Famine Policy of the British

The movie Dunkirk has just hit the theatres and is a classic wartime drama that brings to life the
biggest ever evacuation from a battle-field ever in human history, the Battle of Dunkirk. For the
apologists of the British Empire and fantasisers of the idea of ‘Free-Britain’ and return to the days of
Pax-Britannica, this movie is a classic testament of the Britain’s fight to secure the freedom of the
World from dictators and radical forces. While Britain claimed to be fighting a war for freedom
elsewhere, great ‘UnBritish’ practices were being perpetrated in India which culminated in the Bengal
Famine less than 3 years after the Battle of Dunkirk. Millions of tonnes of wheat and rice were
exported from India and supplied to already well-fed and sturdy British soldiers elsewhere around the
world. So what was at the core of this practice and how was it perpetrated for around two decades?
Those are the question this write-up seeks to answer.

Famine policy before the British

Before the British came, Indian rulers had supported the farmers by policies of tax relief, putting a
price ceiling on food prices and by banning food exports from the famine-hit region. Arthashastra by
Kautilya also talks about several measures that the administration should take in case of such a
calamity. Besides this there was a strong tradition of charity during periods of scarcity.

Reasons behind British Famine Policy

Other than sheer contempt and apathy for Indians, several other factors contributed to the British
Famine policy and are worth analysing here. The famines did little to alarm British administrators into
action. As Will Durant puts it”American Charity has often paid for relief works in India, while the
government collected tax from the dying. “ Ramesh Chandra Dutt similarly argues that there was
never a year in India where the food supply in India was insufficient for the people.

1. Free Trade principles of Adam Smith : Adam Smith propounded the theory of Invisible
Hand, and the idea that collective self-interests will in the end serve the interests of the
society at large. This idea was something the British colonialists swore by. It was considered
common wisdom that government intervention in famines was unnecessary and even harmful.
The market it was believed would restore proper balance.
2. Malthusian Theory of Population: Malthusian theory was based on the premise that the
population growth is happening in a geometric progression, while growth of resources is
happening in an arithmetic progression. To Robert Malthus, who very aptly taught at the East
Indian Company College, this meant that the population growth would soon outweigh the
growth of resources. Hence, to him famines, droughts and natural calamities were a ‘positive
check’ on this burgeoning population. This justified the hands-off approach of British policy.
However the Malthusian theory has been criticized by later thinkers and a theory of
Demographic Transition advanced as a more credible alternative. Economists like Amartya
Sen etc have proved conclusively that famines occur not because of scarcity of goods per se,
as the Malthusian theory implies, but as a result of lack of access or transportation of food.
3. Financial Prudence: The British were very particular to not spend money they had not
budgeted for and stuck to this practice even in the face of famines. One governor of Bengal
retorted on being questioned on the lackadaisical approach of the government to the Orissa
Famine, that he would be no better than a ‘dacoit’ or a thief if he attempted to do so.
 Famine Policy under the Company Rule
During almost a century of rule by the East India Company, India suffered 12 Major famines and 4
severe scarcities. . In the year 1769-1770 there broke out a major Famine in Bengal, which according
to BL Grover wiped a third of the population of the province. No relief measures worth the name were
provided during this time. Infact the East India Company officials engaged in profiteering by buying
up rice and selling it at higher prices.

In 1784 another famine struck the whole of Northern India. During the Madras famine of 1792, the
British instituted some relief works for the famine stricken. In 1803, there was another famine in the
North-Western provinces and Oudh. However in 1837 when famine hit the Upper India, the local
government laid down a policy of finding work for the able-bodies, while it was left to the
communities to look after their infirm. The measures as evident were wholly insufficient.

In summary during the Company rule, there was absolutely no laid down policy of Famine relief.
There were disorganised efforts and experiments by the local administration, but they proved wholly
insufficient

Famines under the British Crown

With the transfer of power to the British crown, there was some change in the erstwhile policy of
doing nothing. With the extension of railways and other means of transport, growth of overseas trade,
things changes, albeit a little. The state realised its responsibility of organising irrigation facilities,
enactment of agrarian reform and preventive measures as well as the formulation of a famine policy.

The Orissa famine, 1866: The famine followed the drought which took place in 1866, and affected
areas of Odisha, Northern Bengal and Bihar. The situation was particularly severe in Odisha were 13
lakh people died. The government adhered to the aforementioned policy of free trade and non-
intervention, it provided employment to the able bodied, leaving the weak and infirm to fend for
themselves.

The Odisha famine in many ways formed the turning point of British famine policy. A committee was
constituted under Sir George Campbell to investigate the famine policies. The committee made
representations to the Royal Commission of 1880. Sir Lawrence, the governor general blamed himself
for listening to the facile assurances of the provincial government. The government declared its
objective to save every life and district officials were to be held personally liable for any preventable
deaths that occurred. The old policy of leaving the infirm to fend for themselves was completely
abandoned.

