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    North Korea's Hidden Assets by H. John Poole

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    Gautam Doshi

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    H. Joun Poove: “Last Hunprep YARDS” AUTHOR Gen, A.C. Zinn) USMC(Ret.): Foreworp NortTH KorREA’s HIDDEN ASSETS ILLUSTRATED E’DIrTION H. Joun Poot Forrworn ny Gen. Antuony C. Zinnt USMC (Rev.) PostTERITy Press™ Copyright © 2018 by H. John Poole Published by Posterity Press P.O. Box 5360, Emerald Isle, NC 28594 (www.posteritypress.org) Protected under the Berne Convention. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying or recording by any information storage- and-retrieval system without full permission in writing from the publisher. All inquiries should be addressed to Posterity Press, P.O. Box 5360, Emerald Isle, NC 28594. Cataloging-in-Publication Data Poole, H. John, 1943- North Korea’s Hidden Assets Includes bibliography and index. 1. Infantry drill and tactics. 2. Military art and science. 3. Military history. I. Title. ISBN: 978-0-981865997 2018 355'.42 Library of Congress Control Number: 2018950300 This work is partially a compilation of copyrighted material from other sources. The permission to use that material is recorded in the “source notes” at the end of the book. It may not be further reproduced without the consent of the original owner, Every effort has been made to contact all copyright holders. Any who were missed can identify themselves now to negotiate the appropriate permission agreements. Cover art composition © 2018 by Posterity Press Edited by Dr. Mary Beth Poole First printing, United States of America, October 2018 For Aut U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL WHO WOULD LIKE TO KNOW MORE ABOUT NoRTH KOREA'S GROUND COMBAT CAPABILITIES. ole Lill eet Weel! NORTH KOREA'S PROPAGANDA POSTERS MAY HELP TO UNRAVE! ITS STRATEGIC INTE! NTIONS. ConTENTS Illustrations ix Tables xiii Foreword xv Preface xvii Acknowledgments xxi Part One: The Competing Styles of Warfare Chapter 1: Relative Degree of Tactical Sophistication 3 Chapter 2: The 1951-1953 Warning 15 Chapter 3: Specifics on the KPA’s New Strongpoint Defense 29 Chapter 4: More Tunneling Appears Beneath the Border 47 Chapter 5: Norih Korea’s Reunification Strategy 57 Part Two: North Korea’s Early Overseas Adventures Chapter 6: The DPRK’s Early Foreign Involvements 69 Chapter 7: On What Subject Was the Training Assistance? 83 Chapter 8: The KPA’s Role in Zimbabwe 89 Chapter 9: KPA Participation in the Angolan War 95 Part Three: The KPA’s Most Recent Foreign Experience Chapter 10: North Korea’s Latest Activities in Africa 107 Chapter 11: KPA Helped Hezbollah with Its Defense Line 115 Chapter 12: North Korean Military Assistance Elsewhere 123 Chapter 13: Evidence of Tactical Intelligence Gathering 129 Part Four: The DPRK’s New Assault Force Phantom Chapter 14: Light Infantry Training Guidance Bureau 137 Chapter 15: How KPA’s Lead Elements Will Fight 143 vii Contents Part Five: The DPRK’s Tactical Orientation Chapter 16: North Korean Defense 155 Chapter 17: North Korean Offense 167 Part Six: Extent of North Korean Technology Chapter 18: DPRK's Response to Advanced U.S. Systems 179 Chapter 19: Overwhelming Supply of Man-Portable Weapons 189 Part Seven: The Dangerous Illusion Chapter 20: Will U.S. Know Location of All DPRK Defenses 197 Chapter 21: Asymmetric Activity Around Any Invasion 205 Chapter 22: DPRK Consolidation of Ground Gained 211 Notes Source Notes 217 Endnotes 223 Glossary 249 Bibliography 257 About the Author 273 Name Index 275 viii ILLUSTRATIONS Maps: Chapter 2: The 1951 - 1953 Warning 2.1: Parts of East End of Line Kansas Were in South Korea 17 2.2. Overall Location of 38th Parallel 18 2.3: The Two Koreas Previously Separated by 38th Parallel 20 2.4: Hill Battles Occurred at Edge of New Communist MLR 24 2.5: Stabilized Front Just South of New DPRK MLR 25 Chapter 4: More Tunneling Appears Beneath the Border 4.1: Number of DPRK Tunnels and Their Design in 1994 50 Chapter 8: The KPA’s Role in Zimbabwe 8.1: Zimbabwe (Formerly Rhodesia) 91 Chapter 9: KPA Participation in the Angolan War 9.1: Zaire-Contested Communist Grab for Southern Africa 98 9.2: Angola 100 Chapter 15: How the KPA’s Lead Elements Will Fight 15.1: The Chinese Attack down Northwest Ridge 146 Chapter 20: Will U.S Know Location of All DPRK Defenses? 20.1: North Korea’s Rail Network 201 ILLUSTRATIONS Figures: Chapter 1: The Relative Degree of Tactical Sophistication 1.1: Standard U.S. Infantry Assault on an Enemy Position 4 1.2: All KPA Riflemen Have Been Prepared to Work Alone = 8 1.3: Junior Gls Regularly Function as a Tiny Group 10 Chapter 2: The 1951 - 1953 Warning 2.1: Battle of Pork Chop Hill 22 2.2: Island Cross-Section Reveals Stacks of Sub-Surface Passageways 27 Chapter 3: Specifics on the KPA’s New Strongpoint Defense 3.1: Tunnels Linked Japanese Squad Bastions to Reverse Slope 33 Each Japanese Squad Strongpoint Had Built-In Firesacks 34 .3: Similar Chinese Version of How to Defend Ridgeline 35 3.4: Soviets Fill Gaps in “V” Pattern with Fake Positions 37 3.5: Nucleus of Each Soviet Squad Strongpoint 37 3.6: North Korean Officer 38 3.7: Russian Diagram Shows North Korean Difference 40 3.8: Many KPA Trenchlines Were Covered 40 3.9: Interior View of North Korean Hilltop Stronghold 41 3.10: Manned Trenchline Segments Became Strongpoints 41 3.11: Machinegun Bunkers Linked by Covered Trenchline 42 3.12: Even Rifle Pits Connected to Lateral Tunnel 42 3.13: Evidence of an Ingenious Infiltration Route 43 Chapter 4: More Tunneling Appears Beneath the Border 4.1: Tunnel Opening Would Be Dug Before Attacking 51 Chapter 5: North Korea’s Reunification Strategy 5.1; Combining Military and Diplomatic Brinkmanship? 