Philippine College of Criminology

Manila Law College

S.Y. 2021-2022

Persons and Family Relations

(Case Digests II)

Submitted by:
Cruz, Jairah Ann. F.

Submitted to:
Atty. Aliakhbar Jumrani
 The Standard Oil vs Arenas
G.R. No. L-5921 | July 25, 1911
Justice Arellano
Facts:
On December 15, 1908, Juan Codina Arenas and Francisco Lara del Pino, as principals,
and Alipio Locso, Vicente Sixto Villanueva and the Chinaman, Siy Ho, as sureties sign a bond in
favor of plaintiff for the obliged to pay the amount of P 3,305.76 at three months from date, with
interest at P 1.00 per month.
On April 5, 1909, the plaintiff sued the debtors regarding the bond sign and was
summoned, the record showing that summons was served on Villanueva;
May 12, 1909 - Villanueva did not appear, and was declared in default. Villanuevas’s
wife appeared when judgment was about to be executed and asked that he be relieved from the
bond and the judgment because he was insane (declared July 24, 1909) with his wife as his
guardian.
Case was reopened and tried and the evidence showed that Villanueva executed the bond
with full understanding of the nature and consequences of the act performed by him although he
was suffering from monomania of great wealth.
He was, therefore, held liable on the bond. Hence this appeal to the Supreme Court.
Issues:
I.Whether or not monomania of wealth necessarily warrants that the person does not have capacity
to act.
II.Whether or not Villanueva was actually incapable of entering into a contract at the time the bond
was executed.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. It would have been
necessary to show that:
a. Such monomania was habitual and constituted a veritable mental perturbation in the
patient;
b. That the bond executed was the result of such monomania, and not the effect of any other
cause, that is, that there were not, or could there have been any other cause for the contract than
the ostentation of wealth and this was purely an effect of such monomania of wealth.
c. That the monomania existed on the date the bond in question was executed. Monomania
of wealth does not necessarily imply that the person is incapable of executing a bond such as that
in question.
d. Capacity to act must be supposed to attach to a person who has not previously been
declared incapable, and such capacity is presumed to continue for so long as the contrary is not
proved, that is, at the moment of his acting he was incapable, crazy, insane, or out of his mind;
which, in the opinion of the court has not been proved in this case.
It is held that capacity to act is presumed until the contrary is proven, and that it be the
reason for the specific act attributed. Proof of restriction: habituality, presence at the time, no
other cause.
 Suan vs. Alcantara
G.R. No. L-1720 | March 4, 1950
Justice Paras
Facts:
Suan and Gaw Chiao, the husband of the former, petitioned for a certiorari re- examining
the decision made by the Court of Appeals in favour of the respondent, Ramon Alcantara.

On August 3, 1931, a deed of sale was executed by Rufino Alcantara and his sons
Damaso Alcantara and Ramon Alcantara then of 17 years, 10 months and 22 days old, conveying
to Sia Suan five parcels of land. A month later, the lawyer of the respondent made it known to
the appellants that he was a minor, disavowing the land contract. After being contacted by the
petitioner’s lawyer, a deed of sale was ratified and the respondent was given P500. Meanwhile,
Sia Suan sold one of the lots.
On August 8, 1940, the respondent acted for the annulment of the deed of sale for the
undivided share from the two parcels of land at the Court of First Instance in Laguna. The action
was denied and the petitioners, which were the petitioners then, were absolved. However, the
respondent was unsatisfied with the result and brought the case to the Court of Appeals, which
ruled in favour of the respondent.
Issue:
Whether or not the deed of sale was valid due to the respondent’s minority.
Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, absolving the
petitioners and incurring costs to the respondent.
.
The Court argued that the respondent being a minor at the time of the sale was of no
significance. The Court of Appeals erred when they did not apply the doctrine used for a ruling
in Mercado v. Espiritu (37 Phil., 215) stating that, “The courts, in their interpretation of the law,
have laid down the rule that the sale of real estate, made by minors who pretend to be of legal
age, when it fact they are not, is valid, and they will not be permitted to excuse themselves from
the fulfillment of the obligations contracted by them, or to have them annulled in pursuance of
the provisions of Law 6 title 19, of the 6th Partida; and the judgment that holds such a sale to
valid and absolves the purchaser from the complaint filed against him does not violate the laws
relative to the sale of minors' property, nor the juridical rules established in consonance
therewith.
The establishment of a contract was of greater importance rather than the cash.
Furthermore, the ratification of the deed of sale only happening in conjunction with the P500
payment was found to be in bad faith on the part of the respondent. As such, the respondent was
stopped from annulling the deed of sale.
 People vs Austria

G.R. Nos. 111517-19 | July 31, 1996

Justice Romero
Facts:
Appellant Roger Navarro Austria was charged with the crimes of Frustrated Murder and
Murder in three separate information filed with the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen,
Pangasinan.
On or about the 25th day of September 1989, in the morning, in barangay Domalandan
West, municipality of Lingayen, province of Pangasinan, New Republic of the Philippines, the
accused armed with a bladed weapon, with intent to kill, with treachery and taking advantage of
his superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault and stabbed
Mylene Samson as for frustrated murder and, two counts of murder for the death of Myrna
Samson and Tyrone Samson.
Appellant sought to establish the defense of insanity by presenting Dr. Constantine D.
Della, a psychiatrist at Baguio General Hospital, who examined and treated appellant, issuing a
"Psychiatric Evaluation" dated November 14, 1991 stating that:

In view of the foregoing history, examinations, interviews, and observations, the patient
Roger N. Austria is found to be suffering from a long-standing illness classified as Schizophrenic
Psychosis, Paranoid type.

