Coming To Terms The Prospects and Polici

Greek Foreign Affairs Council
Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies
Constitutional Development and Democratization

Professor Justin Orlando Frosini
Leonidas Marcantonatos
Coming to Terms: The prospects and policies for (re)unifying Cyprus under a New Constitution
Contents
Introduction Page 2
1. Current state of affairs Page 3
Α. The obstacles to reunification
2. The State within

A. Type of State (Federation, By communal, Republic) Page 5
B. Language and Religion
B1 Language Page 6
B2 Religion Page 7
3. A New Constitution
A. Type of Democracy
A.1 Presidential – Semi Presidential Page 8
A.2 Election Process Page 8
A.3 Veto Powers Page 9
B. Quotas on Powers – Governance and Power Sharing
B.1 Power Sharing – the UN Proposal Page 10
B2. Power Sharing – Quota representation proposal Page 10
B.3 The limits of equal representation Page 11
C. Possible electoral solutions for a quota representation
C.1 The existing electoral system Page 12
C.2 Proposal - Quota representation on an electoral list Page 12
C.3 Election outcome – Seat distribution Page 13
C.4 House of Representatives Page 18
C.5 Judicial Body Page 18
C.6 Referendum – Parties Involved Page 19
4. Final Notes – Finding an Alternative Settlement Page 20

APPENDIX A Important Elements of the Annan Plan (2004) Page 22
APPENDIX B Chronology of Events Page 23
Bibliography – Endnotes Page 25
1 Copyright © Greek Foreign Affairs Council. All rights reserved
Introduction
Cyprus, a small island in the Mediterranean, with a presence of Greek and Turkish
populations, has been struggling ever since 1974 to reunify its two communities under one
constitution. As a former British Colony, the 1960 Constitution gave independence under a
Greek leadership with rights to the Turkish minority, however after an unsuccessful Greek driven
coup to take over the island, the Turkish invasion of 1974 resulted in the island split de facto in
half with a sovereign state under Greek leadership in the south and the Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus in the north, which however is not recognised by the International Community.
Since then, unfruitful negotiations and unsuccessful attempts to reunify have been made for the
island to retain its unity under one constitution. Subsequently, the first real attempt to reunify the
island was made in 2004 with the UN-backed Annan Plani which was however rejected by the
Greek-Cypriot side after a nation-wide referendum.
Either way, one has to question what makes this long peaceful dispute, peaceful and different
from other international cases. Evidently, Cyprus is a divided nation with only two ethnic
communities, an EU member state and a core part of the geostrategic interests of Europe. It is
situated in the eastern part of the Mediterranean and provides a source of stability in protecting
European political and economic interests in the Middle East. Thus, paradoxically, Europe’s
eastern part remains divided in a very unstable region and scholars have supported that the time
has come to resolve one of Europe’s contemporary dispute. On the same note, the official
position of the International Community remains a viable solution which will be a product of the
reunification of the island under one constitution. However, over the past few years another
proposal has surfaced asserting the fact that the Cyprus issue should not be resolved, and that
silently and periodically the island of Cyprus should de facto host two countries rather than one.
Currently, the Cyprus dispute does not only require a new Constitution, it requires coming to
terms across issues in the talks that seem insoluble on their own. These include the multi-billion
euro issue of compensation for restitution of Greek Cypriot properties after the Turkish invasion
of 1974, involving perhaps three quarters of the territory of the Turkish Cypriot north; the future
of immigrants from Turkey, the Turkish Cypriot wish (backed by Turkey) for a continued
Turkish military guarantee; and the question of how much of the 37 per cent of the island now in
Turkish hands will pass to the Greek Cypriots.
In effect, the purpose of this paper will not be to present a solution for the latter issues but
instead, by trying to take in account the interests of both sides regarding power sharing, it will
assess the foundations for a viable Constitution of a reunified Cyprus which is fundamental in
resolving the dispute. Moreover, it will support that the basic structural principles for a solution
exist and that the Cyprus dispute can only be resolved if both negotiating sides exclude taboos
from the negotiation process and agree on a quota power sharing in the executive, legislative and
judicial levels of the new state.
i See APPENDIX A

1. Current state of affairs
1. Α The obstacles to reunification
In principle, Greek Cypriots strongly support a unitary state, but that is rejected by most
Turkish Cypriots. A two-state solution is generally supported by Turkish Cypriot public opinion,
but is rejected by Greek Cypriots as they support that it legalizes Turkish military presence on
the island after 1974. Thus, although Greek Cypriots strongly oppose partition, they also oppose
most elements of a bizonal, bicommunal federation.
Diplomats and officials sometimes suggest a light confederation1 . Such formula may
theoretically be easier for Greek Cypriots to accept and might lead to a single Cypriot state. The
Greek Cypriot majority of the island that took exclusive control of the internationally-recognised
Republic of Cyprus, remains officially opposed to formal partition as that would violate
fundamental principles of International Law2 .
The Greek Cypriot position supports that in order to win a voluntary agreement, Turkey and
the Turkish Cypriots would have to offer much: to return long-occupied territory like the
abandoned city of Famagusta; pull back all or almost all of Turkey’s occupation troops; offer
guaranteed compensation within an overall deal on property that both sides still own in each
other’s territory and acknowledge full Greek Cypriot control of territorial waters south of the
island that have proven natural gas deposits3 .
Additionally, Greek Cypriots support that there is a need of positive rhetoric and gestures
from Turkey in order to persuade Greek Cypriots to consider alternatives. The Turkish think-tank
Global Political Trends Centre which has worked hard in civil society and background meetings
to promote a federal settlement has cautiously supported that Turkey should set aside “old
reflexes”, “adopt a totally different policy and turn the stalemate into an opportunity. Staying
within a federal framework, we just might reach a solution. But the main point should be to keep
avenues of communication open for all possible outcomes” 4 .
On the contrary however, the idea that the Cyprus negotiations could include the possibility
of legalising Cyprus’s divided status quo, with the Turkish Cypriot entity consolidating its self-
declared independence and gaining the right to join in the long term, the EU, has lately become
common among academics and experts on the issue. As a U.S. Congressional Research Service
paper put it, the failures in 2004 and 2008-2012 have “led some observers to question whether a
settlement could still be achieved at all or whether, despite all of the rhetoric, maintaining the
status quo for the Greek Cypriots, or moving to permanent separation on the part of the Turkish
Cypriots, could become less desirable but inevitable outcomes for both sides” 5