66 Chapter 6: The DPRK's Early Foreign Involvements 6.1: Possible Vietnamese “Military Fortress” Segment. 76 6.2: North Koreans Had Trained the PLO 81 ILLusTRATIONS Chapter 7: On What Subject Was the Training Assistance? 7.1: Current North Korean Defensive Stronghold 86 Chapter 9: KPA Participation in the Angolan War 9.1: South Africans and Zaireans Both Fought the MPLA 99 Chapter 11: KPA Helped with Hezbollah’s Defense Line 11.1: Israeli Armor Had Little Chance at Bint Jbeil 118 Chapter 15: How the KPA’s Lead Elements Will Fight 15.1: Chinese Infantryman from the Winter of 1950 148 15.2: NVA Infantryman During the Vietnam War 150 Chapter 16: North Korean Defense 16.1: Chinese “Volunteer” Atop a U.N. Tank in the 1950’s_ 163 16.2: Japanese Tunnelers on Iwo Jima 166 Chapter 17: North Korean Offense 17.1: Chinese Tactics Expert 170 17.2: The “Cloud Battle Array” 171 17.3: How Chinese Battalion Attack Elements Advance — 174 17.4: The “One Point, Two Sides” Chinese Attack 175 Chapter 18: DPRK Response to Advanced U.S. Systems 18.1: North Korean Engineers Have Developed ICBMs 184 Chapter 19: Overwhelming Supply of Man-Portable Weapons 19.1: Kill Zone for New Russian “Shoulder-Fired” FAE — 192 xi TABLES Chapter 10: North Korea’s Latest Activities in Africa 10.1: DPRK Military Aid Still Going to Africa in 2017 113 xiii FoREWORD During the 1980’s and 1990's, I commanded units in the Pa- cific region assigned to our Korean command in case of conflict. This included command of all Marine operational forces assigned there from 1994-1996. From the numerous exercises, war games, and briefings, I became well aware of the difficult terrain we would face, the extreme weather conditions that could be present at cer- tain times of year, and the formidable North Korean conventional forces that would oppose us in a war on the peninsula. We are understandably focused on North Korea’s nuclear capability; how- ever, their extensive conventional-force capacity that is well dug in north of the DMZ will be extremely difficult to defeat. Any student of the Korean War fought in the early 1950’s can grasp the hard-learned lessons from that battlefield from Pusan to the Chosin Reservoir. However, the North Korean military, tough as it may have been then, is vastly more capable and armed [at present]. Given the attention North Korea has been given lately, John Poole’s writing is timely and valuable, especially for our command- ers and troops who may be committed to a conflict there. After decades of planning and fighting in a very different environment and against very different enemies, it is prudent for our political and military leaders to gain an understanding of the situations, conditions, and enemy forces we would face in a Korean conflict that would present a much more difficult challenge. John offers an insightful primer [comprehensive overview] for planners and for those who would have to face this potential enemy on the complex battlefield that is Korea. Gen. AntHony C. Zinnt USMC (Rev.) FORMER Heap or CENTCOM xv PREFACE Some of the information herein has been extracted from mar- ginally obscure sources. Its researcher could be accused of “cher- ry-picking”—and then not adequately confirming—certain disclo- sures. Yet, North Korea is a very secretive nation. And the extent of its military prowess has been difficult for fully funded United States (U.S.) intelligence agencies to ascertain. Donald Gregg, a former U.S. ambassador to Seoul and a 30-year CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] veteran, has ad- mitted that the U.S. intelligence on North Korea has been the longest lasting story of failure in the annals of U.S. intelligence [gathering].' —Director, Center for Korean Affairs (Seoul) As a 20-year educational nonprofit, Posterity Press has very little to gain from being alarmist. Meanwhile, legions of lawyers and public affairs personnel continue to suppress all insinuation of Pentagon inadequacy. This has led to an overly optimistic public perception of all threats to America. So, to get anywhere near the truth about the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), some leeway in open-source intelligence gathering must be permit- ted. The Pentagon’s battlefield superiority largely drives the U.S. economy, so Pyongyang may not be the only governmental entity interested in under-reporting North Korea’s military capabilities. North Korea, which can and is willing to face up to the sole military superpower of the world, cannot be called a weak nation. Nevertheless, Western press and analysts distort the truth and depict North Korea as an “impoverished” na- tion, starving and on the brink of imminent collapse. An xvii PREFACE impoverished, starving nation cannot face down a military superpower.” —Director, Center for Korean Affairs (Seoul) Accurately to predict who wins a conflict between America and. the DPRK, one must first define “victory” and then compare their respective strategies. North Korea has been technically at war with the U.S. since 1953, so its final defeat will take an all-out invasion and unconditional surrender.