Appellant pleaded not guilty to each of the crimes charged in the foregoing Information
but the trial court however, found that appellant was sane when he committed the crimes. The
court found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the three (3) crimes of Murder on two (2)
counts, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal under Criminal Case Nos.
L-4168 and L-4189, and, under Criminal Case No. L-4166, of Frustrated Murder, defined and
penalized under Article 248 in relation to Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code. The penalties are
as follows:
• Under Criminal Cases Nos. L-4168 and L-4169, imprisonment of double reclusion
perpetua; and
• Under Criminal Case No. L-4166, Four (4) Years and Six (6) Months of prision
correccional to Sixteen (16) Years and Six (6) Months of prision mayor
• And under the said three (3) cases, to indemnify the heirs of Myrna dela Cruz Samson in
the amount of P50,000.00, and the heirs of Tyrone Samson in the same amount of
P50,000.00, and Mylene Samson in the amount of P40,000.00.
Hence the appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the appellant is criminally liable given his condition with regard to
insanity.
Ruling:
No. The court finds the appellant not criminally liable due to his mental condition. The
Court is convinced that the testimonial and documentary evidence marshalled in this case by
acknowledged medical experts have sufficiently established the fact that appellant was legally
insane at the time he committed the crimes. His previous confinements, as early as 1972, his
erratic behavior before the assaults and Dr. Della's testimony that he was having a relapse all
points to a man deprived of complete freedom of will or a lack of reason and discernment that
should thus exempt him from criminal liability.
Schizophrenia is defined as a chronic mental disorder characterized by inability to
distinguish between fantasy and reality, and often accompanied by hallucinations and delusion.
However, the court finds him civilly liable thus the accused must make indemnification
to the heirs of his victims, Myrna C. Samson and Tyrone Samson and to the victim who
survived, Mylene Samson the abovementioned indemnification.
The court acquits the accused by reason of insanity and he is ordered confined at the
National Mental Hospital for treatment until further notice.
 Quimiguing vs Icao
G.R. No. 26795 | July 31, 1970
Justice Reyes
Facts:
Case talks about appeal on points of law from an order of the Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga del Norte (Judge Onofre Sison Abalos, presiding), in its Civil Case No. 1590,
dismissing a complaint for support and damages, and another order denying amendment of the
same pleading.
Appellant Carmen Quimiguing, assisted by her parents, sued Felix Icao in the court
below. In her complaint it was averred that the parties were neighbors in Dapitan City, and had
close and confidential relations; that defendant Icao, although married, succeeded in having
carnal intercourse with plaintiff several times by force and intimidation, and without her consent;
that as a result she became pregnant, despite efforts and drugs supplied by defendant, and
plaintiff had to stop studying. Hence, she claimed support at P120.00 per month, damages and
attorney's fees.
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action since the complaint did
not allege that the child had been born; and after hearing arguments, the trial judge sustained the
defendant's motion and dismissed the complaint.
Quimiguing moved to amend the complaint to allege that as a result of the intercourse,
plaintiff had later given birth to a baby girl; but the court, sustaining defendant's objection, ruled
that no amendment was allowable, since the original complaint averred no cause of action. The
plaintiff appealed directly to this Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the child conceived is entitled to support.
Ruling:
Yes. A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality
of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines. The Court also ruled that the unborn child has a right to support from its
progenitors, particularly of the defendant-appellee (whose paternity is deemed admitted for the
purpose of the motion to dismiss), even if the said child is only "en ventre de sa mere;" just as a
conceived child, even if as yet unborn, may receive donations as prescribed by Article 742 of the
same Code, and it's being ignored by the parent in his testament may result in preterition of a
forced heir that annuls the institution of the testamentary heir, even if such child should be born
after the death of the testator Article 854, Civil Code).
 Geluz vs Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-16439 | July 20, 1961
Justice Reyes
Facts:
This petition for certiorari brings up for review question whether the husband of a
woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover damages from physician who
caused the same.
Nita Villanueva, wife of private respondent, and Antonio Geluz, petitioner, met in 1948
through Nita’s aunt. In 1950, she got pregnant and conceal her pregnancy from her parents, she
had an abortion through the petitioner. Nila, this time married to the father of her first unborn
child, got pregnant again. The pregnancy would be inconvenient to her due to her being an
employee of COMELEC, thus contacting the petitioner to once again, have an abortion. This was
dated October 1953.
In 1955, she again became pregnant after 2 years and had an abortion for the third time,
without the knowledge of her husband. The last abortion constituted the plaintiff’s basis in filing
an action for the award of damages. The Court of Appeals and the Trial Court granted the award
of damages in favor of the plaintiff. Hence the appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the claim by a husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured her
abortion, could recover damages from the physician who caused the same is valid with regards to
the legal status of an aborted child.
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court believed that the minimum award was fixed at P3,000 for the
death of a person. The trial court and Court of Appeals predicated that the above statement does
not cover cases of an unborn fetus that is not endowed with personality. Since an action for
pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured, it
is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child
on account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its
parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the
same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place
from on that lacked juridical personality (or juridical capacity as distinguished from capacity to
act).
It is apparent that he consented to the previous abortions. It made his action questionable
for why he only filed for damages on his wife’s third abortion. Also, SC held that the fetus
wasn’t born yet so it has no juridical personality. The award for the death of a person does not
cover the case of an unborn fetus that is not endowed with personality and incapable of having
rights and obligations.
 The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint ordered dismissed. Without
costs.
 Ching vs Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-59731 | January 11, 1990
Justice Paras
Facts:
The case is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to nullify the decision of
respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 12358-SP which in effect affirmed the decision of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, now Regional Trial Court granting ex-parte the cancellation
of title registered in the name of Ching Leng in favor of Pedro Asedillo in Civil Case No. 6888-P
entitled Pedro Asedillo v. Ching Leng and/or Estate of Ching Leng.
In May 1960, Decree No. N-78716 was issued to spouses Maximo Nofuente and
Dominga Lumandan in Land Registration Case No. N-2579 of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal and Original Certificate of Title No. 2433 correspondingly given by the Register of Deeds
for the Province of Rizal covering a parcel of land situated at Sitio of Kay-Biga Barrio of San
Dionisio, Municipality of Paranaque, Province of Rizal. A portion of the property was
reconveyed by said spouses to Francisco, Regina, Perfects, Constancio and Matilde all surnamed
