Legal Ethics Midterm Cases

LEGAL ETHICS
CASES FOR MIDTERMS
SECOND DIVISION
[A.C. NO. 5280 - March 30, 2004]
WILLIAM S. UY, Complainant, v.
ATTY. FERMIN L. GONZALES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
William S. Uy filed before this Court an administrative case against Atty. Fermin L.
Gonzales for violation of the confidentiality of their lawyer-client relationship. The
complainant alleges: ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
Sometime in April 1999, he engaged the services of respondent lawyer to prepare and
file a petition for the issuance of a new certificate of title. After confiding with
respondent the circumstances surrounding the lost title and discussing the fees and
costs, respondent prepared, finalized and submitted to him a petition to be filed before
the Regional Trial Court of Tayug, Pangasinan. When the petition was about to be filed,
respondent went to his (complainants) office at Virra Mall, Greenhills and demanded a
certain amount from him other than what they had previously agreed upon. Respondent
left his office after reasoning with him. Expecting that said petition would be filed, he
was shocked to find out later that instead of filing the petition for the issuance of a new
certificate of title, respondent filed a letter-complaint dated July 26, 1999 against him
with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Tayug, Pangasinan for "Falsification of
Public Documents."1 The letter-complaint contained facts and circumstances pertaining
to the transfer certificate of title that was the subject matter of the petition which
respondent was supposed to have filed. Portions of said letter-complaint read:
The undersigned complainant accuses WILLIAM S. UY, of legal age, Filipino, married
and a resident of 132-A Gilmore Street corner 9th Street, New Manila, Quezon City,
Michael Angelo T. UY, CRISTINA EARL T. UY, minors and residents of the aforesaid
address, Luviminda G. Tomagos, of legal age, married, Filipino and a resident of
Carmay East, Rosales, Pangasinan, and F. Madayag, with office address at A12, 2/F
Vira Mall Shopping Complex, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila, for ESTAFA THRU
FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS, committed as follows: ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
That on March 15, 1996, William S. Uy acquired by purchase a parcel of land consisting
of 4.001 ha. for the amount of P100,000.00, Philippine Currency, situated at Brgy.
Gonzales, Umingan, Pangasinan, from FERMIN C. GONZALES, as evidenced by a Deed
of Sale executed by the latter in favor of the former; that in the said date, William S.
Uy received the Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-33122, covering the said land; chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
That instead of registering said Deed of Sale and Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
T-33122, in the Register of Deeds for the purpose of transferring the same in his name,
William S. Uy executed a Deed of Voluntary Land Transfer of the aforesaid land in favor
of his children, namely, Michael Angelo T. Uy and Cristina Earl T. Uy, wherein William S.
Uy made it appear that his said children are of legal age, and residents of Brgy.
Gonzales, Umingan, Pangasinan, when in fact and in truth, they are minors and
residents of Metro Manila, to qualify them as farmers/beneficiaries, thus placing the
said property within the coverage of the Land Reform Program; chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
That the above-named accused, conspiring together and helping one another procured
the falsified documents which they used as supporting papers so that they can secure
from the Office of the Register of Deeds of Tayug, Pangasinan, TCT No. T-5165
(Certificate of Land Ownership Award No. 004 32930) in favor of his above-named
children. Some of these Falsified documents are purported Affidavit of Seller/Transferor
and Affidavit of Non-Tenancy, both dated August 20, 1996, without the signature of
affiant, Fermin C. Gonzales, and that on that said date, Fermin C. Gonzales was already
dead;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
That on December 17, 1998, William S. Uy with deceit and evident intent to defraud
undersigned, still accepted the amount of P340,000.00, from Atty. Fermin L. Gonzales,
P300,000.00, in PNB Check No. 0000606, and P40,000.00, in cash, as full payment of
the redemption of TCT No. 33122knowing fully well that at that time the said TCT
cannot be redeemed anymore because the same was already transferred in the name
of his children; chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
That William S. Uy has appropriated the amount covered by the aforesaid check, as
evidenced by the said check which was encashed by him; chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
That inspite of repeated demands, both oral and in writing, William S. Uy refused and
continue to refuse to deliver to him a TCT in the name of the undersigned or to return
and repay the said P340,000.00, to the damage and prejudice of the undersigned.2
With the execution of the letter-complaint, respondent violated his oath as a lawyer and
grossly disregarded his duty to preserve the secrets of his client. Respondent
unceremoniously turned against him just because he refused to grant respondents
request for additional compensation. Respondents act tarnished his reputation and
social standing.3 ςrνll
In compliance with this Courts Resolution dated July 31, 2000,4 respondent filed his
Comment narrating his version, as follows: ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
On December 17, 1998, he offered to redeem from complainant a 4.9 hectare-property
situated in Brgy. Gonzales, Umingan, Pangasinan covered by TCT No. T-33122 which
the latter acquired by purchase from his (respondents) son, the late Fermin C.
Gonzales, Jr.. On the same date, he paid complainant P340,000.00 and demanded the
delivery of TCT No. T-33122 as well as the execution of the Deed of Redemption. Upon
request, he gave complainant additional time to locate said title or until after Christmas
to deliver the same and execute the Deed of Redemption. After the said period, he
went to complainants office and demanded the delivery of the title and the execution of
the Deed of Redemption. Instead, complainant gave him photocopies of TCT No. T-
33122 and TCT No. T-5165. Complainant explained that he had already transferred the
title of the property, covered by TCT No.T-5165 to his children Michael and Cristina Uy
and that TCT No. T-5165 was misplaced and cannot be located despite efforts to locate
it. Wanting to protect his interest over the property coupled with his desire to get hold
of TCT No. T-5165 the earliest possible time, he offered his assistance pro bono to
prepare a petition for lost title provided that all necessary expenses incident thereto
including expenses for transportation and others, estimated at P20,000.00, will be
shouldered by complainant. To these, complainant agreed.
On April 9, 1999, he submitted to complainant a draft of the petition for the lost title
ready for signing and notarization. On April 14, 1999, he went to complainants office
informing him that the petition is ready for filing and needs funds for expenses.
Complainant who was with a client asked him to wait at the anteroom where he waited
for almost two hours until he found out that complainant had already left without
leaving any instructions nor funds for the filing of the petition. Complainants conduct
infuriated him which prompted him to give a handwritten letter telling complainant that
he is withdrawing the petition he prepared and that complainant should get another
lawyer to file the petition.
Respondent maintains that the lawyer-client relationship between him and complainant
was terminated when he gave the handwritten letter to complainant; that there was no
longer any professional relationship between the two of them when he filed the letter-
complaint for falsification of public document; that the facts and allegations contained
in the letter-complaint for falsification were culled from public documents procured from
the Office of the Register of Deeds in Tayug, Pangasinan.5 ςrνll
In a Resolution dated October 18, 2000, the Court referred the case to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.6 ςrνll
Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala ordered both parties to appear on April 2,

2003 before the IBP.7 On said date, complainant did not appear despite due notice.
There was no showing that respondent received the notice for that days hearing and so
the hearing was reset to May 28, 2003.8 ςrνll
On April 29, 2003, Commissioner Villanueva-Maala received a letter from one Atty.
Augusto M. Macam dated April 24, 2003, stating that his client, William S. Uy, had lost
interest in pursuing the complaint he filed against Atty. Gonzales and requesting that
the case against Atty. Gonzales be dismissed.9 ςrνll
On June 2, 2003, Commissioner Villanueva-Maala submitted her report and

recommendation, portions of which read as follows:
The facts and evidence presented show that when respondent agreed to handle the
filing of the Verified Petition for the loss of TCT No. T-5165, complainant had confided
to respondent the fact of the loss and the circumstances attendant thereto. When
respondent filed the Letter-Complaint to the Office of the Special Prosecutor in Tayug,
Pangasinan, he violated Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
expressly provides that "A lawyer shall preserve the confidences and secrets of his
client even after the attorney-client relation is terminated." Respondent cannot argue
that there was no lawyer-client relationship between them when he filed the Letter-
Complaint on 26 July 1999 considering that as early as 14 April 1999, or three (3)
months after, respondent had already terminated complainants perceived lawyer-client
relationship between them. The duty to maintain inviolate the clients confidences and
secrets is not temporary but permanent. It is in effect perpetual for "it outlasts the
lawyers employment" (Canon 37, Code of Professional Responsibility) which means
even after the relationship has been terminated, the duty to preserve the clients
confidences and secrets remains effective. Likewise Rule 21.02, Canon 21 of the Rules
of Professional Responsibility provides that "A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage
of his client, use information acquired in the course of employment, nor shall he use
the same to his own advantage or that of a third person, unless the client with the full
knowledge of the circumstances consents thereto."
On 29 April 2003, the Commission received a letter dated 24 April 2003 from Atty.
Augusto M. Macam, who claims to represent complainant, William S. Uy, alleging that
complainant is no longer interested in pursuing this case and requested that the same
be dismissed. The aforesaid letter hardly deserves consideration as proceedings of this
nature cannot be "interrupted by reason of desistance, settlement, compromise,
restitution, withdrawal of the charges, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the
same. (Section 5, Rule 139-B, Rules of Court). Moreover, in Boliver v. Simbol, 16 SCRA
623, the Court ruled that "any person may bring to this Courts attention the
misconduct of any lawyer, and action will usually be taken regardless of the interest or
lack of interest of the complainant, if the facts proven so warrant."
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, we find respondent Atty. Fermin L. Gonzales to have

violated the Code of Professional Responsibility and it is hereby recommended that he
be SUSPENDED for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS from receipt hereof, from the
practice of his profession as a lawyer and member of the Bar.10
On June 21, 2003, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
issued Resolution No. XV-2003-365, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the

Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and applicable laws and
rules, and considering that respondent violated Rule 21.02, Canon 21 of the Canons of
Professional Responsibility, Atty. Fermin L. Gonzales is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for six (6) months.11
Preliminarily, we agree with Commissioner Villanueva-Maala that the manifestation of

complainant Uy expressing his desire to dismiss the administrative complaint he filed
against respondent, has no persuasive bearing in the present case.
Sec. 5, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court states that:
No investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of the desistance,

settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges, or failure of the
complainant to prosecute the same.
This is because:
A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the
complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary
proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance.
They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken
for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons
unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as
an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the
court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no
interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper
administration of justice. Hence, if the evidence on record warrants, the respondent
may be suspended or disbarred despite the desistance of complainant or his withdrawal
of the charges.12
Now to the merits of the complaint against the respondent.
Practice of law embraces any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application
of law, as well as legal principles, practice or procedure and calls for legal knowledge,
training and experience.13 While it is true that a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended
for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to
be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to
continue as an officer of the court,14 complainant failed to prove any of the
circumstances enumerated above that would warrant the disbarment or suspension of
herein respondent.
Notwithstanding respondents own perception on the matter, a scrutiny of the records

reveals that the relationship between complainant and respondent stemmed from a
personal transaction or dealings between them rather than the practice of law by
respondent. Respondent dealt with complainant only because he redeemed a property
which complainant had earlier purchased from his (complainants) son. It is not refuted
that respondent paid complainant P340,000.00 and gave him ample time to produce its
title and execute the Deed of Redemption. However, despite the period given to him,
complainant failed to fulfill his end of the bargain because of the alleged loss of the title
which he had admitted to respondent as having prematurely transferred to his children,
thus prompting respondent to offer his assistance so as to secure the issuance of a new
title to the property, in lieu of the lost one, with complainant assuming the expenses
therefor.
As a rule, an attorney-client relationship is said to exist when a lawyer voluntarily

permits or acquiesces with the consultation of a person, who in respect to a business or
trouble of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view of obtaining professional advice or
assistance. It is not essential that the client should have employed the attorney on any
previous occasion or that any retainer should have been paid, promised or charged for,
neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the case
about which the consultation was had, for as long as the advice and assistance of the
attorney is sought and received, in matters pertinent to his profession.15
ςrνll
Considering the attendant peculiar circumstances, said rule cannot apply to the present
case. Evidently, the facts alleged in the complaint for "Estafa Through Falsification of
Public Documents" filed by respondent against complainant were obtained by
respondent due to his personal dealings with complainant. Respondent volunteered his
service to hasten the issuance of the certificate of title of the land he has redeemed
from complainant. Respondents immediate objective was to secure the title of the
property that complainant had earlier bought from his son. Clearly, there was no
attorney-client relationship between respondent and complainant. The preparation and
the proposed filing of the petition was only incidental to their personal transaction.
Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility reads:
Canon 21 A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE CONFIDENCE AND SECRETS OF HIS CLIENT
EVEN AFTER THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATION IS TERMINATED.
Rule 21.01 A lawyer shall not reveal the confidences or secrets of his client except: ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
a) When authorized by the client after acquainting him of the consequences of the
disclosure;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
b) When required by law; chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
c) When necessary to collect his fees or to defend himself, his employees or associates
or by judicial action.
The alleged "secrets" of complainant were not specified by him in his affidavit-
complaint. Whatever facts alleged by respondent against complainant were not
obtained by respondent in his professional capacity but as a redemptioner of a property
originally owned by his deceased son and therefore, when respondent filed the
complaint for estafa against herein complainant, which necessarily involved alleging
facts that would constitute estafa, respondent was not, in any way, violating Canon 21.
There is no way we can equate the filing of the affidavit-complaint against herein
complainant to a misconduct that is wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and
good demeanor or that renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. To
hold otherwise would be precluding any lawyer from instituting a case against anyone
to protect his personal or proprietary interests.
WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XV-2003-365 dated June 21, 2003 of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the administrative case filed against
Atty. Fermin L. Gonzales, docketed as A.C. No. 5280, is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Callejo, Sr., and TINGA, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 120420. April 21, 1999.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RUFINO MIRANDILLA

BERMAS, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
In convicting an accused, it is not enough that proof beyond reasonable doubt has been
adduced; it is also essential that the accused has been duly afforded his fundamental
rights.
Rufino Mirandilla Bermas pleaded not guilty before the Regional Trial Court of
Parañaque, Branch 274, Metro Manila, to the crime of rape under a criminal complaint,
which read: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
"C O M P L A I N T
"The undersigned complainant as assisted by her mother accuses Rufino Mirandilla

Bermas, of the crime of Rape, committed as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That on or about the 3rd day of August 1994, in the Municipality of Parañaque, Metro
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed
accused, while armed with a knife and by means of force and intimidation, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the undersigned
complainant against her will.
"CONTRARY TO LAW.
"Parañaque, Metro Manila
"August 8, 1994
"(SGD) MANUELA P. BERMAS
Complainant
"Assisted by: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(SGD) ROSITA BERMAS
Mother" 1
Evidence was adduced during trial by the parties at the conclusion of which the lower
court, presided over by Hon. Amelita G. Tolentino, rendered its decision, dated 02 May
1995, finding the accused guilty of the offense charged and sentencing him to suffer
the extreme penalty of death. chanrobles law library
The death penalty having been imposed, the case has reached this Court by way of
automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7659 (otherwise known as An Act To Impose Death
Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending For That Purpose The Revised Penal
Code, as amended, Other Special Penal Laws, and For Other Purposes, which took
effect on 31 December 1993).
The prosecution, through the Office of the Solicitor General, gave an account, rather
briefly, of the evidence submitted by the prosecution.
"On August 3, 1994, complainant Manuela Bermas, 15 years old, was raped by her own
father, appellant Rufino Bermas, while she was lying down on a wooden bed inside their
house at Creek Drive II, San Antonio Valley 8, Parañaque, Metro Manila (pp. 6-7, TSN,
Oct. 19, 1994). Armed with a knife, appellant removed the victim’s shorts and panty,
placed himself above her, inserted his penis in her vagina and conducted coital
movements (pp. 7-8, ibid.). After the appellant satisfied his lustful desire, he
threatened the victim with death if she reports the incident to anyone. (p. 9, ibid.)
"On August 9, 1994, complainant was medically examined at the NBI, which yielded the
following findings: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The findings concluded: 1. No evident sign of extragenital physical injuries noted on

the body of the subject at the time of examination; 2. Hymen, intact but distensible and
its orifice wide (2.7 cm. in diameter) as to allow complete penetration by an average
sized, adult, Filipino male organ in full erection without producing any hymenal
laceration." 2
The defense proffered the testimony of the accused, who denied the charge, and that of
his married daughter, Luzviminda Mendez, who attributed the accusation made by her
younger sister to a mere resentment by the latter. The trial court gave a summary of
the testimony given by the accused and his daughter Luzviminda; viz: chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary
"The accused vehemently denied that he has ever committed the crime of rape on her
daughter, the complainant. He told the Court that he could not do such a thing because
he loves so much his daughter and his other children. In fact, he said that he even
performed the dual role of a father and a mother to his children since the time of his
separation from his wife. The accused further told the Court that in charging him of the
crime of rape, the complainant might have been motivated by ill-will or revenge in view
of the numerous scoldings that she has received from him on account of her frequent
coming home late at night. The accused stressed that he knew of no other reason as to
why his daughter, the complainant, would ever charge him of the crime of rape except
probably in retaliation for being admonished by him whenever she comes home late in
the night.
"The married daughter of the accused, who testified in his behalf, denied that the
complainant was raped by the accused. She said that the complainant did not come
home in the night of August 3, 1994, and that, she is a liar. She told the Court that the
concoction by the complainant of the rape story is probably due to the resentment by
the latter of the frequent scoldings that she has been receiving from the accused. She
further added that she was told by the previous household employer of the complainant
that the latter is a liar. She went on to testify further that she does not believe that the
accused, who is her father, raped the complainant, who is her younger sister." 3
The trial court, in its decision of 02 May 1995, found the case of the prosecution against
the accused as having been duly established and so ruled out the defense theory of
denial and supposed ill-will on the part of private complainant that allegedly had
motivated the filing of the complaint against her father. The court adjudged: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of rape and hereby sentences him to suffer the DEATH PENALTY, to indemnify the
complainant in the amount of P75,000.00, Philippine Currency, and to pay the costs.
"SO ORDERED." 4
In their 61-page brief, defense counsel Fernandez & Kasilag-Villanueva (in collaboration
with the Anti-Death Penalty Task Force), detailed several errors allegedly committed by
the court a quo; thus: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
"I. THE ACCUSED WAS DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS.
"A. THE ACCUSED WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE AND
VIGILANT COUNSEL
1. The trial court did not observe the correct selection process in appointing the
accused’s counsel de officio;
2. The Public Attorney could not give justice to the accused;
a. Negligent in not moving to quash the information on the ground of illegal arrest;
b. Negligent in not moving to quash the information on the ground of invalid filing of
the information;
c. Negligent in not moving for a preliminary investigation;
d. Negligent in not pointing out the unexplained change in the case number;
e. Negligent in not moving to inhibit the judge;
f. Negligent in her conduct at the initial trial.
3. The Vanishing Second Counsel de Officio
a. He was not dedicated nor devoted to the accused;

b. His work was shoddy;
4. The Reluctant Third Counsel de Officio
5. The performance of all three counsels de officio was ineffective and prejudicial to the
accused.
"B. THE ACCUSED WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE TRIED BY AN

IMPARTIAL JUDGE AND TO BE PRESUMED INNOCENT.
"C. THE ACCUSED WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE HEARD AND FOR
WITNESSES TO TESTIFY IN HIS BEHALF.
"D. THE ARRAIGNMENT OF THE ACCUSED WAS INVALID.
"E. THE ACCUSED WAS DENIED THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW.
"II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT `SCRUTINIZE WITH EXTREME CAUTION’ THE
PROSECUTION’S EVIDENCE, MISAPPRECIATED THE FACTS AND THEREFORE ERRED IN
FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF RAPE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT." 5
The Court, after a painstaking review of the records, finds merit in the appeal enough
to warrant a remand of the case for new trial. chanrobles law library : red
It would appear that on 08 August 1994 Manuela P. Bermas, then 15 years of age,
assisted by her mother Rosita Bermas, executed a sworn statement before SPO1
Dominador Nipas, Jr., of the Parañaque Police Station, stating, in sum, that she had
been raped by accused Rufino Mirandilla Bermas, her own father, in 1991 and 1993, as
well as on 03 August 1994, particularly the subject matter of the complaint,
hereinbefore quoted, duly signed and filed conformably with Section 7, Rule 112, of the
Rules of Court. The Second Assistant Prosecutor, issued a certification to the effect that
the accused had waived his right to a preliminary investigation.
On the day scheduled for his arraignment on 03 October 1994, the accused was
brought before the trial court without counsel. The court thereupon assigned Atty. Rosa
Elmira C. Villamin of the Public Attorney’s Office to be the counsel de officio. Accused
forthwith pleaded not guilty. The pre-trial was waived.
The initial reception of evidence was held on 19 October 1994. The prosecution placed
complainant Manuela Bermas at the witness stand. She testified on direct examination
with hardly any participation by defense counsel who, inexplicably, later waived the
cross-examination and then asked the court to be relieved of her duty as counsel de
officio. chanrobles.com : virtual law library
"ATTY. VILLARIN: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
And I am requesting if this Honorable Court would allow me and my pañero besides me,
would accede to my request that I be relieved as counsel de officio because I could not
also give justice to the accused because as a lady lawyer . . . if my pañero here and if
this Honorable Court will accede to my request.
"COURT: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
It is your sworn duty to defend the helpless and the defenseless. That is your sworn
duty, Mrs. Counsel de Officio. Are you retracting?
"ATTY. VILLARIN: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
That is why I am asking this Honorable Court." 6
Counsel’s request was granted, and Atty. Roberto Gomez was appointed the new
counsel de officio. While Atty. Gomez was ultimately allowed to cross-examine the
complainant, it should be quite evident, however, that he barely had time, to prepare
therefor. On this score, defense counsel Fernandez & Kasilag-Villanueva in the instant
appeal would later point out: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"To substitute for her, the Public Attorney recommended Atty. Roberto Gomez to be
appointed as defense counsel de oficio. And so the trial court appointed him.
"Atty. Gomez asked for a ten minute recess before he began his cross examination,
presumably to prepare. But a ten minute preparation to cross examine the complainant
upon whose testimony largely rests the verdict on the accused who stands to be meted
the death penalty if found guilty, is far too inadequate. He could not possibly have
familiarized himself with the records and surrounding circumstances of the case, read
the complaint, the statement of the complainant, the medico-legal report, memos of
the police, transcripts and other relevant documents and confer with the accused and
his witnesses, all in ten minutes." 7
The prosecution abruptly rested its case after the medico-legal officer had testified.
The reception of the defense evidence was scheduled for 12 December 1994; it was
later reset to 09 January 1995. When the case was called on 09 January 1995, the
following transpired: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
Where is the counsel for the accused?
Did he file his withdrawal in this case? It is supposed to be the turn of the defense to
present its evidence.
"PROSECUTOR GARCIA: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Yes, Your Honor. The prosecution had already rested its case.
Last time he asked for the continuance of this case and considering that the accused is
under detention . . . it seems he cannot comply with his obligation.
(To the accused) Nasaan ang abogado mo?
"ACCUSED R. BERMAS: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Wala po.
It is already the turn of the defense to present its evidence in this case. In view of the
fact that the defense counsel is not interested anymore in defending the accused
because last time he moved for the continuance of the hearing of this case and since
this time he did not appear, he is unduly delaying the proceedings of this case and
considering the accused here is under detention, I think it would be better if the Court
appoints another lawyer. He should file his withdrawal if he is not interested anymore.
In view of the fact that the counsel de officio has repeatedly failed to appear in this
Court to defend his client-accused, the Court is hereby constrained to appoint another
counsel de officio to handle the defense of the accused. For this purpose, Atty. Nicanor
Lonzame is hereby appointed as the counsel de officio for accused Rufino Mirandilla
Bermas." 8
The hearing scheduled for that day was reset to 16 January 1995 upon the request of
Atty. Lonzame. On even date, Atty. Lonzame himself asked to be relieved as counsel de
officio but later, albeit reluctantly, retracted; thus: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Where is the accused? Where is the counsel de officio?
"ATTY. NICANOR LONZAME: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
As counsel de officio, Your Honor. The lawyer from the PAO is here, may I be allowed to
give her my responsibility as counsel de officio considering that the lawyer from the
PAO . . .
What about?
"ATTY. LONZAME: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I was appointed because the PAO lawyer was not around. If the Court will allow us to
be relieved from our responsibility as appointed counsel de officio of the accused . . .

