Borne to Die: On the Ethics of Phenomenologies of Birth and Death

In this paper I take up the critique of Heideggerian being-toward-death and the contra
proposal for a phenomenology of natality by noting the ethical limitations of both. I do so by
looking to Anne O’Byrne’s notion of a carnal hermeneutics of being-with derived from natality,
and Enrique Dussel’s notion of proximity in his La Filosofía de la liberación against the
backdrop of Heidegger’s notion of being-toward-death. Whereas being-toward-death has been
critiqued for leading to the over individualizing of human being, the emphasis upon natality
opens itself to the charge that Dussel levels against phenomenology generally, namely, that
phenomenology, as the name suggests, takes what-is as first philosophy thus limiting possibility.
Dussel himself however, at least at this stage of his thought, would seemingly have no problem
with privileging natality, leading to a possible contradiction in his own thinking. In turning to
Dussel’s critique of phenomenology, which follows Levinas’ distinction between ontology and
metaphysics, I question whether either natality or mortality can be phenomenologically framed
without instantiating an ethical dilemma, and whether an appeal to either can be avoided from
the phenomenological standpoint.