by any person
during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void from its performance, and no judicial
decree is necessary to establish its invalidity, as distinguished from mere annulable
marriages. There is here no pretence that appellant's second marriage with Olga Lema
was contracted in the belief that the first spouse, Jovita de Asis, has been absent for
seven consecutive years or generally considered as dead, so as to render said marriage
valid until declared null and void by a competent court. 1âwphïl.nêt

Wherefore, the appealed judgment is reversed and the defendant-appellant acquitted,

with costs de officio so ordered.
Pablo, Bengzon, Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, and Reyes, J.B.L.,
JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

REYES, J., dissenting:

I dissent.

Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code punishes with prision mayor "any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved".

Though the logical may say that where the former marriage was void there would be
nothing to dissolve still it is not for the spouses to judge whether that marriage was void
or not. That judgment is reserved to the courts. As Viada says "La santidad e importancia
del matrinonio no permite que los casados juzguen por si mismos de su nulidad; esta ha
de someterse precisamente al judicio del Tribunal competente, y cuando este declare la
nulidad del matrimonio, y solo entonces, se tendra por nulo; mientras no exista esta
declaracion, la presuncion esta siempre a favor de la validez del matrimonio, y de
consiguente, el que contrae otro segundo antes de dicha declaracion de nulidad, no
puede menos de incurrir la pena de este articulo."(3 Viada, Codigo penal p. 275.)

"This is a sound opinion," says Mr. Justice Tuason in the case of People vs. Jose Cotas,
(CA), 40 Off. Gaz., 3145, "and is in line with the well-known rule established in cases of
adultery, that "until by competent authority in a final judgment the marriage contract is set
aside, the offense to the vows taken and the attack on the family exist."

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-10016             February 28, 1957

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appelle,

vs.
PROCESO S. ARAGON, defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Adolfo Brillantes for
appellee.
Prospero V. Manuel, Fernando Moncada and Antonio Abad Tornis for defendant and
appellant.

LABRADOR, J.:

Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu finding appellant guilty of
bigamy. The facts are not disputed and, as found by the trial court, are as follows:

On September 28, 1925, the accused, under the name of Proceso Rosima, contracted
marriage with a certain Maria Gorrea in the Philippine Independent Church in Cebu
(Exhibits "1" and "1-A"). While his marriage with Maria Gorrea was subsisting, the
accused under the name of Proceso Aragon, contracted a canonical marriage with Maria
Faicol on August 27, 1934, in the Santa Teresita Church in Iloilo City.

The sponsors of the accused and Maria Faicol were Eulogio Giroy, who was then an
employee of the Office of the Municipal Treasurer of Iloilo, and a certain Emilio Tomesa,
a clerk in the said office (Exhibit "A" and testimonies of Eulogio Giroy and complainant
Maria Faicol). After the said marriage, the accused and Maria Faicol established
residence in Iloilo. As the accused was then a traveling salesman, he commuted between
Iloilo where he maintained Maria Faicol, and Cebu where he maintained his first wife,
Maria Gorrea died in Cebu City on August 5, 1939 (Exhibit "2"). After Maria Gorrea's
death, and seeing that the coast was dear in Cebu, the accused brought Maria Faicol to
Cebu City in 1940, where she worked as a teacher-nurse.

It would seem that the accused and Maria Faicol did not live a happy marital life in Cebu,
for it appears that in 1949 and 1950, Maria Faicol suffered injuries to her eyes because of
physical maltreatment in the hands of the accused. On January 22, 1953, the accused
sent Maria Faicol to Iloilo, allegedly for the purpose of undergoing treatment of her
eyesight. During her absence, the accused contracted a third marriage with a certain
Jesusa C. Maglasang on October 3, 1953, in Sibonga, Cebu. (See Exhibits "C", "D", "E"
and "F")

The accused admitted having contracted marriage with Jesusa C. Maglasangin Sibonga,
Cebu, on October 3, 1953, Although the accused made an attempt to deny his previous
marriage with Maria Faicol, the Court, however, believes that the attempt is futile for the
fact of the said second marriage was fully established not only by the certificate of the
said marriage, but also by the testimony of Maria Faicol and of Eulogio Giroy, one of the
sponsors of the wedding, and the identification of the accused made by Maria Faicol.
(See Exhibits "A" and "B"; t.s.n. pp. 32-33, 40, 41, hearing of April 27, 1954).

The Court of First Instance of Cebu held that even in the absence of an express provision
in Act No. 3613 authorizing the filing of an action for judicial declaration of nullity of a
marriage void ab initio, defendant could not legally contract marriage with Jesusa C.
Maglasang without the dissolution of his marriage to Maria Faicol, either by the death of
the latter or by the judicial declaration of the nullity of such marriage, at the instance of
the latter. Authorities given for this ruling are 5 Viada, 5th edition, 651; 35 American
Jurisprudence, Marriage, Sec. 46, p. 212; Bickford vs. Bickford, 74 N. H. 466, 69 A. 579.

Appellant in this Court relies on the case of People vs. Mendoza, (95 Phil., 845; 50 Off.
Gaz., [10] 4767). In this case the majority of this Court declared:

The statutory provision (section 29 of the Marriage Law or Act No. 3613) plainly makes a
subsequent marriage contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first spouse
illegal and void from its performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its
invalidity, as distinguished from mere annullable marriages. There is here no pretense
that appellant's second marriage with Olga Lema was contracted in the belief that the
first spouse, Jovita de Asis, had been absent for seven consecutive years or generally
considered as dead, so as to render said marriage valid until declared null and void by a
subsequent court.

We are of the very weighty reasons by Justice Alex Reyes in the dissent in the case
above-quoted But this weighty reasons notwithstanding, the very fundamental principle of
strict construction of penal laws in favor of the accused, which principle we may not
ignore, seems to justify our stand in the above-cited case of People vs. Mendoza. Our
Revised Penal Code is of recent enactment and had the rule enunciated in Spain and in
America requiring judicial declaration of nullity of ab initio void marriages been within the
contemplation of the legislature, an express provision to that effect would or should have
been inserted in the law. In its absence, we are bound by said rule of strict interpretation
already adverted to.

It is to be noted that the action was instituted upon complaint of the second wife, whose
marriage with the appellant was not renewed after the death of the first wife and before
the third marriage was entered into. Hence, the last marriage was a valid one and
appellant's prosecution for contracting this marriage can not prosper.

For the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the
defendant-appellant acquitted, with costs de oficio, without prejudice to his prosecution
for having contracted the second bigamous marriage. So ordered.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia, and Felix, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

REYES, A.J., dissenting:

I dissent.

Dissenting in the case of People vs. Mendoza, replied on by the majority, I there said:

Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code punishes with prision mayor "any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved."

Though the logician may say that there were the former marriage was void there would
be nothing to dissolve, still it is not for the spouses to judge whether that marriage was
void or not. That judgment is reserved to the courts. As Viada says, 'La satidad e
importancia del matrimonio no permite que los casados juzguen por si mosmos de su
nulidad; esta ha de someterse [precisamente al juicio del Tribunalcompetente, y cuando
este declare la nulidad del matrimonio, y solo entonces, se tendra por nulo; mientras no
exista esta declaracion, la presuncion esta siempre a favor de la validez del matrimonio,
yde consiguiente, el que contrae otro segundo antes de dicha declaracio de nulidad, no
puede menos de incurrir la pena de este articulo. (3 Viada, Codigo Penal, p. 275.)

"This is a sound opinion," says Mr. Justice Tuason in the case of People vs. Jose Cotas,
(CA), 40 Off. Gaz. 3145, "and is in line with the well-known rule established in cases of
adultery, that "until by competent authority in a final judgment the marriage contract is set
aside, the offense to the vows taken and the attack on the family exists."
I may add that the construction placed by the majority upon the law penalizing bigamy
would frustrate the legislative intent rather than give effect thereto.

Padilla and Montemayor, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-23214 June 30, 1970

OFELIA GOMEZ, as Administratrix of the Estate of the late ISIDRA GOMEZ Y

AQUINO, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOAQUIN P. LIPANA, defendant-appellant.
Marcelo Y. Hernandez for plaintiff-appellee.

Presentacion G. Santos for defendant-appellant.

MAKALINTAL, J.:

The defendant-appellant, Joaquin P. Lipana, contracted two marriages: the first with

Maria Loreto Ancino in 1930 and the second with Isidra Gomez y Aquino in 1935. At the
time of the second marriage the first was still subsisting, which fact, however, Lipana
concealed from the second wife.

On December 17, 1943 the spouses of the second marriage acquired by purchase a
piece of land in Cubao, Quezon City, for the price of P3,000.00. The Torrens title for the
property (Transfer Certificate No. 25289 of the Register of Deeds for Quezon City) was
issued on February 1, 1944, in the name of "Joaquin Lipana married to Isidra Gomez."
On July 20, 1958 Isidra Gomez died intestate and childless, and survived only by her
sisters as the nearest relatives. On August 7, 1961 Ofelia Gomez, judicial administratrix
of her estate, commenced the present suit, praying for the forfeiture of the husband's
share in the Cubao property in favor of the said estate. Reliance is placed on Article 1417
of the old Civil Code, the Spanish text of which provides:

La sociedad de gananciales concluye al disolverse el matrimonio o al ser declarado nulo.

El conjuge que por su mala fe hubiere sido causa de la nulidad, no tendra parte en los
bienes gananciales.

The trial court, ruling that the second marriage was void ab initio and that the husband
was the one who gave cause for its nullity, applied the aforequoted provision and
declared his interest in the disputed property forfeited in favor of the estate of the
deceased second wife.

In the present appeal by the defendant he attributes two errors to the trial court: (1) in
allowing a collateral attack on the validity of the second marriage and in holding it to be
bigamous and void ab initio; and (2) in holding that Article 1417 of the Spanish Civil Code
is applicable in this case.

The first error has not been committed. The controlling statute is Act 3613 of the
Philippine Legislature, the Marriage Law which became effective on December 4, 1929
and was in force when the two marriages were celebrated. The pertinent provisions are
as follows:

SEC. 29. Illegal Marriages. — Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person

during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first
spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless;

(a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;

(b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the
second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or
the absentee being generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse
present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, the marriage so contracted
being valid in either case until declared null and void by a competent court.
SEC. 30. Annullable marriages. — A marriage may be annulled for any of the following
causes, existing at the time of the marriage:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) That the former husband or wife of either was living and the marriage with such
former husband or wife was then in force;

xxx xxx xxx

SEC. 31. Time for filing action for decree of nullity. — The action to obtain a decree of
nullity of marriage, for causes mentioned in the preceding section, must be commenced
within the periods and by the parties as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) For causes mentioned in subdivision (b); by either party during the life of the other, or
by the former husband or wife.

xxx xxx xxx

The appellant, relying on Section 30(b) quoted above, maintains that his marriage to
Isidra Gomez was valid and could be annulled only in an action for that purpose, which in
the light of Section 31 could be filed only by either party thereto, during the lifetime of the
other, or by the former spouse.

However, it is not Section 30 but Section 29 which governs in this case, particularly the
first paragraph thereof, which says that "any marriage contracted by any person during
the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first
spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance." This is the general rule, to which
the only exceptions are those mentioned in subsections (a) and (b) of the same
provision.<äre||anº•1àw>

There is no suggestion here that the defendant's 1930 marriage to Maria Loreto Ancino
had been annulled or dissolved when he married Isidra Gomez in 1935, and there is no
proof that he did so under the conditions envisioned in sub-section (b). The burden is on
the party invoking the exception to prove that he comes under it; and the defendant has
not discharged that burden at all, no evidence whatsoever having been adduced by him
at the trial. Indeed, he contracted the second marriage less than seven years after the
first, and he has not shown that his first wife was then generally considered dead or was
believed by him to be so.

The second error bears closer analysis. Is Article 1417 of the Spanish Civil Code
applicable under the facts of this case?

There is one primordial fact which must be considered, namely, that since the
defendant's first marriage has not been dissolved or declared void the conjugal
partnership established by that marriage has not ceased. Nor has the first wife lost or
relinquished her status as putative heir of her husband under the new Civil Code, entitled
to share in his estate upon his death should she survive him. Consequently, whether as
conjugal partner in a still subsisting marriage or as such putative heir she has an interest
in the husband's share in the property here in dispute, even if it was acquired during the
second marriage, of which interest she would be deprived if his share should be declared
forfeited in favor of the second wife.
There is a difference of opinion among the members of this Court as to whether such
resulting prejudice to the first wife is within the contemplation of the Spanish Civil Code
when it decrees in general terms in Article 1417 that the spouse who in bad faith has
given cause for nullity (of the marriage) shall have no share in the conjugal properties,
considering that in the present case the first marriage has not been terminated and
therefore likewise impresses the conjugal stamp of that marriage upon whatever
properties are acquired during its existence. We believe, however, that it is not necessary
to resolve that question here inasmuch as the facts do not call for the application of
Article 1417. The first paragraph of this Article states two causes for the termination of
the conjugal partnership: (1) dissolution of the marriage and (2) declaration of nullity.
Under the second paragraph of the same Article it is upon the termination of the
partnership by either of said causes that the forfeiture of the guilty spouse takes place.
Now then, when did the conjugal partnership formed by virtue of the marriage of the
defendant to the deceased Isidra Gomez terminate? Obviously when the marriage was
dissolved by the latter's death in 1958. By that time Article 1417 was no longer in force,
having been eliminated in the new Civil Code, which took effect in 1950. The legal
situation arising from these facts is that while insofar as the second wife was concerned,
she having acted in good faith, her marriage produced civil effects and gave rise, just the
same, to the formation of a conjugal partnership wherein she was entitled to an equal
share upon dissolution,  no action lies under Article 1417 for the forfeiture of the
1

husband's share in her favor, much less in favor of her estate, with respect to which there
are after all no children, but only collateral relatives, who are entitled to succeed.

It would not do to say that since the second marriage, in this case was void ab initio the
application of Article 1417 should be reckoned as of the date it was celebrated in 1935.
This article speaks from the moment of the termination of the conjugal partnership (either
by the dissolution of the marriage or by the declaration of its nullity); and it would be self-
contradictory to consider that the conjugal partnership was formed and terminated at the
same time and by the same act, that is, by the celebration itself of the marriage. Colin y
Capitant  comments on this provision as follows:
2

Disuelven matrimonio y, por tanto la sociedad de gananciales, la muerte de uno de los

conjuges y la declaracion de nulidad. <äre||anº•1àw>

En caso de declaracion de nulidad, la sociedad de gananciales se extingue al ser

declarado nulo el matrimonio, es decir, en el momento en que sea firme la sentencia
declarativa de la nulidad.

xxx xxx xxx

It may thus be seen that if the nullity, or annulment, of the marriage is the basis for the
application of Article 1417, there is need for a judicial declaration thereof, which of course
contemplates an action for that purpose. In the instant case, however, the conjugal
partnership formed by the second marriage was dissolved by the death of the second
wife; and there has been no judicial declaration of nullity except possibly in this very
action, filed after dissolution by death had taken place and when Article 1417 of the
Spanish Civil Code was no longer in force.

There is, to be sure, a statement of Manresa  that in case of nullity it is presumed, with
3

respect to the spouse who acted in bad faith, that neither the marriage nor the conjugal
partnership ever existed, and hence such spouse has no right to a share in the conjugal
properties; but this legal effect of such presumption derives from the premise that Article
1417 is still in force, and in any event is of doubtful application if it would be in derogation
of and to the prejudice of the right of the other spouse of the first marriage in the conjugal
partnership formed thereby, which includes properties acquired by the husband during its
existence.
The only just and equitable solution in this case would be to recognize the right of the
second wife to her husband, and consider the other half as pertaining to the conjugal
partnership of the first marriage.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint is dismissed,
without pronouncement as to costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo
and Villamor, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. 58 June 2, 1977

PEDRO ODAYAT, complainant,
vs.
DEMETRIO AMANTE, respondent.
ANTONIO, J.:

In a verified amended letter-complaint dated March 10, 1973, 1 Pedro Odayat charged Atty.
Demetrio Z. Amante, Clerk of Court, Court of First Instance, Branch IX, Basey, Samar, with
oppression, immorality and falsification of a public document. 2

Briefly stated, complainant's basic allegations are: (1) that respondent grabbed a portion
of complainant's land, and, when this latter resented, the former arrogantly challenged
the complainant to bring the matter to court; (2) that respondent is cohabiting with one
Beatriz Jornada, with whom he begot many children, even while his spouse Filomena
Abella is still alive; and (3) that respondent, although married, falsely represented his
status as single in the information sheet be submitted in connection with his appointment
to his present position as Clerk of Court.

After respondent Demetrio Amante had submitted his letter-comment dated April 24,
1973, 3 which was considered as his answer to the amended complaint, this Court, in its
minute resolution of July 16, 1974, 4 referred this Administrative Matter No. P-58 to the
Executive Judge of the Court of First Instance, Branch I, Catbalogan, Samar, for investigation,
report and recommendation, and the matter was docketed therein as Administrative Case No.
264. The charges were investigated by District Judge Segundo M. Zosa of said Court. After
appropriate proceedings, Judge Zosa submitted to this Court his Report and
Recommendation dated December 3,1974. 5

1. Oppression. — In the course of formal investigation on August 26, 1974 before Judge
Zosa, complainant acquiesced to the dropping of this charge of oppression against
respondent, inasmuch as the issue involved therein refers to a boundary dispute between
the complainant and the respondent and admittedly being more properly a cause for a
civil action. 6 Hence, the scope of the investigation by Judge Zosa is limited to the other two
charges.

2. Immorality. — To prove this charge of immorality against respondent, complainant

Pedro Odayat testified and presented Exhibits "A" to "E", to the effect that respondent
and Filomena Abella were married in Tacloban City on October 16, 1948 before Judge
Eugenio Brillo (then Justice of the Peace of Tacloban, Leyte; 7 ) that they had one son,
who was born on August 23, 1949 and baptized on October 1, 1949 by the name of Romeo
Amante, in the Sto. Nino Church, Tacloban City, by Rev. Fr. Magdaleno Agnes; 8 that he came
to know Filomena Abella, who is a native of Sta. Rita, Samar, only after her marriage to the
respondent when they took up their residence for five years in Basey, Samar; that he did not
know if Filomena Abella was still single when she married the respondent; that long before he
filed his complaint against respondent on March 10, 1973, he came to know that the
respondent and one Beatriz Jornado were living as husband and wife in Basey, Samar; that
they had several children, two of whom are Maria Felisa J. Amante, who was born on April
12, 1967, as per certified true copy of the Certificate of Birth of said child, 9 duly signed and
issued on May 7, 1973 by Perfecto Cabuquit, the Local Civil Registrar, 10 and Alma Amante y
Jornada, who was born on April 8, 1965 and baptized on July 5, 1965, as per Certificate of
Baptism, duly signed and issued on March 6, 1973 by the Parish Priest, Rev. Fr. Jose M.
Lentejas; 11 and that one of the reasons why he filed his complaint against the respondent
was because of their land dispute.

On the other hand, respondent Demetrio Amante testified, in his behalf, and presented
Atty. Demosthenes Duquilla, as well as Exhibits "1" and "2". Respondent admits his
marriage with Filomena Abella on October 16, 1948. 12 He also admits that he has been
living with Beatriz Jornada, whom he married on April 4, 1964 during a religious revival in
Almagro, Samar, before Rev. Fr. John Belly, a Franciscan Missionary, 13 and with whom he
begot six (6) children.14 Respondent, however, claims he was coerced into marrying Filomena
Abella, unaware that she was already married to another man, and they separated in 1949
after Filomena Abella told him of her previous marriage; that from 1949 to 1964, the
respondent did not hear or received any communication from Filomena Abella, much less
knew of her whereabouts.

To rebut the charge of immorality, respondent presented in evidence the certification

dated September 12, 1974 of David C. Jacobe, the Local Civil Registrar of Pateros,
Rizal 15 attesting that, in accordance with the Register of Marriages in his office, Filomena
Abella was married to one Eliseo Portales on February 16, 1948. Respondent's contention is
that his marriage with Filomena Abella was void ab initio, because of her previous marriage
with said Eliseo Portales.

The Investigator finds for the respondent and recommends his exoneration from this
charge. Indeed, there is no question that Filomena Abella's marriage with the respondent
was void ab initio under Article 80 [4] of the New Civil code, and no judicial decree is
necessary to establish the invalidity of void marriages. 16

3. Falsification of a This document. — The Investigator found that the complainant failed
to prove this charge. Contrary to the allegation of the complainant, the document in
question, 17 shows that the respondent actually placed in "Item 6. Civil Status" therein the
word "Married". 18

In view of the foregoing, We find that the recommendation of the Investigator is in accordance
with law and the evidence on record.

WHEREFORE, respondent Demetrio Amante is hereby exonerated from the charges

filed against him by complainant. Let a copy of this decision be attached to his personal
record,

Castro, C.J., Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Muñoz-Palma, Aquino and

Martin, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-53703 August 19, 1986

LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY (as presiding judge of the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City) and KARL HEINZ
WIEGEL, respondents.

Dapucanta, Dulay & Associates for petitioner.

Siguion Reyna, Montecillo and Ongsiako Law Office for private respondent.

PARAS, J.:

In an action (Family Case No. 483) filed before the erstwhile Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Caloocan City, herein respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel (plaintiff therein)
asked for the declaration of Nullity of his marriage (celebrated on July, 1978 at the Holy
Catholic Apostolic Christian Church Branch in Makati, Metro Manila) with herein
petitioner Lilia Oliva Wiegel (Lilia, for short, and defendant therein) on the ground of
Lilia's previous existing marriage to one Eduardo A. Maxion, the ceremony having been
performed on June 25, 1972 at our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon City. Lilia, while
admitting the existence of said prior subsisting marriage claimed that said marriage was
null and void, she and the first husband Eduardo A. Maxion having been allegedly forced
to enter said marital union. In the pre-trial that ensued, the issue agreed upon by both
parties was the status of the first marriage (assuming the presence of force exerted
against both parties): was said prior marriage void or was it merely voidable? Contesting
the validity of the pre-trial order, Lilia asked the respondent court for an opportunity to
present evidence-

(1) that the first marriage was vitiated by force exercised upon both her and the first
husband; and

(2) that the first husband was at the time of the marriage in 1972 already married
to someone else.

Respondent judge ruled against the presentation of evidence because the existence of
force exerted on both parties of the first marriage had already been agreed upon. Hence,
the present petition for certiorari assailing the following Orders of therespondent Judge-

(1) the Order dated March 17, 1980 in which the parties were compelled to submit the
case for resolution based on "agreed facts;" and

(2) the Order dated April 14, 1980, denying petitioner's motion to allow her to present
evidence in her favor.

We find the petition devoid of merit.

There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force
committed against both parties because assuming this to be so, the marriage will not be
void but merely viodable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and therefore valid until annulled. Since no
annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married respondent she was still
validly married to her first husband, consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID
(Art. 80, Civil Code).

There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her
first husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void
still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration   of such fact and for all legal
1
intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she
contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel); accordingly, the marriage of
petitioner and respondent would be regarded VOID under the law.

WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, for lack of merit, and the Orders
complained of are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Feria (Chairman), Fernan Alampay and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-40003 October 28, 1986

SHIRLEY YAP, in her own behalf and in her capacity as Administratrix of the estate
of MANING YAP, JAIME YAP, and TALINA BIANONG VDA. DE YAP, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, NANCY J. YAP, MANING YAP, JR., JULIA YAP, JASMIN
YAP, and SAMUEL YAP, respondents.

Francisco Villanueva for petitioners.

Ramon Tuangco for respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals which set aside the earlier
decision of the then Court of First Instance of Lanao del Sur in Special Proceeding No.
1334 (R-61), declaring the petitioners as the legal heirs of the late Maning Yap entitled to
inherit his estate and dismissing the opposition filed by the private respondents. The
dispositive portion of the decision on appeal reads:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and, after a complete and
correct inventory is returned by the administratrix, the entire estate of the deceased
Maning Yap shall be divided into two equal parts, one-half (1/2) corresponding to the
petitioner Talina Bianong and her children Shirley Yap and Jaime Yap and the other half
corresponding to the oppositors Nancy J. Yap and her children Maning Yap, Jr., Julia
Yap, Jasmin Yap and Samuel Yap, without pronouncement as to costs.

Maning Yap, during his lifetime married twice: first, to Talina Bianong in 1939 and
second, to Nancy Yap on December 11, 1948.

Maning Yap and Talina Bianong were married at Bara-as Plantation, Malabang, Lanao
del Sur, in accordance with the Muslim rites and practices prescribed by the Islam
religion professed by both of them. Immediately, after the marriage, the couple lived in
the house of the parents of Maning Yap at the poblacion of Malabang, Lanao del Sur.
Out of the marriage, four children were born; two of them died in infancy during the
Japanese occupation, while the two others are petitioners Shirley Yap and Jaime Yap.

While the first marriage was still subsisting, Maning Yap married Nancy J. Yap on
December 11, 1948 in a civil ceremony performed by District Judge Juan Sarenas of the
Court of First Instance of Cotabato. Nancy Yap entered into the marriage in the belief that
Maning Yap was not a married man. They had four children, namely respondents Maning
Yap, Jr., Julia Yap, Jasmin Yap and Samuel Yap. On February 21, 1964, Maning Yap
died in Piagapo, Lanao del Sur, in the crash of an airplane of the Philippine Air Lines. At
the time of his death he, therefore, had two families living separately about 80 kilometers
apart.

On March 3, 1964, Talina Bianong Vda. de Yap filed Special Proceeding No. 1334
(Intestate Estate of Maning Yap) before the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Sur,
seeking the issuance of letters of administration for the estate of Maning Yap. Among
other things, the petition alleged that Maning Yap left personal and real properties all
located at Malabang, Lanao del Sur, with an approximate value of P100,000.00.

The petition was opposed by Nancy J. Yap and her minor children on the ground that she
is the legitimate widow of Maning Yap and that Maning Yap, Jr., Julia Yap, Jasmin Yap
and Samuel Yap, all minors, are their legitimate children.
Talina Bianong was initially appointed special administratrix of the intestate estate of
Maning Yap. However, after a formal hearing and on recommendation of Talina, the
lower court appointed Shirley Yap as regular administratrix of the intestate estate of
Maning Yap.

Various claims filed by the creditors against the intestate estate of Maning Yap were duly
approved by the court and paid by the administratrix. Since there still existed a residue of
the intestate estate consisting of real and personal properties and collectible debts after
payments to creditors, the court set the case for hearing to arrive at a declaration of
heirship for the purpose of liquidating the conjugal partnership of the late Maning Yap
and his surviving spouse and to determine the heirs entitled to inherit his intestate estate.

After trial, the lower court rendered decision declaring Talina Bianong and her children as
the legal heirs of Maning Yap. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered:

(a) Declaring Talina Bianong, Shirley Yap and Jaime Yap, the legal heirs of the late
Maning Yap and entitled to inherit or succeed to his intestate with Talina Bianong, as his
surviving spouse, and Shirleyt Yap and Jaime Yap, as his surviving legitimate children;

(b) Adjudicating to Talina Bianong one-third (1/3) of the whole intestate estate of the late
Maning Yap, as her share, pursuant to Art. 996 of the New Civil Code; to Shirley Yap, the
other one-third (1/3) as her share and to Jaime Yap the remaining one-third (1/3), also as
his share, pursuant to Art. 980 in conjunction with Art. 996 of the new Civil Code.

The opposition and claim of the opposition is hereby dismissed without costs.

Upon appeal by Nancy Yap and her children, the appellate court reversed and set aside
the decision. As stated earlier, the Court of Appeals ruled that the estate of Maning Yap
should be equally divided into two equal parts: one-half (1/2) to Talina Bianong and her
children and the other half (1/2) to Nancy Yap and her children.

The appellate court applied the ruling in Lao and Lao v. Dee Tim (45 Phil. 739). The facts
in the cited case are similar to the case at bar in that Yap Siong in his lifetime contracted
two marriages; first to Dee Tim on September 14, 1893 in China with whom he had three
children and second to Maria Lao on June 24, 1903 with whom he had one child.
Moreover, Maria Lao entered into the marriage believing that Yap Siong was not then a
married man. Yap Siong died on September 1922 leaving properties which were claimed
by the two families. In resolving the issue on how the properties of Yap Siong should be
divided, this Court applied the Leyes de Partidas (Law 1; Title 13, Partida 4), to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

... [W]here two wome innocently and in good faith are legally united in holy matrimony to
the same man, their children and each family will be entitled to one-half of the estate of
the husband upon distribution of his estate. That provision of the Leyes de Partidas is a
very humane and wise law. It justly protects those who innocently have entered into the
solemn relation of marriage and their descendants. The good faith of all the parties will
be presumed until the contrary is positive proved. (Articles 69, Civil Code; Las Leyes de
Matrimonio, section 96; Gaines v. Hennen, 65 U.S., 553).

A woman who is deceied by a man who respresents himself as single and who marries
him, she and her children born while the deception lasted, under the Spanish law, are
entitled to all the rights of a legitimate wife and children. The common law allowing none
of the incidents of a true marriage to follow another marriage entered into during the
continuance of a first, was early found to work a great injustice upon the innocent parties
to the second marriage, and specially upon the offspring of such second marriage. ...

The petitioners now contend that Maning Yap died in 1964 when the New Civil Code had
already super ed the old Spanish Civil Code. They state that pursuant to Article 2263 of
the New Civil Code, the distribution of the estate of Maning Yap should be in accordance
with, the new codal provisions and not the Leyes Partidas, which is an old law no longer
applicable,

We agree.

Article 2263, a transitional provision in the New Civil Code which took effect on August
30, 1950 states:

Rights to the inheritance of a person who died, with or without a will, before the effectivity
of this Code, shall be governed by the Civil Code of 1889, by other previous laws, and by
the Rules of Court. The inheritance of those who, with or without a will die after the
beginning of the effectivity of this Code, shall be adjudicated and distributed in
accordance with this new body of laws and by the Rules of Court; but the testamentary
provisions shall be carried out insofar as they may be permitted by this Code. Therefore,
legitimes, betterments, legacies and bequests shall be respected; however, their amount
shall be reduced if in no other manner can every compulsory heir be given his full share
according to this Code. (Rule 12a)

The Report of the Code Commission explains the rule, to wit:

The decisive fact which gives origin to the right of the heirs, devisees and legatees is the
death of the decedent. This is the basis of the foregoing rule. No heir, devisee or legatee
has any vested right until the moment of such death (Civil Code, Padilla, Volume VII,
1975, p. 712).

We have accordingly ruled that the rights to the inheritance of a person who died before
the effectivity of the New Civil Code shall be governed by the Civil Code of 1889, by other
previous laws and by the Rules of Court (See Vidaurrazaga v. Court of Appeals, 91 Phil.
492; Canales v. Arrogante, 91 Phil. 9; and Morales, et al. v. Yañez, 98 Phil. 677), while
the rights to the inheritance of a person who died after the effectivity of the New Civil
Code shall be governed by the New Civil Code (Del Prado v. Santos, 18 SCRA 68).

There is no dispute that the marriage of Talina Bianong to Maning Yap was valid and that
the second marriage contracted by the latter with Nancy Yap was illegal and void
pursuant to Act 3613 of the Philippine Legislature, the Marriage Law which was in force
when the two marriages were celebrated to wit:

SEC. 29. Illegal Marriages. — Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person

during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first
spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless;

(a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;

(b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the
second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or
the absentee being generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse
present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, the marriage so contracted
being valid in either case until declared null and void by a competent court.
Bearing this in mind, how must the estate of Maning Yap be distributed?

The records show that the real and personal properties under administration in the
intestate estate proceedings of Maning Yap were acquired by Talina Bianong and the
deceased Maning Yap during their marriage. Hence, these properties, in the absence of
any evidence to the contrary are considered conjugal properties of Talina Bianong and
Maning Yap (Article 142, New Civil Code). Considering that there was no liquidation of
the conjugal partnership of gains during the lifetime of Maning Yap, such liquidation must
be carried out in the intestate proceedings of Maning Yap, the deceased spouse as
expressly provided in Section 2, Rule 73, Revised Rules of Court (Lapuz v. Eufemio, 43
SCRA 177).

Article 142 of the New Civil Code provides:

By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband and wife place in a common
fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from their work or industry, and
divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or
benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.

and Article 185 thereof states:

The net remainder of the conjugal partnership of gains shall be divided equally between
the husband and the wife or their respective heirs, unless a different basis of division was
agreed upon in the marriage settlements.

Pursuant to these provisions, the net remainder of the conjugal partnership of gains after
money claims filed by creditors against the intestate estate of Maning Yap approved by
the lower court have been paid by the administratrix should be equally divided between
Maning Yap and Talina Bianong as their shares. The one-half share of Maning Yap
would then comprise his intestate estate to be distributed among his heirs. (See also
Vda. de Delizo v. Delizo, 69 SCRA 216)

Under the law of succession in the New Civil Code, Maning Yap's legal heirs are Talina
Bianong, her children Shirley Yap and Jaime Yap and the children of Nancy Yap by
Maning Yap namely: Maning Yap, Jr., Julia Yap, Jasmin Yap and Samuel Yap. Talina
Bianong, the first wife had not lost or relinquished her status as putative heir of her
husband. She is entitled to share in Maning Yap's estate upon his death (Gomez v.
Lipana, 33 SCRA 615). On the other hand, Nancy Yap, the second wife cannot inherit
from Maning Yap because their marriage was void ab initio. (Art. 83, New Civil Code;
People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845) However, Nancy Yap's children by Maning Yap have
the status of natural children by legal fiction and are considered compulsory heirs of the
late Maning Yap. (Articles 89 and 887, New Civil Code).

Considering the foregoing, the estate of Maning Yap which is one-half (1/2) pro indiviso
of the net remainder of the conjugal partnership of gains of the first marriage (Articles 142
and 185 New Civil Code), the other half being the share of Talina Bianong, should be
distributed as follows:

a. To the legitimate children, Shirley Yap and Jaime Yap-one-half (1/2) of the resulting
net estate to be divided equally between them pursuant to Article 888 of the New Civil
Code;

b. To the legitimate widow Talina Bianong one-fourth (1/4) of the net estate taken from
the free portion or disposable half of the estate pursuant to Article 999 in relation. to
Article 897 of the New Civil Code; and
c. To the natural children by legal fiction --Maning Yap, Jr., Julia Yap, Jasmin Yap and
Samuel Yap-the remaining one-fourth (1/4) of the net estate to be shared equally
between them pursuant to the first and third paragraphs of Article 895 in relation to Article
983 of the New Civil Code.