* Such a thing is hard to accomplish against a society so militaristic that every citizen is expected to become a soldier. Because of the DPRK’s extensive below-ground preparations, no amount of initial U.S. firepower (nuclear or otherwise) is going to destroy its capability to wage surface warfare. After the 38th parallel stalemate of 1951 and Vietnam loss of 1973, the Depart- ment of Defense (DoD) may want to better heed General MacAr- thur’s 1964 advice of “not to send American ground troops . . . any- where on the Asian mainland.” How North Korea would now fight remains largely a mystery, but the U.S. game plan doesn’t. Any punitive non-nuclear strike would first be launched against the DPRK’s hardened missile sites. If Pyongyang failed to back down, other military hardware or infrastructure would be hit. At some point, the Asian nation’s Great Leader might even be targeted.’ Only as a last resort would the U.S. attempt a Hiroshima-like demonstration against missile launch vehicles in a remote region. But, North Korea may not take all of this lying down. It would want to do most of its fighting south of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ)—where there exists a readily available source of resupply. Its army has been specially designed to run on what it can take from a well-endowed opponent. After encircling a few heavily pop- ulated “bargaining chips,” Pyongyang might pull the remainder of its invasion force back into the bomb-proof facilities beneath its southern frontier. Its aim, of course, would be to draw all opposing forces into an extended ground conflict. At that point, America’s expeditionary forces would fight in much the same way they did in the 1950’s. Only this time, their turtle-like phalanxes would be further protected by sophisticated surveillance and targeting equipment. After another amphibious or airborne landing, U.S. mechanized “rock-crusher” formations xviii PREFACE could take back a thoroughly rubbled Seoul. But, at the North Ko- rean border, they may find themselves more “electronically chal- lenged.” Several ridgelines separate Panmunjom from the Pyongyang— each with its own large water barrier.® After a few “low-tech” mod- ifications, all may now be as impenetrable as those at the DMZ in 1953. Even moving across North Korea’s western low lands could prove difficult. They may now contain hidden defense matrices like those that kept a fully supported Chinese army from entering North Vietnam’s heartland in 1979. Throughout Northern Korea, the U.S. Government Issues (GIs) would also face a concerted (con- solidation-blocking) insurgency. Most Americans believe that—for their Armed Forces to be de- feated in battle—the adversary must have as much modern equip- ment. Yet, recent history begs to disagree. Just by “fighting dif- ferently,” Pentagon adversaries have done quite well since 1953. While still loosely defined in America, their strategies have been so successful against Westernized armies as to earn their own title— “Asymmetric Warfare (AW).” Throughout DoD, that term conveys no more specific meaning than “failing to mirror the American way of doing things.” Therein lies a problem. This book should help all American service personnel to better understand what a resump- tion of hostilities with the DPRK might entail. Lr.Cox. H. Joun Poort USMC (Rev.) FORMER FLEET Marine Force Gy.Ser. & ILLINOIS BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AGENT xix ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Thanks be to God for all things productive. North Korea has been guilty of selling arms and fomenting rebellion throughout the world. The question now is whether such behavior can be elimi- nated by offering it another way to sustain its economy. Unlike her past and present mentors, North Korea has no real dream of overseas conquest (other than reuniting the Peninsula). Thus, its long-time animosity towards a former foe after no official peace treaty might be assuaged by more Christian interaction—along with on-site inspections. Considering the extent of the DPRK’s military prowess, it would be worth a try. xxi Part ONE THE Competinc STYLES oF WARFARE “WARS MAY BE FOUGHT WITH WEAPONS, BUT 1 ARE WON BY MEN. Iv Is THE SPIRIT OF MEN . . . THAT GAINS THE VICTORY” — Gen. GrorcE S. Parron = mg Revative DEGREE OF ~ __ TACTICAL SOPHISTICATION @ Did squad tactics evolve as much in U.S. as elsewhere? @ How might America’s enemies take advantage of this? Some Generalizations Will First Be Necessary While frontline US. infantrymen now carry radios, computers, cameras, night vision goggles, range finders, and Global Position- ing Systems [GPSs], they still assault the same way they did in the 1950’s. That’s with a three-to-one manpower edge, on line, upright, and slowly moving forward. (See Figure 1.1.) Meanwhile, North Korean soldiers have shifted away from the human-wave mindset of that era. At the tip of the average DPRK spear is now a single rifle squad. Thus has developed a significant difference in how the two sides fight. THe Competina Stytes or WaRFARE Standard U.S. Infantry A Assault on an Enemy Position, Keren by Fick Ren pose. ecm, galery eageindessarst econ p figured. For any number of reasons, this will be the first full study of the North Korea’s modern-day military potential. More than equipment is involved, so it will necessarily contain some circum- stantial evidence. Most of what has been written so far about the DPRK’s wartime abilities gets bogged down in meaningless minu- tia. For example, the mechanized part of its “order of battle” is of little interest to an adversary who plans to control the airspace. Only, if Pyongyang were concurrently to risk a large part of its rolling stock, would U.S. planes be at all challenged. Yet, one of 4 Revative DEGREE OF Tactical SOPHISTICATION the recognized authorities on such matters claims that the Korean People’s Army (KPA) may attempt to seize the entire peninsula in three days.’ Then, all of those old fashioned tanks, personnel car- riers, and artillery pieces on the move at once might pose quite a problem. Next, there is the little matter of Asian deception. Throughout America’s Far Eastern wars, defenders have mimicked Western formations, waited for their opponent to make the first move, and then engaged him from an unexpected direction. Authorities on Oriental warfare refer to this syndrome as the “False Face” and “Temporary Delay.” Only the least bit difficult to confirm is the greater attention paid to the evolution of squad infantry tactics by the KPA than its U.S. counterpart(s). There are two reasons for this—one internal and the other not. When highly skilled at maneuver, small units tend to display more initiative. To insure complete compliance with White House instructions, the Pentagon seldom delegates that much authority to its bottom echelons. Other nations have had more reason to do so. Being less wealthy, they must com- pensate—with surprise—for any lack of firepower. As with the semi-autonomous German Stormtrooper squads of 1918," an op- timal level of surprise occurs with a tactically gifted squad at the “tip of every spear.” Unfortunately, that’s exactly what the North Koreans now have. All NKA [North Korean Army] divisions and brigades will have a light infantry element which will be forward deployed to conduct [all initial] conventional infantry tactics in the offense.* — “North Korea Handbook” US. Dept. of Defense, PC-2600-6421-94 The KPA’s Way of Fighting The military doctrine of cash-strapped North Korea has be- come quite different from that of the “defense-contract-oriented” Pentagon. A close look at the following official U.S. assessment reveals more emphasis on the tactical ability of each low-ranking soldier within the KPA. Tue Competinc StyLes or WARFARE KPA military doctrine is based on a synthesis of Soviet op- erational practice and Chinese People’s Liberation Army [PLA] military doctrine adapted to conform to the Korean Peninsula’s mountainous terrain and the KPA’s emphasis on light infantry as the key force structure. The result of this amalgamation is the KPA’s five fundamental princi- ples of war: [1] mass and dispersion; [2] surprise attack; [3] increased maneuverability; [4] cunning and personified tactics (such as initiative, leadership, and deception); and [5] secure secrets (including reconnaissance, counterintel- ligence, and terrain utilization) /italics added].° — North Korea, a Country Study of 2008 A greater reliance on the individual fighter is true throughout Communist Asia, but it is particularly strong in North Korea be- cause of Kim II-Sung’s “Juche” or Self-Reliance Policy following the Korean War.® Not only was the country as a whole to become more self-reliant, but also each rifleman. The Chinese Part of North Korea’s Military Heritage The KPA’s warfare style is now mostly Chinese. By the end of the Korean conflict, 73% of all Peoples Republic of China (PRC) infantrymen may have rotated into Korea to gain “modern combat experience.” After an assassination plot by DPRK officers trained in the Soviet Union in the 1980’s, the KPA was purged of all such personnel.* The part of the Chinese battle regimen that is least understood in America is its emphasis on the human component—not on each combatant’s life per se, but on the strategic difference he may make. That’s how China has traditionally attempted to counter Western technology. Mao firmly believed that ... a man could beat a weapon. “Weapons are an important factor in war, but not the de- cisive factor,” Mao wrote. He also said explicitly that “it is people, not things, that are decisive.”® — China’s Battle for Korea, by Xiaobing Li Beijing’s massive population and atheistic ethos have allowed Revative DeGree oF TacticaL SOPHISTICATION it to follow such an approach to battle. Meanwhile, Washington— with its smaller recruiting base and Christian focus—has been hesitant to fully commit (or even train) its infantrymen. Certainly, the Communists have taken more casualties when the two sides fought, but they have also ended up winning (or tying) in the over- all conflict. So, Mao’s point about the power of mind over ordnance may not be so dumb after all. In any war that is not fought to win, all casualties may be in vain. The PLA’s trust in human ingenuity over technology has allowed it to more fully pursue the generally acknowledged alternative to firepower—namely, surprise. Achiev- ing complete surprise through a greater focus on speed, stealth, and deception has led to more small-unit ability and individual initiative within the PLA and KPA. The popular U.S. vision of hundreds of Red