You want to be relieved of your responsibility as appointed counsel de officio? As an
officer of the Court you don’t want to handle the defense of the accused in this case?
I will be withdrawing my previous manifestation that I be relieved of my responsibility

as counsel de officio.
So, therefore, counsel, are you now ready?
Yes, Your Honor." 9
Trial proceeded with the accused being the first to be put at the witness stand. He
denied the accusation against him. The next witness to be presented was his married
daughter who corroborated her father’s claim of innocence. chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
The defense counsel in the instant appeal took over from Atty. Lonzame who himself,
for one reason or another, had ceased to appear for and in behalf of Accused-Appellant.
This Court finds and must hold, most regrettably, that accused-appellant has not
properly and effectively been accorded the right to counsel. So important is the right to
counsel that it has been enshrined in our fundamental law and its precursor laws.
Indeed, even prior to the advent of the 1935 Constitution, the right to counsel of an
accused has already been recognized under General Order No. 58, dated 23 April 1900,
stating that a defendant in all criminal prosecutions is entitled to counsel at every stage
of the proceedings, 10 and that if he is unable to employ counsel, the court must assign
one to defend him. 11 The 1935 Constitution has no less been expressive in declaring,
in Article III, Section 17, thereof, that —
"(17) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed to be innocent until
the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy
and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to
secure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf." chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Except for a proviso allowing trial in absentia, the right to counsel under the 1973
Constitution, essentially, has remained unchanged. Under the 1987 Constitution, a
worthwhile innovation that has been introduced is the provision from which prevailing
jurisprudence on the availability of the right to counsel as early as the stage of
custodial interrogation can be deemed to be predicated. The rule, found in Sections 12
and 14, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution, states —
"SECTION 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
"x x x
"SECTION 14. . . .
"(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy,
impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory
process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his
behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of
the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustifiable." chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The constitutional mandate is reflected in the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedures which
declares in Section 1, Rule 115, thereof, that it is a right of the accused at the trial to
be present in person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings from the
arraignment to the promulgation of the judgment.
The presence and participation of counsel in the defense of an accused in criminal

proceedings should never be taken lightly. 12 Chief Justice Moran in People v. Holgado,
13 explained: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an
opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it
does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated
man may have no skill in the science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure,
and, without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he
does not know how to establish his innocence. And this can happen more easily to
persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be
assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has become a constitutional right
and it so implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court
to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him
whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the court should
assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor or grant him a reasonable
time to procure an attorney of his own." 14
In William v. Kaiser, 15 the United States Supreme Court, through the late Justice
Douglas, has rightly observed that the accused "needs the aid of counsel lest he be the
victim of overzealous prosecutors, of the law’s complexity or of his own ignorance or
bewilderment." An accused must be given the right to be represented by counsel for,
unless so represented, there is great danger that any defense presented in his behalf
will be as inadequate considering the legal perquisites and skills needed in the court
proceedings. 16 The right to counsel proceeds from the fundamental principle of due
process which basically means that a person must be heard before being condemned.
The due process requirement is a part of a person’s basic rights; it is not a mere
formality that may be dispensed with or performed perfunctorily. chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
The right to counsel must be more than just the presence of a lawyer in the courtroom
or the mere propounding of standard questions and objections. The right to counsel
means that the accused is amply accorded legal assistance extended by a counsel who
commits himself to the cause for the defense and acts accordingly. The right assumes
an active involvement by the lawyer in the proceedings, particularly at the trial of the
case, his bearing constantly in mind of the basic rights of the accused, his being well-
versed on the case, and his knowing the fundamental procedures, essential laws and
existing jurisprudence. The right of an accused to counsel finds substance in the
performance by the lawyer of his sworn duty of fidelity to his client. Tersely put, it
means an efficient and truly decisive legal assistance and not a simple perfunctory
representation. 17
It is never enough that accused be simply informed of his right to counsel; he should
also be asked whether he wants to avail himself of one and should be told that he can
hire a counsel of his own choice if he so desires or that one can be provided to him at
his request. 18 Section 7, Rule 116, of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SECTION 7. Appointment of counsel de oficio. — The court, considering the gravity of

the offense and the difficulty of the questions that may arise, shall appoint as counsel
de oficio only such members of the bar in good standing who, by reason of their
experience and ability may adequately defend the accused. But in localities where such
members of the bar are not available, the court may appoint any person, resident of
the province and of good repute for probity and ability, to defend the accused." chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
A counsel de oficio is expected to do his utmost. 19 A mere pro-forma appointment of

de oficio counsel who fails to genuinely protect the interests of the accused merits
disapprobation. 20 The exacting demands expected of a lawyer should be no less than
stringent when one is a counsel de officio. He must take the case not as a burden but
as an opportunity to assist in the proper dispensation of justice. No lawyer is to be
excused from this responsibility except only for the most compelling and cogent
reasons. 21
Just weeks ago, in People v. Sevilleno, G.R. No. 129058, promulgated on 29 March
1999, this Court has said: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"We cannot right finis to this discussion without making known our displeasure over the
manner by which the PAO lawyers dispensed with their duties. All three (3) of them
displayed manifest disinterest on the plight of their client.
"x x x
"Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires every lawyer to serve his
client with utmost dedication, competence and diligence. He must not neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in this regard renders him administratively
liable. Obviously, in the instant case, the aforenamed defense lawyers did not protect,
much less uphold, the fundamental rights of the accused. Instead, they haphazardly
performed their function as counsel de oficio to the detriment and prejudice of the
accused Sevilleno, however guilty he might have been found to be after trial.
Inevitably, this Court must advise Attys. Agravante, Pabalinas and Saldavia to adhere
closely and faithfully to the tenets espoused in the Code of Professional Responsibility;
otherwise, commission of any similar act in the future will be severely sanctioned." chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Court sees no other choice than to direct the remand of the case to the court a quo
for new trial.
WHEREFORE, let this case be REMANDED to the court a quo for trial on the basis of the
complaint, aforequoted, under which he was arraigned. Atty. Ricardo A. Fernandez, Jr.
of the Anti-Death Penalty Task Force is hereby appointed counsel de officio for
the Appellant.
Attys. Rosa Elmina Villamin of the Public Attorney’s Office, Parañaque, Roberto Gomez
and Nicanor Lonzame are hereby ADMONISHED for having fallen much too short of
their responsibility as officers of the court and as members of the Bar and are warned
that any similar infraction shall be dealt with most severely.
SO ORDERED. chanrobles law library
Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,

Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION
[A.C. NO. 6711 : July 3, 2007]
MA. LUISA HADJULA, Complainant, v. ATTY. ROCELES F. MADIANDA, Respondent.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Under consideration is Resolution No. XVI-2004-472 of the Board of Governors,

Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), relative to the complaint for disbarment filed by
herein complainant Ma. Luisa Hadjula against respondent Atty. Roceles F. Madianda.
The case started when, in an AFFIDAVIT-COMPLAINT1 bearing date September 7, 2002

and filed with the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, complainant charged Atty. Roceles
F. Madianda with violation of Article 209 2 of the Revised Penal Code and Canon Nos.
15.02 and 21.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In said affidavit-complaint, complainant alleged that she and respondent used to be

friends as they both worked at the Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) whereat respondent
was the Chief Legal Officer while she was the Chief Nurse of the Medical, Dental and
Nursing Services. Complainant claimed that, sometime in 1998, she approached
respondent for some legal advice. Complainant further alleged that, in the course of
their conversation which was supposed to be kept confidential, she disclosed personal
secrets and produced copies of a marriage contract, a birth certificate and a baptismal
certificate, only to be informed later by the respondent that she (respondent) would
refer the matter to a lawyer friend. It was malicious, so complainant states, of
respondent to have refused handling her case only after she had already heard her
secrets.
Continuing, complainant averred that her friendship with respondent soured after her
filing, in the later part of 2000, of criminal and disciplinary actions against the latter.
What, per complainant's account, precipitated the filing was when respondent, then a
member of the BFP promotion board, demanded a cellular phone in exchange for the
complainant's promotion.
According to complainant, respondent, in retaliation to the filing of the aforesaid

actions, filed a COUNTER COMPLAINT3 with the Ombudsman charging her (complainant)
with violation of Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019, 4 falsification of public
documents and immorality, the last two charges being based on the disclosures
complainant earlier made to respondent. And also on the basis of the same disclosures,
complainant further stated, a disciplinary case was also instituted against her before
the Professional Regulation Commission.
Complainant seeks the suspension and/or disbarment of respondent for the latter's act
of disclosing personal secrets and confidential information she revealed in the course of
seeking respondent's legal advice.
In an order dated October 2, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline required
respondent to file her answer to the complaint.
In her answer, styled as COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT,5 respondent denied giving legal advice

to the complainant and dismissed any suggestion about the existence of a lawyer-client
relationship between them. Respondent also stated the observation that the supposed
confidential data and sensitive documents adverted to are in fact matters of common
knowledge in the BFP. The relevant portions of the answer read:
5. I specifically deny the allegation of F/SUPT. MA. LUISA C. HADJULA in paragraph 4 of

her AFFIDAVIT-COMPLAINT for reason that she never WAS MY CLIENT nor we ever had
any LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP that ever existed ever since and that never
obtained any legal advice from me regarding her PERSONAL PROBLEMS or PERSONAL
SECRETS. She likewise never delivered to me legal documents much more told me
some confidential information or secrets. That is because I never entertain LEGAL
QUERIES or CONSULTATION regarding PERSONAL MATTERS since I know as a LAWYER
of the Bureau of Fire Protection that I am not allowed to privately practice law and it
might also result to CONFLICT OF INTEREST. As a matter of fact, whenever there will
be PERSONAL MATTERS referred to me, I just referred them to private law practitioners
and never entertain the same, NOR listen to their stories or examine or accept any
document.
9. I specifically deny the allegation of F/SUPT. MA. LUISA C. HADJULA in paragraph 8 of

her AFFIDAVIT-COMPLAINT, the truth of the matter is that her ILLICIT RELATIONSHIP
and her illegal and unlawful activities are known in the Bureau of Fire Protection since
she also filed CHILD SUPPORT case against her lover - where she has a child '.
Moreover, the alleged DOCUMENTS she purportedly have shown to me sometime in

1998, are all part of public records '.
Furthermore, F/SUPT. MA. LUISA C. HADJULA, is filing the instant case just to get even
with me or to force me to settle and withdraw the CASES I FILED AGAINST HER since
she knows that she will certainly be DISMISSED FROM SERVICE, REMOVED FROM THE
PRC ROLL and CRIMINALLY CONVICTED of her ILLICIT, IMMORAL, ILLEGAL and
UNLAWFUL ACTS.
On October 7, 2004, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP Commission on Bar

Discipline came out with a Report and Recommendation, stating that the information
related by complainant to the respondent is "protected under the attorney-client
privilege communication." Prescinding from this postulate, the Investigating
Commissioner found the respondent to have violated legal ethics when she "[revealed]
information given to her during a legal consultation," and accordingly recommended
that respondent be reprimanded therefor, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that respondent

Atty. Roceles Madianda be reprimanded for revealing the secrets of the complainant.
On November 4, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2004-472
reading as follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the

Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, and considering the actuation of revealing information given to respondent during
a legal consultation, Atty. Roceles Madianda is hereby REPRIMANDED.
We AGREE with the recommendation and the premises holding it together.
As it were, complainant went to respondent, a lawyer who incidentally was also then a
friend, to bare what she considered personal secrets and sensitive documents for the
purpose of obtaining legal advice and assistance. The moment complainant approached
the then receptive respondent to seek legal advice, a veritable lawyer-client relationship
evolved between the two. Such relationship imposes upon the lawyer certain
restrictions circumscribed by the ethics of the profession. Among the burdens of the
relationship is that which enjoins the lawyer, respondent in this instance, to keep
inviolate confidential information acquired or revealed during legal consultations. The
fact that one is, at the end of the day, not inclined to handle the client's case is hardly
of consequence. Of little moment, too, is the fact that no formal professional
engagement follows the consultation. Nor will it make any difference that no contract
whatsoever was executed by the parties to memorialize the relationship. As we said
in Burbe v. Magulta,6 -
A lawyer-client relationship was established from the very first moment complainant
asked respondent for legal advise regarding the former's business. To constitute
professional employment, it is not essential that the client employed the attorney
professionally on any previous occasion.
It is not necessary that any retainer be paid, promised, or charged; neither is it
material that the attorney consulted did not afterward handle the case for which his
service had been sought.
It a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults a lawyer with
a view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily
permits or acquiesces with the consultation, then the professional employments is
established.
Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding the close personal

relationship between the lawyer and the complainant or the non-payment of the
former's fees.
Dean Wigmore lists the essential factors to establish the existence of the attorney-client
privilege communication, viz:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his
capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in
confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from
disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor, (8) except the protection be waived.7
With the view we take of this case, respondent indeed breached his duty of preserving
the confidence of a client. As found by the IBP Investigating Commissioner, the
documents shown and the information revealed in confidence to the respondent in the
course of the legal consultation in question, were used as bases in the criminal and
administrative complaints lodged against the complainant.
The purpose of the rule of confidentiality is actually to protect the client from possible
breach of confidence as a result of a consultation with a lawyer.
The seriousness of the respondent's offense notwithstanding, the Court feels that there
is room for compassion, absent compelling evidence that the respondent acted with ill-
will. Without meaning to condone the error of respondent's ways, what at bottom is
before the Court is two former friends becoming bitter enemies and filing charges and
counter-charges against each other using whatever convenient tools and data were
readily available. Unfortunately, the personal information respondent gathered from her
conversation with complainant became handy in her quest to even the score. At the end
of the day, it appears clear to us that respondent was actuated by the urge to retaliate
without perhaps realizing that, in the process of giving vent to a negative sentiment,
she was violating the rule on confidentiality.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent Atty. Roceles F. Madianda is

hereby REPRIMANDED and admonished to be circumspect in her handling of
information acquired as a result of a lawyer-client relationship. She is also STERNLY
WARNED against a repetition of the same or similar act complained of.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chief Justice), Corona, Azcuna, Garcia, JJ., concur.
Sandoval-Gutierrez,J., on leave.
Endnotes:
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 77439. August 24, 1989.]
DONALD DEE, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and AMELITO

MUTUC, Respondents.
Tanjuatco, Oreta & Tanjuatco for Petitioner.
Amelito R. Mutuc for and in his own behalf.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE LOWER AND APPELLATE

COURTS, NOT DISTURBED ON APPEAL. — Both the lower court and the appellate court
concur in their findings that there was a lawyer-client relationship between petitioner
and private respondent Mutuc. We find no reason to interfere with this factual finding.
There may be instances when there is doubt as to whether an attorney-client
relationship has been created. The issue may be raised in the trial court, but once the
trial court and the Court of Appeals have found that there was such a relationship the
Supreme Court cannot disturb such finding of fact, absent cogent reasons therefor.
2. LEGAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP; WRITTEN

CONTRACT, NOT MATERIAL. — The absence of a written contract will not preclude the
finding that there was a professional relationship which merits attorney’s fees for
professional services rendered. Documentary formalism is not an essential element in
the employment of an attorney; the contract may be express or implied.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROOF OF RELATION. — To establish the relation, it is sufficient that
the advice and assistance of an attorney is sought and received in any matter pertinent
to his profession. An acceptance of the relation is implied on the part of the attorney
from his acting on behalf of his client in pursuance of a request from the latter.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ALLEGED CONFLICT OF INTEREST, NOT ESTABLISHED. — It is also not
completely accurate to judge private respondent’s position by petitioner’s assumption
that the interests of Caesar’s Palace were adverse to those of Dewey Dee. True, the
casino was a creditor but that fact was not contested or opposed by Dewey Dee, since
the latter, as verifications revealed, was not the debtor. Hence, private respondent’s
representations in behalf of petitioner were not in resistance to the casino’s claim but
were actually geared toward proving that fact by establishing the liability of the true
debtor, Ramon Sy, from whom payment was ultimately and correctly exacted.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; A LAWYER MAY NOT AS A RULE REPRESENT CONFLICTING INTEREST;
EXCEPTION. — Generally, an attorney is prohibited from representing parties with
contending positions. However, at a certain stage of the controversy before it reaches
the court, a lawyer may represent conflicting interests with the consent of the parties. A
common representation may work to the advantage of said parties since a mutual
lawyer, with honest motivations and impartially cognizant of the parties’ disparate
positions, may well be better situated to work out an acceptable settlement of their
differences, being free of partisan inclinations and acting with the cooperation and
confidence of said parties.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ATTORNEY’S FEES; A LAWYER ENTITLED THERETO FOR SERVICES
RENDERED. — A lawyer is entitled to have and receive the just and reasonable
compensation for services rendered at the special instance and request of his client and
as long as he is honestly and in good faith trying to serve and represent the interests of
his client, the latter is bound to pay his just feeds.
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner assails the resolution of respondent court, dated February 12, 1987,
reinstating its decision promulgated on May 9, 1986 in AC-G.R. CV No. 04242 wherein
it affirmed the decision of the trial court holding that the services rendered by private
respondent was on a professional, and not on a gratis et amore basis and ordering
petitioner to pay private respondent the sum of P50,000.00 as the balance of the
latter’s legal fee therefor.
The records show that sometime in January, 1981, petitioner and his father went to the
residence of private respondent, accompanied by the latter’s cousin, to seek his advice
regarding the problem of the alleged indebtedness of petitioner’s brother, Dewey Dee,
to Caesar’s Palace, a well-known gambling casino at Las Vegas, Nevada, U.S.A.
Petitioner’s father was apprehensive over the safety of his son, Dewey, having heard of
a link between the mafia and Caesar’s Palace and the possibility that his son may be
harmed at the instance of the latter. 1
Private respondent assured petitioner and his father that he would inquire into the
matter, after which his services were reportedly contracted for P100,000.00. From his
residence, private respondent called up Caesar’s Palace and, thereafter, several long
distance telephone calls and two trips to Las Vegas by him elicited the information that
Dewey Dee’s outstanding account was around $1,000,000.00. Further investigations,
however, revealed that said account had actually been incurred by Ramon Sy, with
Dewey Dee merely signing for the chits. Private respondent communicated said
information to petitioner’s father and also assured him that Caesar’s Palace was not in
any way linked to the mafia. 2
In June, 1981, private respondent personally talked with the president of Caesar’s
Palace at Las Vegas, Nevada. He advised the president that for the sake and in the
interest of the casino it would be better to make Ramon Sy answer for the
indebtedness. The president told him that if he could convince Ramon Sy to
acknowledge the obligation, Dewey Dee would be exculpated from liability for the
account. Upon private respondent’s return to Manila, he conferred with Ramon Sy and
the latter was convinced to acknowledge the indebtedness. In August, 1981, private
respondent brought to Caesar’s Palace the letter of Ramon Sy owning the debt and
asking for a discount. Thereafter, the account of Dewey Dee was cleared and the casino
never bothered him. 3
Having thus settled the account of petitioner’s brother, private respondent sent several
demand letters to petitioner demanding the balance of P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
Petitioner, however, ignored said letters. On October 4, 1982, private respondent filed a
complaint against petitioner in the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch CXXXVI, for
the collection of attorney’s fees and refund of transport fare and other expenses. 4
Private respondent claimed that petitioner formally engaged his services for a fee of
P100,000.00 and that the services he rendered were professional services which a
lawyer renders to a client. Petitioner, however, denied the existence of any professional
relationship of attorney and client between him and private Respondent. He admits that
he and his father visited private respondent for advice on the matter of Dewey Dee’s
gambling account. However, he insists that such visit was merely an informal one and
that private respondent had not been specifically contracted to handle the problem. On
the contrary, respondent Mutuc had allegedly volunteered his services "as a friend of
defendant’s family" to see what he could do about the situation. As for the P50,000.00
inceptively given to private respondent, petitioner claims that it was not in the nature of
attorney’s fees but merely "pocket money" solicited by the former for his trips to Las
Vegas and the said amount of P50,000.00 was already sufficient remuneration for his
strictly voluntary services.
After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment ordering herein petitioner to pay private
respondent the sum of P50,000.00 with interest thereon at the legal rate from the filing
of the complaint on October 4, 1982 and to pay the costs. All other claims therein of
private respondent and the counterclaim of petitioner were dismissed. 5 On appeal, said
judgment was affirmed by the then Intermediate Appellate Court on May 9, 1986. 6
Petitioner, in due time, filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the Appellate
Court overlooked two important and decisive factors, to wit: (1) At the time private
respondent was ostensibly rendering services to petitioner and his father, he was
actually working "in the interest" and "to the advantage" of Caesar’s Palace of which he
was an agent and a consultant, hence the interests of the casino and private
respondent were united in their objective to collect from the debtor; and (2) Private
respondent is not justified in claiming that he rendered legal services to petitioner and
his father in view of the conflicting interests involved.
In its resolution of July 31, 1986, respondent court reconsidered its decision and held
that the sum of P50,000.00 already paid by petitioner to private respondent was
commensurate to the services he rendered, considering that at the time he was acting
as counsel for petitioner he was also acting as the collecting agent and consultant of,
and receiving compensation from, Caesar’s Palace. 7 However, upon a motion for
reconsideration thereafter filed by private respondent, the present respondent Court of
Appeals issued another resolution, dated February 12, 1987, reinstating the aforesaid
decision of May 9, 1986. 8
Petitioner is now before us seeking a writ of certiorari to overturn the latter resolution.
It is necessary, however, to first clear the air of the questions arising from the change
of stand of the First Civil Cases Division of the former Intermediate Appellate Court
when, acting on the representations in petitioner’s undated motion for reconsideration
supposedly filed on May 28, 1986, it promulgated its July 31, 1986 resolution
reconsidering the decision it had rendered in AC-G.R. CV No. 04242. Said resolution
was, as earlier noted, set aside by the Twelfth Division of the reorganized Court of
Appeals which, at the same time, reinstated the aforesaid decision.
Because of its clarificatory relevance to some issues belatedly raised by petitioner,

which issues should have been disregarded 9 but were nevertheless auspiciously
discussed therein, at the risk of seeming prolixity we quote hereunder the salient
portions of the assailed resolution which demonstrate that it was not conceived in
error.
chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
"The reason for then IAC’s action is that it deemed the P50,000.00 plaintiff-appellee
had previously received from defendant-appellant as adequate compensation for the
services rendered by him for defendant-appellant, considering that at the time plaintiff-
appellee was acting as counsel for defendant-appellant, he was also acting as the
collecting agent and consultant of, and receiving compensation from Caesar’s Palace in
Las Vegas, Nevada, the entity with whom defendant-appellant was having a problem
and for which he had engaged the services of plaintiff-appellee. The crux of the matter,
therefore, is whether or not the evidence on record justifies this finding of the IAC.
"Plaintiff-appellee maintains that his professional services to defendant-appellant were

rendered between the months of July and September of 1981, while his employment as
collection agent and consultant of Caesar’s Palace covered the period from December
1981 to October 1982. This positive testimony of plaintiff-appellee, however, was
disregarded by the IAC for the following reasons: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. In August 1983, plaintiff-appellee testified that he was a representative of Caesar’s