The principal problem is that such arguments are rarely heard from Greek Cypriots, at least
in public meaning that Greek Cypriots easily dismiss the idea of giving Turkey what it wants. In
Ankara, mutually negotiated separation is not Turkey’s current official policy, even if many
Turkish policy makers privately believe that it would be the most rational one and close to
Turkish Foreign Policy interests6 . Turkish and Turkish Cypriot officials always underline the
primary goal of a bicommunal, bizonal settlement, not believing that Greek Cypriots would ever
settle for anything different. However, legitimising Turkish Cypriot self-determination has been
taboo outside the Turkish Cypriot entity and its backers in Turkey. If Ankara has a fall-back
policy that it pursues in parallel to federal reunification, it has so far been based on the idea of
persuading the international community that the only alternative is to accept the “TRNC” as it is.
All in all, any Cyprus settlement will need strong, multi-year guarantees of implementation
through a mix of UN, U.S. and EU oversight, as did the Annan Plan in 2004. Final details would
probably need international arbitration on some points, such as the power sharing in government
and parliament of the two ethnic entities. It would also need guarantees that during a strictly
supervised transition period Turkey would withdraw its troops, not annex the “TRNC” and end
interference in Greek Cypriot affairs. Greek Cypriots would need to end verifiably their EU
sanctions against Turkey in order for the settlement to be complete. Under any settlement
Turkish Cypriots should move from an Ankara-led proposal to an EU-led one and both sides
would have to be fully conscious of the massive adjustments needed 7 . In other words, with
public taboos involved and silent policies of a two-state settlement, would incur quiet diplomacy
which would be necessarily in order for both sides to come to terms for a mutually accepted
solution to the Cyprus dispute.

2. The State Within
The point here will be to adjust the thin line and the intersection of both Greek Cypriot and
Turkish Cypriot positions in order to assess a viable solution. The assessment will be based on
the hypothesis that the two negotiating sides have set aside national taboos and sat around the
table finding a mutually accepted solution in A) The type of Democracy of the new State
(Presidential, Semi Presidential) B) The election process of the executive and legislative powers
and C) the composition of the Supreme Judicial Body. Moreover the assessment will counter
itself in many parts surfacing the problems that such a mutual solutions will produce in the case
of Cyprus.
In principle, the mutually accepted framework would probably be based on a two community
solution with equal rights for both communities and quotas depending on population in every
level of the political sphere i.e. the Executive, the Legislative and the Judicial bodies.
A. Type of State (Federation, By communal, Republic)
One must note that due to difference in opinions from both ethnic communities, the two
parties should agree that the new state should be referred solely with its contemporary name:
‘The Republic of Cyprus’, without any additional terms in the official name such as ‘Federal,
Federation or Democratic Republic’. This view is based on the fact that a simple term would
apply in order to give emphasis on the unity of the new republic and not on the division. In fact,
although the term ‘Federal’ or ‘Federation’ does give emphasis on the bicommunal unity of the
new republic, it may backfire and create the opposite effects, symbolizing the historical ethnic
division between the two communities. Moreover, by referring to the new country with one
name, might serve the basis for constructing in the long term one ethnic identity (Cypriot
national identity) rather than one ethnic identity with ethnic subdivisions (Greek Cypriot and
Turkish Cypriot)8 .
Regarding the new country’s international relations, both sides should agree that the new
state should not only continue to be a member of the European Union (Cyprus became an EU
member in 2004), but also International Agreements which were signed all these years from the
Greek Cypriot sovereign state and the self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, must
continue to apply for the newly formed state ii. As a result, a new solution will have to incorporate
the Northern part into the Southern part by reasserting the continuity of the Republic of Cyprus.
iiii The only International Agreements that the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, has is with Turkey

B. Language and Religion
B1. Language
The two parties should agree that the constitution of the new state should have clauses of
an official language and possibly a reference to an official state religion. Taking in account that
the New Republic would include Greek and Turkish speaking populations the negotiators could
adopt Belgium’s linguistic example. The Belgian Constitution guarantees, since the country's
independence, freedom of language in the private sphere. Article 30 specifies that "the use of
languages spoken in Belgium is optional; only the law can rule on this matter, and only for acts
of the public authorities and for legal matters." For the public authorities, there is extensive
language legislation concerning Dutch, French and German, even though the Belgian
Constitution does not explicitly mention which languages enjoy official status. Article 4 does
however divides the country into linguistic areas, which form the basis of the federal structure:
"Belgium has four linguistic areas: The French-speaking area, the Dutch-speaking area, the
bilingual area of Brussels Capital and the German-speaking area."
Likewise, a new constitution of Cyprus could mention the fact that there are three
linguistic areas: The North Turkish-speaking area, the South Greek-speaking area and the
bilingual area of Nicosia Capital. On the same lines, a new constitution of the Republic of
Cyprus must be written in Greek and Turkish. Thus, it would be applicable to have two official
languages used in every aspect of the state, from official documents to road signs. Moreover, a
clause under education on the new constitution would be applicable in underlining that both
communities should adapt each other’s language in school and universities curriculums creating
a bilingual state in the form of Belgium.
An issue however that arises here is which would be the official translat ion of the new
constitution of the Cypriot Republic and which language (Greek or Turkish) would be the
official one. Here, the Canadian Constitution may provide a possible solution as it recognizes the
equal authority of French and English, which in our case could apply for Greek and Turkish.
The example of Canada is interesting in this respect as Section 23 of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms is the section of the Constitution of Canada, which guarantees
minority language educational rights to French-speaking communities outside Quebec, and, to a
lesser extent, English-speaking minorities in Quebec. In extent, Section 16 (1) of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms confirms that English and French are Canada's official
languages. It also notes that these languages have equal status in terms of their use within and by
all federal institutions. Notably, the province of New Brunswick is also officially bilingual.
More specifically, sections 17, 18, 19 and 20 of the Canadian Constitution all deal with
similar issues: the equality of the French and English languages in particular situations. For
example, everyone has the right to use English or French in Parliament (section 17). This means
that, for example, a witness before a Parliamentary committee may use either official language.
Furthermore, federal laws must be published in both English and French (section 18), and
everyone has the right to use French or English in any court established by Parliament, including
the Supreme Court of Canada (section 19). Members of the public have the right to communicate