soldiers being mown down at once suddenly disappears when the East Asians’ proficiency at dispersing and reassembling is considered. While many of those tiny elements may remain visible to aerial surveil- lance, they are too well spread out to be much hurt by supporting arms. In this way, the Communists can combine large-unit ma- neuvers with Guerrilla Warfare (GW). Proof of Better Small-Unit Tactics Within the KPA For every category of combat, The Tiger's Way disclosed tacti- cal techniques to compensate for almost any deficit in technology or firepower. Over the years, those techniques (football-like moves for squads and below) have been refined by the Germans, Japa- nese, Chinese, North Koreans, and North Vietnamese. Within that book’s first chapter was revealed a unique asset within every KPA battalion—a training cadre of commandos with enough skill to cross the DMZ alone." That means every DPRK rifleman is now getting a least some ninjutsu “fortress entry” instruction. Resembling gymnastics, such training would most easily be accomplished through battledrill competitions between individuals. A good example might be how to dive over a lateral stream of tracer bullets. All North Korean light infantrymen now dedicate at least two months a year to noth- ing but practicing (and likely improving) “squad-level-and-below” combat procedures." THe Competinc StyLes or WARFARE Each [unit’s biannual] cycle consists of approximately 760 hours of training, which progresses from individual . . . exercises to joint service maneuvers.” — North Korean Special Forces, by Bermudez As was also the case during the Korean War, self-improvement efforts by nonrates normally results in an unexpected degree of initiative. “The North Koreans had much more initiative,” he [Joseph Owen, a heavily decorated Korean War vet] said. “They would come on you tenaciously and keep on the attack un- til you killed them. And in defensive positions, they were aggressive and used offensive tactics. Even pinned down, they would get out and come at you. I had great respect for them. They fought with their brains individually.’ — “8 Parting Thoughts,” by Stilwell STREC AB Figure 1.2: All KPA. Riflemen. Have Been. Prepared to \ to Work Alone Revative Degree oF Tacticat SOPHISTICATION Along with this regular practice of squad tactics by the KPA’s frontline fighters occurs the local equivalents to Chinese “Gung Ho” and Vietnamese “Kiem Thao” sessions."* It is through such all-ranks introspection that enough field experimentation takes place for the evolutionary refinement of what might otherwise become outdated “standard operating procedure.” Kim Il Sung was... . sending cadres “down” to local levels . +. requiring small-group . . . “criticism and self-criticism {sessions],” . . . and encouraging soldiers also to engage in [more] production in good “people’s army” fashion. . . . . .. [Sloldiers ... attend . . . self-criticism sessions at least once a week.'® — North Korea Country Study of 2008 To avoid Western bombardment, Eastern armies attack from close range. They also lack the ordnance to operate differently.!® Prerequisite to this style of fighting is—once again—an enhanced Jone-fighter capability. (See Figure 1.2.) The common [Chinese] tactical style manifested itself in the use of surprise, deception and camouflage, movement, patrolling and reconnaissance, and individual skills [italics added]."" — “The Chinese Communist Forces in Korea” U.S. Army, Leavenworth Research Survey No. 6 DPRK Infantry Tactics Are Quite Comprehensive As Western technology has continued to advance, the Eastern trend has been toward: (1) covert maneuver elements operating in conjunction with an actual or feigned holding attack; and (2) some form of “below-ground” offense. For the latter, the Easterner either tunnels beneath his foe’s front lines or simply allows that foe to “overrun” a subterranean attack point. Either way, he can then steal or destroy strategic materiel. The heavy guns with which the Viet Minh leveled Dien Bien Phu had been captured from American units in Korea.'* Even the principal tactical adviser for the U.S. Marine Corps’ Tue Competinc StyLes or WarFARE 29th Commandant and subsequent author of the handbook for its “new-doctrine” admits that Asian small-unit tactics are quite in- novative. [W]hile Oriental armies often can (and have) taken many casualties, their tactics at the small-unit infantry level are often cleverly designed to spare their own men’s lives in the face of massive Western firepower.!” — WSS. Lind (in Foreword to Phantom Soldier) author of Maneuver Warfare Handbook What Has Concurrently Been Going On in America How could each nonrate in the horde of draftees from a Com- munist dictatorship be enjoying more personal leeway in combat than the select infantry volunteer of a free country? Most of the Gis Regularly Function as a Tiny Group 10 Revative Decree oF Tacticat SOPHISTICATION Yank inductee’s natural tendency towards initiative gets driven out of him in boot camp. Then, he must do precisely as told during all initial postings. At no stage of his subsequent time in the U.S. military is there much attempt to reestablish that missing initia- tive. How U.S. units regularly fight also has a lasting effect on all low-ranking members. Along with overwhelming firepower comes less need to surprise one’s quarry. This leads to less small-unit