Nofuente (T.C.T. No. 78633). By virtue of a sale to Ching Leng with postal address at No. 44
Libertad Street, Pasay City, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 91137 was issued on September 18,
1961 and T.C.T. No. 78633 was deemed cancelled.
On October 19, 1965, Ching Leng died in Boston, Massachusetts, United States of
America. His legitimate son Alfredo Ching filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal (now
RTC) Branch III, Pasay City a petition for administration of the estate of deceased Ching Leng
docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 1956-P. Notice of hearing on the petition was duly published in the
"Daily Mirror", a newspaper of general circulation on November 23 and 30 and December 7, 1965.
No oppositors appeared at the hearing on December 16, 1965, consequently after presentation of
evidence petitioner Alfredo Ching was appointed administrator of Ching Leng's estate on
December 28, 1965 and letters of administration issued on January 3, 1966. The land covered by
T.C.T. No. 91137 was among those included in the inventory submitted to the court.
Thirteen years after Ching Leng's death, a suit against him was commenced on December
27, 1978 by private respondent Pedro Asedillo with the Court of First Instance of Rizal docketed
as Civil Case No. 6888-P for reconveyance of the above said property and cancellation of T.C.T.
No. 91137 in his favor based on possession. Ching Leng's last known address is No. 44 Libertad
Street, Pasay City which appears on the face of T.C.T. No. 91137 (not No. 441 Libertad Street,
Pasay City, as alleged in private respondent's complaint. An amended complaint was filed by
private respondent against Ching Leng and/or Estate of Ching Leng on January 30, 1979 alleging
"That on account of the fact that the defendant has been residing abroad up to the present, and it
is not known whether the defendant is still alive or dead, he or his estate may be served by
summons and other processes only by publication;". Summons by publication to Ching Leng
and/or his estate was directed by the trial court.
The summons and the complaint were published in the "Economic Monitor", a newspaper
of general circulation in the province of Rizal including Pasay City. Despite the lapse of the sixty
day period within which the defendant failed to file a responsive pleading and on motion of counsel
for the private respondent, the court a quo in its order dated May 25, 1979, allowed the presentation
of evidence ex-parte.
Said decision was likewise served by publication. The title over the property in the name
of Ching Leng was cancelled and a new Transfer Certificate of Title was issued in favor of Pedro
Asedillo.
Petitioner Alfredo Ching learned of the abovestated decision and filed a verified petition
to set it aside as null and void for lack of jurisdiction which was granted by the court.
On motion of counsel for private respondent the said order was reconsidered and set aside,
the decision aforequoted reinstated in the order. Petitioner proceeded to file a motion for
reconsideration but was denied by the trial court. Petitioner then filed an original petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals but was dismissed. His motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied on February 10, 1982.
Private respondent Pedro Asedillo died on June 7, 198 during the pendency of the case
with the Court of Appeals.
Hence the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not a dead man like Ching Leng and his estate could be validly served with
summons and decision by publication.
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court held that private respondent's action for reconveyance and
cancellation of title being in personam, the judgment in question is null and void for lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the deceased defendant Ching Leng. Verily, the action
commenced thirteen years after the latter's death. As ruled by this Court in Dumlao v. Quality
Plastic Products, Inc. the decision of the lower court insofar as the deceased is concerned, is void
for lack of jurisdiction over his person. He was not, and he could not have been validly served with
summons. He had no more civil personality. His juridical personality, that is fitness to be subject
of legal relations, was lost through death (Arts. 37 and 42 Civil Code).
 Limjoco vs Intestate Estate of Pedro O. Fragante
G.R. No. L-770 | April 27, 1948
Justice Hilado
Facts:
Pedro Fragante, a Filipino citizen at the time of his death, applied for a certificate of
public convenience to install and maintain an ice plant in San Juan, Rizal. His intestate estate is
financially capable of maintaining the proposed service. The Public Service Commission issued
a certificate of public convenience to Intestate Estate of the deceased through its special or
judicial administrator appointed by the proper court of competent jurisdiction to maintain and
operate the said plant.
Petitioner claims that the granting of certificate applied to the estate is a contravention of
law that it was an error on the part of the commission to allow the substitution of the legal
representative of the estate of Pedro O. Fragante for the latter as party applicant in the case then
pending before the commission, and in subsequently granting to said estate the certificate applied
for.
Issue:
Whether or not the estate of the deceased Pedro O. Fragante has a legal personality.
Ruling:
Yes. Under the Civil Code “estate of a dead person could be considered as an artificial
juridical person for the purpose of settlement and distribution of his properties.” Also, under the
regime of the Civil Code and before the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure, the heirs of a
deceased person were considered in contemplation of law as the continuation of his personality
by virtue of the provision of article 661 of the first Code that the heirs succeed to all the rights
and obligations of the decedent by the mere fact of his death.
The heirs were formerly considered as the continuation of the decedent's personality
simply by legal fiction, for they might not have been flesh and blood, the reason was one in the
nature of a legal exigency derived from the principle that the heirs succeeded to the rights and
obligations of the decedent. Under the present legal system, such rights and obligations as
surviving after death have to be exercised and fulfilled only by the estate of the deceased.
Pedro O. Fragrante was a Filipino citizen, and as such, if he had lived, in view of the
evidence of record, he would have obtained from the commission the certificate for which he
was applying. The situation has suffered but one change, and that is, his death. His estate was
that of a Filipino citizen. And its economic ability to appropriately and adequately operate and
maintain the service of an ice plant was the same that it received from the descendant himself. In
the absence of a contrary showing, which does not exist here, his heirs may be assumed to be
also Filipino citizens; and if they are not, there is the simple expedient of revoking the certificate
or enjoining them from inheriting it.
 The Supreme Court also held that both the personality and citizenship of Pedro O.
Fragrante must be deemed extended, within the meaning and intent of the Public Service Act, as
amended, in harmony with the constitution.
 Roldan vs. Philippine Veterans Board
G.R. No. L-11973 | June 30, 1959
Justice Montemayor
Facts:
Plaintiff Roldan is appealing the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
dismissing his complaint on the ground that the action brought against the members of the
Philippine Veterans Board, which was a mere agency of the government, was in effect a suit
against the state and that it was done without its consent.
Roldan was a first grade Civil Service eligible. On March 26, 1953, he was appointed clerk
in the Philippine Veterans Board with compensation at the rate of P2,160 a year, and he entered
upon the performance of his duties. Defendant Antonio F. Garcia, acting Administrative Officer
of the Philippine Veterans Board of which he was a member and signing for the Chairman, in a
letter dated March 10, 1954 addressed to Roldan, among other things, said "no person shall be
appointed or reinstated in the service when he is already fifty seven years of age, etc."