WHEREFORE, the instant PETITION is GRANTED. The questioned decision of the

Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The widow, Talina Bianong
shall receive one half (1/2) of the whole intestate estate as her share in the net remainder
of the conjugal partnership of gains. The other half, which is the net estate of the late
Maning Yap, is distributed and adjudicated as stated above.

SO ORDERED.

Feria (Chairman), Fernan, Alampay and Paras, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. MTJ-92-706 March 29, 1995

LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR., Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 28,
Manila, respondent.

QUIASON, J.:

This is a complaint by Lupo A. Atienza for Gross Immorality and Appearance of

Impropriety against Judge Francisco Brillantes, Jr., Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan
Trial Court, Branch 20, Manila.

Complainant alleges that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro, who are living
together at No. 34 Galaxy Street, Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati, Metro Manila. He stays in
said house, which he purchased in 1987, whenever he is in Manila.

In December 1991, upon opening the door to his bedroom, he saw respondent sleeping
on his (complainant's) bed. Upon inquiry, he was told by the houseboy that respondent
had been cohabiting with De Castro. Complainant did not bother to wake up respondent
and instead left the house after giving instructions to his houseboy to take care of his
children.

Thereafter, respondent prevented him from visiting his children and even alienated the
affection of his children for him.

Complainant claims that respondent is married to one Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he
has five children, as appearing in his 1986 and 1991 sworn statements of assets and
liabilities. Furthermore, he alleges that respondent caused his arrest on January 13,
1992, after he had a heated argument with De Castro inside the latter's office.

For his part, respondent alleges that complainant was not married to De Castro and that
the filing of the administrative action was related to complainant's claim on the Bel-Air
residence, which was disputed by De Castro.

Respondent denies that he caused complainant's arrest and claims that he was even a
witness to the withdrawal of the complaint for Grave Slander filed by De Castro against
complainant. According to him, it was the sister of De Castro who called the police to
arrest complainant.

Respondent also denies having been married to Ongkiko, although he admits having five
children with her. He alleges that while he and Ongkiko went through a marriage
ceremony before a Nueva Ecija town mayor on April 25, 1965, the same was not a valid
marriage for lack of a marriage license. Upon the request of the parents of Ongkiko,
respondent went through another marriage ceremony with her in Manila on June 5, 1965.
Again, neither party applied for a marriage license. Ongkiko abandoned respondent 17
years ago, leaving their children to his care and custody as a single parent.

Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles,
California on December 4, 1991, he believed, in all good faith and for all legal intents and
purposes, that he was single because his first marriage was solemnized without a
license.
Under the Family Code, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous
marriage before a party thereto can enter into a second marriage. Article 40 of said Code
provides:

The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for the purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.

Respondent argues that the provision of Article 40 of the Family Code does not apply to
him considering that his first marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil
Code of the Philippines; while the second marriage took place in 1991 and governed by
the Family Code.

Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code
on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256
of the Family Code, said Article is given "retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice
or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This
is particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not
shown any vested right that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case.

The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not
preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of
procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely
affected (Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 229 [1968]). The reason is that as a
general rule no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws (Billones v.
Court of Industrial Relations, 14 SCRA 674 [1965]).

Respondent is the last person allowed to invoke good faith. He made a mockery of the
institution of marriage and employed deceit to be able to cohabit with a woman, who
beget him five children.

Respondent passed the Bar examinations in 1962 and was admitted to the practice of
law in 1963. At the time he went through the two marriage ceremonies with Ongkiko, he
was already a lawyer. Yet, he never secured any marriage license. Any law student
would know that a marriage license is necessary before one can get married.
Respondent was given an opportunity to correct the flaw in his first marriage when he
and Ongkiko were married for the second time. His failure to secure a marriage license
on these two occasions betrays his sinister motives and bad faith.

It is evident that respondent failed to meet the standard of moral fitness for membership
in the legal profession.

While the deceit employed by respondent existed prior to his appointment as a

Metropolitan Trial Judge, his immoral and illegal act of cohabiting with De Castro began
and continued when he was already in the judiciary.

The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff
of impropriety, not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties but also as to
his behavior as a private individual. There is no duality of morality. A public figure is also
judged by his private life. A judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity
and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times, in the
performance of his judicial duties and in his everyday life. These are judicial guideposts
too self-evident to be overlooked. No position exacts a greater demand on moral
righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the judiciary (Imbing v.
Tiongzon, 229 SCRA 690 [1994]).
WHEREFORE, respondent is DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all leave and
retirement benefits and with prejudice to reappointment in any branch, instrumentality, or
agency of the government, including government-owned and controlled corporations.
This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo,
Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.
 SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 127406               November 27, 2000

OFELIA P. TY, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, and EDGARDO M. REYES, respondents.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This appeal seeks the reversal of the decision dated July 24, 1996, of the Court of
Appeals in C.A. – G.R. CV 37897, which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig, Branch 160, declaring the marriage contract between private respondent
Edgardo M. Reyes and petitioner Ofelia P. Ty null and void ab initio. It also ordered
private respondent to pay P15,000.00 as monthly support for their children Faye Eloise
Reyes and Rachel Anne Reyes.

As shown in the records of the case, private respondent married Anna Maria Regina
Villanueva in a civil ceremony on March 29, 1977, in Manila. Then they had a church
wedding on August 27, 1977. However, on August 4, 1980, the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Quezon City declared their marriage null and void ab initio for lack of a
valid marriage license. The church wedding on August 27, 1977, was also declared null
and void ab initio for lack of consent of the parties.

Even before the decree was issued nullifying his marriage to Anna Maria, private
respondent wed Ofelia P. Ty, herein petitioner, on April 4, 1979, in ceremonies officiated
by the judge of the City Court of Pasay. On April 4, 1982, they also had a church wedding
in Makati, Metro Manila.

On January 3, 1991, private respondent filed a Civil Case 1853-J with the RTC of Pasig,
Branch 160, praying that his marriage to petitioner be declared null and void. He alleged
that they had no marriage license when they got married. He also averred that at the time
he married petitioner, he was still married to Anna Maria. He stated that at the time he
married petitioner the decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria had not been
issued. The decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria was rendered only on August
4, 1980, while his civil marriage to petitioner took place on April 4, 1979.

Petitioner, in defending her marriage to private respondent, pointed out that his claim that
their marriage was contracted without a valid license is untrue. She submitted their
Marriage License No. 5739990 issued at Rosario, Cavite on April 3, 1979, as Exh. 11, 12
and 12-A. He did not question this document when it was submitted in evidence.
Petitioner also submitted the decision of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Quezon City dated August 4, 1980, which declared null and void his civil marriage to
Anna Maria Regina Villanueva celebrated on March 29, 1977, and his church marriage to
said Anna Maria on August 27, 1977. These documents were submitted as evidence
during trial and, according to petitioner, are therefore deemed sufficient proof of the facts
therein. The fact that the civil marriage of private respondent and petitioner took place on
April 4, 1979, before the judgment declaring his prior marriage as null and void is
undisputed. It also appears indisputable that private respondent and petitioner had a
church wedding ceremony on April 4, 1982. 1

The Pasig RTC sustained private respondent’s civil suit and declared his marriage to
herein petitioner null and void ab initio in its decision dated November 4, 1991. Both
parties appealed to respondent Court of Appeals. On July 24, 1996, the appellate court
affirmed the trial court’s decision. It ruled that a judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage (to Anna Maria) must first be secured before a subsequent marriage could be
validly contracted. Said the appellate court:

We can accept, without difficulty, the doctrine cited by defendant’s counsel that ‘no
judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of void marriages.’ It does not say,
however, that a second marriage may proceed even without a judicial decree. While it is
true that if a marriage is null and void, ab initio, there is in fact no subsisting marriage, we
are unwilling to rule that the matter of whether a marriage is valid or not is for each
married spouse to determine for himself – for this would be the consequence of allowing
a spouse to proceed to a second marriage even before a competent court issues a
judicial decree of nullity of his first marriage. The results would be disquieting, to say the
least, and could not have been the intendment of even the now-repealed provisions of
the Civil Code on marriage.

xxx

WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing ratiocination, We modify the appealed Decision in this
wise:

1. The marriage contracted by plaintiff-appellant [herein private respondent] Eduardo M.

Reyes and defendant-appellant [herein petitioner] Ofelia P. Ty is declared null and
void ab initio;

2. Plaintiff-appellant Eduardo M. Reyes is ordered to give monthly support in the amount

of P15,000.00 to his children Faye Eloise Reyes and Rachel Anne Reyes from November
4, 1991; and

3. Cost against plaintiff-appellant Eduardo M. Reyes.

SO ORDERED. 2

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this instant petition asserting
that the Court of Appeals erred:

I.

BOTH IN THE DECISION AND THE RESOLUTION, IN REQUIRING FOR THE

VALIDITY OF PETITIONER’S MARRIAGE TO RESPONDENT, A JUDICIAL DECREE
NOT REQUIRED BY LAW.

II

IN THE RESOLUTION, IN APPLYING THE RULING IN DOMINGO VS. COURT OF

APPEALS.
 III

IN BOTH THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION IN NOT CONSIDERING THE CIVIL

EFFECTS OF THE RELIGIOUS RATIFICATION WHICH USED THE SAME MARRIAGE
LICENSE.

IV

IN THE DECISION NOT GRANTING MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES TO THE

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

The principal issue in this case is whether the decree of nullity of the first marriage is
required before a subsequent marriage can be entered into validly? To resolve this
question, we shall go over applicable laws and pertinent cases to shed light on the
assigned errors, particularly the first and the second which we shall discuss jointly.

In sustaining the trial court, the Court of Appeals declared the marriage of petitioner to
private respondent null and void for lack of a prior judicial decree of nullity of the marriage
between private respondent and Villanueva. The appellate court rejected petitioner’s
claim that People v. Mendoza and People v. Aragon are applicable in this case. For
3  4 

these cases held that where a marriage is void from its performance, no judicial decree is
necessary to establish its invalidity. But the appellate court said these cases, decided
before the enactment of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209 as amended by E.O No. 227), no
longer control. A binding decree is now needed and must be read into the provisions of
law previously obtaining. 5

In refusing to consider petitioner’s appeal favorably, the appellate court also said:

Terre v. Attorney Terre, Adm. Case No. 2349, 3 July 1992 is mandatory precedent for
this case. Although decided by the High Court in 1992, the facts situate it within the
regime of the now-repealed provisions of the Civil Code, as in the instant case.

xxx

For purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second

marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is
essential. . . .
6

At the outset, we must note that private respondent’s first and second marriages
contracted in 1977 and 1979, respectively, are governed by the provisions of the Civil
Code. The present case differs significantly from the recent cases of Bobis v. Bobis 7 

and Mercado v. Tan, both involving a criminal case for bigamy where the bigamous
8 

marriage was contracted during the effectivity of the Family Code, under which a judicial
9 

declaration of nullity of marriage is clearly required.

Pertinent to the present controversy, Article 83 of the Civil Code provides that:

Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the
first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal
and void from its performance, unless:

(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or

(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the
second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or
if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally
considered as dead and before any person believed to be so by the spouse present at
the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead
according to articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the
three cases until declared null and void by a competent court.

As to whether a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage is necessary, the Civil

Code contains no express provision to that effect. Jurisprudence on the matter, however,
appears to be conflicting.

Originally, in People v. Mendoza, and People v. Aragon, this Court held that no judicial
10  11 

decree is necessary to establish the nullity of a void marriage. Both cases involved the
same factual milieu. Accused contracted a second marriage during the subsistence of his
first marriage. After the death of his first wife, accused contracted a third marriage during
the subsistence of the second marriage. The second wife initiated a complaint for
bigamy. The Court acquitted accused on the ground that the second marriage is void,
having been contracted during the existence of the first marriage. There is no need for a
judicial declaration that said second marriage is void. Since the second marriage is void,
and the first one terminated by the death of his wife, there are no two subsisting valid
marriages. Hence, there can be no bigamy. Justice Alex Reyes dissented in both cases,
saying that it is not for the spouses but the court to judge whether a marriage is void or
not.

In Gomez v. Lipana, and Consuegra v. Consuegra, however, we recognized the right of

12  13 

the second wife who entered into the marriage in good faith, to share in their acquired
estate and in proceeds of the retirement insurance of the husband. The Court observed
that although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was
celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there was a need for judicial
declaration of such nullity (of the second marriage). And since the death of the husband
supervened before such declaration, we upheld the right of the second wife to share in
the estate they acquired, on grounds of justice and equity. 14

But in Odayat v. Amante (1977), the Court adverted to Aragon and Mendoza as

15 

precedents. We exonerated a clerk of court of the charge of immorality on the ground

that his marriage to Filomena Abella in October of 1948 was void, since she was already
previously married to one Eliseo Portales in February of the same year. The Court held
that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of void marriages. This
ruling was affirmed in Tolentino v. Paras. 16

Yet again in Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy (1986), the Court held that there is a need for a
17 

judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage. In Wiegel, Lilia married Maxion in 1972.
In 1978, she married another man, Wiegel. Wiegel filed a petition with the Juvenile
Domestic Relations Court to declare his marriage to Lilia as void on the ground of her
previous valid marriage. The Court, expressly relying on Consuegra, concluded that: 18

There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her
first husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void
still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration (citing Consuegra) of such fact
and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at
the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel; accordingly, the
marriage of petitioner and respondent would be regarded VOID under the law. (Emphasis
supplied).

In Yap v. Court of Appeals, however, the Court found the second marriage void without
19 

need of judicial declaration, thus reverting to the Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon rulings.

At any rate, the confusion under the Civil Code was put to rest under the Family Code.
Our rulings in Gomez, Consuegra, and Wiegel were eventually embodied in Article 40 of
the Family Code. Article 40 of said Code expressly required a judicial declaration of
20 

nullity of marriage –

Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.

In Terre v. Terre (1992) the

21 
Court, applying Gomez,
Consuegra and Wiegel, categorically stated that a judicial declaration of nullity of a void
marriage is necessary. Thus, we disbarred a lawyer for contracting a bigamous marriage
during the subsistence of his first marriage. He claimed that his first marriage in 1977
was void since his first wife was already married in 1968. We held that Atty. Terre should
have known that the prevailing case law is that "for purposes of determining whether a
person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first
marriage was null and void ab initio is essential."

The Court applied this ruling in subsequent cases. In Domingo v. Court of

Appeals (1993), the Court held:
22 

Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the
matter. A declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is now explicitly required either as a
cause of action or a ground for defense. (Art. 39 of the Family Code). Where the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a
second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free
from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. (Family
Code, Art. 40; See also arts. 11, 13, 42, 44, 48, 50, 52, 54, 86, 99, 147, 148). 23

However, a recent case applied the old rule because of the peculiar circumstances of the
case. In Apiag v. Cantero, (1997) the first wife charged a municipal trial judge of
24 

immorality for entering into a second marriage. The judge claimed that his first marriage
was void since he was merely forced into marrying his first wife whom he got pregnant.
On the issue of nullity of the first marriage, we applied Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. We
held that since the second marriage took place and all the children thereunder were born
before the promulgation of Wiegel and the effectivity of the Family Code, there is no need
for a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence
at that time.

Similarly, in the present case, the second marriage of private respondent was entered
into in 1979, before Wiegel. At that time, the prevailing rule was found in Odayat,
Mendoza and Aragon. The first marriage of private respondent being void for lack of
license and consent, there was no need for judicial declaration of its nullity before he
could contract a second marriage. In this case, therefore, we conclude that private
respondent’s second marriage to petitioner is valid.

Moreover, we find that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied
to the present case, for to do so would prejudice the vested rights of petitioner and of her
children. As held in Jison v. Court of Appeals, the Family Code has retroactive
25 

effect unless there be impairment of vested rights. In the present case, that impairment of

vested rights of petitioner and the children is patent. Additionally, we are not quite
prepared to give assent to the appellate court’s finding that despite private respondent’s
"deceit and perfidy" in contracting marriage with petitioner, he could benefit from her
silence on the issue. Thus, coming now to the civil effects of the church ceremony
wherein petitioner married private respondent using the marriage license used three
years earlier in the civil ceremony, we find that petitioner now has raised this matter
properly. Earlier petitioner claimed as untruthful private respondent’s allegation that he
wed petitioner but they lacked a marriage license. Indeed we find there was a marriage
license, though it was the same license issued on April 3, 1979 and used in both the civil
and the church rites. Obviously, the church ceremony was confirmatory of their civil
marriage. As petitioner contends, the appellate court erred when it refused to recognize
the validity and salutary effects of said canonical marriage on a technicality, i.e. that
petitioner had failed to raise this matter as affirmative defense during trial. She argues
that such failure does not prevent the appellate court from giving her defense due
consideration and weight. She adds that the interest of the State in protecting the
inviolability of marriage, as a legal and social institution, outweighs such technicality. In
our view, petitioner and private respondent had complied with all the essential and formal
requisites for a valid marriage, including the requirement of a valid license in the first of
the two ceremonies. That this license was used legally in the celebration of the civil
ceremony does not detract from the ceremonial use thereof in the church wedding of the
same parties to the marriage, for we hold that the latter rites served not only to ratify but
also to fortify the first. The appellate court might have its reasons for brushing aside this
possible defense of the defendant below which undoubtedly could have tendered a valid
issue, but which was not timely interposed by her before the trial court. But we are now
persuaded we cannot play blind to the absurdity, if not inequity, of letting the wrongdoer
profit from what the CA calls "his own deceit and perfidy."

On the matter of petitioner’s counterclaim for damages and attorney’s fees.  Although the
1âwphi1

appellate court admitted that they found private respondent acted "duplicitously and
craftily" in marrying petitioner, it did not award moral damages because the latter did not
adduce evidence to support her claim. 26

Like the lower courts, we are also of the view that no damages should be awarded in the
present case, but for another reason. Petitioner wants her marriage to private respondent
held valid and subsisting. She is suing to maintain her status as legitimate wife. In the
same breath, she asks for damages from her husband for filing a baseless complaint for
annulment of their marriage which caused her mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched
reputation, social humiliation and alienation from her parents. Should we grant her
prayer, we would have a situation where the husband pays the wife damages from
conjugal or common funds. To do so, would make the application of the law absurd.
Logic, if not common sense, militates against such incongruity. Moreover, our laws do not
comprehend an action for damages between husband and wife merely because of
breach of a marital obligation. There are other remedies.
27  28

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated July 24, 1996 and its Resolution dated November 7, 1996, are reversed partially,
so that the marriage of petitioner Ofelia P. Ty and private respondent Edgardo M. Reyes
is hereby DECLARED VALID AND SUBSISTING; and the award of the amount of
P15,000.00 is RATIFIED and MAINTAINED as monthly support to their two children,
Faye Eloise Reyes and Rachel Anne Reyes, for as long as they are of minor age or
otherwise legally entitled thereto. Costs against private respondent.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 164435               September 29, 2009

VICTORIA S. JARILLO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
praying that the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated July 21, 2003, and its
Resolution2 dated July 8, 2004, be reversed and set aside.

On May 31, 2000, petitioner was charged with Bigamy before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 117 under the following Information in Criminal Case No.
00-08-11:

INFORMATION

The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses VICTORIA S. JARILLO of the crime
of BIGAMY, committed as follows:

That on or about the 26th day of November 1979, in Pasay City, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
Victoria S. Jarillo, being previously united in lawful marriage with Rafael M. Alocillo, and
without the said marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy
which marriage was only discovered on January 12, 1999.

Contrary to law.

On July 14, 2000, petitioner pleaded not guilty during arraignment and, thereafter, trial
proceeded.

The undisputed facts, as accurately summarized by the CA, are as follows.

On May 24, 1974, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo were married in a civil wedding
ceremony solemnized by Hon. Monico C. Tanyag, then Municipal Mayor of Taguig, Rizal
(Exhs. A, A-1, H, H-1, H-2, O, O-1, pp. 20-21, TSN dated November 17, 2000).

On May 4, 1975, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo again celebrated marriage in a church
wedding ceremony before Rev. Angel Resultay in San Carlos City, Pangasinan (pp. 25-
26, TSN dated November 17, 2000). Out of the marital union, appellant begot a daughter,
Rachelle J. Alocillo on October 29, 1975 (Exhs. F, R, R-1).

Appellant Victoria Jarillo thereafter contracted a subsequent marriage with Emmanuel

Ebora Santos Uy, at the City Court of Pasay City, Branch 1, before then Hon. Judge
Nicanor Cruz on November 26, 1979 (Exhs. D, J, J-1, Q, Q-1, pp. 15-18, TSN dated
November 22, 2000).

On April 16, 1995, appellant and Emmanuel Uy exchanged marital vows anew in a
church wedding in Manila (Exh. E).

In 1999, Emmanuel Uy filed against the appellant Civil Case No. 99-93582 for annulment
of marriage before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.

Thereafter, appellant Jarillo was charged with bigamy before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City x x x.

xxxx

Parenthetically, accused-appellant filed against Alocillo, on October 5, 2000, before the

Regional Trial Court of Makati, Civil Case No. 00-1217, for declaration of nullity of their
marriage.

On July 9, 2001, the court a quo promulgated the assailed decision, the dispositive
portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing premises, this court hereby finds accused Victoria
Soriano Jarillo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of BIGAMY.

Accordingly, said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of SIX

(6) YEARS of prision correccional, as minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor, as
maximum.

This court makes no pronouncement on the civil aspect of this case, such as the nullity of
accused’s bigamous marriage to Uy and its effect on their children and their property.
This aspect is being determined by the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No.
99-93582.

Costs against the accused.

The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the same court in that assailed
Order dated 2 August 2001.3

For her defense, petitioner insisted that (1) her 1974 and 1975 marriages to Alocillo were
null and void because Alocillo was allegedly still married to a certain Loretta Tillman at
the time of the celebration of their marriage; (2) her marriages to both Alocillo and Uy
were null and void for lack of a valid marriage license; and (3) the action had prescribed,
since Uy knew about her marriage to Alocillo as far back as 1978.

On appeal to the CA, petitioner’s conviction was affirmed in toto. In its Decision dated
July 21, 2003, the CA held that petitioner committed bigamy when she contracted
marriage with Emmanuel Santos Uy because, at that time, her marriage to Rafael Alocillo
had not yet been declared null and void by the court. This being so, the presumption is,
her previous marriage to Alocillo was still existing at the time of her marriage to Uy. The
CA also struck down, for lack of sufficient evidence, petitioner’s contentions that her
marriages were celebrated without a marriage license, and that Uy had notice of her
previous marriage as far back as 1978.

In the meantime, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 140, rendered a Decision dated March
28, 2003, declaring petitioner’s 1974 and 1975 marriages to Alocillo null and void ab initio
on the ground of Alocillo’s psychological incapacity. Said decision became final and
executory on July 9, 2003. In her motion for reconsideration, petitioner invoked said
declaration of nullity as a ground for the reversal of her conviction. However, in its
Resolution dated July 8, 2004, the CA, citing Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, 4 denied
reconsideration and ruled that "[t]he subsequent declaration of nullity of her first marriage
on the ground of psychological incapacity, while it retroacts to the date of the celebration
of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, the said
marriage is not without legal consequences, among which is incurring criminal liability for
bigamy."5

Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
where petitioner alleges that:

V.1. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN

PROCEEDING WITH THE CASE DESPITE THE PENDENCY OF A
CASE WHICH IS PREJUDICIAL TO THE OUTCOME OF THIS CASE.

V.2. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN

AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION OF PETITIONER FOR THE CRIME OF
BIGAMY DESPITE THE SUPERVENING PROOF THAT THE FIRST
TWO MARRIAGES OF PETITIONER TO ALOCILLO HAD BEEN
DECLARED BY FINAL JUDGMENT NULL AND VOID AB INITIO.

V.3. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN

NOT CONSIDERING THAT THERE IS A PENDING ANNULMENT OF
MARRIAGE AT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BRANCH 38 BETWEEN
EMMANUEL SANTOS AND VICTORIA S. JARILLO.

V.4. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN

NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE INSTANT CASE OF BIGAMY HAD
ALREADY PRESCRIBED.

V.5. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN

NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE MARRIAGE OF VICTORIA JARILLO
AND EMMANUEL SANTOS UY HAS NO VALID MARRIAGE LICENSE.

V.6. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN

NOT ACQUITTING THE PETITIONER BUT IMPOSED AN ERRONEOUS
PENALTY UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE AND THE
INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW.

The first, second, third and fifth issues, being closely related, shall be discussed jointly. It
is true that right after the presentation of the prosecution evidence, petitioner moved for
suspension of the proceedings on the ground of the pendency of the petition for
declaration of nullity of petitioner’s marriages to Alocillo, which, petitioner claimed
involved a prejudicial question. In her appeal, she also asserted that the petition for
declaration of nullity of her marriage to Uy, initiated by the latter, was a ground for
suspension of the proceedings. The RTC denied her motion for suspension, while the CA
struck down her arguments. In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, 6 the Court categorically stated
that:

x x x as ruled in Landicho v. Relova, he who contracts a second marriage before the

judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
bigamy, and in such a case the criminal case may not be suspended on the ground of the
pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity. x x x
xxxx

x x x The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is
presumed to be subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and
purposes regarded as a married man at the time he contracted his second marriage with
petitioner. Against this legal backdrop, any decision in the civil action for nullity would not
erase the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of
a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of
the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question. x x x7

The foregoing ruling had been reiterated in Abunado v. People, 8 where it was held thus:

The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial
because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated.
Moreover, petitioner’s assertion would only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases
considering that an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage
void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case.
We cannot allow that.

The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to [private
complainant] had no bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in
the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to
prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is
contracted.

Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed
valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner
eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is,
both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was
annulled.9

For the very same reasons elucidated in the above-quoted cases, petitioner’s conviction
of the crime of bigamy must be affirmed. The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of
petitioner’s two marriages to Alocillo cannot be considered a valid defense in the crime of
bigamy. The moment petitioner contracted a second marriage without the previous one
having been judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was already
consummated because at the time of the celebration of the second marriage, petitioner’s
marriage to Alocillo, which had not yet been declared null and void by a court of
competent jurisdiction, was deemed valid and subsisting. Neither would a judicial
declaration of the nullity of petitioner’s marriage to Uy make any difference. 10 As held in
Tenebro, "[s]ince a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is
automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the
avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. x x x A plain reading of [Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code], therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act
of contracting a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid
marriage."11

Petitioner’s defense of prescription is likewise doomed to fail.

Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, bigamy is punishable by prision mayor,
which is classified under Article 25 of said Code as an afflictive penalty. Article 90 thereof
provides that "[c]rimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe in fifteen
years," while Article 91 states that "[t]he period of prescription shall commence to run
from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or
their agents x x x ."
Petitioner asserts that Uy had known of her previous marriage as far back as 1978;
hence, prescription began to run from that time. Note that the party who raises a fact as a
matter of defense has the burden of proving it. The defendant or accused is obliged to
produce evidence in support of its defense; otherwise, failing to establish the same, it
remains self-serving.12 Thus, for petitioner’s defense of prescription to prosper, it was
incumbent upon her to adduce evidence that as early as the year 1978, Uy already
obtained knowledge of her previous marriage.

A close examination of the records of the case reveals that petitioner utterly failed to
present sufficient evidence to support her allegation. Petitioner’s testimony that her own
mother told Uy in 1978 that she (petitioner) is already married to Alocillo does not inspire
belief, as it is totally unsupported by any corroborating evidence. The trial court correctly
observed that:

x x x She did not call to the witness stand her mother – the person who allegedly actually
told Uy about her previous marriage to Alocillo. It must be obvious that without the
confirmatory testimony of her mother, the attribution of the latter of any act which she
allegedly did is hearsay.13

As ruled in Sermonia v. Court of Appeals, 14 "the prescriptive period for the crime of
bigamy should be counted only from the day on which the said crime was discovered by
the offended party, the authorities or their [agents]," as opposed to being counted from
the date of registration of the bigamous marriage. 15 Since petitioner failed to prove with
certainty that the period of prescription began to run as of 1978, her defense is, therefore,
ineffectual.
1avvphi1

Finally, petitioner avers that the RTC and the CA imposed an erroneous penalty under
the Revised Penal Code. Again, petitioner is mistaken.

The Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that the accused shall be sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the
attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the Revised Penal Code, and
the minimum of which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower than that
prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first considering any modifying
circumstance attendant to the commission of the crime. The Indeterminate Sentence Law
leaves it entirely within the sound discretion of the court to determine the minimum
penalty, as long as it is anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower without any
reference to the periods into which it might be subdivided. The modifying circumstances
are considered only in the imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate
sentence.16

Applying the foregoing rule, it is clear that the penalty imposed on petitioner is proper.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty for bigamy is prision
mayor. The penalty next lower is prision correccional, which ranges from 6 months and 1
day to 6 years. The minimum penalty of six years imposed by the trial court is, therefore,
correct as it is still within the duration of prision correccional. There being no mitigating or
aggravating circumstances proven in this case, the prescribed penalty of prision mayor
should be imposed in its medium period, which is from 8 years and 1 day to 10 years.
Again, the trial court correctly imposed a maximum penalty of 10 years.

However, for humanitarian purposes, and considering that petitioner’s marriage to

Alocillo has after all been declared by final judgment 17 to be void ab initio on account of
the latter’s psychological incapacity, by reason of which, petitioner was subjected to
manipulative abuse, the Court deems it proper to reduce the penalty imposed by the
lower courts. Thus, petitioner should be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment from Two (2) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated July 21, 2003, and its Resolution dated July 8, 2004 are hereby
MODIFIED as to the penalty imposed, but AFFIRMED in all other respects. Petitioner is
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from Two (2) years, Four
(4) months and One (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to Eight (8) years and
One (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Third Division, Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 181089               October 22, 2012

MERLINDA CIPRIANO MONTAÑES, Complainant,

vs.
LOURDES TAJOLOSA CIPRIANO, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

For our resolution is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to annul the Order 1 

dated September 24, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Pedro, Laguna,
Branch 31, issued in Criminal Case No. 4990-SPL which dismissed the lnformation for
Bigamy filed against respondent Lourdes Tajolosa Cipriano. Also assailed is the RTC
Resolution dated January 2, 2008 denying the motion for reconsideration.
2 

On April 8, 1976, respondent married Socrates Flores (Socrates) in Lezo, Aklan. On 3 

January 24, 1983, during the subsistence of the said marriage, respondent married
Silverio V. Cipriano (Silverio) in San Pedro, Laguna. In 2001, respondent filed with the
4 

RTC of Muntinlupa, Branch

256, a Petition for the Annulment of her marriage with Socrates on the ground of the
latter’s psychological incapacity as defined under Article 36 of the Family Code, which
was docketed as Civil Case No. 01-204. On July 18, 2003, the RTC of Muntinlupa,
Branch 256, rendered an Amended Decision declaring the marriage of respondent with
5 

Socrates null and void. Said decision became final and executory on October 13, 2003. 6

On May 14, 2004, petitioner Merlinda Cipriano Montañez, Silverio’s daughter from the
first marriage, filed with the Municipal Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, a Complaint for
7 

Bigamy against respondent, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 41972. Attached
to the complaint was an Affidavit (Malayang Sinumpaang Salaysay) dated August 23,
8 

2004, thumb-marked and signed by Silverio, which alleged, among others, that
9 

respondent failed to reveal to Silverio that she was still married to Socrates. On
November 17, 2004, an Information for Bigamy was filed against respondent with the
10 

RTC of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No.
4990-SPL. The Information reads:

That on or about January 24, 1983, in the Municipality of San Pedro, Province of Laguna,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second or subsequent marriage
with one SILVERIO CIPRIANO VINALON while her first marriage with SOCRATES
FLORES has not been judicially dissolved by proper judicial authorities.11

On July 24, 2007 and before her arraignment, respondent, through counsel, filed a
Motion to Quash Information (and Dismissal of the Criminal Complaint) alleging that her
12 

marriage with Socrates had already been declared void ab initio in 2003, thus, there was
no more marriage to speak of prior to her marriage to Silverio on January 24, 1983; that
the basic element of the crime of bigamy, i.e., two valid marriages, is therefore wanting.
She also claimed that since the second marriage was held in 1983, the crime of bigamy
had already prescribed. The prosecution filed its Comment arguing that the crime of
13 

bigamy had already been consummated when respondent filed her petition for
declaration of nullity; that the law punishes the act of contracting a second marriage
which appears to be valid, while the first marriage is still subsisting and has not yet been
annulled or declared void by the court.

In its Order dated August 3, 2007, the RTC denied the motion. It found respondent's
14 

argument that with the declaration of nullity of her first marriage, there was no more first
marriage to speak of and thus the element of two valid marriages in bigamy was absent,
to have been laid to rest by our ruling in Mercado v. Tan where we held:
15 

In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although there was yet no
judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to have
the first marriage declared void only after complainant had filed a letter-complaint
charging him with bigamy. For contracting a second marriage while the first is still
subsisting, he committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code.

That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage
was immaterial. To repeat, the crime had already been consummated by then. x x x 16

As to respondent's claim that the action had already prescribed, the RTC found that while
the second marriage indeed took place in 1983, or more than the 15-year prescriptive
period for the crime of bigamy, the commission of the crime was only discovered on
November 17, 2004, which should be the reckoning period, hence, prescription has not
yet set in.

Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration claiming that the Mercado ruling was not
17 

applicable, since respondent contracted her first marriage in 1976, i.e., before the Family
Code; that the petition for annulment was granted and became final before the criminal
complaint for bigamy was filed; and, that Article 40 of the Family Code cannot be given
any retroactive effect because this will impair her right to remarry without need of
securing a declaration of nullity of a completely void prior marriage.