Palace in the Philippines ‘about two or three years ago.’ From this the IAC concluded
that the period covers the time plaintiff-appellee rendered professional services to
defendant-appellant.
"We do not think that IAC’s conclusion is necessarily correct. When plaintiff-appellee
gave the period ‘about two or three years ago,’ he was merely stating an
approximation. Considering that plaintiff-appellee was testifying in August 1983, and
his employment with Caesar’s Palace began in December 1981, the stated difference of
two years is relatively correct. . . . .
"2. The plaintiff-appellee had testified that he was working for the sake,’ ‘in the
interest,’ and ‘to the advantage’ of Caesar’s Palace. . . . .
"We detect nothing from the above which would support IAC’s conclusion that plaintiff-
appellee was then in the employ of Caesar’s Palace. What is gathered is that plaintiff-
appellee was simply fulfilling a condition which plaintiff-appellee had proposed to, and
was accepted by, Caesar’s Palace, for the release of Dewey Dee from his obligation to
Caesar’s Palace.
"3. Caesar’s Palace would not have listened to, and acted upon, the advice of plaintiff-
appellee if he were no longer its consultant and alter ego.
"Why not? We are witnesses to many successful negotiations between contending

parties whose representing lawyers were not and were never in the employ of the
opposite party. The art of negotiation is precisely one of the essential tools of a good
practitioner, and mastery of the art takes into account the circumstance that one may
be negotiating, among others, with a person who may not only be a complete stranger
but antagonistic as well. The fact that plaintiff-appellee was able to secure a favorable
concession from Caesar’s Palace for defendant-appellant does not justify the conclusion
that it could have been secured only because of plaintiff-appellee’s professional
relationship with Caesar’s Palace. It could have been attributable more to plaintiff-
appellee’s stature as a former ambassador of the Philippines to the United States, his
personality, and his negotiating technique.
"Assuming, however, that plaintiff-appellees was employed by Caesar’s Palace during

the time that he was rendering professional services for defendant-appellant, this would
not automatically mean the denial of additional attorney’s fees to plaintiff-appellee. The
main reason why the IAC denied plaintiff-appellee additional compensation was because
the latter was allegedly receiving compensation from Caesar’s Palace, and, therefore,
the amount of P50,000.00 plaintiff-appellee had previously received from defendant-
appellant is ‘reasonable and commensurate.’ This conclusion, however, can only be
justified if the fact and amount of remuneration had been established. These were not
proven at all. No proof was presented as to the nature of plaintiff-appellee’s
remuneration, and the mode or manner in which it was paid. . . . 10
Both the lower court and the appellate court concur in their findings that there was a
lawyer-client relationship between petitioner and private respondent Mutuc. We find no
reason to interfere with this factual finding. There may be instances when there is
doubt as to whether an attorney-client relationship has been created. The issue may be
raised in the trial court, but once the trial court and the Court of Appeals have found
that there was such a relationship the Supreme Court cannot disturb such finding of
fact, 11 absent cogent reasons therefor. chanrobles.com : virtual law library
The puerile claim is advanced that there was no attorney-client relationship between
petitioner and private respondent for lack of a written contract to that effect. The
absence of a written contract will not preclude the finding that there was a professional
relationship which merits attorney’s fees for professional services rendered.
Documentary formalism is not an essential element in the employment of an attorney;
the contract may be express or implied. To establish the relation, it is sufficient that the
advice and assistance of an attorney is sought and received in any matter pertinent to
his profession. An acceptance of the relation is implied on the part of the attorney from
his acting on behalf of his client in pursuance of a request from the latter. 12
There is no question that professional services were actually rendered by private

respondent to petitioner and his family. Through his efforts, the account of petitioner’s
brother, Dewey Dee, with Caesars Palace was assumed by Ramon Sy and petitioner and
his family were further freed from the apprehension that Dewey might be harmed or
even killed by the so-called mafia. For such services, respondent Mutuc is indubitably
entitled to receive a reasonable compensation and this right cannot be occluded by
petitioner’s pretension that at the time private respondent rendered such services to
petitioner and his family, the former was also the Philippine consultant of Caesar’s
Palace.
On the first aspect, the evidence of record shows that the services of respondent Mutuc
were engaged by the petitioner for the purposes hereinbefore discussed. The previous
partial payments totalling P50,000.00 made by petitioner to respondent Mutuc and the
tenor of the demand letters sent by said private respondent to petitioner, the receipt
thereof being acknowledged by petitioner, ineluctably prove three facts, viz: that
petitioner hired the services of private respondent Mutuc; that there was a prior
agreement as to the amount of attorney’s fees to be given to the latter; and there was
still a balance due and payable on said fees. The duplicate-original copy of the initial
receipt issued and signed in this connection by private respondent reads: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"RECEIVED from Mr. Donald Dee, for professional services rendered, the sum of THIRTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00) as partial payment, leaving a balance of SEVENTY
THOUSAND PESOS (70,000.00), payable on demand.
"Makati, Metro Manila, July 25, 1981." 13
Thereafter, several demand letters for payment of his fees, dated August 6, 1981,
December 2, 1981, January 29, 1982, March 7, 1982, and September 7, 1982 were
sent by private respondent to petitioner, 14 all to no avail.
On the second objection, aside from the facts stated in the aforequoted resolution of
respondent Court of Appeals, it is also not completely accurate to judge private
respondent’s position by petitioner’s assumption that the interests of Caesar’s Palace
were adverse to those of Dewey Dee. True, the casino was a creditor but that fact was
not contested or opposed by Dewey Dee, since the latter, as verifications revealed, was
not the debtor. Hence, private respondent’s representations in behalf of petitioner were
not in resistance to the casino’s claim but were actually geared toward proving that fact
by establishing the liability of the true debtor, Ramon Sy, from whom payment was
ultimately and correctly exacted. 15
Even assuming that the imputed conflict of interests obtained, private respondent’s role
therein was not ethically or legally indefensible. Generally, an attorney is prohibited
from representing parties with contending positions. However, at a certain stage of the
controversy before it reaches the court, a lawyer may represent conflicting interests
with the consent of the parties. 16 A common representation may work to the
advantage of said parties since a mutual lawyer, with honest motivations and
impartially cognizant of the parties’ disparate positions, may well be better situated to
work out an acceptable settlement of their differences, being free of partisan
inclinations and acting with the cooperation and confidence of said parties. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Here, even indulging petitioner in his theory that private respondent was during the
period in question an agent of Caesar’s Palace, petitioner was not unaware thereof,
hence he actually consented to and cannot now decry the dual representation that he
postulates. This knowledge he admits, thus: red:chanrobles.com.ph
"It is a fair question to ask why, of all the lawyers in the land, it was the private
respondent who was singled out by the petitioner’s father for consultation in regard to
an apparent problem, then pending in Caesar’s Palace. The testimony of Arthur
Alejandrino, cousin to private respondent, and the admission of the private respondent
himself supply the answer. Alejandrino testified that private respondent was the
representative of Caesar’s Palace in the Philippines (p. 23, t.s.n., Nov. 29, 1983).
Private respondent testified that he was such representative tasked by the casino to
collect the gambling losses incurred by Filipinos in Las Vegas. (p. 5, t.s.n., Sept. 21,
1983)." 17
A lawyer is entitled to have and receive the just and reasonable compensation for
services rendered at the special instance and request of his client and as long as he is
honestly and in good faith trying to serve and represent the interests of his client, the
latter is bound to pay his just feeds. 18
WHEREFORE, the resolution of respondent Court of Appeals, dated February 12, 1987,
reinstating its original decision of May 9, 1986 is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
1. Petition, 4; Rollo, 9.
2. Rollo, 9-10, 21-22.
3. Rollo, 10.
4. Civil Case No. 1736 (47992): Original Record, 1-4.
5. Judge Ricardo J. Francisco, presiding: Original Record, 127-132.
6. Penned by Presiding Justice Ramon G. Gaviola, Jr., Justices Ma. Rosario Quetulio-
Losa and Leonor Ines Luciano concurring; First Civil Cases Division.
7. Penned, likewise, by Presiding Justice Gaviola, Jr., with the concurrence of Justices
Quetulio-Losa and Luciano of the same Division.
8. Justice Luis A. Javellana, ponente, with whom concurred Justices Pedro A. Ramirez
and Cecilio L. Pe; Twelfth Division.
9. Sec. 18, Rule 46 and Sec. 7 Rule 51, Rules of Court; De la Santa v. Court of Appeals,
Et Al., 140 SCRA 44 (1985); Dihiansan, Et. Al. v. Court of Appeals, Et Al., 153 SCRA
712 (1987).
10. Rollo, 52-55.
11. Vda. de Reyes v. Court of Appeals Et. Al., 116 SCRA 607 (1982).
12. See C.J.S., 848-849, and Hirach Bros. & Co. v. R.E. Kennington Co., 88 A.L.R., 1,
as cited in Hilado v. Gutierrez David, Et Al., 84 Phil. 569 (1949).
13. Exhibit S, Folder of Exhibits. While objected to as self-serving (Original Record,

102), the authenticity and due execution of this document was not definitively denied
by petitioner in his testimony (TSN, Nov. 21, 1983, 20-21).
14. Exhibits B, D, E, F, and G, ibid.
15. Canon 6 of the Canons of Professional Ethics, then in force, provides: "Within the
meaning of this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one
client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires him to
oppose.."
16. Canon 6, id.
17. Memorandum of Petitioner, 5; Rollo, 88.
18. De Guzman v. Visayan Rapid Transit Co., Inc., Et Al., 68 Phil. 643 (1939).
THIRD DIVISION
[A.C. NO. 5554 : June 29, 2004]
LUIS DE GUZMAN, represented by his son Rodrigo C. de

Guzman, Complainant, v. ATTY. EMMANUEL M. BASA, Respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
When a lawyer accepts to handle a case, whether for a fee or gratis et amore, he
undertakes to give his utmost attention, skill and competence to it, regardless of its
significance. Thus, his client, whether rich or poor, has the right to expect that he will
discharge his duties diligently and exert his best efforts, learning and ability to
prosecute or defend his (clients) cause with reasonable dispatch.Failure to fulfill his
duties will subject him to grave administrative liability as a member of the Bar. For the
overriding need to maintain the faith and confidence of the people in the legal
profession demands that an erring lawyer should be sanctioned.
On August 14, 2000, Luis de Guzman, represented by his son Rodrigo C. de Guzman,
filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a complaint against Atty.
Emmanuel M. Basa for disbarment for having committed misrepresentation and gross
negligence in his duties as counsel.
The complaint, docketed as CBD Case No. 00-756, alleges that complainant was the
defendant in Civil Case No. 535-M-90 for rescission and recovery of possession of two
lots and damages filed by Roxas Realty Corporation with the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch XI, Malolos, Bulacan. His counsel was Atty. Emmanuel M. Basa, herein
respondent.
On September 2, 1992, the RTC issued an Order adverse to complainant.Desiring to

challenge the Order through a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals, he
agreed to pay respondent P15,000.00 for his legal services. Thereupon, respondent
collected and received from complainant a down payment of P5,000.00.1 However, no
such petition was filed by respondent, in violation of their agreement.
On September 20, 1994, the RTC rendered its Decision in Civil Case No. 535-M-90
against complainant. He filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied in an Order
dated December 28, 1994.2 ςrνll
Complainant, through respondent, appealed the RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 49928.Respondent then filed successively three motions
for extension of time to submit the appellants brief, or a total of 135 days from March
11, 1996 until July 25, 1996. The motions were granted, but with a warning that no
further extension would be allowed.3 ςrνll
Notwithstanding the Court of Appeals warning, respondent still failed to file the
appellants brief. Instead, he filed two more motions for extension on July 24, 1996 and
August 3, 1996, or a total of 15 days.
Expectedly, the Court of Appeals, in its Resolution dated September 17, 1996, denied
respondents motions and ordered the appellants brief filed on August 8, 1996 expunged
from the records.4 Respondent then filed a motion for reconsideration.In a Resolution
dated November 29, 1996,5 the Appellate Court denied his motion and dismissed the
appeal.
Consequently, complainant, through respondent, filed with this Court a Petition for
Review on Certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals Resolutions of September 17, 1996
and November 29, 1996, docketed as G.R. No. 127190.
However, this Court, in a Resolution dated February 26, 1997, dismissed complainants
petition for his failure to submit a certification of non-forum shopping duly executed
by him.
Respondent rectified the error by filing with this Court a motion for reconsideration,
attaching thereto the required certification signed by the complainant himself. Still, the
motion was denied on the ground that the Court of Appeals did not commit any
reversible error in dismissing complainants appeal.6 ςrνll
On September 19, 1997, the dismissal of complainants petition in G.R. No. 127190
became final and executory.7 ςrνll
Complainant claims that he lost his case before the Court of Appeals and this Court, not
on the merits, but due to technicality caused by respondents dereliction of his duty as
counsel.8 In effect, he adds, it totally dissipated his quest for justice and thereby
deprived him of all the remedies that may be availed of.9 Complainant thus prayed that
respondent be disbarred or suspended from the practice of law.
In his answer to the complaint before the IBP, respondent admitted the following

material facts: (1) he received from complainant P5,000.00 as expenses to be incurred
in filing the petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals; (2) he was granted by the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 49928 three extensions of time to file the
appellants brief, but he filed it beyond the extended period due to his illness, resulting
in the dismissal of his appeal; and (3) he signed the certification of non-forum shopping
attached to the Petition for Review filed with this Court in G.R. No. 127190 because
complainant was ill.10 Respondent thus prayed that the complaint be dismissed.11 ςrνll
During the scheduled hearing of the instant case before the IBP, the parties agreed to
submit it for resolution on the basis of the pleadings and other documents filed.
In its Report dated March 7, 2001, 12 the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD),
through Commissioner Tyrone R. Cimafranca, found respondent negligent in the
performance of his professional duty to his client, herein complainant, and
recommended that: ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
1.The respondent be REPRIMANDED and warned that any similar or other complaint

in the future for breach of his professional duties will be dealt with more severely; and cralawlibrary
2.To return to the complainant, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the order, the
collected amount of P5,000.00.
Commissioner Cimafrancas Report was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of
Governors in its Resolution No. XV-2001-259 dated October 27, 2001.13 ςrνll
The IBP then forwarded the records of CBD Case No. 00-756 to this Court.
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that A lawyer shall serve
his client with competence and diligence. Rule 18.03 of the same Canon mandates that
A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
Also, Rule 12.03, Canon 12 of the same Code requires that A lawyer shall not, after
obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse
without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so.
In his lawyers sacred oath, respondent imposed upon himself the duty, among others,
that he will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer
according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to
the courts as to my clients, x x x.
We sustain the IBP Board of Governors finding that respondent was negligent in the
performance of his professional duty towards complainant. Clearly, he violated the
above Canons14 and his lawyers oath.
Firstly, respondent admitted that he did not seasonably file with the Court of Appeals
the required appellants brief in CA-G.R. CV No. 49928 resulting in the dismissal of the
complainants appeal. Despite several extensions to file the appellants brief, respondent
failed to do so. Instead, he filed two more motions for extension. While he eventually
filed the appellants brief, however, it was late, being beyond the last extension granted
by the Appellate Court. His excuse that his illness caused such delay is flimsy and
deserves no consideration. A motion for extension of time to file an appellants brief
carries with it the presumption that the applicant-lawyer will file the same within the
period granted. As aptly stated in the IBP-CBD Report: ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
Respondent failed to show in his Answer and other pleadings that he exercised that
degree of competence and diligence required of him in prosecuting particularly the
appeal of his client (now complainant) which resulted in its dismissal. If respondent
really believed that his physical condition was the cause why he was not able to submit
the requisite appellants brief seasonably, resulting in its being expunged from the
record, he should have excused himself from the case. A lawyer may withdraw his
services when his mental or physical condition renders it difficult for him to carry out
the employment effectively (see Rule 22.01 (d), Canon 22, Code of Professional
Responsibility). That could have spared him and complainant from the undue strictness
shown by the Honorable Court of Appeals which expunged from the record the belated
appellants brief that he filed in the case.15
ςrνll
Secondly, respondents contention that he signed the certification of non-forum

shopping in the Petition for Review in G.R. No. 127190 because the complainant was ill
lacks merit.We quote with approval the IBP-CBDs finding on this matter, thus: ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
Furthermore, respondent failed to show that he exercised that degree of competence

and diligence required of him in prosecuting the appeal of complainant when he himself
signed (instead of complainant) the certification of non-forum shopping, resulting in the
dismissal of the Petition for Review on Certiorari . He should know, as all lawyers are
presumed to know, that it should be the petitioner (not the counsel) who should sign
the certification of non-forum shopping in the petition. The explanation offered to justify
such non-compliance that complainant was too old, weak and ill to sign the said
certification is too flimsy and, therefore, untenable. If in the motion for reconsideration
that he (respondent) subsequently filed, he was able to submit a certification duly
signed by complainant, there is no reason why it could not be submitted earlier at the
time that the Petition for Review on Certiorari was filed.16
ςrνll
Thirdly, despite receipt from complainant the sum of P5,000.00 for the filing of a
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, respondent did not file the same. Thus,
he should have returned the amount to complainant who, incidentally, is now
deceased.17 In Lothar Schulz v. Atty. Marcelo G. Flores ,18 we held that where a client
gives money to his lawyer for a specific purpose, such as to file an action or appeal an
adverse judgment, the lawyer should, upon failure to take such step and spend the
money for it, immediately return the money to his client. Respondents unjustified
withholding of complainants money is a gross violation of the general morality and
professional ethics warranting the imposition of disciplinary action.19 Again, as correctly
found by the IBP-CBD: ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
The undersigned likewise finds respondents failure to file a petition for certiorari despite

having collected the initial amount of P5,000.00 for attorneys fees reprehensible. There
is no doubt whatsoever that in the contract dated January 10, 1993 (Annex A,
complaint) respondent committed to file said petition for complainant. His explanation
as to why he failed to do so is gratuitous. It should not even be given any probative
value as it would tend to violate the parol evidence rule.
A lawyer may be disciplined for refusing to return to his client what he collected as
payment for his professional services which he never rendered (see Espere v. Santos,
96 Phil. 987). 20
ςrνll
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, this Court may disbar or
suspend a lawyer for committing any gross misconduct specified therein, thus: ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. A

member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such
office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order
of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party in
a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose
of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
(Underscoring supplied) ςrαlαωlιbrαrÿ
In Spouses Jeneline Donato and Mario Donato v. Atty. Isaiah B. Asuncion, Sr .,21 we
explained the concept of gross misconduct as any inexcusable, shameful or flagrant
unlawful conduct on the part of a person concerned in the administration of justice
which is prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right determination of the
cause. Such conduct is generally motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional
purpose. The term, however, does not necessarily imply corruption or criminal intent.
To our mind, respondents dereliction of duty amounts to gross misconduct. Certainly,
he misused the judicial processes and abused the trust and confidence reposed upon
him by complainant. We have consistently held that a lawyer should never neglect a
legal matter entrusted to him, otherwise his negligence in fulfilling his duty subjects
him to disciplinary action.22 Respondent is reminded that the practice of law is a special
privilege bestowed only upon those who are competent intellectually, academically and
morally.23 We have been exacting in our expectations for the members of the Bar to
always uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act
or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence of the public.24 ςrνll
Hence, we cannot sustain the IBP Board of Governors recommendation that respondent
should only be reprimanded. For violating Rule 12.03, Canon 12, and Rule 18.03,
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which constitutes gross
misconduct, as well as his lawyers oath, he should be suspended from the practice of
law for six (6) months.25 ςrνll
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Emmanuel M. Basa is hereby found guilty of gross

misconduct in violation of Canons 12 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and his lawyers oath. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months
effective from notice and is WARNED that any similar infraction in the future will be
dealt with more severely. He is further ordered to RETURN, within five (5) days, also
from notice, the sum of P5,000.00 directly to the heirs of complainant and submit to
this Court the proof of his compliance within three (3) days therefrom.
A copy of this Decision shall be entered in the record of respondent as a member of the
Bar. Further, let copies of this Decision be served on the IBP as well as the Court
Administrator, who is directed to circulate these to all the courts in the country for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
Vitug, (Chairman), J., on official leave.
Endnotes:
THIRD DIVISION
[A.C. NO. 5808 : May 4, 2005]
OSCAR M. ESPIRITU, Complainant, v. ATTY. JAIME C. ULEP, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
In a letter1 addressed to the president of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Nueva Ecija
Chapter, complainant Oscar M. Espiritu sought assistance to enable him to talk to respondent Atty.
Jaime C. Ulep who had allegedly been avoiding him for more than a year. He wanted a meeting with
respondent lawyer for the following reasons:
(1) respondent failed to turn-over to his client, Mr. Ricardo Maon, the amount of P50,000 given to him
by complainant on December 22, 1997 as settlement of Civil Case No. 1028, Municipal Trial Court
(MTC), Rizal, Nueva Ecija, and
(2) respondent refused to give complainant the amount of P30,000 plus interest and expenses as
balance for a deed of absolute sale dated December 22, 1997 which the respondent brokered and
notarized.
On April 5, 1999, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), through Commissioner J.V. Bautista
invited respondent to a meeting at IBP Cabanatuan to determine whether an amicable settlement of
the impending complaint could be reached.2
Due to respondent's failure to appear in the meeting, the IBP Nueva Ecija Chapter formally endorsed
the verified letter-complaint to the IBP - CBD on April 19, 1999.
In an order3 dated May 28, 1999, the IBP-CBD ordered respondent to file his answer to the complaint
pursuant to Rule 139-B, Sec. 6 of the Rules of Court.4
Respondent complied with the order by filing an affidavit which turned out to be the same affidavit he
submitted to the Provincial Prosecutor's Office for the preliminary investigation of the estafa case filed
against him involving the same subject matter. We quote:
COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT
I, Atty. Jaime C. Ulep, of legal age, married, and a resident of and with postal address at Rizal, Nueva
Ecija, after having been duly sworn, in accordance with law, depose and state:
1. The case should be dismissed because the same has no elements of estafa;
2. The truth of the matter is that, at the time the Deed of Sale of that agricultural land was prepared,
Mr. ESPIRITU admitted for the first time that the owner's copy of the Title was lost but the petition for
the issuance of the owner's copy was being prepared;
3. In order to please Mr. ESPIRITU and not to hamper the transaction and, at the same time protect
the interest of the clients (Buyers), Mr. ESPIRITU agreed to hold the amount of fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) in trust to be given to him after giving to me the Owner's Copy;
4. Afterwards, his niece kept coming to my office to ask for money in order, according to her, to
facilitate the issuance of the Title. On November 3, 1998, his niece demanded and received the
amount of five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) from me. In other words, the total amount demanded and
received from me (out of the P50,000.00) was twenty five thousand (P25,000.00), as of November 3,
1998. (A copy of the receipt with a note "Balance Twenty Five Thousand only (P25,000.00) was
written.);
5. After that date, no word was received by the undersigned from Mr. ESPIRITU whether the owner's
copy was issued;
6. I am obligated to give the amount of Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00), provided that he
will give to me the genuine owner's copy of the Title;
7. In view thereof, the case should be dismissed because this is a clear case of specific performance
and not Estafa.
Atty. Jaime C. Ulep

Affiant5
In the cover letter6 of the counter-affidavit, respondent lawyer sought a formal hearing on the
administrative case.
Consequently, notice of hearing7 was served upon the parties to appear before the Commission on
August 13, 1999.
Both parties failed to appear on the scheduled hearing. On record, however, is a letter request8 earlier
filed by respondent to cancel the scheduled hearing due to a prior engagement. He also asked for a
transfer of venue from Pasig City to Cabanatuan City. The Commission did not immediately act on this
request pending complainant's conformity.
In the next scheduled hearing, only complainant appeared although respondent had been duly notified
of the hearing as evidenced by the registry receipt card. In the order9 dated September 17, 1999 the
Commission denied the request for transfer of venue because of complainant's protestation.
Over the vehement objection of the complainant, respondent was given a last chance by the
Commission to appear in a hearing reset to October 29, 1999. It warned that a motion for
postponement would no longer be entertained. In case respondent still failed to appear, the
Commission was going to receive the complainant's evidence ex-parte and deem the case submitted
for resolution.
In a letter10 dated October 28, 1999, respondent once again requested a cancellation of the hearing,
alleging that he was undergoing "eye treatment."
The hearing was reset to November 19, 1999; again respondent failed to appear. The Commission,
once again exercising leniency, afforded respondent "one last chance" to appear before it on January
21, 2000, with another warning of an ex-parte reception of evidence.11
In a letter12 dated January 18, 2000, respondent again requested a cancellation. He explained that he
had to appear before the MTC of Talavera, Nueva Ecija on the same date "in connection with a
criminal case."
Considering that respondent failed to appear successively in all the scheduled hearings of the case,
the Commission proceeded to conduct a hearing on January 21, 2000. Complainant was allowed to
submit and offer his evidence against the respondent ex-parte, consisting of the following:
Exhibit "A" - Complainant's verified letter-request dated March 15, 1999;

Exhibit "B" - Certification by Atty. Jaime C. Ulep dated December 22, 1997 that he had in his
possession the amount of P50,000 as consideration for the settlement of Civil Case No. 1028;
Exhibit "C" - Promissory note issued by Atty. Jaime C. Ulep dated December 22, 1997 for the amount
of P30,000;
Exhibit "D" - Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Oscar M. Espiritu dated December 22, 1997;
Exhibit "E" - Letter of Ricardo Maon dated March 9, 1999 addressed to the Tanggapan ng Punong
Barangay of Barangay Bicos, Rizal, Nueva Ecija that he has not received any amount from Atty. Jaime
C. Ulep for the settlement of Civil Case No. 1028; and cralawlibrary
Exhibit "F" - Decision of the MTC of Rizal, Nueva Ecija in Civil Case No. 1028 incorporating the
compromise agreement between Oscar Espiritu and Ricardo Maon.
After the pieces of evidence were marked, the case was submitted for decision.13
On December 29, 2000 Investigating Commissioner J.V. Bautista submitted his report and
recommendation14 to the IBP Board of Governors. He found respondent lawyer guilty of violating
Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he misappropriated the money received by
him for his client. A six-month suspension from the practice of law was recommended for his
transgression.
In a notice of resolution15 dated June 29, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. It found that the recommendation was
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules. By failing to deliver the
amount of P50,000 to his client Ricardo Maon despite demand - which constituted misappropriation of
the client's money - it found respondent guilty of violating Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. It ordered the immediate delivery to Ricardo Maon of the amount of P50,000 plus
interest computed at the legal rate from December 22, 1997 to the date of delivery and suspended
respondent from the practice of law for six months.
We agree with the IBP Board of Governors that respondent was guilty of violating Canon 16 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
The relation between attorney and client is highly fiduciary in nature. Being such, it requires utmost
good faith, loyalty, fidelity and disinterestedness on the part of the attorney. Its fiduciary nature is
intended for the protection of the client.16
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates every lawyer to hold in trust all money and
properties of his client that may come into his possession.17 Accordingly, he shall account for all money
or property collected or received for or from the client.18 Even more specific is the Canon of
Professional Ethics:
The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain he abuses or takes
advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his client.