In view of the foregoing, and as the appellant was already fifty seven years of age on March
11, 1953, he was advised that your services in the Board will terminate effective at the close of
business on March 25, 1954.

So, Roldan was separated from the service on March 25, 1954 and his place Juan Domingo
was appointed. Roldan initiated Quo Warranto proceedings against Domingo in Civil Case No.
25603. The trial court in said case decided in favor of Roldan, declaring his ouster to have been
illegal. Said decision became final and was executed resulting in the reinstatement of Roldan to
his former position on September 24, 1955.
For the period of about 18 months that he was out of the service due to his separation25, 1954,
Roldan filed the present action against the Philippine Veterans Board and its five members to
recover his back wages during said period plus moral damages in the amount of P5,000.00
including P600.00 for attorney's fees.
Appellant contends that the Philippine Veterans Board is a juridical entity within the
meaning of article 44 of the Civil Code, which reads as follows:

ART. 44. The following are juridical persons:

(1) The state and its political subdivisions;

(2) Other corporation, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose, created by
law; their personality begins as soon as they have been constituted according to law;

(3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose to which the
law grants a juridical personality, separate and distinct from that of each shareholder, partner or
member.

The trial court, through Judge Luis B. Reyes, dismissed the complaint on the ground that
Republic Act No. 65. Hence the appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not Philippine Veterans Board possesses juridical personality therefore being capable
of suing or being sued and that a claim against it would in effect be a suit against the government.
Ruling:
No. The Supreme court cited the case of Metropolitan Transportation Service (Metran)
vs., Paredes, supra. In that case the Metran was created by an Executive Order shortly after
liberation in order to provide transportation service for the government and its employees. It would
appear that as result of a collision resulting in damages, action was brought against it to recover
damages. This Court held that the Metran was a mere office or agency of the government,
unincorporated and possessing no juridical personality under the law, incapable of suing or being
sued and that a claim against it would in effect be a suit against the government, which suit may
not prosper without the government's consent. In the case of Metran, the latter was a mere agency
of the government operating under the Bureau of Public Works. In the present case, the Philippine
Veterans Board was created and functioned under the Department of National Defense. It is also
a mere agency of the government. It is not a body corporate and politic in deed and in law,
incapable of suing or being sued.

It is clear that the Philippine Veterans Board which was created under Section 7 of Republic
Act no. 65 under the Department of National Defense to carry into effect the purpose of said act
and to take charge of effectuating the duties assigned to it by law, which Board is composed of a
chairman and four other members to be appointed by the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointment from among veterans of the Philippine Army and of recognized or
deserving guerrilla organizations, which members are entitled to per diems of P15 each for every
meeting actually attended, may not considered a juridical person within the meaning of the law,
capable of being sued, especially for the recovery of back salaries, which salaries are appropriated
only by Congress. So, a suit like the present one against the Board is in reality an action against
the government itself,
 Cagayan Fishing Development vs Sandiko
G.R. No. L-43350 December 23, 1937
Justice Laurel
Facts:
Manuel Tabora is the registered owner of four parcels of land and he wanted to build a
Fishery. He loaned from PNB P8,000 and to guarantee the payment of the loan, he mortgaged
the said parcels of land. Three subsequent mortgages were executed in favor of the same bank
and to Severina Buzon, whom Tabora is indebted to.
Tabora sold the four parcels of land to the plaintiff company, said to be under process of
incorporation, in consideration of one peso (P1) subject to the mortgages in favor of PNB and
Severina Buzon and, to the condition that the certificate of title to said lands shall not be
transferred to the name of the plaintiff company until the latter has fully and completely paid
Tabora’s indebtedness to PNB.
The articles of incorporation were filed and the company sold the parcels of land to
Sandiko on the reciprocal obligation that Sandiko will shoulder the three mortgages. A deed of
sale executed before a notary public by the terms of which the plaintiff sold, ceded and
transferred to the defendant all its rights, titles and interest in and to the four parcels of land.
He executed a promissory note that he shall be 25,300 after a year with interest and on
the promissory notes, the parcels were mortgaged as security.
A promissory note for P25,300 was drawn by the defendant in favor of the plaintiff,
payable after one year from the date thereof. Further, a deed of mortgage executed before a
notary public in accordance with which the four parcels of land were given as security for the
payment of the said promissory note. All these three instruments were dated February 15, 1932.
Sandiko failed to pay, thus the action for payment. The lower court held that deed of sale
was invalid.
The corporation filed a motion for reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether or not Cagayan Fishing Development has juridical capacity to enter into the
contract at the time the transfer happened.
Ruling:
No. The transfer made by Tabora to the Cagayan Fishing Development Co., Inc., plaintiff
herein, was effected on May 31, 1930 and the actual incorporation of said company was affected
later on October 22, 1930. In other words, the transfer was made almost five months before the
incorporation of the company.
A duly organized corporation has the power to purchase and hold such real property as
the purposes for which such corporation was formed may permit and for this purpose may enter
into such contracts as may be necessary. But before a corporation may be said to be lawfully
organized, many things have to be done. Among other things, the law requires the filing of
articles of incorporation. Although there is a presumption that all the requirements of law have
been complied with, in the case before us it can not be denied that the plaintiff was not yet
incorporated when it entered into the contract of sale.
The contract itself referred to the plaintiff as “una sociedad en vias de incorporacion.” It
was not even a de facto corporation at the time. Not being in legal existence then, it did not
possess juridical capacity to enter into the contract.
“Corporations are creatures of the law, and can only come into existence in the manner
prescribed by law. As has already been stated, general laws authorizing the formation of
corporations are general offers to any persons who may bring themselves within their provisions;
and if conditions precedent are prescribed in the statute, or certain acts are required to be done,
they are terms of the offer, and must be complied with substantially before legal corporate
existence can be acquired.”
“That a corporation should have a full and complete organization and existence as an
entity before it can enter into any kind of a contract or transact any business, would seem to be
self evident. . . . A corporation, until organized, has no being, franchises or faculties. Nor do
those engaged in bringing it into being have any power to bind it by contract, unless so
authorized by the charter. Until organized as authorized by the charter there is not a corporation,
nor does it possess franchises or faculties for it or others to exercise, until it acquires a complete
existence.”
 Concept Builders v. NRLC