On September 24, 2007, the RTC issued its assailed Order, the dispositive portion of
18 

which reads:

Wherefore, the Order of August 3, 2007 is reconsidered and set aside. Let a new one be
entered quashing the information. Accordingly, let the instant case be DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

In so ruling, the RTC said that at the time the accused had contracted a second marriage
on January 24, 1983, i.e., before the effectivity of the Family Code, the existing law did
not require a judicial declaration of absolute nullity as a condition precedent to
contracting a subsequent marriage; that jurisprudence before the Family Code was
ambivalent on the issue of the need of prior judicial declaration of absolute nullity of the
first marriage. The RTC found that both marriages of respondent took place before the
effectivity of the Family Code, thus, considering the unsettled state of jurisprudence on
the need for a prior declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before commencing a
second marriage and the principle that laws should be interpreted liberally in favor of the
accused, it declared that the absence of a judicial declaration of nullity should not
prejudice the accused whose second marriage was declared once and for all valid with
the annulment of her first marriage by the RTC of Muntinlupa City in 2003.
Dissatisfied, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by the prosecution, but opposed by
respondent. In a Resolution dated January 2, 2008, the RTC denied the same ruling,
among others, that the judicial declaration of nullity of respondent's marriage is
tantamount to a mere declaration or confirmation that said marriage never existed at all,
and for this reason, her act in contracting a second marriage cannot be considered
criminal.

Aggrieved, petitioner directly filed the present petition with us raising the following issues:

I. Whether the judicial nullity of a first marriage prior to the enactment of the Family Code
and the pronouncement in Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy on the ground of psychological
incapacity is a valid defense for a charge of bigamy for entering into a second marriage
prior to the enactment of the Family Code and the pronouncement in Wiegel vs. Sempio-
Diy?

II. Whether the trial court erred in stating that the jurisprudence prior to the enactment of
the Family Code and the pronouncement in Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy regarding the
necessity of securing a declaration of nullity of the first marriage before entering a second
marriage ambivalent, such that a person was allowed to enter a subsequent marriage
without the annulment of the first without incurring criminal liability.
19

Preliminarily, we note that the instant petition assailing the RTC's dismissal of the
Information for bigamy was filed by private complainant and not by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) which should represent the government in all judicial
proceedings filed before us. 20

Notwithstanding, we will give due course to this petition as we had done in the past. In
Antone v. Beronilla, the offended party (private complainant) questioned before the
21 

Court of Appeals (CA) the RTC's dismissal of the Information for bigamy filed against her
husband, and the CA dismissed the petition on the ground, among others, that the
petition should have been filed in behalf of the People of the Philippines by the OSG,
being its statutory counsel in all appealed criminal cases. In a petition filed with us, we
said that we had given due course to a number of actions even when the respective
interests of the government were not properly represented by the OSG and said:

In Labaro v. Panay, this Court dealt with a similar defect in the following manner:

It must, however, be stressed that if the public prosecution is aggrieved by any order
ruling of the trial judge in a criminal case, the OSG, and not the prosecutor, must be the
one to question the order or ruling before us. x x x

Nevertheless, since the challenged order affects the interest of the State or the plaintiff
People of the Philippines, we opted not to dismiss the petition on this technical ground.
Instead, we required the OSG to comment on the petition, as we had done before in
some cases. In light of its Comment, we rule that the OSG has ratified and adopted as its
own the instant petition for the People of the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied) 22

Considering that we also required the OSG to file a Comment on the petition, which it did,
praying that the petition be granted in effect, such Comment had ratified the petition filed
with us.

As to the merit of the petition, the issue for resolution is whether or not the RTC erred in
quashing the Information for bigamy filed against respondent.

Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes bigamy as follow:
Art. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who
shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been
legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by
means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.

The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally married; (b)
the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the
absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (c) that he
contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (d) the second or subsequent marriage
has all the essential requisites for validity. The felony is consummated on the celebration
of the second marriage or subsequent marriage. It is essential in the prosecution for
23 

bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be
valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage.
24

In this case, it appears that when respondent contracted a second marriage with Silverio
in 1983, her first marriage with Socrates celebrated in 1976 was still subsisting as the
same had not yet been annulled or declared void by a competent authority. Thus, all the
elements of bigamy were alleged in the Information. In her Motion to Quash the
Information, she alleged, among others, that:

xxxx

2. The records of this case would bear out that accused's marriage with said Socrates
Flores was declared void ab initio on 14 April 2003 by Branch 256 of the Regional Trial
Court of Muntinlupa City. The said decision was never appealed, and became final and
executory shortly thereafter.

3. In other words, before the filing of the Information in this case, her marriage with Mr.
Flores had already been declared void from the beginning.

4. There was therefore no marriage prior to 24 January 1983 to speak of. In other words,
there was only one marriage.

5. The basic element of the crime of bigamy, that is, two valid marriages, is therefore
wanting.25

Clearly, the annulment of respondent's first marriage on the ground of psychological

incapacity was declared only in 2003. The question now is whether the declaration of
nullity of respondent's first marriage justifies the dismissal of the Information for bigamy
filed against her.

We rule in the negative.

In Mercado v. Tan, we ruled that the subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the
26 

first marriage was immaterial, because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime of
bigamy had already been consummated. And by contracting a second marriage while the
first was still subsisting, the accused committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of
the Revised Penal Code.

In Abunado v. People, we held that what is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper
27 

is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted. 28 

Even if the accused eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab
initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first
marriage was annulled. 29
In Tenebro v. CA, we declared that although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a
30 

marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the

celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, it
is significant to note that said marriage is not without legal effects. Among these effects is
that children conceived or born before the judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage
shall be considered legitimate. There is, therefore, a recognition written into the law itself
that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences.
Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold
otherwise would render the State’s penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow
individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner,
and to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling
throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment. 31

And in Jarillo v. People, applying the foregoing jurisprudence, we affirmed the accused's
32 

conviction for bigamy, ruling that the moment the accused contracted a second marriage
without the previous one having been judicially declared null and void, the crime of
bigamy was already consummated because at the time of the celebration of the second
marriage, the accused’s first marriage which had not yet been declared null and void by a
court of competent jurisdiction was deemed valid and subsisting.

Here, at the time respondent contracted the second marriage, the first marriage was still
subsisting as it had not yet been legally dissolved. As ruled in the above-mentioned
jurisprudence, the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage would not
change the fact that she contracted the second marriage during the subsistence of the
first marriage. Thus, respondent was properly charged of the crime of bigamy, since the
essential elements of the offense charged were sufficiently alleged.

Respondent claims that Tenebro v. CA is not applicable, since the declaration of nullity
33 

of the previous marriage came after the filing of the Information, unlike in this case where
the declaration was rendered before the information was filed. We do not agree. What
makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.

Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the
same must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of
the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such
declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a
34 

second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the
risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. 35

Anent respondent's contention in her Comment that since her two marriages were
contracted prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, Article 40 of the Family Code cannot
be given retroactive effect because this will impair her right to remarry without need of
securing a judicial declaration of nullity of a completely void marriage.

We are not persuaded.

In Jarillo v. People, where the accused, in her motion for reconsideration, argued that
36 

since her marriages were entered into before the effectivity of the Family Code, then the
applicable law is Section 29 of the Marriage Law (Act 3613), instead of Article 40 of the
37 

Family Code, which requires a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void before
a person may contract a subsequent marriage. We did not find the argument meritorious
and said:

As far back as 1995, in Atienza v. Brillantes, Jr., the Court already made the declaration
that Article 40, which is a rule of procedure, should be applied retroactively because
Article 256 of the Family Code itself provides that said "Code shall have retroactive effect
insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights." The Court went on to
explain, thus:

The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not
preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of
procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely
affected. The reason is that as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise
from, procedural laws. 1âwphi1

In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, the Court pointed out the danger of not enforcing the
provisions of Article 40 of the Family Code, to wit:

In the case at bar, respondent’s clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration nullity of his
first marriage and thereafter to invoke that very same judgment to prevent his
prosecution for bigamy. He cannot have his cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an
adventurous bigamist has to do is disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract a
subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first
marriage is void and that the subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior
judicial declaration of nullity of the first. A party may even enter into a marriage license
and thereafter contract a subsequent marriage without obtaining a declaration of nullity of
the first on the assumption that the first marriage is void. Such scenario would render
nugatory the provision on bigamy. 38

WHEREFORE, considering the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The Order dated
September 24, 2007 and the Resolution dated January 2, 2008 of the Regional Trial
Court of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31, issued in Criminal Case No. 4990-SPL, are
hereby SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 4990-SPL is ordered REMANDED to the trial
court for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PERSBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
ROBERTO A. ABAD
CASTRO *

Associate Justice
Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's
Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
 THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 137110               August 1, 2000

VINCENT PAUL G. MERCADO a.k.a. VINCENT G. MERCADO, petitioner,

vs.
CONSUELO TAN, respondent.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent

one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first
obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the
earlier union is characterized by statute as "void."

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the July 14, 1998 Decision of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CR No. 19830 and its January 4, 1999 Resolution
1 

denying reconsideration. The assailed Decision affirmed the ruling of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Bacolod City in Criminal Case No. 13848, which convicted herein
petitioner of bigamy as follows:

"WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of accused Dr. Vincent Paul G. Mercado a.k.a. Dr.
Vincent G. Mercado of the crime of Bigamy punishable under Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code to have been proven beyond reasonable doubt, [the court hereby renders]
judgment imposing upon him a prison term of three (3) years, four (4) months and fifteen
(15) days of prision correccional, as minimum of his indeterminate sentence, to eight (8)
years and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor, as maximum, plus accessory penalties
provided by law.

Costs against accused." 2

The Facts

The facts are quoted by Court of Appeals (CA) from the trial court’s judgment, as follows:
"From the evidence adduced by the parties, there is no dispute that accused Dr. Vincent
Mercado and complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan got married on June 27, 1991 before
MTCC-Bacolod City Br. 7 Judge Gorgonio J. Ibañez [by reason of] which a Marriage
Contract was duly executed and signed by the parties. As entered in said document, the
status of accused was ‘single’. There is no dispute either that at the time of the
celebration of the wedding with complainant, accused was actually a married man,
having been in lawful wedlock with Ma. Thelma Oliva in a marriage ceremony solemnized
on April 10, 1976 by Judge Leonardo B. Cañares, CFI-Br. XIV, Cebu City per Marriage
Certificate issued in connection therewith, which matrimony was further blessed by Rev.
Father Arthur Baur on October 10, 1976 in religious rites at the Sacred Heart Church,
Cebu City. In the same manner, the civil marriage between accused and complainant
was confirmed in a church ceremony on June 29, 1991 officiated by Msgr. Victorino A.
Rivas, Judicial Vicar, Diocese of Bacolod City. Both marriages were consummated when
out of the first consortium, Ma. Thelma Oliva bore accused two children, while a child,
Vincent Paul, Jr. was sired by accused with complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan.

"On October 5, 1992, a letter-complaint for bigamy was filed by complainant through
counsel with the City Prosecutor of Bacolod City, which eventually resulted [in] the
institution of the present case before this Court against said accused, Dr. Vincent G.
Mercado, on March 1, 1993 in an Information dated January 22, 1993.

"On November 13, 1992, or more than a month after the bigamy case was lodged in the
Prosecutor’s Office, accused filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against
Ma. Thelma V. Oliva in RTC-Br. 22, Cebu City, and in a Decision dated May 6, 1993 the
marriage between Vincent G. Mercado and Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was declared null and
void.

"Accused is charged [with] bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code for
having contracted a second marriage with herein complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan on June
27, 1991 when at that time he was previously united in lawful marriage with Ma. Thelma
V. Oliva on April 10, 1976 at Cebu City, without said first marriage having been legally
dissolved. As shown by the evidence and admitted by accused, all the essential elements
of the crime are present, namely: (a) that the offender has been previously legally
married; (2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or in case the spouse is
absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
(3) that he contract[ed] a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or
subsequent marriage ha[d] all the essential requisites for validity. x x x

"While acknowledging the existence of the two marriage[s], accused posited the defense
that his previous marriage ha[d] been judicially declared null and void and that the private
complainant had knowledge of the first marriage of accused.

"It is an admitted fact that when the second marriage was entered into with Ma. Consuelo
Tan on June 27, 1991, accused’s prior marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was
subsisting, no judicial action having yet been initiated or any judicial declaration obtained
as to the nullity of such prior marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva. Since no declaration of
the nullity of his first marriage ha[d] yet been made at the time of his second marriage, it
is clear that accused was a married man when he contracted such second marriage with
complainant on June 27, 1991. He was still at the time validly married to his first wife."
3

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Agreeing with the lower court, the Court of Appeals stated:

"Under Article 40 of the Family Code, ‘the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void.’ But here, the final judgment declaring null and void accused’s
previous marriage came not before the celebration of the second marriage, but after,
when the case for bigamy against accused was already tried in court. And what
constitutes the crime of bigamy is the act of any person who shall contract a second
subsequent marriage ‘before’ the former marriage has been legally dissolved." 4

Hence, this Petition. 5

The Issues
In his Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues:

"A

Whether or not the element of previous legal marriage is present in order to convict
petitioner.

"B

Whether or not a liberal interpretation in favor of petitioner of Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code punishing bigamy, in relation to Articles 36 and 40 of the Family Code,
negates the guilt of petitioner.

"C

Whether or not petitioner is entitled to an acquittal on the basis of reasonable doubt." 6

The Court’s Ruling

The Petition is not meritorious.

Main Issue:Effect of Nullity of Previous Marriage

Petitioner was convicted of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which
provides:

"The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a
second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved,
or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings."

The elements of this crime are as follows:

"1. That the offender has been legally married;

2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;

3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage;

4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity." 7

When the Information was filed on January 22, 1993, all the elements of bigamy were
present. It is undisputed that petitioner married Thelma G. Oliva on April 10, 1976 in
Cebu City. While that marriage was still subsisting, he contracted a second marriage, this
time with Respondent Ma. Consuelo Tan who subsequently filed the Complaint for
bigamy.

Petitioner contends, however, that he obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, thereby rendering it void ab initio. Unlike
voidable marriages which are considered valid until set aside by a competent court, he
argues that a void marriage is deemed never to have taken place at all. Thus, he 8 

concludes that there is no first marriage to speak of. Petitioner also quotes the
commentaries of former Justice Luis Reyes that "it is now settled that if the first marriage
9 
is void from the beginning, it is a defense in a bigamy charge. But if the first marriage is
voidable, it is not a defense."

Respondent, on the other hand, admits that the first marriage was declared null and void
under Article 36 of the Family Code, but she points out that that declaration came
only after the Information had been filed. Hence, by then, the crime had already been
consummated. She argues that a judicial declaration of nullity of a void previous marriage
must be obtained before a person can marry for a subsequent time.

We agree with the respondent.

To be sure, jurisprudence regarding the need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the
previous marriage has been characterized as "conflicting." In People v. Mendoza, a
10  11 

bigamy case involving an accused who married three times, the Court ruled that there
was no need for such declaration. In that case, the accused contracted a second
marriage during the subsistence of the first. When the first wife died, he married for the
third time. The second wife then charged him with bigamy. Acquitting him, the Court held
that the second marriage was void ab initio because it had been contracted while the first
marriage was still in effect. Since the second marriage was obviously void and illegal, the
Court ruled that there was no need for a judicial declaration of its nullity. Hence, the
accused did not commit bigamy when he married for the third time. This ruling was
affirmed by the Court in People v. Aragon, which involved substantially the same facts.
12 

But in subsequent cases, the Court impressed the need for a judicial declaration of
nullity. In Vda de Consuegra v. GSIS, Jose Consuegra married for the second time while
13 

the first marriage was still subsisting. Upon his death, the Court awarded one half of the
proceeds of his retirement benefits to the first wife and the other half to the second wife
and her children, notwithstanding the manifest nullity of the second marriage. It held:
"And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observes that although the
second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first
marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity."

In Tolentino v. Paras, however, the Court again held that judicial declaration of nullity of
14 

a void marriage was not necessary. In that case, a man married twice. In his Death
Certificate, his second wife was named as his surviving spouse. The first wife then filed a
Petition to correct the said entry in the Death Certificate. The Court ruled in favor of the
first wife, holding that "the second marriage that he contracted with private respondent
during the lifetime of the first spouse is null and void from the beginning and of no force
and effect. No judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void marriage."

In Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, the Court stressed the need for such declaration. In that case,
15 

Karl Heinz Wiegel filed an action for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lilia Olivia
Wiegel on the ground that the latter had a prior existing marriage. After pretrial, Lilia
asked that she be allowed to present evidence to prove, among others, that her first
husband had previously been married to another woman. In holding that there was no
need for such evidence, the Court ruled: "x x x There is likewise no need of introducing
evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time they married
each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs, according to this Court, a
judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be
regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent
Karl Heinz Wiegel; x x x."

Subsequently, in Yap v. CA, the Court reverted to the ruling in People v. Mendoza,
16 

holding that there was no need for such declaration of nullity.

In Domingo v. CA, the issue raised was whether a judicial declaration of nullity was still
17 

necessary for the recovery and the separation of properties of erstwhile spouses. Ruling
in the affirmative, the Court declared: "The Family Code has settled once and for all the
conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage
is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense; in fact, the
requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of
the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With
the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who marries
again cannot be charged with bigamy." 18

Unlike Mendoza and Aragon, Domingo as well as the other cases herein cited was not a

criminal prosecution for bigamy. Nonetheless, Domingo underscored the need for a
judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage on the basis of a new provision of the
Family Code, which came into effect several years after the promulgation
of Mendoza and Aragon.

In Mendoza and Aragon, the Court relied on Section 29 of Act No. 3613 (Marriage Law),
which provided:

"Illegal marriages. — Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the
lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:

(a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;

(b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the
second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or
the absentee being generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse
present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, the marriage as contracted
being valid in either case until declared null and void by a competent court."

The Court held in those two cases that the said provision "plainly makes a subsequent
marriage contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void
from its performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity, as
distinguished from mere annulable marriages." 19

The provision appeared in substantially the same form under Article 83 of the 1950 Civil
Code and Article 41 of the Family Code. However, Article 40 of the Family Code, a new
provision, expressly requires a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage, as
follows:

"ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such marriage void."

In view of this provision, Domingo stressed that a final judgment declaring such marriage

void was necessary. Verily, the Family Code and Domingo affirm the earlier ruling
in Wiegel. Thus, a Civil Law authority and member of the Civil Code Revision Commitee
has observed:

"[Article 40] is also in line with the recent decisions of the Supreme Court that the
marriage of a person may be null and void but there is need of a judicial declaration of
such fact before that person can marry again; otherwise, the second marriage will also be
void (Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, Aug. 19/86, 143 SCRA 499, Vda. De Consuegra v. GSIS, 37
SCRA 315). This provision changes the old rule that where a marriage is illegal and void
from its performance, no judicial decree is necessary to establish its validity (People v.
Mendoza, 95 Phil. 843; People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033)." 20
In this light, the statutory mooring of the ruling in Mendoza and Aragon – that there is no
need for a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage -- has been cast aside by
Article 40 of the Family Code. Such declaration is now necessary before one can
contract a second marriage. Absent that declaration, we hold that one may be charged
with and convicted of bigamy.

The present ruling is consistent with our pronouncement in Terre v. Terre, which 21 

involved an administrative Complaint against a lawyer for marrying twice. In rejecting the
lawyer’s argument that he was free to enter into a second marriage because the first one
was void ab initio, the Court ruled: "for purposes of determining whether a person is
legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage
was null and void ab initio is essential." The Court further noted that the said rule was
"cast into statutory form by Article 40 of the Family Code." Significantly, it observed that
the second marriage, contracted without a judicial declaration that the first marriage was
void, was "bigamous and criminal in character."

Moreover, Justice Reyes, an authority in Criminal Law whose earlier work was cited by
petitioner, changed his view on the subject in view of Article 40 of the Family Code and
wrote in 1993 that a person must first obtain a judicial declaration of the nullity of a void
marriage before contracting a subsequent marriage: 22

"It is now settled that the fact that the first marriage is void from the beginning is not a
defense in a bigamy charge. As with a voidable marriage, there must be a judicial
declaration of the nullity of a marriage before contracting the second marriage. Article 40
of the Family Code states that x x x. The Code Commission believes that the parties to a
marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void, even if such is the
fact, but must first secure a judicial declaration of nullity of their marriage before they
should be allowed to marry again. x x x."

In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although there was yet no
judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to have
the first marriage declared void only after complainant had filed a letter-complaint
charging him with bigamy. By contracting a second marriage while the first was still
subsisting, he committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code.

That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage
was immaterial. To repeat, the crime had already been consummated by then. Moreover,
his view effectively encourages delay in the prosecution of bigamy cases; an accused
could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency
of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.

Under the circumstances of the present case, he is guilty of the charge against him.

Damages

In her Memorandum, respondent prays that the Court set aside the ruling of the Court of
Appeals insofar as it denied her claim of damages and attorney’s fees. 23

Her prayer has no merit. She did not appeal the ruling of the CA against her; hence, she
cannot obtain affirmative relief from this Court. In any event, we find no reason to
24 

reverse or set aside the pertinent ruling of the CA on this point, which we quote
hereunder:

"We are convinced from the totality of the evidence presented in this case that Consuelo
Tan is not the innocent victim that she claims to be; she was well aware of the existence
of the previous marriage when she contracted matrimony with Dr. Mercado. The
testimonies of the defense witnesses prove this, and we find no reason to doubt said
testimonies.

x x x           x x x          x x x

"Indeed, the claim of Consuelo Tan that she was not aware of his previous marriage does
not inspire belief, especially as she had seen that Dr. Mercado had two (2) children with
him. We are convinced that she took the plunge anyway, relying on the fact that the first
wife would no longer return to Dr. Mercado, she being by then already living with another
man.

"Consuelo Tan can therefore not claim damages in this case where she was fully
conscious of the consequences of her act. She should have known that she would suffer
humiliation in the event the truth [would] come out, as it did in this case, ironically
because of her personal instigation. If there are indeed damages caused to her
reputation, they are of her own willful making." 25

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs

against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, (Chairman), Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

Vitug, J., see concurring and dissenting opinion.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 138509             July 31, 2000

IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS, petitioner,
vs.
ISAGANI D. BOBIS, respondent.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

On October 21, 1985, respondent contracted a first marriage with one Maria Dulce B.
Javier. Without said marriage having been annulled, nullified or terminated, the same
respondent contracted a second marriage with petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis on
January 25, 1996 and allegedly a third marriage with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez.
Based on petitioner's complaint-affidavit, an information for bigamy was filed against
respondent on February 25, 1998, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q98-75611
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 226, Quezon City. Sometime thereafter, respondent
initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage on
the ground that it was celebrated without a marriage license. Respondent then filed a
motion to suspend the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy invoking the pending
civil case for nullity of the first marriage as a prejudicial question to the criminal case. The
trial judge granted the motion to suspend the criminal case in an Order dated December
29, 1998.1 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner argues that respondent should
have first obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage before entering into
the second marriage, inasmuch as the alleged prejudicial question justifying suspension
of the bigamy case is no longer a legal truism pursuant to Article 40 of the Family Code. 2

The issue to be resolved in this petition is whether the subsequent filing of a civil action
for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a
criminal case for bigamy.

A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved therein. It is a question based on a fact distinct and
3 

separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or
innocence of the accused. It must appear not only that the civil case involves facts upon
4 

which the criminal action is based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in the
civil action would necessarily be determinative of the criminal case. Consequently, the
5 

defense must involve an issue similar or intimately related to the same issue raised in the
criminal action and its resolution determinative of whether or not the latter action may
proceed. Its two essential elements are:
6  7

(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
criminal action; and

(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.

A prejudicial question does not conclusively resolve the guilt or innocence of the accused
but simply tests the sufficiency of the allegations in the information in order to sustain the
further prosecution of the criminal case. A party who raises a prejudicial question is
deemed to have hypothetically admitted that all the essential elements of a crime have
been adequately alleged in the information, considering that the prosecution has not yet
presented a single evidence on the indictment or may not yet have rested its case. A
challenge of the allegations in the information on the ground of prejudicial question is in
effect a question on the merits of the criminal charge through a non-criminal suit.

Article 40 of the Family Code, which was effective at the time of celebration of the second
marriage, requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage before a
party may remarry. The clear implication of this is that it is not for the parties, particularly
the accused, to determine the validity or invalidity of the marriage. Whether or not the
8 

first marriage was void for lack of a license is a matter of defense because there is still no
judicial declaration of its nullity at the time the second marriage was contracted. It should
be remembered that bigamy can successfully be prosecuted provided all its elements
concur – two of which are a previous marriage and a subsequent marriage which would
have been valid had it not been for the existence at the material time of the first
marriage. 9

In the case at bar, respondent's clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of
his first marriage and thereafter to invoke that very same judgment to prevent his
prosecution for bigamy. He cannot have his cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an
adventurous bigamist has to do is to disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract a
subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first
marriage is void and that the subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior
judicial declaration of nullity of the first. A party may even enter into a marriage aware of
the absence of a requisite - usually the marriage license - and thereafter contract a
subsequent marriage without obtaining a declaration of nullity of the first on the
assumption that the first marriage is void. Such scenario would render nugatory the
provisions on bigamy. As succinctly held in Landicho v. Relova: 10

(P)arties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only
competent courts having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of
the first marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a second marriage then
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.

Respondent alleges that the first marriage in the case before us was void for lack of a
marriage license. Petitioner, on the other hand, argues that her marriage to respondent
was exempt from the requirement of a marriage license. More specifically, petitioner
claims that prior to their marriage, they had already attained the age of majority and had
been living together as husband and wife for at least five years. The issue in this case is
11 

limited to the existence of a prejudicial question, and we are not called upon to resolve
the validity of the first marriage. Be that as it may, suffice it to state that the Civil Code,
under which the first marriage was celebrated, provides that "every intendment of law or
fact leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds." [] 12 

Hence, parties should not be permitted to judge for themselves the nullity of their
marriage, for the same must be submitted to the determination of competent courts. Only
when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as
there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. No matter how
13 

obvious, manifest or patent the absence of an element is, the intervention of the courts
must always be resorted to. That is why Article 40 of the Family Code requires a "final
judgment," which only the courts can render. Thus, as ruled in Landicho v. Relova, he 14 

who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the
criminal case may not be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil case for
declaration of nullity. In a recent case for concubinage, we held that the pendency of a
civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage is not a prejudicial question. This ruling
15 

applies here by analogy since both crimes presuppose the subsistence of a marriage.
Ignorance of the existence of Article 40 of the Family Code cannot even be successfully
invoked as an excuse. The contracting of a marriage knowing that the requirements of
16 

the law have not been complied with or that the marriage is in disregard of a legal
impediment is an act penalized by the Revised Penal Code. The legality of a marriage is
17 

a matter of law and every person is presumed to know the law. As respondent did not
obtain the judicial declaration of nullity when he entered into the second marriage, why
should he be allowed to belatedly obtain that judicial declaration in order to delay his
criminal prosecution and subsequently defeat it by his own disobedience of the law? If he
wants to raise the nullity of the previous marriage, he can do it as a matter of defense
when he presents his evidence during the trial proper in the criminal case.

The burden of proof to show the dissolution of the first marriage before the second
marriage was contracted rests upon the defense, but that is a matter that can be raised
18 

in the trial of the bigamy case. In the meantime, it should be stressed that not every
defense raised in the civil action may be used as a prejudicial question to obtain the
suspension of the criminal action. The lower court, therefore, erred in suspending the
criminal case for bigamy. Moreover, when respondent was indicted for bigamy, the fact
that he entered into two marriage ceremonies appeared indubitable. It was only after he
was sued by petitioner for bigamy that he thought of seeking a judicial declaration of
nullity of his first marriage. The obvious intent, therefore, is that respondent merely
resorted to the civil action as a potential prejudicial question for the purpose of frustrating
or delaying his criminal prosecution. As has been discussed above, this cannot be done. 1awphi1

In the light of Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent, without first having obtained the
judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, can not be said to have validly entered
into the second marriage. Per current jurisprudence, a marriage though void still needs a
judicial declaration of such fact before any party can marry again; otherwise the second
marriage will also be void. The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity,
19 

the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent was for all
legal intents and purposes regarded as a married man at the time he contracted his
second marriage with petitioner. Against this legal backdrop, any decision in the civil
20 

action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage
during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not
essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial
question. As stated above, respondent cannot be permitted to use his own malfeasance
to defeat the criminal action against him. 21

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The order dated December 29, 1998 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 226 of Quezon City is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the
trial court is ordered to IMMEDIATELY proceed with Criminal Case No. Q98-75611.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.

 EN BANC

G.R. No. 150758             February 18, 2004

VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

We are called on to decide the novel issue concerning the effect of the judicial
declaration of the nullity of a second or subsequent marriage, on the ground of
psychological incapacity, on an individual’s criminal liability for bigamy. We hold that the
subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity does not retroact to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the
Philippines’ penal laws are concerned. As such, an individual who contracts a second or
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally liable for
bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that the second marriage is void ab
initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.

Petitioner in this case, Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with private complainant
Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The two were wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of
the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City. Tenebro and Ancajas lived together continuously
and without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that
he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986.
Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and
Villareyes. Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling
which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes. 1

On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain
Nilda Villegas, before Judge German Lee, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
Branch 15.2 When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes
whether the latter was indeed married to petitioner. In a handwritten letter, 3 Villareyes
confirmed that petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her husband.

Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. 4 The

Information,5 which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 013095-L, reads:

That on the 10th day of April 1990, in the City of Lapu-lapu, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the aforenamed accused, having been previously
united in lawful marriage with Hilda Villareyes, and without the said marriage having been
legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second
marriage with LETICIA ANCAJAS, which second or subsequent marriage of the accused
has all the essential requisites for validity were it not for the subsisting first marriage.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

When arraigned, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty". 6

During the trial, petitioner admitted having cohabited with Villareyes from 1984-1988, with
whom he sired two children. However, he denied that he and Villareyes were validly
married to each other, claiming that no marriage ceremony took place to solemnize their
union.7 He alleged that he signed a marriage contract merely to enable her to get the
allotment from his office in connection with his work as a seaman. 8 He further testified
that he requested his brother to verify from the Civil Register in Manila whether there was
any marriage at all between him and Villareyes, but there was no record of said
marriage.9

On November 10, 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, Branch 54, rendered
a decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy
under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentencing him to four (4) years and
two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor, as maximum.10 On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
the trial court. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.

Hence, the instant petition for review on the following assignment of errors:

I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED, AND THIS ERROR IS

CORRECTIBLE IN THIS APPEAL – WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE
HONORABLE COURT A QUO CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME
OF BIGAMY, DESPITE THE NON-EXISTENCE OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE AND
INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE.

II. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF
BIGAMY DESPITE CLEAR PROOF THAT THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE ACCUSED
AND PRIVATE COMPLAINANT HAD BEEN DECLARED NULL AND VOID AB INITIO
AND WITHOUT LEGAL FORCE AND EFFECT.11

After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no cogent reason to disturb the
assailed judgment.

Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the crime of Bigamy are:

(1) that the offender has been legally married;

(2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;

(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and

(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. 12

Petitioner’s assignment of errors presents a two-tiered defense, in which he (1) denies

the existence of his first marriage to Villareyes, and (2) argues that the declaration of the
nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, which is an
alleged indicator that his marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity,
retroacts to the date on which the second marriage was celebrated. 13 Hence, petitioner
argues that all four of the elements of the crime of bigamy are absent, and prays for his
acquittal.14
Petitioner’s defense must fail on both counts.

First, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence, both documentary and oral, to prove
the existence of the first marriage between petitioner and Villareyes. Documentary
evidence presented was in the form of: (1) a copy of a marriage contract between
Tenebro and Villareyes, dated November 10, 1986, which, as seen on the document,
was solemnized at the Manila City Hall before Rev. Julieto Torres, a Minister of the
Gospel, and certified to by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila; 15 and (2) a
handwritten letter from Villareyes to Ancajas dated July 12, 1994, informing Ancajas that
Villareyes and Tenebro were legally married. 16

To assail the veracity of the marriage contract, petitioner presented (1) a certification
issued by the National Statistics Office dated October 7, 1995; 17 and (2) a certification
issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila, dated February 3, 1997. 18 Both these
documents attest that the respective issuing offices have no record of a marriage
celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on November 10, 1986.

To our mind, the documents presented by the defense cannot adequately assail the
marriage contract, which in itself would already have been sufficient to establish the
existence of a marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes.

All three of these documents fall in the category of public documents, and the Rules of
Court provisions relevant to public documents are applicable to all. Pertinent to the
marriage contract, Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court reads as follows:

Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. – When the
original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office,
its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody
thereof (Emphasis ours).

This being the case, the certified copy of the marriage contract, issued by a public officer
in custody thereof, was admissible as the best evidence of its contents. The marriage
contract plainly indicates that a marriage was celebrated between petitioner and
Villareyes on November 10, 1986, and it should be accorded the full faith and credence
given to public documents.

Moreover, an examination of the wordings of the certification issued by the National

Statistics Office on October 7, 1995 and that issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila
on February 3, 1997 would plainly show that neither document attests as a positive fact
that there was no marriage celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B.
Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Rather, the documents merely attest that the
respective issuing offices have no record of such a marriage. Documentary evidence as
to the absence of a record is quite different from documentary evidence as to the
absence of a marriage ceremony, or documentary evidence as to the invalidity of the
marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes.

The marriage contract presented by the prosecution serves as positive evidence as to

the existence of the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes, which should be given
greater credence than documents testifying merely as to absence of any record of the
marriage, especially considering that there is absolutely no requirement in the law that a
marriage contract needs to be submitted to the civil registrar as a condition precedent for
the validity of a marriage. The mere fact that no record of a marriage exists does not
invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present. 19 There is no
evidence presented by the defense that would indicate that the marriage between
Tenebro and Villareyes lacked any requisite for validity, apart from the self-serving
testimony of the accused himself. Balanced against this testimony are Villareyes’ letter,
Ancajas’ testimony that petitioner informed her of the existence of the valid first marriage,
and petitioner’s own conduct, which would all tend to indicate that the first marriage had
all the requisites for validity.