Money of the client or collected for the client or other trust property coming into the possession of the
lawyer should be reported and accounted for promptly and should not under any circumstances be
commingled with his own or be used by him.
Consequently, a lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds or property held by him on behalf of
his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use to the
prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by, his client. It is a gross violation of general
morality as well as of professional ethics; it impairs the public confidence in the legal profession and
deserves punishment.19
Lawyers who misappropriate the funds entrusted to them are in gross violation of professional ethics
and are guilty of betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession.20 Those who are guilty of such
infraction may be disbarred or suspended indefinitely from the practice of law.
Here, it was established that respondent lawyer received for his client Ricardo Maon the amount
of P50,000 as settlement of Civil Case No. 1028 and that he did not deliver the same upon demand.
As summarized by the IBP Investigating Commissioner:
First, Exhibit "F"21 proved that there was an obligation on the part of complainant Espiritu to deliver to
Ricardo Maon, who was respondent's client, the amount of P50,000 as full settlement of Civil Case No.
1028. Second, Exhibit "B"22 proved that complainant Espiritu gave to respondent lawyer who
acknowledged receipt thereof the amount of P50,000 as settlement of Civil Case No. 1028. And finally,
Exhibit "E"23 proved that Ricardo Maon, respondent's client, did not receive any amount of P50,000
from his lawyer as settlement of Civil Case No. 1028.24
His failure to appear on five consecutive, scheduled hearing dates - requesting the cancellation and
resetting of three and absolutely ignoring two - showed an evasive attitude towards the resolution of
the administrative case filed against him and of which he himself sought a formal hearing. Aside from
his patent lack of respect for the Commission and its proceedings, his repeated and obviously
deliberate failure to appear in the scheduled hearings revealed an attempt to wiggle away from having
to explain and ventilate his side. Worse, he did not file an answer to controvert the allegations in the
complaint. Instead, he filed a counter-affidavit he had earlier submitted in a criminal case which, upon
scrutiny, referred only to a transaction involving what appeared to be a sale of real property
documented in exhibit "D"25 of the complainant.
Respondent has no one else to blame but himself. Had he taken the time to appear before the
Commission and present his defenses, he could have explained why he kept the money delivered to
him by the complainant as settlement of the civil case. As things stand therefore, complainant's
allegations against respondent remain completely uncontroverted.
For misappropriating and failing to promptly report and deliver money received on behalf of their
clients, some lawyers have been disbarred while others have been suspended for six months.26 Since
this appears to be the first case of respondent in the IBP-CBD, we impose the lighter penalty on him.
As to complainant's other claim for P30,000 which respondent lawyer allegedly promised him, we rule
the evidence to be lacking and therefore find it premature to grant the award.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Jaime C. Ulep is hereby found GUILTY of violating Canon 16 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of
six months from notice, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act will be
dealt with more severely.
Respondent is further ordered to restitute to his client Ricardo Maon, in cash within 30 days from
notice, the amount of P50,000 with interest at the legal rate, computed from December 22, 1997 to
the date of delivery.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished all courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant for their information and guidance, and let it be entered in
respondent's record in this Court.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
EN BANC
[A.C. NO. 6656 : May 4, 2006]

[Formerly CBD-98-591]
BOBIE ROSE V. FRIAS, Complainant, v. ATTY. CARMELITA S. BAUTISTA-

LOZADA,* Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
Respondent Atty. Carmelita Bautista-Lozada seeks reconsideration of our December 13,

2005 resolution finding her guilty of violating Rules 15.03 and 16.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and of willfully disobeying a final and executory decision of
the Court of Appeals and suspending her from the practice of law for two years.
Respondent contends that, pursuant to Rule VIII of the Rules of Procedure of the
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), the
complaint against her was already barred by prescription. She also asserts that her
December 7, 1990 loan agreement with complainant complied with Rule 16.04 because
the interest of complainant was fully protected.
Respondent's contentions have no merit.
Respondent anchors her defense of prescription on Rule VIII, Section 1 of the Rules of
Procedure of the CBD-IBP which provides:
SECTION 1. Prescription. A complaint for disbarment, suspension or discipline of

attorneys prescribes in two (2) years from the date of the professional misconduct.
However, as early as 1967, we have held that the defense of prescription does not lie in
administrative proceedings against lawyers.1 And in the 2004 case of Heck v.
Santos,2 we declared that an administrative complaint against a member of the bar
does not prescribe.
If the rule were otherwise, members of the bar would be emboldened to disregard the
very oath they took as lawyers, prescinding from the fact that as long as no private
complainant would immediately come forward, they stand a chance of being completely
exonerated from whatever administrative liability they ought to answer for. It is the
duty of this Court to protect the integrity of the practice of law as well as the
administration of justice. No matter how much time has elapsed from the time of the
commission of the act complained of and the time of the institution of the complaint,
erring members of the bench and bar cannot escape the disciplining arm of the
Court. This categorical pronouncement is aimed at unscrupulous members of the bench
and bar, to deter them from committing acts which violate the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Code of Judicial Conduct, or the Lawyer's Oath. x x x
Thus, even the lapse of considerable time from the commission of the offending act to
the institution of the administrative complaint will not erase the administrative
culpability of a lawyer'.3 (emphasis supplied)
The CBD-IBP derives its authority to take cognizance of administrative complaints

against lawyers from this Court which has the inherent power to regulate, supervise
and control the practice of law in the Philippines. Hence, in the exercise of its delegated
power to entertain administrative complaints against lawyers, the CBD-IBP should be
guided by the doctrines and principles laid down by this Court.
Regrettably, Rule VIII, Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure of the CBD-IBP which
provides for a prescriptive period for the filing of administrative complaints against
lawyers runs afoul of the settled ruling of this Court. It should therefore be struck down
as void and of no legal effect for being ultra vires.
Moreover, assuming that prescription is a valid defense, respondent raised it only at

this late stage. We presume she was familiar with that rule yet she failed to invoke it at
the earliest opportunity. Instead she opted to insist on her innocence.
On the other ground raised by respondent, we have sufficiently discussed the

implications of her loan agreement with complainant in relation to Rule 16.04 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility in our December 13, 2005 resolution. Considering
the fiduciary character of respondent's relationship with complainant, the nature of their
agreement and complainant's lack of independent advice when she entered into it,
there is neither sufficient ground nor compelling reason to reconsider our earlier
resolution.
WHEREFORE, respondent's motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED WITH

FINALITY.
Rule VIII, Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is hereby declared null and void.
Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
Office of the Bar Confidant for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Endnotes:
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 129058. March 29, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. PAULINO

SEVILLENO Y VILLANUEVA alias TAMAYO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
By pleading guilty to the rape and killing of a 9-year old girl a death sentence would
seem inevitable. But a mere plea of guilt is not sufficient for conviction as the court
must first assure itself that the accused fully understood the consequences of his plea.
In the instant case, the trial court failed to conduct a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness of his admission of guilt and that he fully comprehended the implications
thereof. As the court a quo inadequately discharged its duty of conducting a searching
inquiry, the plea of guilt to a capital offense therefore inevitably became null and
void.1
cräläwvirtualibräry
On 22 July 1995, at around 10:00 o'clock in the morning, Paulino Sevilleno y Villanueva
alias Tamayo went to Barangay Guadalupe, San Carlos City. He brought with him bread
and ice candy for his 9-year old and 8-year old nieces, Virginia and Norma, both
surnamed Baquia. He then invited Virginia to accompany him to Sitio Guindali-an "to
see (a) beta show."2 To reach the place, Paulino and Virginia passed through the
sugarcane fields.
At around 11:00 o'clock that same morning, Rogelio Baquia, father of Virginia and
Norma, arrived. Not seeing Virginia in their house, Rogelio asked Norma where her
sister was. After learning from her that Virginia had gone with accused Paulino to Sitio
Guindali-an, Rogelio immediately set out to look for them.
Rogelio failed to find his daughter upon reaching Sitio Guindali-an; instead, he bumped
into the accused. When asked about Virginia the accused denied knowing where she
was. However, Rogelio noticed that the accused had nail scratches on his neck and a
wound on his left cheek.
Rogelio continued his search. He was accompanied by Eugenio Tiongson, a relative of
the accused. The next day they met the accused at the house of the former barangay
captain of Sitio Guindali-an, Paeng Lopez. Eugenio asked Paulino where Virginia was.
This time the accused replied that she was in a sugarcane field known as "Campo
9," still a part of Guadalupe, like Sitio Guindali-an. Accompanied by some police
officers, Rogelio and Eugenio proceeded to "Campo 9." There they found Virginia
covered with dried leaves, her dress raised to her armpits; the lower portion of her
torso was naked; her legs were spread apart. She had wounds on various parts of her
body. She was dead.3 cräläwvirtualibräry
Dr. Arnel Laurence Q. Portuguez, City Health Officer of San Carlos City, autopsied the
body of Virginia. His postmortem examination showed these findings: linear abrasion
over hematoma, 3.0 x 2.0 cm., right superior anterior neck; linear abrasion over
hematoma, 2.5 x 3.0 cm., left superior anterior neck; hematoma 9.0 x 4.0 cm., right
inguinal area; hematoma 9.0 x 5.0 cm., left inguinal area; superficial hymenal
laceration 0.5 cm., at 12 o'clock position, with clot formation at intuitus; abrasion 5.5 x
4.0 cm., left superior gluteal area; abrasion 5.0 x 3.0 cm., right superior gluteal area;
abrasion 6.0 x 2.0 cm., right inferior lateral gluteal area; vaginal smear showing
absence of sperm cells except pus cells and epithelial cells. Cause of death: asphyxia
secondary to strangulation.4 Based on his findings, Dr. Portuguez concluded that
Virginia was raped and then strangled to death.
When news of the gruesome rape and killing spread around the community, the local
residents immediately arrested the accused Paulino Sevilleno and turned him over to
the police authorities. Thereafter, on 25 July 1995, the accused was charged with rape
with homicide for having carnal knowledge of Virginia Baquia, a minor, 9 years of age,
by means of force, violence and intimidation and against her will, and after ravishing
her, with intent to hide his identity and to prevent discovery thereof, with intent to kill,
strangled her which directly caused her death.5 cräläwvirtualibräry
The arraignment where the accused was represented by Atty. Vic Agravante of the
Public Attorney's Office proceeded thus -
Court: Call the case x x x x
Interpreter: Appearances?.
Pros. Tabinas: Appearing for the government, ready for arraignment.
Atty. Agravante: Respectfully appearing for the accused, ready, you Honor.
Court: Arraign the accused.
Stenographer's Observation: Accused was arraigned in a Cebuano language duly known

and understood by him, pleaded GUILTY.
COURT (to accused): Do you understand your plea of guilty?
Accused: Yes, sir.

Q. Do you know that your plea of guilty could bring death penalty?
A. Yes, sir.
Court (to Pros. Tabinas): You still have to present your evidence.
Pros. Tabinas: Yes, your honor.6
The hearing for the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution was scheduled on
31 August 1995. It was however reset several times. On 10 October 1995 the accused
manifested that he had no counsel. Thus, the trial court ordered the Public Attorney's
Office to provide a counsel de oficio for him. The next hearing was set on 21 November
1995.7 cräläwvirtualibräry
On 28 October 1995, taking advantage of typhoon "Pepang" that struck the island of

Negros, the accused escaped from detention, of which the Presiding judge was
accordingly informed.
The records show that Atty. Vic Agravante assisted the accused during the arraignment
only. In the succeeding hearings, Atty. Danilo Pabalinas, another lawyer of PAO,
represented the accused. But after the escape Atty. Pabalinas sought permission from
the court to be released from his duty to assist the accused. The court then directed
that the accused be tried in absentia and counsel was relieved from his responsibility to
his client and the court.8 cräläwvirtualibräry
The prosecution presented the examining physician as well as Maria Lariosa and Norma
Baquia. Notably, these witnesses were not cross-examined because, as already
adverted to, Atty. Pabalinas earlier excused himself from the case. Neither did the court
appoint another counsel for the accused.
The next hearing was set on 30 January 1996. However, for various reasons, the
hearing was reset to 13 March 1996, 21 April 1996, 18 June 1996 and 17 July 1996.
Meanwhile, on 10 July 1996 the Jail Warden of San Carlos City reported to the court
that the accused had been recaptured.9 cräläwvirtualibräry
Atty. Florentino Saldavia, also of PAO, was appointed counsel de oficio for the accused.
On 17 July 1996 the prosecution presented Rogelio Baquia as its last witness. Atty.
Saldavia cross-examined Rogelio but his questions were only considered token, and
even irrelevant. Then the prosecution rested.
On 28 August 1996, the date set for the presentation of the evidence for the defense,
Atty. Saldavia moved that the hearing be reset as he was not feeling well. On 19
November 1996, Atty. Saldavia again moved for postponement and the hearing was
reset to 3 December 1996 on which date, instead of presenting evidence, Atty. Saldavia
manifested that he was submitting the case for decision but invoking the plea of guilt of
the accused as a mitigating circumstance. As recorded, the hearing proceeded thus -
Court: Call the case x x x x

Interpreter: Appearances.
Pros. Tabinas: Appearing for the government.
Atty. Saldavia: For the accused. Your honor please, this is already the turn of the
defense to present evidence. He already pleaded GUILTY. We have no mitigating
circumstance to prove except the plea of guilty. I believe there is no need of presenting
evidence, he already pleaded guilty.
Court: (to Atty. Saldavia): You will rest the case?
Atty. Saldavia: Yes, your honor.
Pros. Tabinas: You will invoke the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty?
Atty. Saldavia: Yes.
Pros. Tabinas: We have no objection to that.
Court: Order.
When this case was called for the presentation of evidence for the accused, counsel for
the accused manifested that he had no evidence to present in favor of the accused
except the plea of GUILTY made in open court.
In view thereof, the above-entitled case is hereby submitted for decision based on the
evidence presented by the prosecution without the accused presenting evidence in his
behalf except the plea of GUILTY which is admitted by the prosecution.
WHEREFORE, the above-entitled case is hereby submitted for decision.
SO ORDERED.10
On 6 March 1997 the Regional Trial Court-Br. 57, San Carlos City, rendered its decision
finding the accused guilty of rape with homicide and sentencing him to death and to
pay the heirs of Virginia Baquia -P50,000.00 plus costs.11cräläwvirtualibräry
This case is now on automatic review. The defense contends that the court a quo erred
in convicting the accused and imposing upon him the penalty of death as it failed to
observe the required procedure for cases where the accused pleads guilty to a capital
offense when arraigned.12 The defense also argues that the arraignment conducted by
the trial court was null and void as it did not conduct a "searching inquiry" before
accepting the plea of guilt and sentencing the accused to death. It concludes that since
the arraignment was fatally defective and not in accordance with law, the case must be
remanded to the court of origin for the proper arraignment of the accused before the
capital punishment may be imposed.
We sustain the defense. Under Sec. 3, Rule 116, of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, when the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct
a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences
of his plea. It must also require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise
degree of his culpability. If the accused so desires he may also present evidence in his
behalf. This procedure is mandatory and a judge who fails to observe it commits grave
abuse of discretion.13 cräläwvirtualibräry
The questions propounded by the trial judge during arraignment hardly satisfied the
requisite searching inquiry. Regrettably, there were only two (2) questions propounded
to the accused: First. Do you understand your plea of guilt? Second. Do you know that
your plea of guilt could bring death penalty? In every case where the accused enters a
plea of guilty to a capital offense, especially where he is an ignorant person with little or
no education, the proper and prudent course to follow is to take such evidence as are
available and necessary in support of the material allegations of the information,
including the aggravating circumstances therein enumerated, not only to satisfy the
trial judge himself but also to aid the Supreme Court in determining whether the
accused really and truly understood and comprehended the meaning, full significance
and consequences of his plea.14 cräläwvirtualibräry
In the instant case, the trial court did not bother to explain the essential elements of
the crime of rape with homicide with which the accused was charged. On the same
note, the trial judge also failed to inform the accused the certainty by which the death
penalty would be imposed on him and the fact that he would also be made to indemnify
the heirs of his victim. As a result, the accused was not properly accorded his
fundamental right to be informed of the precise nature of the accusation leveled against
him.15 Thus, it is with apprehension that ruling for the affirmance of the decision in this
case will prejudice the due observance of the fundamental requirements of fairness and
due process.16 The constitutional rights of the accused are for the protection of the
guilty and of the innocent alike. Only with the assurance that even the guilty shall be
given the benefit of every constitutional guaranty can the innocent be secure in the
same rights.17cräläwvirtualibräry
Trial courts must exercise meticulous care in accepting a plea of guilty in a capital
offense. Judges are duty-bound to be extra solicitous in seeing to it that when an
accused pleads guilty he understands fully the meaning of his plea and the import of his
inevitable conviction.18 Courts must proceed with more care where the possible
punishment is in its severest form - death - for the reason that the execution of such a
sentence is irrevocable. Experience has shown that innocent persons have at times
pleaded guilty.19 Only a clear, definite and unconditional plea of guilty by the accused
must be accepted by trial courts.20 There is no such rule which provides that simply
because the accused pleaded guilty to the charge that his conviction should
automatically follow.21 A judge should always be an embodiment of competence.22 As an
administrator of justice, it is imperative that the trial judge carry out his duties ably and
competently so as not to erode public confidence in the judiciary.
It is quite unfortunate that Attys. Vic Agravante, Danilo Pabalinas and Florentino
Saldavia, all of PAO, were remiss in their duties as defenders of the accused. Atty.
Agravante did not take time to explain to his client the nature of the crime of which he
was charged and the gravity of the consequences of his plea. Instead, he readily agreed
to the accused pleading guilty to a capital offense. In the succeeding hearings, Atty.
Pabalinas was supposed to assist the accused ably but miserably failed. When the case
was called and appearances noted, the trial judge informed the parties that the accused
had escaped from detention. It was then that the prosecution and the defense,
including the trial court, agreed that the accused would be tried in absentia. Then, at
this juncture, Atty. Pabalinas sought to be relieved of his responsibilities as
counsel de oficio which, unfortunately, the court also granted. The court proceeded with
the presentation of three (3) prosecution witnesses who testified but were never cross-
examined because Atty. Pabalinas already left the courtroom, apparently with the
consent of the trial court. Nobody was assigned to replace Atty. Pabalinas.
Consequently, not only was the accused tried in absentia, he was also tried without the
assistance of counsel.
When the prosecution rested its case, Atty. Saldavia of the PAO asked for the
postponement of the succeeding hearings not only once but thrice allegedly because he
was not feeling well. Interestingly, when the time came for him to adduce evidence in
behalf of the accused, he manifested that since his client had already pleaded guilty he
would no longer present any evidence. He only invoked the mitigating circumstance of
plea of guilty.
The plea of guilty as a mitigating circumstance is misplaced. Not under any

circumstance would any admission of guilt affect or reduce the death sentence.23 Art.
335 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the penalty of death when by reason or on
the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed. Death is a single indivisible penalty
and corollary to Art. 63 of the Revised Penal Code, in all cases in which a single
indivisible penalty is prescribed, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstance that may have attended the commission of the
offense.
The court below also erred in disregarding the testimony of Norma Baquia "for the
reason that her testimony failed to establish that the incident happened within the
territorial jurisdiction of this court."24 The court did not consider her testimony
purportedly because she onlytestified that her sister Virginia went with the accused to
Guindali-an without specifying as to what municipality or city it was part of.25 Again,
this is error. Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court requires courts to take judicial
notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and geographical divisions
of our country. There is only one Sitio Guindali-an, Brgy. Guadalupe, San Carlos City
(Negros Occidental).
We cannot right finis to this discussion without making known our displeasure over the
manner by which the PAO lawyers dispensed with their duties. All three (3) of them
displayed manifest disinterest on the plight of their client. They lacked vigor and
dedication to their work. Atty. Agravante did not explain to the accused the nature of
the crime of which he was charged and the consequences of his plea. Atty. Pabalinas,
instead of assisting the accused, hastily left the courtroom after obtaining leave while
the prosecution was presenting its three (3) witnesses. Resultingly, all three (3)
witnesses were never cross-examined. On the other hand, Atty. Saldavia moved for the
postponement of the scheduled hearings during which he was supposed to present
evidence for the defense; worse, on the last scheduled hearing he submitted the case
for decision without presenting evidence. In short, no evidence was ever presented for
the defense. And, as if to compound his deficiency with ignorance, Atty. Saldavia relied
on his client's plea of guilt in the mistaken belief that it would modify and reduce
to reclusion perpetua the imposable penalty of death.
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires every lawyer to serve his

client with utmost dedication, competence and diligence. He must not neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in this regard renders him administratively
liable.26 Obviously, in the instant case, the aforenamed defense lawyers did not protect,
much less uphold, the fundamental rights of the accused. Instead, they haphazardly
performed their function as counsel de oficio to the detriment and prejudice of the
accused Sevilleno, however guilty he might have been found to be after trial.
Inevitably, this Court must advise Attys. Agravante, Pabalinas and Saldavia to adhere
closely and faithfully to the tenets espoused in the Code of Professional
Responsibility; otherwise, commission of any similar act in the future will be severely
sanctioned.
WHEREFORE, the 6 March 1997 Decision of the Regional Trial Court-Br. 57, San Carlos
City (Negros Occidental), in Crim. Case No. 129058, convicting the accused PAULINO
SEVILLENO Y VILLANUEVA alias Tamayo of Rape with Homicide and sentencing him to
DEATH is ANNULLEDand SET ASIDEand the case is REMANDEDto the court of origin for
the proper arraignment and trial of the accused until terminated.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Romero, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,

Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ.,
concur.
Endnotes:
THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 5359, March 10, 2014
ERMELINDA LAD VDA. DE DOMINGUEZ, REPRESENTED BY HER ATTORNEY-IN-

FACT, VICENTE A. PICHON, Complainant, v. ATTY. ARNULFO M. AGLERON,
SR., Respondent.
RESOLUTION
MENDOZA, J.:
Complainant Ermelinda Lad Vda. De Dominguez (complainant) was the widow of the
late Felipe Domiguez who died in a vehicular accident in Caraga, Davao Oriental, on
October 18, 1995, involving a dump truck owned by the Municipality of Caraga.
Aggrieved, complainant decided to file charges against the Municipality of Caraga and
engaged the services of respondent Atty. Arnulfo M. Agleron, Sr. (Atty. Agleron). On
three (3) occasions, Atty. Agleron requested and received from complainant the
following amounts for the payment of filing fees and sheriff’s fees, to wit: (1) June 3,
1996 - P3,000.00; (2) June 7, 1996 - P1,800.00; and September 2, 1996 - P5,250.00
or a total of P10,050.00. After the lapse of four (4) years, however, no complaint was
filed by Atty. Agleron against the Municipality of Caraga.1crallawlibrary
Atty. Agleron admitted that complainant engaged his professional service and received
the amount of P10,050.00. He, however, explained that their agreement was that
complainant would pay the filing fees and other incidental expenses and as soon as the
complaint was prepared and ready for filing, complainant would pay 30% of the agreed
attorney’s fees of P100,000.00. On June 7, 1996, after the signing of the complaint, he
advised complainant to pay in full the amount of the filing fee and sheriff’s fees and the
30% of the attorney’s fee, but complainant failed to do so. Atty. Agleron averred that
since the complaint could not be filed in court, the amount of P10,050.00 was deposited
in a bank while awaiting the payment of the balance of the filing fee and attorney’s
fee.2
crallawlibrary
In reply,3 complainant denied that she did not give the full payment of the filing fee and
asserted that the filing fee at that time amounted only to P7,836.60.
In the Report and Recommendation,4 dated January 12, 2012, the Investigating

Commissioner found Atty. Agleron to have violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility when he neglected a legal matter entrusted to him, and recommended
that he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of four (4) months.
In its April 16, 2013 Resolution,5 the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board of
Governors adopted and approved the report and recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner with modification that Atty. Agleron be suspended from the practice of
law for a period of only one (1) month.
The Court agrees with the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors except as to
the penalty imposed.
Atty. Agleron violated Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
provides that: chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Rule 18.03-A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty bound to serve his client with
competence, and to attend to his client’s cause with diligence, care and devotion
regardless of whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.6 He owes fidelity to such cause
and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him.7 crallawlibrary
In the present case, Atty. Agleron admitted his failure to file the complaint against the
Municipality of Caraga, Davao Oriental, despite the fact that it was already prepared
and signed. He attributed his non-filing of the appropriate charges on the failure of
complainant to remit the full payment of the filing fee and pay the 30% of the
attorney’s fee. Such justification, however, is not a valid excuse that would exonerate
him from liability. As stated, every case that is entrusted to a lawyer deserves his full
attention whether he accepts this for a fee or free. Even assuming that complainant had
not remitted the full payment of the filing fee, he should have found a way to speak to
his client and inform him about the insufficiency of the filing fee so he could file the
complaint. Atty. Agleron obviously lacked professionalism in dealing with complainant
and showed incompetence when he failed to file the appropriate charges.
In a number of cases,8 the Court held that a lawyer should never neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, otherwise his negligence renders him liable for disciplinary action
such as suspension ranging from three months to two years. In this case, the Court
finds the suspension of Atty. Agleron from the practice of law for a period of three (3)
months sufficient.
WHEREFORE, the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors is hereby AFFIRMED with

MODIFICATION. Accordingly, respondent ATTY. ARNULFO M. AGLERON, SR. is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of THREE (3) MONTHS,
with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar wrongdoing will be dealt
with more severely.
Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant to be included in the records
of the respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its
chapters; and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts
throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, Abad, Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
FIRST DIVISION
[A.C. NO. 7023 : March 30, 2006]
BUN SIONG YAO, Complainant, v. ATTY. LEONARDO A. AURELIO, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On November 11, 2004, a complaint-affidavit1 was filed against Atty. Leonardo A.