G.R. No. 108734 | 29 May 1996

Justice Hermosisima

Facts:

A domestic corporation, Petitioner Concept Builders, Inc. which is engaged in the

construction business. Private respondents were employed by said company as laborers,
carpenters and riggers. However, on November, 1981, private respondents were served
individual written notices of termination of employment by petitioner, effective on November
30, 1981. It was stated in the individual notices that their contracts of employment had expired
and the project in which they were hired had been completed.

By then, private respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter
rendered judgment ordering petitioner to reinstate private respondents and to pay them back
wages. This became final and should be executed.

The alias Writ of Execution should not be enforced by the sheriff because all the
employees inside petitioner’s premises at 355 Maysan Road, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, claimed
they were not employees of petitioner, instead by Hydro Pipes Philippines, Inc. (HPPI). Thus,
NLRC issued a break-open order against Concept Builders and HPPI.

Issue:

Whether or not a juridical personality can be used to commit a wrong.

Ruling:

No. It is a fundamental principle of corporation law that a corporation is an entity

separate and distinct from its stockholders and from other corporations to which it may be
connected. But, this separate and distinct personality of a corporation is merely a fiction created
by law for convenience and to promote justice.

Hence, when the notion of separate juridical personality is used to defeat public
convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud or defend crime, or is used as a device to defeat the
labor laws, this separate personality of the corporation may be disregarded or the veil of
corporate fiction pierced. This is true likewise when the corporation is merely an adjunct, a
business conduit or an alter ego of another corporation.
 Cease vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-33172 18 October 1979
Justice Guerrero

Facts:
Forrest Cease and five other American citizens formed Tiaong Milling and Plantation
Company Eventually, the shares of the other original incorporators were bought out by Cease
with his children. The company's charter lapsed in June 1958. Forrest Cease died in August
1959. There was no mention whether there were steps to liquidate the company. Some of his
children wanted an actual division while others wanted a reincorporation. Two of his children,
Benjamin and Florence, initiated Special Proceeding No. 3893 with CF Tayabas asking that the
Tiaong Milling and Plantation Corporation be declared identical to Forrest Cease and that its
properties be divided among his children as intestate heirs. Defendants opposed the same but the
CFI ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. Defendants filed a notice of appeal from the CFI's decision
but the same was dismissed for being premature. The case was elevated to the SC which
remanded it to the Court of Appeals. The CA dismissed the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the lower court's decision that the
subject properties owned by the corporation are also properties of the estate of Forrest Cease

Ruling:
No. The trial court indeed found strong support, one that is based on a well-entrenched
principle of law which is the theory of "merger of Forrest L. Cease and The Tiaong Milling as
one personality", or that "the company is only the business conduit and alter ego of the deceased
Forrest L. Cease and the registered properties of Tiaong Milling are actually properties of Forrest
L. Cease and should be divided equally, share and share alike among his six children, , the trial
court aptly applied the familiar exception to the general rule by disregarding the legal fiction of
distinct and separate corporate personality and regarding the corporation and the individual
member one and the same. In shredding the fictitious corporate veil, the trial judge narrated the
undisputed factual premise
 Kukan International vs. Reyes
G.R. No. 182729, September 29, 2010
Justice Velasco Jr.
Facts:
Private respondent Romeo M. Morales doing business under the name RM Morales
Trophies and Plaques was awarded a P5 million contract for the supply and installation of
signages in a building constructed in Makati sometime in March 1998. The contract price was
later reduced to P3,388,502 because some items were deleted from the contract.
Morales complied with his contractual obligations but he was paid only the amount of
P1,976,371.07 leaving a balance of P1,412,130.93. He filed a case against Kukan, Inc., for sum
of money with the RTC of Manila docketed as Civil Case No. 99-93173. Kukan Inc., stopped
participating in the proceedings in
November 2000, hence, it was declared in default and Morales presented his evidence
ex-parte against petitioner.
On November 28, 2002, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of Morales and against
Kunkan, Inc. ordering the latter to pay the sum of P1,201,724.00 with legal interest of 12% per
annum until fully paid; P50,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as attorney's fees and
P7,960.06 as litigation expenses. The counterclaim filed by Kunkan, Inc. was dismissed. The
decision became final and executory During the execution, the sheriff levied the personal
properties found at the office of Kukan, Inc.. Claiming it owned the properties levied, Kukan
International Corporation
(KIC) filed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim. Morales filed an Omnibus Motion praying
to apply the principle of piercing the veil of corporate entity. He alleged that Kankun, Inc. and
KIC are one and the same corporation His Motion was denied. On Motion of Morales the
presiding Judge of Branch 17 of RTC Manila inhibited himself from hearing the case. It was
raffled to Branch 21 which granted the Motion filed by Morales on March 12, 2007 and decreed
that Kukan, Inc.
And Kukan International Inc., as one and the same corporation; that the levy made on the
properties of KIC is valid; and ordering Kunkan International Corp. and Michael Chan as jointly
and severally liable to pay the award pursuant to the Decision dated November 28, 2002. KIC
filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied.KIC brought the case to the Court of
Appeals which rendered the Decision n January 23, 2008 denying KIC's petition. The CA also
denied its Motion for Reconsideration in the Resolution dated June 7,2007.