Finally, although the accused claims that he took steps to verify the non-existence of the
first marriage to Villareyes by requesting his brother to validate such purported non-
existence, it is significant to note that the certifications issued by the National Statistics
Office and the City Civil Registry of Manila are dated October 7, 1995 and February 3,
1997, respectively. Both documents, therefore, are dated after the accused’s marriage to
his second wife, private respondent in this case.

As such, this Court rules that there was sufficient evidence presented by the prosecution
to prove the first and second requisites for the crime of bigamy.

The second tier of petitioner’s defense hinges on the effects of the subsequent judicial
declaration20 of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity.

Petitioner argues that this subsequent judicial declaration retroacts to the date of the
celebration of the marriage to Ancajas. As such, he argues that, since his marriage to
Ancajas was subsequently declared void ab initio, the crime of bigamy was not
committed.21

This argument is not impressed with merit.

Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity, invoking Article 36 of the Family Code. What
petitioner fails to realize is that a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the State’s
penal laws are concerned.

As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioner’s

valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab
initio completely regardless of petitioner’s psychological capacity or incapacity. 22 Since a
marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the
nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal
liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes "any
person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage
has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings". A plain
reading of the law, therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of
contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid
marriage.

Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10, 1990,
during the subsistence of the valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been
consummated. To our mind, there is no cogent reason for distinguishing between a
subsequent marriage that is null and void purely because it is a second or subsequent
marriage, and a subsequent marriage that is null and void on the ground of psychological
incapacity, at least insofar as criminal liability for bigamy is concerned. The State’s penal
laws protecting the institution of marriage are in recognition of the sacrosanct character
of this special contract between spouses, and punish an individual’s deliberate disregard
of the permanent character of the special bond between spouses, which petitioner has
undoubtedly done.
Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity is not an indicator that petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas lacks the
essential requisites for validity. The requisites for the validity of a marriage are classified
by the Family Code into essential (legal capacity of the contracting parties and their
consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer) 23 and formal (authority of
the solemnizing officer, marriage license, and marriage ceremony wherein the parties
personally declare their agreement to marry before the solemnizing officer in the
presence of at least two witnesses).24 Under Article 5 of the Family Code, any male or
female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments
mentioned in Articles 3725 and 3826 may contract marriage.27

In this case, all the essential and formal requisites for the validity of marriage were
satisfied by petitioner and Ancajas. Both were over eighteen years of age, and they
voluntarily contracted the second marriage with the required license before Judge Alfredo
B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, in the presence of at least two
witnesses.

Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of

psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as
the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that said
marriage is not without legal effects. Among these effects is that children conceived or
born before the judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be considered
legitimate.28 There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a
marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these
legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would
render the State’s penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to
deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus
escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of
hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment.

As such, we rule that the third and fourth requisites for the crime of bigamy are present in
this case, and affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

As a final point, we note that based on the evidence on record, petitioner contracted
marriage a third time, while his marriages to Villareyes and Ancajas were both still
subsisting. Although this is irrelevant in the determination of the accused’s guilt for
purposes of this particular case, the act of the accused displays a deliberate disregard for
the sanctity of marriage, and the State does not look kindly on such activities. Marriage is
a special contract, the key characteristic of which is its permanence. When an individual
manifests a deliberate pattern of flouting the foundation of the State’s basic social
institution, the State’s criminal laws on bigamy step in.

Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for the crime of
bigamy is prision mayor, which has a duration of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve
(12) years. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the same shall
be imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner
shall be entitled to a minimum term, to be taken from the penalty next lower in degree,
i.e., prision correccional which has a duration of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6)
years. Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the decision of the trial court which
sentenced petitioner to suffer an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21636, convicting petitioner
Veronico Tenebro of the crime of Bigamy and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight
(8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Azcuna,

JJ., concur.
Puno, J., join the opinion of J. Vitug.
Vitug, J., see separate opinion.
Quisumbing, J., join the dissent in view of void nuptia.
Carpio, J., see dissenting opinion.
Austria-Martinez, J., join the dissent of J. Carpio.
Carpio-Morales, J., join the dissent of J. Carpio.
Tinga, J., join the dissent of J. Carpio.
Callejo, Sr., J., see separate dissent.

SEPARATE OPINION>

VITUG, J.:

Veronico Tenebro has been charged with bigamy for contracting, while still being married
to Hilda Villareyes, a second marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas. Tenebro
argues that since his second marriage with Ancajas has ultimately been declared void ab
initio on the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity, he should be acquitted for the
crime of bigamy.

The offense of bigamy is committed when one contracts "a second or subsequent
marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent
spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the
proper proceedings".1 Bigamy presupposes a valid prior marriage and a subsequent
marriage, contracted during the subsistence of the prior union, which would have been
binding were it not for its being bigamous.

Would the absolute nullity of either the first or the second marriage, prior to its judicial
declaration as being void, constitute a valid defense in a criminal action for bigamy?

I believe that, except for a void marriage on account of the psychological incapacity of a
party or both parties to the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code (as so
hereinafter explained), the answer must be in the affirmative. Void marriages are
inexistent from the very beginning, and no judicial decree is required to establish their
nullity.2 As early as the case of People vs. Aragon 3 this Court has underscored the fact
that the Revised Penal Code itself does not, unlike the rule then prevailing in Spain,
require the judicial declaration of nullity of a prior void marriage before it can be raised by
way of a defense in a criminal case for bigamy. Had the law contemplated otherwise,
said the Court, " an express provision to that effect would or should have been inserted in
the law, (but that in) its absence, (the courts) are bound by (the) rule of strict
interpretation" of penal statutes. In contrast to a voidable marriage which legally exists
until judicially annulled (and, therefore, not a defense in a bigamy charge if the second
marriage were contracted prior to the decree of annulment) 4 the complete nullity,
however, of a previously contracted marriage, being void ab initio and legally inexistent,
can outrightly be defense in an indictment of bigamy.

It has been held that, by virtue of Article 40 of the Family Code, a person may be
convicted of bigamy although the first marriage is ultimately adjudged void ab initio if, at
the time the second marriage is contracted, there has as yet no judicial declaration of
nullity of the prior marriage. 5 I maintain strong reservations to this ruling. Article 40 of the
Family Code reads:

"Article 40. The absolute nullity of the previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of the final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void."

It is only "for purpose of remarriage" that the law has expressed that the absolute nullity
of the previous marriage may be invoked "on the basis solely of the final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void." It may not be amiss to state that under the
regime of the Civil Code of 1950, the Supreme Court, in Wiegel vs. Judge Sempio-
Diy,6 has held that a subsequent marriage of one of the spouses of a prior void marriage
is itself (the subsequent marriage) void if it were contracted before a judicial declaration
of nullity of the previous marriage. Although this pronouncement has been abandoned in
a later decision of the court in Yap vs. Court of Appeals, 7 the Family Code, however has
seen it fit to adopt the Wiegel rule but only for purpose of remarriage which is just to say
that the subsequent marriage shall itself be considered void. There is no clear indication
to conclude that the Family Code has amended or intended to amend the Revised penal
Code or to abandon the settled and prevailing jurisprudence on the matter. 8

A void marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is a class by itself. The provision has
been from Canon law primarily to reconcile the grounds for nullity of marriage under civil
law with those of church laws.9 The "psychological incapacity to comply" with the
essential marital obligations of the spouses is completely distinct from other grounds for
nullity which are confined to the essential or formal requisites of a marriage, such as lack
of legal capacity or disqualification of the contracting parties, want of consent, absence of
a marriage license, or the like.

The effects of a marriage attended by psychological incapacity of a party or the parties

thereto may be said to have the earmarks of a voidable, more than a void, marriage,
remaining to be valid until it is judicially decreed to be a nullity. Thus, Article 54 of the
Family Code considers children conceived or born of such a void marriage before its
judicial declaration of nullity to be legitimate similar to the rule on a voidable marriage. It
is expected, even as I believe it safe to assume, that the spouses’ rights and obligations,
property regime and successional rights would continue unaffected, as if it were a
voidable marriage, unless and until the marriage is judicially declared void for basically
two reasons: First, psychological incapacity, a newly-added ground for the nullity of a
marriage under the Family Code, breaches neither the essential nor the formal requisites
of a valid marriages;10 and second, unlike the other grounds for nullity of marriage (i.e.,
relationship, minority of the parties, lack of license, mistake in the identity of the parties)
which are capable of relatively easy demonstration, psychological incapacity, however,
being a mental state, may not so readily be as evident. 11 It would have been logical for
the Family Code to consider such a marriage explicitly voidable rather than void if it were
not for apparent attempt to make it closely coincide with the Canon Law rules and
nomenclature.

Indeed, a void marriage due to psychological incapacity appears to merely differ from a
voidable marriage in that, unlike the latter, it is not convalidated by either cohabitation or
prescription. It might be recalled that prior to republic Act No. 8533, further amending the
Family Code, an action or defense of absolute nullity of marriage falling under Article 36,
celebrated before the effectivity of the Code, could prescribe in ten years following the
effectivity of the Family Code. The initial provision of the ten-year period of prescription
seems to betray a real consciousness by the framers that marriages falling under Article
36 are truly meant to be inexistent.
Considerations, both logical and practical, would point to the fact that a "void" marriage
due to psychological incapacity remains, for all intents and purposes, to be binding and
efficacious until judicially declared otherwise. Without such marriage having first been
declared a nullity (or otherwise dissolved), a subsequent marriage could constitute
bigamy. Thus, a civil case questioning the validity of the first marriage would not be a
prejudicial issue much in the same way that a civil case assailing a prior "voidable"
marriage (being valid until annulled) would not be a prejudicial question to the
prosecution of a criminal offense for bigamy.

In cases where the second marriage is void on grounds other than the existence of the
first marriage, this Court has declared in a line of cases that no crime of bigamy is
committed.12 The Court has explained that for a person to be held guilty of bigamy, it
must, even as it needs only, be shown that the subsequent marriage has all the essential
elements of a valid marriage, were it not for the subsisting first union. Hence, where it is
established that the second marriage has been contracted without the necessary license
and thus void,13 or that the accused is merely forced to enter into the second (voidable)
marriage,14 no criminal liability for the crime of bigamy can attach. In both and like
instances, however, the lapses refers to the elements required for contracting a valid
marriage. If, then, all the requisites for the perfection of the contract marriage, freely and
voluntarily entered into, are shown to be extant, the criminal liability for bigamy can
unassailably arise.

Since psychological incapacity, upon the other hand, does not relate to an
infirmity in the elements, either essential or formal, in contacting a valid marriage,
the declaration of nullity subsequent to the bigamous marriage due to that ground,
without more, would be inconsequential in a criminal charge for bigamy. The
judicial declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity merely nullifies the effects of the marriage but it does not negate the fact
of perfection of the bigamous marriage. Its subsequent declaration of nullity dissolves
the relationship of the spouses but, being alien to the requisite conditions for the
perfection of the marriage, the judgment of the court is no defense on the part of the
offender who had entered into it.

Accordingly, I vote to dismiss the petition.

 FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 159218             March 30, 2004

SALVADOR S. ABUNADO and ZENAIDA BIÑAS ABUNADO, Petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Responden

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 26135 which affirmed with modification the decision of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 77, San Mateo, Rizal in Criminal Case No. 2803
convicting petitioner Salvador S. Abunado of bigamy.

The records show that on September 18, 1967, Salvador married Narcisa Arceño at the
Manila City Hall before Rev. Pedro Tiangco. 2 In 1988 Narcisa left for Japan to work but
returned to the Philippines in 1992, when she learned that her husband was having an
extra-marital affair and has left their conjugal home.

After earnest efforts, Narcisa found Salvador in Quezon City cohabiting with Fe Corazon
Plato. She also discovered that on January 10, 1989, Salvador contracted a second
marriage with a certain Zenaida Biñas before Judge Lilian Dinulos Panontongan in San
Mateo, Rizal.3

On January 19, 1995, an annulment case was filed by Salvador against Narcisa. 4 On
May 18, 1995, a case for bigamy was filed by Narcisa against Salvador and Zenaida. 5

Salvador admitted that he first married Zenaida on December 24, 1955 before a
municipal trial court judge in Concepcion, Iloilo and has four children with her prior to
their separation in 1966. It appeared however that there was no evidence of their 1955
marriage so he and Zenaida remarried on January 10, 1989, upon the request of their
son for the purpose of complying with the requirements for his commission in the military.

On May 18, 2001, the trial court convicted petitioner Salvador Abunado of bigamy and
sentenced him to suffer imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to
eight (8) years and one (1) day, as maximum. Petitioner Zenaida Biñas was acquitted for
insufficiency of evidence.6

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court,
as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED as to the penalty

imposed but AFFIRMED in all other respects. Appreciating the mitigating circumstance
that accused is 76 years of age and applying the provisions of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term
of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as Minimum to
six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as Maximum. No costs.

SO ORDERED.7

Petitioner is now before us on petition for review.

First, he argues that the Information was defective as it stated that the bigamous
marriage was contracted in 1995 when in fact it should have been 1989.

Indeed, an accused has the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.8 It is required that the acts and omissions complained of as
constituting the offense must be alleged in the Information. 9

The real nature of the crime charged is determined by the facts alleged in the Information
and not by the title or designation of the offense contained in the caption of the
Information. It is fundamental that every element of which the offense is comprised must
be alleged in the Information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be alleged
in the Information must be determined by reference to the definition and essential
elements of the specific crimes.10

The question, therefore, is whether petitioner has been sufficiently informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, namely, that he contracted a subsequent
marriage with another woman while his first marriage was subsisting.

The information against petitioner alleges:

That in or about and sometime in the month of January, 1995 at the Municipality of San
Mateo, Rizal place (sic) within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, having been legally married to complainant Narcisa Abunado on September 16,
1967 which has not been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously contract a subsequent marriage to Zenaida Biñas Abunado on January 10,
1989 which has all the essential requisites of a valid marriage.

CONTRARY TO LAW.11

The statement in the information that the crime was committed "in or about and sometime
in the month of January, 1995," was an obvious typographical error, for the same
information clearly states that petitioner contracted a subsequent marriage to Zenaida
Biñas Abunado on January 10, 1989. Petitioner’s submission, therefore, that the
information was defective is untenable.

The general rule is that a defective information cannot support a judgment of conviction
unless the defect was cured by evidence during the trial and no objection appears to
have been raised.12 It should be remembered that bigamy can be successfully prosecuted
provided all its elements concur – two of which are a previous marriage and a
subsequent marriage which possesses all the requisites for validity. 13 All of these have
been sufficiently established by the prosecution during the trial. Notably, petitioner failed
to object to the alleged defect in the Information during the trial and only raised the same
for the first time on appeal before the Court of Appeals.

Second, petitioner argues that Narcisa consented to his marriage to Zenaida, which had
the effect of absolving him of criminal liability.
In this regard, we agree with the Court of Appeals when it ruled, thus:

x x x, while he claims that there was condonation on the part of complainant when he
entered into a bigamous marriage, the same was likewise not established by clear and
convincing evidence. But then, a pardon by the offended party does not extinguish
criminal action considering that a crime is committed against the State and the crime of
Bigamy is a public offense which can be denounced not only by the person affected
thereby but even by a civic-spirited citizen who may come to know the same. 14

Third, petitioner claims that his petition for annulment/declaration of nullity of marriage

was a prejudicial question, hence, the proceedings in the bigamy case should have been
suspended during the pendency of the annulment case. Petitioner, in fact, eventually
obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Narcisa on October 29, 1999. 15

A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and separate
from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence
of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said
case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would
be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the
guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. The rationale behind
the principle of suspending a criminal case in view of a prejudicial question is to avoid
two conflicting decisions.16

The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial
because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated.
Moreover, petitioner’s assertion would only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases
considering that an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage
void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case.
We cannot allow that.17

The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to Narcisa had no
bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for
bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first
marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted. 18

Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed
valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. 19 In this case, even if petitioner
eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is,
both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was
annulled.

Finally, petitioner claims that the penalty imposed on him was improper.

Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision mayor for bigamy.
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the
attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the Revised Penal Code, and
the minimum term of which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the Code for the offense. The penalty next lower would be based on the
penalty prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first considering any modifying
circumstance attendant to the commission of the crime. The determination of the
minimum penalty is left by law to the sound discretion of the court and it can be anywhere
within the range of the penalty next lower without any reference to the periods into which
it might be subdivided. The modifying circumstances are considered only in the
imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence. 20
In light of the fact that petitioner is more than 70 years of age, 21 which is a mitigating
circumstance under Article 13, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, the maximum
term of the indeterminate sentence should be taken from prision mayor in its minimum
period which ranges from six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years, while the
minimum term should be taken from prision correccional in any of its periods which
ranges from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years.

Therefore, the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals, i.e., two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as maximum, is proper.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR No. 26135, finding petitioner Salvador S. Abunado guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of bigamy, and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, is AFFIRMED.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ.

Concurring Opinion

CARPIO, J.:

I concur in the result of the ponencia of Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago finding

appellant Salvador S. Abunado guilty of bigamy.

The material facts are not in dispute. On 18 September 1967, Abunado married Narcisa
Arceno. While his marriage with Arceno remained unannulled, Abunado married Zenaida
Biñas on 10 January 1989. Subsequently, on 29 October 1999, Abunado obtained from
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage with
Arceno. On 18 May 2001, the Regional Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal rendered a
decision convicting Abunado of bigamy.

The sole issue is whether the second marriage of Abunado to Biñas on 10 January 1989
constitutes the crime of bigamy under Article 349 1 of the Revised Penal Code. More
precisely, the issue turns on whether Abunado’s first marriage to Arceno was still
subsisting at the time Abunado married Biñas.

Under the Family Code, before one can contract a second marriage on the ground of
nullity of the first marriage, one must first secure a final judgment declaring the first
marriage void. Article 40 of the Family Code provides:

Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.

The Family Code took effect on 3 August 1988, before the second marriage of Abunado
on 10 January 1989.
Prior to the Family Code, one could contract a subsequent marriage on the ground of
nullity of the previous marriage without first securing a judicial annulment of the previous
marriage. If subsequently the previous marriage were judicially declared void, the
subsequent marriage would not be deemed bigamous. The nullity of the previous
marriage could even be judicially declared in the criminal case for bigamy, 2 although the
person remarrying "assume(d) the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy" 3 should the court
uphold the validity of the first marriage. Article 40 of the Family Code has changed this.

Now, one must first secure a final judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage
before he is freed from the marital bond or vinculum of the previous marriage. If he fails
to secure a judicial declaration of nullity and contracts a second marriage, then the
second marriage becomes bigamous. As the Court stated in Domingo v. Court of
Appeals4 in explaining Article 40 of the Family Code:

In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the
protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void,
marries again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the
person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy.

Conversely, if the person remarries without securing a judicial declaration of nullity of his
previous marriage, he is liable for bigamy.

Article 40 of the Family Code considers the marital vinculum of the previous marriage to
subsist for purposes of remarriage, unless the previous marriage is judicially declared
void by final judgment. Thus, if the marital vinculum of the previous marriage subsists
because of the absence of judicial declaration of its nullity, the second marriage is
contracted during the existence of the first marriage resulting in the crime of bigamy.

Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the marital vinculum of a previous marriage that is
void ab initio subsists only for purposes of remarriage. For purposes other than
remarriage, marriages that are void ab initio, such as those falling under Articles 35 and
36 of the Family Code, are void even without a judicial declaration of nullity. As the Court
held in Cariño v. Cariño:5

Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is
sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis
acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final
judgment declaring the previous marriage void. However, for purposes other than
remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. x x
x . (Emphasis supplied)

Cariño, penned by Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago herself, contradicts the statement

in her present ponencia that "under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or
voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding." I
believe the ruling in Cariño is correct and should not be disturbed. As Justice Jose C.
Vitug explained in his recent textbook on Civil Law (Volume I):

The phrase "for purposes of remarriage" is not at all insignificant. Void marriages, like
void contracts, are inexistent from the very beginning. It is only by way of  exception that
the Family Code requires a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage before a
subsequent marriage is contracted; x x x.6 (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, the general rule is if the marriage is void ab initio, it is ipso facto void without need
of any judicial declaration of nullity. The only recognized exception 7 under existing law is
Article 40 of the Family Code where a marriage void ab initio is deemed valid for
purposes of remarriage, hence necessitating a judicial declaration of nullity before one
can contract a subsequent marriage.

Article 40 of the Family Code applies only to a situation where the previous marriage
suffers from nullity while the second marriage does not. Under Article 40, what requires a
judicial declaration of nullity is the previous marriage, not the subsequent marriage.
Article 40 does not apply to a situation where the first marriage does not suffer from any
defect while the second is void.

Accordingly, I vote to deny the petition and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals
finding appellant Salvador S. Abunado guilty of the crime of bigamy.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 94053 March 17, 1993

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
GREGORIO NOLASCO, respondent.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Warloo G. Cardenal for respondent.

RESOLUTION

FELICIANO, J.:

On 5 August 1988, respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Antique, Branch 10, a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet
Monica Parker, invoking Article 41 of the Family Code. The petition prayed that
respondent's wife be declared presumptively dead or, in the alternative, that the marriage
be declared null and void. 1

The Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition through the Provincial Prosecutor of
Antique who had been deputized to assist the Solicitor-General in the instant case. The
Republic argued, first, that Nolasco did not possess a "well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead,"  and second, Nolasco's attempt to have his marriage annulled
2

in the same proceeding was a "cunning attempt" to circumvent the law on marriage. 3

During trial, respondent Nolasco testified that he was a seaman and that he had first met
Janet Monica Parker, a British subject, in a bar in England during one of his ship's port
calls. From that chance meeting onwards, Janet Monica Parker lived with respondent
Nolasco on his ship for six (6) months until they returned to respondent's hometown of
San Jose, Antique on 19 November 1980 after his seaman's contract expired. On 15
January 1982, respondent married Janet Monica Parker in San Jose, Antique, in Catholic
rites officiated by Fr. Henry van Tilborg in the Cathedral of San Jose.

Respondent Nolasco further testified that after the marriage celebration, he obtained
another employment contract as a seaman and left his wife with his parents in San Jose,
Antique. Sometime in January 1983, while working overseas, respondent received a
letter from his mother informing him that Janet Monica had given birth to his son. The
same letter informed him that Janet Monica had left Antique. Respondent claimed he
then immediately asked permission to leave his ship to return home. He arrived in
Antique in November 1983.

Respondent further testified that his efforts to look for her himself whenever his ship
docked in England proved fruitless. He also stated that all the letters he had sent to his
missing spouse at No. 38 Ravena Road, Allerton, Liverpool, England, the address of the
bar where he and Janet Monica first met, were all returned to him. He also claimed that
he inquired from among friends but they too had no news of Janet Monica.

On cross-examination, respondent stated that he had lived with and later married Janet
Monica Parker despite his lack of knowledge as to her family background. He insisted
that his wife continued to refuse to give him such information even after they were
married. He also testified that he did not report the matter of Janet Monica's
disappearance to the Philippine government authorities.

Respondent Nolasco presented his mother, Alicia Nolasco, as his witness. She testified
that her daughter-in-law Janet Monica had expressed a desire to return to England even
before she had given birth to Gerry Nolasco on 7 December 1982. When asked why her
daughter-in-law might have wished to leave Antique, respondent's mother replied that
Janet Monica never got used to the rural way of life in San Jose, Antique. Alicia Nolasco
also said that she had tried to dissuade Janet Monica from leaving as she had given birth
to her son just fifteen days before, but when she (Alicia) failed to do so, she gave Janet
Monica P22,000.00 for her expenses before she left on 22 December 1982 for England.
She further claimed that she had no information as to the missing person's present
whereabouts.

The trial court granted Nolasco's petition in a Judgment dated 12 October 1988 the
dispositive portion of which reads:

Wherefore, under Article 41, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines
(Executive Order No. 209, July 6, 1987, as amended by Executive Order No. 227, July
17, 1987) this Court hereby declares as presumptively dead Janet Monica Parker
Nolasco, without prejudice to her reappearance. 4

The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that the trial court erred in
declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead because respondent Nolasco had
failed to show that there existed a well founded belief for such declaration.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that respondent had
sufficiently established a basis to form a belief that his absent spouse had already died.

The Republic, through the Solicitor-General, is now before this Court on a Petition for
Review where the following allegations are made:

1. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's finding that there existed a well-
founded belief on the part of Nolasco that Janet Monica Parker was already dead; and

2. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial Court's declaration that the petition
was a proper case of the declaration of presumptive death under Article 41, Family
Code. 5

The issue before this Court, as formulated by petitioner is "[w]hether or not Nolasco has a
well-founded belief that his wife is already dead." 6

The present case was filed before the trial court pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code
which provides that:

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent
marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the  spouse
present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the
provision of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph,
the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse. (Emphasis supplied).

When Article 41 is compared with the old provision of the Civil Code, which it
superseded,  the following crucial differences emerge. Under Article 41, the time required
7

for the presumption to arise has been shortened to four (4) years; however, there is need
for a judicial declaration of presumptive death to enable the spouse present to
remarry.  Also, Article 41 of the Family Code imposes a stricter standard than the Civil
8

Code: Article 83 of the Civil Code merely requires either that there be no news that such
absentee is still alive; or the absentee is generally considered to be dead and believed to
be so by the spouse present, or is presumed dead under Article 390 and 391 of the Civil
Code.  The Family Code, upon the other hand, prescribes as "well founded belief" that
9

the absentee is already dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death can
be granted.

As pointed out by the Solicitor-General, there are four (4) requisites for the declaration of
presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code:

1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two
consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under
the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;

2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;

3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and

4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee.  10

Respondent naturally asserts that he had complied with all these requirements. 11

Petitioner's argument, upon the other hand, boils down to this: that respondent failed to
prove that he had complied with the third requirement, i.e., the existence of a "well-
founded belief" that the absent spouse is already dead.

The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to conduct a search for his missing
wife with such diligence as to give rise to a "well-founded belief" that she is dead.

United States v. Biasbas,   is instructive as to degree of diligence required in searching

12

for a missing spouse. In that case, defendant Macario Biasbas was charged with the
crime of bigamy. He set-up the defense of a good faith belief that his first wife had
already died. The Court held that defendant had not exercised due diligence to ascertain
the whereabouts of his first wife, noting that:

While the defendant testified that he had made inquiries concerning the whereabouts of
his wife, he fails to state of whom he made such inquiries. He did not even write to the
parents of his first wife, who lived in the Province of Pampanga, for the purpose of
securing information concerning her whereabouts. He admits that he had a suspicion
only that his first wife was dead. He admits that the only basis of his suspicion was the
fact that she had been absent. . . . 
13
In the case at bar, the Court considers that the investigation allegedly conducted by
respondent in his attempt to ascertain Janet Monica Parker's whereabouts is too sketchy
to form the basis of a reasonable or well-founded belief that she was already dead. When
he arrived in San Jose, Antique after learning of Janet Monica's departure, instead of
seeking the help of local authorities or of the British Embassy,   he secured another
14

seaman's contract and went to London, a vast city of many millions of inhabitants, to look
for her there.

Q After arriving here in San Jose, Antique, did you exert efforts to inquire the
whereabouts of your wife?

A Yes, Sir.

Court:

How did you do that?

A I secured another contract with the ship and we had a trip to London and I went to
London to look for her I could not find her (sic).   (Emphasis supplied)
15

Respondent's testimony, however, showed that he confused London for Liverpool and
this casts doubt on his supposed efforts to locate his wife in England. The Court of
Appeal's justification of the mistake, to wit:

. . . Well, while the cognoscente (sic) would readily know the geographical difference
between London and Liverpool, for a humble seaman like Gregorio the two places could
mean one — place in England, the port where his ship docked and where he found
Janet. Our own provincial folks, every time they leave home to visit relatives in Pasay
City, Kalookan City, or Parañaque, would announce to friends and relatives, "We're going
to Manila." This apparent error in naming of places of destination does not appear to be
fatal. 
16

is not well taken. There is no analogy between Manila and its neighboring cities, on one
hand, and London and Liverpool, on the other, which, as pointed out by the Solicitor-
General, are around three hundred fifty (350) kilometers apart. We do not consider that
walking into a major city like Liverpool or London with a simple hope of somehow
bumping into one particular person there — which is in effect what Nolasco says he did
— can be regarded as a reasonably diligent search.

The Court also views respondent's claim that Janet Monica declined to give any
information as to her personal background even after she had married respondent   too 17

convenient an excuse to justify his failure to locate her. The same can be said of the loss
of the alleged letters respondent had sent to his wife which respondent claims were all
returned to him. Respondent said he had lost these returned letters, under unspecified
circumstances.

Neither can this Court give much credence to respondent's bare assertion that he had
inquired from their friends of her whereabouts, considering that respondent did not
identify those friends in his testimony. The Court of Appeals ruled that since the
prosecutor failed to rebut this evidence during trial, it is good evidence. But this kind of
evidence cannot, by its nature, be rebutted. In any case, admissibility is not synonymous
with credibility.   As noted before, there are serious doubts to respondent's credibility.
18

Moreover, even if admitted as evidence, said testimony merely tended to show that the
missing spouse had chosen not to communicate with their common acquaintances, and
not that she was dead.
Respondent testified that immediately after receiving his mother's letter sometime in
January 1983, he cut short his employment contract to return to San Jose, Antique.
However, he did not explain the delay of nine (9) months from January 1983, when he
allegedly asked leave from his captain, to November 1983 when be finally reached San
Jose. Respondent, moreover, claimed he married Janet Monica Parker without inquiring
about her parents and their place of residence.   Also, respondent failed to explain why
19

he did not even try to get the help of the police or other authorities in London and
Liverpool in his effort to find his wife. The circumstances of Janet Monica's departure and
respondent's subsequent behavior make it very difficult to regard the claimed belief that
Janet Monica was dead a well-founded one.

In Goitia v. Campos-Rueda,   the Court stressed that:

20

. . . Marriage is an institution, the maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply
interested. It is a relationship for life and the parties cannot terminate it at any shorter
period by virtue of any contract they make. . . . .   (Emphasis supplied)
21

By the same token, the spouses should not be allowed, by the simple expedient of
agreeing that one of them leave the conjugal abode and never to return again, to
circumvent the policy of the laws on marriage. The Court notes that respondent even
tried to have his marriage annulled before the trial court in the same proceeding.

In In Re Szatraw,   the Court warned against such collusion between the parties when
22

they find it impossible to dissolve the marital bonds through existing legal means.

While the Court understands the need of respondent's young son, Gerry Nolasco, for
maternal care, still the requirements of the law must prevail. Since respondent failed to
satisfy the clear requirements of the law, his petition for a judicial declaration of
presumptive death must be denied. The law does not view marriage like an ordinary
contract. Article 1 of the Family Code emphasizes that.

. . . Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a

woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family
life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except
that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the
limits provided by this Code. (Emphasis supplied)

In Arroyo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,   the Court stressed strongly the need to protect.
23

. . . the basic social institutions of marriage and the family in the preservation of which the
State bas the strongest interest; the public policy here involved is of the most
fundamental kind. In Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution there is set forth the
following basic state policy:

The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family
as a basic autonomous social institution. . . .

The same sentiment bas been expressed in the Family Code of the Philippines in Article
149:

The family, being the foundation of the nation, is a basic social institution which public
policy cherishes and protects. Consequently, family relations are governed by law and no
custom, practice or agreement destructive of the family shall be recognized or given
effect. 
24
In fine, respondent failed to establish that he had the well-founded belief required by law
that his absent wife was already dead that would sustain the issuance of a court order
declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 February 1990, affirming
the trial court's decision declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead is hereby
REVERSED and both Decisions are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Costs against
respondent.

Bidin, Davide, Jr., Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.

Gutierrez, Jr. J., is on leave.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 165842 November 29, 2005

EDUARDO P. MANUEL, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 26877, affirming the Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Baguio City, Branch 3, convicting Eduardo P. Manuel of bigamy in Criminal Case No.
19562-R.

Eduardo was charged with bigamy in an Information filed on November 7, 2001, the
accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about the 22nd day of April, 1996, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused EDUARDO P.
MANUEL, being then previously and legally married to RUBYLUS [GAÑA] and without
the said marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously contract a second marriage with TINA GANDALERA-MANUEL, herein
complainant, who does not know the existence of the first marriage of said EDUARDO P.
MANUEL to Rubylus [Gaña].

CONTRARY TO LAW. 3

The prosecution adduced evidence that on July 28, 1975, Eduardo was married to
Rubylus Gaña before Msgr. Feliciano Santos in Makati, which was then still a
municipality of the Province of Rizal. 4 He met the private complainant Tina B. Gandalera
in Dagupan City sometime in January 1996. She stayed in Bonuan, Dagupan City for two
days looking for a friend. Tina was then 21 years old, a Computer Secretarial student,
while Eduardo was 39. Afterwards, Eduardo went to Baguio City to visit her. Eventually,
as one thing led to another, they went to a motel where, despite Tina’s resistance,
Eduardo succeeded in having his way with her. Eduardo proposed marriage on several
occasions, assuring her that he was single. Eduardo even brought his parents to Baguio
City to meet Tina’s parents, and was assured by them that their son was still single.

Tina finally agreed to marry Eduardo sometime in the first week of March 1996. They
were married on April 22, 1996 before Judge Antonio C. Reyes, the Presiding Judge of
the RTC of Baguio City, Branch 61. 5 It appeared in their marriage contract that Eduardo
was "single."

The couple was happy during the first three years of their married life. Through their joint
efforts, they were able to build their home in Cypress Point, Irisan, Baguio City. However,
starting 1999, Manuel started making himself scarce and went to their house only twice
or thrice a year. Tina was jobless, and whenever she asked money from Eduardo, he
would slap her.6 Sometime in January 2001, Eduardo took all his clothes, left, and did not
return. Worse, he stopped giving financial support.