Aurelio by Bun Siong Yao before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) seeking for
his disbarment for alleged violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The complainant alleged that since 1987 he retained the services of respondent as his
personal lawyer; that respondent is a stockholder and the retained counsel of Solar
Farms & Livelihood Corporation and Solar Textile Finishing Corporation of which
complainant is a majority stockholder; that complainant purchased several parcels of
land using his personal funds but were registered in the name of the corporations upon
the advice of respondent; that respondent, who was also the brother in-law of
complainant's wife, had in 1999 a disagreement with the latter and thereafter
respondent demanded the return of his investment in the corporations but when
complainant refused to pay, he filed eight charges for estafa and falsification of
commercial documents against the complainant and his wife and the other officers of
the corporation; that respondent also filed a complaint against complainant for alleged
non-compliance with the reportorial requirements of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City and
another complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Malabon City for alleged
violation of Section 75 of the Corporation Code; that respondent also filed a similar
complaint before the Office of the City Prosecutor of San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan.
Complainant alleged that the series of suits filed against him and his wife is a form of
harassment and constitutes an abuse of the confidential information which respondent
obtained by virtue of his employment as counsel. Complainant argued that respondent
is guilty of representing conflicting interests when he filed several suits not only against
the complainant and the other officers of the corporation, but also against the two
corporations of which he is both a stockholder and retained counsel.
Respondent claimed that he handled several labor cases in behalf of Solar Textile
Finishing Corporation; that the funds used to purchase several parcels of land were not
the personal funds of complainant but pertain to Solar Farms & Livelihood Corporation;
that since 1999 he was no longer the counsel for complainant or Solar Textile Finishing
Corporation; that he never used any confidential information in pursuing the criminal
cases he filed but only used those information which he obtained by virtue of his being
a stockholder.
He further alleged that his requests for copies of the financial statements were ignored
by the complainant and his wife hence he was constrained to file criminal complaints for
estafa thru concealment of documents; that when he was furnished copies of the
financial statements, he discovered that several parcels of land were not included in the
balance sheet of the corporations; that the financial statements indicated that the
corporations suffered losses when in fact it paid cash dividends to its stockholders,
hence, he filed additional complaints for falsification of commercial documents and
violation of reportorial requirements of the SEC.
On July 19, 2005, the Investigating Commissioner2 submitted a Report and

Recommendation3 finding that from 1987 up to 1999, respondent had been the
personal lawyer of the complainant and incorporator and counsel of Solar Farms &
Livelihood Corporation. However, in 1999 complainant discontinued availing of the
services of respondent in view of the admission of his (complainant's) son to the bar;
he also discontinued paying dividends to respondent and even concealed from him the
corporations' financial statements which compelled the respondent to file the multiple
criminal and civil cases in the exercise of his rights as a stockholder.
The investigating commissioner further noted that respondent is guilty of forum

shopping when he filed identical charges against the complainant before the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Malabon City and in the Office of the City Prosecutor of San Jose
del Monte, Bulacan. It was also observed that respondent was remiss in his duty as
counsel and incorporator of both corporations for failing to advise the officers of the
corporation, which he was incidentally a member of the Board of Directors, to comply
with the reportorial requirements of the SEC and the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
Instead, he filed cases against his clients, thereby representing conflicting interests.
The investigating commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended from the

practice of law for a period of six months4 which was adopted and approved by the IBP
Board of Governors.
We agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP.
We find that the professional relationship between the complainant and the respondent
is more extensive than his protestations that he only handled isolated labor cases for
the complainant's corporations. Aside from being the brother-in-law of complainant's
wife, it appears that even before the inception of the companies, respondent was
already providing legal services to the complainant, thus:
COMM. NAVARRO:
Was there a formal designation or you where only called upon to do so? cralawlibrary
ATTY. AURELIO:
Well, I understand in order to show to the employees that they have labor lawyer and
at that time I went to the office at least half day every week but that was cut short.
And so when there are cases that crop-up involving labor then they called me up.
xxx
ATTY. OLEDAN:
Will counsel deny that he was the personal lawyer of the complainant long before he
joined the company? cralawlibrary
ATTY. AURELIO:
Yes, with respect to the boundary dispute between his land and his neighbor but the
subject matter of all the cases I filed they all revolved around the Financial Statement
of the 2 corporations. I never devolves any information with respect to labor cases and
the MERALCO case with respect to boundary dispute, nothing I used.
ATTY. OLEDAN:
Was he not also the lawyer at that time of complainant when he incorporated the
second corporation in 1992? cralawlibrary
ATTY. AURELIO:
Well, I was the one submitted the corporate papers and I think after that I have
nothing to do with the SEC requirements regarding this corporation. Just to submit the
incorporation papers to the SEC and anyway they have already done that before. They
have already created or established the first corporation way back before the second
corporation started and there was no instance where I dealt with the Financial
Statement of the corporation with respect to its filing with the SEC.
ATTY. OLEDAN:
My only question is whether he incorporated and therefore was aware of the corporate
matters involving Solar Farms? cralawlibrary
ATTY. AURELIO:
As a stockholder I m aware.
ATTY. OLEDAN:
As a lawyer? cralawlibrary
ATTY. AURELIO:
Well, as a stockholder I m aware.
xxx
ATTY. OLEDAN:
You are not the one who filed'.
ATTY. AURELIO:
I was the one who filed the corporate paper but that's all the participation I had with
respect to the requirement of the SEC with respect to the corporation.
COMM. NAVARRO:
So, you acted as legal counsel of the corporation even before the initial stage of the
incorporation? cralawlibrary
ATTY. AURELIO:
There are two (2) corporations involving in this case, Your Honor, and the first was I
think Solar Textile and this was'.
COMM. NAVARRO:
You were already the legal counsel? cralawlibrary
ATTY. AURELIO:
No, this was created before I became a stockholder.
COMM. NAVARRO:
Who was then the legal counsel before of Solar? cralawlibrary
MR. YAO:
Siya pa rin pero hindi pa siya stockholder.
ATTY. OLEDAN:
Because, Your Honor, he happens to be the brother-in-law of the wife of the

complainant and he is the husband of the wife of her sister so that's why he was'
(inaudible)' other legal matters even before the corporation that was formed and he
became also a stockholder and in fact he charge the corporation certain amounts for
professional service rendered it is part of the Resolution of the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Malabon as annex to the complaint so he cannot say that he only
presented, that he only filed the papers at SEC and aside from that when the
corporation, the Solar Farms was already formed and the property which he is now
questioning was purchased by complainant. He was the one who negotiated with the
buyer, he was always with the complainant and precisely acted as complainant's
personal lawyer. The truth of the matter he is questioning the boundary and in fact
complainant had survey conducted in said parcel of land which he bought with the
assistance and legal advice of respondent and in fact complainant gave him only a copy
of that survey. Him alone. And he used this particular copy to insists that this property
allegedly belong to the corporation when in truth and in fact he was fully aware that it
was the complainant's personal funds that were used to pay for the whole area and this
was supported by the stockholders who admitted that they were aware that the parcel
of land which he claims does not appear in the Financial Statement of the corporation
was purchased by the complainant subject to reimbursement by the Board and should
the corporation finally have sufficient fund to cover the payment advance by
complainant then the property will be transferred to the corporation. All of these facts
he was privy to it, Your Honor, so he cannot say that and he is also a stockholder but
the fact is, prior to the incorporation and during the negotiation he was the personal
counsel of the complainant.5
It appears that the parties' relationship was not just professional, but they are also
related by affinity. The disagreement between complainant's wife and the respondent
affected their professional relationship. Complainant's refusal to disclose certain
financial records prompted respondent to retaliate by filing several suits.
It is essential to note that the relationship between an attorney and his client is a
fiduciary one.6 Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a
lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed on him. The long-established rule is that an attorney is not
permitted to disclose communications made to him in his professional character by a
client, unless the latter consents. This obligation to preserve the confidences and
secrets of a client arises at the inception of their relationship. The protection given to
the client is perpetual and does not cease with the termination of the litigation, nor is it
affected by the party's ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining another, or by any
other change of relation between them. It even survives the death of the client.7
Notwithstanding the veracity of his allegations, respondent's act of filing multiple suits
on similar causes of action in different venues constitutes forum-shopping, as correctly
found by the investigating commissioner. This highlights his motives rather than his
cause of action. Respondent took advantage of his being a lawyer in order to get back
at the complainant. In doing so, he has inevitably utilized information he has obtained
from his dealings with complainant and complainant's companies for his own end.
Lawyers must conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients and the
public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach.8 Lawyers
cannot be allowed to exploit their profession for the purpose of exacting vengeance or
as a tool for instigating hostility against any person most especially against a client or
former client. As we stated in Marcelo v. Javier, Sr.:9
A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The
trust and confidence necessarily reposed by clients require in the attorney a high
standard and appreciation of his duty to his clients, his profession, the courts and the
public. The bar should maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of
honesty and fair dealing. Generally speaking, a lawyer can do honor to the legal
profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to
his clients. To this end, nothing should be done by any member of the legal fraternity
which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity,
honesty and integrity of the profession.10 (Emphasis supplied) cralawlibrary
In sum, we find that respondent's actuations amount to a breach of his duty to uphold
good faith and fairness, sufficient to warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction
against him.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Leonardo A. Aurelio is ordered SUSPENDED from the

practice of law for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS effective upon receipt of this Decision.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The Court Administrator is directed to circulate this
order of suspension to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
Endnotes:
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-961. September 21, 1949.]
BLANDINA GAMBOA HILADO, Petitioner, v. JOSE GUTIERREZ DAVID, VICENTE J.

FRANCISCO, JACOB ASSAD and SELIM JACOB ASSAD, Respondents.
Delgado, Dizon & Flores for Petitioner.

Vicente J. Francisco for Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. ATTORNEY AND CLIENT; RELATION OF ATTORNEY AND CLIENT, WHEN EXISTS.

— "To constitute professional employment it is not essential that the client should have
employed the attorney professionally on any previous occasion . . . It is not necessary that any
retainer should have been paid, promised, or charged for; neither is it material that the attorney
consulted did not afterward undertake the case about which the consultation was had. If a person,
in respect to his business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults with his attorney in his
professional capacity with the view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the
attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces in such consultation, then the professional
employment must be regarded as established . . ." cralaw virtua1aw library
2. ID.; ATTORNEY IS INHIBITED TO ACT ON BEHALF OF BOTH PARTIES. — There is

no law or provision in the Rules of Court prohibiting attorneys in express terms from acting on
behalf of both parties to a controversy whose interests are opposed to each other, but such
prohibition is necessarily implied in the injunctions as provided in section 26 (e), Rule 123 and
section 19 (e) of Rule 127 of the Rules of Court.
3. ID.; INFORMATION PROFESSIONALLY OBTAINED BY ATTORNEY FROM CLIENT

IS SACRED. — Information so received is sacred to the employment to which it pertains, and to
permit it to be used in the interest of another, or, worse still, in the interest of the adverse party, is
to strike at the element of confidence which lies at the basis of, and affords the essential security
in, the relation of attorney and client.
4. ID.; ID. — The mere relation of attorney and client ought to preclude the attorney from
accepting the opposite party’s retainer in the same litigation regardless of what information was
received by him from his first client.
5. ID.; RELATION OF ATTORNEY AND CLIENT IS FOUNDED ON PRINCIPLES OF

PUBLIC POLICY. — The relation of attorney and client is founded on principles of public
policy, on good taste. The question is not necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as to
whether the attorney has adhered to proper professional standard. With these thoughts in mind, it
behooves attorneys, like Ceasar’s wife, not only to keep inviolate the client’s confidence, but
also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing. Only thus can litigants be
encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount importance in the
administration of justice.
6. ID.; RETAINING FEE, WHAT IS. — "A retaining fee is a preliminary fee given to an
attorney or counsel to insure and secure his future services, and induce him to act for the client. It
is intended to remunerate counsel for being deprived, by being retained by one party, of the
opportunity of rendering services to the other and of receiving pay from him, and the payment of
such fee, in the absence of an express understanding to the contrary, is neither made nor received
in payment of the services contemplated; its payment has no relation to the obligation of the
client to pay his attorney for the services which he has retained him to perform." cralaw virtua1aw library
7. ID.; INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM CLIENT BY A MEMBER OF THE FIRM. — An
information obtained from a client by a member or assistant of a law firm is information
imparted to the firm.
8. ID.; PROFESSIONAL CONFIDENCE, EXPIRATION OF. — Professional confidence once

reposed can never be divested by expiration of professional employment.
9. ID.; COURTS; JURISDICTION, EXTENT OF SUMMARY. — The courts have summary

jurisdiction to protect the rights of the parties and the public from any conduct of attorneys
prejudicial to the administration of justice. The summary jurisdiction of the courts over attorneys
is not confined to requiring them to pay over money collected by them but embraces authority to
compel them to do whatever specific acts may be incumbent upon them in their capacity of
attorneys to perform. The courts, from the general principles of equity and policy, will always
look into the dealings between attorneys and clients and guard the latter from any undue
consequences resulting from a situation in which they may stand unequal. The courts act on the
same principle whether the undertaking is to appear, or, for that matter, not to appear, to answer
declaration.
10. ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW; AS OFFICERS OF THE COURTS. — Attorneys are officers of

the court where they practice, forming a part of the machinery of the law for the administration
of justice and as such subject to the disciplinary authority of the court and to its orders and
directions with respect to their relations to the court as well as to their clients.
DECISION
TUASON, J.:
It appears that on April 23, 1945, Blandina Gamboa Hilado brought an action against
Selim Jacob Assad to annul the sale of several houses and lot executed during the
Japanese occupation by Mrs. Hilado’s now deceased husband.
On May 14, Attorneys Ohnick, Velilla and Balonkita filed an answer on behalf of the
defendant; and on June 15, Attorneys Delgado, Dizon, Flores and Rodrigo registered
their appearance as counsel for the plaintiff.
On October 5, these attorneys filed an amended complaint by including Jacob Assad as

party defendant.
On January 28, 1946, Attorney Francisco entered his appearance as attorney of record
for the defendant in substitution for Attorneys Ohnick, Velilla and Balonkita who had
withdrawn from the case.
On May 29, Attorney Dizon, in the name of his firm, wrote Attorney Francisco urging
him to discontinue representing the defendants on the ground that their client had
consulted with him about her case, on which occasion, it was alleged, "she turned over
the papers" to Attorney Francisco, and the latter sent her a written opinion. Not
receiving any answer to this suggestion, Attorneys Delgado, Dizon, Flores and Rodrigo
on June 3, 1946, filed a formal motion with the court, wherein the case was and is
pending, to disqualify Attorney Francisco.
Attorney Francisco’s letter to plaintiff, mentioned above and identified as Exhibit A, is in

full as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"VICENTE J. FRANCISCO
"Attorney-at-Law
1462 Estrada, Manila
"July 13, 1945
"Mrs. Blandina Gamboa Hilado
"Manila, Philippines
"My dear Mrs. Hilado: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"From the papers you submitted to me in connection with civil case No. 70075 of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled ’Blandina Gamboa Hilado v. S. J. Assad,’ I find
that the basic facts which brought about the controversy between you and the
defendant therein are as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(a) That you were the equitable owner of the property described in the complaint, as
the same was purchased and/or built with funds exclusively belonging to you, that is to
say, the houses and lot pertained to your paraphernal estate;
"(b) That on May 3, 1943, the legal title to the property was with your husband, Mr.
Serafin P. Hilado; and
"(c) That the property was sold by Mr. Hilado without your knowledge on the aforesaid
date of May 3, 1943.
"Upon the foregoing facts, I am of the opinion that your action against Mr. Assad will
not ordinarily prosper. Mr. Assad had the right to presume that your husband had the
legal right to dispose of the property as the transfer certificate of title was in his name.
Moreover, the price of P110,000 in Japanese military notes, as of May 3, 1943, does
not quite strike me as so grossly inadequate as to warrant the annulment of the sale. I
believe, lastly, that the transaction cannot be avoided merely because it was made
during the Japanese occupation, nor on the simple allegation that the real purchaser
was not a citizen of the Philippines. On this last point, furthermore, I expect that you
will have great difficulty in proving that the real purchaser was other than Mr. Assad,
considering that death has already sealed your husband’s lips and he cannot now testify
as to the circumstances of the sale.
"For the foregoing reasons, I regret to advice you that I cannot appear in the
proceedings in your behalf. The records of the case you loaned to me are herewith
returned.
"Yours very truly,
(Sgd.) "VICENTE J. FRANCISCO." cralaw virtua1aw library
"VJF/Rag.
In his answer to plaintiff’s attorneys’ complaint, Attorney Francisco alleged that about
May, 1945, a real estate broker came to his office in connection with the legal
separation of a woman who had been deserted by her husband, and also told him
(Francisco) that there was a pending suit brought by Mrs. Hilado against a certain
Syrian to annul the sale of a real estate which the deceased Serafin Hilado had made to
the Syrian during the Japanese occupation; that this woman asked him if he was willing
to accept the case if the Syrian should give it to him; that he told the woman that the
sales of real property during the Japanese regime were valid even though it was paid
for in Japanese military notes; that this being his opinion, he told his visitor he would
have no objection to defending the Syrian;
That one month afterwards, Mrs. Hilado came to see him about a suit she had instituted
against a certain Syrian to annul the conveyance of a real estate which her husband
had made; that according to her the case was in the hands of Attorneys Delgado and
Dizon, but she wanted to take it away from them; that as he had known the plaintiff’s
deceased husband he did not hesitate to tell her frankly that hers was a lost case for
the same reason he had told the broker; that Mrs. Hilado retorted that the basis of her
action was not that the money paid her husband was Japanese military notes, but that
the premises were her private and exclusive property; that she requested him to read
the complaint to be convinced that this was the theory of her suit; that he then asked
Mrs. Hilado if there was a Torrens title to the property and she answered yes, in the
name of her husband; that he told Mrs. Hilado that if the property was registered in her
husband’s favor, her case would not prosper either;
That some days afterward, upon arrival at his law office on Estrada street, he was
informed by Attorney Federico Agrava, his assistant, that Mrs. Hilado had dropped in
looking for him and that when he, Agrava, learned that Mrs. Hilado’s visit concerned
legal matters he attended to her and requested her to leave the "expediente" which she
was carrying, and she did; that he told Attorney Agrava that the firm should not handle
Mrs. Hilado’s case and he should return the papers, calling Agrava’s attention to what
he (Francisco) already had said to Mrs. Hilado;
That several days later, the stenographer in his law office, Teofilo Ragodon, showed him
a letter which has been dictated in English by Mr. Agrava, returning the "expediente" to
Mrs. Hilado; that Ragodon told him (Attorney Francisco) upon Attorney Agrava’s
request that Agrava thought it more proper to explain to Mrs. Hilado the reasons why
her case was rejected; that he forthwith signed the letter without reading it and without
keeping it for a minute in his possession; that he never saw Mrs. Hilado since their last
meeting until she talked to him at the Manila Hotel about a proposed extrajudicial
settlement of the case;
That in January, 1946, Assad was in his office to request him to handle his case stating
that his American lawyer had gone to the States and left the case in the hands of other
attorneys; that he accepted the retainer and on January 28, 1946, entered his
appearance.
Attorney Francisco filed an affidavit of stenographer Ragodon in corroboration of his

answer.
The judge trying the case, Honorable Jose Gutierrez David, later promoted to the Court
of Appeals, dismissed the complaint. His Honor believed that no information other than
that already alleged in plaintiff’s complaint in the main cause was conveyed to Attorney
Francisco, and concluded that the intercourse between the plaintiff and the respondent
did not attain the point of creating the relation of attorney and client.
Stripped of disputed details and collateral matters, this much is undoubted: That
Attorney Francisco’s law firm mailed to the plaintiff a written opinion over his signature
on the merits of her case; that this opinion was reached on the basis of papers she had
submitted at his office; that Mrs. Hilado’s purpose in submitting those papers was to
secure Attorney Francisco’s professional services. Granting the facts to be no more than
these, we agree with petitioner’s counsel that the relation of attorney and client
between Attorney Francisco and Mrs. Hilado ensued. The following rules accord with the
ethics of the legal profession and meet with our approval:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In order to constitute the relation (of attorney and client) a professional one and not
merely one of principal and agent, the attorneys must be employed either to give
advice upon a legal point, to prosecute or defend an action in court of Justice, or to
prepare and draft, in legal form such papers as deeds, bills, contracts and the like."
(Atkinson v. Howlett, 11 Ky. Law Rep. (abstract), 364, cited in Vol. 88, A. L. R., p. 6.)
"To constitute professional employment it is not essential that the client should have
employed the attorney professionally on any previous occasion . . . It is not necessary
that any retainer should have been paid, promised, or charged for; neither is it material
that the attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the case about which the
consultation was had. If a person, in respect to his business affairs or troubles of any
kind, consults with his attorney in his professional capacity with the view to obtaining
professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces in
such consultation, then the professional employment must be regarded as
established . . ." (5 Jones Commentaries on Evidence, pp. 4118-4119.)
"An attorney is employed — that is, he is engaged in his professional capacity as a

lawyer or counselor — when he is listening to his client’s preliminary statement of his
case, or when he is giving advice thereon, just as truly as when he is drawing his
client’s pleadings, or advocating his client’s cause in open court." (Denver Tramway Co.
v. Owens, 20 Colo., 107; 36 P., 848.)
"Formality is not an essential element of the employment of an attorney. The contract

