Francisco Chavez v. Raul M.

Gonzales
GR No. 168338, 15 February 2008
Ponente: Puno

FACTS:
A year following the 2004 national and local elections, Press Secretary Ignacio Bunye disclosed
to the public how the opposition planned to destabilize the administration by releasing an
audiotape of a mobile phone conversation allegedly between President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo and Commissioner Garcillano of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The
conversation was alleged to have been audio-taped through wire-tapping. On June 8, 2005,
respondent Secretary Raul Gonzales of the Department of Justice (DOJ) warned reporters who
are in possession of copies of the said conversation, as well as those broadcasting companies
and/or publishers that they may be held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act. Consequently,
the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) issued a press release strengthening the
prohibition on the dissemination of the same – that the broadcasting/airing of such information
shall be just cause for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or
authorizations issued by the Commission. Petitioner Francisco Chavez filed a petition against
respondent Chavez and NTC, praying for the issuance of writs of certiorari and prohibition for
the nullification of the acts, issuances and orders of respondents – as they were outright
violations of the freedom of expression and of the press, and the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern.

ISSUE: Whether or not the acts of the respondents abridge freedom of speech and of the press.

HELD:

Yes. Generally, restraints on freedom of speech and expression are evaluated by either or a
combination of three tests, i.e., (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine, which limits speech once
a rational connection has been established between the speech restrained and the danger
contemplated; (b) the balancing of interests tests, a standard when courts balance conflicting
social values and individual interests, and (c) the clear and present danger rule which rests on
the premise that speech may be restrained because there is substantial danger that the speech
will likely lead to an evil the government has a right to prevent.

It appears that the great evil which government wants to prevent is the airing of a tape
recording in alleged violation of the anti-wiretapping law. However, respondents’ evidence falls
short of satisfying the clear and present danger test. Firstly, the various statements of the
Press Secretary obfuscate the identity of the voices in the tape recording. Secondly, the
integrity of the taped conversation is also suspect. The Press Secretary showed to the public
two versions, one supposed to be a “complete” version and the other, an “altered” version.
Thirdly, the evidence of the respondents on the who’s and the how’s of the wiretapping act is
ambivalent, especially considering the tape’s different versions. The identity of the wire-
tappers, the manner of its commission and other related and relevant proofs are some of the
invisibles of this case. Fourthly, given all these unsettled facets of the tape, it is even arguable
whether its airing would violate the anti-wiretapping law.

We rule that not every violation of a law will justify straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of
speech and of the press.

The need to prevent their violation cannot per se trump the exercise of free speech and free
press, a preferred right whose breach can lead to greater evils. For this failure of the
respondents alone to offer proof to satisfy the clear and present danger test, the Court has no
option but to uphold the exercise of free speech and free press. There is no showing that the
feared violation of the anti-wiretapping law clearly endangers the national security of the
State.