maneuver. But, the Pentagon is not going to freely admit to ignor- ing the evolution of squad tactics. It has a full contingent of pub- lic-affairs personnel to keep anything that embarrassing from ever reaching its rank and file (or the American public). To determine just how outdated U.S. small-unit maneuvers have become, one must closely listen to a well-respected reformer. It is . . . inexcusable that most of the schools American privates go through still teach pre-machine gun tactics [post-machinegun tactics entail less upright movement]. If the Pentagon thought about war, that would be one of the first things it would change. But so long as the Pentagon thinks only about programs and money, American soldiers and Marines will need to discover post-machine gun tactics on their own. Gunny Poole’s books offer them a readily available way to do so.”° — William S. Lind, “Post-Machinegun Tactics,” Military.com, 18 November 2003 Those American riflemen would not still be learning “pre-ma- chinegun” tactics, if their platoons, companies, and battalions were not regularly following traditional procedures. Things have “always been done that way,” because moving slowly around the battlefield in a massive upright formation tends to maximize down-range firepower and headquarters control. Unfortunately, there is a tre- mendous price to be paid for all that structure and “togetherness.” (See Figure 1.3.) [A] small unit, a squad or even a fire team, that is properly trained in modern, post-machinegun techniques can be just. as effective as a much larger unit, while offering the enemy fewer targets. The German Army, which excelled in drawing lessons from its combat experiences, found as early as World 1 THe Competinc StyLes of WARFARE War I that the only difference between a squad attacking a machinegun position and a company doing so was in the number of casualties suffered. Not surprisingly, by 1918 the Stosstrupp, a squad-sized unit, was the basic German tactical building block. In contrast, in most Marine infantry units today, the squad is regarded as merely a subset of the platoon, seldom trained for independent action. The result, in combat, is likely to be a lot of dead Marines, Marines whose deaths could have been avoided if tasks were assigned to smaller units.” — W.S. Lind (One More Bridge to Cross Foreword) author of 4th Generation Warfare Handbook Why Most U.S. Service Members Are Unaware of Deficit Of late, U.S. SOCOM (Special Operations Command) has been handling most of America’s overseas assignments. Equipped with the latest communications, surveillance, and targeting electronics, its commandos (from all four Service Branches) are quite good at what they do. But, that normally amounts to secretly approaching an enemy position and then either studying it or calling in support- ing arms on it. Seldom are they asked to perform the staples of a more “maneuver-oriented” style of warfare—short-range infiltration and surprise ambush. The first requires sneaking through barbed wire, mines, early warning devices, and watchstanders to secretly enter a fully prepared defensive stronghold. The second involves tackling—from close range—a much larger opposition contingent. Notsurprisingly, both maneuvers take advanced tactical techniques and continual rehearsal thereof. An advanced tactical technique is not something that one inherits, reads about, or memorizes. It can only be acquired through continual field testing under unique battlefield conditions (to include simulated casualty assessment). Any bottom-echelon “experimentation” badly flies in the face of the status quo on which all Western bureaucracies depend for consis- tency. It is tactical techniques on which every North Korean infantry squad now works—and may be permitted to refine—for one sixth of every year. It then puts them into practice during the remainder of that year. That’s because its parent unit—through a shortage of 12 Revative Decree OF TacTICAL SOPHISTICATION advanced electronics and ordnance—must largely depend upon 3rd Generation Warfare (3GW)— bypassing the enemy’s frontline fight- ers to more easily get at his command and logistics apparatus. To do so discreetly, that large KPA outfit requires small-unit ambushes as a key part of its defense and short-range infiltration for its main attack. How Squad Maneuver Affects Overall Tactics There’s a limit to how many people can successfully sneak up on, or suddenly appear in front of, a skilled opponent. Normally, it’s about 14 (a single squad). No amount of surveillance and target- ing technology is going to change that. In fact, the extra gear may make attackers or defenders easier to detect. So, without better squad techniques, U.S. outfits won’t be able to fully practice 3GW themselves. They will be restricted to 2nd Generation Warfare (2GW)—trying only to kill more opposition soldiers. And what that way of doing business accomplished in Vietnam will be replayed every time American expeditionary forces venture onto the Asian mainland. The KPA May Try Proliferation of Inconspicuous Actions The supposedly indomitable U.S. phalanx was defeated in Viet- nam by the collective effort of tens of thousands of nearly naked Viet Cong (VC) sappers, each working alone to damage expensive U.S. equipment. If the North Koreans have to fight Americans again, they may try another “seemingly inconsequential” variation of the Asian principle of mass. If the Pentagon deems squad tactics too “elementary” to justify refinement, it may also see little danger from North Korea’s reli- ance on the individual soldier. If advanced types of shoulder-fired weapons were issued in enough quantity to frontline KPA fighters (for use at their own discretion), the combined effect. on U.S. detach- ments might be considerable. But, before any more of the future can be professionally en- tertained, all lessons from when the two sides last fought must be reviewed . 