may be express or implied and it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of the
attorney is sought and received, in matters pertinent to his profession. An acceptance
of the relation is implied on the part of the attorney from his acting in behalf of his
client in pursuance of a request by the latter." (7 C. J. S., 848- 849; see Hirach Bros. &
Co. v. R. E. Kennington Co., 88 A. L. R., 1.)
Section 26 (e), Rule 123 of the Rules of Court provides that "an attorney cannot,
without the consent of his client, be examined as to any communication made by the
client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of professional employment;"
and section 19 (e) of Rule 127 imposes upon an attorney the duty "to maintain inviolate
the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his client."
There is no law or provision in the Rules of Court prohibiting attorneys in express terms
from acting on behalf of both parties to a controversy whose interests are opposed to
each other, but such prohibition is necessarily implied in the injunctions above quoted.
(In re De la Rosa, 27 Phil., 258.) In fact the prohibition derives validity from sources
higher than written laws and rules. As has been aptly said in In re Merron, 22 N. M.,
252, L.R.A., 1917B, 378, "information so received is sacred to the employment to which
it pertains," and "to permit it to be used in the interest of another, or, worse still, in the
interest of the adverse party, is to strike at the element of confidence which lies at the
basis of, and affords the essential security in, the relation of attorney and client." cralaw virtua1aw library
That only copies of pleadings already filed in court were furnished to Attorney Agrava
and that, this being so, no secret communication was transmitted to him by the
plaintiff, would not vary the situation even if we should discard Mrs. Hilado’s statement
that other papers, personal and private in character, were turned in by her. Precedents
are at hand to support the doctrine that the mere relation of attorney and client ought
to preclude the attorney from accepting the opposite party’s retainer in the same
litigation regardless of what information was received by him from his first client.
"The principle which forbids an attorney who has been engaged to represent a client
from thereafter appearing on behalf of the client’s opponent applies equally even
though during the continuance of the employment nothing of a confidential nature was
revealed to the attorney by the client." (Christian v. Waialua Agricultural Co., 30
Hawaii, 533, Footnote 7, C.J. S., 828.)
"Where it appeared that an attorney, representing one party, in litigation, had formerly
represented the adverse party with respect to the same matter involved in the
litigation, the court need not inquire as to how much knowledge the attorney acquired
from his former client during that relationship, before refusing to permit the attorney to
represent the adverse party." (Brown v. Miller, 52 App. D. C. 330; 286, F. 994.) .
"In order that a court may prevent an attorney from appearing against a former client,
it is unnecessary that the court ascertain in detail the extent to which the former
client’s affairs might have a bearing on the matters involved in the subsequent litigation
on the attorney’s knowledge thereof." (Body v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 274 P., 7;
51 Nev., 264.)
"This rule has been so strictly enforced that it has been held that an attorney, on
terminating his employment, cannot thereafter act as counsel against his client in the
same general matter, even though, while acting for his former client, he acquired no
knowledge which could operate to his client’s disadvantage in the subsequent adverse
employment. Pierce v. Palmer [1910], 31 R. I., 432; 77 Atl., 201, Ann. Cas., 1912S,
181.)
Communications between attorney and client are, in a great number of litigations, a
complicated affair, consisting of entangled relevant and irrelevant, secret and well
known facts. In the complexity of what is said in the course of the dealings between an
attorney and a client, inquiry of the nature suggested would lead to the revelation, in
advance of the trial, of other matters that might only further prejudice the
complainant’s cause. And the theory would be productive of other unsalutary results. To
make the passing of confidential communication a condition precedent; i. e., to make
the employment conditioned on the scope and character of the knowledge acquired by
an attorney in determining his right to change sides, would not enhance the freedom of
litigants, which is to be sedulously fostered, to consult with lawyers upon what they
believe are their rights in litigation. The condition would of necessity call for an
investigation of what information the attorney has received and in what way it is or it is
not in conflict with his new position. Litigants would in consequence be wary in going to
an attorney, lest by an unfortunate turn of the proceeding, if an investigation be held,
the court should accept the attorney’s inaccurate version of the facts that came to him.
"Now the abstinence from seeking legal advice in a good cause is by hypothesis an evil
which is fatal to the administration of justice." (John H. Wigmore’s Evidence, 1923,
Sections 2285, 2290, 2291.)
Hence the necessity of setting down the existence of the bare relationship of attorney
and client as the yardstick for testing incompatibility of interests. This stern rule is
designed not alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but
as well to protect the honest lawyer from unfounded suspicion of unprofessional
practice. (Strong v. Int. Bldg., etc.; Ass’n, 183 Ill., 97; 47 L.R.A., 792.) It is founded on
principles of public policy, on good taste. As has been said in another case, the question
is not necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as to whether the attorney has
adhered to proper professional standard. With these thoughts in mind, it behooves
attorneys, like Caesar’s wife, not only to keep inviolate the client’s confidence, but also
to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing. Only thus can litigants be
encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount importance
in the administration of justice.
So without impugning respondent’s good faith, we nevertheless can not sanction his
taking up the cause of the adversary of the party who had sought and obtained legal
advice from his firm; this, not necessarily to prevent any injustice to the plaintiff but to
keep above reproach the honor and integrity of the courts and of the bar. Without
condemning the respondent’s conduct as dishonest, corrupt, or fraudulent, we do
believe that upon the admitted facts it is highly inexpedient. It had the tendency to
bring the profession, of which he is a distinguished member, "into public disrepute and
suspicion and undermine the integrity of justice." cralaw virtua1aw library
There is in legal practice what is called "retaining fee," the purpose of which stems from
the realization that the attorney is disabled from acting as counsel for the other side
after he has given professional advice to the opposite party, even if he should decline to
perform the contemplated services on behalf of the latter. It is to prevent undue
hardship on the attorney resulting from the rigid observance of the rule that a separate
and independent fee for consultation and advice was conceived and authorized. "A
retaining fee is a preliminary fee given to an attorney or counsel to insure and secure
his future services, and induce him to act for the client. It is intended to remunerate
counsel for being deprived, by being retained by one party, of the opportunity of
rendering services to the other and of receiving pay from him, and the payment of such
fee, in the absence of an express understanding to the contrary, is neither made nor
received in payment of the services contemplated; its payment has no relation to the
obligation of the client to pay his attorney for the services which he has retained him to
perform." (7 C.J.S., 1019.)
The defense that Attorney Agrava wrote the letter Exhibit A and that Attorney Francisco
did not take the trouble of reading it, would not take the case out of the interdiction. If
this letter was written under the circumstances explained by Attorney Francisco and he
was unaware of its contents, the fact remains that his firm did give Mrs. Hilado a formal
professional advice from which, as heretofore demonstrated, emerged the relation of
attorney and client. This letter binds and stops him in the same manner and to the
same degree as if he personally had written it. An information obtained from a client by
a member or assistant of a law firm is information imparted to the firm. (6 C. J., 628; 7
C. J. S., 986.) This is not a mere fiction or an arbitrary rule; for such member or
assistant, as in our case, not only acts in the name and interest of the firm, but his
information, by the nature of his connection with the firm is available to his associates
or employers. The rule is all the more to be adhered to where, as in the present
instance, the opinion was actually signed by the head of the firm and carries his initials
intended to convey the impression that it was dictated by him personally. No progress
could be hoped for in "the public policy that the client in consulting his legal adviser
ought to be free from apprehension of disclosure of his confidence," if the prohibition
were not extended to the attorney’s partners, employers or assistants.
The fact that petitioner did not object until after four months had passed from the date
Attorney Francisco first appeared for the defendants does not operate as a waiver of
her right to ask for his disqualification. In one case, objection to the appearance of an
attorney was allowed even on appeal as a ground for reversal of the judgment. In that
case, in which throughout the conduct of the cause in the court below the attorney had
been suffered so to act without objection, the court said: "We are all of the one mind,
that the right of the appellee to make his objection has not lapsed by reason of failure
to make it sooner; that professional confidence once reposed can never be divested by
expiration of professional employment." (Nickels v. Griffin, 1 Wash. Terr., 374, 321 A.
L. R., 1316.)
The complaint that petitioner’s remedy is by appeal and not by certiorari deserves scant
attention. The courts have summary jurisdiction to protect the rights of the parties and
the public from any conduct of attorneys prejudicial to the administration of justice. The
summary jurisdiction of the courts over attorneys is not confined to requiring them to
pay over money collected by them but embraces authority to compel them to do
whatever specific acts may be incumbent upon them in their capacity of attorneys to
perform. The courts, from the general principles of equity and policy, will always look
into the dealings between attorneys and clients and guard the latter from any undue
consequences resulting from a situation in which they may stand unequal. The courts
act on the same principle whether the undertaking is to appear, or, for that matter, not
to appear, to answer declaration, etc. (6 C.J., 718; 7 C.J.S., 1005.) This summary
remedy against attorneys flows from the fact that they are officers of the court where
they practice, forming a part of the machinery of the law for the administration of
justice and as such subject to the disciplinary authority of the court and to its orders
and directions with respect to their relations to the court as well as to their clients.
(Charest v. Bishop, 137 Minn., 102; 162, N.W., 1062, Note 26, 7 C. J. S., 1007.)
Attorneys stand on the same footing as sheriffs and other court officers in respect of
matters just mentioned.
We conclude therefore that the motion for disqualification should be allowed. It is so

ordered, without costs.
Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Feria, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes and Torres, JJ.,
concur.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-961. September 21, 1949.]
BLANDINA GAMBOA HILADO, Petitioner, v. JOSE GUTIERREZ DAVID, VICENTE J.

FRANCISCO, JACOB ASSAD and SELIM JACOB ASSAD, Respondents.
Delgado, Dizon & Flores for Petitioner.
Vicente J. Francisco for Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. ATTORNEY AND CLIENT; RELATION OF ATTORNEY AND CLIENT, WHEN EXISTS.

— "To constitute professional employment it is not essential that the client should have
employed the attorney professionally on any previous occasion . . . It is not necessary that any
retainer should have been paid, promised, or charged for; neither is it material that the attorney
consulted did not afterward undertake the case about which the consultation was had. If a person,
in respect to his business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults with his attorney in his
professional capacity with the view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the
attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces in such consultation, then the professional
employment must be regarded as established . . ." cralaw virtua1aw library
2. ID.; ATTORNEY IS INHIBITED TO ACT ON BEHALF OF BOTH PARTIES. — There is

no law or provision in the Rules of Court prohibiting attorneys in express terms from acting on
behalf of both parties to a controversy whose interests are opposed to each other, but such
prohibition is necessarily implied in the injunctions as provided in section 26 (e), Rule 123 and
section 19 (e) of Rule 127 of the Rules of Court.
3. ID.; INFORMATION PROFESSIONALLY OBTAINED BY ATTORNEY FROM CLIENT

IS SACRED. — Information so received is sacred to the employment to which it pertains, and to
permit it to be used in the interest of another, or, worse still, in the interest of the adverse party, is
to strike at the element of confidence which lies at the basis of, and affords the essential security
in, the relation of attorney and client.
4. ID.; ID. — The mere relation of attorney and client ought to preclude the attorney from
accepting the opposite party’s retainer in the same litigation regardless of what information was
received by him from his first client.
5. ID.; RELATION OF ATTORNEY AND CLIENT IS FOUNDED ON PRINCIPLES OF

PUBLIC POLICY. — The relation of attorney and client is founded on principles of public
policy, on good taste. The question is not necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as to
whether the attorney has adhered to proper professional standard. With these thoughts in mind, it
behooves attorneys, like Ceasar’s wife, not only to keep inviolate the client’s confidence, but
also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing. Only thus can litigants be
encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount importance in the
administration of justice.
6. ID.; RETAINING FEE, WHAT IS. — "A retaining fee is a preliminary fee given to an
attorney or counsel to insure and secure his future services, and induce him to act for the client. It
is intended to remunerate counsel for being deprived, by being retained by one party, of the
opportunity of rendering services to the other and of receiving pay from him, and the payment of
such fee, in the absence of an express understanding to the contrary, is neither made nor received
in payment of the services contemplated; its payment has no relation to the obligation of the
client to pay his attorney for the services which he has retained him to perform." cralaw virtua1aw library
7. ID.; INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM CLIENT BY A MEMBER OF THE FIRM. — An

information obtained from a client by a member or assistant of a law firm is information
imparted to the firm.
8. ID.; PROFESSIONAL CONFIDENCE, EXPIRATION OF. — Professional confidence once

reposed can never be divested by expiration of professional employment.
9. ID.; COURTS; JURISDICTION, EXTENT OF SUMMARY. — The courts have summary

jurisdiction to protect the rights of the parties and the public from any conduct of attorneys
prejudicial to the administration of justice. The summary jurisdiction of the courts over attorneys
is not confined to requiring them to pay over money collected by them but embraces authority to
compel them to do whatever specific acts may be incumbent upon them in their capacity of
attorneys to perform. The courts, from the general principles of equity and policy, will always
look into the dealings between attorneys and clients and guard the latter from any undue
consequences resulting from a situation in which they may stand unequal. The courts act on the
same principle whether the undertaking is to appear, or, for that matter, not to appear, to answer
declaration.
10. ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW; AS OFFICERS OF THE COURTS. — Attorneys are officers of

the court where they practice, forming a part of the machinery of the law for the administration
of justice and as such subject to the disciplinary authority of the court and to its orders and
directions with respect to their relations to the court as well as to their clients.
DECISION
TUASON, J.:
It appears that on April 23, 1945, Blandina Gamboa Hilado brought an action against
Selim Jacob Assad to annul the sale of several houses and lot executed during the
Japanese occupation by Mrs. Hilado’s now deceased husband.
On May 14, Attorneys Ohnick, Velilla and Balonkita filed an answer on behalf of the
defendant; and on June 15, Attorneys Delgado, Dizon, Flores and Rodrigo registered
their appearance as counsel for the plaintiff.
On October 5, these attorneys filed an amended complaint by including Jacob Assad as

party defendant.
On January 28, 1946, Attorney Francisco entered his appearance as attorney of record
for the defendant in substitution for Attorneys Ohnick, Velilla and Balonkita who had
withdrawn from the case.
On May 29, Attorney Dizon, in the name of his firm, wrote Attorney Francisco urging
him to discontinue representing the defendants on the ground that their client had
consulted with him about her case, on which occasion, it was alleged, "she turned over
the papers" to Attorney Francisco, and the latter sent her a written opinion. Not
receiving any answer to this suggestion, Attorneys Delgado, Dizon, Flores and Rodrigo
on June 3, 1946, filed a formal motion with the court, wherein the case was and is
pending, to disqualify Attorney Francisco.
Attorney Francisco’s letter to plaintiff, mentioned above and identified as Exhibit A, is in

full as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"VICENTE J. FRANCISCO
"Attorney-at-Law
1462 Estrada, Manila
"July 13, 1945
"Mrs. Blandina Gamboa Hilado
"Manila, Philippines
"My dear Mrs. Hilado: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"From the papers you submitted to me in connection with civil case No. 70075 of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled ’Blandina Gamboa Hilado v. S. J. Assad,’ I find
that the basic facts which brought about the controversy between you and the
defendant therein are as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(a) That you were the equitable owner of the property described in the complaint, as
the same was purchased and/or built with funds exclusively belonging to you, that is to
say, the houses and lot pertained to your paraphernal estate;
"(b) That on May 3, 1943, the legal title to the property was with your husband, Mr.
Serafin P. Hilado; and
"(c) That the property was sold by Mr. Hilado without your knowledge on the aforesaid
date of May 3, 1943.
"Upon the foregoing facts, I am of the opinion that your action against Mr. Assad will
not ordinarily prosper. Mr. Assad had the right to presume that your husband had the
legal right to dispose of the property as the transfer certificate of title was in his name.
Moreover, the price of P110,000 in Japanese military notes, as of May 3, 1943, does
not quite strike me as so grossly inadequate as to warrant the annulment of the sale. I
believe, lastly, that the transaction cannot be avoided merely because it was made
during the Japanese occupation, nor on the simple allegation that the real purchaser
was not a citizen of the Philippines. On this last point, furthermore, I expect that you
will have great difficulty in proving that the real purchaser was other than Mr. Assad,
considering that death has already sealed your husband’s lips and he cannot now testify
as to the circumstances of the sale.
"For the foregoing reasons, I regret to advice you that I cannot appear in the
proceedings in your behalf. The records of the case you loaned to me are herewith
returned.
"Yours very truly,
(Sgd.) "VICENTE J. FRANCISCO." cralaw virtua1aw library
"VJF/Rag.
In his answer to plaintiff’s attorneys’ complaint, Attorney Francisco alleged that about
May, 1945, a real estate broker came to his office in connection with the legal
separation of a woman who had been deserted by her husband, and also told him
(Francisco) that there was a pending suit brought by Mrs. Hilado against a certain
Syrian to annul the sale of a real estate which the deceased Serafin Hilado had made to
the Syrian during the Japanese occupation; that this woman asked him if he was willing
to accept the case if the Syrian should give it to him; that he told the woman that the
sales of real property during the Japanese regime were valid even though it was paid
for in Japanese military notes; that this being his opinion, he told his visitor he would
have no objection to defending the Syrian;
That one month afterwards, Mrs. Hilado came to see him about a suit she had instituted
against a certain Syrian to annul the conveyance of a real estate which her husband
had made; that according to her the case was in the hands of Attorneys Delgado and
Dizon, but she wanted to take it away from them; that as he had known the plaintiff’s
deceased husband he did not hesitate to tell her frankly that hers was a lost case for
the same reason he had told the broker; that Mrs. Hilado retorted that the basis of her
action was not that the money paid her husband was Japanese military notes, but that
the premises were her private and exclusive property; that she requested him to read
the complaint to be convinced that this was the theory of her suit; that he then asked
Mrs. Hilado if there was a Torrens title to the property and she answered yes, in the
name of her husband; that he told Mrs. Hilado that if the property was registered in her
husband’s favor, her case would not prosper either;
That some days afterward, upon arrival at his law office on Estrada street, he was
informed by Attorney Federico Agrava, his assistant, that Mrs. Hilado had dropped in
looking for him and that when he, Agrava, learned that Mrs. Hilado’s visit concerned
legal matters he attended to her and requested her to leave the "expediente" which she
was carrying, and she did; that he told Attorney Agrava that the firm should not handle
Mrs. Hilado’s case and he should return the papers, calling Agrava’s attention to what
he (Francisco) already had said to Mrs. Hilado;
That several days later, the stenographer in his law office, Teofilo Ragodon, showed him
a letter which has been dictated in English by Mr. Agrava, returning the "expediente" to
Mrs. Hilado; that Ragodon told him (Attorney Francisco) upon Attorney Agrava’s
request that Agrava thought it more proper to explain to Mrs. Hilado the reasons why
her case was rejected; that he forthwith signed the letter without reading it and without
keeping it for a minute in his possession; that he never saw Mrs. Hilado since their last
meeting until she talked to him at the Manila Hotel about a proposed extrajudicial
settlement of the case;
That in January, 1946, Assad was in his office to request him to handle his case stating
that his American lawyer had gone to the States and left the case in the hands of other
attorneys; that he accepted the retainer and on January 28, 1946, entered his
appearance.
Attorney Francisco filed an affidavit of stenographer Ragodon in corroboration of his

answer.
The judge trying the case, Honorable Jose Gutierrez David, later promoted to the Court
of Appeals, dismissed the complaint. His Honor believed that no information other than
that already alleged in plaintiff’s complaint in the main cause was conveyed to Attorney
Francisco, and concluded that the intercourse between the plaintiff and the respondent
did not attain the point of creating the relation of attorney and client.
Stripped of disputed details and collateral matters, this much is undoubted: That
Attorney Francisco’s law firm mailed to the plaintiff a written opinion over his signature
on the merits of her case; that this opinion was reached on the basis of papers she had
submitted at his office; that Mrs. Hilado’s purpose in submitting those papers was to
secure Attorney Francisco’s professional services. Granting the facts to be no more than
these, we agree with petitioner’s counsel that the relation of attorney and client
between Attorney Francisco and Mrs. Hilado ensued. The following rules accord with the
ethics of the legal profession and meet with our approval:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In order to constitute the relation (of attorney and client) a professional one and not
merely one of principal and agent, the attorneys must be employed either to give
advice upon a legal point, to prosecute or defend an action in court of Justice, or to
prepare and draft, in legal form such papers as deeds, bills, contracts and the like."
(Atkinson v. Howlett, 11 Ky. Law Rep. (abstract), 364, cited in Vol. 88, A. L. R., p. 6.)
"To constitute professional employment it is not essential that the client should have
that any retainer should have been paid, promised, or charged for; neither is it material
established . . ." (5 Jones Commentaries on Evidence, pp. 4118-4119.)
"An attorney is employed — that is, he is engaged in his professional capacity as a

lawyer or counselor — when he is listening to his client’s preliminary statement of his
case, or when he is giving advice thereon, just as truly as when he is drawing his
client’s pleadings, or advocating his client’s cause in open court." (Denver Tramway Co.
v. Owens, 20 Colo., 107; 36 P., 848.)
"Formality is not an essential element of the employment of an attorney. The contract

may be express or implied and it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of the
attorney is sought and received, in matters pertinent to his profession. An acceptance
of the relation is implied on the part of the attorney from his acting in behalf of his
client in pursuance of a request by the latter." (7 C. J. S., 848- 849; see Hirach Bros. &
Co. v. R. E. Kennington Co., 88 A. L. R., 1.)
Section 26 (e), Rule 123 of the Rules of Court provides that "an attorney cannot,
without the consent of his client, be examined as to any communication made by the
client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of professional employment;"
and section 19 (e) of Rule 127 imposes upon an attorney the duty "to maintain inviolate
the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his client."
There is no law or provision in the Rules of Court prohibiting attorneys in express terms
from acting on behalf of both parties to a controversy whose interests are opposed to
each other, but such prohibition is necessarily implied in the injunctions above quoted.
(In re De la Rosa, 27 Phil., 258.) In fact the prohibition derives validity from sources
higher than written laws and rules. As has been aptly said in In re Merron, 22 N. M.,
252, L.R.A., 1917B, 378, "information so received is sacred to the employment to which
it pertains," and "to permit it to be used in the interest of another, or, worse still, in the
interest of the adverse party, is to strike at the element of confidence which lies at the
basis of, and affords the essential security in, the relation of attorney and client." cralaw virtua1aw library
That only copies of pleadings already filed in court were furnished to Attorney Agrava
and that, this being so, no secret communication was transmitted to him by the
plaintiff, would not vary the situation even if we should discard Mrs. Hilado’s statement
that other papers, personal and private in character, were turned in by her. Precedents
are at hand to support the doctrine that the mere relation of attorney and client ought
to preclude the attorney from accepting the opposite party’s retainer in the same
litigation regardless of what information was received by him from his first client.
"The principle which forbids an attorney who has been engaged to represent a client
from thereafter appearing on behalf of the client’s opponent applies equally even
though during the continuance of the employment nothing of a confidential nature was
revealed to the attorney by the client." (Christian v. Waialua Agricultural Co., 30
Hawaii, 533, Footnote 7, C.J. S., 828.)
"Where it appeared that an attorney, representing one party, in litigation, had formerly
represented the adverse party with respect to the same matter involved in the
litigation, the court need not inquire as to how much knowledge the attorney acquired
from his former client during that relationship, before refusing to permit the attorney to
represent the adverse party." (Brown v. Miller, 52 App. D. C. 330; 286, F. 994.) .
"In order that a court may prevent an attorney from appearing against a former client,
it is unnecessary that the court ascertain in detail the extent to which the former
client’s affairs might have a bearing on the matters involved in the subsequent litigation
on the attorney’s knowledge thereof." (Body v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 274 P., 7;
51 Nev., 264.)
"This rule has been so strictly enforced that it has been held that an attorney, on
terminating his employment, cannot thereafter act as counsel against his client in the
same general matter, even though, while acting for his former client, he acquired no
knowledge which could operate to his client’s disadvantage in the subsequent adverse
employment. Pierce v. Palmer [1910], 31 R. I., 432; 77 Atl., 201, Ann. Cas., 1912S,
181.)
Communications between attorney and client are, in a great number of litigations, a

complicated affair, consisting of entangled relevant and irrelevant, secret and well
known facts. In the complexity of what is said in the course of the dealings between an
attorney and a client, inquiry of the nature suggested would lead to the revelation, in
advance of the trial, of other matters that might only further prejudice the
complainant’s cause. And the theory would be productive of other unsalutary results. To
make the passing of confidential communication a condition precedent; i. e., to make
the employment conditioned on the scope and character of the knowledge acquired by
an attorney in determining his right to change sides, would not enhance the freedom of
litigants, which is to be sedulously fostered, to consult with lawyers upon what they
believe are their rights in litigation. The condition would of necessity call for an
investigation of what information the attorney has received and in what way it is or it is
not in conflict with his new position. Litigants would in consequence be wary in going to
an attorney, lest by an unfortunate turn of the proceeding, if an investigation be held,
the court should accept the attorney’s inaccurate version of the facts that came to him.
"Now the abstinence from seeking legal advice in a good cause is by hypothesis an evil
which is fatal to the administration of justice." (John H. Wigmore’s Evidence, 1923,
Sections 2285, 2290, 2291.)
Hence the necessity of setting down the existence of the bare relationship of attorney
and client as the yardstick for testing incompatibility of interests. This stern rule is
designed not alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but
as well to protect the honest lawyer from unfounded suspicion of unprofessional
practice. (Strong v. Int. Bldg., etc.; Ass’n, 183 Ill., 97; 47 L.R.A., 792.) It is founded on
principles of public policy, on good taste. As has been said in another case, the question
is not necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as to whether the attorney has
adhered to proper professional standard. With these thoughts in mind, it behooves
attorneys, like Caesar’s wife, not only to keep inviolate the client’s confidence, but also
to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing. Only thus can litigants be
encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount importance
in the administration of justice.
So without impugning respondent’s good faith, we nevertheless can not sanction his
taking up the cause of the adversary of the party who had sought and obtained legal
advice from his firm; this, not necessarily to prevent any injustice to the plaintiff but to
keep above reproach the honor and integrity of the courts and of the bar. Without
condemning the respondent’s conduct as dishonest, corrupt, or fraudulent, we do
believe that upon the admitted facts it is highly inexpedient. It had the tendency to
bring the profession, of which he is a distinguished member, "into public disrepute and
suspicion and undermine the integrity of justice."cralaw virtua1aw library
There is in legal practice what is called "retaining fee," the purpose of which stems from
the realization that the attorney is disabled from acting as counsel for the other side
after he has given professional advice to the opposite party, even if he should decline to
perform the contemplated services on behalf of the latter. It is to prevent undue
hardship on the attorney resulting from the rigid observance of the rule that a separate
and independent fee for consultation and advice was conceived and authorized. "A
retaining fee is a preliminary fee given to an attorney or counsel to insure and secure
his future services, and induce him to act for the client. It is intended to remunerate
counsel for being deprived, by being retained by one party, of the opportunity of
rendering services to the other and of receiving pay from him, and the payment of such
fee, in the absence of an express understanding to the contrary, is neither made nor
received in payment of the services contemplated; its payment has no relation to the
obligation of the client to pay his attorney for the services which he has retained him to
perform." (7 C.J.S., 1019.)
The defense that Attorney Agrava wrote the letter Exhibit A and that Attorney Francisco
did not take the trouble of reading it, would not take the case out of the interdiction. If
this letter was written under the circumstances explained by Attorney Francisco and he
was unaware of its contents, the fact remains that his firm did give Mrs. Hilado a formal
professional advice from which, as heretofore demonstrated, emerged the relation of
attorney and client. This letter binds and stops him in the same manner and to the
same degree as if he personally had written it. An information obtained from a client by
a member or assistant of a law firm is information imparted to the firm. (6 C. J., 628; 7
C. J. S., 986.) This is not a mere fiction or an arbitrary rule; for such member or
assistant, as in our case, not only acts in the name and interest of the firm, but his
information, by the nature of his connection with the firm is available to his associates
or employers. The rule is all the more to be adhered to where, as in the present
instance, the opinion was actually signed by the head of the firm and carries his initials
intended to convey the impression that it was dictated by him personally. No progress
could be hoped for in "the public policy that the client in consulting his legal adviser
ought to be free from apprehension of disclosure of his confidence," if the prohibition
were not extended to the attorney’s partners, employers or assistants.
The fact that petitioner did not object until after four months had passed from the date
Attorney Francisco first appeared for the defendants does not operate as a waiver of
her right to ask for his disqualification. In one case, objection to the appearance of an
attorney was allowed even on appeal as a ground for reversal of the judgment. In that
case, in which throughout the conduct of the cause in the court below the attorney had
been suffered so to act without objection, the court said: "We are all of the one mind,
that the right of the appellee to make his objection has not lapsed by reason of failure
to make it sooner; that professional confidence once reposed can never be divested by
expiration of professional employment." (Nickels v. Griffin, 1 Wash. Terr., 374, 321 A.
L. R., 1316.)
The complaint that petitioner’s remedy is by appeal and not by certiorari deserves scant
attention. The courts have summary jurisdiction to protect the rights of the parties and
the public from any conduct of attorneys prejudicial to the administration of justice. The
summary jurisdiction of the courts over attorneys is not confined to requiring them to
pay over money collected by them but embraces authority to compel them to do
whatever specific acts may be incumbent upon them in their capacity of attorneys to
perform. The courts, from the general principles of equity and policy, will always look
into the dealings between attorneys and clients and guard the latter from any undue
consequences resulting from a situation in which they may stand unequal. The courts
act on the same principle whether the undertaking is to appear, or, for that matter, not
to appear, to answer declaration, etc. (6 C.J., 718; 7 C.J.S., 1005.) This summary
remedy against attorneys flows from the fact that they are officers of the court where
they practice, forming a part of the machinery of the law for the administration of
justice and as such subject to the disciplinary authority of the court and to its orders
and directions with respect to their relations to the court as well as to their clients.
(Charest v. Bishop, 137 Minn., 102; 162, N.W., 1062, Note 26, 7 C. J. S., 1007.)
Attorneys stand on the same footing as sheriffs and other court officers in respect of
matters just mentioned.
We conclude therefore that the motion for disqualification should be allowed. It is so

ordered, without costs.
Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 5098 April 11, 2012
JOSEFINA M. ANIÑON, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. CLEMENCIO SABITSANA, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve this disbarment complaint against Atty. Clemencio Sabitsana, Jr. who is charged of: (1)
violating the lawyer’s duty to preserve confidential information received from his client; and (2)
1
violating the prohibition on representing conflicting interests.