Sometime in August 2001, Tina became curious and made inquiries from the National
Statistics Office (NSO) in Manila where she learned that Eduardo had been previously
married. She secured an NSO-certified copy of the marriage contract. 7 She was so
embarrassed and humiliated when she learned that Eduardo was in fact already married
when they exchanged their own vows.8

For his part, Eduardo testified that he met Tina sometime in 1995 in a bar where she
worked as a Guest Relations Officer (GRO). He fell in love with her and married her. He
informed Tina of his previous marriage to Rubylus Gaña, but she nevertheless agreed to
marry him. Their marital relationship was in order until this one time when he noticed that
she had a "love-bite" on her neck. He then abandoned her. Eduardo further testified that
he declared he was "single" in his marriage contract with Tina because he believed in
good faith that his first marriage was invalid. He did not know that he had to go to court to
seek for the nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina.

Eduardo further claimed that he was only forced to marry his first wife because she
threatened to commit suicide unless he did so. Rubylus was charged with estafa in 1975
and thereafter imprisoned. He visited her in jail after three months and never saw her
again. He insisted that he married Tina believing that his first marriage was no longer
valid because he had not heard from Rubylus for more than 20 years.

After trial, the court rendered judgment on July 2, 2002 finding Eduardo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of bigamy. He was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from six
(6) years and ten (10) months, as minimum, to ten (10) years, as maximum, and directed
to indemnify the private complainant Tina Gandalera the amount of ₱200,000.00 by way
of moral damages, plus costs of suit.9

The trial court ruled that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt all
the elements of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. It declared that
Eduardo’s belief, that his first marriage had been dissolved because of his first wife’s 20-
year absence, even if true, did not exculpate him from liability for bigamy. Citing the ruling
of this Court in People v. Bitdu,10 the trial court further ruled that even if the private
complainant had known that Eduardo had been previously married, the latter would still
be criminally liable for bigamy.

Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA. He alleged that he was not criminally liable for
bigamy because when he married the private complainant, he did so in good faith and
without any malicious intent. He maintained that at the time that he married the private
complainant, he was of the honest belief that his first marriage no longer subsisted. He
insisted that conformably to Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, there must be malice for
one to be criminally liable for a felony. He was not motivated by malice in marrying the
private complainant because he did so only out of his overwhelming desire to have a
fruitful marriage. He posited that the trial court should have taken into account Article 390
of the New Civil Code. To support his view, the appellant cited the rulings of this Court
in United States v. Peñalosa11 and Manahan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals.12

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) averred that Eduardo’s defense of good faith
and reliance on the Court’s ruling in United States v. Enriquez13 were misplaced; what is
applicable is Article 41 of the Family Code, which amended Article 390 of the Civil Code.
Citing the ruling of this Court in Republic v. Nolasco,14 the OSG further posited that as
provided in Article 41 of the Family Code, there is a need for a judicial declaration of
presumptive death of the absent spouse to enable the present spouse to marry. Even
assuming that the first marriage was void, the parties thereto should not be permitted to
judge for themselves the nullity of the marriage;
the matter should be submitted to the proper court for resolution. Moreover, the OSG
maintained, the private complainant’s knowledge of the first marriage would not afford
any relief since bigamy is an offense against the State and not just against the private
complainant.

However, the OSG agreed with the appellant that the penalty imposed by the trial court
was erroneous and sought the affirmance of the decision appealed from with
modification.

On June 18, 2004, the CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the RTC with
modification as to the penalty of the accused. It ruled that the prosecution was able to
prove all the elements of bigamy. Contrary to the contention of the appellant, Article 41 of
the Family Code should apply. Before Manuel could lawfully marry the private
complainant, there should have been a judicial declaration of Gaña’s presumptive death
as the absent spouse. The appellate court cited the rulings of this Court in Mercado v.
Tan15 and Domingo v. Court of Appeals16 to support its ruling. The dispositive portion of
the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Decision promulgated on July 31, 2002 is
hereby MODIFIED to reflect, as it hereby reflects, that accused-appellant is sentenced to
an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor as maximum. Said Decision
is AFFIRMED in all other respects.

SO ORDERED.17

Eduardo, now the petitioner, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, insisting
that:

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT

RULED THAT PETITIONER’S FIRST WIFE CANNOT BE LEGALLY PRESUMED DEAD
UNDER ARTICLE 390 OF THE CIVIL CODE AS THERE WAS NO JUDICIAL
DECLARATION OF PRESUMPTIVE DEATH AS PROVIDED FOR UNDER ARTICLE 41
OF THE FAMILY CODE.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT

AFFIRMED THE AWARD OF PHP200,000.00 AS MORAL DAMAGES AS IT HAS NO
BASIS IN FACT AND IN LAW.18

The petitioner maintains that the prosecution failed to prove the second element of the
felony, i.e., that the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his/her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead under the Civil Code. He
avers that when he married Gandalera in 1996, Gaña had been "absent" for 21 years
since 1975; under Article 390 of the Civil Code, she was presumed dead as a matter of
law. He points out that, under the first paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil Code, one who
has been absent for seven years, whether or not he/she is still alive, shall be presumed
dead for all purposes except for succession, while the second paragraph refers to the
rule on legal presumption of death with respect to succession.
The petitioner asserts that the presumptive death of the absent spouse arises by
operation of law upon the satisfaction of two requirements: the
specified period and the present spouse’s reasonable belief that the absentee is dead.
He insists that he was able to prove that he had not heard from his first wife since 1975
and that he had no knowledge of her whereabouts or whether she was still alive; hence,
under Article 41 of the Family Code, the presumptive death of Gaña had arisen by
operation of law, as the two requirements of Article 390 of the Civil Code are present.
The petitioner concludes that he should thus be acquitted of the crime of bigamy.

The petitioner insists that except for the period of absences provided for in Article 390 of
the Civil Code, the rule therein on legal presumptions remains valid and effective.
Nowhere under Article 390 of the Civil Code does it require that there must first be a
judicial declaration of death before the rule on presumptive death would apply. He further
asserts that contrary to the rulings of the trial and appellate courts, the requirement of a
judicial declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is only a
requirement for the validity of the subsequent or second marriage.

The petitioner, likewise, avers that the trial court and the CA erred in awarding moral
damages in favor of the private complainant. The private complainant was a "GRO"
before he married her, and even knew that he was already married. He genuinely loved
and took care of her and gave her financial support. He also pointed out that she had an
illicit relationship with a lover whom she brought to their house.

In its comment on the petition, the OSG maintains that the decision of the CA affirming
the petitioner’s conviction is in accord with the law, jurisprudence and the evidence on
record. To bolster its claim, the OSG cited the ruling of this Court in Republic v.
Nolasco.19

The petition is denied for lack of merit.

Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which defines and penalizes bigamy, reads:

Art. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who
shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been
legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by
means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.

The provision was taken from Article 486 of the Spanish Penal Code, to wit:

El que contrajere Segundo o ulterior matrimonio sin hallarse legítimamente disuelto el

anterior, será castigado con la pena de prision mayor. xxx

The reason why bigamy is considered a felony is to preserve and ensure the juridical tie
of marriage established by law. 20 The phrase "or before the absent spouse had been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings" was incorporated in the Revised Penal Code because the drafters of the
law were of the impression that "in consonance with the civil law which provides for the
presumption of death after an absence of a number of years, the judicial declaration of
presumed death like annulment of marriage should be a justification for bigamy."21

For the accused to be held guilty of bigamy, the prosecution is burdened to prove the
felony: (a) he/she has been legally married; and (b) he/she contracts a subsequent
marriage without the former marriage having been lawfully dissolved. The felony is
consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage. 22 It is
essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the
essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first
marriage.23 Viada avers that a third element of the crime is that the second marriage must
be entered into with fraudulent intent (intencion fraudulente) which is an essential
element of a felony by dolo.24 On the other hand, Cuello Calon is of the view that there
are only two elements of bigamy: (1) the existence of a marriage that has not been
lawfully dissolved; and (2) the celebration of a second marriage. It does not matter
whether the first marriage is void or voidable because such marriages have juridical
effects until lawfully dissolved by a court of competent jurisdiction. 25 As the Court ruled
in Domingo v. Court of Appeals 26 and Mercado v. Tan,27 under the Family Code of the
Philippines, the judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is a defense.

In his commentary on the Revised Penal Code, Albert is of the same view as Viada and
declared that there are three (3) elements of bigamy: (1) an undissolved marriage; (2) a
new marriage; and (3) fraudulent intention constituting the felony of the act. 28 He
explained that:

… This last element is not stated in Article 349, because it is undoubtedly incorporated in
the principle antedating all codes, and, constituting one of the landmarks of our Penal
Code, that, where there is no willfulness there is no crime. There is no willfulness if the
subject
believes that the former marriage has been dissolved; and this must be supported by
very strong evidence, and if this be produced, the act shall be deemed not to constitute a
crime. Thus, a person who contracts a second marriage in the reasonable and well-
founded belief that his first wife is dead, because of the many years that have elapsed
since he has had any news of her whereabouts, in spite of his endeavors to find her,
cannot be deemed guilty of the crime of bigamy, because there is no fraudulent intent
which is one of the essential elements of the crime. 29

As gleaned from the Information in the RTC, the petitioner is charged with bigamy, a
felony by dolo (deceit). Article 3, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code provides that
there is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent. Indeed, a felony cannot
exist without intent. Since a felony by dolo is classified as an intentional felony, it is
deemed voluntary.30 Although the words "with malice" do not appear in Article 3 of the
Revised Penal Code, such phrase is included in the word "voluntary." 31

Malice is a mental state or condition prompting the doing of an overt act without legal
excuse or justification from which another suffers injury. 32 When the act or omission
defined by law as a felony is proved to have been done or committed by the accused, the
law presumes it to have been intentional. 33 Indeed, it is a legal presumption of law that
every man intends the natural or probable consequence of his voluntary act in the
absence of proof to the contrary, and such presumption must prevail unless a reasonable
doubt exists from a consideration of the whole evidence. 34

For one to be criminally liable for a felony by dolo, there must be a confluence of both an
evil act and an evil intent. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea.35

In the present case, the prosecution proved that the petitioner was married to Gaña in
1975, and such marriage was not judicially declared a nullity; hence, the marriage is
presumed to subsist.36 The prosecution also proved that the petitioner married the private
complainant in 1996, long after the effectivity of the Family Code.

The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he married the
private complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a
valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense negates malice or
criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse because everyone is
presumed to know the law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat.
It was the burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that when he married the private
complainant in 1996, he was of the well-grounded belief
that his first wife was already dead, as he had not heard from her for more than 20 years
since 1975. He should have adduced in evidence a decision of a competent court
declaring the presumptive death of his first wife as required by Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code, in relation to Article 41 of the Family Code. Such judicial declaration also
constitutes proof that the petitioner acted in good faith, and would negate criminal intent
on his part when he married the private complainant and, as a consequence, he could
not be held guilty of bigamy in such case. The petitioner, however, failed to discharge his
burden.

The phrase "or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by
means of a judgment rendered on the proceedings" in Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code was not an aggroupment of empty or useless words. The requirement for a
judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse is for the benefit of the spouse
present, as protection from the pains and the consequences of a second marriage,
precisely because he/she could be charged and convicted of bigamy if the defense of
good faith based on mere testimony is found incredible.

The requirement of judicial declaration is also for the benefit of the State. Under Article II,
Section 12 of the Constitution, the "State shall protect and strengthen the family as a
basic autonomous social institution." Marriage is a social institution of the highest
importance. Public policy, good morals and the interest of society require that the marital
relation should be surrounded with every safeguard and its severance only in the manner
prescribed and the causes specified by law. 37 The laws regulating civil marriages are
necessary to serve the interest, safety, good order, comfort or general welfare of the
community and the parties can waive nothing essential to the validity of the proceedings.
A civil marriage anchors an ordered society by encouraging stable relationships over
transient ones; it enhances the welfare of the community.

In a real sense, there are three parties to every civil marriage; two willing spouses and an
approving State. On marriage, the parties assume new relations to each other and the
State touching nearly on every aspect of life and death. The consequences of an invalid
marriage to the parties, to innocent parties and to society, are so serious that the law
may well take means calculated to ensure the procurement of the most positive evidence
of death of the first spouse or of the presumptive death of the absent spouse 38 after the
lapse of the period provided for under the law. One such means is the requirement of the
declaration by a competent court of the presumptive death of an absent spouse as proof
that the present spouse contracts a subsequent marriage on a well-grounded belief of the
death of the first spouse. Indeed, "men readily believe what they wish to be true," is a
maxim of the old jurists. To sustain a second marriage and to vacate a first because one
of the parties believed the other to be dead would make the existence of the marital
relation determinable, not by certain extrinsic facts, easily capable of forensic
ascertainment and proof, but by the subjective condition of individuals. 39 Only with such
proof can marriage be treated as so dissolved as to permit second marriages. 40 Thus,
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code has made the dissolution of marriage dependent
not only upon the personal belief of parties, but upon certain objective facts easily
capable of accurate judicial cognizance, 41 namely, a judgment of the presumptive death
of the absent spouse.

The petitioner’s sole reliance on Article 390 of the Civil Code as basis for his acquittal for
bigamy is misplaced.

Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code provide –

Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not, the absentee
still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.

The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till
after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an
absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened.

Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of
the estate among the heirs:

(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is
missing, who has not been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or
aeroplane;

(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for
four years;

(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his
existence has not been known for four years.

The presumption of death of the spouse who had been absent for seven years, it being
unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, is created by law and arises without any
necessity of judicial declaration.42 However, Article 41 of the Family Code, which
amended the foregoing rules on presumptive death, reads:

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent
marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse
present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the
provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be
sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph,
the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Court for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse.43

With the effectivity of the Family Code, 44 the period of seven years under the first
paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil Code was reduced to four consecutive years. Thus,
before the spouse present may contract a subsequent marriage, he or she must institute
summary proceedings for the declaration of the presumptive death of the absentee
spouse,45 without prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the absentee spouse. As
explained by this Court in Armas v. Calisterio:46

In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent bigamous marriage
may exceptionally be considered valid, the following conditions must concur, viz.: (a) The
prior spouse of the contracting party must have been absent for four consecutive years,
or two years where there is danger of death under the circumstances stated in Article 391
of the Civil Code at the time of disappearance; (b) the spouse present has a well-founded
belief that the absent spouse is already dead; and (c) there is, unlike the old rule, a
judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absentee for which purpose the spouse
present can institute a summary proceeding in court to ask for that declaration. The last
condition is consistent and in consonance with the requirement of judicial intervention in
subsequent marriages as so provided in Article 41, in relation to Article 40, of the Family
Code.
The Court rejects petitioner’s contention that the requirement of instituting a petition for
declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is designed merely
to enable the spouse present to contract a valid second marriage and not for the acquittal
of one charged with bigamy. Such provision was designed to harmonize civil law and
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and put to rest the confusion spawned by the
rulings of this Court and comments of eminent authorities on Criminal Law.

As early as March 6, 1937, this Court ruled in Jones v. Hortiguela47 that, for purposes of
the marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an
absentee before the spouse present may contract a subsequent marriage. It held that the
declaration of absence made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has for
its sole purpose the taking of the necessary precautions for the administration of the
estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only
requires that the former spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time
of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse
to be living, that such former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse
present so believes at the time of the celebration of the marriage. 48 In In Re Szatraw,49 the
Court declared that a judicial declaration that a person is presumptively dead, because
he or she had been unheard from in seven years, being a presumption juris tantum only,
subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of finality or become final; and that proof
of actual death of the person presumed dead being unheard from in seven years, would
have to be made in another proceeding to have such particular fact finally determined.
The Court ruled that if a judicial decree declaring a person presumptively dead because
he or she had not been heard from in seven years cannot become final and executory
even after the lapse of the reglementary period within which an appeal may be taken, for
such presumption is still disputable and remains subject to contrary proof, then a petition
for such a declaration is useless, unnecessary, superfluous and of no benefit to the
petitioner. The Court stated that it should not waste its valuable time and be made to
perform a superfluous and meaningless act. 50 The Court also took note that a petition for
a declaration of the presumptive death of an absent spouse may even be made in
collusion with the other spouse.

In Lukban v. Republic of the Philippines,51 the Court declared that the words "proper
proceedings" in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code can only refer to those authorized
by law such as Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code which refer to the administration or
settlement of the estate of a deceased person. In Gue v. Republic of the Philippines,52 the
Court rejected the contention of the petitioner therein that, under Article 390 of the Civil
Code, the courts are authorized to declare the presumptive death of a person after an
absence of seven years. The Court reiterated its rulings in Szatraw, Lukban and Jones.

Former Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino was of the view that "the provision of Article 349
or "before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment reached in the proper proceedings" is erroneous and should be considered as
not written. He opined that such provision presupposes that, if the prior marriage has not
been legally dissolved and the absent first spouse has not been declared presumptively
dead in a proper court proceedings, the subsequent marriage is bigamous. He maintains
that the supposition is not true. 53 A second marriage is bigamous only when the
circumstances in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 83 of the Civil Code are not
present.54 Former Senator Ambrosio Padilla was, likewise, of the view that Article 349
seems to require judicial decree of dissolution or judicial declaration of absence but even
with such decree, a second marriage in good faith will not constitute bigamy. He posits
that a second marriage, if not illegal, even if it be annullable, should not give rise to
bigamy.55 Former Justice Luis B. Reyes, on the other hand, was of the view that in the
case of an absent spouse who could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil
Code, the spouse present cannot be charged and convicted of bigamy in case he/she
contracts a second marriage.56
The Committee tasked to prepare the Family Code proposed the amendments of Articles
390 and 391 of the Civil Code to conform to Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in
that, in a case where a spouse is absent for the requisite period, the present spouse may
contract a subsequent marriage only after securing a judgment declaring the presumptive
death of the absent spouse to avoid being charged and convicted of bigamy; the present
spouse will have to adduce evidence that he had a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead. 57 Such judgment is proof of the good faith of the present
spouse who contracted a subsequent marriage; thus, even if the present spouse is later
charged with bigamy if the absentee spouse reappears, he cannot be convicted of the
crime. As explained by former Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy:

… Such rulings, however, conflict with Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code providing that
the present spouse must first ask for a declaration of presumptive death of the absent
spouse in order not to be guilty of bigamy in case he or she marries again.

The above Article of the Family Code now clearly provides that for the purpose of the
present spouse contracting a second marriage, he or she must file a summary
proceeding as provided in the Code for the declaration of the presumptive death of the
absentee, without prejudice to the latter’s reappearance. This provision is intended to
protect the present spouse from a criminal prosecution for bigamy under Art. 349 of the
Revised Penal Code because with the judicial declaration that the missing spouses
presumptively dead, the good faith of the present spouse in contracting a second
marriage is already established.58

Of the same view is former Dean Ernesto L. Pineda (now Undersecretary of Justice) who
wrote that things are now clarified. He says judicial declaration of presumptive death is
now authorized for purposes of
remarriage. The present spouse must institute a summary proceeding for declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, where the ordinary rules of procedure in trial will not
be followed. Affidavits will suffice, with possible clarificatory examinations of affiants if the
Judge finds it necessary for a full grasp of the facts. The judgment declaring an absentee
as presumptively dead is without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the said
absentee.

Dean Pineda further states that before, the weight of authority is that the clause "before
the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead x x x" should be disregarded
because of Article 83, paragraph 3 of the Civil Code. With the new law, there is a need to
institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of the presumptive death of the
absentee, otherwise, there is bigamy.59

According to Retired Supreme Court Justice Florenz D. Regalado, an eminent authority

on Criminal Law, in some cases where an absentee spouse is believed to be dead, there
must be a judicial declaration of presumptive death, which could then be made only in the
proceedings for the settlement of his estate. 60 Before such declaration, it was held that
the remarriage of the other spouse is bigamous even if done in good faith. 61 Justice
Regalado opined that there were contrary views because of the ruling in Jones and the
provisions of Article 83(2) of the Civil Code, which, however, appears to have been set to
rest by Article 41 of the Family Code, "which requires a summary hearing for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse before the other spouse can
remarry."

Under Article 238 of the Family Code, a petition for a declaration of the presumptive
death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code may be filed under
Articles 239 to 247 of the same Code.62
On the second issue, the petitioner, likewise, faults the trial court and the CA for
awarding moral damages in favor of the private complainant. The petitioner maintains
that moral damages may be awarded only in any of the cases provided in Article 2219 of
the Civil Code, and bigamy is not one of them. The petitioner asserts that the appellate
court failed to apply its ruling in People v. Bondoc,63 where an award of moral damages
for bigamy was disallowed. In any case, the petitioner maintains, the private complainant
failed to adduce evidence to prove moral damages.

The appellate court awarded moral damages to the private complainant on its finding that
she adduced evidence to prove the same. The appellate court ruled that while bigamy is
not included in those cases enumerated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, it is not
proscribed from awarding moral damages against the petitioner. The appellate court
ruled that it is not bound by the following ruling in People v. Bondoc:

... Pero si en dichos asuntos se adjudicaron daños, ello se debió indedublamente porque

el articulo 2219 del Código Civil de Filipinas autoriza la adjudicación de daños morales
en los delitos de estupro, rapto, violación, adulterio o concubinato, y otros actos lascivos,
sin incluir en esta enumeración el delito de bigamia. No existe, por consiguiente, base
legal para adjudicar aquí los daños de ₱5,000.00 arriba mencionados. 64

The OSG posits that the findings and ruling of the CA are based on the evidence and the
law. The OSG, likewise, avers that the CA was not bound by its ruling in People v.
Rodeo.

The Court rules against the petitioner.

Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar
injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if
they are the proximate result of the defendant’s wrongful act or omission. 65 An award for
moral damages requires the confluence of the following conditions: first, there must be an
injury, whether physical, mental or psychological, clearly sustained by the
claimant; second, there must be culpable act or omission factually established; third, the
wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained
by the claimant; and fourth, the award of damages is predicated on any of the cases
stated in Article 2219 or Article 2220 of the Civil Code. 66

Moral damages may be awarded in favor of the offended party only in criminal cases
enumerated in Article 2219, paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5 and 7 of the Civil Code and analogous
cases, viz.:

Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases.

(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;

(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;

(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;

(4) Adultery or concubinage;

(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;

(6) Illegal search;

(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;

(8) Malicious prosecution;

(9) Acts mentioned in article 309;

(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35.

The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in No. 3 of
this article, may also recover moral damages.

The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may bring the action
mentioned in No. 9 of this article in the order named.

Thus, the law does not intend that moral damages should be awarded in all cases where
the aggrieved party has suffered mental anguish, fright, moral anxieties, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury arising
out of an act or omission of another, otherwise, there would not have been any reason for
the inclusion of specific acts in Article 2219 67 and analogous cases (which refer to those
cases bearing analogy or resemblance, corresponds to some others or resembling, in
other respects, as in form, proportion, relation, etc.)68

Indeed, bigamy is not one of those specifically mentioned in Article 2219 of the Civil
Code in which the offender may be ordered to pay moral damages to the private
complainant/offended party. Nevertheless, the petitioner is liable to the private
complainant for moral damages under Article 2219 in relation to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of
the Civil Code.

According to Article 19, "every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and
good faith." This provision contains what is commonly referred to as the principle of
abuse of rights, and sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the
exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s duties. The standards are
the following: act with justice; give everyone his due; and observe honesty and good
faith. The elements for abuse of rights are: (a) there is a legal right or duty; (b) exercised
in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. 69

Article 20 speaks of the general sanctions of all other provisions of law which do not
especially provide for its own sanction. When a right is exercised in a manner which does
not conform to the standards set forth in the said provision and results in damage to
another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be
responsible.70 If the provision does not provide a remedy for its violation, an action for
damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code would be proper. Article
20 provides that "every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes
damage to another shall indemnify the latter for the same." On the other hand, Article 21
provides that "any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
damages." The latter provision
is adopted to remedy "the countless gaps in the statutes which leave so many victims of
moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury
should vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it
is impossible for human foresight to prove for specifically in the statutes." Whether or not
the principle of abuse of rights has been violated resulting in damages under Article 20 or
Article 21 of the Civil Code or other applicable provisions of law depends upon the
circumstances of each case.71
In the present case, the petitioner courted the private complainant and proposed to marry
her. He assured her that he was single. He even brought his parents to the house of the
private complainant where he and his parents made the same assurance – that he was
single. Thus, the private complainant agreed to marry the petitioner, who even stated in
the certificate of marriage that he was single. She lived with the petitioner and dutifully
performed her duties as his wife, believing all the while that he was her lawful husband.
For two years or so until the petitioner heartlessly abandoned her, the private
complainant had no inkling that he was already married to another before they were
married.

Thus, the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioner’s chicanery and
heartless deception, the fraud consisting not of a single act alone, but a continuous
series of acts. Day by day, he maintained the appearance of being a lawful husband to
the private complainant, who
changed her status from a single woman to a married woman, lost the consortium,
attributes and support of a single man she could have married lawfully and endured
mental pain and humiliation, being bound to a man who it turned out was not her lawful
husband.72

The Court rules that the petitioner’s collective acts of fraud and deceit before, during and
after his marriage with the private complainant were willful, deliberate and with malice
and caused injury to the latter. That she did not sustain any physical injuries is not a bar
to an award for moral damages. Indeed, in Morris v. Macnab,73 the New Jersey Supreme
Court ruled:

xxx The defendant cites authorities which indicate that, absent physical injuries, damages
for shame, humiliation, and mental anguish are not recoverable where the actor is simply
negligent. See Prosser, supra, at p. 180; 2 Harper & James, Torts, 1031 (1956). But the
authorities all recognize that where the wrong is willful rather than negligent, recovery
may be had for the ordinary, natural, and proximate consequences though they consist of
shame, humiliation, and mental anguish. See Spiegel v. Evergreen Cemetery Co., 117
NJL 90, 94, 186 A 585 (Sup. Ct. 1936); Kuzma v. Millinery Workers, etc., Local 24, 27
N.J. Super, 579, 591, 99 A.2d 833 (App. Div. 1953); Prosser, supra, at p. 38. Here the
defendant’s conduct was not merely negligent, but was willfully and maliciously wrongful.
It was bound to result in shame, humiliation, and mental anguish for the plaintiff, and
when such result did ensue the plaintiff became entitled not only to compensatory but
also to punitive damages. See Spiegel v. Evergreen Cemetery Co., supra; Kuzma v
Millinery Workers, etc., Local 24, supra. CF. Note, "Exemplary Damages in the Law of
Torts," 70 Harv. L. Rev. 517 (1957). The plaintiff testified that because of the defendant’s
bigamous marriage to her and the attendant publicity she not only was embarrassed and
"ashamed to go out" but "couldn’t sleep" but "couldn’t eat," had terrific headaches" and
"lost quite a lot of weight." No just basis appears for judicial interference with the jury’s
reasonable allowance of $1,000 punitive damages on the first count. See Cabakov v.
Thatcher, 37 N.J. Super 249, 117 A.2d 298 (App. Div.74 1955).

The Court thus declares that the petitioner’s acts are against public policy as they
undermine and subvert the family as a social institution, good morals and the interest and
general welfare of society.

Because the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioner’s perfidy, she is
not barred from claiming moral damages. Besides, even considerations of public policy
would not prevent her from recovery. As held in Jekshewitz v. Groswald:75

Where a person is induced by the fraudulent representation of another to do an act

which, in consequence of such misrepresentation, he believes to be neither illegal nor
immoral, but which is in fact a criminal offense, he has a right of action against the
person so inducing him for damages sustained by him in consequence of his having
done such act. Burrows v. Rhodes, [1899] 1 Q.B. 816. In Cooper v. Cooper, 147 Mass.
370, 17 N.E. 892, 9 Am. St. Rep. 721, the court said that a false representation by the
defendant that he was divorced from his former wife, whereby the plaintiff was induced to
marry him, gave her a remedy in tort for deceit. It seems to have been assumed that the
fact that she had unintentionally violated the law or innocently committed a crime by
cohabiting with him would be no bar to the action, but rather that it might be a ground for
enhancing her damages. The injury to the plaintiff was said to be in her being led by the
promise to give the fellowship and assistance of a wife to one who was not her husband
and to assume and act in a relation and condition that proved to be false and
ignominious. Damages for such an injury were held to be recoverable in Sherman v.
Rawson, 102 Mass. 395 and Kelley v. Riley, 106 Mass. 339, 343, 8 Am. Rep. 336.

Furthermore, in the case at bar the plaintiff does not base her cause of action upon any
transgression of the law by herself but upon the defendant’s misrepresentation. The
criminal relations which followed, innocently on her part, were but one of the incidental
results of the defendant’s fraud for which damages may be assessed.

[7] Actions for deceit for fraudulently inducing a woman to enter into the marriage relation
have been maintained in other jurisdictions. Sears v. Wegner, 150 Mich. 388, 114 N.W.
224, 17 L.R. A. (N.S.) 819; Larson v. McMillan, 99 Wash. 626, 170 P. 324; Blossom v.
Barrett, 37 N.Y. 434, 97 Am. Dec. 747; Morril v. Palmer, 68 Vt. 1, 33 A. 829, 33 L.R.A.
411. Considerations of public policy would not prevent recovery where the circumstances
are such that the plaintiff was conscious of no moral turpitude, that her illegal action was
induced solely by the defendant’s misrepresentation, and that she does not base her
cause of action upon any transgression of the law by herself. Such considerations
distinguish this case from cases in which the court has refused to lend its aid to the
enforcement of a contract illegal on its face or to one who has consciously and voluntarily
become a party to an illegal act upon which the cause of action is founded. Szadiwicz v.
Cantor, 257 Mass. 518, 520, 154 N.E. 251, 49 A. L. R. 958. 76

Considering the attendant circumstances of the case, the Court finds the award of
₱200,000.00 for moral damages to be just and reasonable.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of

the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO

Associate Justice

Chairman

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

 On leave

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO

Associate Justice
Chairman, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairman’s
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision were reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 159614 December 9, 2005

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (TENTH DIVISION), and ALAN B.
ALEGRO, Respondents.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

On March 29, 2001, Alan B. Alegro filed a petition in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 27, for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife,
Rosalia (Lea) A. Julaton.

In an Order dated April 16, 2001, the court set the petition for hearing on May 30, 2001 at
1 

8:30 a.m. and directed that a copy of the said order be published once a week for three
(3) consecutive weeks in the Samar Reporter, a newspaper of general circulation in the
Province of Samar, and
that a copy be posted in the court’s bulletin board for at least three weeks before the next
scheduled hearing. The court also directed that copies of the order be served on the
Solicitor General, the Provincial Prosecutor of Samar, and Alan, through counsel, and
that copies be sent to Lea by registered mail. Alan complied with all the foregoing
jurisdictional requirements.2

On May 28, 2001, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition, which was, however, denied by the
3 

court for failure to comply with Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. 4

At the hearing, Alan adduced evidence that he and Lea were married on January 20,
1995 in Catbalogan, Samar. He testified that, on February 6, 1995, Lea arrived home
5 

late in the evening and he berated her for being always out of their house. He told her
that if she enjoyed the life of a single person, it would be better for her to go back to her
parents. Lea did not reply. Alan narrated that, when he reported for work the following
6 

day, Lea was still in the house, but when he arrived home later in the day, Lea was
nowhere to be found. Alan thought that Lea merely went to her parents’ house in Bliss,
7 

Sto. Niño, Catbalogan, Samar. However, Lea did not return to their house anymore.
8 

Alan further testified that, on February 14, 1995, after his work, he went to the house of
Lea’s parents to see if she was there, but he was told that she was not there. He also
went to the house of Lea’s friend, Janeth Bautista, at Barangay Canlapwas, but he was
informed by Janette’s brother-in-law, Nelson Abaenza, that Janeth had left for Manila. 9 

When Alan went back to the house of his parents-in-law, he learned from his father-in-
law that Lea had been to their house but that she left without notice. Alan sought the
10 

help of Barangay Captain Juan Magat, who promised to help him locate his wife. He also
inquired from his friends of Lea’s whereabouts but to no avail. 11

Sometime in June 1995, he decided to go to Manila to look for Lea, but his mother asked
him to leave after the town fiesta of Catbalogan, hoping that Lea may come home for the
fiesta. Alan agreed. However, Lea did not show up. Alan then left for Manila on August
12 

27, 1995. He went to a house in Navotas where Janeth, Lea’s friend, was staying. When
asked where Lea was, Janeth told him that she had not seen her. He failed to find out
13 

Lea’s whereabouts despite his repeated talks with Janeth. Alan decided to work as a
part-time taxi driver. On his free time, he would look for Lea in the malls but still to no
avail. He returned to Catbalogan in 1997 and again looked for his wife but failed. 14

On June 20, 2001, Alan reported Lea’s disappearance to the local police station. The 15 

police authorities issued an Alarm Notice on July 4, 2001. Alan also reported Lea’s
16 

disappearance to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) on July 9, 2001. 17

Barangay Captain Juan Magat corroborated the testimony of Alan. He declared that on

February 14, 1995, at 2:00 p.m., Alan inquired from him if Lea passed by his house and
he told Alan that she did not. Alan also told him that Lea had disappeared. He had not
seen Lea in the barangay ever since. Lea’s father, who was his compadre and the owner
18 

of Radio DYMS, told him that he did not know where Lea was. 19

After Alan rested his case, neither the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor nor the Solicitor
General adduced evidence in opposition to the petition.

On January 8, 2002, the court rendered judgment granting the petition. The fallo of the
decision reads:

WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, petitioner’s absent spouse ROSALIA
JULATON is hereby declared PRESUMPTIVELY DEAD for the purpose of the
petitioner’s subsequent marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines,
without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the said absent spouse.

SO ORDERED. 20

The OSG appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals (CA) which rendered judgment
on August 4, 2003, affirming the decision of the RTC. The CA cited the ruling of this
21 

Court in Republic v. Nolasco. 22

The OSG filed a petition for review on certiorari of the CA’s decision alleging that
respondent Alan B. Alegro failed to prove that he had a well-founded belief that Lea was
already dead. It averred that the respondent failed to exercise reasonable and diligent
23 

efforts to locate his wife. The respondent even admitted that Lea’s father told him on
February 14, 1995 that Lea had been to their house but left without notice. The OSG
pointed out that the respondent reported his wife’s disappearance to the local police and
also to the NBI only after the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the petition. The
petitioner avers that, as gleaned from the evidence, the respondent did not really want to
find and locate Lea. Finally, the petitioner averred:

In view of the summary nature of proceedings under Article 41 of the Family Code for the
declaration of presumptive death of one’s spouse, the degree of due diligence set by this
Honorable Court in the above-mentioned cases in locating the whereabouts of a missing
spouse must be strictly complied with. There have been times when Article 41 of the
Family Code had been resorted to by parties wishing to remarry knowing fully well that
their alleged missing spouses are alive and well. It is even possible that those who
cannot have their marriages x x x declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family
Code resort to Article 41 of the Family Code for relief because of the x x x summary
nature of its proceedings.