The famine of 1876-78: It was perhaps the most grievous calamity in the 19 th century. It affected
Madras, Bombay, Uttar Pradesh and Punjab. It affected an area of 257,000 sq. miles and 58 million.
RC Dutt estimated that 5 million people perished during single year. The government famine policy
and preparedness was inadequate and ineffective and they made half-hearted attempts to lessen the
suffering. The policy of saving all lives no matter the cost was never achieved.

To add insult to injury, Lord Lytton organised the grand Delhi Durbar to celebrate Queen Victoria’s
accession to the throne and diverted funds away from the famine efforts. Lord Lytton even looked
down upon gratuitous charity by others and tried to scrap of a subscription fund, but faced major
embarrassment when he learnt that Queen Victoria had herself subscribed for it.

Recommendations of the Strachey Commission:

In 1880 Lytton appointed a commission under Sir Richard Strachey to formulate general principles
and suggest measures. Following recommendations were made

1. Employment should be offered before the physical efficiency of the person is impaired.
Wages should be revised from time to time
2. It should be the duty of the state to provide gratuitous relief to the impotent poor.
3. Supplied of food in distressed areas should be carefully watched. However the government
must trust private supply, unless it became certain that action should be taken
4. It recommended suspension and revision of land revenue in affected areas
5. Cost to be borne by provincial government. However central assistance should be made
available whenever necessary
6. In times of excessive drought, measures should be taken to move cattle to greened pastures

The government accepted the recommendation and a famine code was propounded in 1833

The famine of 1896-97: Between 1800 and 1896 there were two famine s and 5 scarcities. This
famine affected almost every province to a relative degree, with a total of 34 million people affected.
The relief measures were conducted fairly except in the Central Provinces were death toll rose high. A
commission headed by Sir James Lyall adhered to the views expressed by the commission of 1880
suggesting some flexible measures.

Famine of 1899-1890: It affected an area of 189,000 sq. miles and 28 million populations. The
authorities either failed or refused to open relief works in the early stages of the famine. And
wherever the relief was provided, the system broke down after sometime.

Recommendations of the MacDonnel commission: Sir Anthony MacDonnell was appointed by

Lord Curzon to make recommendations about famine policy. It submitted its report on 1901 where it
emphasised accepted tenets of relief supply suggesting variation whenever necessary. It emphasised a
moral strategy which included early distribution of advances for seed and cattle and sinking of
temporary wells. It recommended appointment of a famine commission in Provinces which were
supposed to be badly hit. It gave preference to village works over large scale public works which had
hitherto been the backbone of relief work. It stressed desirability of better transport, banking and
irrigation facilities to combat famines.

Most of the recommendations were accepted, before Curzon left India

The Bengal Famine Seventy years ago, at least 3 million people died from starvation and malnutrition
during a famine in the Indian province of Bengal -- a partly man-made disaster that has been largely
forgotten by the world beyond North-Eastern India

A complex confluence of malign factors led to the catastrophe, which occurred with the world at war,
including, as Indian parliamentary member and leading agricultural scientist M. S. Swaminathan cited
in the Hindu newspaper, the Japanese occupation of neighboring Burma and damage to the local rice
crop due to tidal waves and a fungal disease epidemic.

Swaminathan also blamed “panic purchase and hoarding by the rich, failure of governance,
particularly in relation to the equitable distribution of the available food grains, disruption of
communication due to World War II and the indifference of the then UK government to the plight of
the starving people of undivided Bengal.”
Churchill’s attitude toward India was quite extreme, and he hated Indians, mainly because he knew
India couldn’t be held for very long. One can’t escape the really powerful, racist things that he was
saying. It certainly was possible to send relief but for Churchill and the War Cabinet that were
hoarding grain for use after the war.”

Churchill’s hostility toward Indians has long been documented. Reportedly, when he first received a
telegram from the British colonial authorities in New Delhi about the rising toll of famine deaths in
Bengal, his reaction was simply that he regretted that nationalist leader Mahatma Gandhi was not one
of the victims.

Later at a War Cabinet meeting, Churchill blamed the Indians themselves for the famine, saying that
they “breed like rabbits.”

His attitude toward Indians was made crystal clear when he told Secretary of State for India Leopold
Amery: "I hate Indians. They are a beastly people with a beastly religion."

According to the BBC, Madhushree Mukherjee said that Cameron should have apologized for the
Bengal famine on behalf of his predecessor in Downing Street from decades ago -- indeed; even
former Prime Minister Tony Blair apologized for Britain's culpability in the Irish potato famine of the
1840s.
Outside of India, the Bengal famine of 1943 might only be known through the efforts of Indian
filmmaker Satyajit Ray, who directed a movie in 1973 called "Ashani Sanket" (“Distant Thunder”),
based on a novel by the same name by Bengali author Bibhutibhushan Bandyopadhyay.

 Sources and further reading :

Shashi Tharoor, An Era of Darkness, Chapter The Myth of Enlightened Despotism

VD Mahajan, The History of Modern India, Chapter ‘Famines in India and the Development of
Famine Policy

BL Grover, A new look at Modern Indian History, Chapter The Development of Famine Policy