Issue:
Whether or not the trial court and the appellate court correctly applied the principle of
piercing the veil of corporate entity.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate entity finds no
application in this case. According to the Supreme Court, the principle of piercing the veil of
corporate entity and the resulting treatment of two related corporations as one and the same
juridical person applies only to established liability and not to confer jurisdiction. In this case,
the Supreme Court ruled that KIC was not made a party defendant in Civil Case No. 99-93173. It
entered a special but not a voluntary appearance in the trial court to assert that it was a separate
entity and has a separate legal personality from Kunkan, Inc. KIC was not impleaded nor served
with summons. Hence, it could only assert its claim through the affidavits, comments and
motions filed by special appearance before the RTC that it is a separate juridical entity.
The Supreme Court stated that the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate entity comes
to play during the trial of the case after the court has already acquired jurisdiction over the
corporation.
To justify the piercing of the veil of corporate fiction, it must be shown by clear and
convincing proof that the separate and distinct personality of the corporation was purposely
employed to evade a legitimate and binding commitment and perpetuate a fraud or like a
wrongdoing.
In those instances, when the Court pierced the veil of corporate fiction of two
corporations, there was a confluence of the following factors:
1) A first corporation is dissolved;
2) The assets of the first corporation are transferred to a second corporation to avoid a
financial liability of the first corporation; and
3)Both corporations are owned and controlled by the same persons such that the second
corporation should be considered as a continuation and successor of the first corporation.
In this case, the second and third factors are conspicuously absent. There is, therefore, no
compelling justification for disregarding the fiction of corporate entity separating Kukan, Inc.
from KIC.
In applying the principle, both the RTC and the CA miserably failed to identify the
presence of the abovementioned factors. The High Court stated that neither should the level of
paid-up capital of Kukan, Inc. upon its incorporation be viewed as a badge of fraud, for it is in
compliance with Sec. 13 of the Corporation Code, which only requires a minimum paid-up
capital of PhP 5,000. The suggestion that KIC is but a continuation and successor of Kukan,
Inc., owned and controlled as they are by the same stockholders, stands without factual basis.
The fact that Michael Chan, a.k.a. Chan Kai Kit, owns 40% of the outstanding capital stock of
both corporations standing alone, is insufficient to establish identity. There must be at least
a substantial identity of stockholders for both corporations in order to consider this factor to be
constitutive of corporate identity.
 Romualdez vs. Comelec
G.R. No. 119976 18 September 1995
Justice Kapunan

Facts:
The 1987 Constitution requires an aspirant for election for the House of Representatives
to be a registered voter of the desired district as well as a resident of the said district for not less
than one-year prior the election. The petitioner, Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate
of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte stating that she has
lived therein as a resident for the last seven months. Montejo, an opposition, filed a petition for
cancellation and disqualification of her candidacy with the grounds of Romualdez-Marcos does
not have the residency requirement mandated by the constitution. She then amended her
candidacy changing her residency from seven months to since birth indicating that it was an
honest misrepresentation and that she has maintained domicile in Tacloban ever since.