It is the policy of the State to protect and strengthen the family as a basic social
institution. Marriage is the foundation of the family. Since marriage is an inviolable social
institution that the 1987 Constitution seeks to protect from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. For respondent’s failure to prove that he had a well-founded belief that his wife is
already
dead and that he exerted the required amount of diligence in searching for his missing
wife, the petition for declaration of presumptive death should have been denied by the
trial court and the Honorable Court of Appeals. 24

The petition is meritorious.

Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines reads:

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent
marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse
present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is danger under the circumstances set forth in the provisions
of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph,
the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse. 25

The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and that
he has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the present
spouse may contract a subsequent marriage. The law does not define what is meant by a
well-grounded belief. Cuello Callon writes that "es menester que su creencia sea firme se
funde en motivos racionales." 26

Belief is a state of the mind or condition prompting the doing of an overt act. It may be
proved by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence which may tend, even in a slight
degree, to elucidate the inquiry or assist to a determination probably founded in truth.
Any fact or circumstance relating to the character, habits, conditions, attachments,
prosperity and objects of life which usually control the conduct of men, and are the
motives of their actions, was, so far as it tends to explain or characterize their
disappearance or throw light on their intentions, competence evidence on the ultimate
27 

question of his death.

The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness
inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the
absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted
on a well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be
drawn from a great many circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of
the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by present spouse. 28

Although testimonial evidence may suffice to prove the well-founded belief of the present
spouse that the absent spouse is already dead, in Republic v. Nolasco, the Court 29 

warned against collusion between the parties when they find it impossible to dissolve the
marital bonds through existing legal means. It is also the maxim that "men readily believe
what they wish to be true."
In this case, the respondent failed to present a witness other than Barangay Captain
Juan Magat. The respondent even failed to present Janeth Bautista or Nelson Abaenza
or any other person from whom he allegedly made inquiries about Lea to corroborate his
testimony. On the other hand, the respondent admitted that when he returned to the
house of his parents-in-law on February 14, 1995, his father-in-law told him that Lea had
just been there but that she left without notice.

The respondent declared that Lea left their abode on February 7, 1995 after he chided
her for coming home late and for being always out of their house, and told her that it
would be better for her to go home to her parents if she enjoyed the life of a single
person. Lea, thus, left their conjugal abode and never returned. Neither did she
communicate with the respondent after leaving the conjugal abode because of her
resentment to the chastisement she received from him barely a month after their
marriage. What is so worrisome is that, the respondent failed to make inquiries from his
parents-in-law regarding Lea’s whereabouts before filing his petition in the RTC. It could
have enhanced the credibility of the respondent had he made inquiries from his parents-
in-law about Lea’s whereabouts considering that Lea’s father was the owner of Radio
DYMS.

The respondent did report and seek the help of the local police authorities and the NBI to
locate Lea, but it was only an afterthought. He did so only after the OSG filed its notice to
dismiss his petition in the RTC.

In sum, the Court finds and so holds that the respondent failed to prove that he had a
well-founded belief, before he filed his petition in the RTC, that his spouse Rosalia (Lea)
Julaton was already dead.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 73749 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Consequently, the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 27,
is ORDERED to DISMISS the respondent’s petition.

SO ORDERED.

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO

Associate Justice

Chairman

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairman, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairman’s
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision were reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 180863               September 8, 2009

ANGELITA VALDEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Camiling, Tarlac dated
November 12, 2007 dismissing petitioner Angelita Valdez’s petition for the declaration of
presumptive death of her husband, Sofio Polborosa (Sofio).

The facts of the case are as follows:

Petitioner married Sofio on January 11, 1971 in Pateros, Rizal. On December 13, 1971,
petitioner gave birth to the spouses’ only child, Nancy. According to petitioner, she and
Sofio argued constantly because the latter was unemployed and did not bring home any
money. In March 1972, Sofio left their conjugal dwelling. Petitioner and their child waited
for him to return but, finally, in May 1972, petitioner decided to go back to her parents’
home in Bancay 1st, Camiling, Tarlac. Three years passed without any word from Sofio.
In October 1975, Sofio showed up at Bancay 1st. He and petitioner talked for several
hours and they agreed to separate. They executed a document to that effect. 1 That was
the last time petitioner saw him. After that, petitioner didn’t hear any news of Sofio, his
whereabouts or even if he was alive or not.2

Believing that Sofio was already dead, petitioner married Virgilio Reyes on June 20,
1985.3 Subsequently, however, Virgilio’s application for naturalization filed with the United
States Department of Homeland Security was denied because petitioner’s marriage to
Sofio was subsisting.4 Hence, on March 29, 2007, petitioner filed a Petition before the
RTC of Camiling, Tarlac seeking the declaration of presumptive death of Sofio.

The RTC rendered its Decision5 on November 12, 2007, dismissing the Petition for lack
of merit. The RTC held that Angelita "was not able to prove the well-grounded belief that
her husband Sofio Polborosa was already dead." It said that under Article 41 of the
Family Code, the present spouse is burdened to prove that her spouse has been absent
and that she has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the
present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage. This belief, the RTC said, must be
the result of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the
whereabouts of the absent spouse.

The RTC found that, by petitioner’s own admission, she did not try to find her husband
anymore in light of their mutual agreement to live separately. Likewise, petitioner’s
daughter testified that her mother prevented her from looking for her father. The RTC
also said there is a strong possibility that Sofio is still alive, considering that he would
have been only 61 years old by then, and people who have reached their 60s have not
become increasingly low in health and spirits, and, even assuming as true petitioner’s
testimony that Sofio was a chain smoker and a drunkard, there is no evidence that he
continues to drink and smoke until now.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. 6 She argued that it is the Civil Code that
applies in this case and not the Family Code since petitioner’s marriage to Sofio was
celebrated on January 11, 1971, long before the Family Code took effect. Petitioner
further argued that she had acquired a vested right under the provisions of the Civil Code
and the stricter provisions of the Family Code should not be applied against her because
Title XIV of the Civil Code, where Articles 384 and 390 on declaration of absence and
presumption of death, respectively, can be found, was not expressly repealed by the
Family Code. To apply the stricter provisions of the Family Code will impair the rights
petitioner had acquired under the Civil Code.

The RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration in a Resolution dated December 10,
2007.7

Petitioner now comes before this Court seeking the reversal of the RTC Decision and
Motion for Reconsideration.

In its Manifestation and Motion, 8 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) recommended
that the Court set aside the assailed RTC Decision and grant the Petition to declare Sofio
presumptively dead. The OSG argues that the requirement of "well-founded belief" under
Article 41 of the Family Code is not applicable to the instant case. It said that petitioner
could not be expected to comply with this requirement because it was not yet in
existence during her marriage to Virgilio Reyes in 1985. The OSG further argues that
before the effectivity of the Family Code, petitioner already acquired a vested right as to
the validity of her marriage to Virgilio Reyes based on the presumed death of Sofio under
the Civil Code. This vested right and the presumption of Sofio’s death, the OSG posits,
could not be affected by the obligations created under the Family Code. 9

Next, the OSG contends that Article 390 of the Civil Code was not repealed by Article 41
of the Family Code.10 Title XIV of the Civil Code, the OSG said, was not one of those
expressly repealed by the Family Code. Moreover, Article 256 of the Family Code
provides that its provisions shall not be retroactively applied if they will prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights.11

The RTC Decision, insofar as it dismissed the Petition, is affirmed. However, we must
state that we are denying the Petition on grounds different from those cited in the RTC
Decision.

Initially, we discuss a procedural issue. Under the Rules of Court, a party may directly
appeal to this Court from a decision of the trial court only on pure questions of law. A
question of law lies, on one hand, when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law
is on a certain set of facts; on the other hand, a question of fact exists when the doubt or
difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts. Here, the facts are not
disputed; the controversy merely relates to the correct application of the law or
jurisprudence to the undisputed facts.12
The RTC erred in applying the provisions of the Family Code and holding that petitioner
needed to prove a "well-founded belief" that Sofio was already dead. The RTC applied
Article 41 of the Family Code, to wit:

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage
shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior
spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-
founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where
there is danger under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the
Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph,
the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse.

It is readily apparent, however, that the marriages of petitioner to Sofio and Virgilio on
January 11, 1971 and June 20, 1985, respectively, were both celebrated under the
auspices of the Civil Code.

The pertinent provision of the Civil Code is Article 83:

Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the
first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal
and void from its performance, unless:

(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or

(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the
second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, of
if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally
considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of
contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to
Articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases
until declared null and void by a competent court.

Article 390 of the Civil Code states:

Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee
still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.

The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till
after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an
absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened.

The Court, on several occasions, had interpreted the above-quoted provision in this wise:

For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse
judicially declared an absentee. The declaration of absence made in accordance with the
provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable the taking of the necessary
precautions for the administration of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of
civil marriage, however, the law only requires that the former spouse has been absent for
seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the spouse present
does not know his or her former spouse to be living, that such former spouse is generally
reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes at the time of the celebration of
the marriage.13

Further, the Court explained that presumption of death cannot be the subject of court
proceedings independent of the settlement of the absentee’s estate.

In re Szatraw14 is instructive. In that case, petitioner contracted marriage with a Polish

national in 1937. They lived together as husband and wife for three years. Sometime in
1940, the husband, on the pretext of visiting some friends, left the conjugal abode with
their child and never returned. After inquiring from friends, petitioner found that her
husband went to Shanghai, China. However, friends who came from Shanghai told her
that the husband was not seen there. In 1948, petitioner filed a petition for the declaration
of presumptive death of her husband arguing that since the latter had been absent for
more than seven years and she had not heard any news from him and about her child,
she believes that he is dead. In deciding the case, the Court said:

The petition is not for the settlement of the estate of Nicolai Szatraw, because it does not
appear that he possessed property brought to the marriage and because he had
acquired no property during his married life with the petitioner. The rule invoked by the
latter is merely one of evidence which permits the court to presume that a person is dead
after the fact that such person had been unheard from in seven years had been
established. This presumption may arise and be invoked and made in a case, either in an
action or in a special proceeding, which is tried or heard by, and submitted for decision
to, a competent court. Independently of such an action or special proceeding, the
presumption of death cannot be invoked, nor can it be made the subject of an action or
special proceeding. In this case, there is no right to be enforced nor is there a remedy
prayed for by the petitioner against her absent husband. Neither is there a prayer for the
final determination of his right or status or for the ascertainment of a particular fact
(Hagans v. Wislizenus, 42 Phil. 880), for the petition does not pray for a declaration that
the petitioner's husband is dead, but merely asks for a declaration that he be presumed
dead because he had been unheard from in seven years. If there is any pretense at
securing a declaration that the petitioner's husband is dead, such a pretension cannot be
granted because it is unauthorized. The petition is for a declaration that the petitioner's
husband is presumptively dead. But this declaration, even if judicially made, would not
improve the petitioner's situation, because such a presumption is already established by
law. A judicial pronouncement to that effect, even if final and executory, would still be a
prima facie presumption only. It is still disputable. It is for that reason that it cannot be the
subject of a judicial pronouncement or declaration, if it is the only question or matter
involved in a case, or upon which a competent court has to pass. The latter must decide
finally the controversy between the parties, or determine finally the right or status of a
party or establish finally a particular fact, out of which certain rights and obligations arise
or may arise; and once such controversy is decided by a final judgment, or such right or
status determined, or such particular fact established, by a final decree, then the
judgment on the subject of the controversy, or the decree upon the right or status of a
party or upon the existence of a particular fact, becomes res judicata, subject to no
collateral attack, except in a few rare instances especially provided by law. It is,
therefore, clear that a judicial declaration that a person is presumptively dead, because
he had been unheard from in seven years, being a presumption juris tantum only, subject
to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of finality or become final. Proof of actual death
of the person presumed dead because he had been unheard from in seven years, would
have to be made in another proceeding to have such particular fact finally determined.  If 1avvphi1

a judicial decree declaring a person presumptively dead, because he had not been heard
from in seven years, cannot become final and executory even after the lapse of the
reglementary period within which an appeal may be taken, for such presumption is still
disputable and remains subject to contrary proof, then a petition for such a declaration is
useless, unnecessary, superfluous and of no benefit to the petitioner. 15
In Lukban v. Republic,16 petitioner Lourdes G. Lukban contracted marriage with Francisco
Chuidian on December 10, 1933. A few days later, on December 27, Francisco left
Lourdes after a violent quarrel. She did not hear from him after that day. Her diligent
search, inquiries from his parents and friends, and search in his last known address,
proved futile. Believing her husband was already dead since he had been absent for
more than twenty years, petitioner filed a petition in 1956 for a declaration that she is a
widow of her husband who is presumed to be dead and has no legal impediment to
contract a subsequent marriage. On the other hand, the antecedents in Gue v.
Republic17 are similar to Szatraw. On January 5, 1946, Angelina Gue’s husband left
Manila where they were residing and went to Shanghai, China. From that day on, he had
not been heard of, had not written to her, nor in anyway communicated with her as to his
whereabouts. Despite her efforts and diligence, she failed to locate him. After 11 years,
she asked the court for a declaration of the presumption of death of Willian Gue,
pursuant to the provisions of Article 390 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

In both cases, the Court reiterated its ruling in Szatraw. It held that a petition for judicial
declaration that petitioner's husband is presumed to be dead cannot be entertained
because it is not authorized by law.18

From the foregoing, it can be gleaned that, under the Civil Code, the presumption of
death is established by law 19 and no court declaration is needed for the presumption to
arise. Since death is presumed to have taken place by the seventh year of
absence,20 Sofio is to be presumed dead starting October 1982.

Consequently, at the time of petitioner’s marriage to Virgilio, there existed no impediment

to petitioner’s capacity to marry, and the marriage is valid under paragraph 2 of Article 83
of the Civil Code.

Further, considering that it is the Civil Code that applies, proof of "well-founded belief" is
not required. Petitioner could not have been expected to comply with this requirement
since the Family Code was not yet in effect at the time of her marriage to Virgilio. The
enactment of the Family Code in 1988 does not change this conclusion. The Family
Code itself states:

Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.

To retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code requiring petitioner to exhibit
"well-founded belief" will, ultimately, result in the invalidation of her second marriage,
which was valid at the time it was celebrated. Such a situation would be untenable and
would go against the objectives that the Family Code wishes to achieve.

In sum, we hold that the Petition must be dismissed since no decree on the presumption
of Sofio’s death can be granted under the Civil Code, the same presumption having
arisen by operation of law. However, we declare that petitioner was capacitated to marry
Virgilio at the time their marriage was celebrated in 1985 and, therefore, the said
marriage is legal and valid.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 184621               December 10, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
MARIA FE ESPINOSA CANTOR, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

The petition for review on certiorari  before us assails the decision  dated August 27, 2008
1 2

of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 01558-MIN which affirmed be

order  dated December 15, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 25,
3

Koronadal City, South Cotabato, in SP Proc. Case No. 313-25, declaring Jerry F. Cantor,
respondent Maria Fe Espinosa Cantor’s husband, presumptively dead under Article 41 of
the Family Code.

The Factual Antecedents

The respondent and Jerry were married on September 20, 1997. They lived together as
husband and wife in their conjugal dwelling in Agan Homes, Koronadal City, South
Cotabato. Sometime in January 1998, the couple had a violent quarrel brought about by:
(1) the respondent’s inability to reach "sexual climax" whenever she and Jerry would
have intimate moments; and (2) Jerry’s expression of animosity toward the respondent’s
father.

After their quarrel, Jerry left their conjugal dwelling and this was the last time that the
respondent ever saw him. Since then, she had not seen, communicated nor heard
anything from Jerry or about his whereabouts.

On May 21, 2002, or more than four (4) years from the time of Jerry’s disappearance, the
respondent filed before the RTC a petition4for her husband’s declaration of presumptive
death, docketed as SP Proc. Case No. 313-25. She claimed that she had a well-founded
belief that Jerry was already dead. She alleged that she had inquired from her mother-in-
law, her brothers-in-law, her sisters-in-law, as well as her neighbors and friends, but to no
avail. In the hopes of finding Jerry, she also allegedly made it a point to check the
patients’ directory whenever she went to a hospital. All these earnest efforts, the
respondent claimed, proved futile, prompting her to file the petition in court.
 The Ruling of the RTC

After due proceedings, the RTC issued an order granting the respondent’s petition and
declaring Jerry presumptively dead. It concluded that the respondent had a well-founded
belief that her husband was already dead since more than four (4) years had passed
without the former receiving any news about the latter or his whereabouts. The
dispositive portion of the order dated December 15, 2006 reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares, as it hereby declared that respondent Jerry F.
Cantor is presumptively dead pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines
without prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the absent spouse Jerry F. Cantor. 5

The Ruling of the CA

The case reached the CA through a petition for certiorari6filed by the petitioner, Republic
of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). In its August 27,
2008 decision, the CA dismissed the petitioner’s petition, finding no grave abuse of
discretion on the RTC’s part, and, accordingly, fully affirmed the latter’s order, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises foregoing (sic), the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and
the assailed Order dated December 15, 2006 declaring Jerry F. Cantor presumptively
dead is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. 7

The petitioner brought the matter via a Rule 45 petition before this Court. The Petition
The petitioner contends that certiorari lies to challenge the decisions, judgments or final
orders of trial courts in petitions for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse
under Rule 41 of the Family Code. It maintains that although judgments of trial courts in
summary judicial proceedings, including presumptive death cases, are deemed
immediately final and executory (hence, not appeal able under Article 247 of the Family
Code), this rule does not mean that they are not subject to review on certiorari.

The petitioner also posits that the respondent did not have a well-founded belief to justify
the declaration of her husband’s presumptive death. It claims that the respondent failed
to conduct the requisite diligent search for her missing husband. Likewise, the petitioner
invites this Court’s attention to the attendant circumstances surrounding the case,
particularly, the degree of search conducted and the respondent’s resultant failure to
meet the strict standard under Article 41 of the Family Code.

The Issues

The petition poses to us the following issues:

(1) Whether certiorarilies to challenge the decisions, judgments or final orders of trial
courts in petitions for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article
41 of the Family Code; and

(2) Whether the respondent had a well-founded belief that Jerry is already dead.

The Court’s Ruling

We grant the petition.

a. On the Issue of the Propriety of Certiorari as a Remedy

Court’s Judgment in the Judicial
Proceedings for Declaration of
Presumptive Death Is Final and
Executory, Hence, Unappealable

The Family Code was explicit that the court’s judgment in summary proceedings, such as
the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family
Code, shall be immediately final and executory.

Article 41,in relation to Article 247, of the Family Code provides:

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage
shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior
spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-
founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where
there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391
of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph
the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse.

Art. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory.
[underscores ours]

With the judgment being final, it necessarily follows that it is no longer subject to an
appeal, the dispositions and conclusions therein having become immutable and
unalterable not only as against the parties but even as against the courts.  Modification of
8

the court’s ruling, no matter how erroneous is no longer permissible. The final and
executory nature of this summary proceeding thus prohibits the resort to appeal. As
explained in Republic of the Phils. v. Bermudez-Lorino,  the right to appeal is not granted
9

to parties because of the express mandate of Article 247 of the Family Code, to wit:

In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no reglementary

period within which to perfect an appeal, precisely because judgments rendered
thereunder, by express provision of [Article] 247, Family Code, supra, are "immediately
final and executory." It was erroneous, therefore, on the part of the RTCto give due
course to the Republic’s appeal and order the transmittal of the entire records of the case
to the Court of Appeals.

An appellate court acquires no jurisdiction to review a judgment which, by express

provision of law, is immediately final and executory. As we have said in Veloria vs.
Comelec, "the right to appeal is not a natural right nor is it a part of due process, for it is
merely a statutory privilege." Since, by express mandate of Article 247 of the Family
Code, all judgments rendered in summary judicial proceedings in Family Law are
"immediately final and executory," the right to appeal was not granted to any of the
parties therein. The Republic of the Philippines, as oppositor in the petition for declaration
of presumptive death, should not be treated differently. It had no right to appeal the RTC
decision of November 7, 2001. [emphases ours; italics supplied]

Certiorari Lies to Challenge the

Decisions, Judgments or Final
Orders of Trial Courts in a Summary
Proceeding for the Declaration of Presumptive
Death Under the Family Code
A losing party in this proceeding, however, is not entirely left without a remedy. While
jurisprudence tells us that no appeal can be made from the trial court's judgment, an
aggrieved party may, nevertheless, file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court to question any abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
that transpired.

As held in Delos Santos v. Rodriguez, et al.,  the fact that a decision has become final
10

does not automatically negate the original action of the CA to issue certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus in connection with orders or processes issued by the trial court. Certiorari
may be availed of where a court has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion, and where the ordinary remedy of appeal is not available.
Such a procedure finds support in the case of Republic v. Tango,  wherein we held that:
11

This case presents an opportunity for us to settle the rule on appeal of judgments
rendered in summary proceedings under the Family Code and accordingly, refine our
previous decisions thereon.

Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN
THE FAMILY LAW, establishes the rules that govern summary court proceedings in the
Family Code:

"ART. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall
apply in all cases provided for in this Code requiring summary court proceedings. Such
cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner without regard to technical rules."

In turn, Article 253 of the Family Code specifies the cases covered by the rules in
chapters two and three of the same title. It states:

"ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2and 3 hereof shall likewise govern summary
proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar as they are
applicable."(Emphasis supplied.)

In plain text, Article 247 in Chapter 2 of the same title reads:

"ART.247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory."

By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be
immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be
had of the trial court's judgment ina summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes
without saying, however, that an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to
question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be
filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To
be sure, even if the Court's original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent
with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not
sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. [emphasis ours]

Viewed in this light, we find that the petitioner’s resort to certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court to question the RTC’s order declaring Jerry presumptively dead was
proper.

b. On the Issue of the Existence of Well-Founded Belief

The Essential Requisites for the
Declaration of Presumptive Death
Under Article 41 of the Family Code

Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be shown that
the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the present spouse had
a well-founded belief that the prior spouse was already dead. Under Article 41 of the
Family Code, there are four (4) essential requisites for the declaration of presumptive
death:

1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two
consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under
the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;

2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;

3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and

4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee. 12

The Present Spouse Has the Burden

of Proof to Show that All the
Requisites Under Article 41 of the
Family Code Are Present

The burden of proof rests on the present spouse to show that all the requisites under
Article 41 of the Family Code are present. Since it is the present spouse who, for
purposes of declaration of presumptive death, substantially asserts the affirmative of the
issue, it stands to reason that the burden of proof lies with him/her. He who alleges a fact
has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence. 13

Declaration of Presumptive Death

Under Article 41 of the Family Code
Imposes a Stricter Standard

Notably, Article 41 of the Family Code, compared to the old provision of the Civil Code
which it superseded, imposes a stricter standard. It requires a "well-founded belief " that
the absentee is already dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death can
be granted. We have had occasion to make the same observation in Republic v.
Nolasco,  where we noted the crucial differences between Article 41 of the Family Code
14

and Article 83 of the Civil Code, to wit:

Under Article 41, the time required for the presumption to arise has been shortened to
four (4) years; however, there is need for a judicial declaration of presumptive death to
enable the spouse present to remarry. Also, Article 41 of the Family Code imposes a
stricter standard than the Civil Code: Article 83 of the Civil Code merely requires either
that there be no news that such absentee is still alive; or the absentee is generally
considered to be dead and believed to be so by the spouse present, or is presumed dead
under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code. The Family Code, upon the other hand,
prescribes as "well founded belief" that the absentee is already dead before a petition for
declaration of presumptive death can be granted.

Thus, mere absence of the spouse (even for such period required by the law), lack of any
news that such absentee is still alive, failure to communicate or general presumption of
absence under the Civil Code would not suffice. This conclusion proceeds from the
premise that Article 41 of the Family Code places upon the present spouse the burden of
proving the additional and more stringent requirement of "well-founded belief" which can
only be discharged upon a showing of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and
efforts to ascertain not only the absent spouse’s whereabouts but, more importantly, that
the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. 15

The Requirement of Well-Founded Belief

The law did not define what is meant by "well-founded belief." It depends upon the
circumstances of each particular case. Its determination, so to speak, remains on a case-
to-case basis. To be able to comply with this requirement, the present spouse must prove
that his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate
the absent spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that
under the circumstances, the absent spouseis already dead. It requires exertion of active
effort (not a mere passive one).

To illustrate this degree of "diligent and reasonable search" required by the law, an
analysis of the following relevant cases is warranted:

i. Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.) 16

In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.),  the Court ruled that the
17

present spouse failed to prove that he had a well-founded belief that his absent spouse
was already dead before he filed his petition. His efforts to locate his absent wife
allegedly consisted of the following:

(1) He went to his in-laws’ house to look for her;

(2) He sought the barangay captain’s aid to locate her;

(3) He went to her friends’ houses to find her and inquired about her whereabouts among
his friends;

(4) He went to Manila and worked as a part-time taxi driver to look for her in malls during
his free time;

(5) He went back to Catbalogan and again looked for her; and

(6) He reported her disappearance to the local police station and to the NBI.

Despite these alleged "earnest efforts," the Court still ruled against the present spouse.
The Court found that he failed to present the persons from whom he allegedly made
inquiries and only reported his wife’s absence after the OSG filed its notice to dismiss his
petition in the RTC.

The Court also provided the following criteria for determining the existence of a "well-
founded belief" under Article 41 of the Family Code:

The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness
inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the
absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted
on a well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be
drawn from a great many circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of
the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by [the] present
spouse. 18

ii. Republic v. Granada 19

Similarly in Granada, the Court ruled that the absent spouse failed to prove her "well-
founded belief" that her absent spouse was already dead prior to her filing of the petition.
In this case, the present spouse alleged that her brother had made inquiries from their
relatives regarding the absent spouse’s whereabouts. The present spouse did not report
to the police nor seek the aid of the mass media. Applying the standards in Republic of
the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.),  the Court ruled against the present
20

spouse, as follows:

Applying the foregoing standards to the present case, petitioner points out that
respondent Yolanda did not initiate a diligent search to locate her absent husband. While
her brother Diosdado Cadacio testified to having inquiredabout the whereabouts of Cyrus
from the latter’s relatives, these relatives were not presented to corroborate Diosdado’s
testimony. In short, respondent was allegedly not diligent in her search for her husband.
Petitioner argues that if she were, she would have sought information from the
Taiwanese Consular Office or assistance from other government agencies in Taiwan or
the Philippines. She could have also utilized mass media for this end, but she did not.
Worse, she failed to explain these omissions.

iii.Republic v. Nolasco 21

In Nolasco, the present spouse filed a petition for declaration of presumptive death of his
wife, who had been missing for more than four years. He testified that his efforts to find
her consisted of:

(1) Searching for her whenever his ship docked in England;

(2) Sending her letters which were all returned to him; and

(3) Inquiring from their friends regarding her whereabouts, which all proved fruitless. The
Court ruled that the present spouse’s investigations were too sketchy to form a basis that
his wife was already dead and ruled that the pieces of evidence only proved that his wife
had chosen not to communicate with their common acquaintances, and not that she was
dead.

iv.The present case

In the case at bar, the respondent’s "well-founded belief" was anchored on her alleged
"earnest efforts" to locate Jerry, which consisted of the following:

(1) She made inquiries about Jerry’s whereabouts from her in-laws, neighbors and
friends; and

(2) Whenever she went to a hospital, she saw to it that she looked through the patients’
directory, hoping to find Jerry.

These efforts, however, fell short of the "stringent standard" and degree of diligence
required by jurisprudence for the following reasons:

First, the respondent did not actively look for her missing husband.  It can be inferred
1âwphi1

from the records that her hospital visits and her consequent checking of the patients’
directory therein were unintentional. She did not purposely undertake a diligent search for
her husband as her hospital visits were not planned nor primarily directed to look for him.
This Court thus considers these attempts insufficient to engender a belief that her
husband is dead.

Second, she did not report Jerry’s absence to the police nor did she seek the aid of the
authorities to look for him. While a finding of well-founded belief varies with the nature of
the situation in which the present spouse is placed, under present conditions, we find it
proper and prudent for a present spouse, whose spouse had been missing, to seek the
aid of the authorities or, at the very least, report his/her absence to the police.

Third, she did not present as witnesses Jerry’s relatives or their neighbors and friends,
who can corroborate her efforts to locate Jerry. Worse, these persons, from whom she
allegedly made inquiries, were not even named. As held in Nolasco, the present spouse’s
bare assertion that he inquired from his friends about his absent spouse’s whereabouts is
insufficient as the names of the friends from whom he made inquiries were not identified
in the testimony nor presented as witnesses.

Lastly, there was no other corroborative evidence to support the respondent’s claim that
she conducted a diligent search. Neither was there supporting evidence proving that she
had a well-founded belief other than her bare claims that she inquired from her friends
and in-laws about her husband’s whereabouts. In sum, the Court is of the view that the
respondent merely engaged in a "passive search" where she relied on uncorroborated
inquiries from her in-laws, neighbors and friends. She failed to conduct a diligent search
because her alleged efforts are insufficient to form a well-founded belief that her husband
was already dead. As held in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth
Div.),  "[w]hether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the
22

absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances
occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the natureand
extent of the inquiries made by [the] present spouse."

Strict Standard Approach Is

Consistent with the State’s Policy
to Protect and Strengthen Marriage

In the above-cited cases, the Court, fully aware of the possible collusion of spouses in
nullifying their marriage, has consistently applied the "strictstandard" approach. This is to
ensure that a petition for declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family
Code is not used as a tool to conveniently circumvent the laws. Courts should never
allow procedural shortcuts and should ensure that the stricter standard required by the
Family Code is met. In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.),  we23

emphasized that:

In view of the summary nature of proceedings under Article 41 of the Family Code for the
declaration of presumptive death of one’s spouse, the degree of due diligence set by this
Honorable Court in the above-mentioned cases in locating the whereabouts of a missing
spouse must be strictly complied with. There have been times when Article 41 of the
Family Code had been resorted to by parties wishing to remarry knowing fully well that
their alleged missing spouses are alive and well. It is even possible that those who
cannot have their marriages xxx declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family
Code resort to Article 41 of the Family Code for relief because of the xxx summary nature
of its proceedings.

The application of this stricter standard becomes even more imperative if we consider the
State’s policy to protect and strengthen the institution of marriage.  Since marriage
24

serves as the family’s foundation  and since it is the state’s policy to protect and
25
strengthen the family as a basic social institution,  marriage should not be permitted to be
26

dissolved at the whim of the parties. In interpreting and applying Article 41, this is the
underlying rationale –to uphold the sanctity of marriage. Arroyo, Jr.v. Court of
Appeals  reflected this sentiment when we stressed:
27

[The]protection of the basic social institutions of marriage and the family in the
preservation of which the State has the strongest interest; the public policy here involved
is of the most fundamental kind. In Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution there is set
forth the following basic state policy:

The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family
as a basic autonomous social institution.

Strict Standard Prescribed Under

Article 41 of the Family Code
Is for the Present Spouse’s Benefit

The requisite judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse (and
consequently, the application of a stringent standard for its issuance) is also for the
present spouse's benefit. It is intended to protect him/her from a criminal prosecution of
bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code which might come into play if
he/she would prematurely remarry sans the court's declaration.

Upon the issuance of the decision declaring his/her absent spouse presumptively dead,
the present spouse's good faith in contracting a second marriage is effectively
established. The decision of the competent court constitutes sufficient proof of his/her
good faith and his/her criminal intent in case of remarriage is effectively negated.  Thus,
28

for purposes of remarriage, it is necessary to strictly comply with the stringent standard
and have the absent spouse judicially declared presumptively dead.

Final Word

As a final word, it has not escaped this Court's attention that the strict standard required
in petitions for declaration of presumptive death has not been fully observed by the lower
courts. We need only to cite the instances when this Court, on review, has consistently
ruled on the sanctity of marriage and reiterated that anything less than the use of the
strict standard necessitates a denial. To rectify this situation, lower courts are now
expressly put on notice of the strict standard this Court requires in cases under Article 41
of the Family Code.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed decision dated August 27, 2008 of
the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the order dated December 15, 2006 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 25, Koronadal City, South Cotabato, declaring Jerry F. Cantor
presumptively dead is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED. 

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
 Please see concurring opinion
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO DE
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

I join the dissent opinion of Justice

M.M.V.F Leonen MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice
Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

Associate Justice Associate Justice

See dissenting opinion

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
 THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 165545             March 24, 2006

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, Petitioner,

vs.
TERESITA JARQUE VDA. DE BAILON, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES,J.:

The Court of Appeals Decision 1 dated June 23, 2004 2 and Resolution dated September
28, 20043 reversing the Resolution dated April 2, 2003 4 and Order dated June 4, 2003 5 of
the Social Security Commission (SSC) in SSC Case No. 4-15149-01 are challenged in
the present petition for review on certiorari.

On April 25, 1955, Clemente G. Bailon (Bailon) and Alice P. Diaz (Alice) contracted
marriage in Barcelona, Sorsogon. 6

More than 15 years later or on October 9, 1970, Bailon filed before the then Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Sorsogon a petition 7 to declare Alice presumptively dead.

By Order of December 10, 1970,8 the CFI granted the petition, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, there being no opposition filed against the petition notwithstanding the
publication of the Notice of Hearing  in a newspaper of general circulation in the country,
Alice Diaz is hereby declared to [sic] all legal intents and purposes, except for those of
succession, presumptively dead.