with the federal government in either English or French. The government must provide services
in both languages at all of its central offices and in other locations where there is a significant
demand for them or it would be reasonable to expect them (section 20).
B2. Religion
Regarding religion, the negotiators should take into account that the majority of the
Greek Cypriots are Greek Orthodox, while the majority of Turkish Cypriots are Sunni Muslims.
In effect, both sides should consider a possible clause in the new constitution about religion of
the new state. Indeed, the latter policy will recognise the two existing religions, and serve as a
constitutional guardianship for both the Greek majority and the Turkish minority in protecting
their religious rights. Nonetheless, a religion clause in the constitution should not be followed by
increased powers of the leadership of these religions and should emphasize on a clear separation
between state and church or the Sunni spiritual leadership. This will also serve as a safeguard in
preventing extreme radical nationalistic groups which identify themselves through religion. An
issue however with the Turkish Cypriot minority arises with regards to specific forms of the
Sharia law and more specifically with that of the role of religious courts. An example which
would apply in the Cypriot issue is the legal status of the Muslim minority in the region of
Thrace in Greece.
The main minority issue regarding the relationship between the Greek state and that of
the Muslim minority in Thrace is that of the appointment of Muftis. The Muftis are Muslim
religious scholars who issue influential legal opinion interpreting Sharia (Islamic law). The
Greek government started appointing muftis instead of holding elections after the death of Mufti
of the city of Komotini in 1985. Thus, the Greek government maintained the latter policy since
the practice of state-appointed muftis is also carried out in Turkey as well. Human Rights Watch
alleges that this is against the Lausanne Treaty (1923) which grants the Muslim minority the
right to organize and conduct religious affairs free from government interference (although it is
unclear whether issues such as inheritance law are religious matters) 9 . The main issue with the
muftis is that they perform certain judicial functions in matters of family and inheritance law in
the Sunni societies and a significant portion of the Muslim community in Thrace does not
recognize the legal status of the Greek civil courts but would instead adhere to the presence of
the Muftis. As such, there are two muftis for each post, one elected by the participating faith, and
one appointed by Presidential Decree which is recognised by the Greek state.
The status that exists now in North Cyprus is that the institution of Evkaf provides for
control by government instead of the muftis which are concentrated in their spiritual practices.
Moreover, all commercial and financial dealings under the Evkaf Office operate independently
of the spiritual side of religion. Under a new constitution, it is evident that if Sunni Cypriot
Muslims were to proceed in solving legal disputes under a Mufti, the latter should be state
appointed in order to avoid spheres of nationalistic or radical Islamic influence within the
Turkish Cypriot communities. Moreover, this could serve as a safeguard in order to control any
cells of extremism within these Muslim communities as the state would have the principle role in
appointing the new Muftis.

3. The New Constitution
A. Type of Democracy
A.1 Presidential – Semi Presidential
Taking in account the previous proposed Presidential system of the Annan Plan (2004)iii,
the negotiators could take into account the idea of having a fixed four year term for a Greek-
Cypriot President representing the majority and a Turkish-Cypriot Vice – President representing
the minority. One can argue that the Bosnian example could apply here, meaning that of a
rotation system between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot President. Specifically, that
would require a three member Presidential Council were the President and Vice President would
rotate adding a Deputy Vice President selected by the Parliament which would complete the
other two in matters of administration creating a so-called governing ‘Troika’ as seen in the case
of Bosnia.
A.1.1 First type of Presidential Council – Three Member Presidential Council
President of the Republic 2 year term rotation with VP Greek Cypriot
Vice President 2 year term rotation with President Turkish Cypriot
Deputy Vice President 2 year term when Turkish President Greek Cypriot
Deputy Vice President 2 year term when Greek President Turkish Cypriot
According to the Article V of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Presidency
of Bosnia and Herzegovina consists of three members: one Bosniak and one Croat elected from
the Federation and one Serb elected from the Republika Srpska. Together, they serve one four-
year term. The member with the most votes becomes the chairperson unless he or she was the
incumbent chairman at the time of the election, but the chairmanship rotates every eight months,
to ensure equality. The above example evidently would only work in the case of Cyprus by
applying a 2:1 system quota as the Greek Majority consists approximately of 75% of the island’s
population while the Turkish Cypriot population consists that of 25%. In other words having a
Turkish Cypriot President governing in a presidential system of rotation without two Greek
Cypriot vice presidents and vice versa, would create evident problems for the Greek Cypriot
majority and not satisfy the quotas on the island.
iii
The 5th revision of the Annan Plan proposed the creation of the United Cyprus Republic, covering the island of
Cyprus in its entirety except for the British Sovereign Base Areas. This new country was to be a federation of two
constituent states – the Greek Cypriot State and the Turkish Cypriot State – joined together by a federal
government apparatus. This federal level, purported to be loosely based on the Swiss federal model, would have
incorporated the following elements: A collective Presidential Council, made up of six voting members, allocated
according to population (per present levels, four Greek Cypriots and two Turkish Cypriots), and selected and voted
in by parliament. An additional three non-voting members would be assigned 2:1. A President and Vice President,
chosen by the Presidential Council from among its members, one from each community, to alternate in their
functions every 20 months during the council's five-year term of office.