Issue:
Whether or not Imelda Romualdez-Marcos is a resident of the First District of Leyte and
if the petitioner has had the residency requirement therein.
Ruling:
Yes. Imelda Romualdez-Marcos is indeed a resident therein and possesses the necessary
residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of
Leyte. The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence involves
the intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode ends. One may
seek a place for purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a person’s intent be to remain,
it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is
residence.
In election cases, the term "residence" has always been considered as synonymous with
"domicile" which imports not only the intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal
presence in-that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a
fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one
intends to return.
 Valles vs Comelec
G.R. No. 137000 | 9 August 2000
Justice Purisima
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 64 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing Resolutions dated July 17, 1998 and January 15, 1999,
respectively, of the Commission on Elections in SPA No. 98-336, dismissing the petition for
disqualification filed by the herein petitioner, Cirilo R. Valles, against private respondent
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, in the May 1998 elections for governor of Davao Oriental.
Private Responded Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born in Australia on May 16, 1934 to a
Filipino father and an Australian mother. She ran for the position of governor. Petitioner, her
opponent, filed a case for disqualification on the ground that she is not a Filipino citizen since
she was issued an alien certificate of registration; there was an application for an immigrant
certificate of residence and she was a holder of an Australian passport.
The Commission on Elections ruled that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is a
Filipino citizen and therefore, qualified to run for a public office because
(1) her father, Telesforo Ybasco, is a Filipino citizen, and by virtue of the principle of jus
sanguinis she was a Filipino citizen under the 1987 Philippine Constitution;
(2) she was married to a Filipino, thereby making her also a Filipino citizen ipso
jure under Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 473;
(3) and that, she renounced her Australian citizenship on January 15, 1992 before the
Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia and her Australian passport was
accordingly cancelled as certified to by the Australian Embassy in Manila; and (4) furthermore,
there are the COMELEC Resolutions in EPC No. 92-54 and SPA Case No. 95-066, declaring her
a Filipino citizen duly qualified to run for the elective position of Davao Oriental governor.
Issue:
Whether or not Private Respondent is valid to run for governor due to her citizenship
Ruling:
Yes. The respondent is a Filipino citizen since her father is a Filipino. Holding of an
Australian passport and an alien certificate of registration does not constitute an effective
renunciation of citizenship and does not militate against her claim of Filipino citizenship. At
most, she has dual citizenship.
The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a
child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth,
as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of
place of birth.
 In re: Mallare
A.M. No. 533 | April 29, 1968
Justice Fernandez
Facts:
The respondent, Florencio Mallare, was admitted to the practice of law on 5 March 1962.
In his verified petition to take the bar examinations in 1961, he alleged that he is a citizen of the
Philippines and that “his father is Esteban Mallare and his mother is Te Na, both Filipino
citizens”. (Personal Record, No. 17450, Bar Division) On 16 July 1962, the then Acting
Commissioner of Immigration Martiniano P. Vivo denounced the respondent to this Court as a
Chinaman masquerading as a Filipino citizen and requested that the matter be investigated
thoroughly and if the respondent fails to show that he has legally become a Filipino, steps be
taken for striking his name from the roll of persons authorized to practice law. Acting upon the
request, this Court, on 9 August 1962, referred the matter to its Legal Officer-Investigator for
investigation and report. An investigation was thus held wherein the relator or complainant and
the respondent appeared and adduced their respective evidence. The position of the respondent-
lawyer is that he is a Filipino citizen based on the supposed citizenship of his father, Esteban
Mallare, alleged to be a Filipino citizen by choice, because he was the illegitimate son of a
Chinese father and a Filipina mother, Ana Mallare and that the respondent’s mother, Te Na, a
Chinese, followed the citizenship of her husband upon their marriage.
Issue:
Whether or not Mallare is a Filipino citizen able to practice law in the Philippines.
Ruling:
No. The entire family, consisting of the father, mother and their four children (Raymundo
was not yet born) were registered as aliens in 1942 in the then Division of Alien Statistics,
pursuant to the proclamation of the Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Japanese Forces in the
Philippines and Executive Order No. 25 of the then Executive Commission. (See letter of Jan.
18, 1963 from the Bureau of Immigration to the Legal Officer-Investigator, see also pp. 171 and
180-181, Vol. I, No. 4, Official Gazette, published during Japanese occupation.).
In addition, the respondent himself was again registered as an alien in 1950, his
application thereto bearing his thumbprints and stating therein that he is a Chinese; that he
belongs to the yellow race and that he had used these other names: “Tan Jua Gae”, “Enciong”
and “Jua Gac” (Exh. “N”). He had been a teacher in the Candon Chinese School (t.s.n., p. 17,
Oct. 3, 1962). His explanation that it was his mother who registered him as an alien is flimsy;
and, as stated hereinbefore, he did not present his mother as a witness.
The evidence is thus clearly preponderant, if not overwhelming that the respondent’s
father, Esteban Mallare or “Mallari”, also known as “Esteban Dy”, “Esteban Dy Mallare” and
“Esteban Tan”, was and remained a Chinese until he died; consequently, the respondent’s
mother, admittedly a Chinese, retained her original citizenship and their offspring, respondent,
Florencio Mallare, together with his brothers and sisters, are likewise Chinese nationals, through
and through.
On the basis of the foregoing declaration by the Court of First Instance of Quezon
Province, the respondent and his brothers and sisters filed Special Proceeding No. 3925, in the
same court, but in a different branch, for the “correction” of their birth records. The local fiscal,
representing the Solicitor General, appeared but did not oppose the petition; wherefore, after
hearing, the court granted the petition. Based on the same judicial declaration, the then
Commissioner of Immigration De la Rosa (not the complainant) cancelled on June 8, 1960, the
alien registration of the herein respondent and that of his brothers and sisters, and issued to them
identification certificates recognizing them as Filipino citizens. Then Solicitor General Alafriz
took the same position.
Civil Case No. 329-G and Special Proceeding No. 3925 are not modes of acquiring
Philippine citizenship; neither is the Chinese citizenship of the respondent converted to Filipino
because certain government agencies recognized him as such. He remains, by jus sanguinis, a
Chinese until he is naturalized.
 Frivaldo v. Comelec
G.R. No. 120295 | June 28, 1996
Justice Panganiban

Facts:
Frivaldo obtained the highest number of votes in three successive elections but was
disqualified by the Court twice due to his alien citizenship. He claims to have re-assumed his lost
Philippine citizenship thru repatriation. Respondent Lee was the second placer in the canvass and
claimed that the votes cast in favor of petitioner should be considered void; that the electorate
should be deemed to have intentionally thrown away their ballots; and that legally, he secured
the most number of valid votes; or the incumbent Vice-Governor should take over the said post
due to permanent vacancy due to Frivaldo’s ineligibility.
Issues:
I. Whether or not the repatriation valid and legal and reasonably cure his lack of
citizenship as to qualify him to be proclaimed and to hold the Office
II. Whether or not the disqualification for lack of citizenship a continuing bar to his
eligibility to run for or be elected to or hold public office?

Ruling:
I. Yes. According to law, citizenship may be reacquired by
1) direct act of Congress,
2) by naturalization or
3) by repatriation under P.D 725.
The law does not specifically state a particular date or time when the candidate must
possess citizenship, unlike that for residence (at least 1-year residency immediately preceding the
day of election) and age (at least 35 years old on election day). Philippine citizenship is an
indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office to ensure that no alien, or person
owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and our country or a unit of territory
thereof.
An official begins to govern or to discharge his functions only upon his proclamation
and on the day the law mandates his term of office to begin. Since Frivaldore-assumed his
citizenship on the very day the term of his office began, he was therefore already qualified to be
proclaimed, to hold office and to discharge the functions and responsibilities thereof as of said
date. The law intended CITIZENSHIP to be a qualification distinct from being a VOTER, even
if being a voter presumes being a citizen first. The Local Government Code requires an elective
official to be a registered voter.
 It does not require him to vote actually. In other words, the law’s purpose in this second
requirement is to ensure that the prospective official is actually registered in the area he seeks to
govern and not anywhere else. In fact, petitioner voted in all the previous elections. The prime
issue of citizenship should be reckoned from the date of proclamation, not necessarily the date of
election or date of filing of the certificate of candidacy. The repatriation of the petitioner
retroacted upon the date of filing of his application.
II. No. Decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a person’s
future status with finality. This is because a person may subsequently reacquire, or for that
matter, lose his citizenship under any of the modes recognized by law for the purpose.
 Republic vs. Dela Rosa
G.R. No. 104654 6 June 1994
Justice

Facts:
For the annulment of the Decision dated February 27, 1992 by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 28, Manila, in SP Proc. No. 91-58645, where a re-admission of a private respondent as a
Filipino citizen under the Revised Naturalization Law, during Martial Law compelled him to
seek political asylum in the United States, by then to renounce his Philippine citizenship
happened.
He claims that his petition for naturalization was his only available way for his reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship. He tried to reacquire his Philippine citizenship through repatriation and
direct act of Congress. However, he was later informed that, repatriation proceedings were
limited to army deserters or Filipino women who had lost their citizenship by reason of their
marriage to foreigners (Rollo, pp. 49-50). His request to Congress for sponsorship of a bill
allowing him to reacquire his Philippine citizenship failed to materialize, notwithstanding the
endorsement of several members of the House of Representatives in his favor (Rollo, p. 51). He
attributed this to the maneuvers of his political rivals.
Issues:
Whether or not his petition of naturalization is valid and he can have a Filipino
Citizenship
Ruling:
No. Private respondent is not yet a Filipino citizen. Therefore, he is disqualified from
continuing to serve as governor of the Province of Sorsogon. He is ordered to vacate his office
and to surrender the same to the Vice-Governor of the Province of Sorsogon once this decision
becomes final and executory.