2
In her complaint, Josefina M. Aniñon (complainant) related that she previously engaged the legal
services of Atty. Sabitsana in the preparation and execution in her favor of a Deed of Sale over a
parcel of land owned by her late common-law husband, Brigido Caneja, Jr. Atty. Sabitsana allegedly
violated her confidence when he subsequently filed a civil case against her for the annulment of the
Deed of Sale in behalf of Zenaida L. Cañete, the legal wife of Brigido Caneja, Jr. The complainant
accused Atty. Sabitsana of using the confidential information he obtained from her in filing the civil
case.
Atty. Sabitsana admitted having advised the complainant in the preparation and execution of the
Deed of Sale. However, he denied having received any confidential information. Atty. Sabitsana
asserted that the present disbarment complaint was instigated by one Atty. Gabino Velasquez, Jr.,
the notary of the disbarment complaint who lost a court case against him (Atty. Sabitsana) and had
instigated the complaint for this reason.
The Findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner
In our Resolution dated November 22, 1999, we referred the disbarment complaint to the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report
and recommendation. In his Report and Recommendation dated November 28, 2003, IBP
Commissioner Pedro A. Magpayo Jr. found Atty. Sabitsana administratively liable for representing
conflicting interests. The IBP Commissioner opined:
In Bautista vs. Barrios, it was held that a lawyer may not handle a case to nullify a contract which he
prepared and thereby take up inconsistent positions. Granting that Zenaida L. Cañete, respondent’s
present client in Civil Case No. B-1060 did not initially learn about the sale executed by Bontes in
favor of complainant thru the confidences and information divulged by complainant to respondent in
the course of the preparation of the said deed of sale, respondent nonetheless has a duty to decline
his current employment as counsel of Zenaida Cañete in view of the rule prohibiting representation
of conflicting interests.
In re De la Rosa clearly suggests that a lawyer may not represent conflicting interests in the absence
of the written consent of all parties concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. In the present
case, no such written consent was secured by respondent before accepting employment as Mrs.
Cañete’s counsel-of-record. x x x
xxx
Complainant and respondent’s present client, being contending claimants to the same property, the
conflict of interest is obviously present. There is said to be inconsistency of interest when on behalf
of one client, it is the attorney’s duty to contend for that which his duty to another client requires him
to oppose. In brief, if he argues for one client this argument will be opposed by him when he argues
for the other client. Such is the case with which we are now confronted, respondent being asked by
one client to nullify what he had formerly notarized as a true and valid sale between Bontes and the
complainant. (footnotes omitted) 3
The IBP Commissioner recommended that Atty. Sabitsana be suspended from the practice of law for
a period of one (1) year.4
The Findings of the IBP Board of Governors
In a resolution dated February 27, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve
the Report and Recommendation of the IBP Commissioner after finding it to be fully supported by
the evidence on record, the applicable laws and rules. The IBP Board of Governors agreed with the
5
IBP Commissioner’s recommended penalty.
Atty. Sabitsana moved to reconsider the above resolution, but the IBP Board of Governors denied
his motion in a resolution dated July 30, 2004.
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether Atty. Sabitsana is guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting
interests.
The Court’s Ruling
After a careful study of the records, we agree with the findings and recommendations of the IBP
Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors.
The relationship between a lawyer and his/her client should ideally be imbued with the highest level
of trust and confidence. This is the standard of confidentiality that must prevail to promote a full
disclosure of the client’s most confidential information to his/her lawyer for an unhampered exchange
of information between them. Needless to state, a client can only entrust confidential information to
his/her lawyer based on an expectation from the lawyer of utmost secrecy and discretion; the lawyer,
for his part, is duty-bound to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all dealings and transactions
with the client. Part of the lawyer’s duty in this regard is to avoid representing conflicting interests, a
6
matter covered by Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility quoted below:
Rule 15.03. -A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
"The proscription against representation of conflicting interests applies to a situation where the
opposing parties are present clients in the same action or in an unrelated action." The prohibition
7
also applies even if the "lawyer would not be called upon to contend for one client that which the
lawyer has to oppose for the other client, or that there would be no occasion to use the confidential
information acquired from one to the disadvantage of the other as the two actions are wholly
unrelated." To be held accountable under this rule, it is "enough that the opposing parties in one
8
case, one of whom would lose the suit, are present clients and the nature or conditions of the
lawyer’s respective retainers with each of them would affect the performance of the duty of undivided
fidelity to both clients."
9
Jurisprudence has provided three tests in determining whether a violation of the above rule is
present in a given case.
One test is whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim in behalf of one client and, at
the same time, to oppose that claim for the other
client.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/ac_6708.htm - _ftn Thus, if a lawyer’s
argument for one client has to be opposed by that same lawyer in arguing for the other client, there
is a violation of the rule.
Another test of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent
the full discharge of the lawyer’s duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion
of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that
duty.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/ac_6708.htm - _ftn Still another test is
whether the lawyer would be called upon in the new relation to use against a former client any
confidential information acquired through their connection or previous
employment. http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/ac_6708.htm - _ftn [emphasis
10
ours]
On the basis of the attendant facts of the case, we find substantial evidence to support Atty.
Sabitsana’s violation of the above rule, as established by the following circumstances on record:
One, his legal services were initially engaged by the complainant to protect her interest over
a certain property. The records show that upon the legal advice of Atty. Sabitsana, the Deed
of Sale over the property was prepared and executed in the complainant’s favor.
Two, Atty. Sabitsana met with Zenaida Cañete to discuss the latter’s legal interest over the
property subject of the Deed of Sale. At that point, Atty. Sabitsana already had knowledge
that Zenaida Cañete’s interest clashed with the complainant’s interests.
Three, despite the knowledge of the clashing interests between his two clients, Atty.
Sabitsana accepted the engagement from Zenaida Cañete.
Four, Atty. Sabitsana’s actual knowledge of the conflicting interests between his two clients
was demonstrated by his own actions: first, he filed a case against the complainant in behalf
of Zenaida Cañete; second, he impleaded the complainant as the defendant in the case; and
third, the case he filed was for the annulment of the Deed of Sale that he had previously
prepared and executed for the complainant.
By his acts, not only did Atty. Sabitsana agree to represent one client against another client in the
same action; he also accepted a new engagement that entailed him to contend and oppose the
interest of his other client in a property in which his legal services had been previously retained.
To be sure, Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides an exception
to the above prohibition. However, we find no reason to apply the exception due to Atty. Sabitsana’s
failure to comply with the requirements set forth under the rule. Atty. Sabitsana did not make a full
disclosure of facts to the complainant and to Zenaida Cañete before he accepted the new
engagement with Zenaida Cañete. The records likewise show that although Atty. Sabitsana wrote a
letter to the complainant informing her of Zenaida Cañete’s adverse claim to the property covered by
the Deed of Sale and, urging her to settle the adverse claim; Atty. Sabitsana however did not
disclose to the complainant that he was also being engaged as counsel by Zenaida
Cañete. Moreover, the records show that Atty. Sabitsana failed to obtain the written consent of his
11
two clients, as required by Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, we find — as the IBP Board of Governors did — Atty. Sabitsana guilty of misconduct for
representing conflicting interests. We likewise agree with the penalty of suspension for one (1) year
from the practice of law recommended by the IBP Board of Governors. This penalty is consistent
with existing jurisprudence on the administrative offense of representing conflicting interests. 12
We note that Atty. Sabitsana takes exception to the IBP recommendation on the ground that the
charge in the complaint was only for his alleged disclosure of confidential information, not for
representation of conflicting interests. To Atty. Sabitsana, finding him liable for the latter offense is a
violation of his due process rights since he only answered the designated charge.
We find no violation of Atty. Sabitsana’s due process rights. Although there was indeed a specific
charge in the complaint, we are not unmindful that the complaint itself contained allegations of acts
sufficient to constitute a violation of the rule on the prohibition against representing conflicting
interests. As stated in paragraph 8 of the complaint:
Atty. Sabitsana, Jr. accepted the commission as a Lawyer of ZENAIDA CANEJA, now Zenaida
Cañete, to recover lands from Complainant, including this land where lawyer Atty. Sabitsana, Jr. has
advised his client [complainant] to execute the second sale[.]
Interestingly, Atty. Sabitsana even admitted these allegations in his answer. He also averred in his
13
Answer that:
6b. Because the defendant-to-be in the complaint (Civil Case No. B-1060) that he would file on
behalf of Zenaida Caneja-Cañete was his former client (herein complainant), respondent asked [the]
permission of Mrs. Cañete (which she granted) that he would first write a letter (Annex "4") to the
complainant proposing to settle the case amicably between them but complainant ignored it. Neither
did she object to respondent’s handling the case in behalf of Mrs. Cañete on the ground she is now
invoking in her instant complaint. So respondent felt free to file the complaint against her. 14
1âwphi1
We have consistently held that the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be informed
of the charge against oneself and to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, the
opportunity to explain one’s side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. These opportunities were all afforded to Atty. Sabitsana, as shown by the above
15
circumstances.
All told, disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. In the exercise of its disciplinary
16
powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer
of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession. We likewise aim to
ensure the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who,
by their misconduct, have proven themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities of an attorney. This is all that we did in this case. Significantly, we did this to a
17
degree very much lesser than what the powers of this Court allows it to do in terms of the imposable
penalty. In this sense, we have already been lenient towards respondent lawyer.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to ADOPT the findings and
recommendations of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Atty.
Clemencio C. Sabitsana, Jr. is found GUILTY of misconduct for representing conflicting interests in
violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby
SUSPENDED for one (1) year from the practice of law.
Atty. Sabitsana is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of his receipt of this Decision so that we
can determine the reckoning point when his suspension shall take effect.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA*
Chief Justice
Associate Justice
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice Associate Justice
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
[A.C. NO. 7815 : July 23, 2009]
DOLORES C. BELLEZA, Complainant, v. ATTY. ALAN S. MACASA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
This treats of the complaint for disbarment filed by complainant Dolores C. Belleza
against respondent Atty. Alan S. Macasa for unprofessional and unethical conduct in
connection with the handling of a criminal case involving complainant's son.
On November 10, 2004, complainant went to see respondent on referral of their mutual
friend, Joe Chua. Complainant wanted to avail of respondent's legal services in
connection with the case of her son, Francis John Belleza, who was arrested by
policemen of Bacolod City earlier that day for alleged violation of Republic Act (RA)
9165.1 Respondent agreed to handle the case for P30,000.
The following day, complainant made a partial payment of P15,000 to respondent thru
their mutual friend Chua. On November 17, 2004, she gave him an additional P10,000.
She paid the P5,000 balance on November 18, 2004. Both payments were also made
thru Chua. On all three occasions, respondent did not issue any receipt.
On November 21, 2004, respondent received P18,000 from complainant for the purpose
of posting a bond to secure the provisional liberty of her (complainant's) son. Again,
respondent did not issue any receipt. When complainant went to the court the next day,
she found out that respondent did not remit the amount to the court.
Complainant demanded the return of the P18,000 from respondent on several occasions

but respondent ignored her. Moreover, respondent failed to act on the case of
complainant's son and complainant was forced to avail of the services of the Public
Attorney's Office for her son's defense.
Thereafter, complainant filed a verified complaint2 for disbarment against respondent in

the Negros Occidental chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Attached
to the verified complaint was the affidavit3 of Chua which read:
I, JOE CHUA, of legal age, Filipino and resident of Purok Sawmill, Brgy. Bata, Bacolod
City, after having been sworn to in accordance with law, hereby depose and state:
1. That I am the one who introduce[d] Mrs. Dolores C. Belleza [to] Atty. Alan Macasa
when she looked for a lawyer to help her son in the case that the latter is facing
sometime [i]n [the] first week of November 2004;
2. That by reason of my mutual closeness to both of them, I am the one who facilitated
the payment of Mrs. DOLORES C. BELLEZA to Atty. Alan Macasa;
3. That as far as I know, I received the following amount from Mrs. Dolores Belleza as
payment for Atty. Alan Macasa:
Date Amount
November 11, 2004 P15,000.00
A week after 10,000.00
November 18, 2004 5,000.00
4. That the above-mentioned amounts which I supposed as Attorney's Fees were

immediately forwarded by me to Atty. [Macasa];
5. That I am executing this affidavit in order to attest to the truth of all the foregoing
statements.
x x x x x x x x x4
In a letter dated May 23, 2005,5 the IBP Negros Occidental chapter transmitted the
complaint to the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD).6
In an order dated July 13, 2005,7 the CBD required respondent to submit his answer
within 15 days from receipt thereof. Respondent, in an urgent motion for extension of
time to file an answer dated August 10, 2005,8 simply brushed aside the complaint for
being "baseless, groundless and malicious" without, however, offering any explanation.
He also prayed that he be given until September 4, 2005 to submit his answer.
Respondent subsequently filed urgent motions9 for second and third extensions of time
praying to be given until November 4, 2005 to submit his answer. He never did.
When both parties failed to attend the mandatory conference on April 19, 2006, they
were ordered to submit their respective position papers.10
In its report and recommendation dated October 2, 2007,11 the CBD ruled that
respondent failed to rebut the charges against him. He never answered the complaint
despite several chances to do so.
The CBD found respondent guilty of violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides:
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful
conduct.
It also found him guilty of violation of Rules 16.01 and 16.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:
Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for
or from the client.
Rule 16.02 - A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his
own and those others kept by him.
The CBD ruled that respondent lacked good moral character and that he was unfit and
unworthy of the privileges conferred by law on him as a member of the bar. The CBD
recommended a suspension of six months with a stern warning that repetition of similar
acts would merit a more severe sanction. It also recommended that respondent be
ordered to return to complainant the P18,000 intended for the provisional liberty of the
complainant's son and the P30,000 attorney's fees.
The Board of Governors of the IBP adopted and approved the report and
recommendation of the CBD with the modification that respondent be ordered to return
to complainant only the amount of P30,000 which he received as attorney's fees.12
We affirm the CBD's finding of guilt as affirmed by the IBP Board of Governors but we
modify the IBP's recommendation as to the liability of respondent.
Respondent Disrespected
Legal Processes
Respondent was given more than enough opportunity to answer the charges against
him. Yet, he showed indifference to the orders of the CBD for him to answer and refute
the accusations of professional misconduct against him. In doing so, he failed to
observe Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 12.03 - A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings,
memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an
explanation for his failure to do so.
Respondent also ignored the CBD's directive for him to file his position paper. His
propensity to flout the orders of the CBD showed his lack of concern and disrespect for
the proceedings of the CBD. He disregarded the oath he took when he was accepted to
the legal profession "to obey the laws and the legal orders of the duly constituted legal
authorities." He displayed insolence not only to the CBD but also to this Court which is
the source of the CBD's authority.
Respondent's unjustified disregard of the lawful orders of the CBD was not only
irresponsible but also constituted utter disrespect for the judiciary and his fellow
lawyers.13 His conduct was unbecoming of a lawyer who is called upon to obey court
orders and processes and is expected to stand foremost in complying with court
directives as an officer of the court.14 Respondent should have known that the orders of
the CBD (as the investigating arm of the Court in administrative cases against lawyers)
were not mere requests but directives which should have been complied with promptly
and completely.15 ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
Respondent Grossly Neglected

The Cause of His Client
Respondent undertook to defend the criminal case against complainant's son. Such
undertaking imposed upon him the following duties:
CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL
BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
x x x x x x x x x
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
x x x x x x x x x
CANON 19 - A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE
BOUNDS OF THE LAW.
A lawyer who accepts the cause of a client commits to devote himself (particularly his
time, knowledge, skills and effort) to such cause. He must be ever mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed in him, constantly striving to be worthy thereof. Accordingly, he
owes full devotion to the interest of his client, warm zeal in the maintenance and
defense of his client's rights and the exertion of his utmost learning, skill and ability to
ensure that nothing shall be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law
legally applied.16
A lawyer who accepts professional employment from a client undertakes to serve his
client with competence and diligence.17 He must conscientiously perform his duty
arising from such relationship. He must bear in mind that by accepting a retainer, he
impliedly makes the following representations: that he possesses the requisite degree
of learning, skill and ability other lawyers similarly situated possess; that he will exert
his best judgment in the prosecution or defense of the litigation entrusted to him; that
he will exercise reasonable care and diligence in the use of his skill and in the
application of his knowledge to his client's cause; and that he will take all steps
necessary to adequately safeguard his client's interest.18 ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
A lawyer's negligence in the discharge of his obligations arising from the relationship of
counsel and client may cause delay in the administration of justice and prejudice the
rights of a litigant, particularly his client. Thus, from the perspective of the ethics of the
legal profession, a lawyer's lethargy in carrying out his duties to his client is both
unprofessional and unethical.19
If his client's case is already pending in court, a lawyer must actively represent his
client by promptly filing the necessary pleading or motion and assiduously attending the
scheduled hearings. This is specially significant for a lawyer who represents an accused
in a criminal case.
The accused is guaranteed the right to counsel under the Constitution.20 However, this
right can only be meaningful if the accused is accorded ample legal assistance by his
lawyer:
... The right to counsel proceeds from the fundamental principle of due process which
basically means that a person must be heard before being condemned. The due process
requirement is a part of a person's basic rights; it is not a mere formality that may be
dispensed with or performed perfunctorily.
The right to counsel must be more than just the presence of a lawyer in the courtroom
or the mere propounding of standard questions and objections. The right to counsel
means that the accused is amply accorded legal assistance extended by a counsel who
commits himself to the cause for the defense and acts accordingly. The right assumes
an active involvement by the lawyer in the proceedings, particularly at the trial of the
case, his bearing constantly in mind of the basic rights of the accused, his being well-
versed on the case, and his knowing the fundamental procedures, essential laws and
existing jurisprudence.21
' ∞ - ○ - ∞'
[T]he right of an accused to counsel is beyond question a fundamental right. Without

counsel, the right to a fair trial itself would be of little consequence, for it is through
counsel that the accused secures his other rights. In other words, the right to counsel is
the right to effective assistance of counsel.22
The right of an accused to counsel finds substance in the performance by the lawyer of
his sworn duty of fidelity to his client.23 Tersely put, it means an effective, efficient and
truly decisive legal assistance, not a simply perfunctory representation.24
In this case, after accepting the criminal case against complainant's son and receiving
his attorney's fees, respondent did nothing that could be considered as effective and
efficient legal assistance. For all intents and purposes, respondent abandoned the cause
of his client. Indeed, on account of respondent's continued inaction, complainant was
compelled to seek the services of the Public Attorney's Office. Respondent's
lackadaisical attitude towards the case of complainant's son was reprehensible. Not only
did it prejudice complainant's son, it also deprived him of his constitutional right to
counsel. Furthermore, in failing to use the amount entrusted to him for posting a bond
to secure the provisional liberty of his client, respondent unduly impeded the latter's
constitutional right to bail.
Respondent Failed to Return

His Client's Money
The fiduciary nature of the relationship between counsel and client imposes on a lawyer
the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or from the
client.25
When a lawyer collects or receives money from his client for a particular purpose (such
as for filing fees, registration fees, transportation and office expenses), he should
promptly account to the client how the money was spent. If he does not use the money
for its intended purpose, he must immediately return it to the client.26 His failure either
to render an accounting or to return the money (if the intended purpose of the money
does not materialize) constitutes a blatant disregard of Rule 16.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.27
Moreover, a lawyer has the duty to deliver his client's funds or properties as they fall
due or upon demand.28 His failure to return the client's money upon demand gives rise
to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of
and in violation of the trust reposed in him by the client.29 It is a gross violation of
general morality as well as of professional ethics; it impairs public confidence in the
legal profession and deserves punishment.30 Indeed, it may border on the criminal as it
may constitute a prima facie case of swindling or estafa.
Respondent never denied receiving P18,000 from complainant for the purpose of

posting a bond to secure the provisional liberty of her son. He never used the money
for its intended purpose yet also never returned it to the client. Worse, he unjustifiably
refused to turn over the amount to complainant despite the latter's repeated demands.
Moreover, respondent rendered no service that would have entitled him to the P30,000
attorney's fees. As a rule, the right of a lawyer to a reasonable compensation for his
services is subject to two requisites: (1) the existence of an attorney-client relationship
and (2) the rendition by the lawyer of services to the client.31 Thus, a lawyer who does
not render legal services is not entitled to attorney's fees. Otherwise, not only would he
be unjustly enriched at the expense of the client, he would also be rewarded for his
negligence and irresponsibility.
Respondent Failed to Uphold the Integrity and Dignity of the Legal Profession
For his failure to comply with the exacting ethical standards of the legal profession,
respondent failed to obey Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE
DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR. (emphasis supplied)
Indeed, a lawyer who fails to abide by the Canons and Rules of the Code of Professional
Responsibility disrespects the said Code and everything that it stands for. In so doing,
he disregards the ethics and disgraces the dignity of the legal profession.
Lawyers should always live up to the ethical standards of the legal profession as
embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. Public confidence in law and in
lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the
bar.32 Thus, every lawyer should act and comport himself in a manner that would
promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession.33
Respondent was undeserving of the trust reposed in him. Instead of using the money
for the bond of the complainant's son, he pocketed it. He failed to observe candor,
fairness and loyalty in his dealings with his client.34 He failed to live up to his fiduciary
duties. By keeping the money for himself despite his undertaking that he would
facilitate the release of complainant's son, respondent showed lack of moral principles.
His transgression showed him to be a swindler, a deceitful person and a shame to the
legal profession.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Alan S. Macasa is hereby found GUILTY not only of

dishonesty but also of professional misconduct for prejudicing Francis John Belleza's
right to counsel and to bail under Sections 13 and 14(2), Article III of the Constitution,
and for violating Canons 1, 7, 17, 18 and 19 and Rules 12.03, 16.01, 16.02, 16.03 and
18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is therefore DISBARRED from the
practice of law effective immediately.
Respondent is hereby ORDERED to return to complainant Dolores C. Belleza the

amounts of P30,000 and P18,000 with interest at 12% per annum from the date of
promulgation of this decision until full payment. Respondent is further DIRECTED to
submit to the Court proof of payment of the amount within ten days from payment.
Failure to do so will subject him to criminal prosecution.
Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be entered
into the records of respondent Atty. Alan S. Macasa and the Office of the Court
Administrator to be furnished to the courts of the land for their information and
guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Endnotes:
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 10187 [Formerly CBD Case No. 11-3053], July 22, 2015
CELINA F. ANDRADA, Complainant, v. ATTY. RODRIGO CERA, Respondent.