A.1.2 Second type of Presidential Council – President and Vice President
An alternative proposed type of Presidential Council that both sides can consider is a
fixed four year term for the President alongside with the Vice President. The President would
represent the majority of the Island (Greek Cypriot) while the Vice President would represent the
minority of the island (Turkish-Cypriot). Elections would be held at regular times and could not
be triggered by a vote of confidence or other parliamentary procedures.
President of the Republic 4 year term Greek Cypriot
Vice President 4 year term Turkish Cypriot
A.2 Election Process

An effective election process of the A.1.2 proposal would be having Greek Cypriot
presidential and Turkish Cypriot vicepresidential candidates on one ticket, like in the U.S., with
weighted cross-voting to give Turkish Cypriots a bigger say, and victory going to whichever
ticket wins more than 50 per cent island-wide
10
. This would in effect force candidates from both communities stand on a joint list, thus
taking away any possible ethnic tension amongst both communities during the electoral process.
A.3 Veto Powers
Another issue that arises here is, if the elected President and Vice-President should both
have veto powers in matters of legislation and judicial affairs. Accordingly, if we were to apply a
traditional Presidential or Semi-Presidential system, it would be applicable for the President and
the respective Vice President to have veto-powers in matters of legislation. In order to have the
veto power used effectively and not for the purposes of vetoing legislation to the disadvantage of
the community, the veto should only apply if it is used by both the President and the Vice-
President. For example, if the Parliament decides to pass a legislation on abortion and the
President decides to veto it, then the veto will be applied only if the Vice President concurs to the
President’s veto.

Β. Quotas on Powers – Governance and Power Sharing
According to the last Preliminary Results of the Census of Population in 2011 in Cyprus,
the population residing in the Greek Cypriot side accounted of 804 407 citizens iv11 while the
population residing in the North Turkish Cypriot side accounted of 296 906 citizens 12 . Evidently,
this accounts to a 75-25 population division of the island and thus any negotiation on quotas on
the executive, legislative and the judicial powers could take in account a 75/25 principle which
would however not satisfy the Turkish Cypriot side but also give increased political rights to the
Greek Cypriot majority. In addition, another solution that has been proposed merely satisfying a
75/25 principle is that of the Veto power only from the Turkish Cypriot representative in the
Executive Power in any matters of legislation and executive powers (In this case as seen in the
A.1.2 Proposal). This would however produce more tensions as evidently the right to veto could
backfire in the early stages of the New Republic.
B.1 Power Sharing – the UN Proposals
In the UN’s list of tentative convergences in the 2008-2012 process, twenty of the 75
pages relate to governance and power sharing13 . The two communities would each supply a
president and vice-president with six-year terms; a cabinet of ministers with a Greek Cypriot
majority; a senate with equal representation; a parliament with proportional (probably one
quarter) Turkish Cypriot community membership; and deadlock-breaking mechanisms and
ethnic ratios to be applied to courts and the federal civil service. However, the appointment of
ministers and cabinet voting would be complex to ensure ethnic groups were balanced in the fear
that one might dominate.
B2. Power Sharing – Quota representation proposal
Regarding the members of the cabinet, they should serve at the pleasure of the president
and must carry out the policies of the executive and legislative branches. In terms of splitting the
ministers in quotas, again a 75/25 principle could take be taken in account by the negotiators in
order to serve the purposes of a stable majority. A counter claim here may be that a 75/25
principle might not be effective and be abused by the majority, thus a 60/40 principle would
apply for our cause.
Another issue that arises here is the number of ministers and minis tries in a cabinet. More
specifically, one can argue that a government cannot have a fixed number of Ministries for the
sake of powers in quotas as that would create administrative and economic problems. For
example, if the new Republic has to have a fixed number of 10 ministries, with one of them
being a Ministry of Agriculture (Cyprus is not known for its large Agricultural contribution to its
GDP) for the sake of serving the quota system, that would create a Ministry which would be
administratively and economically ineffective.

B.3 The limits of equal representation
Though in principle the rights of the minority should be protected by a new Cypriot
Constitution, evidently equal representation in all levels of the state cannot be a form of solution
as the majority will feel oppressed by the minority. Although equal representation in post-
conflict countries such as Bosnia Herzegovina and Lebanonv predicts equal majority and
minority rights, the proposal of having an equal representation in the legislative level will
certainly create tensions as the southern part of the island will be subject to lesser representatives
than it already has taking in account the populations of the two communities on the island
Moreover, we should note here that the cases of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Lebanon are cases
were more than two or three ethnic and religious groups exist, and the power sharing was
adjusted accordingly. In the case of Cyprus, there are only two communities thus, creating a
Senate with half members being Greek Cypriot and half members being Turkish Cypriot, defeats
the purpose of creating a viable long-term solution for the island as it would immediately create
tensions from the Greek-Cypriot side which will feel that its political rights are underrepresented.
vThe President of Lebanon is elected by the Parliament for a six-year term and cannot be reelected again until six
years have passed from the end of the first term. The Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister are appointed by
the President in consultation with the Parliament; the president is required to be a Maronite, the prime minister a
Sunni, and the Speaker of the Parliament a Shi'a. (See list of the ministers and their political affiliation for a list of
ministers.)
This confessional system is based on 1932 census data which showed the Maronite Christians as having a
substantial majority of the population. The Government of Lebanon continues to refuse to undertake a new
census.