Private respondent, having opted to reacquire Philippine citizenship thru naturalization

under the Revised Naturalization Law, is duty bound to follow the procedure prescribed by the
said law. It is not for an applicant to decide for himself and to select the requirements which he
believes, even sincerely, are applicable to his case and discard those which be believes are
inconvenient or merely of nuisance value. The law does not distinguish between an applicant
who was formerly a Filipino citizen and one who was never such a citizen. It does not provide a
special procedure for the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by former Filipino citizens akin
to the repatriation of a woman who had lost her Philippine citizenship by reason of her marriage
to an alien.

The trial court never acquired jurisdiction to hear the petition for naturalization of private
respondent. The proceedings conducted, the decision rendered and the oath of allegiance taken
therein, are null and void for failure to comply with the publication and posting requirements
under the Revised Naturalization Law.

Under Section 9 of the said law, both the petition for naturalization and the order setting
it for hearing must be published once a week for three consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette
and a newspaper of general circulation respondent cites his achievements as a freedom fighter
and a former Governor of the Province of Sorsogon for six terms.

The petition for naturalization lacks several allegations required by Sections 2 and 6 of
the Revised Naturalization Law, particularly: (1) that the petitioner is of good moral character;
(2) that he resided continuously in the Philippines for at least ten years; (3) that he is able to
speak and write English and any one of the principal dialects; (4) that he will reside continuously
in the Philippines from the date of the filing of the petition until his admission to Philippine
citizenship; and (5) that he has filed a declaration of intention or if he is excused from said filing,
the justification therefor.

Likewise, the petition is not supported by the affidavit of at least two credible persons
who vouched for the good moral character of private respondent as required by Section 7 of the
Revised Naturalization Law. Private respondent also failed to attach a copy of his certificate of
arrival to the petition as required by Section 7 of the said law.

.
 Poe-Llamanzares vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 221697| March 8, 2016
Justice Perez

Facts:
Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares is a foundling adopted when she was five
years old by celebrities famously known as Fernando Poe Jr. and Susan Roces. When she was 18
years old, she registered for voting in Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. By then Grace Poe
migrated to the United States and got a Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Studies from Boston
College Chestnuts Hill, Massachusetts. Eventually she married Teodoro Misael Daniel V.
Llamanzares, a person with dual-citizenship to the Philippines and the United States of America.
After marriage the couple decided to reside int he United States, where they had their first
child. October of 2001.By then, Poe became an American Citizen.
Three years later, she came back to the Philippines to support her father on his
presidential
Candidacy and flew back. Not long later, she went back to the Philippines upon learning of her
Fathers’ medical condition, fell in to coma then later expired. Because of this, she and her
husband Decided to live in the Philippines for Poe's mother, Susan Roces. They began to settle
transactions Pertaining to their forthcoming residence in the country such as the enrolment of
their siblings. Relocating their house goods from the U.S. to the Philippines as well as bringing
their pet dog. She Briefly stayed at her mother's place before purchasing a condominium located
in San Juan City. Her Husband, staying at the United States, officially declared their
abandonment of U.S, address and Sold their house thereafter Poe later took her Oath of
Allegiance and reacquired her Philippine citizenship, registered as a voter again, got her passport
renewed, renunciate her allegiance and citizenship to the US, and worked as a chairperson for
MIRCB and a Philippine Senator.

Issue:
Whether or not Grace Poe is a Filipino Citizen and if she has the qualifications to run for
Presidency.

Ruling:
Yes. Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares has found to be a natural-born citizen and is declared
to be qualified to run for Presidency. This is because by international law, foundlings are
presumed to have been born of citizens of the place where they are found. Hence, the petitioner
is considered as a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
 Recent legislation is more direct. R.A. No. 8043 entitled "An Act Establishing the Rules
to Govern the Inter-Country Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other Purposes" (otherwise
known as the "Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995"), R.A. No. 8552, entitled "An Act
Establishing the Rules and Policies on the Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other
Purposes" (otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) and this Court's A.M. No.
02-6-02-SC or the "Rule on Adoption," all expressly refer to "Filipino children" and include
foundlings as among Filipino children who may be adopted.

It has been argued that the process to determine that the child is a foundling leading to the
issuance of a foundling certificate under these laws and the issuance of said certificate are acts to
acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship which make the foundling a naturalized Filipino at best.
This is erroneous. Under Article IV, Section 2 "Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens
of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship." In the first place, "having to perform an act" means that the act must be
personally done by the citizen. In this instance, the determination of foundling status is done not
by the child but by the authorities. Secondly, the object of the process is the determination of the
whereabouts of the parents, not the citizenship of the child. Lastly, the process is certainly not
analogous to naturalization proceedings to acquire Philippine citizenship, or the election of such
citizenship by one born of an alien father and a Filipino mother under the 1935 Constitution,
which is an act to perfect it.

In this instance, such issue is moot because there is no dispute that petitioner is a
foundling, as evidenced by a Foundling Certificate issued in her favor. The Decree of Adoption
issued on 13 May 1974, which approved petitioner's adoption by Jesusa Sonora Poe and Ronald
Allan Kelley Poe, expressly refers to Emiliano and his wife, Rosario Militar, as her "foundling
parents," hence effectively affirming petitioner's status as a foundling.