13 Py THE 1951-1953 fe WarniNnG @ Why did Korean War conclude with a two-year stalemate? @ Were truce talks initiated after a U.N. attack had stalled? The Stalemate After halting the Chinese Spring Offensive of April 1951, the U.S. Eighth Army counterattacked at the end of May. It soon oc- cupied “Line Kansas”—some of which lay south of the 38th paral- lel.1 (Compare water features in Maps 2.1 and 2.2.) Yet, United Nations (U.N.) Supreme Commander Ridgway was not to announce his willingness to discuss truce terms until 30 June.’ In the interim, his maneuver elements may have run into unexpected resistance. When the [U.N.] advance had stopped in June, it was not 15 Tue CompetinG StYLes oF WaRFARE along any carefully planned battle line. There were bulges, salients, and vague areas of no man’s land along the whole front.* — This Kind of War, by Fehrenbach Some portions of this ragged formation ran below the latitude that had previously separated the two nations.’ So, the U.N. com- mander would have been still trying to recover all South Korean territory. Historians have confirmed this.° But, after the pause in the fighting and truce initiative, such a gain could have only been possible piecemeal. Still, U.N. forces were to attempt more than just straightening the line. Within their failure to do so lies a unique lesson. From a military standpoint, corrections were needed. In many places the Eighth Army held disadvantageous ground.® — This Kind of War, by Fehrenbach For the remainder of the war, U.N. and Communist units would violently clash, but exchange only a few miles of territory each time. There was a good reason for this. With almost unlimited manpower, the People’s Volunteer Army (PVA) from China had been helping the North Koreans to build a very sophisticated “defense in depth” just north of the 38th parallel. No amount of U.S. mechanized firepower could make much of a dent in it. From the Sea of Japan, on the east, to the Yellow Sea on the west, they burrowed into the earth. They entered mountains from the rear slope, tunneled through to make gun positions opening on the front. ... They dug bunkers in which a com- pany ... could bivouac. They dug so deeply into the earth that no conventional gun or cannon could reach them.’ — This Kind of War, by Fehrenbach However, that Communist tunneling consisted of more than just an entrance passageway to each strongpoint cluster. As on Iwo Jima in 1945,* it undoubtedly connected all those clusters to one another. The total length of the tunnels dug by our army was 1,250 16 THe 1951-1953 Warning st idy 2 ‘Burueng ‘suonisog psenuoy LLU jdy p2-€2 ‘SHON UBEIOY YON JO Sky q@— Ady Zz ‘Buiuang "SUOH!SOg PIEMUC} LS61 ludy pe-22 INOS NY3LSV3 SHL End of Line Kansas Were in South Korea 1 195) "by Sty Mosenan. US Amy Cw 3 Het, Net eaghaur. “CMM Pub. 2-4 pa) 2.1: Parts of East ‘ag 24, Ei i ew Noor 80 aps 17 Tre Competina StyLes oF WARFARE REPUBLIC OF KOREA May Location of 38th Parallel csccuczarmncalte pee Overall Location Of 38th ParAN EY csssan 18 THe 1951-1953 Warninc kilometers. [Near the 38th parallel, the Korean Peninsula is only 193 kilometers wide.] ° — Mao’s Generals Remember Korea, as edited by Xiaobing Li, Millett, and Bin Yu The CPVF [Chinese People’s Volunteer Force] dug more than 780 miles of underground tunnels, and the various kinds of surface entrenchments and communication lines along the front that amounted to. . . 3,900 miles. ... CPVF Com- mand... [was] to standardize the construction. .. . [E]very underground tunnel should be at least 100 feet deep . . . , have more than two exits, .. . and be connected to trenches or other fieldworks.'" — Chinese museum records in China’s Battle for Korea, by Xiaobing Li More About That Defense in Depth In June of 1951, the first echelon of Communist fortifications would have been excavated just north of a consecutive string of hastily erected U.N. defense lines—Jamestown, Wyoming, Missouri, and Kansas. The western-most of those lines (Jamestown) was 30 miles north of Seoul and right at the 38th parallel.'' Then, as U.N. forces attempted to move north, the Reds would have dug successive echelons of defense —creating automatic tunnel connections all the way back to the pre-1950 bunkers. That means many of those passageways led well south of the new DMZ. Only a few have since been discovered. (See Map 2.3.) The Communists had not built their new defense in depth along a gently curving trace, but to coincide with North Korea’s various ridgelines. Designed to bend under heavy pressure, this protective barrier consisted of a series of “soft” belts of sub-surface, but still mutually supporting, strongpoint matrices. That's why at Bloody Ridge—the first U.N. attack objective after the truce talks com- menced —enemy defenders finally pulled back to the next belt (at Heartbreak Ridge).” {After