C. Possible electoral solutions for a quota representation in the Legislative Body
C.1 The existing electoral system
According to article 62(1) of the 1960 Cyprus Constitution the number of representatives
in the Cypriot Parliament is 50. Out of this number 35 are elected by the Greek Cypriot
Community and 15 by the Turkish Cypriot Community. However, for the smooth running of the
House of Representatives and of the Committees in particular, the House decided in July 1985 by
adopting law 124, to increase the seats to 80. Of these 56 (70%) representatives are elected by
the Greek Cypriot Community and 24 (30%) by the Turkish Cypriot Community, as provided in
article 62(2) of the Constitution.
The 80 seats in the House of Representatives of the Cypriot Republic are elected from six
multi- member constituencies, with the number of seats allocated according to the population of
each area. However, due to the partition of the island in 1974, the 24 Turkish Cypriot seats are
unfilled and the House of Representatives has de facto had 56 seats since its enlargement in the
1980s.
C.2 Proposal - Quota representation on an electoral list
A mutual accepted solution regarding the representation on the legislative level that both
sides could consider would be to have a 50 member Parliament. The latter would be
accompanied also by an electoral system determined by a constitutional law. The main reason as
to why the new electoral system should be determined by a constitutional law is so that no
political parties could amend it. In our case Political parties would be bound to have a 60/40
quota on their electoral list (i.e. 60% of the candidates on the list being Greek Cypriot and 40%
of the candidates Turkish Cypriots). The voter would vote one list in which the respective
political party would place two name lists, one for the Greek Cypriot candidates and one for the
Turkish Cypriot candidates. Moreover, this would reduce the emergence of ethnic parties, as a
party with two ethnic lists could not be called ‘Greek Democratic Party’ or ‘Turkish Socialist
Party’. Additionally, a clause in the constitutional law could prohibit such parties from taking
place in national elections and a threshold of 3% could be applied.
For Example: The New Democratic Party of Cyprus decides to run in the 2020 elections.
According to the C.2 electoral law, in the elections, a voter of the New Democratic Party of
Cyprus will be given a ballot paper with two lists. Then, the voter must add a total of five
crosses. Six of the crosses should be placed on six different Greek Cypriot Candidates and four
crosses should be placed on four different Turkish Cypriot Candidates (As seen in Table C.2.1).
Table C.2.1
New Democratic Party of Cyprus
Greek Cypriot List Turkish Cypriot List
Greek Cypriot Candidate 1 Turkish Cypriot Candidate 1

C.3 Election outcome – Seat distribution
C.3.1 The Green Party of Cyprus wins 2 seats
Hypothetically speaking, if the electoral law had a threshold of 3% then in a 50 member
Parliament, that party would gain 2 seats with one of the seats for the Greek Cypriot side and one
for the Turkish Cypriot side. It is obvious here that in this system the candidates with the most
votes on each list would become Members of Parliament.
C.3.2 A party wins 20 seats
If a party were to win 40% of the votes in the Parliament elections, then it would receive
20 seats and so forth.
Examples:
In a 50 member Senate nationwide elections:
The New Democratic Party of Cyprus achieves a 38% in the elections
38/100 x 50 = 19 seats
By applying a 60/40 principle:
60/100 x 19 = 11 seats for the Greek Cypriot side, leaving 8 seats for the Turkish Cypriot side
A2 The hypothetical Green party of Cyprus achieves 3.3% marginally passing the threshold
3.3/100 x 50 = 2 seats
Thus 1 seat goes to a Greek Cypriot Representative and 1 seat goes to a Turkish Cypriot
Representative
A3 The hypothetical Socialist Party of Cyprus achieves 18% in the elections

18/100 x 50 = 9 seats
60/100 x 9 = 6 seats for the Greek Cypriot side and 3 for the Turkish Cypriot side, or in
accordance with the Party’s leadership 5 seats for the Greek Cypriot side and 4 for the Turkish
Cypriot side.

Table C.2.2 and C.2.3 – Quota Representation and Total Seats
Quota Representation in Parliament
20
30
Greek Cypriot MP's Turkish Cypriot MP's
Outcome in Elections - Hypothetical Scenario:
Percentage and Seats
New Democratic Party 11 8 8, 16%
Green party 1 1 19, 38%

Socialist Party 7 3
11, 22%
Liberal Democrats Party 7 4
Communist Party 5 3
10, 20%
2, 4%

Table C.2.4 Distribution of Greek Cypriot MP’s with the quota representation
Greek Cypriot MP's
11
7 1
New Democratic Party Green party Socialist Party Liberal Democrats Party Communist Party
Greek Cypriot MP's
Communist Party
16%
New Democratic Party
35%
Liberal Democrats
Party
23%
Green party
Socialist Party 3%
23%
New Democratic Party Green party Socialist Party Liberal Democrats Party Communist Party

Table C.2.5 Distribution of Turkish Cypriot MP’s with the quota representation
Turkish Cypriot MP's
3
1
New Democratic Party 11 Green party 1 Socialist Party 7 Liberal Democrats Party 7 Communist Party 5
Turkish Cypriot MP's

Communist Party 5
16%
New Democratic Party

11
42%
Liberal Democrats Party
7
21%
Socialist Party 7 Green party 1

16% 5%
New Democratic Party 11 Green party 1 Socialist Party 7 Liberal Democrats Party 7 Communist Party 5

Due to the ethnic division of the island (Greek Cypriots live in the south while Turkish
Cypriots live in the North as seen in Map C.2.6) the issue that arises with this electoral system is
that the representation of candidates might not include geographical representation and may
result in candidates being elected from a specific geographic city or constituency. For example,
the hypothetical ‘New Democratic Party of Cyprus’ would gain 40% and the first four candidates
with the most votes of the Greek Cypriot side might come from the largest Greek Cypriot city,
the capital Nicosia, while at the same time the other four first candidates of the Turkish Cypriot
side might reflect the same case.
Another issue that arises is a scenario of one community voting only for the members of
its community. For example in voting for the ‘New Democratic Party of Cyprus’, a Greek
Cypriot from Larnaca would only add a cross on the ballot paper in on Greek Cypriot candidates
thus leaving the Turkish Cypriot Candidates without a cross. A possible solution here would be
an electoral law predicting that only a ballot paper with crosses on both sides would be regarded
as valid.
Map C.2.6 Population division of Cyprus (www.nationsonline.org)
Areas in white: Greek Cypriot populations Blue line: UN Buffer Zone
Areas in Yellow: Turkish Cypriot populations Blue letter words: Main Cities