DECISION
BRION, J.:
This administrative case stemmed from an affidavit-complaint1 filed by Celina F. Andrada

(complainant) against Atty. Rodrigo Cera (respondent) for allegedly engaging in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral, and deceitful conduct in violation of the Lawyer's Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
Antecedents
Sometime in late 2009, the complainant hired the respondent to represent her in an annulment of
marriage case pending before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 59, Baguio City.
In order to file the annulment case, the complainant needed to submit National Statistics Office (NSO)
copies of her children's birth certificates — documents which could not be obtained from the NSO
because of her husband's failure to completely accomplish the certificates resulting in the non-
registration of the births of their two children, Juliane Lourdes and Jose Sebastian. The complainant
gave the respondent the amount of three thousand pesos (P3,000.00) to process the registration and
issuance of her children's birth certificates with the NSO. The complainant also gave the respondent,
through a friend, the amount often thousand pesos (P10,000.00) as advance payment for the hiring of
a psychologist and/or the conduct of psychologist tests for herself and her children.
In July 2010 when the complainant herself followed up with the NSO the release of her children's birth
certificates she was asked to present the corresponding receipt for her request. Knowing that the
respondent had the receipt, the complainant called him up but she failed to get even the receipt
number because the respondent allegedly did not have it in his possession at that time. However, the
respondent reassured the complainant that the necessary payment had been made for the processing
of the birth certificates.
The complainant repeatedly asked the respondent for the NSO receipt, but the latter would always
give an excuse not to turn the receipt over to her. This prompted the complainant to request
confirmation of payment from the NSO. She found out that the respondent never paid nor filed
applications for birth certificates.
On May 29, 2011, the complainant, through her father Freddie J. Farres, wrote a demand letter2 to the
respondent for the surrender of the NSO receipt and the return of the P10,000.00 that was supposedly
for the administration of the psychological tests, within two (2) days from receipt of the letter. The
respondent received the demand letter on May 30, 2011.
On June 7, 2011, after the respondent refused to heed the complainant's demands, the complainant
filed the present administrative complaint3 against him before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD). The complainant alleged that the respondent's deceitful,
irresponsible, and unprofessional conduct in handling her case — his failure to file the necessary
application with the NSO for the issuance of her children's birth certificates, and to provide for a
psychologist to administer psychological tests on herself and her children, as well as his tardiness or
absence during hearings — resulted in the unwarranted delay of her case and forced her to file anew
an annulment case against her husband.
The IBP-CBD called the case for mandatory conference where the complainant and her counsel
appeared. However, despite due notice, the respondent failed to appear at the conference; he also
failed to submit an answer to the affidavit-complaint.
In April 2012, the respondent returned to the complainant the amount of seventeen thousand two
hundred and eighty pesos (P17,280.00), pursuant to a compromise agreement4 that the parties
entered into in exchange for the dismissal of the criminal case for estafa filed by the complainant
against the respondent. As part of the settlement, the respondent agreed to secure the birth
certificates of the complainant's children, an obligation which the respondent has not yet fulfilled up to
the present.
IBP's Recommendation
In a report and recommendation5 dated November 21, 2012, IBP Investigating Commissioner Eldrid C.
Antiquiera found that the respondent had engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, and deceitful
conduct against his client's interest in violation of Canon 1 of the CPR. The Investigating Commissioner
also found the respondent guilty of misappropriating the funds entrusted to him by his client and of
failing to account for and to return his client's money upon demand, in violation of Canon 16 of the
CPR. Commissioner Antiquiera recommended the imposition of three (3) years suspension from the
practice of law.
In Resolution No. XX-2013-233 dated March 20, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved Commissioner Antiquiera's findings of administrative liability but modified the recommended
penalty of suspension from three (3) years to one (1) year.6 chanrobleslaw
Our Ruling
We sustain the IBP Board of Governors' findings of administrative liability, as well as its
recommended penalty of one (1) year suspension from the practice of law.
When a lawyer takes a case, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence in protecting his client's
rights. Failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and attention expected of a good father of a family
makes the lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed by his client, and makes him answerable not just to
his client but also to the legal profession, the courts, and society.7 chanrobleslaw
It is apparent that the respondent did not exert any effort on his client's case and completely reneged
on the obligations due his client. The respondent lied to the complainant that he had made the
necessary application and payment with the NSO for the issuance of the birth certificates of the
complainant's children. Despite the complainant's repeated requests, the respondent failed to comply
with their agreement to provide a psychologist to administer the necessary psychological tests, thus
causing further delay in the proceedings of the complainant's annulment case.
Clearly, these actions show the respondent's negligence and lack of zeal in handling the complainant's
case, for which he should be made administratively liable. He violated not only Rule 1.01 of Canon 1
of the CPR, which prohibits a lawyer from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct, but also Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the same Code, which provides that "a lawyer shall not
neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable."
Moreover, the respondent failed to live up to his duties as a lawyer when he unlawfully withheld the
complainant's money. The money given to the respondent was never used for its intended purposes,
as could be gleaned from the NSO's non-issuance of birth certificates8 of the complainant's children,
and by the non-administration of psychological tests on the complainant and her children. These
omissions confirm the presumption that the respondent misappropriated the funds of his client, in
violation of Canon 16 of the CPR that holds a lawyer in trust of all moneys and properties of his client
that may come into his possession. The respondent, likewise, violated Rule 16.039 of Canon 16 (which
provides that "a lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand")
when he failed to return the complainant's money upon demand. We note that it was only after a year
that the respondent, under threat of a criminal case filed against him, returned the complainant's
money. The respondent's restitution cannot serve to mitigate his administrative liability as he returned
the complainant's money not voluntarily but for fear of possible criminal liability.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Rodrigo Cera is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law

for ONE (1) YEAR. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with
more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be entered into the
respondent's personal record. Copies shall likewise be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts concerned.
SO ORDERED. cralawlawlibrary
Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
SECOND DIVISION
Adm.Case No. 5020 - December 18, 2001
ROSARIO JUNIO, Complainant, v. ATTY. SALVADOR M. GRUPO, Respondent.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a complaint for disbarment filed against Atty. Salvador M. Grupo for malpractice
and gross misconduct.
Complainant Rosario N. Junio alleged that
3. Sometime in 1995, [she] engaged the services of [respondent], then a private

practitioner, for the redemption of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 20394 registered in the name of her parents, spouses Rogelio and Rufina
Nietes, and located at Concepcion, Loay, Bohol.
4. On 21 August 1995, [complainant] entrusted to [respondent] the amount of

P25,000.00 in cash to be used in the redemption of the aforesaid property. Respondent
received the said amount as evidenced by an acknowledgment receipt, a copy of which
is being hereto attached as Annex "A".
5. Notwithstanding the foregoing and for no valid reason, respondent did not redeem
the property; as a result of which the right of redemption was lost and the property was
eventually forfeited.
6. Because of respondent's failure to redeem the property, complainant had demanded

[the] return of the money which she entrusted to the former for the above-stated
purpose.
7. Despite repeated demands made by the complainant and without justifiable cause,
respondent has continuously refused to refund the money entrusted to him.1
In his Answer, petitioner admitted receiving the amount in question for the purpose for
which it was given. However, he alleged that
6. The subject land for which the money of complainant was initially intended to be
applied could really not be redeemed anymore . .;
7. Complainant knew the mortgage agreement between her parents and the mortgage-
owner had already expired, and what respondent was trying to do was a sort of [a]
desperate, last-ditch attempt to persuade the said mortgagee to relent and give back
the land to the mortgagors with the tender of redemption; but at this point, the
mortgagee simply would not budge anymore. For one reason or another, he would no
longer accept the sum offered;
8. By the time that complainant was to return to Manila, it was already a foregone
matter that respondent's efforts did not succeed. And so, when transaction failed,
respondent requested the complainant that he be allowed, in the meantime, to avail of
the money because he had an urgent need for some money himself to help defray his
children's educational expenses. It was really a personal request, a private matter
between respondent and complainant, thus, respondent executed a promissory note for
the amount, a copy of which is probably still in the possession of the complainant.
9. . . . [T]he family of the complainant and that of the respondent were very close and
intimate with each other. Complainant, as well as two of her sisters, had served
respondent's family as household helpers for many years when they were still in Manila,
and during all those times they were treated with respect, affection, and equality. They
were considered practically part of respondent's own family.
That is why, when complainant requested . . . assistance regarding the problem of the
mortgaged property which complainant wanted to redeem, respondent had no second-
thoughts in extending a lending hand . . . .
Respondent did not ask for any fee. His services were purely gratuitous; his acts [were]
on his own and by his own. It was more than pro bono; it was not even for charity; it
was simply an act of a friend for a friend. It was just lamentably unfortunate that his
efforts failed.
xxx - xxx - xxx
Of course, respondent accepts his fault, because, indeed, there were occasions when
complainant's sisters came to respondent to ask for the payment in behalf of
complainant, and he could not produce the money because the circumstances
somehow, did not allow it. [I]t does not mean that respondent will not pay, or that he is
that morally depraved as to wilfully and deliberately re[nege] in his obligation towards
the complainant.2
Complainant filed a reply denying that respondent informed her of his failure to redeem
the property and that respondent requested her to instead lend the money to him.3
The case was thereafter referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report, and recommendation. However, while two hearings were set for
this purpose, both were postponed at the instance of respondent. For this reason, on
August 28, 2000, complainant asked the Investigating Commissioner4 to consider the
case submitted for decision on the basis of the pleadings theretofore filed. Respondent
was required to comment on complainant's motion, but he failed to do so.
Consequently, the case was considered submitted for resolution.
In his report, dated January 5, 2001, the Investigating Commissioner found respondent
liable for violation of Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which forbids
lawyers from borrowing money from their clients unless the latter's interests are
"protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice." The Investigating
Commissioner found that respondent failed to pay his client's money. However, in view
of respondent's admission of liability and "plea for magnanimity," the Investigating
Commissioner recommended that respondent be simply reprimanded and ordered to
pay the amount of P25,000.00 loan plus interest at the legal rate.
In its Resolution No. XIV-2001-183, dated April 29, 2001, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the Investigating Commissioner's findings. However, it ordered
[R]espondent . . . suspended indefinitely from the practice of law for the commission of
an act which falls short of the standard of the norm of conduct required of every
attorney and . . . ordered [him] to return to the complainant the amount of P25,000.00
plus interest at the legal rate from the time the said amount was misappropriated, until
full payment; provided that the total suspension shall be at least one (1) year from the
date of said full payment
On July 4, 2001, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that
(a) there was no actual hearing of the case wherein respondent could have fully
ventilated and defended his position;
(b) the subject Resolution gravely modified the Report and Recommendation of the
Trial Commissioner, Hon. Pedro Magpayo, Jr., . . . such that the resultant sanctions that
are ordered imposed are too leonine, unjust and cruel;
(c) that the factual circumstances attending the matter which gave rise to the complaint
were not rightly or fairly appreciated.5
He argues that the Court should adopt the report and recommendation of the IBP
Investigating Commissioner.
In its resolution of August 15, 2001, the Court resolved to treat respondent's motion for
reconsideration as a petition for review of IBP Resolution No. XIV 2001-183 and
required complainant to comment on the petition.
In her comment, complainant states that her primary interest is to recover the amount
of P25,000.00 with interest and that she is leaving it to the Court to decide whether
respondent deserves the penalty recommended by the IBP.6
The Court resolves to partially grant the petition. In his report and recommendation,
Investigating Commissioner Magpayo, Jr. made the following findings:
In his Answer, the respondent ADMITS all the allegations in paragraph 4 of the
complaint which avers:
4. On 21 August 1995, complainant entrusted to respondent the amount of P25,000.00
in cash to be used in the redemption of the aforesaid property (parcel of land covered
by TCT No. 20394 registered in the name of complainant's parents located at
Concepcion, Loay, Bohol). Respondent received the said amount as evidenced by an
acknowledgment receipt (Annex A).
By way of confession and avoidance, the respondent, . . . however, contended that

when the mortgagee refused to accept the sum tendered as the period of redemption
had already expired, he requested the complainant to allow him in the meantime to use
the money for his children's educational expenses[,] to which request the complainant
allegedly acceded and respondent even executed a promissory note (please see 4th
par. of Annex "B" of complaint).
Respondent takes further refuge in the intimate and close relationship existing between
himself and the complainant's family on the basis of which his legal services were
purely gratuitous or "simply an act of a friend for a friend" with "no consideration
involved." Unfortunately, his efforts to redeem the foreclosed property, as already
stated, did not produce the desired result because the mortgagee "would not budge
anymore" and "would not accept the sum offered."
Thus, the respondent concluded that there was, strictly speaking, no attorney-client
[relationship] existing between them. Rather, right from the start[,] everything was
sort of personal, he added.
Granting to the respondent the benefit of the doubt, we shall assume that there was in
reality a loan in the amount of P25,000.00. This is likewise confirmed by the execution
of a promissory note on 12 December 1996 by the respondent who "undertook to pay
Mrs. Junio on or before January 1997" (Annex B of complaint). Moreover, the demand
letter of 12 March 1998 (Annex B) mentions of "reimbursement of the sum received"
and interest of "24% per annum until fully paid" giving the impression that the funds
previously intended to be used for the repurchase of a certain property (Annex A of
complaint) was converted into a loan with the consent of the complainant who gave
way to the request of the respondent "to help defray his children's educational
expenses" (par. 8 of Answer).
Be that as it may, the duty and obligation to repay the loan remains unshaken. Having
utilized the sum to fulfill his "urgent need for some money," it is but just and proper
that he return the amount borrowed together with interest.
Five (5) years had already passed since respondent retained the cash for his own
personal use. But notwithstanding the same and his firm promise "to pay Mrs. Junio on
or before January 1997" he has not demonstrated any volition to settle his obligation to
his creditor[,] although admittedly "there w[ere] occasions when complainant's sister
came to respondent to ask for the payment in behalf of complainant," worse, "the
passage of time made respondent somehow forgot about the obligation."
A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client's interests are fully
protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice (Rule 16.04, Code of
Professional Responsibility). This rule is intended to prevent the lawyer from taking
advantage of his influence over the client.
This rule is especially significant in the instant case where the respondent enjoys an
immense ascendancy over the complainant who, "as well as two of his sisters, had
served respondent's family as household helpers for many years."
Having gained dominance over the complainant by virtue of such long relation of
master and servant, the respondent took advantage of his influence by not returning
the money entrusted to him. Instead, he imposed his will on the complainant and
borrowed her funds without giving adequate security therefor and mindless of the
interest of the complainant
In the light of the foregoing, . . . respondent has committed an act which falls short of
the standard of the norm of conduct required of every attorney. If an ordinary borrower
of money is required by the law to repay the loan failing which he may be subjected to
court action, it is more so in the case of a lawyer whose conduct serves as an example.7
It would indeed appear from the records of the case that respondent was allowed to
borrow the money previously entrusted to him by complainant for the purpose of
securing the redemption of the property belonging to complainant's parents.
Respondent, however, did not give adequate security for the loan and subsequently
failed to settle his obligation. Although complainant denied having loaned the money to
respondent, the fact is that complainant accepted the promissory note given her by
respondent on December 12,1996. In effect, complainant consented to and ratified
respondent's use of the money. It is noteworthy that complainant did not attach this
promissory note to her complaint nor explain the circumstances surrounding its
execution. She only mentioned it in her demand letter of March 12, 1998 (Annex B), in
which she referred to respondent's undertaking to pay her the P25,000.00 on or before
January 1997. Under the circumstances and in view of complainant's failure to deny the
promissory note, the Court is constrained to give credence to respondent's claims that
the money previously entrusted to him by complainant was later converted into a loan.
Respondent's liability is thus not for misappropriation or embezzlement but for violation
of Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which forbids lawyers from
borrowing money from their clients unless the latter's interests are protected by the
nature of the case or by independent advice. In this case, respondent's liability is
compounded by the fact that not only did he not give any security for the payment of
the amount loaned to him but that he has also refused to pay the said amount. His
claim that he could not pay the loan "because circumstances . . . did not allow it" and
that, because of the passage of time, "he somehow forgot about his obligation" only
underscores his blatant disregard of his obligation which reflects on his honesty and
candor. A lawyer is bound to observe candor, fairness, and loyalty in all his dealings
and transactions with his client.8
Respondent claims that complainant is a close personal friend and that in helping
redeem the property of complainant's parents, he did not act as a lawyer but as a
friend, hence there is no client-attorney relationship between them. This contention has
no merit. As explained in Hilado v. David,9
To constitute professional employment it is not essential that the client should have
that any retainer should have been paid. promised, or charged for; neither is it material
established . . .
Considering the foregoing, the Investigating Commissioner's recommendation to

impose on respondent the penalty of reprimand and restitution of the amount loaned by
him is clearly inadequate. On the other hand, the penalty of indefinite suspension with
restitution imposed by the IBP Board of Governors is too harsh in view of respondent's
apparent lack of intent to defraud complainant and of the fact that this appears to be
his first administrative transgression. It is the penalty imposed in Igual v. Javier10 which
applies to this case. In that case, this Court ordered the respondent suspended for one
month from the practice of law and directed him to pay the amount given him by his
clients within 30 days from notice for his failure to return the money in question
notwithstanding his admission that he did not use the money for the filing of the
appellee's brief, as agreed by them, because of an alleged quarrel with his clients.
Anent petitioner's allegation regarding the lack of hearing during the IBP investigation,
suffice it to say that he waived such right when he failed to comment on petitioner's
motion to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings theretofore filed
despite due notice to him, not to mention the fact that it was he who had requested the
postponement of the two hearings scheduled by the Investigating Commissioner.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds petitioner guilty of violation of Rule 16.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and orders him suspended from the practice of law for a
period of one (1) month and to pay to respondent, within 30 days from notice, the
amount of P25,000.00 with interest at the legal rate, computed from December 12,
1996.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Quisumbing and De Leon Jr., JJ ., concur.

Buena, J., on official business abroad.
FIRST DIVISION
[Adm. Case No. 3907. April 10, 1997.]
PERLA COMPANIA DE SEGUROS, INC., Complainant, v. ATTY. BENEDICTO G.

SAQUILABON, Respondent.
SYLLABUS
LEGAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY; AN
ATTORNEY IS BOUND TO PROTECT HIS CLIENT’S INTEREST TO THE BEST OF HIS
ABILITY AND WITH UTMOST DILIGENCE. — The Code of Professional Responsibility
mandates: "Canon 12 — Rule 12.03 — A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of
time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the
same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so. Canon 18 — Rule 18.03 — A
lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable." In Ford v. Daitol, 250 SCRA 7, a lawyer’s
failure to file brief for his client was held to amount to inexcusable negligence; thus:
"An attorney is bound to protect his client’s interest to the best of his ability and with
utmost diligence. (Del Rosario v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 159) A failure to file brief
for his client certainly constitutes inexcusable negligence on his part. (People v. Villar,
46 SCRA 107) The respondent has indeed committed a serious lapse in the duty owed
by him to his client as well as to the Court not to delay litigation and to aid in the
speedy administration of justice. (People v. Daban, 43 SCRA 185; People v. Estocada,
43 SCRA 515)"
RESOLUTION
VITUG, J.:
Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc., through its Senior Vice-President James O. Lim, has
charged Atty. Benedicto G. Saquilabon with having violated his oath of office and, in
particular, his commitment to "conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of
(his) knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the Courts as to (his)
clients." 1
In its resolution, dated 25 January 1993, the Court referred the matter to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines ("IBP") for investigation, report and recommendation.
cdti
In its letter, dated 24 September 1996, addressed to Chief Justice Andres R Narvasa,
the IBP 2 transmitted to the Court, along with the records of the case, its "Notice and
Copy of Decision," among other things, recommending an imposition of a six-month
suspension on Respondent.
Atty. Saquilabon was the legal counsel of complainant in Civil Case No. 8058 ("Spouses
Marcelino Buco and Cecilia Buco v. Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc."), hereinafter also
referred to as the "Buco" case, and in Civil Case No. 480-G ("Philip Natividad v. Antonio
Padron and Perla Compania de Seguros") or the "Natividad" case.
An adverse decision was rendered against complainant in Buco. Not satisfied with the
decision, complainant, through respondent, sought relief from the Court of Appeals. On
24 November 1988, the appeal was dismissed for failure to file the required appeal
brief. Complainant moved for reconsideration of the dismissal. The appellate court
reconsidered and gave complainant a non-extendible period of fifteen days within which
to finally submit the brief. Respondent lawyer again failed to comply constraining anew
the Court of Appeals to dismiss, on 14 April 1989, the appeal. Complainant’s
subsequent motions for reconsideration were denied. The complainant was ultimately
made to pay certain amounts to the spouses Buco. 3
Atty. Saquilabon was the legal counsel for herein complainant in the Natividad case.
Here, respondent filed with the trial court a motion for an extension to file an answer to
the complaint but he failed, nevertheless, to file the answer on time. The complainant
(the defendant therein) was declared in default, thus allowing the plaintiff to present his
evidence ex-parte. Respondent lawyer’s subsequent compliance was merely noted by
the trial court. After an adverse judgment was rendered against
complainant, Respondent. acting on his own, filed a notice of appeal with the Court of
Appeals. The appeal, however, was dismissed on 10 February 1981 for non-payment of
the required docket fee.
In the Buco case, respondent attributed his failure to file the appellant’s brief to an
oversight or negligence of the complainant’s manager, Dionisio Quinto, at its
Cabanatuan City branch. Quinto, a law graduate, allegedly undertook the printing of the
brief, which respondent had prepared and submitted to Quinto, and the filing thereof
with the Court of Appeals.
The failure to file an answer in the Natividad case was said to be due to the fault of
complainant’s branch manager, Bienvenido S. Pascual, of Santiago, Isabela. According
to respondent, not only did Pascual fail to give respondent a copy of the complaint but
Pascual also neglected to provide the docket fees required on appeal to the Court of
Appeals.
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline ("CBD") 4 exonerated respondent in the

Natividad case but concluded that there was gross negligence on his part in Buco,
warranting a six month suspension from the practice of the legal profession. The report
and recommendations of CBD were approved by the IBP.
We sustain the action of IBP.
In Natividad, it would indeed appear that Bienvenido Pascual was unable to furnish
respondent with a copy of the complaint. What Pascual did was merely to refer the case
and to give the summons, as well as a copy of the complaint, to Quinto. The latter
could not even recall the date when he delivered the complaint to respondent lawyer.
The dismissal of the appeal due to non-payment of the docket fees, upon the other
hand, had been reconsidered by the appellate court.
In Buco, however, respondent lawyer truly was negligent in handling the case. It had
behooved him to make certain that the appeal brief was filed on time. His excuse that
he relied instead on an employee, albeit a branch manager, of his client is
unacceptable. The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Canon 12 —
"Rule 12.03 — A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings,
memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an
explanation for his failure to do so.
"Canon 18 —
"Rule 18.03 — A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable"
In Ford v. Daitol, 5 a lawyer’s failure to file brief for his client was held to amount to
inexcusable negligence; thus: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"An attorney is bound to protect his client’s interest to the best of his ability and with
utmost diligence. (Del Rosario v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 159) A failure to file brief
for his client certainly constitutes inexcusable negligence on his part. (People v. Villar,
46 SCRA 107) The respondent has indeed committed a serious lapse in the duty owed
by him to his client as well as to the Court not to delay litigation and to aid in the
speedy administration of justice. (People v. Daban, 43 SCRA 185; People v. Estocada,
43 SCRA 515)" 6
His arrangements with Quinto did not relieve respondent from his responsibility to
ensure that his client’s cause is not unnecessarily put to possible jeopardy. The
dismissal of the appeal on 24 November 1988 for Quinto’s failure to submit the appeal
brief on time should have been enough warning for respondent not to entrust to anyone
else, definitely not to Quinto, the filing of the brief following the reconsideration of the
dismissal by the appellate court and the grant of the non-extendible period of fifteen
days.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Atty. Saquilabon appears to have been short of scrupulous candor. In asking for the
reconsideration of the 1989 resolution dismissing the appeal for the second time, he did
not blame Quinto but has averred that the non-filing of the brief on the extended period
granted to have been due to the fault of his secretary, "whose poor physical health
forced her too render services to counsel intermittently." 7
The recommendation of the IBP for respondent’s suspension from the practice of law for
a period of six (6) months is more than justified.
WHEREFORE, the Court has resolved, as it hereby resolves to SUSPEND Atty. Benedicto
G. Saquilabon from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months from notice
hereof, with a WARNING that a repetition of a similar misconduct will be most severely
dealt with.
Let a copy of this Resolution be spread on the personal records of respondent in the
Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines, with copies thereof
furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and duly circularized to all courts in
the Philippines. chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Bellosillo and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Hermosisima, Jr., J., is on leave.

Endnotes:

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LEGAL ETHICS

CASES FOR MIDTERMS

[A.C. NO. 5280 - March 30, 2004]

ATTY. FERMIN L. GONZALES, Respondent.

Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala ordered both parties to appear on April 2,

On June 2, 2003, Commissioner Villanueva-Maala submitted her report and

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, we find respondent Atty. Fermin L. Gonzales to have

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the

Preliminarily, we agree with Commissioner Villanueva-Maala that the manifestation of

No investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of the desistance,

Now to the merits of the complaint against the respondent.

Notwithstanding respondents own perception on the matter, a scrutiny of the records

As a rule, an attorney-client relationship is said to exist when a lawyer voluntarily

Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility reads:

b) When required by law; chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Puno, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Callejo, Sr., and TINGA, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 120420. April 21, 1999.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RUFINO MIRANDILLA

"The undersigned complainant as assisted by her mother accuses Rufino Mirandilla

"Parañaque, Metro Manila

"(SGD) MANUELA P. BERMAS

"Assisted by: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"(SGD) ROSITA BERMAS

"The findings concluded: 1. No evident sign of extragenital physical injuries noted on

"I. THE ACCUSED WAS DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS.

2. The Public Attorney could not give justice to the accused;

c. Negligent in not moving for a preliminary investigation;

e. Negligent in not moving to inhibit the judge;

f. Negligent in her conduct at the initial trial.

3. The Vanishing Second Counsel de Officio

a. He was not dedicated nor devoted to the accused;

4. The Reluctant Third Counsel de Officio

"B. THE ACCUSED WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE TRIED BY AN

"D. THE ARRAIGNMENT OF THE ACCUSED WAS INVALID.

"ATTY. VILLARIN: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

"ATTY. VILLARIN: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

That is why I am asking this Honorable Court." 6

"COURT: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Where is the counsel for the accused?

"COURT: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

"PROSECUTOR GARCIA: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

"COURT: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

"COURT: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(To the accused) Nasaan ang abogado mo?

"ACCUSED R. BERMAS: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

"COURT: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

"COURT: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Where is the accused? Where is the counsel de officio?

"ATTY. NICANOR LONZAME: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

"COURT: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

"ATTY. LONZAME: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

"COURT: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

"ATTY. LONZAME: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I will be withdrawing my previous manifestation that I be relieved of my responsibility

"COURT: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

So, therefore, counsel, are you now ready?

"ATTY. LONZAME: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Yes, Your Honor." 9

The presence and participation of counsel in the defense of an accused in criminal

"SECTION 7. Appointment of counsel de oficio. — The court, considering the gravity of

A counsel de oficio is expected to do his utmost. 19 A mere pro-forma appointment of

SO ORDERED. chanrobles law library

Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,