building the first below-ground strongpoint array,} they [the Reds] went backward and dug a new defensive 19 Map 2.3: The Two 0 Koreas P Previously ‘ Separated. by. 38th Parallel shah Tora, edie "280 Nia Kore, OME 9) (soso line, and one beyond that, stretching to the north. They dug a line [series] such as the world had never seen—ten times the depth of any in World War I (WWD." — This Kind of War, by Fehrenbach Of course, the Communist hordes had also constructed all the surface emplacements, trenches (largely covered), and firing steps that would be needed to protect the approaches to this massive underground labyrinth. The various kinds of entrenchments and communication lines that we dug amounted to the total length of 6,240 kilometers. . . . [T]he earthwork construction of more than 20 —_ Jao — Tre 1951-1953 Warning 100,000 bunkers." — Mao’s Generals Remember Korea, as edited by Xiaobing Li, Millett, and Bin Yu Actual Location of Those Defense Lines In the autumn of 1951, the PVA helped to construct three belts of permanent defense works and facilities. Exactly where is now of considerable interest to the Pentagon. The first line was from Cheorwon, Keumhwa, to Munteung- ri and was manned by eight CPVF armies and three NKPA [North Korean People’s Army] corps. The second line was from Keumcheon and Anhap to Koseong and was defended by nine CPVF armies and four NKPA corps. The third line [was] from Haecheon and Euicheon to Tongcheon and em- ployed two CPVF armies.'® — various CPVF documents from China’s Battle for Korea, by Xiaobing Li Most Disturbing of the Defense Belt Attributes At the 38th parallel, North Korea’s mountainous terrain stretch- es all the way to its western coast on the Yellow Sea. Late in the Korean War, Far Eastern U.S. Air Force squadrons were known to have atomic bombs. So, the Communists had carved their sub- surface strongpoints out of solid rock (mostly granite) to withstand a nuclear explosion,"” Then Occurred the Costly Hill Battles While the two sides negotiated, most of the big fights occurred above the 38th parallel. (See Maps 2.4 and 2.5.) Bloody Ridge (18 August - 15 September 1951) 38.255°N, 128.038°E Punchbowl (31 August - 21 September 1951) 38.284°N, 128.125°E 21 THe Competina StyLes OF WARFARE Figure 2.1: Battle of Pork Chop Hill Heartbreak Ridge (13 September - 15 October 1951) 38°18N, 128°1’E Old Baldy (26 June - 4 August 1952) 38°13°4"N, 127°O'1"E White Horse (6 - 15 October 1952) near Triangle Hill Triangle Hill (14 October - 25 November 1952) 38°19°17"N, 127°27°52”E Hill Eerie (21 March - 21 June 1952) 38°15°7"N, 127°03'5"E Outpost Harry (10 - 18 June 1953) 38°19°6"N, 127°17'35"E The Hook (28 - 29 May 1953) 38°01'26"N, 126°50'8"E 22 Tue 1951-1953 Warninc Pork Chop Hill (23 March - 16 July 1953) (See Figure 2.1.) 38°14'29°N, 127°V10"E Kumsong (13 - 27 July 1953). 39.390°N, 127.346°E '* From 1952 onward, all contested territory lay inside what was still North Korea and near the 127° north-south meridian. That’s the same longitude as Seoul. So, one can logically conclude that the U.N. Command had been either attempting to move the west- ern portion of the demarcation line northward or break through to Pyongyang. The last of these battles occurred in July of 1953. Also the farthest north, it was for the Kumsong River Salient occupied by South Korean troops. After the Reds took back the salient, an all- out U.N. counterattack was unable to dislodge the newcomers.'* All fighting then stopped with the signing of the Korean Armistice Agreement. Those Hills Lay Just Inside the Red Defense Zone At the Battle of the Punchbowl, one American GI noticed some- thing that was undoubtedly present throughout the remainder of the Hill Battles. Hill 749 proved to be a heavily defended fortress of bunkers, covered trenches and tunnels and part of the KPA MLR [Communists’ Main Line of Resistance].”° — Punchbow! veteran in his Masters Thesis Those battles hadn’t just been infantry. There had also been extremely heavy U.N. bombardment. No fewer than 451,957 artil- lery rounds had been fired at Bloody Ridge alone,”' and then another 229,724 at Heartbreak Ridge.” But, the enemy’s defenses neverthe- less held. The [Red] bunkers were fortified to withstand air and artil- lery pounding. .. . Dug into the rubble of partially wooded slopes, obscured by morning mists, the North Korean posi- tions were almost impossible to detect.” — This Kind of War, by Fehrenbach 23 THe Competing StyLes or WaRFARE Chinese Had Helped to Design Those Impenetrable Belts In Pyongyang’s present-day Military History Museum is a life- size mock-up of one of those mountain strongpoints (complete with living quarters, armory, supply room, and messhall).” But, most of the details regarding the construction of an entire network of strongpoints comes from former PVA leaders. During that time [just preceding the 1953 Korean hill battles], anyone who happened to enter the mountainous area of our positions could hear the sound of earthwork. . . . Gradually, a defense system took shape. It was backed up by {mutually] supporting [strong] points with tunnel fortifica- Map 2.4: Hill Battles Occurred at Edge of New Communist MLR (Sace Some Src Eater Ag rr orereannin coher nn) 24 Tue 1951-1953 Warning THE STABILIZED FRONT 1952 - 1953 reer UNITED NATIONS Line 27 wu 1953 » © wee

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