C.4 House of Representatives
A proposition that was mentioned above was that of creating a Parliament of 50 members
which would serve on a quota basis (30 Members being Greek Cypriot and 20 Members being
Turkish Cypriot). In this case, on the basis of the aforementioned Presidential Council, the
President of the Parliament would be Greek and the Vice President would be Turkish Cypriot.
Evidently, both the President and the Vice President would have to be members of Parliament
thus being elected from the Parliament.
President of the Cypriot Parliament Greek Cypriot
Vice President of the Cypriot Parliament Turkish Cypriot
C.5 Judicial Body

Regarding the Judicial Body of the new Republic, both sides could consider in having
one Supreme Court which would act as the ultimate authority in civil, criminal, administrative,
and constitutional matters. This would allow the court to rule on both the constitutionality of the
law, with individual constitutional complaints and with appeals from lower courts. The body of
the new Supreme Court would include 13 judges (like the current Greek Cypriot one) again
based on a 60/40 quota just like in the Parliament (8:5).
Many have supported that a Bosnia-like Supreme Court would be applicable for the early
stages of the new Cypriot Republic. The Bosnian Constitutional Court consists of nine judges,
out of which four are selected by the House of Representatives of the Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, two are selected by National Assembly of the Republic of Srpska, and the
remaining three foreign members are selected by the President of the European Court of Human
Rights after consultation with the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Article VI.1.a).
In effect, both sides could accept a 13 member Supreme Court which could serve the
purposes of protecting the new constitution. In this respect, a 8 to 5 quota can be applicable by
representing both communities. Just like in the Bosnian case, 10 of these judges could be
selected from the Parliament after being proposed from the President and Vice President, and 3
of them could be proposed from the EU Court of Justice (CJEU) as the new state would be a
member of the EU.
Evidently, imposing foreign judges to a Constitutional Court creates problems regarding
the knowledge and the application of decisions in the respective languages of the constitution.
Additionally it would create problems within the Cypriot communities as it could lead to rise of
populist or nationalistic groups which would support the lack of sovereignty of the new State.
Additionally, as the new Republic would be a member of the European Union, it would be a
paradox to have a member state were 3 judges of the Supreme Court selected are from a foreign
institution or organization.

C.6 Referendum – Parties Involved
Any concluded settlement from officials of both sides will need the support of both
communities. Ultimately, both will have to approve the arrangement by referendum. The time of
announcing the referendum would be possibly at least six months prior to election in order to
give all sides time to campaign for or against the new constitution. Evidently since the new
constitution would take in account a unified Cyprus, only members of the two communities
would be eligible to vote, thus meaning holders of Greek Cypriot passports (and not foreign
residents of Cyprus) and Turkish Cypriots registered as residents for at least 20 years on the
island taking in account the ongoing migration of Turkish residents from mainland Turkey after
the Turkish invasion in 1974.
C.6.1 The issue with identifying Turkish Cypriots
Mainland Turks in Northern Cyprus are divided into two main groups: citizens and non-
citizen residents. Within the citizens, some have arrived in the island as a part of a settlement
policy run by the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot authorities since 1974, some have migrated on
their own and some have been born in the island to parents of either groups. Most residents of
the north have Turkish identity papers, whether they are citizens of the ‘Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus’.
The aforementioned sub-groups consist of several categories. The first group, citizens,
can further be differentiated into skilled laborers and white-collar workers, Turkish soldiers and
their families, farmers who have settled in Cyprus and individual migrants. The non-citizens can
be divided into students and academic staff, tourists, workers with permits and illegitimate
workers lacking permits however farmers settled from Turkey between 1975 and 1977 constitute
the majority of the settler populationvi.
The Greek Cypriot position regarding the settlers is that the ongoing settlements have
violated the Fourth Geneva Convention, which prohibits an occupying power from willfully
transferring its own population to the occupied area, and thus amounts to a war crime 14 . Greek
Cypriot politicians have thus advocated a return of all settlers to Turkey in a solution of the
Cyprus dispute. However, many of the settlers have severed their ties to mainland Turkey and in
the cases of return by some, they were ostracized in their places of origin. The children of the
settlers also consider Cyprus to be their homeland15 .
vi The Republic of Cyprus accepts as citizens about 110,000 as Turkish Cypriots.

4. Final Notes - The Solution of No Solution
The complex ethnic checks and balances in Cyprus’s constitution at independence in 1960
broke down after fourteen years with the Turkish invasion in 1974. Since then, various models
of settlement have been publicly discussed. Popular opinion on the island is divided, but federal
reunification unfortunately is nobody’s first choice. The Greek Cypriots overwhelmingly
rejected the idea the one time they were asked, in 2004. Turkish Cypriots, with one exception
(2005-2010), have always voted for leaders who prefer a two-state settlement. Besides, the Greek
Cypriots’ 76 per cent rejection in 2004 of the UN’s Annan Plan is hard to overcome.
Taking in account the current state of affairs, the only imminent solution to the Cyprus
dispute may be a no solution. This assertion is based on the fact that thousands of meetings in
various formats have resulted in an incomplete normalisation of the de facto partition between
the Greek Cypriot majority in the south and the Turkish Cypriots in the north. More specifically,
the status quo has proved durable and peaceful and is constantly improving therefore
transforming the Cyprus conflict into a dispute. This is based on the view that depending on the
type of solution, the new legal and political situation might reverse the peaceful partition of the
island and perhaps make Cyprus a new source of instability for Europe and the Mediterranean.
In fact, the Cyprus dispute is one of the world’s most peaceful frozen conflicts, despite the
political rhetoric which is demonstrated throughout the years from both communities on the
island. The slow, steady de facto normalisation has produced since 1974, many economic
benefits for both sides and voices have surfaced supporting a possible political settlement of a de
facto division. Almost every method has been tried in the four decades of negotiations on a
unified political settlement. Nothing has worked, outside arbitration, neutral UN mediation, and
Cypriot-led, locally driven reconciliation processes.
Since 1996 there have been no casualties and only ten have been killed since 1974vii. In 2013,
both sides cancelled for the sixth year running their annual military exercises. Ceasefire
violations along the Green Line typically consist only replacing the sandbags and soldiers
guarding the borders with the the Green Line dividing the island was opened to civilians of both
sides in 2003. Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot citizens can cross easily at any time. Most
European, North American and other tourists who do not need Republic of Cyprus visas, can
cross freely to the Turkish Cypriot side as well. Visitors go to shops and cafés in pedestrian
districts on both sides of the heart of the divided capital, Nicosia. The two sides have long
cooperated over the capital’s waste water, which flows into the Turkish Cypriot north.
Emergencies elicit a quick response, partly because Greek Cypriots make an exception for pre-
1974 Turkish Cypriot entities like the chamber of commerce. Joint action to solve power outages
in the south and fight an oil slick in the north show how the two distinct entities can work
normally once political obstacles are removed 16 .
vii A bicommunal committee is identifying the remains of the missing casualties from the 1963-1974 violence