SO ORDERED.9 (Underscoring supplied)
Close to 13 years after his wife Alice was declared presumptively dead or on August 8,
1983, Bailon contracted marriage with Teresita Jarque (respondent) in Casiguran,
Sorsogon.10

On January 30, 1998, Bailon, who was a member of the Social Security System (SSS)
since 1960 and a retiree pensioner thereof effective July 1994, died. 11

Respondent thereupon filed a claim for funeral benefits, and was granted P12,00012 by
the SSS.

Respondent filed on March 11, 1998 an additional claim for death benefits 13 which was
also granted by the SSS on April 6, 1998. 14

Cecilia Bailon-Yap (Cecilia), who claimed to be a daughter of Bailon and one Elisa
Jayona (Elisa) contested before the SSS the release to respondent of the death and
funeral benefits. She claimed that Bailon contracted three marriages in his lifetime, the
first with Alice, the second with her mother Elisa, and the third with respondent, all of
whom are still alive; she, together with her siblings, paid for Bailon’s medical and funeral
expenses; and all the documents submitted by respondent to the SSS in support of her
claims are spurious.

In support of her claim, Cecilia and her sister Norma Bailon Chavez (Norma) submitted
an Affidavit dated February 13, 1999 15 averring that they are two of nine children of Bailon
and Elisa who cohabited as husband and wife as early as 1958; and they were reserving
their right to file the necessary court action to contest the marriage between Bailon and
respondent as they personally know that Alice is "still very much alive." 16

In the meantime, on April 5, 1999, a certain Hermes P. Diaz, claiming to be the brother
and guardian of "Aliz P. Diaz," filed before the SSS a claim for death benefits accruing
from Bailon’s death,17 he further attesting in a sworn statement 18 that it was Norma who
defrayed Bailon’s funeral expenses.

Elisa and seven of her children19 subsequently filed claims for death benefits as Bailon’s
beneficiaries before the SSS.20

Atty. Marites C. de la Torre of the Legal Unit of the SSS Bicol Cluster, Naga City
recommended the cancellation of payment of death pension benefits to respondent and
the issuance of an order for the refund of the amount paid to her from February 1998 to
May 1999 representing such benefits; the denial of the claim of Alice on the ground that
she was not dependent upon Bailon for support during his lifetime; and the payment of
the balance of the five-year guaranteed pension to Bailon’s beneficiaries according to the
order of preference provided under the law, after the amount erroneously paid to
respondent has been collected. The pertinent portions of the Memorandum read:

1. Aliz [sic] Diaz never disappeared. The court must have been misled by
misrepresentation in declaring the first wife, Aliz [sic] Diaz, as presumptively dead.

xxxx

x x x the Order of the court in the "Petition to Declare Alice Diaz Presumptively
Dead," did not become final. The presence of Aliz [sic] Diaz, is contrary proof that
rendered it invalid.

xxxx
3. It was the deceased member who abandoned his wife, Aliz [sic] Diaz. He, being in bad
faith, and is the deserting spouse, his remarriage is void, being bigamous.

xxxx

In this case, it is the deceased member who was the deserting spouse and who
remarried, thus his marriage to Teresita Jarque, for the second time was void as it was
bigamous. To require affidavit of reappearance to terminate the second marriage is not
necessary as there is no disappearance of Aliz [sic] Diaz, the first wife, and a voidable
marriage [sic], to speak of.21 (Underscoring supplied)

In the meantime, the SSS Sorsogon Branch, by letter of August 16, 2000, 22 advised
respondent that as Cecilia and Norma were the ones who defrayed Bailon’s funeral
expenses, she should return the P12,000 paid to her.

In a separate letter dated September 7, 1999, 23 the SSS advised respondent of the
cancellation of her monthly pension for death benefits in view of the opinion rendered by
its legal department that her marriage with Bailon was void as it was contracted while the
latter’s marriage with Alice was still subsisting; and the December 10, 1970 CFI Order
declaring Alice presumptively dead did not become final, her "presence" being "contrary
proof" against the validity of the order. It thus requested respondent to return the amount
of P24,000 representing the total amount of monthly pension she had received from the
SSS from February 1998 to May 1999.

Respondent protested the cancellation of her monthly pension for death benefits by letter
to the SSS dated October 12, 1999. 24 In a subsequent letter dated November 27,
199925 to the SSC, she reiterated her request for the release of her monthly pension,
asserting that her marriage with Bailon was not declared before any court of justice as
bigamous or unlawful, hence, it remained valid and subsisting for all legal intents and
purposes as in fact Bailon designated her as his beneficiary.

The SSS, however, by letter to respondent dated January 21, 2000, 26 maintained the
denial of her claim for and the discontinuance of payment of monthly pension. It advised
her, however, that she was not deprived of her right to file a petition with the SSC.

Respondent thus filed a petition 27 against the SSS before the SSC for the restoration to
her of her entitlement to monthly pension.

In the meantime, respondent informed the SSS that she was returning, under protest, the
amount of P12,000 representing the funeral benefits she received, she alleging that
Norma and her siblings "forcibly and coercively prevented her from spending any amount
during Bailon’s wake."28

After the SSS filed its Answer 29 to respondent’s petition, and the parties filed their
respective Position Papers, one Alicia P. Diaz filed an Affidavit 30 dated August 14, 2002
with the SSS Naga Branch attesting that she is the widow of Bailon; she had only
recently come to know of the petition filed by Bailon to declare her presumptively dead; it
is not true that she disappeared as Bailon could have easily located her, she having
stayed at her parents’ residence in Barcelona, Sorsogon after she found out that Bailon
was having an extramarital affair; and Bailon used to visit her even after their separation.

By Resolution of April 2, 2003, the SSC found that the marriage of respondent to Bailon
was void and, therefore, she was "just a common-law-wife." Accordingly it disposed as
follows, quoted verbatim:
WHEREFORE, this Commission finds, and so holds, that petitioner Teresita Jarque-
Bailon is not the legitimate spouse and primary beneficiary of SSS member Clemente
Bailon.

Accordingly, the petitioner is hereby ordered to refund to the SSS the amount
of P24,000.00 representing the death benefit she received therefrom for the period
February 1998 until May 1999 as well as P12,000.00 representing the funeral benefit.

The SSS is hereby ordered to pay Alice (a.k.a. Aliz) Diaz-Bailon the appropriate death
benefit arising from the demise of SSS member Clemente Bailon in accordance with
Section 8(e) and (k) as well as Section 13 of the SS Law, as amended, and its prevailing
rules and regulations and to inform this Commission of its compliance herewith.

SO ORDERED.31 (Underscoring supplied)

In so ruling against respondent, the SSC ratiocinated.

After a thorough examination of the evidence at hand, this Commission comes to the
inevitable conclusion that the petitioner is not the legitimate wife of the deceased
member.

xxxx

There is x x x ample evidence pointing to the fact that, contrary to the declaration of the
then CFI of Sorsogon (10th Judicial District), the first wife never disappeared as the
deceased member represented in bad faith. This Commission accords credence to the
findings of the SSS contained in its Memorandum dated August 9, 1999,32 revealing that
Alice (a.k.a. Aliz) Diaz never left Barcelona, Sorsogon, after her separation from
Clemente Bailon x x x.

As the declaration of presumptive death was extracted by the deceased member using
artifice and by exerting fraud upon the unsuspecting court of law, x x x it never had the
effect of giving the deceased member the right to marry anew. x x x [I]t is clear that the
marriage to the petitioner is void, considering that the first marriage on April 25, 1955 to
Alice Diaz was not previously annulled, invalidated or otherwise dissolved during the
lifetime of the parties thereto. x x x as determined through the investigation conducted by
the SSS, Clemente Bailon was the abandoning spouse, not Alice Diaz Bailon.

xxxx

It having been established, by substantial evidence, that the petitioner was just a

common-law wife of the deceased member, it necessarily follows that she is not entitled
as a primary beneficiary, to the latter’s death benefit. x x x

xxxx

It having been determined that Teresita Jarque was not the legitimate surviving spouse
and primary beneficiary of Clemente Bailon, it behooves her to refund the total amount of
death benefit she received from the SSS for the period from February 1998 until May
1999 pursuant to the principle of solutio indebiti x x x

Likewise, it appearing that she was not the one who actually defrayed the cost of the
wake and burial of Clemente Bailon, she must return the amount of P12,000.00 which
was earlier given to her by the SSS as funeral benefit. 33 (Underscoring supplied)
Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration 34 having been denied by Order of June 4, 2003,
she filed a petition for review35 before the Court of Appeals (CA).

By Decision of June 23, 2004, the CA reversed and set aside the April 2, 2003
Resolution and June 4, 2003 Order of the SSC and thus ordered the SSS to pay
respondent all the pension benefits due her. Held the CA:

x x x [T]he paramount concern in this case transcends the issue of whether or not the
decision of the then CFI, now RTC, declaring Alice Diaz presumptively dead has attained
finality but, more importantly, whether or not the respondents SSS and Commission can
validly re-evaluate the findings of the RTC, and on its own, declare the latter’s decision to
be bereft of any basis. On similar import, can respondents SSS and Commission validly
declare the first marriage subsisting and the second marriage null and void?

xxxx

x x x while it is true that a judgment declaring a person presumptively dead never attains
finality as the finding that "the person is unheard of in seven years is merely a
presumption juris tantum," the second marriage contracted by a person with an absent
spouse endures until annulled. It is only the competent court that can nullify the second
marriage pursuant to Article 87 of the Civil Code and upon the reappearance of the
missing spouse, which action for annulment may be filed. Nowhere does the law
contemplates [sic] the possibility that respondent SSS may validly declare the second
marriage null and void on the basis alone of its own investigation and declare that the
decision of the RTC declaring one to be presumptively dead is without basis.

Respondent SSS cannot arrogate upon itself the authority to review the decision of the
regular courts under the pretext of determining the actual and lawful beneficiaries of its
members. Notwithstanding its opinion as to the soundness of the findings of the RTC, it
should extend due credence to the decision of the RTC absent of [sic] any judicial
pronouncement to the contrary. x x x

x x x [A]ssuming arguendo that respondent SSS actually possesses the authority to

declare the decision of the RTC to be without basis, the procedure it followed was
offensive to the principle of fair play and thus its findings are of doubtful quality
considering that petitioner Teresita was not given ample opportunity to present evidence
for and her behalf.

xxxx

Respondent SSS is correct in stating that the filing of an Affidavit of Reappearance with
the Civil Registry is no longer practical under the premises. Indeed, there is no more first
marriage to restore as the marital bond between Alice Diaz and Clemente Bailon was
already terminated upon the latter’s death. Neither is there a second marriage to
terminate because the second marriage was likewise dissolved by the death of Clemente
Bailon.

However, it is not correct to conclude that simply because the filing of the Affidavit of
Reappearance with the Civil Registry where parties to the subsequent marriage reside is
already inutile, the respondent SSS has now the authority to review the decision of the
RTC and consequently declare the second marriage null and void.36 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

The SSC and the SSS separately filed their Motions for Reconsideration 37 which were
both denied for lack of merit.
Hence, the SSS’ present petition for review on certiorari 38 anchored on the following
grounds:

THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IS

CONTRARY TO LAW.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS

DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION.39

The SSS faults the CA for failing to give due consideration to the findings of facts of the
SSC on the prior and subsisting marriage between Bailon and Alice; in disregarding the
authority of the SSC to determine to whom, between Alice and respondent, the death
benefits should be awarded pursuant to Section 5 40 of the Social Security Law; and in
declaring that the SSS did not give respondent due process or ample opportunity to
present evidence in her behalf.

The SSS submits that "the observations and findings relative to the CFI proceedings are
of no moment to the present controversy, as the same may be considered only as obiter
dicta in view of the SSC’s finding of the existence of a prior and subsisting marriage
between Bailon and Alice by virtue of which Alice has a better right to the death
benefits."41

The petition fails.

That the SSC is empowered to settle any dispute with respect to SSS coverage, benefits
and contributions, there is no doubt. In so exercising such power, however, it cannot
review, much less reverse, decisions rendered by courts of law as it did in the case at bar
when it declared that the December 10, 1970 CFI Order was obtained through fraud and
subsequently disregarded the same, making its own findings with respect to the validity
of Bailon and Alice’s marriage on the one hand and the invalidity of Bailon and
respondent’s marriage on the other.

In interfering with and passing upon the CFI Order, the SSC virtually acted as an
appellate court. The law does not give the SSC unfettered discretion to trifle with orders
of regular courts in the exercise of its authority to determine the beneficiaries of the SSS.

The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity on
August 3, 1988 of the Family Code, the applicable law to determine their validity is the
Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration. 42

Article 83 of the Civil Code43 provides:

Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the
first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal
and void from its performance, unless:

(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or

(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the
second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or
if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally
considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of
contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to
Articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid  in any of the three
cases until declared null and void by a competent court. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

Under the foregoing provision of the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage contracted during
the lifetime of the first spouse is illegal and void ab initio unless the prior marriage is first
annulled or dissolved or contracted under any of the three exceptional circumstances. It
bears noting that the marriage under any of these exceptional cases is deemed valid
"until declared null and void by a competent court." It follows that the onus probandi in
these cases rests on the party assailing the second marriage. 44

In the case at bar, as found by the CFI, Alice had been absent for 15 consecutive
years45 when Bailon sought the declaration of her presumptive death, which judicial
declaration was not even a requirement then for purposes of remarriage. 46

Eminent jurist Arturo M. Tolentino (now deceased) commented:

Where a person has entered into two successive marriages, a presumption arises in
favor of the validity of the second marriage, and the burden is on the party attacking the
validity of the second marriage to prove that the first marriage had not been dissolved; it
is not enough to prove the first marriage, for it must also be shown that it had not ended
when the second marriage was contracted. The presumption in favor of the innocence of
the defendant from crime or wrong and of the legality of his second marriage, will prevail
over the presumption of the continuance of life of the first spouse or of the continuance of
the marital relation with such first spouse.47 (Underscoring supplied)

Under the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage being voidable,48 it is terminated by final

judgment of annulment in a case instituted by the absent spouse who reappears or by
either of the spouses in the subsequent marriage.

Under the Family Code, no judicial proceeding to annul a subsequent marriage is

necessary. Thus Article 42 thereof provides:

Art. 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall
be automatically terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance  of the
absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it
void ab initio.

A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in

the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the
instance of any interested person,  with due notice to the spouses of the subsequent
marriage and without prejudice to the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in
case such fact is disputed. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The termination of the subsequent marriage by affidavit provided by the above-quoted

provision of the Family Code does not preclude the filing of an action in court to prove the
reappearance of the absentee and obtain a declaration of dissolution or termination of
the subsequent marriage.49

If the absentee reappears, but no step is taken to terminate the subsequent marriage,
either by affidavit or by court action, such absentee’s mere reappearance, even if made
known to the spouses in the subsequent marriage, will not terminate such
marriage.50 Since the second marriage has been contracted because of a presumption
that the former spouse is dead, such presumption continues inspite of the spouse’s
physical reappearance, and by fiction of law, he or she must still be regarded as legally
an absentee until the subsequent marriage is terminated as provided by law.51

If the subsequent marriage is not terminated by registration of an affidavit of

reappearance or by judicial declaration but by death of either spouse as in the case at
bar, Tolentino submits:

x x x [G]enerally if a subsequent marriage is dissolved by the death of either spouse, the

effects of dissolution of valid marriages shall arise. The good or bad faith of either spouse
can no longer be raised, because, as in annullable or voidable marriages, the marriage
cannot be questioned except in a direct action for annulment.52 (Underscoring supplied)

Similarly, Lapuz v. Eufemio53 instructs:

In fact, even if the bigamous marriage had not been void ab initio but only voidable under
Article 83, paragraph 2, of the Civil Code, because the second marriage had been
contracted with the first wife having been an absentee for seven consecutive years, or
when she had been generally believed dead, still the action for annulment became
extinguished as soon as one of the three persons involved had died, as provided in
Article 87, paragraph 2, of the Code, requiring that the action for annulment should be
brought during the lifetime of any one of the parties involved. And furthermore, the
liquidation of any conjugal partnership that might have resulted from such voidable
marriage must be carried out "in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased
spouse," as expressly provided in Section 2 of the Revised Rule 73, and not in the
annulment proceeding.54 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

It bears reiterating that a voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a

direct proceeding. Consequently, such marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime
of the parties and not after the death of either, in which case the parties and their
offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. 55 Upon the death of either,
the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio.56

In the case at bar, as no step was taken to nullify, in accordance with law, Bailon’s and
respondent’s marriage prior to the former’s death in 1998, respondent is rightfully the
dependent spouse-beneficiary of Bailon.

In light of the foregoing discussions, consideration of the other issues raised has been
rendered unnecessary.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

(ON OFFICIAL LEAVE)

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
 ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Acting
Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
 FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 132955             October 27, 2006

ORLANDO VILLANUEVA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and LILIA CANALITA-VILLANUEVA, respondents.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the January 26, 1998
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51832, affirming with modification
the Decision2 dated January 12, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, Branch 172 in Civil Case No. 3997-V-92 (a) dismissing petitioner's petition for the
annulment of his marriage to private respondent and (b) ordering him to pay moral and
exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs. Also assailed is the March 5, 1998
Resolution3 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Petitioner Orlando Villanueva and private respondent Lilia Canalita-Villanueva got

married on April 13, 1988 in Puerto Princesa, Palawan. On November 17, 1992, Orlando
filed with the trial court a petition for annulment of his marriage alleging that threats of
violence and duress forced him into marrying Lilia, who was already pregnant; that he did
not get her pregnant prior to the marriage; that he never cohabited with her after the
marriage; and that he later learned that private respondent's child died during delivery on
August 29, 1988.4
In her answer with compulsory counterclaim, 5 Lilia prayed for the dismissal of the petition,
arguing that petitioner freely and voluntarily married her; that petitioner stayed with her in
Palawan for almost a month after their marriage; that petitioner wrote letters to her after
he returned to Manila, during which private respondent visited him personally; and that
petitioner knew about the progress of her pregnancy, which ended in their son being born
prematurely. Private respondent also prayed for the payment of moral and exemplary
damages, attorney’s fees and costs.

On January 12, 1996, the trial court rendered judgment the dispositive portion of which
states:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1) Dismissing the above-entitled case; and

2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant moral damages in the amount of
P100,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00, and attorney's fees in
the amount of P20,000.00, plus the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.6

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the petition and the award of
attorney’s fees and costs, but reduced the award of moral and exemplary damages to
P50,000.00 and P25,000.00, respectively. The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration, hence, the instant petition for review based on the following
assigned errors:

I. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION IN NOT GRANTING THE ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE THE CONSENT
OF THE PETITIONER HAVING BEEN OBTAINED BY FRAUD, INTIMIDATION AND
UNDUE AND IMPROPER PRESSURE AND INFLUENCE PLUS THE FACT THAT
THERE WAS NO COHABITATION WHATSOEVER BETWEEN PETITIONER AND
PRIVATE RESPONDENT.

II. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GROSS ERROR IN

AWARDING MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AS WELL AS ATTORNEY'S FEES,
SAID AWARDS NOT BEING THOSE ALLOWED BY LAW.7

The issues for resolution are (a) whether the subject marriage may be annulled on the
ground of vitiated consent; and (b) whether petitioner should be liable for moral and
exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees and costs.

The petition is partly granted.

Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, especially if they coincide with those of the trial
court, as in the instant case, are generally binding on this Court. 8 We affirm the findings
of the Court of Appeals that petitioner freely and voluntarily married private respondent
and that no threats or intimidation, duress or violence compelled him to do so, thus –

To begin with, We are at once disturbed by the circumstance that despite the alleged
coerced consent which supposedly characterized his marriage with Lilia on April 13,
1988, it was only on November 17, 1992 or after a span of not less than four (4) years
and eight (8) months when Orlando took serious step to have the same marriage
annulled. Unexplained, the prolonged inaction evidently finds basis in Lilia’s allegation
that this annulment suit was filed by Orlando solely in the hope that a favorable judgment
thereon would bolster his defense, if not altogether bring about his acquittal in the
criminal case for bigamy which was then already pending against him. Unfortunately,
however, let alone the fact that the criminal case was admittedly decided ahead with a
judgment of conviction against Orlando x x x even the very outcome of the present case
disappointed his expectation. At this late, with his appeal in the bigamy case still pending
with this Court x x x Orlando must be hoping against hope that with a decree of
annulment ensuing from this Court, he may yet secure an acquittal in the same bigamy
charge. Viewed in this perspective, the instant appeal is, therefore, understandable.

But even in terms of merit, the recourse must have to fall.

Appellant anchored his prayer for the annulment of his marriage on the ground that he
did not freely consent to be married to the appellee. He cited several incidents that
created on his mind a reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave
danger to his life and safety, to wit: the harassing phone calls from the appellee and
strangers as well as the unwanted visits by three men at the premises of the University of
the East after his classes thereat, and the threatening presence of a certain Ka Celso, a
supposed member of the New People’s Army whom appellant claimed to have been
hired by appellee and who accompanied him in going to her home province of Palawan
to marry her.

The Court is not convinced that appellant’s apprehension of danger to his person is so
overwhelming as to deprive him of the will to enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It
is not disputed that at the time he was allegedly being harassed, appellant worked as a
security guard in a bank. Given his employment at that time, it is reasonable to assume
that appellant knew the rudiments of self-defense, or, at the very least, the proper way to
keep himself out of harm’s way. For sure, it is even doubtful if threats were indeed made
to bear upon appellant, what with the fact that he never sought the assistance of the
security personnel of his school nor the police regarding the activities of those who were
threatening him. And neither did he inform the judge about his predicament prior to
solemnizing their marriage.

Appellant also invoked fraud to annul his marriage, as he was made to believe by
appellee that the latter was pregnant with his child when they were married. Appellant’s
excuse that he could not have impregnated the appellee because he did not have an
erection during their tryst is flimsy at best, and an outright lie at worst. The complaint is
bereft of any reference to his inability to copulate with the appellee. His counsel also
conceded before the lower court that his client had a sexual relationship with the appellee
x x x. He also narrated x x x that sometime in January 1988, he and the appellee went to
a hotel where "the sexual act was consummated, with the defendant on top" x x x.

Instead of providing proofs that he was tricked into marrying his wife, appellant resorted
to undermining the credibility of the latter by citing her testimony that her child was born,
and died, on August 29, 1989, a year off from August 29, 1988, the date of fetal death as
appearing in the registry of deaths of the Office of the Civil Registrar of Puerto Princesa
City x x x.

To Our mind, appellant cannot make capital of the lapse because it is inconsequential, as
there is no controversy regarding the date of death of appellee’s fetus. Nevertheless,
during the continuation of the cross-examination of the appellee, she declared that her
child was prematurely born on August 29, 1988, matching the date in the certification of
the Civil Registrar x x x. The Court is not prepared to disbelieve the appellee and throw
overboard her entire testimony simply on account of her confusion as to the exact date of
the death of the fetus, especially when she herself had presented documentary evidence
that put August 29, 1988 as the date her fetus died.
Appellant’s propensity to rely on his perceived weakness of the appellee’s evidence
continues in his argument that if indeed there is truth to her claim that she was
impregnated sometime in December 1987, then she could not have a premature delivery
on August 29, 1988, as she had testified during the trial, because the 35-week period of
pregnancy is complete by that time. Whether the appellee’s impression that she had
delivered prematurely is correct or not will not affect the fact that she had delivered a
fetus on August 29, 1988. In the light of appellant’s admission that he had a sexual
intercourse with his wife in January 1988, and his failure to attribute the latter’s
pregnancy to any other man, appellant cannot complain that he was deceived by the
appellee into marrying her.

Appellant also puts in issue the lower court’s appreciation of the letters allegedly written
by him to the appellee. During his cross-examination, when confronted with thirteen (13)
letters, appellant identified the seven (7) letters that he sent to the appellee, but denied
the remaining six (6) x x x. The letters admitted by the appellant contained expressions of
love and concern for his wife, and hardly the rantings of a man under duress. During the
re-direct examination, however, appellant suddenly changed mind and denied authorship
of those seven (7) letters, claiming that he was forced to admit them because he was
threatened with harm by the appellee. If he was laboring under duress when he made the
admission, where did he find the temerity to deny his involvement with the remaining six
(6) letters? The recantation can only be motivated by a hindsight realization by the
appellant of the evidentiary weight of those letters against his case.

As to the second assignment of error, appellant cannot claim that his marriage should be
annulled due to the absence of cohabitation between him and his wife. Lack of
cohabitation is, per se, not a ground to annul a marriage. Otherwise, the validity of a
marriage will depend upon the will of the spouses who can terminate the marital union by
refusing to cohabitate. The failure to cohabit becomes relevant only if it arises as a result
of the perpetration of any of the grounds for annulling the marriage, such as lack of
parental consent, insanity, fraud, intimidation, or undue influence x x x. Since the
appellant failed to justify his failure to cohabit with the appellee on any of those grounds,
the validity of his marriage must be upheld. 9

We also agree that private respondent is entitled to attorney’s fees. Article 2208 (11) of
the Civil Code provides that attorney’s may be awarded where the court deems it just and
equitable under the circumstances, as in the instant case.

We, however, delete the award of moral and exemplary damages for lack of factual and
legal basis. There is nothing in the records or in the appealed decision that would support
an award of moral damages. In justifying the award, the Court of Appeals merely said
thus:

It is not difficult to imagine the suffering of the appellee from the baseless portrayal of her
by the appellant as the perpetrator of fraudulent schemes to trap an unwilling mate. x x
x10

However, the aforesaid finding is only a supposition as it has no reference to any

testimony of private respondent detailing her alleged physical suffering, mental anguish,
fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury as would entitle her to moral damages.

In Mahinay v. Velasquez, Jr.,11 we held that:

In order that moral damages may be awarded, there must be pleading and proof of moral
suffering, mental anguish, fright and the like. While respondent alleged in his complaint
that he suffered mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and moral shock, he
failed to prove them during the trial. Indeed, respondent should have taken the witness
stand and should have testified on the mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings
and other emotional and mental suffering he purportedly suffered to sustain his claim for
moral damages. Mere allegations do not suffice; they must be substantiated by clear and
convincing proof. No other person could have proven such damages except the
respondent himself as they were extremely personal to him.

As private respondent is not entitled to moral damages, a fortiori, she is not entitled to
exemplary damages. This is clear in Article 2234 of the Civil Code, which provides:

ART. 2234. While the amount of the exemplary damages need not be proved, the plaintiff
must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the
court may consider the question of whether or not exemplary damages should be
awarded. In case liquidated damages have been agreed upon, although no proof of loss
is necessary in order that such liquidated damages may be recovered, nevertheless,
before the court may consider the question of granting exemplary in addition to the
liquidated damages, the plaintiff must show that he would be entitled to moral, temperate
or compensatory damages were it not for the stipulation for liquidated damages.

Hence, exemplary damages is allowed only in addition to moral damages such that no
exemplary damages can be awarded unless the claimant first establishes his clear right
to moral damages.12 In the instant case, private respondent failed to satisfactorily
establish her claim for moral damages, thus she is not likewise entitled to exemplary
damages.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The January 26, 1998 Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51832 affirming with modification the January
12, 1996 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172 in
Civil Case No. 3997-V-92 dismissing petitioner’s petition for the annulment of his
marriage with private respondent, is AFFIRMED. However, the award of moral and
exemplary damages is DELETED for lack of basis.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario,

JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 179620             August 26, 2008

MANUEL G. ALMELOR, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF LAS PIÑAS CITY, BRANCH 254, and LEONIDA T.
ALMELOR, respondents.

DECISION

REYES, R.T., J.:

MARRIAGE, in its totality, involves the spouses' right to the community of their whole lives. It
likewise involves a true intertwining of personalities. 1

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) denying the
petition for annulment of judgment and affirming in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Las Piñas, Branch 254. The CA dismissed outright the Rule 47 petition for being the wrong
remedy.

The Facts

Petitioner Manuel G. Almelor (Manuel) and respondent Leonida Trinidad (Leonida) were married
on January 29, 1989 at the Manila Cathedral. 3 Their union bore three children: (1) Maria Paulina
Corinne, born on October 20, 1989; (2) Napoleon Manuel, born on August 9, 1991; and (3) Manuel
Homer, born on July 4, 1994. 4 Manuel and Leonida are both medical practitioners, an
anesthesiologist and a pediatrician, respectively. 5

After eleven (11) years of marriage, Leonida filed a petition with the RTC in Las Piñas City to annul
their marriage on the ground that Manuel was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital
obligations. The case, docketed as LP-00-0132 was raffled off to Branch 254.

During the trial, Leonida testified that she first met Manuel in 1981 at the San Lazaro Hospital
where they worked as medical student clerks. At that time, she regarded Manuel as a very
thoughtful person who got along well with other people. They soon became sweethearts. Three
years after, they got married.6
Leonida averred that Manuel's kind and gentle demeanor did not last long. In the public eye,
Manuel was the picture of a perfect husband and father. This was not the case in his private life. At
home, Leonida described Manuel as a harsh disciplinarian, unreasonably meticulous, easily
angered. Manuel's unreasonable way of imposing discipline on their children was the cause of
their frequent fights as a couple.7 Leonida complained that this was in stark contrast to the alleged
lavish affection Manuel has for his mother. Manuel's deep attachment to his mother and his
dependence on her decision-making were incomprehensible to Leonida. 8

Further adding to her woes was his concealment to her of his homosexuality. Her suspicions were
first aroused when she noticed Manuel's peculiar closeness to his male companions. For instance,
she caught him in an indiscreet telephone conversation manifesting his affection for a male
caller.9 She also found several pornographic homosexual materials in his possession. 10 Her worse
fears were confirmed when she saw Manuel kissed another man on the lips. The man was a
certain Dr. Nogales.11 When she confronted Manuel, he denied everything. At this point, Leonida
took her children and left their conjugal abode. Since then, Manuel stopped giving support to their
children.12

Dr. Valentina del Fonso Garcia, a clinical psychologist, was presented to prove Leonida's claim.
Dr. del Fonso Garcia testified that she conducted evaluative interviews and a battery of psychiatric
tests on Leonida. She also had a one-time interview with Manuel and face-to-face interviews with
Ma. Paulina Corrinne (the eldest child). 13 She concluded that Manuel is psychologically
incapacitated.14 Such incapacity is marked by antecedence; it existed even before the marriage
and appeared to be incurable.

Manuel, for his part, admitted that he and Leonida had some petty arguments here and there. He,
however, maintained that their marital relationship was generally harmonious. The petition for
annulment filed by Leonida came as a surprise to him.

Manuel countered that the true cause of Leonida's hostility against him was their professional
rivalry. It began when he refused to heed the memorandum 15 released by Christ the King Hospital.
The memorandum ordered him to desist from converting his own lying-in clinic to a primary or
secondary hospital.16 Leonida's family owns Christ the King Hospital which is situated in the same
subdivision as Manuel's clinic and residence.17 In other words, he and her family have competing
or rival hospitals in the same vicinity.

Manuel belied her allegation that he was a cruel father to their children. He denied maltreating
them. At most, he only imposed the necessary discipline on the children.

He also defended his show of affection for his mother. He said there was nothing wrong for him to
return the love and affection of the person who reared and looked after him and his siblings. This is
especially apt now that his mother is in her twilight years. 18 Manuel pointed out that Leonida found
fault in this otherwise healthy relationship because of her very jealous and possessive nature. 19

This same overly jealous behavior of Leonida drove Manuel to avoid the company of female
friends. He wanted to avoid any further misunderstanding with his wife. But, Leonida instead
conjured up stories about his sexual preference. She also fabricated tales about pornographic
materials found in his possession to cast doubt on his masculinity. 20

To corroborate his version, he presented his brother, Jesus G. Almelor. Jesus narrated that he
usually stayed at Manuel's house during his weekly trips to Manila from Iriga City. He was a
witness to the generally harmonious relationship between his brother Manuel and sister-in-law,
Leonida. True, they had some quarrels typical of a husband and wife relationship. But there was
nothing similar to what Leonida described in her testimony. 21

Jesus further testified that he was with his brother on the day Leonida allegedly saw Manuel kissed
another man. He denied that such an incident occurred. On that particular date, 22 he and Manuel
went straight home from a trip to Bicol. There was no other person with them at that time, except
their driver.23

Manuel expressed his intention to refute Dr. del Fonso Garcia's findings by presenting his own
expert witness. However, no psychiatrist was presented.
 RTC Disposition

By decision dated November 25, 2005, the RTC granted the petition for annulment, with the
following disposition:

WHEREFORE, premised on the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Declaring the marriage contracted by herein parties on 29 January 1989 and all its effects under
the law null and void from the beginning;

2. Dissolving the regime of community property between the same parties with forfeiture of
defendant's share thereon in favor of the same parties' children whose legal custody is awarded to
plaintiff with visitorial right afforded to defendant;

3. Ordering the defendant to give monthly financial support to all the children; and

4. Pursuant to the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC:

a. Directing the Branch Clerk of this Court to enter this Judgment upon its finality in the Book of
Entry of Judgment and to issue an Entry of Judgment in accordance thereto; and

b. Directing the Local Civil Registrars of Las Piñas City and Manila City to cause the registration of
the said Entry of Judgment in their respective Books of Marriages.

Upon compliance, a decree of nullity of marriage shall be issued.

SO ORDERED.24 (Emphasis supplied)

The trial court nullified the marriage, not on the ground of Article 36, but Article 45 of the Family
Code. It ratiocinated:

x x x a careful evaluation and in-depth analysis of the surrounding circumstances of the allegations
in the complaint and of the evidence presented in support thereof (sic) reveals that in this case
(sic) there is more than meets the eyes (sic).

Both legally and biologically, homosexuality x x x is, indeed, generally incompatible with hetero
sexual marriage. This is reason enough that in this jurisdiction (sic) the law recognizes marriage as
a special contract exclusively only between a man and a woman x x x and thus when
homosexuality has trespassed into marriage, the same law provides ample remedies to correct the
situation [Article 45(3) in relation to Article 46(4) or Article 55, par. 6, Family Code]. This is of
course in recognition of the biological fact that no matter how a man cheats himself that he is not a
homosexual and forces himself to live a normal heterosexual life, there will surely come a time
when his true sexual preference as a homosexual shall prevail in haunting him and thus
jeopardizing the solidity, honor, and welfare of his own family. 25

Manuel filed a notice of appeal which was, however, denied due course. Undaunted, he filed a
petition for annulment of judgment with the CA.26

Manuel contended that the assailed decision was issued in excess of the lower court's jurisdiction;
that it had no jurisdiction to dissolve the absolute community of property and forfeit his conjugal
share in favor of his children.