Finally, policy based on nostalgia and a never-ending process of UN-mediated talks has
proven to be a backward-looking policy. It allows both sides to avoid getting down to real issues
about how the island can operate more efficiently, return to prosperity and, arguably, achieve
real peace. This is primarily due to the fact that Greek Cypriots are stressed by a sense that they
have been robbed, can never feel fully secure and are unable to develop their resources as freely
as a country normally should. On the other hand, Turkish Cypriots feel unfairly isolated,
marginalised by all (including Turkey) and discriminated against. In essence, the two parties are
pointlessly stuck together in an arranged marriage by the international community gone wrong,
used to each other but condemned to share the same property and continue an unhappy and
enforced relationship on the island.

Appendix A
The Annan Plan (2004)
For the full Annan Plan proposal visit:

http://www.hri.org/docs/annan/Annan_Plan_Text.html
The closest time that Cyprus came to reunification was with the 2004 Annan Plan. The 5th
revision of the Annan Plan proposed the creation of the United Cyprus Republic, a federation of
two constituent states – the Greek Cypriot State and the Turkish Cypriot State – joined together
by a federal government apparatus.
The plan included a federal constitution, adding two constitutions for each constituent state, a
string of constitutional and federal laws, and a proposal for a United Cyprus Republic flag and a
national anthem. It also provided for a Reconciliation Commission to bring the two communities
closer together and resolve outstanding disputes from the past.
The most important elements of the Annan Plan were:
Executive Body
- A collective Presidential Council, made up of six voting members, allocated according to
population (per present levels, four Greek Cypriots and two Turkish Cypriots), and selected and
voted in by parliament. An additional three non-voting members would be assigned 2:1.
- A President and Vice President, chosen by the Presidential Council from among its members,
one from each community, to alternate in their functions every 20 months during the council's
five-year term of office.
Legislative Body
- A Senate (upper house), with 48 members, divided 24:24 between the two communities.
- A Chamber of Deputies (lower house), with 48 members, divided in proportion to the two
communities' populations (with no fewer than 12 for the smaller community).
Judicial Body
- A Supreme Court composed of equal numbers of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot judges,
plus three foreign judges; to be appointed by the Presidential Council.

APPENDIX B
CHRONOLOGY
1960 Cyprus granted independence from the UK, guaranteed by the UK, Greece and Turkey.
1963 Constitutional order breaks down, and Turkish Cypriots withdraw from government,
never to return. Greek Cypriot attacks on Turkish Cypriots trigger intercommunal violence.
1964 UN deploys peacekeepers to protect Turkish Cypriots and head off a Turkish invasion.
1974 - After Athens-driven coup in Cyprus in pursuit of enosis (union) with Greece, Turkish
troops invade. Europe and the U.S. impose political and military sanctions against Turkey.
Turkish troops remain on the island occupying the north side.
1977 - First High-Level Agreement between Cyprus President Archbishop Makarios III and
Turkish leader Rauf Denktash lays out basis for bicommunal, bizonal and federal solution.
1983 - September: collapse of peace effort by UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar.
November: Turkish Cypriots unilaterally declare independence as Turkish Republic of Northern
Cyprus.
1992-1993 - Rise and fall of UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s “set of ideas”.
2003 - February: Tassos Papadopoulos elected a s Greek Cypriot president.
December: After advances by pro-solution Turkish Cypriot parties in election, Mehmet
Ali Talat’s Republican Turkish Party forms new government and, with support of pro-
solution government in Turkey, becomes negotiator for a settlement.
2004 - 24 April: Six years in the making, settlement plan sponsored by UN Secretary-General
Kofi Annan is submitted and twin referendums are held. Accepted by 65 per cent of Turkish
Cypriots, rejected by 76 per cent of Greek Cypriots.
1 May: The Republic of Cyprus enters the European Union
2005 - April: Talat is elected as the Turkish Cypriot president. Veteran hardliner Rauf Denktash
steps down as Turkish Cypriot leader.

2006 - 8 July Agreement between Papadopoulos and Talat begins new UN-mediated contacts on
a settlement, which soon stall.
2008 - 17 February: Candidates promising compromise lead Greek Cypriot presidential
elections, won by Demetris Christofias of the nominally communist AKEL party.
21 March: First meeting between Christofias and Talat inaugurates new peace talks.
23 May: Christofias and Talat announce agreement that the reunified federation will have
two constituent states and a single international identity.
3 September: Christofias and Talat start first round of negotiations, meet 40 times over
eleven months.
2009 - 10 September: Second round of UN-facilitated negotiations starts. December: EU heads
of state and government (European Council) to review Turkey’s implementation of the 2005
Additional Protocol to the Customs Union committing it to open ports to Greek Cypriot shipping
and aviation