CA Disposition

On July 31, 2007, the CA denied the petition, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, the present Petition for Annulment of Judgment is hereby DENIED. The Court
AFFIRMS in toto the Decision (dated November 25, 2005) of the Regional Trial Court (Branch
254), in Las Piñas City, in Civil Case No. LP-00-0132. No costs. 27

The CA stated that petitioner pursued the wrong remedy by filing the extraordinary remedy of
petition for annulment of judgment. Said the appellate court:

It is obvious that the petitioner is questioning the propriety of the decision rendered by the lower
Court. But the remedy assuming there was a mistake is not a Petition for Annulment of Judgment
but an ordinary appeal. An error of judgment may be reversed or corrected only by appeal.

What petitioner is ascribing is an error of judgment, not of jurisdiction, which is properly the subject
of an ordinary appeal.

In short, petitioner admits the jurisdiction of the lower court but he claims excess in the exercise
thereof. "Excess" assuming there was is not covered by Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. The Rule refers the lack of jurisdiction and not the exercise thereof. 28

Issues

Petitioner Manuel takes the present recourse via Rule 45, assigning to the CA the following errors:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT TREATING THE PETITION FOR
ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT AS A PETITION FOR REVIEW IN VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE
OF THE ISSUES INVOLVED AND IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE;

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE

TRIAL COURT AS REGARDS THE ORDER DECLARING THE MARRIAGE AS NULL AND VOID
ON THE GROUND OF PETITIONER'S PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY;

III

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE

TRIAL COURT AS REGARDS THE ORDER TO FORFEIT THE SHARE OF PETITIONER IN HIS
SHARE OF THE CONJUGAL ASSETS.29

Our Ruling

I. The stringent rules of procedures may be relaxed to serve the demands of substantial
justice and in the Court's exercise of equity jurisdiction.

Generally, an appeal taken either to the Supreme Court or the CA by the wrong or inappropriate
mode shall be dismissed.30 This is to prevent the party from benefiting from one's neglect and
mistakes. However, like most rules, it carries certain exceptions. After all, the ultimate purpose
of all rules of procedures is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible. 31

Annulment of judgment under Rule 47 is a last remedy. It can not be resorted to if the ordinary
remedies are available or no longer available through no fault of petitioner. 32 However, in Buenaflor
v. Court of Appeals,33 this Court clarified the proper appreciation for technical rules of procedure, in
this wise:

Rules of procedures are intended to promote, not to defeat, substantial justice and,
therefore, they should not be applied in a very rigid and technical sense. The exception is
that while the Rules are liberally construed, the provisions with respect to the rules on the
manner and periods for perfecting appeals are strictly applied. As an exception to the
exception, these rules have sometimes been relaxed on equitable considerations . Also, in
some cases the Supreme Court has given due course to an appeal perfected out of time where a
stringent application of the rules would have denied it, but only when to do so would serve the
demands of substantial justice and in the exercise of equity jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court.34 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

For reasons of justice and equity, this Court has allowed exceptions to the stringent rules
governing appeals.35 It has, in the past, refused to sacrifice justice for technicality.36

After discovering the palpable error of his petition, Manuel seeks the indulgence of this Court to
consider his petition before the CA instead as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

A perusal of the said petition reveals that Manuel imputed grave abuse of discretion to the lower
court for annulling his marriage on account of his alleged homosexuality. This is not the first time
that this Court is faced with a similar situation. In Nerves v. Civil Service Commission,37 petitioner
Delia R. Nerves elevated to the CA a Civil Service Commission (CSC) decision suspending her for
six (6) months. The CSC ruled Nerves, a public school teacher, is deemed to have already served
her six-month suspension during the pendency of the case. Nevertheless, she is ordered
reinstated without back wages. On appeal, Nerves stated in her petition, inter alia:

1. This is a petition for certiorari filed pursuant to Article IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution of the
Philippines and under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

2. But per Supreme Court Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 (Revised Circular No. 1-91)
petitioner is filing the instant petition with this Honorable Court instead of the Supreme
Court.38 (Underscoring supplied)

The CA dismissed Nerves' petition for certiorari for being the wrong remedy or the inappropriate
mode of appeal.39 The CA opined that "under the Supreme Court Revised Administrative Circular
No. 1-95 x x x appeals from judgments or final orders or resolutions of CSC is by a petition for
review."40

This Court granted Nerves petition and held that she had substantially complied with the
Administrative Circular. The Court stated:

That it was erroneously labeled as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is
only a minor procedural lapse, not fatal to the appeal. x x x

More importantly, the appeal on its face appears to be impressed with merit. Hence, the Court of
Appeals should have overlooked the insubstantial defects of the petition x x x in order to do justice
to the parties concerned. There is, indeed, nothing sacrosanct about procedural rules, which
should be liberally construed in order to promote their object and assist the parties in obtaining
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding. As it has been said,
where the rigid application of the rules would frustrate substantial justice, or bar the vindication of a
legitimate grievance, the courts are justified in exempting a particular case from the operation of
the rules.41 (Underscoring supplied)

Similarly, in the more recent case of Tan v. Dumarpa,42 petitioner Joy G. Tan availed of a wrong
remedy by filing a petition for review on certiorari instead of a motion for new trial or an ordinary
appeal. In the interest of justice, this Court considered the petition, pro hac vice, as a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65.

This Court found that based on Tan's allegations, the trial court prima facie committed grave abuse
of discretion in rendering a judgment by default. If uncorrected, it will cause petitioner great
injustice. The Court elucidated in this wise:

Indeed, where as here, there is a strong showing that grave miscarriage of justice would result
from the strict application of the Rules, we will not hesitate to relax the same in the interest of
substantial justice.43 (Underscoring supplied)
Measured by the foregoing yardstick, justice will be better served by giving due course to the
present petition and treating petitioner's CA petition as one for certiorari under Rule 65,
considering that what is at stake is the validity or non-validity of a marriage.

In Salazar v. Court of Appeals,44 citing Labad v. University of Southeastern Philippines, this Court

reiterated:

x x x The dismissal of appeals on purely technical grounds is frowned upon. While the right to
appeal is a statutory, not a natural right, nonetheless it is an essential part of our judicial system
and courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal, but
rather, ensure that every party-litigant has the amplest opportunity for the proper and just
disposition of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. 45

Indeed, it is far better and more prudent for a court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the
parties a review of the case on the merits to attain the ends of justice. 46

Furthermore, it was the negligence and incompetence of Manuel's counsel that prejudiced his right
to appeal. His counsel, Atty. Christine Dugenio, repeatedly availed of inappropriate remedies. After
the denial of her notice of appeal, she failed to move for reconsideration or new trial at the first
instance. She also erroneously filed a petition for annulment of judgment rather than pursue an
ordinary appeal.

These manifest errors were clearly indicative of counsel's incompetence. These gravely worked to
the detriment of Manuel's appeal. True it is that the negligence of counsel binds the client. Still, this
Court has recognized certain exceptions: (1) where reckless or gross negligence of counsel
deprives the client of due process of law; (2) when its application will result in outright deprivation
of the client's liberty and property; or (3) where the interest of justice so require. 47

The negligence of Manuel's counsel falls under the exceptions. Ultimately, the reckless or gross
negligence of petitioner's former counsel led to the loss of his right to appeal. He should not be
made to suffer for his counsel's grave mistakes. Higher interests of justice and equity demand that
he be allowed to ventilate his case in a higher court.

In Apex Mining, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,48 this Court explained thus:

It is settled that the negligence of counsel binds the client. This is based on the rule that any act
performed by a counsel within the scope of his general or implied authority is regarded as an act of
his client. However, where counsel is guilty of gross ignorance, negligence and dereliction of duty,
which resulted in the client's being held liable for damages in a damage suit, the client is deprived
of his day in court and the judgment may be set aside on such ground. In the instant case, higher
interests of justice and equity demand that petitioners be allowed to present evidence on their
defense. Petitioners may not be made to suffer for the lawyer's mistakes. This Court will always
be disposed to grant relief to parties aggrieved by perfidy, fraud, reckless inattention and
downright incompetence of lawyers, which has the consequence of depriving their clients,
of their day in court.49 (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, this Court has the power to except a particular case from the operation of the rule
whenever the demands of justice require it. With more conviction should it wield such power in a
case involving the sacrosanct institution of marriage. This Court is guided with the thrust of giving a
party the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of one's action. 50

The client was likewise spared from counsel's negligence in Government Service Insurance
System v. Bengson Commercial Buildings, Inc.51 and Ancheta v. Guersey-Dalaygon.52 Said the
Court in Bengson:

But if under the circumstances of the case, the rule deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and
becomes a great hindrance and chief enemy, its rigors must be relaxed to admit exceptions
thereto and to prevent a miscarriage of justice. In other words, the court has the power to except a
particular case from the operation of the rule whenever the purposes of justice require it. 53
II. Concealment of homosexuality is the proper ground to annul a marriage, not
homosexuality per se.

Manuel is a desperate man determined to salvage what remains of his marriage. Persistent in his
quest, he fought back all the heavy accusations of incapacity, cruelty, and doubted masculinity
thrown at him.

The trial court declared that Leonida's petition for nullity had "no basis at all because the
supporting grounds relied upon can not legally make a case under Article 36 of the Family
Code." It went further by citing Republic v. Molina:54

Indeed, mere allegations of conflicting personalities, irreconcilable differences, incessant quarrels

and/or beatings, unpredictable mood swings, infidelities, vices, abandonment, and difficulty,
neglect, or failure in the performance of some marital obligations do not suffice to establish
psychological incapacity.55

If so, the lower court should have dismissed outright the petition for not meeting the guidelines set
in Molina. What Leonida attempted to demonstrate were Manuel's homosexual tendencies by
citing overt acts generally predominant among homosexual individuals. 56 She wanted to prove that
the perceived homosexuality rendered Manuel incapable of fulfilling the essential marital
obligations.

But instead of dismissing the petition, the trial court nullified the marriage between Manuel and
Leonida on the ground of vitiated consent by virtue of fraud. In support of its conclusion, the lower
court reasoned out:

As insinuated by the State (p. 75, TSN, 15 December 2003), when there is smoke surely there is
fire. Although vehemently denied by defendant, there is preponderant evidence enough to
establish with certainty that defendant is really a homosexual. This is the fact that can
be deduced from the totality of the marriage life scenario of herein parties.

Before his marriage, defendant knew very well that people around him even including his own
close friends doubted his true sexual preference (TSN, pp. 35-36, 13 December 2000; pp. 73-75,
15 December 2003). After receiving many forewarnings, plaintiff told defendant about the rumor
she heard but defendant did not do anything to prove to the whole world once and for all the truth
of all his denials. Defendant threatened to sue those people but nothing happened after that. There
may have been more important matters to attend to than to waste time and effort filing cases
against and be effected by these people and so, putting more premiums on defendant's denials,
plaintiff just the same married him. Reasons upon reasons may be advanced to either exculpate or
nail to the cross defendant for his act of initially concealing his homosexuality to plaintiff, but in the
end, only one thing is certain - even during his marriage with plaintiff, the smoke of doubt about his
real preference continued and even got thicker, reason why obviously defendant failed to establish
a happy and solid family; and in so failing, plaintiff and their children became his innocent and
unwilling victims.

Yes, there is nothing untoward of a man if, like herein defendant, he is meticulous over even small
details in the house (sic) like wrongly folded bed sheets, etc. or if a man is more authoritative in
knowing what clothes or jewelry shall fit his wife (pp. 77-81, TSN, 15 December 2003); but these
admissions of defendant taken in the light of evidence presented apparently showing that he had
extra fondness of his male friends (sic) to the extent that twice on separate occasions (pp. 4-7,
TSN, 14 February 2001) he was allegedly seen by plaintiff kissing another man lips-to-lips plus the
homosexual magazines and tapes likewise allegedly discovered underneath his bed (Exhibits "L"
and "M"), the doubt as to his real sex identity becomes stronger. The accusation of plaintiff versus
thereof of defendant may be the name of the game in this case; but the simple reason of
professional rivalry advanced by the defendant is certainly not enough to justify and obscure the
question why plaintiff should accuse him of such a very untoward infidelity at the expense and
humiliation of their children and family as a whole. 57

Evidently, no sufficient proof was presented to substantiate the allegations that Manuel is a
homosexual and that he concealed this to Leonida at the time of their marriage. The lower court
considered the public perception of Manuel's sexual preference without the corroboration of
witnesses. Also, it took cognizance of Manuel's peculiarities and interpreted it against his sexuality.

Even assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that Manuel is a homosexual, the lower court cannot
appreciate it as a ground to annul his marriage with Leonida. The law is clear - a marriage may be
annulled when the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, 58 such as concealment of
homosexuality.59 Nowhere in the said decision was it proven by preponderance of evidence that
Manuel was a homosexual at the onset of his marriage and that he deliberately hid such fact to his
wife.60 It is the concealment of homosexuality, and not homosexuality per se, that vitiates the
consent of the innocent party. Such concealment presupposes bad faith and intent to defraud the
other party in giving consent to the marriage.

Consent is an essential requisite of a valid marriage. To be valid, it must be freely given by both
parties. An allegation of vitiated consent must be proven by preponderance of evidence. The
Family Code has enumerated an exclusive list of circumstances 61 constituting fraud.
Homosexuality per se is not among those cited, but its concealment.

This distinction becomes more apparent when we go over the deliberations 62 of the Committees on
the Civil Code and Family Law, to wit:

Justice Caguioa remarked that this ground should be eliminated in the provision on the grounds for
legal separation. Dean Gupit, however, pointed out that in Article 46, they are talking only of
"concealment," while in the article on legal separation, there is actuality. Judge Diy added that in
legal separation, the ground existed after the marriage, while in Article 46, the ground existed at
the time of the marriage. Justice Reyes suggested that, for clarity, they add the phrase "existing at
the time of the marriage" at the end of subparagraph (4). The Committee approved the
suggestion.63

To reiterate, homosexuality per se is only a ground for legal separation. It is its concealment that
serves as a valid ground to annul a marriage. 64 Concealment in this case is not simply a blanket
denial, but one that is constitutive of fraud. It is this fundamental element that respondent failed to
prove.

In the United States, homosexuality has been considered as a basis for divorce. It indicates that
questions of sexual identity strike so deeply at one of the basic elements of marriage, which is the
exclusive sexual bond between the spouses.65 In Crutcher v. Crutcher,66 the Court held:

Unnatural practices of the kind charged here are an infamous indignity to the wife, and which
would make the marriage relation so revolting to her that it would become impossible for her to
discharge the duties of a wife, and would defeat the whole purpose of the relation. In the natural
course of things, they would cause mental suffering to the extent of affecting her health. 67

However, although there may be similar sentiments here in the Philippines, the legal overtones are
significantly different. Divorce is not recognized in the country. Homosexuality and its alleged
incompatibility to a healthy heterosexual life are not sanctioned as grounds to sever the marriage
bond in our jurisdiction. At most, it is only a ground to separate from bed and board.

What was proven in the hearings a quo was a relatively blissful marital union for more than eleven
(11) years, which produced three (3) children. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage rests on Leonida. Sadly, she failed to discharge this onus.

The same failure to prove fraud which purportedly resulted to a vitiated marital consent was found
in Villanueva v. Court of Appeals.68 In Villanueva, instead of proving vitiation of consent, appellant
resorted to baseless portrayals of his wife as a perpetrator of fraudulent schemes. Said the Court:

Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, especially if they coincide with those of the trial court, as
in the instant case, are generally binding on this Court. We affirm the findings of the Court of
Appeals that petitioner freely and voluntarily married private respondent and that no threats or
intimidation, duress or violence compelled him to do so, thus -
Appellant anchored his prayer for the annulment of his marriage on the ground that he did not
freely consent to be married to the appellee. He cited several incidents that created on his mind a
reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave danger to his life and safety. x x x

The Court is not convinced that appellant's apprehension of danger to his person is so
overwhelming as to deprive him of the will to enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It is not
disputed that at the time he was allegedly being harassed, appellant worked as a security guard in
a bank. Given the rudiments of self-defense, or, at the very least, the proper way to keep himself
out of harm's way. x x x

Appellant also invoked fraud to annul his marriage, as he was made to believe by appellee that the
latter was pregnant with his child when they were married. Appellant's excuse that he could not
have impregnated the appellee because he did not have an erection during their tryst is flimsy at
best, and an outright lie at worst. The complaint is bereft of any reference to his inability to
copulate with the appellee. x x x

xxxx

x x x The failure to cohabit becomes relevant only if it arises as a result of the perpetration of any
of the grounds for annulling the marriage, such as lack of parental consent, insanity, fraud,
intimidation, or undue influence x x x. Since the appellant failed to justify his failure to cohabit with
the appellee on any of these grounds, the validity of his marriage must be upheld. 69

Verily, the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion, not only by solely taking into account
petitioner's homosexuality per se and not its concealment, but by declaring the marriage void from
its existence.

This Court is mindful of the constitutional policy to protect and strengthen the family as the
basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. 70 The State and
the public have vital interest in the maintenance and preservation of these social institutions
against desecration by fabricated evidence. 71 Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
validity of marriage.

III. In a valid marriage, the husband and wife jointly administer and enjoy their community
or conjugal property.

Article 96 of the Family Code, on regimes of absolute community property, provides:

Art. 96. The administration and enjoyment of the community property shall belong to both spouses
jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the
court by the wife for a proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of
the contract implementing such decision.

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the common properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance without the
authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or
consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be
construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may
be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by
the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.

A similar provision, Article 12472 prescribes joint administration and enjoyment in a regime of

conjugal partnership. In a valid marriage, both spouses exercise administration and enjoyment of
the property regime, jointly.

In the case under review, the RTC decreed a dissolution of the community property of Manuel and
Leonida. In the same breath, the trial court forfeited Manuel's share in favor of the children.
Considering that the marriage is upheld valid and subsisting, the dissolution and forfeiture of
Manuel's share in the property regime is unwarranted. They remain the joint administrators of the
community property.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The appealed Decision is REVERSED and SET

ASIDE and the petition in the trial court to annul the marriage is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 174451               October 13, 2009

VERONICA CABACUNGAN ALCAZAR, Petitioner,

vs.
REY C. ALCAZAR, Respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse the Decision 1 dated 24 May 2006
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 84471, affirming the Decision dated 9 June
2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos City, Branch 85, in Civil Case No. 664-
M-2002, which dismissed petitioner Veronica Cabacungan Alcazar’s Complaint for the
annulment of her marriage to respondent Rey C. Alcazar.

The Complaint,2 docketed as Civil Case No. 664-M-2002, was filed by petitioner before
the RTC on 22 August 2002. Petitioner alleged in her Complaint that she was married to
respondent on 11 October 2000 by Rev. Augusto G. Pabustan (Pabustan), at the latter’s
residence. After their wedding, petitioner and respondent lived for five days in San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro, the hometown of respondent’s parents. Thereafter, the newlyweds
went back to Manila, but respondent did not live with petitioner at the latter’s abode at
2601-C Jose Abad Santos Avenue, Tondo, Manila. On 23 October 2000, respondent left
for Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, where he worked as an upholsterer in a furniture
shop. While working in Riyadh, respondent did not communicate with petitioner by phone
or by letter. Petitioner tried to call respondent for five times but respondent never
answered. About a year and a half after respondent left for Riyadh, a co-teacher informed
petitioner that respondent was about to come home to the Philippines. Petitioner was
surprised why she was not advised by respondent of his arrival.

Petitioner further averred in her Complaint that when respondent arrived in the
Philippines, the latter did not go home to petitioner at 2601-C Jose Abad Santos Avenue,
Tondo, Manila. Instead, respondent proceeded to his parents’ house in San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro. Upon learning that respondent was in San Jose, Occidental
Mindoro, petitioner went to see her brother-in-law in Velasquez St., Tondo, Manila, who
claimed that he was not aware of respondent’s whereabouts. Petitioner traveled to San
Jose, Occidental Mindoro, where she was informed that respondent had been living with
his parents since his arrival in March 2002.

Petitioner asserted that from the time respondent arrived in the Philippines, he never
contacted her. Thus, petitioner concluded that respondent was physically incapable of
consummating his marriage with her, providing sufficient cause for annulment of their
marriage pursuant to paragraph 5, Article 45 of the Family Code of the Philippines
(Family Code). There was also no more possibility of reconciliation between petitioner
and respondent.

Per the Sheriff’s Return3 dated 3 October 2002, a summons, together with a copy of
petitioner’s Complaint, was served upon respondent on 30 September 2002. 4

On 18 November 2002, petitioner, through counsel, filed a Motion 5 to direct the public
prosecutor to conduct an investigation of the case pursuant to Article 48 of the Family
Code.

As respondent did not file an Answer, the RTC issued on 27 November 2002 an
Order6 directing the public prosecutor to conduct an investigation to ensure that no
collusion existed between the parties; to submit a report thereon; and to appear in all
stages of the proceedings to see to it that evidence was not fabricated or suppressed.

On 4 March 2003, Public Prosecutrix Veronica A.V. de Guzman (De Guzman) submitted
her Report manifesting that she had conducted an investigation of the case of petitioner
and respondent in January 2003, but respondent never participated therein. Public
Prosecutrix De Guzman also noted that no collusion took place between the parties, and
measures were taken to prevent suppression of evidence between them. She then
recommended that a full-blown trial be conducted to determine whether petitioner’s
Complaint was meritorious or not.

Pre-trial was held and terminated on 20 May 2003.

On 21 May 2003, the RTC received the Notice of Appearance of the Solicitor General.

Trial on the merits ensued thereafter.

During trial, petitioner presented herself, her mother Lolita Cabacungan (Cabacungan),
and clinical psychologist Nedy L. Tayag (Tayag) as witnesses.

Petitioner first took the witness stand and elaborated on the allegations in her Complaint.
Cabacungan corroborated petitioner’s testimony.

Petitioner’s third witness, Tayag, presented the following psychological evaluation of

petitioner and respondent:

After meticulous scrutiny and careful analysis of the collected data, petitioner is found to
be free from any underlying personality aberration neither (sic) of any serious
psychopathological traits, which may possibly impede her normal functioning (sic) of
marriage. On the other hand, the undersigned arrived to (sic) a firm opinion that the
sudden breakdown of marital life between petitioner and respondent was clearly due to
the diagnosed personality disorder that the respondent is harboring, making him
psychologically incapacitated to properly assume and comply [with] essential roles (sic)
of obligations as a married man.

The pattern of behaviors displayed by the respondent satisfies the diagnostic criteria of a
disorder clinically classified as Narcissistic Personality Disorder, a condition deemed to
be grave, severe, long lasting in proportion and incurable by any treatment.

People suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder are known to have a pervasive
pattern of grandiosity (in fantasy or behavior), need for admiration, and lack of empathy,
beginning by early adulthood and present in a variety of contexts, as indicated by five (or
more) of the following:

1. has a grandiose of self-importance (e.g. exaggerates achievements and talents,

expect to be recognized as superior without commensurate achievements)

2. is preoccupied with fantasies of unlimited success, power, brilliance, beauty or ideal

love

3. believes that he or she is "special" and unique and can only be understood by, or
should associate with, other special or high status people (institutions)

4. requires excessive admiration

5. has sense of entitlement, i.e., unreasonable expectations of especially favorable

treatment or automatic compliance with his or her expectations

6. is interpersonally exploitative, i.e., takes advantage of others to achieve his or her own
ends

7. lacks empathy: is unwilling to recognize or identify with the feelings and needs of
others

8. is often envious of others or believes that others are envious of him or her

9. shows arrogant, haughty behavior or attitudes.

The root cause of respondent’s personality disorder can be attributed to his early
childhood years with predisposing psychosocial factors that influence[d] his development.
It was recounted that respondent is the first child of his mother’s second family.
Obviously, unhealthy familial constellation composed his immediate environment in his
growing up years. Respondent had undergone a severe longing for attention from his
father who had been unfaithful to them and had died early in life, that he was left alone to
fend for the family needs. More so that they were coping against poverty, his caregivers
failed to validate his needs, wishes or responses and overlooked the love and attention
he yearned which led to develop a pathological need for self-object to help him maintain
a cohesive sense of self-such so great that everything other people offer is "consumed."
Hence, he is unable to develop relationship with other (sic) beyond this need. There is no
capacity for empathy sharing, or loving others.

The psychological incapacity of the respondent is characterized by juridical antecedence

as it already existed long before he entered into marriage. Since it already started early in
life, it is deeply engrained within his system and becomes a[n] integral part of his
personality structure, thereby rendering such to be permanent and incurable. 7

Tayag concluded in the end that:

As such, their marriage is already beyond repair, considering the fact that it has long
been (sic) ceased to exist and have their different life priorities. Reconciliation between
them is regarded to be (sic). The essential obligations of love, trust, respect, fidelity,
authentic cohabitation as husband and wife, mutual help and support, and commitment,
did not and will no lon[g]er exist between them. With due consideration of the above-
mentioned findings, the undersigned recommends, the declaration of nullity of marriage
between petitioner and respondent. 8

On 18 February 2004, petitioner filed her Formal Offer of Evidence. Public Prosecutrix
Myrna S. Lagrosa (Lagrosa), who replaced Public Prosecutrix De Guzman, interposed no
objection to the admission of petitioner’s evidence and manifested that she would no
longer present evidence for the State.

On 9 June 2004, the RTC rendered its Decision denying petitioner’s Complaint for
annulment of her marriage to respondent, holding in substance that:

In the case at bar, the Court finds that the acts of the respondent in not communicating
with petitioner and not living with the latter the moment he returned home from Saudi
Arabia despite their marriage do (sic) not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity
on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already present at the
inception of their marriage or that these are incurable.

That being the case, the Court resolves to deny the instant petition.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Annulment of Marriage is hereby

DENIED.9

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration10 but it was denied by the RTC in an

Order11 dated 19 August 2004.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV
No. 84471. In a Decision 12 dated 24 May 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC
Decision dated 9 June 2004. The Court of Appeals ruled that the RTC did not err in
finding that petitioner failed to prove respondent’s psychological incapacity. Other than
petitioner’s bare allegations, no other evidence was presented to prove respondent’s
personality disorder that made him completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of the marital state. Citing Republic v. Court of Appeals, 13 the appellate court
ruled that the evidence should be able to establish that at least one of the spouses was
mentally or physically ill to such an extent that said person could not have known the
marital obligations to be assumed; or knowing the marital obligations, could not have
validly assumed the same. At most, respondent’s abandonment of petitioner could be a
ground for legal separation under Article 5 of the Family Code. 1avvphi1

Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in a

Resolution14 dated 28 August 2008.

Hence, this Petition raising the sole issue of:

WHETHER OR NOT, AS DEFINED BY THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE,

RESPONDENT IS PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO PERFORM THE
ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATONS.15

At the outset, it must be noted that the Complaint originally filed by petitioner before the
RTC was for annulment of marriage based on Article 45, paragraph 5 of the Family
Code, which reads:
ART. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time
of the marriage:

xxxx

(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the
other, and such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; x x x.

Article 45(5) of the Family Code refers to lack of power to copulate. 16 Incapacity to
consummate denotes the permanent inability on the part of the spouses to perform the
complete act of sexual intercourse. 17 Non-consummation of a marriage may be on the
part of the husband or of the wife and may be caused by a physical or structural defect in
the anatomy of one of the parties or it may be due to chronic illness and inhibitions or
fears arising in whole or in part from psychophysical conditions. It may be caused by
psychogenic causes, where such mental block or disturbance has the result of making
the spouse physically incapable of performing the marriage act. 18

No evidence was presented in the case at bar to establish that respondent was in any
way physically incapable to consummate his marriage with petitioner. Petitioner even
admitted during her cross-examination that she and respondent had sexual intercourse
after their wedding and before respondent left for abroad. There obviously being no
physical incapacity on respondent’s part, then, there is no ground for annulling
petitioner’s marriage to respondent. Petitioner’s Complaint was, therefore, rightfully
dismissed.

One curious thing, though, caught this Court’s attention. As can be gleaned from the
evidence presented by petitioner and the observations of the RTC and the Court of
Appeals, it appears that petitioner was actually seeking the declaration of nullity of her
marriage to respondent based on the latter’s psychological incapacity to comply with his
marital obligations of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Petitioner attributes the filing of the erroneous Complaint before the RTC to her former
counsel’s mistake or gross ignorance.19 But even said reason cannot save petitioner’s
Complaint from dismissal. It is settled in this jurisdiction that the client is bound by the
acts, even mistakes, of the counsel in the realm of procedural technique. 20 Although this
rule is not a hard and fast one and admits of exceptions, such as where the mistake of
counsel is so gross, palpable and inexcusable as to result in the violation of his client’s
substantive rights,21 petitioner failed to convince us that such exceptional circumstances
exist herein.

Assuming for the sake of argument that we can treat the Complaint as one for declaration
of nullity based on Article 36 of the Family Code, we will still dismiss the Complaint for
lack of merit, consistent with the evidence presented by petitioner during the trial.

Article 36 of the Family Code provides:

ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.

In Santos v. Court of Appeals,22 the Court declared that "psychological incapacity" under

Article 36 of the Family Code is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of
psychoses. It should refer, rather, to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence,
and (c) incurability.23

The Court laid down the guidelines in resolving petitions for declaration of nullity of
marriage, based on Article 36 of the Family Code, in Republic v. Court of Appeals, 24 to
wit:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and
our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution
devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It
decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim
of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be a) medically or clinically
identified, b) alleged in the complaint, c) sufficiently proven by experts and d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must
be psychological – not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such
root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the "time of the celebration" of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their "I do’s." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such
time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or

incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to
those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job.
Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing
medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and
raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor
in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of

the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of
the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect
by our courts. x x x.

Being accordingly guided by the aforequoted pronouncements in Republic v. Court of

Appeals, we scrutinized the totality of evidence presented by petitioner and found that the
same was not enough to sustain a finding that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated.

Petitioner’s evidence, particularly her and her mother’s testimonies, merely established
that respondent left petitioner soon after their wedding to work in Saudi Arabia; that when
respondent returned to the Philippines a year and a half later, he directly went to live with
his parents in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, and not with petitioner in Tondo, Manila;
and that respondent also did not contact petitioner at all since leaving for abroad. These
testimonies though do not give us much insight into respondent’s psychological state.

Tayag’s psychological report leaves much to be desired and hardly helps petitioner’s
cause. It must be noted that Tayag was not able to personally examine respondent.
Respondent did not appear for examination despite Tayag’s invitation. 25 Tayag, in
evaluating respondent’s psychological state, had to rely on information provided by
petitioner. Hence, we expect Tayag to have been more prudent and thorough in her
evaluation of respondent’s psychological condition, since her source of information,
namely, petitioner, was hardly impartial.

Tayag concluded in her report that respondent was suffering from Narcissistic Personality
Disorder, traceable to the latter’s experiences during his childhood. Yet, the report is
totally bereft of the basis for the said conclusion. Tayag did not particularly describe the
"pattern of behavior" that showed that respondent indeed had a Narcissistic Personality
Disorder. Tayag likewise failed to explain how such a personality disorder made
respondent psychologically incapacitated to perform his obligations as a husband. We
emphasize that the burden falls upon petitioner, not just to prove that respondent suffers
from a psychological disorder, but also that such psychological disorder renders him
"truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage." 26 Psychological incapacity must be more than
just a "difficulty," a "refusal," or a "neglect" in the performance of some marital
obligations.

In this instance, we have been allowed, through the evidence adduced, to peek into
petitioner’s marital life and, as a result, we perceive a simple case of a married couple
being apart too long, becoming strangers to each other, with the husband falling out of
love and distancing or detaching himself as much as possible from his wife.

To be tired and give up on one’s situation and on one’s spouse are not necessarily signs
of psychological illness; neither can falling out of love be so labeled. When these happen,
the remedy for some is to cut the marital knot to allow the parties to go their separate
ways. This simple remedy, however, is not available to us under our laws. Ours is a
limited remedy that addresses only a very specific situation – a relationship where no
marriage could have validly been concluded because the parties; or where one of them,
by reason of a grave and incurable psychological illness existing when the marriage was
celebrated, did not appreciate the obligations of marital life and, thus, could not have
validly entered into a marriage.27
1avvphi1
An unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage. As we stated in Marcos v.
Marcos28]:

Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that
cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a
serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage.
It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties
and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. x x x.

Resultantly, we have held in the past that mere "irreconcilable differences" and
"conflicting personalities" in no wise constitute psychological incapacity. 29

As a last-ditch effort to have her marriage to respondent declared null, petitioner pleads
abandonment by and sexual infidelity of respondent. In a Manifestation and
Motion30 dated 21 August 2007 filed before us, petitioner claims that she was informed by
one Jacinto Fordonez, who is residing in the same barangay as respondent in Occidental
Mindoro, that respondent is living-in with another woman named "Sally."

Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not constitute psychological incapacity within the
contemplation of the Family Code. Again, petitioner must be able to establish that
respondent’s unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered personality, which makes
him completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state. 31

It remains settled that the State has a high stake in the preservation of marriage rooted in
its recognition of the sanctity of married life and its mission to protect and strengthen the
family as a basic autonomous social institution. Hence, any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity.32 Presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage. Semper praesumitur
pro matrimonio.33 In the case at bar, petitioner failed to persuade us that respondent’s
failure to communicate with petitioner since leaving for Saudi Arabia to work, and to live
with petitioner after returning to the country, are grave psychological maladies that are
keeping him from knowing and/or complying with the essential obligations of marriage.

We are not downplaying petitioner’s frustration and misery in finding herself shackled, so
to speak, to a marriage that is no longer working. Regrettably, there are situations like
this one, where neither law nor society can provide the specific answers to every
individual problem.34

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The 24 May 2006 Decision and 28 August 2008
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 84471, which affirmed the 9 June
2004 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos City, Branch 85, dismissing
petitioner Veronica Cabacungan Alcazar’s Complaint in Civil Case No. 664-M-2002, are
AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
 PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Acting Chief Justice