Bibliography
A. Books
1. Bahcheli, Tozun, ‘Searching for a Cyprus Settlement: Considering Options for Creating a
Federation, a Confederation, or Two Independent States’, Publius, XXX, 1-2 (2000)
2. Varnava and Faustman, ‘Reunifying Cyprus: The Annan Plan and Beyond’. I. B. Tauris
(October 15, 2011)
B. Journals – Papers - Reports
1. International Crisis Group: Cyprus: Reunification or Partition? Europe Report N°201,
2009
2. International Crisis Group: Divided Cyprus: Coming to Terms on an Imperfect Reality
Europe Report N°229, 2014
3. Georgiades, Savvas Daniel, “Public Attitudes Towards Peace: The Greek-Cypriot
Position”, Journal of Peace Research, XLIV, 5 (2007).
4. Hatay, Mete, Beyond Numbers. An Inquiry Into the Political Integration of the Turkish
‘Settlers’ in Northern Cyprus, PRIO Report 4 (2005)
5. James Ker-Lindsay, The Cyprus Problem: what everyone needs to know (Oxford, 2011),
p. xv
6. Morelli Vincent, “Cyprus: Reunification Proving Elusive”, Congressional Research
Service, 25 June 2013.
7. Loizides, Neophytos & Keskiner, Eser, ‘Cross-Voting Moderation for Cyprus,’ Southeast
European Politics, V, 2-3 (2004).
8. Neophytos Loizides and Marcos A. Antoniades, ‘Settlers, Refugees, and Immigrants:
Alternative Futures for Post-Settlement Cyprus,’ ISP Discussion Paper, Discussion Paper
2004-03, (Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, March)
9. Rotberg, Robert I., ‘Cyprus After Annan: Next Steps Towards a Solution’, World Peace
Foundation Reports, 37 (2003).
10. Rotberg, Robert I., ‘The Cyprus Crucible: the Importance of Good Timing’, Leadership,
XXV, 3, 2003.
C. Internet accessed sources
1. James Ker-Lindsay, “The Greek Elections and Cyprus”, Hellenic Foundation for European
and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) blog, 15 September 2009.
2. M. Ergun OLGUN, Turkish Cypriot view: A Confederation for the ‘Island of Cyprus?’
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkish-cypriot- view_-a-confederation- for-the-_island-of-
cyprus__.en.mfa
3. “Convergences – 2008-2012”, 30 April 2013, available at http://bit.ly/1hpiuS0.
4. Human Rights Watch, Greece’s International Obligations in Western Thrace position:
https://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/greece/Greec991-02.htm#P108_13482
END NOTES
1 M. Ergun OLGUN, Turkish Cypriot view: A Confederation for the ‘Island of Cyprus?’
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkish-cypriot-view_-a-confederation-for-the-_island-of-
cyprus__.en.mfa
2 Georgiades, Savvas Daniel, “Public Attitudes Towards Peace: The Greek-Cypriot Position”,
Journal of Peace Research, XLIV, 5 (2007).

3 James Ker-Lindsay, “The Greek Elections and Cyprus”, Hellenic Foundation for European and
Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) blog, 15 September 2009.

4 Crisis Group interview, Mensur Akgün, director, Global Political Trends Centre, Kültür
University, Istanbul, February 2012.

5 Vincent Morelli, “Cyprus: Reunification Proving Elusive”, Congressional Research Service, 25
June 2013.
6 James Ker-Lindsay, The Cyprus Problem: what everyone needs to know (Oxford, 2011), p. xv
7 Robert I. Rotberg, ‘Cyprus After Annan: Next Steps Towards a Solution’, World Peace
Foundation Reports, 37, 2003 and ‘The Cyprus Crucible: the Importance of Good Timing’,
Leadership, XXV, 3, 2003.
8 Bahcheli, Tozun, ‘Searching for a Cyprus Settlement: Considering Options for Creating a
Federation, a Confederation, or Two Independent States’, Publius, XXX, 1-2 (2000)

9 Human Rights Watch, Greece’s International Obligations in Western Thrace position:
https://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/greece/Greec991-02.htm#P108_13482
10 Loizides, Neophytos & Keskiner, Eser, ‘Cross-Voting Moderation for Cyprus,’ Southeast
European Politics, V, 2-3 (2004).

11 http://www.mof.gov.cy/mof/cystat/statistics.nsf/All/732265957BAC953AC225798300406903
?OpenDocument&sub=2&sel=1&e=&print
12 http://www.devplan.org/Nufus-2011/nufus%20son_.pdf (Under the auspices of UN
observers)
13 “Convergences – 2008-2012”, 30 April 2013, available at http://bit.ly/1hpiuS0.
14 Neophytos Loizides and Marcos A. Antoniades, ‘Settlers, Refugees, and Immigrants:
Alternative Futures for Post-Settlement Cyprus,’ ISP Discussion Paper, Discussion Paper 2004-
03, (Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, March)
15 Hatay, Mete, Beyond Numbers. An Inquiry Into the Political Integration of the Turkish
‘Settlers’ in Northern Cyprus, PRIO Report 4 (2005)

16 Rotberg, Robert I., ‘Cyprus After Annan: Next Steps Towards a Solution’, World Peace
Foundation Reports, 37 (2003).

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Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies

Constitutional Development and Democratization

2. The State within

4. Final Notes – Finding an Alternative Settlement Page 20

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A.2 Election Process

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A3 The hypothetical Socialist Party of Cyprus achieves 18% in the elections

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Quota Representation in Parliament

Greek Cypriot MP's Turkish Cypriot MP's

Outcome in Elections - Hypothetical Scenario:

Percentage and Seats

New Democratic Party 11 8 8, 16%

Green party 1 1 19, 38%

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Greek Cypriot MP's

Greek Cypriot MP's

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Turkish Cypriot MP's

Turkish Cypriot MP's

New Democratic Party

Socialist Party 7 Green party 1

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C.5 Judicial Body

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vi The Republic of Cyprus accepts as citizens about 110,000 as Turkish Cypriots.

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For the full Annan Plan proposal visit:

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24 Copyright © Greek Foreign Affairs Council. All rights reserved

Journal of Peace Research, XLIV, 5 (2007).

Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) blog, 15 September 2009.

University, Istanbul, February 2012.

Federation, a Confederation, or Two Independent States’, Publius, XXX, 1-2 (2000)

European Politics, V, 2-3 (2004).

‘Settlers’ in Northern Cyprus, PRIO Report 4 (2005)

Foundation Reports, 37 (2003).

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